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FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE



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Table of Contents

Foreword i
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 1
IDAD STRATEGY 4
UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 5
THREAT FORMS 6
Chapter 2: SUPPORTING HOST NATION AIR FORCES 9
Chapter 3: PRINCIPAL USAF FID ACTIVITIES 15
THE FID CONTINUUM 16
Chapter 4: PLANNING FOR FID OPERATIONS 19
SUPPORT TO FID 21
Chapter 5: USAF FID EXECUTION 25
COMMAND AND CONTROL 25
AIR ADVISORS 28
EMPLOYMENT IN DIRECT SUPPORT OPERATIONS 32
Appendix A: JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES 34
Appendix B: HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE 35
Appendix C: USAF SECURITY ASSISTANCE TEAMS 37
References 40

FOREWORD

Today's global landscape presents complex security challenges, demanding adaptable approaches to foreign internal defense (FID). This publication provides the United States Air Force (USAF) framework for assisting host nations (HNs) against an evolving array of threats, including subversion, insurgency, and terrorism, by integrating all instruments of national power.

USAF FID activities support a state's right to maintain internal order and are conducted with the mutual consent of both the United States (US) and HN governments. The core principle is working "by, with, and through" our foreign partners to build their security capacity. All FID operations require appropriate legal authority and a clear exit strategy that leaves a legitimate government in place with sufficient means to address its own security threats.

Effective FID necessitates a whole-of-government approach that incorporates diplomatic, economic, and informational initiatives, not just military intervention. Therefore, Airmen must understand the full operational environment-including the political, economic, and cultural factors that influence stability-to ensure our involvement reinforces good governance and avoids unintended consequences.

While existing security cooperation structures provide a foundation, this doctrine must evolve to meet emerging challenges. This publication guides innovative Airmen in embracing adaptability and collaboration to support our partners effectively. By mastering these principles, Airmen will be prepared to contribute to the success of FID missions and advance US national security interests.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Foreign internal defense (FID). is defined as **"participation by the civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs or activities undertaken by a host nation's (HN's) government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, violent extremism, terrorism, and other threats to its security."**[1] Though FID has recently been most visibly employed in counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, FID is a broad mission involving varying levels of United States (US)-provided diplomatic, economic, informational, and military support to enable HN internal defense and development (IDAD) programs.

The National Security Council provides initial strategic guidance for FID, the Department of State (DoS) is normally designated as the lead agency for execution, and the Department of War (DoW) provides personnel and equipment to help achieve military FID objectives. DoW support to FID is typically executed through routine SC activities as part of a combatant commander's (CCDR) theater campaign plan.


FID applies across the competition continuum and involves all instruments of national power. Moving across the thresholds that separate one level of engagement from the next carries serious legal and policy implications for the US. US Government (USG) engagement in HN IDAD programs is initiated and advanced through a HN request, a shared HN and USG goal, or USG proposition to an HN to improve its governance and security. **US Air Force (USAF) FID actions entail working by, with, and through foreign aviation forces, foreign law enforcement, counterintelligence, and security agencies to achieve HN IDAD and/or US strategic and operational objectives.**

FID ACTIVITIES

FID operations are divided into three major categories: indirect support, direct support (not involving combat), and combat operations. The "Integrated Security Cooperation Activities" figure shows typical security cooperation (SC) activities aligned to major FID categories. Although various capabilities, programs, and activities within these categories may occur simultaneously, the categories represent significantly different levels of US involvement.

Airpower can serve as a force multiplier in countering subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (including terrorism) by enhancing the survivability and effectiveness of internal security operations. However, government success in a FID context is predicated on a complex set of variables. The application and effectiveness of military force, including airpower, is only one of these variables. A government that can provide adequate services and is slowly reducing violence may succeed. In contrast, a government that achieves quick military victories but fails to make fundamental reforms to address the root causes of internal threats may ultimately fail. Nonetheless, early and effective USAF activities to develop or improve HN capabilities can also reduce the need for higher forms of direct support or intervention.

[1] See Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, for additional information.



FID activities are usually conducted jointly with other US military Services and government agencies, and in coordination with foreign military forces in the HN. The USAF can conduct operations in support of HN programs or support other USG agency FID activities.

The USAF uses combat support capabilities to create, prepare, deploy, employ, sustain, protect, and redeploy forces to conduct FID activities. Failure to incorporate combat support early in any operation may result in USAF capabilities being unable to generate the desired FID effects.[2]

USAF FID activities (except for US-only operations) fall under the broad category of USG foreign assistance (FA) overseen by DoS.


- The legal authority to conduct FA is found in the Congressional findings and declaration of policy, Title 22, US Code (USC), §2151. FA is a DoS program providing developmental, humanitarian, and security assistance to foreign nations. The DoW leverages FA to support HN IDAD programs. FA encompasses overlapping and complementary USG programs including development assistance, security assistance (SA), humanitarian assistance (HA), security cooperation (SC), security force assistance (SFA), and FID.

- SA is an element of FA, the DoW administers portions of SA on behalf of the DoS in support of FID. SA provides resources to HNs in the form of funding, materiel, and training for the HN's military or security forces. Types of SA include foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military funding (FMF), international military education and training (IMET), peace operations (PO), and excess defense articles (EDA).

[2] See Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 4-0, *Combat Support*, for additional information.

- SC comprises DoW interactions to develop foreign defense, security capabilities, and defense relationships that promote US interests, enhance HN capabilities and interoperability, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to the HN.[3] SFA is a subset of SC and refers to DoW's contributions to whole-of-government efforts to augment and develop the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and to support HN institutions.

The interplay and overlap of FA, SC, SA, and FID is complex and varies based on the operational environment, US strategy, HN, allied relationships, and other factors. The "Foreign Assistance Program Interplay" figure illustrates the relationship between various forms of FA, including FID. Airmen should understand the distinction between personnel performing mission activities under the command and control (C2) of a CCDR and personnel performing activities under the laws, regulations, and funding applicable to Title 22, USC, §2151 and under the direct authority of an ambassador or Chief of Mission (CoM).[4]



Foreign Assistance Program Interplay

FID operations may be conducted within the HN's sovereign borders, other friendly foreign countries, or in the US. USAF regional area specialists proficient in foreign languages and cultures help CCDRs build and sustain coalitions, achieve regional stability, and contribute to multinational operations and FID efforts.

[3] See JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, for additional information.
[4] See JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense,* Appendix A, for additional information.

USAF FID may reinforce the HN government's security and defeat internal threats, but it also has the potential to undermine HN stability sought in US policy. For instance, overt US involvement in FID operations may create perceptions of weak or compromised HN governance, thereby aggravating the underlying causes of instability. Further, airpower may concentrate the use of force into a small number of government officials who can use it to attack perceived rivals or reform organizations. USAF FID efforts should always support the broader political reform process necessary to address the underlying threats to internal security, consistently promoting US interests in the HN or region.

THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN FID

FID air operations are founded on the basic tenets of airpower. These tenets, which apply equally to US and HN forces, include mission command, flexibility and versatility, synergistic effects, persistence, concentration, balance, and priority.[5] Specific methods, applications, and expectations may vary according to the nature of the conflict. The HN's IDAD strategy provides the basis for determining appropriate airpower roles and objectives. Accordingly, USAF FID assistance should be designed to support and reinforce the HN's IDAD strategy.

Many critical elements of a HN's IDAD strategy involve "soft power" initiatives that combine tangible actions, operations in the information environment (OIE), coalition building, and subjective perceptions. The military instrument of power, particularly airpower, may offer attractive and relatively simple solutions to internal defense problem sets. Still, commanders must recognize that relatively small miscalculations or missteps involving military force may have disproportionate negative impacts on the HN's overall IDAD strategy. Airpower operations are most successful when their resources and methods support the total range of IDAD functions.

IDAD STRATEGY

IDAD is defined as "the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."[6] The principal functions of an IDAD strategy include balanced development, mobilization, security, and neutralization.

- **Balanced Development** refers to a HN's attempts to achieve national objectives in a way that allows all individuals and groups in society to share in the rewards of development, thereby potentially alleviating frustration.
- **Mobilization** provides organized manpower, resources, and activities to motivate and organize popular support for the HN government.
- **Security** includes all efforts to protect the HN populace from violence and provide a safe environment for national development and mobilization.

[5] For additional information on tenets of airpower, see AFDP 1, *The Air Force.*
[6] See JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, for additional information.

- **Neutralization** encompasses HN law enforcement and military efforts that render internal threat groups unable to impact HN stability. Neutralization can be achieved through a variety of tools, ranging from OIE to combat engagement, and aims to physically, psychologically, and ideologically isolate threat groups from populations.

As the HN government brings together all four functions of the IDAD strategy, its airpower resources should facilitate synergies among defense and development initiatives. Using airpower to support the full range of IDAD initiatives enhances the host government's ability to focus on political and economic solutions to a crisis.

BALANCED DEVELOPMENT AND MOBILIZATION

Airpower's role in development and mobilization is especially useful where ground lines of communication are untenable due to terrain or threats. Aerial logistics and communications networks establish critical links between the government and the population by carrying information, supplies, and services to civilians. Initiatives such as healthcare infrastructure development contribute to regional stability and government legitimacy while improving rapport with and understanding of HN populations. These efforts can provide tangible and enduring HN governance benefits to underserved or marginalized groups that would otherwise be vulnerable to internal threats and influence, while mobilizing them to support the legitimate HN government at crucial times.

SECURITY AND NEUTRALIZATION

Airpower can contribute most effectively to security and neutralization when it functions as an integrated component of the overall IDAD effort. It is least effective when employed unilaterally as a substitute for ground maneuver or long-range artillery. The effectiveness of airpower efforts can be enhanced by including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), C2, and air mobility support. Properly employed airpower can demonstrate to the population that a legitimate government is in control.

UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The operational environment is the composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the commander's decisions. The political, economic, and physical terrains of HNs can present significant challenges to both US and HN air forces during FID operations.

The greatest FID operational challenge is understanding the HN's operational environment (including the HN's governmental structure, information environment, social and cultural factors, and other variables) and the nature of internal security threats that can impact the HN's, US's, and partners' national security interests. The first step should be to identify the USG, CCDR, and HN goals for the FID effort. An in-depth assessment of the HN IDAD situation and needs, coupled with an understanding of the nature of internal threats, typically provides important context and parameters for the FID effort. Threat analysis should include the administrative and financial mechanisms that enable threats, as well as the motivating beliefs and ideologies that drive them.

A crucial part of understanding and shaping the operational environment is conducting an accurate assessment of how internal and external audiences may perceive US involvement in HN IDAD efforts and how those perceptions shape relevant actors' attitudes and behaviors. As such, threat assessments should include target audiences' sentiments and perceptions. Additionally, commanders should apply the same effort to cyberspace operations (CO), OIE, and strategic communication as to other FID operations, since they contribute to achieving mission objectives in concert with other operations, activities, and investments (OAI). USAF information warfare (IW) capabilities (e.g., public affairs [PA], CO, electromagnetic spectrum operations [EMSO], intelligence, and weather) shape perceptions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Collectively, FID operations and OIE can play a significant supporting role in USG efforts to communicate policy and demonstrate US commitment.[7]

The lessons derived from the classic paradigms of insurgency, small wars, and terrorism are crucial for recognizing and analyzing internal security threats. Studies and analyses should address the characteristics of current and emerging threats, including their origins, histories, and prior OAIs within the HN. While historical analysis is critical for understanding internal threats, commanders should not plan their FID initiatives entirely based on past behavior.

SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL CONDITIONS

Major environmental factors affecting FID planning and execution include physical and psychological pressures from hostile elements, social fragmentation, political instability, and economic constraints. Difficult terrain, seasonal weather patterns, physical isolation of population groups, and poorly developed infrastructures often impede HN IDAD efforts. Airpower, because of its inherent flexibility, can overcome many of these obstacles. FID activities may be required in nations where public services, industrial infrastructures, and air support facilities are being developed to modern standards. Austere terrain, adverse climate, and the scarcity of improved airfields affect the tempo, scale, and character of air operations and restrict the types of aircraft that can be employed. However, such obstacles also present opportunities to effectively employ airpower in rural administration, logistics, and tactical mobility.

THREAT FORMS

Subversion, insurgency, lawlessness, and terrorism manifest themselves in a variety of forms capable of challenging the authority and survival of HNs. Strategic and operational level planning should address the degree to which each of these forms manifests in the overall threat to HN’s internal security.

SUBVERSION

Subversion is an action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength of a governing authority. Subversion may weaken government authority by normalizing extortion, bribery, or corruption, and physical threats. In other cases, it can

[7] See AFDP 3-13, *Information in Air Force Operations*, for additional information.

provoke widespread civil disorder, eventually leading to political and economic crises, ethnic and religious confrontations, and armed disputes among rival political factions. Dissident groups may use propaganda and terrorism to dramatize political causes or to extort concessions from HN governments. Civil disorder can cause violence and social upheaval, precipitating the collapse of a HN government.

INSURGENCY

Insurgency is the organized use of subversion or violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgencies often develop because of internal perceptions that a host government is unable or unwilling to solve important domestic problems. An insurgent aims to attain legitimacy through popular support, which fuels the political mobilization required to generate workers, fighters, money, and weapons, while denying the government the same. A HN's ability to preemptively address critical economic and political issues is central to countering insurgencies and should generally take precedence over military force. Insurgency often assumes an ideological foundation with social, economic, political, or religious components, the ability of force to affect the central issues underlying an insurgency warrants special consideration in planning.

Insurgencies have individual characteristics that commanders should consider when initiating FID. Commanders must understand the nature of the conflict. The essential elements of information (EEIs) typically include cultural and political identity and motivation. A failure to critically analyze an insurgent conflict and determine its root causes and nature at the beginning of a confrontation can waste resources and potentially fuel further insurgency.[8]

LAWLESSNESS

Lawlessness often occurs when a government has marginal or ineffective control over its population or territories. Lawlessness may also exist when the government lacks the resources and mechanisms required to monitor and control the formation and activities of subversive organizations. Local dissident groups may use terrorism against government agencies or against other ethnic or religious groups to demonstrate and reinforce their claims of autonomy. The inability of a government to extend its administration and influence into outlying regions often leads to the emergence of ungoverned territories. This is often the result of not having the technological means to provide physical presence and persistence in forward areas.

Subversion, insurgency, illegal drug production, and narco-terrorism all go together with lawlessness. Illicit drug production and trafficking can function subversively when international drug cartels seek permissive environments and resort to intimidation and violence to suppress government interference. Partnerships involving exchanges of drugs, weapons, and money between insurgents and criminal organizations such as drug cartels may also support subversive activities, terrorist organizations, and revolutionary movements. Terrorist organizations, insurgents, and criminal organizations often share common infrastructures.

[8] See JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, for additional information.

TERRORISM

Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population in furtherance of political or social objectives. Threat groups may employ terrorism to pursue religious, political, and ideological goals such as the replacement of a government that encourages changes to a society unwanted by the threat group. Terrorism may also be used to gain political or economic concessions from a HN government. When political mobilization and legitimacy form the critical centers of gravity, terrorism is often employed to demonstrate the inability of regimes to defend themselves and their populations.

CHAPTER 2: SUPPORTING HOST NATION AIR FORCES

USAF FID activities generally focus on support to HN aviation forces. The scale of military airpower operations in developing nations is usually small in terms of force size, total sortie potential, resource consumption and availability, and overall support costs. Despite these limitations, the potential contributions of HN aviation forces can be vital to the success of its IDAD strategy. When HN governments possess only a few aircraft, airframe availability, maintenance timelines, flight safety, and sortie generation rates are critical.

Aircraft sustainment and supportability are difficult problems in small fleets. Funding constraints and supply shortages in HNs can amplify logistics problems. The grounding or combat loss of relatively few aircraft can degrade or destroy an air effort.

The USAF organization model may not offer a workable solution for the HN, nor may a complex organization be necessary if the HN's air force size is small. Detailed organizational models featuring extensive specialization and methods of authority delegation may not be appropriate for a smaller, less sophisticated fleet of aircraft. Training and advising should be tailored to the HN's needs and the operational environment while incorporating appropriate elements of the USAF model.

Commanders conducting FID should anticipate and account for differences between US and foreign organizational structures and personnel policies when providing FID training and advisory assistance. US-centric organizational leadership models, such as empowering noncommissioned and junior officers with significant authority and responsibility, may not be acceptable to air forces in some partner nations.

In some cases, HN aviation programs are dependent upon FA for major weapon systems, aviation support equipment, aircraft spares, training, advice, technical services, survival equipment, specialized clothing, munitions, and even consumables.

AIRCRAFT

HN military aircraft available for internal defense operations may be older-generation aircraft. A lack of commonality or availability with US platforms and parts inventories complicates FID activities in many countries. The cost and complexity of modern aircraft systems usually rule out new procurement and magnify life-cycle support problems. Older-generation, non-standard aircraft may be the only viable option for HNs.

A nation might possess few or no precision-guided munitions. A HN may be unable to conduct close air support (CAS) at night. Many air forces are capable of area engagement but not precision engagement.

A nation may lack an effective strike capability. Some nations in the developing world possess weapons delivery platforms but lack the operations and maintenance (O&M) funding to field them, leaving aircraft unavailable for operational use.

FID efforts in such environments typically need to prioritize aircraft availability, sortie generation, aircrew training, and lifecycle management to ensure a viable air power capability is on hand to support HN IDAD priorities.

AIR FACILITIES

Aerial port facilities vary. Major airports serve most capital cities, however, conducting military air operations from civilian airports is often impractical due to traffic congestion, space restrictions, and political sensitivity. Outside capital cities, civil and military aviation support facilities may be limited. Military aviation units often have access to only a few main operating locations with hard surface runways.

Forward operating locations may include short, unimproved airstrips with limited approach or runway lighting, intermittent or unreliable electrical power infrastructure, and passive defense capabilities. Modern navigational aids may also be limited, with non-directional beacons being more prevalent despite being less reliable. There are generally no terminal approach aids outside international airports except for navigation aids found at air installations occupied by US military forces. Consequently, military flying operations rely extensively on visual flight rules procedures or global positioning system navigation.

FID efforts must include an assessment of air facility constraints and restraints throughout planning and execution. In some cases, air facility capacity and capability limitations may need to be corrected, improved, or mitigated before effective support to HN IDAD operations can be accomplished. For example, airworthiness assessments conducted by USAF personnel at HN air facilities may be used to simultaneously assess HN capabilities, develop air facility improvement initiatives, build rapport, and foster a spirit of cooperation between US and HN authorities.

INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence capabilities (including the collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination of information or intelligence, analysis, counterintelligence activities, and other related skills) will vary across nations. Among the multiple intelligence disciplines, human intelligence (HUMINT) is often the primary source for many HNs. Additionally, counterintelligence activities against internal and local threats are often the HN's best capability to neutralize and exploit intelligence information received through HUMINT. However, even these capabilities may be limited by the lack of all-source analysis and fusion, as well as by uncertain source credibility. Many HNs have limited capability to conduct imagery intelligence and signal intelligence.

The lack of efficient procedures for the timely dissemination of tactical intelligence often degrades overall mission effectiveness. HN's intelligence capabilities may also be limited by existing information sharing agreements with allied nations and coalition partners and may require revision to improve access and cooperation. Aviation units may lack the capability to incorporate intelligence products into mission planning. Therefore, FID efforts should emphasize the use and significance of basic intelligence analysis skills. HN's acquisition of technical intelligence collection capabilities should be accompanied by the development of analytical skills and dissemination systems that will turn the collection into actionable intelligence.

Airpower can help commanders maintain situational awareness through ISR capabilities. Platforms equipped with signals or geospatial intelligence capabilities enable the

identification and assessment of insurgent, terrorist, or drug enterprise infrastructures. Various ISR capabilities may provide real-time battlefield awareness, battle damage assessments, and help identify and pinpoint high-value targets. ISR can also be used to monitor the condition of isolated friendly enclaves, surface lines of communication, and civilian population groups while simultaneously assessing the effectiveness of IDAD initiatives.

AIR MOBILITY OPERATIONS

Air mobility can increase the HN government's capacity to govern and administer through presence and persistence into otherwise inaccessible regions of the country, and by physically extending the reach of public policy, public works, security, and information programs.

- Airlift can carry specialists and trainers to remote regions to provide on-site technical training and assistance in areas such as public services management, sanitation and hygiene, agronomy, agribusiness management and technology, veterinary medicine, ecology, environmental protection, and school administration.
- Air mobility can also support DoS developmental initiatives by delivering construction equipment, supplies, and personnel to build rural housing projects, power generation plants, hydroelectric facilities, bridges, and other public works.
- Air mobility can support security and neutralization by deploying, sustaining, and reinforcing civil law enforcement agencies as well as military and paramilitary surface elements. Air mobility can also effectively advance political goals by extending the electoral process to rural areas.

SUSTAINMENT

USAF sustainment forces play a dominant role in SA and form the backbone of indirect USAF FID assistance. These forces also support US force deployment and specific joint and multinational operations with more direct forms of support. Information developed through site surveys, joint and multinational exercises, mission analysis, and other assessments supporting SA activities may be significant to planners.

The HN's IDAD strategy should be understood, and its aviation requirements and capabilities should be defined before detailed sustainment planning commences. Accordingly, sustainment planning for significant force structure improvements should focus initially on what the HN intends to do, or can do, for itself. Specifically:

- How the host government intends to employ its resources to reach its IDAD goals.
- Immediate and long-range priorities assigned to IDAD objectives.
- How the HN intends to employ airpower to support both military and non-military objectives contained in the overall strategy.
- What the HN's capacity is to receive, store, operate, and maintain both present and projected air, space, and information resources.

Sustainment operations in FID should be designed to enable HN airpower capabilities. Focus areas of HN aviation forces' sustainment capabilities should include maintenance, readiness, logistics, communications, air base defense, medical functions, and airpower infrastructure. Commanders should consider the following sustainment factors when supporting FID operations:

- Operating in austere environments with limited infrastructure.
- Increased combat readiness for surviving and operating in increased threat environments, to include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments.
- Increased security and force protection (FP) requirements.
- Extended logistical lines.
- Communications limitations.
- Multiple distributed operations.
- Medical service availability.

HN forces' sustainment capabilities should be assessed, and training and education developed to ensure full mission capability. Resource priorities should align with objectives identified in the IDAD plan, along with strategy-to-task FID planning. Sustainment planning should account for the limited logistics infrastructure often prevalent in developing nations and for social, economic, and political factors that could enhance or impede operations.

COUNTERLAND/COUNTERSEA OPERATIONS

The FID counterland/countersea mission includes air interdiction (AI) (on land or sea) and CAS in support of the friendly surface scheme of maneuver. Counterland/countersea efforts generally emphasize precision engagement and minimization of collateral damage risk. AI neutralizes or degrades enemy combat power before it can be employed against friendly surface forces. CAS is focused on suppressing or destroying enemy combat power operating near friendly ground forces. Counterland/countersea operations for security and neutralization occur when hostile elements openly commit their forces during assembly and attack or when their C2 centers and logistics elements are exposed and identified.

Counterland/countersea operations should be planned and executed on a scale commensurate with the required effects. When countering certain forms of lawlessness (e.g., illicit narcotics production and civil disorders), surface operations are generally aimed at controlling territory or maritime areas, making arrests, and seizing contraband rather than inflicting casualties. CAS, if required, should be limited to protecting ground forces by using tactics and munitions designed for suppression, shock, and intimidation rather than maximum lethality.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS

Personnel Recovery (PR) operations can be employed in virtually every aspect of FID air operations. Reliable combat search and rescue (CSAR) and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) capabilities, especially at night, historically improve the willingness and ability of HN ground forces to engage in operations they may otherwise be less motivated to perform. Organic and capable PR also provides HN governments with additional capabilities to respond to humanitarian and disaster relief situations.

OPERATIONS IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

The informational and psychological effects of using air assets can have significant consequences in FID contexts. OIE ensures these consequences are fully analyzed and integrated with FID priorities and HN IDAD objectives before acting. Effective planning and the employment of information capabilities can influence relevant actors' decision-making, contributing to the desired set of behaviors.

- Airpower supports psychological operations (PSYOP) by delivering specific information to target audiences through radio, television, loudspeakers, print, and other media, and often by using air mobility to establish the presence of HN government functions in isolated locations.

- Air forces possess capabilities that may produce influential effects by demonstrating superior mobility, responsiveness, and firepower. Influencing target audiences' behavior through air operations can weaken enemy resistance, capture public support, or both. Airpower may also yield indirect OIE benefits through humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) activities.

- USAF PA, in coordination with the responsible combatant commands, can develop, create, and disseminate information both domestically and abroad to bolster HN, multinational, and US operations, as well as complement other OAIs in the IE. Capabilities may include engagements with the local and international press, local communities, and key government stakeholders, as well as information released through US and multinational websites, traditional news media, and social platforms.

- Electromagnetic warfare (EW) is conducted to secure and maintain freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Military forces rely heavily on the EMS to sense, communicate, strike, and dominate offensively and defensively across all warfighting domains. EW is essential for protecting friendly operations and denying adversary operations within the EMS.

- Cyberspace capabilities provide an indirect or direct role to support or extend effects and provide defense-in-depth options in the face of increased probing and attempted cyber actions against friendly networks. In the FID context, planners should coordinate cyber support with interagency partners and sustainment agencies.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Special operations forces (SOF) offer extended military capabilities and tailored options providing great flexibility, stealth, surgical execution, speed, and surprise. SOF aviation is especially useful in situations where conventional solutions are not effective. The development and maintenance of a HN special operations aviation capability is particularly important to countries that must deal with such internal asymmetric threats as insurgency, terrorism, criminal subversion, and illicit drug production and trafficking. US FID efforts should be organized and executed to establish or increase HN special operations aviation in such circumstances.

SOF aviation should be primarily organized, trained, and equipped to support special operations surface forces in hostile, denied, or other politically sensitive territory with air mobility and resupply, insertion and extraction, PR, ISR, and CAS. SOF aviation should enable surface forces to conduct small-unit tactical operations in territory that cannot be accessed or occupied by conventional forces. Whereas many foreign nations possess special operations units, few possess special operations aviation assets. Where needed, HNs may find it expedient to organize, train, and equip to support special operations surface forces with conventional aviation assets. As with US forces, indigenous capabilities should be adaptive, fluid, and responsive to asymmetric threats and circumstances.[9]

[9] See AFDP 3-05, *Special Operations*, for additional information.

CHAPTER 3: PRINCIPAL USAF FID ACTIVITIES

FID operations take place within the broader context of US strategies to shape and influence the operational environment. The decision to conduct FID activities is based on US and international laws, however, the culture and norms of the affected nation influence how FID is conducted. Operations should be tied to specific objectives and may be conducted over extended periods.

INTEGRATED AGENCY OBJECTIVES

The first requirement for USAF FID activities is to ensure commanders clearly articulate military objectives based on HN and US objectives. USAF FID activities should be sensitive to HN needs while integrating plans and operations with other participating departments, executive agencies, and USG organizations.

Commanders should ensure USAF FID-related indirect and direct support activities function as integrated elements of the overall US FID effort. USAF commanders and their assigned or attached forces should be prepared to function as part of a joint-interagency team with mutually supporting programs and objectives. Relationships between command agencies should be clearly defined. USAF FID activities will often fall under the purview of non-DoW agencies.

USAF FID ACTIVITIES

USAF FID activities primarily aim to develop and enhance HN airpower capabilities. FID activities can take a variety of forms and should address the overall needs and capabilities of HN aviation forces' employment and sustainment. Principal USAF FID activities are typically conducted through operational advising (OA), which includes equip, assess, train, advise, and assist functions:

- **Equip** HN aviation forces by facilitating the transfer of US defense articles and services under the SA Program to eligible foreign government aviation units supporting HN IDAD programs.
- **Assess** foreign military aviation capabilities and provide direction or recommendations towards improving HN airpower employment and sustainment methods. Aviation assessments are carried out primarily in support of CCDR requirements and for other key USG agencies and departments. Assessments focus on foreign aviation capabilities and limitations, specifically: aircrew capability and safety, aircraft airworthiness, critical resource availability, resource sustainability, and operational potential.
- **Train** foreign military forces to operate, sustain, and improve indigenous airpower resources and capabilities. Training normally includes operational tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in such areas as C2, CSAR, communications systems support, air-space-ground interface, aerial insertion, extraction, resupply, intelligence production and processes, ISR activities,[10] CAS, AI, and airlift operations. Training

[10] For additional information on intelligence products and ISR activities, see AFDP 2-0, *Intelligence.*

may also include support and sustainment areas, such as aircraft maintenance, logistics, life support, medical, FP, survival, evasion, resistance, escape, PR, munitions, ground safety, and other capabilities supporting combat air operations and aviation enterprise development. Appropriately funded training can be used to close specific gaps in foreign aviation operations and combat support skills, and to raise competency levels to the point where they can be advised on the proper employment of acquired capabilities.

- **Advise** foreign military forces and governmental agencies on how to employ airpower in specific operational situations. Advisors inform CCDRs on foreign airpower capabilities, limitations, potential roles that support operations, and aviation enterprise development. Advisory assistance addresses such areas as airpower doctrine (i.e., how to employ airpower as opposed to how to operate airplanes), mission planning, basing concepts, operational sustainment methods, tactical employment, communications capabilities, protection through approved cyberspace support, C2 development and employment, and the use of available space products for real-world operations and contingency actions. Along with training, USAF advisory assistance helps foreign military forces and government agencies generate and sustain airpower supporting IDAD programs.

- **Assist** foreign aviation forces in executing specific missions or contingency operations. Assistance can take many forms but generally includes hands-on support for sustainment capabilities such as aircraft maintenance, fuels, health services, and aviation medicine. Assistance may also include operational capabilities like C2, intelligence exploitation, mission planning, use of available space products, cyberspace support, and direct on-board advisory assistance in tactical operations. In the tactical realm, assistance can be applied to such functions as CSAR, airlift, personnel insertion and extraction, CASEVAC, ISR, counterintelligence and law enforcement information, and air attack.

A critical requirement overarching all USAF FID activities is **facilitating HN aviation force integration into multinational operations.** USAF personnel bring all other key tasks (equipping, assessing, training, advising, and assisting) together in a coordinated effort to achieve interoperability with and integration of HN forces.

USAF FID activities may be a cost-effective means of helping HNs deal with internal problems before they assume regional or global dimensions. This assistance can also build enduring relationships with foreign officials who may provide or facilitate access to important resources, capabilities, and basing. Bonds of trust between advisors and foreign military leaders forged during FID activities have often overcome critical access problems and acted as force multipliers during crises and contingencies.

THE FID CONTINUUM

The objective of USAF FID activities is to encourage and support HN solutions to subversion, insurgency, lawlessness, and terrorism, and to reduce the possibility of direct US military involvement. USAF support is usually applied indirectly through SA functions, joint and multinational exercises, and logistics support. Alternatively, the USAF can

provide certain forms of direct support that do not commit US forces to combat. In certain circumstances, the USAF can also engage in combat to meet US and HN FID objectives. USAF FID activities do not automatically transition from indirect to direct forms of assistance based on any precondition or sequence of events. The transition is based on policy decisions made by the appropriate, legally empowered authorities.

If direct support is required, the level and type of assistance should be appropriate to the situation and should preserve or increase HN strength and responsibility for self-defense. Direct support should be withdrawn as soon as possible, consistent with HN's needs and capabilities. Tailored USAF teams can assess, train, advise, assist/accompany, equip, and integrate (into multinational or joint operations) HN aviation forces in employment and sustainment at all levels of US support. The USAF may be simultaneously operating across the spectrum of FID categories and activities.

INDIRECT SUPPORT

SA, supplemented by joint and multinational exercises and other joint initiatives, constitutes the primary USAF contribution to indirect support of FID activities. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) International Engagement Plan (IEP) defines USAF SC efforts, and SA is one of the tools available to support SC and FID. The principal objective of SA in FID is to establish secure environments in which foreign governments can pursue social, economic, and political initiatives to relieve tensions in their nations and to prevent internal threat organizations from establishing a safe haven. Although SA encompasses more than FID, it is a component of other FID activities, such as logistics, training, and advisory support.

USAF SA efforts should focus on defense equipment and services that reduce foreign security forces' dependence on in-country supervision and US support. Recipient nations' personnel should be trained to operate and maintain the systems provided. In some cases, they should also be shown how to employ these systems for specific operations. As HN proficiency in air operations improves, developing internal training capabilities within HN aviation units can reduce dependence on in-country USAF assistance. To overcome sustainability problems inherent in maintaining older generation aircraft and systems, USAF SA efforts may also include administrative and logistics support for nonstandard items.

The DoS has the overall responsibility for military and economic SA. The DoW administers the military assistance portion under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The USAF is responsible, as an implementing agency, for those SA programs assigned by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Of the several SA programs involving the USAF, the main programs typically include:

- Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is a non-appropriated program through which foreign governments and international organizations can purchase defense articles, services, and training from the US.

- Foreign Military Funding (FMF) provides grant assistance or financing options for the acquisition of US defense equipment, services, and training. It is subordinate to the DoS's FA budget, which provides FMS credit options for partner nations under the direction of the President (typically delegated to the director of the DSCA) and in consultation with the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury.
- The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, managed by DoS, is integral to US SA efforts to promote regional stability and defense capabilities through professional military training and education. The program contributes to FID by providing partner nations with valuable training and education on US military practices and standards, including exposure to democratic values and respect for internationally recognized standards of human rights.
- Excess Defense Articles (EDA) are DoW- and USG-owned items that are no longer needed by the US military. These items are offered to foreign nations on an "as-is" basis at reduced or no cost to assist in various applications, including internal defense.

DIRECT SUPPORT NOT INVOLVING COMBAT

When it is impractical for HN air forces to achieve self-sufficiency in time to counter a threat, the USAF may be tasked with providing direct support that does not commit US personnel to combat. Such support encompasses Service-funded activities that improve HN air force effectiveness without duplicating or replacing SA efforts to create or maintain HN capabilities. USAF direct support activities normally focus on civil-military operations (CMO) support,[11] intelligence cooperation, communications, cybersecurity support, SFA, PSYOP, logistics support, and other "stand-off" support functions.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Given appropriate authorities, USAF personnel can conduct joint/multinational combat operations in the HN. USAF assets can provide air mobility for both US and HN forces. ISR, attack, and forward air control assets provide capabilities in support of US and HN ground and maritime forces. USAF EW platforms can also provide support, including communications jamming.

[11] For additional information on CMO, see AFDP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense,* Appendix B.

CHAPTER 4: PLANNING FOR FID OPERATIONS

USAF FID primarily entails airpower enablement, i.e., helping foreign aviation forces employ, sustain, and defend their resources. As their US counterparts, allied and partner commanders should employ airpower as mutually supporting, integrated systems that function synergistically with surface operations. USAF planners should tailor FID efforts to achieve the desired level of HN capability, self-sufficiency, and action.

FID planning should be incorporated into theater SC plans, strategies, theater campaign plans, and FID contingency actions. FID planning should account for the DAF IEP along with current DAF and national disclosure policies. The IEP defines objectives pursuant to the national strategy and provides commanders and planners a methodology for evaluating partner nation capabilities and willingness to work with DAF forces. The IEP also provides a framework for synchronizing DAF SC efforts in support of CCDR objectives. CCDRs base force employment guidance on an assessment of employment opportunities and an analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of friendly and hostile forces.

FID plans provide joint forces with a concept of operations and establish resource requirements, priorities, channels of communication, and basing modes. Plans for indirect and direct support are extensions of theater strategy but vary in purpose and execution. FID operations can be planned and carried out independently of US military actions, performed in conjunction with significant joint and multinational actions, or carried out before or after major campaigns aimed at securing specific military objectives.

PLANNING INDIRECT SUPPORT

The principal function of the US military's indirect FID support is to secure US strategic interests. Planning should be directed at specific sustainment capabilities, such as aircraft maintenance, fuels, and training, as well as advisory support to create and sustain HN military capabilities. HN military commanders deploy and employ forces and orchestrate tactical events to accomplish objectives established in the HN IDAD plan.

Joint planning for indirect FID support should guide US military commanders and other agencies charged with SA and joint-multinational exercises. These plans for indirect FID support serve US strategic interests by supporting HN IDAD programs where such assistance is politically feasible, legally permissible, strategically sound, and logistically supportable.

PLANNING DIRECT SUPPORT

Direct support planning for FID primarily involves the employment and logistical support of US forces. Direct support planning guides US military activities and concurrently complements and supports HN IDAD programs. Direct support planning typically does not include training or equipment transfers to the HN. However, it may include combat advisors to help HN forces execute tactical operations and remain connected to multinational joint forces at the tactical level. Airpower priorities and tasks established in the plan involve allocating and apportioning USAF aircraft, aircrews, and support

resources. Planning may include mobility and employment considerations for allied foreign forces when multinational operations are involved.

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

USAF FID planning requires a clear statement of airpower objectives in the HN, specifically, what major role airpower should play and what it should accomplish in furthering the HN's IDAD strategy. These objectives, derived from priorities the IDAD plan's priorities, should serve as the basis for planning various forms of airpower support to the host government to achieve desired effects. USAF planners, SC and SA personnel, and foreign disclosure officers should be involved in the FID planning process.

Operational-level airpower planning for FID generally requires extensive cooperation and coordination within the joint, multinational, and interagency arenas. In most cases, CCDRs and their staffs function as focal points for coordinating both direct and indirect forms of assistance. In many cases, the planning process requires the direct participation of the supported government and its military forces. Requirements for effective FID planning include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Plans that establish guidance and objectives for all types of direct and indirect support, compatible with host-government IDAD initiatives.
- Planning should determine the appropriate airpower tools for the operational environment and local conditions. For example, transferring available air platforms to the HN should account for and be compatible with that nation's technological and financial resources.
- USAF FID planning should be flexible. Periodic revisions may be necessary to accommodate alterations in HN planning, unanticipated restrictions on US assistance, and shifts in conflict intensity or requested levels of US support.
- USAF FID planning should be conducted jointly, or, where appropriate, coordinated with joint US military Services and with US civilian agencies exercising control, supervision, and oversight of FID activities in the recipient nation.
- All forms of direct and indirect FID support are coordinated with and approved by the HN. Joint and multinational planning gives participants a means to negotiate and agree on such issues as mission objectives, force levels, force composition, support arrangements, C2 relationships, and rules of engagement.
- USAF FID planning should be carried out according to US procurement and SA law. Allowable FID activities vary within the USG, the DoW, and the USAF. To ensure compliance with legislative constraints and funding procedures, FID planners should involve knowledgeable judge advocates early and often in the planning process.

STRATEGY TO TASK FID PLANNING

The FID planning process begins with a mission analysis to identify the critical capabilities and vulnerabilities of both friendly and adversary forces. Planners must focus on the HN's internal security threats and how to counter them within its financial and technological

means. This analysis helps the HN develop its IDAD strategy by defining the ends (desired results), ways (methods), and means (resources) required to achieve its security objectives.

Next, planners determine the role of military force within the IDAD strategy and prioritize airpower's contribution. A qualified USAF assessment team then evaluates the HN's existing aviation capabilities to identify gaps between what it has and what it needs.

Based on this assessment, a detailed plan is formulated that establishes the requirements, priorities, and goals for recruiting, organizing, training, and equipping the HN's aviation forces. This culminates in a formal FID plan with a concept of operations, phased timelines, and clear objectives for US actions, all of which must be reconciled with the HN's broader IDAD strategy.

SUPPORT TO FID

Although the most desirable FID course of action is often through indirect support (i.e., minimizing US presence and participation), mission analysis may show that HN aviation forces alone cannot prevail under the timelines and conditions required to bring their units up to operational status. The operational design and resulting plan may require USAF airpower to be introduced alongside enabling FID initiatives aimed at helping the HN counter, survive, and prevail against threats to internal stability. **When FID actions involve the direct use of USAF forces, there is a critical sequence of initiatives to incorporate into the planning process:**

- USAF direct support operations are carried out in accordance with the joint force commander's (JFC) guidance and performed in concert with other joint and multinational military forces and civilian agencies.
- HN airpower is supported through training, advising, assisting, and material support. HN airpower should become functional as soon as practical and, where possible, be applied simultaneously with the USAF direct support effort.
- USAF advisors facilitate multinational operations with HN forces, followed by a transition to a HN-only operation.
- USAF direct support forces and operations are phased out of the campaign or contingency.
- The USAF supports HN air operations with ongoing sustainment initiatives, including specific sustainment capabilities and advisory assistance, until the HN attains a successful conclusion to the conflict.

PLANNING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO FID

The dynamics of internal security threats and the resulting conflicts vary from situation to situation. FID planning should begin with an analysis of the operational environment. Intelligence requirements are based on the commander's information needs. They can include risk assessments, analyses of enemy forces and infrastructures, endemic health

threats to deployed personnel, situation reporting, and targeting data.

The key to effectively employing US intelligence is the early development of EEIs by intelligence analysts. In all cases, commanders must understand the operational environment well enough to determine EEIs for intelligence planning and execution accurately. Commanders should have access to regional area specialists to help develop EEIs. EEIs should be translated into collection requirements for intelligence collection processes, resources, and methodologies.

SPACE SUPPORT TO FID

Space support should be integrated into FID at all stages of engagement. Space systems and personnel, for example, provide commanders with ISR, C2, and position, navigation, and timing (PNT) support. Proper command relationships, normally direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH), should be established between in-country teams and national agencies, such as the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. Those relationships allow in-country teams to access timely intelligence data and analysis.

Long-haul and over-the-horizon communication systems are vital to USAF FID teams operating in austere environments. These teams should have access to regional satellite communications (SATCOM) support centers in the areas where they operate to provide them with SATCOM capabilities. Similarly, DIRLAUTH, with the mission management center for friendly force tracking (FFT), allows management and use of FFT capabilities.

Some space-based communications capabilities and services can be made available to HN forces. In some cases, intelligence derived from space-based assets may also be shared with the HN subject to the appropriate authorizations. USAF FID planners should take appropriate measures to ensure foreign disclosure, security, and classification guidelines are in place and followed.

DIRLAUTH with the Space Operations Center (SpOC) or the Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) allows in-country FID teams to access DoW space support. The SpOC/CSpOC can also request and coordinate reachback to many non-DoW space service providers that offer non-DoW, foreign, and commercial space support. The SpOC/CSpOC provides connectivity to many space service providers that offer ISR, SATCOM, and PNT capabilities. Depending on where the FID effort is taking place, the HN may have better relations with foreign space service providers than the US does. In those cases, the FID team should provide the HN with information that will enable them to request services directly from sources that may not want to support US efforts.

CYBERSPACE SUPPORT TO FID

Cyberspace support should be integrated into the US forces' FID planning and activities at all levels of indirect and direct support operations. CO integrated with operations in other domains creates coordinated and synchronized effects required to support mission accomplishment, however, CO may also be used to produce stand-alone tactical, operational, or strategic effects to achieve objectives. CO are key force multipliers, mission assurance providers, and risk mitigators for operations.

For external missions, CO planners must understand the authorities required to execute the proposed CO actions. The applicable authorities may vary depending on the operation's phase. This includes accounting for the lead time required to obtain the necessary intelligence to define the correct target, develop target access, confirm the appropriate authorities, complete necessary coordination, including interagency coordination, deconfliction, and/or synchronization, and to verify the cyberspace capability matches the intended target using the results of technical assurance evaluations. A network engagement approach to planning external missions can help CO planners understand different layers or networks in relationship to one another, leverage partner capabilities, and assess potential vulnerabilities. Early and continuous coordination with interagency and international partners can the expedite resolution of interagency and international partner issues and potentially enable the discovery of additional options.[12] Coordination for cyberspace support to FID should be accomplished early to determine appropriate authorities and enable planning.

MEDICAL SUPPORT TO FID

Health issues contribute to FID struggles for legitimacy and influence, and USAF medical service professionals routinely operate in HCA, SA, and FID programs. USAF medical support can uniquely help FID operations establish a US presence, build rapport, achieve combined integration of forces, and build a foundation for future cooperation. Therefore, medical support options should be included in FID planning and operations.

USAF international health specialist (IHS) professionals are trained to support the full continuum of USAF FID activities and assist JFCs and joint force air component commanders (JFACCs) in achieving objectives and end-states through health-related engagements that foster rapport, understanding, interoperability, and a more effective health infrastructure. Similar to regional area specialists, IHS professionals are proficient in regional cultures and often foreign languages.

OPERATIONS IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

OIE and FID operations can be complementary and produce synergistic effects. Information capabilities such as military deception (MILDEC), PSYOP, and operational security (OPSEC) considerations and planning should be included in all FID activities, even those activities not primarily designed to achieve influential effects. Operations and logistics planners should ensure information protection and consider the information related impacts of USAF actions involving support to a foreign government. Accordingly, MILDEC, PSYOP, and OPSEC planning should be closely tied to all-source intelligence on friendly and hostile elements. FID planners should anticipate enemy IO directed at USAF support operations in the HN and use PSYOP to maximize the positive effects. Operations likely to generate counterpropaganda operations requirements should be coordinated with appropriate US and HN PA and information agencies.[13]

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[12] For additional information on cyberspace best practices, capabilities, roles, responsibilities, command relationships, and authorities, see JP 3-12, *Joint Cyberspace Operations*, and Department of Air Force Policy Directive 17-2, *Cyber Warfare Operations*.

[13] See AFDP 3-13, *Information in Air Force Operations,* for additional information.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

In some circumstances, US Army or Marine Corps civil affairs (CA) augmentation teams may support USAF elements deployed overseas on FID operations. FID planners should identify CA support requirements early in the planning process. CA teams can assist in preparing overseas bases and facilities to support USAF operations by applying knowledge of civil populations and governance to affect behavior and counter threats. CA teams also assist deployed USAF forces by providing information on local civilian attitudes, culture, religions, ethics, infrastructure, and conflict dynamics in the operational area. CA teams also coordinate USAF HCA and civic action programs and help HN authorities secure the cooperation and support of their citizens.

CHAPTER 5: USAF FID EXECUTION

The geopolitical environment and US force structure reductions have increased the US's reliance on HNs' ability to defend themselves and to function as viable coalition partners. There is increased emphasis by planners and JFCs on creating multinational and joint battlefields. That task, which involves facilitating the availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of foreign forces, falls to US military trainers and advisors.

USAF FID activities can establish a US presence, build rapport, achieve integration of forces, and build a foundation for future regional cooperation. If necessary, commanders can employ a greater range of capabilities and resources in more direct forms of FID support when HN aviation units are inadequately sized or structured to make timely contributions to their defense effort.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Specific C2 systems and processes for indirect and direct support vary according to the conflict situation, HN requirements, US objectives, and the level of US involvement. C2 systems and processes for SA and most forms of direct support (excluding combat) include both civilian and military elements. Non-governmental organizations and commercial consortia can provide much of the C2 infrastructure that enables FID. USAF SA activities overseas are organized within SA offices under a military command structure, but both civilian and military elements control and supervise these activities. Military authorities command, control, and supervise tactical operations.

Security cooperation organizations (SCO) report to two command channels: one through the US diplomatic mission and the other through the CCDR. All USG personnel performing SA duties in a foreign country are under the policy direction and supervision of the US CoM. Commanders and senior officers assigned to SCO positions in foreign countries should receive specialized training on the limits of "policy direction and supervision" and appropriate reporting instructions in military channels when guidance may not be consistent with DoW policy.

C2 INDIRECT SUPPORT

The USAF provides indirect support in accordance with statutory authorities, executive orders, and directives, regulations, and manuals issued by the DoS and the DoW. Military personnel temporarily assigned within a foreign nation serve under the policy direction, coordination, and supervision of the CoM unless deployed to perform duties directed by the CCDR. Forces temporarily deployed overseas to accomplish SA functions within a CCDR's area of responsibility should normally be attached to that commander. The supported CCDR normally exercises operational control of these forces.

SA-funded mobile training teams (MTTs) accomplish tasks and objectives established in SA case letters of offer and acceptance by the DoS, the Secretary of the USAF, and the SA community, rather than a CCDR or special operations command. MTTs fall under SA case management and oversight of the SCO, or US Military Group, in the American embassy. The MTT performs contractual functions, with a training "product" upon

completion. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) MTT deployments, however, should be coordinated with the theater special operations component (TSOC) to advise them of the team's presence in the AOR. USAF teams deployed temporarily for training events and exercises with HN forces normally fall under the policy supervision and oversight of the American embassy, generally through the SCO. Temporarily deployed teams should be supported by the SCO for in-country administrative functions (including appropriate technical, legal, and administrative status in the HN). The CCDR and the CoM provide procedural guidance.

C2 DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT)

Direct FID support (not involving combat) is authorized and directed on a case-by-case basis by the President or SecWar. Direct FID support is classified as a military mission with respect to C2 responsibilities of the CCDR in whose AOR the operation is conducted.

Deployed Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF) trainers and advisors are normally assigned to the TSOC commander. The JFACC, through the CCDR and AFSOC, can also request and employ AFSOF trainers and advisors. Title 10, USC, Armed Forces, § 322, “Special operations forces: training with friendly foreign forces,” allows SOF air advisors (AA) to expend unit operation and maintenance funds to train (and train with) foreign forces. This legal provision gives AFSOF greater flexibility than other FID and military coalition support activities. Their inherent flexibility makes AA forces an attractive and cost-effective way for the US to establish important foreign relationships.

The CoM can request certain forms of indirect and direct support, requests are generally subject to their approval. Coordination of mission requirements, operational constraints, and tasking should be conducted with the JFC or other designated joint force agencies. The CoM normally exercises in-country policy supervision and oversight of these activities.

C2 OF COMBAT OPERATIONS

USAF forces employed in combat operations in support of FID should be organized, commanded, and controlled based on guidance established in joint and USAF doctrine and directives. C2 structures may require tailoring to fit specific operational environments, force allocations, and US-HN agreements on command of multinational forces.

When deployed, AFSOF are normally attached to a joint task force as part of a subordinate joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commanded by a joint force special operations component commander. However, AFSOC personnel performing FID missions may be attached directly to a conventional air expeditionary task force (AETF) under a JFACC. If FID operations expand into larger combat operations, these AFSOC forces may either remain part of the AETF or be reorganized into the JSOTF. JFACCs and participants should be prepared for either command relationship.

UNIFIED ACTION

Where the responsibilities of military, governmental, and non-governmental entities overlap, execution of FID activities requires emphasis on close, continuous coordination

rather than on C2 defined in purely military terms. In many cases, the relationship between agencies is one of interdependence.

SCOs and country teams, with their knowledge of SA activities and other foreign aid efforts, serve the CCDR as important sources of information on HN IDAD planning and military preparedness. In addition, CCDRs have contingency plans and intelligence at their disposal that may be relevant to SA planning and crisis response. These commanders also have assigned forces, personnel on temporary duty, strategic expertise, and materiel resources that can be used in HN relations, SA, joint and multinational exercises, and certain forms of direct support. CCDRs can also promote interoperability and standardization for multinational operations involving the US and HN.

Coordination tailored to specific locations and missions benefits not only the US diplomatic mission objectives but also the CCDR's SA mission. For example, USAF elements assigned to combatant commands and SCOs (or other country team components) support joint-interagency coordination of airpower requirements and capabilities for SA planning, administration, logistics support, and direct support operations. To accomplish such coordination, USAF representatives may choose to use an appropriate channel of communication that may extend outside formal coordination procedures. These channels can support CCDR efforts to help SCOs develop realistic internal defense requirements in HN. They can also be used to keep US diplomatic missions informed about airpower resources and capabilities available for direct support and crisis response.

JOINT AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

FID activities frequently involve joint and interagency efforts supporting unified action. The success of these operations depends on effective communications for tasking, coordinating, monitoring, and reporting among the various US civilian and military agencies. USAF C2 structures should be tailored to specific environments, missions, and joint force compositions, and adaptable to varying scenarios. These structures should connect in-country, joint, and interagency elements and should establish links between in-country elements, the CCDR, and US command and supervisory elements. Deployed USAF teams may function as elements attached to other Service units or attached, under special arrangements, to interagency organizations.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

USAF elements play a key FID role by helping to develop and support multinational C2 capabilities for airpower operations. Multinational activity is inherent in all forms of military FID assistance, and all these forms require links between US and HN C2 elements. Command relationships and responsibilities for multinational exercises and contingency operations are established in accordance with US-HN agreements.

Connectivity is essential, particularly when US and HN forces function in mutual support during combat operations. Interoperability issues should also be considered considering the USAF's need for information assurance.

Significant C2 interoperability challenges in multinational operations typically involve incompatible equipment and standards, language barriers, differing C2 procedures, a lack of HN experience, and inadequate HN logistics infrastructures to maintain modern communications equipment. Equipment modernization provided under SA can alleviate some of these deficiencies. Still commanders should also consider using USAF trainers and advisors to improve HN C2 doctrine, coordinate combined C2 procedures, and facilitate interoperability.

AIR ADVISORS

As the JFC’s primary contact with foreign counterparts, AAs represent the airpower component of the advisory effort. Teams must be sized to address major deficiencies in the HN air force. Advisors are expected to recognize potential airpower applications within an internal conflict and understand how to integrate them with the HN's social, economic, and political initiatives.

AAs exert significant influence by helping the JFC integrate foreign forces into contingency planning as force multipliers, keeping coalitions connected at the tactical level. They advise on airpower application and sustainment methods to support multinational objectives. This core "assess-train-advise-assist" mission is performed across all levels of FID. When supporting an HN conducting COIN, it is specifically called "support for COIN."

Aviation FID supports HN programs like COIN, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics, complementing ground and maritime advisory operations. Ideally, FID training should be used as a shaping operation to encourage HN-led solutions and prevent wider conflict. Commanders must anticipate the specific training HNs require for these missions. For example, counterterrorism operations may demand that foreign air units shift tactics, focusing not just on which platform to use, but how to use it effectively. Achieving "mission-ready" status often requires major improvements in the HN's ability to generate and apply detailed intelligence during mission planning and execution.

OPERATIONAL ADVISING MISSION SET FOR OPERATIONS, ACTIVITIES, AND INVESTMENTS

OA encompasses a wide range of OAI focused on improving a HN's air force capabilities and integrating them with their surface forces. OA is centered on assess, train, advise, assist, and equip activities using the HN’s own equipment. Since HN forces have varying levels of experience, OA bridges the gap between individual training and true operational capability under the HN's unique conditions.

The demand for these advisory skills exceeds the number of specialized forces available, so commanders must consider all options for enabling foreign aviation forces. This support is conducted at the operational and tactical levels, with USAF personnel deploying to collocate with HN units. Generally, "training" occurs in non-operational environments, while "advising" and "assisting" missions take place in operational environments where the risk of confrontation is higher.

The mission follows a critical sequence. All flying-related advisory efforts must be preceded by a thorough assessment of the HN unit's airworthiness and safety. This establishes a baseline for risk management and interoperability. Following the assessment, tactical training may be required to bring HN forces to a level where they can be effectively advised on airpower applications that support their national strategy.

Historically, FID has focused on tactical flying skills. However, the most significant challenge is often institutional: senior HN leaders struggle to effectively organize, train, and create operating regulations for their own forces. Therefore, commanders should elevate advisory efforts to address higher-level military leadership on foundational issues like infrastructure, organization, C2, and logistics. The goal is to build a lasting, self-sufficient defense capability, not a temporary one that erodes when external support leaves.

This institutional advising is a significant challenge that often requires the experience of the broader USAF community, beyond specialized special operations resources. Success is ultimately contingent on the advisors themselves, for whom language ability, cultural intelligence, and geopolitical expertise are indispensable tools.

TRAINING VERSUS ADVISING

There is an important distinction between training and advising. Training is a form of indirect support that provides a doctrinal foundation for military operations. These instructional programs build capabilities ranging from technical flying skills to combat TTPs and sustainment methods, all tailored to the HN’s financial and technological limitations.

Advising, conversely, is direct support involving the practical, real-world application of doctrine within the host country. Because advising can directly implicate the US in an HN’s contingency, it crosses a critical political threshold that often requires presidential approval. Therefore, commanders must provide all personnel with clearly defined rules of engagement.

Advice is most effective when directed at the highest levels of the host government. Guidance on strategic matters and operational planning has a more lasting effect when acted upon by senior military leaders. At the field level, advisors support subordinate commanders in tactical planning, air base security, resource conservation, and technical assistance with US equipment. Due to their close contact with in-country operations, USAF advisors are best positioned to identify requirements for further assistance, coordinate direct support, and help analyze US-provided intelligence.

SOF AIR ADVISORS

SOF AAs provide influence based on their placement and access to partner aviation forces and infrastructure.[14] SOF AAs also provide expertise in IW, C2, ISR, SOF strike, and SOF air mobility to improve HN capability and improve availability, integration, and

[14] See AFDP 3-05, *Special Operations*, and *“Special Operations Theater Air Operations Squadron Mission and Utilization Memorandum”* dated 22 Jun 2024, for additional information.

interoperability of HN air forces. While these functions can be performed across a range of operations, they are often used to help shape the environment and deter future aggression. The special operations theater air operations squadron's deployable force is the special operations advisor team (SOAT). SOATs are cross-functional teams that conduct the SOF core tasks of FID and SFA with allies and partners from the tactical to strategic echelon. SOATs are prepared to conduct a range of supporting mission essential tasks (METs) derived from the universal joint task list (UJTL), while maintaining knowledge, expertise, and capabilities within the following functions:

- Specialized ISR.
- SOF mobility.
- Precision strike.
- Air-ground integration.
- Special tactics.

When directed, AFSOC will employ a SOAT to support a CCDR's regional objectives by conducting the following UJTL METs:

- Conduct FID.
- Integrate OIE.
- Conduct special operations activities.
- Conduct special reconnaissance.
- Maintain situational awareness.
- Conduct unconventional warfare.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE TEAMS

USAF SA teams supplement SCO capabilities by providing training, advice, and technical assistance to a HN. USAF personnel may deploy as a team or function as the air component of a greater joint effort.[15]

CCDRs may employ USAF SA teams for limited technical training in the operation and maintenance of specific airpower systems. The principal criteria for team selection are competence in the requested specialty, teaching skills, and language compatibility with HN recipients. When training and advisory teams are required to guide planning, development, and employment of airpower, skills in a single technical specialty are rarely sufficient.

Country teams or CCDRs normally initiate in-country support requirements, which should be based on recommendations derived from surveys and assessments. This approach

[15] For additional information on USAF SA teams, see AFDP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, Appendix C.

avoids the problem of a team deploying overseas to develop or improve operational capabilities of a particular weapons system when the host air force lacks the infrastructure or resources to employ the system effectively.

Surveys on SA support of FID should include three basic tasks. The first task is to determine appropriate airpower roles and operations for the situation. Second, assess the HN's ability to fulfill those roles with existing airpower resources. Third, develop requirements and recommendations for improvements that can be carried out through HN initiatives or additional US assistance. In addition to providing US defense equipment and services to the HN, USAF logistics personnel should advise HN authorities on the use of airpower to establish and sustain IDAD programs through aerial lines of supply and personnel movement.

Training and equipment provided to the HN may not be sufficient to ensure the success of aviation programs in some conflict situations. When authorized and directed by appropriate legal authority, USAF advisory personnel may also be employed to advise host air force units on how to employ air-support resources in a manner that serves the combined interests of the US and the HN.

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIONS

During certain training, wartime, or contingency deployments, USAF training and advisory personnel may collocate with both US and HN land or maritime forces to perform liaison functions and advise on joint air-ground operations. Specially qualified AAs can accompany US Army or Navy teams into an objective area to provide an Airman's perspective. Support to joint counterparts can entail aviation assessments of HN capabilities and limitations as well as operational- or tactical-level advice on the employment of HN airpower. Support may also include familiarization with the characteristics of HN TTPs.

Commanders should employ AAs to help plan and integrate foreign aviation forces into multinational theater campaigns, contingency actions, and other joint or multinational activities, and to assist foreign aviation forces in operational and tactical planning. Commanders should shape the battlefield before the onset of crisis or war by employing AAs to promote and test multinational effectiveness, safety, and interoperability among joint or coalition players.

JFCs should employ AAs to maintain coordination links between US and multinational air tasking authorities and foreign aviation units. Support includes liaison and advisory assistance to the JFACC for air operations directive, air tasking order planning, and execution involving foreign aviation forces. Assistance includes facilitating airspace deconfliction and area air defense coordination among coalition partners, evaluating safety and interoperability between US and foreign forces, and increasing the tactical effectiveness of foreign airpower in multinational operations. AAs may be used when foreign aviation forces are employed as theater-assigned assets and when operations involving dissimilar types of aircraft are planned.

Additionally, personnel of other US or multinational Services may accompany and train with AAs to provide the necessary ground or maritime perspective. An Army or naval advisor, for example, can help AAs provide HN air force personnel a surface warfare perspective on joint air-ground operations. This is designed to promote effectiveness, safety, and interoperability, not only between HN service components but also between participating HN units and US forces.

EMPLOYMENT IN DIRECT SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The USAF can provide direct support to enhance or supplement a HN's aviation programs when indirect assistance is insufficient. The key is maintaining a balance: direct support should prevent conflict escalation without undermining the HN's will or capacity to achieve its own internal solution.

This support bridges the gap between indirect assistance and full combat operations, especially when a US combat role is inappropriate or politically infeasible. Examples include intelligence sharing, logistics airlift, and communications support, which can often be conducted as stand-off options. While this does not eliminate all risks, it offers specialized assistance without directly exposing US personnel to hostile fire. For sensitive or clandestine operations, commanders should consider using AFSOF.

In multinational settings, commanders must use advisors to resolve differences in TTPs between US and HN forces, tailoring procedures to fit all operational and legal constraints.

Even when combat operations are required, the US role remains strictly supportive. The central objective is to protect vital resources and alleviate threat-group pressure, but the HN retains full responsibility for the strategic offensive. This preserves the HN’s legitimacy and ensures all air support tasks can be transferred back to them as soon as practical.

FORCE PROTECTION AND PERSONNEL RECOVERY

Since FID training and advisory teams often deploy to locations with no other US presence and are outside normal joint FP structures, commanders should ensure that FP and PR processes and procedures are in place.

- **FP** for FID applies to deployed operational units supporting HN IDAD programs. Commanders exercise FP to ensure the defense and survival of US personnel, facilities, C2 structures, and weapons systems. Commanders should, commensurate with the estimated threat level, ensure FP personnel deploy as an integral part of the team. These teams are typically small. FP personnel should be prepared to conduct threat, criticality, vulnerability, and risk assessments and make recommendations to the commander for risk management. They should also provide some measure of FP for the deployed team. Indigenous security force personnel may augment the US team’s FP effort and provide security for US forces and resources. The early integration of HN security forces into the FID operating environment should be a priority consideration. In-country training and advisory FID teams should possess a

robust FFT system or similar capability.[16]

- **PR** for FID applies to all deployed operational units supporting HN IDAD programs. When training and advisory personnel are geographically isolated from the broader joint force, support from the space component (e.g., SATCOM) becomes vitally important. Commanders responsible for austere FID activity should ensure plans are in place to support self-recovery operations, and PR plans integrate with the training and advisory team's FP plan. If lack of HN PR infrastructure dictates, USAF CSAR forces can assess, train, advise, and assist as needed to maintain team integrity and establish HN mechanisms for PR operations, thereby enhancing the safety of both US and HN forces.[17]

[16] See AFDP 3-10, *Force Protection*, for additional information.
[17] See AFDP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*, for additional information.

APPENDIX A: JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES

Concurrently with testing and evaluating mutual capabilities, joint and multinational exercises may include training and construction, as well as HCA projects, within a host country. Although the exercises may be conducted only between USAF and HN air force units, maximum utility is realized when they involve joint and multinational operations.

INTEROPERABILITY TRAINING

The purpose of interoperability training is to ensure that US and HN forces can function as mutually supporting entities during combat operations. Training to achieve interoperability should include doctrine, tactics, individual skills, weapons familiarization (particularly if US and host forces use different weapon systems), maintenance, and C2 procedures.

Interoperability training assumes comparably proficient units are involved. The training experience allows US commanders to learn how other forces conduct IDAD operations and to develop the most compatible methodology, consistent with US FID policies and objectives, for operating together.

If the foreign force is not proficient enough to conduct multinational operations with US forces, SA efforts should be conducted to equalize the foreign force before multinational exercises are undertaken. Joint-multinational exercises are not to be used to provide training to foreign military personnel if that training is normally provided under SA.

SAFETY TRAINING

Safety training reduces the risks inherent in conducting military operations involving two or more forces that differ widely in language, culture, geographic origin, technology, and practical experience. Mutual safety is improved not only through training in the use of specific weapons but also through standardization of TTPs.

CONSTRUCTION

Construction related to multinational exercises is permitted under two sets of rules, one for Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises and another for non-JCS exercises.

Set-aside funds contained in the unspecified minor construction account of each US military Service pay for all exercise-related construction during JCS exercises. Set-aside funds cover only material, supplies, nonmilitary labor costs, overhead (except planning and design costs), and DoW-funded costs applicable to O&M of equipment. O&M funds may not be used for construction related to JCS exercises.

During non-JCS exercises, **O&M funds** may be used to construct or improve facilities under US control if each construction project results in a usable facility for US units to take part in the multinational exercise. Strict project rules and precise funding limits are established for such construction.

APPENDIX B: HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

US Armed Forces personnel participate in HCA activities to create strategic, operational, and tactical effects that support CCDR objectives in theater SC or designated contingency plans while concurrently reinforcing skills required for the operational readiness of the forces executing the HCA mission. **HCA fulfills US military unit training requirements while creating humanitarian benefits for the HN civilian population.** HCA programs and projects may not be provided directly or indirectly to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity.

AUTHORITIES

HCA activities should be distinguished from similar types of projects the USAF may undertake to accomplish a military operation that results in incidental benefits to the local population. Purpose and intent are the key factors in determining whether Title 10 covers a specific activity, USC, § 401, "Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations." For example, if an USAF unit digs wells, clears land, and cuts a road through the jungle to service a base camp for the benefit of that unit, those activities would not constitute HCA even if they result in ancillary and unintended benefits to a local populace.

Expenses incurred as a direct result of providing HCA (other than minimal cost HCA) to a foreign country is paid for with funds specifically appropriated for such purposes (specifically included in USAF's operation and maintenance account). Funding for HCA activities is provided by the annual National Defense Authorization Act and obligated for incremental expenses such as costs for consumable materials, supplies, and services, if any, that are reasonably necessary to execute HCA activities. Funding does not include costs associated with the military operation (e.g., transportation, personnel expenses, petroleum, oils, and lubricants, equipment repair), which would likely have been incurred regardless of whether the HCA was provided.

FORMS OF HCA

HCA is limited to authorized activities and minimal cost HCA, as defined by DoD Instruction 2205.02*, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*. Commanders contemplating participation in HCA activities should seek legal advice on the form of HCA that is most appropriate for the operation or exercise being conducted, especially with respect to rules governing HCA limitations and funding.

HCA Activities performed in conjunction with authorized military operations include:

- Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved areas of a country. Activities may include education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.
- Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
- Well-drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

- ✪ Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

HCA projects are planned and developed through normal SC protocols. The country team, in coordination with the HN, develops project nominations. When the plan is developed, it is coordinated through the DoS to avoid duplication of effort and is approved by the US ambassador to the country. Recommended HCA projects are then submitted to the CCDRs for prioritization and funding. CCDRs, in turn, submit their prioritized projects to the JCS for coordination with legal counsel, country desk officers, the DoS Bureau of Political and Military Affairs, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, which ultimately approves project nominations. Messaging within the HN is coordinated with and delivered through the US Embassy.

Command-approved HCA Projects. The maximum amount authorized for a command-approved HCA project is included in the annual HCA guidance message prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs. The determination that the expenditure is "minimal" is made by CCDRs for activities within their respective geographic areas of responsibility, in the exercise of reasonable judgment, considering the overall cost of the military operation, exercise, or training event in which such expenditure is incurred, and for an activity incidental to the military operation.

APPENDIX C: USAF SECURITY ASSISTANCE TEAMS

This appendix assists commanders in identifying and selecting appropriate FID options by providing a brief survey of teams that perform functions under SA. One of the key operational-level objectives of USAF advisory operations is to help integrate HN airpower into the multinational and joint arenas. Commanders should refer to current directives and publications for guidelines and specific policies on assistance provided under the USAF SA program. This appendix also discusses functions, goals, and special constraints associated with USAF advisory support to HNs. Additional information on SA teams can be found in DoD 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*.

Legislative guidance limits training and advice by permanently assigned SCO personnel. Also, SCOs are not sufficiently sized or configured to advise and train or perform technical assistance duties that extend beyond primary (and essentially logistical) SCO functions. Outside assistance may be required in specific instances.

Besides SCOs, several teams and organizations may perform limited SA functions for specified periods on a temporary duty or permanent change of station (PCS) basis. These teams include technical assistance teams (TAT), technical assistance field teams (TAFTs), MTTs, extended training service specialists (ETSSs), quality assurance teams, language training detachments, site survey teams, and defense requirement survey teams.

Commanders for FID activities can employ these teams, and others assembled for specific purposes, such as health service support teams. In certain instances, temporarily deployed USAF teams may be called on to advise foreign personnel on operational matters directly related to the use of host-nation resources in specific conflict situations.

NON-TRAINING SECURITY ASSISTANCE TEAMS

A variety of non-training assistance functions can be accomplished under the SA program. The principal vehicles for non-training support are TATs and TAFTs.

- **Technical Assistance Teams.** In cases where the operational readiness of host aircraft and support equipment is seriously degraded due to battle damage, unexpected materiel failures, or long-term deficiencies in local maintenance and funding, a requirement for one-time repair and refurbishment may arise. Introducing new equipment provided under SA may also require specialized USAF assistance to place the systems in operation. TATs and civilian engineering technical surveys can be deployed to provide these services. In some cases, US or foreign civilian contract personnel may be used. Such non-training support may be conducted in the host country or, when prohibited or deemed impractical because of inadequate local facilities, conducted out of the country. TATs should not be used to provide technical training or instruction except for incidental over-the-shoulder technical assistance in conjunction with their primary duties.

- **Technical Assistance Field Teams.** Where ongoing aviation support requirements cannot be met through the combined efforts of the HN air force, the SCO, and

deployed USAF TAFTs in PCS status, they can be sent to the HN when MTT and ETSS support is not appropriate. TAFTs provide in-country technical or maintenance support on specific equipment, technology, weapons, and supporting systems. TAFTs are not provided under IMET and are not categorized as SA training.

SPECIALIZED NON-TRAINING SUPPORT

Besides TATs and TAFTs, other forms of non-training support allow commanders to tailor team capabilities to meet specialized field requirements.

USAF assistance teams (funded through SA) can use periodic visits to offset HN aircraft materiel management deficiencies by conducting inventories, refining procedures, clearing backorders, and resolving accounting discrepancies.

The USAF can provide other specialized forms of non-training support. An example is the theater technical training of US logisticians through the logistics team training (LTT) program. Small teams (10 to 15 individuals) train in combat support skills, including aircraft battle damage repair, corrosion control, materiel management, specialized maintenance, transportation operations, and other sustainment functions. Service O&M funds support the training of US personnel. HN SA funds pay for repair parts and other expendables used by an LTT during training activities.

- The LTT program is designed to ensure, and the Service must certify, that deployments offer opportunities for critical training that would not occur, or would occur at significantly higher cost or reduced efficiency, in another similar geographic area. The program is based on the precept that certain US forces training is so critical and reasonably unavailable that incidental, spin-off services provided to a foreign country in exchange for the training opportunities are insignificant in the balance of benefits, thereby making the training in the best interests of the USG.

- As with TATs, training or instruction of host personnel is limited to incidental, over-the-shoulder technical assistance.

TRAINING SUPPORT TO HN FORCES

In many cases, incidental “over-the-shoulder” instruction occurring as a byproduct of certain non-training functions may not be sufficient to produce significant improvements in long-term self-sufficiency. Training teams, funded under SA, should be used where more extensive, formally structured courses of instruction are required. The teams can be deployed to reinforce SCO capabilities.

- **Mobile Training Teams.** MTTs deployed on temporary duty to the recipient nation enhance SCO capabilities by training HN personnel in the operation, maintenance, and employment of airpower weapon systems and support equipment. MTTs are authorized for specific in-country training requirements beyond the capability of US resources. MTTs may be funded from either FMS or IMET programs. MTTs are also authorized to provide training associated with equipment transfers or to conduct surveys and assessments of training requirements. MTTs may be requested to carry out specific training tasks for limited periods.

- **Extended Training Service Specialists.** Sustained USAF training capabilities are available through ETSSs. These teams are comprised of DoW military and civilian personnel deployed in a PCS status to the HN who are technically qualified to provide advice, instruction, and training in the installation, operation, and maintenance of weapons, equipment, and systems. ETSSs are attached to the SA office for operational control and administrative and logistical support.

ADVISORY SUPPORT TO HN FORCES

When specifically authorized and directed, deployed USAF SA teams advise host military personnel on using airpower systems and related support capabilities. Advisory functions are subject to legislative restrictions and DoW directives on levels and types of assistance provided. Commanders and SCO personnel requesting this type of assistance must ensure that advisory activities fall within current policy guidelines and legal parameters.

COMMAND ADVISORY FUNCTIONS

USAF advisory assistance may be required to facilitate HN air force support of IDAD objectives and encourage a satisfactory correlation between US SA goals and the recipient's use of SA assets. Advisory assistance teams accomplish these tasks by advising central command elements of the host military on the capabilities, limitations, and correct use of airpower in conflict. Command advisory functions focus on operational planning that can bridge the gap between IDAD strategy and tactical employment.

FIELD ADVISORY FUNCTIONS

USAF advisory assistance conducted at the field level (operational flying units, aviation support elements, and army maneuver units) focuses primarily on improving host military TTPs for airpower operations.

USAF advisory functions include mission-related advice on intelligence collection and analysis, maintenance, logistics, communications, and administration, as well as tactical operations. Field advisory support also has important applications in medical and MCA programs, military construction, and influence operations. Its principal objective is to provide guidance fostering self-sufficiency in the use of airpower resources for the conflict at hand, not to supplant HN capabilities.

Field advisory functions should be closely linked to operational-level objectives supporting overall US and HN strategic goals. This entails such field advisory functions as testing and verifying HN airpower employment and sustainment capabilities, focusing HN aviation resources on appropriate roles and missions, and facilitating the availability of safe, reliable, and interoperable aviation support as a force multiplier for the US JFC.

Field advisory functions are not automatically linked to direct participation in host military operations. Advisory functions that expose US personnel to hostile fire represent a significant increase in US commitment with profound legal and political implications. Personnel performing defense services may not perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any duties related to training and advising, that may engage US personnel in combat activities outside the US in accordance with federal law.

REFERENCES

All websites accessed 9 March 2026.

US AIR FORCE DOCTRINE: https://www.doctrine.af.mil/

- AFDP 1, *The Air Force*
- AFDP 2-0, *Intelligence*
- AFDP 3-05, *Special Operations*
- AFDP 3-10, *Force Protection*
- AFDP 3-13, *Information in Air Force Operations*
- AFDP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*
- AFDP 4-0, *Combat Support*

JOINT DOCTRINE

- JP 3-12, *Joint Cyberspace Operations*
- JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*
- JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*
- JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS

- Title 10, USC, § 401, *Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations*
- Title 22, US Code (USC), §2151, *Congressional findings and declaration of policy*
- DoDI 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*
- DoD 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*
- DAF Policy Directive 17-2, *Cyber Warfare Operations*

NOTE: All documents are CUI/OPSEC and hosted on the DAF SC Community of Interest sharepoint site. Request access for:

- DAF International Engagement Plan
- Key Leader Engagement Framework
- Country Blueprints