ATP 3-53

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BRANCH AND UNIT ACTIVITIES

APRIL 2026

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Preface

ATP 3-53, *The Psychological Operations Branch and Unit Activities*, replaces FM 3-53, *Military Information Support Operations*, as the authoritative reference for the United States (U.S.) Army Psychological Operations (PO) Branch to influence foreign audiences across the range of military operations. The principles in this revision are linked to higher-level Army and joint doctrine and provide the basis for subordinate Army techniques publications and technical manuals to discuss detailed tactics, techniques, processes, and procedures. ATP 3-53 rescinds GTA 33-01-004 and GTA 33-01-006.

The principal audiences for ATP 3-53 are PO Branch personnel, Psychological Operations-qualified planners, Psychological Operations units, and supported commanders and their staffs, regardless of the Service. This publication informs leaders of other government departments and agencies, U.S. ambassadors, and country team members. In addition, operational Psychological Operations units and the institutional force responsible for fundamental and advanced training and education of Army, sister Service, and joint force-assigned personnel; foreign partners; and other government department personnel can use this publication as their foundational publication for influence. Subordinate Psychological Operations proponent doctrine and training publications expand on the content in this publication and provide the additional requisite tactics, techniques, procedures, and processes to develop individual and unit training and education.

ATP 3-53 (in conjunction with Army tactics, techniques, and procedures and combined arms training strategies) provides Army leaders with practical references necessary to understand the role and core competencies of the career management field 37 (Psychological Operations). It also allows leaders to understand the fundamental processes, approaches, and activities that Psychological Operations units execute at the unclassified level.

ATP 3-53 serves as an authoritative reference for force structure, materiel, training and education requirements, and other resources. This publication describes some of the pertinent legal parameters for the planning and approval of operations and activities. ATP 3-53 also addresses the execution of operations in support of ground combat operations.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27.)

ATP 3-53 uses joint terms, where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-53 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ATP 3-53 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized, and the proponent publication number follows the definition. All photography depicted originate with the United States Army Special Operations Command or from the United States State Department as noted.

ATP 3-53 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard or Army National Guard of the United States and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 3-53 is the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). The preparing agency is the Psychological Operations Doctrine Division. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) directly to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-POD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610; by email to AOJK-POD@socom.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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Introduction

This version of ATP 3-53 updates doctrine to address current and future operating environments through 2030. It incorporates changes from FM 3-0 including multidomain operations, influence as a form of contact, and definitions of conventional and irregular warfare. The publication covers visual, audio, multimedia, and face-to-face and psychological actions (PSYACTs) to counter threats.

Building on more than 80 years of psychological warfare (PSYWAR) doctrine, this update expands beyond psychological operations (PSYOP). It now includes the role of the Psychological Operations (PO) Branch and its two primary influence functions: PSYOP and Department of Defense deception activities (DDAs). To ensure clarity, it codifies the language for the PO Branch, aligning it with AR 870-21, FM 1-02.1, and FM 1-02.2 and addressing terminology changes since 2010 (introductory table 1).

Introductory table 1. Codified language for Psychological Operations

Acronym	*Meaning and Usage*	*Example*
PO	Psychological Operations – new acronym referring only to the Psychological Operations Branch and Soldiers.	--
POG	Psychological Operations group – new acronym referring to Psychological Operations groups.	2nd POG
POB	Psychological Operations battalion – new acronym referring to Psychological Operations battalions.	15th POB
POC	Psychological Operations company – new acronym referring to Psychological Operations companies.	A POC or 346th POC
POD	Psychological Operations detachment – new acronym referring to Psychological Operations detachments.	1st POD
POT	Psychological Operations team – new acronym referring to Psychological Operations teams.	1st POT or POT 1






Note:

1. When referring to the force, always capitalize Psychological Operations (as shown) when spelled out.
2. The Psychological Operations force refers to all Psychological Operations units and individual Soldiers, including those assigned to other units in the operating force.
3. Do not use PO when referring to the force; spell out Psychological Operations.
4. When possible, units in the generating force are specified.
5. Refer to individual PO Soldiers assigned to units in the generating force by their specific duty positions or in general terms as, “individual PO Soldiers assigned to units in the generating force”.
6. There is no standardized numbering convention for detachments and teams across the POGs. The examples provided are only for illustration.


Note: The abbreviation for military information support operations (MISO) and the abbreviation PSYWAR exist in the publication only to provide historical context. Therefore, they are not included in the acronyms list.

Introductory table 2, page viii, provides examples for using and portraying the codified language for the PO Branch.

Introductory table 2. Naming, abbreviation, and symbols for Psychological Operations

Name	*Abbreviation*	*Symbol*
2nd Psychological Operations Group	2nd POG	
13th Psychological Operations Battalion, 2nd Psychological Operations Group	13th POB, 2nd POG	
319th Psychological Operations Company, 13th Psychological Operations Battalion, 2nd Psychological Operations Group	319th POC, 13th POB, 2nd POG	
1st Psychological Operations Detachment, 319th Psychological Operations Company, 13th Psychological Operations Battalion, 2nd Psychological Operations Group	1st POD, 319th POC, 13th POB, 2nd POG	
2nd Psychological Operations Team, 1st Psychological Operations Detachment, 319th Psychological Operations Company, 13th Psychological Operations Battalion, 2nd Psychological Operations Group	2nd POT, 1st POD, 319th POC, 13th POB, 2nd POG	

Depicting planned and executed influence activities on maps and overlays involves building symbols based on the principles found in the current editions of MIL-STD-2525E, FM 1-02.2, and GTA 33-01-006. Introductory figure 1, page ix, illustrates several symbols for depicting Psychological Operations forces and influence activities.



Introductory figure 1. Psychological Operations symbols for maps and overlays

ROLE

The Army's primary focus on the land domain makes it distinctive among the U.S. military Services. Success in large-scale combat operations depends on dominating the enemy. On the other hand, irregular warfare (which is critical in limited conflicts and routine operations) relies on influencing individuals and groups.

irregular warfare

The overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and nonmilitary capabilities by state and nonstate actors to achieve policy objectives other than military domination of an enemy, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare. (ADP 3-0)

The role of the PO Branch is to create and reinforce desired behaviors in foreign individuals and groups to achieve military and national objectives. Psychological Operations units accomplish this through two primary influence activities: PSYOP and DDAs. PO Soldiers advise commanders on employing Psychological Operations units and provide expertise in planning and executing influence activities.

Introductory figure 2 outlines the framework for employing Psychological Operations units, thereby linking their influence activities to the Army's strategic contexts (competition, crisis, and armed conflict). By conducting PSYOP and DDAs, these units create human, informational, and physical advantages to shape foreign audience behavior. The logic chart provides a clear, consistent explanation of the PO Branch functions and serves as a foundation for Soldiers to contextualize their roles and missions.

To support the Army's operational concept, multidomain operations, executed through

Offensive operations, defensive operations, stability operations, and defense support of civil authorities


and cope with anticipated environments characterized by

Accelerated global human interaction via information technology, ubiquitous media and pervasive information, the fragmented media environment, enduring threat influence campaigns operating below the threshold of armed conflict, threat use of information to avoid or offset U.S. military overmatch, irregular threat networks, and coercive and malign threats

Psychological Operations units

influence

across the Army's strategic contexts and the range of military operations




by conducting two primary influence activities

Psychological Operations and Department of Defense Deception Activities

that create and leverage the following interdependent advantages

• Human • Information • Physical

to affect foreign audience behavior



Legend:

PSYOP psychological operations

cyberspace cyberspace

Introductory figure 2. ATP 3-53 logic chart

THE ARMY OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

The Army's operational concept is multidomain operations. These operations span five domains and three dimensions within the strategic contexts of competition, crisis, and armed conflict. Psychological Operations units support combatant commander plans by influencing foreign audiences through PSYOP and DDAs by leveraging human, informational, and physical advantages to shape behavior.

multidomain operations
The combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders (ADP 3-0)

For videos depicting a three-dimensional perspective of the domains and dimensions in an operational environment, visit https://inteldocs.intelink.gov/files/details/c5452529-bd92-472b-8a89-1dc687664e93 to watch *Operational Environment–An Audiovisual Perspective.*

COMPETITION BELOW ARMED CONFLICT

Competition below armed conflict is a persistent rivalry in which adversaries pursue interests incompatible with U.S. objectives short of open conflict. The PO Branch supports the Department of Defense by countering rivals through Psychological Operations units that—

- Integrate with space and cyberspace units to deny adversary dominance in physical, informational, and human dimensions.
- Execute PSYOP and deception activities to create strategic advantages.
- Conduct security cooperation to build partnerships and enhance interoperability.
- Shape the operational environment to favor U.S. interests.

Preapproved PSYOP programs enable rapid deployment of Psychological Operations capabilities during crises and steady-state operations by focusing on behavioral change in target audiences (TAs) to achieve joint force objectives. These programs address areas such as maritime interdiction, personnel recovery, noncombatant evacuation, foreign humanitarian assistance, and the introduction of U.S. forces. CJCSI 3110.05 and chapter 2 of this publication provide more information on competition below armed conflict.

CRISIS

crisis
An emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives (JP 3-0).

In crisis, Psychological Operations units address adversary threats arising from natural or human disasters that disrupt infrastructure and governance, creating exploitable opportunities. Their operations aim to deter threats and prepare the environment for Army and joint forces to succeed in conflict. Key activities include—

- Building international support.
- Creating tension within adversary groups.
- Undermining adversary influence efforts.
- Coordination partner influence plans.
- Supporting deception to protect friendly forces.
- Influencing populations to enable U.S. force deployment and operations.
- Assuring partners.
- Prioritizing resource pre-positioning and distribution.

Chapter 3 provides detailed explanations of these activities.

ARMED CONFLICT

Armed conflict occurs when a state or non-state actor uses lethal force as the primary means to satisfy its interests. During armed conflict, Psychological Operations units may—

- Decrease enemy combat power through surrender, desertion, and malingering.
- Reduce enemy resistance.
- Degrade enemy decision-making abilities.
- Exploit and amplify friendly successes on the battlefield.
- Exploit and amplify enemy failures and actions on the battlefield.

- Cause the enemy to move to positions of disadvantage.
- Create the element of surprise and combat initiative for friendly forces.
- Exploit the psychological effects of deception activities on enemy leaders and forces.
- Increase third-party support to personnel recovery.
- Minimize interference with friendly military operations.
- Create interference of enemy operations.
- Support friendly force resiliency to malign information.
- Decrease compliance with adversary directions.
- Nominate enemy influence capabilities for prosecution through the targeting process.
- Recommend protection of infrastructure critical to achieving military objectives.
- Exploit opportunities created by detainee operations.
- Execute influence activities with unified action partner forces.
- Train and advise unified action partner forces and agencies.
- Isolate threat organizations from population.

ATP 3-53 has five chapters and five appendixes.

Chapter 1 defines the role of the PO Branch, detailing its core competencies, influence skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities. It outlines principles of influence activities, links them to information advantage principles in ADP 3-13, and aligns the branch's influence process with the Army operations process. The chapter also explains the organization of operational forces, the echelons that Psychological Operations units support, and the use of influence objectives.

Chapter 2 focuses on Psychological Operations contributions to strategic competition and integrated deterrence, while preparing for potential conflict.

Chapter 3 highlights how Psychological Operations units shape the operational environment and influence threat decision-making during crises.

Chapter 4 addresses unit operations in large-scale combat operations as part of a joint force.

Chapter 5 discusses employment considerations including task organization, legal guidance, and integration with external capabilities.

Appendix A offers a short history of the PO Branch and key shaping events.

Appendix B lists and describes the individual skills required for influencing foreign audiences and analyzing TAs.

ATP 3-53 introduces, modifies, and rescinds the terms, definitions, and acronyms as noted in introductory table 3, page xiv.

Introductory table 3. New, modified, and removed terms and acronyms

Term	*Acronym*	*Remarks*
behavior	--	New term definition
Cultural Intelligence Element	--	Term removed
influence company team	ICT	New term definition and acronym
information for effect	--	Term definition removed
intermediate psychological objective	IPO	New term and definition
key communicator	--	Term definition removed
key leader engagement	--	Term definition removed
military information support operations	MISO	Removed term and acronym
psychological action	PSYACT	Term definition revised and new abbreviation
psychological objective	PO	Modified definition and new acronym
Psychological Operations	PO	New acronym (only referring to the Branch and its Soldiers)
psychological operations	PSYOP	New abbreviation (only referring to the influence activity)
Psychological Operations battalion	POB	New acronym
Psychological Operations company	POC	New acronym
Psychological Operations detachment	POD	New acronym
Psychological Operations group	POG	New acronym
Psychological Operations task force	POTF	New acronym and term definition
Psychological Operations team	POT	New acronym
supporting psychological objective	SPO	New term, acronym, and definition

Chapter 1

The Psychological Operations Branch, Units, and Force

This chapter highlights the five fundamental Psychological Operations (PO) Branch elements and the branch's two primary influence activities. It also briefly introduces the organization of Psychological Operations units in the Army, discusses the PO Branch's strategic contexts for employment, and details their use of influence objectives.

OVERVIEW

1-1. Militaries have historically used influence activities to demoralize enemies, gain support from populations, and achieve objectives. Americans have employed these tactics since the Revolutionary War, but dedicated United States (U.S.) military elements for influence activities were first created during World War I. The army established the Psychological Warfare Center and School in 1952, the Psychological Operations Regiment in 1998, and the Psychological Operations Branch as a basic branch on October 16, 2006.

1-2. Since World War II, the Department of Defense (DOD) has used more than 13 terms to define a variety of U.S. influence activities. Some of these include propaganda, psychological warfare, and operational deception.

1-3. ADP 3-13 codifies the Army's influence information activity, focusing on two tasks: influencing threat perceptions and behavior, and influencing foreign audiences. It identifies deception activities, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs operations, and Soldier and leader engagement as key ways to achieve these goals.

> ***Note:*** The Influence Activities section (later in this chapter) addresses the DOD codification of influence.




Figure 1-1. Influence Information

1-4. While all Army units can conduct or support influence activities, the Army PO Branch specializes in shaping foreign behaviors to achieve military and national objectives across operations.

1-5. The branch's influence process, the organization and equipment of Psychological Operations units, and the assignment of PO Soldiers enable influencing foreign audiences through two primary influence activities—PSYOP and Department of Defense deception activities (DDAs). The influence process, the assignment of PO Soldiers, and coordination with Psychological Operations units contribute to successful Soldier and leader engagement and civil affairs operations.

1-6. Psychological Operations unit commanders are equipped to lead operations in the information environment by integrating information forces to influence behavior. *Operations in the information* environment are military actions involving the integrated employment of multiple information forces to affect drivers of behavior (JP 3-04). According to ADP 3-13, these operations involve informing, influencing, attacking, exploiting, and protecting information, networks, and systems.

SECTION I – FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS

1-7. The five fundamental elements of the PO Branch are its role, core competencies, base concepts, principles, and the influence process (figure 1-2, page 2). These five fundamental elements are integrated into branch training, education, and leader development efforts, from the branch qualification course and throughout a Soldier's professional military education. Understanding these elements provides the foundation to support future force modernization. Current Army force modernization efforts focus on organizational, training, policy, and material changes; advancing concepts and doctrine for information advantage; and integrating space, cyberspace, and special operations capabilities. All these affect Army PO Soldiers.




Figure 1-2. Five fundamentals of the Psychological Operations Branch

ROLE

1-8. As stated in the introduction, the role of PO Branch is to create and reinforce desired behaviors in selected foreign individuals and groups to achieve military and U.S. national objectives across the range of military operations. Psychological Operations units fulfill the role for which its branch was established through two primary influence activities: PSYOP and DDAs. Individual PO Soldiers assigned to the staffs of other Army and joint force commands create conditions for the employment of Psychological Operations units. These PO Soldiers also provide subject-matter expertise for the planning and command and control of operations that Psychological Operations units and other Army units (that conduct influence activities) execute.

1-9. ***Psychological operations*** are **operations to influence the behavior of targeted foreign audiences in support of a commander's objectives. Also called PSYOP.**

1-10. A *Department of Defense deception activity* is a policy-guided operation conducted by a combatant command, Service, agency, or other components which employ military deception to influence the actions of adversary military, paramilitary, violent extremist organizations, or proxy decision makers, or to mislead a foreign intelligence entity, to aid in the accomplishment of the friendly mission and achieve a United States military advantage. (JP 3-54).

CORE COMPETENCIES

1-11. A *core competency* is an essential and enduring capability that a branch or an organization provides to Army operations (ADP 1-01). PO Branch core competencies describe the capabilities required to execute PSYOP and DDAs and contribute to Army operations. The competencies are collective; however, the required skills are individual. The varying level of skills among individuals contribute to the collective competencies of the branch. Each core competency compliments the other, providing units the capability to plan and execute the two primary influence activities. The PO Branch core competencies are analyzing target audiences (TAs) and influencing foreign audiences. A *target audience* is an individual or group selected for influence (JP 3-04).

INFLUENCING FOREIGN AUDIENCES

1-12. Influence is the ability to cause an effect in direct or indirect ways. An enduring influence capability requires Soldiers with a diverse set of skills. For Soldiers to advance their proficiency in required skills from basic to expert levels requires deliberate institutional, organizational, and individual development.

ANALYZING TARGET AUDIENCES

1-13. Analyzing TAs is essential to influencing foreign audiences and influencing foreign audiences provides the purpose for analysis. Like the previous core competency, analyzing TAs requires Soldiers to advance their proficiency from basic to expert levels over the course of their careers. TM 3-53.11 provides details on the target audience analysis (TAA) activity and supersedes previous information on the topic from ST 33-01.

CULTURAL SKILLS, REGIONAL EXPERTISE, AND KNOWLEDGE

1-14. Cultural skills, regional expertise, and the acquisition of knowledge for both are intertwined and provide foundational understanding required for both the core competencies.

1-15. According to *Intercultural Communication - A Reader*, culture is the deposit of knowledge, experience, beliefs, attitudes, meanings, social hierarchies, religion, notions of time, roles, spatial relationships, concepts of the universe, and material objects and possessions acquired by a group of people during generations through individual and group striving. Culture significantly influences how humans interpret information, make decisions, and behave. Culture incorporates knowledge, experiences, beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, social hierarchies, religions, notions of time, roles (including gender and age-related roles), and spatial relationships. Psychological Operations Soldiers must understand culture from a general perspective to be able to work toward expertise in specific cultures. Figure 1-3, page 4, highlights topics Soldiers must acquire knowledge about to achieve proficiency in cultural skills and gain regional expertise.




Figure 1-3. Psychological Operations Branch core competency related skills

1-16. Cultural skills and knowledge enable PO Soldiers to adapt and succeed in any culture. DODD 5160.41E highlights culture-general capabilities and regional expertise (such as foreign language skills) as essential for influence efforts. These competencies are critical to the DOD mission and must be effectively managed for development and employment.

1-17. The DOD incentivizes Soldiers to develop and sustain language proficiency, particularly in specialties requiring specific languages. DODD 5160.41E defines regional expertise as knowledge of a region's political, historical, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic factors.

BASE CONCEPTS: INFLUENCE AND BEHAVIOR

1-18. Introductory figure 2, page xi, identifies the two primary influence activities Psychological Operations units conduct to achieve physical, human, and information advantages for the Army. These two activities fall within the influence activity of the Army's information advantage construct. (See ADP 3-13.)

1-19. While this publication focuses on Army operations, it acknowledges that Psychological Operations units often conduct influence activities under the operational control of a joint force commander. In joint operations with sister Services, the terms "influence" and "behavior" are used in various contexts, which can cause confusion. To clarify, PO Soldiers can consider a spectrum of influence and categories of behavior to help navigate the terminology and context.

A SPECTRUM OF INFLUENCE

1-20. Psychological Operations units conduct operations in support of the highest echelons of government and down to the smallest units of action. Psychological Operations units achieve influence across a diverse spectrum. A four-tier framework serves as a foundation for clear, mission-specific discussions about influence.

National Strategic Influence

1-21. JP 3-0 outlines four core elements of competition: interests (the foundational element), influence, advantage, and leverage. Among these, national strategic influence represents the highest level within the spectrum of influence and is synonymous with the core element of influence. A nation advances and safeguards its interests by employing the other elements of competition (influence, advantage, and leverage) in a coordinated manner. These core elements are applicable to all relationships between the United States and other state or nonstate strategic actors, as defined within the competition continuum.

1-22. Interests are the values, principles, and priorities that a nation or actor seeks to protect or achieve in the face of competitors. These may include matters of self-preservation, economic prosperity, national security, or ideological goals. For example, the United States prioritizes interests such as maintaining global stability, ensuring access to critical resources, and promoting democratic values.

1-23. Influence refers to the ability to shape outcomes or behaviors (directly, indirectly, or through intangible means). Influence can be accumulated, spent, or lost depending on how it is wielded. For instance, the United States exercises influence through diplomatic efforts, economic efforts (through institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank), and global leadership in institutions like the United Nations. By playing a leading role in brokering peace agreements, the United States shapes regional dynamics and align with U.S. interests in stability and security.

1-24. Advantage is the superiority of position or condition that enables a nation to achieve desired outcomes. Nations can create an advantage by accumulating influence or by leveraging the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). For example, the U.S. maintains a technological advantage through innovation in sectors like artificial intelligence and defense systems.

1-25. Leverage is the application of gained advantage to create effects or exploit opportunities. When a nation has leverage, it is better positioned to promote and protect its interests. For example, the United States uses its economic leverage (such as control over global financial systems and trade agreements) to influence the policies of other nations and global economic policies, ensuring favorable conditions for trade and investment.

1-26. In the context of strategic competition, national strategic influence can be understood as the ability of a nation to shape the global environment in ways that align with its interests. This influence is exercised through a combination of soft power (cultural diplomacy and foreign aid) and hard power (military alliances and economic sanctions).

Theater Strategic Influence

1-27. The military instrument of national power is a critical source of power for achieving theater strategic influence. The information joint function provides an intellectual framework to aid joint force commanders in exerting influence through the timely generation, preservation, denial, or projection of information. The information function also encompasses the use of friendly information to influence foreign audiences and affect the legitimacy, credibility, and influence of the United States Government (USG), joint force, allies, and partners (collectively known as unified action partners). Influence in this context can be thought of as theater strategic. Theater strategic influence seeks to create advantages that can be leveraged to achieve the USG interests communicated as campaign plan objectives.

unified action partners

Those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations (ADP 3-0).

1-28. The forward deployment of U.S. forces in regions such as the Indo-Pacific demonstrates a commitment to regional security and deters potential adversaries like China. This presence reassures unified action partners, thereby strengthening partnerships and enhancing collective security. Large-scale military exercises showcase U.S. military capabilities and interoperability with allied and partner nations. These exercises build trust, improve readiness, and send a clear message of unity and strength to allies and adversaries. The deployment of U.S. military assets to provide disaster relief, such as during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami or the 2010 Haiti earthquake, demonstrates U.S. commitment to humanitarian values. These actions enhance the perception of the U.S. as a reliable and benevolent partner, increasing its influence in the affected regions. Programs like Foreign Military Sales and International Military Education and Training help partner nations build their own defense capabilities. This strengthens their ability to resist aggression, while reinforcing U.S. influence in the region.

1-29. Public affairs operations, senior leader engagements, and PSYOP amplify the influence of these activities, making them more effective than when conducted independently. Theater strategic influence is achieved through a combination of military presence, partnerships, and operations in the information environment, all aligned with broader U.S. strategic objectives. By shaping the operational environment, the combatant commanders create advantages that can be leveraged to protect U.S. interests and those of allies and partners.

Operational Influence

1-30. Operational influence seeks to create and leverage interdependent human, information, and physical advantages to achieve commanders' objectives as they execute combatant command campaign plan subordinate operations, activities, and missions. Often theater Army headquarters, theater special operations commands, task forces, and Psychological Operations units (typically at the battalion echelon) plan these subordinate operations. While operational influence may seek to affect the behavior of a relevant actor, the subsequent behavior may also be used to create enduring conditions that directly support the achievement of combatant commander campaign plan objectives.

1-31. There are many types of operations, activities, and missions that support combatant command campaign plans and their related human, information, and physical advantages. A few examples follow:

- Special operations Soldiers build trust with local leaders by conducting Soldier and leader engagements to foster cooperation and gain support for operations.
- Infantry companies train security forces to enhance the security forces' ability to maintain stability and deter adversarial influence in contested regions.
- Cyberspace units disrupt adversary communication networks to degrade the adversary's ability to coordinate operations and spread disinformation.
- Public affairs operations disseminate success stories of humanitarian aid missions to strengthen the legitimacy of U.S. presence in the region.
- Task forces conduct strikes on enemy logistics hubs to weaken their operational capabilities and influence their decision making.
- Theater Army headquarters deploy rapid response forces to secure key terrain and demonstrate U.S. resolve in deterring aggression.

1-32. All these activities create and/or leverage advantages. Psychological Operations units supporting the echelons planning combatant command campaign plan subordinate operations, activities, and missions leverage the created physical, human, and information advantages. This enables the maintenance and exploitation of these advantages to greater effect.

Tactical Influence

1-33. As the last level of influence, tactical influence includes those activities that seek to create specific effects in a commander's assigned area. Tactical influence can be applied through a series of tactical actions or a single action.

1-34. Every unit leader in the Army can employ tactical influence as the authority to conduct tactical influence activities is inherent in command. Even with this inherent authority, commanders and subordinate leaders ultimately consider all their activities in the context of the commander's mission statement and intent two echelons up. The adage that tactical actions can have unintended strategic effects embodies the speed and breadth of the effects of influence.

1-35. Examples of common actions that can wield tactical influence include—

- The platoon leader meets with local community leaders to build trust, gather information, and foster cooperation in support of the mission.
- The unit sets up checkpoints to control movement, deter enemy activity, and reassure the local population of security.
- The company distributes food, water, and medical supplies to displaced civilians to build goodwill and reduce support for adversaries.
- The platoon conducts regular patrols through villages to demonstrate security, deter enemy activity, and reassure the population.
- The commander deploys Civil Affairs teams to coordinate infrastructure repairs and community projects, fostering stability and support for friendly forces.
- The squad uses nonlethal weapons to disperse hostile crowds, minimizing casualties while maintaining control of the situation.
- The commander supports local officials in organizing town hall meetings to address community concerns and promote stability.
- The unit executes precise raids to capture high-value targets, disrupt enemy operations, and demonstrate the capability of friendly forces.

1-36. These examples illustrate how tactical influence can be applied to achieve specific effects while aligning with the commander's mission and intent. PO Soldiers assigned to maneuver units play a critical role in helping plan the activities to maximize their influence. Supporting Psychological Operations units amplify and exploit the effects to help converge effects for higher echelons across greater geographical areas.

Note: When reading the subsequent chapters, it is beneficial to all PO Soldiers to consider the spectrum of influence and how it applies to the unit to which they are currently assigned.

BEHAVIOR

1-37. ***Behavior*** is **the observable activity of an individual or group representing physical responses to an environment and any event, actor, or influence capable of causing a response.**

1-38. In U.S. Army operations, categorization of types of behavior depends on combinations of frequency, duration, and conditions. However, these categorizations (detailed in the following subsections) are not definitive; they serve as a starting point for PO Soldiers to—

- Think about current and future behaviors in the context of the levels of influence.
- Discuss behavioral-based objectives with commanders.
- Develop psychological objectives, supporting psychological objectives (SPOs), and intermediate psychological objectives (IPOs).
- Plan and implement assessment criteria.

Persistent Behavior

1-39. These are behaviors that continue despite the lack of U.S. military presence in the environment. Societal norms provide examples of persistent behavior (such as driving on the left side of the road, donating blood and organs, and body adornment). Cultural norms provide examples as well, for example the treatment of women, children, and the elderly; and accepting items with one hand versus the other. Language and dialect, dietary staples and culinary traditions, religious practices, agricultural practices, marriage and family structure, and informal economies provide other examples of persistent behavior. Unlike episodic behaviors, persistent behaviors occur regardless of the setting or situation. They stem from a connection a group has with society or culture.

Episodic Behavior

1-40. Episodic behaviors occur consistently in response to specific stimuli. Examples of episodic behavior include voting, customs and courtesies, and autonomic reflexes. An example of an autonomic reflex is smelling something fatty and salty which triggers an autonomic response (feeling hungry), and the reflex would be to order an extra-large portion of fries. Seasonal migrations provide another example of episodic behavior. The movement of pastoral communities or herdsmen is triggered by the changing of seasons to find new grazing lands. Unlike persistent behaviors, episodic behaviors are a response to a specific trigger.

Practical Behavior

1-41. Practical behavior serves a temporary and pragmatic purpose, such as some action that occurs during U.S. military (or another entity's) presence but ceases during U.S. military absence. Examples include staying at home during military operations, observing military imposed curfews, and protesting U.S. presence. For example, using military-provided services like medical clinics, water purification stations, or generators occurs when the services only during a crisis. Hoarding goods, the stockpiling of fuel, food, or medicine in anticipation of shortages or movement restrictions imposed by military operations is another example to consider.

Timely Behavior

1-42. These are actions prompted by stimuli that are only expected to occur once. Examples of timely behavior include reactions to feints and other tactical deception (TAC-D) activities, force protection activities, following crowd control instructions, and throwing objects at a public speaker. Responding to a warning shot by immediately dropping to the ground is one example. Another is following specific instructions broadcast from a military vehicle, such as "Move to the stadium for aid distribution!".

Context

1-43. Behaviors can be episodic in some contexts but not in others. For example, speaking loudly is episodic in response to noise but not if one has hearing problems. The intensity of the response can vary depending on the intensity of the trigger and other contextual factors. Culture can also strongly influence behavior and what triggers a response in one culture may not in another. Furthermore, even within a culture, individuals may have different thresholds for triggering behaviors based on their personal experiences.

SPECTRUM OF INFLUENCE AND CATEGORIES OF BEHAVIOR

1-44. Natural correlations exist between the strata of the spectrum of influence and the categories of behavior described above. PO Soldiers actively align timely behaviors with tactical influence to enhance planning efforts (such as the creation of objectives and the establishment of assessment criteria). In addition, collaboration with the National Center for Narrative Intelligence has demonstrated the effectiveness of combining this spectrum with the categories of behavior. This approach has proven valuable in developing and assessing narratives at both the USG level and the tactical maneuver commander echelons.

Note: The National Center for Narrative Intelligence is a congressionally mandated and National Defense Authorization Act-named organization. The National Center for Narrative Intelligence conducts applied interdisciplinary research, workforce development, and innovate analytic approaches to address narratives.

PRINCIPLES OVERVIEW

1-45. A *principle* is a comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides how an organization approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations (ADP 1-01). ADP 3-13 introduces four information advantage principles that shape the Army's approach to creating, protecting, and exploiting information advantages:

- **Offensively Oriented.** Seize and exploit the initiative to create, protect, and exploit information advantages in all domains.
- **Combined Arms.** Integrate all available Army, joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities in pursuit of information advantages.
- **Commander Driven.** Commanders visualize and describe the deliberate integration of information and capabilities to maximize operational effects.
- **Soldier Enabled.** All Soldiers contribute to collecting, assessing, processing, communicating, and protecting information.

1-46. The principles in ADP 3-13 apply to all information advantage activities. Influence principles (specific to the information advantage influence activity) directly support the information advantage principles by ensuring operations are offensively oriented, integrated across combined arms teams, driven by commanders, and enabled by Soldiers. Together, these principles create a cohesive framework for achieving information advantages and influencing behavior.

HUMAN BEHAVIOR FOCUSED

1-47. Influence activities aim to induce or sustain desired behaviors in foreign TAs to achieve specific objectives. This aligns with the offensively oriented principle, as Psychological Operations units proactively plan, analyze, and execute operations to shape behaviors. Commanders define military objectives, which drive influence objectives specifying desired behaviors. For theories on human behavior drivers, refer to JP 3-04 and ADP 3-13.

ANALYSIS DRIVEN

1-48. Effective influence activities rely on thorough analysis of the operational environment, including TAs and other key factors. This principle supports the combined arms approach by requiring input from across disciplines, units, and warfighting functions to produce analytical products that inform decisions. Soldiers play a critical role in collecting, processing, and distributing information to enable these analyses.

CONTINUOUS ASSESSMENT

1-49. Influence activities require ongoing assessment of the environment to evaluate the psychological effects of friendly, adversary, and other activities. Commanders drive assessments that measure progress toward tasks, conditions, or objectives. Soldiers across the combined arms team contribute by evaluating and categorizing information to ensure assessments provide actionable insights into TAs, behavioral influences, and effective methods of engagement.

COORDINATED INFLUENCE

1-50. Coordination ensures interoperability, consistency, unity of effort, and predictable outcomes. Army units coordinate internally, across joint or multinational forces, and with governmental organizations. This principle complements the combined arms and offensively oriented principles by fostering unified and synchronized influence efforts.

CENTRALIZED PLANNING WITH DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

1-51. Centralized planning establishes clear objectives and precise targeting, while decentralized execution allows flexibility to adapt operations to local circumstances. Commanders drive operations but empower subordinates through mission command this ensures alignment with the commander-driven principle.

IMMEDIATE INTEGRATION

1-52. Influence activities integrate immediately into planning efforts to address mission requirements and shape the environment. For regionally focused units, integration is continuous, reflecting the Soldier-enabled principle by leveraging Soldiers' contributions to operational planning and execution.

COMPLEMENTARY TO STRATEGIC EFFORTS

1-53. Influence activities enhance broader USG efforts by providing capabilities and capacity that other forces, agencies, or departments may lack. Consistency across executing organizations is critical, since discrepancies in posture or messaging can lead to undesired behaviors. Commanders ensure alignment through clear objectives and mission orders thereby facilitating interdependency between elements and echelons.

THE INFLUENCE PROCESS

1-54. ADP 5-0 states, "The Army's framework for organizing and putting command and control into action is the operations process. The operations process consists of the major command and control activities performed during operations (planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing)." Commanders use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand their operational environment; visualize and describe the operation's end state and operational approach; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess operations.

1-55. The influence process is an evolution of the current process described in ST 33-01. The evolution more closely aligns the influence process with the Army operations process that enables supported or supporting commanders of Psychological Operations units to—

- Understand their operational environment.
- Visualize and describe the end state and operational approach through psychological objectives, IPOs, and SPOs.
- Make and articulate decisions.
- Direct, lead, and assess operations and activities.

1-56. The influence process (figure 1-4) is a systematic method for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing influence activities. It provides the foundation for influencing human behavior. PO Soldiers apply the influence process as an integrating process (much like risk management, targeting, intelligence preparation of the environment, information collection, and knowledge management). The influence process consists of the following five activities, two of which are continuous:

- Plan, which includes—
  - Series development.
  - Product development and design.
  - Series approval.
- TAA (continuous once triggered by planning).
- Prepare, which continues—
  - Series development.
  - Product development and design.
  - Series approval (including production and distribution).
- Execute, which continues production and distribution, and includes dissemination.
- Assess (continuous once triggered by planning).




Figure 1-4. The influence process

1-57. Like ST 33-01, TM 3-53.11 and TM 3-53.15 provide more details about the influence process, with a specific focus on TAA and assess respectively. These TMs supersede portions of ST 33-01; and upon publication of the other final manuals in the series (table 1-1), ST 33-01 will become an obsolete publication.

Table 1-1. Psychological Operations technical manual series

Publication Number	*Publication Title*	*Publication Date*
TM 3-53.11	Influence Process Activity: Target Audience Analysis	9 February 2024
TM 3-53.12	Influence Process Activities: Plan, Prepare, Execute	*September 2026
TM 3-53.15	Influence Process Activity: Assess	25 April 2025

Note: The asterisk (*) denotes a projected publication date.

Legend:

TM technical manual

Note: TM 3-53.12 is a future publication that is not included in the references section of this ATP.

SECTION II – PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS UNITS

INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

1-58. Psychological Operations units execute a diverse set of missions enabled by the capability to conduct two primary influence activities that are directly related to the branch role. These two primary influence activities are PSYOP and DDAs.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1-59. PSYOP apply across the range of military operations as a supporting effort and can be a main effort to achieve campaign objectives. In competition, influence can be the most appropriate capability a commander can wield. PSYOP and the Psychological Operations units that conduct those operations and supporting activities provide a critical means to influence a broad range of relevant actors. These actors can be strategic actors, transnational criminal organizations, a partner's internal threats, and undecided actors a commander needs to support or partner with the friendly force. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 include vignettes that describe the use of PSYOP in different operational contexts.

1-60. Figure 1-5 shows leaflets disseminated in support of the Colombian Army's efforts to increase defections and repatriations in guerrilla forces. The operation ran during the Christmas season, when many fighters choose to be with their families instead of fighting.



Leaflet A translation: Do not allow your leaders to steal your opportunity to enjoy a peaceful Christmas with your family.
ENOUGH VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM!
Come to the closest military unit, your freedom awaits you.
ACT NOW!
Discover the benefits you can receive.



Leaflet B translation: YOU MATTER MORE!
This year, don't be the one that's missing, this Christmas can be the first time to change your lifestyle.
Your family is waiting for you.
The National Army wishes you a Merry Christmas and a prosperous New Year.

Figure 1-5. Leaflets targeting guerrilla units

1-61. Generally, PSYOP rely on facts to enhance legitimacy, present arguments, and generate the desired behavior from a foreign audience. While the use of disinformation and the exploitation of misinformation are common in deception, there are also conditions under which they can be appropriate in conducting PSYOP. DODI O-3607.02, CJCSI 3110.05G, and JP 3-53 state that all activities conducted under PSYOP authorities require risk assessments and must be reported to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and Congress. See Appendix A for more information on authorities.

Misinformation and disinformation may be appropriate when influencing a specific target; however, their use increases risk. *Misinformation* is unintentional incorrect information from any source (ADP 3-13). *Disinformation* is incomplete, incorrect, or out of context information deliberately used to influence audiences (ADP 3-13)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DECEPTION ACTIVITIES

1-62. DDAs are the policy-guided operations that a combatant command, Service, agency (or other component that employs military deception [MILDEC]) conducts to influence the actions of adversary military, paramilitary, violent extremist organizations, or proxy decision-makers, or to mislead a foreign intelligence entity. The aim of DDAs is to accomplish the friendly mission and a chive a U.S. military advantage. Historically, Army Psychological Operations units commonly conducted dissemination of audio and visual messages, physical activities executed as psychological actions (PSYACTs), and other tactics to support deception activities. A ***psychological action*** is **an action with the primary purpose of producing a psychological effect that causes a desired behavior change in a foreign target audience. Also called a PSYACT.**

1-63. DDAs include—

- Operational deception (OP-D).
- Deception in support of operations security (DISO).
- TAC-D.

Note: *Military deception* is activities intended to mislead and cause adversary actions or inactions that are beneficial to the friendly force (JP 3-54). MILDEC creates an inaccurate sense of reality for the adversary to drive decisions that mitigate risk to friendly forces and risk to operational success. MILDEC supports all levels of warfare. However, the term MILDEC is academic in nature and refers to the concept of being deceptive in warfare. MILDEC is available to the joint forces and can be conceptualized as two basic categories: deception operations governed by DOD policies and non-governed deceptive actions.

Operational Deception

1-64. An OP-D is a deceptive operation that a combatant command conducts to support a SecDef-approved military campaign or operation by focusing on broad adversarial action. Because of the problem sets that it supports, the OP-D plan requires SecDef authorization prior to execution. An OP-D is planned, approved, synchronized, and assessed at the combatant command level and is executed by its component commands and Service components.

1-65. An OP-D influences an individual adversary military decision-maker's perceptions and actions. Civilian decision-makers who command military actions may also be the targets of an OP-D. The adversary actions that an OP-D intends to influence should create advantage to the joint force. Psychological Operations units can be witting or unwitting (aware or unaware of the OP-D effort) participants in the OP-D plan.

1-66. During Operation DESERT SHIELD, influence efforts promoted an amphibious assault (a diversion) along the southern coast of Kuwait while actual operational plans were for a land assault from the South and West of Iraq. This deception effort set conditions for Operation DESERT STORM. Figure 1-6 depicts a leaflet dropped on Iraqi formations as part of the deception effort.



Figure 1-6. Operation DESERT STORM leaflet warning of amphibious assault

Deception in Support of Operations Security

1-67. Unlike OP-D and TAC-D, DISO only targets foreign intelligence and does not focus on generating a specific adversary action or inaction. A DISO is a deception operation conducted to support operations security. It does so by obfuscating or deceptively revealing select critical information about friendly operations, personnel, programs, equipment, employment techniques, and other assets on which foreign intelligence entities may collect to change the perceived reality of the associated critical information. A DISO supplements the ability of operations security to protect essential secrets.

1-68. DISO does not intend to influence a specific adversary individual to conduct an action or inaction. Rather, it misleads foreign intelligence entities' interpretation of the observed and collected indicators regarding the associated critical information. However, adversary action may still occur based on the conclusion reached by the foreign intelligence entity due to the DISO.

1-69. Support to DISO relies on an operations security assessment to identify vulnerabilities. Examples of how Psychological Operations units can contribute to DISO include—

- Disseminating messages and signals to create the impression of a larger unit.
- Using administrative means (such as overflight requests or other unclassified preparatory coordination) to portray a planned military activity.
- Conducting false or misleading communications or information sharing.
- Disseminating false information concurrent with a unit's movements and training events.

Tactical Deception

1-70. Psychological Operations units plan and execute TAC-D in support of a commander's scheme of maneuver. TAC-D is a near-term, tactical-level effort directed against enemy forces to—

- Provide a commander with an advantage.
- Conceal friendly force intentions and operational vulnerabilities.
- Augment and strengthen the defensive efforts of friendly forces.

1-71. Army maneuver commanders at brigade level and below have substantial latitude to employ attached Psychological Operations units in TAC-D. A TAC-D should be deconflicted and coordinated with higher and adjacent units' operations. MILDEC planners, as subject matter experts on the maneuver commander's staff, actively integrate and execute TAC-D to safeguard and enhance the lethality of military operations. Their employment in TAC-D must be within the boundaries of CJCSI 3211.01F and any combatant commander policies or other guidance. Psychological Operations units attached to brigade or below during armed conflict should come with capabilities appropriate for the unit they are supporting.

1-72. For example, an infantry unit that is expected to conduct rotary-wing insertions benefits from the use of audio products of rotary-wing aircraft flying, taking off, and landing. Also, an infantry unit conducting a deliberate defense may benefit from reproductions of unit activities such as digging fighting positions.

1-73. Psychological Operations units are more likely to deceive enemy decision-makers when diverse signals, such as electromagnetic emissions, audio, and visual displays, are available to enemy sensors. FM 3-13.4 provides more information on Army support to deception. ATP 3-53.5 details the ability of Psychological Operations forces to plan, integrate, and manage military deception influence activities and provides techniques and procedures for those tasks.

ORGANIZATION

1-74. Since the mid-1960s, the highest echelon in the Psychological Operations force structure has been the group. The group consolidated subordinate battalions, companies, detachments, and teams under a single internal organization and this general organizational structure has remained constant.

1-75. The Army has four Psychological Operations groups (POGs): the 2nd POG, 4th POG, 7th POG, and 8th POG. The 2nd POG and 7th POG are in the Reserve Component, and the 4th POG and 8th POG are in the Active Component.

1-76. PO Soldiers serve in staff positions across Active Component, Reserve Component, and National Guard maneuver units, divisions, corps, major commands, and institutional units. They are also assigned outside the Army on combatant command staffs, the Joint Staff, the Secretary of Defense's staff, other U.S. government agencies, and multinational headquarters.

1-77. Individual Psychological Operations units may have different regional focuses and/or specified missions. However, there is an inherent requirement for each unit to be interoperable and interdependent (particularly in large-scale combat operations). In named operations, the joint force commander responsible for planning and executing the operation is largely responsible for fostering interdependence. As they execute missions in competition below armed conflict, the formal and informal coordination between combatant command component commanders and Psychological Operations unit commanders facilitate interdependence.

1-78. The categorization of a Psychological Operations unit as part of the Army's conventional or special operations forces is immaterial to the execution of PSYOP as a special operation and the requirement to report to the SecDef and the Congress all activities conducted under PSYOP authorities. Furthermore, this categorization of units has no bearing on the capability and responsibility to conduct or support DDAs. Therefore, all PO Branch personnel, regardless of assignment, must be familiar with deception, PSYOP, and Psychological Operations unit content in ADP 3-05 and FM 3-05 to facilitate interoperability and integration of individuals and units.

CONTEXT FOR EMPLOYMENT

1-79. At the Joint Staff and combatant command levels, the strategic context for the employment of Army Psychological Operations units considers—

- The national strategy.
- U.S. policy.
- Agreements with allies that inform combatant commander, joint force commander, or U.S. ambassador requirements.
- The character of the operational environment.
- The activities of adversaries or threats.

1-80. From the Army perspective, Army tactical formations typically conduct operations within a context dominated by one strategic relationship at a time. These strategic contexts are competition, crisis, and armed conflict.

1-81. To overcome regional challenges, POCs often conduct operations across two or more contexts simultaneously when they deploy to multiple countries. Within the Army and the Joint Staff combatant command contexts, Psychological Operations units provide the President, SecDef, commanders, and other USG departments with national strategic, theater strategic, operational, and tactical options to achieve enduring outcomes. They are employed in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments as they work alongside U.S. and other unified action partners. Psychological Operations units must be trained, educated, manned, and equipped to face the challenges of-

- Transregional and multifunctional threats.
- Unstable states.
- Advanced information technologies.
- Noncontiguous areas of operation.
- Global operations.
- Whole-of-government approaches.
- Multinational and multi-partner operations.
- The effects created by the speed, propagation, and reach of information.
- Coping with environments characterized by—
  - Accelerated global human interaction through information technology.
  - Ubiquitous media and pervasive information.
  - Fragmented media.
  - Enduring threat influence campaigns operating below the threshold of armed conflict.
  - Threat use of information to avoid or offset U.S. military overmatch.
  - Irregular threat networks.
  - Coercive and malign threat activities.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ECHELONS

1-82. Psychological Operations units are inherently flexible and can adapt to different environments and requirements. Task organization is key to such flexibility. It enables commanders to tailor their unit capabilities to meet the unique requirements of each mission regardless of where it falls across the range of military operations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GROUP

1-83. The Psychological Operations group supports the highest military echelon within a given operation. This may mean the group could provide direct support to an Army corps (or equivalent), a combatant commander, or a joint (combined or multinational) task force commander as a specific operational force or single Service force (area or functional). More than one Psychological Operations battalion headquarters necessitates a group headquarters for command and control. A requirement for more than five battalions will necessitate the addition of another group headquarters. More than one group will require a command, with up to five groups per command. Once there are more than two commands, an additional level of coordinating command must exist to conduct command and control.

1-84. Figure 1-7, page 18, depicts the flexibility of a Psychological Operations group across a range of echelons.




Figure 1-7. Psychological Operations group flexibility across a range of echelons

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION

1-85. The Psychological Operations battalion (POB) is the most flexible organization within the force structure and is the lowest echelon with a complete staff. The battalion commander and staff may be the highest Psychological Operations unit echelon deployed for an operation—particularly those that fall below the threshold of large-scale armed conflict.

1-86. The battalion may be attached to a combatant command, joint task force, theater army, theater special operations command, special operations joint task force, corps, division, or joint special operations task force. However, they are not suited to support echelons above corps for extended operations involving limited armed conflict and with a span of control that exceeds five companies. In these alignments, the battalion conducts operations as an attached direct reporting unit or provides the command and core staff of an influence-focused functional component command. Figure 1-8 depicts the flexibility of a POB across a range of echelons.




Figure 1-8. Psychological Operations battalion flexibility across a range of echelons

Organizing for Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations

Paragraphs 1-82 through 1-86 and their associated figures describe the broad range of echelons Psychological Operations units can support. The Center for Army Analysis uses Army rules of allocation during the modeling process (quantitative analysis) which supports capability demand analysis. These rules of allocation represent a quantitative statement of doctrine for each type of unit. However, they do not account for the capability demand from units outside of the Army.

In terms of combatant commander campaign plans and operational plans, this includes combatant commands, service component commands, functional component commands, joint task force headquarters (or multinational task force headquarters), and joint task force component commands.

Figure 1-9, page 20, bridges the gap between doctrinal alignment of Psychological Operations units and Army modeling analyses. It depicts a notional joint task force for large-scale ground combat operations on day one of the fight. The working presumption is that there is still no presidential decision for mobilization of the Reserve Component or that Reserve Component units have not yet completed mobilization.

Organizing for Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations (continued)




Figure 1-9. Example of Psychological Operations group in notional joint task force operations

In this example of a five corps multinational fight, the requirement is for an Army POG to provide the headquarters for the joint task force component command for operations in the information environment (Joint Force Information Component Command) and provide the theater fires influence capability. There are four other POGs depicted, one to support each of the following: the Joint Force Land Component Command, each of the U.S. Army corps, and the Joint Force Special Operations Component Command. Figure 1-9 also depicts the alignment of 21 POBs and 62 POCs (with one of the companies providing the three separate detachments). Figure 1-9 does not depict specific command relationships. Solid lines depict a relationship, and dotted lines show a breakout from the originating unit.

TASK FORCES

1-87. JP 3-53 introduces both the information task force and the Psychological Operations task force (POTF) as functional component commands without differentiating mission sets. JP 3-53 notes that a POTF could be responsible for operations in the information environment or only for a specific function, for example PSYOP. It is beyond the scope of doctrinal publications to dictate mission statements or state what missions an operational unit can or cannot conduct. Figures 1-7 through 1-9 (pages 18 through 20) depict the various echelons a POG or POB can operate at (depending on mission requirements); those organizations may require individual augmentation or external units.

1-88. A ***Psychological Operations task group*** is **a brigade-sized unit consisting of a Psychological Operations group headquarters, at least two assigned battalions and at least one attached detachment or platoon-sized element from another unit. Also called a POTG**. A ***Psychological Operations task force*** is **a battalion-sized unit consisting of a Psychological Operations battalion headquarters, at least two assigned companies and at least one attached detachment or platoon-sized element from another unit. Also called a POTF.**

1-89. Task organization increases the capabilities of Psychological Operations units. POGs or POBs may control battalions or companies (respectively) or smaller units of action of any kind from other units through an established support relationship and/or command relationship. POG commanders can reinforce their subordinate battalions with the same or other types of POCs or PODs to form a POTG.

1-90. The responsibility for the PO Branch's two primary influence activities will be a key factor in force modernization efforts to include the organizational capability requirement. Until required organizational changes are approved and resourced, the POG and POB will likely require individual augmentation from various Army or other Service branches (for example, jobs in the fields like behavioral science, cyberspace, space, operations research and systems analysis, public affairs, signal, and military intelligence).

Note: The attachment of an external unit is what differentiates the POTG or POTF from a POG or POB.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMPANY

1-91. While organizationally not as flexible as its parent unit, the company conducts operations across a broader range of echelons and is consistently employed in all operational contexts. A company can conduct influence activities at the highest military echelon down to the battalion task force echelon. However, support at higher echelons is not typical for large-scale combat operations. Figure 1-10 depicts the flexibility of a POC across a range of echelons.




Figure 1-10. Psychological Operations company flexibility across a range of echelons

1-92. As depicted in figure 1-10, the POC has a significant range of potential operational responsibility. Mission analysis will determine whether a company requires individual augmentation, external units, or both. An ***influence company team*** is **a combined arms organization formed by attaching one or more nonorganic units, either in place of or in addition to, the Psychological Operations company organic detachments. Also called an ICT.**

Note: Individual augmentation of information forces to a POC does not constitute an influence company team.

INFLUENCE OBJECTIVES

1-93. Military operations are objective focused. Each operation has at least one objective and each objective is clearly defined. The DOD model for objectives begins with higher-level objectives that commanders and staffs at lower echelons support by creating and achieving supporting objectives. This integration continues as commanders and staffs identify intermediate objectives that fill the gap between the current situation and the lowest-level objective. This model also applies to PO Soldiers throughout the influence process (figure 1-4, page 11). PO Soldiers ensure any proposed influence objective—

- Establishes a single desired result.
- Links (directly or indirectly) to higher-level objectives or to the end state.
- Does not imply ways or means.
- Is not written as a task. It is—
  - Specific.
  - Measurable.
  - Achievable.
  - Realistic.
  - Time-bound or condition-bound.

1-94. Influence objectives are behavior-focused and tied to specific observable and measurable behaviors. Effective planning requires clear, precisely worded, and measurable objectives. Influence objectives include psychological objectives, SPOs, and IPOs. more information about objectives, refer to FM 5-0. For details on developing influence objectives refer to TM 3-53.11 and ST 33-01.

1-95. Table 1-2 and the following paragraphs detail the various influence objectives.

Table 1-2. Influence objectives

Objective Name	*Definition*
Psychological Objective	A statement that reflects the desired behavioral effect. Also called a PO.
Supporting Psychological Objective	The desired behavior of a foreign target audience that contributes to accomplishing a psychological objective. Also called an SPO.
Intermediate Psychological Objective	The desired change in the psychological conditions of a foreign target audience that progresses the audience toward a supporting psychological objective. Also called an IPO.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES

1-96. A ***psychological objective*** is **a statement that reflects the desired behavioral effect. Also called a PO.** When developing psychological objectives, planners ensure they are specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time bound. If any of these elements are lacking (either directly in the objective statement, or in the operational context), it is likely not a valid objective. Psychological objectives may take years to achieve. To be time-bound, they must be tied to distinct events or measurable changes in behavior or conditions.

SUPPORTING PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES

1-97. A ***supporting psychological objective*** is **the desired behavior of a foreign target audience that contributes to accomplishing a psychological objective. Also called an SPO.** SPOs are unique for each psychological objective; and each psychological objective always has two or more SPOs.

1-98. If it is impossible to develop two or more SPOs from a psychological objective, the psychological objective is too narrow in focus and must be rewritten. All SPOs must assist in achieving the psychological objective. The ability to write specific, measurable SPOs validates the psychological objective. The ability to write specific measurable indicators (for measures of effectiveness) validates the SPOs. If it is impossible to write measurable indicators for a subsequent objective, the higher objective is invalid and must be rewritten.

INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVES

1-99. An ***intermediate psychological objective*** is **the desired change in the psychological conditions of a foreign target audience that progresses the audience toward a supporting psychological objective. Also called an IPO.** The IPOs cover the gap between the current TA behaviors and the SPO. This coverage addresses how to move the TA in incremental steps from the current behavior towards a desired behavior. IPO behavior indicates awareness, understanding, preferred attitude, preference for action, and the intent to act.

> ***Note:*** While figure 1-11 depicts linear progressive behavior change, behavior change is not always linear; it can skip steps, go backward, and hit stasis.

1-100. IPOs and the associated SPO are not isolated in one line of progression. Instead, they are aligned with several other SPOs that combine to achieve a higher psychological objective, as shown in figure 1-10.




Figure 1-11. Objective level linkages

1-101. Table 1-3, page 24, provides a notional example of objective level linkages. Achieving the IPOs directly leads to SPO achievement and achieving a predetermined number of SPOs can directly lead to achieving the psychological objective.

Table 1-3. Example of notional objective linkages

Military Objective: Decrease combat effectiveness of Donrovian western region ground forces by 20-percent.	
Objective Name	***Defined Objective***
Psychological Objective	Decrease Donrovian western region military ground forces' will to fight.
Supporting Psychological Objectives	• Donrovian 7th Army deserts at a rate of 1-percent or higher beginning D+1. • Donrovian 7th Army increases malingering rates by 2-percent beginning D+5. • Donrovian 7th Army surrenders at a rate of ≥ 1-percent beginning D+12.
Intermediate Psychological Objectives	Examples of intermediate psychological objectives for above supporting psychological objectives: • 5th Brigade, 7th Army desertion rate is ≥ 1-percent beginning D+1. • 1st Sustainment Battalion, 5th Brigade, 7th Army delays resupply to front lines beginning D+1. • Infantry platoons in 5th Brigade, 7th Army mutiny rate is 5-percent beginning D+10.

1-102. Table 1-4 portrays the relationship between influence objectives and USG and DOD objectives. It also aligns the objectives with their appropriate warfare levels.

Table 1-4. Correlation between influence objectives and United States Government and Department of Defense objectives

Influence-focused Objectives	*United States Government Objective Types*	*Department of Defense Objective Names*	*Responsible Parties*	*Warfare Levels*
Psychological Objective	• National Strategic Objective • Multinational Strategic Objective	• National Security Objective • Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Objective • Strategic Military Objective	• President • National Security Staff • Agency Heads	National Strategic
	Theater or Functional Strategic Objective	• Campaign Objective • Theater Strategic Objective • Theater Command Objective • Theater Objective • Country Objective	• Chief of Mission • Combatant Commander	Theater Strategic
Psychological Objective **Supporting Psychological Objectives**	Operational-level Objective	• Joint Force Command Objective • Military Operational Objective • Commander's Objective	• Chief of Mission • Joint Force Commander	Operational
Supporting Psychological Objective **Intermediate Psychological Objective**	Tactical-level Objective	Intermediate Objective	• Department and Agency Representative • Tactical Command	Tactical

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SOLDIERS ASSIGNED TO STAFFS

1-103. Individual PO Soldiers receive assignments to a variety of staff positions across the DOD. The staff positions in the operational force help develop or integrate influence objectives into the unit's plans and operations. This normally occurs through the staff sections of the operations or plans directorates.

1-104. The integration of influence objectives into unit plans and operations is key to the PO Branch's primary influence activities. The influence process is critical in developing these objectives and executing the operations and activities to achieve them. Therefore, the influence process is not used solely for PSYOP.

1-105. Staffs and individual staff members outside of Psychological Operations units do not have the capability to conduct the entire influence process. However, the influence process provides critical techniques and procedures that aid in formulating behavior-based objectives. Specifically, TAA provides a unique understanding of all three dimensions (human, physical, and information) of an assigned area. It is this understanding that facilitates creating commanders' objectives. The capacity of a staff section or staff member to conduct TAA is not equivalent to that of a POC or POD. However, the staff section or staff member can conduct TAA to some capacity given constraints such as time and prioritization.

1-106. Staff members, at echelon, are critical in developing and validating influence objectives. Combatant command staffs are responsible for developing PSYOP programs and their associated objectives. Those programs are processed through the Joint Staff to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy who coordinates those programs with other government departments and agencies (see JP 3-05). At each step, the staff relies on PO Soldiers to provide expertise and facilitate the process that aims to produce an approved program with measurable and attainable objectives. Regarding deception activities, combatant command staff synchronize activities related to psychological objectives and SPOs with the command's deception activities (whether the executing unit is a witting or unwitting participant in the deception plan).

1-107. Staffs at theater Army through corps echelons generally focus on SPOs as they correlate to the command's range of combatant command campaign plan supporting operations and activities. When the command is designated as the joint task force headquarters within a contingency plan or order, the staff needs to analyze existing psychological objectives to determine if they are sufficient to support the mission and develop new psychological objectives to mitigate any gaps. The focus on SPOs includes both developing them and validating them when they are produced by a subordinate or attached unit.

1-108. Division staffs focus on the validation and integration of IPOs. They rely on the attached Psychological Operations unit to develop IPOs as part of the influence process.

Chapter 2
Competition

This chapter identifies the tactics, practices, and resources that Psychological Operations units use to achieve or enable positions of relative advantage. This chapter emphasizes the importance of the commander's operational approach and the various types of security cooperation and military engagement programs and activities that support the Army's role in our nation's strategic competition and integrated deterrence efforts while preparing for war.

OVERVIEW

2-1. Competition deters aggression, prepares for armed conflict should deterrence fail, counters adversaries' competitive strategies that threaten U.S. national interests, and supports the efforts of interorganizational partners. U.S. strategic competition is dependent on unified action partners that act as force multipliers to enhance Army capabilities, optimize its advantages, and mitigate its vulnerabilities.

ARMY

2-2. The Army engages in competition and contributes to joint force efforts to protect and advance U.S. national interests by applying military power to gain a competitive advantage. Army forces contest adversary activities by supporting combatant command campaign plans and theater Army operations and preparing for large-scale combat operations with unified action partners. The objectives that Army forces help achieve are typically aligned to deterring adversary malign action, setting conditions for armed conflict on favorable terms should deterrence fail, and shaping environments with unified action partners to support U.S. strategic interests.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS UNITS

2-3. The activities to achieve these objectives fall under numerous programs within a combatant command. Therefore, specific influence activities that Psychological Operations units execute may not strictly fall under a PSYOP program or a combatant command MILDEC plan. These activities could be any of several other programs such as security cooperation and military engagement programs. Whatever the case, commanders and staffs integrate and synchronize those activities with the plans and objectives of the Department of State, other government agencies, country teams and the relevant ambassadors. However, the units primarily support the combatant command campaign plan.

2-4. During competition, specific activities deter adversary actions; shape the operational environment to better enable friendly operations; create and deepen human, physical, and information advantages; and establish favorable conditions for a potential shift to armed conflict. Since adversaries tend to pursue long-term strategic objectives, enduring DOD engagement and influence activities are vital to ensure lasting outcomes and derail adversary objectives. Such shaping and related activities coincide with overall preparation for large-scale combat operations if deterrence fails. Influence activities in this context shape the operational environment to create and build positions of advantage (relative to threats) if conditions devolve into crisis.

2-5. Typical echelons employing Psychological Operations units include combatant commands, theater special operations commands, and theater armies. Since those echelons participate in joint, regional, multinational, and bilateral exercises, Psychological Operations units also participate, generally in line with established rules of allocation or operation plans. Battalions aligned to specific geographic regions, transregional objectives, or named operations rely on their entire battalion to create persistent presence and achieve strategic outcomes or end states.

2-6. Psychological Operations units may conduct activities in a direct support role to the combatant command campaign plan or in support of a component command's supporting operations. A challenge with discussing planning regarding campaign plans is that they are always in execution; therefore, Psychological Operations unit commanders are already engaged in supporting those plans. Without the context of a specific combatant

command campaign plan and the theater army's (or theater special operations command's) supporting plan, it is easiest to discuss planning as if the campaign plan is new.

2-7. Regionally aligned or apportioned POBs look at combatant command campaign plans from the perspective of the entire campaign plan, not from an individual mission perspective. They develop supporting plans that focus on developing SPOs they can achieve through influence activities. The Psychological Operations unit commander's operational approach specifically informs the influence process. Psychological Operations unit commanders use a combination of direct and indirect approaches to conduct influence activities and achieve behavior-based objectives. When reading the subsequent content of this publication, it is best to consider the activities from direct, indirect, and a combination of approaches. Doing so allows the reader to frame content in the context of their regional alignment and/or assigned missions and increase understanding.

SHAPING OPERATIONS

2-8. According to JP 3-0, "Shaping activities may include long-term persistent and preventive military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence actions to assure partners, build partner capacity and capability, and promote regional stability." This means Army shaping activities help set the conditions for successful execution of operations. Within the range of military operations, the Army places shaping operations under military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence.

2-9. Influence activities align to these descriptions and is a key tactic used before, during, and after operations. In the areas of military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence, influence activities help set conditions to avert conflict escalation. The Army uses space, cyberspace, and Psychological Operations unit capabilities to influence adversaries and preemptively undermine, complicate, and disrupt malign activities. The nature of these Army capabilities is less escalatory, more politically palatable, and more appropriate to competition than conventional options such as military capability demonstrations.

2-10. The convergent and increased use of these three influence capabilities during competition results in units that are better prepared to execute operations in crisis or armed conflict. Authorities in Title 10 United States Code (USC), 22 USC, and 50 USC support execution.

2-11. Psychological Operations units support shaping and deterrence-related objectives with influence activities that—

- Influence relevant actors.
- Mitigate deteriorating conditions.
- Prepare the operational environment for future operations.
- Leverage indigenous populations and other human networks.
- Increase unified action partner security force capability.
- Enhance international legitimacy.
- Increase multinational cooperation.
- Disrupt adversary ability to use supporting physical and human networks.
- Disrupt adversarial shadow governments.
- Disrupt the adversary's ability to make timely and informed decisions.
- Deter escalation.

SECURITY COOPERATION

2-12. *Security cooperation* is Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners (JP 3-20). Security cooperation goes beyond building relationships between the DOD and foreign security establishment. Security cooperation enables and encourages unified action partners to provide U.S. forces with essential access, develop and apply their capabilities and capacity to address shared threats, and carry out other activities that promote U.S. security interests.

2-13. In security cooperation, Psychological Operations personnel establish and maintain relationships with regional counterparts to build partner capability and capacity, increase interoperability, and conduct planning between and among counterparts toward achieving shared objectives.

2-14. Security cooperation is a USG approach to competition and integrated deterrence in which Army forces partner with other USG agencies and organizations. The Department of State is responsible for the diplomatic instrument of national power, so chiefs of mission and country teams coordinate security cooperation programs and activities. They are also the final approval authority for all U.S. military activities within their country of responsibility and retain the authority to modify the execution of planned military activities during competition. Army forces coordinate security cooperation with a host country through the Defense Attaché Office or Office of Security Cooperation at the embassy or consulate. The combatant command provides the approval for the theater army to work with and inform the country team of recommendations for Army force activities across all domains. JP 5-0 and FM 3-0 provide more information.

2-15. Since security cooperation may be useful in increasing U.S. influence, Psychological Operations units can be a significant factor in both military and other government agency activities and operations. Psychological Operations units habitually operate from U.S. embassies on a persistent basis with their size and capabilities dependent on local conditions and requirements. Aside from organic capabilities, the unit provides a key influence-coordinating and synchronizing function through the Defense Attaché Office or Office of Security Cooperation or other designated office at the embassy or consulate.

2-16. By integrating with the embassy staff processes, the unit provides a vital conduit for other Psychological Operations units to gain country team approval for future influence activities. This integration also facilitates support for influence activities to be executed under the auspices of the combatant command and the theater Army. While this applies to security cooperation, it can be particularly important for building partner influence capacity, in which the country team ultimately approves any efforts to build host nation counterpart capabilities.

2-17. Integration with embassy staff processes is also key when influence activities focus on threat deterrence to prevent competition devolving into crisis or armed conflict. An important aspect of security cooperation is that it can shape the operational environment to provide friendly advantages if crisis or armed conflict are a possibility.

MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

2-18. *Military engagement* is contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence (JP 3-0).

2-19. Military engagement may include developing and maintaining partnerships in a theater and tasks related to security assistance, security force assistance, foreign assistance stability actions, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, humanitarian demining assistance, peace operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, defense support of civil authorities, and U.S. homeland defense.

2-20. Military engagement tasks (as identified above) occur in a broad range of operations and mission areas. Most of these operations have doctrinal publications dedicated to them and it is beyond the scope of this publication to address them all. The following subsections use foreign internal defense, security assistance, and security force assistance to illustrate the types of activities Psychological Operations units conduct under the broad category of military engagement.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

2-21. *Foreign internal defense* is participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22).

2-22. Psychological Operations capabilities enable direct and indirect means of supporting foreign internal defense activities. For example, Psychological Operations units can support the Drug Enforcement Administration as part of counterdrug activities in foreign nations. Psychological Operations units can also support U.S. foreign internal defense operations in preparing the populations in the host nation and in neighboring countries to resist and mitigate threats, particularly those that originate in the information

environment. PO Soldiers may also deploy after foreign internal defense operations to conduct influence activities to sustain long-term changes in attitudes and behaviors. JP 3-22 and ATP 3-05.2 provide additional information on foreign internal defense.

2-23. Influence activities may be the main effort if other military activities are not conducted (either unilaterally or in conjunction with civilian assistance efforts). During foreign internal defense operations, Psychological Operations units train, advise, and assist the host nation to develop organic capabilities to conduct influence activities that—

- Publicize the narratives and objectives of the USG and the host nation.
- Resist and mitigate malign information.
- Gain and hold the population's trust and confidence in host-nation military and paramilitary forces.
- Deter interference with host-nation security operations.
- Enhance and reinforce professionalism within host-nation military and paramilitary forces.
- Promote support for host-nation government and institutions.
- Reinforce host-nation efforts to physically and psychologically isolate internal defense threats from the population.
- Reinforce host-nation respect for human rights, and compliance with international and humanitarian law.
- Assist in the development of host-nation infrastructure for executing influence activities.

2-24. In competition, Psychological Operations units often task-organize below the detachment or team levels to maximize economy of force and address personnel constraints outlined in orders. Commanders play a pivotal role in implementing the mission command approach, empowering small, task-organized elements to make decisions and execute operations independently. This decentralized execution is essential for success when a single company or detachment is executing operations in several countries simultaneously.

2-25. Figure 2-1, pages 31 and 32, highlights how tactical echelon narratives feed into higher-echelon narratives, demonstrating the critical role of individual Soldiers. Empowered by the commander's mission command approach to seize the initiative, Soldiers can bridge tactical and national influence objectives, shaping narratives through deliberate words and actions.

In Colombia's vast rural landscapes, far from metropolitan centers, violent revolutionary groups and transnational criminal organizations vie for control. These groups establish shadow governments that fracture societal cohesion by exploiting the drug trade, illicit cultivation, money laundering, "gramaje" (illegal taxation of locals), and land grabbing to expand their influence.

While these groups occasionally align under shared interests, territorial conflicts often erupt, fueling violence and instability. In such volatile regions, Psychological Operations forces can achieve outsized impacts with targeted initiatives, as demonstrated in the following case.

During routine security operations, Colombian military forces were engaged by the Clan del Golfo cartel. The skirmish left one cartel member injured and another, alias "Junior", dead. Junior, a six-year veteran of the cartel, had played a pivotal role in expanding its operations in the Santander region.

Recognizing the opportunity to shape the narrative, a Psychological Operations noncommissioned officer (NCO) advised the Colombian general on leveraging the event to undermine the cartel's influence. The NCO emphasized the importance of narrative control, guiding the creation of a message that highlighted the legitimacy of government actions while exposing the cartel's criminal activities.

Colombian forces quickly prepared and rehearsed the message, with the Psychological Operations NCO providing expertise on scripting, body language, and message accuracy. The recording showcased military equipment and personnel to reinforce the government's presence and capability in the region. The NCO remained off-camera but actively collaborated with Colombian information operations specialists and national police to ensure the narrative was compelling and precise.



Figure 2-1. Seizing the Initiative in Colombia





This initiative demonstrated the power of influence activities in resource-limited regions. The recorded message, disseminated through audio-visual media, achieved several objectives:

- Engaged the local populace through accessible platforms.
- Strengthened the government's credibility and legitimacy.
- Exposed the criminal activities of adversarial groups.
- Established narrative dominance in the region.

The Colombian government amplified the message by integrating footage of seized materials and key figures from the national police and military. This approach communicated the threat landscape while showcasing the government's commitment to dismantling narcotrafficking networks. Within hours, the narrative dominated headlines across Colombia, including the capital city of Bogotá, leveraging social media and national television to reach diverse audiences.

This case highlights how episodic events can be weaponized to construct and control narratives, advancing strategic objectives through deliberate action and creativity. By exploiting vulnerabilities—such as illegal land seizures, narcotrafficking, and oppressive ideologies—Colombian forces demonstrated the inability of criminal organizations to legitimize their activities.

The collaboration between U.S. special operations forces and Colombian partners further underscored the effectiveness of unified action in disrupting transnational criminal networks. This initiative showcased how small victories can yield significant strategic dividends, optimizing influence-focused targeting and network development.

Ultimately, this event illustrated the critical role of Psychological Operations forces in limited armed conflict. Their unique tradecraft—rooted in advanced training, cultural understanding, and communication expertise—enables them to inject key narratives into the operational environment, appealing to the hearts and minds of target audiences. By leveraging creativity and precision, Psychological Operations forces amplify the impact of episodic events, shaping perceptions and advancing broader strategic goals.



Figure 2-1. Seizing the Initiative in Colombia (continued)

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

2-26. *Security assistance* is a group of programs authorized by federal statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which are considered part of security cooperation (JP 3-20).

2-27. Security assistance programs enable Psychological Operations units to leverage USG defense services to increase the capability and capacity of partner nations conducting influence activities. By enabling the partner's influence activities, the unit increases the opportunity to achieve objectives shared by the partner and the USG. In addition, these programs help alleviate a partner's gaps in the short term (whether the unit is operating under foreign internal defense, security force assistance, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, combatting terrorism, counterdrug operations, or other operation or combination of operations authorities).

2-28. DOD-administered Department of State security assistance programs are a subset of security cooperation. Security assistance programs are one means to enable security force assistance activities. While normally required to conduct security force assistance activities, some security assistance programs do not contribute to security force assistance.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

2-29. *Security force assistance* is the Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-20). Psychological Operations units contribute to security force assistance operations and support the interagency and combatant commanders by building partner influence capacity.

2-30. USG efforts center on influencing foreign security forces to remain as apolitical as possible and can plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations to support their legitimate government. Foreign security forces consist of a variety of organizations including military, paramilitary, and police forces; border and customs agents; and the government ministries or departments that control them.

2-31. Security force assistance operations can also be directed at other security-related services—such as those associated with tribal and ethnic groups and the penal system (including their respective overwatch agencies). Psychological Operations units work directly with foreign security force counterparts in a capacity determined by mission requirements and deployment order authorities.

2-32. Psychological Operations units can execute security force assistance as the lead, primary, or sole U.S. military unit. Or Psychological Operations units may be attached to another unit that is leading the assistance effort, such as a security force assistance brigade, or an engineer or infantry unit.

2-33. Psychological Operations units prepare the operational environment for security force assistance operations by influencing populations to support the objectives of the USG and the partner nation. The units also conduct coordinated activities to preempt potential adversary messaging by providing timely, consistent, and credible messages to the populace.

2-34. During security force assistance, achieving a credible and professional foreign security force is necessary for establishing a legitimate and responsive host nation government. Specific activities promote—

- Legitimacy of the USG and partner nation efforts toward creating and maintaining a safe and secure environment.
- Professionalization and credibility of the foreign security forces.
- Population support and cooperation for the foreign security forces.
- U.S. and partner nation military-to-military relations.
- Threat deterrence.
- Assurance to unified action partners.

2-35. Security force assistance includes establishing or building an influence capability within foreign security forces. Prior to an operational unit being assigned to conduct security force assistance, it is common for the partner nation to come to an agreement with the U.S. embassy and the region's combatant command

about the partner nation’s required capability and capacity and the USG’s role in helping them achieve those requirements. Based upon the agreed requirements, Psychological Operations units evaluate the ability of the partner nation and its security forces to conduct effective influence activities. The unit can then design, develop, and conduct training to increase the partner’s capability and capacity.

2-36. Prior to or during security force assistance operations (or as the partner nation capability or capacity matures) the USG may provide additional assistance for the procurement of compatible communication and broadcast equipment. This may be part of broad security force assistance cases, or as specific identified requirements. During this time, Psychological Operations unit leaders advise on the types of equipment required to facilitate interoperability and effectively influence selected relevant actors.

2-37. The following vignette is an example of activities conducted to strengthen a vital partnership, increase interoperability with a long-time ally to achieve mutual objectives, and contribute to strategic deterrence while preparing to prevail against one of our nation's threats.

United States Army Psychological Operations Detachment in the Republic of Korea

In January 2003, a 14-Soldier, regionally oriented POD was deployed to conduct combined product development with the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense Psychological Operations Group. The POD leaders were a major, a captain, and a sergeant first class as the noncommissioned officer in charge. The POD consisted of two Psychological Operations teams, each including a multimedia illustrator, an organic human intelligence collector who was a Korean linguist, and multiple Psychological Operations specialists.

Based on a history of North Korean provocations during major U.S. military operations overseas, the deployment of the POD was planned to coincide with the buildup of U.S. forces in the Middle East prior to the invasion of Iraq. During the nine-month deployment, the POD worked daily with partner nation military and civilian counterparts at a Republic of Korea Psychological Operations facility focusing heavily on TAA, planning, series development, and product development.

The POD capitalized on two exercises: the annual Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise, Ulchi Focus Lens and the joint combined exercise, Balance Knife. Ulchi Focus Lens provided the opportunity for the staffing and approval of numerous products for Republic of Korea–United States combined forces command. This resulted in preapproved products for potential crises and armed conflicts. Being forward-deployed, POD leaders contributed to planning and developing theater contingencies and operations plans. Balance Knife tested the ability of DOD to deploy joint forces to the Korean peninsula and integrate personnel and equipment to support combined military operations.

Joint combined exercise Balance Knife took place after Ulchi Focus Lens. During Balance Knife, Republic of Korea Psychological Operations forces demonstrated loudspeaker operations, a balloon launch, and a leaflet drop in the demilitarized zone, deliberately displaying important armed conflict capabilities to the public. The length of the deployment and daily dedication of the Republic of Korea-United States Psychological Operations forces enhanced the partnership (figure 2-2) and resulted in hundreds of products being approved and prepared in the event of crises or armed conflict.



Figure 2-2. After action review between U.S. and Korean soldiers

CAMPAIGNING

2-38. Whether capability and capacity gaps are mitigated through the activities of security cooperation or another programmed authority, or whether influence activities are conducted with and through a partner or ally, Psychological Operations unit commanders meet the requirements of a campaign plan with the goal of achieving enduring objectives.

2-39. In the near term, a partner may not be capable of executing influence activities at the required scale and scope. Psychological Operations units may be required to lead the execution of influence activities to mitigate this gap. Simultaneously, Psychological Operations units lay the foundation for a partner to increase both capability and capacity to assume responsibility in the mid and long terms.

2-40. In the midterm, the USG can leverage consolidated and sustained gains by conducting bilateral and multilateral operations. Psychological Operations units may be in a lead or supporting role. If the partner force has more credibility than the United States or if an objective is to build their credibility, U.S. support may be in the background driving a need for partner-attributed operations. Partner self-expansion through institutional capacity development and taking control of influence activities is part of the natural maturation expected in the mid-term.

2-41. In the long term, the goal is to have partners capable of conducting unilateral operations and contributing as a partner in bilateral and multinational operations and activities. Continued participation in joint combined exchange trainings and other similar interactions improve capability, maintain interoperability, and strengthen relationships.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

2-42. In competition, Psychological Operations units execute PSYOP as part of DOD strategic and operational messaging and actions. In this context, Psychological Operations units execute PSYOP as part of Army and joint campaigns or operations. This may include the diverse range described earlier in this chapter. A psychological operation can be a stand-alone operation supporting a campaign or major operations, or it can be integrated with other operations in a supporting effort. Like all operations, PSYOP are more effective when designed, planned, and executed in an interdependent manner with other operations and lines of effort. For more information on strategic and operational informational activities, refer to JP 3-04 and JP 3-53.

DECEPTION ACTIVITIES

2-43. As detailed in chapter 1, DDAs consists of three activities: OP-D, TAC-D, and DISO. Each activity is applicable across the strategic contexts to varying degrees and executed to create specific effects that can better enable the achievement of tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. In competition, OP-D and DISO are predominant. Therefore, in competition, deception obscures the deployment and employment of USG capabilities to achieve strategic objectives and to shape the operational environment in preparation for a potential shift to crisis or even armed conflict. However, in crisis and armed conflict, TAC-D gains emphasis since it focuses on the tactical level of war. For more information on the strategic application of deception activities, refer to JP 3-54. For more information on Army support to DDAs, refer to FM 3-13.4.

Chapter 3
Crisis

This chapter addresses Psychological Operations unit operations and activities from the Army's strategic context of crisis. This includes the range of operations found in the categories of crisis response and limited contingency operations (in particular, operations to shape and operations to prevent both providing frameworks to achieve specific objectives).

OVERVIEW

3-1. Crisis response and limited contingency operations focus on changing an adversary's risk calculus by raising the adversary's costs for actions that threaten U.S. interests. In crisis response and limited contingency operations, Psychological Operations units conduct influence activities that support threat deterrence. *Deterrence* is the prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits (JP 3-0). Psychological Operations units provide commanders and other partners with a means to affect threat decision-making as well as shape the operational environment to the U.S. advantage.

3-2. Deterrence and other long-term persistent and preventive shaping activities help assure partners of the USG resolve and commitment to shared interests. However, deterring the threat is their primary objective. Psychological Operations unit influence activities may be executed in support of combatant commander objectives focused on assuring partners.

3-3. In a crisis, limited contingency operations focus on protecting U.S. interests through a combination of military force deployment and interorganizational activities. If a crisis escalates to conflict, the joint force may have to respond by executing large-scale combat operations. However, most crisis responses call for a limited contingency operation that is short of armed conflict. Even though the limited contingency operation may be short of armed conflict, this does not mean the joint force cannot use lethal force; the rules of engagement determine such use. Limited contingency operations are narrow in scope, scale, and objectives—such as in personnel recovery and noncombatant evacuation operations.

Note: Use of the term crisis in this context focuses on situations involving threat actions and activities. The joint force also employs Army Psychological Operations units in operations during natural disaster crises like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunamis. While post-natural disaster crises may have an influence component, the primary focus may be informative in nature regarding security, health, and safety issues confronting affected populations. In such cases, influence efforts focus on deterring, mitigating, and defeating malign actors and rallying national and international support for the affected nations.

3-4. Geopolitical events can quickly deteriorate into a crisis that requires a limited contingency operation involving planned activities in a campaign plan. However, all crises do not fall within the parameters of an existing plan. Consequently, advantages achieved in competition and consolidated as gains form the foundation for plans and activities to counter an adversary during a crisis.

3-5. Whether specific plans exist or don't exist for a given situation, regionally aligned Psychological Operations units conduct continuous analysis of prioritized environments and the potential TAs to ensure any response can be as quick and effective as possible.

3-6. As a crisis escalates, Psychological Operations units may deploy as part of Army forces that establish an early forward presence, provide primary forces, or operate as part of a larger task force effort. Their influence activities directly contribute to—

- Assessment.
- Assurance.
- Shaping the operational environment.
- Provision of active deterrence.

- Execution of DOD influence activities.
- Disruption of threat influence efforts.

3-7. Regionally aligned, war-traced, an apportioned units and PO planners assigned to combatant command or combatant command component staffs help identify indications, warnings, and decision points in operations plans to trigger staff and command actions. The following quote underscores this fact:

> *Our Psychological Operations Officers and Noncommissioned officers assigned to our geographic combatant command, theater special operations command, and theater Army headquarters built in early deployment of advanced teams into all operations plans. In some cases, those plans called for establishing a garrison-based (Fort Bragg) capability to provide support to the forward team and get ahead of the series development cycle by reviewing established and approved series and products and begin development of new series or products.*
>
> Unattributed

3-8. The joint force commander can respond to adversary threats against U.S. interests with deterrent options, such as shaping the operational environment or preventing adversary actions. A *flexible deterrent option* is a planning construct intended to facilitate early decision making by developing a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented actions carefully tailored to create a desired effect (JP 5-0). Integrating influence activities into these operations enhances the Army's ability to establish favorable conditions and block undesirable adversary actions.

3-9. PSYOP have been planned and executed as the main effort of a flexible deterrent option. The following paragraph describes influence activities as supporting efforts of an operation.

3-10. Psychological Operations units conduct influence activities to affect threat behavior in the favor of the United States and influence foreign individuals and groups in support of the mission. In doing so, influence activities create mutually supporting advantages to help U.S. forces achieve the objectives of a limited contingency operation. In a crisis, influence objectives typically focus on—

- Building popular international support.
- Fomenting tension and stress within adversary groups in anticipation of combat.
- Degrading the effectiveness of adversary influence activities.
- Coordinating partner influence plans and actions.
- Participating in deception activities to reduce vulnerabilities of friendly forces.
- Influencing individuals, groups, and populations to facilitate the overt introduction of U.S. forces and the execution of subsequent military operations.
- Assuring partners.
- Prioritizing series development, production, and distribution (including pre-positioning supplies, equipment, and products).
- Leveraging indigenous individuals, groups, and other human networks.

3-11. The following vignette presents an unclassified and modified example of a past operation fictionalized as Operation SOOTY GROUSE. In this vignette, Pyristina conducts influence activities to counter the Cybvian military force's physical advantage within the operational environment (see JP 3-0 for more on human aspects). Pyristina's influence activities flipped the physical advantage in their favor and created an opportunity for de-escalation and resolution through non-lethal means. To view *Operation SOOTY GROUSE* in graphic novel format, visit https://inteldocs.intelink.gov/files/details/c9354a61-9437-4dee-a241-9bb29421244e.

Operation SOOTY GROUSE

Year 2030: The agrarian country of Pyristina has suffered through years of drought and economic failures, resulting in the devastation of Pyristinan governance. Pyristina's neighbor to the east, Cybvia, has disputed the internationally recognized border between the two nations for decades.

The 10 miles east and west of the border was declared a demilitarized zone in 2018. The border region between Pyristina and Cybvia is demographically dominated by people of Puduan ethnicity who historically considered themselves more Puduan than Cybvian or Pyristinan. People of Puduan ethnicity live on either side of the international border within the demilitarized zone.

Claiming risks to national security and the safety of its citizens in the demilitarized zone, the Cybvia government deploys military forces garrisoned in the Eastern portion of the nation to forcibly remove ethnic Puduan civilians from the demilitarized zone. The civilians, a mix of Cybvian and Pyristinan citizens are trucked to temporary camps set up in soccer stadiums in Eastern Cybvia in the same city as the deployed Cybvia military unit's garrison. The Cybvian government occupies and declares martial law in the demilitarized zone.

The dislocated ethnic Puduan Cybvia citizens were not interned, merely housed in the stadiums. Out of work, out of school, bored, and stoked by perceptions of mistreatment, petty crime became rampant and provided a means to strike out against the ethnic majority. Petty misconduct quickly escalated to violent crime.

In response, the Pyristinan Influence Brigade sent targeted messages to the occupying Cybvian military units. Leaflets, radio broadcasts, social media posts, and films encouraged Cybvian soldiers to abandon their posts and return home to protect their families.

Within 48 hours, individual deserters turned into dozens; dozens turned into entire units leaving their posts. Cybvian military leaders in the target zones made no attempt to stop their soldiers from leaving their posts to go home and protect their families.

The Pyristina Ranger Regiment conducted an air assault into the demilitarized zone west of the international border. They established pockets of secure areas on key terrain. This allowed Pyristina conventional infantry units to immediately widen the secured areas and establish civil order without firing a shot.

The Cybvian government lifted its martial law restrictions and ordered the remaining Cybvian units to return to their garrisons. The displaced civilians were allowed to leave the temporary camps in the east and return to their homes in the demilitarized zone.

TYPES OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

3-12. Crisis response and limited contingency operations are complex and challenging due to the short timeframe for execution. They become more challenging and complex if there is no corresponding plan to address them as a potential branch or sequel to the campaign plan. Using Psychological Operations forces in concert with unified action partners for limited contingency provides an economy-of-force measure to enable continuity of effort. Psychological Operations units can enable resistance, facilitate mitigating sources of instability, and extend operational reach. The following sections describe some of the operations within this operational category.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

3-13. A *noncombatant evacuation operation* is the withdrawal of civilians and noncombatants from a threatened area abroad that is carried out with the assistance of the Department of Defense (JP 3-68).

Noncombatant evacuees are U.S. (and usually allied or third country national) citizens whose lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster and involves securing them in regional safe havens or bringing them to the United States. Combatant commanders are responsible for planning and conducting noncombatant evacuation operations in support of the emergency action plan of the American embassy or consulate.

3-14. The primary focus of PSYOP conducted within a noncombatant evacuation operation is force protection and the safety of noncombatant evacuees and civilians in the area. Some Psychological Operations units may conduct PSYOP, while others focus on deception activities. The nature of the environment (permissive, uncertain, or hostile) helps determine the execution of influence activities.

3-15. The employment of Psychological Operations units requires a force package capable of supporting operations in multiple locations. Coordination at the forward command element, the joint task force or combined task force main command post, and the American embassy are essential for pushing the USG narrative and synchronizing words and deeds. During noncombatant evacuation operations, Psychological Operations units and elements provide commanders and U.S. chiefs of mission the means to inform selected populations to accelerate the evacuation and ensure the safety of the evacuees.

3-16. Typically, the delivery of command information is coordinated with U.S. embassy information officers and the chief of mission approves execution. The main purpose of such missions is to provide information to evacuees concerning marshalling areas and evacuation points, items to bring, and general safety and security messages.

3-17. Psychological Operations units may also deliver crowd control and noninterference messages directed at specific populations near airports and seaports and routes leading to them. These activities focus on—

- Informing selected populations of the necessity for a noncombatant evacuation operation.
- Preempting potential rumors, misinformation, and adversary disinformation.
- Countering rumors, misinformation, and disinformation.
- Influencing the international community to support the execution of a noncombatant evacuation operation.
- Publicizing the U.S. and unified action partner intent and the legitimacy of the operation.

3-18. A hostile environment may require the forcible entry of U.S. forces. In such a case, Psychological Operations units reduce interference with the operation, prevent the escalation of hostilities, and preserve goodwill to facilitate post-operation relations.

3-19. In hostile environments, forces must still conduct recovery operations to find and collect dislocated civilians and transport them safely to evacuation sites. Psychological Operations units inform the local populace of the mission's purpose and influence them to not interfere with military operations. They convey messages and actions to direct the populace, clear routes, and provide instructions to evacuees. The units also contribute to security elements and evacuation control center operations by—

- Advising the mission commander on the psychological effects of operations and recommending actions to facilitate the evacuation.
- Informing local nationals of U.S. intent.
- Publicizing the narrative, intent, goals, and objectives of U.S. and unified action partner forces and publicizing that the actions comply with international laws.

3-20. Noncombatant evacuation operations are not a core special operations activity, but Psychological Operations forces can still facilitate and enable such activities based on the rapid availability or forward presence of Psychological Operations units. JP 3-68 and ATP 3-05.68 provide additional information on noncombatant evacuation operations. See CJCSI 3110.05G for specifics on objectives and TAs in a preapproved noncombatant evacuation operations PSYOP program.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

3-21. *Foreign humanitarian assistance* is Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation (JP 3-29). Foreign humanitarian assistance supports a host-nation government and other agencies' efforts in response to natural or man-made disasters, or other conditions (such as human suffering, disease, or hunger).

These disasters and conditions can present a serious threat to life or property, exacerbate tensions within fragile societies, and cause regionally destabilizing dislocated civilian movements.

3-22. The USG employs Psychological Operations units to augment and enhance relief efforts. Psychological Operations capabilities support host-nation, USG, and other relief organizations. They provide the gaining commander and chief of mission with a means to convey the USG's narrative and intent to support the host-nation government's stability efforts. See FM 3-07 for more on stability operations.

3-23. When the communications infrastructure of a host nation is damaged or destroyed, Psychological Operations units provide a means to convey information to the affected populations. Propagating the narrative is essential for synchronizing actions and messages to reassure citizens by explaining planned and ongoing relief efforts through public service announcements, instructions, and news. Psychological Operations forces support foreign humanitarian assistance by—

- Informing local populations about essential service locations for shelter, food, water, and medical care.
- Publicizing humanitarian assistance operations to build support for the USG and host-nation government.
- Directing compliance with host-nation security measures and safety and occupational health programs.

3-24. Employing Psychological Operations units reduces the duration of the operation and overall operational force requirements. Psychological Operations units integrate into U.S. or multinational military operations to disseminate messages that establish credibility, assist with the control and management of dislocated civilians, and provide the population with factual information. JP 3-29 provides more information on foreign humanitarian assistance.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

3-25. In military operations, a joint task force commander establishes a joint search and rescue center if one does not exist in the theater. If Psychological Operations Soldiers are not part of the joint search and rescue staff, the theater or joint task force Psychological Operations staff coordinates and integrates influence activities into the plans. To assist recovery operations, Psychological Operations forces—

- Promote local protection and recovery of U.S. personnel.
- Collect information leading to recovery.
- Convey information to isolated personnel.
- Direct the population not to interfere with military operations.
- Integrate deception activities to protect US personnel and operations.

3-26. Psychological Operations units provide the commander the ability to convey messages to local populations and groups in the area where U.S. personnel are evading capture and awaiting recovery. Psychological Operations units inform local populations about the situation and benefits of providing U.S. personnel haven and security. Further messaging provides instructions on the return of evading personnel; minimizes collateral damage; and reduces the loss of life of rescuers, recovered personnel, and civilians. See JP 3-50 for more on personnel recovery.

HOSTAGE RESCUE

3-27. *Hostage rescue* is a personnel recovery method used to recover isolated personnel who are specifically designated as hostages (JP 3-50). Because most missions to rescue hostages occur in hostile locations, they are usually relatively short-duration missions where speed of execution and withdrawal are key to preventing further losses in friendly lives and materiel.

3-28. Hostage rescue missions often demand swift action that requires rapid analysis, development, and execution to support rescue and recovery efforts. Assessment is not a priority until well after the mission is complete since operational timelines are short. For Psychological Operations units, deception and offensive PSYACTs are likely primary approaches to facilitate mission execution and decrease threat ability to resist. ADP 3-05 and FM 3-05 provide more information on hostage rescue.

PEACE OPERATIONS

3-29. Peace operations include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. While the military plays a limited role in some aspects, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are primarily military operations.

3-30. Peacekeeping operations require the consent of all major parties in a dispute. These operations are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (like a truce or cease fire) to support diplomatic efforts at achieving a long-term political settlement. In contrast, peace enforcement operations apply the threat or use of force to enforce compliance with resolutions or sanctions created to maintain or restore peace and order.

3-31. In peacekeeping operations, PSYOP help build trust and cooperation among disputing parties, local populations, and international actors. Psychological Operations units disseminate messages that reinforce the legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission, promote adherence to agreements (like ceasefires), and reduce tensions by countering misinformation and propaganda. Deception can be used to protect peacekeeping forces by obscuring their movements or intentions to ensure operational security.

3-32. In peace enforcement operations, PSYOP reinforce actions that compel compliance and maintain order. PSYOP target adversaries to deter hostile actions, encourage compliance with resolutions, and undermine support for resistance. These activities can also reassure local populations and allies, thereby fostering support for enforcement efforts. Deception can be employed to mislead adversaries about the timing, location, and scale of enforcement actions to enhance operational effectiveness and reduce risks to forces.

3-33. During peace operations, influence activities help to create the conditions for political, economic, and humanitarian efforts to succeed and to transition the USG out of involvement. Multiple types of peace operations can occur simultaneously within an operational area. ATP 3-07.31 provides more information on peace operations.

3-34. Psychological Operations units contribute to peace operations by—

- Planning and executing Soldier leader engagements and key leader engagements to influence local key communicators who can potentially exert influence to stabilize the region.
- Informing local populations about—
  - The availability of essential health and welfare services.
  - Peacekeeping agreements and the intent of operations.
- Influencing local populaces to cooperate with U.S. efforts to suppress anti-peace groups and their destabilizing actions.
- Directing the populace’s compliance with security measures and safety and occupational health programs.
- Influencing favorable attitudes toward U.S. policies among selected groups.
- Publicizing humanitarian efforts (such as medical and veterinary aid, construction, and public facilities activities) to garner support for U.S. efforts.
- Conducting assessments, in conjunction with supporting and supported intelligence capabilities prior to and after an operation, to determine the most effective application of efforts.
- Influencing selected groups to achieve a renewal of effective self-governance.

3-35. Figure 3-1, pages 43 through 48, is a vignette from Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS that incorporates activities common to many of the aforementioned contingency operations. This vignette is also available at the following address: https://inteldocs.intelink.gov/files/details/6854432c-3a20-450d-a7b4-e466a160d80a. While this operation highlights PSYOP, it was not the only influence activity conducted.

In January 2012, the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion deployed a task-organized element to Central East Africa to help U.S. and partner forces defeat the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).



OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

BACKGROUND

The Acholi tribe—favored by colonial powers in the past—alternated control of Uganda with ethnically related Longo tribe leaders until being overthrown in 1986. A loose coalition of tribes and clans (including the Acholi) became the dominant power group controlling Uganda. In 1987, Acholi nationalist and charismatic Ugandan mystic, Joseph Kony, started a violent ideological resistance group named the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

The LRA began sporadic raids throughout Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), disrupting the lives of populations in the affected areas, causing societal instability, and undermining good governance and the rule of law.

Over the next 30 years, the LRA continued such raids to obtain supplies and abduct over 100,000 people for forced indoctrination into the LRA to become fighters, laborers, and sex slaves. Chief among the victims were Kony's own Acholi tribespeople whom he distrusted since the Ugandan president successfully recruited from among them for service in the Ugandan military.

Figure 3-1. Psychological operations in Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS

FRIENDLY

The United States Africa Command-aligned 7th Psychological Operations Battalion had been executing military information support operations (MISO) programs in theater for several years, including in the Central African Republic (CAR). As part of Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS, influence activities expanded to include operations in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).



Photos of Joseph Kony. Source: www.state.gov.



Displaced Ugandans arrive at Lira camp after seeking refuge from LRA. Public domain.

In late 2011, Commander, Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) realized that lethal operations being conducted were insufficient to achieve objectives. He sought to expand capabilities to combat the LRA and tasked his Psychological Operations planner in SOCAFRICA's J-39 to address the issue. The planner coordinated with the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion commander for deployment of a unit to Uganda. Follow-on execution and deployment orders provided execution authorities, and MISO Support Element – Uganda (MSE-UG) rapidly deployed to execute influence activities in January 2012.

The mission was simple in theory—influence fighters to quit the LRA. However, operations increasingly focused specifically on achieving the third pillar of the U.S. President's Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord's Resistance Army, "Promote defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of LRA fighters". The four pillars in the strategy became the military objectives that informed the development of psychological objectives (POs) and supporting psychological objectives (SPOs). In a scenario where an operational objective is to promote defection, a corresponding PO and SPOs could be:

- PO C: Decrease combat effectiveness of threat organization
- SPO 1: Target audience (TA) defects to regional partner forces

Figure 3-1. Psychological operations in Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS (continued)


- SPO 2: TA deserts units to return home
- SPO 3: TA surrenders to regional partner forces
- SPO 4: TA reports to designated safe reporting sites.
- SPO 5: TA reports to community defection centers.

In close coordination with U.S. State Department representatives, MSE-UG traveled to the other three affected countries to meet with officials and coordinate influence activities. Those meetings established conditions for the range and scope of influence activities that followed.

Enabled with orders and pledges of cooperation, MSE-UG began operations in earnest. The first step was conducting sites surveys to determine what capabilities were available for messaging the LRA fighters who were spread across a very large area. The surveys revealed that FM radio would be critical to reaching those fighters and the surrounding communities.



Survey results also showed broadcast footprints were uneven and scarce. Many stations required upgraded equipment and other changes to increase their capability and range. These conditions required positive change to prepare the environment for operations. As a result, a very small element



Source: Tracy, Jared M., PhD. A Team Approach: PSYOP and LRA Defection in 2012. Veritas. Vol. 17, No. 1. 2021.

Figure 3-1. Psychological operations in Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS (continued)

executed successful influence activities at the tactical level with significant strategic impacts. Upgrades to broadcast capabilities included importation of new radio equipment and training of local operators to use and maintain the systems. These improved conditions enabled partner force operations to begin.

Collectively, the improved broadcasting capabilities provided U.S., Ugandan, DRC, CAR, and South Sudanese military forces better means to broadcast persuasive messaging to LRA members and other TAs. MSE-UG used the newly expanded capabilities to document LRA defector stories and spread them across the region to influence LRA members who still resisted. Local national broadcasters also broadcast "come home" messages MSEUG had loaded on laptops used for broadcasting. The radio messages were synchronized with print products in the same series.

Radio coverage expansion coincided with the dissemination of defection leaflets that a key non-governmental organization (NGO) partner printed, packaged, and delivered to the MSE-UG. By March of 2012, MSE-UG had coordinated for the dissemination of over 100,000 leaflets in areas where the LRA operated. U.S. and partner nations' forces and the NGO further disseminated leaflets using face-to-face interactions; spreading defection messages in places unreachable by other means and reinforcing previous efforts in areas covered in previous dissemination. These initiatives were all part of accelerated efforts to increase defections, support the reintegration of defectors, and increase military pressure on the shrinking number of LRA fighters.



Specific leaflets depicted carefully crafted images of defectors, a senior leader reunited with his family, stories of specific higher-ranked LRA leaders, and defectors who joined the Ugandan military. The NGO further supercharged the influence effort with the release of a 30-minute video, *Kony 2012,* that exposed Kony's crimes. The video went viral and significantly increased interest and support for anti-LRA efforts, increasing efficiency of MSE-UG's efforts.

There were three key challenges that MSE-UG had to overcome. First, persuasion had to overcome the tight, cohesive nature of LRA small units that Kony's strong psychological power reinforced. Second, the size and topography of the LRA operational area made determining specific locations

Figure 3-1. Psychological operations in OBSERVANT COMPASS (continued)





Top: MSE-UG trained locals on operating FM radio stations,with 'come home' messages pre-loaded onto laptops. Bottom: A view of the radio station and antenna in Djema months after installation. Source: Tracy, Jared M., PhD. A Team Approach: PSYOP and LRA Defection in 2012. Veritas. Vol. 17, No. 1. 2021.

difficult; it is hard to influence a TA if they cannot be found or reached.

Finally, the LRA had only limited technology at their disposal and literacy rates were low among LRA fighters, so MSE-UG had to rely on leaflet dissemination and radio broadcasting. The challenges were not insurmountable and MSE-UG did not allow them to impede their efforts.

The destabilization of the leadership disrupted the ability of LRA to recruit, retain, command, and control elements and members. Actions targeting the rank-and-file members of the organization complemented the effects on LRA leadership. DRC helicopters broadcast defection messages with aerial loudspeaker systems that repeatedly dispersed encampments causing constant displacement of LRA combatants. The multinational force destroyed LRA bed-down locations and sustainment infrastructure following the displacement of the elements. These psychological actions created intolerable conditions in which the former refuge of the bush became unwelcoming and uninhabitable; and psychologically wore down LRA members. These actions were synchronized with tailored leaflet and radio broadcast surrender appeals using the voices of LRA family members and LRA senior leaders who had defected. The surrender appeals included statements from village elders welcoming LRA members to Acholi villages where they could rehabilitate and start life anew—a stark contrast to their life on the run.

RESULTS

With the vital contribution of MSE-UG, regional partner counterterrorism and conventional forces steadily drove the LRA out of Uganda and dispersed its fighters in the northeast of the DRC while the remaining strategic leadership of LRA relocated to South Sudan. In total, there are reportedly fewer than 100 fighters left who pose a greatly reduced threat.

Figure 3-1. Psychological operations in Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS (continued)

Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS was terminated in April 2017 when Commander, USAFRICOM, determined local forces could deal with the remnants of the LRA. He shut the mission down, signaling a successful operation.

Sources:
Tracy, Jared M., PhD. *Preface—A Team Approach: PSYOP and LRA Defection in 2012.* Veritas. Vol. 17, No. 1. 2021. https://arsof- history.org/articles/20aug_psy_in_ooc_preface_page_1.html.

Tracy, Jared M., PhD. A Team Approach: *PSYOP and LRA Defection in 2012.* US Army Special Operations History Office. November 2020. https://arsof-history.org/articles/20nov_a_team_ approach_page_1.html.



Top: A Psychological Operations soldier drops leaflets highlighting LRA defectors and the recently captured MG Caesar Achellam over Central African Republic. **Bottom:** A 7th POB soldier conducts a low-altitude aerial loudspeaker mission during Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS, a common practice after 2013. **Source:** Tracy, Jared M., PhD. A Team Approach: PSYOP and LRA Defection in 2012. Veritas. Vol. 17, No. 1. 2021.

Figure 3-1. Psychological operations in Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS (continued)

Chapter 4
Conflict

This chapter discusses armed conflict in the context of Army large-scale combat operations. Throughout this chapter, large-scale combat operations, armed conflict, and war are used interchangeably.

OVERVIEW

4-1. According to JP 1 Volume 1, armed conflict or war "characterizes a strategic relationship surrounding an interest or set of interests where adversaries use lethal force as the primary means for imposing their will and achieving their objectives." International law distinguishes armed conflict from localized disturbances (such as riots and violent protests) by the intensity of the conflict, organization of the actors involved, and the capacity of each actor to sustain armed violence.

4-2. The employment of lethal force is the defining characteristic of armed conflict and is the primary function of the Army. Consequently, war and warfare are the Army's primary concerns in operations as the focus is on the ability to defeat threats.

4-3. In war, the immediate effect of lethality is in the physical dimension, reducing the enemy's capability and capacity to fight. However, the utility of this lethal force extends into the information and human dimensions where this military action (along with the other instruments of national power) influences enemy behavior, decision-making, and the will to fight.

4-4. The Army's operational concept is multidomain operations. Multidomain operations as described and framed in the current edition of ADP 3-0 represent the intellectual approach to the operations that Army forces conduct, not a type of operation. The Army plans and conducts all operations by integrating information with all available capabilities in a combined arms approach to—

- Enable command and control.
- Protect data, information, and networks.
- Inform audiences.
- Influence threats and foreign relevant actors.
- Attack the threat's ability to exercise command and control.

4-5. According to ADP 3-13, "As a dynamic of combat power, Army forces fight for, defend, and fight with information to create and exploit information advantages—the use, protection, and exploitation of information to achieve objectives more effectively than enemies and adversaries." Psychological Operations units are a critical part of any combined arms approach but particularly in large-scale combat operations where influence activities can protect lives and preserve resources.

4-6. When deterrence fails and conflict becomes the inevitable or chosen course of action, the initial military response is usually to change the enemy's behavior using defeat mechanisms. A defeat mechanism is the method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition by creating physical and psychological effects. Physical effects can deprive an enemy of the ability to achieve objectives while psychological effects can deprive them of both the ability and the will to do so.

4-7. Chapters 2 and 3 describe activities whose objectives are to deter conflict and set conditions for the Army to prevail should conflict become the inevitable or chosen course of action. The vignette titled United States Army Psychological Operations Detachment in the Republic of Korea, page 37, provides an example of activities conducted to strengthen a vital partnership, increase interoperability with a long-time ally to achieve mutual objectives and develop shared understanding, and contribute to strategic deterrence while preparing to prevail against one of our nation's threats.

4-8. Armed conflict demands a comprehensive influence effort that leverages all available capabilities to shape enemy behavior. Psychologically focused activities target the minds of the TA by using a tailored combination of capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures to achieve the desired outcomes. In armed conflict, aggressive, threat-focused, and offensive influence activities are destructive, divisive, deceptive, and

disruptive. Psychological Operations units actively target threats, bolster allied and friendly morale, and create effects that—

- Fragment and weaken the threat's control of the situation.
- Degrade the threat's capabilities.
- Disrupt the threat's ability to achieve its objectives.

INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES DURING CONFLICT

4-9. Psychological Operations units use PSYOP and deception in several ways. These include to confuse and disrupt enemy attempts to resist U.S. forces, deprive the enemy of the ability to achieve their objectives, and foster demoralization and dissatisfaction, thereby decreasing the will to fight. Used in tandem, these two influence activities create effects that result in interdependent human, physical, and information advantages that increase the Army's lethality.

4-10. Prior to combat operations, commanders employ Psychological Operations units to assist with—

- Preparing the operational environment for U.S. and coalition combat operations.
- Deterring armed involvement by neutral or hostile neighboring states.
- Preventing interference by civilians during future military operations.
- Creating tension and stress within enemy groups in anticipation of combat.
- Degrading enemy combat power through the encouragement of desertion and creation of division in the ranks.
- Planning deception to reduce risks associated with the introduction of forces (to include obfuscating friendly intent).
- Reducing the enemy's will to resist.
- Degrading the enemy's decision-making abilities and operational effectiveness.

4-11. During large-scale combat operations, Psychological Operations units provide significant influence capability across several echelons. Psychological Operations units may provide—

- Individual augmentation to the joint task force headquarters staff.
- Command and control of operations in the information environment as the joint force commander's information task force.
- Command and control of PSYOP as a joint force commander's functional component command.

Psychological Operations units may also influence activities in support of Army corps and divisions and joint special operations task forces.

4-12. During combat operations, Psychological Operations units—

- Degrade enemy combat power through the encouragement of surrender and malingering.
- Reduce the enemy's will to resist.
- Degrade and destroy enemy assets and capabilities.
- Degrade the enemy's decision-making abilities and operational effectiveness.
- Exploit battlefield successes and gains.
- Exploit the psychological effects of deception activities on enemy leaders and forces.
- Create conditions for friendly surprise and initiative.
- Support personnel recovery operations.
- Prevent harm to civilians.
- Protect key infrastructure critical to achieving military objectives.
- Mitigate collateral damage on neutral and friendly individuals and groups and civilians at large.

4-13. The activation of Reserve Component Psychological Operations units for armed conflict requires a presidential decision. Post-decision, the Reserve Component units may not be available for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration for 180 days. Therefore, there may be a significant transition period between Active Component and Reserve Component units as they conduct relief-in-place operations. For companies and detachments in the close fight, relief-in-place may not happen until there is an appropriate lull in the tempo and intensity of the fight. For Psychological Operations group headquarters supporting the joint task force commander, joint force land component command, special operations joint task force, corps, or other task forces, this transition may be significantly less cumbersome.

4-14. The Psychological Operations Regiment's Reserve and Active Components rely on consistent integration during exercises and other steady-state operations and validated interoperability before deployment. These efforts are essential to ensure the Army's capability and capacity to succeed in armed conflict.

DESTRUCTIVE

4-15. For a destructive act to be considered a PSYACT, it must be a planned action whose primary purpose is to produce a psychological effect in a TA. Destructive PSYACTs are physical attacks conducted to generate physical damage, destruction, or degradation to create a psychological effect (such as in the following vignette). These actions require thorough risk assessments to identify and mitigate potential unintended or undesired effects, especially when civilian populations are involved. If lethality is necessary or desired, careful planning minimizes collateral damage and other unintended consequences.

4-16. The desired psychological effects must be specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-bound to exploit the corresponding physical, human, and information advantages.

Targeted Killing as a Psychological Action

On April 18, 1943, the U.S. Army Air Corps executed Operation VENGEANCE. This was the first acknowledged and verified U.S. targeted killing of a high-ranking enemy nation military leader—Imperial Japanese Navy Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, architect of the Pearl Harbor attack and arguably the Japanese Empire's best leader. Based on intercepted and deciphered Japanese military-coded transmissions, Army Air Corps fighters knew where his transport bomber and escort aircraft would be and when. With less than a week of preparation—and having to cross hundreds of miles of ocean over hostile territory—U.S. pilots hunted down and swiftly killed the admiral while losing one plane and pilot.

Reportedly, aside from the expected decrease in combat effectiveness of the Imperial Japanese Navy due to the loss of one of their greatest military leaders, U.S. planners primarily intended to inflict a devastating psychological shock on Japan while providing a strong psychological boost for the United States. Yamamoto's killing provided both.

The Japanese government hid the news of his death for over a month out of justified concerns it would demoralize the military and civilians alike. Accordingly, it was a shock to national morale when it was finally acknowledged. In contrast, Americans celebrated an act of revenge against the man who led the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. While targeted killing remains controversial, the psychological effects of doing so in specific circumstances are undeniable.

Killing A Peacock:
A Case Study of the Targeted Killing of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto
Adonis Arvanitakis

DIVISIVE

4-17. Creating disunity or dissension between and among threat organizations or between a threat and the population is a standard tactic in influence activities. The more divisive and contentious the relationships become, the greater potential there is for a corresponding degradation in enemy combat effectiveness and fitness as a fighting capability, to include inducing malingering, desertion, and surrender. Divisive techniques can include—

- Limiting access to sustainment or reducing supply to create scarcity that exacerbates tensions and increases intergroup competition.
- Depriving the enemy of sleep and rest to—
  - Heighten in-group and out-group tensions.
  - Deepen and expand existing rifts between groups.

    - Increase paranoia and feelings of persecution to erode cohesion.
- Targeting certain categories of enemy elements more than others on a consistent basis to create jealousy and other negative feelings.
- Exploiting political, economic, or social differences between groups and even individuals.
- Exploiting the negative effects of enemy population control measures on a population to breed resentment against an enemy military (especially an occupying power).

DECEPTIVE

4-18. Deception activities mislead or create an inaccurate perception of reality to shape the decision-making of the TAs, alter their behavior, and disrupt command and control. Execution of deception can render threat actions disjointed, less purposeful, and uncoordinated. Deception activities require deep understanding of the TA, accurate intelligence, and robust planning to mitigate uncertainties and capitalize on the fog of war. Examples of deception actions include—

- Overt execution of operations while masking other activities with false patterns of life or operations.
- Use of a partner, surrogate, or proxy to obscure action or message source.
- Mimicry (physical, virtual, electronic, and so on).
- Deliberately leaked documents.

4-19. Examples of desired changes in thinking and behavior include—

- Diversion of enemy forces (via reconnaissance, attack, and so on.).
- Hesitation by decision-makers.
- Infighting and dissension.
- Reversal of thinking (considering what is true to be false and what is false to be true).


4-20. Figure 4-1, pages 53 and 54, provides an example of TAC-D. This vignette is also available at https://inteldocs.intelink.gov/files/details/9fefda44-ab6c-4085-b04c-04df26e48d5d.

During the early days of the conflict, an Army multidomain task force provided mobile, long-range fires, sustainment, and protection that enabled allied ground forces to maneuver within the enemy's anti-access/area denial layer.

Allied ground forces began pushing enemy forces back, opening airfields, securing sea lanes, and taking vital ports.

The enemy held one port that three U.S. Army divisions besieged. Allied forces needed the port to supply the increasing number of ground forces arriving ashore.

The American corps commander intended to launch an assault on enemy forces holding the port. This required a tactical deception to draw enemy forces to the left flank and away from the center of the assault.



The secondary objective of the tactical deception was to convey the image of a larger attacking force to convince the enemy commander to surrender the port.



Friendly forces formed "Task Force Tank". It's purpose was to persuade the enemy that an allied combined arms battalion was moving into an assembly area five miles from the front to attack the enemy's left flank. The assembly area was within two miles of a known enemy observation post.

Under the cover of darkness, Task Force Tank used an M88 recovery vehicle to lay down tank tracks in the vicinity of the assembly area. A Psychological Operations detachment used four joint light tactical vehicles with mounted loudspeakers to simulate the arrival of three tank companies.

Figure 4-1. Task Force Tank

Friendly forces took additional measures to mimic the electronic and heat signatures of a combined arms battalion. Simultaneously, the Psychological Operations detachment transitioned to tank track adjustment sounds and tread noises to feed enemy sensors the narrative of the deception.

More than 60 dummy tank and other vehicle decoys were placed within the assembly area. Then other members of the task force replicated the sights and sounds of a combined arms battalion as night became day, and then night again.

That evening, Task Force Tank simulated the physical movement, sounds, electronic, and heat signatures of a combined arms battalion moving into the attack position less than one mile south of the enemy's left flank. Some of the decoy tanks and other vehicles were set up in the attack position.

The allied attack began that morning at 1000 hours. Enemy artillery, mortars, crew-served weapons, and small arms fire concentrated on Task Force Tank's position confirmed the success of the tactical deception.



Task Force Tank's tactical deception succeeded in drawing enemy forces toward their left flank. The tactical deception influenced the enemy forces to believe that this was the main attack effort of the allied forces, causing the enemy to change behavior and shift the focus their efforts.

This left the enemy's center vulnerable to the actual main attack. At this location allied ground forces overmatched the enemy through simultaneous maneuver, fires, and information to seize and secure the key terrain of the port.

Figure 4-1. Task Force Tank (continued)

DISRUPTIVE

4-21. Disruptive actions break apart, throw into disorder, or interrupt the normal processes of physical systems. The corruption and shaping of the information a system receives disrupts the decision-making processes, employment of capabilities, and execution of operations. PSYACTs can disrupt threat freedom of maneuver or movement and deployment and employment of capabilities including command, control, and other information systems. PSYACT examples include—


- Feeding automated sensors with disinformation.
- Physical disruption of infrastructure system processes (such as energy, security, health, financial, and transportation).
- Providing more information to a system than it can process efficiently.

OFFENSE

4-22. The purpose of offensive operations is to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers. Psychological Operations units conduct influence activities that target human behavior to create effects across the human, information, and physical dimensions. These activities reinforce the psychological impact of lethal and nonlethal actions. This weakens the enemy's will to resist and shape their decision-making and actions. Influence activities also amplify operational effects by informing and protecting civilians and minimizing infrastructure destruction.

4-23. Figure 4-2, pages 56 through 60, is an example of Psychological Operations forces during offense, using a PSYACT involving a drone and lethal action to induce surrender. This vignette is also available here: https://inteldocs.intelink.gov/files/details/9253e07a-6d97-49c2-94cf-ea5a4e432c38.

Year: 2030… a Psychological Operations detachment deploys as part of an Allied operation against an occupying power. Detachment equipment includes mobile backpack printers and aerial delivery-capable drones.



This equipment facilitates rapid, proactive approaches in a dynamic environment. The new, compact capabilities will prove useful on a mission against an enemy platoon holding a key area. During task force planning, the detachment leader works extensively with attached snipers to develop a psychological action (PSYACT) plan.

Figure 4-2. Example of psychological action (drone surrender)




Figure 4-2. Example of psychological action (drone surrender) (continued)





Figure 4-2. Example of psychological action (drone surrender) (continued)

Suddenly, paper begins to fall directly on the enemy combatants' location from the overhead drone. They grab at the leaflets as the pieces of paper flutter down or grab the leaflets off the ground. They read the leaflets as…





The drone pauses overhead before beginning to move slowly toward Allied lines. The enemy combatants look at their dead leader then, the entire group drops their weapons and follows the drone to safety.

Figure 4-2. Example of psychological action (drone surrender) (continued)




Figure 4-2. Example of psychological action (drone surrender) (continued)

4-24. Psychological Operations units create relative advantages in the physical domain through deception and offensively focused PSYOP. They use deception to confuse and frustrate enemy efforts to predict Army maneuvers and movements. This reduces the effectiveness of enemy decision-making. Upon transition to defense or stability operations, Psychological Operations forces focus more on consolidation tasks to help ensure—

- Gains are not lost.
- Hard-fought advantages continue to favor friendly forces.
- Stabilization activities are supported.
- The operational environment is increasingly hostile to threat forces.

4-25. In armed conflict, offensive influence activities contrast with influence in competition below armed conflict (which heavily invests in stability and consolidation activities). Offensive influence activities are inherently destabilizing actions Army Psychological Operations units take to create shock, confusion, fear, and other psychological effects to fragment and erode threat control of the situation, degrade its capabilities, and frustrate its ability to achieve objectives.

DEFENSE

4-26. A key purpose of defense is to develop the situation to allow Army forces to return to the offense. Defense may also focus on retaining ground or denying it to a threat, fixing an enemy prior to a friendly attack, and countering enemy operations.

4-27. In defensive operations, Psychological Operations forces—

- Coordinate PSYACTs and deliver messages.
- Conduct deception to reduce the enemy's combat power.
- Reduce the enemy's ability to conduct offensive operations.
- Delay the advance of enemy units.

4-28. In defense, Psychological Operations units can continue to shape the environment to aid the shift to offensive operations. Deception and other tactics delay and disrupt enemy actions, inhibit decision-making, and slow threat response to provide Army forces with time to re-engage offensively.

4-29. It is important for planning and execution to set conditions for a strong transition either to offensive operations or to stability. Influence activities can be key to helping Army forces to consolidate and reorganize for offensive operations and disrupting and disorganizing enemy forces from introducing fresh forces to the fight. The purpose of the defense is to create conditions for the offense that allows Army forces to—

- Discourage enemy offensive actions.
- Regain the initiative.
- Bolster friendly force efforts to delay enemy advances.
- Retain decisive terrain or deny a vital area to an enemy.
- Assess enemy influence capabilities to determine their objectives, targets, effectiveness, and vulnerabilities.
- Influence enemy strategy and tactics.
- Create doubt among enemy forces.
- Encourage opposition in enemy-held territory and within the enemy country.
- Attrit or fix an enemy as a prelude to the offense.
- Counter enemy action.
- Elicit willing, active support of local populations.
- Accept risk in one area to create offensive opportunities elsewhere.

STABILITY

4-30. During armed conflict, Army forces attack, defend, perform stability tasks, and continuously consolidate gains to accomplish objectives that support a desirable political outcome. Conflict resolution requires Army forces to consolidate gains with unified action partners as long as necessary to accomplish national objectives. A *stability mechanism* is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADP 3-0).

4-31. According to ADP 3-0, as with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support.

4-32. Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. Control involves imposing civil order. Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign, friendly, neutral, and threat audiences through messages, presence, and actions. Support establishes, reinforces, or sets conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively.

4-33. Psychological Operations units execute the influence mechanism through influence activities to support the primary stability tasks of:

- Establish civil security.
- Establish civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support to governance.
- Support to economic and infrastructure development.

4-34. ADP 3-07, FM 3-07, and ATP 3-07.5 provide further details on stability operations and stability tasks. In armed conflict, the Army focuses on the minimum essential security tasks first, most often in rear operations prior to deep and close operations. As a result, supporting rear operations can become an important line of effort for psychological operations units supporting corps and divisions. Division and corps rear command posts are generally responsible for rear operations.

THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

4-35. In addition to U.S. and international law and agreements, military law requires Psychological Operations units to follow the law of armed conflict when targeting a threat's support groups and organizations, especially civilians. While these supporting entities are indirect and secondary to the main threat, they still enable the threat to operate. This raises the question of whether they are legitimate targets for lethal and nonlethal actions. Legal experts may designate these supporting entities as combatants if they meet the legal criteria. If designated as combatants, they are legitimate targets under the rules of war. If they remain noncombatants, influence is limited to nonlethal actions.

4-36. FM 6-27 notes that in determining when civilians may be directly targeted, neither treaty, law, nor customary international law provides a definition of the phrase "direct part in hostilities." At a minimum, it includes actions that are, by their very nature and purpose, intended to cause actual harm to the enemy. Taking a direct part in hostilities extends beyond engaging in combat, it includes certain acts that are an integral part of combat operations or that effectively and substantially contribute to an adversary's ability to conduct or sustain combat operations. However, directly participating in hostilities is not the only way that members of the civilian population contribute to their state's war effort. For example, they may do so by working in a munitions factory or buying war bonds. The supporting staff judge advocate can provide more information about specific legal and policy parameters of influence targeting.

4-37. Violations of the law of armed conflict can be a friendly vulnerability that the enemy can exploit and can be a potential target of opportunity for friendly forces when the enemy violates it. When the enemy violates the law, Psychological Operations units can exploit the opportunity by depicting the illegitimacy of the action to the civilian population in the conflict area and members of military coalitions, thereby influencing the national will within their respective countries.

TARGET AUDIENCES

4-38. The influence process takes broad TAs and refines them to the most finite audience that can achieve a desired behavior. The following list provides examples of TAs that could be used as a broad audience tied to a psychological objective (or, if refined, TAs for an SPO):

- Specific military units or organizations.
- Opposition rank and file.
- Social, cultural, and political groups.
- Rural populations in specific geographic areas.

- Urban populations of specific cities.
- Population segments based upon whom they support (tacitly or overtly).
- Criminal organizations.
- Academic groups.
- Law enforcement.
- Student populations.
- Commercial organizations.
- Work force, segmented by industry.
- Individual decision-makers (with political, legislative, government department, military, security force, economic, and information associations).
- Social and cultural group leaders.
- A leader's primary group.
- Criminal organization leaders.
- Leaders of student groups.
- Specific commercial business leaders.
- Workforce group leaders (such as union leaders).

SUPPORT TO CORPS AND BELOW

4-39. The following paragraphs outline how Psychological Operations units provide support to the corps and echelons below the corps. FM 3-05 discusses support to echelons above corps. Chapter 1, Section II discusses the range of echelons that POGs, POBs, and POCs support.

Note: References to being attached in this and subsequent content are meant generally and should not be interpreted as a specific command relationship such as attached with operational control or attached less administrative control.

CORPS

4-40. The command relationships, composition, and disposition of Psychological Operations units vary. However, initial requirements are captured in theater or global plans, which facilitate training, exercises, and other preparatory activities. The unit—

- Exercises command and control of subordinate Psychological Operations units and attached information forces.
- Provides the commander and core staff of a functional component command.
- Integrates with the corps staff.
- Advises the corps commander and operations staff (G-3) on the inherent informational aspects of operations.
- Integrates corps influence activities with theater-echelon activities.
- Coordinates for theater-echelon Psychological Operations unit support (fires).
- Manages the influence process in support of corps operations.
- Recommends the apportionment of subordinate Psychological Operations units to the corps' main effort.
- Recommends joint, Army, other Service, multinational, and partner space and cyberspace capabilities to fill corps influence capability gaps.

4-41. The Psychological Operations unit provides planning for all influence efforts in the corps area of operations. As explained in Chapter 1, these influence efforts can be viewed as operational and tactical influence.

4-42. Influence activities must be able to support the corps' focus on an area with depth of 140 kilometers and a breadth of 85 kilometers with a time span of 48 hours to five days (distances and times are a doctrinal template [FM 3-0] that depend on mission variables).

Note: U.S. Army mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and information (METT-TC[I]).

4-43. The supporting Psychological Operations staff must forecast future required actions as they account for the tempo, intensity, and progress made in the fight. The corps' area of interest can rapidly become its area of influence—the deep area of the corps can quickly become the close area of a division. TAs may migrate from one area to another or be removed from the battlefield entirely. The group headquarters must maintain agility to quickly pivot to un-forecasted targets that are susceptible to tailored influence activities.

DIVISION

4-44. The Psychological Operations unit commander and staff focus their subordinate unit efforts on those activities that support achievement of IPOs and other tactical military objectives. The lack of organic PO Soldiers on division staffs places additional responsibility on the Psychological Operations unit headquarters. Augmentation can come directly from the Psychological Operations unit or be sourced through the individual augmentation process. The commander rapidly integrates the staff with the division staff to mitigate gaps and reinforce current efforts. The Total Force Partnership Program of United States Army Forces Command manages the alignment of Psychological Operations units to divisions. This program facilitates training, integration, and operational relationships.

4-45. The division's templated operational tempo focuses on a 24- to 48-hour period, therefore desired effects on enemy behavior rely on higher Psychological Operations echelons to prepare the enemy for the desired behavior. The battalion exploits this preparation with combinations of PSYOP, TAC-D, and other tactical influence activities to achieve the desired behavior within the required time frame. The speed and tempo of the fight require simultaneous coordination among division and corps operations directorates, Psychological Operations unit operations directorates, and unit staffs with their maneuver unit counterparts.

4-46. While defeating enemy maneuver forces is a primary objective, the Psychological Operations unit must also create effects in the division support area. This effort supports—

- Consolidating gains.
- Maintaining security.
- Controlling populations.
- Managing and leveraging enemy prisoner of war activities.
- Preparing to transition area control to a higher echelon as the division advances.

BRIGADE

4-47. While there are Psychological Operations noncommissioned officers are assigned to security force assistance brigades, there are no longer billets at infantry brigades. Prior to the elimination of these billets, these Psychological Operations noncommissioned officers played a key role in planning for an integrating attached POCs.

4-48. Like division headquarters, the lack of organic PO Soldiers on brigade staffs places additional responsibility on the Psychological Operations unit headquarters. Upon receipt of mission to support a brigade, a POC considers immediately sending a liaison element to bridge the coordination gap until they can close with and fully integrate with the brigade. As the brigade role is to maneuver its subordinate battalions and enable close combat, their operational tempo focuses on a 12- to24-hour period.

4-49. Psychological Operations units supporting the brigade rely on pre-produced and approved products, preparation of the battlefield by higher echelon Psychological Operations units, and their understanding of the varied TAs to mitigate risks, retain agility, and provide timely support.

4-50. Attached POCs primarily coordinate and synchronize their subordinate detachment's tactical influence activities. During course of action analysis, the company commander analyzes the requirements of the brigade and its subordinate battalions. Emphasis may be given to the main effort while accounting for other battlefield activities. The recommended disposition of subordinate detachments is an outcome of course of action analysis and does not automatically locate many of the detachments with the battalion that is the main effort. For example, detachments may support the main effort by conducting TAC-D activities. They may support the overall operation by assisting with control of civilians on the battlefield to mitigate collateral damage, supporting enemy prisoner of war activities, and conducting surrender appeals to bypassed enemy units.

4-51. As the lowest echelon supporting close operations, a company's ability to pass information to higher echelon Psychological Operations units is a critical role. The ability to rapidly obtain information that can be exploited by higher echelons helps adjust series, consolidate gains, and prepare for future operations.

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

4-52. Special Forces group headquarters provide the commander and core staff of a joint special operations task force. The headquarters creates effects in the extended deep area (operational deep areas and strategic deep areas). It may also conduct operations in the periphery of the joint operations area to prepare partner forces to participate in special operations. There is no doctrinal template for the breadth, width, and operational planning window of a joint special operations task force like there is for Army maneuver echelons at brigade and above. The lack of a template is due to the broad scope of core activities a joint special operations task force may conduct.

4-53. Therefore, attached Psychological Operations units must be flexible in the type and focus of the support they provide. The organic Psychological Operations officer assigned to the Special Forces group is the lead influence planner for the group and facilitates integration of attached units. The scope of the joint special operations task force mission dictates the echelon of the Psychological Operations unit that is attached; the doctrinal template is to attach a battalion to the joint special operations task force.

4-54. The Psychological Operations commander and staff (or headquarters element) play a key role in coordinating theater-echelon influence support for effects in the extended deep area. The unit plans for precise behavioral outcomes that nest within the effects generated across the joint operations area to create exploitable information, human, and physical advantages.

4-55. Just as the joint special operations task force uses its organic and attached maneuver units to create effects that can be exploited by other components and echelons within the joint task force, advantages may be created for the joint special operations task force or other units or echelons to exploit. In addition to supporting the core activities the joint special operations task force conducts, the Psychological Operations unit—

- Helps obfuscate the presence of joint special operations task force subordinate units in the extended deep area.
- Supports indigenous partners' influence capability, capacity, and employment.
- Facilitates the use of partner capabilities to support development, production, distribution, and dissemination requirements.
- Collects information related to joint task force influence requirements.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

4-56. A special operations task force is organized around a single Special Forces battalion. The special operations task force is responsible for isolating, deploying, controlling, sustaining, recovering, and reconstituting its assigned or attached Special Forces operational detachments–bravo and Special Forces operational detachments–alpha into the extended deep area, the periphery of the joint operational area, and other assigned areas within the joint special operations area.

4-57. A Psychological Operations unit co-locates with the special operations task force headquarters and integrates into the staff. Special emphasis is placed on the integration into effects cells. Effects cells promote current and future operations and degrade or negate threat operations to achieve advantages. FM 3-18 provides more on effects cells and other influence capabilities organic to Special Forces units.

4-58. The unit headquarters—

- Coordinates for theater echelon influence support.
- Nests special operations task force influence activities with higher echelon activities.
- Recommends disposition and missions for its subordinate detachments.

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Chapter 5
Employment and Additional Considerations

This chapter addresses the following considerations: support to component command task organization, integration of external capabilities, legal, and warfighting functions.

SECTION I – EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

5-1. The Army G-3 exercises responsibility for force management including developing rules of allocation with Army functional proponents. Psychological Operations units conduct operations with a variety of units. Rules of allocation provide baseline relationships that aid in planning and modeling that align by echelon to ensure sufficient capacity for operations. However, rules of allocation are based on Army needs, not joint force needs. Further, operational requirements are codified in plans, orders, and the global force management process.

SUPPORT TO SERVICE AND JOINT COMPONENTS

5-2. The designated Psychological Operations group commander uses the unit's capabilities to execute the influence process for a theater Army, corps, or joint task force in support of a specific operation, operation order, operation plan, or concept plan.

SUPPORT TO THE ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT OR ARMY FORCE

5-3. When a theater Army becomes the land component command (or Service component command) it receives Psychological Operations units to support its specific task organization. At the Service component command headquarters, organic assigned Psychological Operations personnel (primarily located in the G-3 staff) provide planning capability for Psychological Operations unit activities. When support is programmed to come from the Reserve Component, the theater Army staff is responsible for integrating mobilization process milestones and decision points into their standing plans.

SUPPORT TO THE MARINE CORPS SERVICE COMPONENT

5-4. Marine expeditionary force information groups are aligned to specific component commanders. Influence Marines are prioritized to support the joint force maritime component commander. Influence Marines plan operations in the information environment and specialize in the conduct of PSYOP and Civil Affairs operations in support of distributed maritime operations, littoral operations in contested environments, and expeditionary advanced base operations. This support comes from expeditionary influence teams organic to special purpose Marine air-ground task forces, Marine expeditionary units, Marine expeditionary brigades, Marine littoral regiments, and Marine expeditionary forces. Expeditionary influence teams are a capability most recently conceptualized as stand-in forces; from an Army perspective, they are attachments, not an organic capability.

Note: Throughout the rest of this chapter, Marine Influence forces who conduct PSYOP will be referred to as Marine Psychological Operations units.

5-5. Marine forces component commands access organic Marine Psychological Operations units who conduct PSYOP to support their specific task organization. The Marine Corps primarily relies on its Psychological Operations units assigned to each Active Component Marine expeditionary force information group to support Marine units during armed conflict. Army Psychological Operations units may augment the Marine service component with language and regional expertise as well as product development and production capabilities. In addition, the Marine Corps may request additional Army Psychological Operations units to support Marine maneuver formations if the mission requirements exceed Marine tactical capabilities.

JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER

5-6. When a theater Army commander is assigned as the land component commander, the support they receive mirrors the capability described in the preceding paragraphs. However, when the United States Marine Corps provides the land component commander, Army Psychological Operations units provide most of the capability and they support Marine Psychological Operations forces with development, production, distribution, and dissemination of products. The highest echelon Marine Psychological Operations unit is the tactical psychological operations company (also referred to as an influence company) assigned to each active component Marine expeditionary force information group. These influence companies have limited regional analysis and deployable product development and production capabilities. Therefore, Army Psychological Operations units may provide the Marine Corps-led land component command with higher echelon planning, language and regional expertise, and product development, production, distribution, and dissemination capabilities.

5-7. Marine Psychological Operations units are prioritized to support the joint force maritime component commander due to their ability to conduct PSYOP in support of distributed maritime operations, littoral operations in contested environments, and expeditionary advanced base operations. This support comes from tactical Psychological Operations teams assigned to the maritime stand-in-forces (for example, Marine expeditionary forces or Marine littoral regiments). Partnered with their naval counterparts, Marine Psychological Operations units take advantage of their ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore, and aviation platform broadcast capabilities. Navy and Marine Corps aviation platforms also provide Marine Psychological Operations units with leaflet and digital product dissemination.

JOINT FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMANDER

5-8. A theater special operations command may be tasked to provide the commander and the primary staff for a special operations component command. United States Special Operations Command may task Marine Special Operations Command or 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) (through United States Army Special Operations Command) with providing the commander and primary staff of a special operations joint task force. Armed conflict requiring a joint special operations task force has the commander and staff sourced from a group or brigade. ADP 3-05 and FM 3-05 provide more information on special operations command and control organizations.

5-9. In each case where 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) or one of its subordinate units is the executing unit, the special operations joint task force (or joint special operations task force) is responsible for the execution of the Army warfighting functions (or joint functions, as needed). The special operations joint task force (or joint special operations task force) relies on a regionally oriented Psychological Operations unit to execute influence activities.

5-10. Marine influence unit support to the joint force special operations component command is aligned to the supporting Marine Special Operations Command element and augmented by Marine tactical Psychological Operation teams. Should a Marine Special Operations Command force be assigned as a special operations joint task force (or a subordinate Marine Special Operations Command element be assigned to a joint special operations task force or special operations task force), Marine influence units may be aligned to those commands. The Marine Corps may request additional Army Psychological Operations units to provide support if the mission requirements exceed Marine Corps organic capabilities. In the absence of a Marine influence capability, the Army may be tasked with providing support to the Marine Special Operations Command.

MAIN EFFORT VERSUS SUPPORTING EFFORT

5-11. Army forces all contend with competing demands for finite resources. This is particularly true in armed conflict which can push all organizations and systems to their limits, especially in large-scale combat operations. Therefore, leaders and planners must prioritize efforts and capabilities in terms of a main effort and supporting effort(s). Commanders reassess priorities and reallocate resources over the course of an operation. At any time, there is only one priority. The priority may change and likely require changes in supporting efforts. During operations below the threshold of armed conflict, often the most valuable capability a commander can wield is influence, so influence capabilities like Psychological Operations units

may frequently and rapidly shift from a main effort to supporting effort and back again, depending on operational necessity.

MAIN EFFORT

5-12. A *main effort* is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success (ADP 3-0). Designation of a main effort reflects the establishment of a priority capability and a flexible and adjustable hierarchy for other capabilities based on mission requirements. As the mission evolves, the main effort changes to whatever capability becomes the necessary focus to best achieve the desired outcome. In the beginning of an operation, a Psychological Operations unit may conduct deception activities with the coordinated support of cyberspace units to disintegrate enemy unit cohesion, create infighting and dissension, and elicit bad decision-making. Once the full attack begins, combat arms units become the main effort with Psychological Operations units assuming a supporting effort.

SUPPORTING EFFORT

5-13. A *supporting effort* is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort (ADP 3-0). In general, units operating in a supporting effort role receive fewer resources and assets than the main effort (as the latter is where the command focus lies). However, supporting efforts are still critical to the success of the main effort. In the case of influence activities, efforts to break down and disorganize threat capabilities and forces can provide crucial disaggregation, disruption, and dilution of enemy efforts to resist U.S. forces and can increase the effectiveness of a friendly attack.

TASK ORGANIZATION CONSIDERATIONS

5-14. *Task-organizing* is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADP 3-0). *Task organization* is a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission (ADP 5-0). A commander task organizes units to enhance the ability to execute a specific mission.

5-15. Task organization is part of the planning process. Task organization enables commanders to detach and move units, integrate new personnel and units into existing force structures, and allow for sufficient time to implement organizational changes for subordinate leaders and units. This planning produces a base plan, order, and Annex A (Task Organization) to a base plan or order that all direct a unit's task organization. Planning may also produce an operation plan or operation order that both provide changes to task organization by phase. Commanders modify the task organization as required by the situation during execution through fragmentary orders. FM 5-0 provides more information on planning and orders.

TASK FORCES

5-16. In task forces, the headquarters provides unity of command and effort through the warfighting functions for subordinate units to conduct operations, while the subordinate units execute operations and supporting activities.

5-17. The most common and enduring task organization for Psychological Operations units is a functional task force established to centralize the influence activity. The task force could be organized around a battalion or group. JP 3-33 provides more information on the organization options for a joint task force headquarters as depicted in figure 5-1, page 70.




Figure 5-1. Joint task force organizational options

Note: When this chapter refers to an information task force, it refers to a functional component of a joint task force.

5-18. The joint force command exercises caution when centralizing influence activities to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. Centralization of information activities facilitates delegating approval authorities at the lowest, most appropriate command echelon. The information task force must not centralize all approval authorities at the same echelon. Rather, the information task force relies on mission command and clear mission orders to push down approval authorities and decentralize operations to the greatest extent practical. Capabilities and responsibilities of the information task force include—

- Coordinating execution of influence activities in support of the joint force command and its components.
- Coordinating influence-focused planning and analysis processes.
- Coordinating with mission partners.
- Executing Psychological Operations unit activities in support of joint force command service components or forces that lack organic or task-organized capability or capacity. This support may range from providing liaisons to attaching units capable of—
  - Planning.
  - TAA.
  - Series development.
  - Product development and design.
  - Series approval.
  - Production, distribution, and dissemination.
  - Evaluation.
  - Synchronization of influence activities for the joint force command.

TASK ORGANIZATION

5-19. Psychological Operations units are organized and equipped to adapt to diverse environments and mission requirements. Task organization plays a critical role in this flexibility that allows units and capabilities to be tailored to the specific needs of each mission.

5-20. Commanders arrange their organic and attached forces as an output of the operations process and articulate task organization in Annex A of an operation plan or order. There are numerous considerations when determining the best task organization of the force, including:

- Creation of interdependence.
- Anticipation of transitions.
- Accounting for interoperability.
- The duration of support.
- Balance of centralized direction with decentralized execution.
- The commander's intent and concept of operations.
- Weight of the decisive operation or main effort.
- Retention of flexibility to meet unforeseen events and support future operations.
- Allocation of resources with minimum restrictions on their employment.
- Exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities.

PRIORITY OF SUPPORT

5-21. In addition to task-organizing, commanders establish priorities of support during planning, and shift priorities during execution as the situation requires. A *priority of support* is a priority set by the commander to ensure a subordinate unit has support in accordance with its relative importance to accomplish the mission (ADP 5-0). Priorities of support for movement, fires, sustainment, and protection all illustrate priorities of support that commanders use to weigh the decisive operation or the main effort if the operation is phased. Establishing priorities of support are particularly critical when it comes to a limited resource like fires. This prioritization is a fundamental principle to consider when task-organizing Psychological Operations units to accomplish missions wherever those missions fall in the Army's strategic context for employment of forces or across the range of military operations.

MUTUAL SUPPORT

5-22. Commanders and staffs consider mutual support when determining how large an area to assign subordinates. *Mutual support* is that support which units render each other throughout joint operations, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, or their inherent capabilities (JP 3-31). In Army doctrine, mutual support is a planning consideration related to force disposition; it is not a command relationship. Mutual support has two aspects: supporting range and supporting distance. Given that the production, distribution, and dissemination capabilities of Psychological Operations units is not equivalent across formations, establishing support relationships is a principle to consider when task organizing these units—whether across a joint task force or within an Army echelon (such as a corps or division).

5-23. Some terms related to support relationships include—

- ***Close support.*** Action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force (JP 3-31).
- ***Direct Support.*** A support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance (FM 3-0).
- ***General Support.*** Support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof (JP 3-09.3).
- ***General Support—Reinforcing.*** A support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole and to reinforce another similar type unit. (FM 3-0).

COORDINATION FRAMEWORK

5-24. When task-organizing Psychological Operations units, it is important to consider that TAs are not limited by geographic boundaries. However, land and maritime commanders operate within areas of operations defined by geographic boundaries that require the establishment of coordination lines for communication. One way to facilitate coordination is to designate a coordinating authority for influence activities like PSYOP, deception, and operations in the information environment. In this role, a commander assigns a subordinate commander or primary staff officer to oversee and ensure coordination among joint force elements conducting influence activities.

5-25. Granting direct liaison authority is another way to build a coordination framework. Direct liaison authority is the authority granted by a commander (at any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Formally establishing the authority for direct liaison in orders supplements the inherent responsibilities of staffs to conduct higher, lower, and lateral cross-command coordination and collaboration. Establishing this authority also facilitates unity of effort.

5-26. Personnel exchanges enable interoperability when existing technology and procedures are absent, insufficient, or cannot be developed quickly. During planning, commanders should identify coordination nodes that may require individual liaisons or larger coordinating elements. Commanders must define the specific functions and roles of these elements and identify known risks and opportunities that warrant their use. At a minimum, commanders should establish liaisons for plan development, operational preparation, and execution of current operations to improve representation, coordination, and overall understanding while minimizing deconfliction requirements. Liaisons are not staff augmentees, watch officers, or full-time planners; they must retain the freedom of action needed to perform functions from planning to execution across appropriate echelons. For more information on liaisons, refer to JP 3-05 and JP 3-33.

Support to Campaign Plans

5-27. Combatant command campaigns shape the operational environment, deter aggressors, mitigate the effects of a contingency, and, when necessary, execute combat operations in support of the overarching national strategy. Psychological Operations units execute subordinate operations and activities in three primary contexts. They do so to achieve objectives from the following echelons: combatant command, Army Service component command, and theater special operations command.

5-28. Every combatant command may have a different approach to how it plans, coordinates, and executes operations in the information environment (and PSYOP specifically) in its area of responsibility. United States Indo-Pacific Command established the Fleet Information Warfare Command Pacific, (subordinate to U.S. Pacific fleet) to plan, coordinate, and direct capabilities for the fleet. Other combatant commands may retain planning, coordination, and directing authority at their echelon. Others may make a different component command, such as the theater Army or theater special operations command—the primary planning and coordinating authority for PSYOP or other influence activities. In the case of U.S. Army Pacific, the commander integrated the 1st Theater Information Advantage Detachment into operations to augment the staff with a more robust planning capability.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

5-29. When the SecDef approves the deployment of Psychological Operations units to conduct interorganizational activities missions, operational control of those missions transfers to the supported combatant commander. The combatant commander may exercise operational control through a subordinate component command or a joint task force. Psychological Operations units employed to assist the Department of State and unified action partners with influence activities during peacetime shaping operations normally perform their mission under the guidance of the chief of mission or a designated country team official. The combatant or subordinate command maintains operational control of the unit.

5-30. During multinational operations, the Joint Staff provides orders that may contain a provision allowing the gaining combatant commander to integrate Psychological Operations units into multinational operations. Operational control of those units may pass to a non-U.S. commander. Mission analysis and requirements determine the optimum command relationships, and resultant deployment orders and fragmentary orders specify those command relationships. In these instances, the Joint Staff issues orders on behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense that identify authorities (including approval authorities) in a multinational environment.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

5-31. Via a deployment order, the SecDef specifies the allocation of Psychological Operations units to gaining units and their command relationship. The authority of command provides the basis for control. When authority is delegated to subordinate commanders, specific controls and responsibilities are also

delegated. FM 1-02.1 and *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* provide definitions of command relationships. JP 3-0 provides specific descriptions of the application of these terms.

5-32. When the DOD reassigns Psychological Operations units from one command to another, orders specify the command relationships of the gaining and losing commanders over those forces. Formal command structures (such as operational, tactical, and administrative controls) establish the relationships between incoming units and gaining commanders.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND TACTICAL CONTROL

5-33. A combatant commander with an assigned area or responsibility may exercise operational control (or delegate it) to any level of subordinate command. *Operational control* is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission (JP 1, Volume 2).

5-34. *Tactical control* is the authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned (JP 1, Volume 2). Tactical control is inherent in operational control, but the combatant commander may retain or delegate it separately to any subordinate level of command. The combatant commander's staff initiates a request for forces to the Joint Staff to begin the process of transferring operational control of forces. The Joint Staff validates the request and determines the sourcing solution.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

5-35. *Administrative control* is direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support (JP 1, Volume 2). Planners consider the requirement to have administrative control authority delegated to the gaining commander for the sustainment of attached Psychological Operations units. Administrative control gives authority over subordinate units or other organizations for logistics, administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Administrative control is not included in operational control or tactical control. The combatant commander specifically delegates those elements of command authority.

INTEGRATION OF EXTERNAL CAPABILITIES

5-36. Organizations and units rely on integrating processes to merge personnel, units, and capabilities into operations. According to ATP 5-0.2-1, "An integrating process consists of a series of steps that incorporate multiple disciplines to achieve a specific end." Well-known integrating processes include intelligence preparation of the operational environment, risk management, and targeting. However, capabilities integration is also an important topic for planners and unit leaders.

5-37. Because Psychological Operations units frequently require nonorganic capabilities, integration of external capabilities is crucial. Integration may take place within the force when a deployed unit is conducting operations and must coordinate for augmentation with other capabilities. For example, a U.S. Army Reserve POB operates as a task force in Country X and requires augmentation of development and production capabilities from an Active Component battalion at Fort Bragg for the duration of the deployment. If approved, the task force would then integrate the augmentees and their capabilities into the organization.

5-38. Integration also applies to capabilities nonresident or nonorganic to the force. Such integration can be for the duration of a deployment but may not always be the case. The more common scenario is a short duration for a specific mission or operational requirement (for example, using the orders process to task aviation assets or cyberspace capabilities to help execute a series).

5-39. Integration also frequently encompasses required joint capabilities. Some circumstances cause Army Psychological Operations units to require capabilities from other services. The orders process also applies in this situation and compels Army Psychological Operations planners to be proactive to ensure requests have sufficient time to route through both Army and joint staffing so the required service capabilities can be tasked in time. The task force can be vital in getting requests through the necessary staffing sections. Once the required capabilities are tasked, the relevant order provides the framework the gaining Psychological

Operations unit needs to properly integrate the new unit or capabilities into operations. This applies whether integration is for a one-time series execution or longer.

5-40. Finally, non-U.S. DOD capabilities may be required in operations. Those capabilities may derive from an ally or friendly nation in a combined joint task force situation. In such cases, planners use applicable combined joint task force procedures like for North Atlantic Treaty Organization operations, which are long-standing and habitual. For more information on multinational operations principles and procedures, refer to FM 3-16.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

5-41. The legal review, copyright, and the staff judge advocate are some of the legal considerations the PO Soldier must employ before, throughout, and after conducting operations. The following subheadings address each of these considerations in more detail.

LEGAL REVIEW

5-42. Commanders, staffs, and planners must always consult the most current legal and policy references for two primary reasons. First, Congress amends or rescinds laws on a recurring basis since the DOD periodically updates policies and strategies. Second, the information presented here provides an overview of legal and policy considerations for familiarization and general understanding, whereas legal authorities are explicitly and purposefully worded with precise terms and definitions.

5-43. Both PSYOP and defense deception activities have important legal considerations ranging from protection of civilians to broadcast rights to the use attribution to identify the source of information. Consult the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate to obtain the most current legal references and their expert interpretations.

COPYRIGHTED INFORMATION

5-44. Psychological Operations units employ a variety of actions, multimedia products, and delivery means and incorporate music, symbols, graphics, and text into messages. Numerous U.S. and international laws protect intellectual properties and other copyrighted material. U.S. law and DOD policy require adherence to the laws that protect all types of information that include published and unpublished works in a variety of forms and formats. To do otherwise, opens the USG to civil lawsuits and may place U.S. personnel at risk of criminal penalties.

5-45. 17 USC 102 stipulates that copyright is a form of protection provided by U.S. law to the authors of “original works of authorship”, including literary, dramatic, musical, artistic, and certain other intellectual works. This protection is available to published and unpublished works. Use of copyrighted material in messages is subject to copyright restrictions under 17 USC. DOD policy concerning the use of sound and video recordings is not a comprehensive source. Consult DOD legal counsel when planning the use of copyrighted material to ensure adherence to law and policy in a particular context. For more information about DOD copyright policy for sound and video recordings, refer to DODD 5535.4.

Department of Defense Copyright Policy

"The application of Title 17 USC to specific situations is a matter for interpretation by legal counsel. It is essential to keep in mind that:

a. The DOD must recognize the rights of copyright owners pursuant to DODD 5535.4.
b. Works of the USG prepared by DOD employees (or any officer or employee of the USG) as part of their official duties are not protected by copyright in the United States, in accordance with Title 17 USC. This includes documents authored by DOD employees during official assignments to attend school as students.
c. Proper attribution must be made for all copyrighted material. Post a clear disclaimer detailing the copyrights retained by USG or non-USG contributors and identify the specific copyrighted work(s) (e.g., information, image, video, sound, design, code, template, service, technology) when placing copyrighted material on electronic messaging services."

DODI 8170.01

5-46. In those rare instances when message developers determine that a copyrighted item is necessary to create an effective series of products (and possibly actions) they must secure the rights to use that item. There are several means to secure the rights to copyrighted material, typically via a contract with a rights clearinghouse. Consult the supporting Office of the Staff Judge Advocate and contracting officer to obtain specific guidance and assistance in securing the rights to use copyrighted material.

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

5-47. DODD 2311.01 requires military lawyers to review operation plans, policies, and directives to ensure compliance with the law of war. A staff may also be augmented with legal expertise in subject areas deemed critical to mission success. It is vital to involve a judge advocate in the planning process to ensure compliance with regulations, policies, treaties, other international agreements, and the law. Judge advocates from the serving Office of the Staff Judge Advocate provide assistance and a review of plans for legal sufficiency.

5-48. As legal experts, judge advocates are counselors and advisors to commanders and Soldiers in all the core legal disciplines (military justice, national security law [international and operational], administrative and civil law, contract and fiscal law, and Soldier and Family legal services [claims and legal assistance]). FM 3-84 provides more information on legal support.

5-49. The Psychological Operations force is primarily concerned with the laws identified in table 5-1.

Table 5-1. Laws of primary concern to Psychological Operations force

Type of Law	*Explanation*
International Law	The application of international agreements, U.S. and international law, and customs related to military operations and activities
Operational Law	The body of domestic, foreign, and international laws that directly affects the conduct of military operations
Contract Law	The area of law that addresses application of domestic and international law to the acquisition of goods, services, and construction
Fiscal Law	The application of domestic statutes and regulations to the funding of military operations and support to non-federal agencies and organizations
Media Law	The body of law that regulates media production and use during the production and delivery of various types of media, including broadcast television, internet, and print media

5-50. Soldiers responsible for contracting and other activities requiring external financial resources frequently consult the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate when working with finance managers, resource managers, and contracting agents. Each of the staff sections has specific authorities and responsibilities, but consultation with a staff member from the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate provides the Psychological Operations staff planners and commanders with proper legal guidance. This consultation can also assist in preventing fraud, waste, and abuse.

5-51. When contracting for services, production, distribution, and other necessary functions, Psychological Operations staff planners and commanders ensure full and open competition as required by 41 USC 3301. To ensure a full understanding of the legal requirements, consult the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for the supported unit, or higher Psychological Operations unit before initiating the contracting process. Psychological Operations unit contracting officers should work closely with contract law attorneys, if available, to ensure compliance with contracting procedures for funding sources.

WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS

5-52. The following sections describe how Psychological Operations unit activities support each warfighting function. Section II of this chapter covers intelligence considerations for supporting and enabling influence activities and Section III of this chapter addresses sustainment considerations for supporting and enabling influence activities.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

5-53. The *command and control warfighting function* is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power (ADP 3-0). Since the command and control warfighting function enables and facilitates the other functions, assigned PO Soldiers and unit leaders at their respective echelons are crucial to ensure integration of the warfighting functions and influence-focused capabilities to effectively execute operations and achieve objectives.

5-54. A critical contribution to the warfighting function is the integration of influence activities and related information (such as TA and locations of contact with adversary influence capabilities) into the common operational picture. Planners and unit leaders use command and control processes to employ capabilities to create and exploit physical, human, and informational advantages as well as increase situational understanding, facilitate decision making, and enable better effects assessment. Command and control empowers and aids Psychological Operations planners and unit leaders to integrate influence activities into overall military operations for unity of effort. For more information on command and control, refer to ADP 6-0.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

5-55. The *movement and maneuver warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats (ADP 3-0). The movement and maneuver warfighting function encompasses force projection tasks, with movement focused on positioning and dispersing forces (either in whole or in part) when maneuvering. Commanders maneuver to mass effects, achieve surprise, shock, and momentum in ways that achieve and exploit operational advantages against threats.

5-56. Psychological Operations planners and unit leaders use the movement and maneuver warfighting function to place and disperse units for maximum utility and effectiveness. For example, dispersed Psychological Operations units and elements at the tactical level can contribute to maneuver tasks like reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations as information collectors in the operational environment and as analyzers of that information.

5-57. Higher echelon Psychological Operations units generate large amounts of information that aid movement and maneuver through analysis of potential and declared threats to identify and attack their vulnerabilities to achieve operational advantages. In doing so, Psychological Operations units and organizations (like task forces) can help Army and joint forces better position themselves relative to threat forces.

5-58. Psychological Operations units and organizations also shape the information dimension of the operational environment to more effectively influence both threats and populations to the U.S. advantage

while undermining threat and adversary influence efforts. For more information on the movement and maneuver warfighting function, refer to FM 3-0.

FIRES

5-59. The *fires warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the adversary or enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations (ADP 3-0). The fires warfighting function leverages PSYACTs, PSYOP, and deception activities to create lethal and nonlethal effects.

5-60. The fires warfighting function lacks sole responsibility for and control over influence activities or the Psychological Operations units planning and executing them. Instead, Psychological Operations forces typically contribute to the fires and the other warfighting functions in the normal course of operation execution. For example, influence activities conducted to degrade threat combat effectiveness can simultaneously enhance and better enable movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, sustainment, protection, and command and control. In a similar way, efforts to increase population support for an allied government and security force operations can also positively affect all warfighting functions. Targeting is the process used to integrate all fires capabilities. For more information about the fires warfighting function, refer to ADP 3-19.

INTELLIGENCE

5-61. The *intelligence warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment (ADP 3-0). The intelligence warfighting function supports operations through a broad range of supporting doctrinal tasks, referred to as intelligence warfighting function tasks. All Army units and organizations perform intelligence warfighting functions tasks through the intelligence process by employing intelligence capabilities to support the commander and staff. Intelligence warfighting function tasks are interrelated, require the commander and staff's participation, and are often conducted simultaneously. When Psychological Operations units are supporting other units integrating with the intelligence staff to support execution of warfighting function tasks is a key consideration for the unit.

5-62. The intelligence warfighting function tasks include—

- Provide intelligence support to force generation.
- Provide support to situational understanding.
- Conduct information collection.
- Provide intelligence support to targeting.

5-63. Psychological Operations unit intelligence staffs are key to integrating unit support through the intelligence process. Psychological Operations unit contributions include TAA and other analyses of the operational environment, collection and analysis of information, and identification of influence-related information requirements for the commander. See FM 2-0 for more information on the information warfighting function tasks and the intelligence process.

PROTECTION

5-64. The *protection warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems, and methods that prevent or mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards to preserve combat power and enable freedom of action (FM 3-0). Protection includes everything that decreases Army force vulnerabilities to detection and destruction. Understanding threats and hazards enables commanders and staffs to prioritize requirements and commit capabilities and resources according to those priorities.

5-65. Potential threats reside within the operational environment and in space, cyberspace, and outside the area of operations, so protective measures account for them all. Since threats present continuous hazards to operations, personnel, and capabilities; planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of protection measures are continuous and permanent activities. The Army employs both active and passive protection measures to safeguard personnel, equipment, movement, and operations. Active protection measures involve the interception or destruction of the delivery systems, sensors, and data of threats and hazards before they can inflict damage on their intended targets. Passive protection measures include protecting personnel and equipment from detection and the effects of threats and hazards.

5-66. Psychological Operations planners, unit leaders, and Soldiers contribute to protection by analyzing threats and hazards to understand how conditions in the operational environment and human actions affect execution of influence activities and preservation of capabilities. Such analysis affects all Psychological Operations echelons. A team conducting sonic deception in a cordon and search mission requires information about weather conditions and threat capabilities to plan mitigation measures if those factors present as obstacles to the mission. In a similar way, a task force conducting cyberspace-based operations requires information about threat cyber capabilities and tactics and techniques to mitigate any possible reactions to friendly influence activities. For more information on protection, refer to ADP 3-37.

SUSTAINMENT

5-67. The *sustainment warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to enable freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADP 3-0). Systems consist of personnel, networks, information systems, processes, procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable sustainment commanders to support operations. The sustainment warfighting function leverages joint, interagency, multinational, and other available capabilities to provide sustainment support to the force.

5-68. The sustainment warfighting function consists of four elements: logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health service support. Each element of the sustainment warfighting function must be integrated and synchronized across all warfighting functions to ensure the appropriate level of support. Advances in information and communication technologies require innovative approaches to procurement, maintenance, manufacturing and resupply to support Psychological Operations units.

Note: Logistics support includes supply, field services, maintenance, transportation, and operational contract support. Personnel services include human resource support, religious support, and legal support.

Logistics

5-69. *Logistics* is planning and executing the movement and support of forces (JP 4-0). It includes those aspects of military operations that deal with—

- Design and development.
- Acquisition.
- Storage.
- Movement.
- Distribution.
- Maintenance.
- Evacuation and disposition of material.
- Movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel.
- Acquisition of construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities.
- Acquisition or furnishing of services.

5-70. During operations, logistics focuses on supply, field services, maintenance, transportation, and operational contract support for attached Psychological Operations units. Psychological Operations units operating under maneuver commanders are attached to the units with whom they execute missions and activities, so Psychological Operations unit leaders must inform the gaining unit of all requirements related to the type of sustainment required.

5-71. Psychological Operations units receive all Army-common logistic support from the gaining unit. They also use specialized equipment not found in the Army supply system. Psychological Operations units coordinate support for branch-specific items through the gaining unit or as specified in the deployment order. This includes information and communication equipment that require logistic and sustainment support which are not common to the Army and other DOD organizations. This also includes different funding sources for operations, direct contracting of host-nation assets, and obtaining resources and support through Department of State contracting capabilities that aid with the planning, development, execution or delivery, and assessment of influence activities.

Time-Phased Force Deployment Data

5-72. Combatant commanders use time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) to manage the requirement flow in and out of theater. As part of the TPFDD validation process, combatant command staffs and Service components validate unit line numbers throughout the flow.

5-73. Psychological Operations planners contribute to TPFDD development in response to a request for forces. They select the appropriate mix of forces to meet plan requirements. Through the TPFDD, the planning staff phases the deployment of Psychological Operations forces into theater according to the plan or order.

5-74. A TPFDD can be particularly helpful to Psychological Operations forces in planning the sequence of deployment. It ensures the right type and number of forces are available for each phase, so transportation requirements can be planned. After the selection of specific units or capabilities for inclusion, the transmittal of a warning order ensures as much preparation as possible.

5-75. Notional TPFDD may be used during planning, but it may not have execution-sourced units. When there are execution-sourced force requirements, planners populate the TPFDD with specific unit and movement data for execution. In addition, planners document any sustainment requirements that require movement so they can also be included. If the TPFDD is notional, commanders continue to provide updated guidance to planners about deployment and redeployment priorities.

5-76. Planners continually incorporate any updated information into a refined TPFDD. Upon development and acceptance of the TPFDD by the commander, the staff completes the plan or order documentation and coordinates joint planning and execution community access as appropriate. A TPFDD is not discarded if it is no longer currently usable (or was done for specific plans). Instead, it remains available to the joint planning and execution community for retrieval and review through the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

Interorganizational Activities

5-77. There are unique funding requirements when Psychological Operations units conduct interorganizational activities. Psychological Operations staff planners coordinate with American embassies prior to deployment to determine the costs of the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services and payment to the embassy for services rendered. According to the Department of State, the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services is a customer-driven, voluntary interagency mechanism for managing and funding administrative support services abroad. These services include the use of the embassy motor pool and vehicle maintenance; cashiering; copying and processing contracts; military interdepartmental purchase requests; and internet, phone, and fax usage to determine estimated charges.

5-78. However, all interorganizational activities do not utilize the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services system. The planner accounts for these expenses when forecasting the budget for long-term operations. During missions requiring Psychological Operations units to operate with other DOD services and agencies (and when there is not an Army Service component command in the operational area), planners organize support relationships during the initial planning stages and during development of the terms of reference. This establishes who is responsible for providing the necessary support during operations and support to the combatant commander.

Personnel Services

5-79. Personnel services are those sustainment functions related to the welfare, readiness, and quality of life of Soldiers. The gaining unit provides personnel services to attached Psychological Operations units. These services are human resource support, legal support, and religious support. Commanders and Psychological Operations planners and unit leaders must understand the command relationship with Psychological Operations units and other supporting relationships to ensure Psychological Operations force integration into systems and processes.

Health Service Support

5-80. Health service support falls under the sustainment warfighting function and pertains to the medical support and services performed to treat, conserve, and restore the behavioral and physical well-being of Service members to enable a medically ready force, treat illness and injuries, and return the force to duty. The health service support mission consists of medical treatment, hospitalization, medical evacuation, and medical logistics.

5-81. The Army Health System mission consists of health service support and force health protection. The treatment and medical evacuation of patients from the battlefield and the required Class VIII supplies, equipment, and services necessary to sustain these operations are part of the health service support mission.

5-82. Force health protection is part of the protection warfighting function. During key leader engagements and face-to-face communication, Psychological Operations Soldiers may have to consume local food and drink. Refusing to dine with a local national may be culturally inappropriate. To avoid cultural alienation and undermining mission success, Soldiers need to make appropriate decisions to mitigate health risks while participating in local customs such as accepting offerings of traditional foods and beverages.

5-83. As part of mission planning, leaders need to coordinate with force health protection personnel to determine what measures are necessary to mitigate health risks while participating in cultural events. While force health personnel fall under the protection warfighting function, sustainment is the means to obtain (re)supply of preventative drugs, chemical compounds, and other measures that may help prevent or mitigate the effect of exposure to pathogens and other health threats.

5-84. Psychological Operations units below the group headquarters lack organic operational public health capabilities and rely on the gaining unit for medical support. In special operations forces support units, preventive medicine personnel perform most of these duties on a limited scale and without the benefit of assigned units. In addition, medical support personnel contribute to analysis by—

- Surveilling the operational environment to identify actual or potential health hazards.
- Recommending mitigation measures.

SECTION II – ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS

5-85. PO Soldiers are both intensive consumers of intelligence and frequent providers of information with potential intelligence value. Intelligence is vital for planning, development, delivery, and assessment. Intelligence supports these activities through fusion analysis and the development of timely, relevant, and directed information applicable to planning. Planning and execution require intelligence about the enemy, adversary, friendly and neutral individuals and groups, and other aspects of the operational environment to accomplish mission objectives. Intelligence enables a shared understanding of the enemy, the operational area, areas of influence, areas of interest, and the effects of each on friendly and threat operations.

5-86. Intelligence also contributes directly to the prediction of probable enemy actions and messages (predictive intelligence). Predictive intelligence enables planners to address adversary countermeasures and assess potential friendly reactions to and consequences of influence efforts.

5-87. Intelligence predictions are estimates or forecasts and there is risk in formulating plans based solely on intelligence assessments. While prediction is inexact and vulnerable to incomplete information, human behavior can be predictable to various degrees. However, free will enables humans to behave outside of anticipated behavior. To compensate, planners utilize intelligence to predict normative behavior and plan for abnormalities. Although imperfect, intelligence provides probable threat courses of action derived from verified or probable threat information capabilities and intent. When applied to the targeting cycle, two of the most important aspects of intelligence are target development and the timely assessment of desired effects. ADP 2-0 provides additional information on intelligence and ATP 2-33.4 provides more information about predictive intelligence.

5-88. *Target intelligence* is intelligence that portrays and locates the components of a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance (JP 3-60). According to ATP 2-33.4, target development involves the systematic analysis of threat forces and operations to determine high-value targets, high-payoff targets, and systems and system components for potential engagement through maneuver, fires, electromagnetic warfare, or information operations (information advantage).

5-89. Intelligence elements and Psychological Operations units frequently focus on the same individuals and groups—albeit for different reasons and purposes. Intelligence and PO Soldiers coordinate to obtain information about the motivation and cultural values of selected individuals and groups. In addition, PO Soldiers routinely develop detailed analyses of the psychological and cultural attributes of friendly and hostile elements in areas of operation. These analyses increase understanding of target or TA attitudes, values, and beliefs. Concurrently, Psychological Operations planners develop collection requirements to determine the effectiveness of the series. The orders process formally tasks intelligence assets to collect indicators once those requirements are included as priority intelligence requirements.

5-90. Intelligence personnel inform planning by obtaining information to aid the understanding of the attitudes, values, beliefs, and behavior of local populations, and by enabling inputs to running estimates. Psychological Operations planners and unit leaders use the information to advise commanders about the psychological effects of friendly force military operations on local populations. Planners may also have access to specific studies available through dedicated links on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System.

INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION

5-91. Information and intelligence are critical to all influence activities. Psychological Operations planners and intelligence personnel collect, analyze, evaluate, and assess information to produce and disseminate intelligence products that are crucial for developing and revising plans and programs. Information facilitates thorough analysis of potential targets and TAs for developing actions and messages designed to achieve effects.

OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

5-92. DODD 3115.18 notes that DOD personnel, "…may access, obtain, and use PAI [publicly available information] to plan, inform, enable, execute, and support the full spectrum of DOD missions." Intelligence personnel leverage publicly available information by conducting open-source intelligence.

5-93. According to Public Law 109-163, open-source intelligence is "… intelligence that is produced from publicly available information and is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement." As a single-source collection discipline, timely, accurate, and relevant collection and dissemination of publicly available information is essential to ensure open-source intelligence is expedient, effective, and usable for end users like Psychological Operations units. To ensure widest possible dissemination, open-source intelligence typically remains at the unclassified level; however, there are several risk tiers as depicted in figure 5-2, page 82.

5-94. Prior to conducting open-source intelligence, intelligence personnel leverage publicly available information by conducting publicly available information research. Army intelligence personnel may conduct publicly available information research for general intelligence activities; however, accessing publicly available information via the internet can pose risk to force and mission. To mitigate risk while conducting publicly available information research, intelligence personnel limit activities to managed attribution tier 0 sources and websites. Managed attribution tier 0 sites pose a low risk to mission and force. Managed attribution is an operations security mitigation strategy employed based on an assessed level or risk as depicted in figure 5-2, page 82.




Figure 5-2. Open-source intelligence risk tiers

5-95. Among the many advantages open-source intelligence provides, the most relevant to influence activities are—

- A persistent information collection capability.
- Situational awareness and an understanding of the operational environment.
- Indicators to direct deeper research.
- Situational awareness of dynamic operational environments.
- An abundance of real-time data and information to exploit and analyze.
- Information that can be shared more easily with foreign partners than other intelligence disciplines.

5-96. Open-source intelligence complements, supports, and enables TAA through the collection, processing, management, and provision of finished intelligence products to examine TAs, conditions in the operational environment, and other factors that create and sustain behaviors.

5-97. Another way that open-source intelligence complements TAA is that both pull information from mass media, public data from government and community resources, academic and scientific literature, and subject-matter expert literature. Since intelligence and TAA access and use many of the same sources, this provides a means to analyze the source material from two different perspectives for better, more thorough analysis, and potentially help verify the accuracy of the information for both.

5-98. In other cases, Psychological Operations elements that collect and analyze information provide information to the intelligence community of potential intelligence value. In any case, open-source intelligence helps answer questions that are particularly relevant to influence activities like—

- Population sentiment and trending behaviors.
- Populace-reported observations of local events and significant activities.
- Information on high-value targets.
- Weather reports, seasonal effects, and terrain analysis.

5-99. While intelligence units support Psychological Operations units through the dissemination of open-source intelligence, PO Soldiers access and use publicly available information to develop a focused request for information or essential information nested within the commander's priority intelligence requirements. Open-source intelligence collectors can then employ specialized tools and tradecraft to safely access publicly available information in support of those requirements.

5-100. Certified open-source intelligence professionals can collect information from publicly available information to support influence efforts. Intelligence personnel must first be certified to conduct open-source intelligence collection by graduating from either the Army's Open-Source Intelligence Basic Course or at the Special Operations Command's Network Exploitation Research and Discovery Course. There are additional courses available from the Army Open-source Intelligence Office and the United States Army Special Operations Command G-2 that intelligence professionals can attend to refine their craft as open-source intelligence collectors. However, none of these courses certify intelligence professionals to conduct open-source intelligence activities. For more information on publicly available information and open-source intelligence, refer to ATP 2-22.9-1.

INFORMATION

5-101. Information is a vital resource PO Soldiers use in simultaneous and coordinated activities. Information that provides insights on the factors of time, history, geography and terrain, culture, and current and future conditions facilitates the commander's decision-making process. In isolation, information may only be data that consists of facts about the operational environment.

5-102. Commanders and their staffs require continuous situational awareness and situational understanding, including that of the information environment. Planners identify information gaps and list them as information requirements which the commander may identify as CCIRs. The information collection plan brings to bear all assets capable of answering these requirements. Psychological Operations units routinely gather information that answers the CCIRs. This information drives intelligence production that allows commanders to determine the course of action that best supports mission accomplishment.

COMMANDER'S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

5-103. During mission analysis, the commander and staff identify information gaps that affect planning and decision-making. They then develop information requirements to fill those gaps. Some information requirements may be critical to timely decision-making and contribute significantly to the successful planning and execution of military operations. The staff nominates these information requirements to the commander to become a CCIR.

5-104. CCIRs limit the information reported to commanders to only what is crucial to decision-making and what is needed to determine courses of action. After the commander selects a course of action, the CCIRs refocus on the information necessary for making decisions during preparation and execution. The commander and staff limit the number of CCIRs (to ten or fewer) to better focus overall efforts and avoid overwhelming limited collection assets. However, the CCIR list is fluid, as commanders add and delete requirements to focus on information necessary for specific decisions throughout the phases of an operation. During planning, warning orders establish CCIRs. During preparation and execution, fragmentary orders disseminate any CCIR changes. See ADP 5-0 for additional information on CCIRs.

5-105. Psychological Operations units use various methods to collect required information. A key method is direct interaction with local populations. The information gathered from these interactions can go to military intelligence personnel who compare the information with classified sources and analyze the information to determine applicability to the commander's priority intelligence requirements. The information also goes to Psychological Operations planners and unit leaders who leverage it for operational planning and targeting.

Relevant and timely information increases situational awareness and improves decision-making for the entire force. This collection and analysis provide planners and unit leaders with the necessary knowledge to act as informed advisors to the commander and staff on the psychological effects of planned operations, risk mitigation measures, and possible unintended consequences.

5-106. As advisors to U.S. commanders and other USG representatives, Psychological Operations leaders provide key information about how military operations affect and are affected by populations in an area of operations. This counsel assists commanders during planning and execution to—

- Address civil considerations within the area of responsibility.
- Support freedom of movement and freedom of maneuver for the U.S. and unified action partners.
- Increase local support for USG activities and policy objectives.
- Assess possible impacts of planned missions or activities on the physical, human, and information dimensions.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

5-107. Theater operation plans, operation orders, campaign plans, and information and intelligence portions of plans and orders contain specific intelligence requirements. Planners ensure these requirements are validated and incorporated into the commander's collection plan. See ADP 2-0 and ATP 2-01 for more information on intelligence requirements.

5-108. Intelligence requirements are consistent with the operational variable categories of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). These are the same categories used for area studies and intelligence preparation of the operational environment products. These categories provide a framework for Soldiers to identify significant characteristics of the operational environment and understand the combined effects of those characteristics on planned operations. Table C-1, pages 85 and 86, aligns relevant influence factors with PMESII-PT.

Table 5-2. Influence factors and operational variables

	People	Organizations	Conditions	Events
Political	Party Leaders Royalty Political Appointees Security Officials Opposition Leaders Civil Servants	Political Parties Courts Departments Ministries Agencies Bureaus Intergovernmental Organizations Nongovernmental Organizations Alliances Prominent Families Local Councils	Legislative Paralysis Corruption Tradition of (in)stability Strength of Leadership Tyranny or Oppression National Debt or Defecits Rule of Law Religious Law Secular Law Status of Freedoms Loss of Central Control Military Coup Violence between Factions Free and Fair Elections	Rallies, Protests, and Riots Official Parades Debates Elections Influence Efforts to Sway Inauguration Resignation Assassination Succession Coronation Meetings Trials
Military	Officers Noncommissioned Officers Opposition Leaders Defense Civilians Contractors	Veteran groups Paramilitaries Militias Multinational Organizations Contractor Companies	Defense Cuts Recruitment Shortfalls Inadequate Staffing Sustainment Inefficiency Obsolete Equipment Graft or Corruption Subservice to Civilian Control Infighting Service Rivalry Discriminatory Practices Level of Morale Nepotism Preferential Treatment Process Disruption Loss of Control over Forces Volunteer Force versus Draft	Leadership Crisis Attacks or Hostilities Deaths Deployments Supply Disruptions Discharges Enlistment Drives Trainings Retirements Parades Ceasefires Exercises
Economic	Banking and Finance Leaders Business Owners Union Officials Cooperative Leaders Shipping Owners Mining Foreign Investors Property Owners Money Lenders	Commerce Exchanges or Trading Labor or Trade Unions Cooperatives Bank Employees Maritime Workers Agricultural Organizations Industrial Organizations Service Organizations Class-based Organizations Distributors Miners Commercial Transportation Guilds	Status of Banking Services Financial Crisis Material Shortages Labor Shortages Unemployment Deflation/Inflation/Stagflation Lack of Capital Interest Rates Foreign Investment Debt Levels Single versus Diversified Crop Disruptive Technologies Economy of Scale Foreign Trade Balance Service versus Production Base Modernization Level	Planting Harvest Pay Days Tax Day Market or Bazaar Days Changes to Economic Policies Budget Passage Debt Default Distribution or Confiscation Rationining Project Completion Strikes
Social	Religious Leaders or Clergy Academics Students Gang Leaders Key Leaders	Religious Organizations Racial and Ethnic Organizations Tribal Organizations Clans Gangs Clubs Majority Organizations Underrepresented Organizations	Religious Tensions Racial and Ethnic Tensions Gang Warfare Majority Relations with Others Unrest in Underrrepresented Groups Assimilation Norms Immigration Emigration Individual versus Group Focus	Festivals Commemorations Film Premiers Funerals Vacations Holidays Holy Days Weddings Births Project Starts

	People	Organizations	Conditions	Events
Information	Media Owners Spokespersons Teachers Media Personalities Journalists Writers or Authors Academics Information Users Influencers	Media or News Networks Writers' Unions or Groups Advocacy Groups School Systems	Central versus Decentral Control Freedom of Expression Censorship Government or Media Relations Spotty Coverage or Dead Zones Foreign or External Influence Education Levels and Quality Scale and Scope of Media Diversity of Sources or Content	Media Reach Expansion Scandals Cyber Attacks Communication Outages Rumor Generation or Spread Graffiti Information Dissemination Publishing Opening/Closing Media Outlets
Infrastructure	Transportation Owners System and Facility Managers Facility Maintenance Workers Construction Workers Power Generation Employees Railway Employees Equipment Installers Engineers	Medical Organizations Law Enforcement Organizations Railroads Airlines Shipping Organizations Transportation Organizations Utilities Transmission Facilities Construction Firms	New versus Outdated State of Repair or Maintenance State versus Private Ownership Vulnerability to Attack Accidents	Service Outages or Disruptions Construction Capability or Capacity Changes Facility Destruction Fuel Shortages Materiel Shortages Congestion /Accidents Strikes
Physical Environment	National Leaders Regional Leaders Local Leaders	Rural versus Urban Organizations	Drought versus Irrigated Seismic Activity Levels Coastal versus Interior Maritime Mountain Valley Temperate versus Tropical Dry or Desert	Weather Effects Natural Disasters Water or Land Resources Disease Outbreak
Time	First Responders Affected Populations Essential Personnel	Rapid Response Security Units Emergecy Services Rapid Reaction Forces Early Warning Units Relief Groups Intelligence Organizations	Speed or Level of Response Population Cooperation Repair Times Preparation for Contingencies Staging of Materiel Ability to Monitor ot Predict	Mass Casualties Response to Sudden Threats Disaster Response Response Training Exercises Practice Drills

Table 5-2. Influence factors and operational variables (continued)

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

5-109. *Intelligence preparation of the operational environment* is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations (FM 2-0). Planners, and the intelligence staff in coordination with the supported unit staff, conduct intelligence preparation of the operational environment to avoid incongruent analysis.

5-110. The intelligence staff uses established intelligence channels to obtain information required to analyze, plan, develop, execute (or deliver), and assess the effectiveness of influence efforts. Planners contribute to this process by providing characteristics of the physical areas and factors of the operational environment that affect the ability of local nationals to receive information and be influenced.

5-111. Information and intelligence obtained from historical facts and biographical data are placed under the major categories of PMESII-PT for intelligence preparation of the operational environment products. The following subheadings detail relevant intelligence preparation of the operational environment products.

Psychological Characteristics Overlay

5-112. During intelligence preparation of the operational environment, Psychological Operations planners evaluate the combined effects of significant characteristics of the operational environment. These characteristics are graphically displayed in the form of a characteristics overlay to enhance the commander's visualization. The characteristics overlay provides cause-and-effect analysis within the context of the physical and social surroundings.

Center of Gravity Analysis

5-113. Center of gravity analysis is a method that links a threat's center of gravity (a military force, organization, or other entity's source of power to act) to critical requirements and associated vulnerabilities. The Psychological Operations staff planner and intelligence staff analyze the threat from a systems perspective using information (PMESII-PT) from area studies and intelligence preparation of the operational environment products. For the planner, threat center of gravity analysis serves to identify exploitable aspects of the threat. While the intelligence staff (G-2 or S-2) of the supported unit is responsible for conducting threat center of gravity analysis, the assigned Psychological Operations planner and supporting Psychological Operations units assist in the process. ATP 2-01.3 provides additional information on center of gravity analysis.

Adversary Information Situation Template

5-114. The unit intelligence staff determines possible threat courses of action and displays this information on a situation template—a graphic depiction of expected threat force dispositions for a specific course of action. Like any other relevant threat information, the situation template of the G-2 or S-2 depicts adversary information activities.

5-115. As required, the Psychological Operations planner and unit G-2 or S-2 produce a separate adversary information situation template to provide clarity for the commander and staff. The adversary information situation template depicts where, when, and why the threat will conduct activities. The adversary information situation template is developed to support the selected threat courses of the G-2 or S-2 and considers likely adversary information objectives, the location of primary information assets, and a prediction of when in the operation those assets will be employed. The Psychological Operations planner provides input to the information advantage officer who then develops an overall concept and supporting objectives for adversary information activities for each course of action that the G-2 or S-2 develops. These concepts and objectives are integrated into the products of the G-2 or S-2.

5-116. In planning, the Psychological Operations contribution to intelligence preparation of the operational environment and an effects assessment are inherently linked. From the influence perspective, the intelligence preparation of the operational environment is an initial assessment of characteristics and behaviors and likely indicators of those behaviors. Effects assessment relies on quantitative assessment of indicators to provide qualitative effects assessment. The same indicators that planners use to identify and assess current behaviors aid trend analysis to determine any movement toward or away from the applicable objectives. The indicators must be—

- **Relevant.** Indicators are relevant to the mission parameters.
- **Measurable.** The indicators produce metrics that can be used to identify measurable changes.
- **Responsive.** The indicator, once assessed as changing, generates a response from the commander to increase, decrease, sustain, or shift the efforts to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.
- **Resourced.** This indicates a command commitment to assign sensors and assess the indicators.

OTHER ANALYSES OF OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

5-117. This section describes analytical approaches that can be used prior to or in conjunction with traditional operational environment analyses to provide commanders an understanding of who are the actors in the environment. This understanding facilitates decision-making, focuses analytical effort, and applies operational art.

Note: This section does not provide details about this task in terms of the physical areas and factors, the information environment, and systems; or their traditional analytical processes (such as using operational variables, mission variables, and civil considerations). JP 2-0, JP 3-0, JP 3-57, JP 5-0, FM 2-0, ATP 2-01.3, and ATP 2-33.4 cover these analyses.

Note: Civil considerations are areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE).

5-118. At the theater strategic through tactical levels, intelligence staffs use their analyses of the operational variables (PMESII-PT), mission variables (METT-TC[I]), and civil considerations (ASCOPE) to assess their operational environment. The proliferation of information- and internet-based technologies have expanded knowledge and awareness of local, national, regional, and global events. This provides people the ability to project their own information beyond local boundaries to reach global audiences.

5-119. One result of this information revolution is the exponential increase in the number of potentially relevant actors that a commander must be aware of and understand. Commanders consult their staffs to determine the actors in their operational environment; and staffs now have larger and more disparate groups of actors. This holds true whether a unit is planning for cooperation activities or armed conflict.

Issues, Goals, Influence, Vulnerabilities, and Opportunities

5-120. The analytical method that uses issues, goals, influence, vulnerabilities, and opportunities (IGIVO) has been applied in many environments and proven valuable in helping staffs identify and inform commanders on what and who are important and why. IGIVO is applicable from combatant commander to tactical commander and allows them to provide informed direction for further staff focus and analysis. Therefore, the results of IGIVO analyses help focus operational efforts to achieve assigned objectives.

5-121. Analysts assess each component of IGIVO from the actor's perspective (not the perspective of the staff) as explained in the following paragraphs. The actors could be countries, populations, human networks, government elements, or sub-groups in a village.

5-122. Issues are what the party perceives to be a problem, grievance, or need. An example of an issue is a town whose commercially supplied water source is tainted. Another example is a national government that is experiencing domestic terrorism, and which notices an increase in extremism.

5-123. Goals are the ends the party wants to achieve. Goals are enduring end states. They are not the near-mid-, or long-term objectives of the party. Using the tainted water example, the goal of the townspeople is to have a safe, dependable, and attainable water source. Using the national government example, a goal may be to maintain a safe, secure, united, and governed environment.

5-124. Influence, in this context, is the capacity or power of persons or things to be a compelling force on or produce effects on the actions, behavior, opinions, and so on of others. In the tainted water issue, the townspeople may think they have no capacity for influence, or they may think they can create influence through nonviolent rallies and by creating awareness through social media. The water company may believe its greatest influence on the situation is by being transparent in their actions and acknowledging the source of the problem. The state government may understand its influence comes from the ability to apply legal action against the water company while providing purification assistance to the company and externally sourced clean water for the townspeople.

5-125. Vulnerabilities are fluid. Vulnerabilities are how the party perceives they are capable of being hurt, or susceptible to being hurt (physically, morally, or via criticism), or a blow to their efforts. The townspeople in the tainted water situation may perceive that their vulnerability is having a single, commercially supplied water source. The national government dealing with domestic terrorism and growing internal extremism may assess their greatest vulnerability as the perceptions of other governments that they are not taking human rights seriously and are at risk of losing economic ties, security assistance, and humanitarian aid.

5-126. Opportunities are situations, conditions, or prospects that the party perceives as favorable for attainment or advancement toward a goal. The commercial water company may perceive this as an opportunity to receive state and federal aid to upgrade their infrastructure with little to no immediate internal financial commitment. This perceived opportunity increases their perception that they are on the side of the public by providing a safe, dependable, and attainable water source. In the domestic terrorism and extremism situation, anti-government groups may perceive that their greatest opportunity is through nonviolent resistance. Therefore, increasing visibility on what they perceive is a failure by the government to abide by most of the values of the public and positioning themselves in the perception of public as a potential legitimate governing party.

5-127. By providing the IGIVO components as perceived by each party, the intelligence staff provides the commander with the situational awareness and knowledge to make informed decisions. The commander can

then focus the staff's efforts and begin or continue operational design. After receiving guidance on where to focus, the intelligence staff can increase the depth of their IGIVO analysis on the priority parties and/or begin analyses of the operational variables, mission variables, and civil considerations.

Irregular Warfare Strategic Estimate

5-128. The USG conducts war with a combination of conventional and irregular warfare. From a DOD perspective, any operation outside of declared legal state of war is conducted under the umbrella of irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is also the predominant form of warfare used by actors who suffer asymmetric capabilities in relation to their opposition (most commonly a nation state). State-based competition tends to be irregular. According to *Crafting Strategy for Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Analysis and Action*, this "blend[s] separate instruments of power to offset military weakness, weaponize[s] narratives to ease strategic progress, and exploit[s] social and political contradictions to undermine and divide target societies." While doctrine identifies this as irregular warfare, within this last decade, this blending has been described as "hybrid war" or "the gray zone." The problem, roots, frame and narrative, threat strategy, and present response (PRFNTP) framework was developed to analyze this strategic-level use of irregular warfare.

5-129. An irregular warfare strategic estimate framework consisting of PRFNTP (figure 5-3), while threat-based, can be used to provide insights into the environment. This framework is also useful because the nature of most irregular warfare is international, transregional, or global. In addition, this framework may be adapted to examine actors that are not threats. In such cases, using IGIVO analysis along with the strategic estimate framework analysis may be a best practice.

5-130. The irregular warfare strategic estimate introduces the framework to cultivate familiarity and create opportunities for further training and education on the topic. Each component impacts the others, and the overlapping components depicted in the figure highlight their interrelated nature.

5-131. This framework does not provide an end state, but it does provide a foundation to begin planning a suitable response. Through the thorough analysis of each component, analysts can generate a precise and prioritized problem statement and develop a justifiable approach.




Figure 5-3. Strategic estimate framework for irregular warfare

5-132. The roots of any conflict are seeded in the history of the environment. This history can go back a decade or even thousands of years. While it may seem obvious, the word root is not used lightly. A grievance or core grievance and a root problem are not synonymous. For example, a core grievance of a movement could be high unemployment rates for a sector of society. However, the cause of that grievance may be lack of representation at local, regional, and national levels. As the analysts dig further, they realize that historically the sect of society once primarily consisted of enslaved people, then indentured servants, who were subsequently allowed to benefit from basic rights, but this progress was always accompanied by systemic, cultural discrimination—the root cause.

5-133. There can be many grievances accompanying the several causes. When it comes to root causes, PO Soldiers and intelligence professionals assigned to or supporting Psychological Operations units find that the root causes (underlying causes) of violence universally fall into the following categories:

- Economic deprivation.
- Poor governance.
- Lack of government legitimacy.
- Marginalization or persecution of identity groups.
- History of conflict in the country or conflict in nearby countries.
- Demographic youth bulge.
- Exploitable primary commodity resources.
- Type of terrain.

5-134. While these categories are root causes of violence, this does not mean that the area of operations is currently in a state of violent conflict; although, it may be headed that way. When people think they do not have another viable recourse, are deeply emotional, or are spurred by the actions of others, they will turn to violence.

5-135. The analyst determines which root causes are being used by the threat to mobilize support and whether those root causes are effective (on specific audiences). After identifying the root causes that fuel the movement, the analyst identifies which root causes, if resolved, will begin the process of reconciliation, and prevent future conflict. Part of determining the effectiveness of root causes comes from the analysis of the frame and narrative(s) used.

5-136. In addressing frames and narratives, it is important to understand the impact of information technologies on societies and how actors exploit these technologies to create desired impacts. The use of information technologies to disseminate tailored content has created symmetry between adversaries despite the existence of asymmetric capabilities in diplomatic, economic, and military areas.

5-137. The wielding of information for effect by other nations and foreign relevant actors is called many different things. U.S. doctrine categorizes all these efforts as information warfare, but the term remains undefined, and this use of undefined jargon may cloud analysis. Others use descriptors like cognitive warfare, psychological warfare, political warfare, propaganda, influence warfare, and cyber warfare. In the context of this strategic analysis, frames and narratives are disseminated and amplified through information technologies as just another capability in irregular warfare. The desired effects include:

- Building legitimacy.
- Eroding the legitimacy of the other.
- Constraining options available to the competitor.
- Favorably tilting the balance of strategic power.

5-138. A frame focuses attention on the proposed reality or paradigm, excluding other perceptions of reality or paradigms. The frame is made up of three parts: diagnostic, motivational, and prognostic and each part may be called a frame or a means of framing.

5-139. The diagnostic serves as the hook. It is designed to catch attention and explain (from the perspective of the actor) what is wrong and who is responsible. The hook primes the target for a proposed solution (action) by using grievances and root causes. However, not all TAs are called to action; they may provide moral support but will not act without proper motivation.

5-140. Motivational framing provides the justification of personal risk for the good of the collective group. Motivational framing motivates people into action by:

- Pitching the in-group against an out-group.
- Presenting sacrifice, injury, and struggle as a means to obtain future redemption, hope, and peace.
- Providing mechanisms for group radicalization (such as isolation, threat, splitting, competition, hate, martyrdom).
- Espousing ideology.

5-141. Effective motivation has depth and elicits strong emotions. Motivation is also used beyond the grass roots level. Nation states use motivational framing to prompt individuals to action and justify violence and sacrifice for the greater good. Both authoritarian and democratic states have histories of motivational framing. One effective example is the motivations used by opposing sides in World War I and World War II. In contrast, USG motivation for the Vietnam conflict did not resonate as broadly to its population and other nations.

5-142. Diagnostic and motivational framing are combined with prognostic framing, which provides the solution. The solution describes the path that leads from misery to the desired end state by presenting that path as just, correct, necessary, and urgent.

5-143. Threat strategy can be conceptualized using ends, ways and means.

5-144. Describing and understanding the strategy employed by the threat must include more than a list of activities or use of overarching terms. Analysts must determine the desired objectives of the threat, its selected course(s) of action, how that course of action is being employed and, most meaningfully, answer why for each of those. Publicly stated objectives may not always be the true objectives of a movement; they may only serve to mobilize support. The analysts' foremost consideration should be determining what the movement leaders want.

5-145. Analysts must determine what the threat is doing, why that tactic was selected and how it is being used. Whereas in traditional warfare lines of operation are what analysts seek to determine; in irregular warfare, lines of effort are most often the key to unlocking why a particular course of action is selected. Baseline questions for the analyst to answer include:

- How does armed conflict or violent methods support political objectives?
- What nonviolent methods of resistance are being used?
- How do those nonviolent methods support political objectives and violent methods?
- What is being done politically?
- What local, regional, national, and transregional alliances are being developed and exploited?
- Which populations does the threat seek to mobilize and how are those populations prioritized?
- What supporting networks (logistics, medical, communication) are used to provide physical support to the movement?

5-146. The means used by the movement can be equated to the resources required to implement the selected course of action(s) (ways) to achieve its objectives (end).

5-147. The definition of irregular warfare provides a direction to begin that center of gravity analysis. The phrase, 'legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)', may steer analysts and planners to presume the population must be the center of gravity. However, this response will never be sufficient. Identifying which part of the population is indispensable to the movement moves analysts closer to an accurate answer.

5-148. Moreover, analysts should avoid presumption. Presumption is not synonymous with predictive intelligence. Legitimacy—as perceived by many different audiences—may be the heart of the movement's strategy. Thorough center of gravity analysis is required to determine the true means needed by the threat.

5-149. The framework for this strategic estimate began by determining the roots of the problem which required analysis of the historical and present roles of all relevant actors. Then, it focused on the narrative and the threat strategy. Now, the framework turns to the government—the adversary of the threat—to determine what is being done to bring an end to the conflict.

5-150. In this irregular warfare scenario, special operations forces are allied with the host nation government and its security forces to resolve the conflict. These friendly agencies and forces are a natural resource to:

- The current strategy.
- The actions being executed.
- The degree of success of those actions.
- Why a change is required to address the roots of the problem.

5-151. Just as analysts must identify internal biases to apply critical thinking, they must be aware of potential biases that the host nation may have inadvertently applied during their own analyses. Thus, they take everything the host nation provides at face value and confirm the findings by conducting their own analysis.

5-152. Analysis of the present government response begins with determining how it views the problem and what it identifies as its duty or purpose to respond to it. Then, analysts can begin to unravel the strategy itself. An important aspect of this is determining how the host nation defines success and how it expects to reach success. Applying this context to analyses provides a more thorough product than a simple list of programs, efforts, and actions. Applying this context also helps define the logic and approach of the strategy to achieve the nation's objectives.

5-153. The final step in analyzing the present government response is a critical assessment of the response. This provides a final product—the strategic estimate—that benefits and improves the current government response. Some questions that may be asked to help steer analytical assessment include:

- Is the host nation's perception of the conflict accurate?
- Is the host nation aware of the root causes of the conflict?
- Is the host nation's estimate of the potential effects of threat success accurate?
- Does the host nation have an accurate understanding of how each relevant actor perceives its legitimacy?
- Does the current strategy only address symptoms, or does it address the root problem as well?
- What has the host nation determined as its center of gravity?
- Is the host nation exploiting the critical vulnerability of the center of gravity?

- Is the host nation protecting the center of gravity as its own critical vulnerability?
- If progress towards achieving objectives is not apparent, why is progress not being achieved?

5-154. After conducting the steps of strategic analysis, analysts help provide a concise problem statement. The problem statement is the final product of the strategic estimate and completes the understanding required to develop a strategic response to assist the host nation. The problem statement describes:

- The issue that drives the conflict.
- The nature of the adversary and its strategy.
- The primary reasons why it is challenging to counter.

Operational Variable Analysis

5-155. The operational variables facilitate a systems approach to analysis. The development of a systems perspective should be founded on the identification and analysis of all mission-relevant characteristics of the adversary and the PMESII-PT systems of other actors. Because the relevance of PMESII-PT factors and characteristics depends upon the specific situation associated with each mission, there can be no definitive listing of all characteristics appropriate under all circumstances. However, IGIVO can help focus operational variable analysis by establishing priorities for analytical efforts. Together, IGIVO and operational variable analysis can help differentiate relevant actors from the greater pool of actors in the environment.

5-156. In addition, analysts will likely see a shift in types of relevant actors depending on whether the environment is permissive, uncertain, or hostile and the type of mission. A humanitarian aid mission in an uncertain environment may have relevant actors ranging from nongovernmental organizations, government organizations, adversaries, and geographically specific population groups. During armed conflict, analysts may have adversaries, threats, partner nation military forces, and governments constituting many of the relevant actors. However, as the conflict approaches resolution, it is more likely that relevant actors will include population groups, local and regional governments, nongovernmental organizations, and non-military governmental organizations.

Intelligence Estimates

5-157. Intelligence estimates provide forecasts for potential situation developments and implications for planning and execution. Predictive intelligence goes beyond descriptions of the capabilities of the adversary or the reporting of enemy activity. Predictive intelligence tries to forecast unknown factors based on an analysis of known facts using techniques such as pattern analysis, inference, and statistical probability. Planners use predictive intelligence to forecast potential threat information activities, advise on their potential effects, and recommend methods for mitigating or countering them.

5-158. This information allows the commander and staff to develop specific plans and consider development of branch and sequel plans. ADP 2-0 provides additional information on intelligence and ATP 2-33.4 provides additional information on intelligence estimates.

CATEGORIES OF ADVERSARY INFORMATION

5-159. Adversary information describes the messages and activities an adversary or enemy uses in peacetime and wartime to undermine the legitimacy of U.S. operations and the credibility of the force. Previously, the term propaganda described all forms of adversary information. The evolution of media forms and capabilities has made the term propaganda too limited. To better clarify the use and application of adversary information, adversary information is divided into four categories detailed in the following paragraphs.

Information for Effect

5-160. *Information for effect* is the use, publication, or broadcast of factual information to negatively affect perceptions and/or damage credibility and capability of the targeted group (ADP 3-13). Examples of uses of information for effect include—

- The premature announcement of collateral damage caused by friendly forces.
- Release of information out of context.
- Reporting or images of the results of insurgent attacks on friendly forces.
- Release of captured sensitive or classified information.

MISINFORMATION

5-161. *Misinformation* is unintentional incorrect information from any source (ADP 3-13). In an influence context, misinformation is simply incorrect information disseminated due to ignorance of its inaccuracy to solicit a response or interest from a potential recipient, or even for unknown reasons.

DISINFORMATION

5-162. *Disinformation* is incomplete, incorrect, or out of context information deliberately used to influence audiences (ADP 3-13). Disinformation is derived, primarily from adversary intelligence organizations or other covert entities. Disinformation is designed to distort information and deceive or influence U.S. decision makers, U.S. forces and unified action partners via indirect or unconventional means.

PROPAGANDA

5-163. Propaganda is any form of adversary communication—especially of a biased or misleading nature—designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. Disinformation and information for effect are forms of propaganda.

5-164. Adversary information activities may be stand-alone efforts or conducted simultaneously with other activities. Adversary information activities aim to augment psychological effects and amplify the effects of lethal actions. Adversaries disseminate messages to deliberately—

- Undermine the legitimacy of U.S. operations and activities.
- Decrease the credibility of USG narratives, themes, and messages.
- Prevent the achievement of U.S. objectives.

5-165. Face-to-face intimidation, threatening pamphlets, and propaganda broadcasts are some of the ways the adversary engages in influential messaging. When messages fail to elicit a desired effect, the addition of violent activities becomes a more spectacular means of influence. For example, the kidnapping and killing of host-nation troops and the broadcasting of the event suggests to local populations and international audiences the government can neither protect its own soldiers nor provide a secure and stable environment. The potential result is an undermining of popular confidence in the effectiveness of the government and its institutions.

ADVERSARY INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND COUNTERMEASURES

5-166. Psychological Operations planners analyze adversary information (and its effects) and recommend potential countermeasures. Other staff sections or capabilities, such as Public Affairs, typically lead these planning activities. However, Psychological Operations units possess organic analysis and development capabilities that contribute to overall efforts. The following areas reflect the process by which U.S. military personnel determine when, if, and how to address adversary information, collection, processing, and countermeasures: initial adversary information analysis, collection, processing, analysis and effects assessment, and countermeasures.

INITIAL ADVERSARY INFORMATION ANALYSIS

5-167. Prior to military operations, intelligence analysts and Psychological Operations planners conduct adversary information analysis during intelligence preparation of the operational environment to determine potential threat actions and messages. This analysis forecasts where, when, and why the threat will likely execute actions and employ messages against friendly and neutral populations. It also ensures that forces are postured to provide timely support for countermeasures, as necessary.

5-168. During initial adversary information analysis, Psychological Operations planners determine the most likely threat actions and messages and their potential effects on military forces and local populations. The commander receives information requirements for consideration, and the command pairs approved information requirements with collection assets.

COLLECTING ADVERSARY INFORMATION

5-169. Military units collect adversary information when conducting operations. The extraction of information regarding adversary intent may answer the commander's information requirements and facilitate the determination of specific courses of action to use in countering the effects of adversary information activities. The collection of adversary information is divided into captured enemy documents, captured enemy materials, and open-source information as detailed below.

Captured Enemy Documents

5-170. Captured enemy documents are any recorded information relating to the enemy. These include printed materials, photographs, and digital media. Examples may include posters, leaflets, handbills, pamphlets, and video.

Captured Enemy Materials

5-171. Captured enemy materials can include anything of foreign manufacture or items produced by the U.S. or its allies that are found on a detainee. Examples may include video editing systems, print media systems, mobile broadcast systems, and weapons systems or their components.

Publicly Available Information

5-172. Army Dir 2016-37 defines publicly available information as "information that has been published or broadcast for public consumption, is available on request to the public, is accessible online or otherwise to the public, is available to the public by subscription or purchase, could be seen or heard by any casual observer, is made available at a meeting open to the public, or is obtained by visiting any place or attending any event that is open to the public." Some examples of sources of publicly available information include social media, libraries, billboards, traditional news, and publicly facing unindividualized Internet of Things device data.

Open-Source Intelligence Research

5-173. Army Dir 2016-37 defines open-source intelligence research as "activities conducted in the preparation of open-source collection: viewing or accessing publicly available information without copying, saving, or storing the information in an intelligence component database. If information is copied, saved, stored, or otherwise preserved in any manner, it is 'collected' and must be evaluated in accordance with…":

- Public Law 109-163.
- DODM 5240.01.
- AR 381-10.

Open-Source Information

5-174. Open-source information refers information that is publicly available, either intentionally or unintentionally, and that can be obtained from a wide range of sources—

- **Local Media.** During operations, Psychological Operations units monitor and analyze local media to obtain valuable information concerning the types of and accessibility to information outlets, their potential biases, and degree of influence within the operational area.
- **Internet.** Many media outlets maintain an internet-based presence (such as websites, social media sites, and other electronic applications). These outlets post their most recent editions, often in the local language and in other languages.

5-175. The following paragraphs detail other sources of information.

Department of Defense Agencies

5-176. J-2, G-2, and S-2 sections have access to adversary message reporting and analyze open-source documents and captured enemy documents (to include messages). The preeminent organization for adversary message collection and exploitation is the theater Joint Document Exploitation Center. DOD agencies include the—

- Service component intelligence sections (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and Space Force).
- Defense Intelligence Agency.
- Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers.
- National Reconnaissance Office.
- National Security Agency.
- Central Security Service.
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

United States Intelligence Agencies

5-177. Non-DOD agencies provide intelligence not usually found through DOD sources. During interorganizational activities, these agencies may provide the balance of information Psychological Operations forces use. These agencies include the—

- Central Intelligence Agency.
- Department of State.
- Department of Commerce
- Department of Agriculture
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
- Department of Treasury.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- Department of Energy.

Public Affairs

5-178. Public affairs personnel and units frequently review and analyze media reports at the international, national, and local levels. The supported commander often receives the results of these analyses regularly.

International Organizations and Nongovernmental Organizations

5-179. Many of these organizations conduct media-monitoring activities. In certain peacekeeping missions, some of these organizations are chartered with the task of tracking and analyzing media reporting. Frequently, these organizations have expertise in the area and can provide information and analysis.

PROCESSING ADVERSARY INFORMATION

5-180. The rapid exploitation of captured documents and materials is necessary for situational understanding and facilitates the planning of branches and sequels. The requirement to process information quickly makes it necessary to screen and evacuate adversary information at the lowest level. Specific procedures reside in the Intelligence Annex of the operation order and the unit standard operating procedures.

5-181. PO Soldiers screen and process adversary information encountered during their missions. The primary focus is determining the immediate effects of adversary information on TAs and answering the CCIRs. Psychological Operations element leaders report adversary information through intelligence and internal channels. The evacuation of captured documents and materials facilitates the conversion of information into targetable information and supports Psychological Operations forces in their efforts to determine adversary information objectives.

5-182. Documents found in the operational area are forwarded directly to the intelligence section of the supported unit. Analysts in the intelligence section then extract information relevant to the commander's priority intelligence requirements and transmit it to the next-higher echelon through intelligence channels. FM 2-22.3 and ADP 2-0 provide additional information on document and media exploitation and handling procedures.

ANALYSIS AND EFFECTS ASSESSMENT OF ADVERSARY INFORMATION

5-183. Psychological Operations forces analyze adversary and enemy actions and messages to determine adversary information themes, targets, and capabilities. This analysis assists Psychological Operations staff planners in determining adversary information objectives and programs and facilitates the prediction of possible adversary courses of action. Analyzing adversary information programs affords the commander the opportunity to execute actions and deliver messages that preempt, counter, or provide alternative narratives to adversary information efforts or reduce their effectiveness.

5-184. Intelligence organizations and Psychological Operations units conduct analysis of adversary information. Psychological Operations planners and unit leaders assist supported unit intelligence sections to determine the intended effects and objectives of adversary information programs. Analyzing adversary information programs facilitates answering the CCIR, thus improving the ability of the commander to discern adversary intentions and operations.

5-185. Psychological Operations forces conduct two levels of analysis of adversary information: analysis of individual actions and messages and analysis of the adversary information program. To conduct analysis of adversary actions and messages, Psychological Operations forces use the source, content, audience, media, and effect (SCAME) and message, audience, reaction, carrier, origin (MARCO) analysis methods. MARCO is a method for discerning the near-term intended effects of adversary information. The SCAME method is a lengthier, more detailed process used to determine the adversary's information program objectives and capabilities.

COUNTERMEASURES

5-186. Countermeasures include a variety of actions and messages (such as press releases and key leader engagements). Analysis of the intended effect of adversary information efforts is a necessary step before determining if there is a need to counter the effort. However, credible actions and messages (enhanced by the actions of Soldiers on the ground) can preempt the adversary's message and negate the need for countermeasures.

5-187. Psychological Operations forces contribute by supporting countering efforts and by disseminating alternative narratives. In so doing, Psychological Operations forces decrease or mitigate the impact of the adversary's information for effect, misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda through the delivery of timely, factual messages to selected TAs to gain and maintain the initiative.

5-188. Countering the use of adversary and enemy information for effect requires timely actions by commanders to either preempt adversary announcements or provide additional information and context to reduce the impact. Psychological Operations forces provide a proactive capability to the commander for assistance in preempting and countering adversary information activities and developing an acceptable alternative narrative. Psychological Operations staff planners and units anticipate the second and third order effects of misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda and assist in efforts to counter these activities by—

- Assessing the effects of adversary information and actions in coordination with the G-2 or S-2, G-3 or S-3, and Public Affairs and recommending appropriate responses, if necessary.
- Advising the commander on the specific capabilities available to provide timely and viable countermeasures to specific adversary information and activities.
- Predicting and planning for second and third order effects.
- Developing proactive actions and messages based on anticipated reactions.
- Delivering timely and credible messages to affected targets and TAs.
- Monitoring the effects of friendly-force countermeasures and adjusting, as required, to maintain initiative.

COUNTERPROPAGANDA

5-189. When necessary and approved, counterpropaganda is a deliberate effort beyond countermeasures. Psychological Operations analysts and planners reverse engineer the adversary campaign and its components to identify and understand—

- Objectives and supporting objectives.
- Themes.
- Approval processes.
- Dissemination.
- Adversary risk analysis.
- Primary and secondary TAs.
- Funding.
- Authorities.
- Policies.
- Methods.
- Resolve.
- Production and distribution.

5-190. Psychological Operations analysts and planners also recognize where the adversary is not engaging in the information and influence space. Analysts then examine the whole adversary influence system for vulnerabilities. Any found vulnerabilities can enable operations and activities to subvert and undermine adversary influence.

5-191. Intelligence Soldiers collect information on the operational environment, local populations, targets and TAs, and analyze it to produce timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence. Timely intelligence is concerned with the receptivity, vulnerabilities, and actual or potential decisions and actions of TAs and audiences. Intelligence capabilities are useful to assess to what degree behavioral changes are attributable to a given series.

5-192. Planners apply intelligence to plans, operations, execution, action and message development, and assessment of effects. Each command identifies specific intelligence requirements to determine which reconnaissance and surveillance assets collect information and how the information is collected. The command then identifies which intelligence assets produce relevant products. Detailed collection plans with specific requirements apply all available sources and techniques to develop messages and assess their effects. Coordination with intelligence staffs and units to develop a collection plan (with specific information requirements to be prioritized, tasked, processed, exploited, and delivered) is critical to success. Leaders ensure the identification and inclusion of information gaps in collection activities.

5-193. Intelligence support consists of the following types of information:

- Comprehensive information about the social structures of a country or region so that potential targets and TAs can be identified.
- Evaluated facts about conditions in the country or region of operation.
- Exploitable vulnerabilities.
- Messages and media that can be transmitted, received, and understood.
- Accurate data about the effectiveness of influence efforts.
- Observable and measurable data that indicate the series effectiveness.

5-194. Psychological Operations forces require access to various sources of information to conduct research and analysis. Information about history; geography and terrain; culture; and political, economic, social, and military factors are readily available from a variety of open-source resources. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets are required for detailed, verified facts and information unavailable from unclassified sources.

5-195. Intelligence support consists of information and intelligence reports, products, and assessments that help them conduct operations. Psychological Operations forces require timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence to assess changes in decision making and actions. Specific information and intelligence requirements include the following:

- Evaluation of threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.
- Potential adversary actions and messages.
- Psychological aspects (attitudes, values, emotional responses, beliefs, and so on).
- Accessibility of targets and TAs.
- Effectiveness of targets and TAs in accomplishing desired actions.
- Population motivations and current behaviors.
- Indicators of effectiveness.
- Populace reactions to friendly, hostile, and neutral force actions and messages.

5-196. Every Soldier has the potential to provide useful information and contribute to situational understanding through observing and interacting with local populations and exposure to events occurring in the operational environment. This approach increases awareness of unit information requirements and supplements the capabilities of reconnaissance and surveillance assets.

5-197. Soldiers report their observations and any information collected while conducting missions during debriefings. Every Soldier is a sensor who can potentially answer information requirements that Psychological Operations units use to plan, analyze, and conduct assessments. Consequently, reporting of any information collected should include Psychological Operations units to ensure their access. For more on information collection, refer to FM 3-55.

5-198. Soldiers report their observations through their unit intelligence section. These reports increase the depth of and provide context to other information collected. Psychological Operations units integrate the collected information into existing area studies, analysis of targets and TAs, and evaluations. This increases the quantity and quality of detailed and accurate intelligence used to analyze, plan, develop, deliver, and assess actions and messages.

5-199. Close coordination before and during operations with supported units allows the integration of influence-focused information requirements into staff planning and execution. This coordination identifies and allocates assets to collect information (such as Soldiers actively observing for psychological effects, and how to report relevant information on subsequent decisions and actions).

5-200. Psychological Operations units require access to the results of other units' analyses. These analyses are integrated into analytical efforts to drive the influence process, particularly in TAA and planning. ATP 3-55.4 provides additional tactics, techniques, and procedures on tactical information collection.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS ORGANIC INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

5-201. The 389th Military Intelligence Battalion provides multifaceted support to all 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) subordinate units. During planning, Psychological Operations units submit a request for support to the 389th Military Intelligence Battalion to mitigate any unit intelligence capability gaps.

SUPPORTED UNIT ORGANIC CAPABILITIES

5-202. Planners develop information requirements at each level of command. These requirements include the information necessary to shape the operational environment and achieve desired effects. These requirements are not fixed. They change with mission requirements and as planners and intelligence analysts identify threat strengths and susceptibilities. Intelligence support is necessary for TAA and identification of psychological vulnerabilities. Collection efforts are critical when determining loyalties (or associations) and identifying the social, ethnic, religious, political, and economic factors required for analysis to achieve the planned effects.

5-203. Unit all-source intelligence analysts assist the assigned and allocated Psychological Operations units in achieving situational awareness from an influence perspective to achieve the commander's end state. In addition, the intelligence planner works within the commander's intent to provide analysis, satisfy intelligence requirements, and provide a common operational picture of the adversary and operational environment that directly affect the operations of the unit.

GROUP AND BATTALION INTELLIGENCE SECTIONS

5-204. The Psychological Operations unit S-2 is the primary staff officer for all aspects of intelligence. The S-2 plans and coordinates all battalion-level information collection, analysis, and production. The S-2 approves all intelligence products before dissemination, develops and recommends information requirements for commander approval, and maintains the collection plan. For planning support, the S-2 accesses existing databases and available intelligence products to support the mission. These products include those from the theater joint information center; theater special operations command J-2; national, coalition, host-nation, and supported unit resources; and other specialized intelligence capabilities available in the area of responsibility.

5-205. Other responsibilities of the S-2 include ensuring intelligence products are included in intelligence databases and that intelligence efforts are coordinated with other unit and agency intelligence assets. The S-2 identifies, confirms, and coordinates requirements for geospatial information products and services to support planning in task force operations. The S-2 determines requirements for collateral and sensitive compartmented information intelligence communications support and intelligence automated data-processing systems support.

5-206. In addition, the S-2 works with the signal staff (S-6) in planning and coordinating sensitive compartmented information and automated data-processing systems support. The S-2 exercises technical supervision over the battalion intelligence-training program to ensure the program enhances military intelligence career management fields.

NON-ORGANIC INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

5-207. At the national level, intelligence community members (for example, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research) collect and produce intelligence of potential relevance to influence activities and monitor all regions. In addition, the National Military Joint Intelligence Center and the Defense Intelligence Agency provide intelligence reports and products of a broader overarching scope. These agencies have extensive knowledge of potential targets and TAs and have databases and well-established collection frameworks. See ADP 2-0, ATP 2-19.1-1, and DODI O-3607.02 for details regarding intelligence support.

SECTION III – ADDITIONAL SUSTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS

5-208. Psychological Operations units rely on the gaining unit for the necessary logistics, finance, personnel, and health service support to sustain operations. Psychological Operations units employ specialized equipment and have unique funding needs that require continual logistical and monetary support. These requirements differ for each mission and are addressed during planning. Psychological Operations forces also require consistent and timely services and logistics to execute the core tasks and contribute to the overall mission. Consequently, sustainment planning is critical to operation success.

5-209. Because Psychological Operations units lack organic sustainment capabilities, unit leaders participate in preparing documents and deployment orders that clearly state the processes and procedures to sustain the force and to identify the entities that have the appropriate responsibilities. Otherwise, Psychological Operations unit leaders may find themselves without support and run the risk of mission failure.

5-210. Gaining units must plan for the sustainment of attached Psychological Operations units. Failure to do so adversely affects the ability of Psychological Operations forces to operate properly and efficiently, thereby potentially jeopardizing mission success.

5-211. Sustainment planning should occur early to ensure proper integration of Psychological Operations units into the sustainment warfighting function. Defining support relationships in the theater support plan increases mission effectiveness and facilitates integration of assigned or attached Psychological Operations units. Message traffic that requests and authorizes the deployment of forces provides details about sustainment support relationships and funding.

5-212. During planning and request for force development, planners contact United States Army Special Operations Command or United States Army Reserve Command to determine the materiel and service requirements required to sustain the force. Gaining commanders ensure the sustainment element of the gaining unit can provide support with billeting, all classes of supply, development services and supplies, finance, personnel services, and health services.

5-213. Psychological Operations units receive all Army-common logistic support from the gaining unit. They also use specialized equipment not found in the Army supply system. Psychological Operations units coordinate support for branch-specific items through the gaining unit or as specified in the deployment order. This includes information and communication equipment that require logistic and sustainment support which are not common to the Army and other DOD organizations. This also includes different funding sources for operations, direct contracting of host-nation assets, and obtaining resources and support through Department of State contracting capabilities that aid with the planning, development, execution or delivery, and assessment of influence activities.

INTERORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

5-214. There are unique funding requirements when Psychological Operations units conduct interorganizational activities. Psychological Operations staff planners coordinate with American embassies prior to deployment to determine the costs of the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services and payment to the embassy for services rendered. According to the Department of State, the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services is a customer-driven, voluntary interagency mechanism for managing and funding administrative support services abroad. These services include the use of the embassy motor pool and vehicle maintenance; cashiering; copying and processing contracts; military interdepartmental purchase requests; and internet, phone, and fax usage to determine estimated charges.

5-215. However, all interorganizational activities missions do not utilize the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services system. The planner accounts for these expenses when forecasting the budget for long-term operations. During missions requiring Psychological Operations units to operate with other DOD services and agencies (and when there is not an Army Service component command in the operational area), planners organize support relationships during the initial planning stages and during development of the terms of reference. This establishes who is responsible for providing the necessary support during operations and support to the combatant commander.

FINANCE SUPPORT

5-216. Financial management provides support to the Army and its unified action partners through the execution of the two core competencies of finance operations and resource management. Finance operations consist of the functions of disbursing, banking, payment support, accounting, internal controls, and financial data analytics. Resource management consists of the functions of programming, budget formulation, budget distribution, budget execution, accounting, internal controls, and financial data analytics.

HUMAN RESOURCES SUPPORT

5-217. ADP 4-0 states human resources support includes—

- Personnel readiness management.
- Personnel accountability.
- Strength reporting.
- Personnel information management.
- Essential personnel services.
- Postal operations.
- Casualty operations.
- Essential personnel services.
- Army band support.
- Postal operations.
- Reception.
- Replacement.
- Return-to-duty.
- Rest and recuperation, and redeployment operations.
- Morale, welfare, and recreation.
- Human resource planning and staff operations.

5-218. Human resources supports Psychological Operations forces with personnel readiness management, personnel information management, casualty operations, and essential personnel service. Other support functions human resources may provide are postal operations; reception; replacement; return-to-duty; rest and recuperation, and redeployment operations; morale, welfare, and recreation; and human resource planning and staff operations.

ARMY BANDS

5-219. Army bands provide a low-threat opportunity to influence the operational environment and achieve desired effects through culturally responsive music performances. Bands are often sent to perform for foreign populations as an advance party, to set the conditions for relationship building and communication, and to counter misinformation. These performances enable bands to support Psychological Operations units in influence activities, such as key leader engagements and Soldier and leader engagements in an area of operations. ATP 1-19 provides more information about Army bands.

LEGAL SUPPORT

5-220. Psychological Operations units consult legal support when planning and executing operations. These consultations may involve the law of war, rules of engagement, lethal and nonlethal targeting, fiscal law, contingency contracting, and military justice. For more information on legal authorities, refer to Appendix A.

RELIGIOUS SUPPORT

5-221. Besides addressing the personal spiritual needs of Soldiers, religious support is relevant to operational planning. The unit ministry team advises the commander and staff on the impact of the faith and practice of indigenous religious groups in the area of operations and provides liaison to indigenous religious leaders. In this function, unit ministry teams provide information on local religious customs, demographics, and other religious data.

OTHER SUSTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS

5-222. Leaders are responsible for protecting their Soldiers against injury or loss resulting from exposure to diseases and environmental and occupational hazards. The following sections address preventive medicine and force health protection considerations.

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

5-223. Psychological Operations units lack organic preventive medicine capabilities and rely on the gaining unit for medical support. In special operations forces support units, preventive medicine personnel perform most of these duties on a limited scale and without the benefit of assigned units. In addition, medical support personnel contribute to analysis by—

- Surveilling the operational environment to identify actual or potential health hazards.
- Recommending mitigation measures.

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

5-224. Psychological Operations units lack organic medical resources and use gaining unit medical services for most requirements. They are heavily dependent on the gaining unit and the Army Service component command for all aspects of force health protection. For operational needs, Soldiers train in Tactical Combat Casualty Care All Service Members, Tier 1 (which includes self-aid and buddy aid) and Tier 2, combat lifesaver skills.

5-225. Health protection requirements for Psychological Operations forces are identical to those of any other deployed force. Personnel require access to medical services and facilities established by the supported unit. Unit leaders request supplies to restock various types of aid kits and combat lifesaver bags through the supported unit in accordance with the command and support relationships and funding guidance. See FM 4-02 for more information about the Army health system.

ADDITIONAL SUSTAINMENT ELEMENTS

5-226. The following paragraphs provide information about additional sustainment considerations and capabilities.

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

5-227. Host-nation support is civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Deployed Psychological Operations units receive support from the Army sustainment enterprise. This may include host-nation commodities that the host nation provides to the Army.

5-228. Psychological Operations elements supporting a U.S. diplomatic mission usually receive host-nation support through the U.S. embassy or consulate to which they are attached. Host-nation support includes every aspect of sustainment based on operational requirements. Unit leaders determine the types and levels of host-nation support required and plan risk mitigation to prevent operational security and mission compromise. Other than sustainment, units may receive information from a host nation or share information with a host-nation government. A bilateral international agreement establishes this information exchange.

FOREIGN-NATION SUPPORT

5-229. Psychological Operations units may utilize foreign-nation support. The distinction between host-nation support and foreign-nation support is that foreign-nation support sustainment derives from a third country, not from U.S. logistics or the country in which the operation is conducted. All aspects of acquiring foreign-nation sustainment are the same as those provided for host-nation support. An example of foreign-nation support is allied military sustainment provided to U.S. Psychological Operations units during a multinational operation abroad.

UNDEVELOPED THEATER SUSTAINMENT

5-230. An undeveloped theater lacks a significant U.S. theater sustainment system. In addition, host-nation support or foreign-nation support is minimal or nonexistent. When Psychological Operations units deploy to

an undeveloped theater, they bring sufficient resources to operate and maintain force protection until the supported unit provides sustainment or coordinates for host-nation or foreign-nation support.

5-231. In accordance with established command and support relationships and funding, units operating in an undeveloped theater request sustainment from the supported unit and coordinate with higher units for resupply that is not Army-common. Units rely on the contracting expertise of the Army Service component command to obtain support and sustainment.

COORDINATION

5-232. Coordination is the foundation for sustainment. Regardless of where sustainment occurs, coordination is the means to integrate unit requirements into any sustainment system. The following sections address some elements for coordination as they relate to Psychological Operations units.

1ST SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)

5-233. 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) monitors ongoing logistic support for assigned or attached Psychological Operations units and provides the initial support from outside the continental United States that may not be available from the gaining command.

5-234. 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) is responsible for providing sustainment support to assigned or attached units in garrison and those that are deployed. For sustainment beyond organic Psychological Operations systems and processes, 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) executes this responsibility through the 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne).

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES UNIT COORDINATION

5-235. When a unit deploys, it coordinates specific support through its next-higher element. The Army Service component commander develops the theater support plan that includes sustainment of forces through theater logistics organizations. The Army Service component command is responsible for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; follow-on support; and sustainment of all in-theater Army forces. The Army Service component commander also provides support to Army forces in intermediate staging bases. The 3rd POB has the responsibility to provide electronic material support for Psychological Operations-specific equipment across components.

5-236. Special operations units are different from other Army units in ways that affect the type of support they require. During logistics planning, the following deployment characteristics dictate special considerations:

- Deploying into isolated and austere locations, making supply distribution vital for operations.
- Requiring extensive and unique contractual requirements and funding.
- Using unique information equipment that requires special operations forces logistical support.

5-237. While operating with special operations units, Psychological Operations unit leaders coordinate for branch-unique items through the special operations liaison element. United States Army Special Operations Command assigns the liaison element to the theater special operations command and attaches it to the operations or logistics (G-3 or G-4) staff of the Army Service component command. As part of that staff, the liaison element coordinates logistics support for all deployed special operations units, including Active Component Psychological Operations units.

THE 528TH SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE (SPECIAL OPERATIONS) (AIRBORNE)

5-238. The 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) plans, coordinates, and (when required) executes sustainment operations for Army special operations forces through its forward-deployed liaison element. At the company level, coordination is primarily through the liaison element. The 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) may also attach logistics liaison officers to higher-level units when its sustainment operations are expected to require complex multi-Service, interagency, and contractual support.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES LIAISON ELEMENT

5-239. The liaison element has a coordination cell with the Army Service component command staff. The liaison element provides special operations staff expertise and coordinates access to the support infrastructure. This element also ensures requirements are included in the support plan and provides the

capability for deployed units to gain access to the theater Army support structures upon arrival in theater. The deploying unit coordinates with the liaison element sustainment section or the 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) support before and during operational deployments.

THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

5-240. The theater special operations command supports theater requirements that the gaining command identifies as special operations forces-specific. The theater special operations command validates the statement of operational requirement and works with the unified command staff, the gaining command, and unit logisticians to request and fill requirements. Deployed units and the gaining command identify support requirements in operation plans and concept plans based on established planning assumptions and the state of requirement. In doing so, the gaining command coordinates the fulfillment of requirements from the support structure in the theater Army by helping to determine logistics support relationships.

5-241. Theater special operations command and unit logisticians coordinate with the gaining command (through the liaison element) to develop plans and subsequent orders that will implement directives. Then, the gaining command issues these plans and orders in support of forces assigned to the unified command. The theater special operations command, in coordination with the unit, advises the gaining commander on the appropriate command and support relationships for each mission. The liaison element informs the sustainment brigade and United States Army Special Operations Command about the status of the plans of the gaining commander.

CONVENTIONAL UNIT COORDINATION

5-242. The theater sustainment command and its subordinate units monitor and provide ongoing sustainment support (that may not be available from the gaining command) to attached Psychological Operations units or to any Army Psychological Operations unit, as directed. The G-4 or S-4 of the gaining unit integrates sustainment personnel from the attached Psychological Operations unit into its support system. This organic sustainment section for the attached Psychological Operations unit includes logistics and maintenance personnel (like Soldiers from 3rd POB and a company headquarters maintenance section) to support unit requirements and service all Army-common and Psychological Operations-unique equipment.

5-243. The G-4 or S-4 of the gaining unit acquires, maintains, and sustains all Army-common materiel and service requirements for units attached to the maneuver commander. At the brigade combat team level, these requirements are identified and coordinated during the planning process and are articulated in the initial operation order. These requirements include services such as medical, maintenance, and recovery.

5-244. Sustainment planners in the gaining and attached units synchronize their efforts to develop a concept of support. Planners need to take into consideration the—

- Number and type of vehicles.
- Number of personnel by specialty.
- Types of weapons systems.
- Mission duration and command relationship established in the deployment orders.
- Availability of support assets from the attached unit.
- Battle damage assessment and repair and recovery of damaged Psychological Operations-unique equipment.
- Purchase and distribution of Psychological Operations-unique supplies and commercial off-the-shelf equipment.
- Replacement of damaged equipment and transportation to the end-user level.
- Pre-positioning of Psychological Operations-unique equipment to address readiness shortfalls caused by equipment that is not mission capable.

SUPPLY

5-245. *Supply* is the procurement, distribution, maintenance while in storage, and salvage of supplies, including the determination of kind and quantity of supplies (JP 4-0). When Psychological Operations units deploy, their organic sustainment sections coordinate with the gaining unit sustainment sections for supplies and services. The report formats and systems specified in the standard operating procedures of the gaining unit help accomplish this coordination. Psychological Operations unit sustainment personnel must be trained and

equipped with systems compatible with those of the gaining unit. The gaining unit is responsible for providing all classes of supply to attached Psychological Operations units. Table 5-1 lists the different supply classes.

Table 5-3. Classes of supply

Class	*Supplies*
I	Subsistence, health, and comfort items (includes rations and water).
II	Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets and kits, hand tools, unclassified maps, administrative and housekeeping supplies, and equipment.
III	Petroleum, fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquids and gases, bulk chemical products, coolants, deicer and antifreeze compounds, components, and additives of petroleum and chemical products, and coal.
IV	Construction materiel, including installed equipment, and all fortification and barrier materiel.
V	Ammunition of all types, bombs, explosives, mines, fuses, detonators, pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propellants, and associated items.
VI	Personal demand items, such as health and hygiene products, soap, and toothpaste, writing materiel, snack food, beverages, cigarettes, batteries, and cameras (nonmilitary sales items).
VII	Major end items, such as launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, and vehicles.
VIII	Medical materiel, including repair parts peculiar to medical equipment.
IX	Repair parts and components, including kits, assemblies, and subassemblies (repairable or irreparable) required for maintenance support of all equipment.
X	Materiel to support nonmilitary programs—such as agriculture and economic development (not included in Classes I through IX).

STATEMENT OF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT

5-246. A statement of operational requirement is a formal statement of need justifying the allocation of resources to develop or enhance a capability necessary for accomplishing approved military objectives, missions, or tasks. The statement of operational requirement process helps ensure each element compiles a comprehensive and valid list of requirements early in the planning cycle. Early identification of requirements enables adequate and responsive support while minimizing the forward placement of logistical assets.

5-247. Statements of operational requirement occur out of cycle or are an immediate need. These statements can be materiel and non-materiel. The statement of operational requirement process is intended to be neither a quick fix, nor a means to circumvent established processes. In addition, the statement of operational requirement is not a method for obtaining desired items.

5-248. Statements of operational requirement are only used to request critical and essential requirements for accomplishing an assigned mission (table 5-4). The commander uses the statement of operational requirement to identify, consolidate, and prioritize all unit requirements that exceed organic capabilities. Based on the results of the statement of operational requirement, the commander authorizes the distribution of available supplies needed at the assigned mission unit level. There are three requirement categories outside the scope of a statement of operational requirement. Table 5-5, page 106, lists those categories and their appropriate courses of action.

Table 5-4. Categories of sustainment of operational requirements

Category	*Description*
Critical	Critical requirements are necessary for mission success.
Essential	Essential requirements provide a new capability or improve an existing one, increasing the likelihood of mission success. Mission success is not dependent on fulfilling essential requirements.
Enhancing	Enhancing requirements increase operational effectiveness, improve quality of life, increase efficiency, reduce operational and support costs, and/or postpone obsolescence. They are neither critical nor essential for mission success.

Table 5-5. Requirement categories outside the scope of the statement of operational requirements

Category	*Description*
In-theater	Units identifying critical requirements after deployment while operating in an established theater, then submit a critical-mission needs statement through the chain-of-command for action.
Non-mission-specific	Identified requirements generated because of global operations against terrorist networks, but not related to a specific mission which must be validated and then added to the command process. Command priorities and the availability of funds determine if these requirements are funded. The same essential elements of information used in a statement of requirement may be used.
Other	Other requirements are validated and approved through established systems and procedures. These requirements flow through deliberate processes to ensure the resolution of identified capability deficiencies in the most effective and efficient way.
Note: The statement of requirement process is an inappropriate means to satisfy each of these requirements.	

FIELD SERVICES

5-249. Field services provide units with basic needs and promote health, welfare, morale, and endurance during operations. These services are laundry, shower support, mortuary affairs, aerial delivery (which includes airborne insertions and airdrop or air land resupply), food service, billeting, and sanitation. Due to a lack of organic sustainment capabilities, attached units rely on gaining units for all field services. For more information on Army airfield services, see ATP 4-42.

MAINTENANCE

5-250. The Army has two types of maintenance: field and sustainment. Field maintenance activities include battlefield damage assessment and repair, recovery and evacuation, controlled exchange (the removal of serviceable components from equipment that is non-mission capable), communication security maintenance, and contracted maintenance support. Operators, organic maintenance personnel, and direct support maintenance personnel of the gaining unit perform this type of maintenance. The focus is on identifying and replacing damaged components, which facilitates a quick return of equipment to operation. Minimizing the loss of the assets needed to conduct operations is the primary intent of field maintenance.

5-251. Sustainment maintenance consists of repairing major end items and components for return to the supply system. Examples of this include rebuilding engines and transmissions for reuse. These items are cost-effective to repair and after rebuilding are placed back into the supply system. These services are not provided below the level of the sustainment brigade and are not used to fix information and communication-specific equipment. Non-Army-common equipment specific to Psychological Operations units returns to the system through other processes.

5-252. Psychological Operations units deploy with a field maintenance capability to repair branch-unique equipment or obtain branch-unique maintenance support as specified in the deployment order. Maintenance support may be sourced through the organic maintenance personnel of the gaining unit, the allocated Psychological Operations unit maintenance section, or contracted repair and replacement personnel.

TRANSPORTATION

5-253. Psychological Operations units may require the gaining unit to assist in moving and transferring personnel, equipment, and supplies upon reception. The Psychological Operations staff planner assigned to the gaining unit establishes coordination for transportation early in planning. This includes military, commercial, and multinational transportation capabilities to and around the operational area. ATP 4-10 provides more information on operational contract support.

OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

5-254. Operational demands often exceed the capabilities of the Psychological Operations unit and the gaining unit. This creates the need for contracting goods and services to meet mission requirements. Contracting occurs routinely to acquire services for the sustainment of units and equipment; development, delivery, and assessment of messages; and fulfillment other mission requirements.

5-255. Planners and leaders require an understanding of the regulations, requirements, and processes necessary to develop and execute contracts prior to deploying. The gaining unit or interagency establishes points of contact and specific procedures for contracting across combatant commands and American embassies. Planners identify contracting requirements during mission planning and execution and process them through the S-4, G-4, J-4 of the gaining unit or the general services officer at the American embassy to obtain services.

5-256. When an organic or attached contracting officer is unavailable (or policy or law prevents units from contracting for themselves) the contracting officer of the gaining agency is responsible for processing and supporting the contracting process. The contracting officer is the only official authorized to obligate USG funds. A contracting officer's representative from the Psychological Operations unit works directly with the contracting officer to oversee ongoing contracts, ensuring that providers or contractors provide contracted materiel, equipment, and services. They also provide contractor accountability reports to the contracting officer. Due to the legal ramifications and time constraints of contracting, Psychological Operations units require assigned trained contracting office representatives.

5-257. The logistics section of the gaining unit is the principal staff element responsible for contracting oversight. The identified requirements reside in Annex W (Operational Contract Support) of the operation plan, operation order, or concept plan. Psychological Operations units receive support from the contracting units assigned to the headquarters, and through sustainment brigades. In theater, the Army contracting command's contracting battalion is aligned to support a joint task force. This battalion provides support to the Psychological Operations groups and their subordinate units. For requirements that cannot be met in the operational area of the joint task force commander, the G-4 forwards requests to the appropriate command for action.

5-258. Psychological Operations units require pre-deployment training on the contract requirements development and submittal procedures. These procedures are dictated by the mission support agreements that the American embassy's resident general services officer or the supporting Army Contracting Agency uses. Determinations about specific training prerequisites for contract support requirements development and submittal procedures take place during the pre-deployment site survey or in coordination with the Psychological Operations unit currently deployed to the respective embassy.

5-259. Psychological Operations unit leaders begin the planning process by following the joint planning process with United States Special Operations Command, the combatant commander, and established contracted support requirements. In addition to the contract support requirements for this mission, Psychological Operations unit leaders determine who is responsible for requesting and funding mission sustainment requirements as established in the deployment order.

5-260. 905th Contracting Battalion provides multi-faceted support to all 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) subordinate units. Psychological Operations unit leaders staff requests for support to 905th Contracting Battalion for action as they conduct operational activities.

Appendix A

A Brief History of the Branch

Militaries have used influence throughout history to demoralize enemies, win the loyalty and support of civilian populations, and support military and national objectives.

WORLD WAR I

A-1. During World War I, the U.S. Army employed what was then called propaganda via a small Propaganda Section within the Press and Censorship Division under the G-2, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces. Part of its activity was the utilization of leaflets and loudspeakers against enemy operations. The effectiveness of the psychological operations led German Generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff to later remark that American and Allied efforts had devastated their troops' morale.

WORLD WAR II

A-2. In World War II, the U.S Army built on its previous experience and executed a planned, coordinated, and synchronized psychological warfare (abbreviated to PsyWar at that time) campaign on a grand scale with devasting effects on the enemy. Staff sections like the Psychological Warfare Branch, Allied Force Headquarters; the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force; and other entities at the theater, Army group, and field Army levels in Europe and the Far East complemented the efforts of the U.S. Office of the Strategic Services and Office of War Information.

Note: Like its more modern variation (PSYWAR), PsyWar is an abbreviation that is only included for historical reference; therefore, it is not included in the acronyms and abbreviations list.

THE KOREAN WAR

A-3. During the Korean War, the Army appointed Brigadier General Robert A. McClure as Chief of a new Psychological Warfare Division, G-3, and later as Chief of the Office of Psychological Warfare (a special staff section at the Pentagon). McClure's efforts led to the establishment of the Psywar Division and school at Fort Riley. In 1952 the PsyWar Center was established. The PsyWar Center was established at Fort Bragg and became the lead institution for training Soldiers in the art of special warfare (unconventional warfare, psychological warfare, and counterinsurgency). The PsyWar Center evolved into the modern USAJFKSWCS.

THE VIETNAM WAR

A-4. During the Vietnam War, the Army prioritized what it formally termed psychological operations (PSYOP) in its war efforts aimed at defeating communism worldwide through supporting a broad range of military operations. In the 1960s, the Army enlarged the organizational structure by officially activating the 2nd Psychological Operations Group, 4th Psychological Operations Group, 7th Psychological Operations Group, and several POBs. More important changes occurred over the years in relatively rapid order. On 1 October 1990, military occupational specialty 96F, Psychological Operations Specialist (a military intelligence military occupational specialty) converted to 37F and became its own functional area independent from military intelligence. On 18 November 1998, the Army established the Psychological Operations Regiment.

POST 9/11

A-5. On 16 October 2006, Psychological Operations officially became a branch in the United States Army. As information capabilities played an ever-increasing role in supporting U.S. military objectives after 9/11, senior DOD leaders recognized the need to change the term PSYOP to reflect the nature of these activities more appropriately. Consequently, in December 2010, the SecDef redefined the activity as MISO to capture the more nuanced set of the military's information and influence activities. While the terms, methodologies, and media have changed, the fundamental mission has remained the same since WWI: to influence behavior change in foreign individuals and or groups across the range of military operations to achieve U.S. military and national objectives.

A-6. On XX December 2025, the SecDef signed a memorandum changing the term military information support operations to psychological operations to more accurately reflect the psychological effects these operations hinge upon.

Note: For more information, refer to *U.S. Army Special Operations Forces Psychological Operations: A Historical Primer* and AR 870-21 for more on the regimental system and its relationship to branches.

Appendix B

Individual Skills

As noted in Chapter 1, the PO Branch core competencies describe the capabilities required to execute PSYOP and DDAs and contribute to Army operations. The competencies are collective; however, the required skills are individual. The varying level of skills among individuals contribute to the collective competencies of the branch. Each core competency compliments the others, providing units the capability to plan and execute the two primary influence activities. The PO Branch core competencies are influencing foreign audiences and analyzing TAs.

This appendix provides brief descriptions of those individual skills in which competency required. This establishes context for development of education and training materials.

SHARED SKILLS ACROSS THE CORE COMPETENCIES

B-1. These shared skills, identified in figure 1-2, page 4, include active listening, verbal and nonverbal communication, critical thinking, and emotional control as addressed below.

ACTIVE LISTENING

B-2. Active listening comprises three aspects: cognitive, emotional, and behavioral. It is providing full attention to words, tone of voice, and body language (implicit and explicit information) and being aware of and controlling emotional responses (staying calm, empathetic, or compassionate). It is also asking questions for clarity, comprehension, and understanding; and providing appropriate feedback and reflection to the speaker that is non-judgmental or biased.

COMMUNICATION (VERBAL AND NONVERBAL)

B-3. This consists of abilities and techniques for conveying or exchanging information (knowledge, ideas, beliefs, values, feelings, or behaviors) using speech, images, signals, symbols, writing, gestures, or behavior for building relationships, rapport, collaboration, negotiation, influence, transactions, or other purposeful interaction or activity.

CRITICAL THINKING

B-4. This is the art of analyzing and evaluating thinking with a view to improving it.

EMOTIONAL CONTROL

B-5. Emotional control is recognition and understanding of one’s emotional responses with an ability to appropriately display emotion in each situation or context.

SKILLS REQUIRED FOR INFLUENCING FOREIGN AUDIENCES

B-6. Influence is the ability to cause an effect in direct, indirect, or intangible ways. An enduring influence capability requires Soldiers with a diverse set of skills. For Soldiers to advance their proficiency in required skills from basic to expert levels demands deliberate institutional, unit, and individual development. Table B-1, page 112, lists and describes the skills required for influencing foreign audiences.

Table B-1. Skills required for influencing foreign audiences

Skill	*Description*
Abstract Thinking	Ability to think conceptually and comprehend ideas that are not associated with tangible objects or experiences
Analysis (Qualitative and Quantitative)	Detailed study or examination of data (text, numeric, image, and observation) at points in time for sense-making, interpretation, and meaning using statistics and qualitative methods
Conflict Resolution	Using active listening, empathy, self-knowledge, communication, negotiation, patience, and situational awareness through informal or formal processes for two or more parties to reach a mutually agreed upon amicable solution
Cross-Cultural Communication	Utilizing an understanding of self and others to professionally, respectfully, tactfully, and clearly interact with people from different national, social, ethnic, organizational, or other collective groups
Cultural	Understanding knowledge, experiences, beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, social hierarchies, religions, notions of time, roles (including cultural roles of men and women and age-related roles), artifacts and objects, and spatial relationships of a particular nation, people, or other social or collective group at a particular time. It also involves understanding the set of shared attitudes, values, beliefs, goals, and practices of a particular nation, social, or collective group.
Diplomacy	Managing professional relationships with partners using tact, sensitivity, and negotiation; an instrument of foreign policy using written, verbal, or other forms of communication to advance state, national, or organizational interests
Empathy	Actively sharing through awareness, understanding, and sensitivity, the experiences, thoughts, and feelings of another
Foreign Language	Ability to read, write and speak competently in a language other than one's native language
Intuition	Understanding or knowing something without reasoning to discovery or having a feeling that indicates this ability; developing intuition as a skill includes recognizing intuition in oneself and learning how and when to trust it
Motivational Techniques	Includes a diverse range of practices sourced from education, leadership, management, marketing, psychology, sales, and sociology
Negotiation	Knowing the goal or objective, understanding the other party's position, and crafting an outcome that is mutually satisfactory; involves harnessing skills in communication, cultural and social understanding, problem-solving, and diplomacy
Persuasion	Science and art of changing or influencing someone's beliefs, attitudes, decisions, or actions through reason, emotion, or request
Problem Solving	Using reasoning, critical, and creative thinking, analytical and planning skills, communication, and decision-making for finding solutions to difficult or complex issues
Situational Awareness	Being mindful of time, place, circumstances, and audience within an environment
Social	A set of learned abilities that enable an individual to interact competently and appropriately for a given location, community, and culture. It may include skills such as understanding self; communication; making human connections; coping; compromising; and regulating emotions, feelings, thoughts, and behaviors.

SKILLS REQUIRED FOR ANALYZING TARGET AUDIENCES

B-7. Analyzing TAs is essential to influencing foreign audiences and influencing foreign audiences provides the purpose for analysis. Like the previous core competency, analyzing TAs requires Soldiers to advance their proficiency from basic to expert levels over the course of their careers. Table B-2 lists and describes the skills required for analyzing TAs.

Table B-2. Skills required for analyzing target audiences

Skill	*Description*
Collaboration	Working with others to produce, create, develop, build, and maximize the talents (knowledge and skills) of the team
Computer Competence	Utilizing computing hardware and software for data and information analysis, reporting, and presentation
Conducting Interviews	Crafting questions specific to a research purpose; determining who, when, and where for obtaining responses; determining the method for data collection; and utilizing appropriate interview techniques for soliciting responses
Data Collection	Researching, obtaining, compiling, and organizing data for analysis, interpretation, and application specific to a research purpose, goal, and objective
Divided Attention	Ability to focus and manage attention within complex environments containing multiple stimuli
Memory	Storing and recalling information for current and future uses in complex circumstances, situations, and environments
Perception	Awareness and comprehension of elements of an environment through the physical senses, mental processes, and emotional response
Presentation	Verbally, visually, and graphically present information that is comprehensive, meaningful, and understood
Reasoning	Ability to think and process information in a logical, systematic, and sensible manner
Reception	Being mentally and emotionally open to information, experiences, people, and places
Recording Information	Using manual or technologically assisted means of capturing observations, interviews, and research in an accurate, thorough, and understandable format that provides meaning to the data
Selective Attention	Focusing on pertinent or critical details while shutting out environmental stimuli; knowing where, when, and how to focus attention
Self-Awareness	Awareness, understanding, and acceptance of personal values, attitudes, thoughts, feelings, emotions, and behaviors acquired through experience, observation, interaction with others, and reflection
Spatial Thinking	The productive mental exploration, reasoning, and visualization of the physical, human, and informational aspects of an environment (singly and in relationship to each other) to express information internally or externally so that the resulting structured information can be interpreted and used
Statistical Analysis	Understanding and utilizing appropriate statistical methods and tools for analyzing data
Sustained Attention	Engaging long-term focus on a problem, issue, product, goal, or phenomenon

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44 Displaced Ugandans arrive at Lira camp after seeking refuge from LRA.

45 ACCE/MSE-UG Organization.

47 MSE-UG trained locals on operating FM radio stations with ‘come home’ messages pre-loaded on to laptops.

47 A view of the radio station and antenna in Djema months after installation.

48 A Psychological Operations Soldier drops leaflets highlighting LRA defectors and the recently captured MG Caesar Achellam over Central African Republic.

48 A 7th POB soldier conducts a low-altitude loudspeaker aerial mission during Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS, a common practice after 2013.

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) or (joint) precedes the definition. Terms for which ATP 3-53 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
AR	Army regulation
ATP	Army techniques publication
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
DDA	Department of Defense deception activity
DISO	deception in support of operations security
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
FM	field manual
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4	assistant chief of staff, logistics
IGIVO	issues, goals, influence, vulnerabilities, and opportunities
JP	joint publication
IPO	intermediate psychological objective
MILDEC	military deception
OP-D	operational deception
PMESII-PT	political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time
PO	Psychological Operations (branch or Soldier)
POTF	Psychological Operations task force
PSYACT	psychological action
PSYOP	psychological operations (activity)
POB	Psychological Operations battalion
POC	Psychological Operations company
POD	Psychological Operations detachment
POG	Psychological Operations group
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SPO	supporting psychological objective
ST	special text
S-2	battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer

S-4	battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
TA	target audience
TAA	target audience analysis
TAC-D	tactical deception
TM	technical manual
TPFDD	time-phased force deployment data
U.S.	United States
USAJFKSWCS	United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USC	United States Code
USG	United States Government

SECTION II – TERMS

administrative control

Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support. (JP 1, Volume 2)

***behavior**

The observable activity of an individual or group representing physical responses to an environment and any event, actor, or influence capable of causing a response. (Term approved for inclusion in FM 1-02.1.)

close support

Action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. See also direct support; general support; mutual support; support. (JP 3-31)

command and control warfighting function

The related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of power. (ADP 3-0)

core competency

An essential and enduring capability that a branch or an organization provides to Army operations. (ADP 1-01)

crisis

An emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)

Department of Defense deception activity

A policy-guided operation conducted by a combatant command, Service, agency, or other components which employ military deception to influence the actions of adversary military, paramilitary, violent extremist organizations, or proxy decision makers, or to mislead a foreign intelligence entity, to aid in the accomplishment of the friendly mission and achieve a United States military advantage. (JP 3-54)

deterrence

The prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits. (JP 3-0)

direct support

(Army) A support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. (FM 3-0)

disinformation

Incomplete, incorrect, or out of context information deliberately used to influence audiences. (ADP 3-13)

fires warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the adversary or enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations. (ADP 3-0)

flexible deterrent option

A planning construct intended to facilitate early decision making by developing a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented actions carefully tailored to create a desired effect. (JP 5-0)

foreign humanitarian assistance

Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. (JP 3-29)

foreign internal defense

Participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

general support

Support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. (JP 3-09.3)

general support—reinforcing

A support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole and to reinforce another similar type unit. (FM 3-0)

hostage rescue

A personnel recovery method used to recover isolated personnel who are specifically designated as hostages. (JP 3-50)

***influence company team**

A combined arms organization formed by attaching one or more nonorganic units, either in place of or in addition to, the Psychological Operations company organic detachments. Also called an ICT. (Term approved for inclusion in FM 1-02.1.)

information for effect

The use, publication, or broadcast of factual information to negatively affect perceptions and/or damage credibility and capability of the targeted group (ADP 3-13).

intelligence preparation of the operational environment

The systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. (FM 2-0)

intelligence warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment. (ADP 3-0)

***intermediate psychological objective**

The desired change in the psychological conditions of a foreign target audience that progresses the audience toward a supporting psychological objective. Also called an IPO. (Term approved for inclusion in FM 1-02.1.)

irregular warfare

(Army) The overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare. (FM 3-0)

logistics

(joint) Planning and executing the movement and support of forces. (JP 4-0)

main effort

A designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. (ADP 3-0)

military engagement

Contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. (JP 3-0)

misinformation

Unintentional incorrect information from any source. (ADP 3-13)

movement and maneuver warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. (ADP 3-0)

multidomain operations

The combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders. (FM 3-0)

mutual support

That support which units render each other throughout joint operations, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, or their inherent capabilities. See also close support; direct support; support. (JP 3-31)

operational control

The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP1, Volume 2)

operations in the information environment

Military actions involving the integrated employment of multiple information forces to affect drivers of behavior. (JP 3-04)

principle

A comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides how an organization approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations. (ADP 1-01)

priority of support

A priority set by the commander to ensure a subordinate unit has support in accordance with it relative importance to accomplishing the mission. (ADP 5-0)

protection warfighting function

The related tasks and systems, and methods that prevent or mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards to preserve combat power and enable freedom of action. (FM 3-0)

***psychological action**

An action with the primary purpose of producing a psychological effect in a foreign target audience. Also called a PSYACT. (Term approved for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)

***psychological objective**

A statement that reflects the desired behavioral effect. Also called a PO. (Term approved for inclusion in FM 1-02.1.)

***psychological operations**

(Army) Operations to influence the behavior of targeted foreign audiences in support of a commander's objectives. (Term approved for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)

***psychological operations task force**

A battalion-sized unit consisting of a Psychological Operations group or Psychological Operations battalion headquarters, at least one assigned company-sized element, and at least one attached detachment or platoon-sized element from another unit. Also called a POTF. (Term approved for inclusion in FM 1-02.1.)

security assistance

A group of programs authorized by federal statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which are considered part of security cooperation. (JP 3-20)

security cooperation

Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners. (JP 3-20)

stability mechanism

The primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. (ADP 3-0).

security force assistance

(joint) The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.. (JP 3-20)

supply

(joint) The procurement, distribution, maintenance while in storage, and salvage of supplies, including the determination of kind and quantity of supplies. (JP 4-0)

supporting effort

A designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort. (ADP 3-0)

***supporting psychological objective**

The desired behavior of a foreign target audience that contributes to accomplishing a psychological objective. Also called an SPO. (Term approved for inclusion in FM 1-02.1.)

sustainment

(Army) The provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion. (ADP 4-0)

tactical control

The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (JP1, Volume 2)

target audience

An individual or group selected for influence. (JP 3-04)

target intelligence

Intelligence that portrays and locates the components of a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance. (JP 3-60)

task organization

A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission. (ADP 5-0)

task-organizing

The act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. (ADP 3-0)

unified action partners

Those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. (ADP 3-0)

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20 April 2026

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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