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SECURITY AND MOBILITY SUPPORT

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SECURITY AND MOBILITY SUPPORT

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Preface

ATP 3-39.30 is aligned with FM 3-39 of the Military Police Corps Regiment and provides Army military police commanders, staffs, and Soldiers at all levels a foundation for conducting security and mobility support during Army operations. To fully understand the doctrine in this manual, readers must first grasp the concept of multidomain operations as described in ADP 3-0. Additionally, readers should be familiar with the protection principles discussed in ADP 3-37, the fundamentals of the operations process found in ADP 5-0, the principles of command and control detailed in ADP 6-0, the Army profession and moral principles outlined in ADP 6-22, the conduct of Army operations described in FM 3-0, and military police operations covered in FM 3-39.

The primary audience for ATP 3-39.30 is military police commanders and staffs; however, all members of the military may use this manual to understand the capabilities and tasks of military police. Commanders and staffs of joint task forces or multinational headquarters should also consult relevant joint or multinational doctrines related to various military operations and joint or multinational forces. Additionally, trainers and educators throughout the Army will find this manual useful.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates must ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and, in some cases, host-nation (HN) laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels are responsible for ensuring that their Soldiers operate according to the law of war and the rules of engagement (ROE). See FM 6-27 for additional information.

ATP 3-39.30 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions are included in the glossary and the main text. Terms for which ATP 3-39.30 serves as the proponent publication (the authority) are italicized in the text and marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which ATP 3-39.30 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. Other definitions found within the text will have the term italicized, followed by the number of the proponent publication.

ATP 3-39.30 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 3-39.30 is the United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS). The preparing agency is the Fielded Force Integration Directorate, Doctrine Division, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence. Send comments and recommendations on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Director, FFID, Doctrine Division, MSCoE, ATTN: ATZT-FFD, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929; by email to usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mpdoc@army.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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Introduction

ATP 3-39.30 focuses on the military police discipline of security and mobility support. It outlines how military police assist Army, joint, and multinational forces by carrying out tactical tasks and activities related to security and mobility. ATP 3-39.30 serves as a foundation for military police commanders, staffs, and Soldiers to effectively conduct security and mobility support across various military operations. The primary emphasis is on the tactical tasks and activities facilitated by military police technical capabilities that enable commanders to generate, project, and maintain combat power. ATP 3-39.30 describes the role of military police in protecting both the force and noncombatants, and how they help ensure that the commander's freedom of action is preserved.

The security and mobility support discipline is enhanced by and contributes to the other military police disciplines, specifically police operations and detention operations. Each of these disciplines is viewed through the lens of policing or corrections and is guided by the overarching function of police intelligence. Police intelligence operations (PIO) assist commanders at all levels by integrating police intelligence activities into all military police operations. These disciplines represent interdependent areas of expertise within the Military Police Corps Regiment.

The tasks in this discipline focus on military police operations typically carried out in a tactical environment. While military police are primarily responsible for many of these tasks, other members of the combined arms team may also perform some of them. Military police engaged in security and mobility support tasks usually serve in a support role. These tasks primarily focus on applying military police combat power to support the movement and maneuver and protection warfighting functions; however, security and mobility tasks also support the conduct of populace and resources control (PRC).

Military police play a crucial role in security and mobility support tasks within the support area, making them vital for the sustainment warfighting function. Their ability to provide security and mobility support is enhanced by the technical tasks associated with the military police disciplines of police operations and detention operations. These disciplines and the integrating function of PIO are discussed in detail in other military police manuals and will be referenced when relevant to discussions on security and mobility support. ATP 3-39.30 includes significant changes. It—

- Discusses military police security and mobility support to Army operations during competition below armed conflict, crisis, and armed conflict.
- Includes additional discussion on military police security and mobility support throughout the operational framework.
- Introduces discussion on counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UASs).
- Includes additional discussion on support to security operations.
- Includes additional discussion on dislocated civilian (DC) operations.
- Introduces an appendix on battlefield confinement of U.S. military prisoners.

This ATP is divided into five chapters and five appendices:

- **Chapter 1** describes the military police discipline of security and mobility support and how it is affected by and affects the operational environment. While focused on the movement and maneuver and protection warfighting functions, this discipline finds application among other warfighting functions and provides support across the range of military operations.
- **Chapter 2** examines how military police conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to collect information and monitor avenues of approach, potential landing zones (LZ), and drop zones.
- **Chapter 3** focuses on military police support to mobility operations as part of the movement and maneuver warfighting function.
- **Chapter 4** focuses on military police support to security operations as part of the protection warfighting function. Military police security and mobility tasks and activities associated with security operations are focused on area and local security and associated tasks and activities.

- **Chapter 5** describes how military police support to PRC can minimize civilian (CIV) interference in military operations while also ensuring the security of DCs. The chapter further describes how security and mobility facilitates resources control. Resources control regulates the movement or consumption of material resources, mobilizes material resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. Resources controls target specific sectors of the material wealth and economy of a nation, including natural resources, food and agriculture, immoveable property, finances, and cultural and critical infrastructure.
- **Appendix A** describes how assessment is an essential, continuous activity that occurs throughout the operations process and how assessment assists commanders and staffs in comparing forecasted outcomes to events to determine the effectiveness of security and mobility support tasks.
- **Appendix B** discusses the options for DC camps and the role of military police in this portion of PRC.
- **Appendix C** provides an overview of battlefield confinement of U.S. military prisoners.
- **Appendix D** describes the route classification system and the types of route signing.
- **Appendix E** provides fundamental considerations, formats, and instructions for developing the security and mobility support (area security, physical security, antiterrorism [AT], and PRC appendixes).

Chapter 1

Security and Mobility Support to Army Operations

Military police support for Army operations is complex and requires a thorough understanding of the operational environment, the commander's intent, the concept of operations, and the capabilities and limitations of military police in these operations. Military police assist each of the Army warfighting functions while performing their three main disciplines: police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support. Through these disciplines, military police units offer commanders a range of customizable and focused capabilities across various military operations. The security and mobility support discipline emphasizes protecting both the force and noncombatants while preserving the commander's freedom of action. This chapter explains how security and mobility support enable mobility, security, and PRC for the joint force commander. Further details on all military police disciplines and their relationships to defense, offense, and stability are in FM 3-39.

SECURITY AND MOBILITY SUPPORT DISCIPLINE

1-1. The security and mobility support discipline primarily involves the technical capabilities and tactical tasks of military police that support mobility operations (a focus on movement over maneuver). Security responsibilities concentrate on area and local security, which includes key tasks such as AT, physical security, logistics security (LOGSEC), and PRC. This includes managing the safety and security of DCs, noncombatant evacuations, and the protection of resources and infrastructure. Mobility operations are integral to the movement and maneuver warfighting function, while security tasks belong to or reinforce the protection warfighting function.

1-2. The security and mobility support discipline works in conjunction with other military police disciplines, including police operations and detention operations. Each of these disciplines is enhanced by the role of PIO. PIO supports commanders at all levels by integrating police intelligence activities into all military police operations. For more detailed information on PIO, see ATP 3-39.20.

1-3. During security and mobility support, military police units provide essential protection to command headquarters for equipment and services that are critical for mission success, as directed by the joint force commander or the geographic combatant commander (CCDR). The missions and tasks categorized under the security and mobility support discipline apply across the full spectrum of military operations, which includes offensive, defensive, and stability operations as outlined in FM 3-39. While many of these missions and subordinate tasks can also be carried out by other members of the combined arms team, they are often best performed by military police. This is particularly true in support areas and along ground lines of communication (GLOC) throughout the area of operations (AO), especially as operations transition from large-scale combat to competition or cooperation.

1-4. Military police have specialized technical skills and capabilities that are developed through training, education, and hands-on experience gained from policing and corrections missions associated with the police operations and detention operations disciplines. See table 1-1, page 2, for major subtasks that are associated with security and mobility support.

Table 1-1. Security and mobility support tasks

Security and Mobility Support	
Provide support to mobility.	• Provide support to breaching. • Provide support to clearing. • Provide support to gap crossing. • Develop a traffic control plan. • Conduct main/alternate supply route regulation and enforcement. • Support passage of lines. • Conduct straggler movement control.
Conduct area security.	• Conduct base/base camp defense. • Conduct critical asset security. • Conduct protective services. • Conduct response force operations. • Conduct lines of communication security. • Conduct checkpoints. • Support port area and pier security. • Conduct area damage control.
Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.	• Collect information. • Conduct route reconnaissance. • Conduct area reconnaissance. • Conduct zone reconnaissance. • Conduct civil reconnaissance. • Conduct patrols.
Apply antiterrorism measures.	• Identify potential terrorist threats and other activities. • Reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist acts and attacks. • React to terrorist incidents.
Implement physical security procedures.	• Establish checkpoints. • Control access to equipment, installations, materials, and documents. • Employ intrusion detection devices.
Provide military working dogs.	• Detect explosives. • Detect narcotics. • Conduct military working dog patrols.
Support populace and resources control.	• Maintain curfews. • Restrict movement in specified areas. • Require travel permits. • Resettle specific portions of a population. • Require licenses. • Implement and enforce regulations or guidelines. • Conduct checkpoints and inspection stations. • Implement amnesty programs. • Implement ration controls. • Conduct dislocated civilian operations. • Support noncombatant evacuation operations.

Table 1-1. Security and mobility support tasks (continued)

Security and Mobility Support	
Conduct logistics security.	• Conduct a threat assessment. • Develop criminal intelligence. ▪ Logistics security threat assessment. ▪ Criminal activity threat assessment. ▪ Port vulnerability assessment. • Coordinate with other agencies.

ASSURED MOBILITY FRAMEWORK

1-5. *Assured mobility* is a framework—of processes, actions, and capabilities—that assures the ability of a force to deploy, move, and maneuver where and when desired (ATP 3-90.4). The fundamentals of assured mobility (predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect) support implementing the assured mobility framework. This framework is designed to help a force achieve the commander's intent. Assured mobility focuses on proactive mobility and countermobility (and supporting protection) actions and integrates them to accomplish its goals. While it is primarily associated with the movement and maneuver warfighting function, assured mobility also connects to each warfighting function through complementary and reinforcing capabilities. The principles of assured mobility are outlined in ATP 3-90.4.

1-6. The assured mobility framework is utilized at the theater strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare to facilitate freedom of action for the joint force and to provide options for the joint force commander. While engineers serve as the principal staff integrator for assured mobility, other staff sections also play essential roles in effectively implementing mobility, countermobility, and related protection tasks. For example, they may be responsible for regulating traffic in an AO or managing DCs to facilitate movement and maneuver. The senior engineer staff officer's role within the assured mobility framework involves integrating the various warfighting functions. Military police commanders and provost marshals (PMs) recognize and use this framework to assist in planning and executing missions performed as part of support to security and security support.

1-7. The assured mobility framework consists of a continuous cycle of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. It relies on six fundamental principles (Predict, Detect, Prevent, Avoid, Neutralize, Protect) that allow friendly forces to move and maneuver while preventing the enemy from doing the same. Commanders and their staffs implement assured mobility by applying these six fundamentals throughout the planning and integration processes. The military police focus within the fundamentals of assured mobility includes:

- **Predict.** This fundamental involves incorporating police intelligence into the intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE). It is essential for planners to recognize that combat situations (or natural or human-made disasters) can turn the local populace into obstacles to movement. Planners must assess what assets (military police and other) will be necessary to manage DCs, stragglers, and other issues related to mobility and security.
- **Detect.** Military police play a unique role in the collection plan. Unlike many other collection assets, they approach situations from a policing perspective, which allows them to offer valuable insights into the synchronization and integration of surveillance assets and reconnaissance missions. Due to their training and experience in law enforcement, military police can help inform commander's critical information requirement (CCIR) that might be overlooked by other forces.
- **Prevent.** This fundamental ensures the unhindered movement of friendly forces while denying the adversary the ability to disrupt it. This encompasses mitigating disruptions caused by CIV activities within the AO. Understanding and monitoring CIV movement patterns are crucial. Proactive measures like patrolling help identify and address potential threats before they impact operations. This includes detecting enemy activity, such as improvised explosive device (IED) emplacements and ambush sites, and recognizing and mitigating potential hazards posed by CIV presence. By proactively managing the CIV factor, we enhance our movement control and traffic flow, safeguarding friendly freedom of maneuver.

- **Avoid.** This fundamental is used if prevention fails; it includes the development of branches and sequels to plans to avoid impediments to mobility (including traffic congestion, crowds, and DCs). Adjusting movement and traffic control plans and rerouting traffic may be necessary to prevent or mitigate the effects of interference or obstacles.
- **Neutralize.** CIV interference (traffic congestion, crowds, and DCs) is mitigated through military police, civil affairs (CA), and other assets and capabilities. This may include supporting civil administration and ensuring public safety and transportation. Key actions involve managing civil disturbances and crowd control, establishing roadblocks and obstacles, creating alternate routes, and developing bypasses (including tactical bridging) to improve traffic flow. Additionally, there may be efforts to persuade the public to avoid certain areas during specific times, provide information to enable a controlled response to catastrophic events, and counter adversarial attempts to manipulate the population.
- **Protect.** Protection is a key component of assured mobility. Protection tasks that support assured mobility involve facilitating trafficability and movement through a designated AO; safeguarding critical sites such as bridges on main supply routes (MSRs); and establishing convoy support centers, patrol bases, or other critical locations along MSRs, routes, or road networks. Military police should also consider the applications of countermobility and survivability in the context of area and local security.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-8. Within the broader strategic security environment, Army forces conduct operations in specific operational environments. An *operational environment* is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). For Army forces, an operational environment includes areas within the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains, which are analyzed through three dimensions (human, physical, and information). The land, maritime, air, and space domains are characterized by their physical characteristics, while cyberspace (being a man-made network) connects the other domains (see figure 1-1). For more information on the domains and dimensions within an operational environment, see FM 3-0.




Figure 1-1. Domains and dimensions of an operational environment

1-9. The operational environment model helps account for all of the factors, specific circumstances, and conditions that influence operations. This understanding allows leaders to better identify problems, anticipate potential outcomes, and comprehend the effects of various friendly or threat actions on achieving military objectives. A thorough understanding of the operational environment is crucial for executing successful

operations. Commanders must recognize and appreciate the evolving nature of an operational environment, which encompasses local variables and the interplay of global or regional influences, including political, social (such as crime), and economic factors that affect conditions and operations.

1-10. Commanders typically consult specialists across various fields to gain a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment. Military police are among these specialists, contributing essential insights that enhance the overall understanding of the situation. The connection between criminal activity and irregular threats has become increasingly intertwined. Criminal elements are now regarded as a subcategory of irregular threats, as their organizational structures, tactics, and activities overlap those of various types of irregular threats. Most criminal activity occurs in densely populated urban areas, where disorder and fear of physical or financial harm impact CIV populations. This can marginalize security forces, destabilize governments, and undermine military operations. The skills and technical abilities developed through policing and corrections missions provide military police a unique perspective on the operational environment, allowing them to view it through the lens of law enforcement and correctional practices.

1-11. Irregular and criminal threats persist in attacking, manipulating, exploiting, and intimidating vulnerable and frustrated populations. These actions aim to discredit governments, gain power and influence, create disorder and instability, and generate illicit profits. Crime, disorder, and the fear of crime persist as debilitating factors that contribute to instability, particularly in densely populated urban areas and in weak, failing, or failed states. For more information on criminal threats, see FM 3-39.

CONTESTED LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT

1-12. A *contested logistics environment* is an environment in which the armed forces engage in conflict with an adversary that presents challenges in all domains and directly targets logistics operations, facilities and activities in the United States, abroad, or in transit from one location to another (10 USC § 2926[h]). In this environment, military police commanders and staffs must plan and execute support to logistics, operating under the assumption that sustainment forces are constantly monitored, engaged, and contested.

1-13. Military police planners should recognize that sustainment forces will be a primary target for enemy actions across all domains, making them vulnerable to detection, targeting, and destruction. To enhance their survival on the battlefield, sustainment forces must be mobile and operate in a dispersed manner, which adds complexity to their protection and security. Given the limitations of available protection assets, logistics and military police planners must identify and prioritize critical sustainment items and missions for protection. To reduce the risk from enemy long-range fire, special purpose forces, and other threats, planners must strategize and prepare for opportune moments to effectively move logistics. The role of the military police in protecting logistics starts at forts, camps, aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, and other essential sites at which U.S. forces can organize and project forces. Throughout the logistics process—moving from fort to port, port to port, and port to theater—military police must coordinate with local, state, federal, and HN authorities to address deployment challenges and meet security requirements.

1-14. Logistics are a priority target for enemy forces and will be challenged across all domains to disrupt our ability to sustain Army operations. Now more than ever, military police forces must plan to protect logistics—from the initial points of force projection to the logistics release points, where sustainment is distributed to maneuver forces. For more information on the contested logistics environment, see FM 4-0.

SUPPORT TO ARMY OPERATIONS

1-15. The Army conducts operations across multiple domains and the information environment. An *operation* is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1). Army tactical formations typically operate within a context dominated by a single strategic relationship at a time. Army doctrine outlines the strategic situation through three contexts that Army forces conduct their operations:

- Competition below armed conflict.
- Crisis.
- Armed conflict.

1-16. Competition below armed conflict occurs when two or more state or nonstate adversaries have incompatible interests, yet neither seeks to engage in armed conflict. Nation-states compete with one another by using all available instruments of national power to gain and maintain advantages that help them achieve their objectives. Low levels of lethal force can be involved in this competition. Adversaries often utilize cyberspace capabilities and information warfare to damage or disrupt infrastructure, interfere with government processes, and conduct operations in a manner that does not provoke a military response from the United States or its allies. This competition allows military forces to prepare for potential armed conflict, provides opportunities to reassure allies and partners of their commitment, and creates the necessary time and space to prevent crises or conflicts from escalating.

1-17. A *crisis* is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives (JP 3-0). Commanders must consider that taking overt military action could escalate a crisis into armed conflict. Instead, utilizing space and cyberspace capabilities offers alternatives that are less likely to provoke, such an escalation. It is important to note that a crisis is relative to the adversary involved, which differs from a crisis response, typically triggered by natural or human-made disasters. During a crisis, armed conflict has not yet broken out, but it is either imminent or a distinct possibility, necessitating a rapid response from forces that are prepared to engage if deterrence fails.

1-18. Armed conflict occurs when a state or nonstate actor primarily uses lethal force to pursue its interests. This conflict can take many forms, from irregular warfare to conventional warfare or a combination of both. In the context of irregular warfare, proxy warfare represents a significant threat. The decision to enter or terminate armed conflict is fundamentally a political one. Military forces may enter a conflict with advanced warning during a prolonged crisis or with little warning during periods of competition. Ultimately, the readiness of military forces for armed conflict is determined by the decisions and preparations made during competition and crisis.

1-19. *Multidomain operations* is the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders (ADP 3-0). In large-scale combat operations, military police play a crucial role in helping Army forces defeat enemy organizations, control terrain, protect CIV populations, and preserve their own forces. They achieve this by providing complementary and reinforcing capabilities through three key disciplines (police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support). *Large-scale combat operations* are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives (ADP 3-0). Army forces attack, defend, conduct stability tasks, and consolidate gains to attain national objectives.

1-20. During large-scale combat operations, commanders focus on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. This involves coordinating multiple unit actions in highly challenging operational environments. The scale, scope, speed, and lethality of large-scale combat intensify the dynamic and uncertain nature of war, making it difficult to accurately determine cause-and-effect relationships. Military police are crucial in helping Army forces defeat enemy organizations, control territory, protect populations, and sustain the joint force. They achieve this by conducting tasks across all three military police disciplines (police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support). For more information on large-scale combat operations, see FM 3-0.

1-21. During armed conflict, military police play a crucial role in protecting forces, CIV populations, and critical infrastructure. They utilize manned and unmanned teams, including military working dog (MWD) teams, to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of bases, routes, facilities, and storage sites. Their mission is to detect, deter, defeat, and delay enemy forces, criminals, irregular threats, and conventional forces that have been bypassed.

1-22. Military police, in coordination with domestic and foreign law enforcement authorities, joint partners, and Army counterintelligence field offices, enhance their security and mobility support operations to protect power projection platforms. This ensures that friendly forces can effectively conduct movement and maneuver operations. In addition to these efforts, military police perform physical security inspections, crime prevention assessments, and vulnerability assessments. These assessments help evaluate the effectiveness of current security measures and identify potential gaps in security posture. Based on these inspections and assessments, military police provide unit commanders and facility managers police intelligence assessments bolstered by biometric and forensic data. This information is crucial for strengthening crime prevention, physical security, and AT measures.

1-23. *Consolidate gains* are activities to make enduring any initial operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Consolidating gains is an integral and continuous part of competition, essential for success in various military operations. Effective consolidation requires a realistic assessment of strategic conditions, the legitimacy of allies and partners, the relative advantages of friendly forces and adversaries, and the sustainability of a political outcome. Military police supporting the consolidation of gains should focus on the six primary stability tasks as the security situation stabilizes. For more details on consolidating gains, see FM 3-0.

1-24. Military police carry out missions as part of an integrated combined arms effort. Although some tasks may be performed solely within the scope of a functional unit, all missions must align with and support the overall goals of the combined arms effort. The technical capabilities and tactical tasks involved in security and mobility support can be utilized across a wide range of military operations. Major operations, crisis responses, and contingency operations may involve close combat. These operations depend on integrating military police and other supporting elements to facilitate the movement and maneuver (mobility) of friendly forces while restricting the freedom of action of adversaries (countermobility).

SUPPORT DURING COMPETITION BELOW ARMED CONFLICT

1-25. Operations during competition below armed conflict involve security cooperation and military engagement, including training and operations to enhance the cohesion and large-scale combat readiness of the United States, its allies, and partners. U.S. forces, allies, and partners conduct these operations with forward-stationed forces to promote mutual interests. Regionally aligned and engaged Army forces are crucial for achieving objectives that strengthen the global network of multinational partners and help prevent conflict.

1-26. Army operations conducted during competition below armed conflict encompass various activities to promote regional stability and create conditions for a favorable outcome of a military confrontation. These operations are designed to deter adversarial actions, prepare for armed conflict under advantageous circumstances if deterrence fails, and shape the operational environment alongside allies and partners to align with U.S. strategic interests and policy objectives. Military police commanders, PMs, and planners must understand common adversary methods and objectives to effectively plan, prepare, and execute military police capabilities to support Army operations. Military police play a crucial role in enabling competition below armed conflict through three military police disciplines.

1-27. During competition below armed conflict, security and mobility support are crucial in facilitating long-term military engagements, security cooperation, and deterrence missions. These efforts aim to assure allies, enhance partner capacity and capability, and promote regional stability. Commanders, PMs, and military police planners must collaborate to synchronize, integrate, and organize military police capabilities and resources throughout operations. This coordination is essential for protecting U.S. interests and fostering partnerships. Security and mobility support during competitions below armed conflict include LOGSEC, which ensures the integrity of the logistics system. This is achieved by preventing, identifying, and investigating criminal acts committed by terrorists, criminal elements, or insider threats, ranging from U.S. Army logistics providers to military forces on the ground.

1-28. During competition, some tasks may be initiated and continue through crisis depending on the commander's requirements and mission variables, such as—

- Protective-services operations to protect Service members, high-risk personnel (HRP), CIV employees, Family members, Department of Defense (DOD) facilities, information, and equipment.
- Physical measures designed to safeguard personnel and prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents, protecting them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.
- Area security to protect critical capabilities, assets, and activities within a specific area, preventing and mitigating threats from special forces, criminals, and irregular threats intended to harm friendly forces and disrupt deployment and sustainment operations.
- Patrol and explosive detector dogs to detect hazards in and around areas, routes, and roadways.
- PRC to protect CIV networks or groups identified by Army forces as critical in facilitating essential services and overall governance.
- Reconnaissance and surveillance to disrupt adversary counterintelligence efforts and threats from special forces, criminals, and irregular threats that endanger friendly forces.
- Checkpoints and roadblocks to control the movement of vehicles, personnel, and materiel, preventing illegal actions that may aid the enemy and deter terrorist activities and other threats.
- Police intelligence activities to enhance situational understanding and provide a holistic common operational picture.
- Traffic control plans to complement movement control and highway regulation, include implemented traffic enforcement measures, establishing speed control, conducting safety inspection checkpoints, and ensuring only authorized traffic uses controlled routes.
- LOGSEC to ensure the integrity of the logistics system by preventing, identifying, and investigating criminal acts committed by terrorists, criminal elements, or insider threats affecting Army logistics providers and military forces.

SUPPORT DURING CRISIS

1-29. Army operations during a crisis are activities aimed at deterring the undesired actions of an adversary. These operations are intended to prevent the adversary from exploiting advantages by increasing the potential costs of their continued aggression. Commanders typically concentrate on actions that protect friendly forces, assets, and partners while signaling the U.S. intent to carry out subsequent phases of a planned operation.

1-30. Military police capabilities play a crucial role in supporting operations to prevent armed conflict during mobilization and during the transit of Army forces and cargo. They are essential along movement routes, initial staging areas, and subsequent assembly areas where uncertain threat conditions require a careful balance between ensuring protection and building combat power. Army operations to consolidate gains during a crisis should align with, stabilize, and support the civil authority phases of a joint operation. Commanders must continually assess the coordination, synchronization, and integration of military police capabilities necessary to consolidate these gains and achieve the desired end state. Military police contribute to crisis management through three distinct disciplines.

1-31. During a crisis, commanders, PMs, and military police planners must work together to synchronize, integrate, and organize military police security and mobility support. This coordination is essential to enable friendly forces to deter undesirable actions from adversaries, protect U.S. interests, and strengthen partnerships and partner capacities. See paragraph 1-28, which outlines tasks that begin in operations during competition and continue throughout the crisis phase of an operation.

SUPPORT DURING ARMED CONFLICT AND LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

1-32. Armed conflict refers to a strategic relationship where adversaries use lethal force as the primary method to achieve their objectives and impose their will on others. During armed conflict, military operations may involve a combination of irregular and conventional warfare. Irregular warfare includes methods such as counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. Leaders apply the doctrine of large-scale combat operations in limited situations that necessitate conventional warfare strategies. For more information, see ADP 3-05 for irregular warfare, ATP 3-05.1 for unconventional warfare, and FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 for counterinsurgency.

1-33. Large-scale combat operations are the focus of Army readiness. These operations involve extensive joint combat activities characterized by the significant scope and size of forces involved and the high levels of destructive violence. Large-scale combat introduces complexities, lethality, ambiguity, and rapidity not typically found in other military operations. The fast pace of these operations can create gaps and seams, leading to opportunities and risks as enemy formations break apart or reposition.

1-34. Large-scale combat operations typically occur in scenarios associated with state-on-state conflicts. These operations involve combat between large formations (such as divisions and corps) across all domains. A peer enemy engaged in large-scale combat can effectively challenge the joint forces. Their capabilities, including integrated air defense systems, long-range fire systems, cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities, weapons of mass destruction, and extensive surveillance and reconnaissance networks, can create a balance or near balance of power across all domains. Army forces operating as part of a joint force focus on defeating and destroying enemy ground forces during these large-scale combat operations. They continuously work to consolidate their gains to achieve objectives that support an effective political outcome.

1-35. Support from military police during large-scale combat operations is complex. It requires a thorough understanding of the operational environment, the commander’s intent, the concept of operations, and the capabilities and limitations of military police. While the various operations involved in large-scale combat are discussed separately in the following paragraphs, they are executed simultaneously. The mission determines the significance of each operation in relation to the others. Military police planners must continually assess and anticipate changes in mission requirements and the necessary military police capabilities as operations transition between phases or as conditions or the commander’s priorities change within the operational environment.

1-36. In support of large-scale combat operations, PIO are conducted as an integral part of all military police missions. During both offensive and defensive operations, police intelligence helps staff identify organizations and networks—both police and criminal—within the AO. This identification can provide early warnings of disruptive activities and conditions that require corrective actions to establish stability. As operations become more prolonged and conventional threats diminish, transitioning to hybrid threats, the distinctions between criminal, terrorist, and insurgent activities often associated with stability operations become less clear. Police intelligence operations, when planned and integrated by military police staff and PM sections, contribute to the overall operations process and enhance the commander's situational awareness. This integration is critical during stability operations, where the role of the military police centers on developing the ability of a country to protect its communities and establish or reestablish civil security and control. For more detailed information on PIO, see ATP 3-39.20.

1-37. Security and mobility support are essential functions of military police that facilitate movement and maneuver on the battlefield. They provide mobility support to conserve the combat power of maneuver forces and ensure efficient movement throughout the AO. By managing the movement of forces, military police enhance the momentum of the force, optimizing the use of space and time to achieve speed and mass while hindering enemy maneuvers. By improving maneuverability, military police accelerate the concentration of combat power, which is vital for increasing the velocity, tempo, and operational reach of the forces necessary to exploit critical vulnerabilities in the enemy. *Operational reach* is the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). Military police are trained, equipped, and organized to neutralize enemy harassment attacks in the rear area. This capability allows them to prevent the diversion of maneuver forces, thereby preserving combat power for the essential tasks and purposes of an operation.

1-38. Several security and mobility support tasks are directly related to the protection aspect of the warfighting function. In an operational environment, the protection scheme includes safeguarding personnel (U.S. forces, unified action partners, and noncombatants) and critical assets. This involves safeguarding bases, base camps, and other essential fixed sites, while also securing routes and ensuring the safety of forces operating within sustainment areas. Protection considerations include supporting battle positions, combat outposts, and vital HN infrastructure. On modern battlefields, commanders must be well-versed in survivability tactics and techniques to ensure protection. For additional information on protection, see ADP 3-37.

1-39. Security and mobility support operations involve distributing military police forces throughout the AO. These forces conduct aggressive patrolling and surveillance to protect military units, critical facilities, and HRP while ensuring the security and control of CIV populations. During these patrols, military police Soldiers interact with various friendly units, CIVs, and governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The information gathered from these interactions—whether passively or actively—significantly contributes to the overall information collection effort. In addition to collecting information, security and mobility support operations often promote stability, as PRC fosters lawfulness and order. Police operations (see ATP 3-39.10) and the associated skills and capabilities inherent to these functions are the fundamental basis for how military police operations are structured and executed.

1-40. Planning is crucial for effectively utilizing military police combat power. Understanding how the security and mobility support discipline and its tasks and capabilities align with the elements of defense, offense, and stability helps planners organize military police forces to achieve mission success. Swiftly transitioning between defense, offense, and stability is vital. Military police planners provide essential planning considerations to the supported commander and staff at every level. They also advise on military police capabilities, methods of employment, and limitations. For further details on military police participation in the planning process, see FM 3-39.

SECURITY AND MOBILITY SUPPORT TO DEFENSE

1-41. A *defensive operation* is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). Defensive operations are designed to counter enemy offensive actions. Their primary goal is to defeat enemy attacks by destroying as many attacking forces as possible. Additionally, these operations focus on retaining territory, protecting CIV populations, and safeguarding critical assets against enemy strikes. Defensive operations can also buy time and conserve resources, allowing offensive actions to be executed in other areas. While a defense alone typically cannot secure a decisive victory, it can set the stage for a counteroffensive operation, enabling Army forces to regain the initiative. Moreover, defensive operations can create a protective barrier that allows stability tasks to be carried out effectively. For more detailed information on defensive operations, see FM 3-90.

1-42. Defensive operations are categorized into mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde. The main goal of these defensive efforts is to create conditions that enable a counteroffensive, allowing Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for performing defensive tasks include—

- Retaining decisive terrain or denying a critical area to the enemy.
- Attriting or fixing the enemy as a precursor to offensive operations.
- Countering enemy action.
- Increasing the vulnerability of the enemy by compelling their commander to concentrate subordinate forces.


1-43. Military police units that support defense operations perform various tasks related to the security and mobility support discipline. Military police leaders conducting security and mobility support tasks supporting the defense must—

- Exercise disciplined initiative while operating within the commander's intent.
- Anticipate operational changes or transitions and prepare the military police efforts accordingly.
- Conduct security and mobility support to aid a force in maneuvering and massing. Military police should anticipate transitions from defense to offense and assist in the movement of reserves or reaction forces.
- Provide security and mobility support to prevent enemy reconnaissance elements from gathering intelligence among the CIV population regarding the location of defending forces. Military police

units must be positioned strategically to control key terrain and enhance the defensive capabilities of bases and base clusters.
- Deny threat elements, including special forces, criminals, and irregular threats, the opportunity to attack or take actions that could harm friendly forces or disrupt sustainment operations.
- Prevent the theft of military equipment and supplies by criminals or other threat actors.
- Mitigate, resolve, and prevent traffic congestion, accidents, and other safety-related issues along MSRs and alternate supply routes (ASRs).
- Target threat actors, groups, organizations, and networks to prevent their ability to cause harm to forces, populations, and critical infrastructure. This will help drive disorder and instability while ensuring freedom of action.
- Understand how operations impact security functions in a support area, in a joint security area, or along lines of communication (LOC) and how these operations protect vital command, control, and sustainment infrastructures or systems.
- Know the location and composition of probable response forces or tactical combat forces (TCFs) to effectively coordinate and assist in securing the support area or joint security area.
- Protect sustainment resources while facilitating the lateral, forward, and rearward movement of combat forces.
- Coordinate the security and treatment of DCs in collaboration with HN or multinational forces.
- Understand the IPOE process, the CCIR, and priority intelligence requirements. This knowledge will help integrate police intelligence activities to support those requirements.
- Consider the type and size of the AO, the security requirements of the LOC, and the threat level to plan for detainee operations and the management of DCs. Assess how their presence may impact the movement of forces.

1-44. Successful military police operations in defense rely on the understanding of the leader of the commander's intent and the effective use of military police capabilities and assets. In all three types of defensive operations, the military police force focuses on supporting the movement of repositioned or counterattacking forces and assisting in evacuating captured or detained individuals. Defensive missions require a concentrated effort to ensure freedom of movement for repositioning forces and reserves when they are committed. These units are given priority of movement along MSRs. Additional activities in defense include protecting sustainment activities, which encompasses critical headquarters, communication facilities, convoys, and supply sites. Examples of typical missions include—
- Securing the movement of resources to ensure that commanders have the necessary forces, supplies, and equipment to support defensive operations.
- Conducting area security operations, including response force operations, to detect, deter, and defeat Level I and Level II threats while delaying Level III threats within the AO. See table 4-1, page 76, for more details on Level I–III threats.
- Conducting convoy escorts.
- Supporting PRC to minimize the impact of DCs on combat forces.
- Integrating patrol and explosive detection dogs to clear routes and roadways of hazards.

1-45. Similar to offensive operations, military police units prepare for defensive operations by integrating and coordinating their efforts with supported units. They coordinate with AO and base camp commanders to establish effective command and support relationships. The PM or military police commander at the appropriate echelon organizes military police capabilities to support these defensive operations. This preparation may involve implementing protection control measures. The activities of military police units are conducted near and are carefully aligned with the preparations of maneuver forces. Figure 1-2, page 12, illustrates various types of military police support, such as area security, MWD support, response force operations, LOC security, and PRC in defense scenarios.



Legend:			
BSA	brigade support area	EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
CIV	civilian	KM	kilometers
DC	dislocated civilian	MP	military police
DET	detention	MSR	main supply route
DOG	military working dog	TCP	traffic control post
DSA	division support area		

Figure 1-2. Notional military police support to a division in the defense

Security and Mobility Support to Offense

1-46. The main objective of offensive operations is to defeat or destroy enemy forces while gaining control over terrain, resources, or population centers. (For more information on offensive and security operations, see FM 3-90.) The military police discipline of security and mobility support primarily focuses on capabilities that facilitate movement and maneuver (mobility operations), provide protection (security operations), and support PRC.

1-47. The types of offensive operations outline the general sequence of the offense and recommended formations. Each type of offensive operation serves a distinct purpose (see FM 3-0 for more information on the purpose of each type). The four types of offensive operations are:

- Movement to contact.
- Attack.
- Exploitation.
- Pursuit.

1-48. Military police units supporting offensive operations perform various tasks within the security and mobility support discipline. (For information on military police disciplines related to police operations and detention operations, refer to ATP 3-39.10, FM 3-39, FM 3-63, and other relevant military police doctrines.) Military police leaders conducting security and mobility support tasks during offensive operations must—

- Exercise disciplined initiative in alignment with the commander's intent.
- Anticipate that selected elements of the offensive force may pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute while other forces continue to attack.
- Anticipate changes in the tempo of operations and adapt the military police effort accordingly.
- Understand how operations impact security functions in a joint security area or along LOC, ensuring the protection of vital command and control and sustainment infrastructure or systems.
- Consider the type and size of the AO, the security requirements for LOC, potential threats, and the plans for detainee operations, including how DC may impact the movement of forces.
- Understand the IPOE process, the CCIR, and related information needs, and integrate police intelligence activities into all military police operations to support these requirements.
- Coordinate the care and security of DCs with HN or multinational forces during PRC.
- Assist the commander in expediting the deployment of forces to support the main effort and improve overall trafficability.
- Anticipate a transition to a pursuit or exploitation by positioning military police forces to support follow-on units.
- Support the movement of maneuver forces, ensuring their ability to concentrate and maintain momentum. Military police also protect command nodes, such as the main command post and the tactical command post. The security and mobility support tasks help coordinate efforts to concentrate forces and sustain the offensive operation.
- Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance according to the commander's information collection plan and perform counterreconnaissance to neutralize, disrupt, or defeat enemy reconnaissance forces attempting to gather intelligence on the protected forces.
- Know the location and composition of probable response forces or TCFs to coordinate and assist in securing the support areas and the joint security area.

1-49. Military police missions related to security and mobility support during offensive operations typically include—

- Securing resource movement by ensuring that commanders receive the necessary forces, supplies, and equipment to support offensive operations.
- Conducting area security by detecting, deterring, and defeating Level I and Level II threats while delaying Level III threats operating within the AO by—
  - Disrupting and countering threat intelligence agents, special forces, criminals, and irregular threats involved in reconnaissance and surveillance of friendly forces.
  - Denying the abilities of threat special forces, criminals, and irregular threats to attack or undertake actions that could harm friendly forces or disrupt deployment and sustainment operations.
  - Preventing the theft of military equipment and supplies by criminals or other threat actors.
  - Mitigating, resolving, and preventing traffic congestion, accidents, and other safety-related issues along MSRs and ASRs.
  - Targeting threat actors, groups, organizations, and networks to prevent their ability to cause harm to forces, populations, and critical infrastructure; drive disorder and instability; and impede freedom of action.
- Conducting security and mobility support tasks, such as aiding in gap crossings (including river crossings), the passage of lines, breaching operations, securing convoys, and HRP security.

- Executing noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), which include enrolling and tracking individuals during the evacuation process.
- Providing regulation and enforcement of main and ASRs to enable freedom of movement.
- Supporting PRC to mitigate the impact of DCs on maneuvering forces.
- Integrating police intelligence activities across military police operations to enhance situational awareness and create a holistic common operational picture.
- Assisting in forcible-entry operations (planning of detainee operations).
- Supporting cordon-and-search tasks (performing outer cordon security and managing detainees).
- Integrating patrol and explosive detection dogs to identify hazards on routes and roadways.

1-50. The PM or military police commander at the appropriate echelon integrates military police capabilities to support offensive operations (see FM 3-39 for more details on PM responsibilities). Military police units prepare for these operations by establishing early linkups with the maneuver units they support. As they prepare for offensive actions, military police units focus on conducting inspections, rehearsing combined arms maneuvers, facilitating the movement of combined arms forces into position for the attack, and managing the evacuation and control of captured and detained individuals. For more detailed information on offensive tasks and security operations, see FM 3-90.

1-51. Military police units participate in combined arms exercises, specifically focusing on breaching and gap crossing operations. They conduct rehearsals for the breach, assault, and support forces. Preparation may involve establishing protection measures and holding areas for tactical units moving along MSRs to their assembly areas. When route and area clearance operations are expected, military police units join engineer; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN); explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); and other forces to conduct route reconnaissance, inspections, and clearance activities. The preparation activities of military police units are closely aligned with and integrated into the preparations of maneuver forces. Figure 1-3 illustrates examples of the security and mobility support of the military police, including gap crossing assistance, area security, MWD support, LOC security, and PRC for offensive operations.




Figure 1-3. Notional military police support to a division in the offense

Legend:			
BSA	brigade support area	EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
CIV	civilian	KM	kilometer
DC	dislocated civilian	MP	military police
DET	detention	MSR	main supply route
DOG	military working dog	TCP	traffic control post
DSA	division support area		

Figure 1-3. Notional military police support to a division in the offense (continued)

SECURITY AND MOBILITY SUPPORT TO STABILITY

1-52. Stability is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States. These efforts are coordinated with other national power instruments to maintain or restore a safe and secure environment. Additionally, they aim to provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (For more information, see ADP 3-07 and JP 3-0.) A *stability mechanism* is the primary method through which friendly forces affect CIVs in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADP 3-0). As with defeat mechanisms, combining different stability mechanisms can create complementary and reinforcing effects that enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of a mission more so than relying on a single mechanism. For organizations assigned an AO, there will always be essential stability tasks that are either implied or explicitly specified.

1-53. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. Compel is the use or threat of lethal force to establish control and dominance; effect behavioral change; or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. Control involves imposing civil order to maintain stability within a given area. Influence is about altering the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behaviors of foreign populations, whether they are friendly, neutral, adversarial, or hostile. This is accomplished by synchronizing information-related capabilities, presence, and conduct. Finally, support focuses on establishing, reinforcing, or creating the necessary conditions for the effective functioning of instruments of national power.

1-54. It is essential to maintain initiative during stability activities by pursuing objectives that address the root causes of instability. The combination of tasks during these activities will vary depending on the situation. Stability consists of six primary tasks: establishing civil security, establishing civil control, restoring essential services, supporting governance, supporting economic and infrastructure development, and conducting security cooperation. (For more detailed information, see FM 3-07.) The purposes of stability are to—

- Provide a secure environment.
- Secure land areas.
- Meet the critical needs of the populace.
- Gain support for the HN government.
- Shape the environment for interagency and HN success.

1-55. Planning and preparing for stability activities can be difficult due to the technical nature of the requirements and the wide range of potential military police missions associated with them. Conducting an early on-the-ground assessment is crucial for tailoring the military police force with the needed specialties and resources. The findings from this assessment are communicated to planners to ensure that an adequate military police unit promptly arrives in the AO. The military police force conducts continuous surveillance and combat patrols to help further this associated assessment or survey to identify—

- Basic security requirements and establish police intelligence within the AO.
- The needs of the HN and necessary military police capabilities to address specific requirements.
- Other special considerations that affect the military police force.

1-56. Military police capabilities can provide specialized technical support integrated into the CA plan, mainly focusing on PRC. (For information on CA planning, see ATP 3-57.60.) This integration is especially relevant for security and mobility support. Integration occurs through the operations process and is facilitated by coordination between military police planners and the CA staff assigned to the supported command. The Civil-Military Operations Center supports the CA staff at echelon, helping to achieve the integration of PRC measures. (For more details on the Civil-Military Operations Center, see ATP 3-57.70.) For additional information on CA operations and PRC, see ATP 3-57.10 and FM 3-57.

1-57. Military police tasks must be prioritized to maximize mission effectiveness. The specific discipline carried out depends on the needs of the supported commander and the availability of military police resources. The supported commander, taking into consideration the recommendations of the PM, establishes the priorities for military police operations. The PM frequently needs to prioritize tasks to ensure optimal military police support.

1-58. Stability tasks typically require a longer duration compared to other offense and defense tasks. Consequently, the effort exerted by military police is initially very high but tends to decrease as the HN capabilities mature. Preparation activities involve assessing the level of the civil rule of law within policing and correctional services and identifying significant infrastructure projects. These projects may include constructing police stations, training centers, and correctional institutions. The highest priority projects might be carried out using general engineering resources, while other projects may compete for contingency funding and be executed through contracted services. Military police forces may engage in counterinsurgency operations as the security framework of the HN develops.

1-59. Military police are uniquely suited for stability operations. Their skills and capabilities are essential for achieving the desired outcomes and transition criteria during stabilization efforts. They possess strong abilities in shooting, moving, and communicating but are trained to use judgment and resolve issues with the lowest level of force possible, according to the use-of-force continuum. Military police are trained to resort to deadly force only after all other options have been exhausted. Military police units must project a professional image of law enforcement and policing. This professional presence is vital for a force that needs significant capabilities while maintaining a low political profile.


1-60. Military police can support stability tasks through all three disciplines. Conducting policing activities to support civil security and civil control efforts is critical for establishing the rule of law. PIO are integrated and continuously executed throughout all military police operations, which may involve establishing, utilizing, and transferring HN PIO capabilities. This typically includes a range of activities aimed at establishing or reestablishing the rule of law and preparing for the handover of responsibilities to an HN to carry out those same tasks. For more information on police operations and stability support, see ATP 3-39.10 and FM 3-39.

1-61. Support for military police detention operations during stability activities with an HN is essential. Detainees must be effectively managed and transferred to HN police, who are appropriately trained and disciplined. Military police can aid stability operations by collaborating with the HN to establish or reestablish detention or correction systems. For more information on detainee operations and support for stability, see FM 3-39 and FM 3-63.

1-62. Military police security and mobility support in stability is often associated with police and detention operations, but it also resembles tasks performed in support of offense and defense. The main objective of security and mobility tasks is to establish civil control and restore essential services. Figure 1-4, page 17, shows that security and mobility support encompass various activities, such as area security, MWD support, response force operations, LOC security, and PRC. Police operation and detention operation support are most likely to require activities and skills associated with security and mobility support, including the following:

- Establishing, operating, and transitioning police stations. This involves transferring control to trained and skilled HN police, contributing to local and area security tasks as discussed in chapter 3 on security operations.
- Controlling the movement of DCs. This includes providing relief to those affected by crises. The topic of DC operations is part of PRC, which is addressed mainly in chapter 2 (mobility operations) and chapter 5 (DC operations).
- Establishing and training regional and urban police patrol operations. This includes managing traffic control and emergency first responder operations, which are primarily related to mobility operations, as discussed in chapter 2.
- Establishing indigenous highway patrol capabilities. This activity is also primarily linked to mobility operations, as explained in chapter 2.
- Conducting facility security and protection efforts. This contributes to local and area security tasks, which are covered in detail in chapter 3 (security operations).

- Establishing and supporting DC camps. This supports the commander's civil-military operations (CMO) plan. Chapter 5 addresses the establishment of DC camps, which are further detailed in appendix B.
- Denying the abilities of criminal and irregular threats. This involves preventing these actors from attacking or carrying out actions intended to harm friendly forces or disrupt sustainment operations.
- Preventing the theft of military equipment and supplies. This aims to protect against theft by criminals or other threat actors.
- Mitigating traffic issues. Efforts focus on solving and preventing traffic congestion, accidents, and other safety-related problems along MSRs and ASRs.
- Targeting threat actors, groups, organizations, and networks. This strategy is designed to prevent their ability to harm forces, local populations, and critical infrastructure; drive disorder and instability; and impede freedom of action.



Legend:			
BSA	brigade support area	EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
DC	dislocated civilian	HN	host nation
DET	detention	MP	military police
DOG	military working dog	MSR	main supply route
DSA	division support area		

Figure 1-4. Notional military police support to a division conducting stability

Establish Civil Security

1-63. Establishing civil security involves providing the safety of the HN and its population, including protection from internal and external threats. This is essential for creating a safe and secure environment. Civil security encompasses various activities, including restoring order and conducting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. When a legitimate civil government cannot take responsibility for the security sector, military forces handle civil security tasks. Simultaneously, they assist in developing the security and police forces of the HN. Typically, the responsibility for establishing and maintaining civil security falls to military forces from the beginning of operations until the transition phase; at this point, the HN security and police forces take over this role.

1-64. Operations to restore order are conducted to stop violence and to support, reinstate, or establish civil authorities. These operations provide security and stability following a conflict while setting the conditions for transitioning to the rule of law. It is crucial to provide effective security for the local population by reducing their exposure to the threat of violent conflict, as this creates a stable environment for ongoing stability tasks and reconstruction efforts. Military police are particularly well-suited for engaging in operations that establish civil order. Military police Soldiers are trained and experienced in using graduated response techniques and applying the minimum force necessary to control a situation. In environments that lie between major conflict and instability, the ability to manage potentially violent events, establish order, and disperse crowds without resorting to significant force can have a profound impact. Successful efforts to maintain order with minimal violence facilitate the transition from instability to stable peace and establish effective governance under the rule of law.

Establish Civil Control

1-65. Civil control focuses on justice reform and the rule of law, with efforts to rebuild the HN judiciary, police, and correctional systems. It involves strengthening key institutions essential for a functioning justice system, including law enforcement, investigative agencies, prosecution services, and public defense. Civil control also includes assisting the state in selecting an appropriate body of laws to enforce, typically using the most recent HN criminal code, which has been revised to remove blatantly abusive statutes. These initiatives are carried out by Army capabilities during stabilization efforts in support of the local government following a U.S. military intervention.

1-66. Military police conduct border control, perform border security, and facilitate civil freedom of movement. These tasks are part of a broader mission to establish civil security. While some of these responsibilities overlap police operations, the tactical aspects of military police support are typically covered in the context of mobility operations (chapter 2) and security operations (chapter 3). Activities supporting PRC are discussed in chapter 5.

1-67. A central component of civil security is the ability of the state to monitor and regulate its borders. Typically, border and coast guard forces are responsible for securing national boundaries, while customs and immigration officials manage the movement of people, animals, and goods across designated entry points. These border controls are essential for several reasons: they regulate immigration, oversee the movement of local and foreign populations, collect excise taxes and duties, prevent the import or export of controlled materials, limit smuggling, and help control the spread of diseases through quarantine. When these capabilities have broken down or no longer exist, U.S. forces may need to step in to fill this gap and maintain the security of the affected nation. Military police may play a significant role in this initiative. The essential tasks involved may include:

- An initial response where military forces—
  - Establish border control and boundary security.
  - Establish and disseminate rules relevant to movement.
  - Dismantle roadblocks and establish checkpoints.
  - Promote stability and CIV freedom of movement.
  - Ensure freedom of maneuver.
- A transformation where military forces train and equip border control and boundary security forces.

Protect Key Personnel and Facilities

1-68. Military forces may extend protection and support to key CIV personnel when necessary to ensure their ongoing contributions to the overall operation. In the interest of transparency, military forces specifically request and carefully negotiate this protection. The long-term success of interventions often depends on the ability of external actors to safeguard and maintain critical infrastructure until the HN can assume that responsibility. Protecting key facilities may be required immediately or over the long term. Essential tasks may include both an initial response and subsequent transformation, described as follows:

- An initial response where military forces—
  - Protect government-sponsored CIV reconstruction and stabilization personnel.
  - Safeguard contractor and CIV personnel involved in reconstruction and stabilization efforts and their resources.
  - Provide emergency logistics support as needed.
  - Protect and secure places of worship and cultural sites.
  - Safeguard critical infrastructure, natural resources, civil registries, and property ownership documents.
  - Protect strategically important institutions, such as government buildings, medical facilities and public health infrastructure, the central bank, the national treasury, integral commercial banks, museums, and religious sites.
  - Secure military depots, equipment, ammunition caches, and communication systems.
  - Establish vetting and screening protocols.
  - Identify, secure, protect, and coordinate the disposition of munitions stockpiles and CBRN material, including precursors and facilities, utilizing EOD technical expertise.
- A transformation where military forces build HN capacity to protect—
  - CIV reconstruction and stabilization personnel.
  - Public infrastructure and institutions.
  - Military infrastructure.

Restore Essential Services

1-69. The activities related to the primary stability task extend beyond merely restoring local civil services and addressing the impacts of humanitarian crises. While military forces typically focus on the immediate response to the urgent needs of the population, other CIV agencies and organizations address broader humanitarian issues and the overall well-being of society. Transition tasks lay the groundwork for long-term development by tackling the root causes of conflicts that lead to famine, the displacement of CIVs, and human trafficking. Efforts to foster sustainability ensure that these changes are lasting by institutionalizing positive societal transformations.

1-70. During these efforts, military forces support HN agencies and CIV relief organizations. However, when the HN cannot fulfill its roles, military forces may need to undertake these tasks directly or assist other CIV agencies and organizations. These activities must be appropriately scaled to match the local capacity for sustainability. Proper scaling maximizes the opportunities for the local population to establish small-scale enterprises that can deliver as many essential services as possible through the private economy. Large-scale projects that demand complex support from the HN should not be initiated until the necessary infrastructure is in place to sustain such efforts.

1-71. Military police play a crucial role in supporting the restoration of essential services in various ways. Their efforts, which involve activities and capabilities related to security and mobility, focus on addressing DCs, ensuring the safety of convoys and personnel, and maintaining necessary controls during missions aimed at preventing famine and providing emergency aid such as food relief, nonfood assistance programs, and public health initiatives. PRC is dedicated to supporting DCs and offers detailed guidelines for planning and executing these missions. (See chapter 5 and ATP 3-57.10 for more information.) For details on the mobility activities associated with managing DCs, see chapter 2.

1-72. International organizations, NGOs, and other humanitarian actors are the most qualified and trained to address the humanitarian crises DCs face. Notable international organizations include the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration. Relevant NGOs might include groups such as Cooperative

Assistance for Relief Everywhere. The International Committee of the Red Cross, a prominent international organization, also plays a crucial role in humanitarian efforts.

1-73. The presence and uncontrolled movement of DCs can jeopardize the success of operations. DCs often indicate broader issues such as conflict, insecurity, and social inequalities. How these displaced populations are treated can either build trust and confidence—laying the groundwork for stabilization and reconstruction among a traumatized community—or foster resentment and lead to further chaos. Local and international aid organizations are typically best equipped to address the needs of the local population but require a secure environment to operate effectively. By working closely together, military forces can help ensure the success of these organizations by providing essential support to the community.

1-74. DCs often mainly consist of women and children. Many members of these communities may experience some form of posttraumatic stress, and all of them require essential resources such as food, shelter, and medical care. In the aftermath of a major disaster, humanitarian crisis, or conflict, providing adequate support to DCs can be a challenge that exceeds the capabilities of available military forces. Therefore, through coordination with other agencies and organizations, military forces play a vital role in providing humanitarian assistance to affected populations. The list of essential tasks includes—

- Assisting DCs.
- Supporting assistance to aid DCs.
- Providing security for camps housing DCs.

1-75. Military police play a crucial role in carrying out various essential tasks. While they often lead these activities, they more commonly support other Army units, joint forces, and CIV organizations. Managing DCs can require substantial effort and military police resources. Their responsibilities include ensuring the safety and security of DCs from the moment they are discovered until they are taken to collection points and camps and ultimately assisting in their resettlement or return to their homes.

Assist Dislocated Civilians

1-76. When assisting DCs, military forces—

- Ensure that humanitarian aid organizations have access to populations in need.
- Estimate food and other aid needs for affected populations.
- Assess the adequacy of local physical transport, distribution, and storage.

Support Assistance to Dislocated Civilians

1-77. When supporting efforts to assist DCs, the essential tasks can be divided into two main phases (initial response and transformation). These phases are described as follows:

- An initial response, where military forces—
  - Estimate food aid needs for DCs.
  - Assess the adequacy of local transport, distribution systems, and storage facilities.
  - Establish camps to accommodate DCs.
  - Provide emergency food, water, shelter, sanitation, and medical care to DCs.
- Transformation, where military forces—
  - Ensure access to basic services, including education and healthcare.
  - Clear damaged and destroyed housing and assess the extent of the damage.

Support Security to Dislocated Civilian Camps

1-78. When providing security for DC camps, the list of essential tasks may include an initial response and transformation, described as follows:

- An initial response, where military forces—
  - Assess the conditions of temporary shelters and camps for DCs.
  - Ensure adequate protection and monitoring of these camps.
  - Facilitate access for humanitarian aid organizations and security forces to the camps.
- Transformation, where military forces assist in establishing and maintaining order in camps.

SECURITY AND MOBILITY SUPPORT TO DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

1-79. Military police first responder capabilities are essential to the defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) mission. DSCA refers to the support provided by U.S. federal military forces, DOD CIVs, DOD contractor personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces. The use of National Guard forces occurs when the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), in coordination with state governors, requests their activation under Title 10, United States Code (10 USC) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities during domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, or other domestic activities and special events. DSCA missions are also known as civil support missions (see DODD 3025.18). Military police support for domestic operations is subject to various legal constraints (see ADP 3-28 for more information on DSCA). While most military police tasks performed in domestic support are similar to those conducted in overseas operations, they are carried out under very different conditions. The following core tasks of DSCA provide domestic support for:

- Disasters.
- CIV law enforcement.
- CBRN incidents.
- Other incidents.

1-80. The list of security and mobility support activities is only slightly reduced from those conducted in offense, defense, and stability. Significant support for mobility operations, and possibly for security operations, will likely be necessary to assist civil authorities. DSCA restrictions only minimally impact this support, which may substantially affect other military police disciplines.

1-81. DSCA has several distinct features that set it apart from other Army operations. DSCA uses nondestructive methods to save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect property. Typically, the Army National Guard is the first military force to respond to domestic emergencies. Federal military forces usually step in to support a federal agency, often after a Presidential declaration, to enhance the efforts and resources of state and local governments. Each state governor has the authority to activate the National Guard forces of the state (both the Army National Guard and Air National Guard) to respond to an incident. State resources fund this activation and fall under the command and control of the governor. These activated forces operate in state active duty status and carry out missions based on the needs of the state, adhering to state laws and regulations. This type of response is termed National Guard Civil Support rather than DSCA. DSCA operations involve the Army National Guard (in 10 USC or 32 USC status), Army Reserve, and active duty Army forces.

1-82. Military police operations in DSCA may involve the simultaneous use of all military police disciplines and specialized capabilities as needed. Military police support might be essential for Army forces that provide movement, maneuver, command and control, protection, and sustainment to government agencies at various levels until those agencies can resume normal operations. In martial law, extensive military police assistance may be necessary. Military police Soldiers are equipped with the training and technical skills required for relief operations, which focus on restoring civil order. This includes support for mobility and security operations. The restoration of civil order requires—

- Operational unity.
- Effective coordination.
- Public acceptance.
- Threat awareness.
- Minimal use of force.

1-83. In DSCA, there are few unique military police missions that differ from those conducted during other operations. The primary distinction lies in the context that these missions are executed. Section 1385, Title 18, USC (18 USC 1385), known as the Posse Comitatus Act, restricts the actions that military forces—especially Regular Army units, including federalized National Guard units—can undertake within the United States and its territories. Unlike federal (active duty) forces, National Guard units, which remain under the control of their respective state governors, are not subject to the same limitations. Army forces work closely with these state-controlled units to coordinate their efforts. These agencies are trained, resourced, and equipped more extensively than similar agencies involved in stability activities overseas. Federal government policies outline the essential services that Army forces provide in response to disasters. Within this

framework of support to federal agencies, the primary focus for military police during DSCA operations is to assist these agencies in restoring essential services. Essential services of concern for military police include—

- Police services.
- Corrections and detention operations.
- Law and order.

1-84. Beyond their core duties, military police can support federal agency personnel by contributing a range of essential support services, to include—

- Rescues.
- Food and water.
- Emergency shelter.
- Basic sanitation, including sewage and garbage disposal.
- Minimum-essential access to affected areas.

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

1-85. The size and composition of military police needed to carry out security and mobility support tasks depend on the tactical situation (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and information considerations [METT-TC(I)], also known as mission variables. Table 1-2 is a baseline for military police leaders and staff to use when planning security and mobility support tasks.

Note. The factors outlined in table 1-2 mainly discuss the possible use of military police capabilities. However, these general considerations do not exempt military police leaders and planners from conducting thorough mission analyses. Such analyses are necessary to identify and employ the specific capabilities to successfully accomplish their missions.

Table 1-2. Security and mobility support planning considerations

Task	*Purpose*	*Squad*	*Platoon*	*Company*	*Remarks*
Reconnaissance and Surveillance (Route, Area, Zone)	Identifies terrain characteristics, enemy and friendly obstacles to movement, and enemy forces and civilian population dispositions to allow freedom of maneuver.	225 sq km (rural) 90 sq km (urban) 45-km route/ pipeline	675 sq km (rural) 275 sq km (urban) 135-km route/ pipeline	2,000 sq km (rural) 800 sq km (urban) 400-km route/ pipeline	Speed and level of detail will modify the requirement and area the element can effectively recon.
Traffic Control Posts	Precludes the interruption of traffic along a designated route.	1 TCP	3 TCPs	9 TCPs	If a commander assumes risk, the number of TCPs can be tripled if only one team is allocated per TCP
Straggler Control	Returns stragglers to parent units.	METT-TC(I)			Need transportation support to return dismounted Soldiers to units.

Table 1-2. Security and mobility support planning considerations (continued)

Task	*Purpose*	*Squad*	*Platoon*	*Company*	*Remarks*
Support to Gap Crossings	Controls traffic at gap-crossing sites to ensure the speed and efficiency of crossings.	N/A; doctrinally a platoon operation	1 brigade gap-crossing operation	1 division gap-crossing operation	Executed at the gap, controlling traffic on the near side, far side, and the on gap/bridge. On average 2 crossing points per brigade
Support to Breaching Operations	Provides an efficient and orderly flow of the movement of forces into and through the breach area.	400-meter breach (reduction area)	1,200-meter breach (reduction area)	3,600-meter breach (reduction area)	Executed at the breach, controlling traffic on the near side and far side of the breach. Also dependent of the number of breach sites.
Support to Passage of Lines	Reduces confusion and congestion of units into and out of the passage area.	N/A; doctrinally a platoon operation	1 brigade passage of lines	1 division passage of lines	Executed through TCPs, route signing, and convoy escorts. Also conduct straggler control to prevent enemy infiltration.
Defile Operations	Precludes the interruption of traffic through a narrow passageway.	1 defile	3 defiles	9 defiles	TCPs located at both sides of the defile.
Area Security	Protects friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area.	166 sq km (rural) 66 sq km (urban)	500 sq km (rural) 200 sq km (urban)	2,000 sq km (rural) 800 sq km (urban)	Higher density of friendly forces and limiting terrain reduces the AO of the unit.
Route Security	Prevents enemy ground forces from moving into direct-fire range of the protected route.	10km	25km	80km	Route security consists of regular patrols. 5-km off of route in rural terrain, 1km off of route in urban area.
Convoy Security	Continuously secures routes when friendly forces are insufficient.	METT-TC (I) Typically, no less than 1 military police squad (4 vehicles) per convoy, averaging 1 military police vehicle per 10 in convoy.			Convoy composition, route, and threat level will determine protection requirement.
Critical Site / Asset Security	Provides security to a site or asset that is deemed essential.	1 small site/asset	3 small sites/assets	9 small sites/assets	Level of criticality and proximity of enemy will modify requirements.
Checkpoints	Enables commanders to control freedom of movement in an AO.	1 light-traffic checkpoint <12 hours	3 light/1 heavy-traffic checkpoints <12 hours	9 light/3 heavy-traffic checkpoints <12 hours	Heavy traffic and constant operation will increase the number of military police squads required.

Table 1-2. Security and mobility support planning considerations (continued)

Task	*Purpose*	*Squad*	*Platoon*	*Company*	*Remarks*
Combat Outposts	Employs security forces for sanctuary, support, information collection, or area denial.	N/A	1 combat outpost	3 combat outposts	
Response Force Operations	Protects the force and ensures freedom of movement for units to conduct assigned missions.	36 enemy personnel–deliberate 30 enemy personnel–hasty	123 personnel–deliberate 102 enemy personnel–hasty	369 personnel–deliberate 307 enemy personnel–hasty	Ratio is 1:2.5 for hasty and 1:3 for deliberate against Level I/II. Can also delay Level III threats at a 1:6 ratio.
Node Protection	Provides layered, integrated, and redundant protection to a command node.	1 node	3 small nodes/1 large node	9 small nodes/3 large nodes	Dependent on the size and level of production required by the node.
Protective Services	Protects high-risk personnel.	METT-TC (I) Normally 1 squad per high-risk personnel (larger security details). Platoon or company may be warranted depending on the threat level to multiple high-risk personnel or if the unit is providing the totality of security (protective security detail, airfield security, and convoy security).			N/A
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations	Provides security at departure locations and extraction sites for convoys carrying evacuees; offers interpersonal skills suited to handling evacuees.	1 extraction site	3 extraction sites	9 extraction sites	N/A
Dislocated Civilian Operations (Clearing Operations)	Ensures priority for military traffic by diverting dislocated civilians from MSRs and other areas to alternate routes/facilities.	12,500 civilians	37,500 civilians	150,000 civilians	Highly dependent on the number of MSRs/ASRs required to regulate and the proximity of supporting facilities.

Table 1-2. Security and mobility support planning considerations (continued)

Task	*Purpose*	*Squad*	*Platoon*	*Company*	*Remarks*
Dislocated Civilian Operations (Collection Operations)	Oversees the temporary resettlement of dislocated civilians–shelter, sustain, guard, protect, and account for dislocated civilians.	1 per dislocated civilian collection point	1 per 1,666 dislocated civilians or 1 per dislocated civilian holding area	1 per 5,000 dislocated civilians (1 per dislocated camp)	May include route security, providing protection to dislocated civilians as they travel from point to point or collection operations, transporting dislocated civilians from collection points to holding areas and camps.
Decontamination Site Security	Provides protection of units executing a mission that puts them in a vulnerable state; Controls traffic at the site.	METT-TC (I)	METT-TC (I)	METT-TC (I)	Size required will depend on the size element being decontaminated and the type of decontamination being conducted.

Legend:

AO	area of operation	METT-TC (I)	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and information consideration
ASR	alternate supply route		
km	kilometer		
MSR	main supply route		
		N/A	not applicable
		recon	reconnaissance
		sq	square
		TCP	traffic control post


MARITIME ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR SECURITY AND MOBILITY SUPPORT

1-86. Previous conflicts have proven the critical role of land forces in maritime theaters. In nearly all instances, the land plays a crucial role in determining the strategies importance of a maritime area for a CCDR. Land masses near or surrounded by water create critical choke points, facilitate the projection of forces into and out of maritime areas, and are home to the majority of the population of the world. The ultimate goal of conflict is usually not to control vast expanses of open water but rather the land and the people who inhabit it. Therefore, planning and training for the unique challenges of operations in these environments is crucial, as is an integrated planning approach with the rest of the joint force.

1-87. Maritime operational environments introduce specific coordination and synchronization requirements for military police units, which typically train and operate in land environments. Planning for the Army and joint forces must encompass the dynamic nature of threats and constraints faced by land forces in maritime regions. The movement and maneuver of Army units between land masses largely depend on joint capabilities. Control over critical land areas is essential for sustaining and protecting joint operations in a maritime operational environment. This interdependence has historically been vital for achieving success in armed conflicts against peer threats in maritime theaters, and it will continue to be crucial in the foreseeable future. For more information on maritime environments, see FM 3-0.

MARITIME OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

1-88. Applying the operational framework in maritime environments requires military police commanders and staffs to consider the effects of maritime surface areas and the integration with maritime forces. It also necessitates a different understanding of what defines deep, close, and rear operations in relation to each other (see figure 1-5). The physical separation of forces by bodies of water impacts considerations for mutual support, as many operations are likely to involve geographically distinct areas. Military police echelons may gather information on maritime surface areas to support other Services. They may also need to defend against enemy amphibious assaults, which requires tactical-level coordination with Navy and Marine Corps forces.



Legend:			
BSA	brigade support area	LR	long range
CSA	corps support area	LZ	landing zone
DC	dislocated civilian camp	MP	military police
DET	detainee collection point	MSR	main supply route
DSA	division support area	DSA	division support area
LC	landing craft	TCP	traffic control point

Figure 1-5. Notional military police support in a maritime-dominated environment

1-89. Military police forces might support amphibious landings or airborne and air assault operations over water as part of joint operations. Operations previously considered close, such as forcible entry, can extend into deep operations depending on the distance between islands or sea bases. Tactical support areas may be widely separated and require watercraft or other joint capabilities to ensure tactical-level sustainment or enable tactical maneuver forces to secure sea LOC.

Deep Operations

1-90. Deep operations in a maritime environment aim to defeat enemy anti-access and area denial capabilities, thereby creating conditions conducive to joint offensive operations. This can be achieved through information collection, special operations forces, and fires. Additionally, these operations may include reconnaissance and security activities to support joint defensive efforts utilizing the same capabilities. While military police forces typically do not directly affect deep operations with their capabilities, they contribute by providing essential support. This support involves protecting long-range fires and information collection assets and supporting special operations forces.

Close Operations

1-91. Security and mobility support in close operations in a maritime environment can resemble traditional land-based approaches discussed earlier in this chapter. Seizing key terrain requires Army forces to conduct offensive operations, including airborne operations, air assaults, and amphibious assaults, all supported by military police. Close operations also involve the defense of islands and island-based nodes that enable joint operations, such as airfields and ports. Due to the isolated nature of some forward-deployed Army forces, which are critical to the success of joint operations, these forces may need to conduct defensive operations for extended periods until additional reinforcements arrive. Sustainment planning should assume potential isolation lasting several weeks or longer. While most security and mobility support tasks will remain consistent during close operations, military police forces must be ready to operate in smaller teams, often isolated from leadership and sustainment and dismounted for longer durations.

Rear Operations

1-92. Rear operations in a maritime environment include those necessary to set and sustain the theater and facilitate combat operations for the joint force. These operations involve conducting protected reception, staging, onward movement, and integration and theater sustainment. Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration may occur thousands of miles from where a unit will be employed in combat. Similar to land operations, military police will continue to provide security and mobility support in the rear area. However, there will be increased joint integration during the planning process to prioritize critical joint resources and mitigate risks to vulnerable and extended air and sea LOC.

1-93. Many security and mobility support missions are linked to specific support areas, which helps build and maintain combat power. While ground forces have their designated support areas, large bodies of water may necessitate waterborne or airborne transport for the staging and movement of personnel and equipment between various echeloned support areas. These support areas can be located at sea or on land, such as on islands, and are interconnected by sea or air LOC. These strategic and tactical support areas are critical assets but can be vulnerable to enemy attacks, requiring heightened security measures.

POLICE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS INTEGRATION

1-94. PIO must be integrated into all aspects of security and mobility support planning and execution. The information collected by military police contributes to police intelligence, which helps inform decision-making processes for commanders, military police staff, Soldiers, and leaders involved in security and mobility support missions. This intelligence feeds into the broader intelligence process, enabling commanders to make informed decisions regarding the security of convoys transiting through the area. It also provides military police the necessary information to mitigate risks during staff planning. During large-scale combat operations, military police supporting maneuver forces rely significantly on traditional military intelligence (MI) processes to drive combat operations against conventional enemy forces. Additionally, military police conducting security and mobility support operations during these large-scale operations also take on tasks to counter irregular threats that could jeopardize friendly operations or hinder freedom of

movement. As military operations shift from offensive and defensive strategies to stability missions, the role of PIO becomes increasingly important. It supports situational awareness of criminal threats that destabilize society and affect police effectiveness, helping to control crime and enable governance according to the rule of law.

1-95. The mobility and communication capabilities of military police units allow them to identify potential threats and rapidly report these contacts. Their involvement in security and mobility support operations enables military police Soldiers to regularly interact with the local population, fostering police engagement and facilitating information gathering. Integrating PIO throughout security and mobility support missions can create opportunities for collecting intelligence that meets requirements and enhances situational awareness.

1-96. The collection of police information and the development of police intelligence products enable military police to plan and implement measures that reduce crime-conducive conditions and counter the impacts of criminal activity on military operations. Figure 1-6, page 29, illustrates the integration of security and mobility support tasks within the police intelligence framework. These countermeasures may include—

- Identifying high-threat areas to focus military police reconnaissance and surveillance efforts and recommending bypass routes to movement control teams.
- Conducting offensive operations to dismantle criminal networks and organizations.
- Hardening likely targets by implementing physical security and AT measures.
- Developing procedures to prevent, detect, and respond to criminal and terrorist actions before they occur.
- Implementing recommendations to reduce vulnerabilities to criminal and other irregular threats.




Figure 1-6. Police Intelligence Operations framework

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Chapter 2
Reconnaissance and Surveillance

Reconnaissance and surveillance are part of information collection. Military police engage in these activities by using their policing capabilities, enhanced through the application of PIO (see ATP 3-39.20). Reconnaissance involves actively collecting information, while surveillance refers to the systematic gathering of information, which should be continuous and include both active and passive methods. Both reconnaissance and surveillance generate raw data and information, which may constitute combat information that satisfies one or more CCIR or other information requirements. This chapter discusses how military police conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to monitor likely high-speed avenues of approach and potential LZ and drop zones.

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO INFORMATION COLLECTION

2-1. *Information collection* is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). This activity implies a function, mission, or action and identifies the organization that performs it. Information collection activities work as a cohesive system, emphasizing, synchronizing, and integrating all components and systems. This process combines the intelligence and operations staff functions to address CCIR. For more detailed information on information collection, see FM 3-55.

2-2. Information collection is the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements. This includes:

- Manage collection.
- Direct and task collection.
- Execute collection.

2-3. Military police support information collection requirements during the conduct of military police operations that may contribute to CCIR. They support intelligence-led, time-sensitive operations or shape policing strategies necessary to forecast, anticipate, and preempt crime or disruptive behavior to maintain order. Military police also focus their efforts on collecting police information. *Police information* is information collected during military police operations concerning crime, disorder, criminal activity, and criminal threats (FM 3-39). Police information encompasses various data regarding crime, law enforcement, and police institutions, along with their effectiveness, collected actionable materials, and additional general information in the operational environment.

2-4. Collecting and analyzing police information enhances situational awareness, protection, civil control, and law enforcement effectiveness. Before assigning military police to gather police information, commanders and staffs utilize police intelligence analysts to carry out activities that generate knowledge about the crime environment or to meet specific information requirements without deploying collection assets. These activities include—

- Performing searches and queries in police or detention databases, such as the Army Law Enforcement Reporting System, Army Corrections Information System, or Detainee Reporting System (DRS).
- Using analytical software to mine police databases and generate initial statistical data that directly answer information needs without requiring further analysis.
- Coordinating and liaising with other military units (both U.S. and multinational), including CA, special operations forces, and elements involved in reconnaissance and security operations.

- Coordinating the use of MI personnel (when authorized) to leverage the Distributed Common Ground System (Army) capabilities for querying intelligence databases and integrating information from intelligence sources.
- Sharing information and collaborating with unified action partners, such as local law enforcement organizations, federal law enforcement agencies, and law enforcement personnel from partner nations.

2-5. Generally, PIO focus on military police activities related directly to crime and criminal behavior, including law enforcement, corrections, and criminal investigations. PIO complements, but does not replace, traditional MI processes during Army operations. Military police utilize reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities as their primary means for collecting information. When conducting reconnaissance in tactical environments, military police primarily aim to identify the presence of criminal groups, terrorist organizations, enemy special operations teams, long-range reconnaissance units, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, and partially attrited or reconstituted small combat units. They also monitor other irregular threats in an AO. For more detailed information on PIO, see ATP 3-39.20.

2-6. Military police emphasize reconnaissance and surveillance to better understand crime environments, police and detention capabilities, and destabilizing elements within society. This information supports U.S. stability operations and helps consolidate gains after large-scale combat. While surveillance is a component of reconnaissance, the two have key differences. Surveillance is systematic, is typically passive in information collection, and may be conducted continuously. In contrast, reconnaissance is generally limited to the duration of a specific mission and actively gathers information. It involves a focused collection effort that utilizes various tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) throughout the mission, which may include extended surveillance periods.

2-7. Military police units conduct surveillance to gather information that helps protect against unexpected threats in an AO. This information is crucial for understanding, planning, and executing missions related to offense, defense, and stability. In populated areas, military police patrols may be more acceptable as a collection asset because they are perceived as a law enforcement organization rather than a purely combat unit. Additionally, military police receive specialized training in nonlethal use of force techniques and the graduated escalation of force.

2-8. Commanders and staffs must comprehensively understand the capabilities and limitations of available military police assets. This prevents collection asset tasking that does not match capability at a particular echelon or organization. Some reconnaissance and surveillance tasks require specialized equipment, training, or expertise to be completed successfully. As a result, there may be a need to make specific requests for technical capabilities that are not part of the standard military police organization. Understanding the capabilities and limitations of various military police organizations is crucial when planning and requesting the appropriate echelon and type of military police technical support to meet mission requirements. See FM 3-39 for details on the different military police organizations and their technical capabilities.

RECONNAISSANCE

2-9. *Reconnaissance* is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). Reconnaissance conducted by small units primarily depends on human dynamics rather than technical resources. It is a targeted collection effort carried out before, during, and after operations. The information gathered is essential for commanders and staffs as it supports the IPOE process. This information enables them to formulate, confirm, or adjust courses of action (COAs).

2-10. The responsibility for conducting reconnaissance does not rest solely with cavalry units. Every unit has an implied duty to gather and report information regarding the terrain, CIV activities, and disposition of friendly and enemy forces, regardless of location or primary function. Troops engaged in close combat and reconnaissance patrols from maneuver units at all levels collect information about enemy units they encounter. In echelon support areas, reserve maneuver forces, functional and multifunctional support and sustainment elements, and other governmental and multinational agencies observe and report on CIV and enemy activity and on significant changes in terrain and trafficability. Certain branches, such as the Corps of Engineers, CA, Military Police, and the Chemical Corps, have specific reconnaissance tasks that enhance the

overall reconnaissance efforts of the force. However, brigade combat team (BCT), division, and corps commanders primarily rely on their organic or attached reconnaissance elements—ground or air—and intelligence units to conduct reconnaissance.

2-11. Military police conduct reconnaissance to answer general and specific information requirements supporting the overall collection effort. They serve as the eyes and ears of the commander, particularly in support areas and along ground lines of communication, by locating the enemy and reporting information gathered from reconnaissance patrols. The areas of focus include MSRs, bridges, tunnels, depots, terminals, sustainment bases, ammunition supply points, communication centers or nodes, critical routes, command posts, and facilities deemed critical by the commander. Additionally, military police familiarize themselves with towns, populated areas, ridgelines, wooded areas, and important terrain features that could affect movements along road networks.

2-12. Military police play a crucial role in this effort by gathering route reconnaissance information for MSRs, ASRs, airfields, seaports, and potential LZ within the operational area. Their reconnaissance capabilities encompass a range of tasks, from tactical assessments to more technical evaluations related to investigative and forensic operations.

2-13. During stability tasks, military police conduct reconnaissance with a specialized focus on policing and investigative aspects of the environment (see figure 2-1). As the demand for technical capabilities from military police increases—typically when stability tasks become more prominent—it may be necessary to consolidate military police assets and capabilities under the command of military police battalions and brigades within the division, corps, and theater echelons. This consolidation ensures the effective integration and synchronization of military police technical capabilities across the AO. For details on police information operations, see ATP 3-39.20; for more information on military police reconnaissance, see FM 3-39.




Figure 2-1. Military police reconnaissance capabilities

2-14. Successful reconnaissance operations share seven fundamental principles that leaders must follow during the planning, preparation, and execution phases. These principles include—

- Ensuring continuous reconnaissance.
- Refraining from holding reconnaissance assets in reserve.
- Focusing on the reconnaissance objective.
- Reporting all information quickly and accurately.

- Maintaining freedom of maneuver.
- Gaining and maintaining contact with the threat.
- Developing the situation rapidly.

2-15. Regardless of the type of reconnaissance (see ADP 3-90, ATP 3-34.81, and FM 3-98 for specific reconnaissance information), the unit comprises three key elements: command, reconnaissance, and security. When a reconnaissance mission is received, the mission leader assesses the situation and organizes the reconnaissance force according to the mission variables. The mission leader develops the plan based on several important considerations:

- Obtaining accurate intelligence.
- Conducting rehearsals.
- Carrying out inspections.
- Utilizing deception measures.
- Using the smallest possible unit to accomplish the mission.
- Minimizing audio and electronic communications.
- Employing surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation devices.
- Remaining undetected.

2-16. This manual focuses on three forms of reconnaissance: route, area, and zone. It also covers the specific focus of civil reconnaissance and the details associated with reconnaissance and presence patrols. Military police typically use two types of patrols during reconnaissance operations: reconnaissance patrols and presence patrols. When carried out in a tactical environment, the guidelines for patrol operations outlined in ATP 3-39.10 remain valid.

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

2-17. *Route reconnaissance* is a form of reconnaissance operation to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route (ADP 3-90). That route may be a cross-country mobility corridor. Military police conduct route reconnaissance to gather new or updated information on the conditions of the route, including obstacles, bridge classifications, and enemy or CIV activity in the area. Typically, the commander assigns this mission when there is a need to use a specific route for the movement of friendly forces.

2-18. The commander assigns a route reconnaissance as a separate mission or a specific task for a unit already conducting zone or area reconnaissance. Usually, a platoon size unit will conduct a route reconnaissance one route at a time. For larger organizations, the number of available platoons or other designated reconnaissance assets directly affects how many routes can be covered simultaneously. By integrating ground, air, and technical resources, route reconnaissance can be completed more quickly and thoroughly. For more detailed information on route reconnaissance, see ATP 3-34.81 and FM 3-90.

2-19. Route reconnaissance tasks include the following:

- Identify, report and, based on engagement criteria, clear all enemy forces within capabilities that could impact movement along the route.
- Assess the trafficability of the route to determine whether it can support friendly forces.
- Survey all terrain the enemy can use to control movement along the route, including choke points, ambush sites, pickup zones, LZ, and drop zones.
- Reconnoiter all urban areas, CBRN contaminated zones, and lateral routes along the route.
- Evaluate and classify all bridges, defiles, overpasses, underpasses, and culverts along the route.
- Identify fords, crossing sites, or bypasses around existing and reinforcing obstacles, including urban areas.
- Locate all obstacles and establish lanes as specified in the execution orders (see appendix C for guidance on developing security and mobility support attachments that assist in the base operation order [OPORD]).
- Report all gathered route information to the headquarters that initiated the route reconnaissance mission. This report should include a sketch map or route overlay.

AREA RECONNAISSANCE

2-20. *Area reconnaissance* is a form of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area (ADP 3-90). Area reconnaissance is vital to maintaining area security and contributes to the commander's information collection plan.

2-21. Military police area reconnaissance involves a series of coordinated actions. It begins with observations and reports collected over time by military police patrols and information gathered through collaboration with HN police and other allied forces. Military police area reconnaissance plans focus on locations near facilities deemed critical by the commander. These locations include—

- Named areas of interest.
- Airbases.
- Bases and base clusters.
- Communications centers.
- Logistic support clusters.
- Key terminals, depots, and bridges.
- Critical terrain features.
- High-value assets.

2-22. When conducting an area reconnaissance mission, military police leaders follow these principles:

- The unit should move to the designated area as quickly as possible, typically by traveling along existing roads using appropriate movement techniques. During this transit, the unit reports enemy opposition and bypasses it according to the commander's reconnaissance guidance.
- Upon reaching the designated area, the unit halts and establishes an objective rally point. After the rally point is set, the unit reconnoiters the objective in one of the following ways:
  - If the terrain allows, the security element moves to an overwatch position to observe the reconnaissance element. The mission leader may direct small reconnaissance teams to each surveillance or vantage point around the objective instead of having the entire reconnaissance element move as a unit from point to point.
  - If the terrain does not permit securing the objective area, the unit will leave a security element at the objective rally point. In this case, reconnaissance and security teams will move to various surveillance or vantage points to reconnoiter the objective.
- After reconnoitering the objective and gathering the necessary details, all elements return to the objective rally point (see appendix C for information on developing security and mobility support attachments that support the base OPORD). Teams will then share information, consolidate it, and report it before returning to the patrol headquarters or proceeding to the next mission.

ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

2-23. *Zone reconnaissance* is a form of reconnaissance operation that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries (ADP 3-90). The commander assigns a zone reconnaissance mission when additional information about a specific area is needed before deploying other forces. This type of mission is suitable when the enemy situation is unclear, there is limited terrain knowledge, or combat operations have changed the landscape. Zone reconnaissance techniques can involve moving elements, stationary teams, or a combination of area reconnaissance efforts. The three methods that military police use to conduct a zone reconnaissance are the fan, converging routes, and successive sectors. See ATP 3-39.4 for more details on zone reconnaissance.

CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE

2-24. *Civil reconnaissance* is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events (JP 3-57). Civil reconnaissance specifically targets the civil component, which can be remembered using the acronym ASCOPE—areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. This type of reconnaissance can be carried out by CA units or other forces as needed. Like CBRN or engineer reconnaissance, civil reconnaissance is not a standalone form of reconnaissance but rather includes specific tasks that enhance the overall reconnaissance efforts of the force. For more detailed information on civil reconnaissance, see FM 3-57.

2-25. Military police may also be involved in civil reconnaissance, a focused type of reconnaissance that is performed by leveraging the specifics of PIO (see ATP 3-39.20), police operations (see ATP 3-39.10), and other skills typically associated with police officers. The presence of military police patrols is particularly effective for various civil reconnaissance missions.

RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS

2-26. A reconnaissance patrol is typically conducted by military police in a tactical role. The purpose of a reconnaissance patrol is to gather information that confirms or disproves previously obtained intelligence. The intent of this type of patrol is to move stealthily, avoid enemy contact, and complete the mission without engaging in close combat. Reconnaissance patrols strive to carry out their objectives without being detected. However, since detection cannot always be avoided, a reconnaissance patrol carries the necessary arms and equipment to protect itself and break contact with the enemy.

2-27. A reconnaissance patrol typically travels light, with as few personnel, arms, ammunition, and equipment as possible. This increases stealth and cross-country mobility in close terrain. Regardless of how a patrol is armed and equipped, the leader must always prepare for the possibility of direct-fire contact with a hostile force. Military police leaders should anticipate potential observation points and implement strategies to mitigate risks (see ATP 5-19). If the patrol is detected or unexpected opportunities arise, reconnaissance teams must be capable of rapidly transitioning to combat.

PRESENCE PATROLS

2-28. A presence patrol is a form of reconnaissance typically used in stability or DSCA activities. Its main objective is to gather information about the conditions within the AO of the unit. To achieve this, the patrol collects specific and general critical information as determined by the commander. The patrol actively seeks out this information, observes it, and reports it. In addition to its reconnaissance role, the presence patrol is a tangible representation of U.S. military forces that projects an image supporting the commander's intent. These patrols are also designed to demonstrate to the local population the presence and intentions of U.S. forces. Ultimately, presence patrols aim to convey determination, competence, confidence, concern and, when necessary, the overwhelming power of the force.

2-29. Military police Soldiers routinely observe and interact with the people and environments that they operate. This consistent contact makes military police patrols effective for collecting passive and active information. Passive collection occurs whenever military police Soldiers engage with their surroundings and the local population. Through these interactions, military police patrols may help fulfill general information and intelligence needs relevant to the entire AO. Additionally, they may uncover valuable information that was not specifically requested. This information is then shared with commanders and staffs, complete with the contextual details and circumstances surrounding its discovery.

2-30. Military police use various patrol methods to effectively gather police information based on specific circumstances. In densely populated areas, such as urban environments, or during special events, military police may choose foot or dismounted patrols. This approach allows for direct interaction, observation, and engagement with the community, increasing the likelihood of receiving valuable information about crime or potential threats. In rapidly evolving situations, such as combat or active-shooter events, military police may prefer vehicle or mounted patrols. These options provide greater mobility, improved communication, and enhanced protection. The ability to quickly switch between different patrol methods makes military police highly effective in uncertain, dynamic, and fast-changing situations. For more details on patrol methods, see ATP 3-39.10.

2-31. Military police patrols are often tasked with carrying out deliberate collection missions to gather specific information about an area or target. These requests are usually tied to a commander's priority intelligence requirements, the PM intelligence needs regarding the AO, or specific police investigations. Before executing their mission, military police Soldiers receive briefings that outline the collection requirements. Preparing specifically for the mission is essential. Postmission debriefings are critical to ensure that the information gathered by military police patrols is passed on to the appropriate staff elements for timely analysis and dissemination.

2-32. Before deploying presence patrols, the commander should carefully consider the message they wish to convey and clearly communicate their intent to the patrol leader. A presence patrol is designed to visibly

reinforce the impression the commander wants to share with the community. Factors such as where the patrol goes, what activities it engages in, how it handles its weapons, what equipment and vehicles it uses, and how it interacts with the public all contribute to that impression. Upon the return of the patrol to the main body, the commander should conduct a thorough debriefing. This debriefing should focus not only on gathering hard information but also on the patrol leader's perceptions of the impact of the patrol on the community. This feedback helps the commander decide whether to adjust the strategies for future patrols. Considerations include—

- Planning and rehearsing actions in and around large crowds of CIVs or noncombatants. (See ATP 3-39.4 and ATP 3-39.33 for additional information regarding civil disturbances.) While U.S. forces or the local population may have basic language skills, interpreters are essential for all but the most basic interactions.
- Briefing the patrol element on collection priorities.
- Assigning specific Soldiers the responsibility of maintaining all-around and high-low security on each floor and building rooftops.
- Periodically occupying rooftops during the patrol to enhance observation and security.
- Using urban city maps, by grid reference for navigation in urban areas. (This can be challenging. Maps that display street names, neighborhoods, and similar details are far more helpful).
- Keeping track of the number and locations of translators or interpreters available during the patrol. (Understand the ethnicity of the translators and how it might influence the local population in the patrol area or along the route.) See ATP 3-39.4 for additional guidance on employing translators.
- Monitoring recent activities or trends within the local population or urban areas.

Note. During DSCA, military police conduct presence patrols in support of local, state, or federal agencies. See ADP 3-28 for additional information on DSCA.

SURVEILLANCE

2-33. Surveillance enhances reconnaissance by directing reconnaissance assets to specific locations or targeted enemy units. Military police surveillance primarily aims to provide early warnings about enemy reconnaissance elements rather than establishing and maintaining contact with the main body of the enemy or engaging them directly. *Surveillance* is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means (JP 3-0). See ATP 3-55.4, ATP 3-55.6, and FM 3-55 for more information on surveillance. For the specialized but related aspects associated with law enforcement investigation, see ATP 3-39.12-1.

2-34. Military police conduct continuous surveillance of the assigned areas of interest and potential enemy reconnaissance routes within an assigned AO. To achieve this, they establish a series of listening posts (LPs) or observation posts (OPs), which can be mounted or dismounted. Additionally, military police carry out active mounted patrols to extend their observation capabilities and cover areas between LPs and OPs that may have blind spots. Special considerations must be considered when establishing LPs or OPs in urban areas. For further details on LPs and OPs, see ATP 3-39.4.

2-35. The ability of a unit to communicate effectively is crucial during surveillance operations. For successful early warning, detailed planning for continuous communications is essential. The mission leader assesses communication ranges and important terrain features to identify potential wireless communication issues. If problems are identified, support is requested from higher headquarters.

LISTENING AND OBSERVATION POSTS

2-36. LPs and OPs are positions that military police use to monitor enemy activity and coordinate indirect fire support against them. They are the primary method for maintaining surveillance over a designated avenue of approach or area of interest. The LP/OP is generally used—

- On key terrain to observe a specific area.
- As an early warning security measure within a defensive perimeter.
- To monitor likely enemy avenues of approach.

TYPES OF LISTENING AND OBSERVATIONS POSTS

2-37. LPs and OPs can be either mounted or dismounted:

- **Mounted LPs/OPs**: These posts have the advantage of vehicular optics, weapon systems, and displacement speed. However, the enemy can more easily detect them than dismounted posts. Mounted LPs/OPs should be used when rapid movement or displacement is expected.
- **Dismounted LPs/OPs**: These posts provide maximum stealth and are less likely to be detected by the enemy. However, they lack the agility that mounted LPs/OPs offer. A significant drawback of dismounted LPs/OPs is the time required to remount and move if necessary.

SELECTION OF A LISTENING OR OBSERVATION POSTS SITE

2-38. Based on an analysis of METT-TC (I) factors and guidance from the commander, the platoon leader decides how many LPs and OPs to establish and where to position them. This positioning facilitates long-range observation along the avenues of approach assigned by the commander, ensuring depth throughout the sector. Squad and team leaders will then select the locations for each LP/OP on the ground. LPs/OPs must have the following characteristics:

- **Covered and concealed routes**: The routes to and from each LP/OP must be covered and concealed, allowing military police to enter and exit without being detected by the enemy.
- **Unobstructed observation**: Positions should provide clear observation of the assigned area. Ideally, the fields of observation for adjacent LPs/OPs should overlap to guarantee complete coverage.
- **Effective cover and concealment**: Leaders should choose sites that offer both cover and concealment to minimize vulnerability on the battlefield. Military police may need to prioritize positions that provide better survivability, even if it means sacrificing some observation capability.
- **Low-profile locations**: LPs and OPs should be placed in areas that do not attract attention, such as avoiding water towers, isolated groves of trees, or single buildings and trees. These locations can draw enemy fire or serve as artillery reference points. Moreover, LPs and OPs should be situated away from natural lines of drift, where enemy forces are likely to move, such as routes in valleys or near major highways.
- **Skyline positions**: Avoid placing observers at topographical crests. Instead, LPs and OPs should be positioned farther down the slope of a hill or on the side, ensuring covered and concealed routes into and out of the location.

OPERATION OF A LISTENING OR OBSERVATION POST

2-39. A military police team should ideally operate an LP/OP to maintain team integrity. Duties at LPs/OPs are rotated among team members: one member observes, another records and reports the observed information, and a third member rests or provides backup security. The team should rotate these duties every 20 to 30 minutes, as the visual efficiency of the observer significantly decreases after that time. The team leader communicates enemy observations up the chain of command using the SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment) report format. When the LP/OP team is part of a defensive perimeter, it—

- Ensures that it has rearward cover.
- Builds fighting positions for protection and concealment.
- Uses trip flares, noisemaking devices, and night-vision optics to detect the enemy.
- Sets up M18A1 claymores and/or networked munitions for added security.
- Coordinates with the perimeter on reentry procedures from the withdrawal route.

2-40. The squad leader prepares a sector sketch that includes—

- A rough sketch of key and significant terrain highlighting named areas of interest and avenues of approach.
- A north-pointing arrow indicating orientation.
- The location of the LP/OP.
- The location of the hide position.
- Locations for vehicle fighting and observation positions.
- Alternate positions for hiding, fighting, and observation.

- Routes to and from the OP and fighting positions.
- Designated sectors of observation.
- Preplanned artillery targets.
- Target reference points for direct fire.
- Prepared spot reports.

OTHER INFORMATION COLLECTION METHODS SUPPORTING SECURITY AND MOBILITY SUPPORT

2-41. Military police gather information from various sources while carrying out their operations. Their ability to operate in different areas allows them to interact with diverse populations to collect essential information. This information is crucial for addressing intelligence requirements related to crime, disorder, public fear, destabilizing factors, and the effectiveness of police efforts to maintain safe and secure environments. These sources help understand the networks, trends, patterns, and associations vital for supporting mobility, security, and PRC and for combating criminal and other irregular threats.

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

2-42. A unmanned aircraft system (UAS) comprises everything needed to operate an unmanned aircraft vehicle (UAV). The UAV is the actual flying device, while the UAS includes the following components: personnel, UAV, payload (such as sensors or weapons), control station, communication links, launch system, and recovery system. Small unmanned aircraft systems (small UASs) are specifically designed for reconnaissance, surveillance, and remote monitoring tasks. They can locate and identify enemy forces, moving vehicles, weapons systems, and other targets that stand out from their surroundings. Additionally, small UASs can confirm the locations of friendly forces, detect noncombatant CIVs, monitor detainee operations, support border operations, and search for missing persons.

2-43. Military police commanders and staffs can utilize small UASs to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of specific locations and routes during tactical or law enforcement operations. This support enhances the security of posts, camps, and stations and helps clarify and verify facts and assumptions in the operational environment. Military police can launch and recover an small UASs from unprepared terrain within minutes and do not require special equipment. The system can be operated via a ground control unit or carry out fully autonomous missions by using global positioning system waypoint navigation for launch and recovery. For more information on the employment of UASs, see ATP 3-04.1.

MILITARY POLICE PATROLS

2-44. Military police patrols are typically deployed throughout the AO while carrying out their assigned missions across the military police disciplines. The strategic dispersion of these patrols (single team, law enforcement unit, or squad or platoon size elements) enhances their effectiveness as collection assets. The observation and evaluation skills developed during police training further bolster the capabilities of military police patrols, enabling them to meaningfully contribute to collection efforts in support of PIO and other requirements.

2-45. Military police use various patrol methods to effectively gather information based on the situation. In densely populated areas, such as urban environments or special events, military police may choose to conduct foot or dismounted patrols. This approach allows for direct interaction, observation, and engagement with the community, facilitating the collection of valuable information about crime or potential threats. In contrast, during rapidly evolving situations that require swift mobility, such as combat scenarios or active-shooter incidents, military police often rely on vehicle or mounted patrols. This method provides greater mobility, communication capabilities, and protection. The ability to quickly adapt patrol methods to meet information collection needs makes military police highly effective assets in uncertain, dynamic, and rapidly changing situations. For further details on patrol methods, see ATP 3-39.10.

2-46. Military police patrols are often tasked with conducting deliberate collection missions to gather specific information about an area or target. These missions are linked to a commander's priority intelligence requirements, the PM intelligence needs regarding the AO, or specific police investigations. Intelligence requirements are typically communicated to military police Soldiers as part of their patrol briefs before mission execution. Thorough preparation for the mission is essential. Additionally, postmission debriefs are

crucial to ensure that the information collected by military police patrols is relayed to the appropriate staff elements for timely analysis and dissemination.

CORDON AND SEARCH, LAW ENFORCEMENT SEARCHES, AND RAIDS

2-47. *Cordon and search* are a variation of movement to contact where a friendly force isolates and searches a target area (FM 3-90). Cordon-and-search operations are conducted throughout the range of military operations. When commanders carry out a cordon and search, they organize their units into four key elements: command, security, search or assault, and support. The security element must be large enough to establish an inner and an outer cordon around the target area for the search.

2-48. In operational areas, military police typically conduct cordon and search at the company level and below while carrying out area security tasks. The information, documents, media, materials, observations, and detainees obtained during these operations provide valuable police information. This information is crucial for immediate, time-sensitive dissemination or use in criminal investigations and analysis to produce police intelligence. The data gathered during cordon-and-search efforts is essential for effectively disrupting criminal activity, advancing investigations, and providing evidence for prosecution under the rule of law.

2-49. Maneuver formations generally conduct cordon-and-search operations at the maneuver battalion level and below. Military police who are attached to or supporting maneuver commanders can provide essential assistance, particularly in securing or conducting the search. Military police assets are particularly valuable in supporting the search element. Advanced technical capabilities that military police may offer for combined arms cordon and search operations include evidence response teams, MWDs, detention specialists, and forensic experts. Additionally, all military police Soldiers receive training in general law enforcement practices that equip them to protect crime scenes, collect forensic materials, and process evidence according to rigorous evidentiary standards.

2-50. Law enforcement searches and raids are carried out by trained officers, including military police Soldiers and Department of the Army CIV police. These officers search to secure evidence for judicial proceedings or recover stolen property. They perform raids to apprehend offenders, gather evidence of illegal activities, or confiscate illegal weapons and contraband. Due to the inherent dangers of high-risk searches and raids, investigative units often request support from special reaction teams. These teams are specifically trained for high-risk law enforcement operations in high-threat environments. For more information on special reaction teams and law enforcement raids, see ATP 3-39.11.

2-51. Law enforcement searches involve more than just finding evidence or locating criminal suspects; they also require strict procedures to ensure that the search is legal and to build a strong case for prosecution. Law enforcement officers typically need a search authorization or a search warrant to conduct a search. These are granted based on a finding of probable cause, indicating that a person, property, or evidence is likely to be found in the area being searched. A search authorization is explicit permission granted by a competent military authority, while a civil authority issues a search warrant. If a search is executed improperly or without proper authority, evidence collected may be considered inadmissible in a court-martial or a federal judicial proceeding due to the exclusionary rule. Evidence obtained due to an illegal act may also be excluded under the fruit of the poisoned tree doctrine. Military police conducting a law enforcement search must follow the guidelines specified in the search authorization. Failing to do so could compromise the value of the information or evidence gathered. For more details on search and seizure during police operations, see ATP 3-39.10.

2-52. Law enforcement raids are used to conduct searches or apprehend suspects, especially when multiple individuals are involved or there is a risk of significant resistance. Requests for support from special reaction teams for these raids usually occur with ongoing operations by the Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) special agents. These agents are highly trained in executing raids and making arrests and are familiar with evidence collection and preservation. Such raids often generate a wealth of information, gathered through active and passive methods, for law enforcement. This information may include statements from apprehended suspects, forensic evidence, biometric signatures, media devices, photographic or audio recordings, and testimonies from witnesses or bystanders at the scene.

SITE EXPLOITATION AND EVIDENCE COLLECTION

2-53. *Site exploitation* is the synchronized and integrated application of scientific and technological capabilities and enablers to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, and support host-nation rule of law (ATP 3-90.15). A site is a location designated by a commander that may contain materials relevant for collection and the positive identification of individuals. Site exploitation plays a crucial role in the broader context of information collection. It involves maximizing the use of information obtained for tactical, operational, or strategic purposes.

2-54. Site exploitation is guided by the information collection plan. This plan helps the commander focus resources on gathering information to answer specific information requirements. When a site is designated for exploitation, the staff establishes clear objectives and tactical tasks that support the information collection plan. The plan also ensures that the staff requests and coordinates all necessary resources before the site exploitation begins. (For more detailed information on site exploitation, see ATP 3-90.15.) Tactical units conducting an operation appoint both a site exploitation team and an evidence collection team to plan, detect, collect, receive, and handle all evidence obtained during the operation.

2-55. Evidence collection involves gathering a diverse range of physical objects, testimonies, electronic data, and analyses. It is a crucial task in successful military police operations. Evidence refers to objects, materials, or data demonstrating or strongly suggesting that an incident, association, or pattern can lead to a conclusion or judgment. It is important to note that the thoughts, intuition, and opinions of an analyst or investigator are not considered evidence. However, they can be vital in forming a conclusion or judgment. Effective evidence collection requires careful planning, preparation, execution, and training. When investigating a site suspected to be or to have been a detention location for captured or detained individuals, investigators and evidence collectors should be aware that these individuals often leave proof of life at their detention sites. Evidence collection teams can be chosen in advance to focus their training and resources effectively. To properly collect evidence, various tools are necessary, including digital cameras, rubber gloves, paper bags, boxes, tape, and marking supplies. The evidence collection process should be deliberate and methodical unless the situation necessitates a hasty effort. To avoid contamination and maintain the chain of custody, as few personnel as possible should handle the evidence. For additional guidance on collecting evidence on the battlefield, see ATP 3-39.21.

2-56. The most recognizable evidence consists of physical items associated with crimes or incidents, such as firearms, illegal drugs, and blood-stained clothing. While these items hold evidentiary value, their significance increases when trained forensic analysts examine them. For example, weapons seized at the scene of an attack on U.S. forces can yield valuable information (such as fingerprints or deoxyribonucleic acid [DNA] evidence) if they are properly handled and analyzed. The barrel and firing pin of a weapon may precisely match with one used in previous attacks against U.S. forces or their multinational partners. Additionally, an evaluation of drugs and related materials may also uncover fingerprints or DNA evidence, while chemical analysis can reveal where the drugs were cultivated or how they were processed.

2-57. The continuous growth of electronic devices, such as cellular phones, digital cameras, laptops, and global positioning systems, has broadened the range of evidence that can be collected. Photographs, video and audio recordings, recording equipment, computers, and portable data storage devices (diskettes, thumb drives, memory cards, media players) can provide a wealth of information about criminal or terrorist organizations. This information may include identities, training techniques, weapons capabilities, targets, and locations. Photographic evidence may be obtained from U.S. or HN security forces, including manned and unmanned aircraft.

Note. Information obtained from electronic devices, photographs, video and audio recordings, and written or printed documents related to law enforcement investigations can be analyzed by trained digital forensic examiners in CID. If the information in these items is not relevant to law enforcement investigations, they should be forwarded to document and media exploitation teams, provided this is permitted by applicable laws and policies, to support intelligence analysis (see ATP 2-91.7).

2-58. Hardcopy documents are valuable sources of police information. Fingerprints and DNA can be extracted from sheets of paper or envelopes. The type of paper or printing used may provide clues regarding the system employed or the age of the document. Additionally, word choices and spelling can offer insights into the background and education of a person. Handwriting analysis can serve as another method investigators can use to identify specific individuals. Lists found near a computer may be particularly valuable, as they might contain passwords, website addresses, access codes, e-mail addresses, and aliases. This category of evidence also encompasses identity documents, such as passports, visas, licenses, property ownership documents, and shipping papers. Analyzing written and printed documentation can reveal locations an individual has visited, suppliers used, funding sources, and associates. For more information on evidence collection, see ATP 3-39.12-1.

BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SUPPORT AND FORENSIC ANALYSIS

2-59. Forensic analysis and biometric identification support through various modalities have significantly enhanced the ability of CID and police intelligence analysts to clarify events and identify individuals involved. Biometric identification tools and forensic capabilities are valuable assets for distinguishing between friendly, neutral, and threatening forces, effectively denying anonymity and impunity to criminals, terrorists, and other irregular threat actors. These tools are also essential in criminal investigations for identifying individuals, establishing their presence at specific locations in relation to time and space, determining physical contact with materials pertinent to an investigation, and identifying indicators of deception. Military police and CID organizations extensively utilize biometric and forensic capabilities during law enforcement operations on military bases and base camps or in support of offense, defense, and stability.

2-60. Biometrics collection capabilities require—

- Approved biometrics collection devices that can collect fingerprints, iris images, voice samples, and facial photographs to DOD standards.
- Personnel trained in the operation of these biometrics collection devices.
- Software that can collect, store, and manipulate biometrics for comparison and analysis.
- Training in biometrics watch listing to empower local commanders to create and manage local watch lists.

2-61. Forensic capabilities require military police personnel, law enforcement investigators, or trained Soldiers who can recognize, preserve, and collect potential forensic evidence. Forensic laboratory examiners are also needed to extract usable information from the collected materials.

Biometrics

2-62. *Biometrics* is the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics (JP 2-0). Biometric applications measure biological characteristics, which are stored in databases for future comparisons. In addition to the biological data saved in these databases, biographical information and personal behavioral traits are also collected for later use.

2-63. Biometric characteristics and traits are valuable for tracking individuals, making positive identifications, establishing security procedures, and detecting deception through measurable biological responses to stimuli. Biometric data can enhance protection and security efforts and serve as evidence in investigations and criminal prosecutions. This identification data is combined with claimed biographical information to match an individual against DOD authoritative databases. During screening, military police compare the claimed identity of a subject with the database to verify or discover their identity or to enroll them as a new identity. The data collected includes biometric information such as fingerprints, voiceprints, facial photographs, iris images, and DNA.

2-64. Military police, CID personnel, investigators, and police intelligence analysts can use biometric data to identify trends, patterns, and associations among individuals. Biometric data that confirms the identity of an individual, indicates their presence at specific times and locations, and assesses truthfulness or deception is invaluable for establishing connections within groups, cells, or organizations. Law enforcement can enhance criminal investigations and directly support military operations by integrating biometric data with the forensic analysis of evidence collected from crime scenes or attacks. Collaborating with the assistant chief of staff for intelligence (G-2) and battalion or brigade intelligence staff officers (S-2) to nominate persons of interest for biometric watch lists allows law enforcement to track these individuals globally. This capability enables all biometrically equipped unified action partners to reliably identify persons of interest during encounters on the battlefield.

Note. Biometric data collected during military police operations can be highly valuable for MI personnel in developing biometrics-enabled intelligence. When there are no restrictions from military police investigations or legal or policy limitations, all efforts should be made to share this data with MI (see ATP 2-22.85).

Forensics

2-65. Forensics is the application of various scientific processes from multiple disciplines to establish facts. Collecting forensic material allows for a systematic analysis of evidence, helping to identify connections between people, objects, or data. While it is most commonly associated with evidence collected at crime scenes or incident sites, forensics encompasses methodologies for analyzing computers and networks, accounting, psychiatry, and other specialized fields. This discipline primarily supports legal proceedings that may lead to criminal prosecution. Additionally, forensic analysis plays a role in processing and exploiting collected material to answer CCIR; provide situational awareness; and support criminal and crime analysis and other mission requirements related to offense, defense, and stability.

2-66. CID supports Army forensics requirements through the Forensic Exploitation Department, Gillem Enclave, Georgia. This facility is stationary due to the specialized equipment and operational needs required for its functions. The Forensic Exploitation Department deploys teams of trained forensic examiners to assist operational commanders in the field. This expeditionary capability allows for timely forensic analysis across various areas, including latent fingerprints, tool marks, firearms, DNA, digital forensics, electronics exploitation, and explosive and drug chemistry. CID laboratory capabilities can be used with forensic laboratories from sister Services, leveraging complementary strengths to aid the operational commander. For more details on multi-Service forensic capabilities and roles, see ATP 3-39.21.

2-67. Forensic analysis expands the ability of police intelligence analysts to establish trends, patterns, and associations by providing scientific facts about relationships between persons, objects, or data. Criminals, terrorists, or other threat actors tend to operate in predictable ways. For example, the analyses may focus on explosive hazards. This includes material at IED incidents to identify similarities in materials, the fuzing system, and other variables. (For additional information on EOD, see ATP 4-32.) These analyses can identify patterns linking the material to the bomb maker. Information from the materials analyses, including chemical characteristics, can enable police intelligence analysts to associate specific suppliers with those materials. These efforts can lead investigators to solving criminal investigations and assist operational commanders in executing targeting strategies.

2-68. Proper handling of materials from crime scenes or incident sites is essential for successful forensic examination by scientists and technicians. Military police receive training on effectively identifying, collecting, and preserving evidence, whether during crime scene processing or at an incident site. For detailed information on evidence collection and preservation, see ATP 3-39.12-1.

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Chapter 3
Support to Mobility

Military police support to the movement and maneuver warfighting function primarily focuses on facilitating mobility operations. This support involves utilizing technical capabilities and tasks related to PIO, managing traffic and enforcement, restoring and maintaining order, and supporting civil security and control, including border control, boundary security, freedom of movement, and detention operations. Military police units play a crucial role in expediting the secure movement of resources in the theater. This ensures that commanders receive the necessary forces, supplies, and equipment to support operational plans and respond to changing tactical situations. They conduct proactive measures to detect, deter, and defeat potential threats within the AO, ensuring the safe and orderly movement of U.S. forces while enabling freedom of movement for the maneuver commander. The framework of assured mobility, as outlined in ATP 3-90.4, clarifies the role of military police in supporting these mobility operations.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

3-1. Military police must understand the framework for providing support for mobility operations. This framework combines movement and maneuver, and its focus may vary between movement and maneuver.

3-2. The *movement and maneuver warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats (ADP 3-0). Direct fire is inherent in maneuver and close combat. This function includes tasks related to force projection to gain a positional advantage over the enemy.

3-3. *Maneuver* is the employment of forces in the operational area, through movement in combination with fires and information to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy (JP 3-0). Maneuver refers to how commanders concentrate the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. For effective maneuvering, it is essential to closely coordinate with fires. Movement is vital for dispersing and repositioning the entire force or parts of it during maneuvers.

3-4. Typically, military police are focused on supporting movement or enabling military police to concentrate on supporting maneuver at the tactical level. While they may engage in maneuvering, their main focus during mobility operations is to enhance the movement of other forces. This includes assisting convoys or maneuver units in navigating routes during breaching, gap-crossing operations, or other mobility-related missions.

MOBILITY

3-5. *Mobility* is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (JP 3-36). According to ADP 3-90 and FM 3-90, mobility is crucial for successful military operations. Its primary purpose is to allow friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield or within a designated AO. Commanders aim to have the ability to move, exploit, and pursue the enemy across a broad front. During an attack, they seek to concentrate combat power at specific locations. This may necessitate improving or constructing combat trails where established routes do not exist. The surprise gained by attacking through regions considered impassable may justify the resources spent on building these trails. For offensive operations, forces should bypass known obstacles rather than attempt to breach them when possible. However, this must be approached with caution, as it could play into the strategy of the enemy. Bypassed obstacles should be reported to higher headquarters and marked when the situation permits.

3-6. *Mobility tasks* are those combined arms activities that mitigate the effects of obstacles to enable freedom of movement and maneuver (ATP 3-90.4). They are conducted to enable friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield. They heavily rely on intelligence gathered from surveillance and reconnaissance. The six primary tasks involved in mobility operations are:

- Conducting breaching.
- Conducting area and route clearing.
- Conducting gap crossings.
- Constructing and maintaining combat roads and trails.
- Constructing and maintaining forward airfields and LZ.
- Conducting traffic management and control.

3-7. Military police primarily focus on supporting the first three primary tasks and the last primary task of conducting traffic management and control. These four tasks provide a tactical framework for military police support in mobility operations.

BREACHING

3-8. A *breach* is a synchronized combined arms activity under the control of the maneuver commander conducted to allow maneuver through an obstacle (ATP 3-90.4). Breaching starts when friendly forces identify an obstacle and implement breaching fundamentals. It concludes when control is transferred from the breaching unit to follow-on forces. The breaching process involves reducing obstacles and may require support from combat engineers.

3-9. Obstacle breaching is the employment of a combination of tactics and techniques to advance an attacking force to the far side of an obstacle that is covered by fire. Most combined arms breaching is carried out by a BCT or a battalion size task force (TF) as a tactical mission. However, higher echelons may also perform operational-level combined arms breaching tasks. Details about combined arms breaching operations can be found in ATP 3-90.4.

3-10. There are three types of breaching operations: the deliberate breach, the hasty breach, and the covert breach. Amphibious breaching is an adaptation of the deliberate breach, and an in-stride breach is a specific type of hasty breach. Basic information includes the following:

- **Deliberate breach**. A deliberate breach involves the systematic planning and execution of a lane through a barrier or fortification. This type of breach is utilized against strong defenses or complex obstacle systems. It resembles a deliberate attack and requires in-depth knowledge of defense and obstacle systems. A deliberate breach is characterized by the extensive prior planning, preparation, and buildup of combat power on the near side of the obstacles. Subordinate units are organized into TFs to accomplish the breach. Additionally, securing the far side of the obstacle with an assault force often occurs before or during the reduction of the barrier.
- **Hasty breach.** A *hasty breach* is the creation of lanes through enemy minefields by expedient methods such as blasting with demolitions, pushing rollers or disabled vehicles through the minefields when the time factor does not permit detailed reconnaissance, deliberate breaching, or bypassing the obstacle (JP 3-15). A hasty breach is an adaptation of a deliberate breach carried out when time is limited. It can occur during a deliberate or hasty attack, especially when there is uncertainty about enemy obstacles or when the enemy situation changes, such as the deployment of scatterable mines.
- **Covert breach.** Covert breaching involves creating pathways through minefields or other obstacles in a way that is planned and executed without detection by the adversary. The main purpose of this tactic is to remove obstacles stealthily, allowing maneuver forces to pass through undetected. A covert breach is carried out when surprise is essential or advantageous, especially in situations with limited visibility and terrain that provide opportunities to eliminate enemy obstacles without being observed. This approach combines elements of both deliberate and hasty breaching as needed.

3-11. Military police support for breaching operations is crucial in ensuring a smooth and organized flow of forces into and through the breach area. While the primary focus of breaching operations is typically on supporting maneuver elements, military police concentrate on facilitating movement within these maneuvers. The support provided by military police during breaching operations (deliberate, hasty, or covert) depends on an analysis of the mission variables. At a minimum, military police support typically includes—

- Establishing traffic control posts (TCPs) along routes leading to and from the breach lanes to expedite traffic flow.
- Setting up holding areas.
- Collaborating with engineers to deploy temporary route signage.
- Conducting straggler-control activities.
- Performing area and local security measures to assist the passage of follow-on forces.
- Expanding area and local security around the reduction area once the assault force has moved through.
- Facilitating the transfer of security and movement control of routes and lanes to follow-on forces.

3-12. The commander of the force conducting the breaching operation organizes into three forces to conduct breaching–support, breach, and assault forces. Military police typically play a role in the breach force (part of the security element) or the support force during a breaching operation. Table 3-1 outlines the responsibilities of each organization involved in the breach. Within the breach force, the military police focus on facilitating the passage of the assault force and follow-on forces. As with other types of operations, military police ensure that DCs do not interfere with breaching activities or impede movement throughout the breach area. In their role within the support force, military police concentrate on assisting follow-on forces. Regardless of the specific role, their primary responsibility is to ensure smooth movement into and out of the breach lanes. The involvement of military police is closely tied to the echelon conducting the breach and the number of lanes needed to accommodate the vehicles passing through. Military police units maintain close coordination with the commanders of the support, breach, and assault forces and the breaching force commander executing the operation.


Table 3-1. Support, breach, and assault forces responsibilities.

Breach Organization	*Responsibilities*
Support force	• Suppress enemies that can target the reduction area with direct fire. This will protect the breach force as they work to clear the obstacle and the assault force as they move through the created passage. • Fix enemy forces to isolate the reduction area. • Control obscuration.
Breach force	• Reduce, proof, and mark the necessary lanes through the obstacle. • Report the status and location of the created lanes. • Ensure that local security is on the near and far sides of the obstacle. • Offer additional suppression of enemies overwatching the obstacle. • Provide further obscuration in the reduction area. • Assist the assault force in passing through the created lanes.
Assault force	• Secure the objective on the far side. • Eliminate enemy protective obstacles. • Create clear routes from the reduction area to the battle handover line for follow-on forces. • Prevent the enemy from directing fire at follow-on forces as they move through the created lanes. • Conduct the battle handover with the follow-on forces. • Provide reinforcing fire for the support forces. • Neutralize the enemy on the far side of the obstacle to minimize threats of direct fire in the reduction area.

3-13. The most critical military police support is to provide traffic management for the breach area, where military police units provide the commander a means to control traffic flow to appropriate cleared lanes. When multiple lanes diverge from a single far-recognition marker, military police can provide guides or

establish TCPs to direct formations to the correct lanes. They also play a role in adjusting traffic flow when lanes are closed for maintenance or upgrades. Additionally, military police units allow commanders to modify traffic patterns in response to the tactical situation, including managing disabled vehicles or artillery fires.

3-14. Figure 3-1 provides an example of breaching operations. In this example, the first BCT conducts a breaching operation to seize OBJECTIVE DOG and pass the second BCT along ROUTES AUSTIN and DALLAS. The breach force (1-52 Combined Arms Battalion) creates breach lanes 2 and 3 to allow the assault force (1-50 Combined Arms Battalion) to seize OBJECTIVE DOG. After the far side objective is seized, the breach force creates an additional lane (Lane 1) to allow the second BCT to pass through the breach area along two passage routes to continue to the attack. Typically, as shown in this example, military police are assigned to the security element within the breach force to provide local security for the reduction element and guide the assault force to the far-recognition markers. They are poised to reroute traffic based on changes in the tactical situation. Military police efforts on the nearside of the breach area are focused on directing the second BCT and other follow-on forces toward the routes leading up to the reduction area and optimizing traffic flow up to and through the breach lanes to maintain momentum. Engineers in the breach force create and mark the lanes through the obstacles to get the assault force through. While not necessarily being collocated with the breach force, military police provide traffic control through the reduction area. The military police force may remain under BCT control while doing this. Military police may also be organized within the assault force and be able to rapidly establish traffic control on the far side of the obstacle. This example depicts the establishment of two lanes by the breach force—providing sufficient passage for the assault force of the first BCT. Follow-on engineers would likely improve ROUTES AUSTIN and DALLAS, and military police would potentially adjust the number of TCPs necessary to support this. Follow-on engineers may also open more lanes to facilitate the passage of follow-on forces with a corresponding requirement for military police support for movement control. The first BCT is responsible for route maintenance and traffic control throughout the breach area until they are handed off to follow-on forces.



Legend:			
BHL	battle handover line	SP	start point
OBJ	objective	TAC	tactical command post
PL	phase line	TCP	traffic control post
RP	release point		

Figure 3-1. Example of a breach


CLEARING

3-15. *Clearing* is a mobility (focused on movement) task performed by follow-on engineers and EOD that involves the total elimination or neutralization of an obstacle not normally done under fire (ATP 3-90.4). Commanders may order clearing tasks to enhance mobility within an AO based on an analysis of mission variables. They may also authorize a critical route or area clearance to eliminate explosive hazards like mines or other obstacles. These operations can be executed as a single mission to open or reopen a route or area or conducted regularly to counter ongoing threats to a critical route. Clearing operations are typically carried out by a combined arms force built around an engineer-based force, which may include MWDs.

3-16. Clearing in the context of this description is not directly related to the tactical task of clear. Military police support for clearing operations primarily focuses on route clearance missions. Route clearance involves detecting, investigating, marking, reporting, and neutralizing or disposing of explosive hazards and other obstacles along a designated route to enable assured mobility for the maneuver commander. This operation is a combined arms effort that relies on reconnaissance of the route to be cleared. Route clearance can be conducted to open a route for necessary traffic or on a recurring basis to reduce the risk along selected routes. Typically, route clearance teams consist of engineers, EOD, a security element (infantry, military police, or an aviation unit), medical personnel, and a special operations team. MWDs may be used during the detection phase of the route clearance operation.


3-17. Military police support for route clearance generally focuses on two key areas: providing reconnaissance information about routes in the AO and ensuring security for the detection and clearing teams. This security involves monitoring oncoming traffic for potential threats, identifying hazards or obstacles along the route, containing suspect vehicles identified by other elements of the route-clearing team, and managing traffic control. The two methods of route clearance are contiguous and combat. Each method carries risks, so conducting a thorough analysis of mission variables is essential before deciding which clearance method, or combination of methods, to use. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for ensuring successful and safe operations in the AO:

- **Contiguous.** In contiguous clearance, the deliberate process begins at Checkpoint 1 and is completed at Checkpoint 2 (see figure 3-2, page 50). This method provides the best assurance for route clearance. However, while effective, it may not be the most secure option in a high-threat environment. The support provided by military police during contiguous route clearance is primarily focused on offering reconnaissance information about routes within the AO and security for detection and clearing assets. Commanders can also integrate patrol explosive-detection dogs or patrol explosive-detection dogs-enhanced MWD teams to search routes and roadways of hazards.
- **Combat.** While contiguous clearance focuses on a specific route, combat clearance targets specific points (see figure 3-3, page 50). As previously mentioned, the IPOE or running estimates can identify locations where the enemy is most likely to place obstacles or set up ambush positions. These areas become designated as named areas of interest or objectives for combat clearance missions. The combat clearance method divides a route into sections based on the number of suspected high-threat areas. Once the clearance team clears these sections, the route is considered secure. In this example, military police may serve as the security element. During the sweep, the security element positions itself to best overwatch the activities of the detection, clearance, and improvement teams as they carry out their tasks. Depending on the situation, the security element may be positioned at the front, flank, or rear of these teams. As part of the security force, military police are also prepared to respond to CIVs to prevent interference with the clearance mission. This may involve diverting CIV traffic or establishing a temporary checkpoint or roadblock. The clearing element may include a specialized search dog or a patrol explosive detection dog team.



Legend:			
AUG	August	MP	military police
CKP	checkpoint	MSR	main supply route

Figure 3-2. Example of contiguous route clearing



Legend:	
MSR	main supply route
NAI	named area of interest

Figure 3-3. Example of combat clearance

GAP CROSSING

3-18. A *gap* is a ravine, mountain pass, river, or other terrain feature that presents an obstacle that may be bridged (ATP 3-90.4). Gaps exist in the operational environment, creating significant challenges for movement and maneuver. A *gap crossing* is the projection of combat power across a linear obstacle (wet or dry gap) (ATP 3-90.4). (Gap crossing operations that support both maneuver and movement are discussed in detail in ATP 3-90.4.) Like breaching operations, there are three types of gap crossings: deliberate, hasty, and covert.

3-19. Gap crossings require units to move in column formations along specific routes that converge at the crossing sites. Military police units are crucial in helping the commander manage traffic at these gap-crossing sites and along the routes leading to and out of the crossing area. They aim to ensure that units cross the gap quickly and efficiently to maintain momentum. Controlling traffic is essential to keep the crossing plan flexible, allowing for adjustments in response to changes in the situation that may affect the routing and sequencing of crossing units. Effective traffic control helps prevent congestion and the pooling of vehicles, which can become lucrative targets for artillery and air strikes.

3-20. The crossing operation is typically planned and executed by the headquarters overseeing the activity. A division gap-crossing operation is conducted by a joint force commander or corps, depending on the structure of the area of responsibility. A BCT deliberate crossing is controlled by a division or corps, depending on how the area of responsibility is structured. During a BCT crossing, the military police assets assigned to the BCT may also cross to ensure continuous support after being relieved by subsequent military police units. In these situations, there is usually a reliance on an engineer headquarters within the area of responsibility to assist with the crossing. Commanders conducting a deliberate gap crossing generally organize their forces into mobility units and assault, bridgehead, and breakout forces as follows:

- Mobility units, including combat engineer companies, mobility augmentation companies, bridge companies, military police, and CBRN units, provide essential support for crossing operations. They ensure traffic control and obscuration and offer crossing means. These supporting units are task-organized to perform specific tasks and are controlled using specified procedures that are clear, simple, and rehearsed by all elements to ensure responsive support of the plan and unity of command and effort.
- Assault forces seize the far-side objective to eliminate direct fire threats at crossing sites.
- Bridgehead forces assault across a gap to secure the enemy side, creating a bridgehead to allow the buildup and passage of a breakout force during gap crossing. The bridgehead is an area on the enemy side of a linear obstacle large enough to accommodate most of the crossing force. It has suitable terrain for defending the crossing sites, protects the crossing forces from enemy direct fire, and serves as a base for continuing the attack. The bridgehead line marks the limit of the objective area during the establishment of the bridgehead.
- Breakout forces attack to seize objectives beyond the bridgehead as part of the ongoing offensive operations.


3-21. The PM section is responsible for developing the traffic control plan. The mission variables influence the employment of military police in gap-crossing operations. The size of the crossing force determines the number and placement of military police units supporting a gap-crossing operation, the direction of the crossing (forward or retrograde), the level of expected enemy resistance, and the number of DCs that may be encountered. Military police units are placed where they can best expedite and enforce movement tables along the routes leading into the crossing area.

3-22. The main effort of military police during gap-crossing operations is to manage the immediate crossing site and the routes leading to and from it. They direct crossing units to their designated locations using holding and staging areas, TCPs, and temporary signage (and subsequent signage). This helps units move through the area according to the established crossing and traffic circulation plans. Effective management is crucial since there are typically a limited number of crossing sites, especially for river crossings. Military police also conduct mobile patrols along primary routes to control traffic, identify problems, guide and escort vehicles, and reroute traffic when necessary. In most gap-crossing operations, TCPs are established on both sides of the gap to improve communication and coordination among the units.

3-23. Support from military police units during gap crossing significantly reduces crossing time and promotes the efficient movement of vehicles. This support helps minimize congestion, accelerates the crossing process, and allows crossing units to maintain momentum. Military police units may establish collection points or holding areas to temporarily secure DCs and detainees until they can be relocated to a holding area of a higher echelon. This ensures that these individuals do not impede the gap-crossing operation. Depending on the traffic volume and the number of detainees and DCs in the area, additional military police support from a higher military police headquarters may be necessary. In challenging terrain, military police platoons and squads may operate defiles (specific circulation control measures designed to maintain smooth traffic flow through narrow passageways [see FM 3-39]). Additionally, military police can provide area security to the rear and flanks of crossing forces to enhance security. See chapter 3 and ATP 3-39.4 for more information.

3-24. Military police units that operate within the crossing areas are usually under the operational control of the crossing area commander for the duration of the operation. Military police units outside the crossing area fall under the command of its appropriate echelon commander.

3-25. Figure 3-4 provides an example of military police support during a gap crossing to facilitate traffic control. This scenario corresponds to Phase I (Advance to the Gap) of a deliberate gap crossing. While military police can also be integrated into assault, bridgehead, or breakout forces, this example focuses on military police assigned to mobility units. Those military police who are either part of or attached to other units will carry out missions or tasks specific to those units. For detailed information on the types of activities military police may perform at holding areas, staging areas, and TCPs, and for an example of a deliberate wet gap crossing, see ATP 3-90.4.



Legend:			
JAN	January	MP	military police
CFA	call forward area	PL	phase line
EEP	engineer equipment park	RL	release line
ERP	engineer regulating point	TCP	traffic control post

Figure 3-4. Example of military police support to a gap crossing

3-26. Retrograde gap crossings have the potential to be more difficult than forward crossings, particularly when under pressure from enemy forces. ATP 3-90.4 outlines specific planning considerations and techniques to keep in mind when faced with a substantial number of DCs.

PASSAGE OF LINES

3-27. While not a primary task of mobility operations, support for a passage of lines is often associated with military support to mobility operations. During a passage of lines, forces move either forward or rearward through the combat positions of another force with the intent to engage or disengage with the enemy. This high-risk operation requires careful coordination between the passing unit, the stationary unit, and supporting forces. A passage of lines serves as both a tactical enabling task and a tactical shaping task. For further details, see ADP 3-90.

3-28. Military police units support the passage of lines by minimizing confusion and congestion for units entering and exiting the passage area. They manage and enforce traffic in the vicinity of passage points and passage lanes, ensuring that passing units have priority for using the routes through these areas. The headquarters directing the operation sets the priority of route use.

3-29. Before the operation, military police units assigned to support the passage of lines conduct route reconnaissance. They become familiar with the routes to, through, and beyond the area of passage. This preparation allows military police units to enhance the commander's command and control by providing directions at passage points and guiding units through the passage lanes. Traffic control measures may include TCPs, temporary route signs, checkpoints, roadblocks, defiles, and escort or guide vehicles. Military police must also be ready to establish vehicle holding areas at designated locations along the movement routes. Vehicles will be directed to a holding area if the road network is damaged until traffic can be restored or rerouted.

3-30. Maintaining unit integrity and minimizing the number of stragglers is crucial for sustaining momentum during a forward passage of lines. Military police units perform aggressive operations to manage stragglers and DCs, ensuring that individuals are returned to positive control. This prevents enemy personnel from blending in with DCs and potentially infiltrating the sustainment area. Military police support during the passage of lines is essential and requires detailed coordination with both passing and stationary units, to include—

- Communication requirements.
- Recognition signals.
- Starting points for routes.
- Times of passage.
- Designated passing lanes.
- Control measures, which include TCPs, escort and guide vehicles, and temporary route signs. (Temporary route signs can reduce the number of TCPs needed; however, if routes are not clearly defined or if they intersect congested areas, expect to provide TCPs or escort vehicles.)
- Procedures for detainee and DC evacuations.

MAIN AND ALTERNATE SUPPLY ROUTE REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT

3-31. MSR and ASR regulation and enforcement (see ATP 3-90.4) involves military police support for the mobility operations task of traffic management and control. This is integrated with the logistics focused portion of movement control (see ATP 4-16) and includes the military police activities of traffic management and enforcement (see ATP 3-39.10 and ATP 3-39.12-1). Traffic management and control is conducted to facilitate the unobstructed movement of personnel and resources along road networks as efficiently as possible. While primarily focused on supporting movement, traffic management can also be selectively applied to enable maneuver. Additionally, traffic management and control contribute to the commander's protection efforts. Reconnaissance is a crucial part of effective traffic management and control. This process holistically incorporates transportation, military police, engineer, and other technical capabilities. Four key activities that support main and alternate route regulation and enforcement are route reconnaissance, traffic control plan development, DC control measures (see ATP 3-57.10), and straggler control. These activities often overlap and are interconnected, even as each fulfills its specific responsibilities.

3-32. Traffic management and enforcement and MSR/ASR regulation and enforcement encompass all active and passive measures used to control traffic circulation, enforce traffic regulations, investigate traffic collisions, and enable the safe movement of both vehicles and pedestrians. Traffic management and

enforcement prioritize reducing disruptions caused by various threats, DCs, and congestion arising from breakdowns, adverse weather conditions, and the deterioration of road surfaces. Military police enforce route regulations consistent with the traffic control plan.

3-33. Traffic management and enforcement activities are an essential part of police operations. These activities include controlling traffic flow, enforcing traffic regulations, and investigating traffic incidents. The technical skills in these areas enhance the ability of military police to effectively carry out their tactical missions during MSR and ASR regulation and enforcement.

3-34. Military police units provide MSR and ASR regulation and enforcement to enhance movement and maneuver. Their goal is to keep these routes clear for priority tactical and sustainment operations within controlled areas. Additionally, military police units support the command MSR regulation measures outlined in the traffic regulation plan. This plan includes specific strategies to ensure the smooth and efficient use of the road network. It designates military route numbers or names, indicates the direction of travel, establishes highway regulation points, and identifies preplanned military police TCPs.

3-35. To improve traffic flow on MSRs, military police units apply special circulation control measures, such as—

- Temporary route signing.
- Static posts such as TCPs, roadblocks, checkpoints, holding areas, or defiles at critical points.
- Mobile patrols between static posts.
- Traffic and road conditions monitoring.

3-36. Military police units collect information on military and police activities concerning friendly and enemy forces. They assist stranded vehicles and crews and set up temporary route signs to warn of hazards or guide drivers unfamiliar with the routes. Through these actions, military police units maintain control over the road network in the AO and coordinate with the HN, when possible, to expedite movement on MSRs.

3-37. Military police units are employed with engineer, logistics, EOD, aviation, and other forces to secure military traffic movement through vulnerable areas. Commanders may gradually implement additional protection measures to safeguard movement along a particular area or route in response to increasing threats. According to published movement tables, supporting protection forces will establish and maintain a safe passage route through uncontrolled terrain. Opening this route requires a coordinated effort, with each branch contributing unique movement and mobility expertise. The process typically involves route clearance and maintenance activities integrated with area security measures along the corridor.

3-38. Engineer and military police forces conduct route reconnaissance missions to identify issues along the route. Based on the tactical situation, sustainment forces may establish temporary holding, maintenance, or rest areas along the corridor. Once military police establish TCPs and provide convoy escorts for critical supplies, and with aviation convoy security in place, the convoys can safely travel along the protected route to their final destination. The protected route may be opened or closed for specific periods to meet movement table requirements.

MARKING ROUTES

3-39. Route signs support the traffic regulation plan by accurately identifying specific routes. Well-placed signs along the roadside help drivers reach their destinations. Military police patrols regularly monitor these signs, checking their condition and creating specific signs before critical moves. When military police patrols find signs damaged, destroyed, or displaced due to weather, sabotage, or combat activities, they must quickly create temporary replacements. (For additional information on route signs, see appendix D.) This protocol also applies when patrols encounter immediate and temporary obstructions, such as blown bridges or CBRN contamination along MSRs. Military police Soldiers quickly construct and erect signs to—

- Identify routes.
- Guide traffic around problem areas.
- Provide directions, distances, and general information.

ESTABLISHING AND OPERATING A TRAFFIC CONTROL POST

3-40. Military police conduct security and mobility support to expedite military traffic flow by operating TCPs at critical locations. A *traffic control post* is a manned post that is used to preclude the interruption of

traffic flow or movement along a designated route (FM 3-39). The location of each TCP is given in the traffic control plan.

3-41. Military police enforce the circulation control of traffic movement and MSR regulations—their focus is not to apprehend violators. Their tasks may include directing military personnel to their units or guiding them to a collection point for stragglers if the location of their unit is unknown. They also maintain surveillance of friendly movements; provide reports as needed; manage DCs; and monitor for insurgents, conventional enemy forces, and enemy aircraft activities. Additionally, they screen suspicious individuals according to standard operating procedures (SOP), area ROE, and commander's guidance. When operating a TCP, military police also monitor local inhabitants. They ensure that local CIV traffic and DCs do not delay military movement. CIV traffic and DCs should be rerouted or temporarily stopped until the MSR is clear for military traffic. When establishing and operating a TCP, the military police—

- Establish overwatch for the TCP.
- Maintain reliable communication.
- Select positions for squad members and assigned crew-served weapons by—
  - Positioning one team to direct traffic flow and control movement on the MSR.
  - Positioning another team to provide overwatch security for the military police conducting movement control.
  - Rotating primary overwatch security duties between the teams in the squad.
  - Rotating responsibilities with the military police conducting movement control on the MSR.
- Direct and prepare concealed defensive positions, ensuring cover and concealment, good fields of fire, and effective communications based on the METT-TC(I) framework. See FM 3-39 for military police perspectives on each mission variable.
- Maintain situational awareness.
- Reconnoiter the surrounding area for enemy activity.
- Record key information about incidents and notify the chain of command according to the unit SOP.

3-42. Military police units are responsible for ensuring that authorized traffic only uses classified routes within their timetable schedule. They set up TCPs to prevent vehicles from traveling on roads that are either too narrow for their passage or unable to support their weight. This helps to avoid obstruction on the route. Many of the skills employed by military police in managing traffic also apply to supporting operations such as breaching, clearing, and gap-crossing movements, including activities such as establishing TCPs, managing defiles, and setting up temporary route signage. While their primary focus is facilitating movement, these skills also support maneuver.

Establishing and Operating a Holding Area

3-43. Forces utilize holding areas during traffic interruptions or when deploying from an aerial port or seaport of embarkation. These holding areas can serve as independent measures or be combined with other measures, such as defiles or checkpoints, to facilitate various operations like gap crossings or the passage of lines. For example, a holding area might be set up at each end of a defile to reduce congestion, or it may be implemented alongside a roadblock or checkpoint for vehicle inspections. It is essential that holding areas provide concealment and the ability to disperse the vehicles stationed within them.

3-44. The number of military police teams required to operate a holding area is determined by METT-TC(I) and the size of the area. Typically, a military police squad operates a holding area. The squad leader assigns teams for specific tasks: one team controls the entrance, another team controls the exit, and a third team provides security. A fourth team provides additional overwatch, assists with traffic direction and parking, and carries out supplementary tasks assigned by the squad leader. The team leader also assigns each squad member a specific fighting position. For larger holding areas, the military police leader may need to deploy additional personnel to manage traffic and parking, ensuring all units adhere to the designated flow plan.

Establishing and Operating a Defile

3-45. Military police operate defiles when natural or man-made obstacles impede traffic flow on an MSR. A defile is a specific traffic control measure implemented to ensure the smooth movement of vehicles through a narrow passage.

3-46. Defile operations prevent traffic jams by allowing vehicles to move in only one direction at a time. When setting up or operating a defile, it is important to remain vigilant for potential enemy attacks, as the nature of a defile can make it vulnerable. Tasks that are associated with establishing and operating a defile include—

- Preparing support-by-fire positions and, if necessary, fighting positions.
- Controlling traffic flow entering and leaving the defile at both ends.
- Maintaining security throughout the defile.
- Informing road users about traffic and tactical situations.


3-47. Before establishing a defile, conduct a reconnaissance of the area and the proposed location. Use the simplest control method available and plan for an alternative method if a backup is needed. Control measures can include the following:

- **Flags**. A flag is given to the last driver or attached to the last vehicle entering the defile. Another military police Soldier removes the flag when the vehicle reaches the end of the defile, signaling for traffic to begin moving in the opposite direction.
- **Riders**. The rider method is similar to the flag method; however, the control person rides in the last vehicle of each group. This approach ensures that all vehicles have cleared the area.
- **Lead vehicles**. The lead vehicle guides the convoy through the defile. This method is beneficial when navigating through a long or confusing defile.
- **Trail vehicles**. The trail vehicle method follows the same principles as the flag and rider methods; however, a trail vehicle is placed directly behind the last vehicle passing through the defile.
- **Visuals**. Control personnel are stationed where they can easily see and signal each other at both ends of the defile. Hand-and-arm signals or signaling devices, such as flashlights, are used for communication. This technique is typically employed in smaller defile operations, where holding areas are generally unnecessary.
- **Communication**. Radios should be used as a last resort for communication.

3-48. Additional tasks include—

- Establishing a temporary or static defense based on how long the defile will be in use.
- Utilizing temporary signs to mark alternate or bypass routes. These signs should be placed well in advance to allow vehicles to avoid the defile where possible, thus minimizing the need for additional personnel.
- Controlling access to the defile to prevent large numbers of vehicles and personnel from entering at the same time.
- Developing procedures for clearing the road in the event of breakdowns. This may require coordinating wrecker support; if wrecker support is unavailable, field methods should be employed.

3-49. Large defile operations require a holding area at both ends of the defile. These holding areas should provide cover and concealment for vehicles and troops and must be spacious enough to accommodate the expected number of vehicles using the route. In scenarios where a nuclear airburst is possible, these holding areas should be 2 to 3 kilometers (1.24 to 1.86 miles) away from the defile. See figure 3-5 for a depiction of a defile operation.



Legend:			
ALT	alternate	MP	military police
ASR	alternate supply route	MSR	main supply route
JAN	January	TCP	traffic control post

Figure 3-5. Example of a defile operation

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

3-50. Military police units conduct hasty and deliberate route reconnaissance to gather information about routes and surrounding terrain where enemy activity could impact troop movement. Route reconnaissance involves the ongoing monitoring of MSRs and ASRs and crucial terrain features along these routes. The information collected is reported to the tactical commander. Military police patrols look for obstacles such as difficult terrain, weather effects on the routes, route damage, CBRN contamination, and the presence or absence of enemy forces.

3-51. When enemy activity is spotted, military police patrols report the observations, maintain surveillance, and respond in alignment with the commander's plan and intent. To gather information for proposed traffic plans, military police units assess the type and number of available routes, load classifications, route widths, obstructions, and restrictions. This information is crucial for the commander's situational awareness and for developing a common operational picture. Route reconnaissance may be conducted as part of a multifunctional team that includes engineer, CBRN, and other specialties. For more details on route, area, and zone reconnaissance, see ATP 3-34.81 and FM 3-90.

TRAFFIC CONTROL PLAN DEVELOPMENT

3-52. Movement control measures are supported by a traffic control plan that outlines military police support in managing the use of MSRs and ASRs. This plan includes details on checkpoints, rest and refueling areas, TCPs, highway regulation points, and mobile patrols. It identifies the major routes that will handle most of the traffic and specifies restrictions such as direction of travel, size and weight limits, and critical points along the routes.

3-53. Military police create a traffic control plan to complement the movement control and highway regulation plan. This plan includes traffic enforcement measures that uphold movement control and highway traffic regulations. It focuses on speed control, sets up safety inspection checkpoints to protect personnel, and ensures that only authorized vehicles use designated routes. The traffic control plan provides specific measures to ensure the efficient use of the road network, including route designations, restrictions, priority of movement, direction of travel, highway regulation points, and preplanned military police TCPs. The traffic control plan supports the task of providing movement control. For further details, see ATP 4-16, which discusses this and other control measures. See GTA 90-01-005 for insights on TCP operations.


3-54. Critical points in the transportation network may include facilities, terminals, ports, railheads, and cargo transfer points. If these areas become congested, they can significantly limit the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire network. The traffic control plan aims to address high-volume traffic conditions and mitigate or prevent excessive congestion on highways, major routes, and urban streets, including secondary routes and residential streets.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CONTROL

3-55. DC operations are a specific category of PRC (see chapter 5 and ATP 3-57.10). The primary objectives of DC operations are to minimize CIV interference with military operations while ensuring their protection from the impacts of combat and natural or man-made disasters. Military police units responsible for traffic regulation and enforcement on designated routes may encounter DCs, potentially hindering military traffic flow. These units prioritize military movement by redirecting DCs away from MSRs and other critical areas, directing them instead to designated refugee routes or DC camps. They deny the movement of CIVs whose location, direction, or actions threaten their safety, hinder tactical operations, or compromise sustainment operations. When the HN government is operational, it is responsible for identifying safe routes for the movement of DCs out of an AO. Military police units may assist CA and HN assets in redirecting DCs to alternative routes as needed. The control of DCs may focus on tactical routes to support maneuver operations or on MSRs and ASRs to facilitate movement during mobility operations that are typically focused on the support area.

3-56. Effective planning for managing DC populations must incorporate bottom-up and top-down information to ensure that the plan is viable and efficient. Strategies may involve blocking, clearing, or collecting to minimize disruptions caused by DCs, as discussed in chapter 5.

3-57. Military police and other U.S. forces do not take control of DCs unless requested by the HN or when operating in an environment where the government is hostile or nonfunctional. When the joint force commander or geographic CCDR assumes responsibility, military police units coordinate with CA elements to establish TCPs at critical points along the route. These points help direct DCs to secondary roadways and areas not occupied by military forces. When necessary, DCs may be housed in camps managed by U.S. forces and supported by military police. Ideally, HN authorities handle mass DC operations by executing planned and rehearsed evacuation strategies. If a military force takes responsibility for planning DC operations, the planners should consider incorporating HN resources into the planning and implementation processes. Figure 3-6 provides an example of an overlay for a DC collection plan supporting an offensive operation. The plans encompass collection points, designated DC routes (and time windows), assembly areas or holding areas, and the anticipated location of DC camps. For more information on DC camps, see appendix B; for additional details on DC planning and techniques, see ATP 3-57.10.



Legend:			
ASR	alternate supply route	LD	line of departure
AUG	August	MP	military police
CKP	check point	MSR	main supply route
DC	dislocated civilian	PL	phase line
DCAA	dislocated civilian assembly area	OBJ	objective


Figure 3-6. Example of a dislocated civilian collection plan overlay

STRAGGLER CONTROL

3-58. Straggler control refers to the operations to manage friendly forces that have become separated from their commands due to events in the AO. Military police units carry out straggler control by using mobile patrols, TCPs, and checkpoint teams to reunite stragglers with their parent units. Most stragglers are simply Soldiers who have been separated from their command due to a tactical operation. Forced marches and movements may lead to disabled vehicles and emerging stragglers. Military police units direct Soldiers back to their parent unit or a replacement unit according to command policies. They also provide basic first aid and initiate medical evacuation for wounded stragglers.

3-59. Military police units can establish special posts and collection points for managing stragglers following CBRN hazards or major enemy actions that lead to many lost or confused military personnel. Mobile military police patrols operate between these posts to direct and collect stragglers. If many stragglers are present in the AO, designated straggler collection points may be necessary. When multinational forces are present in the theater, each nation will set up its own collection point for its personnel. Military police units must be aware of where allied straggler collection points are located and assist allied Soldiers in returning to their respective commands. They utilize available theater transportation assets to move stragglers from TCPs and checkpoints to the main straggler collection points. Stragglers are screened and sorted at these collection

points for further action, including transport to a medical treatment facility, return to their units, or movement as directed by the controlling headquarters. The establishment of a hasty collection point is highlighted in figure 3-7. This method supports straggler control by using a quadrant system to facilitate the organized separation of various activities that may occur at a collection point. Each quadrant of a crossroads can be designated for a specific group or purpose. Control points should be located 55 to 110 yards (50 to 100 meters) away from the roads to keep different groups adequately separated. Common requirements (food and water, medical treatment, and protection) can be consolidated by establishing various collection points within the same vicinity, maximizing the efficient use of available resources.



Legend:			
JAN	January	MP	military police
DC	dislocated civilian	SCP	straggler control point
MSR	main supply route		

Figure 3-7. Example collection point activities

3-60. Military police units are responsible for reporting information about stragglers they encounter. This information is compiled by the headquarters of the military police unit and then forwarded through the appropriate channels to higher command. Information from stragglers with immediate tactical significance is reported promptly through command channels. Stragglers identified as deserters are placed in detention channels.

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Chapter 4
Support to Security

Military police support security operations primarily by carrying out area and local security tasks. These tasks are the last two of the five subordinate tasks outlined in ADP 3-90 and further detailed in FM 3-90. Area and local security tasks focus on protecting friendly forces, assets, and operations in an AO, particularly in support areas. In area security, military police play a vital role in enhancing the security of the sustainment base and support units by executing several key tasks and activities. They are also important contributors to local area security efforts, encompassing aspects of AT and physical security. For a comprehensive discussion of area and local security, see ADP 3-37.

SECURITY OPERATIONS

4-1. *Security operations* are those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the forces being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their protected forces (ADP 3-90). Security operations consist of five primary tasks—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security. The first three tasks are associated with the movement and maneuver warfighting function, while the last two are related to the protection warfighting function. Although the latter tasks primarily focus on providing protection, they can also facilitate the movement and maneuver of the force. Military police conducting security operations can concentrate on a force, such as during convoy operations, or a facility, which may include a base camp, a DC camp, a detention site, or other locations where they are responsible for providing security.

4-2. Military police may also conduct counterreconnaissance in the performance of area and local security as a supporting tactical mission task. *Counterreconnaissance* is a tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a unit to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts (FM 3-90) Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct mission; rather, it is an integral part of all forms of security operations.

4-3. Military police use their technical skills and engage in specialized activities to support security operations. This encompasses a range of tasks, including reconnaissance and surveillance, the use of UAS, and the deployment of MWDs.

AREA SECURITY

4-4. *Area security* is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, and activities within a specific area (ADP 3-90). It preserves the commander's freedom to move reserves, position fire support means, exercise command and control, and conduct sustaining operations.

4-5. Forces involved in area security are responsible for protecting the force, installations, routes, areas, and local security assets and efforts. While area security is crucial for the success of military operations, it is typically considered an economy-of-force mission. Its primary aim is to ensure the continuation of sustainment operations and to support the essential tasks, purposes, and objectives of an operation by generating and maintaining combat power.

4-6. Area security is a key method for protecting support areas essential for positioning, employing, and safeguarding the resources needed to sustain, enable, and control forces. Area security is an effective means of providing civil security and maintaining order during stability activities. When engaged in area security, forces can saturate a specific area or position on important terrain to offer protection. This includes capabilities such as early warning, reconnaissance, surveillance, preemptive attacks, and defense against surprise enemy assaults. Early warning, reconnaissance, and surveillance data can be gathered from a variety of sources depending on the operational environment, including—

- **Space-based sensors**. Satellites offer a broad view of areas and can detect large-scale movements or activities.
- **Ground-based sensors**. Ground-based sensors include radar systems and acoustic sensors that provide localized information.
- **UAS**. UASs deliver flexible and continuous surveillance capabilities, supplying real-time imagery and data.
- **Aviation assets**. Manned aircraft, both fixed-wing and rotary, offer various reconnaissance options, from high-altitude imagery to close air support.
- **Maritime assets**. Ships increase maritime domain awareness by tracking vessels and monitoring coastal regions.

Note. Military police units have a specific function and typically do not possess the independent resources needed to fully understand the complexities of their operating area. They must collaborate and share information with other friendly forces to gain a comprehensive understanding of the area.

4-7. Area security primarily focuses on named areas of interest to answer CCIR, confirm or deny threat intentions, and aid in decision making. The maneuver enhancement brigade, along with certain military police units, is specially equipped and trained to conduct area security operations, which may be the only force available during certain phases of an operation. Additionally, area security benefits from the local security measures performed by all units, regardless of their location in the AO. Military police forces carry out area security missions emphasizing mobility, lethality, and communication capabilities.

4-8. During offense, defense, and stability operations, various military organizations may conduct area security in an economy-of-force role to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. This approach also establishes standoff distances from enemy direct and indirect fire systems; enhances movement and maneuver; and protects convoys, collection points, supply points, and other critical fixed sites. Additionally, it protects LOCs without significantly diverting combat power. In DSCA, many of the same tasks may be performed, but they typically do not occur in an economy-of-force role or against the same type of enemy. Bases and base camps implement local security measures, including EOD, assessments and recommendations, random AT measures, and increased force protection levels. However, they may still be vulnerable to remnants of enemy forces, necessitating a response that exceeds the capabilities of the base camp. Area security supports offensive operations by providing a response capability to base clusters and sustainment areas and to designated geographical locations such as routes, bridge sites, or lodgments. Commanders perform area damage control (ADC) in support areas to prevent and respond to adverse effects from enemy actions that could diminish combat power.

4-9. For a discussion on critical asset security and the methodology involved in vulnerability assessments for units, installations, facilities, and base camps, see ADP 3-37. This reference includes the staff planning required to develop a critical asset list, followed by the identification of supporting assets for those designated on the defended asset list. The general sequence of a vulnerability assessment is—

- **Step 1**. List assets and capabilities along with the threats against them.
- **Step 2**. Determine the common criteria for assessing vulnerabilities.
- **Step 3**. Evaluate the vulnerability of assets and capabilities.

4-10. All commanders apportion combat power and assign resources for protection tasks and systems by analyzing the operational environment, evaluating the likelihood of threats, and determining the relative value of friendly resources and populations. Based on their assessments, joint force commanders may designate the Army to appoint a joint security coordinator responsible for specific joint security areas. While

all resources hold value, an analysis of mission variables may reveal that certain resources, assets, or locations are more critical to the success of the mission from both enemy/adversary and friendly perspectives. Commanders rely on risk management, which includes threat assessments; critical asset evaluations; and vulnerability analyses of units, installations, facilities, and bases or base camps. This information helps facilitate decision making, provide guidance, and allocate resources. Key considerations in determining protection priorities include criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability, which shape commander guidance and focus area security efforts. Area security often focuses on the following activities:

- Route and convoy security.
- Checkpoints and combat outposts.
- DC control.
- ADC.
- Base and base camp security and defense.
- Node protection.
- Protective services.
- Air, sea, and rail ports and terminals security.
- Response force operations.

ROUTE AND CONVOY SECURITY

4-11. The protection of LOCs and the friendly forces along them is crucial for military operations. Plans for route security may involve increasing security measures for all or part of a route, designating specific units for convoy security, providing guidance to units for self-protection during convoys, or establishing security requirements for convoys transporting critical assets. Although convoy security is a distinct task, it is always connected to the overall security of LOCs and relies on broader area security to support local activities related to convoy protection. Ensuring the security of LOCs and supply routes (railroads, pipelines, highways, and waterways) poses one of the greatest challenges in an AO. Typically, route and convoy security operations are perceived as defensive and focus on the terrain. For further information, see ADP 3-37.

4-12. Movement control is a critical component to the control of LOCs, routes, and area security. However, its primary focus is on control rather than security of the movement. *Movement control* is the dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating movements according to command priorities to synchronize distribution flow over lines of communications to sustain land forces (ADP 4-0). Security considerations must always be integrated into movement control. Additionally, mobility considerations are essential for ensuring security. See chapter 2 and ATP 3-90.4 for a detailed discussion on the role of mobility operations in LOCs and route and convoy security.

4-13. Military police units are crucial in providing security for LOCs and routes identified as critical to military operations. They also provide convoy security for high-priority designated units transporting critical supplies to combat forces, as designated by the joint force commander or geographic CCDR. However, it is generally less effective to have military police teams embedded directly within a convoy for security purposes. Instead, deploying military police units for aggressive patrolling and conducting route, area, and zone reconnaissance is often the most efficient way to create a safe and secure environment for all unit movements. The effectiveness of military police security depends on a well-trained convoy employing appropriate self-protection techniques, as seen in ATP 4-01.45.

Route Security

4-14. Route security operations protect LOCs such as highways, pipelines, railways, waterways, and friendly forces traveling along these routes. Units conduct route security missions to prevent enemy ground forces from moving into direct-fire range of the protected route. These operations also aim to deter or reduce other threats that could disrupt traffic along the route. Generally, route security operations are terrain-oriented and defensive in nature.

4-15. Threat forces attempt to sever supply routes and LOCs by various methods. Roads, waterways, and railways may be obstructed by explosive hazards such as mines, IEDs, or other obstacles; ambush sites may be located adjacent to the route being secured; or bridges and tunnels may be destroyed by demolitions causing diversions, delays, or further actions against traffic using the route. Because of the nature of this

mission, long routes may be challenging to secure; however, measures can be enforced to reduce the effect of threat forces on the routes.

4-16. A route security force operates along and on the flanks of a designated route. Route security is typically used in an economy-of-force role to secure critical MSRs or other routes. To accomplish the route security mission, the force performs the following functions:

- Conduct continuous mounted and dismounted reconnaissance of the route and key locations along it to ensure that the route is trafficable.
- Perform route clearance at irregular intervals to identify explosive hazards and other obstacles along the route.
- Identify specific sections of the route to be searched and locations that are likely to support threat activities.
- Establish roadblocks and checkpoints along the route and lateral routes to stop and search vehicles and individuals entering or traveling along the route.
- Occupy key locations and terrain near the route. Establish a screen to prevent direct-fire threats and observation from impacting the route.
- Conduct aggressive ground and aerial patrols and surveillance to maintain route security.
- Establish OPs, either covertly or overtly, or set up ambushes at critical points to monitor for threat activity.

4-17. Security forces conduct route reconnaissance at irregular intervals to prevent the threat from recognizing a predictable pattern. If sufficient resources are available, they should reconnoiter the route and perform zone reconnaissance to a designated distance on both flanks. Supporting aviation or intelligence assets may conduct reconnaissance ahead of ground elements or help screen the flanks. In addition to reconnaissance, security elements may escort engineers performing route clearance, improvements, or maintenance; clearing terrain at choke points or other potential ambush sites; or repairing damage caused by threat actions.

4-18. Military police may assist with route reconnaissance, route clearance, and route maintenance as part of route security missions. Generally, military police will be part of the forces performing route security. For a detailed discussion on reconnaissance and mobility support activities related to route security, see chapter 2.

4-19. Military police may require engineer support to assist with the hasty construction of checkpoints and potentially for building barriers that direct traffic to designated search areas (see ATP 3-37.34). The primary focus of military police is security, which enhances mobility along the route. Engineer geospatial support can assist with the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of the mission (see ATP 3-34.80). This support includes analyzing potential ambush sites or locations where the enemy could hinder friendly forces or local CIV traffic by deploying obstacles or explosive ordnance. For further details, see ATP 4-32.

Convoy Security

4-20. A convoy security operation is a specialized type of area security operation conducted to protect convoys. Units carry out convoy security operations when there are insufficient friendly forces to continuously secure routes and other LOCs in an AO, especially when there is a significant risk of enemy or adversary ground action targeting the convoy. Commanders should conduct convoy security in conjunction with route security and coordinate with other supporting activities in the area. Typically, local or theater policies dictate when or which convoys receive support for security and protection.

4-21. Planning involves designating units for convoy security, providing or confirming TTP for units to ensure their safety during convoys, and establishing protection and security requirements for convoys carrying critical assets. Convoy security operations are primarily defensive, focusing on the protected force; however, this does not negate the importance of aggressive reconnaissance as part of the mission. For more detailed information on convoy security training requirements and TTP, see ATP 4-01.45.

4-22. Convoy security missions have specific requirements that the commander must consider when developing a plan. The convoy security commander and their subordinates receive briefings on the latest information regarding the threat situation and the area where the convoy will travel. The commander then formulates a comprehensive plan and issues orders that include the commander's intent, assignments for security force elements (reconnaissance, screening, escort, and response), the movement formation, the

intervals between echelons and vehicles, the rate of travel, and detailed plans for actions upon contact. (See appendix C for guidance on developing security and mobility support attachments that support the base OPORD.) Immediate action drills, such as responses to enemy ambushes, obstacles, and indirect fire, must be identified, rehearsed before movement, and executed if contact occurs.

4-23. A convoy security mission involves essential tasks that guide both planning and execution. To protect a convoy, the security force must carry out the following actions:

- Reconnoiter the convoy route.
- Clear the route of obstacles and positions where a threat could affect movement along the route.
- Provide early warning to prevent the threat from impeding, harassing, containing, seizing, or destroying the convoy.

4-24. The convoy security force typically consists of four key elements:

- **Reconnaissance**. The reconnaissance element is responsible for conducting route reconnaissance ahead of the convoy. It may also carry out tasks usually assigned to the screen element.
- **Screen**. The screen element provides early warning and security for the flanks and rear of the convoy. It can also perform functions typically associated with the reconnaissance element.
- **Escort**. The escort element offers local protection to the convoy. Additionally, it may serve as a response force to help repel or neutralize threats.
- **Response**. The response force is equipped to provide firepower and support, assisting other elements in managing the situation or conducting a hasty attack. It may also take on duties typically handled by the escort element.

4-25. Commanders plan and execute all troop and supply movements as part of tactical operations. Due to the inherent dangers associated with convoy operations, there is a strong emphasis on implementing extensive security measures. These measures include—

- Maintaining secrecy when planning and disseminating orders, adhering to strict noise and light discipline during movement, and varying routes and schedules to avoid predictability.
- Coordinating with fire support and aerial support units to ensure that they understand how their assistance can enhance movement security and provide close, continuous support for combat operations.
- Maneuvering to prepare for counterambush actions, formulating contingency plans for immediate responses to ambushes, and utilizing formations that allow part of the convoy to maneuver against an ambush force.
- Establishing clear communication and coordination with supporting units, units positioned along the route, adjacent HN forces, and higher headquarters, including airborne radio relay assets.
- Collaborating with the supported unit that is moving in formation by implementing control measures, identifying leader locations, ensuring communications, and providing medical support and weapon systems.
- Gathering information from local CIVs along the movement route to identify potential enemy ambush sites.

4-26. Military police are often selected to conduct convoy security operations, primarily in the support area and along LOCs. They are generally best suited for either the reconnaissance or escort element. While limited additional training may be necessary to fulfill various tasks associated with convoy security, this can be effectively managed when properly equipped. Commanders may have access to geospatial support to help identify choke points, potential ambush locations, or concerns related to road conditions during the IPOE. Many tasks associated with route security may also be relevant to or connected with the execution of this mission.

Note. The demand for military police resources is significant during large-scale combat operations making convoy security a top priority. To optimize the use of limited military police assets, protection working groups should rank convoy protection based on the importance of the assets or missions involved. This approach enables military police to allocate resources effectively and ensure the security of the most vital movements.

4-27. Military police units can provide convoy security for high-priority designated units that are transporting critical supplies, as designated by the joint force commander or the geographic CCDR, to combat forces. However, military police teams traveling with a convoy are generally not the most effective means of securing it. A more effective approach is to use military police units for aggressive patrolling and conducting reconnaissance missions—whether route, area, or even zone reconnaissance—to create a safe and secure environment for all types of unit movement. This may include acting as the forward security element, as seen in ATP 4-01.45.

4-28. During the execution of convoy security missions, military police adhere to four key principles of mounted movement for tactical convoys:

- **360-degree security**. Combine maximum all-around visibility for situational awareness with interlocking sectors of fire and mutual support. Convoy members must be aware of their surroundings, including what is above and below their position. Situational awareness involves being vigilant about approaching vehicles, explosive ordnance, suspicious wires and antennas, and terrain features such as bridges, overpasses, and questionable individuals or groups.
- **Deterrence**. Project an aggressive, professional demeanor that conveys a readiness and willingness to engage. Such a posture can deter potential adversaries from approaching or attacking the convoy.
- **Agility**. Adapt to the conditions presented by the environment or the actions of the enemy.
- **Unpredictability**. Minimize the ability of the enemy to anticipate the timing, route, composition, or purpose of the convoy.

4-29. Military police leaders assigned to a convoy security mission are responsible for developing the security plan, providing guidance on TTP for units to provide their own security during convoys, and establishing protection and security requirements for convoys transporting critical assets. The mission leader organizes the security of the convoy by creating a strategy that considers all essential factors for the specific mission. This includes coordinating with relevant units for necessary support, acquiring the required equipment and supplies, and preparing mission briefings for security personnel. When planning convoy security operations, the mission leader completes the following tasks:

- Coordinate with HN security personnel (when necessary).
- Consult with all sources (intelligence, engineers, highway traffic division, and other units) to obtain as much information as possible about current and past activity and other information affecting the convoy route (and alternate routes) and projected timeframes.
- Apply mobility considerations (see ATP 3-90.4).
- Reconnoiter the convoy route to—
  - Identify likely trouble spots and ambush sites.
  - Determine possible locations for TCPs or checkpoints.
  - Identify route conditions.
  - Determine the location of friendly units in the area.
- Coordinate with the convoy commander.
- Determine actions to take if—
  - Attacked by an explosive ordnance.
  - Attacked by a sniper.
  - Ambushed with the road blocked.
  - Ambushed with the road not blocked.
  - Attacked from the air.
  - Attacked by indirect fires.
  - Encountering CIVs on the route.

Note. The response to an enemy attack during convoy security operations depends on the specific mission and the type of cargo being transported. When dealing with special weapons or ammunition, it is crucial to outline the appropriate procedures in the special orders, detailing exactly how to react to enemy contact.

- Determine convoy organization, to include locations of critical cargo vehicles, command vehicles, armored vehicles, maintenance and recovery vehicles, and those equipped with crew-served weapons.

- Determine the location at which military police vehicles and Soldiers will be positioned within or in proximity to the convoy.
- Determine primary and backup radio frequencies and emergency communications procedures.
- Determine the timetable for movements.
- Determine start points and release points.
- Determine security measures to be used at halts and rest stops.
- Determine the time and place that military police support begins and ends.
- Determine road conditions.
- Determine available support from indirect fires, mobility assets, aviation assets (to include UASs), HN police support, or other friendly assets that may affect the convoy routes.
- Identify primary and alternate routes.
- Determine the method of escort for the convoy.
- Brief the personnel on the mission, enemy situation, and specific individual duties to be performed.
- Coordinate with friendly units in the area where the convoy will pass and identify the support the friendly units can provide.
- Coordinate with aviation assets, if available.
- Ensure that leaders conduct thorough precombat checks or precombat inspections and rehearsals. See ATP 3-39.4 for a description and examples of precombat checks or precombat inspections.

Watercraft Security

4-30. Military police may be requested to enhance the security of Army watercraft and provide security during transit, at ports, or while conducting joint logistics over-the-shore. Watercraft can encounter threats while navigating restricted waterways such as straits and harbors or when anchored off hostile coastlines, making them high-risk targets.

4-31. When conducting watercraft security, many of the same principles used for convoy security apply; however, there are unique factors that require careful consideration. Leaders must first understand the type of vessel being used for the operation. The characteristics of the supported vessel greatly impacts mission planning, security posture, the size of the security force, and equipment required.

4-32. During the mission analysis and planning phase of the operation, military police must consider several factors to determine the security plan of the vessel, such as:

- What type of vessel is being secured? This will dictate the size of the security element needed.
- What type of weapons and equipment are already on board the vessel?
- What are the expected threats? (Request a threat analysis from S-2.)
- How long will the vessel be in motion? This will influence the size of rations and the work/rest cycle.
- Is lodging available on the vessel?
- Are rations provided on the vessel?
- Are there CIV crew members on the vessel, and have they been properly screened?
- Who is the vessel captain, and/or who is the point of contact for this mission at higher headquarters?
- Are other security elements, such as HN or joint-service waterborne security, contracted security, or HN port police operating during this mission?

4-33. When supporting vessel security while in port or during joint logistics over-the-shore, leaders should consider—

- The location of access control points at the port or causeway and who is responsible for security and operations at these points.
- The traffic control plan, including the priority for embarkation.
- The control measures for access to restricted and limited areas for both vehicles and pedestrians.
- The barrier plan, which should include appropriate stand-off distances for vehicles and small craft.
- The force protection condition posture during cargo transfer and as the cargo departs from the port area.
- Security boundaries for adjacent security elements and the plan for early warning and response forces.

- Whether the military police have the required personal protective equipment to effectively conduct watercraft security.


4-34. Before departing for watercraft security, ensure that at least the following preparations are completed:

- Communicate with the port authority.
- Coordinate with joint or HN security forces providing waterborne or land-based security (if available).
- Request additional security and protection assets (biometrics, sensors, and C-UAS).
- Ensure that effective communication is established between the vessel, headquarters, and the port.

Roll-off Plan

4-35. When transitioning from watercraft security to port security, it is crucial to have a completed roll-off plan that is thoroughly understood by the security team and all entities at the port. The nature of the port (contested or noncontested) will dictate the security posture of the support security element. Figure 4-1, provides an example of a roll-off concept at a port. Below are key considerations for developing an effective roll-off plan:

- Is the port contested?
- How long does it take for the vessel ramp to lower into position?
- Is the off-load area at the port clear of CIVs or obstacles that could impede ground movement?
- How long will it take to unload equipment from the vessel?
- Is the vessel docking at a CIV port or an unimproved landing site (joint logistics over-the-shore)?



Legend:

MP	military police	MSR	main supply route
TCP	traffic control post		

Figure 4-1. Example roll-off at a port

Littoral Defense

4-36. The littoral zone is the coastal area of the sea situated between the high tide and low tide marks, typically ranging in depth from 0 to 200 feet. For military operations, vessels in this zone must be light enough to traverse over the sandbar and reach land or be close enough to establish a floating bridge, especially in the case of joint logistics over-the-shore. Within this zone, units are vulnerable to direct and indirect fire from small arms, including attacks from UASs. The conditions in the littoral zone compel vessels to slow their movement, often leading to docking, which increases the risk of disruption from enemy attacks. Providing effective security for units operating in the littoral zone is crucial.

4-37. As the vessel approaches the littoral zone, the security team should man all weapon stations and activate available electronic warfare or C-UAS equipment. The team should then conduct a reconnaissance of the dock using UAS. The UAS can help identify potential enemy forces, suspicious activities, or obstacles that could impede the docking of the vessel. The necessary clearance to operate in an airspace must be obtained before a UAS is launched. The security element will implement their roll-off plan once the vessel docks at the port.

CHECKPOINTS AND COMBAT OUTPOSTS

4-38. Controlling movement within an AO may be necessary for specific periods or as part of long-term operations. This can be achieved by establishing checkpoints and combat outposts along designated roads and routes, and on key terrain identified through mission variables.

4-39. Checkpoints control, regulate, and verify movement, while combat outposts provide sanctuary, support, information collection, or area denial. Typically, most checkpoints will not evolve into combat outposts. However, a checkpoint may develop into a combat outpost if it experiences a high density of other activities. These activities could include several collocated collection points, the necessity to maintain the checkpoint for an extended period, or significant enemy activity in the area.

Checkpoints

4-40. Commanders often need to control the freedom of movement within an AO. Military police achieve this by establishing short- or long-term checkpoints along designated routes and roadways and on key terrain identified by analyzing the mission variables. Checkpoints monitor and control the movement of personnel and vehicles, inspect cargo, enforce laws and regulations, and provide information. Additionally, checkpoints can be used to coordinate movement and surveillance activities.


4-41. Establishing checkpoints is a critical measure of a commander's overall protection efforts. The commander designates these checkpoints along a movement route to help marching units comply with the timetable. The movement overlay highlights key points along the route where potential disruptions could occur. To prevent congestion and confusion, the commander positions TCPs along the route, which may be staffed by military police or personnel from other units. These Soldiers report to the appropriate area movement control organization when a convoy, march column, or march serial arrives at and completes passage of their location. Checkpoints can also indicate critical terrain features, assisting in coordinating air-ground integration and facilitating effective civil control. For more information regarding civil disturbance, see ATP 3-39.4 and ATP 3-39.33.

4-42. Military police offer their expertise to commanders regarding the construction and procedures of checkpoint operations. They are responsible for operating essential checkpoints that manage traffic flow, enforce laws, and control movement at important locations, such as border crossings and access points to critical facilities. (See chapter 5 for more information on border operations.) Military police establish and manage two types of checkpoints: deliberate and hasty.

Deliberate Checkpoints

4-43. A deliberate checkpoint is a fixed location established to protect an operating base camp, a well-established MSR, or a main road in rural or urban areas. Unlike a hasty checkpoint, a deliberate checkpoint is typically preplanned and intended to remain in place for longer periods of time. Additionally, rehearsals may be required to ensure proper operation.

4-44. Survivability considerations may be significant when compared to a hasty checkpoint. For detailed information on creating and utilizing obstacles, including access and entry control points, see ATP 3-37.34. Additionally, ATP 3-39.4 provides specifics related to all access control points. For an example of a deliberate checkpoint, see figure 4-2.



Legend:
U.S. United States

Figure 4-2. Example of a deliberate check point

4-45. Deliberate checkpoints are typically used to—

- Control all vehicles and pedestrian traffic so crowds cannot assemble.
- Identify and detain known offenders or suspected enemy or insurgent personnel.
- Provide straggler control collection.
- Enforce curfews.
- Deter illegal movement.
- Prevent the movement of supplies to the enemy.
- Deny the enemy contact with or prevent insurgents from hiding with the local inhabitants.
- Dominate the area around the checkpoint.
- Collect information.

4-46. Checkpoints are typically categorized based on the expected volume of traffic that will pass through them. A heavy-traffic checkpoint usually requires a platoon to operate it. While not ideal, a military police squad (or other types of squads) can manage a light-traffic checkpoint for a limited duration, typically 12 hours or less. Checkpoints may also be classified by the number of other activities collocated or occurring in the same vicinity.

Hasty Checkpoints

4-47. Units establish a hasty checkpoint as part of a larger tactical plan or in response to hostile activities, such as a bomb, mine incident, or sniper attack. The checkpoint can be closed on the command of the controlling headquarters. A hasty checkpoint always has a specific task and purpose. Additionally, hasty checkpoints can evolve into deliberate checkpoints. Figure 4-3 provides an example of a hasty checkpoint.




Figure 4-3. Example hasty checkpoint

4-48. Units establish hasty checkpoints to achieve surprise. Leaders avoid predictable patterns by randomly changing the checkpoint locations and methods of operation. Hasty checkpoints are set up in locations where they cannot be seen by approaching traffic until it is too late for vehicles to withdraw unobtrusively. Ideal locations for hasty checkpoints include bridges, narrow passages (defiles), highway intersections, the reverse slope of a hill, and just beyond sharp curves. Key characteristics of a hasty checkpoint include—

- Using vehicles reinforced with concertina wire as obstacles. Soldiers may also use tire deflation devices or road spike strips, which can be more effective and less intrusive in stability operations.
- Positioning vehicles at each end of the checkpoint to partially block the route.
- Conducting searches in the area between the vehicles.
- Concealing a reaction force, consisting of at least one team, nearby to respond if the site is attacked.

4-49. The basic organization of a checkpoint includes a headquarters element, a security element, a search element, and an assault element. While checkpoint forces may vary in size, typical sizes are shown below. To operate a checkpoint, task-organize the unit as follows:

- **Headquarters element**. This element is responsible for—
  - Exercising command and control.
  - Maintaining a log of all activities.
  - Maintaining communication with its higher headquarters.
  - Coordinating local patrols.
  - Coordinating the role of civil authorities, as required.
  - Coordinating linkups, as required.
  - Coordinating relief in place, as required.

  - Integrating a reserve force or a response force.
- **Security element**. This element consists of a military police squad responsible for—
  - Monitoring traffic flow up to and through the checkpoint.
  - Watching for and reporting suspicious activity.
  - Providing early warning to the search and assault elements.
  - Preventing enemy ambush.
- **Search element**. This element consists of a military police squad and is responsible for—
  - Halting vehicles at the checkpoint.
  - Guiding vehicles to the designated search point.
  - Conducting personnel and vehicle searches.
  - Directing cleared vehicles to continue through the checkpoint.
  - Detaining personnel as directed.
- **Assault element**. This element is responsible for—
  - Preparing and occupying fortified fighting positions.
  - Eliminating hostile elements that force their way past the search team, according to the ROE.

Note. Checkpoints are a part of police operations. All Soldiers involved in the operation must clearly understand the ROE and the use of deadly force.

4-50. The layout, construction, and operation of checkpoints are based on an analysis of the mission variables. The following procedures and considerations typically apply:

- Position the checkpoint in a location where traffic cannot turn back, leave the road, or bypass it without being observed.
- Place vehicles and crew-served weapons off the road but within sight of the checkpoint. This positioning helps deter resistance against Soldiers operating the checkpoint. Vehicles should be positioned in a hull-down configuration, allowing Soldiers to engage vehicles attempting to break through or bypass the checkpoint.
- Install obstacles to slow or channel traffic into the search area. Traffic should be funneled through the checkpoint in a single file.
- Display signs written in the HN language that explain the purpose of the checkpoint and provide instructions for passing through it.

- Establish communications according to the unit SOP.
- Designate specific search areas for vehicles and personnel. If possible, surround the search area with barriers to protect against threats such as booby-trapped vehicles or suicide bombers. Women should only be checked with a metal detector or searched by female personnel, depending on the ROE and mission variables. ATP 3-39.4 contains additional information regarding searches of vehicles and personnel.

Note. If applicable, checkpoint personnel should include linguists.

Combat Outposts

4-51. A *combat outpost* is a reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations (FM 3-90). Using combat outposts is an effective strategy for deploying security forces in challenging terrain where mounted units cannot adequately cover the area. These outposts are also useful when smaller OPs or checkpoints and TCPs are at risk of being overrun by enemy forces infiltrating the security zone. The commander establishes a combat outpost to extend the depth of the security perimeter, maintain friendly forward OPs until they can observe the main body of the enemy, or protect friendly forward OPs that may become encircled by enemy forces. Both mounted and dismounted units can utilize combat outposts effectively. See figure 4-4 for an example of combat outposts supporting a guard mission.




Figure 4-4. Combat outposts

4-52. An analysis of the mission variables determines the appropriate size, location, and number of combat outposts a unit should establish. Typically, a reinforced platoon occupies a combat outpost. A combat outpost must have enough resources to accomplish its designated missions effectively but not so many that it significantly weakens the strength of the main unit. The outpost is generally positioned far enough ahead of the protected force to prevent enemy ground reconnaissance elements from observing the actions of that force.

4-53. The commander organizes a combat outpost to provide an all-around defense to withstand a superior enemy force. When the enemy possesses a significant amount of armored capability, the commander may allocate more antitank weapons to the combat outpost than the standard amount. The forces stationed at these outposts can conduct aggressive patrolling, engage and eliminate enemy reconnaissance units, and confront the main body of the enemy before their extraction. The commander also plans to extract friendly forces from the outpost before the enemy overruns their position.

4-54. The most likely situation is when multiple activities are collocated at a specific site, and the likelihood of enemy activity against that site increases to where the security level of a combat outpost may be needed.

BASE AND BASE CAMP SECURITY AND DEFENSE

4-55. *Base defense* is the local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to United States forces (JP 3-10). Base security and defense primarily fall under the protection warfighting function; however, they also incorporate tasks from both the protection and movement and maneuver warfighting functions as described in ADP 3-37 and ADP 3-90, respectively. Additional important references for base security and defense operations include ATP 3-37.2, FM 3-90, GTA 90-01-011, JP 3-10, and JP 3-26.

4-56. A division or corps may be required to protect multiple bases or base camps. They may choose to establish one or more base cluster. In *base defense operations*, a base cluster is a collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control (JP 3-10). Base commanders are responsible for establishing defense procedures for their AO. Depending on the mission variables, units may be assigned to conduct base defense operations on a permanent or rotating basis. For a detailed discussion on the security and defense of bases and base camps, see ATP 3-37.10.

4-57. The base and base camp security and defense framework is organized into three primary areas (see figure 4-5, page 75). This structuring facilitates the organization of protection and defense information, aligns requirements, and directs efforts. The three areas include the—

- **Outer security area**. The outer security area extends beyond the base camp perimeter to the limits of the base camp commander's AO. Commanders establish an outer security area to ensure early warning, provide reaction time, and deny enemy reconnaissance efforts and vantage points for conducting standoff attacks. Mobile security elements typically patrol this outer area and establish checkpoints or other security measures along LOCs.
- **Perimeter zone**. The perimeter zone encompasses the base camp perimeter and the area immediately in front of or behind it, where operations, fighting positions, and entry control points are located. Selected base camps may have designated inner and outer perimeters. A single perimeter is more common in larger base camps, supplemented by inner barriers and access control measures around critical facilities. Creating a double perimeter is resource-intensive and seldom used.
- **Inner security area**. The inner security area is situated inside the base camp perimeter. Plans for interior barriers can be implemented around individual unit locations and critical assets, serving as traffic control measures that enhance the depth of the base camp security plan. These measures aim to halt or impede threats that penetrate the perimeter zone.

Note. The framework for base and base camp security and defense can be applied for planning the security and defense of critical assets/sites.




Figure 4-5. Framework for base camp security and defense

4-58. Collectively, the outer perimeter area, perimeter zone, and inner security area form the base camp AO. Commanders assigned to an AO must fulfill specific responsibilities as outlined in FM 3-90. However, not all commanders designated as base camp commanders will possess the necessary organic capabilities within their units to fulfill every requirement. In such cases, the higher commander must specify in the order which AO responsibilities will not be carried out by the base camp commander and identify who will perform those tasks. Alternatively, they should provide the necessary additional capabilities to meet these responsibilities. For further details, see appendix E regarding the development of security and mobility support attachments for the base OPORD.

4-59. Base camp commanders and their staffs apply the framework for base security and defense to guide their planning activities, ensuring that all critical elements of base security and defense are considered. This framework is not meant to be a comprehensive solution for base security and defense; instead, it serves as a general template for planning.

4-60. Military police are responsible for conducting security operations to protect friendly forces, bases, base camps, and actions in the support area. As part of their area security duties, military police units provide protection for bases and base camps, including airbases, within the AO. In this capacity, they are equipped to detect enemy forces, provide early warnings, and engage threats in the outer security areas. Utilizing their skills, military police may interact with the local population and apply intelligence techniques to enhance the security of the base camp. They deliver thorough security by operating beyond the perimeter of the base camp, where they are out of range of threats to the base itself and within the perimeter and inside the base camp. This approach allows for the early detection and engagement of enemy forces from a safe distance, enabling military police to disrupt or eliminate threats before they can effectively target the base camp. Additionally, military police units may operate within the perimeter and inner security zones, acting as the response force when needed.

4-61. Airbase protection and defense are key components of military police area security. When a threat exceeds the capabilities of the airbase, the commanding officer can request assistance from military police. Effective airbase defense requires special coordination between military police, the United States Air Force security forces, and other security personnel responsible for base defense. Air Force security forces units are tasked with internal security and defense of the airbase, while military police units typically handle external defense. Air Force and Army forces must coordinate their defensive efforts, which include establishing boundaries, fire control measures, and contact points. By combining the resources of Air Force security forces with military police units, a comprehensive defense can be implemented for critical assets such as weapon systems, aircraft, command centers, personnel, and other priority resources defined by the airbase commander. For more information on Air Force security operations, see DAFI 31-101.

4-62. In developing a base defense strategy, creating a simple and flexible defensive plan is essential. This plan should maximize the use of SOPs and battle drills at the user level. Additionally, the base defense plan should incorporate the following fundamentals:

- **Understand the enemy**. Defenders must be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of enemy forces, including their weapons, equipment, and tactics.
- **Create situational awareness**. Intelligence reporting is crucial for providing an accurate overview of the operational environment.
- **Use the advantages of the defenders**. Defenders may be able to overcome a numerically superior force by leveraging their advantages, which include—
  - The ability to fight from cover.
  - Detailed knowledge of the local terrain and environment.
  - The ability to prepare positions, routes between them, obstacles, and fields of fire in advance.
  - The ability to plan for communications, control measures, indirect fires, and logistics support for contingency operations.
  - The ability to mislead enemy forces regarding friendly defensive capabilities, troop positions, and execution of operations.
- **Concentrate at critical times and places**. The defense of a base or base camp should leverage interior lines, enabling the timely and secure movement of forces to engage the most significant threats. Commanders must concentrate combat power at points of decision by economizing resources in some areas, maintaining a reserve, and maneuvering to achieve local superiority where it is most needed.
- **Conduct counterreconnaissance and counterattacks**. Fixed bases typically have well-established perimeters with limited depth. Implementing counterreconnaissance and counterattacks can provide added depth to the battle outside the perimeter, allowing the base or base camp to fulfill its primary mission with minimal interruption. Counterreconnaissance patrols should extend 2 to 3 miles (approximately 3 to 5 kilometers) beyond the perimeter, depending on the terrain, to reduce the risk of fratricide, especially at night.
- **Coordinate critical defense assets**. Synchronizing indirect fire, air defense resources, tactical aircraft, engineers, dismounted troops, armored vehicles, naval surface fire support, and helicopters can create a combined-arms effect.
- **Balance base security with political and legal constraints**. This fundamental is particularly critical in a low-intensity conflict environment.
- **Understand the law of war and ROE**. Base and base camp commanders and their subordinates must adhere to ROE. In joint-service or multinational operations, resolving inconsistencies related to ROE is crucial.

4-63. Emphasis on specific base defense and security measures varies with the anticipated threat level. Any or all levels presented in table 4-1, page 77, may exist simultaneously.

Table 4-1. Level I, II, and III threats

Threat Level	*Definition or Description*	*Response*
I	A *Level I threat* is a small enemy force that can be defeated by maneuver units operating in the rear area or by the perimeter defenses (JP 3-10). For a typical base or base camp, a Level I threat consists of a squad size unit or smaller group of enemy soldiers, agents, or terrorists. Common objectives for a Level I threat include resupplying from friendly supply stocks; disrupting friendly command and control, logistics, and facilities; and interdicting friendly LOCs. Addressing Level I threats should be an integral part of the daily FP measures implemented by all commanders. ***Note.*** These include a potential for insider attacks by elements or individuals of HN partners and security forces, often characterized as green-on-blue.	Established perimeter defenses.
II	A *Level II threat* is represented by enemy activities that can be defeated by a base camp or base cluster augmented by a response force (JP 3-10). Level II threats encompass enemy special operations teams, long-range reconnaissance units, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, and small combat units that have suffered partial attrition. The typical objectives of a Level II threat include disrupting and destroying friendly command and control systems, logistics and commercial facilities and interdicting friendly LOCs.	Military police platoons or combat arms maneuver element.
III	A *Level III threat* is a threat beyond the defensive capability of both the base camp and base cluster and any local reserve or response force (JP 3-10). Level III threats arise when an adversarial force can project combat power through air, land, sea, or other means within the operational area. These threats typically involve a mobile enemy force. The primary objectives of a Level III threat may include seizing key terrain, disrupting the movement and deployment of reserves and artillery, and destroying friendly combat forces. Additionally, they may aim to destroy facilities, supply points, and command posts and target airfields, aviation assembly areas, and arming and refueling points. Interdicting LOCs and major supply routes is also a critical objective for these threats.	Requires tactical combat force.

Legend:

FP	force protection	JP	joint publication
HN	host nation	LOC	lines of communication

4-64. The mission of the base security forces is to conduct operations that react to, deter, deny, resist, or destroy an enemy Level I force (see table 4-1) that is attacking the base or base camp. The base defense force comprises a combination of security assets provided by the units located at the base camp. The base camp commander evaluates all available Army, joint, and multinational resources and forces to determine the appropriate organization of the base defense force. In the event of an attack on the base camp, the commander will respond based on the capabilities of the base defense force.

4-65. A base defense force should have significant direct-fire lethality, achieved through small arms, automatic weapons, and antitank systems. It should also have access to supporting indirect fires, a high degree of tactical mobility, and a reasonable span of control. The force should be capable of—

- Conducting reconnaissance patrols to detect and report the location, strength, and capabilities of enemy forces near the base camp.
- Developing positions both within and outside the base camp to effectively stop or destroy enemy advances.
- Utilizing reserve elements to engage and attack smaller enemy units that threaten to breach the base camp perimeter.
- Providing internal security for critical assets and capabilities within the base camp.

4-66. To streamline the command and control of the base defense force during an attack, the base commander may appoint a base defense force commander and set up a base defense operations center. This center will facilitate the integration of defense plans and maximize the overall effectiveness of the defense efforts of the base. A *base defense operations center* is a command-and-control facility established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense (JP 3-10). The structure of the base defense operations center will depend on the types of forces involved, which may include joint, interagency, or multinational components.

4-67. Military police leaders anticipate the integration of their capabilities into the base defense plan. They understand their roles, abilities, and dependencies and can effectively communicate this information to nonmilitary police leaders or battle staff. PIO can provide crucial early warnings of enemy activity, enabling early predictions and potentially preventing threats from impacting base operations. Additional tasks for base defense may include conducting patrols, managing access control, securing critical base facilities, setting up LPs or OPs, and deploying quick reaction forces or initial response forces.

Fixed Site Unmanned Aircraft System Defense

4-68. When building a defense in depth for a fixed-site location, military police must consider that an adversary may use UASs to observe or attack the location. If C-UAS capabilities are available, military police should incorporate them into their defense plan. To develop an effective C-UAS defense plan, leaders must first determine the optimal placement of radar, electronic warfare, optic, or kinetic systems. The locations of these systems should be indicated on a map, sector sketch, or base defense plan, detailing their maximum detection and engagement ranges. Generally, radar and optics can detect threats at greater distances than the engagement ranges, providing an early warning zone. This allows the operations center to issue alerts and warnings about incoming threats (see figure 4-6). Furthermore, military police must coordinate with the air defense and air management cell in the area to maintain an updated air picture, enabling them to identify and differentiate between friendly and hostile UASs.




Figure 4-6. Detection and engagement ranges

4-69. If handheld or man-packed C-UASs are available, they can be deployed to OPs to cover blind spots or critical approaches. Leaders should consider placing these systems in elevated positions to avoid obstructions caused by terrain and structures. Commanders and leaders should position some portable systems at static posts to protect critical assets on site. Others should be assigned to mobile teams to ensure a quick response to any location on the site.

4-70. For bases located in the United States or overseas, effective coordination between military police, local law enforcement, and HN security forces is crucial when responding to UAVs, especially if the UAV is monitoring a fixed site from a location beyond U.S. control. In contingency environments involving base clusters, base camps, or lodgments, collaboration between the operations center on the base and the mobile security force in the area is essential for effectively responding to UAS.

4-71. Security forces should take the following steps in response to a UAV detected at a fixed site:

- **Maintain visual contact**. Upon detecting a UAV, focus your attention outward and upward, ensuring that you maintain visual contact with the UAV.
- **Collect information**. Use the SALUTE report format to collect information about the UAV. This includes the—
  - **Size**. The dimensions or type of the UAV.
  - **Activity**. The current actions or behaviors of the UAV.
  - **Location**. The position of the UAV.
  - **Unit**. A description of the UAV.
  - **Time**. The time of detection.
  - **Equipment**. Noticeable payload or cameras on the UAV.
- **Report the incident**. Immediately report the incident to the appropriate authorities, such as the operations center, command post, or police operations center.
- **Identify the operator**. Attempt to locate individuals holding a controller or device that appears to be operating the UAV. If the UAV seems to be coming from outside the fixed site, or if an operator can be seen offsite, contact local law enforcement, HN security forces, or a mobile security team if applicable.
- **Check for injuries or damage**. Look for damages or injured individuals. If the UAV is suspected of carrying a chemical agent or a device that could detonate, search the area for signs of injury or items that may have been dropped from the UAV.
- **Execute appropriate actions**. If the operator is found, instruct them to land the UAV and interview them regarding its operation. If the approval authority has determined that the UAV should be disabled, follow the active defense measures listed in ATP 3-01.81.

4-72. Downed UAVs should be treated as evidence or captured enemy material, and the area surrounding them should be considered a crime scene or sensitive site. When security forces respond to the downing of a UAV, they must take the following actions:

- **Establish security and secure the scene**. Initial responding security forces must secure the area and establish a cordon around the UAV. If there are injured individuals or damaged infrastructure, notify additional emergency services. Additional responding security forces should search nearby for a possible operator or potential dropped payload (technical, explosive, or chemical). If it appears that the UAV has a payload attached to it or if a dropped payload has been discovered, a larger cordon should be established, the surrounding area should be evacuated, and security forces must take extra precautions.
- **Contact EOD**. UAVs may have been used as weapon delivery platforms or could be booby-trapped. They may contain explosives or a chemical payload. Once the UAV has been rendered safe by EOD, processing of the scene may begin.
- **Process the UAV**. Treat the UAV like any other piece of electronic or digital evidence. This includes photographing it, handling it with care, and packaging it appropriately (see ATP 3-39.12-1 for evidence collection and handling procedures). After collecting the UAV, adhere to installation-specific SOPs regarding electronic evidence and suspected espionage or sabotage, and submit the UAV to the appropriate law enforcement or intelligence authorities.

NODE PROTECTION

4-73. Command posts and operations centers typically use area security techniques to safeguard operations. This involves deploying protection and security assets in a layered, integrated, and redundant manner. Such an approach can help keep potential threats at a distance by maximizing the standoff distance from explosive effects while ensuring that the protected asset remains beyond the range of direct-fire weapons and observation from enemies or adversaries.

4-74. Military police understand the elements of the movement order, including the potential activation of alternate command post nodes. Providing security for key nodes is potentially a very fluid requirement. Therefore, military police must take a proactive approach to this mission. This responsibility is often linked to the security of HRP. Nodes may be mobile rather than static sites. Part of the military police requirement is reconnaissance of new sites before that site is established as a node. In these situations, military police may participate as part of the reconnaissance team or as a quartering party to facilitate the transition and ongoing security of the node and the associated HRP.

PROTECTIVE SERVICES

4-75. *High-risk personnel* are personnel who, by their grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation, are likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets (JP 3-26). Special precautions are taken to ensure the safety and security of these individuals and their family members from terrorist or criminal threats. When units identify a significant risk to selected personnel, the local commander typically organizes security details from organic resources. However, in certain circumstances, designated personnel may require protective services from specially trained units or teams. For more information on protective services, see ATP 3-39.35.

4-76. There are four levels of HRP:

- Level 1 and 2 HRP require significant protection, which includes dedicated personal security details and other security measures as outlined in DODI O-2000.22.
- Level 2.5 allows appointing a personal security officer who coordinates travel security for the assigned HRP. This officer may only be armed when functioning as part of a larger, temporary protective detail.
- Level 3 personnel do not qualify for protective services; however, they should receive additional training in AT and personal protective measures.

4-77. Military police are responsible for conducting HRP security in high-risk/combat environments when designated by a CCDR or identified through a personal security vulnerability assessment. CID is tasked with providing continuous executive-level protective services for key officials, including the SecDef, Deputy SecDef, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the commanders of U.S. Africa Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Southern Command. MWD teams may also enhance the detection and protection capabilities of military police and CID.

4-78. A protective services detail mission aims to safeguard the HRP from all potential hazards, whether they arise from intentional actions, accidents, or negligence. While absolute protection is never achievable, adhering to established principles of protective services can significantly enhance the likelihood of a successful mission. Five essential fundamentals contribute to the effectiveness of protective services detail missions. They include—

- **Planning and coordinating**. Effective planning is crucial for a successful mission. Every aspect of the protection detail should be meticulously organized, with close attention paid to each action and movement of the principal and the protective services personnel to ensure maximum security. Mission leaders must provide thorough briefings and conduct rehearsals of emergency procedures, enabling team members to react instinctively and appropriately in critical situations.
- **Ensuring the availability of resources**. The number of personnel assigned to a protection detail and the equipment used are influenced by several factors, with the availability of resources being the most pivotal. It is important to consider the position of the principal, the threat level at the destination, and the complexity of the mission when requesting and allocating resources for a successful operation.

- **Assigning responsibilities**. Clearly defining individual responsibilities is essential for completing all aspects of the mission.
- **Controlling information**. It is crucial to closely manage the release of personal information related to the principal and other members of the party, details of the itinerary, and the security procedures in place. Ensure that personnel assigned to protective services understand that they are prohibited from discussing or sharing this information with anyone except authorized personnel. Unauthorized release of information can compromise the integrity of the security mission.
- **Being flexible**. Unexpected changes to the itinerary require a focus on flexibility when planning protective services missions. It is important to prepare alternate and contingency plans to address circumstances such as inclement weather, potential threats, or other factors that may affect the security of the HRP. Implementing effective preventive measures and having comprehensive backup plans are critical for ensuring safety.

AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

4-79. *Area damage control* are the measures taken before, during, and/or after a hostile action or natural or manmade disasters to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects (JP 3-10). Commanders conduct ADC when the extent of damage and the impact of an attack are limited, allowing them to use local assets and resources to respond and recover. Commanders engage in ADC in support areas to prevent and mitigate the adverse effects of enemy or adversary actions that may diminish combat power. While engineers carry out many tasks related to ADC, military police also play a crucial role. For more information on ADC, see ADP 3-37, FM 3-39, and FM 3-81.

4-80. Military police facilitate the reestablishment of order and control during disasters, helping to mitigate their often-devastating effects. There are probably few, if any, new activities or capabilities required for military police to perform support to area damage, and many of them may not be specific to the security and mobility discipline.

4-81. When performed as part of DSCA, ADC is commonly referred to as incident management. Some incidents may escalate to a level of national significance, necessitating additional resources for mitigation, recovery, and investigation. Incident management and ADC follow established battle drills and SOPs. These drills enable effective action against the fear, panic, and confusion that can arise following an attack. They may be carried out as part of a maneuver enhancement brigade. For more information on incident management, see ADP 3-28, ADP 3-37, FM 3-81, and JP 3-10.

RESPONSE FORCE OPERATIONS

4-82. Response force operations involve planning to counter Level I and II threats and managing Level III threats until the designated TCF arrives. These operations use a mobile force with the necessary fire support to address Level II threats in the AO. A crucial aspect of these activities is the seamless transition of responsibility from a base camp or base cluster and its security forces to a TCF. A *tactical combat force* is a rapidly deployable, air-ground, mobile combat unit with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets assigned to, and capable of, defeating Level III threats, including combined arms (JP 3-10).

4-83. Response force operations expediently reinforce unit organic protection capabilities or complement that protection with maneuver capabilities based on the threat. These operations involve planning and training to defeat Level I and II threats while managing Level III threats until a designated TCF arrives. A response force, typically supported by firepower designated by the area commander, handles Level II threats in the AO. For further details on response force operations, see ATP 3-37.10, FM 3-39, and JP 3-10.

4-84. A response force is a mobile unit, equipped with appropriate fire support that is designated by the area commander to address Level II threats within the operational area. Military police units may serve as the response force for base camps or critical facilities, particularly against Level I and Level II threat attacks. These units gather intelligence about enemy activities while conducting security and mobility support missions throughout the AO. This intelligence helps update the commander's common operational picture regarding enemy and criminal activity near base camps and throughout the AO. When necessary, military police units can deploy wheeled armored response forces to respond to attacks on base camps and critical facilities, with the objective of neutralizing the enemy. The defense plan of a base camp commander is essential for protecting units and ensuring the success of sustainment operations.

4-85. Military police may serve as the designated response force for a base camp or other specific location. Being designated as a response force is similar to creating a reserve in that the response force may only be used to perform activities associated with being the response force—it is a dedicated force. The response force operates with adequate tactical mobility and fire support, prepared to address Level I and Level II threats and to manage Level III threats until they can be defeated by a TCF or other available response units (see ATP 3-37.10). The response force provides the base camp or base cluster commander enhanced security and defense capabilities. Once the response force is committed, the commander should be ready to reorganize and reconstitute it. The base camp commander can assign various tasks to the response force, both within the security area and the perimeter of the base camp. These tasks may include—

- Reinforcing a threatened area or responding to perimeter breaches.
- Establishing contact with potential threats and engaging them as needed within the base camp security area, defeating Level II threats and delaying Level III threats until a TCF can defeat them.
- Reinforcing engaged units located outside the perimeter.
- Conducting reconnaissance and surveillance activities.
- Responding to threats against critical assets, infrastructure, or HRP.
- Performing security checks and conducting random patrols within the base camp perimeter.

4-86. The size and composition of the response force depend on a threat assessment and the levels of uncertainty and risk. These factors may be adjusted based on changes in the situation. Additionally, the responsiveness level (readiness condition) of the response force is modified according to the current threat conditions. The response force should be effectively deployed to ensure adequate protection and tactical mobility.

4-87. When a threat surpasses the capabilities of a base camp or critical facility, the commander will request support from a response force. If military police are designated as the response force, units that are nearby, on patrol, or conducting area security will consolidate their forces, respond as quickly as possible, and engage in combat operations to destroy the enemy. If the threat exceeds the capabilities of the military police, they may conduct a battle handover to a TCF. Military police forces performing or tasked as a response may conduct a—

- Movement to contact.
- Hasty ambush.
- Hasty attack.
- Delay.
- Call for fire (indirect fire or close air support).
- Critical site defense.

4-88. If military police are designated as the response force, they must—

- Review the base defense plans.
- Coordinate with the supported base commanders to synchronize response strategies.
- Exchange communication frequencies to ensure effective communication between security elements.
- Identify contingency plans to counter likely enemy activities.
- Integrate air defense artillery, engineer, CBRN, indirect fire, and close air support into their plans, if available.

4-89. Although the current intelligence and the base or critical facility commander's risk assessment and stated needs are the primary factors in decision making, the military police commander should also assist in determining the size and composition of the response force. When designated as the response force commander, the military police commander should consider the following when developing the response plan:

- The existing base defense plans and the commander's guidance.
- The priority of ongoing operations.
- The criticality of the base under attack.
- The amount of time required for different elements to consolidate.
- The ability to effectively communicate between security elements.
- The identification of contingency plans to counter likely enemy activities.

- The availability of additional forces to supplement the response element, if necessary.
- The integration of engineer, CBRN, fires, and close air support.

4-90. Military police consolidate into squads or platoons to delay, defeat, or defend against Level I and Level II threats. They also work to shape and delay Level III threats until a designated combined arms TCF arrives. Military police forces acting as a response unit must be capable of performing the following tasks:

- Movement to contact.
- Hasty ambush.
- Hasty attack.
- Delay.
- Call for fire.
- Defense of critical sites and assets.
- Establishment of a fighting or survivability position (see ATP 3-37.34 and ATP 3-39.4).

CONTESTED LOGISTICS, SUSTAINMENT MODE, AND NODE SECURITY

4-91. Peer adversaries have the ability and resources to observe, disrupt, delay, and attack U.S. forces, infrastructure, and operations across all domains, both within the United States and abroad, and during transit. Military police are crucial in detecting, preventing, and mitigating risks to sustainment and force generation. They protect logistics and Army forces from their points of origin to the endpoint.

4-92. Leaders must recognize that they are constantly under observation from various domains and ensure that they do not become attractive targets for adversaries. During competition, military police deter enemies from gathering intelligence and sabotaging Army forces, infrastructure, and operations. Peer adversaries have capabilities in air, space, and cyberspace, which increases the chances that they can maintain continuous visual and electromagnetic contact with Army forces. During crisis and armed conflict, enemies focus on logistics operations across all domains, employing methods to detect and quickly target sustainment forces and resources. Concentrated and stationary forces and resources are easier for adversaries to detect and destroy. Therefore, sustainment forces plan to operate in a dispersed manner, quickly massing when necessary and then rapidly dispersing again to enhance their survivability. Military police forces must remain agile to effectively support these operations.

4-93. Compared to sustainment forces, military police have significantly fewer resources and capabilities. This scarcity necessitates prioritizing the protection of vital sustainment nodes, capabilities, and capacities. When planning logistics protection, military police leaders must ensure that sustainers focus on essential logistics and allocate security forces appropriately. By effectively managing movement tables, regulating routes, and securing areas and routes, military police enable effective distributed sustainment operations.

Air, Sea, Rail Ports, and Terminals

4-94. Army forces deploy by air and sea from designated strategic support areas. Greater emphasis is placed on the protection of air and sea routes for embarkation and debarkation due to the enhanced capabilities of the adversary to attack them. Military police are often called upon to provide security support for ports and terminals involved in terminal operations. Although there are similarities among different environments, each port or terminal is unique and requires specialized knowledge to effectively apply security fundamentals and basic military police skills and capabilities. While other military police disciplines may have connections to ports and terminals, the focus remains on mobility and security support, ensuring the uninterrupted movement of U.S. forces and sustainment assets at aerial ports of embarkation, aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of embarkation, and seaports of debarkation.

4-95. Aerial ports and terminals often have military police supporting the Air Force or CIV organizations, focusing on the transitions from air to land or land to air shipment and transport. Seaports and terminals typically require support from the Navy and Marine Corps or CIV organizations, concentrating on the transitions from water to land or land to water. Railheads can link to aerial ports, seaports, and terminals but also have unique requirements. Military police may need to secure the length of the railway and fixed sites within the rail system. LOGSEC offers a range of specialized capabilities that enhance security for ports and terminals (see chapter 5).

4-96. Army expeditionary intermodal operations encompass a range of activities related to transportation. The fundamentals of these operations and general terminal techniques integrate various transportation skills to improve the deployment, redeployment, and distribution processes for moving personnel, equipment, or forces from start to finish. To better understand how military police may support intermodal operations, see ATP 4-13 or the specific manuals related to intermodal components and transportation competencies.

Aerial Port and Terminal Security

4-97. Military police may be needed to support the security of airfields or LZ. When these locations are connected to a base, base camp, or base camp cluster, the respective commanders outline specific security requirements. If the base primarily serves as an air base, the Air Force will likely hold the command. Regardless, the senior airfield authority plays a crucial role in this type of mission.

4-98. Most base camps require at least a LZ to support resupply operations and casualty evacuations. When these activities are conducted near a base camp with active airfields and LZ, assessing vulnerabilities related to aircraft approaching and departing is important. Protective measures should be implemented to counter threats, including shoulder-launched and surface-to-air weapons and heavy machine guns. For more information, see JP 3-10.

4-99. Military police may need to coordinate their security efforts with Air Force security forces when an airbase is situated within or connected to a base camp. The Air Force approach to airbase security closely resembles the doctrine used for securing a base camp, although there are differences in terminology and specific practices. For more information on integrated defense operations, see DAFI 31-101.

4-100. Military police may be needed to help secure airports and airfields in the United States and its territories at the request of other federal agencies. When this occurs, it is part of DSCA tasks, and ADP 3-28, JP 3-27, and JP 3-28 should be reviewed for more information. The only significant change when operating in the domestic environment is the legal restrictions that may apply.

Seaport and Terminal Security

4-101. Military police are responsible for providing security in port and pier areas. The joint force commander and subordinate joint force commanders must clearly define and assign port security plans and responsibilities. The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command serves as the single port manager for all ports, as designated by the United States Transportation Command. Area commanders, along with their subordinate military police assigned to a port area, must develop and organize plans in collaboration with the appropriate Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command units (either brigade or battalion). This ensures that Soldiers are properly trained and equipped to secure port areas and cargo as needed. Dedicated port security units typically patrol harbors and anchorages, including waterfront security operations. For more information on port security units, see JP 3-10; for details on Army water transportation operations, see ATP 4-15.

4-102. In a wartime environment, military police and CID personnel implement LOGSEC measures (see chapter 5) at terminals within the continental United States and overseas locations. Teams stationed at ports of debarkation are aware of sensitive cargo shipments arriving at their facilities. This awareness is crucial for minimizing or eliminating the risk of criminal activity targeting military equipment as it moves into the theater of operations. The same procedures must be followed during redeployment to protect military equipment returning to its home station.

4-103. Base camps can be located alongside military ports and terminals. The CCDR or the joint force commander defines the responsibilities of the base camp commander, the military port commander, and the senior airfield authority (if one is included in the port area) to ensure a unified effort.

Railway and Railhead Security

4-104. Military police and CID support the security of railheads, terminals, and railways with LOGSEC. This collaboration provides specialized capabilities to enhance security. Similar to air and sea ports, railheads and terminals may be collocated with a base camp.

4-105. Military police support Army rail operations by providing local and area security and the specialized capability of LOGSEC to facilitate these operations. To effectively plan for these intermodal operations, military police must have a solid understanding of the basics involved. (For more information on Army rail operations, see ATP 4-14.) It is important to be aware of the key assets associated with rail operations, such as tracks, locomotives, rolling stock, switching modes, tunnels, bridges, and marshalling yards, in addition to the materiel and personnel being transported. Route security considerations apply to the tracks, while local security principles focus on protecting specific sites and points within the rail system. Military police may also provide security as part of the security force on the rolling stock, which includes armored trains and cars. Many of the basic concepts of convoy security are also applicable in these situations.

DISLOCATED CIVILIANS

4-106. Controlling DCs has a security component to it, but the primary focus is facilitating movement and maneuverability for other forces. While supporting security operations, the primary consideration is to ensure that enemy forces and threats are not concealed among the DC population.

4-107. Chapter 5 discusses the importance of DC control in PRC operations. Additional information is provided in appendix A, which details camps related to DC operations. Military police support for populace control primarily focuses on DC control.

ANTITERRORISM

4-108. *Antiterrorism* consists of defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include rapid containment by local military and civilian forces (JP 3-26). It is an element of protection and part of the broader mission of combating terrorism. All military forces must consider AT during their operations. Military police receive extensive training in AT measures, methods for assessing threats, implementing preventative actions, and responding to terrorist incidents in both law enforcement and broader contexts. They can also advise leaders and staffs from other units on AT requirements and response strategies. Additionally, military police are expected to be adept at applying various AT measures and activities. For more information, see ATP 3-37.2.

4-109. Military police identify potential terrorist threats and other threat activities to support the freedom of action by U.S. forces. Recognizing these threats is essential for establishing protective measures against surprise attacks, observation, detection, interference, espionage, terrorism, and sabotage. By identifying threats, U.S. forces can take proactive steps and implement procedures to minimize vulnerabilities to terrorist acts or attacks. These efforts aim to reduce personnel vulnerability to terrorism through education that enhances understanding of its nature, maintaining a heightened awareness of current threats, and mitigating risks by implementing appropriate protective measures.

4-110. Military police are trained and prepared to quickly respond to terrorist attacks when prevention efforts fail. Their emergency response actions include treating casualties, apprehending perpetrators, preserving evidence, minimizing property damage, restoring operations, and speeding up the criminal investigation process. They also focus on collecting lessons learned from the incident. For more information on this topic, see AR 525-13 and ATP 3-37.2 regarding AT.

4-111. *Counterterrorism* consists of activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals (JP 3-26). Counterterrorism actions involve conducting strikes and raids against terrorist organizations and their facilities outside the United States and its territories. While counterterrorism is a designated mission for certain special operations forces, conventional Army units can also play a role. When commanders use conventional forces to target terrorists, they are carrying out offensive operations rather than counterterrorism operations. Although counterterrorism is related to AT efforts, it typically does not fall under protective measures, as it primarily focuses on offensive actions.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

4-112. *Physical security* is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft (JP 3-0). The Army employs comprehensive physical security measures to protect personnel, information, and critical resources in various locations and

situations against multiple threats. This is achieved by developing and implementing effective security policies and procedures. The approach is systematic and relies on continuous analysis and the deployment of protective measures, which include physical barriers, clear zones, lighting, biometrics-capable access and key control systems, intrusion detection devices, defensive positions, and nonlethal capabilities. For more information regarding physical security requirements and procedures, see AR 190-13 and ATP 3-39.32. GTA 19-08-004 may be a useful reference for nonlethal munitions.

4-113. Physical security measures are applied in-depth to implement security and AT strategies at static locations. These measures are essential for preventing unauthorized access to restricted, controlled, or vulnerable areas. It is important to prioritize physical security measures based on available resources and vulnerability and threat assessments to effectively protect critical sites, personnel, and equipment. Physical security should be integrated with other security measures—such as mobile patrols, operational strategies, and information security—as part of a comprehensive security program. Areas that require extensive physical security measures may include—

- Bases, installations, and base camps.
- Troop housing areas, particularly those with high concentrations of personnel.
- Storage areas for arms, ammunition, and explosives.
- Key command posts.
- Aerial ports of debarkation and embarkation and seaports of debarkation and embarkation.
- Critical sustainment hubs.
- Access points and entry control points.

4-114. Physical security policies, programs, and objectives are approved by the Provost Marshal General, under the authority of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The United States Army Military Police School offers a physical security course designed to train physical security inspectors and subject matter experts. This course provides military police Soldiers an H3 (Physical Security) identifier. Completion of the course is a requirement for physical security inspectors stationed at Army installations, posts, camps, and stations. Installation PMs are typically responsible for delivering physical security expertise, including conducting periodic inspections to ensure compliance with established physical security directives.

4-115. Military police are experts in physical security procedures and applications. They can offer valuable subject matter expertise to commanders and their staffs regarding the safety of personnel and assets. In operational environments where strict adherence to physical security standards may not be feasible, military police trained in this area can help commanders and staffs develop strategies to address gaps in physical security requirements. While military police implement various physical security measures during their operations, it is important to note that all Army units are required to implement these measures. Physical security measures employed to protect personnel and equipment may include—

- **Establishing checkpoints**. Checkpoints are set up to monitor and control the movement of personnel and vehicles, inspect cargo, enforce laws and regulations, and provide information. They play a critical role in a commander's overall protection strategy and can facilitate effective civil control operations. Military police can offer valuable expertise to commanders regarding the construction and procedures associated with checkpoint operations. These checkpoints may regulate traffic flow, enforce laws, and control movement at significant locations such as border crossings or access points to critical facilities. For further details on access control and checkpoint operations, see ATP 3-39.32 and TC 19-210.
- **Controlling access to equipment, installations, materials, and documents**. Access control involves creating a system of complementary and overlapping security measures to regulate access to vital resources and information. These measures can include physical barriers, secure zones, adequate lighting, access and key control, the issuance of security badges, intrusion detection devices, defensive positions, and nonlethal capabilities. (For more information on access control and checkpoint operations, see ATP 3-39.32 and TC 19-210.) Additionally, AR 190-11 outlines physical security requirements related to access control for arms, ammunition, and explosives, while AR 190-13 covers physical security requirements for Army assets other than arms, ammunition, and explosives.
- **Employing electronic security systems**. The employment of electronic security systems includes conducting site surveys and installing and operating these systems to protect Army installations,

personnel, operations, and critical resources in tactical and nontactical situations. For more information on the use of electronic security systems, see ATP 3-39.32.

4-116. Coordinating the employment of countermobility and survivability measures is essential for enhancing the physical security of facilities and sites. Countermobility (see ATP 3-90.8) and survivability (see ATP 3-37.34) measures are often linked to specialized entry control strategies and checkpoint operations. These measures encompass a variety of barrier types. Additionally, for considerations regarding camouflage and concealment that may impact physical security, see ATP 3-37.34.

LOCAL SECURITY

4-117. *Local security* is the low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy (ADP 3-90). Local security offers immediate protection to friendly forces. Typically, this is conducted by a unit for its defense, but another unit can also provide it if the security needs exceed what a unit or facility can offer by itself or requires specialized capabilities that it lacks. Local security may involve countermobility and survivability activities. All area security operations benefit from the local security measures implemented by various units, regardless of their location within the AO. Furthermore, all local security efforts should be connected to the broader area security initiatives.

4-118. Local security involves measures taken by military units to counter enemy actions. This includes avoiding detection by the enemy and misleading them about friendly positions and intentions. Additionally, local security focuses on identifying nearby enemy forces and gathering as much information as possible about their positions and plans. By maintaining effective local security, a unit can prevent surprises and maintain the initiative in operations. This requirement is vital across all military actions, including tactical enabling operations. Military police play a crucial role in AT and physical security activities due to their specialized training and capabilities. LOGSEC is one specialized capability that military police provide for both tasks.

4-119. Units use both active and passive measures to provide local security. Active measures include—

- OPs and patrols.
- The establishment of specific levels of alert in the unit. The commander adjusts those levels based on the mission variables.
- The establishment of stand-to times. The SOPs of a unit detail its activities during the conduct of a stand-to.
- Using UASs.

4-120. Passive local security measures include—

- Camouflage and concealment.
- Movement control.
- Noise and light discipline.
- Proper communications procedures.
- The employment of available sensors, night-vision devices, and daylight sights to maintain surveillance over the area immediately around the unit.
- The incorporation of emission control to prevent the enemy from detecting, identifying, and locating friendly forces.

4-121. When military police provide protection around critical sites or assets, they typically use wheeled armored vehicles equipped with crew-served weapons and communication systems to conduct mobile patrols. These patrols are staffed by three military police Soldiers who are part of a military police team and are organized into squad, platoon, or company size elements. This standoff protection can detect and neutralize Level I and Level II enemy threats as they attempt to approach within direct-fire range of facilities or assets. Responsibilities may include establishing checkpoints and LPs or OPs. They may also involve controlling internal access points to facilities or sites and acting as an initial response force. Additionally, military police may provide in-transit security for critical assets moving between locations.

4-122. Military police can assist HN forces by establishing security measures and identifying vulnerabilities in the existing security of critical facilities. Facilities with national, cultural, religious, or military significance may require dedicated security forces. Critical assets include power generation plants, water treatment facilities, hospitals, police stations, religious structures, and armories.

4-123. A military police unit tasked with securing a critical facility or site typically undertakes the following tasks:

- **Receive and review the mission directive**. Begin by understanding the security mission directive, and initiate troop leading procedures.
- **Gather information**. Collect data from previous reconnaissance reports, other units, or personnel relieved at a static post.
- **Brief squad members**. Ensure that all squad members are informed about the following details before executing the mission:
  - ROE, including actions to take upon contact.
  - The tactical situation and the security defense plan.
  - General orders.
  - Special orders that outline specific duties, responsibilities, and procedures.
- **Determine the security method**. Decide on the security approach—whether to use static posts or mobile patrols—and assign teams to specific mission tasks. If no specific orders are given, the squad leader should choose the best method to employ or utilize a combination of both (see appendix C for guidance on developing security and mobility support attachments that complement the base OPORD).
- **Enforce situational awareness**. Stress the importance of situational awareness, and ensure that certain squad members know the procedures for reporting unusual activity. Soldiers must be familiar with their surroundings, including the local CIV and military populace.
- **Act as a response force**. Respond as quickly as possible to engage in combat operations to destroy the enemy.

COUNTER-UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

4-124. Military police face a growing threat from small UASs as adversaries take advantage of these relatively inexpensive, flexible, and expendable technologies. This proliferation poses challenges, particularly regarding attribution and its implications for deterrence. Commanders at every level must find ways to counter this air threat and thwart adversarial reconnaissance within their operational environments. Small UASs come in various sizes and capabilities, and military police will likely encounter them in all Army operations. These systems are difficult to detect as they move across the battlefield, making them a preferred method for executing tactical-level strikes. While not every hostile air threat necessitates engagement by air defense measures from air and missile defense units, there remains a critical need to detect, identify, and prepare to defeat all classes of UASs.

4-125. Passive air defense, combined arms for air defense, and training for counterreconnaissance tasks should be essential components of C-UAS practices of units. Military police should develop and refine C-UAS planning tailored to the expected threat environment. They must plan and execute operations as an integrated combined arms team, utilizing all available passive air defense techniques when active air defense is limited or unavailable. IPOE provides commanders and their staffs specific information about known enemy locations, tactics, and capabilities. Military police should operate under the assumption that they are being observed by the enemy and should not assume they are protected by air and missile defense units.

4-126. For any mission, adversary, and environment, military police must reduce its signature. While it is possible to reduce their signature, it will never completely mask it. Battle positions, patrol bases, and operating bases should be small, dispersed, well-camouflaged, and temporary. For more information on threats and C-UAS operations, see ATP 3-01.81.

TECHNIQUES FOR CONDUCTING COUNTER-UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

4-127. The use of air guard techniques enhances security operations. An air guard helps mitigate the threat posed by UASs, which can conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations and carry out attacks on friendly forces. Air guards must remain vigilant and watch the horizon while employing search and scan techniques to detect approaching threat UAVs. They are responsible for monitoring their assigned sectors to identify potential launch points and patterns of UAV activity. Early warning is crucial for air guards, as they are responsible for alerting their formation of potential air threats. When reporting UAS activity, air guards should provide an estimated location of the threat based on their position. They need to convey details such as the approximate distance, time, duration, size, estimated elevation, and direction the

UAV was headed at the time of detection. A standard reporting format. For an example of this reporting format should be used to report a threat UAS, see table 4-2.

Table 4-2 Counter-unmanned aircraft systems reporting format, example

Line	*Information Example*	*Example*
1	Unit call sign and frequency	Red 1, FHXXX
2	Unit location	NV1234598765
3	Location of threat unmanned aircraft system (UAS)	NV1234598765, headed northeast
4	Time threat UAS asset spotted or detected	DTG: 252355ZDEC23
5	Estimated time on site	32 minutes
6	Flight characteristics	Flight pattern in figure 8 formation
7	Estimated size, elevation, and physical description	12-inch wingspan, 200 meters above ground level, gray with three red dots on side
Legend: DEC December DTG date-time group UAS unmanned aircraft system		

Passive Defense

4-128. Companies and platoons should be prepared to employ passive defense measures to protect themselves from detection, observation, and attack. These measures reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks using UAS. Damage-limiting and attack avoidance strategies are types of passive defense that help avoid detection by aerial threats and minimize damage if an attack occurs. Military police must exercise caution when using C-UAS passive measures. Commanders should choose advantageous positions that provide concealment for Soldiers, equipment, and unit activities. When planning damage-limiting and attack avoidance measures, commanders should consider the following passive defense tasks for their forces:

- Operate at night or during limited visibility. It is important to conduct operations at night or under limited visibility conditions. During these times, light restrictions should be practiced, and discipline must be maintained to enhance operational effectiveness.
- Disseminate early warnings of air threats. Providing early warnings of air threats down to the lowest echelons is crucial for countering UAS threats.
- Practice good operational security (OPSEC). OPSEC is a vital component of the planning process. Commanders and leaders must consistently enforce OPSEC measures within their units.
- Use emission control. Limit your electromagnetic and acoustic footprint by selectively and strategically using emitters. This optimizes command and control systems while protecting OPSEC.
- Utilize camouflage and concealment. Camouflage involves using natural or artificial materials to disguise personnel and equipment. Concealment focuses on reducing recognition factors. Techniques such as hiding, blending in, and disguising help achieve concealment.
- Employ decoys and deception. Use decoys to create false locations, use smoke to divert attention from operations, or employ emitters and emulators to confuse enemy reconnaissance. These tactics help conceal unit activities from enemy detection.
- Hardening. Use protective construction measures and overhead cover to limit potential damage to friendly forces and equipment. Hardening and fortifying cover reduces the ability of UASs to visually detect targets and limits the impact of aerial attacks.
- Use obscurants. Use optical and noise-reducing techniques to limit equipment glare and noise. Placing mud on headlights and using camouflage nets to obscure the glare of windshields prevents drawing attention to their position.
- Unit dispersion. Disperse assets strategically to minimize detection and damage in the event of an attack. The proper dispersion of units and equipment reduces target density, diminishing the potential impact of enemy ordnance.

- Find a concealed site. Conform to terrain by finding low dead ground and micro-terrain behind hills, tucked against the shadows of buildings, or under trees. In urban environments, move inside a building.
- Maintain vigilance. The company team must assume they are always vulnerable to enemy targeting attempts. This is especially true during troop movements, supply actions, traversing open areas, or concentrating at choke points.
- Establish an early warning network. Establish an air defense early warning network using radios and digital networks.

Active Defense

4-129. Commanders are responsible for taking all necessary actions to protect their forces and equipment from attacks while ensuring that their Soldiers operate according to established ROE. When Soldiers encounter groups 1 and 2 UAS, they should consider these as threats eligible for engagement unless they can be positively identified as nonthreatening. Active measures should include basic rules that aid in identifying and defeating threat UASs. For example, commanders should establish SOPs for disseminating weapon control status and hostile criteria. Additionally, commanders should consider training their forces on the following active measures:

- Define characteristics for threat UASs. Factors defining the characteristics of threat UASs are speed, altitude, location, and heading.
- Develop and transmit weapon control status. Weapon control status is a control measure designed to establish procedures for forces using surface-to-air weapons (including small arms weapons) to engage threats. Weapon control statuses can apply to weapon systems, volumes of airspace, or types of air platforms. This includes established restricted and engagement zones. Categories of weapons control status are:
  - Weapons-free. This indicates that weapons systems may fire at targets not positively identified as friendly. This is the least restrictive weapon control status.
  - Weapons-tight. This indicates that weapons systems may only fire at targets identified as hostile according to the current ROE.
  - Weapons-hold. This indicates that weapons systems may only fire in self-defense or in response to a formal order. This is the most restrictive weapon control status.
- Use air guard. Designate air guards for every vehicle and position to establish 360-degree security.
  - React to threat UAVs by determining distance and bearing to the threat and take pictures if possible.
  - Immediately report sightings of threat UASs using the SALUTE report as prescribed by ATP 3-01.81, table 3-1.
  - If the position and personnel of the air guards become threatened, respond according to the established unit SOP, which could include moving to alternate positions, engaging the threat UAV with small arms using combined arms for air defense firing techniques, and requesting engagement support with air and missile defense weapon systems and aviation assets.

LOGISTICS SECURITY SUPPORT

4-130. LOGSEC supports the integrity of the logistics system by preventing, identifying, and investigating criminal acts carried out by terrorists, criminal elements, or insider threats. These threats can range from actions involving the logistics provider of the United States Army to the military forces on the ground. LOGSEC addresses criminal or terrorist activities aimed at diverting, stealing, destroying, substituting inferior products, or sabotaging supplies meant for the U.S. military. Additionally, it focuses on protecting the transportation infrastructure and conveyances under the control of the United States Army from damage or destruction. The LOGSEC mission is the responsibility of all CID field elements, and each level of CID should be actively involved as needed to provide cohesive and effective support to the Army. This support enhances combat readiness, safety, and security, serving as a combat force multiplier. When CID is absent, military police may initiate LOGSEC support for commanders at echelon until CID personnel arrive in the theater and establish command and support relationships.

4-131. LOGSEC encompasses the security of the entire logistics system, from the acquisition of materials (procurement fraud operations are under the investigative purview of CID through all modes of the transportation network and storage sites; retrograde cargo through the transportation system; and reutilization, disposal, or demilitarization operations. Supply diversion is normally encountered during in-transit movement of supplies or cargo and would fall to the investigative purview of the mainstream CID forces.

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO LOGISTICS SECURITY

4-132. Criminal investigators, as required and assigned, provide investigative support and criminal intelligence on the battlefield to each echelon of command, from battalion to echelons above corps. CID will assess the threats, capabilities, and intentions of criminal and terrorist elements. Additionally, CID assist the supported command in taking actions to eliminate these threats or minimize their impact.

4-133. The CID LOGSEC mission is critical for accomplishing the combat mission of the Army. LOGSEC ensures the integrity of the logistics pipeline, which runs from the manufacturer to the individual combat Soldier. It involves preventing, detecting, and investigating criminal and terrorist activities related to HN or allied personnel and U.S. personnel. Operations that support the CID LOGSEC mission prevent, detect, and investigate criminal interference in the logistics pipeline that could negatively impact the combat readiness and effectiveness of the Army. This is achieved by—

- Enhancing the readiness of the force.
- Increasing the effectiveness of CID LOGSEC-related activities.
- Raising awareness of LOGSEC and the role of CID in improving the combat readiness of the Army.

4-134. Regardless of the port type, the principles of LOGSEC remain consistent, though the specifics change. A successful LOGSEC program at a port relies on a three-pronged approach aimed at enhancing the security of military property during its transit from the port of embarkation to the port of debarkation and to its final destination. This approach includes—

- Implementation of proactive crime prevention measures designed to eliminate crime-conducive conditions within the staging areas of the port of embarkation and the port of debarkation.
- Surveillance and visual inspection of the cargo and loading and unloading procedures.
- LOGSEC awareness briefings for supercargo personnel accompanying cargo shipments.

4-135. Shipping major end items such as tanks, trucks, and weapon systems poses a significant LOGSEC challenge to CID. Unlike containers, these items must remain fully accessible to port personnel during the loading and discharging processes.

4-136. Major end items are identified, accounted for, and processed by military terminals in the same way as containers. This cargo is controlled by the logistics application of automated marking and reading symbols (LOGMARS). With the logistics application of automated marking and reading symbols label, the cargo is scanned when it arrives at staging areas, scanned again when it leaves, and then scanned again for manifesting onto its designated vessel. During discharge, this process is reversed. However, frequent problems arise in accountability due to inaccurate scanning or the loss or absence of logistics application of automated marking and reading symbols labels. Major end items are often reported missing when they are not clearly indicated on the manifest of the final ship. In many cases, it becomes frustrated cargo.

4-137. Secondary, or nested cargo, is not controlled by logistics application of automated marking and reading symbols and is not listed on the ship manifest. In many cases, this cargo is readily accessible to criminal elements. Determining the exact circumstances surrounding the loss of such cargo is nearly impossible. Historically, in their eagerness to move supplies and equipment, deploying units have often overlooked established security procedures. To prevent losses, it is essential to implement strong security measures and conduct proactive threat assessments at the embarkation and debarkation seaports.

4-138. Previously referred to as frustrated cargo, astray cargo can become a source of frustration. Unidentified cargo will eventually be placed in the astray cargo area. Frequently, reports of lost, missing, or stolen cargo can be resolved by checking this area. Careful examination should be made of the frustrated cargo procedures. Lack of security and inexperienced personnel can result in cargo being stolen, diverted, or reissued without accountability.

4-139. Immediately following the departure of a loaded vessel, a criminal information report will be prepared in message format and forwarded to the CID activities responsible for the seaport of debarkation and the final destination of the cargo. A criminal information report should contain the following information:

- Date of departure.
- Cargo identification and inventory.
- Intermediate stops.
- Identity of supercargo personnel.
- Identify of LOGSEC issues.
- Estimated time of arrival at the seaport of debarkation.

PHASES OF LOGISTICS SECURITY

4-140. In the acquisition management phase, the investigative efforts focus on supporting user activities, whether from the end users or the acquisition program manager. This investigative support spans from concept development and exploration to research and development, engineering, manufacturing, and the delivery and acceptance process by the United States government (USG). Major procurement fraud units normally engage this segment of LOGSEC.

4-141. The materiel distribution phase is the most fluid aspect of the logistics pipeline and the most vulnerable to criminal activity. This phase involves the movement of materiel through various modes of transportation, including land, rail, air, and sea; and material storage and warehousing activities at depots. (For more detailed information on intermodal and rail center operations, see ATP 4-13 and ATP 4-14.) Depots are responsible for releasing materiel to supply activities or deploying units. Vulnerabilities in materiel are most apparent at locations where there are changes in transportation modes, commonly known as transportation nodes. During the distribution phase of LOGSEC operations, CID field elements assist in investigating supply diversion. Field CID elements routinely conduct these investigations as assets progress through the logistics pipeline.

4-142. Proactive investigative efforts conducted during the materiel distribution phase of LOGSEC include LOGSEC awareness briefings and threat assessment support for commanders and their unit movement control officers during deployment or redeployment. These efforts help identify and update estimates of criminal activity threats, assess risks along transportation routes, and evaluate the potential for economic crimes at transportation facilities, storage locations, and military installations. Additionally, LOGSEC threat assessments support operations at major transportation nodes and conduct vulnerability assessments at ports of debarkation and embarkation.

4-143. The materiel management phase of LOGSEC should concentrate on ensuring the security of materiel after it is delivered from depots or ports to intermediate supply activities, installations, or forward-deployed operating bases. At an installation, investigative support is provided to accountable officers at supply support activities. This investigative support must be provided to forward-deployed operating bases where materiel is warehoused before it is issued to the user.

4-144. LOGSEC performed during deployment is typically joint in nature, as CCDRs face a variety of missions. A forward-deployed LOGSEC mission should begin by establishing effective liaison with all interested organizations. This collaboration allows for a more thorough analysis of the mission. The analysis should consider the investigative resources of other military criminal investigative organizations, and the responsibilities, requirements, and capabilities of each agency and branch of Service. Because of their specific focus areas, some Services may have LOGSEC capabilities that are better suited for a specific mission than another Service.

THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS

4-145. CID and PM staffs provide police information and conduct intelligence analysis for commanders to identify potential crime indicators and criminal threats against Army property, facilities, or personnel. CID elements collect, consolidate, analyze, and disseminate criminal intelligence and terrorist counteraction operations aimed at U.S. and allied interests and activities on the battlefield.

4-146. The CID LOGSEC effort focuses on proactively preventing, detecting, and investigating criminal activities that lead to logistics and sustainment materiel loss or malfunction. The threat assessment process consists of the following four steps:

- Step 1. Identify the threat.
- Step 2. Identify targets vulnerable to the threat.
- Step 3. Prioritize identified targets.
- Step 4. Develop proactive plans of action.

4-147. To implement an effective LOGSEC program, CID field activities should be added to the distribution list for installation activities that receive reports related to the supported commander's logistics posture. These reports may be internal or external to the installation and can be prepared by one or more of the following:

- Army Audit Agency.
- Defense Contract Audit Agency.
- Office of Workers' Compensation Programs.
- Defense Finance and Accounting Services.
- Government, DOD, and contracting organizations for military Services.
- Government Accounting Office.
- Internal Review and Compliance Office.
- Directorate of Logistics.
- Movement control team.
- Theater Movement Control Agency.

4-148. Reviewing and analyzing audit reports and coordinating with the relevant preparation activities can provide a clear overview of specific logistics operations at the installation. Reports generated by other agencies can highlight particular issues that may negatively impact the combat capabilities of the Army. These reports cover a broad range of topics, including logistics systems and their use in support of combat operations. Other agencies preparing such reports may include the—

- Department of the Army Inspector General.
- Department of the Defense Inspector General.
- Installation inspector general.
- Logistics Control Activity. Upon request, this activity can provide the ordering history of a specific class of supply or item, along with details about the required activity, through the Logistics Information File. This file can be accessed by computer modem.
- Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange. This information is also accessible by computer modem.

4-149. Reports on logistics systems are initiated based on either a cyclic requirement or as needed. These reports can be obtained from either the Department of Logistics Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics or the accountable supply office and include the following:

- Unit status reports. These reports provide the status of Soldiers and their materials by unit.
- Material release denials.
- Report of discrepancies.
- Discrepancy in shipment reports.
- Quality deficiency reports.
- Inventory adjustment reports.
- Reports of survey.
- Sample data collection reports.

4-150. Unit commanders generate reports such as AR 15-6 investigations and statements of charges. These reports are typically initiated when property is destroyed or lost or when accountability for an item has been lost. This can occur at the installation level, within the unit, or for an individual Soldier.

4-151. Additional sources of information regarding the local criminal threat include local police, HN police, MI, and counterintelligence. Informants and sources used by the CID drug suppression team can also be leveraged to gather intelligence on economic crimes and LOGSEC issues. It is common for both drug users and dealers to trade or steal government property to support their activities.

DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE

4-152. The development of criminal intelligence at the operational level in support of LOGSEC must be directed at assessing the criminal threat of the adversary, whether it is an enemy military unit, terrorist elements, the HN, allied personnel, or U.S. personnel. The focus on the development of operational-level intelligence is broad and includes the following factors:

- Political.
- Economic.
- Sociological.
- Technological.
- Opportunity.

4-153. These factors can significantly influence the nature of threats at the operational level. Developing this type of intelligence requires access to information not typically developed or obtained by CID. To assist in the development of operational-level intelligence, whether in a peacetime or combat environment, the military police and special agent should—

- Assess the situation and identify the threats.
- Identify targets that may be vulnerable to these threats.
- Analyze and convert information into usable criminal intelligence.
- Target activities based on the gathered criminal intelligence.
- Identify, investigate, or deter and prevent criminal activities.
- Recognize conditions or procedures conducive to criminal activity.
- Minimize or eliminate opportunities for criminal offenses or criminal activity.
- Understand the criminal environment.

4-154. The engagement of police and the subsequent collection of information remains a primary focus for military police. PIO is vital for proper situational understanding, given the linkage to criminal, terrorist, and insurgent threats. However, some police intelligence may not be shared with the intelligence community due to intelligence oversight regulations and procedures regarding collecting information on U.S. citizens, U.S. corporations, and non-U.S. citizen residents. For more information, see ATP 3-39.20 and DODM 5240.01.

4-155. Initial collected information may indicate potential problems, such as product substitution, supply diversion, or other criminal activities. This information can arise from a commander's situation or after-action report, which may highlight issues such as shortages of fuel, spare parts, ammunition, or other critical items that delayed or prevented mission completion. This information should be disseminated by the most expeditious means available to the widest audience possible to assist in the further development of the information, even if it may still be fragmented, incomplete, or cryptic. Over-classification can limit the use of this information and should be avoided.

4-156. Agents assigned to support combat operations are responsible for identifying conditions and indicators that may suggest criminal activity. Follow-up investigative work involving fragmentary information and occurring outside the area of combat operations will be conducted by CID in the continental United States or at the location where the crime occurred. Threat assessment instruments used within this arena include the following:

- A LOGSEC threat assessment**.** This assessment—
  - Is a crime prevention survey of a logistics activity.
  - Is performed in the same manner as a crime prevention survey.
  - Reports findings and observations.
  - Provides recommendations.
  - Is initiated by CID or can be requested by commanders.
- A criminal activity threat assessment**.** This assessment—
  - Is performed separately from all other reports.
  - May be incorporated into a LOGSEC threat assessment or a port vulnerability assessment.
  - Reports on specific criminal threats to a specific installation or activity.
  - Identifies crime trends and threats.
  - Requires collection and correlation of information collected from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

- A port vulnerability assessment. This assessment—
  - Is a crime prevention survey of a sea or aerial port of debarkation or port of embarkation.
  - Is performed the same as a LOGSEC threat assessment.
  - Is formatted as prescribed by headquarters.
  - Incorporates information from the criminal activity threat assessment into the body of the report.

4-157. These assessments help identify areas of potential criminal vulnerability associated with the logistical flow of supplies leaving wholesale activity and being delivered to the most forward-deployed units. All traveled routes and stops should be evaluated, with an emphasis on the security and safety of the following:

- Depots and supply nodes.
- Airports, railheads and terminals, and seaports.
- Air, land, and water transportation nodes.

COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES

4-158. A multitude of federal, state, and local government agencies and activities oversee the ports, waterways, railroad infrastructure, highways, and other transportation facilities used by the military. Additionally, several DOD and Army commands conduct assessments of transportation infrastructure vulnerability and physical security. This includes port-integrated vulnerability assessments done by the U.S. Navy and the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports. Other agencies, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, perform balanced survivability assessments, while high-quality joint staff integrated vulnerability assessments are conducted by the Joint Staff (J-34/Combating Terrorism) of the DOD. The U.S. Coast Guard has an Office of Investigations and Analysis that is a valuable resource for conducting LOGSEC assessments. The Area Maritime Security lead, done by the U.S. Coast Guard captain of the port, can be another good resource when conducting LOGSEC assessments. Additional resources for conducting LOGSEC assessments include open sources such as the American Association of Port Authorities, the National Waterways Conference, the American Waterways Operators, the Center for Ports and Waterways of the Texas Transportation Institute, and international organizations like the International Maritime Organization. Other relevant U.S. agencies include the Department of Transportation, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Interior, the Maritime Administration, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the Transportation Security Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency.

4-159. Past assessments provide valuable guidance on the expertise needed to assemble a team of specialists for conducting a LOGSEC assessment. Previous assessment teams have included experts in counterterrorism, structural engineering, emergency operations, information operations, security operations, utility operations, communications, and mission operations. Since the onset of the Global War on Terrorism, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, leading a joint terrorism TF, has collected intelligence on a wide range of potential terrorist activities and targets. When CID receives a request for LOGSEC support from a senior Army commander, and the scope of the mission is defined, CID field elements may discover that much of the necessary groundwork has already been completed by one or more of the aforementioned agencies. Therefore, coordination with other agencies involved in transportation security is imperative.

4-160. LOGSEC support to military commanders includes logistics-related crime prevention efforts, LOGSEC awareness briefings, and criminal activity threat assessments. These operations aim to enhance the accountability, security, and visibility of the Army concerning materiel, personnel, and data within the logistics pipeline. This term refers to the entire process of acquiring, producing, transporting, and maintaining military assets. It encompasses acquisition management, materiel distribution, materiel management, and property disposal.

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Chapter 5
Support to Populace and Resources Control

PRC is conducted in conjunction with and as an integral part of all military operations. PRC consists of two distinct yet linked components: populace control and resources control. Typically, these components are managed by local civil governments. The appropriate authorities define, implement, and enforce PRC measures in civil or military emergencies. For practical and security reasons, military forces apply PRC measures throughout military operations. Military police play a key role in supporting PRC, primarily focusing on reducing CIV interference with military activities. However, ensuring the safety of DCs is also a crucial part of the military police mission. Many activities associated with mobility operations (chapter 3) and security operations (chapter 4) are also relevant to providing military police support to PRC. Whether dealing with uncontrolled CIV movements within the operational environment or illegal activities by certain sectors of the population (which can disrupt resource control), military police must understand and integrate PRC measures in both the planning and execution of operations.

POPULACE CONTROL

5-1. Populace control provides security for the indigenous populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy access to the population, and identifies and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. This involves establishing public order and safety, securing borders, protecting population centers and individuals, holding people accountable for criminal activities, managing the actions of individuals or groups that may pose security risks, reestablishing essential civil services, and creating conditions in the operational area that support stability through unity of effort. Populace control may become necessary due to military operations, man-made disasters, or natural disasters.

5-2. International law requires that military forces focus on essential tasks that create a safe and secure environment while addressing the immediate humanitarian needs of the local population. Measures for controlling the populace can include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and CIV resettlements. The decision on which populace control measures to implement requires a framework that can be applied across the spectrum of military operations, ranging from stable peace to general warfare. Two special categories of populace control—DC operations and NEO—require extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR POPULACE CONTROL

5-3. Populace control is typically the responsibility of HN CIV governments. U.S. forces may take on populace control when HN CIV authorities or agencies are unable or unwilling to control the CIV population. Populace control and resources control are escalated during CIV or military emergencies. In a permissive environment, U.S. forces carry out populace control measures with the consent of the local government. In a hostile environment, these measures are implemented according to international law and the laws of war.

5-4. Population control typically requires integrated and synchronized CMO as an inherent command responsibility. These operations involve the activities undertaken by commanders to establish and maintain relationships with civil authorities, the general population, and other organizations. The assistant chief of staff, CA operations (G-9), or the battalion or brigade CA operations staff officer (S-9) serves as the primary staff integrator for CMO. The G-9 or S-9 is responsible for developing plans that use U.S. and multinational forces, along with all available NGOs and resources, to enhance CMO efforts. Given the potential impact on the CIV population and the movement of HN assets and personnel, CA forces are responsible for planning support for PRC.

5-5. The G-9 or S-9 enhances the relationship between military forces, CIV authorities, and personnel in the AO to ensure mission success. The responsibilities and functions of the G-9 or S-9 can vary depending on the operational echelon. Military police units may be deployed to support CMO globally, and those involved

in CMO must be briefed and understand the intent of these operations. The function of PIO (see ATP 3-39.20) is a significant enabler during CMO, as is the proper treatment of all categories of detainees and DCs. Maintaining an appropriate mindset and good situational awareness is critical. U.S. Armed Forces may be tasked with alleviating human suffering, such as following a natural disaster. Appropriate disciplinary measures and controls are enacted to meet each situation in these situations.

SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS

5-6. PRC involves coordinating and synchronizing activities among multiple CIV agencies and military organizations, with significant participation from military police. The organizations supporting PRC include a wide range of military and nonmilitary participants with divergent missions. The agencies involved in PRC typically come from the joint community, interagency organizations, NGOs, international organizations, and HN or multinational entities.

5-7. Because there are typically many different organizations involved, achieving a unified effort is critical to avoiding duplication of effort. Effective unified action relies on close coordination, liaison, and a common purpose for mission success. For more information on supporting organizations, see ATP 3-57.10.

GENERAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

5-8. The specific planning focus of PRC may vary at different levels of command. It will depend on the type and nature of the operation and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. All commands and national and international agencies involved must have clearly defined responsibilities. When planning and executing PRC, consider the following actions:

- Coordinate with the Department of State (DOS), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and HN civil and military authorities to identify the appropriate levels and types of aid required and available.
- Minimize outside contributions by providing only basic needs items until DCs become self-sufficient and encourage them to achieve as much independence as possible.
- Review the effectiveness of humanitarian responses regularly and adjust relief activities as necessary.
- Coordinate with CA units to ensure collaboration with the United States, HN, and international organizations such as the United Nations Children's Fund and the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere. Receiving assistance from these organizations leverages their experience and reduces the demands on U.S. Armed Forces.
- Implement security restrictions as necessary for DCs. Although DCs have the right to freedom of movement under international law, security considerations may require restrictions in the event of a mass influx of DCs.

5-9. The planning scope for PRC often differs from the actual task execution, depending on the command level. This variation also depends on the type and nature of the operation and other relevant aspects in the operational environment. Military police must have a basic understanding of the planning CA units conduct for PRC.

5-10. The theater commander issues directives regarding the care, control, and management of DCs based on national policy directives and other political efforts. These directives include general guidance on mitigating the challenges DCs pose. Potential ways for mitigating the DC situation include preventing dislocations (for example, implementing a stay-put policy), avoiding situations that cause dislocations, controlling the movement of DCs, or employing a combination of these approaches. The PRC operations plan—

- Includes procedures for migration and evacuation.
- Establishes minimum standards for care.
- Provides definitions regarding the status and management of DCs.
- Establishes designated routes and movement control measures.
- Considers cultural and dietary needs.
- Includes information on the plans, routes, and areas of concentration related to DCs that all concerned staff elements need.
- Provides measures to alleviate suffering.

- Establishes protocols for enforcing order and discipline within facilities to ensure the security and safety of both DCs and military personnel.
- Provides an aggressive information program utilizing support agencies and leadership from the DC community.

5-11. PRC measures may require large groups of CIVs to be temporarily quartered for less than six months or semipermanently for more than six months. Military police may be assigned to establish, manage, and operate DC camps in close coordination with CA forces, HN agencies, USG agencies, psychological operations units, NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, and other interested entities. A military police unit commander may be designated as the commander of the DC camp. For more information, see appendix B.

RULE OF LAW

5-12. Planning for the follow-on phase after major combat operations should begin during the early stages of war planning. Efforts to transition to the rule of law must commence as soon as stability tasks are underway, often occurring simultaneously with major combat operations. First, it is essential to establish security conditions and initiate political conditions that support policing and judicial and corrections systems, ensuring fair and equitable treatment of citizens by the HN government. Achieving this can be challenging, as many nations lack the foundational elements necessary for the rule of law and may need coaching, mentoring, training, and ongoing support to move toward a peaceful existence. Additionally, if combat operations do not focus on shaping the area for stability, organized crime groups, insurgents, and violent extremist organizations may attempt to control the population and the emerging government, making efforts to establish the rule of law significantly more difficult. Citizens must have the right to ownership, fair treatment by policing and judicial systems, and corrections systems that enforce compliance with the law equitably and uniformly. Military police forces are particularly well-suited to provide assistance and training to the HN, focusing primarily on two of the three legs of the rule of law—the policing and corrections aspects.

5-13. Military police units should establish relationships with HN police and local officials in the operational area as early as possible in the operation. This proactive approach will enhance efficiency during the transition period. Building these relationships will also provide valuable police intelligence, which will help the unit plan and recommend COA to establish the rule of law.

5-14. Whether in a transitional military authority role or supporting a legitimate HN government, military police support the PRC plan to mitigate the impact of criminal activity through resources control measures. These actions may include—

- Securing critical commodity stocks from theft or pillage.
- Supporting border security and customs enforcement.
- Identifying and mitigating black market activities dealing in critical commodities.
- Protecting stockpiles of natural resources.

5-15. Military police support for transitioning to the rule of law may include—

- Assisting in establishing and training local police officers in basic and advanced law enforcement skills and in the operation of police stations.
- Aiding in developing requests for necessary law enforcement equipment and sustainment items for local law enforcement agencies.
- Conducting joint patrols.
- Operating police stations.
- Mentoring HN personnel until they are capable of independent operations.

5-16. Military police detention units can aid in establishing correctional operations in a reopened or temporary facility. They can also train the guard forces and prison operations staff to run a facility effectively.

5-17. All these activities build confidence in the local population that law-abiding citizens will be treated fairly and equitably and that laws will be applied equally and uniformly to everyone. Citizens need assurance that they will not be unlawfully detained or imprisoned. They must also be confident that unlawful activities others commit will be policed and punished.

5-18. The rule of law cannot flourish or be maintained in crime-ridden environments where citizens fear for their safety due to criminal activity. Resources control measures specifically targeted to deter criminal activity contribute toward building the trust and confidence of the local populace while strengthening the legitimacy of the HN government or provisional authority. For more information on the rule of law, see ATP 3-39.10.

RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE

5-19. Rules for the use of force (RUF) used in PRC vary depending on the operation. The CCDR establishes RUF in coordination with the staff judge advocate and with approval from the joint staff. They also approve special RUF created for use in resettlement facilities. The RUF is designed to adapt to changing circumstances, ensuring the protection and safety of the DC population and U.S. military personnel. RUF should remain simple and understandable so that Soldiers are not confused and do not have to memorize extensive checklists. Standing RUF applies to 10 USC military police conducting operations in the United States and its territories unless there is specific additional guidance from the SecDef. After consulting with their servicing judge advocate, commanders may also submit requests for supplemental RUF for approval by the SecDef.

5-20. The RUF can authorize nonlethal measures at any time during an operation to protect Soldiers and DCs from injury. Nonlethal weapons may include items such as riot batons, pepper spray, stun guns, and shotguns loaded with nonlethal munitions. For any operation that employs nonlethal weapons to succeed, extensive preparation is essential, with individual and unit training vital. Training should be designed to give individuals an understanding of the entire subject area and enable them to function efficiently as members of a unit or independently. To achieve this, the training must be intensive and realistic. Familiarity with nonlethal weapon capabilities is critical to ensure that personnel can deploy these tools with confidence and proficiency. The RUF may allow less-than-lethal force to protect mission-essential equipment from damage or destruction. Mission-essential equipment includes tactical and nontactical vehicles, communications equipment, weapons, computers, and office and personal items.

RULES OF INTERACTION

5-21. The rules of interaction serve as a guideline for Soldiers when interacting with CIV populations. Rules of interaction include—

- Treating all evacuees humanely and with respect.
- Avoiding discussions of politics and policies with DCs.
- Avoiding promises. If pressed, respond with, "I will see what I can do."
- Refraining from making obscene gestures, as DCs may understand their meaning.
- Avoiding derogatory remarks, as DCs may comprehend English, and local linguists certainly do.
- Treating all DCs equally, as some may feel offended if they do not receive the same treatment or resources as others.
- Respecting religious articles and materials.
- Treating medical issues seriously and maintaining a professional relationship.
- Greeting DCs in their native language.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN OPERATIONS

5-22. *Dislocated civilian*, or DC, is a broad term primarily used by the DOD that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person (JP 3-29). Legal and political factors define the categories of DCs. These individuals leave or are forced to leave their homes or usual places of residence due to several reasons, including fear of persecution, armed conflict, widespread violence, violations of human rights, natural disasters, man-made disasters, or economic hardship. The categories of DCs include:

- **Displaced person**. *Displaced person* is a broad term used to refer to internally and externally displaced persons collectively (JP 3-29).
- **Refugee**. A refugee is a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of their nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country (see JP 3-29).

- **Evacuee**. An *evacuee* is a civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation (JP 3-57).
- **Stateless person**. A *stateless person* is a person who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law (JP 3-29).
- **War victim**. This is a classification created during the Vietnam era to describe CIVs suffering injuries, loss of a Family member, or damage to or destruction of their homes because of war. War victims may be eligible for a claim against the United States under the Foreign Claims Act.
- **Migrants**. A *migrant* is a person who belongs to a normally migratory culture who may cross national boundaries or has fled their native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution (JP 3-29).
- **Internally displaced persons**. An *internally displaced person* is any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters and who has not crossed an internationally recognized state border (JP 3-29).
- **Returnee**. A *returnee* is a displaced person who has returned voluntarily to his or her former place of residence (JP 3-29).
- **Resettled person**. A *resettled person* is a refugee or an internally displaced person wishing to return somewhere other than his or her previous home or land within the country or area of original displacement (JP 3-29).

5-23. The goals of DC operations are to protect CIVs from the effects of violence or disasters and to reduce CIV interference with military operations. These activities typically include controlling the movement of CIVs (see chapter 3). DC activities are carried out throughout Army operations but are most commonly conducted in support of stability operations and DSCA. The authority to approve these operations within U.S. territories lies with the SecDef and may require a special exception to the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385). The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits 10 USC (federal status) U.S. military from enforcing CIV laws within the United States or its territories without specific authorization.

5-24. The U.S. Constitution, along with federal, state, and local laws, can significantly influence operations within the United States and its territories if enforcement of CIV law is required. Using 10 USC U.S. military forces for law enforcement tasks in these situations requires authorization from Congress, such as under the Insurrection Statutes (10 USC 331-334), or a Constitutional authorization, like the President invoking his Executive Authority under Article 2 of the Constitution. The Posse Comitatus Act does not restrict National Guard Soldiers operating in a nonfederal status (32 USC or state active-duty status). For further information, see ADP 3-28 and JP 3-28.

5-25. Planning and conducting DC activities is a collective effort involving CA forces and military police, who coordinate with the supported command and other CIV organizations within the operational area. The United Nations, other international organizations, and NGOs provide basic assistance and services for the affected population. However, the U.S. military may be requested to offer support when necessary. This support can include establishing and operating DC camps; providing essential care such as food, medical treatment, and protection; and assisting with the movement or relocation of DCs. Military police units are particularly well-suited for this mission because many skills required for effective DC camps overlap with those needed in policing and detention operations. These skills include enforcing curfews, implementing movement restrictions, managing travel permits and registration cards, establishing checkpoints, overseeing amnesty programs, and conducting inspections. Additional details about DC camps are discussed in appendix B.

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO DISLOCATED CIVILIAN OPERATIONS

5-26. The first objective of military police support for DC operations is to control the movement of DCs. This ensures that their presence does not obstruct military forces and protects them from avoidable hazards. Effective movement control is critical when managing large groups of DCs. Military police incorporate the movement of these CIVs into a comprehensive traffic control plan, which is developed in close coordination with movement control, CA planners, and other staff members. Additional tasks related to DC activities

(conducted within the framework of police operations) include enforcing curfews, restricting movements, issuing travel permits and registration cards, establishing checkpoints, implementing amnesty programs, and conducting inspections. While military police may provide limited support during the initial contact with DCs, efforts are focused on quickly moving them to designated HN-controlled sites where they can receive assistance.

5-27. When performing DC activities, the level of control is typically drastically different from that of the majority of those interned during detainee operations. In detainee operations, there is a high level of control and supervision due to significant and obvious security risks. However, in activities involving DCs, individuals are granted freedom of movement as long as it does not interfere with ongoing operations. While security risks are always present, measures must be implemented to manage these risks to an acceptable level. Counterinsurgency operations can influence DC activities and may blur the distinctions between DCs and detainee operations. For more detailed information on detainee operations, see FM 3-63.

5-28. The mitigation of casualties among CIVs is always a priority. Military police may use various techniques to achieve this goal while conducting activities supporting DCs or NEOs. A discussion on the rules of interaction, RUF, and the rule of law is included in the following discussion of NEOs. For more information on DC operations, please see ATP 3-57.10.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN SITUATION TEMPLATE


5-29. Military police planners consider several factors when creating a situation template for DC movements. Key considerations include the time and distance involved (such as the length of a DC column), the gaps between individual DCs and groups of DCs, traffic density (usually measured in DCs per kilometer), and the rate of march. Once these factors are established, they can be illustrated in a movement graph (a time-space diagram that visually represents DC movements within a specific area). This situation template is a foundation for planning and helps coordinate route usage within the movement control plan for operational forces. For more information, see ATP 3-57.10.

Dislocated Civilian Route Planning

5-30. Military police and those involved in planning consider several factors when developing movement routes (figure 5-1, page 103) for DCs:

- **Route selection**. When selecting routes for CIV movement, military police consider the types of transportation commonly used in the area. The PM typically coordinates the proposed traffic control plan with the movement control officer and the G-9 or S-9. All DC movements occur on designated CIV evacuation routes, which HN requirements may influence.
- **Route identification**. After designating movement routes, plans are made to ensure that these routes are marked in languages and symbols that CIVs and U.S. and multinational forces can understand. Psychological operations units; military police units; and other joint, multinational, and HN military forces can assist in marking the routes according to agreed-upon standards.
- **Control and assembly points**. Once the movement routes are selected and marked, control and assembly points are established at key intersections. These points are coordinated among military police, CA, transportation, and logistics planners and captured in the traffic control plan.
- **Emergency rest areas**. Emergency rest areas are set up at congested points to address immediate needs such as water, food, fuel, maintenance, and medical support.
- **Local and national agencies**. Collaborating with local and national agencies conserves military resources and minimizes the need for interpreters and translators. CIV authorities usually have the legal status necessary to effectively manage their people.
- **Routing fundamentals**. Planners use the following key principles when developing routes for DCs:
  - **Balance**. The characteristics of each route must align with the needs of the traffic it supports. This includes identifying the route maintenance and improvement requirements and implementing protective measures.
  - **Separation**. Adequate road space must be allocated to prevent conflicts and minimize the potential for congestion.
  - **Distribution**. The number of routes provided should be sufficient to meet demand and avoid congestion. Distributing traffic across multiple routes also enhances passive security.

- **Routing principles**. When creating routes for DCs, planners take the following principles into account:
  - Assign the highest-priority traffic to routes that minimize time and distance.
  - Consider the sustainability of the route network when assigning movements.
  - Separate motor vehicle movements from pedestrian movements.
  - Ensure that CIV traffic (both vehicular and pedestrian) is kept separate from military movements.



Legend:
DC dislocated civilian

Figure 5-1. Example of dislocated civilian route planning

Dislocated Civilian Movement Planning Factors

5-31. When creating a situation template for DC movements, planners must consider several variables or factors. These factors assume a controlled movement and apply to all types of DC movements, regardless of size. Planners evaluate the values of these variables based on logical assumptions until they can be confirmed through observation. For DCs moving in denied areas, it may be beneficial for planners to request support from UAS to gather accurate information. DC movement planning factors include—

- **Distance factors**:
  - **Dislocated civilian road space (DCRS).** Used in determining time length of the column.

Note. DCRS consists of two parts: (1) the space occupied by one DC alone and distance between another DC, and (2) the sum of the distance between elements of a number of DC foot columns. (Total DCRS = road space [individual DC] + DCRS column distances.)

  - **DC column gap.** The space between two organized DC elements following each other on the same route.

  - **DC traffic density.** The average number of DCs that occupy 1 kilometer—expressed in **DCs per kilometer** (DC/km).
  - **Length of DC column.** The length of roadway occupied by a column, including gaps, measured from front to rear inclusive.
  - **Road gap.** The distance between two DC march elements.
- **Rate factors:**
  - **Speed.** The actual rate of speed at a given moment.
  - **Pace.** The regulated speed of a DC column or element set by the column.
  - **Rate of march.** The average number of kilometers traveled in any given period of time, including short delays or periodic halts—expressed in kilometers per hour (km/h).
- **Time factors** (must be adjusted for demographic of column, health, and weather conditions):
  - **Arrival time.** The time when the head of the DC column arrives at a designated point.
  - **Clearance time.** The time when the last of a DC column passes a designated point.
  - **Completion time.** The time when the last element of a DC column passes a designated point.
  - **Extra time allowance**. Time added, based on assessment of situation, to the pass time.
  - **Pass time.** Actual time required for a DC column, from the first to the last element, to pass a given point.
  - **Road clearance time.** The total time a DC column requires to travel over and clear a section of road.
  - **Time distance.** The time required to move from one point to another at a given rate of march.
  - **Time gap.** Time measured between rear and front of successive DC columns as they move past any given point.
- **Formulas**:
  - Distance = Rate x Time.
  - Distance/Time = Rate.
  - Distance/Rate = Time.
  - **EXAMPLE**: Determine Time distance of a DC column moving on foot traveling 20 kilometers at a rate of 4 km/h. Answer: Time distance = 20 km ÷ 4 km/h = 5 hours.

Note. An additional time allowance of 3 hours has been added based on the assessment of the demographic composition of the DC column, which includes women, children, and the elderly, and current weather conditions. The head of the DC column is expected to reach the completion point in approximately 8 hours.

  - Completion Time = Start Point + Time Length (TL) + Scheduled Halts + Extra time allowance.
- Time Length, Foot Column (Rate Formula) (table 5-1), shows an example of individual space factors for day and night DC movement):
  - 0 km/h TL (min) = road space (meters) × .0150.
  - 3.2 km/h TL (min) = road space (meters) × .0187.
  - 2.4 km/h TL (min) = road space (meters) × .0250.
  - 1.6 km/h TL (min) = road space (meters) × .0375.

Note. The DC movement rate of 4 km/h during the day slows to 3.2 km/h at night. The cross-country DC movement rate of 2.4 km/h during the day slows to 1.6 km/h at night.


Table 5-1. Individual dislocated civilian road space factors

DC Movement	*Meters Per DC (Day)*	*Meters Per DC (Night)*
Formation	2	5
Single File	2.4	5.4
Column of Twos	1.2	2.7
Column of Fours	0.6	1.3
Legend: DC dislocated civilian		

Note: Distance between DCs during the day is 2 to 5 meters—50 meters between columns. Distance between DCs at night is 1 to 3 meters—25 meters between columns.

Dislocated Civilian Movement Graph

5-32. A DC movement graph (see figure 5-2) is a time-space diagram that visually represents the movement of DCs from the starting point to the completion point. This graph is used during the movement-planning phase to integrate and coordinate efforts, prevent congestion along the route, and deconflict route usage with the military highway regulation and traffic circulation plan. It is also used to prepare or check the DC road movement table. The graph illustrates the relative time and location of both the lead and trailing elements of each march column at any given point along the route and the arrival and clearance times of DC columns at critical points and restrictions or congestion in the network.



Legend:
DC dislocated civilian

Figure 5-2. Dislocated civilian movement graph

5-33. Planners directly transfer information from march formulas or DC march tables onto the graph. To complete the movement graph, they must determine the time-distance, arrival time, and pass time for each identified column based on data collected from organized DC columns.

Controlling Movement

5-34. Controlling movement is a common mission for military police. Military police may use techniques such as blocking, clearing, and collecting to control DC movement. These techniques depend on detailed planning and assessment.

Blocking

5-35. Roadblocks may be accompanied by checkpoints to prevent DCs from accessing roads or areas essential for military operations. The purpose of blocking is to stop these CIVs from entering these sensitive

locations and to redirect them to alternative areas, such as returning to their homes or along a designated DC route.

5-36. Depending on the security situation and other factors, CIVs and their means of transport may or may not be searched at the blocking position. The following questions must be considered when planning blocking operations:

- What is the expected timing, direction, route, rate, and flow of DCs? (This information is required to position forces where and when they are most needed.)
- Where is the terrain that canalizes DCs?
- Does the ability exist to reinforce a roadblock under pressure?
- Does the flexibility exist to disengage on order?

Clearing

5-37. Clearing involves directing DCs away from MSRs, ASRs, and other areas of military significance to prevent interference with operations. This process is carried out at the small-unit level by assigned Soldiers or specialized teams specifically tasked with confronting DCs. Their goal is to safely remove these individuals from their current location and guide them to the designated area determined by the commander, which may sometimes be the shoulder of the road.

5-38. Clearing is designed for fast-paced, unit-level operations and is ineffective for managing large-scale DC missions. It must be deliberately planned and integrated with other control techniques. The primary purpose of clearing is to channel or direct DCs away from military operations, installations, or encampments until better-organized DC activities, such as collecting, can manage them. Some of the challenges of clearing operations include the following:

- The clearing technique is temporary; units must continuously guide or redirect new or returning DCs.
- External support is often necessary to communicate the intended message in a manner that DCs can understand.
- DCs pose an ongoing security concern for friendly forces, including the threat of terrorist acts like car or suicide bombings.
- The resources of a unit can quickly become overwhelmed if the number of DCs is large or if they require emergency assistance.

Collecting

5-39. Collecting provides positive control over DCs in designated holding areas. This helps prevent interference with operations and facilitates their care and processing. The resource-intensive collection plan must be carefully coordinated and synchronized with operations, logistics, and security plans. Identifying DCs during collection may not always be necessary; this decision depends on guidance from higher headquarters, CA units, the HN, and other agencies. The need for identification can vary with each operation. Identification of DCs might be necessary for the following reasons:

- To verify rosters against the actual population.
- To provide timely reunification of Family members.
- To match DCs with their medical records in case of a medical emergency or evacuation.
- To check the identities of DCs against the transfer roster.
- To identify individuals sought by HN, multinational, or U.S. forces.

5-40. Existing HN facilities should be considered as collection points. Collecting must be planned and executed in collaboration with HN authorities, NGOs, and international governmental organizations specializing in public health, public safety, public communications, transportation, public works and utilities, and mass care and feeding. Its main features are:

- **Collection points**. These are temporary holding areas for gathering small numbers of DCs before they are moved to assembly areas or DC camps. Units establishing DC collection points should provide minimal emergency relief supplies to address immediate needs for a short duration (one day to three or four days). This may include items such as water and trauma first aid.

- **DC routes**. These routes protect DCs by diverting them from the main activities of military, logistics, or humanitarian assistance operations.
- **Emergency rest areas**. These designated locations along routes provide DCs immediate essentials such as water, food, and medical services.
- **Assembly areas**. These are larger and more organized than collection points. They offer DCs emergency relief, including food, medical support, and temporary shelter. Designated personnel, including military members and CIVs from interagency, HN, NGO, and international governmental partners, begin screening and registering DCs. This process helps identify Family groups, determine points of origin and intended destinations, and gather other pertinent information. Additionally, they start to separate enemy prisoners of war, hostile CIVs, and deserters. Assembly areas are typically in division security zones and may accommodate DCs for a week or longer. Authorities may decide to transfer DCs from assembly areas to camps so they can continue toward their intended destinations or return home. If necessary, assembly areas may evolve into DC camps.
- **DC camps**. These facilities, which can be temporary or semipermanent, support the effective and efficient provision of shelter and aid to DCs over an extended period. DC camps are discussed in appendix B.

TASK FORCE DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CONTROL

5-41. DC operations require significant manpower and a combined arms approach to achieve success. One effective technique for managing DCs in a tactical AO is to organize organic forces into a TF specifically designed for this mission, referred to as TF DC control. This TF has four imperatives:

- Implement an integrated system of control.
- Provide lifesaving and life-sustaining care, including access to water.
- Process CIVs to determine their identity and status and to collect military and civil-military information.
- Transition control operations in an orderly manner.

5-42. Generic TF DC consist of a combined arms team that integrates infantry with military police, psychological operations teams, and CA specialists or personnel trained in CA. These teams manage CIV populations using fundamental techniques such as blocking, clearing, and collecting. Table 5-2 illustrates the essential equipment these various teams require to perform their tasks effectively.

Table 5-2. Basic equipment of TF DC combined arms teams

Equipment	*Block/ Collect Team*	*Clear Team*
Vehicles	• Military police, infantry, or combat engineer vehicle, supplemented by vehicles obtained through HN support.	• Military police vehicle.
Control Materials	• Pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum) and heavy-duty foggers for mass dispersion. • Captor spray riot control agent with means of mass dispersion, such as M320. • Flash bangs, riot batons (riot gear), and other crowd control equipment. • Flex cuffs and cable ties.	• Pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum) and heavy-duty foggers for mass dispersion. • Captor spray riot control agent with means of mass dispersion, such as M320. • Flash bangs, riot batons (riot gear), and other crowd control equipment.
Care Materials	• Water and cups for thirst and riot control agent flushing. • Oral rehydration therapy mixes and ingredients. • Emergency medical kits. • Humanitarian rations (emergency only).	• Water and cups for thirst and riot control agent flushing. • Oral rehydration therapy mixes and ingredients. •
Local Security	• Lethal weapons (organic). • Hand-held metal detector. • Undercarriage inspection device (mirror).	• Lethal weapons (organic).
Barrier Materials	• Concertina wire and gloves.	N/A

Table 5-2. Basic equipment of TF DC combined arms teams (continued)

Equipment	*Block/ Collect Team*	*Clear Team*
Information	• Loudspeaker with approved tape-recorded messages; route signage.	• Loudspeaker with approved tape-recorded messages; route signage.
Legend: HN host nation		

5-43. The basic action element for clearing operations is the combined arms clearing team, which consists of one military police team equipped with their own vehicle and one military information support operations (MISO) team. TF DC control may adjust one or more combined arms teams based on the civil-military situation, specific tasks, terrain, and available assets. For example, this could involve using a military police squad rather than a military police team as the core component of all combined arms teams or augmenting the teams with combat engineers.

5-44. DC control may be enhanced by deploying five special-purpose ad hoc teams, each tailored to specific mission requirements, forming a combined arms team. Each team is designed to successfully carry out missions requiring specialized training or equipment. The five special-purpose teams are as follows:

- **Negotiation team**. The primary purpose of the negotiation team is to assist in high-stakes negotiations that have the potential to create or escalate unrest or may lead to highly negative public perceptions beyond the battlefield. The negotiations involve discussions with civil leaders but do not include hostage situations; hostage rescue and similar operations fall outside the scope of generic TF DC control. Instead, the objectives of the negotiation team are to manage the incident or issue in a way that prevents undue adverse influence on the populace, to resolve it peacefully whenever possible to protect CIV lives, and to ensure that the incident does not become a focal point for local or international news media.
- **Special reaction team (overwatch)**. The primary purpose of the special reaction team (overwatch) is to effectively and safely neutralize specific threats that may arise during blocking, clearing, and collecting operations. This team also supports the apprehension of troublemakers and ringleaders by assisting in their removal from a crowd. However, apprehending suspects in other contexts is beyond the scope of generic TF DC control.
- **Special reaction team (armored vehicles)**. The primary purpose of the special reaction team (armored vehicles) is to conduct show-of-force operations, particularly at roadblocks. They are responsible for protecting TF elements and CIVs in their care. Additionally, they assist the TF as needed, including executing apprehensions in crowd situations.
- **Medical care team**. The primary purpose of the medical care team is to respond swiftly to CIV mass casualty incidents. They begin the triage process and coordinate further medical responses with the surgeon and medical operations center of the parent unit or the equivalent. They provide medical care beyond basic emergency first aid, as needed by the TF.
- **Civil-military team**. The primary purpose of the civil-military team is to exploit the potential for military and civil-military information from CIVs encountered by the TF. This may involve biometric collection to assist with positive identification and vetting of DCs. Human intelligence collectors are trained explicitly in screening operations and are often fluent in the primary language of the AO, or they work with a translator. CA, human intelligence, and MISO forces create a strong collaborative effort within the TF and for higher headquarters.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN COMMUNICATION

5-45. Convincing people to follow a DC plan can be quite challenging. To assist in this process, HN public information programs and MISO assets can be invaluable. They can provide mass media broadcasts, use loudspeakers with prerecorded messages, create culturally appropriate signs, and distribute leaflets.

5-46. The following messages, prerecorded in the dominant language of the AO, are useful for controlling CIVs in tactical situations:

- Standard roadblock recording:
  - This is a roadblock.

  - For your safety, you will not be allowed to pass this point.
  - Return to your homes.
- Standard clearing recording:
  - Stay off the road or leave this area.
  - If you do not comply, you will be detained or arrested.
  - Return to your homes.
- Standard recording for a DC collection point:
  - This is a civilian collection point.
  - You will not be harmed.
  - Everyone will be searched. Vehicles will be searched and parked. Some belongings may be taken from you temporarily for the safety of everyone.
  - Water and emergency medical care will be provided to you after you have been searched.
  - If we take any of your belongings, you will receive a receipt. If any of your belongings for which you have a receipt are not returned to you, you will be compensated for them.

5-47. The following words should be printed in both English and the primary language of the AO on 3 x 5 cards. These cards can be used for point and talk by number. A well-prepared DC control site should also display the words in the same order on a large sign. The 10 words or phrases that every Soldier should be able to say in the dominant language of the AO are—

- Go.
- Stop.
- Hands up.
- Right.
- Left.
- Stand.
- Sit.
- Yes.
- No.
- Water.

Note. "Put down your weapon" and other phrases are also important, but "hands up" is a simpler way to express surrender, control, and related concepts

TECHNIQUES FOR DISLOCATED CIVILIAN COLLECTION POINTS

5-48. The quadrant method is a technique used to designate specific areas for managing noncombatants and other groups at hasty sites. In this method, each quadrant of a crossroads is assigned a specific purpose or group. For example, as seen in figure 5-3, West is designated as a CIV collection point; Northeast is designated for enemy prisoners of war or detainees; Southeast serves as a casualty collection point; and Southwest is designated as a multipurpose area for maintenance, supplies, and other purposes.




Figure 5-3. Designation of hasty control sites by quadrant

5-49. Each control point is positioned 50 to 100 meters from the roads to ensure that the groups remain sufficiently separated. This distance enhances the safety and security of each group, minimizes workforce requirements, and reduces the potential for terrorism by keeping people at a reasonable distance from passing troops. Prior training and basic supplies, such as water cans or bottles and large quantities of chemical light sticks, facilitate the operation of a hastily set up CIV collection point day and night.

5-50. When a hasty DC collection point is activated, designated personnel will convert the site into a deliberate DC collection point. Five key tasks must be completed at a deliberate DC collection point. These tasks are shown in figure 5-4 and are explained in detail in the following paragraphs.




Figure 5-4. Example layout of a dislocated civilian collection point

Local Security

5-51. The collection point should be located so that DCs will not suffer any greater exposure to the effects of combat than would exist for them away from the collection point. Local security measures must be implemented to protect the occupants, personnel operating the collection point, and friendly troops nearby or passing through the area. Guards should be stationed at both the entrance and exit of the collection point and given special orders, as required.

Physical Security Within the Collection Point—Vehicle Search and Dislocated Civilian Search

5-52. This task requires setting up special purpose areas within the collection point and following certain procedures—

- Ensure that all private cars, public vehicles, livestock, and carts are parked outside or on the outskirts of the collection point, specifically in the vehicle search area, until they have been searched. All passengers must dismount.
- Direct passengers to the DC search area.
- Make the driver remain with the vehicle until it is searched. Designated personnel will conduct the search. If an undercarriage observation device is available, it should be used during the search. Once

the search is complete, the driver and search personnel will jointly move the vehicle, livestock, or cart to the vehicle holding area.

5-53. Searchers treat livestock as vehicles and pets as livestock if this does not create more problems than it avoids. A searcher then escorts the driver to the DC search area. Designated personnel—

- Search DCs and their belongings for prohibited items.
- Vary search methods. A quick pat down is used for some people. A more invasive search is done for others. If a handheld metal detector is available, it should be used to expedite the searches. Property taken under the control of the searcher should be tagged, and a copy should be given to the owner. A field property control card and an explanation card should be used as necessary.
- Always use trained personnel to perform searches. If possible, female Soldiers are used to search females, infants, and little boys. If a female Soldier is not at the collection point but is close enough to get there in a reasonable time, these searches are deferred until she arrives. The unsearched people are held separately until then, so they do not pose a potential danger to others. If a female Soldier cannot be obtained, a trained male Soldier should do the search using the back of the hand technique if its use is not contrary to orders and if special security concerns require a search.
- Always use a searcher (unarmed) and an overwatcher (armed). They must be trained in these skills and work together.

Dislocated Civilian Processing and Property Control

5-54. The operation of a deliberate DC collection point may be postponed for some time, but it is not advisable to completely waive this process as a general practice. The processing of DCs consists of two stages. All individuals must go through stage one. Stage two can be delayed, reserved for specific individuals, or may not occur at all.

Stage One Processing

5-55. This is the quick screen to identify enemy prisoners of war, CIV internees, and detainees who need to be immediately segregated from the rest of the group. This initial processing can be conducted without the assistance of a translator. Searchers should remain vigilant for irregulars and infiltrators attempting to disguise themselves as CIVs. Once identified, all enemy prisoners of war, CIV internees, and detainees should be placed in the short-term detainee holding area. Generally, anyone causing disruptions at the collection point is detained. While it is ideal to further separate CIV internees and detainees from enemy prisoners of war, there is often insufficient time or resources to do so.

5-56. Consistent with orders, searchers are responsible for securing all items that could be dangerous to the team, friendly forces passing through the collection point, or the DCs. Additionally, searchers will confiscate and label all items that noncombatants are prohibited from possessing under U.S. or HN policy.

5-57. If available, a DA Form 4137 (*Evidence/Property Custody Document*) is attached to the vehicle or animal. The DA Form 4137 must contain, at a minimum, the following information: the DC collection point number, the date, the quantity of seized items, a description of the seized items, and a signature block for the officer in charge or the noncommissioned officer in charge at the collection point. A copy of this card is given to the driver.

Stage Two Processing

5-58. This stage is intended to help categorize DCs more effectively. It aims to determine details such as U.S. citizenship, reunite families at the collection point, identify influential individuals, and gather information that may have intelligence value from equipment, weapons, documents, and conversations. This processing occurs when time and resources allow and is not considered a high priority. A translator is usually required.

Controlled Property

5-59. Units have several options for the disposition of controlled property. Depending on the property category, units may choose to retain control, return the property to the individuals from whom it was taken, hand it over to other forces or agencies (such as local law enforcement or follow-on forces taking control of

the DC collection point), or a combination of all three. Unit commanders must act according to their moral and legal obligations, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each option.

Retaining Control

5-60. If units are taking possession of property (they must do so if no one signs for it and returning the item is not an option), they should provide the owner an official receipt (such as DA Form 3161, [*Request for Issue or Turn-In]*). The units should explain the intention for the property, and the rights and procedures of the owner for seeking compensation should be outlined. This reiteration of rights is meant to reassure the owners and may be necessary to ensure a smooth handoff.

Transferring

5-61. To transfer control of the property, units must complete a property control register that lists all items being transferred. An official from the follow-on forces must sign for these items and a copy of the register using DA Form 3161.

Limited Services (Medical, Food, Water, Shelter, and Sanitation)

5-62. Services at a DC collection point can vary based on need and available resources, ranging from immediate care for life-threatening conditions to ancillary services like food distribution. However, to comply with international law, providing at least water and immediate medical care is essential. Medical services should not be offered to DCs until they have completed the quick-screen stage of processing, except in cases of emergency care necessary to prevent imminent death. Soldiers should—

- Treat life-threatening emergencies, including providing first aid for traumatic injuries and administering oral rehydration therapy for dehydrated infants.
- Provide water as a preventive measure if an adequate supply is available.
- Allow occupants to relieve themselves by providing one designated area for males and another for females, along with basic equipment (such as shovels and latrine screening materials) to facilitate the creation of rudimentary sanitation facilities (slit trenches). Occupants must be supervised.
- Distribute food only to occupants who have been at the collection point for 24 hours or more. Distributing food too generously can create a pull factor. Soldiers should also be mindful that certain ready-to-eat meals may not be appropriate due to religious or cultural restrictions or may be too rich for malnourished individuals, potentially causing immediate health issues. (Yellow-packaged international humanitarian rations are considered safe.)
- Provide additional services that align with the commander's legal, moral, and mission-specific obligations and requirements.

Resolution or Disposition of Dislocated Civilians

5-63. When a DC collection point becomes operational, there are four potential outcomes for the collection point operators:

- **Retain control of the collection point**. The moral obligations to the DCs at the collection point increase as time passes.
- **Close down the collection point**. This can be done by releasing the DCs if the tactical situation and other factors justify this action.
- **Arrange for movement of the DCs**. This involves transferring the DCs to another holding area, such as a CIV assembly area.
- **Hand off collection point operations**. This would involve transferring responsibility for the collection point to other operators, such as a support unit or the HN. This is the most likely outcome for combat units that are on the move.

Dislocated Civilian Collection Point Handoff

5-64. As a unit moves out of an area, it must be ready to hand off (transition) an active DC collection point to follow-on forces. These forces may or may not have training in managing DCs. Regardless, the outgoing

unit should ensure that it provides a comprehensive briefing to the follow-on forces about the operation of the collection point.

Note. Using biometric collection devices allows for collecting, sharing, matching, and storing identity information, such as fingerprints, iris scans, facial recognition, voice recordings, and contextual data. This information can be cross-referenced with DOD biometric holdings (DOD ABIS) and the Defense Watch List.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

5-65. NEO refers to the organized and authorized departure of noncombatants from a specific area by the DOS, the DOD, or other appropriate authorities. While the United States typically associates NEOs with combat operations, these operations may also be conducted in anticipation of or response to natural disasters or human-made crises in foreign countries. Additionally, civil unrest in a country may prompt an evacuation to the United States or other safe haven.

Note. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, the DOS is responsible for protecting and evacuating U.S. citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding their overseas property. The DOS is the lead agency for planning and conducting NEOs. Executive Order 12656 also directs the SecDef to advise and assist the Secretary of State in preparing and implementing these plans.

5-66. DOD defines two categories of noncombatant evacuees:

- U.S. citizens that competent authority can order to evacuate. This includes—
  - CIV employees of all USG agencies and their dependents.
  - Military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces who are specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants.
  - Dependents of members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
- U.S. and non-U.S. citizens that competent authority may authorize or assist (but not necessarily order) to evacuate. This includes—
  - CIV employees of USG agencies and their dependents who are residents in the country and are willing to evacuate.
  - Private U.S. citizens and their dependents.
  - Military personnel and their dependents who are not under an ordered evacuation.
  - Designated aliens, including dependents of CIV employees of the USG and military personnel, as prescribed by the DOS.

Note. JP 3-68 provides additional information on NEO.

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

5-67. Military police assist with NEOs at the request of the DOS. They coordinate with HN police and CA units to carry out these evacuations. Military police can provide security at departure locations, extraction sites, and for convoys transporting evacuees. Their experience in law enforcement has equipped them with skills in interpersonal communication and the graduated use of force, making them well-suited for direct interactions with evacuees, often in collaboration with a translator. These skills are essential for interacting with evacuees and handling potentially hostile situations. Military police are key members of marshaling teams, responsible for locating evacuees and guiding them to assembly areas and evacuation sites.

5-68. When a decision is made to evacuate a community, planners must create detailed plans to ensure that uncontrolled groups do not interfere with the movement of military units, supplies, and first responders. Mass evacuation planning includes the following:

- **Transportation**. Planners should maximize the use of CIV transportation.
- **Movement control**. Planners must identify both natural and man-made obstacles that could hinder movement along designated routes and take steps to mitigate their effects. Checkpoints and signage

should be established to guide traffic flow, and measures should be in place to redirect vehicles to alternate routes as needed, depending on changes in the situation. Collection points should be set up for vehicles that break down.

- **Security**. Military and HN security forces are responsible for ensuring the safety of CIVs following evacuation. These organizations also safeguard CIV property left behind, including farm animals, pets, and other personal belongings.
- **Documentation**. In certain situations, evacuees may need identification documents to ensure proper registration and facilitate orderly movement.
- **Briefing**. Before movement, the movement control officer conducts a briefing for evacuees. This can be done using leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other available means. The briefing covers the details of the move, restrictions on personal belongings, the organization of movement, and schedules.
- **Rations**. For movements lasting no more than two days, planning should ensure that evacuees receive rations at departure or at designated points along the route.
- **Health care**. The public health team will make the best use of CIV medical personnel, equipment, and supplies to care for the health and well-being of the evacuees. Military medical personnel and resources may be used to support HN and CIV organizations if necessary and authorized. Before movement, medical personnel should take appropriate measures to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.
- **Return**. During planning, it is important to consider the eventual return of the evacuees and to establish criteria for determining the duration of their absence.

RESOURCES CONTROL

5-69. Resources control involves regulating the movement and consumption of material resources, mobilizing these resources, and denying them to the enemy. It specifically targets sectors of the wealth and economy of a nation, including natural resources, food and agriculture, immovable property, finances, and critical infrastructure. (For more detailed information, see ATP 3-57.20.) Military police support to resources control may include—

- Securing existing harvest storage facilities to prevent spoilage and protect harvested crops from looting.
- Implementing rationing and distribution programs for essential commodities, such as food and fuel.
- Establishing border security, including customs procedures, to prevent arms smuggling, human trafficking, and the transport of contraband like drugs and currency.
- Regulating and securing access to valuable natural resources.
- Stopping illicit trade in natural resources and developing governance mechanisms and incentives to bring this trade into the legal market.
- Initiating processes to address and resolve resource ownership and access issues.
- Locking international access to overseas financial accounts to prevent money laundering.
- Protecting and securing strategically important institutions, including government buildings, archives, museums, religious sites, courthouses, and communications facilities.

5-70. Military police may be tasked to secure critical convoys to ensure safe transit. Their functions in support of resource control operations include the following activities:

- Protecting against enemy activities along MSRs.
- Securing supply routes and critical convoys.
- Conducting reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Evaluating and recommending protective measures for high-risk facilities.
- Implementing protective measures for HRP.
- Applying protective measures for designated supplies.
- Conducting area and local security operations.
- Performing response force operations.
- Applying AT measures.
- Implementing physical security measures.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY CONTROL

5-71. Resources control, which includes managing both public and private movable and immovable property, is most common during the occupation of foreign territory by U.S. forces. However, control measures can also be implemented across various military operations based on specific authorities granted to a commander for a particular mission. Effective resources management requires the combined efforts of all instruments of national power. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) outline rules regarding property in occupied territories. A territory is considered occupied when it is taken over by a sovereign power following military intervention. Typically, the period of occupation is temporary and lasts until a peace treaty is signed or a new government is established. The occupation is limited to the areas where such authority has been established and can be exercised. (See ATP 3-57.20 for additional information.) International law recognizes five basic powers that a military commander of an occupying force holds concerning property in enemy territory:

- Destruction.
- Confiscation.
- Seizure.
- Requisition.
- Control.

Note. The authority of an occupational force commander regarding public and private property depends on the specific situation. The treatment of real and personal property by the occupier is assessed based on several factors, including the type of property, the needs of the occupier, and whether it is state-owned or privately owned. It is strongly recommended that the servicing staff judge advocate conduct a legal review before exercising authority granted to an occupational force. See FM 6-27 and the Operational Law Handbook for more detailed information.

5-72. Resources control measures can be implemented in collaboration with an HN government during military engagements, limited interventions, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major operations. The authority to execute these measures stems from a formal agreement negotiated by the DOS, including a status-of-forces agreement, a mutual defense treaty, or a security cooperation treaty ratified by the United States and the HN government.

5-73. The long-term success of any intervention largely depends on the ability of the military to protect and maintain critical infrastructure until the HN can resume that responsibility. Measures that control critical infrastructure directly support the primary stability task of establishing civil security. The initial aim of the response is to create a safe and secure environment that allows the HN to sustain and further develop its infrastructure capabilities.

5-74. Military police implement countermeasures to enhance security. These measures may include conducting vulnerability and threat assessments, developing procedures to predict and prevent terrorist actions before they occur, hardening likely targets, and carrying out offensive operations to destroy enemies. Military police units actively establish checkpoints and roadblocks to control the movement of vehicles, personnel, and materials, thereby preventing illegal actions that could assist the enemy. These control measures serve as a deterrent against terrorist activities, sabotage, and other threats.

CIVIL SECURITY SUPPORT

5-75. Key to the control of national resources is the primary stability task—establish civil security. A crucial aspect of establishing civil security is effective border control and safeguarding the borders of the nation and its points of entry and embarkation. For more information, see FM 3-07.

5-76. Border controls regulate immigration, manage the movements of local residents, collect excise taxes or duties, and limit smuggling. When it comes to safeguarding national resources, emphasis must be placed on the illegal export of assets, which can occur through smuggling or the corruption of border officials.

5-77. Planning resources control measures must consider illegal activities and their impact on resource management within the operational environment. Examples of such criminal activities include black market operations, smuggling, theft, and the corruption of HN officials. These actions can negatively affect the

availability of critical resources. Criminals involved in the trafficking of contraband items, such as arms and ammunition, pose significant security threats to the population, the HN government, and deployed military forces.

5-78. An essential element in controlling criminal activity in the area of resources is border security and control. Border security activities involve managing land borders, airspace, coastal and territorial waters, and exclusive economic zones. Effective management of border areas and crossings deters smuggling, prevents the movement of irregular forces into HN territory, and controls the flow of DCs. Border security forces are responsible for monitoring, detecting, and preventing crimes in border regions, including illegal entry and the trafficking of goods, services, and human capital.

BORDER OPERATIONS SUPPORT

5-79. Military police may occasionally be assigned to support border operations along the U.S. borders as part of DSCA. This support can include using technical equipment such as thermal imaging, night vision, and infrared detection to aid in detecting individuals illegally entering the United States. The Posse Comitatus Act may prohibit Regular Army and Army Reserve Soldiers from enforcing civil law, allowing them to respond only to defend themselves or law enforcement officials from imminent danger. However, nonfederalized National Guard military police, operating under the control of their respective state governors, are not restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act. Once mobilized (federalized), National Guard Soldiers are subject to the limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act unless other valid legislation is enacted to remove these restrictions.

5-80. Borders outside of the United States may require support from military police units. Military police may be needed to operate control posts, conduct border patrols, and supervise crossing points at international borders. Many countries regulate the movement of military personnel and CIVs at their borders for various reasons, including security; customs and tariff enforcement; protection of the CIV economy; and the apprehension of criminals, absentees, and individuals of intelligence interest. Control is maintained through establishing authorized road or rail crossing points, border patrols, control posts, and collaboration with authorities from neighboring countries when feasible. Prohibited or restricted zones are often created to further manage movement at the borders.

5-81. In conducting border control, military police typically coordinate with indigenous police forces and HN counterintelligence and CA units. They monitor individuals and items involved in criminal activities or customs violations. Additionally, they establish the identity and purpose of U.S. forces crossing borders and inspecting vehicles and travel documents. Supporting border control is crucial to prevent adversaries from moving weapons, supplies, and personnel across borders, which could be used to attack or disrupt friendly forces.

5-82. Military police may also be responsible for enforcing customs laws and regulations to support local government or HN officials. The enforcement of customs laws by the U.S. military in countries where U.S. forces are stationed often occurs as part of agreements, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization status-of-forces agreement between the United States and the respective HN.

5-83. In controlling national resources, emphasis must be placed on the illegal export of assets through smuggling and the corruption of border officials. Ineffective border control and management systems can hinder efforts to detect and prevent organized criminal activity. This often leads to increased trafficking of illegal arms, goods, and human trafficking, and it negatively affects the ability of the government to generate revenue from duties and import and export fees. While conventional military forces can provide immediate border security, they are not suitable for law enforcement unless they are acting as an occupying force.

Appendix A

Assessment

Assessment is an essential, continuous activity that occurs throughout the operations process. It involves comparing expected outcomes with actual events to determine the effectiveness of security and mobility support tasks. Assessment helps commanders gauge progress toward achieving the desired end state, achieving objectives, and determining the effectiveness of security and mobility support within the context of larger Army and joint operations. While failures in executing security and mobility support tasks are usually straightforward to identify, measuring and quantifying successful applications can be challenging.

CONTINUOUS ASSESSMENT

A-1. Assessment is a continuous process that precedes and concludes the operations process and is integral to modifying and adjusting the focus and direction of security and mobility support. *Assessment* is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Figure A-1 shows the activities of assessment, which include—

- Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.
- Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.
- Recommending or directing action for improvement.




Figure A-1. Activities of assessment

A-2. Commanders typically base assessments on their situational understanding, which is usually a combination of various information sources and their intuition. These assessments help them gauge progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. The process involves monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to identify changes impacting operations. However, operations may not proceed as visualized during planning.

MONITORING


A-3. *Monitoring* is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation (ADP 5-0). Monitoring enables military police commanders and staffs to gather information about the current situation, including threats (such as crime), freedom of movement, DCs, and overall security. This information is essential for assessing whether current strategies and approaches effectively accomplish the commander's intent and operational concept or if adjustments are necessary. Effective decision making relies on a clear and accurate understanding of the current situation, as progress cannot be evaluated without it.

A-4. During planning, commanders assess the situation to establish the facts and assumptions that form the basis of the plan. Throughout the preparation and execution stages, commanders and staffs continue to monitor the situation to ensure that the established facts are still applicable, that their assumptions are still valid, and that new conditions affecting the operation are identified.

A-5. CCIR and decision points guide the monitoring activities of the staff and prioritize the information collection efforts of the military police. Information requirements related to the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations are identified and prioritized through reconnaissance and surveillance. These activities are part of the overall information collection process. Military police conduct reconnaissance and surveillance using their policing capabilities and the application of PIO, as outlined in ATP 3-39.20. This enhances their effectiveness in performing these tasks. Conducting PIO—including collecting, assessing, developing, and disseminating police intelligence products—is a primary responsibility of commanders and the PM.

A-6. Staffs monitor and collect information from the common operational picture and friendly reports. This information includes operational and intelligence summaries from subordinate, higher, and adjacent headquarters, and communications and reports from liaison teams. Staffs also identify information sources outside military channels, such as local law enforcement, and monitor their reports. These additional sources may include products from CIV agencies, HN entities, and other government agencies. Staffs apply information management and knowledge management practices to ensure that this information reaches the right people at the right time.

A-7. Staff sections are responsible for documenting relevant information in running estimates. Each staff element begins to develop their respective running estimates during mission analysis. The commander and each staff section must continually update and maintain these estimates throughout the entire operations process. Staff sections conduct ongoing assessments of current operations to determine if they are aligned with the commander's intent, mission, and concept of operations. In their running estimates, staff sections utilize new information and updated facts and assumptions as the basis for evaluation (see figure A-2).



UNIT	REQ	ASG	PCT	T/PNS Platform	Mission
HHD	40	40	100%	Green	Battalion Operations
1MP	169	169	100%	Green	Route regulation and enforcement – MSR Morgan (1/2/1, 3/2/1) / critical asset Security (2/2/1)
7MP	169	166	98%	Green	Route regulation and enforcement – MSR Viking (1/7) / response force (2/7)/ DC camp security (3/7)
194MP	169	169	100%	Green	Route and area reconnaissance and surveillance (2/194) / response force (1/194)
571MP	169	169	99%	Green	Route and area reconnaissance (3/571)

Figure A-2. Sample security and mobility support running estimate

Legend:			
ASR	alternate supply route	MP	military police
ASG	assigned	FRAGO	fragmentary order
BN	battalion	MSR	main supply route
CO	company	OBJ	objective
DC	dislocated civilians	PCT	percent
FA	field artillery	REQ	required
HHD	headquarters and headquarters detachment	TCP	traffic control post
		US	United States
Hrs	hours	WPNS	weapons
KIA	killed in action		

Figure A-2. Example security and mobility support running estimate (continued)

A-8. During planning, commanders assess the situation to establish the facts and assumptions that will shape the plan. Throughout the preparation and execution phases, commanders and staffs continue to monitor the situation to verify if the facts remain relevant, if their assumptions are still valid, and if new conditions have arisen that could affect the operations.

EVALUATION

A-9. Staffs analyze relevant information collected through monitoring to evaluate the progress of the operation. *Evaluating* is using indicators to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists (ADP 5-0). Evaluation is central to the assessment process, where analysis occurs. It helps commanders identify what is effective and what is not, providing insights into improving mission accomplishment.

A-10. Criteria in the form of measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP) help determine the progress toward achieving end-state conditions, meeting objectives, and performing tasks. An MOE helps to determine whether a task is producing its intended results, while an MOP assesses whether a task has been completed correctly. It is important to note that MOEs and MOPs are merely criteria; they do not constitute the actual assessment. To evaluate these measures, relevant information must be gathered in the form of indicators. MOEs and MOPs are developed during the planning phase, refined during preparation, and monitored throughout execution.

A-11. The assessment plan is enabled by monitoring and evaluating MOE and MOP criteria that stem from security and mobility support tasks. These criteria serve as clear, relevant, and responsive benchmarks that are applicable across all operations. They may include CCIR, essential elements of friendly information, and can generate specific information requirements. MOEs and MOPs are valuable decision-support tools that can influence transition periods, resource allocation, and other critical decisions (see table A-1, page 120). For more information on MOPs and MOEs, see FM 6-0.

- MOE. A *measure of effectiveness* is an indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time (JP 5-0). An MOE evaluates changes in both positive and negative conditions, is focused on mission accomplishment, and considers the results or consequences of an action. It is used to assess changes in the operational environment (for example, a 33 percent reduction in attacks on MSR TINA over the past seven days). MOEs are often subjective as they tend to measure long-term outcomes. They are typically documented and monitored in formal assessment plans. Examples of MOEs for the objective of providing a safe and secure environment may include—
  - An increase in the freedom of movement and maneuver for friendly forces.
  - A decrease in attacks on base camps.
  - A decline in threat activities along transportation routes.
  - An increase in knowledge regarding the activities and resources of enemy or adversary forces.

- MOP. A *measure of performance* is an indicator used measure friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 5-0). MOPs help answer questions such as, "Was the action taken?" or "Were the tasks completed to standard?" or "Are we doing things right?" An MOP confirms or denies whether a task has been properly performed. MOPs are typically tracked at all levels within execution matrices and are also commonly used to evaluate training effectiveness. Using MOPs to assess task accomplishment is relatively straightforward, often resulting in a simple yes or no answer. Examples of MOPs include—
  - Route X cleared.
  - Generators delivered, operational, and secured at locations X, Y, and Z.
  - $15,000 spent for schoolhouse completion.
  - Aerial dissemination of 60,000 leaflets over village D.
- Indicator. In the context of assessment, an indicator is an item of information that provides insight into an MOE or MOP. Indicators can come from reports submitted by subordinates, surveys, polls, and information requirements. They help answer the question, "What is the current status of this MOE or MOP?" A single indicator can influence multiple MOEs and MOPs. Examples of indicators for an MOE are the decrease in threat activity by the—
  - Number of attacks along MSR TINA each week.
  - Number of times that DCs restricted movement on MSRs each day.
  - Number of reports of criminal activity by the population per area each week.
  - Number of explosive hazards found along routes each week.
  - Number of attacks on base camps each week.

Table A-1. Assessment measures and indicators

MOE	***MOP***	***Indicator***
Answers the question: *Are we doing the right things?*	Answers the question: *Are we doing things right?*	Answers the question: *What is the status of this MOE or MOP?*
Measures the purpose accomplishment.	Measures the task completion.	Measures raw data inputs to influence MOEs and MOPs.
Measures why in the mission statement.	Measures what is in the mission statement.	The information used to make measuring what or why possible.
Often formally tracked in formal assessment plans.	Often formally tracked in execution matrixes.	Often formally tracked in formal assessment plans.
Typically, challenging to choose the correct ones.	Typically, simple to choose the correct ones.	Typically, as challenging to select correctly as the supported MOE or MOP.
Legend: MOE measures of effectiveness MOP measures of performance		

A-12. Significant changes in some operational environment conditions can be subtle and may occur over a long period. However, many security and mobility support tasks are continuous, including reconnaissance, surveillance, area security, physical security, AT, and support to PRC. The constant nature of these tasks can lead to complacency or inattentiveness. As a result, leaders need to remain focused on identifying, monitoring, and evaluating accurate indicators and warnings. This vigilance is necessary to maintain situational awareness and to alert them to potential hazards and associated risks.

A-13. Commanders monitor MOEs and evaluate variances and change indicators to understand their causes and effects. This helps forecast potential failures or identify critical points of failure in activities or operations. Based on this assessment, resources can be reallocated to reduce the overall risk to the mission or to support specific security efforts. The goal is to anticipate the need for action before a failure occurs rather than merely responding to an unplanned loss. Thorough staff planning during the military decision-making process

enables commanders to accelerate decision making by preplanning responses to anticipated events through battle drills, branches, and sequels. War-gaming critical events allow commanders to focus on their critical information requirements and effectively coordinate supporting information collection efforts. Information gathered during this process can be used to develop essential elements of friendly information and indicators or warnings that inform the development of protection priorities.

A-14. If an action seems to be failing to achieve its desired effect, the reasons may include—

- Personnel or equipment system failures.
- Insufficient resource allocation at critical points.
- Variations in the expected threat-combat power ratio, which may increase the overall risk.
- Ineffective supporting efforts, leading to a cumulative failure of more critical elements.

A-15. Assessment identifies the magnitude and significance of variances in performance or conditions compared to expectations based on prior forecasts. This evaluation helps determine whether an adjustment is necessary. Commanders oversee the ongoing operation to ensure that it is progressing satisfactorily according to the current plan, including fragmentary orders that have modified it. The staff assesses the situation against established protection criteria. This assessment ensures that both facts and assumptions are still accurate and identifies new facts or assumptions that may arise. Assessment reduces reaction time by anticipating and aligning future requirements with current plans.

A-16. Based on the evaluation of progress and effectiveness, the staff brainstorms possible improvements. They assess the merit of these changes and identify those that are most promising. These recommendations are presented to the commander or implemented within their delegated authority. Commanders review the recommendations from the staff, subordinate commanders, and other mission partners, combining them with their own assessments. Based on this gathered information, they decide whether and how to adjust the operation to better accomplish the mission.

A-17. Throughout Army operations, recommendations to the commander may involve several options, including continuing the operation as planned, executing a branch plan, or making unanticipated adjustments. Adjustments can entail assigning new tasks to subordinates, reprioritizing support efforts, modifying information collection assets, or significantly changing the COA. During security and mobility support, recommendations might indicate that additional TCPs and checkpoints are needed to manage DCs on MSRs (output) to ensure freedom of movement (outcome). There may be a need for additional reconnaissance and surveillance efforts (output) to identify and destroy threats (outcome) before they can attack friendly forces or disrupt operations in support areas.

Assessment During Execution

A-18. *Execution* is the act of putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and adjusting operations based on changes in the situation (ADP 5-0). During execution, commanders (supported by their staffs) focus on turning decisions into actions. This process involves determining whether to execute planned activities, such as transitioning to different phases or executing a branch plan. Execution also includes adapting the plan in response to changes in the situation and continuously assessing the progress of the current operation.

A-19. Assessment during execution is essential and involves a deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes with actual events, using specific criteria to evaluate operational progress toward success. Throughout execution, commanders (supported by their staffs) continuously assess the progress of the operation through monitoring and evaluation. They make decisions and direct combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. It is essential for commanders and their staffs to consistently evaluate the expected outcomes of the operation. This allows them to determine if changes are needed, take advantage of opportunities, or respond to unexpected threats to accomplish the mission.

ASSESSMENT TOOLS

A-20. Throughout the operations process, commanders work closely with their staffs, subordinate commanders, and other unified action partners to integrate their assessments. The main tools used to evaluate the progress of the operation include the OPORD, the common operational picture, personal observations, running estimates, and the assessment plan. See FM 6-0 for more information.

A-21. During planning, staffs can develop an assessment plan by following the six steps outlined below. This assessment plan ensures that the continuous assessment process (monitoring, evaluating, and recommending or directing ongoing assessment) is applied throughout the preparation and execution of operations.

- Step 1. Gather tools and assessment data.
- Step 2. Understand the current and desired conditions.
- Step 3. Develop an assessment framework.
- Step 4. Develop the collection plan.
- Step 5. Assign responsibilities for conducting analyses and generating recommendations.
- Step 6. Identify feedback mechanisms.

A-22. Staff members develop running estimates that illustrate significant aspects of security and mobility support discipline over time. Commanders use these estimates to maintain situational awareness and make necessary adjustments. Significant changes or discrepancies in the running estimates can indicate either a threat or an opportunity, alerting commanders to take action. The importance of these estimates increases as time becomes more limited. Decision making in time-sensitive situations typically occurs once a unit has entered the AO and is actively conducting operations. Therefore, the IPOE, an updated common operating picture, and portions of the running estimates should already exist.

A-23. Rehearsals are a tool for commanders to ensure that their staffs and subordinates comprehend the commander's intent and the concept of the operations. Conducting a rehearsal helps commanders and staffs identify weaknesses in the plan that may not have been recognized earlier. Rehearsals enhance external and internal coordination as staff members pinpoint further coordinating requirements. A well-planned and executed rehearsal allows leaders to incorporate lessons learned during the rehearsal assessment into existing plans and orders or future rehearsals, ultimately improving mission success. For more information on rehearsals, see FM 6-0.

LESSONS LEARNED INTEGRATION

A-24. How organizations and Soldiers learn from their mistakes is key for mission success. While the evaluation process occurs throughout the operations process, it also occurs during the after-action review and assessment following the mission. Leaders at all levels must ensure that Soldiers and equipment are combat-ready. They are responsible for practicing sound stewardship and adhering to risk management principles to minimize the loss of resources and military assets due to hostile, nonhostile, and environmental threats and hazards.

A-25. Key lessons learned are promptly applied and shared with other commands. Commanders establish systems to rapidly disseminate approved lessons learned, along with proven TTP that protect forces and achieve mission success. Staff at each command level evaluates the integration of these lessons and coordinates with other staff elements within and across different levels of command. Postoperational evaluations typically—

- Identify threats not identified during the initial assessment or reveal new threats that developed during the operation or activity. For example, reevaluations are necessary when changes occur in personnel, equipment, the environment, or the mission.
- Assess the effectiveness of operational goals and objectives. This includes determining whether the controls positively or negatively impacted mission accomplishment and whether they aligned with existing doctrine and TTP.
- Evaluate the implementation, execution, and communication of controls.
- Assess the accuracy of residual risk and the effectiveness of controls in eliminating hazards and controlling risks.
- Ensure coordination throughout the integration processes.
  - Was the process integrated throughout all phases of the operation?
  - Were the risk controls effective?
  - Were risk decisions made at the appropriate level?
  - Was the process cyclic and continuous throughout the operation?
  - For units with a staff, assessments become more formal at higher echelons. The resources available for assessments (such as the expertise of staff officers and the time they can dedicate)

increase proportionally from battalion to brigade, division, corps, and theater army. Small units that lack a staff typically conduct assessments informally. Leaders of these small units focus on evaluating the readiness of their unit in terms of personnel, equipment, supplies, morale, and their ability to complete assigned tasks. As these units assess their performance and learn from their experiences, they adapt their TTPs accordingly. Therefore, even the lowest echelons of the Army adhere to the assessment process.

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Appendix B

Dislocated Civilian Camps

The establishment of DC camps may be required during various military operations. HNs have the primary responsibility for constructing and operating these camps, and providing basic assistance and services to the affected population. They receive support from the United Nations, international organizations, and NGOs. However, U.S. military forces may also be assigned to perform this mission. The purpose of this appendix is to supplement the doctrine contained in the manual by emphasizing the planning, design, and operational considerations specific to DC camps. Creating efficient and effective camps is essential for conserving resources, minimizing liabilities, and reducing the overall logistical burden during extended operations.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

B-1. The CCDR identifies the facilities that meet operational requirements. Planning involves determining when, where, and why a DC camp is needed. It outlines the purpose of the camp; functional requirements; and connections with other camps, operational forces, and agencies. Additionally, planning generates the information needed to implement all life cycle phases of the camp. The planning process for DC camps takes place at all levels of warfare and command echelons. Planning activities cover a continuum that ranges from conceptual to fully detailed. Effective planning for DC camps relies on expertise from various fields, much of which may only be accessible through coordination with higher headquarters and supporting organizations, such as the United States Army Corps of Engineers.

B-2. The planning and construction of DC camps will likely occur under significant time constraints to meet aggressive construction schedules. This urgency arises from the unpredictable nature of situations where DCs are present. While preplanning is essential for avoiding crises, planners should anticipate having little preplanning time. DC operations are typically long-term and require resources often not immediately available from DOD sources.

B-3. Unlike base camps that are used solely for operational forces, many activities within DC camps involve participation from HN entities, U.S. and international government organizations, and NGOs. These include the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Organization for Migration. International humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, carefully maintain their neutrality and prefer not to be associated with or dependent on the military, as this could jeopardize their special status within the international community. This status is vital for them to fulfill their mission effectively. It is crucial for camp planners to understand the interests and requirements of these stakeholders early in the planning process and to earn their trust and support from the outset. For more information on interorganizational coordination, see JP 3-08. See JP 3-28 for situations where military police respond to natural disasters within the United States and its territories as part of DSCA.

B-4. Effective DC camps begin with accurately identifying the requirements for each life cycle phase of the camp. This includes generating supporting estimates and schedules for each phase of the operation. Estimates encompass the necessary resources, such as skilled personnel and organizations with the required capabilities, materials, and funding needed to meet the identified requirements. Commanders and their staffs use the planning process outlined in FM 6-0 to assess their needs for DC camps and integrate these plans into the overall concept of operations and base camp development planning process. The planning process provides a framework for coordinating the actions of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and others. A DC camp is simply a base camp developed to serve a special purpose. A key ingredient for all DC camp planning and design activities is the incorporation of the base camp principles described in ATP 3-37.10.

B-5. In rare cases, Army forces may be tasked with establishing DC camps. In these instances, the force must take into account legal considerations regarding the availability and ownership of land for camps. Additionally, logistical aspects must be addressed, including the provision of shelter, food, sanitation, and medical care. Security measures and crime prevention within the camps are also important, alongside

contracting needs for construction. The primary factor in planning operations for DCs is the transition plan for caring for the population and transferring responsibility to a controlling agency. These agencies may include the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the HN. Controlling agencies are responsible for meeting the basic needs (food, water, shelter, sanitation, and security) of DCs. They must also be prepared to prevent the outbreak of communicable diseases among DCs. This consideration is crucial not only for the health of the CIVs but also for the well-being of the supporting military forces.

General Planning Considerations

B-6. The primary objective of DC operations is to protect CIVs from the impacts of violence or disaster while minimizing their interference with military operations. DC camps serve as designated safe areas where DCs can be consolidated, allowing for the effective and efficient delivery of aid.

B-7. The planning focus for DC camps, including their duration and composition, can vary at different command levels. This variation depends on the characteristics and location of the DC population and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. Establishing DC camps and implementing resettlement efforts require a combined arms approach since no single branch has the expertise to build, sustain, and protect these camps. Military police organizations provide command and control for these efforts. All commands and national and international agencies involved have clearly defined responsibilities. Planners consider the following when planning and projecting the establishment, operation, and management of DC camps:

- Coordinate with CA units to collaborate with the United States, HN, and other international organizations to assess the appropriate levels and types of aid needed. Engaging with these organizations leverages their expertise and reduces the burden on U.S. Armed Forces.
- Limit outside contributions to basic necessity items only until the DCs achieve self-sufficiency while encouraging them to become as independent as possible.
- Review the effectiveness of humanitarian responses and adjust relief activities as needed.
- Implement security measures for DCs that comply with U.S., international, and HN laws and regulations. While international law grants DCs the right to freedom of movement, significant influxes of DCs may necessitate security-related restrictions.

Camp Standards

B-8. The CCDR specifies the facility allowances and standards for construction, quality of life, design, environmental conditions, and protection at base camps in-theater. These standards are tailored to the specific characteristics of the region, such as resource availability, local climate, the local labor market, and the anticipated duration of the mission. For DC camps, applicable international humanitarian standards may also apply. For more information on basic guidelines for facility allowances and construction standards, see JP 3-34.

Note. International humanitarian principles, minimum standards, and resources can be found at United Nations Refugee Agency website and the Sphere standards website.

Site Selection

B-9. Site selection involves balancing mission objectives, sustainment needs, protection measures, and environmental and engineering requirements. The planning team identifies potential locations for disaster response camps by analyzing operational and mission factors, focusing on terrain and civil and environmental considerations.

B-10. The location of a DC camp can vary widely. It may range from a spontaneous settlement spread over a large area to a well-organized rural settlement or a concentration in a very limited space. When planning for these camps, planners must typically determine whether establishing a few larger or several smaller camps is more effective. Having multiple smaller camps requires them to be interconnected to optimize the use of limited resources. Generally, smaller camps are easier to manage and control. Fewer larger camps can reduce the number of personnel needed for command, operation, and management, allowing for consolidating resources and capabilities. Often, the only differences in the effort required between small and large base camps lie in the amount and type of resources used and the level of technical expertise and engineering needed.

B-11. The security of camps should be a major consideration during the initial stages of site selection. Implementing solutions that promote self-reliance among the dislocated population is always preferable. The CCDR should develop a plan for PRC operations and the construction of DC camps early in the operational plan. This approach provides timely notification of engineers, the selection and development of facility sites, and the procurement of construction materials. Military police should coordinate with engineers, sustainment units, higher headquarters, and the HN to determine the appropriate locations for the camps.

B-12. Existing structures, facilities, and infrastructure should be used whenever possible to minimize the need for new construction, provided they do not pose health or environmental hazards that cannot be mitigated. There are multiple options for constructing new facilities and infrastructure. These options include modifying existing structures, using preengineered metal or fabric buildings, employing modular base camp kits, and constructing buildings framed and supported by wood, steel, or concrete masonry units.

B-13. If immediate solutions to the causes of dislocation are not found, it will be necessary to engage in long-term planning for the needs of DCs. This planning must consider all seasons (winter and summer) and weather conditions, including rain and drought. Identifying potential weather extremes should be a key factor in the design process. Temporary arrangements can be very difficult and costly to change once established. Site selection, planning, and the types of shelter available all directly affect the level of assistance.

B-14. The command should analyze the logistics and operational requirements for establishing DC camps. The first requirement is to ensure that the appropriate number and type of personnel and necessary construction materials are onsite well before the start of hostilities. The second requirement is to develop a long-term plan to sustain the operations and maintenance of the camps for their anticipated duration. Failing to accurately assess the logistics and operational needs for each phase of the DC camp lifecycle early in the process may lead to inefficiencies that waste valuable resources and ultimately undermine the overall mission.

B-15. If a DC camp is not located correctly, the entire camp population may need to be relocated once resources are depleted. Planners consider the following when selecting a site for a DC camp:

- **Operational and mission variables**. The specific goals and requirements of the camp.
- Accessibility. The proximity of the site to other organizations (both military and CIV) that can provide additional support and protection.
- **Relief organization access**. The ability of CIV relief organizations to access and operate at the camp location.
- **Real estate viability**. The feasibility of acquiring the necessary real estate.
- **Threat assessment**. The threat level and aggression of adversaries in the area.
- **Local population attitude**. The sentiment and responsiveness of the locals towards the camp.
- **Transportation accessibility**. The accessibility of the site for support elements and transportation routes.
- **Hazardous structures**. Proximity to potentially dangerous structures (such as dams and industrial chemical plants) that could pose a risk if damaged or destroyed.
- **Military target avoidance**. Distance from communications centers, large military installations, ammunition storage areas, and other potential military targets that should be avoided.
- **Transportation networks**. Accessibility to MSRs, transportation hubs, and distribution centers.
- **Existing facilities**. The availability of suitable existing facilities to minimize the need for new construction.

- **Natural disaster susceptibility**. Vulnerability to natural disasters such as flooding, earthquakes, or fires.
- **Public health management**. Management and control of food and water resources, and the presence of vermin, vectors (disease carriers), and drainage issues affecting public health.
- **Potable water supply**. Access to an adequate source of clean drinking water to meet consumption, food sanitation, and personal hygiene needs.
- **Infrastructure availability**. The existence of essential infrastructure, including power, sewage, water supply, and waste disposal systems.
- **Construction resources**. The availability of labor and materials for construction.
- **Soil drainage**. Considerations regarding the soil drainage capabilities of the site.
- **Environmental considerations**. Any other relevant environmental factors.

SECURITY

B-16. The security of U.S. forces, assets, and information is a high priority, and this importance remains consistent during DC operations, just as it does during offensive or defensive operations. Risks such as banditry, vandalism, and various levels of violent activity from criminal or unruly crowds can still arise even in stable environments. During humanitarian missions, there should be a balance between the necessary security measures and the right to live for the population of the camp without feeling like they are in an armed camp. Overly stringent security tactics can be intimidating and may undermine the overall purpose of the camp.

COMMUNICATIONS

B-17. Effective communication is vital for mission success. Interagency organizations, international groups, and NGOs will each have their own communication networks. Planning must include procedures that ensure that these networks are interoperable and compatible among all participants. Achieving interoperability may require unclassified communication methods, which can be quite challenging for U.S. military forces.

DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

B-18. Design is an extension of planning. During design, the construction means; construction standards; quality-of-life standards; the level of camp capabilities; on-site conditions; and adaptable, scalable designs are matched against facility and infrastructure requirements. Planning and design are interdependent. The effectiveness of the design relies on the accuracy of the information gathered during planning, especially regarding facility and infrastructure requirements, available resources, construction methods, and site location.

CONSTRUCTION MEANS

B-19. Construction may be performed by joint and multinational engineer units (troop construction), contractors, or a combination of both. See FM 3-34 for more information on contract construction.

B-20. Sustainable DC camps leverage resources easily accessible through local means, established supply channels, and operational contract support. (For more information on operational contract support, see ATP 4-10; for guidance on integrating Logistics Civil Augmentation Program support into these operations, see ATP 4-10.1.) The cost-effective use of materials and labor primarily relies on local resources, including selected DCs, when appropriate. Utilizing local resources tends to be less expensive and helps avoid the complications associated with international shipments. However, the cost-benefit analysis must consider the quality of materials and services rendered.

CONSTRUCTION METHODS

B-21. There are multiple options for constructing facilities and infrastructure. These options include modifying existing structures, using preengineered metal or fabric buildings, using modular base camp kits (such as the Force Provider system), and building framed or supported structures using wood, steel, or concrete masonry units. The choice of construction method depends on factors such as the climate, the expected lifespan of the facility, the number of facilities to be built, and the availability of construction resources, including labor and materials.

Preexisting Facilities and Infrastructure

B-22. Existing facilities and infrastructure should be used whenever possible to save time, conserve resources, and reduce the overall logistical footprint. However, using these preexisting structures comes with certain protection risks related to survivability, safety, and force health protection. These risks must be addressed through structural assessments and occupational and environmental health site evaluations. Documenting the current environmental conditions is essential to limit liabilities. In some instances, existing facilities with minor damage may be quickly repaired to make them immediately usable. For example, leaking roofs can be temporarily fixed using plastic sheeting.

B-23. Facilities are categorized into six broad groups prioritizing using existing assets over new construction. To the maximum extent possible, facility or real estate requirements should be met from these categories in the following order of priority:

- U.S.-owned, occupied, or leased facilities, including captured facilities.
- U.S.-owned facility substitutes that are prepositioned in-theater.
- HN and multinational support, where there is an existing agreement for the HN; multinational nations are to provide specific types and quantities of facilities at designated locations and times.
- Facilities available from commercial sources.
- U.S.-owned facility substitutes that are stored in the United States.
- The construction of new facilities only after assessing the availability of existing assets and identifying shortfalls.

B-24. Public buildings and community facilities (such as schools, barracks, hotels, gymnasiums, and warehouses) found in urban areas can provide excellent temporary or transitional accommodation. Using these existing facilities may offer the following advantages:

- They are not continuously occupied during regular use, allowing for the immediate accommodation of DCs without disrupting the existing occupants.
- Essential services like water and sanitation are readily available, although they may be insufficient if a large number of DCs are present.
- The need to construct additional structures specifically for DCs is avoided.

B-25. The disadvantages associated with using existing facilities might include the following:

- Facilities can quickly become overcrowded.
- Sanitation and other services may become overwhelmed.
- Equipment and structures can suffer damage.
- Facilities may no longer serve their original purpose, disrupting public services for the local population.
- There may be a lack of privacy and increased protection risks.

B-26. Accommodations in public buildings should be a temporary solution. The supporting infrastructure of these buildings (water, electricity, and sanitation) can quickly deteriorate due to concentrated use, leading to dangerously unhealthy living conditions. The rapid decay of the buildings is largely due to their unsuitability for housing large numbers of people and the lack of necessary infrastructure and utilities. Additionally, the low sense of responsibility among the inhabitants contributes to this deterioration. Moreover, since the normal use of the building must be suspended, this creates various social and economic repercussions, which makes both local and national governments hesitant to convert public buildings into designated facilities. If such a conversion is allowed, it is crucial to remember the need for a rapid evacuation of the building, as the government may request this.

Hurricane Katrina

When Hurricane Katrina struck, the Superdome seemed like a suitable existing facility to accommodate evacuees. However, the number of people needing shelter quickly exceeded initial estimates. The Superdome was understaffed, undersupplied, and lacked accessibility due to high floodwaters, which made resupply efforts, evacuations, and other operations difficult. Power was lost, and the backup power provided only dim lighting. Conditions inside the stadium deteriorated as the population grew, compounded by a lack of air conditioning, running water, and proper waste management. Ultimately, the Superdome was declared uninhabitable and ordered to be evacuated as soon as possible. However, state and local officials did not have the necessary transportation assets to evacuate without additional support.

Tentage

B-27. The primary advantage of using tents is that they provide a quick way to establish basic capabilities. However, the long-term use of tents comes with important considerations. The lifespan of a canvas tent depends on several factors, including its manufacturing quality, the duration of storage before deployment, climate conditions, and the care taken by those using it. When tents are used for long durations, provisions for repair materials should be considered. The longer a tent is exposed to the elements, the more difficult it becomes to repack, store, and reuse. Tents used outside of the United States typically cannot be returned unless they meet the strict cleanliness requirements mandated by Executive Order 13122. Furthermore, when you factor in shipping costs to remote areas, the overall expense of using tents may exceed that of employing local materials and labor to build base camp facilities. Other disadvantages of tents include their susceptibility to damage from high winds and their flammability unless made from fire-retardant materials. Additionally, tents may not offer adequate protection against extreme weather conditions.

B-28. Figure B-1 shows a DC camp that utilized tents. Hundreds of tents were set up on the plains near Fier, Albania, as the United States established a tent city called Camp Hope on May 23, 1999, as part of Operation Sustain Hope. This operation aimed to provide food, water, medicine, and relief supplies while creating camps for refugees fleeing the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The camp was designed to accommodate up to 20,000 refugees.




Figure B-1. Example of a DC camp using tents

Prefabricated or Manufactured Buildings

B-29. Prefabricated or manufactured buildings are structures made up of several components constructed in a factory and then assembled onsite to complete the building. The main advantage of prefabrication is the time it saves during construction, which can be particularly important when timelines are affected by tactical needs or weather conditions. However, there are some potential disadvantages, such as the need to carefully handle prefabricated components (like concrete panels) and the possibility of leaks at the joints where these components are connected.

Traditional Construction

B-30. Traditional construction methods using wood, steel, or concrete masonry units provide design flexibility, allowing for the integration of essential safety measures and the ability to adapt to specific site conditions. However, these methods require significant time and effort to design and construct individual facilities, especially on a large scale. The environmental impacts, such as soil degradation, associated with sourcing or using local construction materials (like timber harvesting) must also be considered.

BASIC DESIGN

B-31. The overall physical layout of the camp should reflect a decentralized, community-based approach that focuses on Families, communities, or other social groups. The camp should be subdivided into sections for ease of administration and the relief of camp tension. Each section can function as an administrative subunit for managing camp operations. Major sections typically include a camp headquarters, a clinic, a dining facility, personal hygiene facilities, sleeping areas, and animal compounds. Sleeping areas should be further divided into separate sections for Families, unaccompanied children, unattached females, and unattached males. Cultural and religious practices should also be considered, and efforts should be made to keep Families together when possible.

B-32. Site planning should adopt a bottom-up approach that begins with the characteristics and needs of individual Families while reflecting the wishes of the community as much as possible. Each community should be designed to include essential services such as latrines, showers, water points, waste collection, and laundry facilities. This approach fosters a sense of ownership, encouraging the community to maintain facilities better. Site planning and design should consider the potential transition to humanitarian organizations or NGOs in the future.

B-33. The basic design for a DC camp consists of an administrative area and up to 16 enclosures, each capable of housing 500 individuals. The facility is intended to be expandable in increments of 500, allowing for greater capacity as needed. Initially, the camp is constructed with an administrative area and two 500-person enclosures, and it can be expanded by adding additional enclosures until reaching a maximum capacity of 8,000 people. The target population of the camp is approximately 8,000 CIVs. This number helps maintain control measures and allows for efficient administration of the camp and its population. Figures B-2 and B-3 on page 132 illustrate a DC facility with 16 enclosures, each accommodating 500 persons. Additionally, each enclosure can be divided into two sub-compounds of 250 people. Each 500-person enclosure must be self-contained, equipped with electricity and water, and ready for immediate occupancy upon completion. The flexibility of the design enables various separations within the larger camp, accommodating single men, single women, Families, and other potential segregation requirements.

B-34. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Joint Construction Management System contains basic plans, specifications, and material requirements for DC facilities based on the expected population size. These plans can easily be adapted for different climates, including temperate, frigid, tropical, and desert conditions. Additionally, the system offers specifications and material requirements for facilities once the dimensions and population needs are provided. Facilities can be quickly constructed using locally available materials, which allows for the use of existing supplies and local craftsmen. This approach significantly reduces costs and saves time. The facilities and components outlined in the Joint Construction Management System meet many of the construction requirements for DC camps identified during planning. Ultimately, this system aids units at lower tactical levels in designing DC camps, even if they lack advanced design skills and capabilities.




Figure B-2. Example of an 8,000-capacity designed and dedicated DC camp




Figure B-3. Example of a 500-person DC compound

OPERATIONS

B-35. The skills required to operate a DC camp are not concentrated in a single branch or functional area. A base operations center is established to bring together the necessary capabilities to create synergistic effects. The size, composition, and configuration of the base operations center for a DC camp may vary based on factors such as the camp population, the complexity of facility operations and maintenance requirements, and the characteristics of the DC population. For smaller DC camps with simpler facilities and infrastructure, the base operations center may be integrated into the command post of the owning unit or function as a standalone operations center. The organizational structure of base operations centers and the tasks they perform are detailed in ATP 3-37.10. Some of the key tasks or areas of focus that are particularly relevant to operating DC camps include—

- Camp control.
- Information dissemination.
- Liaison.
- Initial processing.
- Mistreatment or abuse.
- Basic conduct.

CAMP CONTROL

B-36. Controlling the camp population is essential for successful camp operations. DC camp commanders must swiftly and fairly establish and uphold discipline within the camp. They are responsible for publishing and enforcing rules of conduct as needed. Camp rules should be brief and kept to a minimum.

B-37. Due to the high number of DCs that require care and control, it is preferable to use HN CIVs as staff for camp administration. DCs should become as involved in the administration of the camp as is viable.

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

B-38. Effectively sharing instructions and information with the camp population is essential. Communication methods can include notices on bulletin boards, posters, public address systems, loudspeakers, camp meetings and assemblies, or even a camp radio station. CA public information teams and area MISO units may be able to assist.

LIAISON

B-39. Liaison involves coordinating with all interested agencies. The USG, military authorities, allied liaison officers, and representatives from local governments and charitable organizations may assist in relief and assistance operations.

INITIAL PROCESSING

B-40. The initial processing of DCs begins with their transportation to a DC camp. In coordination with NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, and other international organizations, the HN usually assists in arranging this transportation. However, military assets may be necessary to move DCs from the initial point of contact to established collection points and camps. Processing must be conducted in a supportive manner, as many CIVs may be fearful and in shock. These individuals must understand the processing procedures and what to expect at each stage. Upon arrival, the facility commander ensures that all DCs, HN representatives, and other officials receive an entrance briefing. This briefing is provided in the native language of the DCs, and if multiple languages are represented, the facility will accommodate this by offering briefings in those languages. To minimize difficulties and facilitate a smoother experience, the facility commander may implement the following measures:

- Maintain separation of different national and cultural groups within distinct facilities or sections.
- Keep Families together while separating unaccompanied males, females, and children under 18, according to the laws of the HN regarding the age of adulthood.
- Provide necessary information about the status and future of the DCs.
- Allow DCs to communicate freely with camp officials.
- Involve DCs in the administration, work, and recreational activities of the camp.

B-41. Military personnel provide training and support, while NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, international organizations, or other U.S. agencies typically handle the processing of DCs at designated processing camps. Military personnel may take on the responsibilities outlined in table B-1 if these organizations and agencies are unavailable. The number and type of processing stations can vary depending on the specific operation. Table B-1 also lists the stations that are generally required during DC operations.

Table B-1. Actions during in-processing

Station	*Purpose*	*Responsible Individuals**	*Actions*
1	Search and screen	Military police staff, MI personnel, NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, and international organizations	Conduct a pat-down search to ensure that weapons are not brought into the facility and that the facility is not infiltrated by insurgents.
2	Accountability	Military police staff	Prepare forms and records to maintain accountability of DCs. Use forms and records provided by the HN or CA personnel or forms and records used for detainee operations that may apply to DCs. Biometrically enroll DCs.
3	Identification card or band	Military police staff	Issue an identification card or band to each DC, if required, to ease facility administration and control.
4	Medical evaluation	Medical personnel	Evaluate DCs for signs of illness or injury and treat them as necessary.
5	Assignment	Staff	Assign a sleeping area to each DC.
6	Personal items	Staff	Issue personal comfort items and clothing if available.

Note. *The number of people performing these tasks depends on the number of DCs and the time available. When possible, allow HN authorities to conduct most of the processing.

Legend:

CA	civil affairs	MI	military intelligence
DC	dislocated civilian	NGO	nongovernmental organization
HN	host nation		

B-42. The commander of the DC camp establishes the procedures and requirements for accountability during operations within the camp. Translators are available throughout processing. A senior staff member welcomes new arrivals and ensures that they feel welcome. The DCs receive a briefing on facility policies and procedures, and screenings are conducted to identify security or medical concerns. They are also provided access to personal hygiene facilities. Family integrity is always maintained, if possible.

B-43. Searches of arriving DCs are conducted to take control of items that may pose a risk to camp personnel and residents. During these searches, all prohibited items that noncombatants are not allowed to possess, according to U.S. or HN policy, are confiscated and labeled. Units have several options for the disposition of controlled property. Depending on the category of the property, units may choose to retain control of it, return it to the individual from whom it was taken, or hand it over to other agencies, such as local law enforcement. The owner should receive an official receipt, such as DA Form 3161, along with an explanation of their rights and the procedures for retrieving their confiscated items. Camp commanders must ensure that there is proper accountability for all confiscated property.

B-44. Same-sex searches should be conducted whenever possible. Strip searches are only performed with special authorization and only in exceptional circumstances. Due to considerations of speed and security,

mixed-sex searches may be required. If such searches are necessary, they must be conducted respectfully, using all possible measures to avoid actions that could be perceived as sexual molestation or assault. The onsite supervisor must closely oversee Soldiers conducting mixed-sex searches to prevent allegations of sexual misconduct. Utilizing personnel from HNs, NGOs, or international humanitarian organizations to conduct searches may help avoid negative situations.

B-45. Military police are responsible for classifying DCs during processing. They coordinate with CA personnel, NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, and other international bodies to determine the appropriate classifications for these CIVs. Military police personnel should anticipate a continuous need for reclassifying and reassessing DCs. The initial classifications of DCs are based on their statements and the information provided on their identification papers. Individuals who may be considered DCs, such as agitators or enemy plants, are identified through their activities. Reclassification of DCs may occur based on their true identity and/or ideology, facilitated by a CIV internee review tribunal. If DCs are reclassified as detainees, they will be transferred to either a theater internment facility or a strategic internment facility.

B-46. When processing DCs, military police should use the reporting and tracking systems provided by the HN, other U.S. agencies (such as the DOS), or international governmental organizations. If these systems are unavailable, the National Detainee Reporting Center can assist commanders by granting access to the DRS, the official database of the DOD for detainee operations. The National Detainee Reporting Center is responsible for training personnel, maintaining the system, and administering access to the DRS to ensure accurate accountability of detainees. An identification card is issued to facilitate the identification of a DC. This card includes the name, photograph, and control number of the DC. The control number can be an internment serial number or a unique sequence number specific to the DC. Identification cards or bands help categorize DCs for identification purposes. Identification bands allow for rapid and reliable identification of individuals and may be used during resettlement operations. Although DCs cannot be prevented from removing or destroying these identification bands, most will accept their use for identification. If identification bands or cards deteriorate, they should be replaced immediately.

Addressing Mistreatment or Abuse

B-47. All DOD personnel, including military members, CIV employees, and contractors, are required to identify, report, and document incidents or situations that may involve the mistreatment or abuse of DCs. Acts and omissions that result in inhumane treatment could violate U.S. laws, U.S. policies, and the laws of war. Immediate action must be taken to rectify these violations. Simply reporting them is not enough. If a violation is ongoing, it is the responsibility of Soldiers to take action to stop it and to inform their chain of command.

B-48. All personnel who observe or have knowledge of potential abuse or mistreatment must immediately report the incident through their chain of command or to their supervisor. Reports can also be submitted to military police, a judge advocate, a chaplain, or an inspector general, who will then forward the report through the appropriate chain of command or supervision. Reports made to other officials will be accepted and promptly forwarded through the chain of command of the recipient, with an informational copy sent to the appropriate CCDR.

B-49. Any commander or supervisor who receives credible information regarding actual or potential abuse or mistreatment must report the incident immediately through the appropriate command or supervisory channels. This should be directed to the responsible CCDR or another relevant authority, such as CID or the inspector general, particularly in cases involving personnel not assigned to a CCDR. In such cases, an information report must also be sent to the CCDR responsible for the location of the alleged incident.

Basic Conduct Reminders

B-50. The following basic conduct reminders should be observed from the initial contact with DCs, during in-processing, and throughout DC activities. All DC camp personnel will—

- Maintain rigorous self-discipline.
- Uphold a professional and impartial attitude.
- Adhere to the established guidelines in the rules of interaction and ROE.
- Remain calm with hostile or unruly behavior or incidents.
- Respond fairly and promptly to issues that arise.

B-51. The commander of the DC camp takes proactive steps to establish daily and periodic routines that promote discipline and control. DC camp personnel—

- Enforce policies and procedures to maintain order among camp residents.
- Provide clear and decisive instructions to DCs in a language they understand.
- Display camp rules, regulations, instructions, notices, orders, and announcements in an easily accessible area for residents to follow. This information must be printed in a language that the DCs understand. Those who cannot access the posted materials will receive a printed copy (see figure B-4).
- Ensure that DCs comply with orders, rules, and directives.
- Report DCs who refuse to follow an order or regulation.
- Enforce a policy of nonfraternization with DCs.
- Refrain from accepting gifts from, or engaging in commercial activities with, DCs.

BARRACKS RULES

1. **Do not move from assigned barracks without permission.** *NOTE: Area teams assign individuals to the designated barracks. Only the U.S. center's administrative staff can change barracks assignments. Occupants desiring to change barracks must request permission from the area office.*
2. **Maintain the sanitary and physical condition of the barracks.** *NOTE: Barracks chiefs organize occupants to perform these tasks.*
3. **Empty and wash trash cans daily.** *NOTE: Put the trash into the trash receptacles (dumpsters) in the barracks area.*
4. **Do not bring food or cooking utensils into the barracks. Do not take food from the mess halls (other than baby food and fruit).**
5. **Do not have weapons of any kind in the barracks and in the surrounding camp.**
6. **Do not have pets in the camp.**
7. **Observe barracks lights-out time of 2300. Barracks indoor lights will be turned out at 2300 each night. Do not play radios or other electronic devices after 2300.**
8. **Do not allow children to play on the fire escape.**
9. **Watch children carefully and do not allow them to wander out of the residence areas.**
10. **Do not throw diapers and sanitary napkins into the toilets. Place these items into trash cans.**
11. **Do not allow children to chase or play with wild animals, as these animals may bite and carry diseases.**
12. **Obtain necessary barracks supplies from the barracks chief.**
13. **Do not smoke, use electrical appliances for heating or cooking, or have open fires in the barracks.**

Figure B-4. Example of camp rules

Appendix C

Battlefield Confinement of United States Military Prisoners

This appendix discusses the considerations for battlefield detention and confinement that a CCDR must take into account if they decide to retain U.S. prisoners in-theater. Battlefield detention and confinement facilities are crucial in the U.S. military justice system, enabling commanders to maintain discipline, law, and order. These facilities are equipped to provide both pretrial and posttrial confinement for U.S. military personnel, DOD CIV employees, DOD contractor personnel, and other individuals accompanying or authorized to work with the U.S. military during declared war and contingency operations.

BATTLEFIELD FACILITY

C-1. The field detention facility and the field confinement facility provide a uniform system for incarcerating individuals and offering limited correctional and rehabilitative services to those who have violated established rules of discipline. Field detention facilities can operate at the BCT level. A field confinement facility is established at the theater level and is responsible for longer-term confinement before the evacuation of U.S. military prisoners from that theater. The process of evacuating U.S. military prisoners from a field detention facility to a field confinement facility, or from a field confinement facility to a permanent facility, is conducted according to established and coordinated guidelines and the availability of appropriate facilities.

FIELD DETENTION FACILITY

C-2. Military police use field detention facilities to temporarily hold prisoners in custody. These facilities are designed to keep prisoners until they can be tried, sentenced, and transferred away from the immediate area. Prisoners awaiting trial remain with their units whenever possible instead of being placed in a field detention facility. According to the legal requirements established in Rules for Courts-Martial 305(k) (see the Manual for Courts-Martial), prisoners can be placed in pretrial confinement and retained by military police. This rule requires a probable cause belief that a court-martial offense has occurred, that the prisoner is responsible for it, and that a more stringent form of restraint is necessary to ensure that the prisoner attends pretrial proceedings or the trial, or to prevent serious criminal misconduct. PMs are responsible for the location, setup, and operation of these field detention facilities.

C-3. When operating a field detention facility, military police use DD Form 2707 (*Confinement Order*) to sign for each prisoner and DA Form 4137 to document the property of each prisoner. Follow established policies and procedures regarding the care and treatment of prisoners and safeguarding their personal effects in both field detention and field confinement facilities. If preexisting structures are available, they should be used as field detention facilities. Tents should be no smaller than the medium general-purpose tent in cases where they are necessary. Probable equipment and supplies required for the establishment of a field detention facility include, but are not limited to:

- Barbed wire (roll and concertina).
- Fence posts.
- Gates and doors.
- Floodlights and spotlights.
- Generators.
- Food service and cleaning equipment.
- Water cans and/or lister bags.
- First-aid supplies and equipment.
- Field sanitation equipment and supplies.
- Clothing and bedding.

FIELD CONFINEMENT FACILITY

C-4. Military police may need to establish a field confinement facility in the theater to detain prisoners for a short term, whether for pretrial, posttrial, or until they can be transferred to another facility outside the theater. Accompanying the prisoner will be DA Form 4137 and DD Form 2707. The field confinement facility can be either semipermanent or permanent and should be better equipped and resourced than a field detention facility (see figure C-1 for an example of a field confinement facility). The unit commander and staff will use the military decision-making process to identify the tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. These tasks may include—

- Selecting a suitable location and constructing the facility.
- Determining processing, classification, and identification requirements.
- Providing clothing and meals.
- Providing medical care and sanitation facilities.
- Exercising discipline, control, and administration.
- Conducting emergency planning and investigations.
- Enforcing ROE and RUF.
- Providing transportation.
- Overseeing the transfer and disposition of U.S. military prisoners.




Figure C-1. Field confinement facility example

C-5. The location of the field confinement facility is influenced by several factors, including the availability of sustainment assets such as transportation and medical treatment facilities, the terrain and existing structures, the enemy situation, existing LOC, the layout of the battlefield, and mission variables. Before selecting a site, the PM must collaborate with engineers, the staff judge advocate, HN authorities, and other coordinating staff. The facility should be positioned away from perimeter fences, public thoroughfares, gates, headquarters, troop areas, dense vegetation, and wooded areas.

C-6. The construction of the field confinement facility depends on the availability of existing structures, workforce, and materials. Existing facilities will be used to the fullest extent possible. If no preexisting facilities are available, the PM should coordinate with the engineering staff to construct a facility based on designs in the Joint Construction Management System database.

PROCESSING, CLASSIFYING, AND IDENTIFYING

C-7. Processing, classifying, and identifying U.S. military prisoners are critical for operating a correctional facility. Accurate documentation ensures that the classification and identification processes can run smoothly. The accountability of all prisoners in field confinement facilities is maintained using the Army Corrections Information System module of the Army Command Information System, when available.

Processing

C-8. Each time the control of a U.S. military prisoner is transferred, the receiving organization uses DA Form 4137 to acknowledge receipt. This documents the property of the prisoner during the transfer process.

C-9. Upon arrival, prisoners undergo in-processing at the field confinement facility, which is managed by a military police detention company, prisoner operations section. This process helps to integrate newly confined prisoners into the correctional environment. Newly confined prisoners are processed according to the guidelines to ensure that—

- DD Form 2707 is accurate.
- Property is searched and segregated (authorized and unauthorized).
- Prisoners are strip-searched.
- Prisoners are issued the appropriate health and comfort supplies and complete a DD Form 504 (*Request and Receipt for Health and Comfort Supplies*).
- Prisoners are photographed and fingerprinted.
- Prisoner DNA samples are taken.
- All documents are completed. Use the Army Corrections Information System Centralized Operations Police Suite (see AR 190-47).
- Prisoners are informed of mail and visitation rights.

C-10. A medical officer examines each prisoner within 24 hours of confinement and completes DD Form 503 (*Health Assessment Certificate for Segregation*) or SF 600 (*Chronological Record of Medical Care*). Newly admitted prisoners are segregated from the general population during their initial processing. Tattoos, scars, and identifying marks are recorded on DD Form 2710 (*Prisoner Background Summary*). The personal property of the prisoner (clothing, money, official papers, and documents) is examined.

C-11. Newly confined prisoners complete training that explains the facility rules and regulations, counseling procedures, the Uniform Code of Military Justice disciplinary authority and procedures, and work assignment procedures as soon as possible. The rights of prisoners and the procedures for presenting complaints and grievances, as detailed in AR 20-1, are fully and clearly explained. Pretrial prisoners receive careful instruction regarding their privileges, status, and rights. They participate in the correctional orientation or treatment program phases determined necessary by the facility commander to ensure custody and control, and to support their employment, training, health, and welfare. Confined officers and noncommissioned officers do not exercise command or supervisory authority over others while incarcerated and must adhere to the same facility rules and regulations as other prisoners. They are not granted special privileges typically associated with their former rank.

Classifying

C-12. U.S. military prisoners in a field confinement facility are classified into two categories:

- Pretrial prisoners. These individuals have been ordered into pretrial confinement by a competent authority while awaiting trial by court-martial. Pretrial prisoners must be kept separate from those who have already completed their trial. Additionally, they must be segregated by sex and classified according to rank, including officer, noncommissioned officer, or enlisted Soldier.
- Posttrial prisoners. This category includes individuals who have been found guilty and sentenced to confinement. Posttrial prisoners also encompass in-transit prisoners being transferred to another facility, and those who remain at the field confinement facility for short-term sentences.

Identifying

C-13. All prisoners have individual identification photographs taken. The last name, first name, and middle initial of the prisoner are displayed on the first line of a name board, while the prisoner registration number is placed on the second line. Two front-facing photographs and two profile pictures of the prisoner are captured. Fingerprints are obtained according to AR 190-47.

CLOTHING, MEALS, AND DINING FACILITIES

C-14. One of the many challenges that military police commanders and leaders face when operating a facility is ensuring that the basic treatment standards for U.S. military prisoners are upheld. These standards include, but are not limited to—

- Proper clothing for all seasons and weather.
- Meals that are properly rationed and distributed.

C-15. Dining facilities must address special security concerns. Military police guarding U.S. military prisoners need to remain vigilant in areas where prisoners gather, such as dining facilities. Proper planning is critical for establishing an effective system that meets supply needs and ensures that those requirements are fulfilled.

Clothing

C-16. Prisoners at a field confinement facility wear the uniform of their military Service. Certain clothing items, as specified in AR 700-84, and additional articles, as determined by the facility commander, are returned to the prisoner. Rank insignia is not worn while in confinement. The issuance and cost of clothing supplied to prisoners (excluding officers) follow the guidelines in AR 700-84 and CTA 50-900. DA Form 3078 (*Personal Clothing Request*) is maintained for personnel with less than six months of active duty service and those receiving clothing on an issue-in-kind basis. Within the allowances specified in CTA 50-900, organizational clothing may be provided to prisoners according to AR 710-2. Clothing for prisoners, except for officers on pay status, is laundered or dry-cleaned at no charge (see AR 210-130). The disposal of clothing and personal property is conducted according to AR 190-47.

Meals

C-17. Prisoners receive nutritious and sufficient meals prepared according to the Army Master Menu. They are typically provided with all necessary eating utensils. However, the field confinement facility commander must approve the withholding of utensils. Prisoners in close confinement, those who have lost privileges, or those undergoing approved disciplinary actions may be denied supplemental rations as outlined in the Army Master Menu. To ensure safety and prevent injuries to staff and prisoners, the field confinement facility commander or a designated representative may implement alternative meal control procedures if a prisoner is suspected of tampering with food. A medical officer must document and approve these procedures and should not exceed seven days.

Dining Facilities

C-18. Dining facilities may be part of the unit operating the field confinement facility or established through appropriate contracting procedures. The commander of the field confinement facility must determine the most effective method for providing meals to the prisoners, considering the available dining facilities, logistics, and support from the HN.

MEDICAL CARE AND SANITATION

C-19. Medical personnel at a field confinement facility provide medical and behavioral health care, referrals, limited counseling, and social services. Medical officers, clinical nurses, or physician assistants conduct medical examinations to assess the fitness of newly confined prisoners and those outside military control for more than 24 hours. These examinations are completed within 24 hours of the initial arrival of the prisoner or return to confinement, typically at the field confinement facility. Dental services are also available to all prisoners as needed. A medical officer, clinical nurse, or physician assistant examines each prisoner in close confinement daily. Except in cases that require the protection of medical information, the facility commander is informed of medical observations and recommendations regarding the correctional treatment needs of an individual prisoner.

C-20. Prisoners are tested for human immunodeficiency virus and screened for tuberculosis within three duty days of their initial confinement. The human immunodeficiency virus test and the tuberculosis screening results are recorded on DD Form 503 or SF 600.

C-21. The medical commander or a designated representative, such as preventive medicine personnel, conducts a monthly inspection of the field confinement facility. This inspection ensures that the facility operates according to established preventive medicine standards. The field confinement facility commander receives a copy of the inspection results immediately after completion. Additional medical guidance can be found in AR 190-47.

C-22. The commander of the field confinement facility must enforce strict sanitation standards. Preventive medicine personnel provide direct oversight and support to the field sanitation teams as needed.

C-23. Prisoners must maintain personal hygiene and bathe regularly while in custody to prevent the spread of communicable diseases. The commander of the field confinement facility is responsible for enforcing high sanitation standards in facilities where prisoners share common latrines and showers.

DISCIPLINE, CONTROL, AND ADMINISTRATION

C-24. Establishing discipline, control, and administrative procedures for military police managing correctional facilities is crucial for the success of U.S. military corrections operations. Military police leaders must implement procedures that comply with U.S. laws and policies to guide personnel working in these facilities. These procedures ensure that prisoners are allowed the full range of privileges afforded to persons of their status if facility standards are consistently applied.

Discipline

C-25. Field confinement facility commanders are authorized by public law and AR 190-47 to—

- Restrict the movement and actions of prisoners.
- Take necessary measures to maintain control.
- Protect the safety and welfare of prisoners and other personnel.
- Ensure the orderly operation and administration of the field confinement facility.

Note. A prisoner is considered on duty except during mandatory sleep periods, meal times, and reasonable periods for voluntary religious observance, as determined by the facility commander in coordination with the facility chaplain. Therefore, a prisoner involved in administrative disciplinary action or deemed ineligible for recreation time privileges may be required to perform other duties during that time. This performance of duty does not constitute extra duty. Privileges are withheld from prisoners individually, without regard to custody requirements or rank, and only as a disciplinary measure authorized by AR 190-47. The living conditions and the type or quantity of personal items prisoners can possess may vary based on their custody rank to incentivize elevation in custody status. Prisoners are not permitted to render military salutes. However, pretrial prisoners must salute when they are in the appropriate Service uniform.

C-26. The only authorized forms of administrative disciplinary action and punishment for military prisoners are outlined in AR 190-47 and the Manual for Courts-Martial. Procedures, rules, regulations, living conditions, and other factors influencing discipline are regularly reviewed to determine the appropriate disciplinary measures. Physical or mental punishments are strictly prohibited. The authorized administrative disciplinary actions include the following:

- **Written or oral reprimand or warning**. This includes formal notifications regarding inappropriate behavior.
- **Deprivation of privileges**. Visits may be denied or restricted only when the offense directly involves violations of visitation privileges. However, restrictions on mail are not permitted as a disciplinary action.
- **Extra duty**. Prisoners may be assigned extra duties not exceeding two hours per day for a maximum of 14 consecutive days. This extra duty cannot interfere with regular meal times, sleeping hours, or attending scheduled religious services.
- **Reduction of custody grade**. Prisoners may face a decrease in their custody classification.
- **Disciplinary segregation**. This measure can last up to 60 consecutive days. Prisoners will be informed of the reasons for their segregation and released after serving the specified time. During segregation, they will receive the same diet as nonsegregated prisoners; however, nonessential items (such as soft drinks and candy) not part of the Army Master Menu will not be provided.
- **Forfeiture of good conduct time**. Prisoners may lose all or part of their earned military good conduct time or extra good conduct time according to AR 633-30 and DODI 1325.07. The forfeiture does not need to specify whether the time lost is from good conduct time or extra good conduct time.

C-27. The commander of the field confinement facility is authorized to administer punishments but may delegate this authority to a subordinate officer (captain or above) for minor punishments. Major punishments are imposed by the first field grade commander in the chain of command when they have been delegated authority by the first general officer in that chain of command. Prohibited punitive measures include, but are not limited to—

- Clipping hair excessively short on a prisoner.
- Instituting the lockstep.
- Requiring silence during meals.
- Having prisoners break rocks.
- Using restraining straps and jackets, shackles, or hand or leg irons as forms of punishment.
- Removing the underclothing or clothing of a prisoner or subjecting them to other degrading practices.
- Flogging, branding, tattooing, or cruel or unusual punishment.
- Mandating strenuous physical activity or requiring a prisoner to hold a body position that induces undue stress on the body.
- Using hand or leg irons, belly chains, or similar restraints to create the appearance of a chain gang.

C-28. Prohibited security measures include, but are not limited to—

- Employing chemicals to subdue or incapacitate prisoners (except riot control agents).
- Employing machine guns, rifles, or automatic weapons at guard towers, except to protect the field confinement facility from enemy or hostile fire. Selected marksmen equipped with rifles may be used as part of a disorder plan specifically authorized by the higher echelon commander (other than the field confinement facility commander).
- Using electrically charged fencing.
- Securing a prisoner to a fixed object. This is prohibited, except in emergencies or when specifically approved by the facility commander to prevent potential danger to the field confinement facility staff and/or the outside community. Medical authorities should be consulted to assess the health risk to prisoners.
- Using MWDs to guard prisoners.

Control

C-29. The commander of the field confinement facility adheres to the custody and control guidelines outlined in AR 190-47. The facility commander, or a designated representative, conducts physical counts of prisoners daily. The report submitted by the inspecting officer includes verification of DD Form 506 (*Daily Strength Record of Prisoners*). Physical counts must include, at a minimum, the following:

- A roll call or a similarly accurate accounting method during morning, noon, and evening formations.
- A head count immediately upon the return of prisoners from work details.
- Bed checks conducted between 2300 and 2400 hours, and between 2400 and 0600 hours.

C-30. The appropriate level of custodial supervision for each prisoner is determined by reviewing all relevant records, including the DD Form 2713 (*Prisoner Observation Report*), DD Form 2714 (*Prisoner Disciplinary Report/Action*), DODI 1325.07, and recommendations from corrections supervisors and support personnel. Prisoners are not assigned to a permanent custody grade solely based on the offenses for which they were confined. Instead, prisoner classification is established at the minimum custody grade necessary while adhering to sound security requirements and the guidelines outlined in DODI 1325.07. The custody grades include trustee, minimum, medium, and maximum security. Field confinement facility commanders may further subdivide these custody grades to implement additional security controls.

Administration

C-31. The commander and staff of a military police detention company or battalion operates a field confinement facility. In addition to fulfilling personnel and service requirements during processing, they perform the following duties:

- **Shift supervisor**. The shift supervisor keeps the commander of the field confinement facility informed about matters affecting the custody, control, and security of the facility. The commander must select a shift supervisor who directly oversees correctional and custodial personnel within the facility. Shift supervisors ensure compliance with rules, regulations, and the SOP. They directly supervise facility guards and are responsible for overseeing prisoner activities. Additionally, they monitor custody, control, and security measures; ensure adherence to scheduled calls; and initiate emergency and control procedures. Supervisory personnel assigned to the facility may also carry out these duties.
- **Facility correctional officers and guards**. Facility guards report to the shift supervisor and are responsible for the custody, control, and discipline of prisoners. They manage activities according to the established schedule and oversee the execution of emergency action plans. Their responsibilities include conducting periodic inspections, searches, head counts, roll calls, and bed checks. Table C-1, page 144, outlines the specific duties that facility guards must perform.

Table C-1. Facility guards duties and actions

Duties	*Actions*
Close confinement	Close-confinement Soldiers are responsible for maintaining custody and control of prisoners who are separated from the general population for reasons such as in-processing, administrative issues, or disciplinary actions. They ensure that activities are carried out according to the schedule applicable to the close-confinement area. When a DD Form 509 (*Inspection Record of Prisoner in Segregation*) is required, close-confinement Soldiers must conduct checks every 30 minutes. Special-status prisoners are checked every 15 minutes, while prisoners identified as suicide risks are monitored continuously. Guards are also responsible for obtaining all required signatures on the DD Form 509 daily.
Dining facility	Dining facility Soldiers are responsible for the custody and control of prisoners during mealtimes. They ensure that the dining facility traffic plan is followed to prevent prisoner congestion in high-traffic areas. Silverware is counted before and after the meal. Prisoners are searched before leaving the dining facility.
Detail	Detail supervisors maintain custody, control, and supervision of prisoners on assigned details. They ensure that work is completed and that safety precautions are observed. They maintain strict accountability of equipment and tools. Detail supervisors assist with frisking and/or strip-searching prisoners who are returning from details. They account for prisoners on details according to the schedule of calls. They constantly track the location of the prisoner(s) while they are on a detail.
Prisoner escorts	Prisoner escorts provide custody and control while moving prisoners to and from designated places. If required and authorized by the facility commander, each may be armed with a pistol. If armed, escorts are qualified with a pistol and trained in RUF, ROE, and firearms safety procedures for transporting prisoners by land, air, and sea.
Main gate and/or sally port	Soldiers assigned to the main gate and/or sally port ensure that only authorized persons enter the field confinement facility, provide custody and control of prisoners, and inspect vehicles entering and leaving the field confinement facility. They provide security by inspecting packages, conducting inventories of items entering and exiting the facility, and requiring noncustodial personnel to register on sign-in logs.
Visitor room	Visitor room Soldiers are responsible for the custody and control of prisoners during visits authorized by the field confinement facility commander. They are to detect violations of rules and regulations, improper behavior, and contraband delivery. They position themselves in an inconspicuous place and observe the conversations rather than listen to them. Any identified infractions are reported to the shift supervisor and may be grounds for termination of the visit.
Medical treatment facility	Health care escorts provide custody and control while escorting prisoners to and from medical appointments and during specified hospitalizations within the medical treatment facility. They ensure that rooms are clear of contraband and prevent unauthorized communications with other individuals. For those prisoners evacuated through medical channels, the echelon commander or supporting military police commander must provide guards/escorts, as health care personnel cannot perform guard duties.
Tower watch	Soldiers assigned to duty in towers provide custody and control by observing specific perimeter sectors. The Soldiers are briefed on the use of force and are qualified with a 12-gauge shotgun and/or their assigned weapon. They ensure that contraband is not passed through the fence and protect Soldiers in the compound/enclosure.
Note. The facility commander may adjust the number and types of guards based on available personnel.	
Legend: DD — Department of Defense (form) ROE — rules of engagement RUF — rules for the use of force	

C-32. The commander of the field confinement facility must keep various records and reports to facilitate administrative operations. They should also ensure that a complete and current set of regulations governing corrections and confinement facilities is readily available. These regulations include, but are not limited to, the following:

- AR 15-130.
- AR 190-14.
- AR 190-47.
- AR 633-30.
- DODI 1325.07.
- Manual for Courts-Martial.

C-33. A correctional treatment file is established within the first 72 hours of initial confinement and is maintained throughout the entire time the prisoner is in custody. If a prisoner is transferred to a different facility, this file will accompany them. AR 190-47 outlines the minimum requirements for the correctional treatment file.

C-34. The field confinement facility commander must consider sentence computations if the theater commander determines that certain sentences will be served within the theater. This decision depends on the type of operation and its projected duration. Sentence computation is conducted according to AR 633-30 and DODI 1325.07. The facility commander should ensure that the personnel services noncommissioned officer in the personnel staff office is properly trained to perform sentence computations. Incorrect computations could lead to erroneous release dates and violate the legal rights of a prisoner. The rate of earning good conduct time is calculated based on the confinement length for the prisoner, including pretrial time.

MAIL AND CORRESPONDENCE

C-35. The staff at the field confinement facility documents the inspection of mail, correspondence, and authorized correspondents using DD Form 499 (*Prisoner's Mail and Correspondence Record*) of each prisoner. The guidelines for mail and correspondence, as stated in AR 190-47, applies to the battlefield confinement of U.S. military prisoners.

PRISONER PERSONAL PROPERTY AND FUNDS

C-36. Prisoners at the field confinement facility are permitted to store personal property in the prisoner personal property storage area for safekeeping, provided that the facility commander has not authorized retention of that property. The guidance for managing prisoner personal property and funds, as outlined in AR 190-47, applies to the battlefield confinement of U.S. military prisoners.

SUPPORT PERSONNEL

C-37. Support personnel assigned to the unit operating the field confinement facility are responsible for assisting the facility. Soldiers with specialized training, such as medical personnel, chaplains, and behavioral health staff, serve as valuable resources for the administration of the facility. These support personnel receive orientation and training in the procedures related to custody and control. A formal training program is established that may include, but is not limited to—

- Supervisory and interpersonal communication skills.
- Self-defense techniques.
- RUF.
- Weapons qualifications (see DA Pamphlet 350-38).
- First-aid procedures.
- Emergency plans.
- Field confinement facility regulations.
- Riot-control techniques.

SUPPLY SERVICES

C-38. The supply functions for units operating the field confinement facility are similar to those in other military operations. However, there is greater emphasis on security measures and accountability procedures. This focus is necessary to prevent certain supplies and equipment from falling into the hands of prisoners.

C-39. Weapons, ammunition, and emergency equipment (handcuffs and leg irons) must be stored in maximum-security locked racks and cabinets. These racks and cabinets should be placed in a room located away from prisoner areas.

C-40. The unit logistics officer is responsible for ensuring that a sufficient supply of general-use and janitorial items is available to maintain the cleanliness of the field confinement facility and prevent the spread of potential diseases. General-use items include mops, buckets, brooms, toiletries, and office supplies. These items are issued strictly under controlled procedures and only on an as-needed basis to prisoners and staff. Health and comfort items are provided to new prisoners during the initial processing and are regularly replenished afterward. Prisoners can request additional supplies using DD Form 504. Those in a nonpay status receive these items free of charge. Basic health and comfort supplies include, but are not limited to, safety razors, bath soap, toothbrushes, toothpaste, and shoe polish.

C-41. Physical inventories are conducted at least once a month to reconcile and balance the records of the previous inventory, supplies received, and supplies issued to prisoners. The commander of the field confinement facility or a designated representative verifies the inventory in writing.

EMERGENCY PLANNING AND INVESTIGATIONS

C-42. The commander of the field confinement facility publishes formal plans for apprehending escaped prisoners, protecting against and preventing fires, evacuating the field confinement facility (in CBRN and other scenarios), quelling prisoner riots and disorders, evacuating mass casualties, quarantining U.S. military prisoners, and conducting special-confinement and U.S. military prisoner processing operations. These plans must form part of the unit SOPs and be tailored to the physical environment where the field confinement facility is located. Emergency action plans are tested at least every six months. Evacuation drills (such as fire drills) are conducted monthly. The essential elements of these plans include—

- Providing notification by alarm and confirming the nature of the situation.
- Providing procedures for manning critical locations on the exterior of the field confinement facility (control points, escape routes, observation points, and defensive positions).
- Providing procedures to secure the prisoner population while executing emergency action plans.
- Instituting prisoner and cadre recall procedures and developing a means of organizing forces (for example, search parties and riot control teams).
- Implementing procedures to terminate the emergency action plan and conducting follow-up actions (submitting reports, conducting an investigation).
- Providing procedures for evacuating mass casualties and securing prisoners.

C-43. The commander of the field confinement facility is responsible for organizing a reaction force trained in the use of force, riot control formations, and other emergency actions. The size of the reaction force will vary based on the available personnel and the specific nature of the emergency.

C-44. Where appropriate or required by law, incidents of misconduct, breaches of discipline, or violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice are investigated according to the procedures established in AR 15-6. Before interviewing prisoners suspected or accused of violations, investigators must inform them of their rights against self-incrimination under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice. Prisoners are advised that their statements may be used as evidence against them in a criminal trial or disciplinary proceedings. They are also informed of their right to counsel and the option to have an attorney present during questioning. Requesting to consult with counsel does not automatically lead to the case being referred to a three-member board. If a prisoner requests an attorney, arrangements will be made for them to meet with legal counsel as soon as practicable. Relevant witnesses, including those identified by U.S. military prisoners, are interviewed as deemed appropriate by the investigator. Written, sworn statements are obtained when possible. The investigation is conducted promptly, and a disciplinary report is submitted to the field confinement facility commander or a designated representative.

C-45. After receiving the disciplinary and adjustment board report, the senior board member will summarize the report in a memorandum for record. The member may refer the case for counseling and/or reprimand, or take other necessary actions as appropriate. For additional guidance on disciplinary and adjustment boards, see AR 190-47.

RULES OF INTERACTION

C-46. The commander of the field confinement facility must establish and enforce rules of interaction to ensure the humane treatment and care of prisoners, regardless of the reasons for their confinement. These rules of interaction include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Maintain professionalism and be a positive role model for the prisoners.
- Be firm, impartial, and decisive in all actions.
- Avoid being overly familiar or confrontational with prisoners.
- Do not become emotionally or personally involved with prisoners.
- Refrain from gambling, fraternizing, or engaging in commercial activities with prisoners.
- Do not show favoritism toward prisoners.
- Do not give gifts to prisoners or accept gifts from them.

USE OF FORCE

C-47. Guidelines on the use of force are included in orders, plans, SOPs, and instructions at field detention and field confinement facilities. Under all circumstances, only the minimum necessary force should be used. The use of firearms or other deadly force is justified only in situations of extreme necessity and as a last resort. Guards are prohibited from using physical force against a prisoner except in the following circumstances: to defend themselves, to prevent an escape, to prevent injury to individuals, to prevent property damage, to control a disturbance, to move an unruly prisoner, or as otherwise authorized in AR 190-47.

C-48. In the event of an imminent group or mass breakout from the field confinement facility, or another general disorder, it should be clearly communicated to the prisoners that order will be restored, using force if necessary. If the situation allows, a qualified senior noncommissioned officer or the facility commander should attempt to reason with the prisoners involved in the disorder. If reasoning fails or the situation does not permit it, a direct order should be issued to the prisoners to terminate the disorder. Before escalating to the use of force, prisoners who are not involved in the disturbance may be given the opportunity to voluntarily assemble in a controlled area away from the disturbance.

C-49. According to AR 190-47, commanders must ensure that personnel are trained on the policies regarding the use of force. Personnel should also be trained and qualified in the use of oleoresin capsicum spray and familiar with the weapons they carry. All staff receive comprehensive training on the use-of-force policies and the guidelines outlined in AR 190-14. Tower and escort guards are specifically instructed not to fire a shotgun at a distance of less than 20 meters to prevent prisoner escapes. These instructions will be included in the training programs for prison guards and in special directives prepared for guard personnel.

ESCAPE

C-50. Each guard is provided a whistle or another suitable audible alarm. The use of firearms to prevent an escape is justified only when no other reasonable means are available to prevent it (see AR 190-14). If a prisoner attempts to escape from the confines of the facility, the guard should follow these priorities:

- Blow three short blasts on the whistle or sound an alarm to alert other guard personnel about the attempted escape.
- In a loud voice, command the prisoner to halt three times.
- Use firearms only if the prisoner has passed all perimeter barriers of the facility and continues to attempt an escape.

Note. Warning shots are prohibited.

C-51. The physical layout of the field confinement facility determines the placement of barriers. Typically, barriers consist of fences or walls that enclose athletic fields, drill areas, recreational spaces, prisoner housing units, and administrative buildings.

TRANSPORTATION

C-52. The commander of the field confinement facility is responsible for transporting prisoners, which includes ensuring their safety and security once they are in the commander's direct custody. The field confinement facility commander must ensure that the guard and escort force is thoroughly familiar with the RUF and the movement tasks. The field confinement facility commander should ensure that the escort guards—

- Know the—
  - Type of vehicle being used.
  - Departure time.
  - Number of prisoners and their status.
  - Number of assigned escorts.
  - Type of weapons with which they are armed.
  - Type of restraints used (if applicable).
  - Transfer procedures at the final destination.
- Know the actions to take in the event of a disorder or an escape attempt.
- Conduct a thorough vehicle search and ensure that items that could be used as weapons are removed or secured.
- Do not handcuff two prisoners together if both are at risk of escape.
- Do not handcuff prisoners to any part of a vehicle.
- Sign a DD Form 2708 (*Receipt for Pretrial/Post-Trial Prisoner or Detained Person*) for each prisoner escorted out of the field confinement facility.
- Frisk the prisoners before loading them into the vehicle.
- Follow loading procedures based on the type of transport available.
- Know the emergency planning, loading, unloading, latrine, and meal procedures.

C-53. A service pistol and/or service rifle is used when prisoners are under escort. Machine guns and submachine guns are not permitted for guarding U.S. military prisoners. Weapons are not allowed inside controlled areas of the field confinement facility unless specifically directed by the field confinement facility commander.

TRANSFER AND DISPOSITION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY PRISONERS

- The commander of the field confinement facility must be prepared to transfer U.S. military prisoners to other correctional facilities outside the theater or back to their units. The receiving units are responsible for the movement of these prisoners. Prisoners may only be released from confinement with proper authorization. The field confinement facility commander will coordinate with the staff judge advocate and the next higher commander to determine the release authority and to authenticate the DD Form 2718 (*Prisoner Release Order*). Detailed guidance on the administrative and operational processes required for prisoner transfer is outlined in AR 190-47.

Appendix D

Route Classifications and Signing Systems

Military police use the military route classification system when performing the security and mobility support discipline. A route classification assigns a specific designation to a route based on several factors, including minimum width; the worst type of route; the lowest military load classification for bridges, rafts, or culverts; and obstructions that may impede traffic flow (see JP 3-34). This appendix discusses the route classification system and the types of route signage. For additional information on these topics, see ATP 3-34.81.

ROUTE CLASSIFICATION

D-1. Route classification describes to the assessment of the traffic-bearing capabilities and conditions of a specific route. This process aids in determining what improvements are necessary for the route to accommodate the proposed traffic. The method of route reconnaissance varies based on the level of detail needed, the time available, the terrain challenges encountered, and the current tactical situation. A hasty route classification quickly assesses the immediate military trafficability of a given route. This type of assessment is limited to collecting the critical terrain data required for classification and contributes to the mobility aspect of the common operational picture. Information about the route is updated with additional reports as the situation changes or as directed by the commander. A deliberate route classification, including evaluation of roads, bridges, tunnels, and other components, occurs when adequate time and qualified technical personnel are available. This thorough classification is typically conducted when operational needs are expected to result in heavy and prolonged road use, often following an initial hasty route reconnaissance.

D-2. Route classification involves gathering detailed technical information about various components of a designated route, including the road network, bridges, and underpasses or overpasses. Route classification visually represents the load-carrying capacities and travel rates along the selected route. All components of the designated route are reconnoitered during route classification, and a classification formula is determined. The resulting formula and the graphical information from the classification are presented as a route classification overlay. This overlay can be incorporated directly into a common operational picture and is accompanied by component reports created to determine the classification.

D-3. Route classification generally involves analyzing technical information about the various components of a selected route. In application, a route classification may focus on the most crucial details, such as whether the route includes bridges with limited weight capacity, underpasses with low overhead clearance, or road sections in poor condition. These would be the determining components (and possible sole components) of a route classification. A route classification may include information about alternate roads that can be used, and the types of vehicles and traffic loads that these alternative routes can accommodate. During combat operations, only the necessary facts about a route are gathered as quickly and safely as possible from a route reconnaissance.

D-4. The route classification formula uses numbers, letters, and symbols to represent, in order, the—

- Route width (narrowest part along the route), in meters.
- Route type, which is based on the ability to withstand weather and includes—
  - Type X—all weather.
  - Type Y—limited all weather.
  - Type Z—fair weather.
- Lowest military load classification, which is found in the vehicle technical manual or on the vehicle data plate. A route military load classification is a class number that represents the safe load-carrying capacity and indicates the maximum vehicle class that can be accepted under normal conditions. Usually, the lowest bridge military load classification (regardless of the vehicle type or traffic flow condition) determines the route military load classification. If there is no bridge on the route, the worst section of road will determine the overall route classification. The basis for a route military load classification are the effects of the vehicle characteristics (such as vehicle speed and tire width) and their loads on route trafficability. The broad categories are—

  - Class 50—average traffic route.
  - Class 80—heavy traffic route.
  - Class 120—very heavy traffic route.
- Lowest overhead clearance, in meters, between the road surface and the overhead obstacle (power lines and overpasses). Use the infinity symbol (∞) for unlimited clearance in the route classification formula.
- Obstructions to traffic flow, if applicable, which are represented in the classification formula by the letters OB. The exact nature of an obstruction is identified graphically in a route classification overlay.
- Seasonal conditions, such as snow blockage (T) or flooding (W).

D-5. The following are examples of route classification formulas:

- **6.1/Z/40/∞.** This formula depicts a fair-weather route (Z) with a minimum traveled way of 6.1 meters (6.67 yards) and a military load classification of 40. Overhead clearance is unlimited (∞), and there are no obstructions to traffic flow. This route accommodates wheeled and tracked, single-flow traffic without obstruction.
- **7/Y/50/4.6 (OB) (W).** This formula depicts a limited, all-weather route (Y) with a minimum traveled way of 7 meters (7.66 yards), a military load classification of 50, an overhead clearance of 4.6 meters (5.03 yards), and an obstruction. This route width is not suitable for double-flow traffic (wheeled or tracked). This route is subject to regular, recurrent flooding.

D-6. The route classification formula and the graphical information from the classification components are presented as a route classification overlay. This overlay visually represents a network of roads, bridge sites, and other components. As shown in figure D-1 on page 151, the route classification overlay provides detailed information about obstructions that can slow down a convoy or maneuver force along a route. Figure D-2, page 152, depicts the different route reconnaissance symbols used on these overlays.


TEMPORARY ROUTE SIGNS

D-7. Posting signs at bridges and other constriction points or key locations along a route enhances traffic control and reduces the impact of hazardous areas. Signs serve several purposes: they help identify special controls placed on specific sections of a route or technical components; warn drivers about hazardous areas or conditions; and indicate holding areas, turnouts for parking and unloading vehicles, and checkpoints. The United States and its allied nations utilize standardized procedures for posting military routes; however, this system can be integrated with other road sign systems based on military requirements.

D-8. A military route sign system, similar to the U.S. highway sign system, helps users navigate to their destinations by following the route signs and road markings displayed along the roadside. Military police patrols regularly monitor these signs, checking specific ones before critical movements. Engineers install permanent signs, but these can be damaged, destroyed, or displaced by weather, sabotage, or battle.

D-9. When military police on patrol encounter immediate and temporary obstructions on MSRs, such as blown bridges or CBRN contamination, they quickly create and erect signs to direct vehicles around the obstruction. Military police prepare and post temporary signs to—

- Identify routes.
- Reroute traffic away from problem areas.
- Assist convoys and units in moving swiftly and easily to their destinations, even on unfamiliar routes.
- Show drivers the locations of staging areas, tactical assembly areas, detours, key units, and facilities.
- Provide directions, distances, and general information.
- Help lost military personnel find their way to the nearest military police element.



Legend:

km	kilometer	NB	number
m	meter	Sec	second
min	minute	UT	universal time
N	north		

Figure D-1. Example route classification overlay

D-10. Military police acquire signing materials (signs, paint, and wire) through the Army supply system. Typically, military police platoons possess route-signing kits that contain the necessary items to construct hasty signs. In an emergency, they should use boards, shingles, or cardboard.

D-11. Conduct preplanned route signing for convoys and units traveling on long stretches of MSRs, ensuring that routes are linked well in advance. This operation can be time-consuming and requires significant manpower and materials. Engineers or military police typically construct preplanned route signs. If tasked to build these signs, store the constructed and coded signs in a secure location to prevent them from being compromised.




Figure D-2. Route reconnaissance overlay symbols




Figure D-2. Route reconnaissance overlay symbols (continued)




Figure D-2. Route reconnaissance overlay symbols (continued)





Figure D-2. Route reconnaissance overlay symbols (continued)



Note. All measurements in this figure are shown in meters (1 meter = 39.37 inches).

Legend:

DA	Department of the Army	RL	railroad bridges
m	meter(s)	U.S.	United States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization		

Figure D-2. Route reconnaissance overlay symbols (continued)

D-12. Military police squads use a route-signing kit to position signs along a designated route within their AO. One team is responsible for posting the signs, while another team provides overwatch security. The squad leader verifies the placement of each sign by traveling the entire route. He also creates an overlay that details the location of each sign within the AO of the squad. These individual squad overlays are then consolidated to contribute to a comprehensive traffic control plan for the platoon.

D-13. Place signs that will support traffic control and traffic circulation plans. Reflect changes in sign locations on the traffic control plan overlay. Ensure that all route signs are large enough to be read easily in poor light. Size is not specified, but—

- Signs for international use cannot be less than 40 centimeters (15.75 inches) by 33 centimeters (12.99 inches).
- Bridge classification signs must conform to Standardization Agreement 2010.

D-14. Use the following guidelines when placing signs:

- Place hazard signs about 150 meters (164.04 yards) before the hazard.
- Place regulatory signs (such as stop or yield signs) where a regulation takes effect.
- Place signs on the side of the road that face the traffic flow, about 1 meter (1.09 yards) off the traveled roadway. Conceal them from air view. If no cover is available, slant the sign stake forward.
- Place signs above the road level 1 to 2 meters (1.09 to 2.19 yards). Place the signs at the same height, if possible. Sign height is governed by roadside foliage, whether the route is in an urban or rural area, and by day or night use. Do not use foliage to block signs. In urban areas, signs should be placed so that they are not hidden by vehicles or pedestrians and do not hinder pedestrians. Choose locations where street lighting and vehicle headlights increase sign visibility.
- Use the least number of signs needed to be effective. Ensure that every sign is necessary and specific.
- Use more signs in urban areas than in rural areas.
- Use more signs on night routes than on routes primarily used during the day.
- Use signs to inform drivers to follow the common route when one road is used for two signed routes.
- Use signs to inform drivers when such routes diverge.

D-15. Conceal signs so that they are only visible from the direction of travel. While there is no specific rule regarding the distance from which a sign should be seen, it should be no greater than what security allows and no less than what is reasonable for those following the directions.

D-16. Carefully conceal illuminated signs. Make sure the light source is adequate to illuminate the sign but not so bright that it is visible from the air. This may require masking and covering the light sources. Consider placing chemical light sticks on top of the signs.

D-17. Place temporary route signs in locations that will give drivers adequate warning and reaction time. Ensure that these signs do not obstruct existing CIV signs. Position warning signs at appropriate distances from where a route regulation begins; this distance can be indicated on the sign (for example, BLACKOUT 500 METERS). In areas where blackout driving is required and drivers are using night-vision equipment, infrared emitters on the signs along the routes are used to assist units in reaching their destinations. Just like other light sources, make sure that the infrared emitters are not visible from the air.

D-18. Figure D-3 shows sample direction indicators that identify routes or names. Place such signs at intersections where roads merge or routes separate.




Figure D-3. Military route and location signs

D-19. Figure D-4, page 158, shows the guide and warning signs used at important road junctions. These signs are rectangular, featuring white symbols on a black background. They include a directional arrow, route number, name, and/or symbol. Guide signs should be placed at road junctions to help prevent confusion.




Figure D-4. Guide and warning signs

D-20. Figure D-5 depicts confidence and confirmation signs. Confidence signs reassure drivers that they are still on the correct route and should be placed as necessary. Confirmation signs inform drivers that they are on the correct path after they have changed direction. These signs should be positioned after turns and visible to drivers as they make those turns. Place confirmation signs 150 meters (164.04 yards) beyond critical road junctions to confirm to drivers that they are following the correct route.





Figure D-5. Confidence and confirmation signs

D-21. Figure D-6 depicts countdown and regulatory signs. Countdown signs alert drivers to situations that require significant changes in movement. These signs are placed in a series of three, spaced 100 meters (109 yards) apart, before designated locations such as start points, relay points, MSR junctions, and blackout areas.

Countdown Signs



Regulatory Signs



Legend:			
KPH	kilometers per hour	MPH	miles per hour
m	meter	SP	start point

Figure D-6. Countdown and regulatory signs

D-22. Figure D-7, page 160, depicts the signs used for hazardous situations and military casualty evacuation routes. Hazard signs alert drivers to potential traffic dangers, such as steep hills, crossroads, sharp curves, or flooded roads. While CIV signs are generally adequate, military signs should be used in combat zones. Military casualty evacuation route signs indicate the path for evacuating injured military personnel. These signs are rectangular, featuring a white background with a red directional arrow, cross, or crescent. They include the word military, the designation of the unit or subunit, and other details, such as national markings. The signs can be represented as directional disks with four segments cut out to create a cross, or as a directional disk with a crescent shape cut out.




Figure D-7. Hazard and military casualty evacuation route signs

D-23. Figure D-8, page 161, depicts signs for CIV casualty evacuation routes and blackout warnings. CIV casualty evacuation route signs indicate routes established specifically for evacuating CIV casualties. These signs feature a blue background with a Geneva Convention information symbol depicting an ambulance in white, marked with a red cross or crescent. Below the symbol, the words CIV Casualty Evacuation Route are displayed in the HN language. These signs are placed along routes designated for CIV traffic, as authorized by the HN. Blackout warning signs indicate the beginning of an area where blackouts are in effect. These signs are also based on the Geneva Convention hazard warning standard.





Figure D-8. Civilian casualty evacuation route and blackout warning signs

D-24. Figure D-9, page 162, depicts two types of signs: blackout enforcement signs and blackout relaxation signs. Blackout enforcement signs indicate that a blackout is in effect and are installed every 100 meters (109.36 yards) along the blackout route. Blackout relaxation signs signal the end of the blackout area and are placed at the end of the blackout route.

Blackout Enforcement Sign



Blackout Relaxation Sign



Figure D-9. Blackout enforcement and relaxation signs

MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE SIGNS

D-25. MSR signs are identified by number, a pictorial symbol, or a name. Pictures and names—

- Are easier to identify and remember than numbers.
- Prevent confusion with link route signs, marking the routes of units with three-figure identification numbers. (A link route connects a unit or an activity to an MSR.)
- Prevent the risk of compromising security by removing the chance of using an identification number already used on a map overlay.

D-26. The two types of MSRs used in a theater of operations are axial and lateral. The following considerations are given for the theater of operation traffic circulation plan:

- **Axial**. Axial MSRs run to and from the forward edge of the battle area and are identified by odd numbers. Axial MSRs are shown as solid lines on the traffic circulation plan overlay. Axial routes are represented by a pictorial symbol on the route sign and are marked on the overlay as pictorial (such as MSR CLUB). On axial MSRs, up is toward the forward edge of the battle area. It is shown on overlays and signs as a plain arrow. Down is away from the forward edge of the battle area. It is shown as an arrow with a bar on the tail end.
- **Lateral**. Lateral MSRs are identified by even numbers and are shown as broken lines on the traffic circulation plan overlay. A named route sign represents lateral routes. The names are short, three- or four-letter words (such as fox, ant, or hen). Up and down arrows on lateral MSRs show only general directions of travel. The general direction shown by up or down arrows varies with the theater of operation. Up is usually to the north or east; down is usually to the south or west. A plain arrow on an overlay or sign indicates up; a barred arrow shows down. To avoid confusion on lateral MSRs, use the following letters on route signs to show the general direction of movement:
  - N—north.
  - S—south.
  - E—east.
  - W—west.
  - NE—northeast.
  - NW—northwest.
  - SE—southeast.
  - SW—southwest.

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Appendix E

Security and Mobility Support Appendices to the Protection Annex

Orders are formal methods used by leaders to communicate essential information. Orders specify the who, what, when, where, why, and how a unit will support a particular mission. This appendix outlines key considerations, formats, and instructions for developing the security and mobility support appendices (area security, physical security, AT, and control of the populace and resources) to annex E, Protection, of the commander's base order or plan. Military police planners should also coordinate with other sections to address military police security and mobility support capabilities within the intelligence, operations, sustainment, CA, information collection, and HN support annexes of the base order or plan.

ORDERS

E-1. Under command and control, commanders issue mission orders focusing on the desired outcomes rather than the specific methods to achieve them. This approach allows subordinates the greatest freedom to determine the best way to accomplish their assigned missions. Effective mission orders clearly convey the situation at hand, the commander's objectives and intentions, and the key tasks assigned to each unit. The commander's intent and operational concept provide guidelines that promote unity of effort while allowing subordinate leaders the flexibility to take initiative.

E-2. Orders are communicated both verbally and in writing, often accompanied by detailed graphic overlays. Written orders typically follow a standard five-paragraph format. These orders may be updated or modified as subordinate Soldiers and units submit timely reports regarding their experiences during missions.

WARNING ORDERS

E-3. An Army warning order is a communication tool used to alert a unit or Soldier about an upcoming mission. It can be delivered verbally or in writing and should be clear and detailed to maximize the time available for mission preparation. Figure E-1, page 166, shows an annotated warning order format. The initial warning order includes key information such as the type of operation, the general location, and an initial timeline. Subsequent warning orders will provide additional details to inform subordinate leaders about the upcoming mission, ensuring that Soldiers, vehicles, and equipment are ready once the OPORD is finalized by the staff and approved by the commander. For more information on warning orders, see FM 6-0.

OPERATION ORDERS

E-4. The OPORD is a formal directive issued by the commander that outlines the mission for a company, platoon, squad, or individual Soldier. It specifies how the company, platoon, or squad will support the overall mission. An example of the OPORD format can be found in figure E-2 on page 167.

[CLASSIFICATION]
(Change from verbal orders, if any) (Optional)

Copy ## of ## copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number

WARNING ORDER [number]
References: Refer to higher headquarters OPORD and identify map sheets for operation (optional).
Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: (Optional).

Task Organization: (Optional).

1. **Situation.** The situation paragraph describes the conditions and circumstances of the operational environment that impact operations in the following subparagraphs:
    a. Area of Interest. Describe significant changes to the area of interest.
    b. Assigned Area. Describe significant changes to the area of operations.
    c. Enemy Forces. Include significant changes to enemy composition, disposition, and courses of action. Information not available may be included in subsequent WARNORDs.
    d. Friendly Forces. Address only if essential to the WARNORD.
    e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Address only if essential to the WARNORD.
    f. Civil Considerations. Address only if essential to the WARNORD.
    g. Attachments and Detachments. Provide initial task organization.
    h. Assumptions. List significant assumptions for order development.
2. **Mission.** State the issuing headquarters mission.
3. **Execution.**
    a. Initial Commander's Intent. Provide brief commander's intent statement.
    b. Concept of Operations. This may be "to be determined" for an initial WARNORD.
    c. Tasks to Subordinate Units. Include known tasks at the time of issuance of the WARNORD.
    d. Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions and tasks applicable to two or more units not covered in unit SOPs.
4. **Sustainment.** Include known logistics, personnel, or Army health system preparation tasks.
5. **Command and Signal.** Include changes to the existing order, or state "no change."

ACKNOWLEDGE: Include instructions for the acknowledgement of the OPLAN or OPORD by addressees. The word "acknowledge" may suffice. Refer to the message reference number if necessary. Acknowledgement of a plan or order means that it has been received and understood.
[Commander's last name]
[Commander's rank]

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-1. Warning order format

[CLASSIFICATION]

OFFICIAL:
[Authenticator's name]
[Authenticator's position]

ANNEXES:
DISTRIBUTION:

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Legend:

OPLAN	operations plan
OPORD	operation order
SOP	standard operating procedure
WARNORD	warning order

Figure E-1. Warning order format (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the OPLAN or OPORD. Place the classification marking TS, S, or C in parentheses at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions.

Copy ## of ## copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number

The first line of the heading is the copy number assigned by the issuing headquarters. Maintain a log of specific copies issued to addressees. The second line is the official designation of the issuing headquarters (for example, 1st Infantry Division). The third line is the place of issue. It may be a code name, postal designation, or geographic location. The fourth line is the date or date-time group in which the plan or order was signed or issued and becomes effective unless specified otherwise in the coordinating instructions. The fifth line is a headquarters internal control number assigned to all plans and orders according to unit SOPs.

OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)] [(classification of title)]

Number plans and orders consecutively by calendar year. Include code name, if any.

References: List documents that are essential to understanding the OPLAN or OPORD. List references concerning a specific function in the appropriate attachments.

(a) List maps and charts first. Map entries include the series number, country, sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale.

(b) List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-2. OPORD format

[CLASSIFICATION]

OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD: State the time zone used in the AO during execution. When the OPLAN or OPORD applies to units in different time zones, use ZULU time.

Task Organization: Describe the organization of forces available to the issuing headquarters and their command and support relationships. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) if it is long or complicated.

1. **Situation.** The situation paragraph describes the conditions of the operational environment that impact operations in the following subparagraphs:

a. Area of Interest. Describe the area of interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

b. Assigned Area. Describe the AO. Refer to the appropriate map by its subparagraph under references; for example, "Map, reference (b)." Refer to appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations) as required.

(1) Terrain. Describe the aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

(2) Weather. Describe the aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

(Place the classification and title of the OPLAN or OPORD and the issuing headquarters at the top of the second and subsequent pages of the base plan or order.)

c. Enemy Forces. Identify enemy forces and appraise their general capabilities. Describe the enemy's disposition, location, strength, and probable COA. Identify known or potential terrorist threats and adversaries within the AO. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

d. Friendly Forces. Briefly identify the missions of friendly forces and the objectives, goals, and missions of civilian organizations that impact the issuing headquarters in the following subparagraphs:

(1) Higher Headquarters Two Levels Up. Identify the mission of the higher headquarters and commander's intent two echelons above (for example, Joint Task Force-18).

(2) Higher Headquarters. Identify the mission of the higher headquarters and commander's intent one echelon above (for example, 1st U.S. Armored Division).

(3) Missions of Adjacent Units. Identify and state the missions of adjacent units and other units whose actions have a significant impact on the issuing headquarters.

e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and state the objective or goals and primary tasks of those non-DOD organizations that have a significant role within the AO. Refer to Annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required.

f. Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact operations. Refer to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

g. Attachments and Detachments. List units attached to or detached from the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order, on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the OPLAN or OPORD. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A.

h. Assumptions. List assumptions used in the development of the OPLAN or OPORD.

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-2. OPORD format (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]
OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

2. **Mission.** State the unit mission—a short description of who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.

3. **Execution.** Describe how the commander intends to accomplish the mission in terms of the commander's intent, an overarching concept of operations, schemes of employment for each warfighting function, assessment, specified tasks to subordinate units, and key coordinating instructions in the subparagraphs below.

a. Commander's Intent. Commanders develop their intent statement personally. The commander's intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions that the force must establish concerning the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations representing the desired end state. It succinctly describes what constitutes the success of an operation and provides the purpose and conditions that define the desired end state. The commander's intent must be easy to remember and clearly understood by two echelons.

b. Concept of Operations. The concept of operations is a statement that directs how subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions that the force will use to achieve the end state. It is normally expressed in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. It states the principal tasks required, the responsible subordinate units, and how the principal tasks complement each other. Usually, the concept of operations projects the status of the force at the end of the operation. The commander may phase the operation if the mission dictates a significant change in tasks during operations. The concept of operations may be a single paragraph, divided into two or more subparagraphs, or, if unusually lengthy, it may be summarized here with details in Annex C (Operations). If the concept of operations is phased, describe each phase in a subparagraph. Label these subparagraphs as "Phase" followed by the appropriate Roman numeral. For example, "Phase I." If the operation is phased, all paragraphs and subparagraphs of the base order and annexes must mirror the phasing established in the concept of operations. The operation overlay and graphic depictions of lines of effort help portray the concept of operations and are located in Annex C (Operations).

c. Scheme of Movement and Maneuver. Describe the employment of maneuver units according to the concept of operations. Provide the primary tasks of maneuver units that conduct the essential task and purpose of an operation. Next, state the primary tasks of maneuver units that conduct objectives (including security operations) and the purpose of each. For offensive operations, identify the form of maneuver. For defensive operations, identify the type of defense. For stability operations, describe the role of maneuver units by primary stability tasks. If the operation is phased, identify the main effort by phase. Identify and include the priorities for the reserve. Refer to Annex C (Operations) as required.

(1) Scheme of Mobility/Countermobility. State the scheme of mobility/countermobility, including priorities by unit or area. Refer to Annex G (Engineer) as required.

(2) Scheme of Battlefield Obscuration. State the scheme of battlefield obscuration, including priorities by unit or area. Refer to appendix 9 (Battlefield Obscuration) to Annex C (Operations) as required.

(3) Scheme of Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Describe how the commander intends to use reconnaissance and surveillance to support the concept of operations. Include the primary reconnaissance objectives. Refer to Annex L (Reconnaissance and Surveillance) as required.

Note: Army forces do not conduct reconnaissance and surveillance within the United States and its territories. For domestic operations, this paragraph is titled "Information Awareness and Assessment", and the contents of this paragraph comply with Executive Order 12333.

d. Scheme of Intelligence. Describe how the commander envisions intelligence that supports the concept of operations. Include the priority of effort to situation development, targeting, and assessment. State the priority of intelligence support to units and areas. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-2. OPORD format (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

e. Scheme of Fires. Describe how the commander intends to use fires to support the concept of operations, emphasizing the scheme of maneuver. State the fire support tasks and the purpose of each task. State the priorities for, allocation of, and restrictions on fires. Refer to Annex D (Fires) as required.

f. Scheme of Protection. Describe how the commander envisions protection that supports the concept of operations. Include the priorities of protection by unit and area. Include survivability. Address the scheme of area security, including security for routes, bases, and critical infrastructure. Identify tactical combat and other reaction forces. Use subparagraphs for protection categories (for example, air and missile defense and explosive ordnance disposal) based on the situation. Refer to Annex E (Protection) as required.

g. Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities. Describe how cyberspace electromagnetic activities (including spectrum management operations) support the concept of operations. Refer to appendix 12 (Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities) to Annex C (Operations) as required. Refer to Annex H (Signal) for defensive cyberspace operations, Department of Defense information network operations, and spectrum management operations as required.

h. Stability Tasks. Describe how the commander envisions the conduct of stability tasks in coordination with other organizations through primary stability tasks. (See ADP 3-07 for additional information.) If other organizations or the HN cannot provide for civil security, essential services restoration, and civil control, commanders with an assigned AO must do so with available resources, request additional resources, or request relief for these requirements from higher headquarters. Commanders assign specific responsibilities for stability tasks to subordinate units in paragraph 3j (Tasks to Subordinate Units) and paragraph 3k (Coordinating Instructions). Refer to Annex C (Operations) and Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.

i. Assessment. Describe the priorities for assessment and identify the measures of effectiveness used to assess end state conditions and objectives. Refer to Annex M (Assessment) as required.

j. Tasks to Subordinate Units. State the task assigned to each unit that reports directly to the headquarters, which issues the order. Each task must include who (the subordinate unit assigned the task), what (the task itself), when, where, and why (purpose). Use a separate subparagraph for each unit. List units in task organization sequence. Place tasks that affect two or more units in paragraph 3k (Coordinating Instructions).

k. Coordinating Instructions. List only the instructions and tasks that are applicable to two or more units not covered in unit SOPs.

(1) Time or Condition When the OPORD Becomes Effective. List the time or condition when the OPORD becomes effective.

(2) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. List the commander’s critical information requirements.

(3) Essential Elements of Friendly Information. List EEFIs.

(4) Fire Support Coordination Measures. List critical fire support coordination or control measures.

(5) Airspace Coordinating Measures. List critical airspace coordinating or control measures.

(6) Rules of Engagement. List the rules of engagement. Refer to appendix 11 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations) as required.

Note. For operations within the United States and its territories, title this paragraph “Rules for the Use of Force.”

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-2. OPORD format (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]
OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

(7) Risk Reduction Control Measures. State the measures that are specific to this operation but are not included in unit SOPs. This may include mission-oriented protective posture, operational exposure guidance, troop-safety criteria, and fratricide avoidance measures. Refer to Annex E (Protection) as required.

(8) Personnel Recovery Coordination Measures. Refer to appendix 2 (Personnel Recovery) to Annex E (Protection) as required.

(9) Environmental Considerations. Refer to appendix 5 (Environmental Considerations) to Annex G (Engineer) as required.

(10) Themes and Messages. List information themes and messages.

(11) Other Coordinating Instructions. List in subparagraphs additional coordinating instructions and tasks that apply to two or more units, such as the operational timeline and other critical timing or events.

4. **Sustainment.** Describe the concept of sustainment, including priorities of sustainment by unit or area. Include instructions for administrative movements, deployments, and transportation or references to applicable appendices, if appropriate. Use the following subparagraphs to provide the broad concept of support for logistics, personnel, and Army health system support. Provide detailed instructions for each sustainment subfunction in the appendices to Annex F (Sustainment) listed in table E-2.

a. Logistics. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

b. Personnel. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

c. Army Health System Support. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. Command.

(1) Location of Commander and Key Leaders. State where the commander intends to be during the operation. State it by phase if the operation is phased.

(2) Succession of Command. State the succession of command if it is not covered in unit SOPs.

(3) Liaison Requirements. State liaison requirements not covered in unit SOPs.

b. Control.

(1) Command Posts. Describe the employment of CPs, including the location of each CP and its time of opening and closing, as appropriate. State the primary controlling CP for specific tasks or phases of the operation (for example, “Division tactical command post will control the air assault”).

(2) Reports. List reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.

c. Signal. Describe the concept of signal support, including the location and movement of key signal nodes and critical electromagnetic spectrum considerations throughout the operation. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required.

ACKNOWLEDGE: Include instructions for the acknowledgement of the OPLAN or OPORD by addressees. The word “acknowledge” may suffice. Refer to the message reference number if necessary. The acknowledgement of a plan or order means that it has been received and understood.

[Commander’s last name]

[Commander’s rank]

The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase “For the Commander.” The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarters files.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-2. OPORD format (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]
OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

OFFICIAL:
[Authenticator's name]
[Authenticator's position]

Use only if the commander does not sign the original order. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.

ANNEXES: List annexes by letter and title. Army and joint OPLANs or OPORDs do not use Annexes I and O as attachments, so they label them as "Not Used." In Army orders. Annexes T, W, X, and Y are available for use in Army OPLANs or OPORDs and are labeled as "Spare." When an attachment required by doctrine or an SOP is unnecessary, label it "Omitted."

Annex A–Task Organization
Annex B–Intelligence
Annex C–Operations
Annex D–Fires
Annex E–Protection
Annex F–Sustainment
Annex G–Engineer
Annex H–Signal
Annex I–Not Used
Annex J–Public Affairs
Annex K–Civil Affairs Operations
Annex L–Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Annex M–Assessment
Annex N–Space Operations
Annex O–Not Used
Annex P–HN Support
Annex Q–Spare
Annex R–Reports
Annex S–Special Technical Operations
Annex T–Spare
Annex U–Inspector General
Annex V–Interagency Coordination
Annex W–Spare
Annex X–Spare
Annex Y–Spare
Annex Z–Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Furnish distribution copies for action or for information. List, in detail, those who are to receive the plan or order. Refer to Annex Z (Distribution) if lengthy.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Legend:

ADP	Army doctrine publication	HN	host nation
AO	area of operations	OPLAN	operation plan
AR	Army regulation	OPORD	operation order
C	confidential	S	secret
COA	course of action	SOP	standard operating procedure
CP	command post	TS	top secret
DOD	Department of Defense	ZULU	time zone indicator for universal time source
EEFI	essential elements of friendly information		

Figure E-2. OPORD format (continued)

OPERATION ORDER ATTACHMENTS

E-5. Attachments (annexes, appendices, tabs, exhibits) simplify orders by providing a clear structure for organizing information. Using attachments enhances the clarity and usefulness of the base order by emphasizing specific information, administrative support details, and instructions that expand on the base order.

ATTACHMENTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO MILITARY POLICE

E-6. Military police do not have standalone annexes. Instead, the PM or military police planner contributes to Annex C (Operations) and a portion of Annex E (Protection) of the OPORD or operation plan. Security and mobility support areas of interest for annexes and attachments—

- Conducting maneuver and mobility support operations, which encompass route reconnaissance, surveillance, circulation control, management of DCs and stragglers, and information dissemination.
- Conducting area security operations involving activities related to AT (security measures and mitigation strategies); zone and area reconnaissance; checkpoint access control; and the physical security of critical assets, nodes, ADC, and sensitive materials.
- Providing physical security guidance to commanders.
- Implementing AT measures.

PHYSICAL SECURITY APPENDIX TO PROTECTION

E-7. Physical security measures that support the base order are outlined in the physical security appendix to annex E. See figure E-3 for a sample format for this attachment.

[CLASSIFICATION]

Follow classification marking guidance as described in AR 380-5.
Include full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.

APPENDIX __ (PHYSICAL SECURITY) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

References: List the documents that are essential to understanding the attachment.

a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include the series number, country, sheet name or number, edition, and scale.

b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.

Note. Doctrinal references for this attachment include ATP 3-39.10, ATP 3-39.11, ATP 3-39.20, ATP 3-39.30, ATP 3-39.32, ATP 3-39.34, ATP 3-39.35, and FM 3-39.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Write the time zone established in the base order.

1. **Situation.**

a. Area of Interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

b. Area of Operations. Refer to appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).

(1) Terrain. Describe the five military aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

(2) Weather. Describe the five military aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

c. Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-3. Format for physical security to Annex E

[CLASSIFICATION]

d. Friendly Forces. Refer to base order, Annex A (Task Organization), and Annex C (Operations).

e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may impact physical security or the implementation of physical security procedures.

f. Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact physical security. Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required. View civil considerations through a physical security perspective by using operation and mission variables.

g. Attachments and Detachments. If pertinent, list the units or assets attached to or detached from the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the base order. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization).

h. Assumptions. List the assumptions that are specific to physical security which support the appendix development.

2. **Mission.** Describe how physical security supports the commander's intent and protection. Discuss the physical security measures that should be employed to safeguard personnel to prevent unauthorized access to arms, ammunition, explosives, equipment, installations, materials, and documents. Also discuss measures to safeguard against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

3. **Execution.**

a. Scheme of Physical Security. The scheme of physical security is a statement of the overall physical security objective. Describe how physical security supports the commander's intent and the protection plan. Direct how each element of the force will cooperate to accomplish the physical security requirements, and tie that to support of the operation with the task and purpose statement. The following subparagraphs are examples; omit what is unnecessary for brevity.

(1) Perimeter Security and Protective Barriers. Describe emplacement considerations of barriers and fencing (to form the perimeter of controlled areas) and vehicle barriers (to impede, channel, or stop vehicle traffic).

(2) Security Lighting. Describe the emplacement considerations of security lighting in support of physical security.

(3) Electronic Security Systems. Describe the emplacement considerations of interior and exterior electronic security systems.

(4) Access Control Points. Describe the procedures for controlling access to equipment, bases and base camps, materials, and documents in support of physical security.

(5) Security Forces. Identify the authority and jurisdiction of security forces and the type of security forces that are required.

(6) In-transit Forces. Describe the risk management for deploying forces and the security procedures for in-port cargo and rail cargo protection.

b. Tasks to Subordinate Units. List the physical security tasks that are assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order.

c. Coordinating Instructions. List only the instructions that are applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight police operations-specific timings, information themes and messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations.

4. **Sustainment.** Identify priorities of sustainment for physical security key tasks, and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. Command.

(1) Location of the Commander. State the locations of the provost marshal and military police commanders within the AO.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-3. Format for physical security appendix to Annex E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

(2) Liaison Requirements. State the physical security liaison requirements that are not covered in SOPs.

b. Control.

(1) Command Posts. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of each command post and its opening and closing time.

(2) Reports. List police operations-specific reports that are not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.

c. Signal. Address police operations-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required.

ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if the attachment is distributed separately from the base order.

[Commander's last name]

[Commander's rank]

The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of the attachment. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarters files.

DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Legend:

AO	area of operations	FM	field manual
AR	Army regulation	OPORD	operation order
ATP	Army techniques publication	SOP	standard operating procedure

Figure E-3. Format for physical security appendix to Annex E (continued)

E-8. AT measures that support the base order are outlined in the AT appendix to annex E. See figure E-4 for a sample format for this attachment.

[CLASSIFICATION]

Follow classification marking guidance as described AR 380-5. Include full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.

APPENDIX 6 (ANTITERRORISM) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD [number] [(code name)]-[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

References: List documents essential to understanding the attachment.

a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet name or number, edition, and scale.

b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.

c. The doctrinal reference for this attachment includes ADP 3-37, ATP 3-37.2, ATP 3-39.10, ATP 3-39.20, and ATP 3-39.30.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Write the time zone established in the base order.

1. **Situation.**

a. Area of Interest. No change to Annex B (Intelligence) or appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C (Operations).

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-4. Format for antiterrorism appendix to Annex E

[CLASSIFICATION]

b. Area of Operations. No change to appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C (Operations).

(1) Terrain. Describe the five military aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

(2) Weather. Describe the five military aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

c. Enemy Forces. If not indicated in the base order or Annex B (Intelligence) of the base order, describe specific details on the terrorist threat within the AO. Include identification, operational capability, intentions activity, composition, disposition, location, estimated strength, and known threat vulnerability. Ensure threat information includes potential terrorist capabilities and intentions for the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Threat information should be divided, and each paragraph classification level should be labeled to ensure that as much information as possible remains unclassified.

d. Friendly Forces. If indicated in the base order or Annex A (Task Organization) Annex B (Intelligence) of the base order, identify the forces available (military and civilian) to respond to terrorist threats or attacks. Include the next higher headquarters, adjacent bases, units, and organizations that are not under base command but may be required to respond to such an incident. These units and organizations may include HN, multiservice, and U.S. Army military police forces; fire and emergency services; medical, federal, state, and local agencies; special operations forces; engineers; (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) reconnaissance and surveillance or decontamination services; and explosive ordnance disposal services. Include a memorandum of agreement or understanding and other special arrangements that improve forces that are available to support the plan before, during, and after a terrorist attack.

e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may impact the conduct of antiterrorism measures or the implementation of antiterrorism-specific equipment and tactics.

f. Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact antiterrorism. Refer to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

g. Attachments and Detachments. If pertinent, list units or assets attached to, or detached from, the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the base order. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization).

h. Assumptions. List assumptions specific to antiterrorism that support appendix development. Assumptions are those factors that are unlikely to change during the implementation of the antiterrorism appendix and that must be addressed to continue to plan. They can range from discussing base troop strength to addressing the local political and social environment.

2. **Mission.** State the antiterrorism mission supporting the current operation by providing a short description of who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) that indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.

3. **Execution.**

a. Scheme of Area Security. The scheme of antiterrorism is a statement of the overall antiterrorism objective. Describe how the commander envisions antiterrorism measures to support the scheme of protection that supports the concept of operations in the base order. It should stress detection, deterrence, and mitigation of the terrorist threat in the environment (intransit, on base, during operations, in protection of the HN and local civilians.)

(1) Terrorist Threats and Other Threat Activities. Describe the unit process for developing its tailored threat assessment or local terrorist threat picture. The unit tailored threat assessment should be continuously evaluated, updated, and disseminated by implementing the antiterrorism principles as appropriate and as directed by the commander. Include the priority of effort to situation developments; force protection conditions; and random antiterrorism measures, determinations, and assessments.

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[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-4. Format for antiterrorism appendix to Annex E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

(2) Reduce Vulnerabilities to Terrorist Acts and Attacks. Describe the unit procedural process for reducing identified vulnerabilities to terrorist actions. This section should be tailored to support the environment that the appendix supports, such as troops and equipment during movement, airfield security, port security, embarkation/arrival areas, bases, and HN/local civilian terrorist mitigation measures. Discuss legal limitations or agency coordination procedures required to mitigate antiterrorism risks.

(3) Physical Security. This includes building and vehicle modification (sandbags, additional armor plating, blast film), barrier plans, specialized equipment employment, and entry control.

(a) Access control procedures.

(b) On-site security elements.

(c) Operations and information security.

(d) High-risk personnel procedures.

(4) Terrorist Incident Response Measures. Discuss the critical areas within the unit or base terrorist threat or incident response plan that address the unit response reconstitution responsibilities upon notification of an imminent terrorist threat or incident response and the procedures for obtaining technical assistance and augmentation if the incident exceeds the unit or base organic capabilities. Include the—

(a) Base Defense Operations Center. Discuss command relationships, staffing (partial/full), tenant unit responsibilities, messages and message flow, and security and access procedures.

(b) Reporting Procedures. (Who/What/When/Where/How)

(c) Incident Response Management Procedures. (Who/What/When/Where/How)

(d) Critical Systems Continuity of Operations. Describe those systems that are essential to mission execution and the critical infrastructure that supports essential operations of the base (utilities systems, computer networks). This is particularly important if vulnerability has identified one or more single points of failure for capabilities to the operations of the base or unit primary mission. For bases and fixed-site facilities, it is also important to note that critical infrastructure may be located off the base, with services being supplied by local municipalities. This document outlines how the base or unit should continue to operate if one or more critical systems are disrupted or fail and how the systems should be restored.

(5) Information Operations. State the overall concept for synchronizing antiterrorism with information operations.

(a) Force Protection Condition. Describe the implementation of security measures across all force protection condition levels. Each set of force protection condition measures is the minimum that must be implemented when a particular baseline force protection condition level is designated. Although not completely applicable in a combat zone, these measures can be used as a template in the development of assessment, delay, denial, and notification. Force protection condition measures include provisions for reinforcing physical security; increasing security personnel and inspections of vehicles, hand-carried items, and packages; reinforcing random antiterrorism measures; and implementing other emergency measures.

(b) Random Antiterrorism Measures Procedures. Refer to the Random Antiterrorism Measure attachment that outlines the implementation of random antiterrorism measures based on a weekly schedule in the form of an execution matrix by date/time, unit, and necessary equipment.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-4. Format for antiterrorism appendix to Annex E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

(c) Rules of Engagement. See appendix 11 to Annex C as required.

(d) Critical Asset List. Identify assets of such extraordinary importance that their incapacitation or destruction would have a severe, debilitating effect on operations. The list will vary depending on the mission variables and should represent the most attractive assets to terrorist action. Critical assets can range from facilities (such as barracks for Soldiers on a forward operating base or base) to local infrastructure (such as HN power plants and wells) to voting centers and HN government officials. Criticality decision support tools (such as MSHARPP and CARVER) support critical asset list development.

(e) Defended Asset List. Identify assets from the critical asset list that are prioritized by the commander to be defended with available resources. This allows the commander to apply finite protection capabilities to the most vital assets. The defended asset list includes assets that could directly impact mission failure or strategic setbacks.

(6) Tasks to Subordinate Units. List antiterrorism tasks assigned to specific subordinate units that are not contained in the base order.

(7) Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units that are not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight antiterrorism-specific timings, information themes and messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations.

4. **Sustainment.** Identify the priorities of sustainment for area security operations key tasks, and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. Command.

(1) Location of Commander. State the locations of the provost marshal and military police commanders within the AO.

(2) Liaison Requirements. State the area security operations requirements not covered in unit SOPs.

b. Control.

(1) Command Posts. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of each command post and its opening and closing time.

(2) Reports. List area security operations-specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.

c. Signal. Address area security operations-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required.

ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.

[Commander's last name]

[Commander's rank]

OFFICIAL:

[Authenticator's name]

[Authenticator's position]

Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-4. Format for antiterrorism appendix to Annex E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

ATTACHMENTS: List lower-level attachments (for example, exhibits).
DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Legend:

ADP	Army doctrine publication	MSHARPP	mission, symbolism, history,
AO	area of operations		accessibility, recognizable,
AR	Army regulation		population, and proximity
ATP	Army techniques publication	OPORD	operation order
CARVER	criticality, accessibility, recoverability,	SOP	standard operating procedure
	vulnerability, effect, and recognizable	U.S.	United States
HN	host nation		

Figure E-4. Format for antiterrorism appendix to Annex E (continued)

E-9. PRC measures that support the base order are outlined in the PRC appendix to annex E. See figure E-5 for a sample format for this attachment.

[CLASSIFICATION]

Follow classification marking guidance as described AR 380-5. Include full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.

APPENDIX (Populace and Resources Control) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD [number] [(code name)]-[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

References: List documents essential to understanding the attachment.

a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet name or number, edition, and scale.

b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.

c. The doctrinal reference for this attachment includes ADP 3-37, ATP 3-39.10, ATP 3-39.20, ATP 3-39.30, ATP 3-57.10, FM 3-39, and FM 3-57.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Write the time zone established in the base order.

1. **Situation.** Include items of information affecting PRC support not included in paragraph 1 of the OPORD or information that needs expansion. The situation paragraph describes how implementing PRC measures may affect friendly, adversary, and other operations. It should discuss how PRC would influence friendly operations. The situation paragraph describes the conditions and circumstances of the operational environment that impact PRC in the following subparagraphs:

a. Area of Interest. No change to Annex B (Intelligence) or appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C (Operations).

b. Area of Operations. No change to appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C (Operations).

(1) Terrain. Describe the five military aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

(2) Weather. Describe the five military aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-5. Format for PRC appendix to Annex E

[CLASSIFICATION]

c. Enemy Forces. If not indicated in the base order or Annex B (Intelligence) of the base order, describe specific details on the terrorist threat within the AO. Include the factors of identification, operational capability, intentions activity, composition, disposition, location, estimated strength, and known threat vulnerability. Ensure threat information includes potential terrorist capabilities and intentions for the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Threat information should be divided, and each paragraph classification level should be labeled to ensure that as much information as possible remains unclassified.

d. Friendly Forces. If indicated in the base order or Annex A (Task Organization) Annex B (Intelligence) of the base order, identify the forces available (military and civilian) providing support to PRC tasks. Outline the higher headquarters plan as it pertains to PRC. List the designation, location, and outline the plans of higher, adjacent, and other PRC assets that support or impact the issuing HQ or require coordination and additional support. Include additional information on HN, interagency, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations that may impact PRC measures.

e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may support PRC measures. Outline the higher HQ plan as it pertains to PRC. List the designation, location, and outline the plans of higher, adjacent, and other PRC assets that support or impact the issuing HQ or require coordination and additional support. Include additional information on HN, interagency, International organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that may impact PRC measures.

(1) Interagency Organizations. Assess the ability of key interagency organizations operating in the AO to support the PRC mission. Include the missions of the agency, capabilities, capacity, and coordination points of contact. Identify known requirements to support interagency operations.

(2) Intergovernmental Organizations. Assess the ability of key international organizations, especially United Nations agencies, operating in the AO to support the PRC mission of the unit. Include the missions, capabilities, capacity, and coordination POCs of the agencies.

(3) Nongovernmental Organizations. Assess the key NGOs operating in the AO to support the PRC mission of the unit. Include the missions, capabilities, capacity (such as the ability to support civil relief systems), and coordination POCs of the agencies. Identify known requirements to support NGOs.

f. Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact operations. Liaise with the intelligence staff section (G-2/S-2) and refer to Tab C (Civil Considerations), Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate), and Annex B (Intelligence), as required. Address the general overview of civil considerations for the AO (described by mnemonic ASCOPE—areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events). Review the critical aspects of the civil situation by applying each operational variable (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure—physical environment, and time [PMESII-PT]) that could impact the civil considerations analysis.

(1) Areas. List the key civilian areas in the supported commander's operational environment. This paragraph approaches terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Commanders analyze key civilian areas in terms of how they affect the mission and how military operations affect these areas. Examples of key civilian areas are areas defined by political boundaries, such as districts within a city or municipalities within a region; locations of government centers; social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves; agricultural and mining regions; trade routes; and possible sites for the temporary settlement of dislocated civilians (DCs) or other civil functions.

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[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-5. Format for PRC appendix to Annex E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

(2) Structures. List the locations of existing civil structures (critical infrastructure), such as ports, air terminals, transportation networks, bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams, which are traditional high-payoff targets. List churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals as cultural sites, which are generally protected by international law or other agreements. List other infrastructures, including governance and public safety structures, such as national, regional, and urban government facilities; record archives; judiciary, police, fire, and emergency medical services; and economic and environmental structures (banking, stock and commodity exchanges, toxic industrial facilities, and pipelines). List other facilities with practical applications, such as jails/prisons, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants, which may require specific PRC protection measures.

(3) Capabilities. Describe civil capabilities for implementing PRC measures by assessing the capabilities of the populace to sustain itself through public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture sources. Include whether the populace needs assistance with public works and utilities, public health, public transportation, economics, and commerce. Examples: “Restoration of law enforcement is limited and will require support from United Nations or coalition forces; HN basic emergency and medical services are reportedly adequate to support the local populace. Criminal organizations provide population with critical economic need—schools, roads, economic infrastructure.” Refer to the preliminary area assessment developed during mission analysis.

(4) Organizations. List civil organizations that may or may not be affiliated with government agencies, such as church groups, ethnic groups, multinational corporations, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, international organizations, and NGOs. Do not repeat those listed in Annex V or paragraph 1.e. above (Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations). Example: “There are several charitable organizations in the AO. Religious groups provide minimal support but lack internal transportation. What infrastructure criminal organizations directly control or have influence over through intimidation or bribery.” Include HN organizations capable of forming the nucleus for PRC and humanitarian assistance programs, interim governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.

(5) People. List key personnel and linkage to the population, leaders, figureheads, clerics, police chiefs, and subject-matter experts, such as plant operators and public utility managers.

Note. This list may extend to personnel outside the operational environment whose actions, opinions, and influence can affect the supported commander’s operational environment. Categorize groups of civilians, such as local nationals (town and city dwellers, farmers, other rural dwellers, and nomads), local civil authorities (elected and traditional leaders at all levels of government), expatriates, tribal or clan figureheads, religious leaders, third-nation government agency representatives, foreign employees of international organizations s or NGOs, contractors (United States [U.S.] citizens, local nationals, and third country nationals providing contract services), the media (journalists from print, radio, and visual media), and the DC population (refugees, displaced persons, internally displaced persons, evacuees, migrants, and stateless persons).

(6) Events. Determine what events, military and civilian, are occurring, and provide analysis of the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, moral, and legal implications. Categorize civilian events that may affect military missions. Civilian events may include harvest seasons, elections, riots, voluntary and involuntary evacuations, holidays, school year, and religious periods. Examples: “The school year has been suspended; the HN does not have the assets to enforce a curfew; this is not an electoral year.”

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-5. Format for PRC appendix to Annex E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

g. Attachments and Detachments. List units attached to or detached from the issuing HQ. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the OPLAN/OPORD. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization). This paragraph includes all military and nonmilitary organizations participating in civil-military operations center (CMOC) operations and PRC. Identify other resources attached and detached, and include effective times of transfer, if appropriate.

h. Assumptions. Only list assumptions when preparing a protection annex to an OPLAN. (This step may be omitted when preparing a PRC appendix to an OPORD.) Include unvalidated assumptions developed while preparing the PRC running estimate. List key assumptions used in developing the OPLAN/OPORD if they pertain to the PRC mission.

(1) Identify critical planning considerations and unknown conditions that personnel must confirm during the initial assessment(s). Examples: “Restoration of law enforcement is limited and will require support from United Nations or coalition forces; military and interagency support will be available; personnel and facilities of relief and welfare organizations will continue to provide a basis for civilian relief programs; the civilian populace will continue to offer resistance to the opposing force.”

(2) Provide a statement describing the operational risks of not engaging the civil component(s) of the AO.

2. **Mission.** State the PRC mission in support of the current operation by providing a short description of who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) that indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.

3. **Execution.**

a. Scheme of Support. The scheme of support is a statement of the overall PRC objective. Describe how the commander envisions PRC measures supporting the scheme of protection that supports the concept of operations in the base order. It should stress PRC objectives, civil decisive points, measures of performance and effectiveness, transitions for each phase of the operation, and a general timeline for the operation.

(1) Dislocated Civilian Operations. Describe methods for protecting civilians from violence or disaster and minimizing civilian interference with military operations. Tasks include establishing and operating dislocated civilian camps, providing care (food, medical treatment, protection), and assisting with the movement or relocation of dislocated civilians because many of the talents needed for efficient and effective dislocated civilian camps are linked to the disciplines of police operations and detention operations (such as enforcing curfews, movement restrictions, use of travel permits and registration cards, establishing checkpoints, amnesty programs, and inspections) military police must be involved planning and conducting dislocated civilian operations.

(2) Noncombatant Evacuation. Describe the process for the authorized and orderly departure of noncombatants from a specific area. Noncombatant evacuation is normally connected with combat operations; Noncombatant evacuation may also occur in anticipation of or in response to natural or human-made disaster in a foreign country or civil unrest in a country, which may warrant evacuation to the United States or other safe haven.

Note. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, the Department of State is responsible for protecting and evacuating U.S. citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding their overseas property. The Department of State is the lead agency for planning and conducting noncombatant evacuation. Executive Order 12656 also directs the Secretary of Defense to advise and assist the Secretary of State in preparing and implementing these plans.

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[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-5. Format for PRC appendix to Annex E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

(3) Resources Control. Describe how resources control provides security for the indigenous natural and human-made materiel resources of a nation-state, mobilizes economic resources, denies the enemy access to resources, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy and criminal activity. Resources control target specific sectors of the material wealth and economy of a nation, including natural resources, food and agriculture, immovable property, finances, and cultural and critical infrastructure. Resources control measures also include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints, and border security to include customs inspections, ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

(4) Information Operations. State the overall concept for synchronizing PRC with information operations.

b. Tasks to Subordinate Units. List PRC tasks assigned to specific subordinate units that are not contained in the base order.

c. Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units that are not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight PRC-specific timings, information themes and messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations.

4. **Sustainment.** Identify the priorities of sustainment for PRC key tasks, and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. Command.

(1) Location of Commander. State the locations of the provost marshal and military police commanders within the AO.

(2) Liaison Requirements. State the PRC operations requirements not covered in unit SOPs.

b. Control.

(1) Command Posts. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of each command post and its opening and closing time.

(2) Reports. List PRC operations-specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.

c. Signal. Address PRC operations-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required.

ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.
[Commander's last name]
[Commander's rank]

OFFICIAL:
[Authenticator's name]
[Authenticator's position]

Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.

ATTACHMENTS: List lower-level attachments (for example, exhibits).
DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-5. Format for PRC appendix to Annex E (continued)

E-10.

Legend:			
ADP	Army doctrine publication	HQ	headquarter
AO	area of operations	NGO	nongovernmental organizations
AR	Army regulation	OPLAN	operations plan
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events	OPORD	operation order
		PMESII-PT	political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure—physical environment, and time
ATP	Army techniques publication		
CMOC	civil-military operations center		
DC	dislocated civilian	POC	point of contact
FM	field manual	PRC	populace and resources control
HN	host-nation	SOP	standard operating procedures

Figure E-5. Format for PRC appendix to Annex E (continued)

E-11. Below is an area security annex example to provide planners with an example of area security requirements. See figure E-6 for a sample format for this attachment.

[CLASSIFICATION]

Follow classification marking guidance as described in AR 380-5. Include full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.

APPENDIX 1 (AREA SECURITY) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

References: List documents essential to understanding the attachment.

a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet name or number, edition, and scale.

b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.

c. Doctrinal references for this attachment include ADP 3-37, ADP 3-90, and FM 3-39.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Write the time zone established in the base order.

1. **Situation**.

a. Area of Interest. No change to Annex B (Intelligence) or appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C (Operations).

b. Area of Operations. No change to appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C (Operations).

(1) Terrain. Describe the five military aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

(2) Weather. Describe the five military aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

c. Enemy Forces. No change to Annex B (Intelligence).

d. Friendly Forces. No change to the base order Annex A (Task Organization) and Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may impact the conduct of area security.

f. Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact area security operations. Refer to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

g. Attachments and Detachments. If pertinent, list units or assets attached to, or detached from, the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the base order. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization).

h. Assumptions. List assumptions specific to area security that support appendix development.

2. **Mission**. State the area security mission supporting the current operation by providing a short description of who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.

3. **Execution**.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-6. Format for area security appendix to Annex E

[CLASSIFICATION]

a. Scheme of Area Security. The scheme of area security is a statement of the overall area security objective. Describe how area security supports the commander's intent, the maneuver plan, and protection priorities. Direct how each element of the force will cooperate to accomplish area security, and tie that to support of the operation with a task and purpose statement. Discuss how area security orients the force, installation, route, area, or assets to be protected and how area security is often an economy-of-force role assigned to many organizations and often designated to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations and to support the essential task and purpose and objectives of an operation. Describe how forces engaged in area security saturate an area or position on key terrain to provide protection through early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance and to guard against unexpected enemy attack with an active response. Discuss the role of response forces in the area security concept. The following subparagraphs are examples; omit what is unnecessary for brevity.

(1) Base and Base Cluster Defense. Describe how base and base cluster defense measures (normal and emergency) are required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to U.S. forces. A division or corps may be required to protect multiple forward-operating bases. Describe how bases leverage mutually supporting capabilities or joint assets for their collective defense. Units may be assigned base defensive operations on a permanent or rotating basis, depending on mission variables.

(2) Critical Asset Security. Describe how critical asset security supports the commander's intent and area security. Discuss the protection and security of personnel, physical assets, and information analyzed and deemed essential to the operation and success of the mission and the required resources for protection. This designation generally comes as a result of a deliberate assessment or as a directed mission. Refer to the commander's critical assets list and defended asset list as required.

(3) Command and Control Node Protection. Describe how command and control node protection supports the commander's intent and area security. Discuss how command posts and operations centers are protected through area security techniques that employ a layered, integrated, and redundant array of protection and security assets. Describe when, where, or under what conditions command posts will be massed or dispersed for survivability.

(4) High-risk Personnel Security. Describe how high-risk personnel security supports the commander's intent and area security. Identify high-risk personnel by grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation. High-risk personnel are likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets and could include HN dignitaries. Discuss what special precautions are taken to ensure the safety and security of these individuals. Identify the requirements for security details from internal resources. However, designated personnel may require protective services by specially trained units under certain circumstances.

(5) Response Force. Describe how response force operations support the commander's protection priorities and area security. Direct minimum response force capabilities and procedures for increasing those capabilities. Discuss how response force operations expediently reinforce the organic protection capabilities of the unit or complement that protection with maneuver capabilities based on the threat. Discussion should include planning for defeating Level I and Level II threats and shaping Level III threats until designated combined arms and tactical combat force arrive.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-6. Format for area security appendix to Annex E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

(6) Lines of Communication Security. Describe how lines-of-communication security support the commander's movement priorities and area security. Outline locations for concentrated protection along lines of communication and supply routes that are critical to military operations. Discuss focused protection for lines of communication and supply routes (rail, pipeline, highway, waterway) throughout the AO. Describe how route security operations are defensive in nature and how route security forces prevent an enemy force from impeding, harassing, or destroying traffic along a route or portions of a route.

(7) Checkpoint and Combat Outposts. Describe how checkpoint and combat outposts support the commander's movement and protection priorities. Discuss how organizations control the freedom of movement in an AO for a specific period (curfews) or as an enduring operation (safety and antiterrorism). This can be accomplished by placing permanent or temporary checkpoints and combat outposts along designated avenues and roadways or on key terrain identified through mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time movement. Combat outposts are used for sanctuary, support, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance or area denial.

(8) Convoy Security. Describe how convoy security supports the commander's concept of support and area security. Discuss how convoy security is a specialized area security operation conducted to protect convoys and how units conduct convoy security operations anytime there are insufficient friendly forces to continuously secure routes in an area of operations and there is a significant danger of enemy ground action directed against the convoy. Also discuss how units conduct convoy security operations in conjunction with route security operations. Planning includes designating units for convoy security; providing guidance on tactics, techniques, and procedures for units to provide security during convoys; or establishing protection and security requirements for convoys carrying critical assets. Local or theater policy typically dictates when or which convoys receive security and protection.

(9) Port Area and Pier Security. Describe how the port area and pier security support the commander's intent and area security. Discuss how units assigned a port area as part of their AO must develop and organize plans to ensure that forces are trained, led, and equipped to concentrate the necessary combat power at the decisive time and place to protect or secure port areas and cargo. The patrol of harbors and anchorages is generally the mission of a dedicated port security unit and may include waterfront security operations.

(10) Surveillance. Describe how surveillance supports the commander's intent and area security. Discuss how the protection working group uses staff analysis and coordination with higher headquarters to determine which critical assets or locations will likely be attractive targets and require surveillance. Direct the collection of information against specified intelligence requirements or at specified locations by units engaged in area security operations.

(11) Area Damage Control. Describe how area damage control supports the commander's intent and area security. Discuss how commanders conduct area damage control when the damage and scope of the attack is limited, and they can respond and recover with local assets and resources. This recovery involves resuming operations, maintaining or restoring order, evacuating casualties, isolating danger or hazard areas, and mitigating personnel and material losses. Some attacks may rise to the level of incidents of national significance and require additional resources for mitigation, recovery, and investigation. In the latter case, commanders transition from area damage control to consequence management activities.

b. Tasks to Subordinate Units. List area security tasks assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure E-6. Format for area security appendix to Annex E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

c. Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight area security-specific timings, information themes and messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations

4. **Sustainment**. Identify priorities of sustainment for area security operations key tasks, and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

5. **Command and Signal**.

a. Command.

(1) Location of Commander. State the locations of the provost marshal and military police commanders within the AO.

(2) Liaison Requirements. State the area security operations requirements not covered in unit SOPs.

b. Control.

(1) Command Posts. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of each command post and its opening and closing time.

(2) Reports. List area security operations-specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.

c. Signal. Address area security operations-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required.

ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.

[Commander's last name]

[Commander's rank]

OFFICIAL:

[Authenticator's name]

[Authenticator's position]

Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.

ATTACHMENTS: List lower-level attachments (for example, exhibits).

DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

Legend:

ADP	Army doctrine publication	HN	host nation
AO	area of operations	OPORD	operation order
AR	Army regulation	SOP	standard operating procedure
FM	field manual	U.S.	United States

Figure E-6. Format for area security appendix to Annex E (continued)

FRAGMENTARY ORDER

E-12. The fragmentary order is used to update the OPORD with new information, tasks, or requirements. Fragmentary orders are issued when changes occur. See figure E-7, page 188, for an illustration of the fragmentary order format.

[CLASSIFICATION]
(Change from verbal orders, if any) (Optional)

Copy ## of ## copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number

FRAGMENTARY ORDER [number]
References: Refer to higher order being modified.
Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: Write the time zone established in the base order.

1. **Situation**. Include changes to existing order, or state "No change." For example, "No change to OPORD 03-XX."
2. **Mission**. State "No change."
3. **Execution**. Include changes, or state "No change."
    a. Commander's intent. Include changes, or state "No change."
    b. Concept of operations. Include changes, or state "No change."
    c. Scheme of movement and maneuver. Include changes, or state "No change."
    d. Scheme of intelligence. Include changes, or state "No change."
    e. Scheme of fires. Include changes, or state "No change."
    f. Scheme of protection. Include changes, or state "No change."
    g. Stability operations. Include changes, or state "No change."
    h. Assessment. Include changes, or state "No change."
    i. Tasks to subordinate units. Include changes, or state "No change."
    j. Coordinating instructions. Include changes, or state "No change."

4. **Sustainment**. Include changes, or state "No change."
5. **Command and signal**. Include changes, or state "No change."

ACKNOWLEDGE:
[Commander's last name]
[Commander's rank]

OFFICIAL:
[Authenticator's name]
[Authenticator's position]

ANNEXES:
DISTRIBUTION:

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Legend:
OPORD operation order

Figure E-7. Fragmentary order format

Source Notes

This division lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it lists the page number followed by the paragraph number.

Page 130, paragraph B-26 **Hurricane Katrina**. Vignette adapted from United States Congressional Serial Set, Serial No. 15013, Senate Report No. 322, *Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared.* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 2009).

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Glossary

(U) All acronyms are unclassified. The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which ATP 3-39-30 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADC	area damage control
ADP	Army doctrine publication
AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques publication
AO	area of operations
AR	Army regulation
ASR	alternate supply routes
AT	antiterrorism
ATP	Army techniques publication
BCT	brigade combat team
CA	civil affairs
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CID	Department of the Army criminal investigation division
CIV	civilian
CMO	civil-military operations
COA	courses of action
CSA	corps support area
C-UAS	counter-unmanned aircraft systems
DA	Department of the Army
DAFI	Department of the Air Force instruction
DC	dislocated civilian
DCRS	dislocated civilian road space
DNA	deoxyribonucleic acid
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DODM	Department of Defense manual
DOS	Department of State
DRS	detainee reporting system
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal

FM	field manual
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-9	assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
GTA	graphic training aid
HN	host nation
HRP	high-risk personnel
IED	improvised explosive device
IPOE	intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JP	joint publication
LOC	lines of communication
LOGSEC	logistics security
LP	listening post
LZ	landing zone
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MCTP	Marine Corps tactical publication
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication
METT-TC (I)	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations
MI	military intelligence
MISO	military information support operations
MSCOE	Maneuver Support Center of Excellence
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
MSR	main supply route
MWD	military working dog
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OP	observation post
OPORD	operation order
PIO	police intelligence operations
PM	provost marshal
PRC	populace and resources control
ROE	rules of engagement
RUF	rules for the use of force
S-2	battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-9	battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SOP	standard operating procedure
SUAS	small, unmanned aircraft systems
TC	training circular
TCF	tactical combat force

TCP	traffic control post
TF	task force
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAS	unmanned aircraft system
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
U.S.	United States
USC	United States Code
USG	United States Government

SECTION II – TERMS

None.

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ATP 3-39.30

25 March 2026

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

RANDY A. GEORGE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:



MATTHEW L. SANNITO
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