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HOMELAND DEFENSE

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FOREWORD

Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-27, *Homeland Defense*, provides Airmen with the fundamental principles guiding the United States Air Force (USAF) in protecting the nation from external threats and aggression. This publication marks a significant shift from the previous version, AFDP 3-27, *Homeland Operations*, which primarily addressed crisis response to natural disasters and counterterrorism actions in which the USAF and Department of War (DoW) often played a supporting role to civilian agencies in defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). This revised publication prioritizes homeland defense (HD) as the DoW's paramount mission and outlines the increasingly complex threat environment, encompassing traditional nation-state actors, asymmetric threats, and the growing potential for attacks on US interests both at home and abroad, recognizing that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary.

HD outlines the evolving threat landscape, emphasizing the need for deterrence and a global perspective on homeland security. It details how the USAF will leverage its core functions-air superiority to deny adversaries freedom of action, global precision attack capabilities for rapid and decisive response, robust global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) for early warning and threat assessment, rapid global mobility to swiftly deploy airpower, and resilient command and control to synchronize defense across all domains. This publication describes the command relationships and authorities unique to HD, including interactions among United States Northern Command, United States Indo-Pacific Command, North American Aerospace Defense Command, and non-DoW agencies. It emphasizes the importance of clear command arrangements, especially in scenarios involving dual-status commanders and forces operating under different legal statuses.

Finally, HD stresses the criticality of mission command as a philosophy of leadership and discusses some of the nuances of command and control of air operations in the homeland. It highlights the need for seamless integration with interagency partners, recognizing that success hinges on effective collaboration among federal, state, local, and private sector entities.


This publication serves as a vital resource for all Airmen involved in homeland operations, providing a common frame of reference for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations to protect the nation and its interests. It encourages commanders and staff at all levels to embrace the criticality of airpower to homeland operations, ensuring the USAF remains ready to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing security environment.

CHAPTER 1: AIRPOWER IN HOMELAND DEFENSE

Homeland defense (HD) is the military protection of United States (US) sovereignty and territory against external threats and aggression or, as directed by the President, other threats.[1] The greatest responsibility of the federal government, and by extension the United States Air Force (USAF), is protecting the American people.

> "The U.S. military's foremost priority is to defend the U.S. Homeland."
>
> **–Department of War 2026 National Defense Strategy**

The USAF plays a crucial role in HD, contributing air power to achieve joint force commander (JFC) objectives by leveraging its core functions: air superiority, global precision attack, rapid global mobility, global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and command and control (C2), to protect the nation from a wide array of threats. Many of the USAF capabilities that support HD are equally applicable to defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) operations. The legacy term "homeland operations" encompasses the USAF's role in both the HD mission and DSCA. An important distinction between the two lies in the supported and supporting relationship. While the Department of War (DoW) is the lead federal agency for HD, it operates in support of another federal agency when conducting DSCA.[2] While not the primary purpose of this publication, specific information regarding DSCA can be found in Chapter 4.



As the rapidly evolving operational environment (OE) affects homeland operations, the authorities and laws associated with HD and DSCA require careful consideration and clear prioritization. This publication focuses on airpower's role in homeland operations and its primary objective, defending the United States from attack.

[1] For additional information on homeland defense, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-27, *Homeland Defense*.
[2] See JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense,* JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, and Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)* for additional information.

THE HOMELAND

The US homeland is the physical region that includes the continental United States (CONUS), Alaska, Hawaii, territories in the Pacific (i.e., Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands), as well as territories in the Caribbean (i.e., the US Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the surrounding territorial waters and airspace). The United States also enjoys exclusive sovereignty 12 nautical miles out to sea and exercises responsibilities extending 200 nautical miles from the coast.[3]

CHALLENGES TO HOMELAND DEFENSE

HD represents a complex and evolving challenge for the USAF. It demands a strategic approach that leverages all core functions to deter aggression and maintain a secure and resilient posture. As competition with adversaries intensifies across all domains, commanders and their staff should recognize that HD is not confined to simply protecting our national borders. Maintaining air superiority over the homeland in a contested environment will require enhanced global precision attack capabilities, resilient C2 systems, and strong working relationships with all levels of government. Furthermore, bolstering global ISR to provide early warning and accurate assessments of adversary intentions and capabilities is essential for maintaining an advantageous position in the modern threat environment.

USAF HD operations support the joint function of **protection**. Protection encompasses the JFC's efforts to secure and defend the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or between the boundaries of a given operational area (OA) to maintain mission effectiveness.[4] For the past two decades, HD has been seen primarily as a crisis response to natural disasters and anti-terrorism actions when local or regional civilian authorities have been overwhelmed. **Given the growing multi-domain threats and increasingly capable US adversaries, HD requires the greatest effort and attention.** Achieving the DoW's top priority is becoming increasingly important, as the homeland is no longer a sanctuary from enemy attack. HD is vital to ensure the protection of the American people, the sovereignty of the United States, and the ability to project power beyond the homeland.

[3] Consistent with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United States has claimed a 12 nautical mile territorial sea and a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone.
[4] For additional information on protection, see JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*.

THREATS TO THE HOMELAND

HD should address all external threats as directed by the President, to facilitate a broad-based, globally integrated defense-in-depth. Threats planned, promoted, caused, or executed by external actors may take place inside the homeland, with or without attribution. The persistent presence of both traditional nation-states and asymmetric threats requires a proactive, comprehensive, and disciplined approach to HD.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Adversaries have and continue to seek WMD and the means to deliver them to enhance their influence and achieve greater strategic leverage against US advantages. They may use the weapons to conduct an attack on US citizens, infrastructure, and other vital interests and to exploit US power projection, sustainment, and force protection (FP) vulnerabilities.

Missile Threats. Our competitors continue to develop long-range and novel missile capabilities to threaten the US homeland---including traditional ballistic missiles, aero ballistic and cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, and novel nuclear and conventional warhead delivery systems. Their goals are to exploit defense gaps, affect our ability to generate surge forces, raise the risks and costs of intervention abroad, and introduce a destabilizing threat to the general populace.

Electromagnetic Warfare/Cyberspace Operations (CO). Adversaries have invested in capabilities to exploit US and allied satellites and networks through electromagnetic warfare and CO. Additionally, adversaries have demonstrated the ability to infiltrate critical homeland infrastructure cyberspace networks that, if acted upon, could cause significant damage to both the military and civilian sectors. The DoD Cyber Crime Center (DC3) is a key resource for analyzing these intrusions and identifying vulnerabilities.

Malign Influence. Adversaries will likely expand the use of malign influence to pursue their objectives in an increasingly aggressive and hostile manner. This includes actions to deny access to information or spread propaganda and deception. Malign influence activities can also leverage social media and artificial intelligence to interfere with democratic processes and incite domestic terrorism or civil unrest.

Conventional Military Forces. Adversaries have frequently tested America's border sovereignty using conventional forces. For example, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) regularly conducts fighter intercepts of Russian Tu-95 Bear bombers and IL-20 reconnaissance aircraft flying near Alaskan and Canadian airspace. More recently, Russia conducted a bilateral mission with People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) H-6 bombers in the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). NORAD has executed its aerospace control mission over 2,000 times since 9/11.

Unconventional Hostile Forces. The threat to USAF installations in the homeland does not only originate from sovereign nations overseas. Porous national borders have enabled the undetected invasion of unvetted individuals, many of whom originated from adversary nations or designated terrorist organizations openly expressing hostility

towards the United States. This reality poses a greater threat of asymmetric attacks against USAF infrastructure, equipment, and personnel. Such hostilities could augment or incite international conflict. Both the Russian seizure of Crimea and the October 7th Hamas attacks on Israel illustrate the efficacy of well-organized unconventional forces.

Unmanned Aircraft (UA). With exponential improvements in technology, the manufacture and procurement of UA has become increasingly easy. The maturation of UA and convergence with other technologies, including artificial intelligence, big data, Internet of Things, and 5G telecommunications, will only exacerbate this threat. Small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) are inexpensive, widely available, and easy to operate, enabling a broad range of actors to exploit their capabilities. As technology advances, the means by which UA and sUAS threaten the US homeland will only increase.

Drug Trafficking and Narcoterrorism. Organized drug traffickers leverage their hidden routes, support networks, and illicit revenue to move drugs, people, weapons, and other commodities that may pose a threat to the homeland.

Military Role in Protecting Territorial Integrity of the United States

"The Armed Forces of the United States have played a long and well-established role in securing our borders against threats of invasion, against unlawful forays by foreign nationals into the United States, and against other transnational criminal activities that violate our laws and threaten the peace, harmony, and tranquility of the Nation."

–Derived from Executive Order 14167

Espionage. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) works with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency (DCSA) to execute counterintelligence missions. One such mission is protecting intellectual property (IP) related to the Defense Industrial Base (DIB).[5] Because DIB is predominantly composed of commercial companies, IP theft is a constant risk, and protecting IP from exploitation is paramount to maintaining US technological superiority.

Sabotage. Adversaries have historically conducted sabotage to disrupt military operations and critical infrastructure. More recently, Russian sabotage activity against European infrastructure, likely aimed at fracturing Allied cohesion, demonstrates that sabotage remains as relevant today as in past conflicts. AFOSI conducts criminal and counterintelligence investigations with interagency partners to provide early warning and actionable intelligence to defend the homeland.

[5] For additional information on counterintelligence, see JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence* and AFDP 2-0, *Intelligence.*

USAF HOMELAND DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

Within the United States, the National Strategy for Homeland Security envisions circumstances under which the DoW would be involved in defending national security. Specific instances where the USAF could play a key role in HD, based on USAF core functions, include:

AIR SUPERIORITY

Airpower's primary role in joint air operations is to achieve control of the air.[6] Historically, control of the air has been a prerequisite to success for modern operations. It facilitates freedom of action and freedom of movement and prevents enemy air and missile threats from effectively interfering with the operations of friendly air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, and special operations forces (SOF). Dominance of the air cannot be assumed, even in the homeland.

Offensive Counterair (OCA). OCA operations seek to dominate enemy airspace and, more importantly for HD, prevent the launch of threats, resulting in greater freedom from attack, increased freedom of action, and the ability to project power. OCA can provide support to HD by projecting power against an adversary to deter them from threatening the homeland. OCA is typically grouped with the joint function of fires and is often associated with countering an adversary's anti-access and area denial capabilities.

- **On-call Missions.** OCA operations are employed in a fast-moving, dynamically changing OE. A frequently used best practice is to task on-call aircraft. Armed appropriately, aircraft sit in alert status on the ground or loiter while airborne, awaiting the call to strike a target that could threaten the homeland.

Defensive Counterair (DCA). Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) integrates capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the US homeland and national

Golden Dome

The Golden Dome initiative represents a critical modernization of US homeland defense for the era of hypersonic and advanced missile threats. More than a single system, it encompasses a network of space-based sensors, interceptors, effectors, and command-and-control elements designed to detect and neutralize threats throughout their flight path. This layered defense strategy, leveraging both existing and rapidly developed technologies, aims to close critical gaps in current homeland defense capabilities and deter adversaries by increasing the cost and complexity of potential attacks. The Golden Dome underscores the growing importance of protecting the US homeland from 21st-century threats.

[6] For additional information on counterair, see Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-01, *Counterair Operations.*

interests, protect the joint force, and enable freedom of action by negating an adversary's ability to create adverse effects from their air and missile capabilities. As a critical component of IAMD, DCA operations defend friendly lines of communication, deny the enemy the freedom to conduct offensive air attacks, and provide a secure area from which all elements of the joint force can operate. DCA operations are not limited to protecting the joint force. They can be conducted in conjunction with or independently of OCA. They also ensure the homeland, the American people, and critical defense infrastructures are protected from attack. In some cases, DCA may be the only means to counter air and missile threats due to political constraints. DCA can also be on call, with aircraft sitting in alert status to intercept air and missile threats that deterrence failed to stop. Thus, DCA directly supports the joint function of protection.

Emerging Threat: Hypersonics

Our adversaries are undertaking hypersonic weapons testing and development from a variety of delivery platforms. These weapons operate at speeds greater than Mach 5. Their maneuverability makes them challenging to detect and defeat. Weapons operating at these speeds provide significant offensive capabilities that challenge an opponent's decision timelines.

Point Defense of Air Bases.[7] The emergence of asymmetric threats such as sUAS, loitering munitions, and hypersonic weapons presents complex problems for defending air bases both at home and abroad. The war in Ukraine and the plethora of attacks in the Middle East have illuminated the serious threat posed by sUAS to military forces and installations abroad. Similar systems could be used with deadly effect against military installations, personnel, and civilian infrastructure stateside. Technological advancements and ease of access to inexpensive sUAS only increase the threat of swarm tactics that can overwhelm defensive systems, dictating expansion of the base security zone. Commanders at all levels need to understand the threat posed by sUAS, available mitigation options, and the authorities afforded them to do so, regardless of the location.

GLOBAL PRECISION ATTACK

Global precision attack is the ability to hold a target at risk or strike rapidly and persistently, with a wide range of munitions, to create swift, decisive, and precise effects across multiple domains. The global precision attack function includes strategic attack, nuclear operations, and counterland operations in the form of air interdiction (AI) and close air support (CAS).

Strategic Attack. Strategic attack is an offensive action against a target, whether military,

[7] For additional information on point defense of air bases, see the Doctrine Advisory on *Point Defense of Air Bases*.

political, economic, or other, that is specifically selected to achieve strategic objectives.[8] These attacks seek to weaken the adversary's ability or will to engage in or escalate conflict and may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily achieving operational objectives as a precondition. Strategic attack, a crucial deterrent against threats to the homeland, is closely associated with the joint function of fires.

Nuclear Operations. Nuclear operations are activities conducted across the competition continuum, in cooperation with mission partners, that include nuclear deterrence, response to a crisis involving nuclear weapons, nuclear strike, assessment of the effects of a nuclear strike, and stability.[9] The threat of nuclear attack in response to enemy attacks is the bedrock of strategic nuclear deterrence while assuring the security of allies and partners against regional aggression. USAF nuclear capabilities form two legs of the US Nuclear Triad (nuclear bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM]). Like strategic attack, nuclear operations serve to deter adversaries from threatening the homeland. The employment of nuclear weapons is a form of strategic attack that supports the joint function of fires.

Air Interdiction. AI is defined as air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military potential before being brought to bear effectively against friendly forces or to otherwise achieve the JFC's objectives. AI can channel movements, constrain logistics systems, disrupt communications, force urgent movement, and destroy enemy fielded forces. AI can be used to project power and strike targets that could threaten the homeland.

Close Air Support. CAS is defined as action by aircraft against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces and requires detailed integration with the fire and movement of those forces. CAS supports firepower in offensive and defensive operations to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or delay enemy targets as an element of joint fire support. The speed, range, and maneuverability of airpower enable CAS assets to attack targets and support the ground scheme of maneuver. Both AI and CAS are USAF counterland operations that support the joint functions of movement & maneuver and fires. Should an adversary strike in the homeland, CAS would be a means to deliver fires against those forces, as well as to protect friendly forces and the civilian populace.

Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO). EMSO are military actions to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the electromagnetic operating environment.[10] These actions include and impact all joint force transmissions and receptions of electromagnetic energy. The goal of EMSO is to achieve electromagnetic spectrum superiority, contributing to gaining and maintaining information advantage and decision advantage to achieve the JFC's objectives. All aspects of EMSO can be used to support HD. Electromagnetic attack carries the risk of electromagnetic friendly fire and therefore requires robust coordination

[8] For additional information on strategic attack, see AFDP 3-02, *Strategic Attack.*
[9] For additional information on nuclear operations, see AFDP 3-72, *Nuclear Operations.*
[10] For additional information on EMSO, see AFDP 3-85, *Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.*

with other affected agencies.

Cyberspace Operations. The DoW seeks to preempt, defeat, or deter malicious cyber activity targeting US critical infrastructure that could cause a significant cyber incident, regardless of whether that incident would impact DoW's warfighting readiness or capability.[11] Its primary role in HD is to defend forward by leveraging its focus outward to stop threats before they reach their targets.[12] Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER) presents Airmen and USAF capabilities to US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), including the DC3 which provides forensic and analytical support. Additionally, AFOSI routinely uses its law enforcement and counterintelligence authorities unilaterally or in conjunction with USCYBERCOM and federal law enforcement agencies to protect the homeland from foreign intelligence threats operating in cyberspace. Protecting critical infrastructure is one of the most crucial aspects of HD, given the civilian and defense sectors' reliance on it.

RAPID GLOBAL MOBILITY

The USAF provides mobility forces with global reach to employ and sustain military forces that enable JFCs to conduct decisive operations across the competition continuum. The USAF fulfills the rapid global mobility function through air mobility, which is the rapid movement of resources to, from, or within a theater by air.[13]

Airlift. Airlift is the movement of personnel and materiel via mobility air forces (MAF) to support strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Airlift provides rapid, flexible, and secure transportation for the joint force. Personnel and cargo, categorized as requirements, are transported to meet the JFC's objectives and priorities. The ability to rapidly transport cargo across the homeland and globally supports the joint force and the American people in homeland operations.

Mobility Support. The USAF, either through conventional forces, the Civil Air Patrol (CAP), US Air Force Auxiliary (AFAUX), or the civil reserve air fleet, can rapidly transport personnel, equipment, and supplies across the globe-a crucial mission in homeland operations.

Air Refueling (AR). AR is the in-flight transfer of fuel from a tanker aircraft to a receiver aircraft in support of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. AR expands options available to commanders by increasing the range, payload, persistence, and flexibility of joint and coalition receiver aircraft. AR can support almost all homeland operations.

Aeromedical Evacuation (AE). AE is the movement of patients under medical supervision by air to and between medical treatment facilities. AE provides time-sensitive, in-flight care to patients or casualties to and between levels of care, predominantly using

[11] For additional information on CO, see AFDP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations.*
[12] See Summary, Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, 2023, for additional information.
[13] For additional information on rapid global mobility, see AFDP 3-36, *Air Mobility Operations*.

mobility aircraft or contracted aircraft (civilian air ambulances) with trained medical aircrew onboard.

Medical Support. The USAF Medical Service can be portioned into small, incremental packages of tailored medical capability that can be rapidly deployed to meet immediate and short-term requirements. Additional capabilities provide emergency response for chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incidents, environmental surveillance, and occupational health of personnel.

GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

ISR is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems, and analytic systems or capabilities to directly support current and future intelligence operations. ISR operations comprise the primary activities that feed data and information into the joint intelligence process supporting the JFC in homeland operations. ISR is critical for HD, providing essential data for threat detection and analysis.[14] Persistent ISR operations enable preemptive threat identification and rapid response against threats to the homeland.

Airborne ISR. One of the most visible representations of USAF intelligence operations is airborne ISR. Airborne ISR can provide a unique, taskable, and visible presence, delivering real-time, tailored information during mission execution. Airborne ISR provides the information the JFC needs to best defend the homeland. When lawful and authorized to do so, USAF intelligence forces may be tasked to conduct ISR within the homeland.

Targeting. Intelligence operations are a primary contributor to targeting and directly influence the joint targeting process. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets, and matching appropriate responses to them, while considering operational requirements and capabilities. Having appropriate targets nominated prior to the start of operations would allow the JFC to coordinate actions across combatant commands (CCMDs) and project power while conducting HD.

Operations in the Information Environment (OIE). OIE includes military actions conducted to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or attack adversaries' information environment while simultaneously protecting our own. For HD, OIE can be utilized against adversaries overseas to identify potential attacks by monitoring communications, assessing hostile propaganda, and analyzing online behavior, thus enabling preemptive actions to prevent these threats from materializing.

- **Intelligence Oversight.** In the United States, legal restraints, particularly the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA; 18 US Code § 1385), generally restrict the military from performing routine law enforcement duties in the homeland by enforcing domestic laws; this protects American citizens from unwarranted military involvement in civilian matters. Executive Order (EO) 12333 further restricts operations in the homeland by

[14] For additional information on ISR, see, JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, and AFDP 2-0, *Intelligence.*

mandating that intelligence activities respect the freedoms, privacy rights, and civil liberties of all US persons guaranteed by federal law. However, several exceptions exist, including for National Guard troops operating under state authority, responses to specific threats such as the release of nuclear material, and intelligence gathering related to drug interdiction or counterterrorism. The Intelligence Oversight Directorate within the DoW ensures OIE activities comply with the law and protect civil liberties, a critical balance emphasized in EO 12333. Finally, the Smith-Mundt Act governs the dissemination of information intended for foreign audiences, preventing the targeting of American citizens with government-sponsored propaganda.[15]

COMMAND AND CONTROL

C2 is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. In addition to the commander, the C2 function encompasses the act of exercising authority (the C2 process), the framework that guides it, and the systems that support it. C2 is the central joint function that integrates all the other functions and enables operations.

Tactical C2. Tactical C2 (TAC C2) encompasses elements that conduct battle management, such as Air Operations Centers (AOCs), Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), and Battle Control Centers (BCCs). Battle management is C2 in execution-the management of operational activities in accordance with the commands, direction, and guidance given by an appropriate authority. Battle management is required in HD but carries the added consideration of integration with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

OTHER ACTIVITIES AND CONSIDERATIONS

The USAF is uniquely suited to provide **quick response** in support of civilian agencies by providing forces and capabilities during an emergency, such as an attack or natural disaster. USAF assets and capabilities are also leveraged in **limited scope missions** where other agencies have primary responsibility for security, such as at national special security events like the Olympics or the State of the Union address.

[15] For additional information on OIE, see, JP 3-04, *Information in Joint Operations* and AFDP 3-13, *Information in Air Force Operations*.

Border Security. A secure national border is a key aspect of HD. The DoW and the USAF have supported civilian law enforcement agencies' border security activities since the early 1990s. Border security missions in which the USAF participates include Operational Support, Detection and Monitoring Support, Crisis Response Force Support, and Air Support. Operational Support involves motor transport operations, light maintenance, and heavy equipment operations. Detection and Monitoring Support has service members manning mobile surveillance cameras to observe and report activity to Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Crisis Response Force Support, at CBP's request, includes FP, medical, aviation, and engineering support. Air Support missions include tracking foot traffic signs, transporting CBP agents into remote areas, monitoring for illicit activity, casualty evacuation, and transporting equipment.

DoW Activities at the Southern Border

On Jan. 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 14167, declaring a national emergency at the Southern Border and clarifying the military's role in protecting the territorial integrity of the United States. The EO directs the DoW, through USNORTHCOM, to take all appropriate action to assist the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in obtaining full operational control of the Southern Border. Absent an exception, military personnel in Title 10 status may not directly participate in civilian law enforcement activities. USAF personnel have and will support enhanced detection and monitoring efforts as well as repairing and emplacing physical barriers. USAF personnel who have provided border security support as part of the Fiscal Year 2025 DHS request have performed duties to include detection and monitoring, logistics, and transportation support that enhances CBP's ability to impede or deny illegal crossings, maintain situational awareness, and apply the appropriate law enforcement response in support of its overall border security mission.

Insurrection Act of 1807. The Insurrection Act of 1807 is a US federal law that empowers the president to deploy military personnel nationally and to federalize the National Guard in specific circumstances, such as the suppression of civil disorder, insurrection, and armed rebellion against the federal government. The Insurrection Act provides a statutory exception to the Posse Comitatus Act that limits the president's deployment of the military to enforce either civil law or criminal law within the homeland.

Armed Forces Act of 2001. The Armed Forces Act of 2001 was passed post 9/11 to grant the president authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States.[16] This Act, along with the Insurrection Act of 1807, could give the president the authority to use military force in the

[16] See Public Law 107-40 107th Congress, "Authorization for Use of Military Force," for additional information.

homeland to protect America and its citizens from terrorist attacks such as those that might come from rogue or hijacked aircraft.

Countering WMD Operations. The USAF contributes to defending the Homeland from WMD attacks through its core functions and agile combat support. The USAF also contributes to domestic responses to WMD attacks or CBRN incidents as part of DSCA.[17]

AFOSI Interagency and Law Enforcement Partnerships. AFOSI strengthens HD through its membership in the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, National Counterintelligence Task Force, and National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (JTF). These forums enable integration of USAF equities into national counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts. AFOSI also maintains liaison officers with other federal agencies and close partnerships with state and local law enforcement, ensuring timely information exchange and unity of effort against threats to the homeland.

[17] See AFDP 3-40, *Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations*, for additional information.

CHAPTER 2: COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND AUTHORITIES

Though all combatant commanders (CCDRs) contribute to the defense of the homeland, US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), and NORAD directly provide HD in the territory of the United States.

USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM's mission is to "defend our homeland-deter, detect, deny, and defeat threats to the United States, conduct security cooperation activities with allies and partners, and support civil authorities." USNORTHCOM conducts HD within its assigned area of responsibility (AOR), which includes CONUS, Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Mexico, parts of the Caribbean, and surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. In addition, it conducts DSCA in CONUS, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. It may conduct the related mission of foreign disaster response in Mexico, Canada, and the Bahamas.[18]

USAF forces permanently located within the boundaries of the USNORTHCOM AOR are typically service retained. The multitude of commands operating within the US drives the need to carefully deconflict roles, responsibilities, and missions. Doing so requires consistent collaboration when planning operations, particularly when determining support relationships and organizational policies, roles, and responsibilities. For example, it is important to understand that CCMD FP policies take precedence over the FP policies of a DoW component deployed in that CCMD's AOR.

NORAD. NORAD is a separate command from USNORTHCOM, though they operate via an integrated staff for mutual support during planning and execution of assigned missions. Like USNORTHCOM, NORAD is charged with the critical mission of defending the United States and North America. NORAD is a binational command responsible for providing aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning of the North American continent, specifically the CONUS, Alaska, Canada, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. This also includes the air defense identification zones, the air approaches, maritime areas, internal navigable waterways, and the maritime approaches thereto. The missions of aerospace warning, control, and defense in North America are collectively known as Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE). USNORTHCOM's AOR also encompasses a defined portion of North America with a broad spectrum of missions assigned in the Unified Command Plan (UCP). Deconflicting the NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and USINDOPACOM missions within the overlapping geographic areas is accomplished by SecWar orders and the UCP.

Continental US NORAD Region (CONR)-First Air Force (1 AF). Operating from a single location, CONR-1 AF (Air Forces Northern [AFNORTH]) leads air defense operations across CONUS.

[18] See https://www.northcom.mil/HomelandDefense/ for additional information on USNORTHCOM and NORAD.

- **Continental US NORAD Region.** As the CONUS geographical component of NORAD, CONR provides air defense through airspace surveillance and control, and directs all air sovereignty activities in CONUS, the US Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. The CONR Commander serves as the combined forces air component commander (CFACC), Area Air Defense Commander (AADC), and Airspace Control Authority (ACA) in partnership with the FAA.


- **First Air Force.** 1 AF receives its authorities from Air Combat Command (ACC) and presents air, cyber, and space forces supporting USNORTHCOM and USSPACECOM. It is responsible for ensuring air sovereignty and air defense of CONUS. It is also the Air Component to AFSPACE. 1 AF facilitates the planning and execution of air, cyber, and space operations. The 1 AF Commander exercises Service authorities and performs the duties of the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR).[19]

- **Air Forces Northern.** AFNORTH reports to, receives its authorities from, and is the Air Force Service component to USNORTHCOM. AFNORTH is the senior agency in the US Theater Air Control System. Specifically, AFNORTH is responsible for the land areas of the continental United States, US Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and surrounding seas out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It focuses on HD, DSCA, and Theater Security Cooperation. The AFNORTH commander is dual-hatted as the CONR Commander and serves as JFACC for US-only air operations within CONUS, ACA, AADC, Space Coordinating Authority (SCA), and Collections Operations Manager (COM), as well as overseeing Personnel Recovery (PR) and Search and Rescue (SAR).

Alaska Command (ALCOM). ALCOM is a subordinate unified command assigned to USNORTHCOM. The majority of forces in the Alaska Theater of Operations (AKTO) are assigned to USINDOPACOM, necessitating close working relationships between USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM. The Commander, ALCOM, is assigned responsibility for HD within the AKTO by Commander, USNORTHCOM (CDRUSNORTHCOM). ALCOM normally requires staff augmentation for HD operations.

Canadian NORAD Region (CANR). CANR provides aerospace surveillance, identification, control, and warning for the defense of Canada and North America. Headquartered at 1 Canadian Air Division, the CANR commander exercises OPCON of all air defense forces within CANR.

[19] See https://www.1af.acc.af.mil/About-Us/FactSheets/ for additional information on 1AF (AFNORTH).



USNORTHCOM Homeland Defense COMREL (JP 3-27, *Joint Homeland Defense*)

USINDOPACOM. USINDOPACOM's AOR includes Hawaii, the US territories of Guam and American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and several smaller nations in free association with the US. These include the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. The USAF component to USINDOPACOM is Pacific Air Forces (PACAF).

Allies and Partners. The US military must be prepared to achieve its foremost duty of defending the homeland alone. It is important to note, however, that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies have historically honored collective defense and invoked Article 5. Such was the case following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when NATO AWACS patrolled US airspace. Increased burden-sharing with Allies to address all threats strengthens our collective deterrence against attacks on all homelands protected by the NATO alliance. For example, Allies can augment early warning with data sharing between their radar systems, and supply chain redundancy can mitigate a degraded domestic DIB.

Beyond the organizations above, a few standing organizations are in place to accomplish homeland operations. Since many homeland operations are in response to emergency or crisis-driven events, organizations such as AFNORTH and 601 AOC are pre-established to cover response activities. Commanders should consider establishing additional organizations for the same purpose as conditions and threats warrant. Below are some other standing USAF organizations that aid in homeland operations:

- **Civil Air Patrol/United States Air Force Auxiliary.** CAP is a congressionally chartered, federally funded, 501(c)3 nonprofit corporation that also serves as the civilian auxiliary of the USAF. The Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) can employ the CAP in its capacity as an USAF auxiliary, in lieu of or to supplement USAF resources, to fulfill USAF noncombat programs and missions. Title 10 USC § 9492 identifies CAP as the civilian auxiliary of the USAF when its services are used by any department or agency in any branch of the federal government, including the USAF. The AFAUX is deemed an instrumentality of the United States while carrying out missions assigned by the SECAF and is required to comply with the PCA. The AFAUX is not authorized to perform USAF assigned missions outside of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands unless specifically authorized by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Operations (AF/A3), on behalf of the SECAF, or if certain criteria are met.

> CAP/AFAUX assets, much like the Air National Guard (ANG), can be classified into two categories within the law and can only be in one status at a time. The first category is Title 10, in which AFAUX forces are deemed an instrumentality of the United States when carrying out non-combat missions assigned by the Secretary of the Air Force. The second category is Title 36, in which these same individuals and equipment operate in the CAP Corporate category as a federally sanctioned non-profit corporation.
>
> **–Derived from Titles 10 and 36, USC**

- **Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs).** CDRUSNORTHCOM delegates operational SAR Coordinator authority for day-to-day SAR of the Langley Search and Rescue Region (SRR) (contiguous with CONUS) to Commander, AFNORTH, who executes via the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC). For the Elmendorf SRR (contiguous with Alaska), SAR Coordinator authority is delegated to Commander Alaska, ALCOM, who executes via the Alaska Rescue Coordination Center (AKRCC). These RCCs coordinate federal support to inland SAR requirements within CONUS and Alaska, respectively, in accordance with the National SAR Plan (NSP). Duties include searching for missing/overdue aircraft, managing beacon alerts, and assisting states with their SAR requirements. They also validate all requests and broker federal assistance to save lives and prevent undue suffering. Under the NSP, the US Coast Guard (USCG) provides these services to Hawaii and US territories in the INDOPACOM AOR and the Caribbean.

HOMELAND AUTHORITIES RELATED TO AIRPOWER

Authoritative duties, the legal framework, and complexities that are specific to the homeland that the air component commander should consider include the following:

Airspace Control Authority. Unlike other AORs, where the air component commander is normally delegated ACA by the JFC, the term airspace coordination authority is used in homeland operations. The airspace coordination authority is responsible for coordinating and deconflicting air traffic. The FAA almost always retains this responsibility. All airspace planning is coordinated with and approved by the FAA. The FAA provides liaisons to USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM to collaborate and minimize conflicts during mission execution. If the FAA cannot fulfill these responsibilities, the air component commander should be prepared to assume their role. The president may transfer any function of the FAA through EO to the DoW in a time of war.

Area Air Defense Commander (AADC). The AADC is responsible for DCA operations, including the integrated air defense system for the operational area. DCA and OCA operations constitute the counterair mission, designed to attain and maintain the degree of control of the air desired by the JFC. The AADC develops, integrates, and distributes a JFC-approved joint area air defense plan in coordination with the component commanders.

Incident Awareness and Assessment. Various organizations, such as the FBI, National Counterterrorism Center, DHS, and state and local law enforcement, can provide much of the required information. When authorized by the SecWar to conduct incident awareness and assessment (IAA), Services should coordinate with these agencies before collecting data independently.

Quick Response through Standing Command Elements



When the alert fighters scrambled during the response to 9/11, the fact they were on alert and tied to a 24/7 chain of command allowed their response to be nearly instantaneous.

This rapid response was again demonstrated by Air Forces Northern through their staff and standing AOC in 2005 during the preparations for and the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Similarly, alert air forces assigned to the Alaskan NORAD Region are on 24/7 tasking from the combined AOC-Alaska to protect critical oil resources and the national missile defense sites in the remote Alaskan homeland.

These standing organizations provide the operational C2 capability necessary for homeland operations in CONUS, Alaska, and Asia-Pacific territories.

OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

When conducting HD or DSCA under CCDR authority within the homeland, policy, doctrine, and law apply the same as they do for operations in any other AOR regarding command relationships, authorities, and responsibilities. Additionally, the ANG may conduct state-level operations in the homeland under the executive authority of a governor, with commensurate state command authorities.[20]

With several CCMDs, NORAD, the Department of the Air Force, and each state's ANG all operating within the homeland, it is important to understand command relationships for homeland operations. Unity of command of USAF forces, whether in Title 10 or Title 32, USC, or State Active Duty (SAD) status in homeland operations, is maintained through the presentation of forces to the appropriate JFC at the CCMD, JTF, NORAD, incident command system, or state level. For purposes of unity of command and effort, forces conducting DSCA or HD in the homeland are normally assigned or attached, with specification of operational control (OPCON), to the commander of USNORTHCOM, USINDOPACOM, or, for specified missions, NORAD. When personnel are attached to a USAF Service component for homeland operations, detailed administrative control (ADCON) authorities to be exercised by the gaining commander should be specified in appropriate orders. The ADCON requirements for Air Reserve Component forces are complex and require legal review.

COMMAND ARRANGEMENT AGREEMENTS

Command arrangement agreements (CAAs) establish procedures and delineate responsibilities between two or more CCDRs for mutual support, interface, and cooperation. The CAA between CDRUSNORTHCOM and Commander, USINDOPACOM (CDRUSINDOPACOM) establishes the methodology for the transfer of forces between the two CCMDs in support of HD missions. Proper execution of CAAs is paramount to provide unity of effort in support of civil authorities across various jurisdictions. To ensure CAAs are formed and executed properly, they are established according to the following principles:

- The use of attached forces should be limited to specific missions or operations.
- Force roles, functions, and uses to accomplish missions or operations should be specified.
- Conditions of attachment should be established.

[20] ANG operations under gubernatorial control are often labeled Domestic Operations or DOMOPS. For purposes of this document, homeland operations include DOMOPS.

- The command authority specified in the CAA should define the nature, extent, and degree of control a CCDR and subordinate commanders have over forces in Title 32 status regarding operational aspects of directing forces and planning missions or operations.
- Administrative aspects of "command" are reserved for the nation, state, or Services.
- Agreements should be negotiated at senior levels of command and agreed to by appropriate executive agents, e.g., the SecWar or state governors.
- Agreements should be promulgated using or referring to relevant memoranda of agreement, doctrine, or other appropriate documents.

COMMAND OF USAF FORCES IN DIFFERENT LEGAL STATUSES

Airmen accomplish HD and provide support to civil authorities under multiple laws and authorities, which may enable or restrict Airmen's actions. The status of Airmen is commonly defined by the legal authority that authorizes them to perform their assigned missions. These statuses are commonly grouped as:

- **Title 10, USC** Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guardsmen in federal active-duty status operate in Title 10 status. In addition, CAP is a volunteer civilian AFAUX while operating under Title 10 status. Forces operating under Title 10 are under the authority of the President as Commander in Chief.
- **Title 32, USC** Air National Guardsmen may also be requested to accomplish federal activities, including DSCA and HD, while remaining under the control of the governor. This circumstance is referred to as Title 32 status. They are under the authority of the state governor, they are funded by the federal government.
- **State Active Duty.** When the governor of a state mobilizes the National Guard, state Air National Guardsmen are typically in SAD status. The governor exercises command over forces in SAD status through the state's Adjutant General (TAG). Funding is provided by the state. SAD forces conduct state missions in accordance with state needs and within the guidelines of state laws and statutes.

ANG forces can be classified into three categories within the law. Except for a dual-status command scenario discussed below, forces can be in only one status at a time, which is critical to preventing legal violations and maintaining clear lines of authority. The coordinating authority allows the state governor to direct ANG forces in accordance with a Title 10 commander's orders. In such an arrangement, Guard forces remain under the authority of the governor, but coordination between the ANG commander and Title 10 commander (i.e., regular USAF officer) is required to achieve unity of effort. Coordination challenges can be overcome using CAAs.

Special considerations exist in determining command relationships when dealing with the ANG. **When federalized in Title 10 status for homeland operations**, **the COMAFFOR exercises OPCON of applicable ANG units and members.** ADCON for discipline, personnel support, and administration for these federalized units or ANG forces is routinely shared by the gaining command and the ANG Readiness Center. However, when fully mobilized, ADCON is transferred to the gaining command. While training for federal missions (Title 32 status), the commander of the gaining unit may exercise training and readiness oversight of ANG personnel, but not command. Command authority for ANG members in Title 32 status lies with the governor of their state, normally exercised through TAG, regardless of their location within the United States. However, it remains subject to any coordinating authority or state-to-state agreements, such as emergency management assistance compacts (EMAC). If no pre-negotiated agreement exists, responsibilities should be coordinated between applicable commanders. **ANG members operating outside the United States are required to be in Title 10 status.**

DUAL-STATUS COMMANDERS

A unique command relationship is usually established when federal and state forces operate together. The following information describes circumstances in which regular USAF and National Guard officers may be appointed to command both federal and state forces pursuant to a CAA promulgated as a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between a governor and the SecWar (via delegated authority from the President of the United States). The intent of dual-status command is to improve unity of effort for operations focused on a specific, temporary mission in which forces are in different legal statuses, and when having a single commander directing operations is advantageous.

- **National Guard Dual-Status Commander.** Title 32 USC § 325 authorizes a federally recognized National Guard officer to exercise command on behalf of, and receive separate orders from, both a federal Title 10 and state chain of command simultaneously. If the President authorizes such service in both duty statuses, and the governor of the National Guard state or territory (or the Commanding General of the District of Columbia National Guard) consents to such service in both duty statuses, the National Guard officer is not relieved from duty in the National Guard.

- **Regular USAF Dual-Status Commander.** Title 32 USC § 315 authorizes a commissioned regular USAF officer to exercise command on behalf of, and receive separate orders from, both a federal Title 10 and state chain of command simultaneously. The SECAF details the regular USAF officer to duty with a state National Guard unit. With the President's permission, the officer may accept a commission in the National Guard without prejudicing his or her rank and without vacating the regular commission.

Upon approval of dual-status, the officer may be appointed to command both state and federal forces through distinct, separate chains of command. Before a dual-status command can be established, an MOA must be signed by the governor and the President

or their respective designees. The MOA includes command arrangements as agreed to by the parties and is reviewed by judge advocates from both chains of command to ensure the concerns of both are addressed.

Forces assigned or attached to the dual-status commander are not in dual-status. Federal forces can only be placed under the command of Title 10 authorities (e.g., COMAFFOR). In contrast, while operating in Title 32 or SAD status, state forces can be placed under the command of state authorities only. **Although the dual-status commander is empowered to exercise command on behalf of, and may receive orders from, two separate chains of command, those chains of command must recognize and respect the dual-status commander's duty to exercise all authority in a mutually exclusive manner.** A dual-status commander gives orders on behalf of, or relays orders from, the federal chain of command to federal military forces, and gives orders on behalf of, or relays orders from, the state chain of command to state military forces. Federal orders are never given or relayed to state military forces, or state orders to federal military forces. In addition, the commander maintains separate federal and state staff to ensure the two chains of command remain separate and distinct.

Because the dual-status commander must comply with all applicable state and federal laws appropriate to the assigned mission while executing his or her duties, operation plans (OPLANs), execute orders (EXORDs), and CAAs should address procedures and processes for resolving potential conflicts in policy or process. If the dual-status commander perceives that orders provided by the state or federal chains of command may violate state or federal law or create a potential conflict of interest in policy or process, the commander should refrain from executing such orders and advise the state and federal chains of command and seek resolution.

HOMELAND COMMAND RELATIONSHIP COMPLEXITY

The C2 of HD air operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR is complex. Where the NORAD OA and the USNORTHCOM AOR overlap, the NORAD Commander (CDRNORAD) normally retains authority for aerospace control and aerospace warning missions. CDRNORAD exercises OPCON of aerospace forces through the region commanders; the region commanders are designated as the CFACC, AADC, and the ACA within their respective regions. The Commander, CONR, is appointed CFACC for CONUS, the US Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. The Commander, AFNORTH, is designated the JFACC for US-only air operations within CONUS. Additionally, the Commander, AFNORTH, is dual-hatted as the Commander, CONR. The Commander, ALCOM, is the designated JFC for the AKTO. As a USNORTHCOM subordinate unified commander and JFC, the Commander, ALCOM, serves as, or designates, a JFACC, as required, for US-only air operations. Close coordination between the JFACC(s) and NORAD is essential for synchronization of operations. The Commander, ALCOM, is dual-hatted as the Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command Region (ANR) Commander.

MISSION COMMAND IN HOMELAND DEFENSE

Commanders accustomed to the Mission Command framework of Centralized Command-Distributed Control-Decentralized Execution (CC-DC-DE) in other AORs could face unique challenges when operating in an HD capacity. Authorities distributed across federal, state, local, and private industry levels require commanders to work closely with non-DoW agencies over which the DoW has no authority and to remain aware of state and federal legal restraints unique to operations within the United States. The private sector plays a crucial role in HD, owning and protecting a large majority (85%) of the nation's critical infrastructure. This includes energy grids, transportation networks, water, and communication systems. The private sector collaborates with other agencies such as DHS and law enforcement to share information and resources, ensuring a robust defense against threats. The air component commander and their staff would need to integrate as seamlessly as possible into these pre-existing relationships should HD operations commence, and the DoW take the lead in protecting the nation.

CHAPTER 3: HOMELAND COMMAND AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES

Operational C2 is conducted by a commander through the four major activities of the C2 process: planning, preparing, executing, and assessing. These activities are both progressive and continuous. However, conducting these C2 activities in the homeland presents some unique challenges. Commanders will need to anticipate the necessity of interagency coordination and adherence to domestic policies or legal constraints. Additionally, when planning homeland operations, commanders must consider the prioritization dilemma: whether to devote limited resources to power projection or to dedicate the few standing organizations to conduct HD.

PLANNING

Planning is the broad term to describe how Airmen address and solve problems. It is generally the first C2 activity conducted by a commander and their staff. The outputs of planning provide foundational guidance for the remainder of the C2 process. Design and planning are discussed separately, but they are inextricably linked. Design is part of planning, and planning informs design.[21]

C2 of HD is complex and requires careful consideration in Alaska. USAF forces there are typically assigned to USINDOPACOM, but the defense of Alaska is a USNORTHCOM and NORAD responsibility. ALCOM is the sub-unified command responsible for the AKTO. Similarly, while Hawaii, Guam, and other US territories and commonwealths in the Pacific are a part of the homeland, the commander of USINDOPACOM is responsible for those locations, with some exceptions. One such exception is that CDRUSNORTHCOM provides ICBM defense of Hawaii while CDRUSINDOPACOM provides all other missile defenses of Hawaii.

It is paramount that commanders and their staffs at all levels understand their superior commanders' intent and convey it clearly to subordinate commanders. HD operations are particularly vulnerable should combat erupt elsewhere around the globe, as any operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR could effectively become a second front in that conflict. This creates a prioritization dilemma, one which is typically associated with conflict against a peer or near-peer adversary. HD operations could drive decisions that would impact other AORs, given the limited resources within the DoW and the USAF. Commanders and planners will need to understand the supporting/supported relationships to avoid confusion should an OPLAN or an integrated plan set (IPS) be implemented.

Department of the Air Force Instruction (DAFI) 10-208, *Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program*, provides guidance for developing programs to ensure continuity of essential USAF operations during an impending or actual national emergency. DoW and USAF

[21] For additional information on planning and design, see JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, JP 3-30, *Joint Air Operations*, AFDP 5-0, Planning, and Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-3.AOC, *Combat Fundamentals Air Operations Center*.

guidance require Headquarters Air Force, major commands, direct reporting units, and field operating agencies to possess a comprehensive and effective COOP program. All USAF organizations are required to develop plans to ensure the continuity of their essential functions, including alerting and notifying personnel, movement of key personnel, and operational capability. To meet requirements and ensure mission continuity, COOP plans should integrate FP, information assurance, counterterrorism, antiterrorism, mission assurance, critical infrastructure protection, and other efforts, as required. Furthermore, COOP plans integrate with and are required to support the overarching and enduring constitutional government, the continuity of the presidency, resilient C2 communication channels, and continuity of government programs. Current guidelines require an all-hazards approach to continuity planning that covers any contingency, from natural or manmade disasters to a general nuclear war. Accordingly, the USAF maintains COOP plans and provides significant input into the threat assessment process.

Though relatively rare, some ANG members or USAF Reservists work as civilians in critical positions for other governmental agencies. Commanders should know who these individuals are and which role's (military or civilian) contributions are most valuable to HD. Such situations should be addressed through interagency agreements or memoranda of understanding (MOUs).[22]

Guard/Reserve Airmen in civilian governmental positions

Occasionally Air Guardsmen or Air Force Reservists have civilian jobs in other federal, state, or local governments. Examples of such situations include a full-time White House employee who was also a guardsman in the National Guard when Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf coast in 2005. Although his National Guard unit was activated and he was put on military orders for Hurricane Katrina response, he was retained by the White House to continue work there. Additionally, a government employee was not released to his National Guard unit when a typhoon struck Guam in 2023, since his role as a civilian employee was deemed more beneficial to the situation.

PREPARING

Preparing represents the overlapping activities between planning and execution used to share information, gain consensus, explain tasks, and optimize operations. Effective preparation includes rehearsals or exercises to ensure transition activities are understood, inspections and checks to verify readiness, and timely back-briefs to address lessons learned prior to execution.

[22] Refer to DoDI 4000.19, *Support Agreements*, for additional guidance.

Commanders should establish and maintain a comprehensive and effective emergency management program. Preparation of standing orders improves readiness and enables faster responses. These can include prepare-to-deploy orders, establishment of direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) relationships or command relationships, and other responsibilities, all before an event occurs. They can also include force modules with unit type codes identified, sourced, and ready for deployment within a certain notification window. DIRLAUTH allows subordinate echelons to establish relationships within the interagency community, crossflow information, and refine plans and potential support requests.

Similarly, concepts of operation help the air component prepare to act by documenting processes, policies, and plans well before an event takes place. ACC is the lead agent for the USAF's homeland security concepts of operation. The previously discussed standing C2 elements enable the air component to lean forward. Once identified, the air component commander and staff can become experts on the plans and policies affecting homeland operations, which differ substantially from traditional operations.

Local Preparations. Normal day-to-day preparation activities include creating MOAs/MOUs between military installation commanders and local municipal leaders for support. Military and civilian units should test the functionality of these agreements through local response exercises. Regular communication serves to maintain relationships between the base and the local community and can significantly increase effectiveness during an actual disaster response.

To ensure solid passive defense measures and allow a coordinated approach to installation and community protection, upgraded emergency preparedness planning and training are coupled with other efforts at the installation level, including counterterrorism, antiterrorism, critical infrastructure protection, mission assurance, and information assurance for USAF infrastructure and personnel. Combining these protection measures with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and COOP planning gives local base offices the tools to respond to an event quickly, efficiently, and adequately.[23] To sustain these efforts, networks of DoW installations should be integrated into the local community's preparation and response scheme with rapid detection, response, and incident management capabilities.

An installation may be identified as a support location. USAF commanders may be called upon to provide support listed below:

- **Incident Support Base.** An extension of the national distribution system includes distribution centers and sites positioned to enable resource management and provisioning capability. When a DoW installation is selected as an incident support base, its purpose is to support the lead federal agency and supporting personnel and equipment. This ability is vital to ensure that resources are in or near the disaster

[23] For additional information on NIMS and the National Response Framework, see DAFI 10-2501, Emergency Management Program,.

impact area for immediate distribution upon direction from appropriate state and federal officials. These resources remain national assets until directed to distribution points when the state takes control.

- **Federal Team Staging Facility.** When the full capabilities of an incident support base are not required, the lead federal agency may select an installation or facility as a Federal Team Staging Facility for use by a supporting agency to mass responding forces.

- **Base Support Installation (BSI).** A BSI is normally a DoW installation with an airfield and suitable support facilities, the domestic equivalent of a main operating base in other operational areas. It may be the aerial port of debarkation and may become the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) facility for the joint forces. CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSINDOPACOM designates the BSI after receiving concurrence of the owning military department Secretary. Not all states have a DoW facility capable of handling military or heavy commercial aircraft. Units should be prepared to conduct JRSOI from a civilian aerial port of debarkation and conduct further movement to a BSI or incident area.

- **Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.** JRSOI is the essential process that assembles forces (personnel, equipment, and materiel) arriving in theater into forces capable of meeting the CCDR's operational requirement. During JRSOI, responsibilities are delineated, communications frequencies are deconflicted, and incoming personnel are fed and housed before departure to forward areas. The reception process varies by mission but always provides accountability for personnel and equipment. Various briefings, such as local area orientation, safety, communications, and logistics support, may be provided. Personnel should also be briefed on the chain of command, rules of engagement/rules for the use of force (ROE/RUF), and any legal restrictions to operations.

EXECUTING

Execution is putting a plan into action while using situational understanding to assess progress and adjust operations as the situation changes. **C2 in execution focuses on activities and decisions to seize and retain the initiative, build and maintain momentum, and exploit success.**

AIR OPERATIONS IN HOMELAND DEFENSE

NORAD is assigned the mission of aerospace control, including aerospace defense, of the airspace of the United States and Canada. NORAD routinely maintains forces on alert for homeland air defense, cruise missile defense, and aerospace control alert missions against long-range incursions. USNORTHCOM is generally responsible for all other air operations supporting land and maritime HD outside the scope of the NORAD Agreement.

NORAD is prepared to intercept and defend against potential air threats. Early detection and successful interception of such threats require close cooperation and coordination with interagency partners, including the FAA and DHS.

Aerospace defense operations within the homeland pose unique concerns for CDRNORAD/CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSINDOPACOM.

- **Size.** HD responsibilities include vast areas of airspace, land masses, and water. North America is a huge land mass with multiple avenues of approach that an adversary could exploit.
- **Control of Airspace.** US airspace is under the control of the FAA. Civilian control of airspace, as well as other security functions vital to the homeland, requires coordination among several United States Government (USG) departments and agencies.
- **Competition Continuum.** USAF forces must be prepared to operate throughout the spectrum of conflict, from cooperation to total war. Airmen must be intentional and disciplined to ensure operations conducted during competition remain below the threshold of armed conflict and violence.
- **Duration.** Defense of the homeland is an enduring mission that operates throughout the spectrum of conflict.
- **ROE.** The airspace over the homeland is congested, with up to 5,000 aircraft in the skies over CONUS at any given time. Operation NOBLE EAGLE operates with strict ROE in this very dense airspace. The ROE for operating in US airspace often drives a constrained engagement environment.

SecWar has designated CDRNORAD as the supported commander for aerospace warning and aerospace control aspects of HD within the NORAD OA.

- **Aerospace Warning.** Aerospace warning consists of surveillance, detection, validation, and warning of an attack against North America, whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles. Aerospace control consists of air sovereignty and air defense operations within United States and Canadian airspace.
- **OA.** The OA includes the portions of the homeland that fall within the USNORTHCOM AOR, specifically CONUS, Alaska, the US Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. CDRUSINDOPACOM is the designated CCDR for HD missions within the USINDOPACOM AOR. CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported CCDR for HD missions within the USNORTHCOM AOR that are not under the authority of CDRNORAD.

The missions of NORAD and USNORTHCOM are complementary. NORAD conducts aerospace defense missions and operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR and provides warning of all airborne threats, to include aircraft and missile attack, as well as maritime threats. USNORTHCOM conducts US-only air, land, and maritime defense.

- **ONE.** ONE is the SecWar-approved EXORD that authorizes CDRNORAD to conduct air defense of the United States and Canada in the NORAD OA and for CDRUSINDOPACOM and, when necessary, CDRUSNORTHCOM to conduct HD of the United States in the USINDOPACOM and USNORTHCOM AORs. [24]

- **Engagement Authority.** The authority and decision to engage within the homeland is made at the highest levels of command. NORAD and USINDOPACOM constantly refine their procedures and coordinate with appropriate agencies including DHS, Public Safety Canada, Emergency Preparedness Canada, the FAA, Transport Canada, NAV CANADA (an air traffic control agency), civilian law enforcement organizations, and other government departments and agencies within the United States and Canada.[25]

INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

IAMD is the amalgamation of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the homeland and US national interests, protect the joint force, and enable freedom of action by negating the adversary's ability to create adverse effects from their air and missile capabilities. Due to policy differences, legal agreements, and physical characteristics of threats, homeland air and missile defense are not integrated in the same manner as air and missile defense in other AORs. NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and USINDOPACOM share the missions of homeland air defense and missile defense, and C2 of forces are integrated at the CCDR level. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center coordinates air and missile defense fires. CDRNORAD provides aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for North America, while CDRUSNORTHCOM provides ballistic missile defense (BMD) and all other forms of HD within the AOR. CDRUSINDOPACOM is responsible for HD within the USINDOPACOM AOR, including air and missile defense. CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for ICBM defense of Hawaii, and CDRUSINDOPACOM is responsible for all other missile defense of Hawaii.

Air Defense. NORAD provides aerospace control for North America, including surveillance and control of Canadian and United States airspace, and ensures air sovereignty and air defense. NORAD protects the United States and Canadian homelands against airborne threats.[26]

- **Aircraft.** To accomplish the aerospace control mission, NORAD uses a network of satellites, ground-based radar, airborne radar, and fighters to detect, intercept, and, if necessary, engage any air threat to Canada and the United States.

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[24] See NORAD Concept Plan 3310, *Aerospace Warning, Aerospace Control and Maritime Warning, and ONE EXORD*, for additional information.
[25] For additional information on the NORAD missions, organization, and structure, see JP3-27, *Homeland Defense, Appendix B, "North American Aerospace Defense Command, Missions, Organization, and Structure*."
[26] For additional information on air and missile defense, see to JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*.

- **Cruise Missiles.** Cruise missiles, including hypersonic weapons, whether launched from the air, ground, or sea, are airborne threats capable of delivering a full range of warheads. Because they pose an air threat, cruise missiles are part of NORAD's air defense role. Cruise missiles pose significant detection challenges due to their standoff range, very small radar cross-section, and flight profiles.

- **Other Threats.** UA are a growing threat to the United States and Canadian homelands. Larger UA threats are prosecuted in the same manner as other military or civilian-based air threats. Smaller UA threats are addressed through cooperation efforts with federal, state, and local agencies. A terrorist attack using an aircraft as a weapon continues to be a threat to the homeland. In a potential future conflict, agents of US adversaries could use sUAS to attack the homeland from within.

National Capital Region (NCR). Defense of the NCR is a special case of homeland air defense. DoW employs an integrated air defense system (sensors, weapons, visual warning system, C2 systems, and personnel) as part of the around-the-clock, multilayered, military and interagency effort to protect the NCR.

- **NCR-Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).** The NCR-IADS augments ONE fighter defenses by providing in-place assets that are in a quick reaction posture to protect the seat of the USG and other key locations in the NCR from air attacks.

- **Transportation Security Administration (TSA).** The TSA and other elements of DHS, as well as the Department of Justice and Department of Transportation (DOT), conduct significant aviation security efforts throughout the United States and in the NCR. Principal among the efforts designed to improve interagency partner coordination is the National Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC), sponsored by the TSA. The NCRCC enhances interagency partner coordination by providing a venue for representatives of the many organizations with a stake in the defense of the NCR to stand watch together. Through the NCRCC, various agencies gain improved situational awareness of their defense partners' actions. The NCRCC is a coordination center, and there is no command or control of forces. NCRCC participants include the FBI, the TSA, FAA, US Capitol Police, US Secret Service, CBP, Office of Air and Marine Operations, USCG, JTF-NCR, and NORAD. Representatives from other state and local law enforcement agencies and the NORAD Joint Air Defense Operations Center also participate at the NCRCC when threats or circumstances warrant.[27]

BMD. BMD capabilities are designed to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat adversary ballistic missile and hypersonic glide vehicle threats to protect the US domestic population and critical infrastructure. US homeland BMD includes not only the means for active and passive defenses but the capability to strike in retaliation or to preempt the launch of a missile threat. For HD, there are BMD capabilities against limited attacks by rogue states using ICBMs, as well as against threats from short-range, medium-range, and

[27] For additional information on air operations, see JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*, JP 3-30, *Joint Air Operations*, and JP 3-52, *Joint Airspace Control*.

intermediate-range ballistic missiles. ICBM threats are deterred by US capabilities that include global strike. BMD is a key element of HD. However, BMD activities do not include defense against cruise missiles or tactical air-to-surface missiles.[28]

- **BMD System.** The BMD system includes sensors (air, land, sea, and space), anti-ballistic missiles (interceptors), communications, and C2 for launch warnings and assessment for all categories of ballistic missile launches, whether targeted against the homeland or other AORs. The ground-based midcourse defense element of the BMD system provides USNORTHCOM the capability to engage and destroy limited intermediate-range and ICBM threats in space to protect the United States. The ground-based midcourse defense system is composed of ground-based interceptors, associated sensors, and fire control systems. The ground-based interceptor is a multi-stage, solid-fuel booster with an exoatmospheric kill vehicle. Fire control systems consist of redundant fire control nodes, interceptor launch facilities, and a communications network.

- **BMD Roles and Responsibilities.** CCDRs plan and execute BMD against ballistic missile threats that target their AORs, to include threats that cross AOR boundaries. This is supported by shared situational awareness, integrated battle management, adaptive planning, and accurate and responsive battle damage assessment provided by United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), which is assigned to execute transregional missile defense. USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM have specified HD responsibilities and authority to deter ballistic missile attacks on the United States, its territories, and bases within their respective AORs, as well as other areas as directed by the President or SecWar. In coordination with USSPACECOM and other CCMDs, they synchronize operations to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat ballistic missile attacks on the homeland. Should deterrence fail, or as directed by the President or SecWar, they employ BMD forces to protect the United States against ballistic missile attacks. CDRUSNORTHCOM, in coordination with CDRUSINDOPACOM, has responsibilities within the USINDOPACOM AOR to ensure homeland BMD. Employing the ground-based midcourse defense system requires centralized planning and direction by CDRUSNORTHCOM and centralized execution due to the need for positive direction from the weapons release authority. Weapons release authority is the authority delegated from the President to use ground-based interceptors against ICBM threats. CDRUSINDOPACOM is the supported commander for homeland BMD in the Indo-Pacific AOR that does not include ground-based midcourse defense.

AVIATION OPERATIONAL THREAT RESPONSE (AOTR) PROCESS

An AOTR process ensures a comprehensive and coordinated USG response to air threats against the United States or its interests. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-47/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 16, Aviation Security

[28] For additional information on missile defense, see JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats.*

Policy, prescribes the AOTR Plan as part of the overall national aviation policy. Simply stated, the AOTR primarily counters asymmetric threats involving civilian aviation but includes considerations for interagency coordination to defend against foreign military air and missile attacks. Several DoW HD responsibilities fall under the AOTR protocols. DoW response capabilities remain an integral part of the overall national response in support of HD and homeland security complementary objectives and missions.

AOTR comprises immediate actions, generally short in duration, to counter the full range of airborne and ground-based aviation security threats. These threats include attacks using civilian aviation (i.e., commercial/general aviation) manned aircraft and UA as weapons against ground-based or airborne targets, attacks against aircraft, including hijacking and air piracy, attacks using standoff weapons, including man-portable air defense systems, attacks involving civilian aircraft carrying WMD, and attacks against aviation transportation system infrastructure. AOTR execution begins when intelligence or other information indicates that an incident is imminent or in progress and that an immediate response is necessary, and concludes when the threat has been defeated or otherwise resolved.

Upon AOTR execution, and time permitting, DoW initiates secure communications with appropriate departments and agencies to facilitate the timely flow of information. This allows for appropriate consultation related to the initial DoW airborne operational response, as well as coordination of related law enforcement actions or other security measures. DoW performs the following activities specific to AOTR, as appropriate:

Specific Airborne Threats (an ongoing or potential attack from the air).

- Through CCDRs and NORAD, SecWar directs the necessary supporting measures to facilitate an effective response and mitigate the subsequent effects of an ongoing or potential attack from the air. In extreme circumstances, this includes a determination, made in consultation with the DOT and DHS, on whether to implement emergency security control measures for air traffic. Unless the President directs otherwise, DoW is the only USG department authorized to direct engagement using deadly force against airborne civilian aircraft that present an imminent threat to the United States or US interests.
- Interception of designated flights of interest that do not present an immediate threat to the United States or its interests, as deemed necessary by SecWar or their designee. This includes responding to a threat against aircraft with US persons onboard that occurs overseas, in coordination with the Department of State and the affected countries, as appropriate.
- Conducting air defense against airborne hostile military threats.

General Threats

- Conducting air defense against threats to DoW assets and infrastructure on DoW installations. [29]
- Respond to other aviation threats globally, including airborne or ground-based actions taken at the request of foreign partners and when directed by SecWar or the President.[30]


POINT DEFENSE OF AIR BASES

The installation commander, under FP authorities, is determined by the DoW or Service components in CONUS. This is based on the classification of the base and the functions and unique security requirements of each Service. The Service designated with base command responsibilities, also called base operating support (BOS) (or BOS integrator [BOS-I] for locations with multiple Service components present), provides the C2 structure for FP, security, and defense operations within the base boundary. When the USAF is given both BOS and defense responsibilities, it determines the overall base FP structure and scheme of defense.

In the absence of an activated OPLAN, IPS[31], or National Command Authority (NCA) order, CONUS installation commanders employ defensive capabilities (including point defense [PD] capabilities) against threats in accordance with the standing rules for the use of force[32] or the authority of federal law rather than Combatant Command (COCOM) (i.e., NORAD/USNORTHCOM) authority.[33]

[29] For additional information on the full range of air operations, see to JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*, and JP 3-30, *Joint Air Operations*.
[30] For additional information on the AOTR, see the Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan.
[31] An IPS is a coordinating authority-led planning effort composed of a core plan, concurrent plans, and conditional plans likely to execute contemporaneously. See JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, for more information.
[32] For additional information on the use of force, see CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for Use of Force for US Forces*.
[33] For additional information on Point Defense, see the Doctrine Advisory on *Point Defense of Air Bases*.

In the notional integrated IAMD example depicted in the figure below, the USAF installation commander has been delegated authority, via the airspace control order (ACO), to employ organic PD capabilities inside a base defense zone (BDZ).[34] In this example, the base commander plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls PD activities through the base defense operations center (BDOC) as the focal point for base defense and security.[35]



Air base point defense within a notional IAMD construct

ASSESSING

Assessment starts when defining tactical tasks and objectives. Assessment is a continual activity where the staff observes the OE and incremental progress toward the end-state(s). Assessment drives changes to plans and strategy. Operational assessments help the commander and staff determine progress toward mission accomplishment. Assessment results enhance the commander's decision-making capability, directing more effective operations and addressing a constantly evolving OE. A secondary purpose is to maintain alignment with higher headquarters priorities, schemes of maneuver, and operational objectives.

[34] For additional information on airspace control orders, see JP 3-52, *Joint Airspace Control* and AFDP 3-52, *Airspace Control*.
[35] For additional information on base defense operations centers, see JP 3-10, *Joint Force Protection.*

Assessment supports a commander's decision-making process and should, at a minimum, provide the answers to three basic questions:

- Are we doing things right (measures of performance)?
- Are we doing the right things (measures of effectiveness)?
- Are we measuring the right things?[36]

USAF commanders executing HD operations will still need to answer these questions. The challenge lies in integrating with other non-DoW agencies that typically do not work closely with the USAF.

INTEGRATION

Assessment is a critical part of HD prior to, during, and after the event that initiated HD operations. Due to HD involving many local, state, regional, and federal entities, getting all entities to coexist and seamlessly integrate could be difficult. Exercising with other non-DoW entities before any real-world need arises would help mitigate issues that may arise during a crisis.

Other governmental agencies might value different information. Some may not have experience conducting operations in harm's way. Still others might not be familiar with the USAF or DoW as an entity during a crisis. Commanders and their staffs executing HD operations should initially avoid using military jargon, acronyms, and colloquialisms, and use plain English when passing or requesting information from other agencies to avoid confusion.

[36] For additional information on command and control activities, see AFDP 3-0.1, *Command and Control*.

CHAPTER 4: DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Many USAF capabilities can provide a rapid response to support civil authorities during domestic emergencies and disasters. Planning for and responding to these events should be a Total Force effort.

Installation commanders should plan for situations that may require assigned units to assist local authorities. They should be aware of the various industries or other facilities in the surrounding community and should assess potential hazards or threats these industries and facilities may pose to the installation. They should also determine what type of assistance each may require in an emergency.

Risk management is integral to any planning related to homeland operations. Installation commanders should also be aware of critical dependencies within the surrounding community. They should work with involved agencies to ensure the installation can continue to perform the minimum essential functions in an emergency. **Coordinated planning between the installation and the community is critical to a successful emergency response and should account for the need to preserve the installation's ability to perform its mission and protect its forces when and where needed.** What occurs in the community may affect the installation's ability to perform its mission. In addition to providing support, USAF installations should have plans and procedures to receive aid and assistance from DoW or civil agencies when needed.

MOAs, MOUs, and Intergovernmental Support Agreements[37] with surrounding communities can clarify issues such as response procedures, capabilities, and cost reimbursement. Establishing and exercising such agreements prior to an incident enables a mutual understanding of risk, requirements, and authorities. Governors may also establish EMACs.

The National Response Framework (NRF) contains detailed guidance and planning considerations and should be the primary reference in developing MOAs/MOUs. Refer to the NRF and consider the following when drafting an MOA/MOU:

- **Installation commanders may provide immediate response to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage resulting from any civil emergency or attack.** Immediate response authority applies when the local capability is overwhelmed, triggered by a request from civil authorities under imminently serious conditions, with no time to seek approval from a higher authority. The requirement to employ forces under immediate response authority should be reassessed at least every 72 hours. Otherwise, SecWar approval is required before providing USAF support. Commanders acting under immediate response authority must notify the joint director of military support through command channels. In cases other than immediate response, installation commanders should seek legal advice

[37] Intergovernmental Support Agreements should be established under the Air Force Community Partnership Program. See to 10 USC § 2679 for additional information.

before providing support.

- Memoranda should include specific procedures for responding units to follow when reporting to the scene of an emergency. Procedures should specify how military organizations should integrate with the civil authorities. A section within an MOA/MOU should also include radio frequencies, how to obtain spectrum support, radio procedures, equipment requirements, personnel requirements, FP requirements.

Defense of Critical Infrastructure Assets. Certain infrastructure within the United States is critical to the defense and normal function of the nation. If a disaster disrupts this infrastructure, it could cause grave damage. Examples include national missile defense sites, the NCR, communications and networking infrastructure, and electrical generation plants. The DoW can be called on to help protect such installations from attack and respond if a disaster occurs. The USAF should be prepared if it is called on to detect, preempt, respond to, mitigate, and recover from any potential threat to the nation's critical infrastructure.

USAF CAPABILITIES FOR DSCA

Most USAF support to civil authorities will be in familiar roles such as airlifting supplies to affected areas or providing medical or engineering assistance to people in need. The list below provides examples of the breadth of capabilities the USAF can bring to its DSCA role. It is not all-inclusive but conveys the large variety of responses to DSCA needs the USAF can perform.

Examples of USAF capabilities that may be requested in a domestic disaster or emergency include:

- **Air Mobility.** The USAF may provide airlift to support local, state, DoW, or other federal agencies (e.g., aeromedical evacuation [AE]).

- **Communications.** Deployable USAF communications systems can provide worldwide, single-channel, secure voice and record communications, and secure on-site communications. Additionally, as telecommunications are vital to HD, the AFCYBER may provide defense of civil telecommunications and the DoD Information Network.

- **Investigative Support.** AFOSI can provide investigative expertise to support criminal investigations and counterintelligence services.

- **Search and Rescue.** USAF assets can provide rapid response capability for search, transportation, insertion, and extraction functions in support of rescue activities and initial treatment of medical and other needs.

- **Civil Engineer Support.** USAF civil engineer forces are capable of rapidly responding to worldwide contingency operations. Capabilities include operation and maintenance of facilities and infrastructure, aircraft rescue and facility fire suppression, explosive

ordnance disposal (EOD), and construction management of emergency repair activities. In addition, the emergency management program integrates preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities in an all-hazards threat environment, helping commanders maintain and restore mission capability. EOD responds to all incidents involving military munitions and assists federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies with EOD matters when determined to be in the interest of public safety.[38] EOD supports specialized JTF operations and hazardous materials response for incidents involving explosives. 10 USC 2692, *Storage, Treatment, and Disposal of Nondefense Toxic and Hazardous Materials*, prohibits introducing non-DoW hazardous material onto DoW installations.

- **Health Services.** While primarily designed to meet wartime missions, USAF Medical Service capabilities are easily adaptable for civil disaster response. Small, incremental packages of tailored medical capability can be rapidly deployed to meet immediate and short-term civilian requirements. Additional capabilities provide emergency response for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, environmental surveillance, and occupational health of personnel.

- **Incident Awareness and Assessment.** IAA refers to the SecWar-approved use of DoW ISR and other intelligence capabilities for domestic, non-intelligence DSCA support. When a Title 10 DoW intelligence component asset or capability is needed for a non-intelligence activity, specific SecWar authorization is required for both the mission and use. Intelligence oversight rules do not apply to non-intelligence activities. Rather, the SecWar authorization includes any restrictions on the forces or capabilities used in a domestic support operation. Examples of IAA capabilities include monitoring floodwaters and wildfires or assessing natural disasters.

  Whether DoW intelligence components are conducting an intelligence activity or a non-intelligence activity, certain rules apply universally to data and imagery collected from overhead and airborne sensors. No intelligence activities should take place while conducting DSCA unless authorized by appropriate authorities per EO 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, DoD Directive (DoDD) 5240.01, *DoD Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities and Defense Intelligence Component Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies and Other Civil Authorities*, and DoD Manual 5240.01, *Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities* and other applicable laws and regulations. IAA missions should only be conducted following an approved proper use memorandum or domestic imagery legal review. The servicing staff judge advocate and senior intelligence officer should be involved in discussing these missions.

- **National Security Emergency Preparedness Program (NSEP).** This 1 AF directorate integrates DSCA mission considerations into contingency plans and

[38] For additional information on domestic EOD support of civilian law enforcement agencies, see Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*.

exercise scenarios. They also coordinate mission requirements with CCMDs and civilian agencies for planning, training, and execution. During DSCA events, they provide trained emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs) to represent the USAF to the defense coordinating officer (DCO) and civilian agencies. To support USINDOPACOM, NSEP deploys EPLOs to Hawaii, Guam, and other US territories and commonwealths in the Pacific when required. AFNORTH maintains OPCON of the EPLOs and transfers tactical control to the DCO.[39]

- **Unique Airborne Capabilities.** The USAF frequently provides specialized assets such as the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS), the Modular Aerial Spray System (MASS), and the WC-130J "Hurricane Hunter", in response to natural disasters.

All requests from civilian agencies for DoW assistance are submitted to the Joint Staff/J33. Exceptions to this include assistance provided under mutual aid agreements, in response to imminent serious conditions, or Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) mission assignments. Joint Staff/J33 forwards requests to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War (Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs) and the DoW Executive Secretariat for staffing. Decision authority is at the SecWar level. The Assistant Secretary of War (Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs) has been delegated the authority to approve requests for certain forms of assistance. If appropriate, the Joint Staff/J33 will prepare an EXORD for SecWar approval. If approved, the DoW provides support.

DoW operations within the US are governed by law, including the PCA, which prohibits use of the military for law enforcement purposes except as authorized by the President (Insurrection Act) or by Congress. For DSCA, the USAF's involvement is supportive and dependent on a request to the DoW from the designated lead federal agency. The SecWar determines the scope of DSCA missions to ensure they do not interfere with higher priority missions. Unless directed by higher authority, combat operations remain the USAF's highest priority and take precedence over noncombat operations. To comply with HSPD 5, *Management of Domestic Incidents*, USAF organizations providing support to domestic emergencies should use the NIMS structure used by civil response agencies.[40]

When the SecWar approves the use of military forces to aid in a domestic incident, the corresponding CCMD establishes a command structure to conduct the response and incorporate the appropriate USAF response forces and capabilities. As operations progress, military forces receive direction from civil authorities on how to respond. This continues until the emergency subsides.

[39] All Air Force EPLOs are reservists, and therefore Air Force Reserve Command may have administrative control depending on duty status.

[40] For additional information on NIMS structure outlined in the National Response Framework, see DAFI 10-2501, Emergency Management Program.

APPENDIX A: NATIONAL POLICY AND LAW

The USAF examines US policy, domestic law, and international obligations when planning homeland operations. There are two general points regarding homeland operations and the law:

First is the overall legal framework affecting the application of airpower in the homeland. There are restrictions on using the military to collect intelligence in the homeland. In addition, there are restrictions on using the military for civil law enforcement purposes, with exceptions. Some examples include the President's ability to invoke the Insurrection Act if needed and legislation permitting some use of the military in law enforcement roles to counter the influx of illegal narcotics.

Second is the law and its impact on potential financial reimbursement to the DoW. When managing the consequences of an event, states normally exercise primacy over domestic incidents. Only when they ask for federal assistance, or in extraordinary circumstances, will the federal government get involved. The request process is key for the military because, except for immediate emergencies, a formal request by the state followed by Presidential approval is necessary for the military Services to be reimbursed financially.

Because of the legal and policy complexities, prompt and frequent consultations with military legal experts are among the most important considerations in planning for and employing military assets. The homeland legal environment is very complex and dynamic. The following is a nonexclusive list of legal sources for homeland operations:

Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 USC §§ 1341-42, 1511-19. This act generally prohibits the obligation or expenditure of appropriated funds in advance of, or in excess of, an appropriation by Congress.

Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 50 USC Chapter 40. Requires DoW coordination with WMD response agencies. Authorizes DoW support to the Department of Justice when the SecWar and Attorney General jointly determine that a WMD threat exists, and civil authorities lack sufficient capabilities.

Economy Act, 31 USC § 1535. This act governs the transfer of material between executive branch agencies within the federal government. The Economy Act does not apply to the transfer of material to non-federal law enforcement agencies. Reimbursement to the DoW from civilian law enforcement agencies is authorized under 10 USC § 277 to the extent such would be authorized under the Economy Act.

Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order Act, 10 USC §§ 251-255. These statutes authorize the use of military forces by presidential order in response to civil disturbances, including rebellion, insurgency, insurrection, or domestic violence such that the state authorities cannot or will not enforce state or federal law. The statutes permit the President to use federal forces in response to a request from a state or territory to enforce federal authority or to protect Constitutional rights.[41]

Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities. The US intelligence effort shall provide the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense, and economic policy, and the protection of US national interests from foreign security threats. All means, consistent with applicable Federal law and this order, and with full consideration of the rights of US Persons, shall be used to obtain reliable intelligence information to protect the United States and its interests. The USG has a solemn obligation and shall continue in the conduct of intelligence activities under this order to protect fully the legal rights of all US Persons, including freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by federal law.

Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities. The national security emergency preparedness policy of the United States is to have sufficient capabilities at all levels of government to meet essential defense and civilian needs during any national security emergency. A national security emergency is any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, terrorist attack, technological emergency, or other emergency that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United States.

Executive Order 13228, Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council. The Office of Homeland Security is headed by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Its mission is to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The office coordinates the executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a terrorist attack within the US. Since the promulgation of this EO, the DHS has been established as a cabinet department of the USG.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and Amendments, 50 USC §§ 1801 *et seq*. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) establishes a legal framework for foreign intelligence surveillance separate from ordinary law enforcement surveillance. It aims to regulate the collection of foreign intelligence information in furtherance of US counterintelligence while protecting the privacy interests of US citizens. Under FISA, surveillance is generally permitted based on a finding of probable cause that the surveillance target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, in these cases, specific procedural processes must be followed.

[41] See DoD Instruction 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*, for additional information.

Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 USC §§ 101 *et seq*. The Homeland Security Act established the DHS by consolidating previously existing agencies, such as the USCG, TSA, Secret Service, Customs, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, into one department. The DHS's mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that occur within the United States. DHS also has responsibility for investigating and prosecuting terrorism.

Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, 10 USC Chapter 15. This chapter authorizes support to civilian law enforcement agencies and deals with the use of military information, equipment, facilities, and personnel.

- Military Information: Information collected during the normal course of military operations may be forwarded to a federal, state, or local law enforcement agency if the information is relevant to a violation of criminal law. While the needs of law enforcement agencies may be considered when scheduling routine missions, missions may not be planned primarily to aid law enforcement agencies.

- Intelligence: The USA Patriot Act removed some of the legal obstacles to sharing information between law enforcement and intelligence components. Intelligence is a specialized activity governed by multiple Congressional statutes, EOs, and DoDD.[42]

- Military Equipment and Facilities: Military equipment and facilities may be made available to law enforcement agencies, subject to certain restrictions.[43] Generally, military working dogs can support civilian law enforcement agencies.[44]

- Military Personnel: Except when authorized by statute or the Constitution, direct participation by military members in Title 10 status in the execution or enforcement of the law is prohibited. Prohibited activities include interdictions, searches and seizures, arrests, and surveillance. Generally, the USAF will not provide advanced military training to civilian law enforcement agencies. Permissible training includes basic marksmanship, patrolling, mission planning, medical, and survival skills.[45]

National Defense Authorization Acts. Since 1991, Congress has annually renewed military support for counterdrug operations. Under this, the SecWar may authorize support to federal, state, local, or foreign law enforcement agencies if requested. Types of support include maintenance and repair of DoW equipment, transportation of personnel and supplies to facilitate counterdrug activities, counterdrug training activities, aerial and ground reconnaissance, and provision of support for C2 networks. 10 USC § 124 makes the DoW the lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime

[42] See EO 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, DoDD 5240.01, *DoD Intelligence Activities*, and AFI 14-404, *Intelligence Oversight*, for additional information.
[43] See DoD Instruction 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.*
[44] See DAFI 31-126, *Military Working Dog Program*, for additional information.
[45] See DoD Instruction 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*, for additional information.

transit of illegal drugs into the US. 32 USC § 112 authorizes certain federal funding for the state counterdrug activities of the National Guard. 10 USC, chapter 16, discusses the authority for most counterdrug operations.

National Emergencies Act, 50 USC §§ 1601-1651. This act establishes a process for presidential declarations of emergencies. These declarations must be published in the Federal Register, and Congress must review declarations every six months. Congress can also terminate these declarations. This act does not impact the President's Constitutional authority.

Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC § 1385. The PCA prohibits using members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or Space Force, while in Title 10 status, for law enforcement purposes, except as authorized by Congress or the United States Constitution. Prohibited direct support includes arrests, searches, and seizures. In addition, any form of indirect support that would subject civilians to a regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory use of DoW power is prohibited. The PCA does not apply to National Guard units in non-federal status.

- **Military Purpose.** The PCA does not prohibit direct support to law enforcement agencies if the primary purpose is to further a US military or foreign affairs function. Actions that serve a primarily military purpose include investigations taken pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice or other military administrative proceedings and actions taken pursuant to a commander's inherent authority to protect military personnel, property, or guests or maintain order on an installation.

- **Emergency Authority.** The PCA does not prohibit direct support in emergencies when the action is taken under the inherent right of the US to preserve order and carry out government operations. During sudden or unexpected emergencies, responsible DoW officials or commanders may approve the use of military forces in a law enforcement capacity to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property or restore governmental functioning or order. This authority should be used with great caution and in extremely unusual situations.

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 USC §§ 5121 *et seq*. (Stafford Act). The statutory authority for federal disaster assistance. The act provides procedures for declaring an emergency or major disaster and the type and amount of federal assistance available. The act authorizes the President to provide DoW assets for relief once a disaster is declared. After a presidential determination is made, DoW may use resources to "save lives, protect property," and avert future threats.[46]

[46] See DoDD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, for additional information.

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- JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*
- JP 3-04, *Information in Joint Operations*
- JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*
- JP 3-27, *Joint Homeland Defense*
- JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*
- JP 3-30, *Joint Air Operations*
- JP 3-52, *Joint Airspace Control*
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TACTICAL DOCTRINE

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