ATP 3-57.40

MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF TRANSITIONAL GOVERNANCE

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Contents

Page

Preface v
Introduction vii
CHAPTER 1 1
OVERVIEW 1
History of Military Government 1
Authorities and Directives 1
Transitional Governance 3
Transitional Governance and Competition Continuum 4
Transitional Military Authority and Military Government 5
Military Government Through Stability Operations and Stabilization Framework 6
Military Government Operations 10
Objectives of Military Government Operations 11
Support to Civil Administration 12
Support to Foreign Assistance 14
Foreign Assistance 15
Support to Foreign Assistance for Military Government Operations 15
Security Assistance 16
Support to Security Assistance for Military Government Operations 16
Humanitarian Assistance 16
Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance for Military Government Operations 17
Development Assistance 17
Support to Development Assistance for Military Government Operations 17
Integration of Other Core Competencies 18
CHAPTER 2 21
PLANNING, CONSOLIDATION OF GAINS, AND TRANSITIONS IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 21
Planning for Operations 21

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Consolidating Gains 22
Civil Affairs Plan Development 23
Army Plan Development 23
Joint Plan Development 24
Military Government Operations Planning Considerations 24
Governance Assessment Tools 28
Transition to Other Legitimate Authorities 30
Civil-Military Teaming 31
CHAPTER 3 35
MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS IN CONFLICT 35
Military Government Operations During Conflict 35
Transfer of Authority 40
Transition to Competition 40
CHAPTER 4 41
MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS IN CRISIS 41
Military Government Operations During a Crisis 42
Support to Foreign Assistance in Crisis 42
Return to Competition 44
CHAPTER 5 47
MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS IN COMPETITION 47
Military Government Operations During Competition 47
At the Strategic Level 49
At the Operational Level 49
At the Tactical Level 50
APPENDIX A 51
ASSESSMENT TOOLS 51
APPENDIX B 61
GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT PROCESS 61
APPENDIX C 73
CHARACTERISTICS AND PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 73
APPENDIX D 79
CIVIL AFFAIRS FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIST REFERENCE CHART AND DESCRIPTIONS 79
Glossary 113
References 117
Index 119

Figures

Figure 1-1. DIME across the competition continuum 5
Figure 1-2. Stability operations tasks and U.S. Government stability sectors 8
Figure 1-3. Nested missions of military government operations 11
Figure 2-1. Planning variables for Civil Affairs MGO augmentation, example 33
Figure 3-1. Military government operations in conflict 36
Figure 4-1. Military government operations in a crisis 41
Figure 5-1. Military government operations in competition 48
Figure B-1. Government assessment process in civil knowledge integration 62
Figure B-2. Quad chart of governance providers 68

Tables

Introductory table. New and modified terms viii
Table A-1. PMESII and ASCOPE crosswalk 54
Table A-2. Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threat analysis format 57
Table A-3. CARVER targeting matrix format 57
Table B-1. Governance assessment process: overview 63
Table B-2. Governance assessment process: steps, inputs, and outputs 64
Table B-3. Relevant governing body matrix 66
Table B-4. Questions for identifying the governance assessment process 67
Table B-5. Government assessment process analysis 69
Table B-6. Implementation strategy matrix 70
Table B-7. Notional completed governance assessment process 71
Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties 80

Vignettes

Achieving More with Less 73
Respect and Rituals 76

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Preface

This manual describes the military's role as an instrument of national power in the framework of transitional governance. Civil Affairs forces support transitional governance through the execution of military government operations. The doctrinal principles presented in this manual are intended to be used as a guide and are not to be considered prescriptive. Civil Affairs forces conduct missions within military government operations that are essential to the commander's ability to consolidate gains to ensure the appropriate establishment, control, support, and continuation of government and governance functions. Normally the responsibility of civilian authorities, Civil Affairs forces provide expertise in civilian sector functions until they establish conditions necessary for transfer back to civilian control. The goal for military government operations during or post conflict, is to return governance from military control to the appropriate civil authorities as soon as possible while maintaining basic levels of government administration and essential services. Civil Affairs forces support the ground commander's execution of military government operations or enabling existing governments as necessary, enhancing existing government functions and services affecting the civil population.

The principal audience for ATP 3-57.40 is Civil Affairs forces and planners that leverage the civil component of the operational environment while enabling, enhancing, or providing governance. ATP 3-57.40 is applicable to officers and senior non-commissioned officers who lead Civil Affairs forces or who serve as the (J-9), assistant chief of staff, Civil Affairs operations (G-9), or the brigade or battalion Civil Affairs operations staff officer (S-9).

The military government operations described in ATP 3-57.40 can only be used for operations and support activities in foreign countries and territories. There is not an application for this material for any domestic operations or defense support to civil authorities. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate according to the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27.)

ATP 3-57.40 uses joint terms, where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-57.40 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ATP 3-57.40 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 3-57.40 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 3-57.40 is the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-CAD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610; by email to cadoctrine@socom.mil; or by submitting an electronic DA Form 2028.

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Introduction

Since World War II, U. S. defense policy requires the Army to maintain the capability to occupy enemy territory and provide for the establishment of military government. Department of Defense policy also directs the responsibility of establishment and conduct of military government to Civil Affairs. However, the Army has not fully exercised the use of military government since World War II. With the focus of the U. S. military shifting to winning in large-scale combat operations, the difficulty is answering the question: "What do we do after the enemy is defeated and military forces are required to execute military government?"

Civil Affairs enables a commander to fulfill the military contribution to transitional governance through military government operations. All Civil Affairs forces, regardless of unit of assignment, environment of engagement, or phase of continuum, need to train and prepare to conduct the missions within military government operations: Support to foreign assistance, support to civil administration in host-nation territory, and support to civil administration in occupied territory. Civil Affairs forces conduct military government operations to support the Army operating concept of multidomain operations. Commanders use Civil Affairs capabilities as a primary means to achieve unified action.

Civil Affairs forces conduct military government capabilities in competition to further national policies and objectives; in conflict to assist military operations and consolidation of gains; and in post conflict to assist the occupying commander to fulfill the obligations to the civil population imposed by international law. Civil Affairs forces apply government and governance functions using applicable United States, partner nation, and international laws to assist established, interim, or reconstructed governments. When conducting military government operations, Civil Affairs forces integrate all Civil Affairs operations with the six Army stability operations tasks. The integrated efforts enhance consolidation of gains, support from the indigenous population, and enable the transition of operations to the legitimate civil authorities.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of military government operations including the history, authorities, and definitions of transitional governance, military government, and military government operations. Chapter 1 discusses the framework of transitional governance and the role of the military within that framework. The chapter flows into discussing the execution of military government through the Army's stability operations tasks and discusses how those operations nest within the stabilization framework. Next, the chapter discusses the use of transitional military authority; the missions of support to civil administration in hostile territory, support to civil administration in host-nation territory, and support to foreign assistance. The chapter concludes by discussing the integration of other core competencies of civil network development and engagement, civil knowledge integration, and civil-military integration.

Chapter 2 explains the planning process and tools Civil Affairs forces use for assessing governance and consolidating gains throughout the competition continuum. The governance assessment tools include the governance assessment process, the Civil Affairs areas study, and Civil Affairs assessments. In addition, this chapter discusses the ability of the commander to establish a joint civil-military operations task force to consolidate gains during stability operations.

Chapter 3 provides a discussion of Civil Affairs forces and military government operations in the conflict phase of the competition continuum.

Chapter 4 provides a discussion of Civil Affairs forces and military government operations in the crisis phase of the competition continuum.

Chapter 5 provides a discussion of Civil Affairs forces and military government operations in the competition phase of the competition continuum.

The introductory table outlines changes to terminology reflected in ATP 3-57.40.

Introductory table. New and modified terms

Term	*Remarks*
military government	Modifies definition and takes proponency
military government operations	New term with definition
support to civil administration in host-nation territory	New term with definition
support to civil administration in an occupied territory	New term with definition
support to foreign assistance	New term with definition
transitional governance	Modifies definition and takes proponency
transitional military authority	Modifies definition and takes proponency

Chapter 1
Overview

"The basic objectives and principles of war do not change. The final objective in war is the destruction of the enemy's capacity and will to fight...This optimum is obtainable only on land where physical occupation can be consolidated and maintained."

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

Civil Affairs (CA) forces provide in-depth study, analysis, evaluation, and access to the civil component to enable Army and joint force commander's understanding of the vulnerabilities, capabilities, capacities, and resources within a civil populace. When needed, CA provides expertise and advice on civilian sector functions to establish military government. This enables commanders to set the stage for establishing local government capability or enhancing its capacity for deterring or defeating emerging threats from within the civil component.

HISTORY OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1-1. Military government operation's (MGO's) historical significance predates the founding of America as a nation. Historically, the U.S. Army established a military government in the aftermath of various conflicts. Army officers and supporting personnel conducted military government functions during regional pacification efforts in the United States. The U.S. Army conducted reconstruction with military government after combat operations in Mexico, California, U.S. Southern states, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines, Germany, and Japan. Civil War reconstruction and military control ended with the Compromise of 1877, which manifested into the Posse Comitatus Act. The Posse Comitatus Act ended the concept of military government on U.S. soil, but not as it pertained to foreign wars. The United States performed military government in various locations following the Spanish American War but found itself unprepared for the task following World War I. Colonel Erwin Hunt wrote a scathing report citing how ill-prepared the Army was to conduct military government in 1919 post-conflict Europe. At the onset of World War II, U.S. war planners used the lessons learned from Hunt's exposé and General George Marshall's understanding that the post-conflict occupation was going to be equally as challenging as the war itself. General Marshall created military government and CA units to facilitate the military occupation and military government in Germany and Japan, and the liberation of formerly occupied friendly territories as well. The occupation of Europe exemplifies success and is a model for the execution of military government and transition to civilian authorities.

AUTHORITIES AND DIRECTIVES

1-2. Military government authority is derived from three sources: International law, the statutory authorities found in Title 10 and Title 22, USC, and the regulatory authority within DODD 5100.01, DODD 3000.05, and DODD 2000.13. Only the President of the United States and Congress can authorize the implementation of military government and assertion of transitional military authority (TMA).

INTERNATIONAL LAW

1-3. Hague Convention of 1907 and customary international humanitarian law contain the rules applicable to belligerent occupation. Article 42 of the Hague Regulations is the accepted definition of what amounts to an occupation for the purposes of international law: territory is considered occupied when it is placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where the hostile authority establishes itself and is exercising authority.

1-4. The Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 2, expanded the definition of occupation to that which encounters no armed resistance. The Hague Regulation, Article 42, outlines that for an occupation to exist, for the purposes of international law, hostile troops must have some degree of control over a foreign territory,

effective control. Therefore, the three elements listed below are necessary for an occupation to exist according to international law:

- The unconsented-to presence of foreign forces.
- The foreign forces' imposition of its own authority.
- The related inability of the local sovereign power to exert its authority over the territory due to the occupation.

1-5. Once a foreign territory is under occupation, the occupying power becomes bound by the rules of international humanitarian law, whether customary or treaty based. International humanitarian law applicable in international armed conflict governs any armed confrontation between the armed forces of the occupied state and the occupying power and armed groups operating under its overall control, in addition to the rules of occupation. International humanitarian law governs armed groups operating under the occupying power's control. International humanitarian laws appliable to international armed conflict govern any armed confrontations among the occupied state's armed forces, the occupying power, and the armed groups under the occupying power's control.

1-6. The 1907 Hague Regulations (Articles 42-56), the Fourth Geneva Convention, and Additional Protocol I to the Four Geneva Conventions outlines the occupying power's duties. An occupant does not have sovereignty over an occupied territory; therefore, the occupation is temporary. The occupant has an obligation to ensure the well-being of the population and is prohibited from making permanent changes to the territory in the judicial, economic, or social spheres. The main duties of the occupying power under international law are listed below:

- The occupying power must respect the laws in force while in the occupied territory unless they constitute a threat to its security or are an obstacle to the application of the international law of occupation.
- The occupying power must take measures to restore and ensure, as far as possible, civil life and public order and safety.
- The occupying power must ensure sufficient hygiene and public health standards. The occupying power must also provide food and medical care to the occupied population.

TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

1-7. Title 10, USC states that Congress provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense of the United States, the Commonwealths and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States.

1-8. Title 10 directs Army forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat combined with the Army's operating concept and unified land operations requirements. This law supplies the manpower and organization for all the operations the Army leads and supports. The Army asserting TMA to execute military government is a follow-on action linked to the sustained land combat and the protection of occupied areas.

1-9. Among the command responsibilities specified in Title 10, Section 161 the primary duties of the commander of a combatant command are—

- To create plans for the armed forces to execute national defense strategies and respond to significant military contingencies.
- To take actions, as necessary, to deter conflict.
- To command United States Armed Forces as directed by the Secretary and approved by the President.

TITLE 22, UNITED STATES CODE

1-10. Army forces conduct operations to support civil administration in host-nation territory and to support foreign assistance during competition and crisis under the authority of Title 22, USC, which includes foreign humanitarian assistance guidance. Title 22 also establishes support for military assistance programs, foreign military financing programs, and international military education training programs. The *Foreign Assistance Act* (Title 22 USC 2151) establishes support for economic support funds, peacekeeping operations, international narcotics control and law enforcement programs; and nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs. The *Foreign Assistance Act* mandates close coordination and cooperation between the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. civilian agencies at all levels of the security assistance process.

DODD 3000.05, STABILIZATION

1-11. DODD 3000.05 establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities for stabilization efforts. The directive establishes the Department of State (DOS) as the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization efforts. The USAID is the lead implementing agency for non-security U.S. stabilization assistance. The Agency provides requisite security and civilian effort reinforcement where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities. The DOD is a supporting element of the Agency for International Development. DODD 3000.05 states if directed and consistent with available authorities, DOD leads United States Government (USG) stabilization efforts in extreme situations and less permissive environments until it is feasible for DOD to transition lead responsibility to other USG departments and agencies.

DODD 5100.01, FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENTS

1-12. DODD 5100.01 provides authority and guidance to the U.S. Army to "…develop concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organize, train, equip, and provide forces with expeditionary and campaign qualities…." In addition, DODD 5100.01 specifically states the following requirements for the Army:

- Organize, train, and equip forces to support civil authorities in the United States and abroad, to include support for disaster relief, consequence management, mass migration, disease eradication, law enforcement, counter-narcotics, critical infrastructure protection, and response to terrorist attack. The Army coordinates with other military Services, combatant commands, the National Guard, and USG departments and agencies.
- Conduct Civil Affairs operations (CAO).
- Occupy territories abroad and provide for the initial establishment of a military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.

1-13. DODD 5100.01 directs that the United States Special Operations Command "…in coordination with the Military Service Chiefs, organize, train, equip, and provide special operations forces, doctrine, procedures, and equipment for…CAO."

DODD 2000.13, CIVIL AFFAIRS

1-14. DODD 2000.13 states that CAO includes DOD actions that—

- Coordinate military activities with other USG departments and agencies, civilian agencies of other governments, host-nation military or paramilitary elements, and nongovernmental organizations.
- Support stability operations, including activities that establish civil security; provide support to governance, provide essential services; support economic development and infrastructure; and establish civil control for civilian populations in occupied or liberated areas until DOD can return control to civilian or non-U.S. military authority.
- Provide assistance outside the range of military operations, when directed, to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population.
- Provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of civilian authorities. The expertise implements DOD policies that advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civilian sector functions.
- Establish and conduct military government until civilian authority or government can be restored.

DODD 2000.13 provides additional information on the DOD-directed requirements.

TRANSITIONAL GOVERNANCE

1-15. The national security strategy provides strategic context to employ military capabilities with other instruments of national power. The United States' ability to advance its national interests depends on the USG's ability to employ national power (DIME [diplomacy, informational, military, and economics]) to achieve national strategic objectives.

1-16. *Unified action* is the synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1, Vol 1). Unified action integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with other USG departments and agencies,

nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations (such as the United Nations), and the private sector.

1-17. ***Transitional governance is the transition of foreign governing authorities and functions based on a United States Government policy decision or directive.*** The USG uses transitional governance to assure appropriate control and the continuity of government functions throughout the range of military operations.

TRANSITIONAL GOVERNANCE AND COMPETITION CONTINUUM

1-18. MGO is how CA forces support Army commanders with military government responsibilities described in Army and Joint doctrine. Army doctrine describes the army commander's military government responsibility but does not describe the capabilities required to perform military government. In the absence of higher Army doctrine, this ATP draws on Joint doctrine for guidance regarding transitional governance and military government.

1-19. Joint doctrine describes the operational environment of a competition continuum. Rather than a world at peace or at war, the competition continuum describes three broad categories of strategic relationships—cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. Each relationship is defined as between the United States and another strategic actor relative to a specific set of policy aims. Cooperation, competition, and even armed conflict commonly occur simultaneously in different parts of the world. Due to this competition continuum, the strategic needs of others affect the needs of combatant commanders and Army component commanders in the same area. (See JP 3-0.)

Note. This manual uses the term competition to mean competition below armed conflict.

1-20. Transitional governance combines national policy and theater strategy exercised simultaneously through the instruments of national power. The level of involvement for each of the four instruments is not set in any phase of the competition continuum. If one instrument has less involvement, the involvement of another instrument must increase to keep the environment in balance. The military leads when U.S. national command authority directs military intervention due to crisis, disaster, or a decision that diplomatic efforts are ineffective or appropriate. (Figure 1-1 visualizes the malleable nature of the interdependent relationships among the four instruments of national power across the competition continuum.)

1-21. The U.S. DOS leads all U.S. diplomatic initiatives such as engaging with other states and foreign groups to advance U.S. values, interests, and objectives, and to solicit foreign support for U.S. military operations. Diplomacy is the primary instrument of national power employed during competition and crisis.

1-22. Information throughout the continuum remains an important supporting instrument. The informational instrument is a strategic resource critical to national security, which uses information to further U.S. causes and undermine those opposed to the USG and our allies.

1-23. The economic instrument can be both positive (aid programs) and punitive (sanctions) in shaping U.S. objectives. The Department of the Treasury collaborates with various USG agencies, foreign governments, and international financial institutions. Their collective efforts aim to foster economic growth, enhance living standards, and proactively anticipate and mitigate economic and financial crises to the best of their abilities.

1-24. The military instrument of national power can be applied in a scalable manner that varies in purpose, scale, risk, and combat intensity across the competition continuum, connecting the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. The United States uses the range of military operations to provide insight into the various usages of military power from a strategic perspective. Waging war should involve the use of all instruments of national power that one government can bring to bear against another particularly at the higher levels. Leaders must not consider the use of military force in isolation.




Figure 1-1. DIME across the competition continuum

1-25. The military instrument is coercive in nature. The military contributes to transitional governance through coercive measures (force or threat of force) or in non-conflict (through Foreign Assistance) as described in JP 1, Vol I, and JP 3-0. DODD 5100.01 states that the Army is directed to "…occupy territories abroad and provide for the initial establishment of a military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority." The Army is responsible for military government and CAO. The CA branch supports the U.S. Army execution of military government through CAO, specifically through the execution of MGO. MGO possess three distinct activities: support to civil administration (SCA) in occupied territory, SCA in host-nation territory, and support to foreign assistance.

TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1-26. TMA and military government play critical roles in managing transitions and maintaining stability in complex environments. Essentially, it is the difference between authority to control and the mechanism for applying control.

TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY

1-27. ***Transitional military authority is the supreme authority the military exercises by force or agreement over the lands, property, and indigenous populations and institutions of allied, neutral, or enemy territory, therefore, substituting sovereign authority under rule of law for the previously established government***. When directed, military forces assert TMA to establish a military government, supplanting the authority of a sovereign government. In the absence of a functioning government, or when military operations prevent a government from administering to the public sector, military forces use military government to ensure the continuation of government functions. Military forces support stabilization activities through the execution of stability operations tasks until directed to transfer operations to other military forces or designated civil authorities.

1-28. The U.S. President authorizes the use of TMA, and the Secretary of Defense and the joint force commander approve the process. U.S. forces assert TMA outside the United States and its territories. As a land component commander, Army commanders assert TMA in allied or neutral territory liberated from the enemy, neutral, or allied territory proven to be hostile, and any ungoverned area. TMA allows for the establishment of military government in forms. Operational military government is commanders overseeing civil functions of government in their respective operational areas. Territorial military government is commanders establishing a separate organization to exercise the functions of civil administration.

1-29. All CA forces support the assertion of TMA and military government through the execution of MGO. When asserting TMA, joint and Army forces exercise military government functions to consolidate gains and establish the conditions to stabilize the population. Army units need to accomplish the following subordinate tasks to support governance: (For more information on TMA and stability, see JP 3-07 and FM 3-07.)

- Support transitional administrations.
- Support development of local governance.
- Support anticorruption initiatives.
- Support elections.

Note. For more information on TMA and stability, see JP 3-07 and FM 3-07.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1-30. When TMA is directed and instituted, a temporary military government is required. A military government is a necessary proactive measure to promote stability and prevent an insurgency after conflict. Army forces conduct stability operations tasks in conjunction with large-scale combat operations to lead the initial stabilization effort. Military forces achieve unified action through civil-military integration (CMI) when performing stabilization activities. Stabilization activities include governance and participation, and stability operations tasks include support to governance. These activities are established on a temporary basis and transitioned to another authority when directed. Military government can draw assistance from experienced interagency personnel. These agencies and organizations possess the expertise to establish a system of government that fosters the gradual transition to a legitimate host-nation authority. Military forces lead until they stabilize the security situation and can safely transition responsibility for the stability sectors to legitimate civil authority and civil control.

1-31. ***Military government is a temporary military organization exercising governance and the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority***. When directed, Army or land component commanders develop the overall design and methodology of occupying and establishing military government to protect the civil populace, consolidate gains, and set conditions for the application stability operation tasks. At the operational echelon, the stability mechanisms of control, compel, influence, and support provide a rubric to describe how friendly forces affect civilians to attain conditions that support a lasting, stable peace. (See FM 3-0 for more on the stability mechanisms.) An occupying force establishes a military government pursuant to international law, including The Hague and Geneva Conventions.

1-32. To ensure that situational understanding and cultural awareness inform planning and the conduct of military government, commanders at all levels maintain open, continuous dialogue. They also collaborate among the echelons of command and various agencies, organizations, and institutions recognized to restore legitimate governance to the host nation.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT THROUGH STABILITY OPERATIONS AND STABILIZATION FRAMEWORK

1-33. The joint force commander is responsible for the detailed planning and operations of a military government under the general guidelines received from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See figure 1-2, page 8.) The structure and organization of the military government depend on—

- International law, including any applicable U.S. Security Council resolutions or similar authorities.
- The mission of the military force.
- The organization, capabilities, and capacities of deployed forces.

- The military and political conditions of the operational area.
- The nature, structure, and organization of the existing or former host-nation government.
- The physical, political, economic, and cultural geography of the host nation.

1-34. Based on the tenets of international law, the occupying force must maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory and must have, as its goal, the creation of a legitimate and effective civilian government. Historically, during military government, the following can exist:

- Military governor. A military governor is the military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory, exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws and usages of war and to any directive received from the commander's government or superior.
- Military governor proclamation. The proclamation, propagated through media outlets, informs the populace of the occupation, the intent of the military operation, and military government ordinances. While the proclamation seeks to allay fears and encourage cooperation from the occupied population, it also instructs them to obey the existing laws and military government ordinance.
- Military government ordinance. A military government ordinance is an enactment on the authority of a military governor promulgating laws or rules regulating the occupied territory under such control.

1-35. Stabilization is an inherent responsibility of government, and when asserting TMA, a military requirement. The degree of military participation in long-term stabilization efforts is a political decision of the President or other Executive Department leaders. When asserting military government, military leaders and Soldiers may be appointed as governors in a broad sense, influencing events and circumstances normally outside the bounds of the military. In theater planning for MGO, from strategic to tactical, CA capabilities prevent harm to civilian populations and their associated property, mitigate friction between the military and civil component, engage the civil component to set the conditions for stability, and assess civil considerations necessary to achieve understanding of the operational environment (including civil society). The intent of MGO is to return the operational environment to stability and competition. The key to the stability effort is a detailed conflict assessment, and an assessment of how the local population perceives U.S. activities and the support of the emerging indigenous government. Successful stability efforts require the support of the populace and confirmation that the U.S. mission and the actions of the emergent government are legitimate in the eyes of the populace. There is no mechanism to measure the sentiment of the population. Some indicators include the outward willingness of the populace to participate in governance through public debate or voting. An indicator can be the result of a third-party polling or survey. One clear measure of effectiveness is the abandonment of armed conflict to impose or shape policy.

1-36. Stability planning efforts nest within those of the DOS. (ADP 3-07 discusses nesting stability tasks with stability activities including the stability sectors.) Nesting tactical to strategic efforts requires an understanding of the joint stability functions at the strategic echelon. At the operational and tactical echelons, planners use the Army's stability operations tasks.

1-37. The stability sectors form a framework for executing stability operations that represents the five key areas in which civil-military efforts focus on building host-nation capacity. Individually, the stability operations tasks encompass the distinct yet interrelated tasks that constitute reform activities in a functional sector. Collectively, they are the pillars upon which the government frames the possible reconstruction tasks required for nations torn by conflict or disaster. Although U.S. forces execute some tasks sequentially, success necessitates an approach that focuses on simultaneous actions across an operational area. These tasks are inextricably linked; positive results in one sector depend on integrating and synchronizing tasks across other sectors successfully.

1-38. CA forces provide functional specialists and military government officers that align with the stability sectors. Planners must identify the MGO requirements within the mission to ensure the appropriate forces are available to accomplish the stability operations tasks that set the conditions for stabilization. To ensure that no lapse in governance occurs, CA forces perform tasks that a civil authority usually performs.




Figure 1-2. Stability operations tasks and U.S. Government stability sectors

1-39. Commanders apply the uniformed code of military justice as it applies to U.S. forces in the area of operations. Commanders should ensure the operation of courts to enforce local laws applying to the populace. When local courts cease to operate, commanders reestablish the rule of law through military tribunals. Commanders must consider military necessity and abide by international law. Before attempting to change

any local laws, commanders must consider formal and informal accepted rule of law practices the local populace deems as having legitimacy. Commanders should consult the rule of law experts and their legal advisors. (See FM 6-27.)

1-40. In general, the military authority should not impose the customs of another nation on an occupied nation. Implementing changes or reforms inconsistent with local customs may foster active or passive resistance, adding friction to an already complex effort. Commanders must recognize that laws and customs often vary between political divisions of a country, such as between provinces or municipalities. The CA staff officer identifies issues related to civil society, ensuring policies of the military government do not inadvertently disadvantage segments of the population. Commanders should avoid redrawing local boundaries and political divisions except when permitted by international law. Unit boundaries should reflect these boundaries as closely as possible. Periodically, however, unit boundaries shift to avoid inadvertently creating sanctuaries for adversaries. Commanders examine existing civil security jurisdictional boundaries and lines to determine if their locations contribute to setting the conditions for successful operations. Established precincts, zones, districts, regions, counties, parishes, or other mechanisms that delineate civil security authority facilitate commanders using decision making and employing military forces. Security jurisdictional boundaries reflect dominant or sensitive cultural realities or fault lines that exist in a community. Some security boundaries also exist to ensure that civil security capability is commensurate or appropriate to the criminal conditions of an area.

FORMS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1-41. An operational form of military government expands in authority as operations continue. In the territorial form of military government, the joint force commander establishes a separate organization under the direct command of the joint force commander or an authorized subordinate.

OPERATIONAL FORM OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1-42. The responsibilities and geographic area over which a military government exercises civil administration expand as operations continue. Commanders oversee civil functions of government in their respective operational areas. This includes ensuring the safety, security, and well-being of the local populace as well as providing humanitarian assistance in conjunction with other USG agencies foreign assistance operations. Under the operational form of military government, the chain of command retains the responsibility for authority and is supported by its staff structure.

1-43. Concentrating authority and responsibility in the commander ensures that activities related to civil administration remain integrated with ongoing operations. These activities include relationships between the military force and civilians. By ensuring the integrity of unity of command in an operational area, commanders mitigate much of the friction associated with operations in and among the local populace. As the situation permits, the responsibility for civil administration transfers to the local civil authority to assist the nation's return to self-governance. Using a transitional authority or civilian advisory groups helps to accelerate this transfer of authority.

1-44. The rate of military activities frequently tempers advantages of a military government's operational form. Generally, the higher the tempo within the operational area, the less the commander can address the requirements of military government. In areas where the tempo of operations and civil situations are consistently dynamic, civil administration policies may change frequently. Finally, operational headquarters are not always assigned operational areas corresponding to known political subdivisions. Even after hostilities, conformance of these areas to political boundaries may prove impossible, however desirable.

TERRITORIAL FORMS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1-45. In the territorial form of military government, commanders establish a separate organization to exercise civil administration functions. The organization may be under the direct command of the joint force commander or an authorized subordinate, or it may report directly to the Secretary of Defense or the President. The military governor may command subordinate military governors assigned to political subdivisions throughout the occupied territory. Usually, the territorial form of the military government follows a chain of command separate from operational forces.

1-46. A territorial form of military government typically uses military manpower and expertise more effectively and economically than an operational form of military government. Established after the operational area is stabilized, a territorial form of military government may ensure improved continuity of policy and administration. However, a territorial form can also facilitate the smooth transition to develop civil networks to free up military personnel. A territorial form of military government operates under the stability principle of unity of effort and purpose to achieve unified action.

1-47. The existence of a separate chain of command within an operational area or a political subdivision presents unique challenges to the territorial form of military government. The territorial military government must carefully coordinate activities with those of operational military forces. Use of civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) to facilitate CMI deconflict these activities from ongoing operations and mitigate exposure of the operational force to undue risk. To ensure unity of effort, the territorial form of TMA and the operational forces maintain close communications, cooperation, and coordination.

1-48. In practice, asserting TMA is not the sole action. Understanding the operational environment, the current conditions in the occupied country force a commander to adapt to whichever form of military government is appropriate to suit the political and military situation. A territorial form of military government draws certain features from an operational form or vice versa. As operations progress, the character of the military government evolves according to the situation, mirroring the effort to build host-nation capacity. In certain cases, one type of military authority dominates in one region of the occupied territory, while another type is better suited for another region.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

1-49. ***Military government operations*** **are the actions taken by Civil Affairs forces to support government functions and governance throughout the competition continuum**. MGO have three different missions that CA forces use to enable military commanders to provide government and governance support throughout the competition continuum. CA forces and their supported commanders must understand that government is the organization, machinery, or agency through which a political unit exercises authority and performs functions, which is usually classified according to the distribution of power within. Governance is the state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society. (See JP 3-24.)

1-50. CA forces support military government requirements through the development and mobilization of civil networks and the deployment and expertise of government function specialists. The civil networks possess capabilities, capacities, and resources that CA forces can use to conduct administrative requirements until those networks can transition to the civil authorities.

1-51. CA forces that are conducting MGO can be different elements within the same area of operation or joint operations area. These forces can have different MGO requirements based on mission, the desired end states of the commander, and the capabilities and resources of the established local civil networks. (See figure 1-3.) At the operational level, CA units inside the theater of operations for large-scale combat operations may conduct different MGO requirements than CA units outside the theater of operations.




Figure 1-3. Nested missions of military government operations

OBJECTIVES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

1-52. CA forces executing MGO need to establish measures of performance and measures of effectiveness during mission planning to ensure supported forces are using CA efforts and resources appropriately. If CA forces can answer the following three questions, then forces are using CA efforts and resources appropriately. Does this mission—

- Rapidly consolidate gains and repair vital infrastructure to stabilize the populace?
- Secure the populace and establish civil control using military authorities to protect civilians from harm and preserve legitimacy of the mission?
- Ensure the continuation of government services throughout the range of military operations to stabilize civilian populations and obtain a stable end state, facilitating transition to another authority?

Ideally, the mission answers all three questions affirmatively. Realistically, the mission meets one or two of the three questions. The questions are meant to serve as a guide for the mission, not approval authority. A re-evaluation of the mission goals might allow for the mission proposal to meet the affirmative in all questions.

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

1-53. To provide governance (security, order, and essential services) to a population, there must be a level of control over the populace and resources. To secure and stabilize the area and set conditions ideal for the consolidation of gains, the occupying force implements populace and resources control measures. These measures aim to secure and control the population and promote stability. In theaters where pre-existing treaties exist, the occupation of enemy territory results in a coalition of nations providing governance.

1-54. Populace and resources control measures result from policy developed at national and theater strategic levels and are implemented at the operational and tactical levels. Populace and resources controls are operations which provide security for the populace, deny personnel and materiel to the enemy, mobilize population and materiel resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of civilians. Resource control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (for example, roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

1-55. The degree of populace and resources control exercised by military government varies greatly due to several factors, including—

- Black market constructs—
  - Network size (local, regional, global).
  - Percentage of illicit economy versus licit economy and commodities traded.
- Influence of external criminal networks.
- Criminal activity.
- Existing civil networks.
- The legal authorities of the military commander under international law.
- The previous relationship between the U.S. Government and the deposed government.
- Existing attitudes and the level of cooperation among the host-nation's national, regional, and local leaders and the local populace.
- Ongoing and projected military operations.
- The presence of hostile or enemy forces.
- The level of civil obedience.
- Local existing laws.

For more information on populace and resources control, see ATP 3-57.10

1-56. The time during which CA enforces strict populace and resources control measures varies based on the requirements of the military operation and international law. To consolidate gains and promote stability, commanders implement measures to control the indigenous populace and available resources commensurate with military necessity. Such obedience provides security of military forces, maintenance of law and order, and proper administration of the operational area. Commanders can reduce infringement on the individual liberties of the local populace to reward civil obedience.

1-57. As conditions in the territory subject to populace and resources control measures begin to stabilize, the military authority's degree of control decreases. Authority and control transfers to the legitimate sovereign or to another civil authority. For more information on populace and resources control measures. See JP 3-57, FM 3 57, and ATP 3-57.10.

SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

1-58. *Support to civil administration* (SCA) is the assistance given by United States Armed Forces to stabilize or enhance the operations of the governing body of a foreign country by assisting an established or interim government. (See FM 3-57.)

1-59. At the strategic echelon, CA staff and planners support the actions of SCA through the implementation of plans, programs, and policies of the joint stability functions (security, foreign humanitarian assistance, rule of law, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure). CA forces at the tactical echelon conduct MGO in conjunction with the Army's stability operations tasks, which are—

- Establish civil security.
- Support to civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support to governance.
- Support to economic infrastructure and development.
- Conduct security cooperation.

1-60. CA forces support civil administration in occupied and host-nation territories. SCA in occupied territories requires using the joint stability functions to create a framework at the strategic and operational echelons to execute tactical level Army stability operations tasks. These stability operations tasks are required to obtain a stable population-centric operational environment. For more information on the operational environment, see JP 3-0 and for operational variables see ADP 1-01.

1-61. When CA forces provide SCA in host nations, they use the stabilization framework and Army stability operations tasks to support the DOS. The DOS can implement an interim civil authority or U.S foreign policy to support host-nation internal defense and development. ADP 3-07 provides information on the critical

stability aspects of SCA. ADP 3-07 discusses movement corridors and personnel recovery, which provides guidance to CA forces when conducting these aspects of SCA.

Note. CA forces can gain a baseline understanding of an operational environment through several means, which include the reviews of current CA area studies by other CA forces and government entities.

SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

1-62. Civil Affairs *support to civil administration* in an occupied territory is assistance given by United States Armed Forces to stabilize or enhance the operations of the governing body of a foreign country by assisting an established or interim government (FM 3-57). ***Support to civil administration in an occupied territory*** **is support provided to indigenous governing bodies during a military occupation**. SCA begins with the assertion of TMA and the establishment of a military government. Military government is essential to consolidate gains that are made in offensive operations. CA tailors SCA to the situation based on U.S. law, host-nation law, international law (including the law of war), international treaties, agreements, and memoranda of understanding. Subject to the military requirements, the plans directorate of a joint staff should avoid military activities disposed to increase tensions in the occupied territory and instead conduct activities to facilitate and accelerate a return to a civil administration. This is especially important in tribal, ethnic, racial, or cultural environments where one or more of the parties to a conflict invariably perceive a chosen course of action as biased against them.

1-63. In the close area, commanders primarily establish populace and resources control measures to mitigate the adverse effects on the population. Populace and resources control measures mitigate civil interference with military operations. Commanders establish populace and resources control measures to complement the execution of stability operations tasks. While U.S. forces establish rear areas, they assume a defensive posture and increase stability operations. Within these defensive operations, CA forces establish contact with existing civil authorities and networks to prioritize SCA efforts with coordination, cooperation, and support from U.S. civilian agencies at all levels. CA functional specialists provide expertise in civilian sector functions that are normally the responsibility of civilian authorities. In occupied territories, a typical plan of action includes—

- Asserting TMA.
- Dislocated civilian operations and foreign humanitarian assistance (civil reconnaissance [CR] civil engagement [CE], and support to civil administration [SCA]).
- Reestablishment of local government through civil network development [CND].
- Provision of emergency supplies through CR, CE, and CND.
- Public health and sanitation surveys (inputs from CR and CE).
- Organization of auxiliary police (build and integrate mobilized civil networks).
- Issuance of passes for necessary civilian travel population and resources control (PRC).
- Supporting the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program (integrate mobilized civil networks).
- Procurement of civilian labor for the army (integrate mobilized civil networks).
- Assistance to the Army in its relations with the civilian population (CND).
- Restoration to nearly normal pre-conflict conditions (SCA).
- Assisting with DDR activities (SCA).

Note. CA is integral to planning and coordinating the execution of the above tasks (and others) with civilian entities.

1-64. CA forces ensure governance, promote stabilization, and prevent a return to conflict, or an insurgency. When performing SCA in an occupied territory, CA forces—

- Monitor and anticipate future requirements of the indigenous populations and institutions regarding CA functional areas.
- Coordinate and synchronize collaborative interagency or multinational SCA operations.
- Monitor measures of performance and assess measures of effectiveness of SCA operations and costs.

- Assist in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of SCA operations.
- Coordinate and synchronizing transition of SCA operations from military to indigenous government or international transitional government control.
- Mobilize civil networks to assume civil administration responsibilities.

1-65. When the security situation develops beyond simple populace and resources control measures and essential services, control of the civil administration, when directed, is transitioned to another authority. Military forces continue SCA through security cooperation activities, deterrence, foreign internal defense, partner nation resiliency, and combatant commander campaign plans as a function of stability operations and irregular warfare.

1-66. CA units continue to facilitate the gradual transition of government functions to civilian authorities. Government functions relates to the institutions, laws, and administrative structure that provides organization, machinery, or agency through which a state exercises authority and performs functions. Continued CMI ensures SCA activities synchronize with unified action partners.

SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY

1-67. As the security situation stabilizes, the military government can transition from a civil administration in an occupied territory to a civil administration in a host-nation territory. ***Support to civil administration in a host-nation territory*** **is the support provided to a host nation to restore or enhance governance capability**. The DOS has the lead on foreign policy and controls the majority of the resources that can be used under the *Foreign Assistance Act*, Title 22, USC, the. These resources are typically tied to achieving U.S. interests.

1-68. Once an interim civilian government is established, military resources are exerted to support civil administration. Under this diplomatically arranged status, U.S. forces remain to support the interim or newly formed government. CA forces conduct SCA in a host-nation territory to support the DOS when implementing an interim civil authority or U.S. foreign policy to support host-nation internal defense and development.

1-69. When transitioning to a U.S. interim authority, the military assists the stabilization, resiliency, and if necessary, reconstruction efforts of the DOS and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) while the U.S. diplomatic mission resumes. Stabilization, resiliency, and reconstruction assistance may be required in a wide range of situations such as military occupation, counterinsurgency, and humanitarian crises response.

1-70. SCA in host-nation territory includes advising authorities and performing specific functions within the limits of authority and liability that international treaties and agreements establish. Security cooperation activities should be considered to strengthen the capability, capacities, and resiliencies of security forces in conjunction with the DOS and other USG agencies.

1-71. When a legitimate and functional host-nation government exists, military forces operating to support the state have a limited role. However, if the host-nation government cannot adequately perform its basic civil functions, some degree of military support to governance may be necessary. A state's domestic legitimacy is related to its perceived ability to provide essential services. In extreme cases, where civil government is completely dysfunctional or absent, military forces may provide basic functions of government under a civil administration in host-nation territory.

1-72. When conducting SCA in a host-nation territory, a CMOC or a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) can provide stabilization-focused, civil sector expertise as agreed upon by the USG and the host nation. Army CA units at echelon may form the core of a CMOC or a JCMOTF.

SUPPORT TO FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

1-73. All CA forces support foreign assistance to engage the civil component during competition. ***Support to foreign assistance*** **is civil or military aid and activities rendered to legitimate indigenous authorities of a foreign nation to support governance, promote stability, and create conditions for long-term stabilization to support United States Government objectives. Support to foreign assistance includes development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.** These activities are executed

as stand-alone events or concurrent with other exercises and programs to increase the impact. Since they occur during competition, all assistance activities and foreign discourse are through the diplomatic efforts of the DOS with coordination and cooperation with other functional lead U.S. civilian agencies at all levels.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

1-74. To understand the methods in which CA supports foreign assistance, it is important to establish how the DOD describes military support to foreign assistance. The Army identifies four strategic roles it employs to support the joint force and unified action partners in accomplishing its mission to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. These four strategic roles are shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. Shaping the operational environment to prevent conflict and to maintain stability for U.S. national interests is a key goal of all national powers and is primarily executed during competition.

1-75. Army operations to shape bring together activities intended to promote regional stability and to set conditions for a favorable outcome in the event of a military confrontation. Army operations to shape help dissuade adversary activities to achieve regional goals short of military conflict. Army operations to shape are continuous throughout a geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility. These operations occur before, during, and after a joint operation within an operational area.

1-76. Shaping activities include security cooperation and forward presence to promote U.S. interests, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, continuously setting the theater for operations and training while providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Regionally aligned and engaged Army forces are essential to accomplishing objectives to strengthen the global network of multinational partners and to prevent conflict.

1-77. The *Foreign Assistance Act* is 22 USC 2151. The act focuses on developing countries and supports foreign military financing programs, military assistance programs, and international military education training programs. The DOS controls the *Foreign Assistance Act*, which also supports economic support funds; peacekeeping operations; international narcotics control and law enforcement programs; and nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs. The act provides various forms of military assistance upon request (contingent upon Congressional approval) to assist foreign countries to fight internal and external aggression. The *Foreign Assistance Act* also mandates close coordination and cooperation between the DOD and U.S. civilian agencies at all levels of the security assistance process.

1-78. CA elements can engage the civil component during competition to support of the U.S. diplomatic mission in host-nation countries by engaging in the following programs with coordination and cooperation with other functional lead U.S. civilian agencies at all levels:

- Security assistance.
- Humanitarian assistance.
- Development assistance.

SUPPORT TO FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

1-79. CA forces conducting support to foreign assistance can complement, support, enhance, and enable security cooperation, theater security cooperation activities, deterrence, foreign internal defense, and combatant commander campaign plans as a function of stability operations. Within MGO, support to governance is a stability operations task that focuses on a stable population-centric operational environment. Working under these three activities allows CA forces to continue to conduct CR, CE, and CND.

1-80. CA forces conduct support to foreign assistance, mostly under Title 22 authorization, to enable and enhance the diplomatic mission by providing opportunities for interacting with and influencing civil populations and institutions. CA forces support the DOS in the promulgation of U.S. foreign policy to support a host-nation’s stability and resiliency. The MGO mission of support to foreign assistance is executed through the joint stabilization framework to align with the following USG stability sectors:

- Security.
- Justice and reconciliation.
- Governance and participation.
- Economic stabilization and infrastructure.
- Humanitarian assistance and social well-being.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

1-81. Security assistance is a group of programs DOD implements according to policies that the DOS establishes. U.S. security assistance programs provide defense articles, military training, and other defense related services to foreign nations through grants, loans, credits, or cash sales to further national policies and objectives. CA forces enable, synchronize, coordinate, and integrate civil information and knowledge into the planning and development of the common operational picture for these missions. CA forces provide civil measures of performance or measures of effectiveness to determine the impact on the indigenous populations and institutions.

1-82. *Security assistance* is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by the DOS, to be administered by the DOD or Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Through these programs, the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations. The DOD implements the programs that DOS policies establish. The principal components of these programs include foreign military sales, foreign military financing, international military education and training, peace operations, and excess defense articles.

SUPPORT TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

1-83. CA forces supporting security assistance programs—

- Identify partner-nation requirements.
- Develop civil networks to enable mission requirements.
- Develop or review the nomination list of programs or projects to support the mission.
- Determine the feasibility of each program.
- International military education and training for professional military education.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

1-84. The DOD humanitarian assistance mission includes several DOD programs conducted to build the capacity of partner nations. These programs provide essential services and meet basic human needs to ensure the well-being of the population.

1-85. The designated USG lead for coordination of foreign disaster response is the Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance within the USAID. The Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance is the lead federal coordinator for international disaster assistance, and lead integrator for the USG responding to natural disasters and complex crises globally. The Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance takes a holistic look at humanitarian aid and providing assistance before, during, and after a crisis. This includes non-emergency programming that is foundational to linking humanitarian assistance to long-term country development goals and strategies.

1-86. United States Armed Forces participation in humanitarian assistance may be limited in scope and duration. Their participation is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation that has the primary responsibility for providing assistance and support other USG departments or agencies. All humanitarian and other assistance should be in accordance with Title 10, USC, Chapter 20 (Humanitarian and Other Assistance).

1-87. Foreign humanitarian assistance consists of DOD activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. These operations are different from other DOD humanitarian assistance operations or activities because they may occur on short notice as a contingency operation to provide aid in specific crises or similar events. and because U.S. military forces perform these operations exclusively.

SUPPORT TO FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

1-88. The CA role within foreign humanitarian assistance is to assist the commander in planning; advising on the activities; and coordinating with unified action partners, indigenous populations and institutions, and interagency to synchronize efforts. CA forces also play a key role in conducting assessments. Humanitarian assistance operations are complex and require a significant amount of interagency coordination. Usually, humanitarian assistance is directed from the strategic level, planned and managed at the operational level, and conducted at the tactical level. To support humanitarian assistance activities on all levels, CA forces—

- Participate in interagency assessment, planning and synchronization of humanitarian assistance activities.
- Identify, validate, or evaluate host nation and international resources available for humanitarian assistance activities.
- Mobilize vetted and developed civil networks to aid in foreign humanitarian assistance activities.
- Advise, assist, and plan displaced civilian movement and control.
- Participate in the execution of selected humanitarian assistance activities as directed.
- Provide liaison with indigenous populations and institutions.
- Assist in the coordination of local labor.
- Coordinate with judge advocates to assist the commander to meet legal and moral obligations.
- Monitor and evaluate humanitarian assistance.
- Assess requirements and support for the operation of a CMOC.
- Conduct and maintain an assessment of humanitarian issues in designated nations or regions.
- Identify shortfalls in host-nation humanitarian assistance programs and resources.

See JP 3-29 for more information about foreign humanitarian assistance.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

1-89. Development assistance is a set of programs, projects, and activities that the USAID carries out that improve the lives of the citizens of developing countries while furthering United States foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and promoting free market economic growth. (See JP 3-08.)

1-90. Development assistance programs are a key component of U.S. foreign policy to encourage and sustain support to people of developing nations by improving their quality of life. The DOS executes development assistance programs directly or indirectly through USAID, which finances numerous programs to address the following needs:

- Agriculture and nutrition.
- Population control.
- Health.
- Education.
- Energy.
- Environment improvement.

SUPPORT TO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

1-91. The DOD is required to support the DOS during stabilization and reconstruction according to National Security Presidential Directive 44. Generally, the Department of the Army is the Service component responsible for occupying foreign territory and establishing military government. The Army coordinates with the interagency to support long-term development in foreign territory.

1-92. When supporting stabilization and reconstruction operations, U.S. forces must support, enhance, and maintain the legitimacy of the indigenous institutions at all times in civil networking. U.S. forces operate to support the American Embassy (U.S. Ambassador) by complement the agencies ensuring the indigenous institution of governance receives credit for successes to gain the maximum visibility and strengthen the government's legitimacy with the local populace. Operations should ensure continuous synchronization with

well-developed influence activities and liaisons with host-nation military. U.S. forces also support the American Embassy by—

- Providing CAO support as the lead element of U.S. Army support to developing nations. Examples include—
  - Proficiency in the civil sector.
  - Sociocultural understanding of the operational environment.
  - A working knowledge of host-national governmental organizations and structure.
  - Regional focus.
  - Economic development.
  - Liaison as required.
  - Possession of cultural or regional expertise to project and extend U.S. support.
  - Operational oversight and supervision as required.
  - Mentoring and training.
- Focusing on operations of lasting significance to the supported nations and long-term regional stability rather than short-term tasks. For example, operations focus on—
  - Supporting the ambassador's country plan and the combatant command's campaign plan.
  - Applying the correct mix of other military personnel and functions.
  - Applying measure of effectiveness to assess capabilities, capacities, and resources.

1-93. If a crisis emerges, commanders identify military requirements and objectives. Humanitarian and civic assistance in a host nation executes from staging areas to which forces deploy. CA forces support CMI and interorganizational cooperation that enables the host nation to facilitate staging and onward movement. Military forces, interagency partners, and the diplomatic mission coordinate with the host nation to obtain required permissions, authorities, and host-nation support.

1-94. If a crisis escalates to conflict, the USG establishes an initial response. The response includes tasks executed to stabilize an operational environment in a crisis state. The role of CA executing MGO can shift to SCA in host-nation territory with the proper diplomatic agreements. A theater CA planning team works with the joint planner in coordination and cooperation with U.S. civilian agencies at all levels. Performing minimum essential stability operations tasks allows military forces to attend to the immediate humanitarian needs of the host-nation population.

INTEGRATION OF OTHER CORE COMPETENCIES

1-95. MGO maintain a symbiotic relationship with the CA core competencies of civil network development and engagement (CNDE), civil knowledge integration, and CMI. The commander uses the three core competencies to gain situational understanding of the populous throughout the competition continuum. The relationship between these three competencies ensures MGO achieves the desired end state of the supporting commander allowing for a faster transition to stability.

1-96. Each MGO mission requires a varying amount of application of the other competencies at each echelon. For example, a CA company and teams execute CNDE at the tactical level through CR, CE, and CND, with limited application of civil knowledge integration, and CMI. A CA battalion possesses a greater capacity to execute civil knowledge integration and CMI. In addition, further and more specific capabilities reside in the higher echelons of the CA force, such as reachback for government functional specialty. As a result, understanding the capabilities and limitations of CA organizations is helpful when employing CA forces efficiently and effectively.

CIVIL NETWORK DEVELOPMENT AND ENGAGEMENT

1-97. Civil network capabilities and resources engage, evaluate, develop, and integrate into operations using CNDE. Commanders develop and engage civil networks to gain a complete understanding of the operational environment and to gain access to the networks to shape operational outcomes. A *civil network* is a collection of formal and informal groups, associations, military engagements, and organizations within an operational environment that interact with each other with varying degrees of frequency, trust, and collaboration (FM 3-57). Civil networks are mobilized or self-motivated to bring collective action and social or political pressure to an area of common interest.

1-98. CNDE is critical to MGO through the development of specific civil networks that possess the ability to execute or enhance governance capacity and capabilities. CA must identify, evaluate, and develop governance civil networks throughout the conflict continuum at all levels of warfare. Once CA identifies and vets the networks, they can mobilize the networks to extend operational reach and influence of a commander, preserve combat power and military resources through populace and resources control, and conduct government functions until civil authorities can resume control.

1-99. CNDE enables CA forces to execute MGO in the wake of large-scale combat operations. CNDE enables commanders to develop courses of action that create effects in the civil component, which facilitates consolidation of gains and creates multiple dilemmas for an enemy force attempting to act and maneuver through that area. Civil networks, specifically developed to enable governance and government functions, enhance the commander's ability to build stability within the area of operations. The following list is the steps of CNDE:

- Develop a civil network engagement plan.
- Conduct civil network engagement.
- Analyze civil networks.
- Develop selected civil networks.
- Evaluate developed civil networks.
- Integrate mobilized civil networks.

For more information regarding CNDE, see ATP 3-57.30.

CIVIL KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION

1-100. Civil knowledge integration is the action taken to analyze, evaluate, and organize collected civil information for operational relevance and to inform the warfighting function. CA integrates the resulting civil knowledge with other knowledge about the operational environment to create shared understanding among commanders, unified action partners, international organizations, and civilian partners. CA forces use civil knowledge integration primarily to inform, plan, focus, and direct MGO and CMO at all echelons. The Army incorporates civil knowledge integration through combining processes of intelligence preparation of the battlefield, information collection, targeting, risk management, and knowledge management.

1-101. Civil knowledge integration enables the commander to understand the operational environment and develop the common operational picture. CA units use this information as inputs to the CNDE process to refine information requirements and to shape branches, sequels, and other future missions. CNDE also provides inputs into the civil knowledge integration process that assists with refining and focusing the civil information collection plan. In addition, the process identifies specific civil networks that can fill gaps or requirements that CA units identify during operational planning and while collecting civil information and data. These specific civil networks enable units to conduct CAO effectively and efficiently. The steps of civil knowledge integration are as follows:

- Develop the civil information collection plan.
- Collect civil data.
- Process civil information.
- Analyze and evaluate civil information.
- Produce civil knowledge products.
- Integrate civil knowledge.

For more information regarding CKI, see ATP 3-57.50.

CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION

1-102. CMI is the actions taken to establish, maintain, influence, or leverage relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions to synchronize, coordinate, and enable interorganizational cooperation and to achieve unified action. CMI is essential to integrating operations with commanders and unified action partners to achieve unity of effort. The establishment of a CMOC, or other mechanisms, enables civil information sharing and integration. CNDE is critical to CMI using civil networks to synchronize, coordinate, and enable interorganizational cooperation within an area of operation to achieve unity of effort. These civil networks are specifically identified and developed to coordinate, disseminate, and

produce informational products that can synchronize efforts between civilian entities and military forces within a geographical area. These efforts help inform the indigenous populations and institutions and reduce risk to the populace and gain maneuverability, consolidate gains, preserve combat power, and enable mission command for the commander's military operations.

1-103. The primary method to facilitate CMI and interorganizational cooperation during MGO in crisis and conflict is through the establishment of a CMOC. CMI, which is affected by the CMOC, focuses on ensuring all entities in the area of operations are informed and understand the commander's intent and the common operational picture. The CMOC, in coordination with the S-9, G-9, and J-9 by echelon, is designed to share information, identify and distribute resources, and assist in the execution of CAO, MGO, and CMO.

Chapter 2

Planning, Consolidation of Gains, and Transitions in Military Government Operations

"*In the planning phase, military government was considered a staff function and was not self-contained. This was a mistake against which the military government sections protested, but on which they were overruled. Theoretically, we were to be messed* and *subsisted by Island Command, Island Command was located about five miles away and this was impractical. Under the circumstances, we existed on C-rations until we could beg, borrow, or steal sufficient cooking equipment, screening material, and material to build a mess hall."*

Report of
Lt. Paul S. Hawkins
Tinian Island, 27 June 1945
(Obsolete Publication)

Throughout the competition continuum, the CA planning teams review and update echelon specific contingency plans. These plans include concept of operations that enable CMI and anticipating implementation of a military government, when directed.

In large-scale combat operations, the focus of military government is the successful military authority to ensure a rapid and efficient consolidation of gains. CA forces may develop, or use established civil networks to ensure the sustainment or restoration of government functions and governance in the close area and minimize expenditure of Army resources and preserve combat power. This is usually a phased operation and should detail all aspects of conducting MGO and the criteria to transfer authorities when appropriate. A clear understanding of the current or previous governance system and then an identifiable and achievable end state with specific goals must be established for transitional planning and execution to be successful. This focused planning ensures effective use of civil networks and resources and expedites the transition to legitimate authority.

Leaders at all levels use consolidation of gains to integrate military, civilian, allies and partners to achieve results. Executing CMI enables leaders to achieve better results by integrating the full array of relevant efforts and actors spanning military, civilian, allies, and partners. *Consolidating gains* are activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for transition of control to other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Consolidation of gains is a function that permeates the tactical, operational, and theater strategic levels of warfare, and spans the competition continuum. The strength of consolidating gains is the ability to bring all partners and priorities together.

PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS

2-1. MGO are assessed and planned for much like all other CAO. Similar to CAO, MGO assessment begins when the unit or organization receives the mission and continues through the mission analysis process. The focus at all echelons is planning and executing MGO in support of maneuver commanders across the competition continuum. CA planners at all echelons plan to consolidate gains in support of maneuver commanders through stability operations tasks that ensure the continuity of government functions. MGO are assessed and planned for using the Army's operations process. Planners should incorporate a functional specialty team to understand the potential opportunities and risks in executing MGO. Planners use myriad resources to identify vulnerabilities within the stability sectors but chief among them are the CA government functional specialists.

2-2. Military government planning at the combatant command and higher levels (DOD and Joint Chiefs of Staff) is based on national policy directives and strategies. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the contingency planning guidance, prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, task the combatant command to develop plans for potential operational contingencies and deterrence. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan tasks the combatant command to prepare operation plans, selected concept plans (with or without time-phased force and deployment data), and functional plans. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System formalizes the planning process and develops orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision making in two related but distinct categories—contingency planning and CA planning—which differ primarily in the amount of available planning time.

2-3. The joint force command alerts the components in advance of need on expected force sourcing and includes a concept plan in their contingency plans for execution. The components share regional concept plans with units that their respective service component would potentially source. The ground force commander must plan military government in conjunction with any regional concept plan that includes a military intervention and the occupation of territory.

2-4. When conflict is imminent or when the National Security Council anticipates military action, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs issues a planning order to the respective joint force commanders to prepare operation plans.

CONSOLIDATING GAINS

2-5. Army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains throughout an operation as part of defeating the enemy to accomplish overall policy and strategic objectives. Early and effective consolidation activities are a form of exploitation Army forces perform while other operations are ongoing and achieve lasting favorable outcomes in the shortest time span. Tactical units consolidating on an objective in the close area is the first step in consolidating gains. Army forces consolidate gains for a sustained period over large land areas to support allies and unified action partners. CA forces enable the consolidation of gains through MGO. Military authorities temporarily govern, via military government in occupied areas until populations are stable enough for transition to legitimate civilian authorities. The transition of control to civil authorities reduces demands on combat power.

2-6. Historically, the Joint Force has recognized the Army as a leader of consolidating gains and deterrence in the land domain, however, some leaders underestimate Army capabilities that operate within air, maritime, cyberspace, and space for enhanced deterrent effects. As military leaders face aggressive competitor strategies across the range of military operations, the Army offers many cost-imposing deterrent options. These include low-cost command and control, intelligence, protection, and sustainment assets from across the total Army inventory (such as, Active Components, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve).

2-7. Regionally, the Army is well-positioned to consolidate gains to support integrated deterrence to protect security interests at home and abroad. From Soldier and unit presence in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-member nation states, to remote activities in lesser-known islands across the Pacific, the Army's ability to consolidate gains provides the Joint Force with a relative position of advantage to deter potential adversaries in key regions that contain U.S. security interests. Consolidation of gains also involves active integration with key allies and partners to facilitate long-term relationships of trust between Army leaders and their military counterparts who live and work on the ground. Consolidation of gains is a critical capability that enables Army leaders to build tactical trust with allies and partners that can produce partnerships and relationships that lead to an integrated deterrence at the strategic level.

2-8. Consolidating gains enables forces to transition from the occupation of a territory and control of populations through military government to control by civil authorities. The area of operations size is a challenge to maneuver commanders as they look to transfer control. The battlefield ranges from larger, expansive areas to more restrictive, congested, urban space, which makes transition difficult. Activities to consolidate gains continue through all phases of a military operation.

2-9. MGO are executed within the stabilization framework to support U.S. interests and consolidation of gains. These operations—

- Support governance by a host nation, an interim government, or a military government.
- Involve coercive and constructive actions.

- Help to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries.
- Assist in building relationships among unified action partners.
- Promote U.S. security interests.
- Help establish and improve political, legal, social, and economic institutions while supporting transition to a legitimate host-nation government.
- Cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives.
- Must maintain the initiative by pursuing objectives that resolve causes of instability.

2-10. Protection of civilians supports consolidation of gains because it establishes a safe and secure environment that fosters legitimacy for the government. To protect civilians, commanders may employ the following capabilities:

- Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear.
- Explosive ordnance disposal.

2-11. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units may be required to mitigate residual chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards to protect the civilian population, property, and equipment. These efforts may be assisted by or transition to interagency, international, and nongovernment entities.

2-12. Explosive ordnance disposal units mitigate residual explosive hazards. Explosive ordnance operations support emergency management efforts to counter the effects of unexploded ordnance and enable the restoration of civil security and essential services.

CIVIL AFFAIRS PLAN DEVELOPMENT

2-13. CA planners must identify civil considerations within the operational framework in conjunction with the supported unit's operational plan to determine the impact on military operations conflict. Planning and preparing for rear operations facilitate future consolidation of gains at the operational and tactical levels during armed conflict. Where possible, the theater army involves the rear area command posts of regionally aligned corps and divisions in the development and refinement of plans dealing with rear areas likely to be included in those unit's assigned areas of operation. CA planners must include regionally aligned maneuver enhancement brigades, regional support groups, CA units, and other units that primarily operate in the rear area when planning exercises prior to large-scale combat operations and any other operations.

2-14. Planners execute an assessment of governance to identify indicators within the operational environment that aid in targeting the assessments and follow-on operations. CA planners use previously established assessments of the current or previous systems of governance. In the event that an assessment doesn't exist, they must conduct an initial assessment before developing a plan of action to support the joint force commander. The assessment establishes a known point to plan, prepare, and execute campaign plans.

ARMY PLAN DEVELOPMENT

2-15. The Army is typically assigned as the land component command of a joint force command. One of the land component commander's responsibilities if enemy territory is occupied, is to set conditions for the establishment of a military government to restore or maintain government functions and to consolidate gains. The G-9 is responsible for identifying capabilities necessary to carry out the joint force commander's objectives and developing the unit annex K (Civil Affairs Operations). The operation order task-organizes subordinate units to carry out missions including military government. The Service components identify units for mobilization and deployment to support a military intervention. The Army arrays and task-organizes CA forces to conduct MGO throughout their assigned area of operations.

2-16. When considering consolidation of gains activities under the levels of warfare lens, the U.S. Army provides the preponderance of capabilities to the tactical level because of its size and focus on the land domain where civilians reside. The operational level requires greater coordination, resources, and effects, thus demanding efforts and capabilities across the joint force and ever-increasing involvement from unified action and host-nation partners. At the theater strategic level, consolidating gains involves the orchestration of diplomacy, information, military, and economic instruments of power. Optimal consolidation of gains builds on activities at each level of warfare to yield the greatest effects.

JOINT PLAN DEVELOPMENT

2-17. Joint force commanders implement the joint planning process when directed to prepare an operation plan. The J-9 identifies the requirements for establishing a military government in occupied territory. The J-9 also identifies Service components with the capabilities to establish a military government that can maintain government functions reflecting the joint force commander's visualized end state.

2-18. Regionally aligned CA forces support theater-level Army planning. These elements analyze the civil component of the operational environment and develop CA plans that support the combatant command's strategic plan. CA functional specialists support theater-level analysis and planning with expertise in specific governance sectors.

2-19. The joint force commander has a J-5 to incorporate military government into the overall operation plan through the attachment and publication of annex G (Civil-military Operations). The J-9 assists the J-5. The land campaign of a joint operation is typically tasked to a joint forces land component command. To establish a path to strategic victory, the land campaign culminates with stabilization and reconstruction and the transition to and enabling of an emergent civil authority. These plans must address military government if forces are going to initiate large scale combat operations. Commanders must alert service components early to mobilize and deploy the necessary capabilities to establish and maintain military government. The Army is responsible for establishing a temporary military government in occupied territory. All Service components have inherent capabilities to support military government. Service components provide CA, military police, engineer, and medical units necessary to perform government functions. International partners, allies, interagency, and the Joint Force view gains and prioritize them differently. The U.S. Army, as the primary landowner, is the critical element whose operations lead to creating gains that must be consolidated. Commanders at all echelons must understand how the actions they take contribute to the overall success of the mission. Commanders must understand which actions to consolidate as the initial steps toward the establishment of a military government and eventual transition of that military government to unified action partners or the host nation.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

2-20. Each joint force command prepares and maintains contingency plans. Understanding the operational environment is critical to the Army operations process. A CA planner analyzes operational variables and civil considerations to identify civil vulnerabilities. Planners focus the mission tasks of CR, CE, and CND on how various actors may exploit or be exploited within the operational environment. Within the operational variables, there are factors that planners can identify as societal vulnerabilities that undermine governance. Some of the vulnerabilities listed below are discussed in the following paragraphs:

- POLITICAL.
  - Sovereignty encroachment.
  - Cross-Border encroachment.
  - Ineffective government.
  - Political grievances.
- MILITARY.
  - Military leaders versus political and military leaders.
- ECONOMIC.
  - Economic inequality.
  - Illicit networks.
  - Resource scarcity.
- SOCIAL.
  - Mobilizing ideologies.
  - Divided societies (ethnic, religious, or cultural).
  - Demographic pressures.
  - Respect for human rights.

- INFORMATION.
  - Technification of society.
- INFRASTRUCTURE.
  - Infrastructure deficits.

SOVEREIGNTY ENCROACHMENT

2-21. Sovereignty encroachments are areas that are not subordinate or accountable to the national government. A group challenges the legitimacy and stability of the state when they declare in words or actions that the government no longer holds jurisdiction over them. Sovereignty requires a government that resident populations recognize as the supreme authority that has recognized borders and a monopoly on the use of force within those borders. Challenges to sovereignty include—

- Supplanting the government.
- Declaring a separate state within the territory of a recognized state.
- Refusing to recognize the rule of law and instead implementing different laws.
- Limiting central governance within a section of the country or running a shadow or alternative government.

2-22. Examples include cities or regions forging independent internal and even international policies and trade agreements based on their economic power, drug cartels establishing their own de facto rule over certain areas, and violent extremist groups taking over so-called ungoverned areas within the boundaries of states. External actors may easily exploit countries whose sovereignty is challenged by forging agreements with either the government or the challengers to gain advantage.

CROSS-BORDER ENCROACHMENT

2-23. Spillover effects from proximity to sources of instability. Conflict, illicit activity, and effects on the environment in one country may spill across the border due to proximity, sociocultural and historical ties, or deliberate efforts. Cross-border effects are largely the result of neighboring governments' inability to manage internal dynamics and maintain rule of law. For example, insurgents, violent extremist groups, or other criminal elements may cross borders to avoid authorities and draw the people or government of that area into the conflict or illicit activity. Groups can exploit cross border encroachment to gain advantage over people, groups, or governments through threats, withholding of resources and benefits, or direct interference in sovereign territories.

INEFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT

2-24. The inability of a government to provide for a society's essential needs. A government is deemed ineffective when it is unable to sufficiently provide the necessary public goods and services for its people to function in society, thus, failing to motivate public trust and participation. Ineffective governments range on a continuum. Examples of ineffective governance include an inability to impartially adjudicate legal cases or maintain public order, a legislature that cannot perform its representational duties, or bureaucracies that are not fulfilling basic needs for their population such as functioning hospitals, schools, utilities, and public transportation. Corruption, including nepotism, cronyism, kleptocracy, and other forms of predatory behavior are often symptoms of an ineffective government. Corruption may enhance perceptions of government failure or fill gaps in governance to advance their own interests to exploit government ineffectiveness.

MILITARY LEADERS VERSUS POLITICAL OR MILITARY LEADERS

2-25. Do military leaders respond to and carry out the orders of the government or do they act and govern on their own? Whether or not they are seen as legitimate by the populace is an indicator of the effectiveness of governance. A key indicator of weak governance and an illegitimate fighting force is the military acting as an internal policing agent as opposed to an agent of executing foreign policy.

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

2-26. Economic inequality exists when there is a skewed distribution of access to money and opportunity within a society relative to global norms. Economic inequality is the unequal distribution of income, wealth, and opportunity. Nearly all countries have seen wide discrepancies in wealth and income increase at different speeds. Nations from all six populated continents have massive wealth gaps between the richest and

the poorest, a prime example of economic inequality. At their extreme, this inequality includes substantial numbers of people with incomes below the international poverty line of $1.90 per day, as well as pervasive instances of homelessness, hunger, poor health, and low levels of education. Globalization is an important driver of economic inequality. Actors may exploit any real or perceived disparities to their advantage by mobilizing the have nots and portraying the haves or other elites as their oppressors.

ILLICIT NETWORKS

2-27. Illicit networks are organized systems of transaction operating outside of established norms that emerge when the state or other regulatory authority has limited control or is complicit in sustaining these networks. Both legal and illegal goods and services are exchanged across illicit networks. These systems can eventually develop internal legitimate structures that directly challenge, subvert, or otherwise undermine formal authority. The significance of illicit networks depends on the network's scope (such as local, national, or global), the types of goods and services exchanged such as weapons, illicit substances, human labor, and so forth), and the amount of money and number of people involved. Illicit networks are a pervasive feature of the operational environment and include drug cartels, radical ideological groups, human trafficking networks, unlicensed resource extraction ventures, and neighborhood gangs. Actors establish linkages with illicit networks to gain freedom of movement to pursue their interests by undermining governmental, economic and law and order systems.

RESOURCE SCARCITY

2-28. Resource scarcity occurs when the demand for a resource (or resources) exceeds the available supply. Economic decisions must be made to manage both the availability and the proper distribution of resources to meet specific needs. There are four distinctive types of scarcity: demand-induced, wherein demand for a resource increases, but the supply stays the same; supply-induced, wherein demand for a resource is consistent but the supply decreases; structural, wherein the resource is unable to be harvested or distributed for structural reasons; and government interference, wherein policy restricts the resource, which causes slow or interrupted supply chains. When scarcity occurs, it can lead to competition for resources among different groups. Scarcity of arable land can create competition and conflict among groups, labor shortages can force populations to economically migrate, or a fixed supply of transport networks may produce massive congestion. Actors exploit resource scarcity by exacerbating or mitigating the deficit to sew instability or to curry favor with the government or population.

MOBILIZING IDEOLOGIES

2-29. Unifying belief systems threaten the status quo. Ideologies that unify a critical mass of people in defiance of political authority can be a major source of instability in any political system. Unifying belief systems are most potent when they incentivize large segments of a population to act collectively in pursuit of an alternative socio-political configuration. Ideological belief systems that threaten the political status quo may be rooted in religious, communal, historical, or other group-identity forms of solidarity. Belief systems often invoke tropes and symbols that harken to an idealized past in which the imagined bonds of communal solidarity were either deeper, more easily understood, or better aligned with the sociocultural foundations or realities of a given population. Actors can exploit mobilized ideologies in various ways to destabilize a country, particularly by strengthening mobilized movements through misinformation or other information campaigns.

DIVIDED SOCIETIES

2-30. Competing values or identities create factions within communities. Societies are divided when differences between groups create perceptions of deep, insurmountable divisions. The factions that emerge may be based on politics, culture or ethnicity, and religion. The inability to communicate through a shared language can create division. Pronounced sociocultural divisions can foster intolerance, competition, friction, and sometimes high levels of violence. Groups can use strategic information campaigns to easily divide societies and exacerbate divisions, especially in areas with longstanding historical conflicts. Even in areas with burgeoning conflicts, actors who understand the differences between opposing groups can easily exploit them for their own ends.

DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES

2-31. Significant changes within a population can cause stress. Significant changes to the demographic structure of populations create social and political pressures that often lead to internal competition and conflict. These pressures manifest as stress on the economic, health, environmental, political, and security well-being of populations with their form depending on existing social structures. Demographic shifts include substantial imbalances in demographic pyramids (such as youth bulges, aging populations, and lost generations), or changes to the distribution of a given population (such as urbanization and emigration). Shifts in demographic structures often occur in response to broader changes in the socio-political environment. Migration, for instance, may be rooted in armed conflict, environmental strain, or new economic opportunities, whereas changes to demographic pyramids may occur through improvements in health care, increased prosperity, or government policies limiting population growth. Demographic pressures may strain the environment's ability to support a population and in doing so create social tensions and divisions. Actors may leverage these challenges to their advantage by easing some of the pressures and thus gaining favor with populations and governments.

TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES WITHIN SOCIETY

2-32. Mass adoption of disruptive technologies, trends, and significant technological changes can rapidly upend established sociocultural norms. Many societies are becoming increasingly reliant on the digitalization of many aspects of life. Widespread access to information and communication via the Internet of Things creates more informed and connected populations. Private encryption technology enables users to bypass institutional systems to conduct business, manage wealth, and communicate. Automation, including artificial intelligence, is replacing human labor and technology, and increasingly controlling and operating vital systems. This technification of society may exacerbate social inequities, creating additional divisions in societies. Access to new technologies varies globally and is primarily available to those with control over its distribution and use. Actors exploit technologically controlled systems through actual or threatened intrusion, damage, and destruction potentially leading to denial of essential services, economic, and risk to public health. Additionally, actors may seek to use perceived failures or shortcomings against a government as leverage or to foment unrest among affected populations.

INFRASTRUCTURE DEFICITS

2-33. Inadequacy of systems and institutions to provide basic services and needs is an example of infrastructure deficits. Infrastructure deficits exist where the quality and reach of the physical framework of public systems is insufficient for a population. Expectations for physical infrastructure depend on the particularities of a given socio-political environment, but usually include—

- Transport infrastructure, such as—
  - Roads.
  - Bridges.
  - Ports.
  - Rail lines.
  - Airports
- Energy infrastructure, such as—
  - Electricity (sources: solar, nuclear, hydro, and so forth).
  - Natural gas and oil.
  - Cross border energy infrastructure.
- Information and communication technology, such as—
  - Internet.
  - Mobile telephone.
  - Radio.
  - Emergency broadcast systems.
- Water and sanitation infrastructure.

2-34. Infrastructure deficits are unequally distributed at the international and national levels and are often linked to levels of economic prosperity. However, policies, strategies, and application of state resources contribute to the quality and reach of basic services provision. Infrastructure deficits allow actors to intervene

by helping to build, upgrade and maintain basic infrastructure, often in ways that create indebtedness or other beholden relationships that are primarily beneficial to the external actor.

GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT TOOLS

2-35. CA forces execute MGO using multiple types of assessments. Capacity and functions are continually assessed before, during, and after a crisis or conflict beginning with the governance assessment process (GAP). CA forces perform the initial assessment, deliberate assessment, and the survey to develop an area study and to confirm an understanding of civil considerations. The overarching focus for the area study and assessments is on CR, CE, and CND to collect information based upon stability sectors or stability operations tasks (depending on echelon). Gathering information needs to be tied to one or both. Additionally, each type of assessment in the progression becomes more focused, specific, and detailed, with the goal of identifying those civil vulnerabilities or opportunities related to institutions, facilities, essential services, and civil administration.

2-36. When forces organize consolidation of gains efforts across the competition continuum, distinct purposes emerge for competition, crisis, and large-scale combat operations. In competition, consolidation of gains contributes to setting the theater and reducing latent risk (risk deferred to later stages on the continuum). Consolidation of gains activities aim to capitalize on previous efforts and leverage advantageous positions to prevail in a crisis. Consolidation of gains progress at each stage on the continuum, which contributes to success at later stages while decreasing costs and risks. Accordingly, the preponderance of consolidation of gains investments should occur in the competition stage to maximize success in a crisis and a victory in conflict.

GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

2-37. The GAP provides the framework for assessing governance by analyzing capability, evaluating the populace's view of that government's legitimacy, identifying governance gaps, and modeling strategies for addressing those gaps within the civil component of an area of operations. The GAP is a process not a platform at every level. A Soldier with a notebook can execute the GAP at the tactical level, which requires minimal resources, or as an advanced analytical tool that automated systems and capabilities at higher levels support. The GAP's design is effective across the competition continuum, yielding similar results regardless of environment.

2-38. When a state at the national or local level does not have the capability, capacity, or motivation to provide for the needs of a target population, then informal governance structures emerge to fill that void. Those informal structures can be in concert with, or in opposition to the formal government structure. The GAP aids in the identification of those governance gaps and development of CAO to address them.

2-39. The analysis of data and information through the GAP creates the civil knowledge that allows CA planners to develop and evaluate options for affecting legitimacy of relevant governing bodies.

2-40. The GAP is explained in detail in appendix B. The four steps of the GAP are—

- Step 1: analyze relevant governing bodies.
- Step 2: identify governance gaps.
- Step 3: develop implementation strategies.
- Step 4: evaluate and prioritize options.

CIVIL AFFAIRS AREA STUDY

2-41. CA personnel obtain, analyze, evaluate, and record information as part of the running estimate prior to operations. The J-9 regional threaten CA planning teams at joint force commands or theater armies collect information while conducting civil preparation of the environment. The CA area study establishes baseline information relating to the civil component of the area in question. The information is by country regions or for a specific subnational area within a country. The CA area study presents a description and analysis of the operational variables using a combination of open- and restricted-source materials.

2-42. The CA area study is composed of three sections. CA personnel conducting civil preparation of the environment update each section. Section I is the initiation of an area study that provides commanders and staff with general information on a region or country. Section II is a composite collection of civil information collated into the operational variables. Section III is the analysis and evaluation of information as related to the stability sectors. Commanders obtain this information through ongoing assessments, surveys, and studies.

The information uses the stability sectors to assist commanders with understanding and visualizing operational actions they need to perform to maintain or gain stability in their area of operation.

2-43. During MGO, military government and functional specialists assigned to a CA organization are a major source of expertise on civil information in their focus areas. The military government and functional specialists develop detailed information to give CA personnel a better understanding of the country's government and the services it provides at each level (village, town, district, province, nation) facilitating civil knowledge integration to the supported commander's decision-making process.

CIVIL AFFAIRS ASSESSMENTS

2-44. CA assessments provide an effective means to gather relevant civil information to incorporate in the civil preparation of the environment. Assessments are a critical component of the Army operations process. The Army uses multiple assessments methodologies to inform mission analysis. The Army uses mission variables to assess the tactical situation. At the operational level, the Army uses operational variables to assess the operational environment. CA planners contribute to the mission analysis with their informed understanding of civil considerations. Gathering information should not be a haphazard process; each type of assessment is built upon the information and analysis of the previous type.

Initial Assessments

2-45. While the CA forces prepare a CA area study as a continual process prior to deployment, the initial assessment is conducted upon entry into the designated area of operation. The initial assessment occurs upon entry into the operational area as MGO planners focus their efforts to collect, collate, update, and process current essential services and civil administration information from available resources. CA collects much of the information from news media, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, social media or the populace to formulate an initial assessment. The objective and focus of the initial assessment should be broad enough to allow CA forces to quickly get an updated baseline of the general conditions within the entire area of operation. CA forces use their knowledge of the conditions within the area of operations to validate or refute the information and assumptions used in planning, as well as to update focused priorities and the civil information collection plan. During continuous operations, the initial assessment requirement may not be necessary for follow-on CA forces due to the transfer of current and detailed knowledge as part of the civil knowledge integration process. There is always a chance that confidence and support of the population may degrade if multiple tactical elements conduct the initial assessments on the same area, facility, or population due to miscommunication or poor planning. CA teams conducting initial assessments must understand specific requirements for MGO and must always be aware of the security situation.

Deliberate Assessments

2-46. CA conducts deliberate assessments according to CAO priorities and the civil information collection plan. The assessments are a determination of current conditions, capabilities, or attitudes within defined areas. Deliberate assessments are characterized by firsthand observation, interviews, and other tools to gather information used to make informed decisions and to determine locations and priorities for follow-on, in-depth analysis. The deliberate assessment should focus on the specifics of essential services and civil administration. CA should direct deliberate assessment toward civil security and control, essential services, governance, economic, and infrastructure. When executing MGO during large scale combat operations, CA elements at all echelons may use a wide variety of detailed checklists or formats during a deliberate assessment to ensure they have scrutinized all aspects of the assessment area. The deliberate assessment may necessitate the use of specific government functional specialists to execute an in-depth assessment of a specific area or thing. These experts may be assigned to units in the operations area and involved directly in the assessment process or located in rear areas and integrated via reachback.

Surveys

2-47. The survey is a detailed assessment in which the object of the assessment is examined carefully, as during an inspection or investigation. CA conducts surveys in a methodical manner according to the specific information requirements that are related to the priority information requirements, and on specific locations that require in-depth analysis during deliberate assessments. The analysis may include people, groups,

locations, facilities, or capabilities within a location or part of a critical geopolitical, cultural, or ethnic system. During the survey, the CA element at each echelon may use a variety of detailed checklists or formats to ensure it has remained focused on the requirements for survey. Surveys usually necessitate the use of specific government functional specialists to execute an in-depth assessment of a civil sector specific capability, resource, or risk. Like the deliberate assessment, CA personnel use these functional experts for their immediate knowledge or expertise either as a member of the unit, or through reachback to a CA unit staff in rear areas. The focus is on refining details related to stability, essential services, or civil administration. Survey development should leverage operations and research analysis capabilities if available. The findings of a survey may lead to refined mission statements or reallocation of forces and resources based on the recommendations of the experts executing the survey.

2-48. Army forces planning assessments use analysis tools to stay informed such as the mission variables known as METT-TC (I): mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations, and PMESII-PT: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. Civil considerations are crucial for every commander's mission analysis. Commanders rely on CA capabilities to provide civil considerations expertise. Commanders at the operational level use operational variables, many of which capture civilian variables within the area of operation. Other tools are available to enhance analysis of the mission and operational environment. When assessing the military aspects of terrain, the commander and staff can use the mnemonic OAKOC: observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment. When assessing the infrastructure operational variable, use the mnemonic SWEAT-MSO: sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations. For more information on CA planning, area study format, assessments, and surveys, see ATP 3-57.60.

ANTICIPATE, PLAN, AND EXECUTE TRANSITIONS

2-49. Transitions mark a change of focus in an operation. The S-9, G-9, J-9, and other CA planners must anticipate transitions as part of the initial plan. These planners must ensure that branches and sequels are developed to account for changes in the mission, transitions, and unexpected events within the operational are that affect the civil population. Effective transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution, so the force can maintain the momentum and tempo of operations. Common transitions may be between competition, crisis, and armed conflict. Common transitions also include—

- Task organization changes.
- Passing of responsibility for civil networks crossing unit or echelon boundaries.
- Passing of terrain responsibility between units.
- Transitions based on political decision points will mark a change of focus in an operation. The S-9, G-9, J-9, and other CA planners must anticipate transitions as part of the initial plan.
- Changes in the environment that cause a reframe of the mission or change in the operation's purpose.

TRANSITION PLANNING

2-50. CA planners and staff officers identify potential transitions during planning and account for them throughout execution. Transition planning and preparation should include—

- Forecasting when and how to transition areas of responsibility.
- Establishing protocols to transition civil networks.
- Creating a task organization that anticipates transitions.
- Ensuring the force understands changes to rules of engagement during mission transitions.
- Understanding potential unintended consequences and the risk they pose to successful transition.

2-51. CA planners and forces must consider the time required to plan, prepare, execute, and assess transitions. Planners must also consider friction due to the environment, degraded communications, and enemy action.

TRANSITION TO OTHER LEGITIMATE AUTHORITIES

2-52. The primary goal of CA forces conducting military government is to transition governance and government function to appropriate civil authorities as quickly as possible. Once the transition criteria are met, it is incumbent upon the S-9, G-9, and J-9 to recommend transition to the commander. CA forces must evaluate civil networks developed during competition for transition, termination, or assimilation into the new

government. Facilitating consolidation of gains while executing MGO according to the six stability operations tasks, enables the synchronization, coordination, and integration of all military efforts to transfer operations to civil authorities. In an SCA environment, where CA forces enable a diminished government because of a natural or manmade disaster, transfer back to the proper civil authorities is of primary concern. In all instances when CA conducts MGO, the primary goal is to transfer military control to the appropriate civil authorities as quickly as possible.

CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMING

2-53. Lead component commanders facilitate CMI with interagency partners by organizing and employing civil-military teams in occupied enemy territory. Lead component commanders can employ civil-military teams or task forces suited to rapidly engaging indigenous populations and institutions in bypassed populations to promote stability and consolidate gains. U.S. forces integrate host-nation civil capabilities to begin the transfer of governance to other legitimate authorities.

2-54. A JCMOTF is a scalable organization purposely built to lead civil military and stability operations within an area of operation to enhance, enable, or provide governance while consolidating gains, and freeing the supported commander's combat power. A JCMOTF lays the foundation for stabilization and reconstruction. The primary mission of this task force is to focus the stability efforts in an area of operation under one command line, thereby increasing the speed and efficiency of stability operations tasks. The speed with which transition occurs from U.S. forces to local authorities is dependent on the ability to plan and control elements aimed at increasing governance at the tactical and operational levels.

2-55. The JCMOTF is temporarily task-organized with formations sourced from Army units and assigned to a any echelon of command in the area of operation. From the execution of consolidation of gains in the close area to stabilization efforts in the rear areas, the ratio of CA units to the other CMO enablers changes as the mission necessitates. The further the task force is from the close area, the greater the necessity for more CA forces to establish the core of a JCMOTF with the commander, staff, and their respective subordinate units. It is in these areas that stability, governance, resilience, and stabilization are the bulk of the task force operations. In rear areas, a CA brigade or CACOM size task force is the templated size element to execute civil administration and to provide essential services within an area of operation based on terrain and population density. However, the JCMOTF is scalable based on multiple planning factors. Elements from the following capabilities augment the JCMOTF:

- Public affairs.
- Maneuver elements.
- Engineers.
- Medical units.
- Military police.
- Logistics and transportation elements.
- Other units as necessary for stabilization activities.

2-56. A JCMOTF or CMOC can provide the DOD linkage with interagency and interorganizational partners. During large-scale combat operations and consolidation of gains, a JCMOTF or CMOC can—

- Act as a stand-alone task force or subordinate unit to a higher task force.
- Assist unit commanders when their organic ability cannot meet the civil needs of their area of operations.
- Plan and direct CAO and CMO to support stability.
- Coordinate and manage the contributions of each warfighting function withing the area of operations.
- Provide command and control, or direction of military host-nation advisory, assessment, planning, and other assistance activities by U.S. forces.
- Assist in establishing military-to-civilian links to facilitate cooperative assistance arrangements.
- Perform essential coordination or liaison with host-nation agencies; country teams; United Nations agencies; and deployed U.S., multinational, and host-nation military forces and supporting logistic organizations.
- Assist in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects to—

- Build civil acceptance and support of U.S. operations.
- Promote local capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development.
- Advise and assist in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services.
- Facilitate the transition to peacekeeping or consolidation operations and the associated transfer of responsibilities to other government agencies, international organizations, or the host-nation.

2-57. During a crisis, a JCMOTF enables interactions between military and interagency groups and interorganizational partners through CMI to—

- Respond to humanitarian needs.
- Provide disaster relief.
- Build partner nation capacity and partner nation governance.

2-58. If the commander orders the execution of a JCMOTF during competition or crisis, it provides the organizational structure to facilitate MGO support foreign assistance in cooperation with the U.S. Embassy under Title 22, USC, authority.

2-59. A JCMOTF empowers the commander with proactive and responsive CAO. This leads to consolidating gains and preservation of combat power for the supported commander to use in offensive, defensive, or stability operations elsewhere in the area of operation.

2-60. JCMOTF can command and control CA forces and partner elements needed to support—

- Increased governance capacity.
- Increased civil security.
- Increased civil control.
- Restoration of essential services.
- Response to humanitarian needs.

2-61. When working in joint environments, CA elements form the core of a JCMOTF. As a supporting commander, the task force commander ascertains and fulfills the needs of the supported commander within the imposed parameters by determining the type of force, employment, and procedures the force requires. (See figure 2-1.)

2-62. When updating theater concept plan, planners must understand that as a baseline for deployment, CA forces are allocated on an existence basis. For example, one CACOM per theater, one CA brigade per corps, one CA battalion per division, one company per brigade combat team, and so forth However, there are other factors that require more CA forces or less forces, to be allocated at each level.

2-63. CA planners use the additional rules for allocation (shown in figure 2-1) to ensure each area is addressed with the proper amount of CA force augmentation. Planners use four variables that affect workload as a tool change in the CA force package. The are two major factors and two assumptions. The major factors are population density and square mileage of the occupied area. The two assumptions are based on the populations access to resources and efficacy of government.

2-64. Trends in urbanization continue to challenge the normal allocation of forces necessary to achieve operational success amongst a large number of civilians within a condensed footprint. The occupation of large, urban areas during large scale combat operations requires a more robust force augmentation package to implement the populace and resources control measures necessary to implement a military government and begin the consolidation of gains.

2-65. The left portion of figure 2-1 depicts a baseline for a CA team. The assumption is that a CA team working within a brigade combat team area of operations, can manage 100,000 people in an area of 1,125 square miles (89 per square mile), if the number of resources available is greater than or equal to 70%, and the government capacity is functioning at a capacity greater than or equal to 70%. This formula was derived using population numbers from an average size U.S. county and must be modified if the area or population increases or the resources or host-nation capacity decreases.

CA Team Baseline 89 per mi^2			CA Company Baseline 89 per mi^2	
Population	Area		Population	Area
100,000	1,125 mi^2		500,000	5,625 mi^2
Resources Available	Government Capacity		Resources Available	Government Capacity
=> 70%	=> 70%		=> 70%	=> 70%

Figure 2-1. Planning variables for Civil Affairs MGO augmentation, example

2-66. The right portion of figure 2-1 illustrates the same resources available and the same government capacity, however, the population and area are five times larger, necessitating five teams, or one CA company.

2-67. The CA company is the lowest level unit augmentation rules of allocation provide. CA teams are not allocated to Army forces through rules of allocation. CA teams, based on the mission requirements, may be attached from the company to subordinate elements of the brigade combat team or equivalent-sized element.

2-68. CA planners allocate CACOMs and brigades most effectively as general support elements for a specific area of operation. Planners do not conduct all operations in conjunction with a brigade combat team. A task force commanded by CA forces may be allocated to rear area support elements such as expeditionary support commands, and regional support groups. These support elements are responsible for military government, consolidation of gains, and stability operations in the division and corps rear areas or joint security area. See FM 3-57 and ATP 3-57.60 for more information about rules of allocation for CA forces. JP 3-57 and JP 3-33 provide additional information on the establishment of a JCMOTF and its capabilities.

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Chapter 3

Military Government Operations in Conflict

"The initial, and perhaps the primary, service which Military Government can render to the combat forces is the prompt restoration of public order and safety. Through reorganization of the native police and securing the careful use of military police, public safety officers contribute to the security of the occupying forces."

"One of the responsibilities laid upon us as "occupying forces" by international law is that of the restoration of public order within the country we occupy. How execution of this responsibility has paid off is shown in the peaceful submission of the Okinawan and German civilians to our rule."

Civil Affairs Report (Part I) 1944-1945
HQ, A.C.
(Obsolete Publication)

To effectively campaign throughout the transition from armed conflict to competition, joint and Army forces take specific actions that assert TMA over occupied territories to establish a military government (for example, The Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, and the law of war). The execution of military governance is an inescapable, crucial aspect of warfare that senior military and civilian leaders must consider.

Joint and Army planners plan and prepare for the execution of military governance before, during, and after armed conflicts. Commanders may task organize for the purpose of executing governance operations. This type of planning warrants the same level of preparation as waging armed conflict as it is essential to consolidating gains and preserving combat power for the commander. (See figure 3-1, page 36.)

MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS DURING CONFLICT

3-1. Armed conflict occurs when a state or nonstate actor uses lethal force as the primary means to satisfy its interests. Armed conflict can range from irregular warfare to conventional warfare and combinations of both. Entering and terminating armed conflict is a political decision. Army forces may enter conflict with some advanced warning during a prolonged crisis or with little warning during competition. How well Army forces are prepared to enter an armed conflict depends upon decisions and preparations made during competition and crisis.

3-2. One of the four strategic roles of the Army is to prevail in large-scale ground combat. The ability to control areas of land that are normally occupied by civilian populations is essential. ADP 3-0 states that "…war is inextricably tied to the populations inhabiting the land domain." As such, almost every conflict the U.S. Army participates in occurs among the civilian populations inhabiting that land.

3-3. As the joint force quickly transitions to armed conflict, CA forces mobilize civil networks. This enables joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; population and resources control and foreign humanitarian assistance to support SCA in a host-nation territory.

3-4. During the commencement of offensive operations, CA units focus on establishing or reestablishing contact with civil authorities or civil networks. Doing so enables situational understanding (which enhances the decision making of the commander), targeting, executing effects, and reducing civil interference (which preserves combat power). Commanders can allocate or task-organize CA to engage, assess, and evaluate the civil components of bypassed population centers to begin stabilization processes.




Figure 3-1. Military government operations in conflict

3-5. CA forces use CMI and the developed civil networks within the area of operation to support TMA or to conduct SCA which enables accomplishing U.S. military objectives. Joint Chiefs of Staff conduct initial planning for military governments incorporating civil military and CAO into theater Army campaign plans. Civilian affairs command commanders support the theater planning with CA forces to augment the theater CA planning teams, J-9, or G-9 to develop these plans prior to the initiation of armed conflict.

3-6. CA forces and their supported commanders understand that the assertion of TMA allows them to provide military government. However, it is the rule of law and populace and resources control that facilitates the governance to consolidate gains, protect the force and the population, and set conditions for stabilization and reconstruction.

3-7. Achieving a level of security and stability is the first step to provide SCA in an occupied territory. Various international agreements outline the U.S. obligations to use all measures in its power to restore public order and safety while respecting the laws and governments in the occupied territories.

3-8. Commanders must conduct protection tasks to protect friendly forces, populations, installation routes, critical infrastructure, and actions within their area of operations. In occupied territory, forces first conduct minimum-essential stability operations tasks, then provide essential governmental services, emergency, and humanitarian relief according to the law of war. It is, therefore, necessary for the Army to understand the

requirements to establish a governance structure to control the populace and resources of an occupied area during operations, then be able to transfer control to a legitimate authority.

3-9. CA forces enable the Army to conduct military government through the application of MGO. CA forces conducting MGO can provide governance action by identifying viable governance networks in close and deep areas. This enables populace and resource control measures in addition to conducting military government in close and rear areas including transferring control to legitimate authorities.

DEEP AREA OPERATIONS

3-10. The deep area is where the commander sets conditions for future success in close combat. A deep area is considered a denied area; and therefore, is an area under enemy or unfriendly control. In this area, friendly forces cannot expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force capabilities. However, the deep area can be influenced and affected from contiguous areas. CA forces conduct preparation of the environment to set conditions for MGO to influence the denied space. Through the execution of CNDE, CA forces continue the process of identifying, connecting with, and analyzing civil networks in the deep areas to fulfill governance roles as operations continue. These governance networks can influence and achieve effects through their capabilities and capacities and are invaluable resources to identifying the needs of the population.

3-11. Identification of governance networks starts with identifying governments in exile or civil networks that are supportive of U.S. or allied forces operations and end states. Selecting the appropriate civil networks with the capabilities, resources, and capacities to gain civil knowledge, which can be used for desired effects within the framework of the USG stability sectors, is critical. Civil networks are developed in the deep though proxy elements or contiguous networks that can contact, influence, and enhance a relationship. CA forces can leverage civil networks in denied areas to consolidate gains for the supported maneuver commander. Civil networks in the deep can produce non-governance effects initially and reassess for transition to MGO use. Of specific interest in the deep area are civil networks that have expertise in logistics, medicine, civil security, civil control, and essential services, which commanders in the close area need to consolidate gains. (See ATP 3-57.30 for more information on civil network development and ATP 3-57.80 for more information on developing civil networks in denied areas.)

3-12. Once U.S. forces identify legitimate networks, targeted operations can begin to prepare the networks to stand up governance capacity and influence in the deep area. These networks influence the movement of the populace and resources during operations to ensure freedom of maneuver of friendly forces and the quick transition to consolidation of gains once offensive operations have passed. Governance networks assist friendly elements to identify and target criminal elements and asymmetric threats in the area of operation.

3-13. It is important for CA forces at echelon to vet networks for their motivation and governance capability. (Appendix B provides a tool to evaluate the capacity and capability of a governance network.) A network's willingness to work with U.S. forces does not guarantee it is the best network for U.S. forces to engage with. Governance networks motivated by grievance or networks that do not have the capability or capacity they are espousing are not effective partners.

3-14. Governance networks are valuable sources of information regarding the capability and capacity of the civil component in the deep area. Their information aids in the planning for future MGO as the battlefield moves in pursuit of the enemy. Essential service capacity and the amount, capability, and disposition of civil security elements are important due to their ability to facilitate the minimum essential, stability operations tasks in the close. CA elements must pass civil information back to planners in the Corps and task force to ensure that resources and forces essential for conducting stability operations are ready and the integration of these governance networks into operations occurs as quickly and seamlessly as possible.

3-15. CA operation staff elements are responsible for conducting the necessary CMI to transition governance networks to CA elements and other governmental agencies in the close and rear areas. The CAO staff is responsible for the civil information these networks provide. The analyzed and evaluated information informs and updates the COP and civil considerations through civil knowledge integration. These governance networks have the local knowledge and influence to plan and guide stability efforts that have local buy-in and can quickly transition to local control when practicable. CA elements that focus on governance networks

in the deep area must closely coordinate with follow-on elements to ensure this transfer is done quickly and with the safety and security of these networks in mind.

3-16. Adversaries work in direct opposition and sabotage stability efforts of the current governing apparatus in an attempt to destabilize the populace. Governance networks have access to information of the current, governing apparatus, which is valuable for the planning of military information support operations, to leverage competitive governance actions aimed at delegitimizing the hostile government or shifts the population's support.

3-17. When the networks are transitioned to the close area, their capabilities continue to develop. The safety and security of these networks is imperative. Their willingness to work with U.S. forces, and against adversary elements, puts them at an increased risk of retaliation. CA elements must ensure the supported commander and staff are aware of these networks are available for inclusion in the protection plan.

CLOSE AREA OPERATIONS

3-18. The *close area* is the portion of the commander's area of operations where most subordinate maneuver forces conduct close combat (ADP 3-0). The area typically extends from the forward line of own troops back to a distance that is reliably out of enemy, indirect fire range. Operations in the close area generally focus on the main and supporting efforts in direct contact with enemy elements. MGO within the close area are constrained to the minimum essential stability operations tasks and populace and resources control measures to provide for the protection and well-being of civilian populations. Stability operations begin the process of consolidation of gains. The close area is where the commander asserts TMA and conducts military government.

3-19. Military government in the close area focuses on population and resources control to ensure freedom of maneuver for friendly elements. These actions enable friendly forces freedom of maneuver by ensuring civilians in need of support are not unintentionally putting themselves in the axis of advance of friendly elements still in close combat with the enemy. Previously developed civil networks provide manpower, capabilities, resources, and capacities that integrate into current operations that conserve combat power for the commander and extend the culmination point for Army forces. For example, civil networks in the close area could provide sustainment, medical capabilities, and early warning of enemy activity.

3-20. Active combat in the close areas increases risk to civilians and critical infrastructure. The needs of the civilian population become greater as services and supplies that the local government normally provides is delayed or shifts to unified action partners with limited maneuverability on the battlefield. Therefore, it is vital for CA forces to identify civilian needs as quickly as possible and begin the process of segregating the populace from the areas of military operations, directing them to safer areas and conducting the minimum essential stability operations tasks. CA elements working in the close largely do the work of triaging civilian needs to ensure the most efficient use of Corps resources that focus on stability. CA forces conducting CR, CE, and CND identify immediate needs of the civilians in the area and begin the process of marshalling resources to those in need.

3-21. In simultaneity, the military government specialists focus on broader stability efforts that align with the USG stability sectors. As the close area becomes more secure, each of the specialty skill teams identifies gaps in capabilities and capacities of the civil networks that correspond to their specialty. The teams' efforts include using assessments of essential civilian infrastructure and services to identify and prioritize reconstruction efforts. CA military government specialists liaise with governmental agencies, interagency, and international organizations to identify resources. and use their civil networks and communities of interest to support the consolidation of gains within the area of operation.

3-22. CA planners develop plans that advise CA forces on their priorities of efforts and missions to provide for the safety and security of the population while they transition to stabilization and reconstruction. CA forces must plan for the following issues in conflict:

- War criminals.
- Investigative teams.
- Use of former civil workers.
- Economic recovery.

- Army's role in rebuilding economic infrastructure (the British military rebuilt the Volkswagen plant post-Word War II).
- Reconstruction and disruption of criminal activities.
- Changing sentiments towards the military operations within the civil population and developed civil networks.
- Displaced persons.
- Exiles.
- Refugees.
- Disagreements and courts.

3-23. CA forces supporting combat units in the close area use their access to civil networks to identify and defeat threats to brigade combat team operations that can emanate from, or hide within, the civil component. Criminal organizations, whether affiliated with an adversary or working independently in the newly created security and governance vacuum, are an example of the types of threats that exist in the civil component. CA forces in the close area conduct CR, CE, and CND to identify local actors that are working to degrade security or exploit the lack of governance to target the population. CA forces are also beginning the process of identifying and working with local civil security and health networks to begin rebuilding legitimate civilian governing structures. The security in the close area generally prevents other governmental agencies (such as the DOS, USAID) from working in these areas, but CA forces coordinating through military government specialists can provide for this initial stability and rebuilding effort until the security levels increase.

3-24. As the forward line of own troops moves forward, the close area transitions to the rear area. The amount of population and resources control measures should decrease in severity and security levels should increase. CA forces, that the military government specialists support, begin to transition from conducting the minimum essential stability operations tasks to conducting stability operations. The successful transition of civil network contacts and stability efforts can be facilitated by the establishment of a civil administration in occupied territory. This sets the conditions for a diplomatically negotiated civil administration in host-nation territory. The establishment of a civil administration facilitates the transfer of governing control from military forces to appropriate civil authorities.

REAR AREA OPERATIONS

3-25. The rear area is the portion of the land commander's area of operations that may be designated to facilitate freedom of action, consolidate gains, and set conditions to transition the area of operations to follow on forces or other legitimate authorities. As governance transitions into the rear area, the goal is to transition more of the responsibilities of governance from military forces back into the control of civilian authorities. However, there may still be the need for some form of military government. A functioning local governance network is vital for the ultimate transition to legitimate, civil authorities as the culmination of consolidation of gains.

3-26. The formation of choice for this transition in the rear area is a task force. A designated CMO or stability task force can work to coordinate all stability operations within the Corps area of operation to ensure there is an efficient and effective transfer of responsibility from military control of governance to legitimate, civilian control of governance. A task force achieves this transfer of authority through conduct of the stability operations tasks (minus conducting security cooperations) and the integration of military elements, other governmental agencies, and local civil authorities.

3-27. Civil networks designated to conduct governance, transition from the deep and close area into the rear area and can now mobilize and leverage to form the backbone of a burgeoning governance apparatus. These networks aid in setting the conditions for enduring political and strategic outcomes to military operations. By executing CNDE, CA forces identify and select civil networks carefully. CA forces develop or build capabilities and capacities within these civil networks to assume control of governance functions from U.S. military forces in the rear area. Their actions free combat power and resources for the Corps to move to the forward line of own troops to engage the enemy. These governing networks aid in the establishment of civil security and civil control, the restoration of essential services, and the control of populace and resources, frees lines of communication for the movement of supplies, personnel, and equipment from the rear to the forward line of own troops.

3-28. Aiding in this effort are military government specialists who focus their efforts through the USG stability sectors to ease the transition of these governance networks from U.S. military control to local control. The military government specialists must be well-versed in interorganizational cooperation to coordinate with DOS, the USAID, and other international agencies that focus on long-term stabilization. The role of the Army is to provide governance during the transitory period between the removal of a hostile government and the implementation of legitimate civil authorities. Military government specialists in the rear area offer support by conducting detailed assessments of governance structures in place that have been degraded through military action or were absent but needed for future stabilization.

TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY

3-29. CA elements in the rear area support the consolidation of gains through identification and development of governance networks, the identification and defeat of threats to the civil component and setting the conditions for the transition of civil control from the U.S. military to other legitimate authorities. Assessments of local governance capacity, resources, and capability provide valuable civil knowledge to planners focused on stability and setting conditions for transfer of authority and, ultimately, long term stabilization, resilience, and reconstruction. The development of civil networks and the engagement of existing civil networks in the rear area lays the groundwork for partnerships that CA elements can use throughout the competition continuum to support the new government.

TRANSITION TO COMPETITION

3-30. Upon implementation, the military government aims to transition authority to another entity as expeditiously as possible. Once security has stabilized in the occupied territory, a transition to a civil administration can be initiated with the involvement of other relevant USG agencies. This transition may involve the designation of a U.S. interim authority or an international organization. Throughout this process, the military continues to support the DOS in their efforts towards stabilization and reconstruction. Once the temporary military government has transitioned authority to the interim authority, a U.S. diplomatic mission can then negotiate the establishment of a civil administration in the host-nation territory. The military may be directed to maintain a presence and provide support and continuity of stabilization and reconstruction efforts executed designated authorities.

3-31. During large-scale ground combat and the consolidation of gains, a task force can command and control multiple units. The task force is responsible for accomplishing offensive, defensive, and stability operations in its area of operation. Once the transition to competition begins and higher echelons redeploy, the corps may assign a division to assume the Army forces or joint force land component commander role in an operational area for a limited duration.

3-32. During transition to competition, the task force may fulfill the Army forces or joint force land component commander role for operations of limited scope and duration. Under such conditions, it may also form the core for a very small-scale joint task force or a JCMOTF, although it would require significant joint force augmentation. During this transition, the task force conducts a final transition to or through the DOS, or to the indigenous government, as directed.

Chapter 4
Military Government Operations in Crisis

"The Haiti earthquake response was described as 'more like a complex war event' than a natural disaster because of its scope and the political setting. The massive impact of the earthquake on a densely populated urban environment was compounded by an already weak central government (with no military to lead an in-country response) which was further decimated by losses to both leadership and government infrastructure."

"Haiti Earthquake: Interagency Lessons Learned"
Workshop Report
June 22, 2010
(Obsolete Publication)

During a crisis in foreign states, U.S. forces can be requested to support a host-nation crisis response. A crisis can be exploited by an adversary, leading to conflict. U.S. forces involved in stability operations can prevent escalation to conflict.

4-1. A *crisis* is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and strategic objectives (JP 3-0). (See figure 4-1.)




Figure 4-1. Military government operations in a crisis

MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS DURING A CRISIS

4-2. During the initial response, U.S. forces execute stability operations tasks to stabilize an operational environment in a crisis state. CA forces at all echelons should be familiar with the provisions in the Annual Cable: USAIDs' Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance Guidance for Disaster Planning and USAID Humanitarian Response for use as resources in planning and response.

4-3. Military forces conduct stability operations during or after a conflict or disaster when a state of crisis persists. SCA and interorganizational cooperation promote stabilization activities.

Note. CA is integral in planning and coordinating the execution of the above tasks (and others) with civilian entities.

SUPPORT TO FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN CRISIS

4-4. When a crisis occurs, a host nation can request support through diplomatic channels. If both governments agree that military support is necessary, then military forces conduct stability operations to support foreign assistance. During this response, CA forces conduct MGO in the form of support to foreign assistance. When a host-nation's capacity or capability is degraded or whose original capacity and capability cannot meet the needs of the populace, CA forces can be requested and directed to conduct SCA in host-nation territory. CA forces must facilitate CMI to work in conjunction with the interagency and indigenous populations and institutions during crisis short of conflict. If it is a post-conflict crisis, CA forces support in the form of SCA in occupied territory. As the situation stabilizes, the area can be transitioned to support to foreign assistance in a partner-nation territory.

4-5. When a crisis occurs, forces do not make decisions about planning, deployment, or employment of military forces without political authorization. Governments of each participating country collectively make decisions, which may include political, military, or civil preparedness measures depending on the nature of the crisis.

CRISIS RESPONSE PLANNING AND DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

4-6. Nations must be resilient to natural disaster and conflict and must allow for and retain freedom of movement to facilitate commerce and societal flow. CA forces integrate fully into the supported command to assist with military operations in crisis. They plan, assess, and execute operations and focus on the existing civil networks that are in place that can respond or assist with response to the crisis. These networks should be strengthened if necessary to enable their resiliency. The immediate question that must be answered is, who is running what? The primary function of CA forces in either type of crisis, but especially in a natural disaster, is to enable and facilitate the host nation, the United States and USG lead federal coordinator USAID Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance. DOS with populace and resources control and foreign humanitarian assistance. During crisis, CA forces monitor networks to identify indicators that show a movement to conflict, or a potential preconflict vacuum that they must address.

4-7. CA forces support the DOD effort to prevent the escalation of crisis into conflict. Regional, persistent engagement before, during, and after a crisis enables CA forces to identify and work with civil networks that provide early warning to impending crisis. These same networks provide on the ground capability to build resilience against crisis as well as having the elements in place to respond to the needs of the populace during and after crisis. The goal of CA forces in coordination with developed civil networks and other U.S. forces is to identify a crisis quickly and to divert capabilities or respond to it in a way to ensure the crisis does not transition into conflict. The objective of the combined response to crisis is to transition back to competition at a position of relative advantage.

4-8. CA forces must be proficient in using assets available on the ground as well as executing effective reachback with the government functional specialists available. Crisis response for a disaster may have a deployed CA team as the immediate DOD response to support the DOS due to its established working relationship with the affected or nearby nation's embassy.

4-9. In crisis, CA forces must—

- Advise on what is essential to protect and restore immediately after the crisis.
- Coordinate with host-nation government emergency services to enable planning and execution of crisis management actions.
- Coordinate minimal essential services, food, and water.
- Provide continuous updates on the civil component to the commander and staff.
- Provide guidance to the commander and staff on the effective use of military resources and capabilities to ease suffering.
- Identify and mobilize the civil networks that have the capacity and capability to provide services, at least temporarily, in the absence of government.

4-10. Regardless of the crisis, CA must coordinate and execute operations with all U.S. forces and interagency and host-nation elements that operate on the ground. CA forces must find and engage active civil networks or prepare to activate others, if possible. CA forces must have reachback capabilities to the rear, specifically to ascertain information and expertise from the government functional specialists and other government subject matter experts as needed.

4-11. Contributing nations in crisis need to share a common set of standards, especially among military forces, to accomplish multinational operations. Diverse systems and organizations working together and sharing a common set of standards ensures interoperability. CA units can assist in working as liaison officers between U.S. forces and the partner nation to facilitate CMI through the establishment of a CMOC. A CMOC acts as an integrating mechanism to enable unity of action through the collaboration among the interagency and other entities supporting the crisis. CA forces conduct CMI to develop interorganizational cooperation, which maximizes all capabilities, to move the nation in crisis back to stability.

DURING DISASTER RESPONSE

4-12. There are two types of disasters: natural and manmade. Natural is exemplified by hurricanes, earthquakes, drought, and so forth. Man-made disasters include the result of terrorist or criminal activity, the failing of essential infrastructure, or the results of improper resource control. During either type of crisis, the balance of instability and stability vary widely. However, the focus must be restoration or continuation of primary or critical needs (water, sewer, power, food, medical, and communications). Any pre-positioned resources available should be utilized first and prior to the use or requisition of U.S. stocks. Priorities are given to minimum essential stability tasks. Governance, economic and infrastructure development, and security cooperation are dependent upon the success of the minimum essential stability operations tasks. CA MGO activities must support stability, stabilization, resiliency and if necessary, reconstruction efforts in crisis. If required, in the absence of government, CA forces can execute government functions until the host nation relieves them or the DOS assumes responsibility.

4-13. Prior to crisis, CA elements conduct MGO in the form of support to foreign assistance to partner-nation governments as they develop internal resiliencies against disasters. In coordination and cooperation with U.S. civilian agencies at all levels, CA forces can identify, develop, and support civil networks that have the capability and capacity to assist in stability for an area before, during, and after a disaster.

4-14. During a disaster, the capability of CA forces can rapidly respond deploy to support the humanitarian needs of a population as part of the US response. Manmade disasters can be of a lasting nature and necessitate peace operations or foreign humanitarian assistance efforts before the actual crisis event is concluded. After disaster, CA forces can be part of initial response elements conducting assessments and working through civil networks to identify threats to stability and begin the process of initiating immediate support actions. CA forces can form the core of a JCMOTF or establish a CMOC to coordinate the efforts of U.S. military, partner agencies, and international actors.

CRISIS DEVOLVES TO CONFLICT

4-15. As tensions increase, U.S. forces quickly transition to armed conflict. CA forces engage, mobilize, and use civil networks developed during the competition and crisis phases to enable joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration to assist with civil support as required. Prior to and while transitioning into conflict, these networks provide information that enhances the commander's situational understanding of the area of operation and the civil component. These networks can work with U.S. forces or as a proxy,

using their freedom of movement and affiliated contacts to support U.S. interests. Information from these entities enable situational understanding, updated planning and targeting, effects-based planning and execution, and a reduction of possible civil interference.

4-16. Armed conflict results in the destruction of essential service infrastructure, economic infrastructure, security apparatus, and can even lead to a vacuum in power due to the loss of governance officials. This situation leads to a crisis for the people left in the wake of conflict due to a lack of capability or capacity of the remaining governance structure to meet the needs of the populace.

4-17. Due to the possibility of a degraded security environment post-conflict, it is sometimes necessary for the U.S. military to assist with the stability effort and to alleviate humanitarian needs that arise due to conflict. This is the most critical time for U.S. forces to consolidate gains and execute stability operations tasks to prevent the conflict from turning into an extended crisis.

4-18. CA forces conduct CNDE to identify functioning civil networks provide administration of governance, restoration of government functions, and access to areas U.S. forces still find inaccessible. Using civil knowledge integration and CMI, CA forces synthesize knowledge and coordinate with other stakeholders to funnel resources to the most desperate populations. Using support to foreign assistance, CA forces support local governance institutions that work desperately to provide for the needs of the populace.

4-19. CA elements on the ground conduct assessments and work through local partners using CR, CE, and CND to identify the most pressing needs of the populace and prioritize the implementation of stability operations tasks to address those needs. Military government specialists work to identify the best way possible to focus military efforts within each stability operation task and the most efficient way possible to transfer those efforts to the international community and legitimate authorities as soon as possible.

RETURN TO COMPETITION

4-20. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. (See ADP 3-07.) In MGO, this shift from conflict to competition involves a transition. CA forces plan the transition prior to conflict. If the plan exists, CA planners adjust the plan prior to the return to competition. CA planners identify potential transitions throughout execution of MGO; they note progress and work toward updating plans to reflect MGO in the post-conflict or competition environment. Note that in MGO, there can be multiple transitions by echelon as each may be transitioning at different times. As the return to competition can equate to stability, transitions may include transitions of authority and control to legitimate governments, military forces, or identified civilian agencies and organizations. As these transitions are usually from U.S. military forces to a USG organization or agency (often the DOS) or to the legitimate country's government, the role may change from leading the conduct of stability operations to temporarily supporting a new organization executing stability operations.

4-21. Forces must not overlook interdependence among security and reconstruction in a crisis. Security strategies must inextricably link with reconstruction strategies. When a crisis occurs, military forces conduct stability operations during or after a conflict or disaster when the security situation hinders the introduction of civilian personnel. (See ADP 3-07.) CA elements conduct MGO support to this initial response with support to foreign assistance. When the crisis is caused by a disaster, and a host-nation's capacity or capability has been degraded or whose original capacity and capability cannot meet the needs of the populace, CA forces may need to work in conjunction with the interagency to conduct SCA in host-nation territory. If it is a post conflict crisis, the support may be in the form of SCA in occupied territory. As the situation stabilizes, the area can be transitioned to SCA in host-nation territory.

4-22. As operations transition from conflict and return to competition, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) take place. CA forces executing transition can play a role in the DDR effort. DDR is a process with dimensions that include culture, politics, security, humanity, and socioeconomics. The program induces the legitimized government and anti-government forces to conduct peace negotiations resulting in a peace agreement, the dissolution of rebel forces, and the partial demobilization of government forces. CA forces assist with oversight of the disarming and demobilizing of the former combatants. The former combatants are then reintegrated through reintegration either into civil society or the new armed forces and police. *Reintegration* is the process through which former combatants, belligerents, and displaced civilians receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of

the local populace (ADP 3-07). DDR successfully sustains stability if properly executed. Programs poorly executed or not done at all can be destabilizing for the legitimate government and could forestall the transition back to competition or lead to a renewal of conflict. (See JP 3-07 and ADP 3-07 for more information on DDR.)

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Chapter 5
Military Government Operations in Competition

"It did not take long for the 82d Airborne Division to recognize that "restoring democracy" was going to involve more than merely removing the military regime – it quickly became a nation assistance mission."

"A most profound problem is Haiti's lack of a professional, administrative structure. The military has been the most stable government structure since the U.S. Occupation in 1913."

Eric A. Doerrer
Colonel, US Army Reserve, Retired
"Civil Affairs in Haiti." *Military Review*, March-April 1996

Military commanders must consider not only the military forces, but also the civil environment in which those forces operate during the competition phase. One factor of the civil environment that commanders must consider is the civilian populace and whether the people are supportive, neutral, or hostile to the presence of military forces introduced to assist. Operations that involve the interaction of military forces with the civilian populace to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives are a primary mission for CA units. Support to foreign assistance is a form of MGO in which CA forces engage during the competition phase of the continuum.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS DURING COMPETITION

5-1. The U.S. Foreign Assistance Program is evolving to respond to global shifts and the rise of new competitors. Learning from past successes and challenges, the USG continues to adapt aid programs to meet the demands of strategic competition in the modern world. The United States has furthered its own foreign policy objectives by helping developing countries to achieve their goals. (See figure 5-1, page 48.) During competition, CA forces at all echelons conduct support to foreign assistance which provides military commanders and country teams with governance expertise to—

- Assess the civil component and produce civil considerations.
- Create situational understanding.
- Compete with adversaries to gain positions of advantage.
- Build partner capability, capacity, and resiliency to deny freedom of maneuver or action to near peer adversaries.
- Set conditions in theater through persistent and episodic engagement.




Figure 5-1. Military government operations in competition

5-2. CA forces that have persistent engagement within a partner nation can designate a team to act as a liaison, coordination, and assessment element to support U.S. Embassies during steady-state competition. These teams are tailored to work closely with State Department personnel, local governments, community organizations, and various U.S. agencies to build partner interoperability, capability, resiliency, and capacity in the host nation. Their mission includes fostering relationships, understanding local needs, and providing support to foreign assistance, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance when necessary.

5-3. Consolidation of gains during competition following armed conflict or crisis is significantly different than consolidation of gains during steady-state competition. In areas that have not seen recent armed conflict or a disruptive crisis, Army forces consolidate gains by reinforcing the success of steady-state competition activities. Army forces consolidate gains by consistently follow through on what was begun earlier to provide predictability to allies and partners. In most cases, these activities are indistinguishable from other competition activities designed to build partner capabilities and improve other advantages relative to threat forces.

5-4. Consolidating gains following armed conflict requires significant operations that, if not properly conducted, could result in a return to crisis or conflict. These efforts include information collection and intelligence analysis to understand threats, population support, and the options available to defeat them. Consolidating gains also includes stability tasks related to providing security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment to the population. When appropriate, Army forces then work to restore or rebuild civil institutions and to transition security and stability tasks to those institutions. (See FM 3-07 and FM 3-57 for additional details on stability operations and governance.)

AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

5-5. At the strategic level, the National Security Council considers military government requirements for implementation through the military instrument of the national power. Using the whole-of-government approach, the diplomacy, informational, and economic instruments are applied proportionally to promote stabilization, resiliency, and reconstruction efforts. For this strategic level of operations, CA forces are responsible for conducting civil preparation of the environment. This involves identifying capabilities, resources, and capacities within the civil component, which are then used in joint operations to achieve the commander's end state. The groundwork for this process is laid by the CR, CE, and CND, conducted during support to foreign assistance missions to facilitate the entire process.

5-6. Theater CA planning teams answer commander’s critical information requirement for the commander and staff. CA forces provide input through the theater CA planning teams and update the campaign plan. CA teams check and update measures of performance, measures of effectiveness, and measures of effectiveness indicators.

5-7. The theater CA planning teams focus their efforts on updating theater campaign plans and to confirm, deny, or change them accordingly. The J-9 functions as a theater liaison as required. Activities, programs, and interactions (and all related funding) tie into the theater campaign plan. The J-9 and supporting staff conduct civil preparation of the environment to identify civil capabilities that CA forces develop and integrate into the operations once they locate within the area of operations.

5-8. CA planning teams plan and support MGO using support to foreign assistance to set and shape the physical conditions within the area of operations, which support the end state of the commander, and the policies and strategies of the USG. Additionally, civil preparation of the environment should identify the areas where MGO is the most effective when building capabilities, capacities, and resiliencies to strengthen diplomatic partnerships or prepare courses of action for follow-on operations.

AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

5-9. At the corps, the G-9—

- Works with the staffs to realign force structure to support the theater campaign plan.
- Assists in the management of transition, transfer, or termination requirements to proper civil authorities.
- Establishes CMOC to execute theater strategic synchronization and integration with all agencies, ensuring interface between DOD, United Nations, host nation, and other elements as required.
- Executes contingency planning through civil preparation of the environment.
- Refines and focuses the civil knowledge engagement plan and CNDE plan.
- Establishes CMOC to integrate, synchronize, and collaborate with networks and agencies.
- Acts as liaison to other agencies and organizations (as required) via the CMOC.
- Transitions, transfers, or terminates mobilized civil networks that were established before or during MGO.

5-10. The division is the Army’s principle tactical warfighting formation. While supporting the division in competition, the G-9 and S-9 refine plans including the incorporation of branches and sequels, and the execution of contingency planning.

CIVIL ENGAGEMENT IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

5-11. It is imperative to recognize the limitations of exerting influence through military engagement. In partner nations, significant policy decisions remain within the purview of political leaders, thus constraining the ability to sway them through military engagement. It is important to understand the

limitations of influence achieved through military engagement. In partner nations, major policy decisions are still reserved for political leaders, limiting the ability to influence major policy decisions through military engagement.

5-12. Civil engagement practitioners should be aware that the DOS often uses the term military-to-military engagement to refer to military exercises, where the DOD considers these exercises to be a form of security force assistance.

ENABLING AND ENHANCING INTEROPERABILITY

5-13. CA forces conduct support to foreign assistance through persistent engagement to shape and influence the indigenous populations and institutions within the operational environment to support the theater campaign plan. These targeted engagements help build partner nation capacity using a preventive, population-centric, and indirect approach to enhance the capability, capacity, resiliency, and legitimacy of partner governments. The civil-military engagement program—

- Increases the capability of USG-supported indigenous populations and institutions.
- Reduces the influence of malign actors within targeted countries and regions.
- Leverages civil vulnerabilities and resiliencies within the operational environment.
- Engages with civil networks to provide access, information, and effects across the competition continuum.

5-14. Title 22, USC, Sections 2292 through 2292b, funds and allows for the conduct of many CA actions at the operational level during competition. The President directs the DOD to respond to man-made or natural disasters. The President delegates disaster relief authority to the Secretary of Defense with DOS concurrence (except in emergencies). The DOD has limited authority to engage in disaster assistance. Each section after 2292b indicates countries that are the intended recipients of the disaster assistance funds. Additional countries are added to the list as the magnitude of the disaster is known. In addition to funds mentioned in Title 10 USC, the bulk of foreign humanitarian assistance operations are funded in accordance with Title 22. USC Section 2292.

AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

5-15. CA forces are deployed across the globe in both episodic and persistent engagements CA teams conduct CR, CE, and CND to execute support to foreign assistance under the authorities of the DOS for most of these engagements. To facilitate interorganizational coordination, regional support elements send team-level support elements to leverage information sharing, enable CMI, and act as a specialized platform allowing access to a country for additional forces.

5-16. CA teams are deployed throughout multiple theaters to support U.S. embassies during steady-state operations during competition. These teams work closely with DOS personnel, local governments, community organizations, and various U.S. agencies to build partner interoperability, capability, resiliency, relationships, and capacity in the host nation.

5-17. CA teams are responsible for network analysis and network engagement.CA teams identify critical nodes through network analysis, evaluation, and engagement. In addition, the elements partner with friendly networks to engage neutral networks to counter threat networks. CA teams collect information through engagements for use in the civil knowledge integration process.

5-18. The S-9 supports the brigade at the tactical level as follows:

- Oversees and executes CR, CE, and CND.
- Continues to confirm, deny, or validate CNDE and civil knowledge integration plans.
- Consistently and constantly evaluates and assesses mobilized civil networks.
- Transitions, transfers, or terminates mobilized civil networks established specifically for MGO.
- Acts as oversight, and if necessary, liaise as the brigade’s civil information element.

Appendix A

Assessment Tools

This appendix is comprised of different assessment tools that CA forces can use for the study and evaluation of a governing body. Use of these assessments can assist CA forces to identify and understand which entities are acting as relevant governing bodies.

PRE-DEPLOYMENT STUDY

A-1. The following resource is provided to aid CA forces in the pre-deployment study of government and as a precursor to the on-the-ground GAP. The tool was developed (using materials provided by Dr. Spencer Meredith of the National Defense University) to serve as a guide for the comprehensive evaluation of relevant governing bodies. Its output provides soldiers with critical insights into the identification, efficacy, strengths, and weaknesses of relevant governing bodies.

A-2. The underlined headings are to be used as an outline for the study. The helping text is captured in italics and should be deleted or replaced with specific information. Every heading does not need to be filled out.

ELEMENTS

- State.
  - **Enduring entity**: Administrations and regimes in government change. Appointees may or may not change based on term of appointment and process.
  - Inputs → processes → outputs.
  - Sovereign:
    - **Internal**: Who makes and enforces rules with specific territorial boundary?
    - **External**: Is the governing entity recognized as legitimate by other sovereign states?
- Society.
  - **Organic relationships**—between and across communities.
  - **Inputs for change**—are shaped by governance?
- Power.
  - **Hard**: Quantifiable—military forces or presence, economic policy, or laws.
  - **Soft**: Influence—threat to reputation, linkages (connections), leverage (ability to move others), coercion—the ability to push others against their wishes.
- Ideology.
  - **Worldview/paradigm**: Which religious, historical, political, or economic systems supplied the foundational beliefs?
  - **Values**: Does ideology effect the decision-making criteria for right and wrong?
  - **Norms of behavior**: What is considered appropriate or inappropriate actions?
- Legitimacy.
  - **Implicit belief** Private beliefs? ←→explicit expression public expression? Are they equal in power?
- Effectiveness.
  - Follow-through: Can the governing entity do what it says it will do?
- Responsivity.
  - Listening to inputs:
    - *Create and defend space for public debate (applies to open systems as much as closed).*
    - *Who participates? Citizenship, power holders, masses.*
    - *What can they discuss? What is necessary (all agree), important (some agree), immediate (few agree).*
    - *Does the governing entity respond with action — key measure of responsivity.*

    - Space.
        - Small — large.
        - Open — closed.
    - Topics.
        - Narrow — broad.
        - Limited — open-ended.
- Core conditions that shape decision making to action.
    - **Opportunity/constraints** systems and structures.
    - **Capability** + will Agency.

PROCESSES

- Institutions.
    - **Formal**: Codified, rule of law, buildings, and procedures.
    - **Informal**: Interpersonal connections, word of mouth, expectations.
- Bureaucracy.
    - **Professional implementors**: Who are the heads of the bureaucracies? Who has been there a long time? What do they "own" through their positions?
    - **Central/capital** — **regional** — **local**: Where do they exist?
    - **Regularized procedures or ad hoc** (make it up): How do they function?
- Corruption.
    - **Watchdogs**: Is there an absence of legal oversight of "normal" actions?
    - **Workarounds**: What shortcuts exist to get around inefficiencies in bureaucracy, institutional processes?
    - **Patronage**: Are personal connections more important than procedures?
    - **Clientelism**: Are groups more important than procedures?
- Civil Society.
    - Is there space between family, work, and political power?
    - Where do people discuss governance?
- Interests.
    - **Aggregation**: (bringing together).
    - **Articulation**: (speaking with one voice).
- Problems:
    - **Free rider**: Who will gain benefit without putting in effort?
    - **Collective action**: How difficult is it to get people with different interests, identities, plans, and goals to point, walk, speak, and act in the same direction for the same destination?

LOCATIONS

- Place.
    - **Functional**: Is the facility suitable for accomplishment of the task?
    - **Sacred**: Does it have enduring impact on memory, meaning?
- Purpose.
    - Tied to values, norms: What is the significance? Do people remember and teach the next generation?

MEASURES

- Capacity.
    - Can they do what they say they will do?
    - What resources do they need?
    - What is their ability to collect, store, process, and use those resources?
- Autonomy.
    - Ability to make and enforce rules without countermanding rules from others.
    - Does this exist completely or only in some areas?

  - How do those different authorities interact?
  - Who wins and why?
- Legitimacy.
  - Belief and support for governance that produces actions (implicit belief – explicit behavior).
- Sample sources for measuring governance.
  - Transparency International.
  - Freedom House.
  - World Bank.
  - United Nations Human Development Index.
  - Fragile States Index.

NETWORKS

- In-group/out-group.
  - Identity that shapes interests of the group.
  - Who is known/familiar, valued, and who is not?
  - Reasons for boundaries (in-group versus out-group).
  - Ways to cross between groups if any exist.
- **Nodes**: Who are the main actors who do the most or are acknowledged as such?
  - **Hubs**: Who are the central dispensers of information/resources, and where are they? How did they become that way (passed down, competition, absence of alternatives)?
  - **Bridges**: What is the link between the networks (regularity, predictability, uniformity)?
- Models.
  - **Simple** — predictable, limited interactions.
  - **Complicated** — predictable, diverse interactions.
  - **Complex** — unpredictable, diverse interactions.
- Considerations.
  - **(in)Efficiencies** — what is promised versus what is delivered (how much is lost along the way)?
  - Open/closed.
    - **Gates**: *controlled, limited — do restrictions exist to control access, high security?*
    - **Doorways**: *regularly open/closed — are there access points that are used more frequent, less secure?*
    - **Windows**: *occasional communication — is there visibility without direct access?*
  - **Accept/reject outsiders**: Based on the following criteria, will they submit to change?
    - **Beliefs.**
    - **Practices.**
    - **Actions**.

A-3. Once the governing body is studied for relevance, those bodies can be evaluated for vulnerabilities using one or more of these tools:

- Political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII).
- Areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events (ASCOPE) crosswalk.
- Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threat (SWOT).
- Criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability (CARVER).

The tools provide the Soldier with different approaches and techniques to achieve the same outcomes.

PMESII AND ASCOPE CROSSWALK

A-4. The PMESII and ASCOPE crosswalk is a technique that assists CA planners to capture vital civil information that may be present in numerous products, or as a collection of information papers on specific information pertaining to each operational and mission variable as well as specific sub-variables.

A-5. Using a systems perspective, CA planners prepare a PMESII and ASCOPE crosswalk to synthesize operational and mission variables to inform the common operational picture. Also, to help decision making in course of action or line of effort development of the commander's plan (table A-1, pages 54 through 56).

Table A-1. PMESII and ASCOPE crosswalk

	Political	*Military*	*Economic*	*Social*	*Information*	*Infrastructure*
Areas	National, provincial, district or municipality borders and boundaries, party, and tribal affiliation areas.	Designated areas of responsibility, jurisdictions, key terrain, security boundaries, coalition bases, historic ambush sites, explosive hazards, enemy or insurgent controlled areas, militia-controlled areas.	Land use, natural resources (arable land, oil, water, forests, game, livestock), commercial lines of communications, financial services, markets, cities, agricultural, mining, manufacturing, salvage yards, imports, and exports.	Religious and ethnic demographics, population centers (city, town, village), migration routes, tribal boundaries, economic demographics, traditional meeting sites, national and local parks, cultural landmarks.	Radio broadcast range, television broadcast range, internet or wireless fidelity service areas, word of mouth, gathering points, newspaper distribution, coverage zones, graffiti.	Rivers and estuaries, electric service area or grid, sewer networks, water tables, irrigation networks, water distribution systems, water treatment facilities, medical service coverage, transportation.
Structures	Infrastructure from which any level of governance or political activity is perpetuated, including national, provincial, district centers, government or political buildings, meeting halls, polling sites, worship sites.	Operating bases, provincial or district police headquarters and buildings, border points of entry, gang locations, militia, enemy or insurgent bases, checkpoints, roadblocks.	Commercial centers, banks, energy infrastructure, transportation (highways, rail, ports, airports), processing plants, manufacturing plants, storage facilities, marketing sites, stores, factories, foundries.	Parks, club houses, sport facilities, religious structures, historic, cultural, archeological sites, informal gathering places, universities, schools, courthouses, libraries, social hierarchy, police headquarters, border points, museums, popular attractions.	Radio stations, television stations, fiber optic and server or search engine hard structure, satellite reception, internet systems, transmission facilities and relays, print shops, internet cafes.	Interstate system, rail system, power generators, dams, reservoirs, secondary and tertiary roads, government buildings, banks, schools, communication network, water, sewer, electric, medical and transportation centers, jails and prisons, hospitals, fire stations, police stations, electrical or water and sewage distribution lines, airports.

Table A-1. PMESII and ASCOPE crosswalk (continued)

	Political	*Military*	*Economic*	*Social*	*Information*	*Infrastructure*
Capabilities	Influence, control, or communicate between the governed and the governing, monetary policy, fiscal policy, informational distribution, level of influence, dispute resolution, judicial system, ability of populace to access government officials.	Response times, training, aircraft number or type, armored or motorized vehicle number or type, ship or boat number or type security, offense and defense weapons, judges' expertise power projection, quick reaction force, response times, crime rate, police or criminal and friendly or enemy ability to recruit.	Land ownership, land use, water resources controls, energy resources controls, food production, raw material mining, manufacturing and distribution systems, banking, access to credit and jobs, government assistance programs, monetary reserves, national debt, gross domestic product.	Economic class system, social mobility, tribal influences, religious influences, support networks, government involvement, means of justice.	Social media, internet accessibility, phone service prescribers, radios or television per household, distribution and projection, printing abilities, process times, literacy rate.	Commodity market interstate commerce, regional economic zones jail or prison capacity emergency services mass transportation manufacturing, storage ability of indigenous population, institutions to build, inspect, and maintain infrastructure.
Organizations	Political parties or opposition, regional collective security organizations or alliances, religious, governmental, nongovernmental organizations.	Coalition or host-nation Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, border police, highway police, municipal police, national police, national investigation services, gangs, command structure, volunteer organizations, conscript organizations, militias.	Ministries (water, agriculture, energy, labor, commerce, finance, treasury), criminal organizations, national commodity exchange, trading guilds, banks, money exchanges, government support agencies, cooperatives, non-governmental organizations, class deviations.	Religious, educational leaders, advocacy groups, relief organizations, ministries of labor, religious affairs, education, justice, and interior, police, worship, tribal, family, sports, clubs, welfare support, youth groups.	News and media networks, religious organizations, ministry of public affairs, tribal, political, and government businesses, information operations groups.	Ministries of water, energy, urban development, unions, and construction firms, medical and transportation companies.

Table A-1. PMESII and ASCOPE crosswalk (continued)

	Political	*Military*	*Economic*	*Social*	*Information*	*Infrastructure*
People	Key leaders with political influence, formal and informal political leaders, governors, religious leaders, mayors, elders, councils, judges, clergy.	Defense and coalition leaders, ministries, morale of members, commanders, police chiefs, tribal leaders, neighborhood key leaders.	Business leaders, ministers, regional or national banks, nonstate entities, business owners, labor leaders, poverty level, foreign investors, landholders, money lenders, criminals.	Governors, mayors, district leaders, minorities, influential families, religious leaders, tribal or village elders, key clergy, family leaders, key mentors with social influence.	Media owners, reporters, formal and informal influencers, religious leaders, teachers, professors, heads of prominent families, tribal leaders.	Civil servants, builders, contractors, local development councils, engineers.
Events	Elections, tribal gatherings, provincial council meetings, protests and speeches, religious gatherings, political meetings, rallies, trials, debates.	Lethal events, loss of leadership, operations, peace operations support, attacks, instances of crime, riots, political unrest, labor unrest, regional meetings, religious celebrations, military or police operations, conflicts, exercises, historical operations.	Elections, holidays, planting seasons, harvest seasons, drought, flood, rain, snow fall or melt cycles, financial crisis, business activity, agricultural activities, weather.	Days of worship, holidays, holy days, births, weddings, deaths and bazaar days, traditional holidays, state holidays, religious holidays, gatherings, festivals.	Days of worship, media publishing dates, project openings, civilian casualty events, opening and closing of media outlets, information media capacity changes, distribution times.	Medical, police, transportation, disruptions of service, major construction projects, capability, or capacity increases.

STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, THREAT ANALYSIS

A-6. The SWOT analysis is a strategic planning and management tool for identification, efficacy, strength and weaknesses of government offices, officials, and systems. This tool is sometimes referred to as a situational assessment or situational analysis tool. (See table A-2.)

Table A-2. Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threat analysis format

	STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
	What are the positive characteristics and advantages of the government that allow it to be effective?	*What are the negative characteristics and disadvantages of the government that make it less effective or ineffective?*
OPPORTUNITY	**S-O STRATEGY / ANALYSIS**	**W-O STRATEGY / ANALYSIS**
Factors, situations, or techniques, which can benefit, enhance, or improve the performance of the government.	*Is the government using its strengths to take advantage of opportunities?* *Does an adversary have access to the same opportunity to counter the strength?*	*Is the government overcoming its weaknesses by taking advantage of opportunities?* *Does an adversary have access to the same opportunity to exploit the weakness?*
THREATS	**S-T STRATEGY / ANALYSIS**	**W-T STRATEGY / ANALYSIS**
Factors, situations, or techniques that can hinder or degrade the performance of or destroy the capability of the government.	*Is the government using its strengths to avoid or root out threats?* *Is an adversary working to counter the strength to create multiple threats?*	*Is the government taking steps to mitigate the vulnerabilities attributed to the weakness?* *Does an adversary have knowledge of the vulnerability attributed to the weakness?*
S-O strengths-opportunity S-T strengths-threats	W-O weaknesses-opportunity W-T weaknesses-threats	

CARVER TARGETING MATRIX

A-7. The CARVER targeting matrix is a valuable tool to assess government entities. This tool helps assessment teams and commanders rank the entities for which they are responsible for providing governance and determining which resources (personnel, infrastructure, information) to allocate to protect them. The CARVER targeting matrix assesses a potential target from an adversary's perspective to identify what the threat might perceive as a good (soft or valuable) target (table A-3, pages 57 through 59).

Table A-3. CARVER targeting matrix format

Criticality Criteria. Determine the importance of a government office, official, or system. A target is critical when its dissolution or ineffectiveness has a significant impact on the output of the targeted system, subsystem, or complex (at the highest level) on the government's ability to perform essential functions.	
Immediate halt in output, production, or service; office, official, or system cannot function.	9-10
Halt within 1 day or 66% curtailment in output, production, or service.	7-8
Halt within 1 week or 33% curtailment in output, production, or service.	5-6
Halt within 10 days or 10% curtailment in output, production, or service.	3-4
No significant effect on output, production, or service.	1-2

Why and how	Value	Controls and mitigation

Table A-3. CARVER targeting matrix format (continued)

Accessibility Criteria. A government office or official is accessible when the population can reach them through predictable face-to-face meetings, correspondence, or voting to convey legitimacy and representation. A target can be accessible even if it requires the assistance of knowledgeable insiders. This assessment entails identifying and studying critical paths that the population must take to achieve its objectives and measuring those things that aid or impede access.		
Easily accessible to constituency, face-to-face meetings.		9-10
Only accessible through staffers or knowledgeable insiders.		7-8
Only accessible through written or electronic correspondence.		5-6
Only accessible by voting or polling.		3-4
Not accessible to population (real or perceived).		1-2
Why and how	Value	Controls and mitigation
Recuperability Criteria. A measure of time required to replace or bypass the dissolution or ineffectiveness of the government office, official, or system. Recuperability varies with the processes by which offices, officials, and systems are created or replaced, the support of the population and its willingness to support the continuation or replacement of the target (legitimacy).		
Recreation, replacement, or substitution that requires 1 month or more.		9-10
Recreation, replacement, or substitution that requires 1 week to 1 month.		7-8
Recreation, replacement, or substitution that requires 72 hours to 1 week.		5-6
Recreation, replacement, or substitution that requires 24 to 72 hours.		3-4
Same-day recreation, replacement, or substitution.		1-2
Why and how	Value	Controls and mitigation
Vulnerability Criteria. A measure of a threat's ability to damage the physical wellbeing, professional or political credibility or legitimacy using available methods, people, and resources. A target is vulnerable if the threat has the means and expertise to successfully attack it.		
Vulnerable to coercive tactics due to past or current bribery or scandals.		9-10
Vulnerable because of illicit business endeavors or support of black-market activities.		7-8
Vulnerable influence from business partners, corporate pressures, special interest groups.		5-6
Vulnerable to safety concerns of family, legitimate or illegitimate, or personal relationships.		3-4
Invulnerable to all but the most extreme targeting measures.		1-2
Why and how	Value	Controls and mitigation
Effect Criteria. Estimate the positive or negative influence on the population because of the action taken. The effect considers the location of the public near the target, but also considers the domestic and international reaction as well.		
Overwhelming positive effects for the threat; no significant negative effects.		9-10
Moderately positive effects for the threat; few significant negative effects.		7-8
No significant effects; neutral.		5-6
Moderately negative effects for the threat; few significant positive effects.		3-4
Overwhelming negative effects for the terrorist; no significant positive effects.		1-2
Why and how	Value	Controls and mitigation

Table A-3. CARVER targeting matrix format (continued)

Recognizability Criteria. The recognizability of the government office, official, or system is how likely it is that a threat would recognize the office, official, or system as a valuable target. Recognizability includes the size and complexity of the target (are there multiple layers of security to gain access?), existence of distinctive target signatures (daily pattern of life), presence of overt power and influence, and the technical sophistication and training of the enemy.		
The target is clearly recognizable under all conditions and from a distance; it requires little or no training for recognition.		9-10
The target is easily recognizable at small arms range and requires a small amount of training for recognition.		7-8
The target is difficult to recognize at night or in bad weather, it might be confused with other targets or target components, or it requires some training for recognition.		5-6
The target is difficult to recognize at night or in bad weather (even within small arms range), it is easily confused with other targets or components, or it requires extensive training for recognition.		3-4
The target cannot be recognized under any conditions except by experts.		1-2
Why and how	Value	Controls and mitigation

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Appendix B

Governance Assessment Process

The GAP provides a methodology for analyzing governance capability. The GAP identifies governance gaps to evaluate the populace's view of that government's legitimacy. The process also identifies modeling strategies for addressing governance gaps within the civil component of an area of operations. Once CA forces identify governance gaps, they develop and prioritize implementation strategies to target those gaps. The GAP is a tactical level assessment process that is platform agnostic and does not require advanced analytical systems or capabilities to complete. CA forces complete the GAP using minimal resources during large-scale combat operations or in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments.

GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

B-1. Information analysis and evaluation of the civil component is vital to achieving situational understanding and planning successful operations. When conducting civil knowledge integration, CA forces analyze and evaluate information from the civil component to inform the warfighting functions and increase the commander's situational awareness. Through the GAP, the analysis of governance information creates governance knowledge. Governance knowledge allows CA planners to develop and evaluate options for affecting legitimacy of relevant governing bodies.

B-2. *Governance* is the state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society (JP 3-24). Government is the structure that is used to conduct governance. Government structure includes all the public systems used to create laws, administer justice, provide essential services, and maintain order.

B-3. The legitimacy of relevant governing bodies is based on the populations' perception of their ability to provide governance. According to JP 3-24, all governments govern through a combination of consent, influence, and to some degree, coercion. The host-nation government generally needs some level of legitimacy among the population to retain the confidence of the populace and an acknowledgment of governing power. ADP 3-07 states, "Legitimacy is a condition based upon the perception by specific audiences of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions and of the propriety of the authority of the individuals or organizations in taking them."

B-4. The GAP is a process specifically designed to analyze the legitimacy of relevant governing bodies within an area of operations by identifying gaps in the provision of government services for a target population. The populace views a relevant governing body that is providing for their needs as legitimate and stable. According to JP 3-07, "…ultimately, stability results from government effectiveness and perceptions of its legitimacy by the people it represents." Identification of governance gaps and development of options to address those gaps provides CA forces with the civil knowledge they need to ensure appropriate control and the continuation of government services across military operations. (Figure B-1, page 62, depicts where the GAP as a continuing process feed into the civil knowledge integration process.)




Figure B-1. Government assessment process in civil knowledge integration

B-5. The GAP is a continual process. (See table B-1, which clarifies the GAP.) CA forces use the GAP to—

- Assess the current governance landscape.
- Identify perceived governance gaps.
- Develop implementation strategies for addressing those governance gaps.
- Evaluate options to ensure CAO achieve the commander's desired effects and end state.

Table B-1. Governance assessment process: overview

Target Population	Governance Gap	Relevant Governing Body	Implementation Strategy	Alignment with Stability Operations Task	Desired Effect within the Area of Operations
In this framework, a target population is the group of the populace that the commander has determined as necessary to be engaged for the furtherance of the mission. This should be described as locally as possible to ensure that governance gaps and implementation strategies are as specific as possible.	Governance gaps are described from the standpoint of the needs of the target population. These gaps describe the difference between what a population expects and what a governing body provides. Governance gaps can be caused by: - Lack of relevant governance structures or actors. - Lack of capability/ capacity of governance structures or actors to provide for the needs of the target populations. - Lack of desire of governance actors to provide for the needs of target population.	Describe the formal or informal governing actor, institution, structure, or civil network that provides governmental services.	Implementation strategies are the actions or group of actions needed to address the governance gaps identified. Each strategy will have assets assigned as well measures of performance and measures of effectiveness tied to the ability to address one or more of the governance gaps of a target population.	The relevant Army stability operations task is identified. This will aid in the integration of implementation strategies to unified action partners (UAPs).	The desired effects are in relation to the commander's overall objectives within the area of operations.

B-6. Within the GAP, the target population is the populace group whose engagement is essential for the furtherance of the mission according to the commander. This is not an assessment of the entire population, but of a targeted subset of the entire population. This assessment is tactical in nature. See JP 3-07 for further assessments of larger governance capability and capacity.

B-7. CA forces use the following four steps to complete the GAP: (See table B-2, page 64.)

- Assess relevant governing bodies.
- Identify governance gaps.
- Develop implementation strategies.
- Evaluate and prioritize options.

Table B-2. Governance assessment process: steps, inputs, and outputs

Step	Inputs	Tools	Outputs
1. Assess Relevant Governing Bodies.	• Area studies. • Initial / deliberate assessments. • Prior reporting.	• PMESII-ASCOPE. • CARVER. • MSHARPP.	• Detailed PMESII-ASCOPE crosswalk. • Governance structures identified by stability sector.
2. Identify Governance Gaps.	• PMESII-ASCOPE. • Formal and informal governance structures. • CARVER analysis. • MSHARP analysis. • Area studies.	• Civil reconnaissance. • Civil engagement. • Population surveys. • Governance actor analysis.	• Identified governance gaps by priority from the standpoint of the target population.
3. Develop Implementation Strategies.	• Prioritized governance gap analysis. • CARVER analysis. • MSHARP analysis. • Governance Actor analysis. • METT-TC (I) analysis.	• Implementation strategy matrix.	• Implementation strategies with cost/benefit of each.
4. Evaluate and Prioritize Options.	• Commander's desired effects. • Implementation strategy matrix. • METT-TC (I) analysis.	• Governance assessment framework.	• Mission recommendations for targeted implementation strategies to address governance gaps in furtherance of the commander's desired effects.

ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
CARVER criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability
METT-TC (I) mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations
MSHARPP mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability, population, and proximity
PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure

CIVIL AFFAIRS GOVERNMENT ASSESSMENT PROCESS VOCABULARY

B-8. Relevant governing bodies, governance gap, and implementation strategies are terms relevant to the GAP.

RELEVANT GOVERNING BODIES

B-9. Relevant governing bodies are actors, structures, institutions, networks, or other elements that the population expects to provide government services. They can be formal government institutions or informal civil networks. They can be part of the current government, work alongside the current government, or work against the current government to provide government services for the target population.

B-10. CA forces review the current area study to ensure they have a clear understanding of the baseline governance that exists or had existed within the operational area. They can apply that information to the relevant governing body assessment from Appendix A. Once this analysis and evaluation are complete, forces conduct initial assessments to confirm or deny gaps that they have identified. Forces can conduct deliberate

assessments or surveys about specific buildings, areas, or individuals to gain the necessary information to support MGO. CA staff officers identify which relevant governing bodies, and their capabilities need to be added to the civil considerations for integration into Army planning processes. This process enables the commander to allocate finite resources, capabilities, and capacities to support Army operations. See ATP 3-57.60 and FM 3-57 for in-depth information about the types of assessments and their integration into operations for CA forces.

GOVERNANCE GAP

B-11. A governance gap is the delta between what a target population expects, needs, or demands from its relevant governing body and what that relevant governing body is providing. The lack of one or more of the following factors is the cause of governance gaps:

- Government structure.
- Capability or capacity within existing government structures.
- Motivation of relevant governing bodies to provide services to a target population.

B-12. When a state (at the national or local level) does not have the capability, capacity, or motivation to provide for the needs of a target population, then informal governance structures stand up. Those informal structures can be in concert with or antagonistic toward the formal government structure. The GAP aids in the identification of those governance gaps and development of CAO to address the governance gaps.

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

B-13. Implementation strategies are targeted actions aimed at addressing a governance gap. They can be actions of any of the following or a combination of the following:

- The government in power.
- A resistance partner.
- A partner civil network.
- Unilateral actions by U.S. forces.
- Actions by, with, and through unified action partners.

STEPS IN THE GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

B-14. Military forces should prepare to conduct a broad, large range of governance activities that civilians normally handle. This is particularly true in the days immediately following combat operations or when a hostile or uncertain security environment limits the ability of civilians to govern. The following paragraphs explain the four steps of the GAP.

STEP ONE: ASSESS RELEVANT GOVERNING BODIES

B-15. After receipt of mission, CA forces immediately begin to assess the current governing structures within the area of operations. This list of the relevant governing bodies that exist within an area of operations also includes identifying the lack of official government structures (for example, no uniformed police force). Gaps in information of relevant governing bodies are put into the civil information collection plan.

B-16. Next, categorize the relevant governing bodies in alignment with their related Army stability operations tasks (with the exception of conduct security cooperation). Some relevant governing bodies may align with multiple tasks. This framing allows for the development of stability operations and for easier transfer of governance knowledge with joint and interagency partners. This categorization also aids in the analysis of those governing bodies using Army, joint, and interagency assessments of each USG stability sector.

B-17. In under-governed areas, this assessment must include the informal governing bodies. For example, in areas with little official government, it is common for criminal persons or organizations to provide services generally identified as the responsibility of government (such as, civil security and civil control). These informal governing bodies can even levy taxes and provide essential services. Civil networks are also integral to the provision of governance informally and must be accounted for when possible. Gaps in understanding the current civil networks are included in the CND plan. For a full discussion of each stability operations task, see ATP 3-07.5.

B-18. Once the relevant governing bodies are categorized in alignment with the Army stability operations tasks, CA analysts work to assess and evaluate the strengths and vulnerabilities each relevant governing body to develop a full understanding of each. (These analysts do this by using one of the methodologies provided in appendix A.) The SWOT evaluation is a more simplistic approach to gauge vulnerability, while CARVER is primarily used for targeting and identifying vulnerabilities of physical structures to terrorist or other attacks. They both can be modified to identify strengths and vulnerabilities of relevant governing bodies. For descriptions of CARVER and SWOT, see appendix A.

B-19. The output of step one is the relevant governing body matrix as depicted in table B-3.

Table B-3. Relevant governing body matrix

Relevant Governing Body	Army Stability Operations Task Assignment	Formal or Informal	Strengths	Vulnerabilities
Describe the governing actor, institution, structure, or civil network that provides governmental services.	• Civil Security. • Civil Control. • Essential Services. • Governance. • Economic and Infrastructure Development. (May align with multiple tasks)	Are these bodies formal or informal? If there are more than one, are they in conflict with each other?	What strengths does this governing body have? This can be in terms of capability, capacity, resiliency, or other factors that strengthen this body.	What vulnerabilities does this governing body have? This can be in terms of capability, capacity, resiliency, or other factors that weaken this body.

STEP TWO: IDENTIFY GOVERNANCE GAPS

B-20. The second step in the GAP is identification of the lack of government service provisions for a target population. Inputs to this step are the relevant governing body matrix identifying formal and informal governing bodies and their strengths and vulnerabilities. The purpose of this step is to identify the gaps in provision of services for the formal government institutions or structures. Effectively addressing these governance gaps is how a relevant governing body gains or maintains legitimacy.

B-21. Targeted CR, CE, and CND are tools for assessing the needs of the target population due to the lack of provision of government services. Each identified need should be specific to the target population and framed to understand whether the formal government institutions or structures are providing or whether informal governing bodies are providing for those needs. This is the most difficult step in the production of the GAP because it requires CA forces to view the area of operations from the perspective of the target population.

B-22. In some instances, informal governing bodies are providing services either in concert with, or in spite of, the formal government institutions of structures. It is important to note these areas. Noting these areas helps identify areas where governance gaps are leading to governmental legitimacy issues for the formal government.

B-23. Upon receiving the answers, CA forces match the perceived needs of the target population against the formal government institutions or structures that should be attempting to provide those needs. CA forces analyze the formal government institutions or structures to determine the cause of the lack of service provision.

B-24. Table B-4 provides questions that forces can use to address governance gaps from the standpoint of a target population. These questions can identify areas where formal government institutions or structures are failing to provide services.

Table B-4. Questions for identifying the governance assessment process

Civil Concern	*Questions*
Civil Security	Are laws enforced equally between the target population and other segments of the population? Do members of the target population feel safe in public? Do members of the target population feel their property is protected? Do members of the target population feel targeted by police or intelligence services? Are members of the target population identified by specific documents?
Civil Control	Are laws created specifically to disadvantage the target population? Does the target population feel there is equitable resolution of disputes within the court system? Does the target population feel there is equitable distribution of punishment? Are the corrections systems different depending on which part of the population you are in?
Essential Services	Are essential services provided equally to all segments of the population? Is the education system inclusive of the views of the target population? Is the formal government responsive to the public health needs of the target population?
Governance	Does the target population feel they have a voice in the selection of local or national political representation? Does the target population have current representation on local, territorial, or national legislative bodies?
Economic and Infrastructure Development	Is there an excess tax burden on the target population? Is the target population free to operate business and trade compared to the rest of the population? Does the target population have to resort to illicit trade to access goods and services? Are the prices of goods and services different for the target population versus the rest of the populations?

B-25. A quad chart (figure B-2, page 68) describes the formal government institutions or structures based on their capability (or capacity) and motivation to provide government services for a target population. Identifying levels of capability (or capacity) and motivation helps determine impediments to provision of government services and helps inform the development of implementation strategies based on where issues with provision are found.

Note. It is noteworthy that a government cannot simply have a capability to provide services or structures in name only. A government service capability might be designed to provide services, but this does not guarantee that there will not be a gap from the population's standpoint.




Figure B-2. Quad chart of governance providers

B-26. If they exist, this step in the GAP identifies informal governing bodies that the target population relies upon to fill governance gaps (table B-5). Those informal governing bodies are working complementary to, or in competition with, the formal government institutions or structures. This distinction is important because those informal governing bodies are either aiding in governmental legitimacy or driving illegitimacy.

B-27. The outcome of this step is a list of specific governance gaps aligned to the Army stability operations tasks. These gaps are prioritized from the viewpoint of the target population. The identification and

prioritization of these gaps drive the development of implementation strategies for addressing gaps to produce desired effects within the civil component.

Table B-5. Government assessment process analysis

Target Population	Perceived Need	Formal Government Institution or Structure	Governance Gap Identified	Informal Governing Bodies Providing Services	Alignment with Stability Operations Task
The target population is identified during mission analysis or is prescribed during receipt of mission.	Needs of the population are identified using civil reconnaissance (CR) and civil engagement (CE), population surveys, data analysis, and other methods to infer or directly assess the need of the population.	Formal structures and actors responsible for provision of governance are identified. This responsibility is from the point of view of the target population. Lack of governance structure is also noted as the failure to provide for a perceived need could be from the lack of relevant governance structures or actors.	The gap between perceived needs of the target population and ability of governance structures or actors is characterized. Governance gaps are caused by: - Lack of relevant governance structures or actors. - Lack of capability or capacity of governance structures or actors to provide for the needs of the target population. - Lack of desire of governance actors to provide for the needs of the target population.	Informal structures and actors providing government services are identified. These governing bodies are identified as competing or complimentary with the formal government.	The relevant Army stability operations task is identified. This will aid in the integration of implementation strategies to unified action partners (UAPs).

STEP THREE: DEVELOP IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

B-28. The third step to completing the GAP is to develop implementation strategies by—

- Prioritizing governance gap analysis from step two.
- Assessing of current force capabilities and capacities.
- Identifying of any partner elements that could assist in implementation.

B-29. CA forces develop implementation strategies for each gap. These strategies must be comprehensive enough to include all actions CA forces need to address that gap or multiple gaps.

B-30. When developing implementation strategies, CA forces identify the performance measures they need to complete the strategy and the measures of effectiveness to identify if the implementation strategy addresses the identified gap in governance provision. This information is input into the implementation strategy matrix

(table B-6). Implementation strategies are presented in the matrix based upon civil knowledge that reflect the benefits and friction on the mission for each implementation strategy.

Table B-6. Implementation strategy matrix

Target Population	Governance Gap	Implementation Strategy			Cost – Benefit Analysis
The target population is identified during mission analysis or is prescribed during receipt of mission. If there is more than one target population, they are prioritized based on the commander's priorities.	Governance gaps identified in step 2 are prioritized based on the viewpoint of the target population.	Each implementation strategy is described based on MoPs and MoEs. Strategies are assigned a notional asset for action to assist in evaluation.			Each strategy is assessed for risk/benefit as well as feasibility, sustainability, and applicability.
Population 1	Population 1 –Gap 1	**Strategy to Address Gap 1** MOE Alpha	**MOP A1**	Implementing Asset	F: S: A: Cost:
			MOP A2	Implementing Asset	
		Strategy to Address Gap 1 MOE Bravo	**MOP B1**	Implementing Asset	F: S: A: Cost:
			MOP B2	Implementing Asset	
	Population 1 –Gap 2	**Strategy to Address Gap 2** MOE Charlie	**MOP C1**	Implementing Asset	F: S: A: Cost:
			MOP C2	Implementing Asset	
		Strategy to Address Gap 2 MOE Delta	**MOP D1**	Implementing Asset	F: S: A: Cost:
			MOP D2	Implementing Asset	

A applicability **MOE** measure of effectiveness
F feasibility **MOP** measure of performance
S sustainability

B-31. The output of step three is the completion of the implementation strategy matrix. This matrix aids in the next step of evaluating options to direct MGO.

Step Four: Evaluate and Prioritize Options

B-32. The final step of the GAP is to evaluate options for addressing governance gaps. The inputs to this step are the—

- Implementation strategy matrix.
- Commander's desired effects for the area of operations.
- Ability of each implementation strategy to achieve the commander's desired end state.
- Assessment of METT-TC (I).

B-33. CA forces evaluate implementation strategies against METT-TC (I) and the importance of desired effects.CA forces determine which strategies are feasible and acceptable in producing desired effects for the commander. Table B-7 depicts a completed GAP for a fictional area of operations.

B-34. The outcome of this step is mission recommendations prioritized based on which implementation strategies produce the greatest effect for the commander. These prioritized strategies are then integrated into the operations process for allocation of resources to conduct MGO.

Table B-7. Notional completed governance assessment process

Target Population	Governance Gap	Relevant Governing Body	Implementation Strategy			Alignment with Army Stability Operations Task	Desired Effect Within the Operational Environement
The target population for this example is an ethnic minority population geographically isolated within a larger state in a Middle Eastern country. They are reliant on the central government for services and incapable of starting their own state for provision of those services.	Priority gap is related to power provision. The target population currently receives less than 12 hours of reliable power each day. This distresses the population because power is needed to control air conditioning during oppressively hot summer months. The target population also recognizes this gap due to the fact that ethnic minorities who happen to align with the ruling population have reliable power for 24 hours a day.	The Ministry of energy is responsible for power provision. They are a part of the formal government and the director of the ministry is aligned with the ruling party. There are currently no informal actors capable of providing power at the local level.	Strategy 1 to address the gap is to provide SCA to the Ministry of Energy to increase energy production for the target population. Measure of effectiveness of this strategy is the 25 percent increase in reliable power daily to the target population.	Measure of Performance 1 Conduct engagement with Ministry of Energy leadership to discuss population grievance.	CAT 378	This gap is aligned with the Army stability operations task – Restoration of essential services.	Resolution of this grievance among the target population will decrease insurgent recruiting within the target population by at least 10% leading to an increase in stability and a decrease in insurgent effectiveness. Successful engagement with leadership in the target population will also expand the commander's operational reach to an ethnic minority group that has ties to the neighboring country that U.S. forces are unable to physically access.
				Coordinate with U.S. department of energy to provide training and equipment for increased energy production.	CAT 375		

CAT Civil Affairs team **MOE** measure of effectiveness **SCA** sociocultural analysis **U.S.** United States

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Appendix C

Characteristics and Principles of Military Government Operations

CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

C-1. The MGO necessitate distinctive qualities that are unique to CA forces. Collectively, these characteristics are keys to mission success. The characteristics of MGO are outlined below:

- Demonstrate cultural competency.
- Promote government for the local population by the local population.
- Enable local authorities as much as practicable.
- Implement sustainable solutions with local standards.
- Plan transfer criteria.

DEMONSTRATE CULTURAL COMPETENCY

C-2. A competency is a combination of skill, knowledge, and experience. Cultural competency is a combination of understanding culture and cultural adaptability.

C-3. Understanding culture is defined as understanding the different dimensions of culture, how cultures vary according to key elements such as interpersonal relations, concept of time, attitude towards interpersonal space, thinking style, tolerance, and authority as well as values, beliefs, behaviors, and norms. Cultural adaptability is the gathering and interpreting of information about people and surroundings and adjusting behavior to interact effectively with others. CA forces must understand people's actions in relation to their culture. In addition, CA forces must show respect for the people and their culture to maintain a positive rapport.

GOVERNMENT FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION BY THE LOCAL POPULATION

C-4. CA forces must understand the importance of supporting the government through the local population. Searching for the local solution or using the local population or local government as the face of a project or operation to achieve success avoids fixing what is not broken or providing advice and assistance too soon. The local population's participation and execution fosters a sense of ownership or buy-in, adding to the legitimacy of the government. When describing legitimacy in government, there are three subtopics of legitimacy: legal authority, traditional authorities, and charismatic authority, all viewed through the lens of the population. Legitimacy is important for all regimes or governments to sustain political stability.

C-5. The government systems where local government is extremely important includes public safety (police, law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency and rescue, and penal systems), public health (clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, emergency services, and so on), and environmental management (plans, policies, procedures). (See the following vignette.)

Achieving More with Less

On August 21, a detachment, which had been sent forward to reconnoiter a site for a Refugee Collecting Point, found at Thun a set-up which had been working quite smoothly for several days. A camp had been set up by the local maire (mayor)*, who provided all food and drink for approximately 100 refugees. The camp was run entirely by refugees. There were several experienced butchers available, many cooks and even a barber. The food provided was excellent. The maire needed, and asked for, Civil Affairs help in only one thing—help in the organization of the camp. There had been a certain amount of disorganization due chiefly to the fact that too many of the refugees wanted to "run the show." This help was at once offered.*

First Canadian Army, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
Fortnightly Report No. 3
France, 25 September 1944
(Obsolete Publication)

ENABLING LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS MUCH AS PRACTICABLE

C-6. The dictionary defines the words cede and ceding as allowing someone else to have or own something, because you are forced to do so. When it comes to military governance, it is imperative to prioritize the delegation of power to local authorities. This allows the CA forces to facilitate the legitimized government's leadership in all aspects, at every level. By lending support to the local government, the community perceives them as a government that truly represents their interests. In this scenario, the U.S. military's role is minimal, with the local government being viewed as the primary distributor of local and national resources, goods, and authority.

SOLUTIONS MUST BE SUSTAINABLE TO LOCAL STANDARDS

C-7. Although the United Nations and other partners use the International Organization for Standardization and other guides related to governance activities and capacity building, CA forces executing MGO use local standards as the baseline for all areas of life. These standards may be pre-war but must be as close to normal as possible for the population within the area of operation. The U.S. military attempts to support the government and the population by ensuring that the legitimized government not only meets the standard requirement, but that these standards can be sustained by local and national resources.

PLAN TRANSFER CRITERIA

C-8. To transfer the functions of governance to a legitimate authority, CA forces must understand the criteria that must be met to facilitate that action. This criterion must be considered in the initial planning of the military mission. The DOD considers the following stabilization questions when operating in fragile or conflict-affected areas outside the United States:

- How do DOD operations and actions, including combat actions, partner selection, and security cooperation, impact stabilization efforts as well as indigenous political dynamics at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels?
- How can U.S. or partner military forces transition from threat-focused combat operations to more population-focused stabilization actions?
- How can U.S. military and civilian personnel influence foreign partners to plan and conduct stabilization actions in ways that are acceptable locally and consistent with U.S. policy objectives? (See DODD 3000.05.)
- How can U.S. or partner military forces promulgate a coherent narrative consistent with USG objectives that counters adversaries and affirms effective and legitimate local governance?

The transfer criteria focus on ensuring the DOS and other United States and international partners recognize the special circumstances and requirements of an uncertain or hostile environment.

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

C-9. The following principles provide comprehensive and fundamental rules, or assumptions of central importance, which guide how a military commander approaches military government missions. These principles capture the broad and enduring guidelines for the execution of MGO across the competition continuum. These principles are the foundation for planning and executing MGO. The principles are outlined below:

- Military necessity.
- Building capabilities, capacities, and resiliencies.
- Economy of personnel and resources.
- Flexibility.
- Continuity of policy.
- Reasonable treatment of populations.
- Retention of existing laws, customs, and political subdivisions.
- Retention of local government departments and officials.

MILITARY NECESSITY

C-10. Military necessity is the primary underlying principle in the assertion of TMA and conduct of a military government. The prosecution of a military operation to a successful conclusion is the primary consideration.

One of the duties of a commander of occupying forces is to fulfill legal obligations and to take the necessary steps relating to the civilian population. A commander must provide civil control and civil security to the civil population to effectively consolidate gains. A military government within the occupied territory requires using populace and resources control measures in conjunction with stability operations tasks to provide a framework for building stability. The JCMOTF, with CA augmentation, is the primary force that can be given the mission to support military government through the conduct of MGO within the rear area of the battlefield to enable the transfer of government authority from the military to the appropriate civil authorities.

ECONOMY OF PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES

C-11. The efficient control and use of developed and mobilized civil networks lessens the need for additional military support. The commander must augment the JCMOTF and CA forces within an area of operations to have control of the CMO enablers to efficiently execute a military government. CMO enablers include Special Forces, CA, Psychological Operations, legal support, public affairs, engineers, transportation, health support personnel; military policy; security forces; and maneuver units. There must be constant oversight and supervision of local civil network's capabilities, resources, and capacities to ensure that forces use finite resources effectively to accomplish desired effects and mission end states.

FLEXIBILITY

C-12. CA elements must provide flexibility in the plans and in the conduct of MGO. CA elements either provide governance or support host-nation administration of governance, which varies widely at each echelon and is dependent on the factors below:

- Military forces available and their disposition.
- Structure of the host nation and local government.
- Presence or absence of civilian officials.
- Geography of the area.
- Characteristics of people, officials, key influencers.
- Necessary degree of control.
- Economic system challenges.
- Degree of destruction of local resources, personnel available, and basic policies.

C-13. In large-scale combat operations, the plan may vary widely at each echelon between the forward line of own troops and rear areas. The amount of populace and resources control measures necessary to conduct military government in large-scale combat operations are directly proportional to the level of security within the area of operation. The more permissive the environment, where civil security and civil control are established, the more easily CA forces can execute MGO to support military government effectively.

CONTINUITY OF POLICY

C-14. When planning and executing MGO to support military government, CA elements must provide for a continuity of local policy and personnel. Frequent changes in policies and procedures reduce the effectiveness and prestige of the administration, while inefficient use of personnel deprives the occupying forces of the services of personnel who may be used elsewhere. It is essential that directives as to such policies and procedures be transmitted to responsible echelons in time to allow for planning and promulgation. The personnel of the military government should, so far as possible, deal with the populace through the officers and employees of their own government. The perception of the populace is that a return to normalcy is a quick transition from task force and command objective to the DOS and back to the host nation.

REASONABLE TREATMENT OF POPULATIONS

C-15. International law requires and military necessity dictates just and reasonable treatment of the civil populous to minimize their belligerency and obtain their cooperation. This cooperation gives leverage to United States and friendly forces in maintaining public order and achieving stability through military government. U.S. forces should consider the welfare of the inhabitants on humanitarian grounds and should provide a safe and secure environment for the inhabitants as far as military requirements permit. A military government facilitates the consolidation of gains and provides the minimum essential needs of the population to ensure a commander meets the obligations of international law.

C-16. A swift and effective transition to the legitimate civil authorities benefits U.S. forces by preventing chaos, promoting order, and in reestablishing labor, services, and supply and distribution. The transition creates a favorable influence upon the present and future attitude of the population toward the United States and its allies. The transition provides incentive to other areas in crisis or conflict to assist and accept U.S. support to become stable and to return to normalcy. The desire to transfer authorities as quickly as possible, to accomplish the commander's objectives in the operational area, should not affect the imposition of punitive measures by local law enforcement, national, or U.S. policy.

C-17. The handling and control of the population during a military government varies in degree of intensity depending upon the conditions on the ground where forces execute the operations. Until civil security and civil control are restored, making it possible to restore essential services, CA forces must enforce more restrictive populace and resources controls. As the security situation stabilizes, less restrictive measures are necessary when dealing with the civil populace. This facilitates a civil administration in the occupied territory and sets the conditions for the diplomatic treaties and agreements necessary for a civil administration in host-nation territory, and ultimately foreign assistance. The following factors should be considered:

- The baseline amount of governance and levels of essential services in existence before the crisis or armed conflict.
- The attitudes of the people toward their local security (police or military forces), toward United States or friendly forces, and their degree of cooperation with these forces.
- The degree of movement toward pre-conflict conditions regarding industrial, economic, political, and social development; and the political, diplomatic, and military policy of the U.S. Government toward the government in the transitional area of operations.

C-18. Force may be used to the extent necessary by local law enforcement, security forces, or by the U.S. military as a last resort to prevent the escape of prisoners or persons suspected of crimes. Persons accused are entitled to a fair trial before the imposition of punishment. Local pre-conflict laws should be examined for fairness and equity and followed as closely as possible. The maximum punishment should not be awarded automatically. The nature of sentences to be imposed and whether they should be carried out in public, depends in part upon the customs and habits of the population and the types of punishment which have been found most effective in the locality.

C-19. Arrests, the imposition of collective fines, or the carrying out of judicial punishment become military necessities in some situations but should be taken only as an unavoidable last resort to induce a hostile population to desist from attacking United States. or United States-related interests. Local law enforcement must ensure safe, judicious, and effective control of the inhabitants as operations move to stability and transition. The following vignette illustrates how performing even the smallest actions can garner respect and build legitimacy within the populace for the occupying power.

Respect and Rituals

At the morning muster at 0700, the native headman in charge of reporting serious illnesses, births, and deaths made a formal request that we pay our respects to the first boy-child born in our village. He insisted that since this was the first boy-American-Okinawan, that the father should be congratulated. We went to the house where the child was born, a healthy well-formed boy. The mother was sitting up holding the child, which had been born two hours previously. After a bowing and scraping ceremony on the part of the natives and an encouraging smile from us, we moved on to our next task.

The headman led us to our reception center, a preliminary station enclosed by barbed wire where all incoming civilians were processed. He took us to a grief-stricken young woman who had just lost her only son. He had been mortally wounded by a grenade. The grief of the mother seemed to call for more than a simple burial detail, so to indicate our sympathy, we suggested through our interpreter that perhaps the mother would like to have some simple burial service for her son. She did not understand at first, but when the interpreter explained our burial customs for the dead, the woman's face lighted with enthusiasm and requested that the American officer say some American prayers for her child. Our thought had been that one of the Okinawans would perform some simple rites, but having been stuck with the job, we assembled a burial detail followed by

relatives of the dead child and went to work. We marked the grave with a piece of driftwood and then while everyone stood with bowed heads, we read a few prayers from our bible. The occasion was extremely solemn and seemed to appease entirely the grief of the woman. The simple ceremony did a great deal to increase the people's respect for our unit.

Report of Lt Comdr. Charles E. Frazier
United States Navy Reserve, CAHSA
Okinawa, 12 June 1945
(Obsolete Publication)

RETENTION OF EXISTING LAWS, CUSTOMS, AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS

C-20. Theater commanders should consider the U.S. Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 and its strategy to fulfill a whole of government approach to military government. Commanders must also allow diplomacy to set the rules for government participation to avoid imposing western or U.S. laws when implementing military government. Any attempted changes or reforms contrary to local custom may result in the development of active or passive resistance and thereby handicap theater operations and consolidation of gains. For similar reasons, when possible, it is advisable to retain existing territorial divisions and subdivisions. Laws and customs in one political division of a country may differ widely from those in another and the inhabitants may be accustomed to decentralization of governmental authority, which usually parallels such divisions.

C-21. Theater commanders should not attempt to impose western or U.S. laws when conducting military government. CA forces conducting MGO to support military government must not attempt to impose western or U.S. laws. Any attempted changes or reforms contrary to local custom may result in the development of active or passive resistance and thereby handicap theater operations and consolidation of gains. For similar reasons, it is advisable, if possible, to retain existing territorial divisions and subdivisions. Laws and customs in one political division of a country may differ widely from those in another and the inhabitants may be accustomed to decentralization of governmental authority, which usually parallels such divisions.

RETENTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND OFFICIALS

C-22. Offices which are unnecessary or detrimental to the host nation or United States interests should be temporarily discontinued or suspended, if possible. In some areas, this may be the case with entire departments or bureaus of the government. Such legislative bodies still in existence are usually suspended.

C-23. Sometimes it is necessary to remove high ranking political officials from office. This action could include the removal of the nominal and actual heads of the government, from national to local levels, and may include cabinet ministers and the heads of principal political divisions. All recommendations for replacement during MGO support to military government is brought to the appropriate echelon commander and the populous so that a replacement may be selected or elected. No permanent appointments to such positions should be made by a CA element and no elections should be held without approval of a higher authority because of the political implications of such appointments. Willful failure of retained host-nation officials at any level to perform their duties satisfactorily should be regarded as a serious offense against the people and the host-nation government.

C-24. In some cases, former officials may disappear into the civilian population due to initial fears that forces may persecute them for their role in the previous government. Some civil officials may flee as large-scale combat operations begin, or when it is inexpedient or unsafe for them to continue in office. Eventually, forces locate them through civilian leaders and civil network engagement.

C-25. Some of the selections for key posts may be trusted nonprofessionals. The U.S. commander vets the officials' choice of subordinates. So far as practicable, subordinate officials and employees of the local government should be retained in their offices and made responsible for the proper discharge of their duties.

C-26. CA personnel should attempt to deal with the inhabitants at each echelon in the area of operation through retained or appointed employees of the local government. When officials are replaced, replacements should be sought from among the inhabitants who by training and experience are qualified to take over the duties of the office. In the selection of government officials, careful consideration should be given to their reliability, their positions in the community, and their other qualifications for the position.

C-27. CA elements should confine themselves to supervision and avoid assumption of the duties of any political subdivision or department of government. This is especially important when MGO is supporting a military government TMA mission. Overall governorship is the charge of the commander, and initially, military personnel fill the subordinate leadership vacancies. Again, as much as the situation allows, the locals need to be the face of government departments. CA forces act as mentors and facilitators unless a task force with a CA commander is in place, and the commander is the governor by proxy.

C-28. CA elements need to avoid any negotiations with any local political elements that do not adhere to local policy or law for that specific locality. Forces should work CAO in conjunction with the local authority or through approval, if required, from the supported commander. As a rule, CA Soldiers are representatives of the USG and should keep their relations with local officials and inhabitants on a strictly official basis. Avoid unofficial social relationships and personal favors and gifts. Soldiers must refuse gifts from civilians unless authorized by higher authority.

C-29. The United States has a legal obligation to protect civilians, but it is advisable to provide a higher level of protection for persons or entire civil networks that continue in, or are assigned to, local public office. Some area inhabitants may accuse these persons of disloyalty, threating and endangering them and damaging their property.

Appendix D

Civil Affairs Functional Specialist Reference Chart and Descriptions

D-1. To conduct MGO, CAO staff officers, planners, units, and other military personnel use the CA functional specialties chart. This chart is a valuable guide, ensuring capabilities are identified, and the proper functional specialty is engaged. The chart contains recommendations for actions executed during competition, crisis, and conflict. Commanders and staff planners can leverage this chart to identify and address vulnerable capabilities and capacities requiring specialized assistance.CA operations staff officers, planners and units, non-CA units, and personnel involved with CMO or MGO may use the CA functional specialties chart below as a guide.

D-2. The chart below (table D-1, pages 80 through 104) contains tasks that CA units can perform at all echelons in one form or another. The paragraphs of this appendix describe in detail each area and specialty capability.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY	**Laws, Regulations, and Policies**	Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine the organizational structure of government system at all levels, and to develop a list of key personnel. Advise commanders on the status of efficacy of existing government agencies or social control, government officials, employees, and community leaders. Advise on civil laws governing property and property control.	Same as under COMPETITION, but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation. Support civil-military operations center (CMOC) to facilitate civil-military integration (CMI) with Department of State, the host nation, and other agencies concerned with disaster assistance and property control. Assist in the development of programs to improve capabilities, resiliencies, training, equipment facilities, and operational effectiveness agencies to protect citizens, legal records, public and private property, and enforcement agencies.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Support CMI through the civil-military operations (CMO) center to assure return of all property taken into custody to legal owners. Determine which private property and government property has potential for military use. Supervise functional systems of government. Transition full control of government, as soon as practical, to legitimate authorities.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Remove all persons who are hostile to the United States Government or who are not aligned with its policies and objectives, appoint new officials when competent and vetted persons can be empowered. Institute populace and resources control measures to block and control all negotiable assets and resources of potential military use not contained in other functional areas.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY	**Corrections**	Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine the organizational structure of the penal system. Advise commanders on the status of penal system in the area of operations. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement, and civil network development to develop list of key personnel in the penal system. Conduct civil engagement and survey of penal agencies to determine the level of training, status of equipment, auxiliary forces available, conditions of facilities, operational effectiveness.	Same as under COMPETITION, but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation. Assist in the development of programs to improve capabilities, resiliencies, training, equipment facilities, and operational effectiveness penal agencies.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Establish control over penal installations; ensure utilization of acceptable control personnel.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered. Recommend use of military police or other tactical forces to staff penal agencies as required.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY	**Law and Border Enforcement**	Advise commanders on the status of public safety in the area of operations. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement and civil-network development to develop a list of key personnel in police, fire and rescue services, border control. Analyze and evaluate the capabilities and resiliencies of police to maintain law and order in all situations. Advise commanders on character of populations with respect to obedience to law. Assess capabilities and resiliencies to maintain or restore law and order during civil emergencies. Prepare plans and procedures to maintain or restore law and order during civil emergencies.	Same as under COMPETITION, but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation. Support CMOC to facilitate CMI with United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the host nation, and other agencies concerned with public safety activities. Assist in the development of programs to improve capabilities, resiliencies, training, equipment facilities, and operational effectiveness of police, fire, and rescue services. Conduct civil-network development to develop of auxiliary forces to augment police agencies and the maintenance of public order.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Assist recognized local authorities to: Establish or re-establish police, fire, and rescue agencies as necessary. Enforce all laws and ordinances after the populace has been duly informed. Establish populace and resources control measures to control circulation of civilian personnel, to control arms and ammunition (sale, possession, registration, and use).	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Collect and take into custody all arms and ammunition and other implements of war. Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered. Use military police or other tactical forces to staff police, and fire and rescue services as required. Keep commander informed of levels of legitimacy and hostility within the local populace.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY	**Law and Border Enforcement (continued)**	Conduct civil engagement and survey of police, fire and rescue, and border agencies to determine the level of training, status of equipment, auxiliary forces available, conditions of facilities, operational effectiveness. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine the organizational structure of the police, and fire and rescue services.	Develop contingency plans for military support of police agencies in keeping the public order.	Develop plans and procedures for the return of control to legitimate authorities as soon as practical.	Conduct civil network development and engagement to screen officials and other safety personnel for suitability and remove and replace them as required.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO CIVIL CONTROL	**Judiciary and Legal Systems**	Advise commander on all applicable United States, the host nation, and international laws. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine organization and functionality of local judiciary systems and bar. Conduct civil network development to establish liaison with the host nation, United States Government, and international legal organizations. Prepare programs to assist with reception, staging, onward movement, and integration for troop education concerning importance of adherence to and administration of laws and legal systems. Coordinate civil affairs actions with staff judge advocate to protect the command.	Same as under COMPETITION, but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation. Support CMOC to facilitate CMI with Department of State, the host nation, and other agencies concerned with administration of existing or re-establishment of administration of justice systems. Recommend procedures to safeguard judiciary, and court systems and personnel.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Assist recognized local authorities to— Draft legislation for the improvement of judicial administration. Provide for the security of judicial records.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered. Review, analyze and evaluate, recommend suspension, modification, amendment, or retention of current or proposed laws. Supervise the local judicial systems and make appropriate changes as needed. Establish and supervise the functioning of military government courts. Establish repositories and supervise existing for legal documents.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO CIVIL CONTROL	**Transportation**	Advises the commander on all aspects of the transportation systems in an area of operations. Analyze organization, routes, and capacities of transportation systems. Coordinate use of port terminal operations, both sea and air. Provide knowledge, experience, and technical expertise to the host nation on operations and equipment modernization. Prepare recommend-ations for improving training and education programs and maintenance facilities for the host nation. Conduct civil engagement and survey officials for bulk fuel requirements, maintenance requirements and capabilities, minimum requirements of civilian use of transportation, and key facilities within the network.	Same as under COMPETITION, but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation. Establish liaison with host-nation transportation personnel, United States Embassy country team, and USAID.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Determine the extent of civilian transportation assets that can be used by military. Recommend key host-nation transportation assets and facilities for protection. Conduct civil reconnaissance to determine rehabilitation reconstruction of damaged systems and infrastructure.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Advising commanders on assuming full control of all civilian transport agencies and functions. Impound and control records and files to determine acceptability of restoring officials to key positions. Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO CIVIL CONTROL	**Transportation (continued)**	Conduct civil reconnaissance to determine sources of bulk fuel and replacement parts, locations of key facilities. Conduct civil network development to build transportation civil networks.	Prepare plans and make recommendations for using transport facilities for civil defense in the event of enemy attack or natural disaster. Determine priority of movement control programs for sea, air, and land.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Determine the extent of civilian transportation assets that can be used by military. Recommend key host-nation transportation assets and facilities for protection. Conduct civil reconnaissance to determine rehabilitation reconstruction of damaged systems and infrastructure.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Advising commanders on assuming full control of all civilian transport agencies and functions. Impound and control records and files to determine acceptability of restoring officials to key positions. Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES	**Emergency Management**	Provide instruction for removal of unexploded ordnance. Advise commanders and embassy staff on emergency management planning and control measures. Recommend programs to build host-nation emergency management capabilities and resiliencies. Conduct CMOC to identify vulnerabilities in food and medical supply systems. Recommend stockpiling of food stuffs and medical supplies. Conduct civil network development to identify civil networks associated with emergency management, emergency services, for recruitment of personnel and training for locations of shelters and evacuation routes. Recommend education programs for identification, reporting, and avoidance of unexploded ordinance. Provide instruction for removal of unexploded ordinance.	Same as under COMPETITION, but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation. Support CMOC to facilitate CMI with USAID host nation to make recommendations for providing minimal essential services during a disaster or enemy attack. Ensure United States personnel are aware of emergency warning systems and shelter locations and evacuation procedures.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to survey damage to emergency management systems and infrastructure. Support CMOC to facilitate CMI and inter-organizational cooperation to recommend restoration priorities. Implement populace and resources control measures to protect population from hazards and isolate from asymmetric threats. Activate and empower civil networks for emergency services, restoration of essential services, repair of critical infrastructure and facilities. Assist in debris removal plan.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered. Employ all passive defense measures as necessary.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES	**Public Water and Sanitation**	Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to assess the capabilities of systems and regulatory agencies. Advise commanders on the capabilities and vulnerabilities of current water systems, to include capacity and requirements of the populace. Conduct civil network development to establish networks of key management personnel in water supply, water treatment, and waste disposal systems. Recommend education and training programs for the host nation to build the capacity, capability and resiliency of water treatment and distribution systems.	Same as under COMPETITION, but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation. Support CMOC to facilitate CMI with USAID, host nation, and other agencies concerned to share technical expertise on increasing capabilities and resiliencies, facility operations, technical training programs, modernization, expansion, and protection of key infrastructure.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Implement populace and resources control measures to protect potable water supply from hazards and asymmetric threats. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to survey damage to public water and sanitation systems and infrastructure. Support CMOC to facilitate CMI and inter-organizational cooperation to recommend restoration priorities.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered. Apply additional populace and resources control measures to assume full control of all public water and sanitation.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES	**Agri-Business and Food**	Advise commander of the effect of military operations on food and agriculture systems for production and distribution. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine key personnel involved with food production, processing, storage facilities, and marketing systems. Conduct civil network development to establish liaison with technical agri-business and food specialist networks. Recommend the establishment of programs to increase capabilities, capacities and resiliencies in marketing, livestock production, crop production, irrigation, use of fertilizers and pesticides.	Same as under COMPETITION, but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine locations of deficit and surplus areas. Support CMOC to facilitate CMI and inter-organizational cooperation to facilitate plan and distribution of relief supplies. Identify and safeguard food stocks.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to survey damage to emergency management systems and infrastructure. Support CMOC to facilitate CMI and interorganizational cooperation to recommend restoration priorities for resumption of agriculture production. Conduct civil network development to establish labor pool for planting and harvesting. Implement populace and resources control measures to protect food storage and distribution centers and establish ration control to the populace.	Take control of all agri-business and food systems public and private. Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE	**Laws, Regulations, and Policies**	Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine the organizational structure of government system at all levels, and to develop a list of key personnel. Advise commanders on the status of efficacy of existing government agencies or social control, government officials, employees, and community leaders. Advise on civil laws governing property and property control.	Same as under COMPETITION but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation. Support CMOC center to facilitate CMI with Department of State, host nation, and other agencies concerned disaster assistance and property control. Assist in the development of programs to improve capabilities, resiliencies, training, equipment facilities, and operational effectiveness agencies to protect citizens, legal records, public and private property, and enforcement agencies.	Same as under CRISIS plus: Support CMO through the CMOC to assure return of all property taken into custody to legal owners. Determine which private property and government property has potential for military use. Supervise functional systems of government. Transition full control of government, as soon as practical, to legitimate authorities.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Remove all persons who are hostile to the United States Government or who are not aligned with its policies and objectives, appoint new officials when competent and vetted persons can be empowered. Institute populace and resources control measures to block and control all negotiable assets and resources of potential military use not contained in other functional areas.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE	**Public Adminis-tration**	Survey governmental organization at all levels. Survey lines of authority and influence having impact on political matters. Analyze effectiveness of existing agencies of government or social control. Study effectiveness of government officials and employees, and other community leaders. Negotiate to gain support or cooperation for U.S. forces.	Same as under COMPETITION. Recommend to host nation the organization, functioning staffing, and authority of agencies of government or social control at all levels of government. Advise on legislation, regulations, or policies based on the analysis of the society and the economy of the area. Participate on joint commissions, committees, or councils concerned with governmental affairs.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Supervise existing organs of government. Restore full control of government as soon as practicable to friendly officials. Issue such proclamations and notices as are authorized by higher headquarters upon initial entry into the area. Display appropriate United States. or allied flags in public centers when practicable.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus. Same as “Occupied Friendly,” plus: Remove persons who are inimical to the United States or who are not in sympathy with its policies and objectives, and secure appointment of leaders who will further desired programs. Temporarily appoint key officials after consultation with respected civilians of the area.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE	**Education**	Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine locations of existing education facilities. Conduct civil network development to establish liaison with public education specialist networks. Advise commanders on the status of efficacy of existing public education agencies or ministries.	Same as under COMPETITION, Advise commanders on the effects of military operations on school systems. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to survey damage to education systems and facilities.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Support CMOC to facilitate CMI and interorganizational cooperation to recommend restoration priorities for resumption of education services. Recommend plans and procedures for the repair of damaged school facilities on a priority basis. Assist host nation government in constructing or improving existing facilities. Assist with training programs for training teachers.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Close all schools. Remove all persons in public education who are hostile to the United States Government or who are not aligned with its policies and objectives, appoint new officials when competent and vetted persons can be empowered. Screen all text materials to determine suitability. Plan phased re-opening of educational facilities.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE	**Environment and Natural Resources**	Advises the commander on the protection of natural resources and the environment in an area of operations. Prepare programs to assist with reception, staging, onward movement, and integration for troop education concerning importance of expertise and experience identifying and assessing hazards and mitigation methods to protect natural resources and the environment. These specialists can develop plans, policies, and procedures to build, sustain, and improve host-nation capabilities to protect human life and the natural environment.	Same as under COMPETITION but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation. Advises the commander on the protection of natural resources and the environment in an area of operations.	Same as under CRISIS plus:	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

Functional area	*Functional specialty*	*Competition*	*Crisis*	*Conflict*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE	**Heritage and Preservation**	Advises the commander on the protection of traditional culture, customs, and arts in an area of operations. Prepare programs to assist with reception, staging, onward movement, and integration for troop education concerning importance of safeguard and preserve cultural property. Create and teach programs and policies to build, improve, and sustain host-nation capabilities to preserve cultural property. Conduct civil reconnaissance to develop and maintain a database of cultural data and archival storage facilities for the area. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to engage persons, groups, and institutions to develop civil networks with the heritage and preservation community.	Same as under COMPETITION but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Assist in locating, documenting, and returning stolen or looted items or returning collections and artifacts from safeguard facilities to original facilities.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY except emphasis is placed on directory rather than advisory role. Advise commanders on the protection, preservation, cataloging, transportation, and safe storage of all historical and cultural monuments and works, religious shrines and objects of art, and any other national collections of artifacts or art until hostilities have ceased.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

Functional area	*Functional specialty*	*Competition*	*Crisis*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE	**Heritage and Preservation (continued)**	Develop and maintain cultural data for historical, religious, and cultural sites in the area of operations. Provide input for civil considerations to protect and preserve cultural heritage such as oral traditions, performing arts, social practices, rituals, festive events, knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe, or the knowledge and skills to produce traditional crafts.			
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE	**Archivist**	Advises the commander on the protection of traditional culture and customs in an area of operations. Recommends measures for protecting and securing archives and records. Prepare programs and assist in troop education concerning importance of securing and protecting archives.	Same as under COMPETITION but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with host nation.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Within command policy, assist in the restoration of programs, facilities, and systems for archiving. Assist in locating and returning archives to the original facilities.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY except emphasis is placed on directory rather than advisory role.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

Functional Area	Functional Specialty	Competition	*Crisis*	*Conflict*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE	**Archivist (continued)**	Conduct civil reconnaissance to develop and maintain a database of cultural data and archival storage facilities for the area. Advise on guidelines for use of archival sites during emergencies. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to engage persons, groups, and institutions to develop civil networks with the archivist community. Develop and maintain cultural data for the area of operations. Establish guidelines for use of or destruction of archives, official, public documents and records related to persons, groups, institutions, and property as a source of valuable intelligence, and information for running the government.			

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

Functional area	*Functional specialty*	*Competition*	*Crisis*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT	**Economic Development**	Advises the commander on the governmental structure as related to economics and commerce. Advise the commander of the effect of military operations on production and prices. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine: • Location, type, and availability or natural resources. • Surveys or public law and public and private agencies concerned with economic activities. • Compilation and analysis of statistics on domestic and foreign trade. Develop list of key industries. Determine economic controls being used. Establish liaison with government, university, and industry economists.	Same as under COMPETITION, but— Determine the availability of the local resources for military and civilian use. Those business activities essential to the continued production and of essential goods and services.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Development of plans for the maintenance, preservation, rehabilitation, or restoration of the local economy. Advise commanders of measures to be taken to control inflation. Bonuses, subsidies, and price adjustments to encourage production and movement of required goods and materials. Determination of specific types of business enterprises including brokerage houses, markets. and banks to be opened or closed. taking into consideration the rules of international law. Information and advice to local business and commercial institutions concerning policies of the military commander.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Take control of all economic and commerce offices. Screen government economic and commerce officials and restore these who are acceptable. Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered. Preparation of requirements for materials to be diverted to military use in according to international law, particularly the Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949 and the Hague Conference of 1907, Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and policy guidance published by higher headquarters. Recommendation for allocation of resources between military and civilian needs and between areas, industries, and plants.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

Functional Area	Functional Specialty	Competition	*Crisis*	*Conflict*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT	**Economic Development (continued)**	Conduct surveys of: • Means of production. • Channels of distribution. • Types & volume of commodities entering foreign trade. • Location of industry and raw materials. • Prices to include any commonly used indexes. • Assistance programs. Establish working relationship with USAID, Embassy, Country Team, and host country and international economists. Evaluate effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies and make recommendations when appropriate. Conduct feasibility studies for establishment of new industry. Advise and assist in the establishment of programs in: • Export expansion. • Industrial expansion. • Vocational training. • Price stabilization. Implementation of economic assistance programs.		Restrictions on exports or imports. Plan and program for inputs necessary to get priority industries operating. Assure that industrial plants and machinery are protected. Assure that necessary raw materials can move to industry. Inventory raw materials and finished goods. Assist in establishing priorities to get industries operating. Assist in establishing or continuing price control and rationing programs as necessary. Recommend and program for necessary economic assistance. Assist in the prevention of unnecessary exploitation of economic resources	

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

Functional Area	*Functional Specialty*	*Competition*	*Crisis*	*Conflict*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMEMNT	**Industry and Production**	Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine: Key industries, means of production, channels of distribution, volumes of production for domestic and foreign use, location of production and raw materials, price indices, and assistance programs.	Same as under COMPETITION but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine: Availability of local resources for military and civilian use.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Analyze, evaluate, and recommend the establishment of new industries.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT	**Energy**	Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to assess the capabilities of systems and regulatory agencies. Advise commanders on the capabilities and vulnerabilities of resources and energy systems. Conduct civil network development to establish networks of key management personnel. Recommend education and training programs for the host nation to build the capacity, capability and resiliency of water treatment and distribution systems.	Same as under COMPETITION but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation.	Same as under CRISIS, plus:	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus:

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT	**Finance Money and Banking**	Advises the commander on all aspects of the structures, and responsibilities of financial organizations, central bank. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine: Locations of financial institutions and banks, revenue producing systems, budgetary systems, treasury operations, monetary and fiscal policies, banking regulatory policies, money supply and interest rates. Conduct civil network development to determine key personnel in government finance and civilian institutions.	Same as under COMPETITION but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine:	Same as under CRISIS, plus:	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN A HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered.
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMEMNT	**Commerce and Trade**	Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine: • The lack of licit versus. illicit trade. • Illicit market constructs and networks. • The integration of illicit markets into licit markets.	Same as under COMPETITION but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation.	Same as under CRISIS, plus:	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN A HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRA-STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT	**Technology and Telecom-munications**	Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine: Organization and capabilities of postal services, telecommuni-cations networks. Powers and functions of regulatory agencies. International communication agreements. Communication equipment and sources of replacement parts. Maintenance capabilities. Global positioning and navigational systems. Minimum requirements for security and control during a disaster. Conduct civil network development to establish networks of technical specialists. Recommend education, training, and programs for equipment modernization, technical training, maintenance, system expansion, and key facility protection.	Same as under COMPETITION but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Coordinate use of civilian communication facilities required for military uses. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine minimum essential communication needs for civilian use. Recommend resources control measures to control supply, procurement, and allocation of critical materials. Recommend priorities for restoration and rehabilitation of damaged facilities. Coordinate the return of facilities no longer required for military use.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Assume full control of civilian technology and communications agencies. Seize and impound all technology and communication facilities. Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in a Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in an Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT	**Transportation**	Advises the commander on all aspects of the transportation systems in an area of operations. Analyze organization, routes, and capacities of transportation systems. Coordinate use of port terminal operations, both sea and air. Provide knowledge, experience, and technical expertise to the host nation on operations and equipment modernization. Prepare recommendations for improving training and education programs and maintenance facilities for the host nation. Conduct civil engagement and survey officials for bulk fuel requirements, maintenance requirements and capabilities, minimum requirements of civilian use of transportation, and key facilities within the network.	Same as under COMPETITION but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation. Establish liaison with host-nation transportation personnel, United States Embassy country team, and United States for International Development. Prepare plans and make recom-mendations for using transport facilities for civil defense in the event of enemy attack or natural disaster. Determine priority of movement control programs for sea, air, and land.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Determine the extent of civilian transportation assets that can be used by military. Recommend key host-nation transportation assets and facilities for protection. Conduct civil reconnaissanc e to determine rehabilitation reconstruction of damaged systems and infrastructure.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Advising commanders on assuming full control of all civilian transport agencies and functions. Impound and control records and files to determine acceptability of restoring officials to key positions. Remove all operating officials and restore those who are competent and vetted.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs functional specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT	**Transportation (continued)**	Conduct civil reconnaissance to determine sources of bulk fuel and replacement parts, locations of key facilities. Conduct civil network development to build transportation civil networks.	Determine priority of movement control programs for sea, air, and land.	Conduct civil reconnaissance to determine rehabilitation reconstruction of damaged systems and infrastructure.	Remove all operating officials and restore those who are competent and vetted.

Table D-1. Civil Affairs Functional Specialties (continued)

FUNCTIONAL AREA	*FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY*	*COMPETITION*	*CRISIS*	*CONFLICT*	
				Civil Administration in Host-Nation Territory	*Civil Administration in Occupied Territory*
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRA-STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT	**Agri-Business and Food**	Advise commander of the effect of military operations on food and agriculture systems for production and distribution. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine key personnel involved with food production, processing, storage facilities, and marketing systems. Conduct civil network development to establish liaison with technical agri-business and food specialist networks. Recommend the establishment of programs to increase capabilities, capacities and resiliencies in marketing, livestock production, crop production, irrigation, use of fertilizers and pesticides.	Same as under COMPETITION, but as primary advisory role to theater commanders, ambassadors, country teams, and for work with the host nation. Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to determine locations of deficit and surplus areas. Support CMOC to facilitate CMI and interorganizational cooperation to facilitate plan and distribution of relief supplies. Identify and safeguard food socks.	Same as under CRISIS, plus: Conduct civil reconnaissance and civil engagement to survey damage to emergency management systems and infrastructure. Support CMOC to facilitate CMI and interorganiz-ational cooperation to recommend restoration priorities for resumption of agriculture production. Conduct civil network development to establish labor pool for planting and harvesting. Implement populace and resources control measures to protect food storage and distribution centers and establish ration control to the populace.	Same as under CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOST-NATION TERRITORY plus: Take control of all agri-business and food systems public and private. Remove all illegitimate operating officials when competent and vetted officials can be empowered.

ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY

D-3. Establishing civil security involves providing for the safety of the host nation and its population, including protection from internal and external threats. (See ADP 3-07.) Establishing a safe, secure, and stable environment is key to obtaining local support for large-scale combat operations and any other military action.

D-4. Civil security enables freedom of maneuver to allow the USG and our unified action partners to concentrate on consolidating gains. Civil security sets the conditions for all other stability tasks, as no other stability task can be effective in high-threat environments while allowing for the transition of authority to legitimate, stable, and sustainable institutions.

D-5. The CA civil security functional specialty area is concerned with civil security and public order which generates the foundation for stability within the operational environment. This function relates to the development and administration of policies, planning mechanisms, and training partner nation public officials to respond to threats and hazards (manmade, natural, internal, and external) across all levels of government. When required, the capabilities within this functional specialty area assist with the establishment and maintenance of a military government.

D-6. CA functional specialists support civil security by performing CR, CE, and CND in MGO to support civil security. Civil security specialists provide knowledge, experience, and technical expertise in public safety, including protection from internal and external threats. Civil security specialists analyze, assess, and evaluate in a multitude of security topics including cessation of large-scale violence, public order, DDR, border control, territorial security, explosives and hazards clearance, and key terrain, personnel, and facilities protection. Civil security concentrations include law enforcement administration, application of the rule of law, the legitimate monopoly of force, and science-based investigative methodologies.

D-7. The following paragraphs describe the CA functional specialties, and the responsibilities of the military government officers, that are available to support the establishment of civil security.

LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES

D-8. The laws, regulations, and policies focus area is part of the rule of law functional specialty which includes expertise in political systems and legal frameworks. These specialists support stable and inclusive host nation governance and non-violent conflict management to shape the policies that support the DDR of partisans and combatants. They work with commanders and host nation representatives to establish, strengthen, and reform legislative and political structures to achieve these goals.

Corrections

D-9. The corrections functional specialty includes specialists with expertise in conducting and managing the administration of corrections operations. Corrections functional specialists advise on corrections systems that result in the safe and humane detention and incarceration of prisoners for the maintenance of public order. Corrections specialists works to resolve the disposition of persons that the previous government imprisoned for political or racial reasons only.

Law and Border Enforcement

D-10. The law and border enforcement functional specialty include experts with knowledge and experience of conducting transitional law enforcement. These specialists are instrumental to the process of resettling dislocated civilians. They design and improve operational and ministerial responses to illicit power networks, implement community security approaches, and mitigate violence targeted to vulnerable populations. (See FM 3-57 for more information on the civil security functional specialty focus areas.)

SUPPORT TO CIVIL CONTROL

D-11. Support to civil control centers on justice reform, the rule of law, and public order, underpinned by efforts to rebuild the host-nation judiciary, police, and correction systems. (See ADP 3-07.) Civil control is the consolidation of security gains that allow the USG and our unified action partners to set the conditions for governance transition to legitimate authorities. Public trust and civil order require legal systems that are

publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated. Forces use civil control stability tasks to support civil security stability tasks by overlaying institutions, organizations, processes, and legitimacy onto immediate physical security activities.

D-12. CA functional specialists perform CR, CE, and CND to support civil control with MGO, which provides knowledge, experience, and technical expertise in populace and resources control, rule of law institutions, judiciary, and corrections systems. Civil control specialists analyze, assess, and evaluate the concepts, institutions, and processes of transportation systems that are essential to population and resources control measures needed in the establishment and maintenance of a military government. Civil control concentrations include transportation and infrastructure systems, laws, regulations, policies, comparative legal frameworks, international human rights, and institutional reform.

D-13. The following paragraphs describe the CA functional specialties, and the responsibilities of the military government officers, that are available to support civil control.

Judiciary and Legal Systems

D-14. The judiciary and legal systems focus area is part of the rule of law functional specialty which includes expertise and experience in court systems and case management. Legal and judiciary advise on the formation of transitional justice institutions, which are based on indigenous, national, and international laws. These institutions encompass systems for interpreting and enforcing laws, such as criminal justice, judicial arbitration, dispute arbitration, corrections, and reconciliation. Their guidance is crucial to developing effective transitional justice mechanisms that uphold the rule of law and promote accountability, thereby fostering sustainable peace and justice in societies affected by conflict or past human rights abuses.

Transportation

D-15. The transportation focus area is part of the public transportation functional specialty which includes experts with knowledge and experience on developing and maintaining transportation infrastructure and systems. These specialists advise on crucial aspects of populace and resources control measures used to achieve civil security and civil control. Transportation specialists identify and designate the waterways, ports, airports, highways, and roadways that move people and material to support U.S. forces and to support civilian supply. (See FM 3-57 for more information on the civil control functional specialty focus areas.)

Restore Essential Services

D-16. The restoration of essential services ultimately contributes to achieving a stable democracy, a sustainable economy, and the social well-being of the population. Restoring essential services reduces the risk of a humanitarian disaster, which could disrupt operational momentum and the consolidation of gains.

D-17. CA functional specialists perform CR, CE, and CND to support the restoration of essential services in MGO to provide knowledge, experience, and technical expertise in an immediate and sustainable social well-being. Essential services specialists assess, analyze, and evaluate fundamental needs of the populace, beyond the aspects of security, for the eventual and sustainable transition to legitimate authorities following large-scale combat operations and any other military action. Immediate and emergency needs include food, water, shelter, and medical support. Restoring of essential services enables the reestablishment of stable economic systems, education, public health, and resettlement. The full spectrum of social needs must be addressed and transitioned to capable institutions to prevent future destabilization and security deterioration in rear areas. Essential services concentrations include specialties in food relief, water security, sanitation, public works, power, education administration, public health, transportation and distribution, communications, and human dislocation and resettlement.

D-18. The following paragraphs describe some of the CA affairs functional specialties, and the responsibilities of the military government officers, that are available to restore essential services.

Emergency Management

D-19. The emergency management focus area is part of the public safety functional specialty, which includes expertise and experience to manage emergency service assets to prepare for responses to complex emergencies. The specialists identify the immediate humanitarian needs of the population that can lead to

famine, dislocated civilians, and human trafficking. The specialists coordinate with relief agencies and identify vital transportation routes, airfields, and helicopter landing zones to enable access for essential services restoration and delivery. They build, sustain, and improve host nation capabilities to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of man-made or natural disasters.

Public Water and Sanitation

D-20. The public water and sanitation focus area is part of the public works and utilities functional specialty. This specialty includes expertise and experience identifying and assessing capabilities and capacities of public works and utilities. Specialists can plan and execute the rehabilitation, development, and operations supervision of the national and localized public facilities and utilities network as it exists within the operational environment. They build, sustain, and improve host nation capabilities to strengthen distribution, collection, and treatment, and build infrastructure for flood control and drainage, solid waste, and agriculture irrigation.

Agri-business and Food

D-21. The agricultural business and food focus area is part of the food and agriculture functional specialty. The food and agricultural specialty include expertise and experience in identifying and assessing food and agriculture systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities that specialists need to care for the immediate nutritional needs of the population after a crisis or conflict. (See FM 3-57 for more information on the essential services and functional specialty focus areas.)

SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE

D-22. Support to governance addresses the processes, systems, institutions, and actors that enable a state to function; effective, legitimate governance ensures that these are transparent, accountable, and involve public participation (ADP 3-07). Support to governance activities leverage the successful implementation of civil security, civil control, and essential services (consolidation of gains). In addition, support to governance sets critical conditions for the execution of economic and infrastructure development and the conduct of security cooperation.

D-23. The role of CA governance experts is to synchronize the efforts of government. Government experts perform CR, CE, and CND in military operations to support this activity. They provide knowledge, experience, and technical expertise in public administration, cultural relations, public information, and environmental management. Governance officers develop programs, policies, systems, and institutions to enable a state's ability to serve the citizens and recommend rules, processes, and behavior by which the citizenry can articulate interests, participate in nonviolent political processes, and enjoy the collective benefits and services of the nation. When required, the capabilities within this functional specialty area assist in the establishment and maintenance of a military government.

D-24. A crucial component of the government functional specialty addresses the former combatants within the population. Without a monopoly on the use of force, a state has few ways to uphold the rule of law and protect the inalienable rights of citizens. By definition, a conflict-affected state has lost this monopoly, and must restore or establish it by disbanding nonstate, armed actors and reconstituting statutory forces.

D-25. A complex DDR process is implemented to achieve reconciliation and renewal of legitimacy in the government. DDR is a confidence-building program to induce confidence and legitimacy in government and mitigate reprisals and animosity between government, factions, and the population. DDR efforts strive to increase stability by disarming and demobilizing former combatants (for example, government and rebel forces). These former combatants are then reintegrated into civil society or incorporated into the new armed forces and police. *Reintegration* is the process through which former combatants, belligerents, and displaced civilians receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local populace (ADP 3-07).

D-26. A successful DDR program helps establish sustainable stability. A DDR program considers the different needs of the population associated with armed forces and groups, as well as those of civilians forced to flee their homes after violent conflict or disaster. A failed or partially implemented DDR effort can stall security sector reform, disrupt peace processes, and destabilize communities socially and economically.

D-27. CA forces use the GAP assessment tool to analyze, assess, and evaluate government provision of services, state-resource management, public empowerment, legitimacy, public participation, and political accountability. CA forces identify gaps to center the CND plan and prioritize deficit areas and systems.

D-28. The following paragraphs describe the CA functional specialties, and the responsibilities of the military government officers that work in concert with the civil security, civil control, and essential services functions that are available for support to governance.

Laws, Regulations, and Policies

D-29. The laws, regulations, and policies focus area is part of the rule of law functional specialty, which includes expertise and experience in management of political systems and legal frame works. The specialists establish, strengthen, and reform constitutional, legislative, and political structure that incorporate customary indigenous methods with internationally accepted policies. They assess, provide formal and traditional policies and programs, and provide oversight to support host nation governance and nonviolent conflict management through political processes.

Public Administration

D-30. The public administration functional specialty places emphasis on the structure and conduct of the indigenous government from national to local levels. The specialty includes expertise and experience in assessing, advising, improving, or establishing legislative and executive institutions from national to local levels, and the processes of these institutions in the administration of governance. These specialists can develop plans, policies, and procedures to build, sustain, and improve host-nation capabilities to certify political parties, eligibility for franchise, elections, tenure, civil servant service, policy and programming, and all other aspects of the development and operation of the apparatus of government. These specialists are prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the national and subnational institutions, can also develop civil networks with access to additional resources to augment the nationwide network of indigenous civil authorities.

Education

D-31. The education specialists' focus area provides expertise in the structure and conduct of the formal education system of indigenous institutions. These specialists can create programs and policies to build, sustain, and improve host nation capabilities for structuring, resourcing, organizing, rehabilitation, and implementation of the curriculum, facilities, processes, and personnel development required to implement and sustain inclusive public education. This specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the national and subnational institutions, whilst providing teaching techniques, educational programs, access to public libraries and introduction of audiovisual means for adult education programs.

Environment and Natural Resources

D-32. The environment and natural resources specialists' focus area is part of the environmental management functional specialty. The specialty includes expertise and experience identifying and assessing hazards and mitigation methods to protect natural resources and the environment. These specialists can develop plans, policies, and procedures to build, sustain, and improve host nation capabilities to protect human life and the natural environment.

Heritage and Preservation

D-33. The heritage and preservation specialists' focus area are part of the cultural relations functional specialty, which includes expertise and experience on the stewardship of social and cultural resources. These specialists can create programs and policies to build, sustain, and improve host nation capabilities to safeguard and preserve cultural property. They provide an in-depth understanding of traditional culture, customs, heritage, and arts of an area in a nation or region. Heritage and preservation specialists protect and preserve all historical and cultural monuments and works, religious shrines and objects of art, and any other national collections of artifacts or art.

Archivist

D-34. The archivist focus area is part of the cultural relations functional specialty, which includes expertise and experience on the securing, and protection of archives and records. These specialists can identify, recover, appraise, safeguard, and dispose of official, public documents and records related to persons, groups, institutions, and property interests of the host nation. These documents can be of immediate and continuing use to the military force as a source of valuable intelligence and other information. They provide invaluable information in running the government making them even more important to the military government as it transitions to a civil administration TMA. (See FM 3-57 for more information on the governance functional specialty focus areas.)

Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development

D-35. Support to economic and infrastructure development addresses a host-nation's economic sector and critical infrastructure and how it affects sustainable economic development. The economic viability of a state is among the first elements of society to exhibit stress and ultimately fracture as conflict, disaster, and internal strife overwhelm the government (ADP 3-07). Building a host-nation's capacity within the economic sector requires an integrated approach to achieve sustainable growth. Appropriate civilian or host-nation organizations can accomplish much of this effort at the macro level through development mechanisms, but they may look to military forces for security, in conjunction with the other stability operations tasks.

D-36. Economic development function specialists support this activity by performing CR, CE, and CND in military operations. The specialists provide knowledge, experience, and technical expertise in economic generation, industry and production, price and currency stabilization, control over an illicit economy, and individual economic stability. Specialists must address these tasks early in their planning. They cannot achieve full potential and implementation until civil security, civil control, restoration of essential services, and the reestablishment of governance is in place. These programs are crucial to the progression from stability to stabilization and reconstruction, and ultimately to the transfer to other legitimate authorities.

D-37. The following paragraphs describe the CA functional specialties, and the responsibilities of the military government officers that work in concert with civil security, civil control, and essential services and governance functions.

Economic Development

D-38. The economic development functional specialty places emphasis on the existing national to localized economic network. These specialists have expertise and experience in the development, implementation, regulation, and enforcement of interstate and international policies and programs. These policies and programs focus on macroeconomics, market(s) development, and microeconomics. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the national and subnational institutions when conditions allow.

Industry and Production

D-39. The industry and production focus area are part of the economic development functional specialty, which includes expertise and experience monitoring and assessing an indigenous economy, economic systems, and the potential for commercial activities. These specialists can determine a host nation's economic capabilities, the impacts of labor throughout the economy, and the nation's impact on governance and the rule of law.

Energy

D-40. The energy focus area is also part of the economic development functional specialty. The specialists work within the public works and utility's function. Specialists have expertise and experience in the production and distribution of electric, petroleum, natural gas, coal, nuclear, and other renewable sources. These specialists build, sustain, and improve host nation capabilities to establish, strengthen, or rehabilitate systems to produce energy to meet the needs of the population.

Finance, Money, and Banking

D-41. The finance, money, and banking focus area are part of the economic development functional specialty. Specialists in this specialty possess expertise and experience in the technical aspects of monitoring and assessing banking, financial activities, agencies, services personnel, and resources. These specialists can create programs and policies to build, sustain, and improve host nation capabilities to develop financial sector programs and policies to stabilize and enhance the development of a host nation. These specialists work directly with military finance officers to analyze and evaluate an economic environment to identify potential vulnerabilities through threat financing. They can build capacities and capabilities to monitor monetary regimes, fiscal policy, domestic economic environment, foreign direct investment, foreign lending, and grant assistance. Monetary regimes include interest rates, exchange rates, currency black markets and counterfeiting, foreign exchange reserves, traditional banking, cryptocurrencies and cryptocurrency exchanges, and digital and informal value transfer systems). Fiscal policy includes taxes and government spending. Domestic economic environment is price controls; price discrimination; quotas; subsidies; tariffs; inflation, deflation, and hyperinflation; monopoly and oligopolies; employment and unemployment; and informal economy.

Commerce and Trade

D-42. The economic development functional specialty includes the commerce and trade focus area. is part of. Commerce and trade include expertise and experience in the administration of economic controls related to monetary and fiscal policy. These specialists can assess the existing or former national to local economic networks, compare them to competing systems, and create policies to strengthen economic and industrial stability within the operational environment.

Technology and Telecommunications

D-43. The technology and telecommunications focus area is part of the public communication functional specialty. The technology and telecommunications specialists have expertise and experience in the development, implementation, regulation, and enforcement of interstate and international policies for radio, television, wire, wireless, satellite, cable communication, and postal means.

Transportation

D-44. The public transportation functional specialty includes the transportation focus area. Specialist in this focus area have expertise and experience in the development, reconstruction, and maintenance of transportation infrastructure. The specialists work to support the civil security functional specialty because it is deeply intertwined with the state's ability to secure and serve the populace through populace and resources control. Specialists work to develop plans, policies, and procedures to build, sustain, and improve host nation capabilities. The specialists develop and maintain the national network to enforce interstate and international policies for the physical movement of commerce and people across ground and water and through air conveyances.

Agri-business and Food

D-45. The agri-business and food focus area nests under the food and agriculture functional specialty. These specialists can create programs and policies to build, sustain, and improve host nation capabilities to implement national local agriculture systems, agencies, services, personnel, methods, resources, institutions, and facilities. These include any competing systems and their collective impacts upon conditions of the operational environment and effects on stability. Specialists in this focus area provide for the structuring, resourcing, organizing, rehabilitation, and implementation of the curriculum and education, facilities, technology, processes, and personnel development required to implement and sustain food and agriculture activities. (See FM 3-57 for more information on the economic development functional specialty focus areas.)

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army and joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which ATP 3-57.40 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events
ATP	Army Training Publication
CA	civil affairs
CACOM	civil affairs command
CAO	civil affairs operations
CAPT	civil affairs planning team
CARVER	criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability
CE	civil engagement
CMI	civil-military integration
CMOC	civil-military operations center
CMO	civil-military operations
CND	civil network development
CNDE	civil network development and engagement
CR	civil reconnaissance
DA	Department of the Army
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DIME	diplomacy, informational, military, and economics
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DOS	Department of State
FM	field manual
G-9	assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
GAP	governance assessment process
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
J-9	civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff
JCMOTF	joint civil-military operations task force
JP	joint publication
METT-TC (I)	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations
MGO	military government operations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAKOC	observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment

PMESII	political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
S-9	battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
SCA	support to civil administration
SWEAT-MSO	sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations
SWOT	strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threat
TMA	transitional military authority
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United States Code
USG	United States Government

SECTION II – TERMS

civil administration

An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 3-05)

civil engagement

A targeted, planned, and coordinated meeting with known or potential contacts in a civil network that is designed to develop or maintain relationships and to share or collect information. (FM 3-57)

civil network

A collection of formal and informal groups, associations, military engagements, and organizations within an operational environment that interact with each other with varying degrees of frequency, trust, and collaboration. (FM 3-57)

civil network development

The planned and targeted action in which civil affairs forces develop networks within the civil component of the operational environment to influence populations and manage local resources in order to extend the operational reach, consolidate gains, and achieve military objectives. (FM 3-57)

civil reconnaissance

A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events. (JP 3-57)

close area

The portion of the commander’s area of operations where the majority of subordinate maneuver forces conduct close combat. (ADP 3-0)

consolidating gains

Activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for transition of control to other legitimate authorities. (ADP 3-0)

crisis

An emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)

governance

The state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society. (JP 3-24)

***military government**

(Army) A temporary military organization exercising governance and the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority.

***military government operations**

The actions taken by Civil Affairs forces to support government functions and governance throughout the competition continuum.

reintegration

The process through which former combatants, belligerents, and displaced civilians receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local populace. (ADP 3-07)

support to civil administration

Assistance given by United States Armed Forces to stabilize or enhance the operations of the governing body of a foreign country by assisting an established or interim government. (FM 3-57)

***support to civil administration in a host-nation territory**

Support provided to a host nation to restore or enhance governance capability.

***support to civil administration in an occupied territory**

Support provided to indigenous governing bodies during a military occupation.

***support to foreign assistance**

Civil or military aid and activities rendered to legitimate indigenous authorities of a foreign nation to support governance, promote stability, and create conditions for long-term stabilization to support United States Government objectives. Support to foreign assistance includes development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.

unified action

The synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1, Vol 1)

***transitional governance**

The transition of foreign governing authorities and functions based on a United States Government policy decision or directive.

***transitional military authority**

(Army) The supreme authority the military exercises by force or agreement over the lands, property, and indigenous populations and institutions of allied, neutral, or enemy territory, therefore, substituting sovereign authority under rule of law for the previously established government.

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Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

C

consolidating gains, 2-5, 2-16, 2-54, 2-59, 5-4

D

diplomacy, informational, military, and economic (DIME), 1-15

G

G-9, 1-105, 2-15, 2-49, 3-5, 5-10

governance assessment process (GAP), 2-35

J

J-5, 2-19

J-9, 1-105, 2-19, 2-41, 2-49, 3-5, 5-7

M

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations (METT-TC (I), 2-48

O

observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC), 2-48

P

political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT), 2-48

S

S-9, 1-105, 2-49, 5-10

sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations (SWEAT-MSO, 2-48

support to civil administration in a host-nation territory, 1-72

support to civil administration in an occupied territory SCA, 1-62

T

transitional governance, 1-17, 1-26

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ATP 3-57.40

05 June 2025

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