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Protection of Civilians

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Protection of Civilians

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Preface

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.6, Protection of Civilians, replaces Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-37.31, Civilian Casualty Mitigation, dated 18 July 2012. ATP 3-07.6 is the primary doctrinal publication for the protection of civilians during unified land operations, including the mitigation of civilian casualties and mass atrocity response operations (MARO).

The principal audience for ATP 3-07.6 is commanders and staffs at the tactical to operational levels of war.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and, in some cases, host nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate according to the law of war and the rules of engagement (see FM 27-10).

ATP 3-07.6 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text.

ATP 3-07.6 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

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Introduction

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.6, Protection of Civilians, replaces ATTP 3-37.31, Civilian Casualty Mitigation, dated 18 July 2012. ATP 3-07.6 expands on the discussion of the protection of civilians in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-07, Stability, and Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability.

As Army Professionals, we are servants of the Nation, morally committed by Oath to support and defend the Constitution. This Duty depends on Trust with the American people, reinforced through Military Expertise, Honorable Service, Esprit de Corps, and Stewardship. Within the Army Profession, we earn and sustain Trust by demonstrating our Character, Competence, and Commitment—making decisions and taking actions that are ethical, effective, and efficient. As Stewards of the Army Profession, we provide coaching, counseling, and mentoring while properly managing the Army's resources entrusted to our care.

+ATP 3-07.6 discusses the importance of civilian protection during unified land operations and presents guidelines for Army units that must consider the protection of civilians during their operations. Protection of civilians refers to efforts to protect civilians from physical violence, secure their rights to access essential services and resources, and contribute to a secure, stable, and just environment for civilians over the long-term. ATP 3-07.6 describes different considerations including civilian casualty mitigation and mass atrocity response operations. Change 1 updates verbiage regarding gender, diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility to comply with DOD guidance.

ATP 3-07.6 contains five chapters:

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the protection of civilians, discusses its legal underpinnings, and addresses considerations including civilian risks. It discusses civilian protection during military operations and introduces the protection of civilians framework used in the document, which includes three components: understanding civilian risks, conducting operations to protect civilians, and shaping a protective environment.

Chapter 2 addresses situational understanding of civilian risks. It discusses civilian protection in the context of an operational environment, intelligence activities, information sharing, and assessments.

Chapter 3 discusses the relationship of the operations process and the warfighting functions to the protection of civilians. It also discusses the conduct of operations that support the protection of civilians.

Chapter 4 describes the relevance of governance, rule of law, conflict-related sexual violence, protection of children, and other issues for achieving enduring protection of civilians. It also discusses the importance of a comprehensive approach that engages the population, host nation leaders and organizations, and other actors.

Chapter 5 discusses the mitigation of civilian casualties, including preventive measures and methods to address civilian casualties that occur.

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, multi-service, or joint definitions, and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the term. Terms for which ATP 3-07.6 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

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Chapter 1
Introduction to the Protection of Civilians

This chapter provides an overview of the protection of civilians during military operations and discusses considerations including civilian risks, cross-cutting themes, and legal underpinnings. The chapter introduces a three-part framework for the protection of civilians: understanding civilian risks, protecting civilians during operations, and shaping a protective environment.

OVERVIEW

1-1. Protection of civilians refers to efforts that reduce civilian risks from physical violence, secure their rights to access essential services and resources, and contribute to a secure, stable, and just environment for civilians over the long-term. Protection of civilians is important for moral, political, legal, and military reasons and must be addressed during unified land operations regardless of the primary mission. According to the law of war, civilians may not be the object of attacks and must be spared and protected.

1-2. A civilian is any person who is not a combatant. They are not a member of their country's armed forces, a militia or other armed group, nor do they directly participate in hostilities. In case of doubt about whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered a civilian. Collateral damage involves unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is not unlawful if it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the attack.

1-3. The protection of civilians is a layered set of issues, broadly categorized as shown in figure 1-1, on page 1-2. Challenges and solutions are more complex when civilian protection is expanded beyond physical violence perpetrated by armed actors during a conflict. Many peace operations or stability efforts build the capacity of a host nation to achieve long-term stability. However, such activities do not automatically reduce violence against civilians, and in some cases can spark greater risks for civilians. Moreover, cooperation with some host nation actors, such as the governmental leadership and security forces, create moral and legal dilemmas if there is a record of abuses by these actors. While host nation actors are important partners for achieving other goals or reducing threats to civilians over time, they may be contributing to abuses in the short term.




Figure 1-1. Layers of civilian protection

1-4. Various actors interpret the protection of civilians differently. It has military and nonmilitary aspects and requires more than a short-term focus on imminent threats of violence. Protection of civilians incorporates important sub-topics including:

- Civilian casualty mitigation: Measures to avoid or minimize unnecessary civilian casualties and to reduce the adverse impact of those that occur.
- Mass atrocity response operations (MARO): Military activities conducted to prevent or halt mass atrocities (JP 3-07.3).
- Conflict-related sexual violence: Violent acts of a sexual nature, including rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, mutilation, indecent assault, trafficking, inappropriate medical examinations, and strip searches.

PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS

1-5. The protection of civilians is an important consideration during all military operations. Army leaders address the protection of civilians whether they are engaged in foreign humanitarian assistance missions, peace operations, specific combat, and noncombat responses to contingencies and crises, or large-scale combat operations. Depending upon the situation, protection of civilians may be the primary purpose of a mission, an important supporting task, or a constraint.

1-6. In addition to overarching legal and moral civilian protection requirements, there are three other significant reasons to support the protection of civilians. First, counterinsurgency and stabilization

experiences highlight that the population is often the center of gravity for military operations, and the population's support is partly related to providing protection from perpetrators or, in some cases, from rival identity groups. Second, harming civilians undermines military efforts and becomes a divisive issue between multinational partners. Even if a military force is not responsible for civilian casualties that occur, there are expectations that the force prevents widespread harm to civilians, regardless of the cause.

1-7. Finally, during most operations, Army units are concerned with civilian welfare while achieving the desired outcomes to a conflict or crisis. Operational objectives may include a safe and secure environment, good governance, rule of law, social well-being, a sustainable economy, and ensuring the protection of civilians from future threats. Under certain circumstances, other urgent human security threats are the main operational focus of Army units as they support other actors. In any case, it may be unlikely that a peaceful political settlement can be achieved unless the protection of civilians is adequately addressed.

1-8. Regardless of the operation, Army units support the protection of civilians in two general ways.

- Avoidance of civilian harm. Army units comply with the law of war and other relevant bodies of law to minimize civilian harm. Additionally, Army units avoid actions that undermine the efforts of other actors to improve human security.
- Deliberate civilian protection actions. Army units perform offensive, defensive, and stability tasks that mitigate harm to civilians and create an environment conducive to the protection of civilians.

1-9. The protection of civilians involves many actors aside from Army units. These include domestic and international civilian, police, and military organizations that address security, governance, rule of law, humanitarian, and developmental needs. The latter considerations are relevant to the protection of civilians because they affect civilian well-being and mitigate grievances and root causes of conflict that harm civilians. Civilian protection actors have dissimilar goals and use different methods, even if they agree about the general desirability to protect civilians.

1-10. To the extent possible, civilian populations (including those loyal to the enemy) must be protected from the effects of combat. In addition to humanitarian reasons and the need to comply with the law of war, excessive civilian casualties create political pressure that limits freedom of action of Army units. Civilian harm creates ill will among the population, with lasting repercussions that impair post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation.

1-11. Civilians are vulnerable to the direct effects of combat operations and the indirect effects of having their lifestyles, livelihoods, and infrastructure disrupted. The law of war, particularly the principles of proportionality and discrimination, directs units not to target civilians and other noncombatants. However, enemies may be located among civilians and place these civilians in danger. It may be appropriate to modify or delay operations when civilians are at risk and the expected civilian harm is excessive in relation to the actual military advantage anticipated.

1-12. Units may have to contend with large numbers of dislocated civilians, and enemy combatants may attempt to blend into these groups. This can complicate matters if dislocated civilians seek security, shelter, or sustainment from Army units. Whenever possible, units establish specific routes and control measures for civilian movement and avoid contact between civilians and maneuver units. Tactical military information support operations (MISO) units use face-to-face communications, printed products, broadcast media, and loudspeakers to inform civilians of such measures. Traffic control points may be used to guide civilians away from areas of expected combat. In some cases, "stay put" messages may be effective in keeping civilians out of the way of maneuver units, especially if humanitarian assistance can be delivered to civilian locations. See ATP 3-57.10 for more information.

1-13. Civilian harm jeopardizes any operation. The population's support is critical during many operations, and civilian harm can undermine such support if civilians conclude that Army units and their partners (such as host nation security forces or security contractors) are their greatest threats or cannot provide security.

1-14. Protection of civilians is a consideration during limited contingency operations involving Army units and may be one of the objectives of such an operation. Protection of civilians may be a subordinate task for some missions such as the removal of an adversarial regime, strikes, raids, shows of force, or sanctions

enforcement. Civilian protection is related to the objective of other operations such as foreign humanitarian assistance missions, noncombatant evacuation operations, consequence management, or a MARO that addresses mass atrocities. See the Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide for more information on the military's role in protecting civilians.

MASS ATROCITY RESPONSE OPERATIONS

1-15. MARO refers to military activities to prevent or halt mass atrocities. A MARO can be the primary mission or be incorporated as part of any operation that includes the potential for mass atrocities. Mass atrocities can intensify and expand once they begin. Army units may have to defend vulnerable civilians, defeat enemies that perpetrate mass atrocities, and perform stability tasks to address the root causes of mass atrocities. See JP 3-07.3 and The MARO Handbook for more information on MARO.

IRREGULAR WARFARE

1-16. Civilian protection is problematic during irregular warfare. It is difficult to distinguish enemies from the surrounding population, and because enemies often use civilian noncombatants as human shields or occupy their places of worship, homes, and other civilian locations. Enemies avoid attacks on well-defended targets, preferring instead to strike weakly defended locations. These often include terrorist acts in which most of the victims are civilians. One motivation for such attacks is to demonstrate that U.S. and partnered forces are incapable of providing adequate security and are illegitimate. Another motivation for such attacks may be to cause Army units to respond disproportionately, causing civilian casualties and eroding their support from the local population. Insurgents may attempt to gain genuine popular support for their efforts, and if such attempts fail, the insurgent group may resort to the violence against the population to intimidate them into cooperating.

1-17. In their efforts to defeat irregular enemies, Army units and their partners avoid actions that create more adversaries from the population. Civilian harm, whether directly caused by lethal action or because the population's welfare is seriously disrupted, generates resentment and undermines popular support for the mission. Operations against insurgents are postponed or modified if civilian harm undercuts mission goals or political support.

PEACE OPERATIONS

1-18. Peace operations include peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement operations, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention. With the exception of peace enforcement, these operations occur when the main parties to a conflict agree to a peace process, and external forces perform peace operations to monitor and enable this process. During peace enforcement, some of the parties do not consent to the peace process and are influenced to do so. Most modern peace operations authorized by the United Nations (UN) include mandates to protect civilians. While it is often the highest priority of these missions, the protection of civilians is typically their most difficult challenge. See JP 3-07.3 for more information on peace operations.

MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND DETERRENCE

1-19. While protection of civilians is normally viewed in the context of armed conflict or peace operations, civilian deaths and injuries during noncombat military operations have serious repercussions. The law of war does not apply in these circumstances; instead, relevant national laws, international human rights law, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) govern these situations. Although such deaths and injuries entail a different means of consequence management under the Foreign Claims Act, they involve considerations that are similar to those arising from civilian harm during conflict.

1-20. During their contacts with foreign security forces, it is important for Army leaders to emphasize protection of civilians and the general imperatives to treat civilian populations with dignity and to respect human rights. This emphasis ensures that foreign security forces properly address protection of civilians in their own domestic and international operations. In many cases Army units provide training to foreign militaries to help them prepare for international peacekeeping missions. As most peacekeeping missions

include a mandate to protect civilians, it is important that Army units effectively convey this information to their counterparts.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

+1-21. Army units should incorporate several considerations while accounting for civilian protection during operations. These include legal considerations, legitimacy, unity of effort, host nation ownership and capacity, and cultural issues.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

1-22. Obligations regarding the protection of civilians emanate from two separate but related bodies of international law—the law of war and international human rights law. As a matter of policy, the U.S. holds that during armed conflict, the law of war and customary international law adequately secure the intent of international human rights law. The law of war (also known as international humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, and the law of land warfare) includes four principles: military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity.

1-23. Depending on the nature and location of the operation, as well as other factors, additional legal authorities that could affect Army operations and the conduct of Army personnel include:

- The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
- Status-of-forces agreements (SOFA).
- Host Nation (HN) laws.
- Rules of engagement (ROE).
- Department of Defense directives and service regulations.

1-24. In most cases, legal instruments with the most significant relevance for Army units will be the law of war, the UCMJ, and rules of engagement (ROE). Army leaders ensure their subordinates abide by the law of war. Under the legal doctrine of command responsibility, commanders are criminally responsible for war crimes committed by personnel in their unit if they directed them or if they know that war crimes occurred and failed to prevent them or investigate and hold accountable those perpetrating the offenses. For more information on the law of war, see FM 27-10. On legal issues, commanders and their staffs seek legal guidance from their units' judge advocates.

LEGITIMACY

1-25. Legitimacy is a function of the operation's purpose, the way in which it is conducted, and the results that are achieved. Legitimacy, which can be a decisive factor in operations, is based on the actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of the actions from the various perspectives of interested audiences. Legitimacy is often a matter of perception, and inadequate protection of civilians undermines the legitimacy of military operations. (See JP 3-0.)

1-26. Corruption occurs in fragile states, erodes legitimacy, and jeopardizes civilian welfare. There is a fine line between corrupt activities (such as bribes, misappropriation, and nepotism) and some culturally-acceptable behavior (such as gifts, reallocation of resources, and patronage). Local and international actors may have different interpretations regarding the appropriateness of particular actions. Corruption is not just a host-nation problem, but can also be found in international organizations including military units, contractors, and others.

1-27. Corruption undermines civilian protection efforts and results in the diversion of resources from their intended purposes. It empowers enemies and adversaries who jeopardize the protection of civilians, threatens friendly forces and partners, and fosters a culture of impunity rather than a culture of lawfulness. In practice, there is not always a clear distinction between criminals, corrupt administrators, and responsible officials. For example, an official may occasionally perform a corrupt act if a bribe is large enough or if the official's family is threatened. Additionally, perpetrators obtain indirect leverage over legitimate officials through personal relationships with criminal actors and corrupt officials.

UNITY OF EFFORT

1-28. Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1). Nonmilitary actors are vital for civilian protection, and Army units coordinate and cooperate with these actors to achieve this objective. Army units provide security so that other actors have space to operate. Ultimately, protection of civilians depends on the effectiveness of police forces and other host-nation organizations assisted by international organizations with the necessary nonmilitary expertise. Other actors have the lead role for many of the tasks necessary to protect civilians. Civilian protection actors have different interests and objectives and their willingness to cooperate with the military force will vary. Additionally, they are often responsive to different lines of authority. While Army units strive for unity of effort, achieving it is a difficult challenge in the best of circumstances.

HOST NATION OWNERSHIP AND CAPABILITY

+1-29. Host nation ownership and capability ensures protection of civilians. Moreover, protection of civilians is an obligation of any sovereign authority. Some host-nation actors lack the capability or will to protect civilians and in some cases oppose necessary civilian protection measures. Conversely, external actors have limited expertise, capability, or staying power, and the different organizations lack unity of effort. It may be difficult to determine whether some host-nation actors, including the government or its security forces, are friendly or adversarial. Some host-nation cultural norms (such as human rights and acceptable levels of corruption) differ from international norms, creating challenges for actors that seek to protect civilians effectively while navigating the cultural landscape. The respective roles of host nation and external actors require balancing and continual adjustment to support transitions, and all involved should understand that host-nation police forces ultimately are the primary protectors of civilians.

+SOCIO-CULTURAL ISSUES

+1-30. Often overlooked in the past, there is now increasing awareness of sexual violence during conflicts and other unstable situations. Sexual violence is usually, but not always, directed against women and girls. There is also greater recognition that women are vital to establishing peace and maintaining future stability. Social issues include protective and participatory dimensions. The protective dimension mitigates harm, exploitation, discrimination, abuse, conflict-related sexual violence, and human trafficking while holding perpetrators accountable. This protective dimension also addresses access to humanitarian assistance, relief, and recovery and protection of human rights. Socio-cultural issues also include women's participation in a nation's political, economic, and security sectors and institutions. This participatory dimension helps to ensure that women's interests are safeguarded and results in greater stability. Institutions are more effective and societies are more stable when women are integrated and not marginalized.

FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

1-31. Protection of civilians is a moral, political, and legal priority for most Army operations. Communities on the ground and around the world expect Army units and Soldiers to protect the population. Failure to do so jeopardizes the credibility and legitimacy of the operation and undermines other objectives. The framework for the protection of civilians includes three main elements, as depicted in figure 1-2.

Understanding Civilian Risks	• Operational Environment • Intelligence Activities • Civil Information • Assessments
Protecting Civilians During Operations	• The Operations Process and the Protection of Civilians • Warfighting Functions and the Protection of Civilians
Shaping a Protective Environment	• Comprehensive Approach • Synchronization of Information-Related Capabilities • Stability Tasks • Ensuring Protection of Vulnerable Groups

Figure 1-2. Framework for the protection of civilians

UNDERSTANDING CIVILIAN RISKS

1-32. Army units comprehend an operational environment (OE) to identify civilian threats and vulnerabilities as well as the opportunities for improving protection of civilians. Civilians face a variety of risks including collateral damage from armed conflict, deliberate targeting from terrorist attacks or mass atrocities, conflict-related sexual violence, and others. Army units must understand the relevant political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) considerations. In many cases the nonmilitary issues are more important than the military matters. Units influence (and often should be influenced by) a wide range of other actors. In many situations, Army units support other actors whose efforts are more important to achieve protection of civilians. Additionally, it is important to comprehend dynamics such as the enemies' strategic logic, the impact of operations, changing vulnerabilities and threats that relate to civilian protection, emerging opportunities to enhance protection of civilians, and changes in the OE. Civilian protection requires accurate intelligence and effective current assessments. Although different civilian protection actors are often reluctant to exchange information and compromise their neutrality, confidentiality, security, or operational independence, it may be possible to develop formal and informal information-sharing mechanisms that improve protection of civilians. This element is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.

PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS DURING OPERATIONS

1-33. In some situations, such as while participating in a MARO mission, Army units plan, prepare, and execute operations to protect civilians. In other circumstances, they conduct unified land operations to achieve other purposes, but their operations have an impact on civilian protection. The operations process accounts for the protection of civilians and Army units apply the warfighting functions to reduce civilian risks. It is important for Army units to incorporate civilian protection considerations into their planning and operations to protect civilians, mitigate civilian casualties, and anticipate unintended consequences. This element is discussed further in Chapter 3.

SHAPING A PROTECTIVE ENVIRONMENT

1-34. It is important to set conditions that provide enduring protection of civilians. This is achieved with five desired outcomes: a safe and secure environment, good governance, the rule of law, social well-being, and a sustainable economy. Failure to achieve these outcomes affects civilian well-being and causes

grievances that renew conflict. Recognizing that this requires contributions from a variety of actors (including the host-nation government and security forces, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and others), Army units adopt a comprehensive approach to achieve unified action with these organizations. Synchronizing information-related capabilities is critical for managing expectations, supporting the desired outcomes, and enhancing the effectiveness of Army efforts to protect civilians. Army units help establish a protective environment by accomplishing the five essential stability tasks described in FM 3-07. It is important to ensure that vulnerable groups such as minorities, women, and children are protected. This element is discussed in Chapter 4.

Chapter 2
Understanding Civilian Risks

Army units understand a changing operational environment to protect civilians. The wide array of operational variables, actors, and dynamics affect civilian risks and potential remedies. Situations will change and units must remain current in their understanding of these variables so that they can anticipate, act, and adapt effectively. This requires focused commander's critical information requirements, effective intelligence activities, management of civil information, and realistic assessments.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

2-1. Army units must understand how the protection of civilians is affected by an operational environment (OE). Civilian vulnerabilities and threats, the operational variables, relevant actors, and dynamics affect civilian risks and the effectiveness of Army operations to protect them. Leaders understand the many nonmilitary issues that impact civilian protection. The OE changes and Army units must understand and anticipate evolving circumstances. An effective intelligence preparation of the battlefield synthesizes information from a variety of internal and external sources, including nonmilitary aspects that relate to the protection of civilians. See ATP 2-01.3 for more information on the intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

CIVILIAN PROTECTION RISKS

2-2. Civilian protection risks are functions of vulnerabilities and threats that create situations where violence and deprivation harms civilian well-being. Assessments and plans account for the interplay between vulnerabilities and threats, and operations are effectively tailored to address them. Some risks are preventable, some can be mitigated, and some are directly relevant to military operations while others are less relevant and more appropriate for mitigation by other actors. Many civilian protection risks include intent or action by an enemy to harm civilians. Enemies often have deliberate or strategic motivations for harming civilians; however, their motivations may be more local and opportunistic in nature. Some civilian protection risks originate from a surrounding structural context, such as an authoritarian government, a failed state, natural disaster, or environmental degradation. This structural context creates specific patterns of violence, coercion, exploitation, and deprivation against particular victims for specific reasons. Other risks can be less visible or physical, such as economic marginalization or discriminatory social practices. Civilian protection risks may be incidental, such as collateral damage that occurs during military operations. Army units should understand vulnerabilities and threats perceived by the local population, which may have a different perspective from international actors.

Vulnerabilities

2-3. Vulnerabilities refer to civilian exposure to imminent or specific threats. For example, ethnic or sectarian violence targets certain groups within a population, rendering those more vulnerable than others. Civilians in the proximity of military targets are more vulnerable to collateral damage. Some groups are vulnerable in certain contexts, such as women, children, or the elderly, infirmed, and disabled. In other situations young adult males may be the population in the greatest danger. Vulnerabilities also include a lack of access to services such as food and life-saving assistance.

2-4. Vulnerabilities are mitigated with different approaches and often involve other actors besides Army units. Some actors such as parties to a conflict and state authorities have formal legal obligations to protect

civilians in accordance with the law of war. Some relevant vulnerability characteristics are summarized in figure 2-1.

Vulnerability Dimensions	Vulnerabilities	Potential Assisters	Possible Mitigations
Scale the number of affected civilians **Severity** level of civilian depredations **Duration and Frequency** length of time and rate of occurrence **Accessibility** ability of outside actors to learn about civilian vulnerabilities and provide assistance **Others** location, time, activity, gender, age, disability, group identity	**Physical Insecurity** exposure, required activities that increase exposure Lack of willing and able protectors Lack of medical care, food, water, shelter, livelihood Lack of Access to Essential Services **Property Loss** vandalism, arson, theft, forcible displacement	**National, Regional, Local Governments** **Host Nation Security Forces** Military Police **Non-State Security Actors** Paramilitaries Militias **International Military Forces** **International Organizations** United Nations **Non-Governmental Organizations** **Neighboring Countries** **Private Organizations and Individuals**	**Humanitarian Assistance** **Military Security** **Police Security** **Human Rights** Monitoring Advocacy **Development** **Diversity Management** **Compensation** **Mobilization and Self-Defense**

Figure 2-1. Civilian vulnerability characteristics

Threats

2-5. Threats are based on the capability, intent, and opportunity to harm civilians. The most important aspect of the threat is the motivation or strategic logic behind the violence. These motivations may change over time and may overlap. Army units need to understand enemy motivations and operational patterns to understand the threat.

2-6. A specific violent threat to civilians varies in terms of its dimensions, type, the enemy, and the enemy's motivations. Figure 2-2 includes many of the variables that characterize particular threats:

Threat Dimensions	Threats	Potential Perpetrators	Possible Motivations
Scale the number of affected civilians **Severity** level of civilian depredations **Duration and Frequency** length of time and rate of occurrence **Conspicuousness** ease with which violence is observed despite perpetrator efforts to conceal it **Others** goals, capability, will, opportunity	**Physical Violence** mass atrocities, genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, war crimes **Collateral Damage** **Political Violence** **Kidnapping, Detention** **Sexual Violence** **Murder, Beating, Torture** **Mutilation** **Property Loss** vandalism, looting, arson, forcible displacement **Denial of Access to Essential Services**	**Government Forces** Military, Intelligence, Security, Secret Police **Government-Aligned Forces** Paramilitaries Proxies **Non-Government Armed Groups** Militias Death Squads Insurgent Groups Armed Wings of Political Parties Organized Crime Gangs **Individuals**	**Deliberate Targeting of Civilians** Retribution Political Objectives Obtain Resources Sustain Operations Deny Human Needs Intimidation Submission **Collateral Damage** Accident Negligence Use of human shields **Criminal Enterprises** **Opportunistic Crime** **Corruption**

Figure 2-2. Civilian threat characteristics

CIVILIAN RISK SITUATIONS

2-7. Vulnerabilities and threats combine to create a variety of civilian risk scenarios that confront Army units and other civilian protection actors. Potential situations generally include armed conflict including insurgencies and civil wars, mass atrocities (including genocide and ethnic cleansing), regime crackdowns, post-conflict instability resulting in revenge killings and violent power struggles, communal conflict, and widespread predatory violence. See Protection of Civilians: Military Planning Scenarios and Implications for more information on potential scenarios.

Armed Conflict

2-8. All combatants are obliged to abide by the law of war whether or not they are signatories to relevant international agreements and treaties. Combatants should perform their operations according to the law of war principles of military necessity (actions must fulfill a legitimate military objective), distinction (actions target combatants and not civilians), proportionality (actions must not cause excessive incidental civilian harm in relation to the anticipated military advantage to be gained), and humanity (actions must not use means that cause unnecessary suffering). Nevertheless, civilians are often deliberately targeted and are also at great risk from collateral damage during military operations, particularly when some combatants are irregular elements that are indistinguishable from civilians. Civilians are also in jeopardy when combatants of any type are located among them. This includes the intentional and forcible use of civilians as auxiliaries, human shields, or hostages to dissuade attacks by enemies.

2-9. In many situations civilians are at risk because, through choice or compulsion, they are supporting or located with a party to the conflict. Examples of such at-risk civilians include camp followers, sex slaves, family members, contractors, workers, and crews of merchant marine vessels. Other civilians, such as humanitarian assistance workers, can also be at risk due to a perception that they may be directly or indirectly supporting a party to a conflict, or because enemies view them as vulnerable and convenient targets. While protected under the law of war, humanitarian workers could find themselves inadvertently or deliberately targeted because of their activities or locations. For more information regarding security of government contractors (authorized and unauthorized) and Department of Defense civilians, see JP 3-10 and JP 4-10.

2-10. Civilians may also be in jeopardy immediately after combat situations or in post-conflict settings. Damaged infrastructure, fires, flooding, destruction of crops, disease, landmines and other unexploded ordnance, societal disruption, and other factors can result in long-term civilian suffering after hostilities have stopped.

Mass Atrocities

2-11. A mass atrocity refers to widespread and often systematic acts of violence against civilians by state or nonstate armed groups, including killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, or deliberately inflicting serious bodily or mental harm. Genocide is a form of mass atrocity and refers to acts committed to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Ethnic cleansing is similar in nature, but is intended to force a group to leave an area. Civilians are often deliberately targeted to inflict terror, reduce popular will to continue a struggle, punish an adversary, deter or compel civilian behavior, or achieve other objectives. Widespread targeting occurs in other situations such as reprisals against civilians during a guerrilla or counterinsurgency campaign. A crime against humanity is an extremely brutal act committed on any scale, such as systematic rape or some human rights violations such as torture. It may be difficult to distinguish mass atrocity situations from other circumstances such as political violence, massacres, or large-scale violations of human rights, particularly during the early stages of a conflict or when low levels of violence have been occurring for an extended period of time. Civilians can also be vulnerable to perpetrators who are less systematic or who do not have underlying political or strategic objectives. Protecting civilians from such targeting is an important supporting task of unified land operations, and it could be the primary objective of an operation.

Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

2-12. Conflict-related sexual violence consists of violent acts of a sexual nature, including rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, mutilation, indecent assault, human trafficking, inappropriate medical examinations, and strip searches. Sexual violence occurs during armed conflict and in fragile states, particularly when undisciplined militaries, police forces, or other armed groups believe that they can act with impunity. In addition to occurring as nonsystematic acts of violence, conflict-related sexual violence can be part of a deliberate campaign of terror against a population group, and it is frequently a part of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other mass atrocities. See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of conflict-related sexual violence.

Human Trafficking

2-13. Human trafficking such as slavery, prostitution, and theft of body organs frequently occurs in fragile states and post-conflict situations due to the widespread poverty and limited rule of law. These activities are often controlled by organized criminal groups with transnational ties and linkages to those in official, legitimate, and respectable positions. It should be a topic of emphasis when interacting with host-nation leaders, especially those in security forces. Army units tasked with broader stabilization responsibilities should know the possibility of human trafficking and criminal networks exist and address these issues aggressively. This is an area where it is important for Army units to create a secure environment in which the host-nation police and other rule-of-law organizations operate.

Children Risks

2-14. Children depend on others to take care of them and are vulnerable to numerous threats and forms of exploitation. Orphans are at risk, and any support programs require adequate resources and close monitoring. Some governmental and nongovernmental armed groups kidnap, conscript, and indoctrinate children as soldiers, which is a war crime. Planning for Army operations accounts for the possibility of vulnerable children and child-soldiers among enemy forces. When detained or captured, child-soldiers require special handling, treatment, and reintegration.

Dislocated Civilian Risks

2-15. In armed conflicts, civilian deaths occur from an array of non-violent causes including starvation, disease, exposure, and dehydration. Civilians are vulnerable when they flee or are forced from their homes and lose their sources of sustainment and communal networks. A refugee is a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of their nationality and is unable or, due to such fear, is unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. A dislocated civilian (DC) is the broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Many DCs overwhelm the available capacity to sustain them and are vulnerable to extortion, human trafficking, conflict-related sexual violence, and other acts of violence.

Impeded Access to Humanitarian Assistance and Essential Services

2-16. Even if not displaced from their homes and communities, civilians may lack essentials such as food, water, medical care, and fuel. This can occur either because the necessities are not available or because it is too risky for civilians to travel even short distances to obtain them. Additionally, although the law of war obligates parties to facilitate humanitarian aid, civilian humanitarian workers may be unable to deliver assistance because they are prevented or targeted by enemies. In many cases, armed actors could wrongfully appropriate civilians' supplies and humanitarian relief items. When deprived of humanitarian assistance or essential services, civilians can become victims of malnutrition, dehydration, illness, exposure, and lack of medical care. In some cases civilian deaths from these conditions have exceeded those from violence.

Other Civilian Risk Types

2-17. Particularly in fragile states, armed conflict situations, and post-conflict environments, civilians are confronted with crime, human rights violations, corrupt officials, property disputes, unemployment, health risks, environmental risks, and other issues. Civilians may take actions that could increase their vulnerability to violence (for example, to protest against grievances, support "enemies" of the state, protect their property, help family or community members, or resist displacement efforts). Army units will often not have direct responsibility for reducing such risks. However, in some situations they can mitigate these risks while working with civilians and police and by establishing a secure environment for suitable actors to address them.

OPERATIONAL VARIABLES

2-18. Commanders and staffs understand the OE by analyzing eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). Leaders narrow their focus for particular missions by understanding the mission variables: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations.

Political Factors

2-19. Army civilian protection efforts are carried out within a political context where the military is just one actor. Political issues frequently underlie threats to civilians and political structures, and political entities enhance or undermine protection of civilians. The local, sub-national, national, regional, and

international political contexts surrounding a mission shape civilian protection objectives, operations, and constraints. Additionally, the failure to protect civilians causes severe political repercussions at all levels.

2-20. Civilians are at risk from conflict related to political issues such as boundaries, sovereignty, ideology, and the struggle for political power between rival factions. Within these factions, violence often occurs between sub-groups such as moderates and extremists, with a spillover effect that harms civilians. A powerful centralized political authority characterizes some countries; in others political power largely resides with local actors. Both situations create their own opportunities and challenges regarding protection of civilians. Unofficial actors in the host nation such as businessmen, tribal and religious leaders, and elders may have substantial political clout.

2-21. Political conflict exists in a variety of forms including insurgency, civil war, terrorism, and political violence. Civilians are at risk from incidental harm or may be targeted to support political objectives. Civilians are potentially vulnerable both when the host government is either too powerful or when it is too fragile. Any international response is shaped by political discourse between nations (especially in the United Nations [UN] and regional organizations) and by the domestic politics within these nations.

2-22. Local norms regarding governance, justice, and rule of law contribute to problems and solutions. For example, councils of elders may resolve disputes effectively, although in some cases punishments are extreme by international standards. Army units and other international actors may not be accustomed to such practices, but they must understand local perspectives regarding justice and dispute resolution to foster an appropriate rule of law.

2-23. Civilian casualty incidents undermine political support for the mission in the host nation, internationally, and among the American public and policymakers. These audiences have high expectations that Army units will use their training, discipline, and technology to avoid civilian casualties and to create a secure environment where civilians are protected from violence. Civilian casualties undermine the political objectives of the operation by generating hostility and active resistance in the population and by creating friction between the U.S. and host-nation political leadership. Coalition states and the host nation may experience domestic pressure if civilian casualties are not addressed sufficiently. In short, civilian casualties undermine the political objectives of the operation and, if perceived as a chronic problem, become political issues. In some cases, an action may be militarily sound and legally permitted, but should not be taken because of political considerations. Civilian casualties that occurred during conflict is a serious issue during post-conflict periods. Future instability will most often occur when the citizens or societal groups demand justice or retribution, and long-term stability may not be possible until these grievances are addressed.

2-24. During a conflict or in a post-conflict society, most civilians view their personal security and the security of their families as the most urgent issue. It is one of the elements of good governance that affects early perceptions of the legitimacy of the state and is always one of the first and most important stability tasks. Those providing security will claim leadership and gain support from citizens who see them as the only immediate option for protection of persons and property, however undemocratic and unaccountable the security providers may be.

2-25. Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO), like many conflicts, are political in nature. Mass atrocities are often politically motivated by leaders who foster ethnic tensions as a way to consolidate power or seek scapegoats. National, transnational, and sub-national political dynamics impact the crisis and resolution efforts and give planners insight toward the primary objective of a perpetrator's actions. Key political factors include a country's political structure, political doctrine and ideology, centers of political power and authority, level of competence, extent of control, and factions that complicate the problem or can be exploited to achieve a solution. The country in question ranges from a failed or fragile state with limited government control to a totalitarian regime with near absolute power. It is important to understand the flow of power, who is politically dominant and who is subordinate, and who stands to gain what from the atrocities. Other political concerns include levels of corruption, key charismatic leaders, secessionist tendencies of factions, and existing peace agreements.

2-26. The role of provincial or state governments should be understood and the authority and identity of key political figures should be noted. In some cases, these governing elements are more powerful and

influential than the central government and may facilitate or hinder civilian protection efforts. An understanding of the justice system is important if courts and prisons are used to support atrocities. Understanding regional and international politics is also critical. Refugees and armed actors from one country may be located in another country. Once military operations begin, second and third order effects have an impact on civilian well-being, regional stability, and security, requiring continual reassessment of the political factors.

2-27. Army leaders should know the relevant political issues at each level that affect civilian protection in their areas of operation. They understand that their operations serve a political purpose and that their successes and failures have political consequences. They must know the formal and informal authorities and the structural processes that impact the OE and their own actions. For example, if Army units operate with multinational forces, some of these units have national constraints on their employment. Army units provide the security to enable these processes and otherwise support these efforts when it is appropriate to do so. Additionally, Army units may be involved in political processes, such as elections or the improvement of governance, which contribute to the mission's effectiveness.

Military Factors

2-28. This category accounts for the size, organization, locations, activities, capabilities, vulnerabilities, objectives, and intentions of armed groups including military, paramilitary, police, intelligence services, and criminal groups. Army units understand these factors as they apply to themselves, other friendly forces, enemies, adversaries, and any neutral armed parties relevant to the OE and civilian well-being.

2-29. Armed groups may threaten civilians, protect civilians, or do both. Victim groups may defend themselves and the creation of any self-defense militias potentially constitutes a new threat to other civilians. While they could be attacked simply because they are members of an ethnic or other group, in other cases civilians may not be at great risk from such deliberate targeting. Rather, in a lawless environment, the population in its daily activities is vulnerable to widespread individual acts of violence such as murder, rape, robbery, and kidnapping. Other civilians, such as aid workers, are also at risk. It is important for Army units to understand civilian attitudes towards and perceptions of different military and security actors.

2-30. Army units may have host nation and multinational security partners with differing capabilities and attitudes with respect to civilian casualty mitigation. Civilian casualties can occur if units do not have intelligence or forces to control an area. Leadership and training reinforce desired Soldier attitudes towards civilian casualties and shape their actions. Regardless of nationality, Soldiers are influenced by factors such as fear, the tendency to respond with overwhelming force against a threat, the desire for revenge, fatigue, frustration with the mission or the environment, apathy regarding civilians (as compared with their own well-being or that of their comrades), the fog of war, risk-aversion, or insufficient attention regarding extended weapons effects (such as the surface danger zones of most direct fire weapons).

2-31. Enemy forces exploit and exaggerate U.S. civilian casualty incidents for propaganda purposes. Additionally, they take advantage of Army unit efforts to minimize civilian casualties by operating among civilians, disguising themselves as civilians, and using civilians as human shields. Multinational forces can use restrained measures to avoid civilian casualties, which could result in a larger operational burden on Army units.

2-32. In MARO situations, the enemy may consist of regular military units that operate under the direction of the state, rogue military units that operate more or less independently, temporary paramilitary units, police units, internal security forces, or other armed groups such as rebels, militias, gangs, or private armies. Other armed factions may be aligned with victim groups who may have developed their own self-defense militias. Some armed groups may be uninvolved in the mass atrocity situation, but Army units must understand all armed entities in the OE; while particular groups may not actually be involved in mass atrocities, they may oppose or support Army units during a MARO.

2-33. Security forces, including secret police, may orchestrate mass atrocities. In some countries, rival organizations compete with the military and with each other for the leader's favor. This either accelerates tendencies toward mass atrocities or creates vulnerable divisions that Army units exploit. The military

assessment should include potential actors such as UN or regional peacekeeping forces in the country in question or its neighbors, and an overview of the military capabilities of these neighboring countries as appropriate. Some multinational forces may also be perpetrators of abuses.

Economic Factors

2-34. Economic issues impact civilian vulnerabilities and potential threats. Economic grievances and drivers of conflict impact an operational environment, while armed conflict and natural disasters disrupt livelihoods and make civilians vulnerable to various deprivations. Although usually not relevant in terms of physical violence towards civilians, economic issues are meaningful when the overall mission objectives include the welfare of the population and securing its support. Additionally, civilians concerned about personal property may remain in conflict areas and resist removal efforts. Consequently, Army units should not assume that an objective area is devoid of civilians.

2-35. Understanding the OE's economic factors helps identify potential sources of instability and suggests solutions. The analysis includes key considerations with respect to agriculture, manufacturing, trade, gross domestic product, natural resources, income distribution, poverty, unemployment, corruption, the black market, narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, and humanitarian assistance needs. If not controlled, humanitarian assistance supplies during and after an intervention risk appropriation by criminals, military forces, or other armed groups.

2-36. Mass atrocity situations can develop over a struggle for control and access to natural and strategic resources or because the majority of the populace resents an economically advantaged minority. Widespread deprivation and unemployment results in increased criminal activity when people believe it is their only means to survive. Civilians suffer as illicit economic activities flourish such as human trafficking, kidnapping, theft, looting, extortion, corruption, narcotics trafficking, and black market activities. Illegal exploitation of natural resources fuels conflict and there are economic incentives for some actors to prolong a conflict and avoid a peaceful political settlement. Civilian suffering is further compounded when criminal influences corrupt governmental regulatory, fiscal, and decision-making processes and programs.

Social Factors

2-37. Social factors such as religion, demographics, culture, identity groups, and other issues affect civilian risks. Ethnic, religious, regional, or other social cleavages may motivate violence against civilians and contribute to mass atrocity situations. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, religious or ethnic diversity in itself does not necessarily create a greater likelihood for genocide or mass atrocity. More commonly, perpetrators manipulate tribal, ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional differences to convince those within the perpetrating group and, potentially, internal and external bystanders to take part in or provide support to mass atrocities. One potential focus for the Army unit is the subversion of this manipulation. Any attacks on civilians, regardless of the source, jeopardize mission objectives. Many expect Army units to prevent such incidents, particularly if some of the actors that harm civilians are viewed as their partners.

2-38. A society disrupted by armed conflict has numerous civilian vulnerabilities, particularly if there are large numbers of dislocated civilians who lack food, water, shelter, medical care, and security. As previously mentioned, disease, starvation, dehydration, and the climate may be more threatening to civilians than violence. Dislocated civilians may migrate to Army units to obtain assistance, and in some cases hostile actors may attempt to blend in with the civilians. This poses a challenge to Army units attempting to balance force protection measures with the desire to provide assistance to dislocated civilians.

+2-39. Sexual discrimination, marginalization, and sexual exploitation and abuse by those in authority, including military forces or unified action partners, can be serious problems. Sexual violence is usually directed at females, but members of both sexes can be victims. It can be fostered by a culture of impunity, culturally accepted biases against women, lack of discipline in security forces, and beliefs and behavior that violate accepted human rights standards. High levels of sexual violence indicate that civilians are not adequately protected.

2-40. Cultural norms will be relevant in how the local population responds to incidents where civilians are harmed and, accordingly, the appropriate mitigation measures Army units should adopt in different situations. In some cultures, family members may be expected to perform acts of revenge for the rest of their lives. In others, a one-time token gesture may suffice. Revenge may not be common in some cultures, provided appropriate compensation is made. Monetary compensation could be expected in some places, while it may be viewed as an insult in others. In some situations it may be expected that family members are contacted directly, while in other cultures such contact would not be advisable. Contact with female members of the population may be problematic in some societies and could require specially trained teams of female Soldiers or the use of intermediaries. In many societies widows, orphans, and victims of sexual violence are vulnerable to deprivation of essential needs.

2-41. Soldiers should be able to recognize and understand the normal patterns of life in the host nation, which can help them be more aware of emerging threats to civilians or Army units. Army units should obtain training and insight regarding culturally appropriate behavior from host-nation partners and others who provide useful advice, including how to act if they are the first responders to conflict-related sexual violence. In most cases, key leader engagement will be important to mitigate civilian casualties and prevent incidents from escalating. When engaging with women and girls, the use of female Soldiers can help maintain credibility and avoid misperceptions. However, this does not imply that only female Soldiers should address these issues.

2-42. Social unrest over a variety of issues generate civil disturbance in which Army units are confronted by large numbers of angry civilians who could potentially become a threat to Soldiers or others. This may occur because of long-term fundamental political concerns, new struggles for political power in a post-conflict setting, or as a result of sudden situational shifts such as when humanitarian assistance is being distributed to a large and desperate crowd. During these occasions, civilians could be harmed as Soldiers attempt to protect themselves or others, and such incidents could cause even greater unrest. For more information on civil disturbance operations, see ATP 3-39.33.

2-43. Army leaders should be cognizant of dislocated civilian camps if they have been formally or spontaneously set up, and should note their populations, conditions, and what groups control them—all key social factors that could predict violence against civilians. In the early stages of a mass atrocity situation, flows and encampments of displaced persons may not be evident or easily recognizable. Camps could be internally run by gangs to the detriment of the dislocated civilians, or they could serve as safe havens for insurgents (or others) that could incite government action against the camps. Additionally, the camps could provide lucrative targets for those intending to commit mass atrocities.

2-44. A variety of other societal characteristics may be relevant to the analysis of an operational environment. For example, xenophobia could galvanize national resistance against any outsiders, however well-intentioned they might be. Social issues such as crime, drug use, child-soldiers, and human trafficking have direct impact on civilian protection. Finally, the analysis should include any significant health issues such as diseases, which, in addition to affecting the population, could affect Army units.

Information Factors

2-45. Information technology facilitates the instantaneous global impact of the professional media and individual commentators. In most countries, information technology has a profound local impact via social media. Messages can be widely and rapidly distributed, whether or not they are accurate. A limited and local minor action can have far-reaching strategic consequences.

2-46. Army leaders must know the importance of information and should consider audiences, messages, and methods of delivery. Potential audiences include the local population, host-nation leaders, enemies and adversaries, international audiences, and the leaders and populations of the countries contributing troops to the operation. Messages might include that Army units are committed to protection of civilians, have adopted stringent measures to protect civilians, and sincerely regret any civilian harm caused by their actions. If appropriate, other messages may emphasize civilian harm caused by enemies or the role of enablers who provide support to enemies and adversaries.

2-47. Delivery methods may include a range of audio, visual, and audio-visual methods, websites, television broadcasts, radio broadcasts, leaflets, posters, signs social media, and key leader engagement. Army units should maintain a consistent pattern of truthfulness and timeliness in their messages. Additionally, commanders manage local and international expectations regarding the provision of security and protection of civilians. The legitimacy of and commitment to the operation may suffer if expectations are not properly managed. Army units synchronize information-related capabilities to ensure that the local population has a realistic understanding of the mission, actions, and capabilities of Army units.

2-48. Enemies will use information as a weapon to advance their narratives to justify violence against civilians. They will also attempt to discredit the efforts of Army units, and protection of civilians may be a theme they attempt to exploit. They will not necessarily be truthful in these efforts, but perceptions can be more important than reality. Army units may be challenged by rumors of civilian casualties and inaccurate media reports. Particularly in a vacuum of authoritative information, sensationalist rumors are prone to spread. Army units should know the rumors that are being circulated and address them directly with key leader engagements and synchronizing information-related capabilities such as military information support operations (MISO) and public affairs efforts. An established pattern of accurate and timely messages can develop the credibility required to counteract rumors that can undermine the mission.

2-49. It is critical to supplement military information and intelligence with information from nonmilitary sources because of the complexity and ambiguity that characterizes civilian risks. These sources include victim groups, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, including human rights organizations that may be monitoring the situation.

2-50. International media reports about an unfolding mass atrocity are likely to be a catalyzing agent for response, and may powerfully shape how various elements of an operation are perceived and prioritized. The actions of enemies, victims, and others are likely to be affected by how they perceive the responses of the international community. Enemies may be less likely to perform mass killings in the direct presence of international observers, peacekeepers, and media.

2-51. Enemies attempt to control the information environment (both international and local), and manipulate it to conceal, deny, or legitimize a mass atrocity. Local or national media, whether it is radio, TV, word-of-mouth, village loudspeakers, or the internet, are an important part of an enemy's efforts. Victim groups can also use media to advocate for a response or retribution. Enemy and victim groups can both use media to recruit from groups outside the country. Informational analysis includes details about key media outlets, and whether they are open or restricted, balanced or partisan. The language and rhetoric advanced by enemies and victim groups should be closely monitored by MISO teams and by Army units more generally, with a focus on identifying hate media, inflammatory speeches, and the dehumanization of victim groups. Army units should consider the potential for dissuading or blocking inflammatory information and promoting other messages.

Infrastructure Factors

2-52. Infrastructure affects civilian protection as it relates to enemy capabilities, access to the civilians, civilian well-being, Army operations and logistics, and humanitarian efforts. Key considerations include power generation and distribution, road and rail networks, river ways, ports, airfields, medical systems, water sources, and communications systems. Commanders should ensure that humanitarian and other important actors have appropriate access to the available infrastructure. Transportation infrastructure affects access to vulnerable populations and supports throughput, operational reach, and responsiveness of Army units. Infrastructure is subject to disruption from enemies and natural causes, and a range of other actors will likely compete for access.

2-53. Key infrastructure, such as bridges and power plants, is often targeted during conflict, which places civilians in close proximity at risk. Damaged infrastructure disrupts the provision of essential services necessary for civilian well-being that could cause suffering and casualties among the local population. In contemplating combat operations, the military benefit of doing so should be balanced against the possibility that the targets are close to civilians, the potential that destroying such targets will unduly harm civilians, or that their destruction will have undesired long-term effects after the operation. Conversely,

enemies may attack key infrastructure in areas controlled by Army units, and the protection of civilians in these areas should be considered.

2-54. If left unrepaired, damaged infrastructure such as building, bridges, and roads can cause civilian casualties if the structures collapse or if they otherwise create unsafe conditions. Infrastructure that deteriorates from lack of maintenance, as might occur in a fragile or failing state, can also present a threat to civilian well-being and inhibit access to civilians and the return to previous economic activity. Some infrastructure, such as dams, can have catastrophic consequences if they fail. When time and resources permit, the clearance and repair of damaged infrastructure can help prevent future harm to civilians. Army units may be directly involved in such efforts or may help other developmental actors who would be better suited to the task.

2-55. It may be useful to prioritize new infrastructure that needs to be created or old infrastructure requiring replacement to enhance the protection of civilians. Generally, port capacities, airfield capacities, and rail capacities are of particular importance to support deployment and sustainment of the operation, and are also vital for other actors such as nongovernmental organizations.

Physical Environment Considerations

2-56. Physical features affect both civilian protection and any Army operations. Terrain and climate will affect general civilian vulnerability, particularly with respect to dislocated civilians. Enemies may use restrictive terrain such as dense jungles to facilitate or conceal violence against civilians. Mountains, deserts, and harsh climates can hinder victims' survival. Features such as river areas and other water sources can serve as flash points because large numbers of civilians live in these vicinities.

2-57. As with all Army operations, terrain, weather, and illumination affect a unit's ability to mitigate civilian casualties to the extent that these conditions impair effective control of the areas of operation. Army presence in remote and rugged areas may be sporadic, resulting in tenuous control and limited unit familiarity with the area and population. This, in turn, results in more situations where civilian casualties occur as these environments lend themselves to operations such as airstrikes and raids that can result in civilian casualties.

Time Considerations

2-58. Enemies may accelerate their efforts to destroy victims, particularly if they determine that a perceived window of opportunity is closing. Military operations to protect civilians may be delayed by the need for political leaders to gain situational awareness, build consensus, and make the necessary decisions to respond. Army units and other intervening forces need time to mobilize, deploy, and prepare before effective operations can commence. In some cases, it can be anticipated that mass atrocities might occur in conjunction with upcoming events such as elections, seasonal changes, or weather periods. In others, they may be sparked by unforeseen events such as civil unrest, a terrorist attack blamed on the victim group, or the death of a prominent political or social leader.

2-59. A commander's decision to attack an objective or a Soldier's decision to engage a target often must be made rapidly, to maintain the initiative, exploit a fleeting opportunity, or protect against a potential threat. When decisions are made quickly, there is greater likelihood of acting upon incorrect information, causing incidental harm to civilians, or engaging a target that in fact was not a threat. In some cases, tactical patience is possible to develop the situation and gain more accurate information. Units and Soldiers reduce the potential for civilian casualties by creating standoffs in time or space to avoid the need for split-second decisions.

2-60. In many situations it is important to have a long-term perspective with respect to the security in an area of operations. For example, patrols that are concerned about their own immediate protection and adopt a consistent pattern of maneuvering aggressively, firing weapons indiscriminately, threatening civilians, and causing civilian casualties could generate widespread resentment. This results in a much more insecure OE in the future. Similarly, civilian casualty mitigation entails an extended cycle that addresses much more than the moment a decision is made to engage a target. Unit actions that are conducted before and after an incident are also important.

2-61. Cyclical events such as seasons or holidays affect whether civilian casualty events are more likely. For example, farmers may work their fields at night during the planting and harvesting seasons and may be mistaken as enemies by units that are not accustomed to seeing civilians at night. Civilians may be more apt to travel during holidays, which could increase their vulnerability. Civilian casualty incidents that occur on some holidays may be more inflammatory than events that occur at other times.

2-62. As discussed later, civilian protection can be enhanced by having good relationships with key host-nation leaders and the population. Cultivating such relationships requires time, and civilian casualty mitigation efforts can have an important effect on these relationships.

ACTORS

2-63. Army units should have a comprehensive understanding of the domestic and international actors in their areas of operation. These actors may include individuals, organizations, or broad categories such as ethnic groups, religious sects, socio-economic classes, or regional populations. Particular actors may be victims of violence against civilians while others perform such violence. Some may provide support to victims or to those that target them, while others may attempt to be bystanders. Actors may change their inclinations. For example, today's victims may seek revenge in the future. When inter-communal violence occurs between ethnic groups or religious sects, a particular group could simultaneously target other civilians while it is in turn being targeted.

2-64. Some actors, such as many nongovernmental organizations, will avoid being perceived as partners of the military and should not be referred to in this manner. Nongovernmental organizations that maintain neutrality perform an important role in protecting civilians, and Army units should not attempt to compromise their neutrality. The type of conflict or mission will determine how the military and nongovernmental organizations interact with each other. It is essential for nongovernmental organizations to keep their distance during conflict in order to retain their neutrality, unless cooperation is absolutely necessary. However, during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, the military may act in a supporting role to nongovernmental organizations, as they may have a common objective. Generally, nongovernmental organizations will be more willing to interact with civilian agencies such as those from the UN, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, although even these relationships may be limited. Nevertheless, these entities may be effective intermediaries between Army units and nongovernmental organizations.

DYNAMICS

2-65. Army units must understand how armed conflict and other situational dynamics affect the protection of civilians. This necessitates a thorough understanding of the conflict's root causes and consequences. Dynamics are the major influences that affect the overall situation and potentially include the type of conflict, the strategic logic of enemies, and the impact of the Army unit's own operations. Additionally, as situations will not be static, civilian vulnerabilities and threats will change and new civilian protection issues will emerge. Finally, key PMESII-PT considerations regarding the OE and the relevant actors will continually evolve and require reassessment. Understanding the dynamics will enable effective application of the Army design methodology, including framing the problem comprehensively and developing an operational approach. See ADRP 5-0 for more information on the Army design methodology.

2-66. Conflict dynamics present changing challenges including new vulnerabilities and threats, but they also create new opportunities. An understanding of the broad dynamics will help explain specific incidents related to the protection of civilians. Conversely, proper interpretation of incidents that occur help Army units understand emerging dynamics so they can perform operations that protect civilians more effectively. Commanders and staffs identify the dynamic influences which affect the situation, anticipate their impact, and understand how the dynamics can be constructively influenced.

Type of Conflict

2-67. Civilian protection will have to be addressed within the context of a conflict already underway or likely to emerge. Examples include inter-state war, a proxy war, civil war, insurgency, secessionist or

irredentist conflict, terrorism, a failed state situation, or instability in the aftermath of a natural disaster. The type of conflict will affect the civilian vulnerabilities and threats as well as the Army unit's actions and mission priorities. The type of conflict may change, particularly as actors adapt and develop new ways to pursue their objectives.

Strategic Logic of Enemies

2-68. Although they are often portrayed as irrational, perpetrators of mass atrocities may target civilians to achieve their strategic objectives. Motivations could be rooted in deep-seated ethnic, political, ideological, or economic grievances; alternatively, the enemy leadership could manipulate such grievances. Violence against victims could be intrinsic to the enemy's goals, including their own perceived survival, or it could be an instrumental means to an end. An accurate understanding of the enemy's strategic logic may suggest a range of methods to improve civilian protection. Some enemies may be influenced by a cost-benefit analysis or opportunism and potentially dissuaded from undesired actions. Others may be undeterred from conducting civilian violence because they believe such action is necessary for their own survival or for other reasons. The enemy's leadership, facilitators, and rank-and-file members may be influenced in different ways.

Impact of Operations

2-69. Army units protect civilians by conducting offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. The balance between them will vary at different times and in different parts of the area of operations. Commanders should anticipate and understand both the short and long-term effects of the operations on an operational environment. A heavy emphasis on offensive operations may seize the initiative and weaken enemies, but it could provoke retaliation, generate national resistance, and result in civilian casualties. Operations that are primarily defensive in nature may protect some important locations, but could cede both initiative and territory to enemies and consequently fail to protect many civilians or to obtain the security needed for development and the rule of law. Multinational operations that are led by Army units or other international forces could fail to develop host-nation forces adequately. Operations by host-nation forces may be ineffective or could pose a threat to civilians. Some operations could result in the short-term protection of civilians but result in greater long-term risk, such as through subsequent retaliation by enemies.

Changing Vulnerabilities and Threats

2-70. Civilian vulnerabilities and attendant threats will constantly change. Army units should anticipate that conflict-related sexual violence and threats to children are likely to be constant features of any complex situation. The nature of these threats may evolve with changing circumstances.

2-71. Enemies may adapt and modify their approaches to targeting civilians, and new adversaries could emerge that pose challenges for civilian protection. Enemies may want to take revenge, intimidate civilians from cooperating with Army units or host-nation authorities, and demonstrate the authorities' inability to provide security and governance, or perform criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking, narco-trafficking, extortion, and robbery. It is possible that actors who were previously victims may target other civilians. New threats could include host-nation security forces and other armed actors who have previously cooperated with Army units.

2-72. Civilians can be threatened when old grievances flare up or when new disputes arise over issues such as land and water rights, political and religious matters, employment, and a rate of progress that is perceived as too slow or excludes part of the population. Even if violence is held at reasonably low levels, civilians may still be vulnerable to other human security threats such as malnutrition, disease, and a lack of essential services. These can be magnified by natural or other disasters, or policy changes by humanitarian organizations or governments.

Emerging Opportunities

2-73. Army units should be alert for events and trends that can have a positive impact. Events may be specific occurrences such as meetings, holidays, elections, ceasefires, ceremonies, or seasonal and

climactic changes. Progress in one region may be highlighted as a successful model that should be emulated elsewhere. Conflict fatigue may also provide an opportunity. This may be most prominent among groups such as women, the elderly, students, religious leaders, or farmers. It may be possible to encourage and enable such sentiments through effective synchronization of information-related capabilities.

Other Dynamics

2-74. All of the operational variables contain dynamics that potentially can affect the protection of civilians. Army units must know of such changes in an operational environment and continually reassess the variables and actors described earlier. Additionally, they should reappraise their situational understanding with partners and other actors to ensure a common appreciation of the issues and measures that should be taken.

Potential Operational Environment Dynamics

2-75. Some of the possible PMESII-PT changes include the following.

- Political—emerging international, regional, national, and sub-national issues and debates.
- Military—new conflicts; capability and capacity changes.
- Economic—indicators such as employment, trade, growth, and illicit economic activity.
- Social—dislocated civilian movements; changed health threats; changed group preferences and expectations.
- Information—changes in capability, messages, or population access.
- Infrastructure—changes in capacity and needs.
- Physical environment—seasonal changes, natural disasters, and droughts.

Potential Actor Dynamics

2-76. The array, interests, and activities of relevant actors are also likely to change. New groups can form, organizations may have internal divisions, and new leaders emerge. Army units should maintain awareness of evolving capabilities, requirements, motivations, intentions, and vulnerabilities so they can anticipate new civilian protection risks and opportunities.

INTELLIGENCE

2-77. Accurate intelligence is critical for the protection of civilians. Intelligence enables situational understanding of the civilian vulnerabilities and threats, and it is important to comprehend how these are viewed from the population's perspective. Intelligence activities and protection of civilians are mutually reinforcing; civilians will provide information more freely when they can do so safely and if it enhances their security. In turn, accurate intelligence should drive operations that improve protection of civilians and make the population more secure.

2-78. Information should be obtained and cross-referenced from a variety of sources including military assets and those from the host nation. Close working relationships with host-nation organizations help formulate a comprehensive understanding of the local population. This includes a focus on the people and the degree to which the population accepts the mission's legitimacy, the degree to which the government is accountable to its people, and the degree to which other actors support the mission.

2-79. In addition to their normal information collection assets, Army units capitalize on their other activities to support collection of information related to the protection of civilians. For example, a logistical unit may deliver supplies to a remote outpost and while doing so may observe civilian protection indicators that can satisfy some information requirements. This implies that intelligence requirements should be systematically included in pre-mission briefings and that post-mission debriefs can be a useful collection method. See FM 2-91.6 for additional information on mission pre-briefs and debriefs.

2-80. Civilian harm is more likely when actions are based on information that is inaccurate, incomplete, or if critical information regarding civilians is lost in a large mass of other data. Information collected on threats should be crosschecked with other sources to improve confidence in its accuracy. While collecting

on threats, information on civilians in the proximity should also routinely be gathered to support decision-making on whether or not to engage a target.

2-81. Efforts to protect civilians include actions taken before, during, and after incidents of civilian harm and incorporate key leader engagements and engagement with the population. When performed effectively, and if accompanied by improved civilian protection, these mitigation efforts can make the population more forthcoming with information. Effective interface with host-nation leaders and the local population can also provide situational understanding regarding their protection concerns.

2-82. Host-nation government officials, leaders in host-nation security forces, local leaders, and nongovernmental organization personnel can be valuable sources of information regarding the civilian population, including civilian protections issues of which Army units may be unaware. Information from local sources should be crosschecked, as some host-nation personnel may manipulate Army units into taking actions that support ulterior motives (such as to undermine a rival). Information from nongovernmental organizations and other sources must be handled discretely because their neutral status will be jeopardized if they are seen as intelligence providers for the military.

2-83. Commanders ensure that protection of civilians is adequately reflected in their commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), as it will often compete for attention with other mission considerations. A representative set of CCIR related to protection of civilians is shown in figure 2-3. For more information on intelligence and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, see ADP 2-0, ADRP 2-0 and ATP 2-01.3.

Priority Intelligence Requirements	Friendly Force Information Requirements
What are the locations, compositions, activities, capabilities, weaknesses, and intentions of perpetrators or other adversaries? What support is being provided to perpetrators or other adversaries, and who is providing it? Have there been any new, significant acts of violence against civilians? What are the greatest threats to civilians in our area of operations? Are new perpetrator groups forming? If so, why?	Have there been any policy changes by the host nation or other key actors that are relevant for the protection of civilians? Are there any significant changes in the capability of the force or its partners that impact the protection of civilians? What significant civilian protection problems and successes are the force and its partners experiencing? What are the major civilian vulnerabilities? What are the future civilian protection plans of the force's higher headquarters, subordinates, supporting and supported organizations, and partners? What additional resources are required to improve the protection of civilians?

Figure 2-3. Commander's critical information requirements

CIVIL INFORMATION

2-84. Units may have to exchange information with other actors in order to protect civilians effectively. This cultivates productive relationships, obtains a common understanding of the situation, achieves common objectives, improves operational effectives, avoids duplication of effort, and synchronizes information-related capabilities.

2-85. To support a comprehensive situational understanding of civilian protection in a complex environment, Army units should draw a distinction between information and intelligence. Civil information

management is the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other United States Government (USG) and Department of Defense agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. This process ensures the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Additionally, to obtain information from various sources units will share information with other actors to achieve a common appreciation of civilian risks. Information sharing depends on the level of mutual trust and requires time and dedicated effort to build this. Information sharing must always be done in accordance with National Disclosure Policies. Units must consult with their Foreign Disclosure Officer before releasing information outside of the Department of Defense. Information shared with others can potentially be compromised, either through maliciousness or carelessness, thus endangering either operational security or the sources of the information. For more information on civil information management, see FM 3-57, Change 1 and ATP 3-57.50.

2-86. Valuable nonmilitary information sources include civilian agencies, nongovernmental organizations, the media, and the local population. Many human rights organizations monitor conflict situations and make their reports readily available. These are useful to analyze trends and to gain familiarity with a situation at the outset of an operation. Army leaders must carefully handle information they receive from nongovernmental organization representatives in the field. Normally, they should not attribute information to the nongovernmental organizations and in some cases it may be advisable to delay any use of the information obtained from these sources.

2-87. Because of their concerns for neutrality and security, many organizations are reluctant to cooperate with Army units. It may be more effective to interact with them through civilian intermediaries. In any event, units should generally treat them as protected sources and refrain from attributing information to them. Local leaders and members of the population can be excellent sources of information, particularly when they believe that their well-being and that of their families will be preserved. Operations that protect civilians will make the population more forthcoming with information, which in turn will improve the effectiveness of future operations.

ASSESSING PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

2-88. Because of the dynamics, an operational environment will continually change. Army leaders monitor and evaluate civilian risks and the effectiveness of operations with respect to the protection of civilians and direct changes as necessary. Assessment is part of the operations process and is discussed further in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3
Protecting Civilians During Operations

Protection of civilians requires disciplined, trained, and prepared Army units that plan and operate effectively. This chapter applies the operations process to the protection of civilians and discusses civilian protection within the context of the warfighting functions. Many tasks for Army units apply to any military operation whether or not protection of civilians is a significant consideration. However, civilian protection could be severely impeded if these tasks are not successfully accomplished.

THE OPERATIONS PROCESS AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

3-1. The operations process has four key steps: plan, prepare, execute, and assess. It can be applied to the protection of civilians and related topics such as civilian casualty mitigation and mass atrocity response operations (MARO). Protection of civilians includes measures that occur long before and long after the moment that civilians are in jeopardy from acts of violence. Protection of civilians should be routinely incorporated into staff processes such as targeting, intelligence planning, and synchronization of information-related capabilities.

PLANNING

3-2. Army leaders plan for protection of civilians in two circumstances. The first is when the protection of civilians is the primary purpose of an operation and the second is the protection of civilians during other operations. In either case, commanders and staffs should address protection of civilians in their plans and operations. By incorporating protection of civilians into routine planning efforts (patrol, target, or convoy planning), leaders can ensure their unit's actions minimize the potential for civilian harm. It may be appropriate to include protection of civilians as a line of effort for planning and conducting Army operations. Because protection of civilians is a multidimensional issue, its planning will be enhanced with the involvement of other unified action partners when possible.

3-3. Plans address civilian casualty avoidance, and any specific response, as an important shaping effort to other decisive operations. Commanders at higher levels may want to reserve for themselves the approval authority for operations that have an excessively high risk of civilian casualties. In any case, distinction, proportionality, and precautions should be incorporated into mission planning.

3-4. A MARO contingency plan potentially can include the six doctrinal phases presented in JP 3-05 (shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority). It may be prepared before an Army unit deploys or it may be appropriate to develop a MARO contingency plan during an operation. MARO plans, and other plans to protect civilians can reflect one or more of the following seven general approaches described in JP 3-07.3:

- Area security.
- Shape-clear-hold-build.
- Separation.
- Safe areas.
- Partner enabling.

- Containment.
- Defeat perpetrators.

3-5. Different approaches will likely be combined. For example, an operational concept could simultaneously employ the area security, partner enabling, and containment approaches. Some approaches may predominate in different geographic areas or during different phases of the operation. See JP 3-07.3 and The MARO Handbook for more information on MARO.

PREPARATION

3-6. Preparation includes measures to train, orient, equip, inform, and inspect Soldiers and units so that they can protect civilians while performing other military tasks. Units should include preparations that will better enable them to interact with the population and other actors. Units prepare for protection of civilians both by conducting long-term preparation for deployments as well as short-term preparations for specific operations. Preparations include measures such as individual and unit training, development of standard operating procedures, and the integration of specialized equipment.

3-7. Leaders must continually emphasize protection of civilians to ensure that units are adequately prepared. Leaders at all levels demonstrate commitment to protection of civilians and exercise necessary initiative when they encounter unforeseen circumstances. Pre-deployment preparations will be challenging for teams that do not come together until after they are deployed. Once deployed and operationally committed, Army units may find it difficult to make appropriate procedural and training adjustments.

3-8. Leaders anticipate that, despite their best efforts to prevent them, civilian casualty incidents occur. Similarly, mass atrocities may occur even if commanders take all possible steps to preclude them. Systems should be established in advance to respond to civilian casualty incidents; these include reporting, tracking, investigation, public response, and making amends to families and communities through the recognition of harm, appropriate compensation, and apologies and dignifying gestures if necessary. Officers should be designated to be in charge of incident handling. They should be reasonably senior within the unit but still have the capacity to spend sufficient time on the task.

Pre-Deployment Preparations

3-9. Army units include protection of civilians as a major area of focus when preparing for deployments. In addition to ensuring that Soldiers receive training on the law of war, commanders should incorporate civilian protection, civilian casualty, and mass atrocity response scenarios into training and exercises. Effective pre-deployment preparation includes:

- Commander and leader emphasis on protection of civilians, including the importance of minimizing and addressing civilian harm.
- Training on the law of war.
- Rules of engagement (ROE) training.
- Escalation of force training.
- Cultural awareness training.
- Identification of and training for unit and staff civilian protection subject matter experts.
- Inclusion of civilians in training exercises.
- Training on civilian casualties and other civilian protection issues.
- Development of and training on consequence management procedures.

3-10. Leaders establish and are familiar with procedures, lessons learned, and any relevant information for their expected area of operation. During training and exercises, commanders avoid focusing exclusively on fighting a hostile adversary. This could reinforce a shoot-first mentality. Exercises include civilians who are not hostile, and units should receive training on the ROE and escalation of force procedures so that Soldiers know how to act towards civilians. Leaders provide Soldiers a protection of civilians "smart card," such as that shown in figure 3-1, to assist Soldiers' awareness.

Prevent Civilian Casualties	In Case of Civilian Casualties
Do not intentionally target civilians or civilian objects. Do not take unnecessary actions that could harm civilians. Do not abuse, degrade, or seek revenge against civilians. Protect civilians from the effects of combat when you can. Know and practice the rules of engagement and escalation of force procedures. Provide support to wounded civilians. Treat civilians as you would want yourself and your family to be treated if the roles were reversed. Follow the Army Values when dealing with civilians.	Alert other Soldiers that civilians are present. Continue the mission. **When the situation permits** Treat or evacuate any wounded civilians. If possible, allow a local representative to accompany evacuated casualties. Report the incident through your chain of command (who, what, when, where, and, why). Obtain names of witnesses (military and civilian). Explain procedures for claims to local civilian leadership. Provide required forms. Maintain a respectful bearing. Provide updates to the chain of command as appropriate.

Figure 3-1. Protection of civilians smart card

3-11. During training, units should practice the appropriate response procedures, such as inquiries or investigations, making of amends, and key leader engagements. Units war-game potential situations, develop unit standard operating procedures, and ensure that Soldiers understand the importance of civilian protection and their own responsibilities. Units should also develop and train on response procedures when civilians become victims. This includes potential civilian casualty situations or extreme cases where genocides, mass atrocities, or crimes against humanity are committed by enemies.

Cultural Awareness

3-12. Effective pre-deployment cultural awareness training can help prevent disdainful perceptions of local civilians. Negative attitudes, such as perceiving local civilians as inferior, must be avoided. Leader emphasis on the importance of all human life and cultural respect will help reinforce desired attitudes. Soldiers must not, for example, refer to civilians with disparaging slang terms. Cultural awareness training should address issues such as the forms of violence anticipated in an area of operations (blood feuds, sexual violence, ethnic conflict, or suicide attacks), the likelihood that civilians carry weapons, the form and level of host-nation rule of law, and whether the host-nation government and security forces deliberately target civilians. The training should also include local customs, particularly those that are relevant for protection of civilians. For example, elders or religious leaders may play a key role in mediating grievances, or women, especially mothers and grandmothers, could exert a strong but publicly unseen influence over the behavior of males.

Command Post Organization

3-13. Unit commanders assign oversight of civilian protection issues to a staff section or to an integrating functional cell. Depending on the circumstances, the operations section might provide oversight and control during operations. The G-9/S-9 is the principle and coordinating staff officer to ensure the effective integration of civil considerations into the planning cycle. The civil affairs section could also manage civil information databases, the civil reconnaissance plan, or the making of amends. It may be appropriate to establish a protection of civilians control element that meets periodically and includes representation from

the operations, intelligence, civil affairs, public information, legal, and fire support sections. The staff proponent monitors the protection of civilians in coordination with other relevant staff sections, civil-military operations centers, subordinate units, other commands, unified action partners, and other actors including civilian or host-nation organizations. The protection of civilians control element may include some full-time staff members who collect and analyze data, assist and monitor progress, assess mitigation activities and incorporate lessons learned, monitor protection of civilians response actions, and respond promptly to reports of civilian casualties and other incidents of civilian harm. Such a control element should be established before deployment. Examples of its responsibilities include:

- Monitoring all movements and engagements, possible incidents of civilian harm, reports, inquiries or investigations, the synchronization of information-related capabilities, and making of amends.
- Collecting, maintaining, analyzing, and disseminating relevant data, including lessons learned.
- Ensuring other staff members and subordinate units understand the importance of civilian protection as well as their responsibilities for reporting, investigating, and taking action.
- Providing frequent and accurate assessments to the commander and other key unit personnel.
- Coordinating effectively with higher, lower, and adjacent units and other partners including the host nation, U.S. government agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.
- Specialized Training and Equipment

3-14. Pre-deployment preparations may also include acquisition of and training on specialized equipment that can help reduce civilian casualties, such as signaling equipment and other nonlethal items. Some unit personnel may receive specialized training to help with protection of civilians. For example, unit points of contact should be identified for incidents involving civilian harm, and appropriate staff members can become trained in reports, inquiries, or investigations, including interviews of victims. Units may train Soldiers on tasks that support protection of civilians such as mentoring and advisory skills, first aid, or medical evacuation. Selected Soldiers may be trained as designated marksmen so that small units have an improved capability to engage targets with discrimination and precision.

Post-Deployment Preparations

3-15. After deploying to an area of operations, Army units make adjustments to their pre-deployment preparations, set conditions in their areas, and prepare for specific missions. Post-deployment preparation includes early engagements with local leaders to establish relationships, understand the population's perspective on threats and vulnerabilities, explain that Army units have good intentions, discuss procedures for handling unfortunate incidents such as civilian harm, and convey any expectations Army units might have of the local population. Engagements with other civilians, such as nongovernmental organizations, may also be appropriate to develop mutual understanding and to reduce the risk of harm as a result of Army operations or enemy actions. Leaders frequently emphasize the importance of civilian protection to their subordinates. This can be particularly challenging if their units have suffered casualties, if it is difficult to distinguish enemies from the general population, or if the population provides support to enemies and adversaries.

Relationships with the Host Nation

3-16. Good personal relationships established in advance with respected host-nation leaders at all levels can be critical in mitigating the effects of any civilian harm that occurs. Host-nation representatives may include political, religious, or tribal leaders. In some situations, it may be appropriate for Army units to expand contacts to include members of the business community, academia, women's groups, minority groups, or others. Host-nation leaders frequently will interact with Army units on a variety of issues, and protection of civilians should be included in the dialogue when appropriate.

3-17. In some cases, protection of civilians concerns may be addressed before an actual incident. In their engagements with community leaders, Soldiers emphasize the importance they assign to protecting civilians, explain the rationale behind some military procedures, discuss ways to prevent incidents and

enable local leaders to report imminent civilian threats to Army units, and mutually develop procedures should incidents of civilian harm occur.

3-18. It is also helpful to inform the population regarding measures they can take to minimize civilian casualties and other incidents of civilian risk. In particular, if civilians are expected to behave in a certain way when encountering Army units (pulling their vehicles over to the side of the road), this should be clearly promulgated to the extent possible. Units should carefully consider whether any such expectations are reasonable and support the overall mission. Depending on the situation, this may potentially be accomplished by radio and television broadcasts, websites, leaflets, key leader engagements, or signs that warn people to keep away or slow down. Some signs may be permanently installed at suitable locations; others may be affixed to Army vehicles or be portable enough to be transported to temporary locations. Signs should be in host-nation language(s) and a native speaker should verify the content. Keep in mind that a large percentage of the population may be illiterate or very minimally educated. Therefore, it may be more beneficial to provide portable speakers or other acoustic devices to communicate with civilians verbally and at a distance. It is important to convince the population that the Army never intends to cause deliberate harm to civilians.

3-19. Protection of civilians should also be addressed with any partnered host-nation security forces, which develop their own procedures to protect civilians. This should be a recurring area of emphasis during any security cooperation efforts. In many situations, host-nation security forces will ultimately assume the lead for civil security, and their approaches to civilian protection could be decisive. Consequently, the protection of civilians should be an integral part of the training and mentoring provided to host-nation forces.

Mission Preparation

3-20. Protection of civilians should be a routine consideration as units prepare for specific missions. As part of their planning and rehearsals, units should include civilian protection contingencies such as: unit encounters with civilians, situations where civilians are being threatened or attacked, enemy contact in populated areas, and procedures if casualties occur including incident reporting. Leader inspections verify that units are equipped with items such as signs to inform the population and claims cards that can be provided to civilians in the event of an incident. Leaders should continue to emphasize that civilians should always be treated with respect and kindness. Interpreters are usually more effective with advance preparation, and they should be instructed regarding possible situations such as encountering civilians, directing civilians from danger, responding to civilian casualties, and engaging with host-nation leaders. In some situations, interpreters may be able to provide helpful cultural advice as to how Soldiers should address these situations.

3-21. Civilian protection preparations may include the procurement, distribution, and maintenance of nonlethal equipment, including signaling items, items to disable individuals and equipment, and equipment such as shields, batons, and faceguards that may be issued to Soldiers performing crowd control tasks. Army units may require large quantities of barrier materials for bases and checkpoints to provide security and standoff. Engineering support may need to assist with these efforts, and infrastructure repairs reduce the risks to civilians. For example, road craters could be repaired which would remove a hazard to civilian traffic and would also reduce the ability of adversaries to seed these craters with explosive devices. In some cases, Army units may provide transportation, supplies, or other support for delivering humanitarian assistance.

3-22. After they are well-established in an area of operations, Army units should be adaptive and conduct other required preparations. This includes any necessary additional training, based on changing situations, experiences (including those of other units), new equipment, or newly-assigned personnel or subordinate organizations.

EXECUTION

3-23. The “execute” step addresses unified land operations that are conducted to protect vulnerable civilians or to neutralize enemies that threaten them. It also applies to other operations with a potential impact on civilian welfare. A key consideration is minimizing the possibility of civilian harm caused by

Army unit operations. Execution also includes actions taken after civilians have been harmed, whether as collateral damage to Army operations or by the actions of other actors. These follow-up actions are discussed further in Chapter 5.

ASSESSMENT

3-24. Assessments are conducted to compare the current situation with desired end state conditions. Assessment of the protection of civilians begins with civil reconnaissance and includes monitoring, evaluating, and recommending or directing action. Assessments are conducted to enhance the unit's understanding and to provide meaningful information to higher headquarters and other organizations.

3-25. A protection of civilians assessment has two purposes. The first is to understand an operational environment and identify problems, capabilities, and gaps that need to be addressed in order to reduce civilian risks. The second purpose is to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of Army units, and other relevant actors, in their implementation of a civilian protection approach to determine if any changes are required. Changes could include a revision of the civilian protection approach, modifications in the employment of Army units, additional training or resources, or transition from one phase of an operation to another.

3-26. Assessments should be conducted on the general situation, including the operational variables, actors, and conflict dynamics described earlier. A general assessment additionally helps gauge progress towards the protective environment described in Chapter 4. Assessments may also be conducted on particular issues. For example, a unit may require an assessment of the policing capabilities in a small city and gather information including the number of police, their organization, training, special capabilities such as investigators and forensics, status of equipment such as vehicles and radios, and adequacy of such administrative and logistical systems such as pay, schools, maintenance, and supplies. Information from Army units may inform integrated assessments at higher political levels, and assessments may be accomplished in conjunction with the host nation or other international actors.

3-27. Army units must learn and adapt quickly to protect civilians in complex environments. Lessons can be obtained from near-miss situations as well as incidents in which civilians were actually harmed. Units should collect and analyze information related to the protection of civilians, including intelligence and inquiry or investigation reports, and disseminate insights to higher, lower, and adjacent organizations. Useful information can also be obtained from nonmilitary actors, including the civilian population. This learning process can be facilitated and made more rigorous with a staff section that has clear responsibility for monitoring protection of civilians. However, as with most issues, leader emphasis is the critical variable. See ADRP 5-0 for additional information on assessment.

WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

3-28. The following is a discussion of each of the Army's six warfighting functions, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection, and how they can be applied to the protection of civilians during Army operations.

MISSION COMMAND

3-29. The commander is the central figure in mission command. Commanders provide subordinates with their intent, the purpose of the operation, the key tasks, the desired end state, and resources. Mission command is based on mutual trust and shared understanding and purpose. Shared understanding of the importance of protection of civilians and the framework in this document will minimize incidents of civilian harm.

3-30. The mission command warfighting function consists of the specific mission command warfighting function tasks and the mission command system. The mission command warfighting function integrates the other warfighting functions (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection) into a coherent whole. It provides purpose and direction to the other warfighting functions. Commanders use

the mission command warfighting function to help achieve objectives and accomplish missions including protecting civilians or minimizing harm to them.

3-31. Mission command includes command relationships, networks and other communications systems, effective decision-making processes, leadership, comprehensive engagement with a variety of actors, and synchronization of information-related capabilities. Mission command can be used to overcome issues resulting when vague or multiple lines of authority exist. Effective mission command can contribute to minimizing incidents of civilian harm, while deficient mission command can result in failure to protect civilians adequately. Protection of civilians must be emphasized within command channels and when leaders engage with other actors. A responsive mission command system is critical to provide useful guidance when unforeseen civilian protection issues develop. In the absence of such guidance or the necessary time to obtain it, leaders must exercise the initiative required to address civilian vulnerabilities and threats.

3-32. Leadership is often the most important variable with respect to protection of civilians. Leaders emphasize the importance of minimizing civilian harm to their subordinates and make it clear that protection of civilians is a priority. Army leaders should also be mindful of this factor as it applies to host-nation and international partners. Confronted with a complex or ambiguous situation, leaders can either act decisively or remain passive. When protection of civilians is the issue, a commander should intend for their subordinate leaders to take the necessary actions to protect civilians.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

3-33. Patrolling is one of the most important tasks Army units perform to support protection of civilians. It is necessary to understand the situation, secure and reassure the population, and deter or defeat enemies that threaten civilians. Patrols may be conducted specifically to protect civilians or conducted primarily for other objectives, with civilian protection as a secondary effect. For example, patrols may be conducted so that women in villages may safely gather firewood or obtain water. Conversely, patrols for any purpose can also protect civilians, as long as patrol members understand these expectations and conduct the patrols accordingly. Patrols should proactively ask questions to assess threats to the population; they may be approached by civilians with protection concerns, such as abducted women or children who have escaped their captors and who are seeking assistance.

3-34. In addition to patrols, Army units establish outposts that can include fixed sites such as checkpoints, guard posts, and observation posts to help provide security at critical locations or over a large area. These outposts may be temporary (i.e., operational for a few hours) or relatively permanent in nature, and they usually are austere. They are normally manned with a small force (squad or platoon) that may reside at the site or be rotated during their daily shifts. Outposts, like patrols, help Army units establish a presence over a large area. They provide surveillance, control activity at key areas, and monitor vulnerable populations as well as potential perpetrators. Outposts are an important method to reassure the population and support engagement with local civilians.

3-35. Cordon and search operations may be conducted to locate perpetrators of violence against civilians, evidence of such actions, criminals who are attempting to escape justice, or vulnerable civilians who need assistance. These operations are often conducted for other purposes, yet they impact protection of civilians. Army units should refrain from causing inadvertent civilian harm during cordon and search operations. Accurate intelligence is required for successful cordon and search operations, which in turn can provide additional information that should be acted upon as rapidly as possible. Units will have to protect sources as well as civilians who cooperate with units during these operations. These operations may be more effective if host-nation security forces play a prominent role. However, such integration could undermine operations security and can be counterproductive if these forces do not respect human rights. Operations should be conducted in a manner that does not reduce the population's support or result in civilian harm.

Neutralization of Threats

3-36. Army units conduct offensive and defensive tasks to disrupt, defeat, or destroy enemies who threaten civilians. Combat operations may be necessary to gain the initiative against threats. By demonstrating that

it has both the will and the capability to defeat enemies, an Army unit establishes the credibility required to deter future aggressive behavior by the threats.

3-37. Combat operations should be carefully planned and conducted to avoid civilian harm, including collateral damage. Civilians could be located with or near intended targets, and in accordance with the principle of proportionality their potential harm must be balanced against the military necessity of conducting an operation. In some cases, these civilians may be present against their will, and provisions may also be required for the possibility that enemy forces include child soldiers who should be protected as much as possible. Commanders should integrate nonlethal means, such as electronic warfare and synchronizing information-related capabilities, in their efforts to neutralize or defeat their enemies.

3-38. Combat operations, especially those that occur outside of strictly self-defense situations, could result in unintended escalation and additional civilian harm. Even if combat operations are largely successful, enemies could elect to retaliate against vulnerable civilians if Army units do not have the resources to secure the entire area of operations. Positioning Army units close to civilians may be intended to protect them, but could also make civilians vulnerable to collateral damage if the military assets are attacked. See FM 3-90-1 for more information on offensive and defensive tasks.

Security Operations

3-39. Army units may screen, guard, or cover vulnerable civilians from enemies that potentially threaten them. Army units can also protect civilians with area security and local security operations. Security operations can be conducted during armed conflict or after a cease-fire has been arranged. These operations will not necessarily protect vulnerable civilians that are outside Army units' areas of operations. See FM 3-90-2 for more information on security operations.

INTELLIGENCE

3-40. Effective intelligence is critical to support protection of civilians by providing the commander and staff a full appreciation of the civilian vulnerabilities and threats in an operational environment. For more on intelligence, see ADRP 2-0, ATP 2-01.3, and Chapter 2.

FIRES

3-41. Fire support is significant to protection of civilians for five reasons. First, fires can suppress, neutralize, defeat, or destroy enemies who have attacked or threaten to attack civilians. Second, fire support assets (including radars and defensive systems such as air defenses) can be deployed to protect civilians. Third, the employment of fire support should avoid causing collateral damage. Fourth, the deployment and employment of fire support assets should not place civilians in proximity at risk because of enemy action. Finally, unexploded munitions can pose a hazard to civilians. When feasible, they should be identified and disposed of as soon as possible.

3-42. In many cases, the use of fires to support protection of civilians will be restricted because of rules of engagement (ROE), a lack of assets, or concern over collateral damage. In other situations, there will be a heavy reliance on the employment of fires because enemies are easily targeted and because some fires, such as airstrikes, can be delivered from great distances. The principles of the law of war govern the use of fires (military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity). The primary challenge is the provision of accurate and timely fire support while avoiding undesired lethal effects upon civilians, friendly forces, other partners, or infrastructure. Positive identification, target location error (TLE), and the clearance of fires are three technical fire support considerations that are particularly important for the protection of civilians.

SUSTAINMENT

3-43. Sustainment affects all military activities and will seldom be specifically related to the protection of civilians. However, inadequate sustainment could critically impair the ability of Army units to provide protection of civilians. Unified land operations require extensive logistical support, which could strain

limited infrastructure used by other actors such as nongovernmental organizations, drive up wages and prices, and reduce the availability of already scarce resources. This can indirectly have a negative impact on civilian welfare. In some emergency situations, Army logistical resources may be used to support other actors or to provide essential goods and services to needy civilians, many of whom may seek security and support from Army units. Protection of civilians may impose other unique sustainment requirements, such as security lighting for large numbers of dislocated civilians.

3-44. Infrastructure improvements, such as airfields and roads, can expand operational reach while improving access to vulnerable civilians. Medical personnel should consider appropriate screening measures for Soldiers from foreign countries who may carry diseases that could threaten civilians. Some partners may not follow sound environmental protection methods, which can further harm civilians. Units should be careful to avoid unnecessary environmental pollution by properly disposing of human waste, trash, and used petroleum products.

3-45. Some unified action partners, such as host-nation security forces, may lack adequate sustainment capabilities. If their personnel are not paid or supplied properly, they may prey upon the population. Army security cooperation activities that improve sustainment functions in these partners can indirectly support the protection of civilians.

PROTECTION

3-46. Effective force protection helps preserve the capability to achieve mission objectives, including protection of civilians. However, concern about force protection may result in a cautious posture that ultimately reduces operational effectiveness and inhibits protection of civilians. Additionally, Soldiers who focus on force protection may be prone to adopt a "shoot first and ask questions later" approach that jeopardizes civilians.

3-47. Conflict and other disasters result in a large number of dislocated civilians who need security and other essentials such as food, water, shelter, and medical care. When they leave their homes and communities, civilians become more vulnerable to malnutrition, disease, exposure to harsh climates, crimes including sexual violence, and other afflictions. In addition, they may still be subject to the effects of armed conflict. Large numbers of civilians may seek protection from Army units, resulting in spontaneous camps adjacent to military bases and outposts. Assistance for dislocated civilians is normally managed by civilian organizations such as humanitarian relief agencies from nongovernmental organizations or intergovernmental organizations. Army units will usually be concerned with the security of the areas surrounding dislocated civilians, particularly camps and any routes that might be travelled by civilians and relief agencies. Units may be responsible for local security immediately outside of the camps' perimeters. More information on the protection and handling of dislocated civilians and dislocated civilian camps can be found in ATP 3-57.10.

3-48. Public unrest can threaten other civilians and their property, with increased chances of civilian harm as individuals attempt to protect themselves and their belongings. Public unrest can be manipulated to result in the targeting of vulnerable population groups, especially minorities. In addition, civilians could be at risk from actions of host nation security forces, especially overreaction with disproportionate means by poorly trained and ill-disciplined units. Army units may perform different tasks to mitigate public unrest, including crowd control or the protection of facilities. These tasks are normally performed to support police forces or host-nation military units. See ATP 3-39.33 for more information on civil disturbances.

3-49. Army units may need to evacuate civilians from conflict areas or from other situations in which they are at risk. The evacuation could be for a temporary or extended time period. The evacuees could include all civilians in the area or members of a particular group (such as humanitarian workers, third-country nationals, or members of an ethnic group). An operation may entail ground evacuation to a safe haven several kilometers away, or it may be a complex endeavor using multiple modes of transportation to more remote locations. While possibly removing civilians from an immediate threat, an evacuation can result in large numbers of dislocated civilians with subsequent humanitarian and resettlement challenges. Civilians could be vulnerable as they leave their homes and travel to a safe area. An evacuation may indirectly support enemy goals, if these include ethnic cleansing. See JP 3-68 for more information on noncombatant evacuation operations.

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Chapter 4
Shaping a Protective Environment

It is important to establish an environment in which civilians are protected over the long term. This requires a comprehensive approach that includes other actors who are better suited to set the necessary conditions. Effective synchronization of information-related capabilities is also critical. It is important for Army units to help establish a safe and secure environment that protects civilians from threats of violence. However, this security usually cannot be sustained over long periods without the attainment of four other desired outcomes including good governance, rule of law, social well-being, and a sustainable economy. Army units perform essential stability tasks to support other actors with the capability, responsibility, and authority to achieve these outcomes. All of these outcomes directly relate to civilian vulnerabilities. Particular attention must be devoted to the protection of vulnerable groups such as women, children, and minorities.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

4-1. Effective protection of civilians requires coordination with other actors, engagements with host nation leaders and the population, multinational operations, and security cooperation that improves the capabilities of host-nation security forces.

COORDINATION WITH UNIFIED ACTION PARTNERS

4-2. A range of other actors have a role in the protection of civilians including host-nation security forces, governmental agencies, local leaders, multinational partners, intergovernmental and international organizations, U.S. government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and the media. However, these actors will often have dissimilar goals, protection priorities, and authorities. To the extent possible, coordination with these actors is essential to achieve an integrated approach to protection of civilians, avoid gaps and redundancies, and resolve disagreements.

4-3. Army leaders should determine what level of cooperation is possible and desirable with other actors. This determination is largely shaped by higher level guidance, will change over time, and will depend on how the other actors view the desirability of a cooperative relationship. The overall operational-level determination may differ from that at local levels in certain areas. Potential areas for coordination may include information-sharing regarding civilian risks and needs, humanitarian assistance, planned operations, requests for assistance, transitions, and security concerns. Eventually, it will be important for host-nation actors to assume control over protecting civilians, maintaining security, and achieving other desired outcomes including good governance, the rule of law, social well-being, and a sustainable economy. This can be problematic when host-nation actors, who are to be entrusted with the future, may be the same actors who perpetrated abuses against civilians in the past. Many nongovernmental organizations and other important actors will attempt to preserve their neutrality and avoid the appearance of collaborating with political and military entities such as Army units or the host-nation government. Consequently, great care must be taken in safeguarding the information provided by these individuals, organizations, and agencies.

4-4. Civilian casualty mitigation can be enhanced when Army units work with other actors. Although many of these actors may be reluctant to cooperate closely with Army units, they may nevertheless be willing to exchange information related to civilian casualty incidents and their prevention, and may support

mitigation efforts. If these actors share some level of agreement with Army units, such as the importance of preventing civilian casualties, a degree of cooperation may be achievable. Army commanders will need diplomatic skills to influence some of these actors and achieve unity of effort. See JP 3-08 for more information on interorganizational coordination.

KEY LEADER AND POPULATION ENGAGEMENTS

4-5. Engagements with key leaders and the population are important ways to coordinate with other actors and to support the protection of civilians. Specific engagements can have a variety of purposes such as to foster relationships, clarify intentions, establish desired conditions to support future efforts, convey messages (including promises, threats, condolences, or apologies), or address problems. Engagement is critical to gain a mutual understanding of civilian risks such as conflict-related sexual violence, to explain how Army units protect civilians while achieving their other objectives, and to obtain the cooperation needed from other actors to support protection of civilians. Engagements with adversaries may at times be appropriate to reduce civilian risks. Army units will occasionally have to engage actors who are competitors with each other and leaders must be careful about losing their impartiality or being manipulated by an actor for ulterior motivations. Additionally, some of the actors may be perpetrators or otherwise have questionable legitimacy. Army units should be careful not to overlook or marginalize important groups such as women or minorities so that their concerns are understood and addressed. If possible, engagements should be coordinated with those of other unified action partners to avoid sending contradictory messages. See FM 3-13 for more information on engagements with key leaders and the population.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

4-6. Multinational operations are those in which Army units are teamed with other international and host-nation actors. These organizations may include civilian or police agencies that integrate their expertise with Army units. Multinational operations support the objectives of the participating organizations and can facilitate monitoring, assessments, and the operational effectiveness of the contributing actors. They are particularly important to obtain host nation involvement in and ownership of civilian protection efforts, since the host nation retains its obligation to protect civilians and eventually must be capable of doing so. Additionally, multinational operations expand mutual situational understanding and can improve the effectiveness of the participants and enhance their relationships with each other. See FM 3-16 for more information on multinational operations.

SECURITY COOPERATION

4-7. Security cooperation activities support and enable partners and other supporters so that these contributors can better protect civilians. Ultimately, the host nation must have the capacity to ensure a safe and secure environment in which civilians are protected and must likewise develop the capacity to maintain acceptable conditions related to good governance, the rule of law, social well-being, and a sustainable economy. One of the most significant security cooperation efforts related to protection of civilians is the improvement of host-nation policing and, when authorized, Army units may be able to contribute to this and other security efforts. See FM 3-22 for more information on security cooperation.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

4-8. A civil-military operations center (CMOC) supports the protection of civilians by facilitating information sharing and coordination between Army units and other actors, including the host-nation population and institutions such as police forces. As described in Chapter 2, information sharing will always be done in accordance with National Disclosure Policies. Units must consult with their foreign disclosure officer before releasing information outside of the Department of Defense. In the case of a CMOC, a formal information sharing agreement may already be in place to facilitate the rapid exchange of information. The unit's foreign disclosure officer can assist CMOC members in understanding the requirements. Different echelons may establish their own CMOCs. Supporting Civil Affairs elements, company and above, possess a standing CMOC capability. A CMOC provides the unit a proponent agency

to improve understanding and facilitate remedial action regarding civilian vulnerabilities and threats. See FM 3-57 for more information on CMOCs.

SYNCHRONIZATION OF INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES

4-9. Army units conduct informational efforts to promulgate messages, inform audiences, and influence perceptions regarding the situation and particularly the objectives and actions of Army units. These efforts can dissuade enemies who target civilians, influence other actors to support civilian protection efforts, inform vulnerable populations, and increase support for Army units as legitimate protectors of civilians. Synchronization of information-related capabilities is also essential to manage expectations and to mitigate the effects of incidents that result in civilian harm. The synchronization of information-related capabilities is an important part of civilian casualty mitigation. As discussed in chapter 5, this can help reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties, mitigate the damage should they occur, and address associated rumors that may be circulating among the population. Examples of enduring messages could include:

- Army units and their partners are committed to the protection of civilians.
- The international community, as well as responsible host-nation actors, supports the mission and the protection of civilians.
- Enemies that deliberately attack civilians or internationally sanctioned peacekeepers are committing war crimes or crimes against humanity and will be held accountable.
- It is important to establish a safe and secure environment that does not foster conflict-related sexual violence, threats to children, or other threats to civilians. Army units and their host-nation partners will not tolerate such acts.

4-10. See FM 3-13 and JP 3-13 for additional information.

4-11. Messages should foster realistic expectations regarding the scope, actions, and success of Army units and other actors that strive to protect civilians. This will help reduce audience frustrations that can develop over time and consequently undermine the mission's credibility. Army units should not encourage any perception that they can protect all civilians at all times, even when protection of civilians is their highest priority. While it is important for Army leaders to gain host nation support, they must be careful not to exaggerate the collective ability to make quick and significant improvement in a country crippled by armed conflict or that is in an otherwise fragile state.

STABILITY TASKS

4-12. For civilian protection to be more than a temporary condition, five desired outcomes are required. These include a safe and secure environment, good governance, rule of law, social well-being, and a sustainable economy. These outcomes affect civilian welfare and reduce grievances that can result in conflict which threatens civilians. Of these, Army units will focus on establishing and maintaining a safe and secure environment in order to protect civilians and enable other host-nation and international actors to operate effectively.

4-13. Army units shape a protective environment by accomplishing the primary stability tasks:

- Establish civil security.
- Establish civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support to governance.
- Support to economic and infrastructure development.

4-14. Efforts such as security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; transitional justice; community building; and humanitarian assistance are particularly critical for ensuring the protection of civilians. Transitions can result in high-risk situations for civilians if they are poorly managed. While other actors will normally have responsibility for these programs and activities, Army units may perform an important supporting role. See ADP 3-07, ADRP 3-07, FM 3-07, and ATP 3-07.5 for more information on stability tasks. See JP 3-29 for more information on humanitarian assistance.

ENSURING PROTECTION OF VULNERABLE GROUPS

4-15. Army units should know the risks facing particularly vulnerable groups. Depending upon the situation, religious, tribal, ethnic, or other groups may be deliberately targeted or marginalized. Women, children, the elderly, and infirm are often at risk during conflict situations.

PROTECTION OF WOMEN

4-16. Women and girls are frequently victims in conflict and unstable environments. Executive Order 13595, which promulgated the United States government's National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (Executive Order 13595), directed that the plan be implemented throughout the federal government. The Department of Defense subsequently created an implementation guide to support the National Action Plan and instructed that the National Action Plan's objectives be incorporated into relevant documents.

+4-17. When appropriate, Army protection of civilian efforts should integrate the following five objectives from the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security:

- National integration and institutionalization. Army units contribute to population-responsive policies in conflict-affected environments and support the integration of women into host-nation positions of responsibility.
- Participation in peace processes and decision-making. Army units support prospects for inclusive, just, and sustainable peace by promoting and strengthening women's rights and effective leadership and substantive participation in peace processes, conflict prevention, peace building, transitional processes, and decision-making institutions in conflict-affected environments.
- Protection from violence. Army units protect women and children from harm, exploitation, discrimination and abuse, including sexual-based violence and trafficking in persons, and hold perpetrators accountable in conflict-affected environments.
- Conflict prevention. Army units support the promotion of women's roles in conflict prevention, improve conflict early-warning and response systems through the integration of women's perspectives, and assist efforts to invest in women and girls' health, education, and economic opportunity to create conditions for stable societies and lasting peace.
- Access to relief and recovery: Army units support the distinct needs of women and children in conflict-affected disasters and crises. This includes ensuring safe, equitable access to humanitarian assistance.

Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

4-18. Conflict-related sexual violence refers to violent acts of a sexual nature, including rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, mutilation, indecent assault, human trafficking, inappropriate medical examinations, and strip searches. Conflict-related sexual violence often occurs when undisciplined militaries, police forces, or other armed groups believe that they can act with impunity against vulnerable populations, especially women and girls. Army units, in conjunction with other actors, must ensure that sexual violence is addressed as a major area of focus and is routinely incorporated into their civilian protection efforts.

4-19. Conflict-related sexual violence frequently occurs during and after armed conflict and is common in fragile states. It is impossible to obtain a safe and secure environment with adequate protection of civilians if conflict-related sexual violence is a widespread problem. Sexual violence is often a component of genocide, mass atrocities, and crimes against humanity and may occur as part of a deliberate and systematic campaign to target a victim group (for example, to destroy families and communities or to support ethnic cleansing from an area). It may also occur in a more decentralized fashion due to a general lack of security and stability. Sexual violence is a crime and should not be dismissed simply as a social problem; however, conflict-related sexual violence is a problem that persons in authority too easily overlook. While conflict-related sexual violence is often assumed to be directed against women and girls, conflict-related sexual violence also includes assaults against men and boys. The mere threat of conflict-

related sexual violence also has an adverse effect, as potential victims may avoid necessary activities such as traveling, working, farming, obtaining water, or collecting firewood if they are vulnerable when doing so.

+4-20. Sexual violence results in long-term physical and psychological harm to the victims themselves and may cause disrupted families, unwanted pregnancies, infant mortality and deaths from childbirth, and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. It can break down the society and social networks for victims, which contributes further to societal inequality and poverty. Women may be more vulnerable to conflict-related sexual violence in traditional societies, even if the culture tends to shelter them, because of stigmas that are attached to victims. Widows may have additional vulnerabilities if they have no means of earning wages, and mothers or other guardians must also see to the needs of children as well as their own. Women often remain silent about conflict-related sexual violence because they fear retribution or being ostracized, or because they are not permitted to have a public voice.

4-21. Other actors have a larger role than does the military in mitigating conflict-related sexual violence. These include police forces, advocacy groups, and specialists in international organizations. The rule of law is important in criminalizing sexual violence, regardless of the perpetrator. Army units can support conflict-related sexual violence reduction in critical ways and must be perceived as a decisively positive force in combating it. In insecure environments in which social services are absent, Army units may often be the first responders to conflict-related sexual violence incidents. Soldiers and leaders must be prepared to take appropriate action in such situations. When perpetrated by military personnel, sexual violence undermines the mission's legitimacy and has adverse effects on military unit cohesion and discipline.

+4-22. Army units should view conflict-related sexual violence elimination as an important and distinct task, but conflict-related sexual violence must also be incorporated in other efforts. For example, units must include conflict-related sexual violence as a focus area when attempting to understand an operational environment. Socio-cultural issues should also be incorporated in the pursuit of the desired outcomes and while executing the primary stability tasks. Regardless of their primary intended purpose, patrols and other operations should reduce vulnerabilities and threats related to conflict-related sexual violence. Units should be alert for conflict-related sexual violence indicators such as changes in mobility patterns, anti-women propaganda, and the absence of girls from schools. Army units should address conflict-related sexual violence when engaging security forces, women (who can be too easily marginalized in some societies), local leaders, and other actors.

4-23. Leaders must emphasize the importance of eliminating conflict-related sexual violence, as well as its significance to the mission, and ensure that Soldiers receive adequate training. This may include scenario-based training and the inclusion of conflict-related sexual violence incidents in exercises. Training should be tailored to local and cultural circumstances and address both the standards of conduct expected of Soldiers and how to respond to conflict-related sexual violence incidents that occur (such as medical treatment for victims, conduct of inquiries or investigations, and detention of perpetrators). Leaders should consider the use of female teams to interact with women in the population, and members of these teams may require their own specialized training in cultural awareness and how to handle victims of sexual violence. Units will require reliable interpreters, and some of these should be women. Army units may also identify and liaise with local women's organizations that can advise them on the local culture and services available.

4-24. Some operations may be specifically intended to reduce conflict-related sexual violence. For example, security patrols may be scheduled to protect women as they conduct their regular activities such as gathering firewood, obtaining water, travelling to markets, or taking children to school. During other operations, such as routine patrols and checkpoints, units should be alert for indicators of conflict-related sexual violence such as the tendency for women to hide, large numbers of displaced women, and statements from witnesses. Interviews with potential victims can help identify incidents and chronic perpetrators, but these should be conducted discretely to prevent retaliation against those who provide information. Units should be prepared to intervene and halt acts of sexual violence when they encounter them and, depending upon their guidance, detain perpetrators. As early as possible, these operations should be conducted jointly with host-nation security forces, including police. Preventive measures can also

reduce the necessity for women to place themselves at risk. For example stockpiling wood in villages or providing water tanks that are regularly replenished can help keep women secure.

4-25. In many cases conflict-related sexual violence will require responsive actions such as medical treatment for victims, inquiry or investigation, accountability of perpetrators, and remediation. While these measures will largely be beyond the expertise of Army units, they can nonetheless identify requirements, enable other actors with the necessary capabilities, and exert pressure to address these issues. As the victims' social networks will likely be destroyed, it may be necessary to establish one-stop centers that provide medical care, psychological counseling, and access to police investigators, legal assistance, and essential services. Transitional justice efforts must account for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence and ensure they have access to health, education, property rights, justice, and compensation. Host-nation justice and medical structures must work to support victims, rather than make their situations worse. A responsive and trained judiciary, perhaps through the use of mobile courts and enhanced with witness protection programs, will help end a culture of impunity. International teams of experts may be necessary to monitor, advise, and report the deficiencies of host-nation institutions that have a role in conflict-related sexual violence mitigation. Collaboration with nongovernmental organizations and civil society can help the international teams perform these functions.

4-26. Conflict-related sexual violence should be emphasized as a prominent theme while synchronizing information-related capabilities and during engagements with key host-nation leaders and other partners. Commanders should ensure that conflict-related sexual violence receives appropriate emphasis, and host-nation authorities should be aware that this is an important standard by which they are judged. Leaders should solicit women's views regarding conflict-related sexual violence and, if they do not already exist, it may be possible to facilitate the creation of women's groups to provide insight on conflict-related sexual violence and other issues. Women's groups, nongovernmental organizations, the media, and civil society organizations can increase awareness, generate the communal interest to eliminate conflict-related sexual violence, conduct local activities, implement and strengthen local norms in accordance with international standards, share information, form multinational partnerships, and advocate to generate political pressure to eliminate conflict-related sexual violence.

Sexual Exploitation

4-27. Prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse refers to the responsibility to respect the physical and sexual integrity of beneficiaries receiving assistance and protection. Sexual exploitation and abuse includes two distinct problems: 1) sexual exploitation, which includes any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another, and 2) sexual abuse, which includes the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions. International organizations have codes of conduct that further specify what is considered serious misconduct and grounds for disciplinary measures. When Soldiers or aid workers exploit the local population, they can erode trust in the purpose of the mission and seriously undermine the legitimacy of operations.

4-28. Army leaders must be alert to sexual exploitation and abuse incidents that may be conducted by persons in authority, including Soldiers in the unit or police and civilians associated with the mission. It may also be perpetrated by partners such as host-nation security forces, members of organizations or institutions that are intended to assist civilians, and other authorities who believe they will not be held accountable in a surrounding culture of impunity. Such actions constitute criminal behavior, undermine the legitimacy of the mission, and generate hostility among the population. Training and education, leader emphasis, clearly articulated policies, quick and thorough inquiries or investigations of reported sexual exploitation and abuse, and disciplinary measures, when appropriate, can reduce these actions. Sexual exploitation and abuse prevention requires command emphasis, and every Soldier must have a basic understanding of the issue. It cannot simply be mentioned as one of many topics during pre-deployment training and subsequently ignored. Leaders must ensure that their own actions, policies, and statements do not implicitly condone sexual exploitation and abuse or related problems such as human trafficking.

+4-29. Host-nation education programs will be vital to shape attitudes, stress the importance of eliminating conflict-related sexual violence, and counter myths such as victims are to blame or that conflict-related sexual violence is anything but a serious crime. Army leaders should encourage the participation of women in community meetings and in sectors such as politics, economics, and security. Perhaps more importantly, they should encourage women's perspectives in the host nation. Positive role models can be highlighted and Army leaders should not be perceived as condoning negative behavior either through their statements or by failing to take action when conflict-related sexual violence or sexual exploitation and abuse occurs. Women constitute half of the adult population, and their active participation is essential for development and reconciliation. Notwithstanding local cultural restrictions that may exist, in many traditional societies women, particularly mothers, often exert a decisive influence on the perceptions and actions of males, even if this largely occurs in the home.

4-30. In addition to any operational difficulties associated with stopping perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence, Army units are likely to encounter three major challenges. First, leaders must ensure that their own Soldiers are disciplined and that unit climates preclude conflict-related sexual violence and sexual exploitation and abuse. Discipline is potentially a challenge with partnered host-nation security forces as well. Second, the host nation's culture may include traditions that discriminate against women and in effect condone sexual violence. Cultural norms may also discourage women and men from reporting sexual violence, thus complicating an Army unit's ability to obtain accurate situational understanding. Finally, a culture of impunity may exist in which important partners are in fact egregious sexual predators.

PROTECTION OF CHILDREN

4-31. Children are particularly vulnerable to armed conflict due to their greater needs for care, their dependence upon others to provide that care, and their greater vulnerabilities. They suffer from the impact of dislocation and disruption to their normal lives. Children are exposed to a variety of threats including malnutrition, disease, psychological harm, separation from or loss of their families, physical attack, unexploded ordnance, sexual abuse, child pornography, abduction, and forcible conscription as slaves, laborers, child-soldiers, or auxiliaries such as lookouts, smugglers, suicide bombers, or messengers. Girls are especially marginalized in some societies and may even be sold into bondage by their families.

4-32. Child protection prevents children from becoming victims of violence, exploitation, neglect, and abuse and allows them to grow into healthy and productive adults. Army units, in conjunction with other actors, address child protection both as a major focus of protection of civilians and within many of the other efforts discussed in this manual. While the protection of children is a distinct task, it should also be integrated into other tasks that relate to situational understanding, operations, and environmental shaping. Army units primarily have a supporting role, as other actors are better able to provide for the unique needs of children. Units may modify their methods and objectives if they know that an adversary's forces include child-soldiers.

4-33. It is generally best for children to remain with their immediate or extended families. This is not always possible, however, and children may end up in foster homes, orphanages, in gangs, or wandering alone or in small groups. While many orphanages are reputable and do their best to care for the resident children, others have squalid conditions in which children do not receive adequate care and are subjected to exploitation and abuse. Establishing or restoring schools should be an early priority to care for and develop children while establishing a normal environment for communities.

4-34. Child welfare should be consciously incorporated within the desired outcomes and primary stability tasks discussed earlier. In addition to improving the current environment, it will be an important investment that will pay dividends as children become adults, often within the timeframe of a mission. It is particularly important to develop institutional capabilities to work with children, such as training police officers who specialize in incidents involving juveniles. While Army units will have limited ability to affect these outcomes directly, they can support and enable the creation of effective institutions such as schools, orphanages, juvenile justice systems, recreation opportunities, and medical care. The primary means is by achieving and ensuring a secure environment in which host-nation actors, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) can operate. Army units can also identify and report needs, monitor progress, and emphasize the importance of child

protection with host-nation counterparts. Civil-military task forces may be established to care for and reintegrate abandoned or abducted children and child-soldiers.

4-35. Leaders emphasize the importance of child protection, and Soldiers should be trained regarding expected standards of behavior and the situations they are likely to encounter. For example, child-soldiers that are captured must be separated from other combatants and given the necessary physical and psychological support to be reintegrated into society. Unit plans and operations may account for the likelihood that child-soldiers will be encountered, but the practical impact on tactical operations may be limited due to the difficulty in determining whether or not an armed and deadly enemy is a child.

4-36. Army units may conduct missions that are specifically related to child protection, such as securing schools or clearing unexploded ordnance. Other operations, such as routine patrols, can also support the protection of children by being alert for indicators that child protection is deficient. These may include the prevalent behavior of children, the presence of abandoned children or abducted children who have escaped their captors, and information obtained from interviews. Units should be alert for child abuse in institutions such as orphanages and hospitals. Interacting with and interviewing patients and orphans can mitigate this while caretakers are not present. In addition to creating the secure space for child specialists to work, units can respond to identified problems by coordinating for necessary civilian support, if reasonably available. Ultimately, child abuse should be addressed as a criminal matter by legal systems that are capable of handling such incidents.

4-37. Children require protection against disease and from stronger competitors for food and other essentials. Especially in situations involving large numbers of dislocated civilians, it will be difficult to find the capacity necessary to adequately care for children who have been separated from their families. Traumatized children, in particular, will require supportive resources that will undoubtedly be lacking. Basic human needs such as food and water may be an urgent priority, and the provision of other requirements, such as schools for children, may be delayed.

OTHER VULNERABLE GROUPS

4-38. A protective environment should safeguard other groups that may be vulnerable. Ethnic, religious, and other identity groups may become victims of violent acts including mass atrocities. Dislocated civilians may encounter violence when they seek to return and reclaim their homes. Army units should anticipate such problems and ensure that adequate security is provided to these groups. This may require physical protection as well as engagement with other actors and effective synchronization of information-related capabilities.

Chapter 5
Mitigating Civilian Casualties

This chapter discusses civilian casualty mitigation during unified land operations. After a brief overview, it presents considerations for preventing civilian casualties and responding to incidents that occur.

CIVILIAN CASUALTY OVERVIEW

5-1. Civilian casualties refer to civilians who are either killed or wounded as a result of armed conflict. They could include members of the local population, civilians from nongovernmental organizations, representatives from intergovernmental and international organizations, and other noncombatants. Civilian casualties have historically been tragic but frequent consequences of conflict. Because contemporary combat increasingly occurs among populations, civilians comprise the vast majority of casualties in modern conflict and in many instances are deliberately targeted.

5-2. Civilian casualties may occur as collateral damage, which consists of unavoidable and unintentional damage to civilian personnel and property incurred while conducting lawful military operations during conflict. They can also be caused by enemy actions against civilians and their property either through deliberate targeting or the excessive use of force. The law of war regulates the conduct of armed hostilities and includes the principles of military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity. Discussed comprehensively in FM 27-10, it includes the following considerations:

- It is unlawful to direct attacks against civilians or civilian objects. Civilians and civilian objects enjoy this protection unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.
- In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare civilians. Army units and their security partners must take all feasible precautions to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects.
- It is unlawful to conduct an attack that may be expected to cause collateral damage excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated

5-3. As counterinsurgency and stability doctrines emphasize, minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage is more than a legal obligation. It is also good policy that supports the mission, and adherence to the law of war is the minimum standard. Minimizing and addressing civilian casualty incidents supports strategic imperatives and is also at the heart of the profession of arms. Excessive civilian casualties call the legitimacy of U.S. operations into question and may assist the enemy. In addition to abiding by the law of war, Army units also act in accordance with other legal directives from U.S. policy makers, such as the rules of engagement and other directives. Civilian casualty prevention may be a fundamental requirement of the mission, rather than simply being viewed as a limitation.

5-4. Unified land operations are increasingly transparent and evaluated by external actors, and Army units are expected to uphold the highest standards in an environment where the enemy will make false accusations and seek to exploit mistakes. Even squad-level actions can have strategic and other significant second-order effects.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR CIVILIAN CASUALTY MITIGATION

5-5. Army units must balance the necessity of using force with the likely effects of using that force. The rules of engagement indicate when the use of force is authorized. However, not all permissible force is necessary in every case, and leaders must consider second-order effects as well. In other words, even if Soldiers or units are permitted to use lethal action, they should not necessarily do so.

5-6. This does not mean that engagements cannot be conducted if civilians will be harmed; it involves a decision of operational benefit versus cost. Some targets are of such benefit that military commanders could determine that the risk of civilian incidental harm and collateral damage is warranted by military necessity. Other targets can be engaged because of self-defense considerations.

5-7. Accidents involving U.S. military vehicles can be another source of civilian casualties. While casualties tend to be low per event, these can cause resentment with the local population and even become a rallying point for political opposition to U.S. forces being present. Accidents can involve either a local vehicle or pedestrians. Operating vehicles safely at regulated speeds mitigates both accidents and resulting casualties, and military personnel should be trained to document accidents and to provide civilians claims cards and contact information whenever accidents occur.

LEADERSHIP AND CIVILIAN CASUALTY MITIGATION

5-8. Leader emphasis on civilian casualty mitigation is critical. Leaders must understand its significance, convince their subordinates of its importance, and ensure that the proper climate regarding civilian casualty mitigation exists in their organizations. As decision-makers, leaders are responsible for balancing military necessity against the risk of harm to both forces and civilians. As trainers, they must prepare their units to mitigate civilian casualties with foresight and agility. In directing their subordinates, commanders must phrase their intent and guidance to best influence those making decisions while in harm's way.

5-9. Commanders should understand the larger context in which civilian casualty mitigation relates to mission goals. They must skillfully balance short-term military needs with long-term mission objectives and consider the effect of civilian casualties on the mission, risks to units when exercising restraint, and expectations of the population regarding the actions of Army units. Commanders should include civilian casualty issues as appropriate when engaging with host-nation leaders and unified action partners.

5-10. Civilian casualty guidance is only as effective as its dissemination and reinforcement. Civilian casualty mitigation is most effective when leaders at all levels emphasize the importance of the issue at appropriate opportunities. This may require particular emphasis in units that have recently suffered casualties. The noncommissioned officer support chain is vital for emphasizing that civilian casualty mitigation is a duty, not an option, and noncommissioned officers must foster the proper climate regarding the protection of civilians. Small unit leaders are key, as they are the Soldiers most challenged when balancing imperatives to preserve the force, defeat the enemy, and protect civilians.

MISSION VARIABLES

5-11. The mission variables that include mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations address the detailed considerations that apply to specific operations. Army units should routinely incorporate civilian casualty mitigation when analyzing the mission variables.

5-12. The unit's mission may dictate that preventing civilian casualties is a higher priority than securing a particular objective or destroying a particular enemy. This may especially be the case during counterinsurgency efforts or stability tasks. Moreover, the mission may indicate that Army units should strive to prevent civilian casualties caused by other actors. For example, long-range enemy assets that can strike friendly population centers may be higher priority targets than other assets that can be employed against the U.S. military.

5-13. The enemy is usually the most critical variable regarding civilian casualties. The enemy may be an irregular force that is indistinguishable from and exists among civilians. They may use this anonymity both for protection and to facilitate their own operations. Additionally, they may attempt to provoke Army units and their partners into overreacting or demonstrate their inability to provide security. Conventional enemy forces may also be located among civilians, and some enemies may intentionally use civilians as shields to dissuade attack by U.S. forces. Although the enemies are still legitimate targets in such circumstances, the civilians retain their right of protection. Discrimination and proportionality, as well as other considerations, may dictate that indirect fires, air strikes, or reconnaissance by fire should be restricted or reserved for a higher approval authority.

5-14. Terrain considerations may have civilian casualty implications that should be incorporated into the analysis for each mission. Terrain must be covered by the available troops and other support. Inadequate coverage increases the risk of civilian casualties because units will be less familiar with the area and people, and because enemy forces will have greater operational freedom. When Army units have limited presence in and access to remote areas, cooperating partners and other actors such as nongovernmental organizations may be helpful in civilian casualty mitigation, particularly with respect to engagement with local host-nation leaders and the population. It may be hard to identify civilians in some types of terrain.

5-15. The time available for an operation will affect the ability to incorporate civilian casualty mitigation during planning and preparations, including the gathering of accurate intelligence that may help prevent civilian casualties. The time required to conduct an operation may determine whether units can use tactical patience to prevent civilian casualties. Leaders should always be mindful that civilian casualty prevention may actually be more important than the tactical objective of the operation they are conducting.

5-16. Civil considerations are also critical and include the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events that are relevant for a specific mission. An Army unit's appreciation of civil considerations is based on its operational experience, previous civilian casualty incidents, and information that can be gained from other units, host-nation representatives, and other actors.

CIVILIAN CASUALTY TRACKING, ASSESSMENT, AND RESPONSE ELEMENT

5-17. Commanders may elect to establish a permanent civilian casualty tracking, assessment, and response element to assist in effective civilian casualty mitigation, collect and analyze data, track progress, incorporate lessons learned, monitor any monetary payments made, and respond promptly to allegations of harm with accurate information. The civilian casualty tracking, assessment, and response element should be established before deployment and its responsibilities may include:

- Monitor all movements and engagements, possible civilian casualty incidents, reports, investigations, the synchronization of information-related capabilities, and making of amends.
- Collect, maintain, analyze, and disseminate civilian casualty data, including lessons learned.
- Ensure other staff members and subordinate units understand the importance of civilian casualty mitigation as well as their responsibilities for reporting, investigating, and making amends.
- Provide frequent and accurate assessments to the commander and other key unit personnel.
- Coordinate effectively with higher, lower, and adjacent units as well as host-nation, U.S. government, international, and nongovernmental organizations.

5-18. Officers should be designated to be in charge of incident handling. They should be reasonably senior in the unit but still have the capacity to spend sufficient time on the task. They should also have sufficient operational awareness and ready access to relevant Soldiers and information. Standard operating procedures should be developed to address established timelines for investigations and response. Civilian casualty incidents should be systematically tracked and included in the commander's critical information requirements. Every Soldier should be trained on what to do in the case of a known or suspected civilian casualty incident. They should know who to report to and what information to have on hand, as well as how to advise host-nation personnel to bring forward claims or grievances to ensure that all alleged incidents of civilian casualties are treated in the same manner.

PREVENTING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

5-19. Civilian casualty mitigation involves more than adhering to the law of war at the moment a target is engaged. It should be routinely incorporated into the military decision-making process, troop leading procedures, staff battle rhythms, the operations process, the decide-detect-deliver- assess methodology that supports targeting processes, and the find-fix-finish-exploit-analyze-disseminate methodology used by maneuver commanders and their staffs to conduct operations. Planning processes should provide an accurate picture of the OE including civilian concentrations, their vulnerabilities, and implications for Army units in terms of their operations and potential responses to civilian casualty incidents. More information on the operations process can be found in Chapter 3 of this ATP.

5-20. Courses of action should account for possible civilian casualties, and its minimization may be one of the decision criteria used to analyze the different options. Depending upon the situation, actions against legitimate targets may even be deferred if the likelihood of civilian casualties is too great. Commanders at higher levels may want to reserve for themselves the approval authority for operations that have an excessively high risk of civilian casualties. In any case, distinction, proportionality, and precautions should be incorporated into mission planning.

5-21. Civilian casualty risks may include direct fires, indirect fires, or traffic accidents; plans should account for these possibilities and include controls to minimize their impact. Comprehensive risk management should also account for the possibility of civilian casualties caused by partnered host-nation security forces, multinational forces, or security contractors associated with U.S. forces. Civilian casualty risks increase when Army units and host-nation security forces have limited capacity to secure an area, prevent civilian casualties, and tend to the consequences of civilian casualties. Host-nation security forces may be unable to protect the civilian population or, even worse, they may be major contributors to civilian casualties.

5-22. Civilian casualty mitigation is similar to fratricide avoidance in many respects, in that both are intended to avoid inflicting casualties upon an unintended target. Civilian casualties are more challenging in that there may be more civilians throughout the area, in unexpected locations, outside of a common command chain with Army units, and in many cases are virtually indistinguishable from the enemy. In the same way that Army units continually consider the possibility of fratricide and take measures to mitigate its risk, they should adopt a similar mindset regarding civilian casualty avoidance.

5-23. It is also important to consider civilian casualty incidents that are indirectly caused by combat operations and civilian casualties resulting from noncombat activities of Army units. As discussed previously, unexploded ordnance and damaged infrastructure present a residual threat to civilians, and civilians also could become victims to traffic accidents or range accidents. National law prohibits Army units from conducting humanitarian demining, but they can dispose of ordnance when there is an operational need to do so. For example, when unexploded ordnance poses a threat to Army units that operate in the area, or if the ordnance could be used by enemy forces to create improvised explosive devices. Army units can also train host-nation explosive ordnance disposal units so that local security forces can take the lead in removing unexploded ordnance that is a threat to civilians. When conducting activities such as convoys or live-fire exercises in the host-nation, units should include the possibility of civilian casualties in their risk management.

5-24. Effective partnerships between Army units and host nation security forces can support civilian casualty mitigation and response efforts. Local security forces tend to have a better understanding of the local culture and environment, which can aid in discrimination and more effective response if civilian casualties occur. These host-nation security forces should be involved in planning and decision-making as much as possible. Partnered operations also can lead to shared responsibility for negative consequences of those operations.

5-25. Soldiers should be trained on the importance of civilian casualty mitigation and the law of war. Units conduct collective training and develop procedures to minimize civilian casualty likelihood and how to respond to civilian casualty incidents as effectively as possible. Civilian casualty scenarios should be incorporated into training exercises. If such simulate incidents occur, units should practice the appropriate consequence management procedures discussed in this chapter, such as investigations, making of amends, and key leader engagements.

5-26. In their engagements with community leaders, Army personnel should emphasize the importance they assign to avoiding civilian casualties, explain the rationale behind some escalation-of-force procedures, discuss ways to prevent incidents, and mutually develop procedures should civilian casualty incidents or allegations occur. Host-nation leaders should be assured that allegations will be taken seriously and will be investigated.

5-27. Civilian casualty mitigation should be addressed with any partnered host-nation security forces who should also develop their own procedures to mitigate civilian casualties. This should be a recurring area of emphasis during security cooperation activities. In many situations, host-nation security forces will

ultimately assume the lead for civil security, and their approaches to civilian casualties could be decisive. Consequently, civilian casualty mitigation should be an integral part of the training and mentoring provided to host-nation forces.

ESCALATION OF FORCE CONTINUUM

5-28. Escalation of force is a process by which forces can escalate from military presence to nonlethal or lethal uses of force, with the goal of using minimal force to deal with the situation. Escalation of force procedures are appropriate when civilians are present and serve two purposes. One is to respond to clear hostile intent with the minimum required force. This is often in the context of situations such as civil disturbance, when an Army unit may be facing a crowd that has shown hostile intent or perhaps committed hostile acts, such as throwing stones. The second purpose of escalation of force is to determine whether an individual has hostile intent. An example of this is when a car approaches a checkpoint in an environment where there is a risk of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and the car does not respond to initial warnings.

5-29. Escalation of force procedures warn or impede approaching civilians, some of whom may be potential threats. The procedures may vary depending upon whether an Army unit is stationary (such as at a checkpoint) or moving (such as on a patrol). Appropriate measures depend upon the proximity of the civilians, their activities, available response time, and the overall security level.

5-30. When escalation of force aims to determine whether hostile intent is present, it is particularly important to avoid misunderstandings with the local individuals involved. This implies that the local population should understand instructions from Army personnel so it can comply with them. Appropriate warning signs and instructional signs should be displayed in local language and in symbols understood by the local population. Separate but mutually supporting messaging by military information support operations (MISO) and public affairs supported by MISO loud speaker teams should be used to emphasize the need to cooperate with U.S. military forces.

5-31. It is also important that Army units have an understanding of normal civilian behavior, or the prevailing patterns of life, so that they can assess possible threatening behavior in an appropriate context. Misunderstandings can occur on both sides. For example, civilians who appear to be approaching too closely may be unaware of the presence of the Army unit, may be attempting to establish contact for legitimate purposes, may be distracted by other matters, or may be accustomed to less restricted norms of behavior. This can occur especially when civilians travel from an area that is highly secure and stabilized to one that is less so, or if an Army unit or partner does the reverse, so there is benefit in establishing standard escalation of force procedures that apply across unit areas of operation and that are shared with the civilian population. Escalation of force procedures and any civilian casualties caused by them should be analyzed to ensure timely capture of lessons learned. Escalation of force stages can include:

- Verbal or visual warnings.
- Demonstrations.
- Nonlethal force.
- Warning shots.
- Disabling force.
- Lethal force.

5-32. Warnings can be conveyed by voice, signs, hand and arm signals, or using other visual means such as laser dazzlers or pyrotechnics. Demonstrations include actions such as steering a vehicle in the direction of an oncoming civilian vehicle to get the driver's attention, charging weapons, adopting a defensive posture, or pointing weapons in the general direction of the potential threat.

5-33. When warnings or demonstrations are inadequate, other escalation-of-force procedures may be employed to impede the progress of a potential threat. These may include blocking the path with an armored vehicle, executing a pre-planned obstacle, or the use of nonlethal measures such as dazzlers or other means. If warnings, demonstrations or other nonlethal means fail to achieve the objective, or are not practical, warning shots (when authorized in rules of engagement) may be fired in the air or in the vicinity of the target. Warning shots should be used judiciously, considering surroundings, chance of ricochets, or

presence of bystanders. They could also inadvertently result in undesired escalation by nearby Soldiers or other actors. In some cases, warning shots may not be authorized. Disabling shots (for example to the tires or engine block of an approaching vehicle) may be required. In some cases such escalation of force may be preferable to lethal force.

5-34. Soldiers should be aware that excessive use of some aggressive escalation of force measures may generate resentment among the local population even if civilian casualties do not occur. For example, civilians may become more hostile if they feel that Soldiers are too frequently pointing weapons or firing warning shots at them or their families.

USE OF FORCE

5-35. Some situations will require instantaneous decisions about using force. In other cases, tactical patience will be appropriate to develop the situation with due consideration for preventing civilian casualties. While many urgent situations will preclude a methodical review of these questions, units can proactively consider them when preparing for their operations. Some factors that may be considered include the following:

- Is action necessary for self-defense, defense of other Soldiers, defense of partners, or defense of civilians?
- Can action be taken without endangering civilians or by minimizing the danger to civilians?
- Is immediate action required, or can it be delayed until better conditions are obtained (such as removing vulnerable civilians from the area)?
- Are other options readily available?
- What are the rules of engagement (ROE) and standard operating procedures for this situation?
- What action will best support the mission over the long term?

5-36. Whether higher command levels or Soldiers make decisions in direct observation of a potential enemy, the risks of civilian casualties increase when time is short and information is incomplete or inaccurate. Civilian casualty risks can be mitigated if time can be bought with tactical patience, when Soldiers are afforded standoff that gives them more time to decide whether or not to engage a target, and when enemies are denied their own ability to maneuver. Key questions related to tactical patience include: How important is the objective? How great is the threat to self or unit? What are the potential negative consequences of waiting? Is the situation likely to be clarified or improved with time? What are the potential benefits and costs associated with exercising tactical patience?

5-37. Direct fire can result in civilian casualties either through collateral damage and incidental harm during an engagement of the enemy, or misidentification when forces target civilians mistakenly believed to be hostile. Civilian casualties can be mitigated by consideration of the local environment and where locals are likely to be located, as well as surface danger zones and beaten zones to avoid situations in which direct fire projectiles go through populated areas. When possible, unit maneuvers should attempt to minimize civilian exposure to these fires. Misidentification can be reduced with tactical patience as discussed above.

5-38. Self-defense engagements can be particularly prone to civilian casualties. There are two components to the decision to engage: whether there is a threat, and whether the nature of a threat is immediate, requiring prompt action. Discerning whether there is a threat means deciding if there is a hostile act or hostile intent present. The first is usually relatively straightforward to determine—small arms fire aimed at Army units, incoming artillery, or throwing rocks can all constitute hostile acts. The second can be more difficult to discern, as this involves interpreting the behavior of a potential threat, when no hostile act has been committed. U.S. forces can sometimes misunderstand the intent of local nationals, such as individuals digging in the ground at night. This behavior, which may be an indicator of hostile intent could be the emplacement of an improvised explosive device, could also be a local farmer working at night to avoid the heat during the day. In addition, some societies are armed cultures in which it is common for citizens to possess weapons for self-defense. In this context, the fact that a person is armed may not be a sufficient indicator of hostile intent. U.S. forces can often use verbal or visual warnings, barriers, and physical standoff to gain more time to determine whether hostile intent is present.

5-39. At the same time, civilian casualties can often be avoided if an Army unit can employ tactical options that are more limited than extreme measures. This requires considering both alternative tools—lethal and nonlethal—and the timing of the response. Civilian casualty mitigation requires the adoption of a thought process that, when feasible, incorporates tactical patience and the consideration of alternatives. Examples of this thought process include the following:

- Use Soldiers and weapons that are precise, locally controlled, and limited. For example, snipers or designated marksmen in some situations are preferable to indirect fires, airstrikes, or giving all Soldiers in a unit the permission to engage at their discretion.
- Conduct census operations and assessments in partnership with host-nation forces, rather than raids, in order to cull out a hidden enemy, in manners that positively engage the population and minimize civilian casualties. For information on census, civil affairs assessments, and management of relevant information, see FM 3-57, ATP 3-57.10, ATP 3-57.20, and ATP 3-57.50.
- During actions on contact, use fire and maneuver rather than indirect fires and airstrikes as the default response, and raise the authority for fires clearance to higher levels.
- Develop small unit standard operating procedures that facilitate quick distinction between civilians and actual threats.
- Employ nonlethal capabilities to warn away civilians and help determine the presence of hostile intent. Depending upon the tactical situation, during periods of limited visibility lights or pyrotechnics may be necessary to signal civilians in time.
- Change vantage points to gain better observation of a suspected target, or contact other Soldiers and units that may have a better view. Observation can often be improved by using binoculars and magnified individual and vehicle weapon sights. Helicopters and tactical unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) can change vantage points quickly.
- Proactively share information between units. For example, with prior coordination Army aviation forces can provide digital communication and digital video feed sharing from the aircraft's day video system through a one system remote viewing terminal to the ground force commander, thereby increasing situational awareness.

5-40. Army units and their partners who are conducting administrative movements such as convoys also can cause civilian casualties. If moving through areas that they believe are not secure, they may be inclined to shoot at possible threats or fire indiscriminately in an effort to suppress potential threats. These actions can cause civilian casualties and, as discussed earlier, can undermine long-term security by causing resentment in the population. A greater civilian casualty threat may be accidents involving civilian vehicles and pedestrians, which can be likely if military vehicles drive rapidly and aggressively, particularly in congested areas.

5-41. Convoys that travel long distances may not be familiar with the different areas they pass through. Close coordination with the U.S. or host-nation units responsible for different areas of operations, including escort by these local units if appropriate, can avoid some of the civilian casualty risks associated with a unit passing through unfamiliar territory. Depending upon the tactical situation, convoys may use signs, advance and trail elements, lights, and pyrotechnics to warn civilians regarding their presence. Soldiers should not assume that host-nation drivers are alert, skilled at operating their own vehicles safely, or familiar with informally expected ways to behave (such as stopping on the side of a road when a military convoy approaches). When possible, Army units should use alternate routes away from civilian populations and, possibly, not use main civilian thoroughfares. While this may be more inconvenient and time consuming, it could lessen the chances of civilian casualty incidents and improve overall relations with the population.

5-42. Army units should avoid becoming complacent because civilian casualty incidents have not occurred. They should also monitor relevant information such as near misses and escalation-of-force occurrences that did not actually result in civilian casualties. This may help prevent future civilian casualty incidents or identify related host-nation concerns and perceptions that should be addressed.

LEARNING FROM CIVILIAN CASUALTY INCIDENTS

5-43. Army units can prevent civilian casualties by incorporating lessons learned from previous incidents, including near misses. Collection, analysis, and dissemination of civilian casualty information horizontally and vertically are critical for civilian casualty mitigation. Insights on civilian casualties can be obtained from mission after action reviews and debriefs, assessments of unit experiences, cross-talk with other units, data management and analysis, investigation results, and a focused effort to gather lessons from host-nation individuals and organizations, other U.S. government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and other actors. Relevant information can be obtained from professional literature, social networking websites, and new doctrine.

5-44. Learning is best achieved when the chain of command continues to emphasize civilian casualty mitigation at appropriate opportunities. Within units, civilian casualty mitigation lessons can be absorbed with training sessions, mission briefings, rehearsals, noncommissioned officer calls, and officer calls. These sessions can discuss engagements, ROE changes, and other topics and can use resources such as storyboards, gun tapes, and reports.

5-45. Army leaders should foster an appropriate organizational climate that balances trust, transparency, and accountability. When a civilian casualty incident occurs, leadership should avoid creating an overly punitive environment where the focus is on finding someone to blame for an incident. Sometimes, civilian casualty is simply an unfortunate part of warfare. A purely punitive approach provides incentives for subordinates to suppress information and cover up incidents, keeps valuable lessons in legal channels, and limits initiative and learning. Instead, leaders should first mentor units and individuals to help them to refine their approaches and overcome challenges with which they may be struggling. Monitoring of civilian casualties at all echelons can aid leaders in deciding when mentoring is needed and what kind of mentoring is appropriate.

5-46. Investigations for civilian casualty incidents often contain valuable lessons but are often too restricted to disseminate widely. The investigation team can overcome this by producing a summary of key lessons that can be distributed separately from the investigation itself. Since investigations of civilian casualty incidents can vary widely, there is also benefit from the investigation team having a standard list of issues and facts to include in their investigation (see example in Appendix A).

5-47. Collection, analysis, and dissemination of civilian casualty data is vital. Units should maintain an accessible, historical civilian casualty database that includes the "who/what/when/where/why" of incidents. It can also include information regarding the area of operations such as local customs and key points of contact. Such information should be used for lessons learned, as an archive for actions such as amends and as a resource for future units that rotate into the area of operations. This database should be updated as a case progresses and should also include information on the response to the case, including any amends made. It is preferable for such a database to be established early at a high echelon and have subordinate units conform to it, rather than to have subordinate units independently develop their own systems.

5-48. Despite the inevitable challenge of incomplete and conflicting information, Army leaders and staffs must analyze data and significant insights from both involved Soldiers and civilians. Pattern analysis can help identify locations where civilian casualty incidents have greater likelihood of occurring as well as the procedures or units that may be prone to cause such incidents. Conversely, analysis might identify useful methods that could be emulated more widely. Analysis may also provide other relevant insights. For example, the local population may perceive that civilian casualties are a significant problem while Army units might believe that a problem does not exist. These dissimilar viewpoints should then be reconciled. Further analysis may reveal that while Army units may not be involved in civilian casualty incidents, the population may blame them for not preventing civilian casualties by other actors such as host-nation security forces, security contractors, armed militias, criminal gangs, or the enemy. Additionally, the population may blame Army units for hardships and decreased human security resulting from a lack of infrastructure or diminished essential services.

5-49. Civilian casualty lessons do not come solely from actual civilian casualty incidents, but also from incidents that posed a high risk of civilian casualties which did not actually happen. Such near misses can offer valuable lessons and best practices. While collecting information on near misses can be a challenge,

Soldiers may be more willing to discuss these experiences more openly than those involving actual casualties. Leaders should ensure that these incidents are also used for training, mentoring, and learning. Lessons learned that result in a change in civilian casualty mitigation procedures should be shared across the entire area of operations and implemented wherever appropriate, to maximize the benefit and minimize the tendency to create ad hoc or disparate procedures.

5-50. For more information, see Reducing and Mitigating Civilian Casualties: Enduring Lessons.

RESPONDING TO CIVILIAN CASUALTY INCIDENTS

5-51. Army units should anticipate that, despite their best efforts to prevent civilian casualties, serious incidents of civilian harm will occur. Army units must be able to recognize possible incidents of civilian harm, conduct inquiries or investigations, analyze imperfect information to ascertain facts and trends, and take appropriate action when they receive reports that civilians have been harmed. Effective response will enhance the Army units' legitimacy and build trust among the civilian population and other actors.

5-52. A major challenge will be determining which reports are true and which are false or inaccurate. Deceitful reports may be generated by adversaries seeking to discredit Army units or their partners, or by false claimants who are hoping for monetary compensation. Another challenge will be to convince different audiences that any military inquiries or investigations are truthful, which will require effective synchronization of information-related capabilities.

5-53. It is important to identify when immediate information efforts are required to respond to media or rumors after a reported incident, even if the facts are not completely known, because the first credible story usually has the greatest influence. Effective synchronization of information-related capabilities must respond quickly to local, international, and US national media, and not wait until after the incident has been fully investigated, to prevent enemies from spinning the incident in their favor.

5-54. Civilian casualty response includes the following stages:

- Incident awareness.
- Initial response.
- Investigation.
- Sharing findings.
- Making amends.
- Informing local media and wider communities.

INCIDENT AWARENESS

5-55. Army units may directly witness civilian casualty incidents, and these should always be reported through the chain of command. However, many allegations may be brought to their attention by other sources. Allegations may be legitimate, mistaken, or false. Allegations may be referred to Army units indirectly because complainants are reluctant to make contact with U.S. forces. Allegations that are not raised directly with Army units or host-nation security forces may nevertheless be genuine and damaging to U.S. interests.

5-56. Ideally, civilians should be confident that they can report civilian casualty incidents without fear of retribution or harassment. Even if relatively assured of the former, base access procedures that are perceived as unreasonable or humiliating may compound the complainants' anger and resentment. Soldiers should treat civilians respectfully and take their concerns seriously. They should refrain from appearing rude, impatient, or dismissive. This respectful attitude needs to be command-driven and reflected at all levels, as all Soldiers, regardless of rank, have the potential to be approached and must know their appropriate actions and attitudes.

5-57. Army units should be proactive in their situational understanding of civilian casualty incidents and the population's perceptions. This can be accomplished by regular engagement and effective liaison with local leaders, intergovernmental and international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as monitoring the local media, enemy propaganda, and local rumors. American perceptions of such

information are largely irrelevant; local assessments of the credibility are what matters. Army leader interest in civilian casualties can enhance improved relations with local leaders, and constructive relationships with these leaders can also enhance commanders' situational awareness regarding civilian casualty and mitigation efforts.

5-58. Accurate information may be obtained through a civilian casualty battle damage assessment (BDA), in which Army units inspect the site where the incident took place to understand what effects an operation had on the civilian population. Units must be prepared to support basic site exploitation activities including evidence preservation, biometric enrollment, and forensic collection. Site exploitation may require specialty teams with capabilities typically not found in Brigade and below conventional force maneuver units (see ATP 3-90.15, Site Exploitation Operations, for a more detailed discussion of Site Exploitation). Host-nation security forces, which can be more culturally attuned to the population, may be better able to find key evidence at the site. Storyboards based on BDA results can be provided through the chain of command and to inform host-nation civilian and military leaders. It can also be helpful for local or provincial leaders to visit the site and help with investigations, thus adding legitimacy to the findings.

5-59. On-site BDA is not feasible in all circumstances, due to the locations of Army units and threat considerations. When air platforms are involved, full motion video (if available) can be used as a surrogate for on-site BDA. Recorded video can be declassified, if necessary, and used as evidence in an investigation. Recognizing the value of this capability for providing a record of events, aviators may adopt the practice of "talking to the tape," and provide a narrative of their decisions and the operational context to provide a complete account of a potential civilian casualty incident.

INITIAL RESPONSE

5-60. Initial responses to civilian casualties are critical both by Soldiers at the site of an incident and by the higher headquarters of the units involved. Soldiers who are aware of civilian casualties should alert other Soldiers of the presence of civilians, as this may prevent additional casualties. When the operational situation permits, unit leaders should:

- Treat or evacuate any wounded civilians. When circumstances permit, the law of war requires taking all possible measures to search for, collect, and evacuate wounded combatants and civilians. Treatment may also be provided subsequently, once Army units are aware of the casualties. If possible, allow a local representative to accompany any evacuated casualties.
- Report the incident through the chain of command (who, what, when, where, why) and provide updates as appropriate. See Appendix A.
- Obtain names of witnesses (military and civilian).
- Explain procedures for claims to local civilian leadership. Provide any required forms.
- Maintain a respectful bearing.
- Provide updates to the chain of command as appropriate.

5-61. When a command post receives a report of a civilian casualty incident, the following actions should be conducted as an initial response:

- Confirm circumstances with the unit, and update information as available.
- Arrange necessary medical or other support for casualties or the unit(s) involved.
- Document incident in accordance with procedures and update information as required.
- Contact local key leaders to express condolences, exchange information, or coordinate subsequent steps.
- Develop public affairs guidance and command message, and disseminate to media and other outlets. Identify and counter enemy information activities related to the incident.
- Initiate any required investigations or other procedures.

5-62. The synchronization of information-related capabilities, including key leader engagement and public affairs, is particularly critical to maintain credibility, preempt rumors, and minimize the enemy's possible exploitation of a reported incident for propaganda purposes. This may be required before all the facts are

known, but should be as credible and responsive as possible. A consistent pattern of accuracy and transparency regarding civilian casualties and other issues will help maintain credibility.

Allegations

5-63. If an allegation is clearly well founded, Army units should begin to make amends. Conversely, if an allegation is clearly incorrect, leaders should explain this in as much detail as possible. When in any doubt, leaders should opt for an investigation of an incident. Often, the process itself can play a major part in addressing local anger and concerns. The worst thing that can be done is to ignore a grievance, and local civilians will not necessarily accept Soldiers' credibility without question. If an investigation is required, Soldiers should explain the relevant procedures, clearly establish the expected timeframes, and identify the assistance and cooperation required. The entire process of consequence management works best when it is done in a transparent fashion and in frequent contact with victims, survivors, or their community representatives.

5-64. When dealing with people who claim to have lost relatives or have been involved in an incident, Soldiers should show empathy and respect even if they are unsure as to whether the civilian casualty claim is genuine. People show grief in different ways, even within a culture, and Soldiers should act as they would want to be treated if the roles were reversed. Soldiers should also be prepared for the fact that civilian casualty response can be an emotional and intense experience. In the immediate aftermath of an incident, Soldiers should be sensitive to local anger and any cultural norms (such as not touching dead bodies). In some cultures, extensive discussion of important events is expected; Soldiers should be patient during such sessions even if they seem unnecessarily repetitive.

5-65. Leaders should know cultural norms, as the negative effects of a civilian casualty incident can be compounded if these are disregarded. In some cases it may be appropriate to contact the victim's family directly, while in other situations this should never be done; an intermediary such as a tribal leader should be used instead. Some cultures may "require" acts of vengeance by surviving family members, though in some cases token gestures of vengeance will suffice. Monetary compensation may be appropriate in some situations; in others it would be perceived as an insult.

5-66. In some cultures, female Soldiers and interpreters, or female engagement teams, will be invaluable to interview host-nation women who are potential witnesses to a civilian casualty incident. These Soldiers should be trained beforehand regarding interview procedures, cultural norms, and civilian casualty mitigation procedures.

5-67. Some complainants will be insulted if they are asked to provide evidence to back up an allegation, rather than being believed outright. The need for evidence can be justified in several ways, such as explaining chain-of-command requirements to back up reports with evidence before compensation money is released. Requiring all claimants to provide sufficient evidence should be weighed against the potential for fostering resentment by not paying real claims that have insufficient evidence for legitimate reasons.

5-68. Personnel services include financial support and procedures to provide compensation to victims and their families. Army units can anticipate requiring legal support for civilian casualty investigations and any related judicial proceedings. Psychological or religious support may be required for Soldiers involved in civilian casualty incidents and, when directed by the commander, for liaison with host-nation religious leaders or family members. Graves registration and forensics capabilities may be required to handle the remains of civilian casualties. Health service support may be required for wounded civilians, and Soldiers involved in civilian casualty incidents may need psychiatric treatment. Medical needs could persist long after the incident occurred.

5-69. Army units may need to assist host-nation security forces and multinational forces with their requirements to address civilian casualties. Additionally, they may be tasked to facilitate humanitarian assistance to reduce civilian suffering caused by conflict. Much of the aid work for host-nation civilians, including treatment of casualties, may be accomplished by intergovernmental organizations, other U.S. government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. They will be particularly important to provide assistance in rural or remote areas. Army units can support the efforts of these other actors by facilitating

their transit through checkpoints, ensuring adequate security, providing emergency transportation, and assisting with their situational understanding.

Mass Atrocity Sites

5-70. During a mass atrocity response operation (MARO), Army units should expect to discover mass graves or other mass casualty locations. These situations will require mobilization of civilian-military resources to treat wounded, conduct burials and graves registration, establish security, provide essential goods and services to survivors, conduct investigations, and cope with a wide range of other activities such as media requests and visits by political authorities. It will be important to establish on-site coordination with a senior officer who can ensure effective cooperation with local and international civilian and police officials. Army units may be critical to provide security, communications, transportation, and logistics to other organizations until they are established and fully operational. Higher headquarters must proactively provide any required support to the on-site commander, including conducting the external coordination required to obtain such support.

5-71. The following steps should be considered when Army units encounter a mass atrocity situation or other extreme cases of civilian harm. For more information on site exploitation see ATP 3-90.15.

- Provide medical treatment to survivors.
- Secure site.
- Report to higher headquarters.
- Avoid disturbing site, and try to prevent others from disturbing site (looters or family members of victims).
- Document the situation, especially with photographs and video. Combat camera teams, if available, can be useful in recording the circumstances.
- Bring in experts to begin an investigation as soon as possible. These may include qualified police/legal/medical experts from higher headquarters or outside experts from the International Committee of the Red Cross, international organizations such as the United Nations, civilian agencies, or from the host nation. Army units may have to facilitate their transportation, access, and logistical support. Ideally, qualified investigators should interview witnesses, if available.
- Synchronize information-related capabilities and consider access of media outlets.
- Attempt to determine perpetrators' modus operandi to determine indicators that might help identify other atrocities, including those that may be imminent.
- Incidents can be stressful for Soldiers that come across them. Soldiers that are involved in such situations may require counseling or other services.

INVESTIGATION

5-72. Civilian casualty investigations may include commanders' inquiries, investigations in accordance with Army Regulation 15-6, criminal investigations, and independent investigations by other organizations such as the United Nations or host-nation agencies.

5-73. Commanders' inquiries are conducted to determine if it is reasonably likely that civilians were harmed. The inquiries are nonpunitive, base their conclusions on the preponderance of the evidence, and should be conducted expeditiously. Commanders' inquiries are conducted in response to most reports and allegations of civilian casualties. These investigations often have two goals: to determine the facts of the incident, and to identify lessons for the future.

5-74. AR 15-6 investigations are initiated in response to serious and credible civilian casualty reports and allegations. They may require an extended timeframe to complete. As with commander's inquiries, the standard of proof is the preponderance of the evidence. These investigations may result in determinations of fault, misconduct, recommended procedural changes, or appropriate compensation to victims and families. It is desirable that amends be made quickly when it is reasonably likely that civilians were killed or injured. If allegations of U.S. abuse or misconduct are made, care must be taken to ensure that amends are not perceived as an attempt to pay off the victims without conducting the proper investigations and

ensuring disciplinary action is taken. In cases of confirmed abuse or misconduct, the Foreign Claims Act should be used to compensate victims appropriately. Thorough, comprehensive, and well-documented AR 15-6 investigations can also serve to rebut false allegations of the cause or nature of a civilian casualty incident, which the enemy may make in an effort to discredit or delegitimize U.S. forces.

5-75. If a criminal investigation is warranted, it should be initiated as early as possible in accordance with the SOP or regulations applicable to the servicing investigative unit or, if charges have been preferred, Article 32 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Adherence to due process and protection of the accused's rights will become additional important considerations for the command.

5-76. Independent investigations may provide several benefits including integrity, credibility, effective countering of false or misleading information, the ability to take prompt action regarding short and long-term mitigation, and the opportunity to incorporate external perspectives. However, independent investigations will often not be feasible and Army investigations should also strive for as many of these benefits as possible. Reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross may be used to assist Army investigations and actions.

5-77. Investigative reports provide information that support trend analysis and assessments. See Appendix E for standardized civilian casualty data elements that should be considered when conducting investigations.

Conducting an Investigation

5-78. Investigators should make effective use of internal military records and crosscheck allegations with them. However, allegations should not be automatically dismissed if relevant internal records do not exist. Investigators should also interview and obtain statements from Soldiers and host-nation security personnel who are potential witnesses.

5-79. Investigations should involve the community. This gives the population an opportunity to tell their story, air grievances, and strengthens the credibility of the investigation's findings by demonstrating that a serious investigation has taken place. Witnesses should be interviewed separately and results checked with other accounts and evidence for consistency. In some cultures, special arrangements should be made to interview female witnesses. This may require female interpreters and interviewers. If possible, injured personnel should be interviewed. Interviewers should consider such factors as education, social and familial ties, and political motivations when assessing credibility.

5-80. Interviewers should ask for evidence such as pictures of dead or wounded, their names, and pictures of damaged and destroyed items. Many people in the host nation may have camera phones that can be used to provide pictures. If unable to visit locations personally, interviewers may be able to obtain footage from Soldiers or host-nation personnel who have access to the area. The importance of an investigator taking photographs and video footage cannot be overstated. The adage "a picture is worth a thousand words" is especially true when conducting an investigation of civilian casualties. Photographs and video preserve important factors that may not be recognized until much later.

5-81. Investigations should seek to determine key facts and factors regarding the civilian casualty incident. If there is no overall template for an investigation, investigations can be hit or miss in identifying key factors at play. Appendix A includes a civilian casualty investigation format containing information that may be addressed.

Investigation Challenges

5-82. Investigators may have to cope with inaccurate or false claims, which in some cases may be extremely sophisticated. Inaccurate claims may be a result of genuine confusion about circumstances surrounding a civilian casualty incident. For example, witnesses may attribute any occurrence to actions by U.S. forces regardless of whether or not that was actually the case. The enemy may also deliberately conduct attacks against civilians and attempt to make it appear that U.S. forces or their partners are at fault. False claims may be made to discredit U.S. forces, perhaps as a result of intimidation by enemy elements. They may also be made simply to make money through compensation payments. Casualties may have actually occurred from accidents or the actions of other entities such as host-nation security forces, but the

allegations may be made against Army units to obtain monetary compensation or for some other motivation. For example, they may not know who actually caused the harm or may not have a readily available alternative for making a report. It may be possible to mitigate these investigation difficulties by involving local leaders with whom long-term relationships have been established, but this may not be feasible or effective in all cases. Concern about false claims can be mitigated if Army units or trusted host-nation partners are familiar with the areas and people where the claims are made.

5-83. Cultural sensitivities can impede investigations, including a host-nation reluctance to involve women or provide photographs of bodies. These may require sensitive handling such as assurances regarding the use of evidence and the involvement of female investigators. In the same way that the potential for civilian casualties must be weighed against military necessity, the possibility of paying a false claim should be weighed against the potential for fostering resentment by requiring what civilians perceive as too high a standard of proof. It is important to work closely with host-nation partners to help strike the right balance.

5-84. Witnesses may refuse to cooperate because they are afraid of retribution or because the civilian casualty problem is so widespread that an investigation of a particular case is viewed as a token effort that ignores broader issues. Army units should establish systems that handle all civilian casualty incidents in their areas of operations. This necessitates regular coordination and sharing of relevant information between Army units, other U.S. and multinational forces, host-nation security forces, host-nation government agencies, local leaders, and nongovernmental organizations.

SHARING FINDINGS

5-85. An investigation's findings should be shared with the affected community, potentially during engagements with local key leaders. Depending upon the culture, it may be preferable for victim family members to be present. Any amends to be made can often be incorporated into the same forum. Accurate translations will be particularly important during these sessions.

5-86. Determinations that civilians were harmed need not entail findings of fault, and need not be presented as such. Individual U.S. and host-nation sources should be protected from possible retaliation. The local community may not be satisfied with the findings; the less likely the conclusions will be well received, the more important the explanation of the evidence and reasoning becomes. It may be possible to agree to disagree, although ideally a face-saving compromise may be reached. Army leaders should be concerned about maintaining a reputation for credibility, which will be established by acknowledging actual incidents and convincingly refuting false allegations.

MAKING AMENDS

5-87. Whenever it is likely that civilians were harmed, Army leaders should make appropriate amends, which may include apologies, ex gratia monetary payments (paid without obligation or liability), other tangible dignifying gestures, and/or explanations of any resulting changes such as new guidelines or policies. Making amends does not imply legal liability and is separate from other military systems of accountability. Amends may be directed at individual families, the wider community, or both (a community project in the memory of the victims). The making of amends may also include truth and justice commissions and dignifying gestures such as ceremonies, memorials, and community projects in honor of victims. Higher-level commands must carefully prescribe procedures and standards for any monetary disbursement to ensure that Army units act consistently and legally and to prevent abuse of any funds.

5-88. A program of amends is most effective when it operates equitably and fairly across an area of operations. Army leaders should streamline civilian casualty response mechanisms, so that civilians suffering losses do not see an ad hoc response that they could mistake for political or economic bribery or other deceitful efforts. This requires coordination among commanders in a particular area of operations, tactical guidance on the proper civilian casualty procedures, appropriate mechanisms to capture and analyze information on civilian casualties, and the rapid sharing of lessons learned.

5-89. Communities may be concerned with accountability. If the facts warrant, it may help to explain that more detailed investigations may continue. Military systems of accountability and due process may not align with local expectations of accountability, and it may be necessary to explain why these processes are

inevitably slow. Sharing the outcomes from formal investigations, even months or years after the relevant event, can have a positive impact and this should always be considered as a default public relations action.

5-90. The harming of civilians can cause considerable economic hardship, especially when a wage earner is killed or wounded. Federal law prohibits paying claims for death, personal injury or property that were incurred while incidental to combat. However, the making of ex gratia payments for harm is an important goodwill gesture as part of a wider making of amends, showing that US forces care about the host-nation population. Providing compensation also has operational benefit. For example, in World War II, US forces found that providing compensation for military harm had a pronounced stabilizing effect that more than justified the expenses of the program. While not intended as a means for civilian casualty compensation unless guidelines permit it, a commander's discretionary fund can sponsor projects as a means to facilitate community-wide reconciliation. If no such payment mechanism is in place, it should be requested through the chain of command.

5-91. Ex gratia payment processes must strike a balance between not being excessively bureaucratic and not becoming viewed as an opportunity for local populations and their leaders to make a quick profit. Payments should be governed by a principle of fairness and be proportionate in amount and accessibility for all those harmed. Amounts and means of payment should be linked to local tradition when possible. Standardized payment guidelines and conducting credible investigations that are shared with the communities can avoid bargaining and ill will. Payments given are meant to be token amounts as recognition for loss as opposed to strict compensation and should be explained as such to avoid anger and resentment. Guidance on amounts should be established at the beginning of an operation based upon input from area and cultural experts, and can be given in ranges so that the commander maintains some discretion to suit the situation. The range should be similar across the area of operations, and should be reviewed periodically to ensure they are still appropriate in the context of economic shifts such as inflation, or changes in an operational environment.

5-92. Units and their servicing judge advocates or other designated responsible personnel should judiciously track payments made in an area of operations to ensure standardization and avoid double payments. They should designate amends points of contact who are culturally sensitive, possess connections with the local community, and can develop mutual trust between their units and the community. All Soldiers should know who the point of contact is and how to refer cases for amends.

5-93. In addition to cash payments, amends may also include programs to help rebuild lives after civilian casualty incidents, particularly as widows and orphans may have no support in some societies. Support arrangements may be required for women, children, and elderly survivors who have lost the primary breadwinners in their families. These programs may best be developed by civilian organizations from the U.S. government, the host nation, or nongovernmental organizations and can follow the immediate offering by the military of condolences.

INFORMING LOCAL MEDIA AND WIDER COMMUNITIES

5-94. Army units, often through their public affairs officers, should respond promptly to any allegations even if they simply state that allegations will be investigated. These announcements should provide an anticipated timeline for the findings. It may be appropriate to deny the accuracy of some aspects of an allegation, while promising an investigation into the rest. Immediate and broad denial, without complete and accurate information in hand, potentially leads to later changes in the official story, which undermines credibility.

5-95. Local media representatives may not have the professional standards, investigative skills, corroboration requirements, or English capability found with most international journalists. Units should attempt to cultivate relationships with local journalists and opinion leaders, and provide them updates regularly by cell phone or face-to-face meetings.

5-96. Centralized public affairs activities may not be completely effective, and public affairs officers may need to be assigned at lower echelons than normal. In some situations, a publicly accessible website may be useful. All messages should be translated, carefully tailored to local environments, and vetted with advisors who can confirm the translation's accuracy and gauge the message's suitability and probable

impact. Messages may need to be reinforced in public settings and meetings with local leaders and should address rumors as well as actual events.

5-97. The enemy will likely go to great lengths to calibrate messages for their intended audiences. They may use local folklore, religious and historical allusions, and language to great effect. They are also apt to cultivate relations with local media or seek to intimidate them. Army units must anticipate these measures and attempt to disrupt them while implementing their own sophisticated information efforts. These can include official reporting, radio, television, and communication through local community or government leaders.

CONCLUSION

5-98. Civilian casualty mitigation is a requirement that must always be considered alongside other imperatives such as defeating the enemy and preserving the force. Depending upon the mission, civilian casualty mitigation may in fact be one of the most important considerations when deciding to take action at any level. Civilian casualty mitigation is an extended cyclical process that includes measures to prepare, plan, employ, assess, respond, and learn. Each of the warfighting functions has applicability to civilian casualty mitigation, but the following considerations are particularly important:

- Commanders and leaders must emphasize the importance of civilian casualty mitigation.
- Accurate, complete, and prioritized intelligence is critical.
- Planning and decision-making processes should routinely account for civilian casualty considerations.
- Relations with the host-nation population and leaders are vital to and influenced by civilian casualty mitigation.
- Commanders must effectively synchronize information-related capabilities to provide timely and accurate messages.
- Minimal, controlled, and precise force should be used when possible.

Appendix A

Civilian Casualty Data Collection

Section 1 of this appendix includes civilian casualty data elements that can be incorporated into standard unit incident reports. Section 2 contains data elements and issues of inquiry that civilian casualty investigations should consider. They should also be provided to replacement units to facilitate their deployment preparation and preserve institutional knowledge.

SECTION 1: DATA ELEMENTS FOR UNIT-SUBMITTED CIVILIAN CASUALTY INCIDENT REPORTS

A-1. Reports and investigations should be disseminated horizontally and vertically to increase situational understanding.

GENERAL INCIDENT INFORMATION

A-2. General incident information includes—

- Date and time of the incident.
- Location of the incident (include grid reference as well as village, province, address, or other identifying information).

UNIT INFORMATION

A-3. Unit information includes the unit name (including parent organizations up to brigade level). This should be standard numerical identification, not nicknames of units.

MISSION SPECIFIC INFORMATION

A-4. Mission specific information discusses—

- Type of mission (such as convoy, checkpoint, raid, operational area security, of reconnaissance patrol).
- Time and duration of operation.
- Weather conditions.
- Facts and circumstances that led to the engagement.
- Involvement and role of host-nation security units.

ENGAGEMENT INFORMATION

A-5. Engagement information answers each engagement that results in civilian casualties.

Shooter Information

A-6. Shooter information identifies—

- Unit or nationality.
- Time in the theater of operations during this deployment.
- Number of previous deployments.
- Shooter location (grid reference and description).

Target Information

A-7. Target information answers—

- Intended target (with grid reference and description).
- Range from the shooter to the intended target.
- How unit acquired target identification (hostile act, hostile intent, or deliberate targeting).
- What rules of engagement (ROE) unit used for the engagement.
- If unit maintained target identification throughout the entire engagement.
- What weapon system was used.
- What ammunition was used.
- From what platform the unit fired the weapon.
- If shooter was under effective enemy fire.
- If rounds impacted their intended target. If no, explain.
- If weapon malfunctions were a factor in the engagement. If so, how?
- If obscuration impacted the shooter's ability to engage the target. If so, how?
- Number of confirmed and suspected civilians wounded and/or killed during this engagement.
- If civilian casualties were caused as a primary effect (primary munitions hit civilians) or a secondary effect. (falling debris hit civilians)
- Whether the rounds (during an escalation-of-force incident) that caused civilian casualties were intended to be warning, disabling, or killing shots.

BATTLE HANDOVER AND BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT INFORMATION

A-8. Battle handover and battle damage assessment information answers—

- If a battle handover occurred after the mission. If so, to which unit.
- Whether a battle damage assessment (BDA) focusing on identifying civilian casualties was conducted after the operation.
- How soon after the operation was complete that the civilian casualties battle damage assessment was conducted.
- If there were factors limiting the civilian casualty battle damage assessment. If so, explain.

MITIGATION INFORMATION

A-9. Mitigation information answers—

- If medical care was provided to any civilian casualties.
- If key leader engagements were conducted. If so, what was the effect?
- If ex gratia payments were made. If so, to whom and in what amount.
- How soon after the mission payments were made.
- If any information efforts conducted. If so, explain.
- If any additional mitigation measures were taken. If so, explain.

SECTION 2: DATA ELEMENTS AND ISSUES OF INQUIRY FOR INVESTIGATION REPORTS

A-10. The following required set of data elements are recommended for every civilian casualty investigation to capture the lessons and identify trends in order to facilitate operational learning. Investigations should be distributed throughout the chain of command, shared with adjacent units, and provided to replacement units.

GENERAL INCIDENT INFORMATION

+A-11. General incident information answers—

- Date and time of the incident.
- Location of the incident (grid reference as well as village, province, address, or other identifying information).
- Number of civilians confirmed killed.
- Number of civilians confirmed wounded.
- Number of civilians suspected killed.
- Number of civilians suspected wounded.
- List of names, ages, sexes, and type of injury for all casualties.
- Previous incidents at or near this location.

UNIT INFORMATION

A-12. Unit information answers—

- Unit name (including parent organizations up to brigade level). This should be standard numerical identification, not nicknames of units.
- Time this unit or individual has been in theater on current deployment.
- Unit's authorized, assigned, and available strength.
- If the was trained on ROE. If so, the date of the last training.
- If the unit was trained on escalation-of-force (if this is an escalation-of-force incident). If so, date of the last training.
- If unit has experienced any casualties in the previous 30 days. If so, explain.

MISSION SPECIFIC INFORMATION

A-13. Mission specific information answers—

- Type of mission unit was conducting (convoy, checkpoint, raid, operational area security, or reconnaissance patrol).
- If this a deliberate operation or if this was an operation with a condensed planning timeline.
- How much time the unit had for mission planning.
- If this unit had conducted this type of mission before. If so, how many times.
- What time the operation began or ended.
- If this was a day or night operation?
- What the enemy situation was before the operation.
- What the civilian situation was before the operation.
- What the weather conditions were during this operation.
- If troops were in contact with the enemy and the circumstances of the engagement.
- If HN security forces were involved in the mission. If so, explain.
- If any civilian leaders were involved in the planning process for the mission. If so, explain.

ENGAGEMENT INFORMATION

A-14. Engagement information answers for each engagement that results in civilian casualties.

SHOOTER INFORMATION

A-15. Shooter information identifies—

- Unit.
- Nationality.

- Time in theater for this deployment.
- Number of previous deployments.
- Amount of rest before the start of the operation.
- Shooter location (grid reference and description).
- ROE used for the engagement.
- Weapon system used.
- Type of ammunition used.
- From what platform was the weapon fired (truck, tank, aircraft).
- If the shooter was under enemy fire.
- If shooter was qualified on the weapon system used.
- If rounds impacted their intended target. If no, explain.
- If weapon malfunctions were a factor in the engagement. If so, how?

TARGET INFORMATION

A-16. Target information answers—

- Intended target.
- Target location (grid reference and description).
- Range of the shooter to the intended target.
- How target identification was acquired (hostile act, hostile intent, or deliberate targeting).
- If target identification was maintained throughout the entire engagement.
- If obscuration impacted the shooter's ability to engage the target If so, how?
- Number of confirmed and suspected civilians wounded and/or killed for this engagement.
- If civilian casualties were caused as a primary effect (primary munitions hit civilians) or a secondary effect (falling debris hitting civilians).
- If this was an escalation-of-force incident, whether the rounds that caused civilian casualties were intended to be warning, disabling, or killing shots.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS) OR CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK (CCA) INFORMATION

A-17. Close Air Support or Close Combat Attack information answers—

- If a 9-line CAS call or 5-line CCA brief was provided.
- If the aircraft was under enemy fire.
- If the controller or CCA requester was under enemy fire.
- Supported commander's desired effect.
- Who made the weaponeering decision.
- If friendly locations were exchanged between the controller/requester and aircrew.
- If civilian locations were exchanged between the controller/requester and aircrew.
- If the target location was agreed upon between the controller/requester and aircrew?
- If a joint fires observer was involved.
- If target was visible to the controller or requester.
- What the range was from the controller or requester to the target.
- How positive identification of the target was established.
- How and by whom a collateral damage estimation was performed.
- The altitude of the aircraft.
- What CAS/CCA control type was used (1, 2, or 3).

BATTLE HANDOVER AND BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT INFORMATION

A-18. Battle handover and battle damage assessment information answers—

- If a battle handover occurred after the mission. If so, to which unit.
- If the battle handover was preplanned or impromptu.
- If BDA was focused on identifying civilian casualties conducted after the operation.
- How soon after the operation was complete that the civilian casualty BDA was conducted.
- Explain how the civilian casualty BDA was conducted.
- If the initial civilian casualty BDA identified all of the civilian casualties. If not, how were additional civilian casualties identified?
- If there were limiting factors with the civilian casualty BTM. If so, explain.

MITIGATION INFORMATION

A-19. Mitigation information answers—

- Whether medical care was provided to any civilian casualties.
- How soon medical care was provided.
- If any civilian casualties were evacuated for additional medical care. If so, explain.
- If medical assistance was coordinated with family, and tribal leaders, if necessary.
- If any key leader engagements were conducted. If so, at what level, with whom, and how soon after the mission?
- If ex gratia payments were made. If so, to whom, in what amount, and how soon after the mission were payments made?
- If any information measures were taken. If so, explain.
- If military information support operations and public affairs efforts were conducted to rebut enemy propaganda.
- If there were any additional mitigation measures taken. If so, explain.
- If these measures were successful, and why.

DISSEMINATION

A-20. Dissemination information answers—

- When and to whom were reports and any updates disseminated.

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. The proponent manual for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ATP	Army techniques publication
BDA	battle damage assessment
CAS	close air support
CCA	close combat attack
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CMOC	civil-military operations center
DA	Department of the Army
DC	dislocated civilian
FM	field manual
HN	host nation
JP	joint publication
MARO	mass atrocity response operations
MISO	military information support operations
OE	operational environment
PMESII-PT	political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time
ROE	rules of engagement
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
TLE	target location error
UAS	unmanned aircraft system
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UN	United Nations
USG	United States Government

SECTION II – TERMS

assessment

Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (JP3-0)

civil-military operations

Activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. (JP 3-57)

civil-military operations center

An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. (JP 3-57).

counterinsurgency

Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. (JP 3-24)

dislocated civilian

A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. (JP 3-29)

host nation

A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 3-57)

irregular warfare

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. (JP 1)

law of war

That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. (FM 27-10)

mass atrocity response operations

Military activities conducted to prevent or halt mass atrocities. (JP 3-07.3)

military information support operations

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. (JP 3-13.2)

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

peacekeeping

Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 3-07.3)

peacemaking

The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it. (JP 3-07.3)

peace operations

A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. (JP 3-07.3)

rules of engagement

Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-04)

unified action

The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

unity of effort

The coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the particpants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1).

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