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CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING

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Washington, D.C., 07 May 2024

CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING

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Preface

Civil Affairs (CA) forces support missions in every theater and in competition, crisis, and armed conflict. ATP 3-57.60, *Civil Affairs Planning*, illustrates CA planning across the range of military operations. It is critical that CA elements at all echelons properly plan and execute Civil Affairs operations (CAO) to enhance the supported commander's operational success. From the basic principles of CAO planning through determination of measures of effectiveness and measures of performance, this manual outlines and provides Army techniques for CAO.

ATP 3-57.60 provides U.S. Army doctrine for the CAO/civil-military operations (CMO) planning as a whole and CA doctrine for CAO planning. CA planning doctrine is aimed at achieving a unified plan of action in support of staff action planning procedures and the decision-making process—the joint planning process (JPP) and the military decision-making process (MDMP)—as they relate to CA-specific actions (civil considerations). This manual addresses the CA aspects of troop leading procedures (TLP), the MDMP, the Army design methodology (ADM), operational design and the JPP, and transition planning considerations, where CAO planners apply civil considerations to meet the commander's objectives. The commander must always consider the civil component within the area of operations.

The principal audience for this publication is the CAO planner. The commander is responsible for planning, and it is the CAO planner's responsibility to apply the commander's vision as it relates to all the aspects of civil considerations. It is also applicable to the Army's leaders, which includes officers and noncommissioned officers that command Army forces or serve on the staffs that support those commanding U.S. forces at all levels of warfare. In addition, ATP 3-57.60 gives credible information to the civilian leaders of the United States.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27.)

ATP 3-57.60 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. This publication does not add or modify any terminology found in the Army lexicon and is not the source document for any term.

ATP 3-57.60 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of this manual is the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Reviewers and users of this manual should submit comments and recommended changes on DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-CAD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Liberty, NC 28310-9610; by e-mail to cadoctrine@socom.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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Introduction

ATP 3-57.60 details the doctrinal discussion of the role of CA forces supporting Army and joint operational planning that resides in FM 3-57. Publication of ATP 3-57.60 incorporates revisions to the Army's running estimate and operation plan (OPLAN) formats.

Support of operational planning by CA forces occurs at all levels of warfare. U.S. forces' integration, coordination and synchronization with the civil component of the operational environment is required throughout the competition continuum and across the range of military operations. Interaction with the civil component is planned and executed to meet the commander's objectives.

ATP 3-57.60 consists of five chapters and five appendixes:

Chapter 1 is an overview of the operations process and the CA contribution.

Chapter 2 addresses CAO and the planning and preparation that must occur to support the CA core competencies of transitional governance, civil network development and engagement, civil knowledge integration, and civil-military integration. This chapter outlines assessments and planning specific to CA and describes how they support the Army's operations process, including Army assessments and planning. This chapter provides a brief illustration of the Army planning processes describing CA techniques in the execution of TLP, MDMP, and ADM. This chapter provides detailed CA techniques and methods for analysis of civil considerations in the Army operations process.

Chapter 3 discusses the role of the CAO planner in CMO and the JPP. The chapter provides a discussion of the linkage required in the planning of CAO supporting the joint force commander's intent and concept of operations. The discussion provides techniques used by CAO planners during each step of the JPP. The chapter provides techniques used by CAO planners participating in operational design, contingency planning, campaign planning, and transition planning. JP 3-07, JP 3-57, and ATP 3-07.5 provide techniques and planning considerations used by the force in supporting the development of a transition plan from adversary to military government, and military government to an interim or civil government. This chapter clarifies which CA forces plan transitions. It describes the various types of transition and provides a listing of transition tasks that help the CAO planner to identify and prioritize those tasks required for transition.

Chapter 4 describes the role of CAO planners in the execution of interagency planning. The discussion provides awareness to CAO planners during interagency planning. The chapter provides techniques used by CAO planners participating in the joint planning and execution enterprise and stabilization. This chapter also describes CA participation in security cooperation planning by the Army and the combatant commander.

Chapter 5 identifies or describes the various planning products prepared by CAO planners to include: area study, running estimate, annexes, civil information collection plan, civil engagement plan, stability matrix, decision support matrix, and execution matrix.

Appendix A details the procedures and format for the Civil Affairs area study.

Appendix B details the procedures and format for the Civil Affairs running estimate.

Appendix C details the procedures and the format for the development of annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) to an Army OPLAN or operation order (OPORD).

Appendix D details the procedures and the format for the development of annex P (Host-Nation Support) to a joint OPLAN or OPORD.

Appendix E details the procedures and format for the development of annex V (Interagency Coordination) to an Army OPLAN or OPORD.

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Chapter 1
The Civil Affairs Contribution to the Army Operations Process

OVERVIEW

1-1. Planning a military operation is similar to planning other activities; however, plans for military operations are based on an imperfect understanding and uncertainty of how the commander expects the military situation to evolve. A well-developed plan does not guarantee successful implementation, which makes flexibility and adaptability essential to planning. Operations demand a flexible approach to planning that adapts methods to each situation. An effective planning process structures the thinking of commanders and staffs while supporting their insight, creativity, and initiative. Following this type of planning process, whether for offensive, defensive, stability operations, or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) tasks, offers the best opportunity of mission success.

1-2. Planning success leads to winning battles and engagements that are critical but rarely decisive. Army forces will continue to conduct operations in populations that range from small villages to modern metropolitan areas. These operational conditions are continuously evolving, from the beaches of Normandy to the provinces of Afghanistan. Warfare in modern society requires not only defeating the enemy but also simultaneously understanding and shaping civil conditions of both the government and the populace in concert with multinational forces, the interagency, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Understanding of the operational environment, the cumulative effect of winning battles, and the consolidation of gains facilitates what the Commander in Chief visualizes, commanders strive for, and the American people support—Victory!

1-3. The Army executes operations in multiple domains in support of joint operations. Operations are executed by adhering to fundamentals (known as tenets and principles) which link tactical actions to strategic objectives by exercising operational art and the Army's operations process within the operational framework in order to leverage the elements of combat power. (See ADP 3-0 and FM 3-0.) The operations process represents the Army's methods to assess, plan, prepare, and execute land operations. (See ADP 5-0.)

1-4. Mission command is the Army's approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. Planning is a critical component of mission command, command and control, and the operations process. Commanders and their staff constantly and perpetually assess, plan, prepare for, and execute operations referred to in the operations process. (See figure 1-1, page 2.) Civil Affairs (CA) planners, Civil Affairs planning teams (CAPTs), and units perform critical requirements to support assessment, planning, preparation, and execution of Civil Affairs operations (CAO) and civil-military operations (CMO) in support of Army operations in multiple domains and unified action. (To fully understand the Army operations process, see ADP 5-0. To fully understand mission command and command and control, see ADP 6-0 and FM 6-0. These publications are critical to understanding Army planning.)

1-5. *Planning* is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0). Planning helps commanders create and communicate a common vision between commanders, their staffs, subordinate commanders, and unified action partners; this results in a plan and orders that synchronize the action of forces in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish missions.

1-6. Planning is also the process by which the staff translates the commander's vision into a specific course of action (COA) for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results. All echelons perform military planning across the competition continuum. Joint planning integrates military actions with those of the other instruments of national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve the desired end state.




Figure 1-1. The Army operations process

1-7. Planning begins at receipt of a mission or guidance, verbal or otherwise, from higher headquarters (HHQ). Planning may start the operations process sequence; however, planning is a continuous process that must be conducted throughout the entire operation. The result of the planning process is an operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD) that provides instructions, control measures, and time increments. The plan or order synchronizes all efforts in an action that meets the tactical, operational, and strategic objectives of the operation, and leads to a predeveloped and desired end state.

1-8. A plan is a design for a future or anticipated operation. Plans come in many forms and vary in scope, complexity, and length of planning horizons. Strategic plans cover the overall conduct of a war. Operational or campaign plans cover a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. Tactical plans cover the employment of units in operations, including the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and to the enemy.

1-9. A product of planning is a plan or order—a directive for future action. Commanders issue plans and orders to subordinates to communicate their understanding of the situation and their visualization of an operation. A plan is a continuous, evolving framework of anticipated actions that maximize opportunities. It guides subordinates as they progress through each phase of the operation. Any plan or order is a framework from which to adapt, not a script to be followed to the letter. The measure of a good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned, but whether the plan facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events. Orders are issued as a warning order (WARNORD), fragmentary order (FRAGORD) or OPORD. In order to effectively convey the intent, commanders issue mission orders which foster initiative.

1-10. CA forces support the prepare step by collecting civil information and collating the information into operational context. This CA activity is *civil preparation of the environment* (CPE), which is the continuous development of civil knowledge within an area of operations to help commanders identify capabilities within civil society that can be integrated with operations for stability and security activities (FM 3-57). CPE applies to the joint force or Army operational commands that occupy enemy territory. CA forces continue preparing within the operations cycle by performing *civil preparation of the battlefield* (CPB), which is the systematic process of analyzing civil considerations in an area of operations or interest to determine their effects on friendly, neutral, and enemy operations (FM 3-57). CPB places civil considerations into context with the unit's mission analysis.

1-11. CA forces further prepare the operational environment by conducting tactical mission tasks such as civil reconnaissance (CR), civil engagement (CE), and civil network development (CND) necessary to identify, develop and engage civil networks in competition as well as conflict. CA forces integrate, coordinate and synchronize with governmental and nongovernmental entities as well as the private sector assisting the commander in achieving unified action.

1-12. CA forces execute CAO in its totality to support multidomain operations, the Army's operations process and to enable CMO. CAO allows the commander to visualize their assigned area of operations (AO) and promotes the commander's situational understanding. CAO facilitates mission command with entities with which there is no command relationship and no command and control authority to achieve unified action.

UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF OPERATIONS

1-13. Military operations are human endeavors—a contest of wills characterized by violence and continuous adaptation among all participants. Fundamentally, all war is about changing human behavior. During operations, Army forces face thinking and adaptive enemies, differing agendas of various actors, and changing perceptions of civilians in an operational area. The enemy is not an inanimate object to be acted upon but an independent and active force with its own objectives. As friendly forces try to impose their will on the enemy, the enemy resists and seeks to impose its will on friendly forces. A similar dynamic occurs among civilian groups whose own desires influence and are influenced by military operations. Appreciating these relationships among opposing human wills is essential to understanding the fundamental nature of operations. (See ADP 3-0, FM 3-0, and JP 3-0. Figure 1-2 introduces the concept of the operational environment [OE]).




Figure 1-2. The operational environment

1-14. An OE is composed of five domains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace) and understood through three dimensions (physical, information, human). CAO planners must understand the complementary and reinforcing ways in which they can employ CA capabilities and effects through multiple domains in support of land operations. CA forces mainly operate through the physical dimension to influence through the information dimension and produce effects in the human dimension. CA forces create or maintain and exploit relative advantages within the civil component that encompasses:

- Physical advantage.
- Human advantage.
- Information advantage.

ASSESSING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-15. The joint force commander's (JFC's) OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. The OE encompasses physical areas of the air, land, maritime, and space domains as well as the information environment (which includes cyberspace) and the electromagnetic spectrum (also known as the EMS). Also, the OE involves the capabilities of conventional and special operations forces; ballistic missile, information, strike, cyberspace, and space operations; and electromagnetic warfare (also known as EW). Included within these domains are enemy, friendly, and neutral entities, which are either military or civilian. It must be recognized that the overwhelming majority of inhabitants within the OE will be civilians.

1-16. Civil societies form systems that permit a society to function with a relative degree of certainty, predictability, and security. When functioning, these systems create a stable civil society. JFCs recognize the systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation. The nature and interaction of these systems will affect how the commander plans, organizes for, and conducts joint operations.

1-17. A system is a functionally, physically, or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a unified whole. As depicted in a systems perspective, one way to think of the OE is as a set of complex and constantly interacting systems represented by the mnemonic PMESII: political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure. (See figure 1-3.) The interaction of these systems can then be viewed as a network or networks based on the participants. The nature and interaction of these systems affect how the commander plans, organizes, and conducts joint operations. The JFC's international partners and other civilian participants routinely focus on systems other than military, so the JFC and staff should understand these systems and how military operations affect them. Equally important is understanding how elements in other PMESII systems can help or hinder the JFC's mission. A commonly shared understanding among stakeholders in the operation can influence actions beyond the JFC's directive authority and promote a unified approach to achieve objectives.




Figure 1-3. Systems perspective of the operational environment

1-18. A systems understanding of the OE typically is built through cross-functional participation by other joint force staff elements and collaboration with various intelligence organizations, U.S. Government (USG) departments and agencies, and nongovernmental centers that possess expertise. The JFC should consider the best way to manage or support this cross-functional effort. The J-2 is the staff lead for this effort as part of joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). (See JP 2-0 for more on JIPOE.) A variety of factors, including planning time available, will affect the fidelity of a systems perspective. Understanding PMESII systems, their interaction with each other, and how system relationships change over time increases the JFC's knowledge of how actions within a system can affect other system components. Among other benefits, this perspective helps intelligence analysts identify potential sources of warning intelligence and facilitates understanding of the continuous and complex interaction of friendly, adversary, enemy, and neutral systems. The J-9 or theater Civil Affairs planning team (T-CAPT) contributes to the effort by initiating and integrating civil knowledge created through CPE.

1-19. A systems understanding also facilitates identification of operational design elements such as centers of gravity (COGs), lines of operation(s), and decision points. For example, figure 1-3, on page 4, depicts notional operational and strategic COGs (there could be more). It shows each as a subsystem composed of related nodes and clarifies that the two COGs are related by a common node. This helps commanders and their staffs visualize and develop a broad approach to mission accomplishment early in the planning process, which makes detailed planning more efficient. (For further guidance on developing a systems understanding, refer to JP 3-0. For further guidance on the use of a systems perspective in operational design and joint planning, refer to JP 5-0. For more information regarding CPE, see FM 3-57.)

1-20. Operational environments include considerations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. At the strategic level, leaders develop an idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) in a synchronized and integrated fashion to accomplish national objectives. The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives, with the focus being on the design, planning, and conduct of operations using operational art. The tactical level of warfare involves the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. The levels of warfare help commanders visualize a logical arrangement of forces, allocate resources, and assign tasks based on a strategic purpose, informed by the conditions within their operational environments.

1-21. An operational environment continually evolves because of the complexity of human interaction and how people learn and adapt. People's actions change that environment. Some changes can be anticipated, while others cannot. Some changes are immediate and apparent, while other changes evolve over time or are extremely difficult to detect.

1-22. The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment makes determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and contributes to the friction and uncertainty inherent in military operations. Commanders must continually assess their operational environments and re-assess their assumptions. Commanders and staffs use the Army design methodology, operational variables, and mission variables to analyze an operational environment to support the operations process. (See ATP 5-0.1.)

1-23. CA forces enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the OE, identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society, and/or apply functional specialty and military government expertise normally the responsibility of civil government.

1-24. Army commanders also use a systems approach but include physical space and time as a part of their operational perspective. The Army approach uses the mnemonic PMESII-PT: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. These variables are referred to as operational variables whether they are used by a JFC's staff or an Army staff. Army commanders make a tactical assessment of the OE as it applies to their assigned mission. Army commanders use civil considerations in the evaluation of their mission tasks to form a holistic situational understanding and perform an informed mission analysis.

1-25. To understand their mission and the AO, the commander and staff asses the OE and perform the military decision-making process (MDMP) in order to identify their specific unit tasks, potential courses of action and select the best course of action for execution. To inform this process, the staff prepares for planning by collecting all available information. To understand and analyze the mission, the commander and staff use a collection of variables that collates information into bins known as METT-TC (I): mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations. This collection of information is referred to as mission variables. (See ADP 1-01.)

1-26. The Army and joint force staffs continuously assess the OE on behalf of the commander in order to plan, prepare, and execute operations. The entire staff supports assessment in their functional area of expertise. For example, intelligence staff support the intelligence aspects of the OE, sustainment staff assess the sustainment aspects of the OE, and CA staff assess civil aspects of the OE. The Army uses both operational variables and mission variables to assess the OE. (See ADP 3-0.) CA forces consolidate assessments during CPE, CPB and when executing the civil network development and engagement (CNDE) process and the civil knowledge integration (CKI) process. (See FM 3-57.)

1-27. Army forces asses the characteristics of their AO focusing on how they might affect a mission. Mission variables are analyzed and evaluated to produce a common operational picture (COP), promote the commander's situational understanding and visualization of the operation, and make decisions. Mission variables enable the staff to produce COAs for a given operation. Using the operational variables as a source of relevant information for the mission variables allows commanders to refine their situational understanding of their OE and to visualize, describe, direct, lead and assess operations. (See ADP 5-0 for more information on mission variables and situational understanding.)

1-28. Based on information from HHQ, the CA area study, or their own knowledge and judgment, leaders identify civil considerations that affect their mission. CA staff and forces assess the civil component within the OE. CA staff support prepare and plan aspects of the operations process and mission analysis by providing civil information and civil knowledge gained through studies, assessments, and surveys. CA forces produce civil considerations for integration into mission planning. Commanders may analyze civil considerations using the six factors known by the memory aid ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. CA forces provide analysis of civil considerations using the ASCOPE framework.

MISSION VARIABLES

1-29. Upon receipt of a WARNORD or mission, Army leaders filter relevant information categorized by the operational variables or the categories of the mission variables used during mission analysis. They use the mission variables to refine their understanding of the situation. Incorporating the analysis of the operational variables with METT-TC (I) helps to ensure that Army leaders consider the best available relevant information about conditions that pertain to the mission. When assessing the OE during mission analysis, CAO planners focus on the civil considerations within the mission variables.

OPERATIONAL VARIABLES

1-30. The conditions of an OE are described in terms of operational variables. Operational variables are those aspects of an OE, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an OE but also the population's influence on it. Army planners analyze an OE in terms of the eight interrelated operational variables known as PMESII-PT: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. Joint planners use only the initial six variables, PMESII, in describing the systems approach to analyzing the OE. The operational variables provide the commander with a systems perspective of the OE. When assessing the OE during mission analysis, CAO planners focus on the civilian aspects of the operational variables. (Using the operational variables to assess the OE provides a systems perspective of the OE, which is further discussed in chapter 3.) Understanding of the OE allows the commander to make informed decisions and guide planning to exercise operational art. (For additional information on the use of Army operational variables, see ADP 6-0.)

PLANNING OPERATIONS INTEGRATION AND TRANSITIONS

1-31. The Army's contribution to joint operations and unified action is joint land operations. (See JP 3-31.) Unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, international organizations such as the United Nations, and the private sector to achieve unity of effort. (See JP 3-16.)

1-32. In the course of conducting joint land operations, the Army executes operations composed of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or DSCA tasks. Army operations continuously and simultaneously execute offensive, defensive, and stability operations or DSCA tasks. Offensive and defensive operations are designed to defeat enemy forces. Stability tasks are designed to shape civil conditions and to secure lasting peace.

1-33. DSCA dominates operations within the continental United States (CONUS). DSCA is complemented by defensive and (rarely) offensive operations. The simultaneous nature of these operations necessitates planning for transitions from predominantly offensive to predominantly defensive or stability operations. (See ADP 3-0 regarding operations.)

1-34. A transition occurs when the commander makes the assessment that the unit must change its focus from one type of operation to another. A commander halts the offense only when it results in complete victory and the end of hostilities, reaches a culminating point, or the commander receives a change in mission from a higher commander. This change in mission may be a result of the interrelationship of the other instruments of national power, such as a political decision, or the balance of strength shifting from the attacking force to its opponent if offensive actions do not achieve complete victory but have reached a culminating point.

1-35. Usually, offensive actions lose momentum when friendly forces encounter heavily defended areas that cannot be bypassed. They also reach a culminating point when the resupply of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies fails to keep up with expenditures, Soldiers become physically exhausted, casualties and equipment losses mount, and repairs and replacements do not keep pace with losses. Because of enemy surprise movements, offensive actions also stall when reserves are not available to continue the advance, the defender receives reinforcements, or the defender counterattacks with fresh troops. Several of these causes may combine to halt an offense. When this occurs, the attacking unit can regain its momentum, but normally this only happens after difficult fighting or after an operational pause.

1-36. Commanders drive the operations process through their activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing the conduct of offensive operations. All offensive planning addresses the mission variables of METT-TC (I), with special emphasis on—

- Missions and objectives, to include task and purpose, for each subordinate element.
- Commander's intent.
- Enemy positions, obstacles, strengths, and capabilities.
- AOs for the use of each subordinate element with associated control graphics.
- Time the operation is to begin.
- Scheme of maneuver.
- Targeting guidance and high-payoff targets.
- Special tasks required to accomplish the mission.

1-37. The commander plans a pause to replenish combat power, and phases the operation accordingly, if the commander cannot anticipate securing decisive objectives before subordinate forces reach their culminating points. Simultaneously, the commander attempts to prevent the enemy from knowing when friendly forces become overextended. All operations planning starts with the assessment of the mission variables: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations. Different components of the staff bear the responsibility to inform the commander of these variables. The S-9 or the G-9 has the responsibility to inform the commander and staff of civil considerations within the OE and throughout the operations process by providing and maintaining the CAO running estimate. (See ADP 5-0 regarding the operations process.)

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1-38. Offensive operations carry the fight to the enemy by closing with and destroying enemy forces, seizing territory and vital resources, and imposing the commander's will on the enemy. Offensive operations focus on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. This active imposition of land power makes offensive operations a decisive type of military action, whether undertaken against irregular forces or the armed forces of a nation-state. In addition, the physical presence of land forces and their credible ability to conduct offensive operations enable the unimpeded conduct of stability operations.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1-39. Defensive operations counter enemy offensive actions. Defensive operations are designed to defeat attacks, destroying as many attackers as necessary. Defensive operations preserve control over land, protect key resources, and guard populations. Defensive operations also buy time and economize forces, which allows the conduct of offensive operations elsewhere. Defensive operations not only defeat attacks but also create the conditions necessary to regain the initiative and transition to offensive operations or execute stability operations.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

1-40. Stability operations sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources. Military capabilities are employed to reconstruct or establish essential services and to support civilian agencies and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI). Stability operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. These types of operations are conducted continuously and simultaneously with offensive and defensive operations. Stability tasks require a high level of CA capabilities. This can lead to conditions in which (in cooperation with a legitimate government) the other instruments of national power predominate. (See ADP 3-07 regarding stability.)

DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

1-41. U.S. Army forces do not conduct stability operations within the United States and its territories; under U.S. law, the federal and state government(s) are responsible for those tasks. Instead, Army forces conduct DSCA, when requested, by providing capabilities to lead agency authorities. (For more information on the CA role in offense, defense and stability, see FM 3-57.) The Department of Defense (DOD) supports civil authorities through its participation within the national response framework. DSCA addresses the consequences of man-made or natural accidents and incidents beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities. During DSCA, unit CAO planners coordinate with DOD-appointed liaisons and coordination officers at the U.S. regional level with coordination authority in various states. The DOD addresses coordination between DOD, interagency and local authorities through the regionally appointed emergency preparedness liaison officers and state-assigned defense coordinating officers. (See ADP 3-28 regarding DSCA.)

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO ARMY OPERATIONS

1-42. When maneuver units conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations, CAO planners support the execution aspects of the operations process and these tasks with CAO. CAO planners support the mission analysis by providing civil information and performing the CA core competencies in simultaneity. Focused on assessment and planning within the operations process, CA personnel plan and execute CKI and CNDE, which feeds the operations process with civil considerations and broader civil knowledge for Army and joint mission analysis. (See ATP 3-57.30 and ATP 3-57.50.) CAO planners supporting defensive operations focus on planning transitional governance (TG), CNDE, and civil-military integration (CMI) that integrate, coordinate and synchronize civil-military stabilization efforts, preventing civilians from interfering with military operations and mitigating the effects of military operations on civilians in the OE.

1-43. When U.S. forces seize and occupy enemy territory, CAO planners support offensive operations by conducting TG to consolidate gains made during the offensive. (See FM 3-90.) While performing stability operations, military leaders are vested with military authority to assert the U.S. national will and are assigned AOs where they assert their authority. In doing so, they must maintain their legal obligations based upon the law of land warfare. One such obligation is the establishment of military government. Commanders may turn to available CA forces to assist them in carrying out this task which facilitates transition from predominantly offensive to predominantly stability operations. These operations are planned, prepared for, and executed through continuous assessment and perpetual mission analysis within the operations process.

1-44. Once an initial assessment has been completed, the CA staff may include the establishment of a civil information collection plan, a civil engagement plan and an initial staff estimate. Once operations transition from planning and preparation to execution, CAO may include the establishment of a civil-military operations center (CMOC) which enables CMI, supports mission command, and command and control of the operation by leveraging civil authorities with which there is no command relationship or authority. Situational understanding is enhanced by obtaining greater fidelity of the available civil information and facilitating a more in-depth deliberate assessment as the operation progresses. During short-term contingency operations that are of a humanitarian nature, CA forces may provide the nucleus to establish a humanitarian action coordination center on behalf of a combatant commander (CCDR) or they may provide a civil liaison within a host-nation's (HN's) humanitarian operations center. CA staff officers can then produce a much clearer CA running estimate with information collected from the civil component and other unified action partners.

ARMY PLANNING METHODOLOGIES

1-45. To perpetuate the cognitive aspects of planning, the Army uses planning methodologies to plan, prepare for, and execute operations. Army planning processes are based upon problem solving methods. These planning methodologies are outlined in ADP 5-0 and ATP 5-0.1. Commanders, leaders, and staff use several approaches to planning. The U.S. Army prescribed planning processes include the MDMP and, at lower echelons, troop leading procedures (TLP). At echelons above brigade combat team (BCT), commanders and their planning staff may utilize the Army design methodology (ADM) to visualize and articulate their operational approach. When planning in a joint command, the commander uses the joint planning process (JPP). Depending on the situation, commanders and staffs may opt to apply guidance from JPP or MDMP, or they may conduct the process in an informal concept similar to TLP. The CAO planner must be adept at tactical-, operational-, and strategic-level planning in support of Army, joint, unified, and multinational forces.

1-46. CA units at every echelon perform CAO planning to either conduct operations or support CAO staff planning. CA team and company leaders may find themselves utilizing TLP for basic tactical operations while performing CR, CE, CND, or contributing as part of another Army formation in the MDMP as part of the integral staff. They may also be initiating the MDMP if their unit has formed the nucleus of a CA task force (also known as a CATF) or a joint civil-military operations task force (also known as a JCMOTF).

1-47. At echelons above BCT, CAO planners and units from CA battalion to CA command (CACOM) will participate as a component of the planning and execution staff. At echelons above BCT, CAO planners will contribute to ADM. When echelons above BCT assimilate joint capabilities or are assigned joint authorities, they will often transition to the JPP. (See JP 5-0 regarding JPP.) (Table 1-1 depicts a comparison of these various problem-solving models.)

Table 1-1. Problem-solving methodologies

Basic Problem-Solving Steps	***Joint Planning Process***	***Military Decision-Making Process***	***Troop Leading Procedures***
Identify the problem	Initiation	Receipt of mission	Receive mission
Identify facts and assumptions	Mission analysis	Mission analysis	Issue a warning order
Generate alternatives	COA development	COA development	Make a tentative plan
Analyze the alternatives	COA analysis and wargaming	COA analysis (war game)	Initiate movement
Compare the alternatives	COA comparison	COA comparison	Conduct reconnaissance
Make a decision	COA approval	COA approval	Complete the plan
	Develop plan or order	Orders production	Issue the order
Execute the decision			Supervise and refine
Assess the results			

COA course of action

1-48. CAO planners participate with the planning staff in these processes to plan and conduct CAO. CA forces also participate in these processes to enable the commander's CMO. While conducting operations, the military component asserts military authority culminating from large-scale combat operations, the Army establishes transitional military authority and immediately plans transition to another authority, whether that authority is military or civilian, interim or enduring, U.S., indigenous, or international. The objective is to assert national will and then transition to sustainable indigenous self-governance. (See JP 3-24.) CA forces support this effort by planning and executing TG. For these complex OEs, Army formations typically adopt joint authorities and execute long term stability missions, actions, or tasks. These complex activities require detailed planning as it relates to the civil component while the commander still maintains supreme authority in many respects. ADM perpetuates complex planning and CAO planners integrate the civil aspects to that planning. CA forces participate in ADM tailored to conceive, plan, and execute CMO. CMO promotes stability, the legitimacy of the military mission, and contributes to achieving unified action.

1-49. Commanders may form a planning team (sometimes referred to as a design team) to perform ADM. This planning, including ADM, is usually executed by the G-5 staff element in coordination with the remainder of the commander's staff. This team leverages multiple, diverse perspectives and knowledge to help the commander understand the OE, the problem(s), and develop an operational approach to solve the problem(s). (See ATP 5-0.1 and ATP 6-0.5.)

1-50. *Army design methodology* is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). ADM is particularly useful as an aid to conceptual planning but must be integrated with the detailed planning typically associated with the MDMP to produce executable plans. Key concepts that underline the ADM include—

- Critical and creative thinking. (See ADP 5-0.)
- Collaboration and dialogue. (See ADP 5-0.)
- Framing.
- Narrative construction.
- Visual modeling.

1-51. These concepts serve as links between conceptual and detailed planning. Based on their understanding and learning gained during ADM, commanders issue planning guidance (to include an operational approach) to guide more detailed planning using the MDMP.

1-52. The understanding developed through ADM continues through preparation and execution in the form of continuous assessment. Assessment, to include updated running estimates, helps commanders measure the overall effectiveness of employing forces and capabilities to ensure that the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable within the context of the higher commander's intent and concept of operations (CONOPS). If the current operational approach fails to meet these criteria, or if aspects of the OE or problem change significantly, the commander may decide to reframe. Reframing involves revisiting earlier hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current operational approach, and can lead to a new problem statement and operational approach, resulting in an entirely new plan. Sometimes the most dynamic feature of the OE is the civil component. CAO planners informed by continuous assessment inform the commander of the civil considerations and their efforts to shape the OE to maintain or promote stability.

1-53. Figure 1-4 depicts the general activities associated with the ADM. While planners complete some activities before others, the learning generated in one activity may require revisiting the learning derived in another activity. The movement between the activities is not entirely unidirectional, because what the commander, staff, and partners learn later will affect previous conclusions and decisions.

1-54. The commander, members of the staff, subordinate commanders, and unified action partners form a planning team to establish context for describing the problem and developing an operational approach by framing an OE. This framing facilitates hypothesizing, or modeling, that focuses on the part of the OE under consideration. Framing provides a perspective from which commanders can understand and act on a problem. In joint operations, JFC's use operational design for conceptual planning and the JPP for detailed planning. (See JP 5-0.) Interagency validation and review are performed through the Joint Strategic Planning System and rarely involves the population-centric planning utilized in the joint planning and execution enterprise and ADM. (For more information regarding joint planning and execution, see CJCS GDE 3130.)




Figure 1-4. Army design methodology

1-55. Developing an operational approach helps commanders identify the ways in which they intend to address the problem. The approach is typically visualized as lines of effort (LOEs) when referring to the interagency and lines of operation(s) when addressing military operations involving the same problem. When integrating the actions of unified action partners, the commander can visualize the operational approach as LOEs. Each LOE is composed of tasks required to achieve desired effects. As an example, the objectives or actions of the commanders, as well as other unified action partners, are depicted in order to visualize the mutually supporting efforts and how they achieve an end state. (See figure 1-5.) In this example from ADP 5-0, they identify one LOE out of three that is directed at defeating enemy forces, while the other two are focused on the IPI. It is the responsibility of CAO planners to identify objectives that ensure civil security and civil control as well as impose transitional military authority or support to the civil administration.




Figure 1-5. Sample operational approach

1-56. Commanders and their staff understand and visualize the OE based upon assessments. The Army assesses its OE through the use of mission and operational variables. CAO planners and units support that visualization by assessing civil considerations in conjunction with mission and operational variables. This enhances the commander's and staff's situational understanding and helps the staff produce the COP. It is important to note that the OE is composed of predominantly civilian entities and only minutely military entities. The CAO planner therefore has volumes of civil information to collect, analyze and evaluate, process, collate, produce, and disseminate in order to inform assessments, establish the CA running estimate, integrate it into the COP, and develop plans.

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS AND CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING

1-57. CA Soldiers are involved in all components of the operations process, especially planning. The CA contribution to the operations process is the planning and execution of CAO. CAO are actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the OE; identify and reduce underlying causes of instability within civil society, and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. (See figure 1-6.)




Figure 1-6. Civil Affairs operations

1-58. CAO staff of a headquarters (HQ), along with those who augment the HQ, plan CA and support the planning of CMO. CAO planners prepare plans to—

- Assess, understand, and advise commanders and staffs on civil considerations.
- Engage unified action partners and IPI.
- Enable CMO. (See figure 1-7.)
- Identify and mitigate threats to civil society.
- Supply functional specialty skills normally performed by civil government.




Figure 1-7. Civil-military operations components and functions

1-59. CMO are activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and IPI by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or HN. CAO enables the commander's CMO. CAO planners are stability focused and assist the commander by integrating stability activities into the plan. CAO planners plan to integrate with other Services, IPI, international organizations, and NGO capabilities to achieve the commander's CMO.

1-60. Land operations demand a flexible approach to planning that adapts methods to each situation. An effective planning process structures the thinking of commanders and staffs while supporting their insight, creativity, and initiative. Army forces will continue to conduct operations in and around population centers that range from rural small villages to modern metropolitan mega-cities. These operational conditions are continuously evolving. Warfare in modern society requires not only defeating the enemy but also simultaneously understanding and shaping civil conditions of both the government and the populace in concert with multinational forces, the interagency, international organizations, and NGOs. CAO planning that addresses civil conditions can enhance the prospect of achieving the desired end state of victory and the consolidation of those gains. The CAO planners identify the planning requirements in support of operations in multiple domains throughout the competition and conflict continuum, to support the strategic roles of the Army and the joint force to achieve unified action.

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Chapter 2

Civil Affairs Operations Preparation and Planning

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO PREPARATION

2-1. CA forces support the operations process in preparation, planning and execution by conducting CAO. CA forces support preparation by performing CPE and CPB. These CA activities support the Army and joint force at tactical and operational echelons when the supported command is using TLP, the MDMP or JPP.

CIVIL PREPARATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

2-2. CA forces support the prepare step of the operations process by collecting civil information necessary to initiate planning and collating the information into operational context to enable the commander's understanding and unit execution. This CA activity is CPE, which applies to the joint force or Army operational commands that occupy enemy territory. CPE is the continuous development of civil knowledge within an AO to help commanders identify capabilities within civil society that can be integrated with operations for stability and security activities. When civil information is analyzed and evaluated, it becomes civil knowledge. (For more information on CPE, see chapter 3 of this publication and TC 3-57.51.)

2-3. CA forces start CPE by collecting civil information on a specified area of interest. The area, country or region is usually one in which operations can be envisioned by the joint force commander (JFC). A combatant command (CCMD) may have a formally defined area of responsibility (AOR). (See JP 1, Vol 2) That assigned AOR will be made up of multiple sovereign countries or territories. The AOR may be segregated into separate subregions. Each subregion requiring their own CA area study performed at echelon. The CMO directorate (known as the J-9) of the JFC or the assigned T-CAPT is responsible for ensuring the establishment of a CA area study for their assigned AOR and specific countries within the AOR in which operations are envisioned by the commander. CACOMs provide augmentation for this effort when requested by the CCMD or theater army. The primary output of CPE is a comprehensive CA area study. (See figure 2-1.)




Figure 2-1. Civil Affairs operations support to preparation and joint planning

CIVIL PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

2-4. Army CA forces perform CPB using the JFC's CA area study as a baseline of information to assist tactical commanders in examining civil considerations when performing mission analysis. Civil preparation of the battlefield is the systematic process of analyzing civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effects on friendly, neutral, and enemy operations. This systematic process is informed by intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) and also informs IPOE and other integrating processes critical to the development of the COP. (See FM 2-0.)

2-5. CPB is conducted by CA forces at echelons from BCT to theater army. A corps or joint task force (JTF) may use CPB to obtain a greater understanding of the OE and the tactical mission. CA forces and the G-9 or S-9 collate information from section one (General Information) of the area study into operational context. (See appendix A.) This is done by collecting civil information, collating the information using operational variables and civil considerations, which produces a tool of information management (as defined by the Army) referred to as the PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk. As operations progress, CPB is informed by the CA area study to develop LOEs that promote stability within the AO. The primary output of CPB is the continuous use and perpetual development of the CA area study. (For more information on CPB, see FM 3-57 and TC 3-57.51.)

2-6. CPE and the CA area study expanded through CPB inform the civil information collection plan and the civil network engagement plan, which initiate the CKI and CNDE processes respectfully. CPB identifies entities to engage and develop into civil networks and integrates the civil component into Army operations. CPB analyzes and evaluates the operational variables in an area of interest to determine opportunities and risks in an AO. The PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk is the primary method used by Army forces to analyze and evaluate the operational variables. CA forces use the crosswalk as the primary means to understand the civil component of an OE and identify the related tasks, activities, and objectives that support commander's mission or specific objectives that develop the civil component of the OE. The goal is to provide the commander with the capability to enhance, enable, or provide governance. The analysis and evaluation of civil data and information gained through CKI, area studies, initial and deliberate assessments, surveys, and other CA processes, is developed into civil knowledge. CA forces integrate civil knowledge into CAO and all Army planning processes and use this civil knowledge to inform the warfighting function. (See figure 2-2.) Civil knowledge—

- Provides commanders with a greater situational understanding of the OE.
- Enables the commander's visualization of the battlefield.
- Provides options that facilitate decision making and enables information advantage.
- Supports the development of effective plans and operations.

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO PLANNING

2-7. CA forces execute four core competencies within the rubric of CAO. CA units execute all core competencies in support of large-scale combat operations. The CA core competencies are TG, CNDE and CMI, and CKI. CAO staff supports the operations process through CKI and CMI to enhance the commander's understanding and decision making in order to accomplish missions and achieve unified action. (See figure 2-2.) The CAO staff is assigned to commands from BCT through theater army level. CA units are structured to provide CAO staff planning and operations support from BCT through CCMD. The role of CA is to engage and leverage the civil component of the OE while enhancing, enabling, or providing governance. CA forces accomplish this through the execution of the CA core competencies throughout the range of military operations and across the competition continuum.

2-8. The S-9 is the primary staff entity providing CAO staff support at the BCT level. General officer level commands, from functional commands to divisions, corps, field army, and theater army are assigned a G-9. When the command is not assigned a CA officer or noncommissioned officer to perform the duties of the S-9 or G-9, the commander must decide whether they should use other personnel to perform the function. If the command is sourced a CA unit, the commander can consider assigning the staff duties to the CA commander at the appropriate echelon. (See JP 1-0 regarding personnel roles and responsibilities.)




Figure 2-2. Civil Affairs operations support to the Army operations process

2-9. CA companies are structured to provide a CMOC capability to the BCT and provide CA teams (also known as CATs) in support to subordinate battalions. CA teams can perform a wide array of CAO but can also be assigned the duties of CAO staff support as a battalion S-9. CA battalions are structured to provide a CMOC and CAPT capability to Army divisions. CA brigades provide a CMOC and CAPT capability to Army corps and joint task forces. CACOMs are structures that provide a CMOC and CAPT capability to theater army and the CCMD. Additionally, there are T-CAPTs assigned to each theater army with duty at the CCMDs to support CMO staff planning integration at the CCMDs. (Table 2-1 shows the CA rules of allocation and support functions. For more information regarding the S-9, G-9, CA teams, CAPTs, and CMOCs, see FM 3-57, ATP 3-57.70, GTA 41-01-003, and GTA 41-60-001.)

Table 2-1. Civil Affairs rules of allocation and support functions

Support Level and Operational Scope	***Unit***	***Focus and Functions***	***Coordination***
Theater Strategic Combatant command, theater army, field army Regional to national scope	Civil Affairs command	Plan, assess, and manage theater civil-military operations Support stabilization, reconstruction, and development Enable interorganizational cooperation	U.S. Embassy U.S. Agency for International Development or interagency International partners or donors International organizations or nongovernmental organizations Indigenous populations and institutions
	Theater Civil Affairs planning team	Plan, assess, and manage theater Civil Affairs operations Plan and assess military government operations (national) Support stabilization, reconstruction, and development Enable interorganizational cooperation	

Table 2-1. Civil Affairs rules of allocation and support functions (continued)

Support Level and Operational Scope	*Unit*	*Focus and Functions*	*Coordination*
Operational Corps, joint task force, 1st Special Forces Command National to subnational scope	Civil Affairs brigade	Plan, shape, and manage civil-military operations Plan, assess, and manage theater Civil Affairs operations Plan, assess, and support military government operations (subnational) Support stabilization, reconstruction, and development Enable interorganizational cooperation	U.S. Embassy U.S. Agency for International Development or interagency International organizations or nongovernmental organizations Indigenous populations and institutions
Operational to Tactical Division, joint task force, 1st Special Forces Command Subnational to province or large city scope	Civil Affairs battalion	Plan, enable, shape, and manage civil-military operations Plan, assess, and execute Civil Affairs operations Plan and assess stability operations Enable interorganizational cooperation	U.S. Embassy U.S. Agency for International Development or interagency International organizations or nongovernmental organizations Indigenous populations and institutions
Tactical Brigade combat team, joint force task, chief of mission, Special Forces battalion, regional civil-military support element, maneuver enhancement brigade Initiate movement scope	Civil Affairs company	Plan, enable, shape, and manage civil-military operations Plan, assess, and execute Civil Affairs operations (execution oriented): • Civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, civil information management, civil-military operations center • Foreign assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance, populace and resources control, civil-military engagement Plan and assess stability operations Enable interorganizational cooperation	Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance Interagency International organizations or nongovernmental organizations Indigenous populations and institutions

2-10. The operations process is continuously informed by assessments, especially the planning component of the operations process. CA forces perform three types of assessments: initial assessments, deliberate assessments, and surveys. Specific facts that help commanders formulate assumptions from which mission analysis starts, and preparation and execution is implemented, are drawn and validated through continuous assessments. CA forces represent a significant information gathering capability. CA forces focus the gathering of information on the civil component of the OE to include the interagency, IPI, unified action partners and the private sector. CA forces conduct CKI and CNDE to support the execution of CAO within the operations process carried out by supported commands. CA forces also plan for CMI and TG when supported commanders execute CMO in support of joint operations to achieve unified action. (See figure 2-3.)




Figure 2-3. Essential planning requirements supporting operations and governance

2-11. Assessments of the OE are greatly determined by the nature of the conflict in terms of traditional or irregular warfare. (See a discussion regarding traditional and irregular warfare in JP 1, Vol 1, and JP 3-0.) In traditional warfare, CAO planners focus on the impact of the population on military operations and the impact of military operations on the population. This focuses more broadly on the military component of the OE and activities that either friendly or adversary forces are doing that may destabilize or otherwise affect the civil component. In irregular warfare, the focus is more broadly on the population and their response to either military activity or other civil vulnerabilities. (See figure 2-4.)




Figure 2-4. Contrasting traditional and irregular warfare

2-12. CA units not only plan, they prepare to plan by starting with building a general knowledge of the OE. That general knowledge is captured in a CA area study. The information in a CA area study is then refined, analyzed, and evaluated to create a greater understanding of the OE. By applying the CKI and CNDE processes, CAO planners expand on the baseline knowledge of the OE found in the nascent CA area study. (See ATP 3-57.50 for more information on civil information and civil knowledge.)

2-13. CA forces further refine the information through assessments which inform the CKI and CNDE processes, which in turn informs the operations process. (See ATP 3-57.50 and ATP 3-57.30 regarding more information on CKI and CNDE.) In OEs where an area study is not available, CAO planners may start by performing CPB. This process may start by prioritizing and addressing the civil considerations within the political, economic and social operational variables.

2-14. The civil information collection plan is a product resulting from CPB. The resulting collection of civil information, analysis and evaluation during CPB reveals information gaps that drives CA forces to conduct CR, CE, or CND to collect information that addressees these gaps in the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs), resources and capabilities within the civil component, and identification of civil strengths and vulnerabilities. (For more information regarding CPB, see TC 3-57.51.)

STABILITY SECTORS

2-15. The interagency identifies stability sectors as they apply to joint operations. The joint force addresses the stability sectors by performing stability activities, and the Army addresses those activities by conducting stability operations and executing operations tasks. Planning that addresses the stability sectors is critical as operations progress and evolve into primarily stability operations versus primarily offensive and defensive operations. (See JP 3-07 and ADP 3-07 for more regarding stability sectors, activities, operations, and tasks.)

2-16. CAO planners rely on the assessment, analysis, and evaluation of civil information as it impacts the stability sectors to formulate CAO plans. CA units from battalion to CACOM are organized with functional specialty cells and teams that include Army functional specialists and military government specialists who are educated to perform the functions of civilian authorities. These specialties enable CA units to conduct TG, support transitional military authority, and provide support to civil administration. The functional specialty cells and teams analyze civil considerations as they apply to the five functional areas and the corresponding 16 functional specialties. The functional areas are aligned with the stability sectors: security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social wellbeing, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure. (For additional information on the stability sectors, see ADP 3-07.)

2-17. CA forces and military government specialists collect and collate information on the functions of civil authority within the indigenous governing structure. Military government specialists in five functional specialty areas support planning and coordination of interagency or HN efforts, and military government. CA functional specialists, in a general support role, provide support to joint force components requiring such capabilities. (See figure 2-5 for the CA functional area and specialty alignment based on the stability sectors.)




Figure 2-5. Civil Affairs functional area and specialty alignment

2-18. Military government specialists can perform a more direct role to any assigned or attached command tasked with establishing a military government. Military government specialists ensure the military government maintains the continuity of government functions as governance transitions from a hostile government to a military government and from a military government to another entity.

THE CIVIL AFFAIRS AREA STUDY

2-19. CA personnel obtain, analyze, evaluate, and record information in advance of need. The J-9 or regional T-CAPT at JFCs or theater armies collect this information in the course of conducting CPE. The basic evaluation of an area is the CA area study that establishes baseline information relating to the civil components of the area in question. The CA area study is a pre-mission study, prepared regionally by country, or prepared for a specific subnational area within a country as the baseline research document for CA forces. The CA area study presents a description and analysis of the geography, historical setting, and the social, political, military, economic, health, legal, education, governance, infrastructure, and national security systems and institutions of a country using a combination of open- and restricted-source materials.

2-20. CA personnel update the information detailed in the CA area study periodically as required prior to the receipt of a mission. CA requires the ability to retrieve accurate and current data on demand. This requirement necessitates a system to capture, store, collate, and produce this data in the form of a report (or area study), which is comprised from all available collected data at any given time. By committing the CA area study to a digital database, the JFC's civil information management (CIM) system or framework can produce area studies, on demand, for CA forces. (The area study format is discussed in more detail in chapter 5 and appendix A.)

2-21. The CA area study is composed of three sections. Each section is updated by CA personnel performing CPE. Section I is the initiation of an area study that provides commanders and staff with general information on a region or country. Section II is a composite collection of civil information collated into the operational variables (PMESII). Section III is the collation of information into the stability sectors. This information is obtained through ongoing assessments, surveys and studies. The information addresses the stability sectors to help commanders visualize their operational actions needed to maintain stability or stabilize their AOR. (See appendix A of this publication regarding the CA area study format.)

CIVIL AFFAIRS ASSESSMENTS

2-22. CA assessments provide a precise means to gather meaningful and significant information. All military planning starts with assessments. The most basic assessments are performed in order to inform mission analysis. The Army uses mission variables to assess the tactical situation. At the operational level, the Army uses operational variables to assess the OE. CAO planners contribute to the mission analysis with their informed understanding of civil considerations.

2-23. To obtain an in-depth understanding of civil considerations, CA Soldiers perform three basic types of assessments: initial assessments, deliberate assessments, and surveys. Gathering information should not be a haphazard process; each type of assessment is based upon the information and analysis of the previous type. Additionally, each type of assessment in the progression becomes more focused, specific, and detailed, with an ultimate goal of identifying civil vulnerabilities or opportunities that can impact the mission or the civil component. As with all military missions, this task must have a well-formed, practical plan.

INITIAL ASSESSMENTS

2-24. While the CA area study is done ahead of the need, reviewed, and updated prior to deployment, the initial assessment is conducted upon entry into the designated AO. The initial assessment occurs upon entry into the operational area as CA forces collect, collate, process, analyze, evaluate, produce, and disseminate civil information from multiple civil sources within the AO. Much of the information can be collected from news media, international organizations, NGOs, or social media to formulate an initial assessment. The objective and focus of the initial assessment should be broad enough to allow CA forces to quickly get an updated baseline of the general conditions within the entire AO in order to validate or refute the information and assumptions used in planning as well as to update the CAO priorities and information collection plan. During continuous operations, the initial assessment requirement may not be necessary for follow-on CA forces due to the transfer of current and detailed operational data during transition. CA teams conducting initial assessments must be aware of the security situation at all times.

DELIBERATE ASSESSMENTS

2-25. Deliberate assessments are conducted in a methodical manner in accordance with information and planning requirements and the civil information collection plan on specific geographic areas or social, economic, governmental, or infrastructure systems of interest. They are a determination of current conditions, capabilities, or attitudes within these defined areas. Deliberate assessments are characterized by firsthand observation, interviews, and other tools to gather information used to make knowledgeable decisions and to determine locations and priorities for follow-on, in-depth analysis. CA teams may use a wide variety of detailed checklists or formats during a deliberate assessment to ensure they have scrutinized all aspects of the assessment area.

SURVEYS

2-26. The survey is a detailed assessment in which the object of the assessment is examined carefully, as during an inspection or investigation. Surveys are conducted in a methodical manner in accordance with CAO priorities, and the CAO information collection plan, on specific locations identified as requiring in-depth analysis during deliberate assessments. This analysis may include individuals, groups, locations, facilities, or capabilities within a location or part of a critical geopolitical, cultural, or ethnic system. During the survey, the CA team may use a variety of detailed checklists or formats within the CIM construct to ensure it has scrutinized all aspects of the specified entity, location or facility targeted for survey. Survey development should leverage operations/research analysis capabilities if available. The findings of a survey may lead to refined mission statements or reallocation of forces and resources.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS ANALYSIS

2-27. Army forces planning assessments can be informed by the use of analysis tools such as the mission and operational variables. The essence of CA assessments is based upon civil considerations that can inform both mission and operational variables. The mission variables of METT-TC (I): mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations are crucial for every commander's mission analysis. Commanders rely on CA capabilities to provide civil considerations expertise. Commanders at the operational level utilize operational variables, many of which capture civilian variables within the AO. Other tools are available to enhance analysis of the mission and OE. When assessing the military aspects of terrain, the commander and staff can use the mnemonic OAKOC: observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment. When assessing the infrastructure operational variable, it may be useful for CA and other capabilities to utilize the mnemonic SWEAT-MSO: sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, other considerations.

2-28. CAO planners focus on civil considerations within the OE at every echelon. Civil considerations continue to be a significant aspect of all operations. Commanders at all levels will be faced with complex OEs, such as global and regional influences, urbanization, failed or failing states, nonstate actors, political actors, corruption, economic conditions, and a host of other influences that can change the OE on a daily basis. Commanders must understand these complex influences and be prepared to successfully engage the civil component within their operational areas. CA force's analysis of the civil considerations of an OE help the commander understand the complex influences of the civil component. CA forces assist in—

- Shaping the OE.
- Mitigating friction between military forces and the civil component.
- Setting the conditions for stability.
- Identifying civil strengths and vulnerabilities.

2-29. The Army identifies civil considerations as the "C" in METT-TC (I). Civil considerations are addressed in mission analysis by using the mnemonic ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. When analyzing a mission, both operational and mission variables should be considered. The limiting factor for consideration of operational variables is time, as well as the nature of the mission. In tactical planning, leaders use TLP and MDMP during mission analysis using mission variables. Although leaders using TLP analyze all the variables including civil considerations, CAO planners have advanced understanding of the civil component and civil considerations necessary to inform the leaders and staff of civil considerations during mission analysis using TLP as well as MDMP.

AREAS

2-30. Areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander's OE not normally thought of as militarily significant. However, failure to consider key civil areas can seriously affect the success of any military mission. At times, the answers to these questions may dramatically influence major portions of the COAs under consideration. Examples of how CAO planners may analyze and evaluate the area include the following questions:

- How do these areas affect the military mission?
- How do military operations affect civilian activities in these areas?

STRUCTURES

2-31. Civil structures (or lack thereof) can have significant effects. Some, such as bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams are traditional high-payoff targets. Others, such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals are cultural sites that international law or other agreements generally protect. Other structures, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants are facilities with practical applications that may be useful for military purposes. Structures analysis involves determining the locations, functions, capabilities, and applications of structures in support of military operations. Structures analysis also involves weighing the consequences of removing the structures from civilian use in terms of—

- Political, economic, religious, social, and information implications.
- Populace reaction.
- Replacement costs.

CAPABILITIES

2-32. Civil capabilities (shortfalls and strengths) can be viewed from several perspectives. The term civil capabilities may refer to—

- Capabilities that exist and allow the populace to sustain itself, such as—
  - Public administration.
  - Public safety.
  - Emergency services.
  - Food and agriculture systems.
- Capabilities the populace needs assistance with, such as—
  - Public works and utilities.
  - Public health.
  - Public transportation.
  - Economics.
  - Commerce.
- Resources and services that can be contracted to support the military mission, such as—
  - Interpreters.
  - Laundry services.
  - Construction materials.
  - Equipment.

2-33. Local vendors, the HN, or other nations may provide these resources and services. In hostile territory, civil capabilities include resources that military forces may take and use consistent with international law. Analysis of the existing capabilities of the AO is normally conducted based on the CA functional specialties. The analysis also identifies the capabilities of partner countries and organizations involved in the operation, which allows CAO/CMO planners to consider how to address shortfalls and capitalize on strengths in capabilities.

ORGANIZATIONS

2-34. Civil organizations are organized groups that may or may not be affiliated with government agencies. They can be church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, or community watch groups. They may be international organizations, NGOs, or even criminal organizations or violent extremist organizations that work contrary to the HN.

2-35. Organizations can assist or deter the commander in keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO, influencing the actions of the populace. They can also form the nucleus of foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) programs, interim governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.

PEOPLE

2-36. People, both individually and collectively, can have a positive, a negative, or no effect on military operations. In the context of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE), the term "people" includes civilians or nonmilitary personnel encountered in an AO. The term may also extend to individuals outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. In all military operations, U.S. forces must be prepared to encounter and work closely with civilians of all types. When analyzing people, CA Soldiers may consider historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, humanitarian, and other social factors. They should also identify the key communicators and their organizational ties or relationships that influence people in the AO. Regardless of the nature of the operation, military forces will usually encounter various civilians living or operating in and around the supported unit's AO. Separating civilians into distinct categories helps Soldiers identify locals. In foreign operations, these categories might include—

- Local nationals (town and city dwellers, farmers and other rural dwellers, and nomads).
- Local civil authorities (elected and traditional leaders at all levels of government).
- Third-country nationals.
- Foreign nationals.
- Foreign employees of international organizations or NGOs.
- USG and third-nation government agency representatives.
- Contractors (U.S. citizens, local nationals, and third-nation citizens providing contract services).
- DOD civilian employees.
- The media (journalists from print, radio, and visual media).

2-37. Civilian activities are primarily dictated by the type of environment in which they occur. Each category of civilian should be considered separately because the activities of each will have both a positive and negative impact on the unit's mission. Military operations affect civilian activities in various ways. Commanders should consider the political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal impact of operations on the categories of civilians identified in the AO.

EVENTS

2-38. There are different legal categories of civilians and different categories of civilian events that may affect the military mission. Some examples include—

- Planting and harvesting seasons.
- Elections.
- Riots.
- Religious activities and holidays.
- Evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary).
- Natural or man-made disasters.

2-39. There are military events that affect the lives of civilians in an AO. Some examples include—

- Combat operations, including indirect fires.
- Humanitarian assistance.
- Deployments and redeployments.
- Sustainment operations.
- Unit training.

2-40. CAO/CMO planners, in conjunction with the staff, determine what events are occurring and analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

2-41. Commanders use operational variables to assess the OE when performing mission analysis. These operational variables are primarily civilian in nature with the exception of the military variable. CAO planners utilize their civilian component expertise to highlight critical information as it applies to the operational variables during the mission analysis and operational planning.

2-42. Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to available information and knowledge. The conditions of an OE are described in terms of operational variables. Operational variables are those aspects of an OE, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an OE but also the population's influence on it. Army planners analyze an OE in terms of the eight interrelated operational variables, which are shown in table 2-2. Joint planners use only the initial six variables, PMESII, in describing what joint planners call the systems approach. A systems perspective facilitates ADM and provides the staff with a common frame of reference for collaboration with unified action partners that are beyond the commander's authority. The systems approach is discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.

Table 2-2. Operational variables

Variable	*Description*
Political	Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers.
Military	Explores the military and paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given operational environment.
Economic	Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources.
Social	Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members.
Information	Describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.
Infrastructure	Comprises the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society.
Physical Environment	Includes the geography and man-made structures, as well as the climate and weather in the area of operations.
Time	Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an operational environment, as well as how the timing and duration are perceived by various actors in the operational environment.

2-43. Each of these variables may have sub-variables, as shown in table 2-3, page 26, that also deserve analysis or may manifest as information requirements. It is important to note that the majority of the operational variables focus on aspects of the civil component and not the military component of the OE. CA personnel may be required to provide, discover, or inform the commander and staff of the nonmilitary aspects as they are portrayed in the operational variables.

2-44. Many of these sub-variables can be answered by CA staff from within the volumes of civil information collected to enhance the situational understanding of the OE. Each operational variable is analyzed to enhance the situational understanding.

Table 2-3. Operational sub-variables

Political Variable	*Social Variable*	*Time Variable*
Attitude towards the United States Centers of political power Type of government Government effectiveness and legitimacy Influential political groups International relationships	Demographic mix Social volatility Education level Ethnic diversity Religious diversity Population movement Common languages Criminal activity Human rights Centers of social power Basic cultural norms and values	Cultural perception of time Information offset Tactical exploitation of time Key dates, time periods, or events
Military Variable	***Information Variable***	***Physical Environment Variable***
Military forces Government paramilitary forces Nonstate paramilitary forces Unarmed combatants Nonmilitary unarmed combatants Military functions: • Command and control (mission command) • Movement and maneuver • Information warfare • Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition • Fires • Protection • Logistics sustainment	Public communications media Information warfare: • Electromagnetic warfare • Computer warfare • Information attack • Deception • Physical destruction • Protection and security measures • Perception management Intelligence Information management (Army definition)	Terrain: • Observation and fields of fire • Avenues of approach • Key terrain • Obstacles • Cover and concealment • Landforms • Vegetation • Terrain complexity • Mobility classification Natural hazards Climate Weather: • Precipitation • High temperature—low heat index • Low temperature—wind chill index • Wind • Visibility • Cloud cover • Relative humidity
Economic Variable	***Infrastructure Variable***	
Economic diversity Employment status Economic activity Illegal economic activity Banking and finance	Construction pattern Urban zones Urbanized building density Utilities present Utility level Transportation architecture	

POLITICAL

2-45. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance including formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers. Adversaries seek to understand not just the formal political system, such as political parties and elected officials, but also the informal systems of political influence, such as ethnic groups and other centers of power.

2-46. There is a connection between the political variable and the social variable. CA staff collect civil information as it applies to the political variable, to identify and engage key civil nodes. Civil information on the political variable informs the IPOE and the COP. It is also pivotal in the development of a CE plan and civil information collection plan.

MILITARY

2-47. The military variable explores the military and paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given OE. The HN or enemy military capabilities are analyzed and described. The interaction between the military and the political structure is important to understanding this variable's relationship with the political distribution of power in a society. The authorities to which the military respond or act are important. CA staff collect civil information, as it applies to the military variable, in order to build unified action, reduce impacts of military operations and vice versa, and to identify and engage key civil nodes which promote stability. Civil information on the military variable informs the IPOE and the COP.

ECONOMIC

2-48. The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to gaining access to, producing, distributing, and consuming resources. These behaviors determine incentives and disincentives that encourage or discourage economic decisions. The sum of these individual and group decisions may determine the production, distribution, and consumption of economic resources. Typically, an economy is conceptualized as currency, stocks, major commodities, banking, and trade controlled and monitored by the government. However, informal economies, trade, or economic exchanges outside state-controlled or money-based transactions may be of equal or greater importance than formal economies in understanding an OE. CA staff collect civil information, as it applies to the economic variable, to identify and engage key civil nodes. Civil information on the economic variable informs the IPOE and the COP. Economic stability enhances political and civil security.

SOCIAL

2-49. The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society. Understanding the society is foundational to understanding the social variable. A society is defined as a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture, and share a sense of identity. However, no society is completely homogeneous. A society usually has a dominant culture, but it can have secondary cultures. Different societies may share similar cultures as Canada and the United States do. Societies are not static but change over time. CA staff collect civil information, as it applies to the social variable, to identify and engage key civil nodes. Civil information on the social variable informs the IPOE and the COP. Social aspects affect all other variables. CA staff may have available civil information that assists the intelligence staff with their collection requirements, such as the establishment of a sociocultural estimate. (See JP 2-0 for more on sociocultural factors.) The sociocultural estimate may require information that informs the intelligence staff of their sociocultural collection task such as—

- Discover what the meaningful social group identities are in the AO.
- Conduct a community power study.
- Determine the community's hierarchy of needs and the gaps between the needs of the people and the abilities and resources of the local leaders.
- Determine the community's cultural narrative.

INFORMATION

2-50. The information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. Understanding the communications systems is important because they influence international, national, regional, and local audiences. Understanding how people communicate and who influences them on a daily basis is essential. CA staff collect civil information, as it applies to the information variable, to identify and engage key civil nodes. Civil information on the information variable informs the IPOE and the COP. CA staff engaging with information operations working groups enable the promulgation of themes and messages through CE. Through judicious dissemination to the IPI, the CA staff help achieve unified action within the civil component of the OE.

INFRASTRUCTURE

2-51. The infrastructure variable is composed of the facilities (buildings and equipment), personnel, and services needed for the functioning of a community or society. Societies have different infrastructure needs. For example, the expectation for hours of available electricity vary widely. Counterinsurgents try to access infrastructure needs to meet the expectation of the user, not their own expectations. Infrastructure is also interrelated with other variables in that each societal system possesses an infrastructure that sustains it. For example, the development of a highway system will affect the development of the economy or the way in which indigenous populations share information. CA staff collect civil information, as it applies to the infrastructure variable, to identify and engage key civil nodes as they relate to the infrastructure of any particular variable. CA assessments, studies, and surveys help commanders understand what essential services or infrastructure that supports those services must be restored in order to promote stability. Civil information on the infrastructure variable informs the IPOE and the COP.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

2-52. The physical environment includes the geography, man-made structures, and climate and weather in an AO, which affects the tactics and operations of friendly and enemy forces. CA staff collect civil information, as it applies to the physical environment variable, to identify and engage key civil nodes that may be tied to specific geographic areas. Civil information on the physical environment variable informs the IPOE and the COP. Geography shapes the demographic, economic and political composition of the OE.

TIME

2-53. Time describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an OE, as well as how various actors in an OE perceive the timing and duration. Time also has an interrelated relationship with other variables. CA staff collect civil information, as it applies to the time variable, to identify and engage key civil nodes. Civil information on the time variable facilitates synchronization of operations and CMO. Civil information on the time variable informs the IPOE and the COP. (See JP 2-0 for more on synchronization.)

SYNTHESIZING OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES

2-54. A collaborative environment is comprised of individuals, organizations, knowledge management systems, infrastructure, and processes to create and share the data, information, and knowledge. A collaborative environment is required to plan, prepare for, execute, and assess operations. Commanders must be able to make informed decisions faster than the adversary. Commanders and staffs also require the capability and capacity to facilitate the creation of a shared situational awareness so they can plan and operate with an enhanced unity of effort.

2-55. Included in the collaborative environment are the knowledge management techniques and procedures that are required in order to govern collaboration within the HQ, the CMOC, and among subordinate forces. These techniques and procedures must encompass the processes and databases to integrate and synchronize the command and staff activity to generate orders, supporting information and CA products. Collaboration through information collection activities, automation, and decision-support capabilities all enhance the efficiency of the organization's battle rhythm and the commander's decision making. The collaborative environment must provide the right information to the right people at the right time in an understandable and actionable format or display. (See FM 3-55 regarding information collection.)

2-56. The operations process is fueled by information and the analysis and evaluation of that information which produces situational understanding. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders filter information categorized by the operational variables into relevant information with respect to the mission. They use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to refine their understanding of the situation and to visualize, describe, and direct operations.

2-57. Using a systems perspective, CAO planners can synthesize operational and mission variables by preparing a PMESII-PT/ASCOPE crosswalk to inform the COP and help decision making in COA development or LOE development of the commander's plan. CAO planners synthesize the operational variables and civil considerations through connecting the informational aspects that connect civil considerations to the OE. (See figure 2-6.)




Figure 2-6. Synthesizing operational variables and civil considerations

2-58. CAO planners utilize established processes to collect, collate, and analyze civil information to inform the assessment of the operational environment as well as enhance the systems perspective analysis. The application of ASCOPE during civil considerations analysis identifies the key and decisive areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of each operational variable. This early analysis informs the staffs' mission analysis.

2-59. Army planners utilize PMESII-PT, while joint planning generally only considers PMESII at the operational level. When performing a PMESII-PT/ or PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk, CAO planners can capture physical environment and time through the civil considerations of areas, structures, and events. When doing so, CAO planners should consider addressing physical environment and time sub-variables (Addressed in table 2-3, page 26.) within other operational variables. For example, cultural perceptions of time can be addressed in the social operational variable. When considering operational variables, CA forces frame the civil component of the OE as the civil considerations. CA forces develop a civil information product that informs the COP. (Table 2-4, pages 30 and 31, shows an example of a possible PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk format.)

2-60. The PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk is a technique that helps CAO planners capture vital civil information that may be presented in numerous products, or as a collection of information papers on specific information pertaining to each operational and mission variable as well as specific sub-variables.

2-61. Commanders and staff seek to build and maintain situational understanding throughout the operations process. Situational understanding comes from the application of analysis and judgment to relevant information. CAO planners analyze and evaluate the civil data and information to determine the relationship with operational and mission variables that enable decision making.

Table 2-4. PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk

	Political	*Military*	*Economic*	*Social*	*Information*	*Infrastructure*
Areas	National, provincial, district or municipality borders and boundaries, party and tribal affiliation areas	Designated areas of responsibility, jurisdictions, key terrain, security boundaries, coalition bases, historic ambush and improvised explosive device sites, enemy or insurgent controlled areas, militia-controlled areas	Land use, natural resources (arable land, oil, water, forests, game, livestock), commercial lines of communications, financial services, markets, cities, agricultural, mining, manufacturing, salvage yards, imports and exports	Religious and ethnic demographics, population centers (city, town, village), migration routes, tribal boundaries, economic demographics, traditional meeting sites, national and local parks, cultural landmarks	Radio broadcast range, television broadcast range, internet or wireless fidelity service areas, word of mouth, gathering points, newspaper distribution, coverage zones, graffiti	Rivers and estuaries, electric service area or grid, sewer networks, water tables, irrigation networks, water distribution systems, water treatment facilities, medical service coverage, transportation hubs, ports
Structures	Infrastructure from which any level of governance or political activity is perpetuated, including national, provincial, district centers, government or political buildings, meeting halls, polling sites, worship sites	Operating bases, provincial or district police headquarters and buildings, border points of entry, gang locations, militia, enemy or insurgent bases, checkpoints, roadblocks	Commercial centers, banks, energy infrastructure, transportation (highways, rail, ports, airports), processing plants, manufacturing plants, storage facilities, marketing sites, stores, factories, foundries	Parks, club houses, sport facilities, religious structures, historic, cultural, archeological sites, informal gathering places, universities, schools, courthouses, libraries, social hierarchy, police headquarters, border points, museums, popular attractions	Radio stations, television stations, fiber optic and server or search engine hard structure, satellite reception, internet systems, transmission facilities and relays, print shops, internet cafes	Interstate system, rail system, power generators, dams, reservoirs, secondary and tertiary roads, government buildings, banks, schools, communication network, water, sewer, electric, medical and transportation centers, jails and prisons, hospitals, fire stations, police stations, electrical or water and sewage distribution lines, airports
Capabilities	Influence, control, or communicate between the governed and the governing, monetary policy, fiscal policy, informational distribution, level of influence, dispute resolution, judicial system, ability of populace to participate	Response times, training, aircraft number or type, armored or motorized vehicle number or type, ship or boat number or type, security, offense and defense weapons, judges' expertise, power projection, quick reaction force, response times, crime rate, police or criminal and friendly or enemy ability to recruit	Land ownership, land use, water resources controls, energy resources controls, food production, raw material mining, manufacturing and distribution systems, banking, access to credit and jobs, gov't assistance programs, monetary reserves, national debt, gross domestic product	Economic class system, social mobility, tribal influences, religious influences, support networks, government involvement, means of justice	Social media, internet accessibility, phone service prescribers, radios or television per household, distribution and projection, printing abilities, process times, literacy rate	Commodity market, interstate commerce, regional economic zones, jail or prison capacity, emergency services, mass transportation, manufacturing, storage, ability of indigenous population and institutions to build, inspect, and maintain infrastructure

Table 2-4. PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk (continued)

	Political	*Military*	*Economic*	*Social*	*Information*	*Infrastructure*
Organizations	Political parties or opposition, regional collective security organizations or alliances, religious, governmental and nongovernmental organizations	Coalition or host nation Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, border police, highway police, municipal police, national police, national investigation services, gangs, command structure, volunteer organizations, conscript organizations, militias	Ministries (water, agriculture, energy, labor, commerce, finance, treasury), criminal organizations, national commodity exchange, trading guilds, banks, money exchanges, government support agencies, cooperatives, nongovernmental organizations, class deviations	Religious, educational leaders, advocacy groups, relief organizations, ministries of labor, religious affairs, education, justice, and interior, police, worship, tribal, family, sports, clubs, welfare support, youth groups	News and media networks, religious organizations, ministry of public affairs, tribal, political, and government businesses, information operations groups	Ministries of water, energy, urban development, unions, and construction firms, medical and transportation companies
People	Key leaders with political influence, formal and informal political leaders, governors, religious leaders, mayors, elders, councils, judges, clergy	Defense and coalition leaders, ministries, morale of members, commanders, police chiefs, tribal leaders, neighborhood key leaders	Business leaders, ministers, regional or national banks, nonstate entities, business owners, labor leaders, poverty level, foreign investors, landholders, money lenders, criminals	Governors, mayors, district leaders, minorities, influential families, religious leaders, tribal or village elders, key clergy, family leaders, key mentors with social influence	Media owners, reporters, formal and informal influencers, religious leaders, teachers, professors, heads of prominent families, tribal leaders	Civil servants, builders, contractors, local development councils, engineers
Events	Elections, tribal gatherings, provincial council meetings, protests and speeches, religious gatherings, political meetings, rallies, trials, debates	Lethal events, loss of leaders, operations, peace operations support, attacks, crime, riots, political unrest, labor unrest, regional meetings, religious celebrations, military police operations, conflicts, exercises, historical operations	Elections, holidays, planting seasons, harvest seasons, drought, flood, rain, snow fall or melt cycles, financial crisis, business activity, agricultural activities, weather	Days of worship, holidays, holy days, births, weddings, deaths and bazaar days, traditional holidays, state holidays, religious holidays, gatherings, festivals	Days of worship, media publishing dates, project openings, civilian casualty events, opening and closing of media outlets, information media capacity changes, distribution times	Medical, police, transportation, disruptions of service, major construction projects, capability or capacity increases

CIVIL AFFAIRS UTILIZATION OF THE ARMY PLANNING PROCESSES

2-62. CAO planners use TLP, MDMP, and ADM to analyze the mission at various echelons. The MDMP and TLP are similar but not identical. Commanders with a coordinating staff use the MDMP as their primary planning process, while small units without a formal staff use TLP. (Figure 2-7, page 32, shows the flow of information across these processes and the echelons during parallel planning.)




Figure 2-7. Parallel planning

2-63. Depending on the situation—to include their familiarity of the problem—commanders conduct ADM before, in parallel with, or after the MDMP. When faced with an unfamiliar problem or when developing initial plans for extended operations, commanders often initiate the ADM before the MDMP. This sequence helps them better understand the OE, frame the problem, and develop an operational approach to guide more detailed planning.

2-64. Commanders may also elect to conduct the ADM in parallel with the MDMP. In this instance, members of the staff conduct mission analysis as the commander and other staff members engage in framing the OE and the problem. This focus helps commanders better understand aspects of the OE. The results of mission analysis (to include IPOE and running estimates) inform commanders as they develop their operational approach that, in turn, facilitates COA development during the MDMP.

2-65. The staff's effort during the MDMP focuses on helping the commander understand the situation, make decisions, and synchronize those decisions into a fully developed plan or order. Staff activities during planning initially focus on mission analysis. The products that the staff develops during mission analysis help commanders understand the situation and develop the commander's visualization. During COA development and COA comparison, the staff provides recommendations to support the commander in selecting a COA. After the commander makes a decision, the staff prepares the plan or order that reflects the commander's intent, coordinating all necessary details.

CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING AND TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES

2-66. TLP is a planning technique used at the small-unit level. Company-level and smaller units lack formal staffs and use TLP to plan and prepare for operations. This places the responsibility for planning primarily on the commander or small-unit leader.

2-67. *Troop leading procedures* is a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation (ADP 5-0). These procedures enable leaders to maximize available planning time while developing effective plans and preparing their units for an operation. TLP consists of eight steps, but the sequence of the steps is not rigid. Leaders modify the sequence to meet the mission, situation, and available time. Leaders perform some steps concurrently, while other steps may be performed continuously throughout the operation. (See table 1-1, page 9.) The eight steps are:

- Receive the mission.
- Issue a WARNORD.
- Make a tentative plan.
- Initiate movement.

- Conduct reconnaissance.
- Complete the plan.
- Issue the order.
- Supervise and refine.

2-68. Small unit leaders use TLP when working alone or with a small group to solve tactical problems. For example, a company commander may use the executive officer, first sergeant, fire support officer, supply sergeant, and communications sergeant to assist during TLP.

2-69. Small unit leaders begin TLP when they receive the initial WARNORD or receive a new mission. As each subsequent order arrives, leaders modify their assessments, update tentative plans, and continue to supervise and assess preparations. In some situations, the HHQ may not issue the full sequence of WARNORDs; security considerations or tempo may make it impractical. Commanders carefully consider decisions to eliminate WARNORDs. Subordinate units always need to have enough information to plan and prepare for an operation. In other cases, leaders may initiate TLP before receiving a WARNORD based on existing plans and orders (contingency plans or be-prepared missions) and on their understanding of the situation.

2-70. Small unit leaders use mission variables to analyze their mission. Small units at company and below generally do not have CAO planners or elements available to assist the commander. CAO planners at higher echelons provide in-depth analysis and evaluation of civil considerations within the mission variables (as discussed earlier in this chapter) to analyze the problem or mission. CA units from company to team level utilize TLP to plan, prepare for and execute unit operations.

2-71. Parallel planning hinges on distributing information as it is received or developed. Leaders cannot complete their plans until they receive their unit mission. If each successive WARNORD contains enough information, the HHQ final order will confirm what subordinate leaders have already analyzed and put into their tentative plans. In other cases, the HHQ order may change or modify the subordinate enough that additional planning and reconnaissance are required. CAO planners at higher echelons push civil considerations and other civil information down to the lowest possible level to assist small unit leaders in analyzing their mission and making a plan.

CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING AND THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

2-72. CAO planners execute and integrate into the MDMP when planning CAO. It is not merely a reiteration of the generic MDMP discussion found in ADP 5-0. The CAO planner must possess both U.S. Army and joint planning skills and an understanding of CA doctrine and of the customs, mores, and values of the civil component of the AO. In the planning process, knowing the enemy, whether it is a military foe or a natural or man-made disaster, is necessary. Staff planners must provide the supported commander with updated, factual information about the OE that includes nonmilitary aspects of the AO. Therefore, it is imperative that CA integrate early in the planning stage of any military operation. Mission success is greatly enhanced when commanders integrate CA forces with staffs early in the planning process. Benefits are amplified when CA forces use their knowledge of local customs and attitudes to prepare supported forces for the cultural context of their operations.

2-73. The CA area study is a good baseline source of information of a designated AO. The purpose is to provide the supported commander with the civil information regarding the AO. The area study is not designed merely as a compilation of information, but rather to identify information gaps and to identify concerns that could influence the operation in a positive or negative manner. The impact of early CA involvement is even greater when forces apply civil considerations early on in the mission analysis and planning process.

2-74. The MDMP combines the conceptual and detailed aspects of the planning process. Commanders use it to build plans and orders for operations. The MDMP can be initiated based on a mission from HHQ or directed by a commander or staff based on changing situations. The MDMP helps commanders understand situations, develop COAs, and decide on a COA to accomplish mission requirements.

2-75. MDMP includes identifying and understanding the problem and determining a desired outcome. The commander applies operational art (design, organization, and integration), an understanding of the situation, insight, abstract thought, and a conceptual understanding to take them through the process from intuition to a specific COA. From this understanding, commanders develop several options for achieving the desired outcome. This comparative analysis may result in a choice that modifies one of the options by incorporating features of others. The MDMP ends with the production of a fully synchronized plan or an order for execution.

2-76. The MDMP integrates activities of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other military and civilian partners when developing an OPLAN or OPORD. Knowledge products—such as results from an IPOE and running estimates—help inform the commander and staff about the OE. This section describes the methods and provides techniques for conducting each step of the MDMP specifically from the CAO planner's perspective. It describes the key inputs to each of the seven steps. The seven steps include:

- Receipt of mission.
- Mission analysis.
- COA development.
- COA analysis (wargaming).
- COA comparison.
- COA approval.
- Orders production.

STEP 1: RECEIPT OF MISSION

2-77. The supported commander will usually receive a mission tasking through a WARNORD or OPORD. Other types of orders include service support, movement, and FRAGORDs. A WARNORD should contain as much detail as possible. It informs subordinates of the unit mission and gives them the leader's timeline. Army leaders may also include any other instructions or information they think will help subordinates prepare for the new mission. This includes information on the enemy, the nature of the HHQ plan, and any specific instructions for preparing their units. At a minimum, a WARNORD contains the following:

- Approved unit mission statement.
- Commander's intent.
- Task organization changes.
- Attachments and detachments.
- Unit AO (sketch, overlay, or some other description).
- CCIRs and essential elements of friendly information.
- Risk guidance.
- Priorities by warfighting functions.
- Military deception guidance.
- Minimum essential stability tasks.
- Specific priorities.

2-78. An OPORD is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Traditionally called the five-paragraph field order, an OPORD contains, at a minimum, descriptions of the following:

- Situation.
- Mission.
- Execution.
- Sustainment.
- Command and signal.

2-79. Commanders initiate the MDMP upon receipt or in anticipation of a pending mission. The purpose of this step is to alert all participants of the pending planning requirements, determine the amount of time available for planning and preparation, and decide on a planning approach, including guidance on design and how to abbreviate the MDMP, if required. When a new mission is identified, individual commanders and staffs perform the actions and produce the outputs. (Figure 2-8 shows the inputs and outputs of step 1.)




Figure 2-8. Receipt of mission inputs and outputs

2-80. The CAO planner, as one of the commander's staff elements, is responsible to integrate CAO into the OPLAN or OPORD. The following considerations aid the planner in balancing the need for CAO detailed planning against the requirements for immediate action to meet the supported commander's desired effects and end states:

- Conduct an initial assessment, including METT-TC (I), legal authority, and international law requirements.
- Conduct a time analysis, determining the amount of time available for planning, identifying benchmarks (if possible), and developing an estimated timeline using reverse planning. The amount of time available greatly affects whether planners can apply operational variables or if they are constrained to mission variables.
- Alert CA staff and supporting CA elements that a mission is coming. This may be in the form of a WARNORD, message format, or verbal order (effect initial notification as soon as possible). The WARNORD should include if forces will immediately be engaged in stability operations, or if any of the CA core competencies and functions will have to be implemented by the operational commander.
- Alert affiliated agencies, as appropriate, that planning will be taking place while considering operations security orientation; for example, interagency, HNs, NGOs, international organizations, and IPI. (See JP 3-13.3 regarding operations security.) Agencies that play a key role in the initial success of offensive or defensive operations must be included in crisis action planning. Agencies taking part in the long-range stabilization or campaign planning require less urgency in initial coordination.
- Gather necessary tools for planning such as CA area studies, doctrinal material, applicable treaties, bilateral or multilateral agreements, current estimates, intelligence data and assessment products, products from other agencies, HNs and NGOs as needed, applicable policies, authorities, standard operating procedures, and supplies. If transitioning with another unit, HN, international organizations, or others, gather all available information, plans, and data from the currently assigned unit for the mission.
- Update the current CAO running estimate with as much information as possible.
- Define the civil environment by assessing current conditions against a defined norm or established standards by portraying the environment using mission or operational variables or a combination thereof.
- Ensure accessibility to the civil information repository.
- Consolidate data to be transferred to the CIM database.

Note. The CAO planner can build most of the CAO annex through cut and paste from a well-prepared (continuously updated) CAO running estimate.

2-81. The last task in the receipt of mission is to issue a WARNORD or, when needed, subsequent WARNORDs to subordinate and supporting units. The WARNORD is issued as early as possible to increase the time for COA development. The WARNORD should include, at a minimum, the type of action (offense, defense, stability, or DSCA) or describe the situation and state the mission, objectives, and assumptions (if applicable); as well as the general location of the operation, the initial timeline, and any movement or reconnaissance to initiate the mission.

2-82. The WARNORD may set a tentative C-day (unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins) or an L-hour (a specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence), or the CAO planner may ask for the commander's recommendation. Relevant civil considerations are addressed in the situation paragraph of the WARNORD. Civil information from CR, CE, and CND may be introduced by CAO planners at higher echelons, assigned or attached CAO planners on the staff, or from reconnaissance performed by other units at various echelons.

STEP 2: MISSION ANALYSIS

2-83. To the CAO planner, the CA area study combined with the initial assessment forms the basis for initial analysis during the MDMP. The MDMP continues with an assessment of the situation or analyzes the mission. Commanders (supported by their staffs and informed by subordinate and adjacent commanders and by other partners) gather, analyze, and synthesize information to orient themselves on the current conditions of the OE. The CAO planner's focus is on the civil considerations of the OE. The commander and staff conduct mission analysis to better understand the situation and problem and identify what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done, and, most importantly, why (the purpose of the operation). During mission analysis, the CA focus on civil considerations is oriented toward developing unified action and promoting stabilization. In most OEs, they will be interrelated with one another. (See figure 2-9.)




Figure 2-9. Mission analysis inputs and outputs

2-84. The mission analysis process for the CAO planner focuses on defining the civil components of the supported commander's AO (for example, the nonmilitary factors of ASCOPE). The CA area study is a foundational part of the process. CA forces assess each of the 16 functional specialties with the five functional areas, as well as the general aspects of the AO. It is important for the CAO planner to focus only on the civil component during this process. The CAO planner needs to fully understand the supported unit's CONOPS when analyzing the mission from the CAO aspect—a critical step in the planning process, since the focus for CA is on civil considerations of the OE.

2-85. To a CAO planner, the mission statement will be the driving factor during mission analysis. For a CAO planner, mission analysis is "key," as it feeds into the IPOE by providing civil considerations data to the process. Sometimes civil considerations are not the commander's top priority. Depending on the type of operation expressed in the mission statement, the CAO planner will get an initial understanding of the CAO requirement for a particular operation.

2-86. CAO planners must understand the problem. It is important that the tasks (specified, implied, and essential) and their purpose are thoroughly understood, clearly stated, and encompass all requirements and limitations (can do, must do, and constraints). CAO planners should understand the correlation between the supported commander's CONOPS and the mission/intent of the HHQ. The commander's visualization is the mental process of developing a situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will achieve that end state. CA staff members must assist the commander in visualizing the civil components of the OE. CA staff members must also understand all requirements limitations of what they—

- Can do.
- Must do.
- Cannot do, such as—
  - **Constraints.** A constraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General Eisenhower was required to liberate Paris instead of bypassing it during the 1944 campaign in France.
  - **Restraints.** Restraint, in the context of joint planning, is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General MacArthur was prohibited from striking Chinese targets north of the Yalu River during the Korean War.
  - **Operational limitations.** Many operational limitations are commonly expressed as rules of engagement. Operational limitations may restrict or bind COA selection or may even impede implementation of the chosen COA. Commanders must examine the operational limitations imposed on them, understand their impacts, and develop options that minimize these impacts in order to promote maximum freedom of action during execution. (JP 5-0 contains more information on constraints and operational limitations.)

Note. OPORDs always specify an execution date and time.

2-87. When commanders receive a mission tasking, they begin their analysis with the following questions:

- What tasks must the command do for the mission to be accomplished?
- What is the purpose of the mission?
- What limitations have been placed on the actions of the command's forces?
- What forces/assets are available to support the operation?

2-88. Once these questions are answered, the commander should understand the mission and should be prepared to describe a CONOPS. The CAO planner, upon receipt of a WARNORD, FRAGORD, OPORD, and/or the supported commander's guidance, should immediately begin analyzing the mission and gathering information and data directed toward the civil components of the OE. The following provides the CAO planner with a list of considerations when analyzing the mission:

- Read and analyze the HHQ OPLAN or OPORD.
- Identify specified tasks that are received in writing or in verbal form from HHQ.
- Determine implied tasks, which are tasks that are not stated by HHQ but must be accomplished to achieve a specified task or mission.
- Determine essential tasks that are specified or implied and must be executed to accomplish the mission (for example, civil security, restoration of essential services, and civil control).
- Identify CA operations assets; for example, units, personnel (functional specialists), and equipment (note any shortfalls).
- Determine constraints, which are found in paragraph 3 of the OPLAN or OPORD. Annexes to the OPORD may also include constraints.
- Determine risks (for example, the environment [population, terrain, weather, and light data]) and threats (strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities).
- Delineate facts and develop assumptions; for example, there are 30,000 dislocated civilians (DCs) in the AO (this could be a fact or an assumption; do not repeat assumptions already listed in the plan).
- Develop CAO information requirements for input to address the civil considerations factor of "C" in METT-TC (I) for possible nomination into the commander's critical information requirement.
- Consider transition (for example, transition planning).

Note. The factor of "C" should address the civil considerations as they apply to both the adversary (to include lethal and nonlethal and no-strike list targeting) and friendly COGs (ASCOPE).

2-89. CAO is totally integrated into the operations process to achieve unity of effort. CA mission analysis is situation dependent and must articulate how the commander views the human, informational, and physical dimensions of the OE. The CAO planner should, from a CAO prospective, prioritize the effort necessary to maximize results within the constraints, limitations, and risks of the operation. These efforts are directed at the supported commander's desired end state.

STEP 3: COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

2-90. The COA development step generates options for follow-on analysis and comparison that satisfy the commander's intent and planning guidance.

2-91. During COA development, planners use the problem statement, mission statement, commander's intent, planning guidance, and the various knowledge products developed when analyzing the mission in an effort to develop COAs. Each prospective COA is examined for validity using the following screening criteria:

- **Feasibility.** The COA can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource limitations.
- **Acceptability.** The COA must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained.
- **Suitability.** The COA accomplishes the mission within commander's intent and planning guidance.
- **Distinguishability.** Each COA must differ significantly from the others such as scheme or form of maneuver, LOEs, phasing, day or night operations, use of forces in reserve, and task organization.
- **Completeness.** A COA must incorporate—
  - How the main effort leads to mission accomplishment.
  - How supporting efforts create/preserve conditions for success of decisive operations or efforts.
  - How sustaining operations units enable shaping and decisive operations or efforts.
  - How offensive, defensive, and stability operations or DSCA tasks are accounted for.
  - Tasks to be performed and conditions to be achieved.

2-92. The staff also continues to revise and update products. During COA development, commanders and staffs perform the process actions and produce the outputs. (See figure 2-10.)




Figure 2-10. Course of action development inputs and outputs

2-93. From a CAO planner's perspective, COA development is a unified staff action under the auspices of the operations section of the supported unit commander. Brainstorming is the preferred technique for generating options. It requires time, imagination, and creativity, but it usually produces the widest range of options. The staff (and members of organizations outside the HQ) must be unbiased and open minded when developing proposed options. In COA development, the CAO planner must remain engaged in the process even though it is mostly in a support role (mission dependent). The CAO staff can provide the commander detailed analysis during the brainstorming process focused on the civil components of the AO. The product of the mnemonic ASCOPE may influence the COAs when applied (as discussed earlier in this chapter).

2-94. During COA development, the CA staff should work through the following list of considerations (which is neither prioritized nor all-inclusive):

- Consider the safety and security of noncombatants for each COA.
- Consider applications of stability operations tasks such as establish civil security, support to civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, support for economic and infrastructure development, and conduct security cooperation.
- Identify the emergency services required for each course of action (include time limitations).
- Consider food, water, and shelter availability in terms of the number of people to be fed and the number of days of stock needed for civilian populaces.
- Identify any capabilities and assets of international organizations, NGOs, IPI, and other government agencies, and their capabilities that may impact the COA.
- Determine the physical space requirements (if any) for each COA such as proposed DC camps, evacuation routes, major supply routes, storage (climate-controlled [especially cold]), stabling livestock, and so forth.
- Consider the time of the year such as elections, school events, fiscal schedules, and holidays (religious periods and traditional vacation time), harvest, planting, climate, weather, and significant reoccurring weather events (floods), and so forth.
- Identify the condition and location of key structures to determine capabilities and vulnerabilities such as government facilities, medical treatment facilities, power generation and transmission facilities, cultural sites (monuments, religious shrines, libraries, museums, and so forth), and radio and television production and transmission facilities.
- Address solutions to any mission constraints or limitations for each COA from a CAO perspective.
- Consider the previously identified facts and assumptions for each COA.
- Delineate civil considerations using ASCOPE.
- Consider second-order effects and subsequent tertiary effects for each COA.

Note. ASCOPE applies to the "C" factors of METT-TC (I).

STEP 4: COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS (WARGAMING)

2-95. COA analysis enables the commander and staff to identify problems, as well as the probable consequences, for each COA being considered. It helps to visualize the concept while conceptualizing and synchronizing a plan. COA analysis may require commanders and staffs to revisit as discrepancies arise (for example, changing assumptions to facts, modifying force structure, and updating intelligence). These changes help precipitate detailed planning necessary to refine COAs. COA analysis not only ranks and appraises the quality for each COA from both a friendly and enemy point of view but also, hopefully, identifies potential execution problems, decisions, and contingencies. COA analysis influences how commanders and staffs understand the problem and may require the planning process to restart.

2-96. Wargaming is a disciplined, yet flexible, process. The simplest form of a war game is the manual method, often utilizing a tabletop approach with blowups of matrices and templates. The most sophisticated form of is modern, computer-aided modeling and simulation. Regardless of the form used, each critical event within a proposed COA should be war-gamed using the action, reaction, and counteraction methods of friendly and enemy forces interaction. This basic war-game method (modified to fit the specific mission and environment) applies to offensive, defensive, stability, operations, or DSCA tasks. In essence, when conducting COA analysis, commanders and staffs receive input in the way of HHQ orders, IPOE products, running estimates, and so forth.

2-97. Key input involves—

- Gathering tools; for example, easel, whiteboard, butcher paper, map boards, maps with overlays, and chalkboard.
- Identifying the war-gaming method and how to assess, display, and record the results.
- Listing the following:
  - Friendly forces.
  - Assumptions.
  - Critical events.
  - Decision points.

2-98. The key input involves a process of gathering tools, listing friendly forces, listing assumptions, listing known critical events and decision points, identifying a war-gaming method, determining how to record or display the results, wargaming the operation while assessing the results, and, if need be, conducting a war-game briefing.

2-99. During the war game, the staff takes each COA and begins to develop a detailed plan, determining the COA strengths or weaknesses. Wargaming tests and improves COAs. (See figure 2-11.)




Figure 2-11. Key course of action outputs

2-100. Wargaming that leads to key outputs aids the staff in synchronizing the six warfighting functions for each COA. It also helps the commander and staff to—

- Determine how to maximize the effects of combat power while protecting friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage.
- Further develop a visualization of the operation and anticipate operational events.
- Determine conditions and resources required for success.
- Determine when and where to apply force capabilities.
- Focus IPOE on enemy strengths and weaknesses, important civil considerations, and the desired end state.
- Identify coordination needed to produce synchronized results.
- Determine the most flexible COA.
- Determine branches and sequels to the COA.
- Determine possible second- and third-order effects from a probable COA.

Note. The information the CAO planner develops during COA comparison and analysis forms the basis for paragraph 3 of the CAO running estimate. (Appendix B provides a generic CAO running estimate format.)

2-101. The CAO planner assesses the CAO concept of support against each COA and its war game. The results of this assessment are the basis for the COA comparison that planners record in paragraph 5 of the CAO running estimate (appendix B has a generic CAO running estimate format). When addressing COA analysis and wargaming, CA staff should work through the following list of considerations (which is neither prioritized nor all-inclusive):

- Avoid comparing one COA with another during the war game. Comparison is done during the COA comparison step.
- Ensure each COA effectively integrates civil considerations (the "C" of METT-TC [I]). Civil considerations for the AO are analyzed using ASCOPE.
- Consider the OE; for example, how operations affect public order and safety, the potential for disaster relief requirements, noncombatant evacuation operations, emergency services, and protection of culturally significant sites. (See JP 3-68.)
- Be prepared to discuss all the functional specialties as related to the analysis and the war-gaming process.
- Represent the point of view of the other actors such as other government agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and IPI when these agencies are not able to represent themselves.
- Assess the overall risk cost with mission benefit including hazards such as enemy activity, accident potential, weather or environmental conditions, health, sanitation, behavior, and materiel or equipment.
- Assess the threat posed by hazardous materials (commercial enterprises), special traffic hazards and problems (urban areas/main supply routes), and health hazards.

Note. The staff must compare COAs to the subjective positive and negative while considering risk assessment and the probability of success.

2-102. The CAO planner (or G-9/S-9) develops a CAO concept of support, establishes CAO goals and objectives, and addresses risks based on civil considerations for each COA. The CAO planner ensures each COA effectively integrates civil considerations. The CAO officer considers not only tactical and operational issues, but also sustainment issues. The CAO staff officer assesses how operations affect civilians and estimates the requirements for essential stability tasks that commanders might have to undertake based on the capability and capacity of the unified action. Protection, care of DCs, and HN support are of particular concern when planning support for either a tactical or operational mission. The CAO officer provides feedback on how the culture in the AO affects each COA. If the unit lacks an assigned CAO officer, the commander assigns these responsibilities to another staff member. The CAO staff officer represents the other actors' points of view if these agencies are not able to participate in the war game for security or other reasons.

STEP 5: COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

2-103. COA comparison is an objective process to evaluate COAs independently of each other and against set evaluation criteria approved by the commander and staff during COA development. After each COA is examined for its strengths and weaknesses, the one with the highest probability of success is developed into an OPLAN or OPORD. The commander and staff perform certain actions and processes that lead to the key outputs of evaluated COAs, usually with three recommended COAs that are standard operating procedure (SOP)-driven and updated assumptions and running estimates.

2-104. The decision matrix is a highly structured and effective method used to compare COAs against criteria that, when met, suggest a great likelihood of producing success. Specific broad categories of COA characteristics are given a basic numerical value based on evaluation criteria. Weights are assigned based on subjective judgment regarding their relative importance to existing circumstances. Basic values are then multiplied by the weight to yield a given criterion's final score. The staff member then totals all scores to compare COAs. Although there are many ways of analyzing a COA during MDMP, most units develop a standard procedure. Staff officers may each use their own matrix to compare COAs with respect to their areas of expertise. Commanders compare COAs by weighing the advantages, disadvantages, strengths, and weaknesses of each, as noted during the war game. They decide which COA to execute, based on this comparison and on their professional judgment.

2-105. In weighing the positives and negatives of the matrix (the staff assigns numerical value to the advantages and disadvantages of each COA in the priority of importance to mission success), CAO planners identify which COA can best be supported from a CAO perspective. (Table 2-5 is an example of a decision matrix focused on the civil considerations of the OE.)

Table 2-5. Example of a decision matrix (advantages and disadvantages)

Course of Action	*Advantages*	*Disadvantages*
Course of action 1 (whatever the action is) Supportable from a Civil Affairs operations perspective	(+) Low-density population (area of operations) (+) Cooperation from friendly populaces expected (+) Once closed school in the area of operations (three rooms with an estimated 34 students) (+) There are no recommended protected targets in the area of operations (+) Potable water is available throughout the area of operations (streams/wells)	(-) D-day is the beginning of Ramadan (-) Host-nation civil and military authorities cannot support or control a stay-put policy. (-) School is closed because of the holiday (children are in the streets) (-) Local materials to support military operations are minimal (-) No “reefer” (ice, refrigeration, or storage) support in the avenue of approach (area of operations)
Course of action 2 (whatever the action is) Supportable from a Civil Affairs operations perspective	(+) Cooperation from friendly populaces expected (+) Attitudes of the various factions of the populace within the area of operations are cooperative (+) Axis of advance is paved roads; ease of mobility	(-) D-day is the beginning of Ramadan (-) Avenue of approach has a high-density civilian population (-) All schools are closed because of the holiday (children in the streets) (-) Large number of noncombatants may elect to flee, blocking the main supply route (-) Substantial risk to noncombatants (-) Numerous tall structures in the area of operations

Note. Decision matrices can result in prioritized lists, presentations, charts, consolidated data, or a decision matrix table based on the mission requirements and the CA planning element. The decision matrix will be used to evaluate COAs and assess the factor’s relative importance in the decision-making process. ASCOPE is the criteria to evaluate COAs analysis to assess requirements.

2-106. The CAO planner compares (advantages and disadvantages) the COAs in terms of the evaluation criteria (supportable from a CAO perspective). The COAs are ranked or ordered for each criterion from the best to least supportive from a CAO perspective. The staff will visually support the comparison with a decision matrix. The staff considers the costs (personnel, material, funds, and funding resources available) for each COA and the time required to execute the COA in relation to the operational impact of success in terms of measures of effectiveness (MOEs). When selected in the COA development phase, MOEs may be used as criteria if their impact on the COAs is distinguishable. The staff prioritizes the criteria in order and assigns a weight to each criterion in order to reflect relative importance. The staff considers criteria and MOEs that—

- Measure success in relieving or reducing the results of natural or man-made disasters and other endemic conditions of human suffering.
- Recognize the limited duration of U.S. military and support requirements.
- Assist in identifying shortfalls in U.S., HN, and information operations FHA plans and resources.
- Recognize the interagency coordination requirements.
- Allow comparison of the efficient use of limited resources.
- Assess the impact on the populace.
- Assess the impact of implemented control procedures on the long-range mitigation of political, economic, social, legal, and military issues affecting the OE.

2-107. The staff compares the levels of risk (if there is a stated evaluation criteria). The staff summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of the COAs to evaluate the chance of success of each. It is not unusual for each staff member to present their findings for the others to consider in a brief to the commander. Unit SOPs usually determine the order of presentation for supportability; for example, S-2, S-1, S-4, S-6, S-9, and S-3. (Figure 2-12 illustrates the outputs of step 5 [COA comparison]).




Figure 2-12. Course of action comparison inputs and outputs

Note. The CAO planner analyzes the war game of the CA scheme of support and compares the results for each COA with the others. The CAO scheme of support is ranked or ordered according to how well the COA meets the evaluation criteria. Usually, the comparison and ranking of the scheme of support are shown on a COA decision matrix. The matrix and a narrative explanation are recorded in paragraph 4 of the CAO running estimate and briefed during the COA decision brief. (Appendix B provides a generic CAO running estimate format.)

2-108. The COA comparison, the Army's MDMP, and the joint concept are very similar in nature when applied. The key outputs of the MDMP are predicated on the ultimate goal of identifying the strengths and weaknesses of each COA so that the COA with the highest probability of success can be selected and further developed into an OPLAN or OPORD. During COA comparison, the CA staff should consider and be prepared to address the following:

- Mission accomplishment as vital.
- Time as related to CA operations (comparison to specified, implied, and essential tasks).
- Risks involved to the force's mission accomplishment, residuals, noncombatants, and to IPI.
- Information/data provided by intelligence networks, CKI, CNDE, and CR.
- Coordination with other staffers (especially the S-2 and S-3) to ensure the CAO position is not generally different in comparison to those staff sections and, if so, be sure to verbally justify that position well before the decision brief.
- Validity of CA force structure to support the COAs; for example, need for request for additional CA forces or reachback. (See JP 3-30.)
- Support to future operations including transitions such as termination, transfers to follow-on forces, or transitions to IPIs and other government organizations.
- Consequences if a certain COA is not taken in relation to the COA perspective.

2-109. Commanders compare COAs by weighing the advantages, disadvantages, strengths, and weaknesses of each, as noted during the war game. They decide which COA to execute based on this comparison and on their professional judgment (usually through a decision brief).

STEP 6: COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL

2-110. The three basic components of COA approval are:

- The staff's recommendation of a COA (usually through a decision brief).
- The commander's decision and possible approval of the recommended COA or a modification thereof. (See figure 2-13, page 44.)
- The commander's issuance of the final planning guidance (if necessary).

2-111. After the decision briefing, the commander can direct one of four outcomes:

- Select the COA to best accomplish the mission.
- Direct the development of a hybrid COA comprising the two or more presented.
- Direct the development of a COA not considered by the staff, with new guidance from the commander.
- Reject all COAs and direct the staff to begin COA development again.




Figure 2-13. Course of action approval inputs and outputs

2-112. After selecting a COA, the commander issues the final planning guidance. The final planning guidance includes a refined commander's intent (if necessary) and new CCIRs to support execution. It also includes any additional guidance on priorities for the warfighting functions, orders preparation, rehearsal, and preparation. This guidance includes priorities for resources needed to preserve freedom of action and ensure continuous sustainment.

STEP 7: ORDERS PRODUCTION

2-113. Based on the commander's decision and any additional final planning guidance, the staff will issue a WARNORD. The WARNORD confirms guidance issued in person or by video teleconferencing and expands on details not covered by the commander personally. The WARNORD issued after COA approval normally contains—

- The mission.
- The commander's intent.
- The updated CCIRs and essential elements of friendly information.
- The CONOPS.
- The AO.
- The principal tasks assigned to subordinate units.
- Any preparation and rehearsal instructions not included in the SOPs.
- A final timeline for the operation.

2-114. The staff prepares the OPLAN or OPORD by turning the selected COA into a clear, concise CONOPS with required supporting information. The COA statement becomes the CONOPS for the plan. The COA sketch becomes the basis for the operation overlay. OPLANs and OPORDs provide all the information subordinates need for execution of the mission. Mission orders avoid unnecessary constraints that inhibit subordinate initiative. The staff assists subordinate staffs with their planning and coordination. (Figure 2-14 illustrates the key output of step 7 [orders production]).

2-115. CAO planners identify CA tactical mission tasks that must be addressed in the order as a subunit task or in a CAO annex. (For more information on CA tactical mission tasks, see FM 3-57.)

Note. The CAO annex addresses sustainment and command and control of CA forces as well as mission command with unified action partners.




Figure 2-14. Orders production key output

2-116. The commander's approval of a COA initiates the production of the OPLAN and OPORD. The staff prepares the OPLAN or OPORD by turning the selected COA into a clear, concise CONOPS with the required supporting information. The CONOPS for the approved COA becomes the CONOPS for the OPLAN. There are three types of orders:

- **OPORDs.** OPORDs are directive in nature, issued by a commander to a subordinate commander for the purpose of execution of a planned operation. A commander issues an OPORD to direct the execution of long- or short-term operation within the framework of a long-range OPORD.
- **WARNORDs.** WARNORDs help subordinate units and staffs prepare for new missions by describing the situation, providing initial planning guidance, and directing preparation activities. WARNORDs increase subordinates' planning time, provide details of the impending operation, and list events that accompany preparation and execution.
- **FRAGORDs.** FRAGORDs are abbreviated forms of an OPORD issued, when needed, after an OPORD to change or modify the OPORD or to execute a branch or sequel to the OPORD. FRAGORDs include all five paragraph headings. FRAGORDs differ from OPORDs only in the degree of detail provided. FRAGORDs provide brief and specific instructions. They address only those parts of the original OPORD that have changed.

2-117. The COA sketch becomes the basis for the operation overlay. Orders and plans provide all information subordinates need for execution. (See FM 6-0.) The CMO staff produces the CAO annex (Known as annex K.) in support of the OPLAN/OPORD largely from the information contained in the CAO running estimate developed during the MDMP process. The CAO/CMO planner can build most of the CMO annex from information taken from a well-prepared CAO running estimate. (See figure 2-15.) CAO planners must maintain situational awareness after the publication of an OPLAN and OPORD. As new information becomes available, CAO planners update the CAO running estimate. A staff section first synchronizes critical data affecting the plan with the other staff sections and then disseminates the information, as appropriate.




Figure 2-15. Running estimate and annex relationship

2-118. The CAO annex serves three primary purposes—

- The situation paragraph provides operational details on the situation from a CMO perspective.
- The execution paragraph and matrix provide the direction needed to focus the effects of the CMO elements.
- The assessment matrix displays the information needed to assess CMO tasks.

2-119. The CAO annex also addresses service support, command, and signal aspects of CAO that are not covered elsewhere in the OPLAN or OPORD. Much of the information in the CAO annex is derived from the CA area study and CAO running estimate. Major portions of the annex can be written directly from the estimate. Much of the information required for the execution and assessment matrices can be taken from CA worksheets developed for COA approval. In Army operations, this annex is annex K (Civil Affairs Operations). In joint operations, it is annex G (Civil-Military Operations). (See chapter 3 for more regarding CMO.)

2-120. Commanders review and approve orders before the staff reproduces and disseminates them unless they have delegated that authority. Traditionally, the chief of staff/executive officer or operations officer receives the order. If time and conditions make it possible, the order is briefed to subordinate commanders face to face by the higher commander and staff. CAO planners are expected to brief their portion of the OPLAN or OPORD. Confirmation briefings can be done collaboratively, with several commanders at the same time, or with single commanders. They may be performed face to face or by video teleconferencing.

CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING AND ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY

2-121. Army formations may be required to assume an operational approach to planning. The Army addresses operational planning by using ADM. ADM is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. ADM results in an improved understanding of the operational environment, a problem statement, initial commander's intent, and an operational approach to a military problem. (For more regarding ADM, see ADP 5-0 or ATP 5-0.1.)

2-122. CAO planners support operational planning and the ADM. Army doctrine utilizes an example of an operational approach to address stability in the OE when stability activities are the predominant form of operational activities executed by military forces. (Figure 2-16 represents the Army's visualization and operational approach to operations specifically as it applies to stability. See ADP 3-07.)

2-123. CAO planners support ADM by focusing the effects of CMO on the IPI and the nodes and links that weave together the societal framework within the OE. There is no single technique or a prescribed set of steps to employ ADM. There are, however, several activities associated with ADM including framing an OE, framing problems, framing solutions, and reframing when necessary. The learning from these activities results in a conceptual framework that guides the development of an OPLAN or OPORD using the MDMP.

2-124. ADM entails framing an OE, framing a problem, and developing an operational approach to solve the problem. Army forces use operational and mission variables to inform their understanding of the OE and perform mission analysis. S-9 or G-9 staffs understand that in a complex OE operational planning becomes population centric. This is the case during both irregular warfare and traditional warfare, especially during long-term stability operations. For the interagency, it is a constant for development and diplomacy.

2-125. The focus of all CAO is to enable commanders to engage the civil component within their OEs. CAO are integrated into the conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) of all operations. They include those activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, international organizations, NGOs, HN organizations, the interagency, IPI, and the private sector within an AOR, joint operational area, or AO. CAO efforts focus on assessing, monitoring, protecting, reinforcing, establishing, and transitioning political, economic, social, and cultural institutions. CA Soldiers assist commanders by conducting these operations and tasks both actively through direct contact and passively through observation, research, and analysis.




Figure 2-16. Stability tasks, functions, and sectors (ADP 3-07)

FRAMING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

2-126. Framing an OE involves critical and creative thinking by a group to build models that represent the current conditions of the OE (current state) and models that represent what the OE should look like at the conclusion of an operation (desired end state). The planning team models the future natural tendency of the OE and constructs models of desired future states of other actors as points of comparison with the desired end state. Members of the planning team capture their work in an environmental frame (visual models supported by narratives) that describes and shows the relationship among the operational variables including the history, culture, relationships, and future goals of relevant actors for both the current state and future states of an OE.

2-127. CAO planners use CA products to develop a situational awareness and in-depth understanding of the OE so that obstacles to achieving the desired end state may be represented. They also use assessments to inform their in-depth understanding of the OE and integrate civil information with other accumulated knowledge to inform the commander's situational understanding. This allows the commander to better visualize the ways and means to achieve a desired end state. It is rare that the desired end state of any operational effort would be any other condition other than a general state of stability. (See figure 2-16.)

FRAMING PROBLEMS

2-128. Identifying and understanding problems is essential to solving problems. As the commander and planning team gain an initial understanding of an OE, they shift their efforts to identifying and understanding those issues impeding progress toward achieving the desired end state. Through critical thinking and dialogue, the planning team frames problems by examining the differences between the current state of an OE and the desired end state. They also examine the differences between the natural tendency of an OE and desired future states of relevant actors with the desired end state. These differences are tensions (frictions, conflicts, and competitions) between relevant actors including geographic, demographic, economic, religious, and resource consumption trends. Combined, these tensions represent a set of interrelated problems (a system of problems) requiring resolution. The planning team captures their work in a problem frame that describes the system of problems in visual models supported by a narrative. (In the example illustrated in figure 2-16, page 47, the problem is identified and the system of problems surrounds the operational framework.)

2-129. CAO planners utilizing CA products (PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk, CA area study, CA running estimate, CA assessments) and identify conditions (civil vulnerabilities) within the OE that represent obstacles to achieving the desired end state. Identifying these underlying problems allows the commander and the planning team to break the military problem down into smaller problems within a system of problems. The smaller problems represent issues that must be addressed in order to visualize a solution.

2-130. With an understanding of the OE and associated problems, the commander and planning team consider an operational approach—the broad general actions and means to solve or manage identified problems. The commander and planning team use elements of operational art to visualize and describe the operational approach. In developing the operational approach, the commander and planning team consider resources to support the operational approach and considers associated risk. The team describes the operational approach in a visual model with supporting text. The operational approach forms the basis for the commander's planning guidance used to develop an OPLAN or OPORD during the MDMP. (In the example used in figure 2-16, page 47, the solutions are represented by arrows in this model that are referred to as LOEs. When stabilization is the unified objective or end state as it is in this example from ADP 3-07, the LOEs are aligned with stability sectors.)

2-131. CAO planners use their knowledge of the civil component as well as reachback capability (civilian expertise) to develop solutions collaboratively with IPI, the interagency and NGOs that may share or be executing similar LOEs and striving to achieve a similar end state. CA forces coordinate, integrate, and synchronize with unified action partners to achieve the end state through unified action. Identifying the solutions helps planners break down the LOEs into tasks to be executed.

REFRAMING

2-132. In some cases, planned operations do not achieve their desired end state or may not proceed as visualized during planning. Commanders are continuously assessing the OE and the conduct and outcome of operations within the operations process. CA forces continuously inform the operational assessments with CA assessments conducted during the operation. CAO planners continuously use information from the CA assessments to update the CA running estimate and the area study.

2-133. Commanders reframe after assessing that desired conditions have changed or are unattainable, by executing the current plan (including associated branches and sequels). Reframing includes revisiting early hypotheses, conclusions, and the operational approach that underpins the current plan. In reframing, the commander and staff revise their understanding of the OE and problem. If required, they develop a new operational approach to overcome the challenges or opportunities that precipitated the need to reframe.

OPERATIONAL ART

2-134. ADM supports operational art by helping commanders and staffs answer the ends, ways, means, or risks questions. It helps commanders and staffs with the conceptual aspects of planning and applying operational art. *Operational art* is defined as the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). Operational art applies to all levels of warfare, not just at the operational level.

2-135. Through operational art, commanders and staffs combine art and science to develop plans and orders that describe how (ways) the force employs its capabilities (means) to achieve the desired end state (ends) while considering risks. This requires commanders to answer the following questions:

- What conditions, when established, constitute the desired end state (ends)?
- How will the force achieve these desired conditions (ways)?
- What sequence of actions helps attain these conditions (ways)?
- What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)?
- What risks are associated with that sequence of actions and how can they be mitigated (risks)?

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Chapter 3
Civil-Military Operations Planning

OVERVIEW

3-1. CMO are activities of a commander performed by military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and IPI, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or HN. CMO are conducted in order to facilitate unified action and joint operations, the ultimate purpose of which is to establish, restore, or maintain a stable OE. (See figure 3-1.)




Figure 3-1. Civil-military operations in joint land operations

3-2. CAO enables CMO, often falling upon the CAO planner to plan both. Restated, *civil affairs operations* is defined as actions planned, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the OE; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government (JP 3-57).

3-3. Planners from various branches and services, representing diverse capabilities, often see CAO as an Army function and CMO as a joint function. Commanders at the tactical as well as operational level are responsible for CMO as well as CAO. CAO planners enable the commander's CMO by maintaining their focus on the IPI and stability. The distinct purpose of CMO is to coordinate with the IPI to achieve stability. CAO planners are stability focused and may be involved in identifying stability tasks associated with and integrated with offensive and defensive operations as well as stability activities associated with joint land operations. These stability tasks and activities necessitate both CAO and CMO planning, often accomplished by the same CAO planners. In joint operations, CAO planners perform and enable CMO planning and are referred to as CMO planners such as the J-9. Both CAO and CMO planners focus on addressing stability operations and activities respectively. In the case of CMO, those tasks can be accomplished with a wide array of capabilities in addition to CA. Some of these capabilities can be information operations, military police operations, engineer operations, and medical operations as well as security operations performed by infantry, armor, or cavalry units. (See ADP 3-90.)

3-4. Commanders conduct CMO in order to attain unified action during the execution of joint operations. Unified action is achieved when the JFC synchronizes, coordinates, and integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, international organizations (such as the United Nations), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort. By synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating all partner efforts with those of the JFC, the whole of government obtains a unified objective of stabilization.

3-5. CMO planning is performed by CMO planners to execute three CMO components; civil-military relations, information management and other CMO-enabling operations. CA supports each of these components by performing CAO, specifically CNDE, CMI, CKI, and TG. CAO planners support other CMO-enabling activities such as interorganizational cooperation, CIM, and military government. CMO planners integrate CAO into the operations of other capabilities to achieve the commander's intent. (See figure 1-6, page 12.) Components of CMO are broad categorizations consisting of supporting actions required to achieve a designated role as a contribution to the achievement of CMO. CMO activities are service capabilities that support the overall CMO goals and objectives through the execution of assigned missions and tasks.

3-6. CAO supports CMO and joint planning in the same way that it supports the Army's operations process. Army units typically rely on CAO planners to plan CMO within the Army operations process. At some operational units or within joint force commands, CMO planners integrate CMO planning into the JPP.

3-7. Using Army planning methodologies, planning CMO is not much different than planning CAO except the scope is broader and includes capabilities other than CA. CMO planners often address joint activities such as populace and resources control (PRC), FHA, foreign assistance, and civil-military engagement. These activities are usually executed by the joint force. When operational level or JFCs execute these activities, they require the expertise of CA or CMO planners. But these activities are most often executed by other or multiple military capabilities. (For additional information on CMO and FHA, see JP 3-57 and JP 3-29.)

3-8. CAO/CMO planners participate in boards, centers, cells, and working groups to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate military capabilities with civilian organizations carrying out CMO objectives aimed at promoting stability and meeting the commander's objectives. This participation extends CAO activities (CIM, CA staff support, CR, and CE) into support of CMO at echelons above BCT.


CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS IN JOINT OPERATIONS

3-9. The joint combat operations model is a tool that helps JFCs, component commands, and CAO/CMO planners from combatant commands (CCMDs) to BCTs formulate supporting plans and CAO or CMO annexes that support the operation by promoting stability and informing appropriate CAO/CMO annexes to supporting orders and plans. The joint combat operations model structures operations into phases. (See figure 3-2.)

3-10. Army forces support joint land operations by conducting offense, defense, and stability as inherent elements of conventional and irregular warfare. Divisions and higher echelons typically perform some combination of all three elements in their operations simultaneously. Army forces do so by planning and executing offense, defense, and stability in simultaneity throughout all phases of a joint campaign. (Figure 3-3 shows the necessity of prioritizing offensive, defensive, and stability operations.) This phasing structure applied in operations allows CAO and CMO planners to support the commander's visualization of the operations, support the CONOPS, and promote stability as operations progress.

3-11. To support the operational design at the JFC, Army commanders and their planning staff perform ADM to support the commander's visualization of the operation. CAO/CMO planners at Army Service component commands and JFCs support the commander's visualization in using both ADM and operational design to identify and prioritize stability operations by phase.

3-12. CMO and joint planning is informed by an in-depth understanding of the OE. CAO/CMO planners support the CMO estimate as well as other staff estimates by integrating information found by analyzing information from a systems perspective. For example, the CMO directorate integrates civil information found in the CPE or CA area study with the intelligence directorate to assist in JIPOE. The CCDR and staff (with input from subordinate commands, supporting commands, and agencies) prepare a strategic estimate by analyzing operational variables and describing the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure factors and trends, and the threats and opportunities that facilitate or hinder achievement of the objectives over the timeframe of the strategy.



- The model depicts six general groups of military activities that typically comprise a single joint combat operation. The model applies to a large-scale combat operation as well as to a combat operation relatively limited in scope and duration. It shows that emphasis on activity types shifts as an operation progresses.
- Operation shaping activities may begin during plan development to help set conditions for successful execution. They may continue after the operation ends if the command continues to maintain an operation plan.
- Theater and global shaping activities occur continuously to support theater and global requirements. Specific theater and global shaping activities may support a specific joint operation plan during its execution.

Derived from JP 3-0

Figure 3-2. Joint combat operations model




Figure 3-3. Operations integration and transition across the joint phases

3-13. The JFC staff performs a center of gravity analysis to support the JIPOE as well as the overall mission analysis. These staff planning processes help commanders identify critical links and nodes (to be defended or attacked) associated with the system of systems assessment of the operational variables. JFCs perform assessments before and during operations to assess the OE for planning and assess the effectiveness of their executed operations. CMO planners support this staff analysis by providing the staff analysis and evaluation of civil considerations associated with the mission and operational variables. (See JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 for additional information on joint operations and planning.)

3-14. CAO planners support CMO and joint operations by performing CA joint responsibilities. (For more information on CMO and CA joint responsibilities, see JP 3-57.) These responsibilities include planning and execution of CMO and assessing the OE. (See figure 3-4.)




Figure 3-4. Civil Affairs joint responsibilities

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING IN SUPPORT OF JOINT PLANNING

3-15. Planning is supported by assessments performed before and during operations, which subsequently inform mission analysis, COG analysis, JIPOE, and operational design.

SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3-16. Joint planning is informed by CA assessments. Like the Army's assessment of the OE, CAO planners supporting CMO use mission and operational variables to assess the OE. CAO planners use civil information to evaluate civil considerations using the mission variables of METT-TC (I). Civil considerations are further defined as ASCOPE. Additionally, CAO planners supporting CMO evaluate civil considerations amongst the diverse operational variables. Operational variables identified in joint doctrine include PMESII.

3-17. This analysis and evaluation of information supports the operational assessment, JIPOE, the COG analysis, and JPP, all of which inform the commander's CONOPS and operational design. CAO planners support these planning staff processes and apply it to joint planning and processes. (See chapter 2.)

3-18. Systems perspective is established at operational level. Systems analysis defines how the physical and behavioral state of the PMESII, and other systems of an adversary (or a supporter) result from a military or nonmilitary action or set of actions. Analysis of the systems data gathered details the prevailing conditions within the AO. (Figure 1-3, page 4, shows a systems perspective of the OE.)

3-19. The systems perspective is established by using multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build a common, shared, and holistic knowledge base of the OE. System perspective emphasizes a multidimensional approach to situational understanding. The application of ASCOPE elements during systems analysis and evaluation identifies the key and decisive areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of each subsystem; for example, the staff would apply ASCOPE to the entire concept of economics.

3-20. This approach to the analysis of the OE assists in COG analysis and operational design by identifying nodes (a person, place, or physical thing) that are fundamental components of a system and links (the behavioral, physical, or functional relationship) between the nodes. The COG construct is a useful analytical tool that helps JFCs and staffs identify friendly and adversary strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. Planners must take this step seriously. A faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have serious consequences, such as the inability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost.

3-21. Friendly and enemy COGs can change over time because of actions taken by friendly forces and reactions by enemy forces. COGs are based on the end state, mission, objectives, and adversary strategy. Planners must continually analyze and refine COGs. Selection of COGs is not solely a static process by the J-2 during JIPOE. Systems analysis includes an assessment of important capabilities and vulnerabilities of the systems and nodes, which enables the subsequent identification of COGs and decisive points.

3-22. CAO and CMO planners support the plans directorate at JFCs by applying civil considerations to the mission and operational variables in a similar manner to supporting the Army operations process. (See chapter 2.) Using CAO planning and applying it to CMO and joint planning promotes the use of PMESII/ASCOPE analysis and evaluation and expands its use to support CMO planning in the JPP. CAO/CMO planners support the staff analysis by creating and sustaining a CA area study and performing CPE.

THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS

3-23. JPP is an orderly, analytical set of logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. The application of operational design provides the conceptual basis for structuring campaigns and operations. JPP provides a proven process to organize the work of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners to develop plans that will appropriately address the problem. It focuses on defining the military mission, development, and synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that mission. (Figure 3-5 portrays the seven steps of the JPP. For more information, see JP 5-0.)




Figure 3-5. The joint planning process

STEP 1: PLANNING INITIATION

3-24. Joint planning begins when an appropriate authority recognizes potential for military capability to be employed in support of national objectives or in response to a potential or actual crisis. Guidance is provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). CCMD J-9s, theater army G-9s, and prospective JTF HQs, T-CAPTs, and CACOMs (along with Army regionally aligned forces) exploit or begin area studies on potential operational areas. CAO and CMO planning nodes prepare civil information for inclusion into mission analysis by examining the theater campaign plans, concept plans (CONPLANs), mission variables, and civil considerations.

3-25. CAO/CMO planners initiate planning in anticipation of future military operations. During periodic CONPLAN reviews, specific CONPLANs are reviewed by priority based upon the probability of military operations being initiated. During these reviews, the CCMD or theater army may require publishing or review of the CA area study of specific countries or regions. The CMO directorate or Army T-CAPT is responsible for initiating an AOR CA area study or conducting CPE. The CA area study or CPE informs the CA running estimate before the JFC issues planning guidance.

STEP 2: MISSION ANALYSIS

3-26. The CCDR and staff analyzes the strategic direction and derive the restated mission statement for the commander's approval, which allows subordinate and supporting commanders to begin their own estimates and planning efforts for HHQ concurrence. The joint force's mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. CCMD J-9s, theater Army or land component command G-9s, prospective JTF HQs, T-CAPTs, and CACOMs prepare the relevant staff estimates and area studies that support the JPP, including evaluation of mission and operational variables and the civil considerations relevant to those variables.

3-27. The primary products of mission analysis are staff estimates, the mission statement, a refined operational approach, the commander's intent statement, updated planning guidance, and initial CCIRs. The CMO directorate participates with the staff in a COG analysis to understand the strengths and vulnerabilities of the joint force, friendly partners and adversaries. (For more information regarding COG analysis, refer to JP 5-0.)

3-28. CAO/CMO planners use and maintain a running estimate which is used to produce the staff estimate that supports mission analysis. CAO planners rely on the area study and the synthesized use of civil considerations as they apply to the operational variables to provide a systems approach to understanding the OE. CAO planners integrate and synchronize information with the intelligence directorate to produce the JIPOE. Consolidation with other information amplifies the significance of civil information as it applies to operational variables. The continued use of the PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk permits the commander and staff to receive relevant information presented in a concise manner that enables a clear understanding of the OE. The PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk informs the systems approach during the COG analysis. The clear understanding provided by the CMO directorate staff estimate along with other staff estimates, allows the commander to confirm the mission statement, refine the operational approach and establish the intent statement. It also assists in identifying key links and nodes in COG analysis to determine friendly and adversary strengths and vulnerabilities.

STEP 3: DEVELOPMENT

3-29. COA is a potential way, solution, or method to accomplish the assigned mission. The staff develops COAs to provide unique options to the commander, all oriented on accomplishing the military end state. A good COA accomplishes the mission within the commander's guidance, provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution, and positions the joint force for future operations. It also gives components the maximum latitude for initiative. CCMD J-9s, theater army or land component command G-9s, and T-CAPTs identify civil considerations and use their running estimates to identify potential contributions to each COA then project CMO requirements, competencies, and functions needed to address each COA in support of the joint force.

3-30. Each COA typically has an associated initial CONOPS with a narrative and sketch and includes the following:

- OE.
- Objectives.
- Key tasks and purpose.
- Forces and capabilities required, to include anticipated interagency roles, actions, and supporting tasks.
- Integrated timeline.
- Task organization.
- Operational concept.
- Sustainment concept.
- Communication synchronization.
- Risk.
- Required decisions and decision timeline (mobilization).
- Deployment concept.
- Main and supporting efforts.

3-31. CAO/CMO planners portray the various potential actions of the civil component based on each COA. CAO/CMO planners identify key interagency partners with whom the command must coordinate, integrate, and synchronize in order to achieve unified action. CAO/CMO planners identify people and organizations within the IPI and anticipate CEs that should occur with other regional partners and their leaders ensuring communication synchronization. Evaluating risk is not confined to the protection of the force.

3-32. CAO/CMO planners evaluate risk to the military mission based on civilian interference or the risk posed by military force to the civil component. Risks to the civil component or to the legitimacy of the mission can have a significant impact on the information environment adversely affecting U.S. interests. The CMO Directorate identifies civil vulnerabilities and strengths that can be leveraged by CA or other information-related capabilities in order to achieve desired effects in the OE based on each COA.

3-33. The COAs should focus on COGs and decisive points or areas of influence for CCMD-level campaigns. The commander and the staff review and refine their COG analysis begun during mission analysis based on updated intelligence, JIPOE products, and initial staff estimates. The refined enemy and friendly COG analysis, particularly the critical vulnerabilities, is considered in the development of the initial COAs.

3-34. Once the staff begins to visualize COA alternatives, they should see how to best synchronize (arrange in terms of time, space, and purpose) the actions of all the elements of the force. The staff should estimate the anticipated duration of the operation. One method of synchronizing actions is the use of phasing as discussed earlier and portrayed in figure 3-3, page 53. Phasing assists the commander and staff to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign, and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose.

3-35. A notional time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) depicts force requirements and force flow. It is used to assess sourcing and transportation feasibility. When developed, the notional TPFDD will be entered into the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System as the basis for this analysis. A notional TPFDD is used during planning and does not always contain execution sourced units.

3-36. CAO/CMO planners ensure that their capabilities and all information-related capabilities or CMO capabilities are integrated throughout all phases within the joint operations model to ensure desired effects are achieved by phase in each COA. It is necessary for CMO planners to ensure that the capability requirements for CMO or stability operations are integrated into the notional TPFDD.

STEP 4: COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS AND WARGAMING

3-37. The analysis and war-gaming process can be as simple as a detailed narrative effort that describes the action, probable reaction, counteraction, assets, and time used. A more comprehensive version is the "sketch-note" technique, which adds operational sketches and notes to the narrative process in order to gain a clearer picture. Sophisticated war games employ more extensive means to depict the range of actions by competitors and the consequences of the synthesis of those actions.

3-38. COA analysis is the process of closely examining potential COAs to reveal details that will allow the commander and staff to tentatively identify COAs that are valid and identify the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed friendly COA. The commander and staff analyze each COA separately according to the commander's guidance. COA wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint force strengths and dispositions, adversary capabilities and possible COAs, the OA, and other aspects of the OE. Each critical event within a proposed COA should be war-gamed based upon time available using the action, reaction, and counteraction method of friendly and/or opposing force interaction. CCMD J-9s, theater army or land component command G-9s, and T-CAPTs identify anticipated CMO outcomes for each COA and identify impact of the civilian populace and impact of the civil component on the operations as presented in each COA.

3-39. Various COAs can have differing civil impacts depending on enemy and friendly actions as well as the civil reaction to those actions in each COA. CAO/CMO planners must anticipate the reaction of the populace to military operations in each COA. The planning of branches and sequels may be the military counteraction based on the anticipated actions or reactions of the populace. CAO/CMO planners document anticipated tasks with an execution matrix which is subsequently integrated with the execution matrices from other directorates. For CMO, the tasks are predominantly stability oriented and are presented on the tactical stability matrix. (See JP 3-07 regarding the tactical stability matrix.) Synchronizing the tasks in a single execution matrix allows the commander to array tasks within the phasing construct for each COA. CMO planners determine if there are sufficient CMO capabilities available to accomplish CMO tasks and stability tasks envisioned in each COA.

STEP 5: COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

3-40. COA comparison is a subjective process whereby COAs are considered independently, then evaluated/compared against a set of criteria that are established by the staff and commander. The objective is to identify and recommend the COA that has the highest probability of accomplishing the mission.

3-41. CCMD J-9s, theater army or land component command G-9s, and T-CAPTs evaluate anticipated CMO outcomes for each COA and identify in order the COA that has the least impact of the civilian populace and the least impact of the civil component on the operations as presented in each COA. They also consider whether each COA has the requisite CMO competencies and functions to address the anticipated CMO requirements of each COA.

STEP 6: COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL

3-42. In this JPP step, the staff briefs the commander on the COA comparison, analysis, and war-gaming results, including a review of important supporting information. Usually, every COA can be supported from a CMO perspective, but the CCMD J-9, T-CAPT, and theater army or land component command G-9 should recommend the COA that has the least impact on the civil component and the smallest civilian impact on the selected COA. The staff determines the preferred COA to recommend to the commander. The commander, upon receiving the staff's recommendation, combines personal analysis with the staff recommendation, resulting in a selected COA.

3-43. Planning results is a plan that is documented in the format of a plan or an order. If execution is imminent or in progress, the plan is typically documented in the format of a five-paragraph OPORD. During plan or order development, the commander and staff, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting components and organizations, expand the approved COA into a detailed plan or OPORD by refining the initial CONOPS associated with the approved COA. The CONOPS is the centerpiece of the plan or OPORD.

3-44. The CCMD J-9, T-CAPT, and theater army or land component command G-9, in conjunction with the J-5 or G-5, prepare the annexes relevant to CMO in support of the order. These steps are similar to other problem-solving methods used by U.S. forces. (Figure 1-3, page 4, reveals how Army problem-solving methodologies including the Army's operations process compares to the JPP.)

3-45. In joint planning, JFCs focus on planning for contingencies as well as for campaigns. CMO planners must plan the CMO for the theater campaign plan as well as the various high priority contingencies or completely unforeseen contingencies.

STEP 7: PLAN OR ORDER DEVELOPMENT

3-46. The CONOPS clearly and concisely expresses what the JFC intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. It describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels. The CONOPS:

- States the commander's intent.
- Describes the central approach the JFC intends to take to accomplish the mission.
- Provides for the application, sequencing, synchronization, and integration of forces and capabilities in time, space, and purpose including those of multinational and interagency organizations as appropriate.
- Describes when, where, and under what conditions the supported commander intends to conduct operations and give or refuse battle, if required.
- Focuses on friendly, allied, partner, and adversary COGs and their associated critical vulnerabilities.
- Provides for controlling the tempo of the operation. Visualizes the campaign in terms of the forces and functions involved.
- Relates the joint force's objectives and desired effects to those of the next higher command and other organizations as necessary. This enables assignment of tasks to subordinate and supporting commanders.

JOINT PLANS AND ORDERS

3-47. The Secretary of Defense issues joint planning guidance to the CJCS. The CJCS directs the joint staff to initiate contingency planning. JFCs perform the JPP to develop planning for contingency or for campaigns. The planning staff uses JPP to produce a joint OPLAN or OPORD, just as MDMP helps in the development of plans and orders. The joint planning process is similar to other MDMP. (See figure 1-3, page 4.) The JPP is an orderly, analytical set of logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA, and produce a plan or order.

3-48. The application of operational design provides the conceptual basis for structuring campaigns and operations. Operational design represents the commander's visualization and CONOPS. The CONOPS is reiterated and expounded upon through the deliberate planning and publication of plans and orders. Plans and orders can come in many varieties from very detailed campaign plans and contingency plans to simple verbal orders. They may also include orders and directives such as OPORDs, WARNORDs, planning orders (PLANORDs), alert orders, execution orders (EXORDs), and FRAGORDs, as well as prepare to deploy orders and deployment orders.

3-49. Planning for these orders is proceeded by planning and development of OPLANs and contingency plans. All OPLANs, contingency plans, and OPORDs are released with a complement of annexes that further express the commander's intent for specific joint activities. CMO planners, in conjunction with the J-5, publish annex G (Civil-Military Operations) in accordance with JP 5-0. (A specific CMO annex format is not specified in JP 5-0.) When joint planning is expressed in the format specified in the joint planning and execution enterprise, CMO planners publish annex G (Civil-Military Operations) as specified in CJCSM 3130.03A.

PLANNING LEVELS DRIVE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

3-50. There are four levels of planning details for contingency plans, with an associated planning product(s) for each level.

- **Level 1 planning detail: commander's estimate.** This level of planning involves the least amount of detail and focuses on producing multiple COAs to address a contingency and the commander's estimate.
- **Level 2 Planning Detail: Base Plan (BPLAN).** A BPLAN describes the CONOPS, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes.

- **Level 3 Planning Detail: Concept Plan (CONPLAN).** A CONPLAN is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete and detailed Level 4 OPLAN or OPORD. It includes a plan summary, a BPLAN, and usually includes the following annexes:
  - A (Task Organization).
  - B (Intelligence). CMO planners in the J-9 integrate civil information into annex B.
  - C (Operations).
  - D (Logistics).
  - J (Command Relations).
  - K (Communications).
  - S (Special Technical Operations).
  - V (Interagency Coordination). In coordination with the J-3, CMO planners prepare annex V.
  - Z (Distribution).
- **Level 4 Planning Detail: Operation Plan (OPLAN).** An OPLAN is a complete and detailed plan containing a full description of the CONOPS, all applicable annexes to the plan including a time-phased force and deployment list (known as a TPFDL), and a transportation-feasible notional TPFDD. The notional TPFDD phases unit requirements in the theater of operations at the times and places required to support the CONOPS. The OPLAN identifies the force requirements, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater. An OPLAN is normally prepared when:
  - The contingency is critical to national security and requires detailed prior planning.
  - The magnitude or timing of the contingency requires detailed planning.
  - Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning.
  - Detailed planning is necessary to determine force deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment requirements; determine available resources to fill identified requirements; and validate shortfalls.

CAMPAIGN PLANS

3-51. A campaign is a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Campaigns are informed by strategic guidance and the requirement to be ready to execute contingency plans.

3-52. The purpose of CCMD campaigns is to shape the OE, deter aggressors, mitigate the effects of a contingency, and/or execute combat operations in support of the overarching national strategy. The CCMD campaign plan consists of all plans contained within the established theater or functional responsibilities to include contingency plans, subordinate and supporting plans, posture plans, country-specific security cooperation (SC) sections/country plans (for geographic commands), and operations in execution.

3-53. CMO can be supported by all components but is usually land component–centric because civilians with whom U.S. forces must engage, coordinate, integrate, and synchronize with reside in the land domain. The land component command is often tasked to lead CE with the IPI, NGOs, or interagency partners who are also working in the land domain. During campaign planning and execution, the land component command is often directed to plan operations and exercises in the land domain in order to support the JFC's SC objectives. The land component command (usually the designated theater army) is tasked to set the theater for support to the campaign plan, contingencies or establishing the posture of strategic land power.

3-54. When employing land forces in the CCMD's AOR, international agreements are negotiated to establish the status of U.S. forces in a specific foreign country, as well as coordinate support for those U.S. forces. CMO planners coordinate with foreign countries IPI to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize that status and support through basing, logistics, overflight, and permissions. CMO planners usually coordinate directly with the U.S. diplomatic mission (senior defense official or defense attaché) as well as partner nation (PN) defense establishment to ensure all parties adhere to the tenets of any international agreement thus assuring the status of forces. Any international agreements should be cited in annex G (Civil-Military Operations) as well as the assigned interagency and IPI coordinating nodes.

CONTINGENCY PLANS

3-55. Contingency plans are branches of campaign plans that are planned for potential threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions without a crisis at hand, pursuant to the strategic guidance in the Unified Command Plan, published strategic guidance statements, the joint strategic campaign plan, and of the CCDR.

3-56. CMO planners are responsible for the CMO annex to any contingency plan that is periodically updated based upon precedent and priority. Some contingency plans are preceded or succeeded by a PLANORD to increase the level of planning and fidelity associated with any of the various contingency plans held within the JFC's archives. Also, CMO planners are responsible for updating estimates and producing the CMO annex and appendices for contingency plans.

SUPPORTING PLANS

3-57. Supporting CCDRs, subordinate JFCs, component commanders, and combat service agencies (CSAs) prepare supporting plans as tasked by the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan or other planning guidance. Campaign plans and contingency plans use the joint combat operations model that structures joint operations into phases that lead to the achievement of a desired end state.

3-58. CMO planners must ensure their input supports the JFC's intent and operational concept. The J-9 normally leads the CMO staff element and is an important asset in planning and coordinating CMO. Planning should establish the objectives, MOEs, decisive points, and desired outcomes of the operation or campaign. The primary focus of CMO is achieving unified action to promote stability. CMO planning normally conforms to six joint stability functions established as LOEs within the stability framework and the JFCs operational design. Those LOEs are governance, economic stability, infrastructure, public health and welfare, public education and information, and rule of law. (See figure 3-6. For additional information on LOEs within the stability framework, see JP 3-07, FM 3-07, and ATP 3-07.5.)

3-59. A JTF will have a J-9 to serve as the JFC's lead for planning CMO. While not all of the CCMDs have this staff section organic to their joint manning document, CA has planning teams to assist the JFC with deliberate and crisis action planning throughout all four levels of joint planning:

- Level 1: commander's estimate.
- Level 2: BPLAN.
- Level 3: CONPLAN.
- Level 4: OPLAN.



Figure 3-6. Primary stability tasks

3-60. Just as in MDMP, CA Soldiers on the CMO staff provide the commander with an analysis of the civil components that shape the OE during the JPP. Civil considerations are evaluated for those aspects of the OE that directly affect a mission. The CMO staff provides the commander detailed civil considerations analysis focused on the civil component of the AO. CMO planners further develop and implement their plans in conjunction with civilian officials from other USG agencies and other nonmilitary organizations in order to synchronize U.S. and multinational efforts. The J-9 responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

- Determining the requirement for a CMOC to maintain liaison with unified action partners, IPI, interagency, NGOs, and international organizations in the AO.
- Advising the JFC and staff on legal and moral considerations as they pertain to the civil component.
- Participating in the targeting process to identify civil component protected targets.
- Participating in information operations (IO) planning to ensure CMO is synchronized with IO.
- Analyzing the effects of civilian populations on military operations.
- Analyzing the effects of military operations on the civil component.
- Assessing the HN resources to support military operations.
- Identifying NGOs and other independent organizations operating in the AO.
- Identifying civil networks that can be mobilized and leveraged to reduce the requirements for finite military resources and elements within the operational area.
- Recommending CA force requirements.
- Participate in required boards, cells and workgroups as required.
- Maintaining the CMO staff estimate.
- Develop annex G (Civil-Military Operations).
- Assist the operations directorate with the development of annex V (Interagency Coordination).

ASSESS JOINT OPERATIONS

3-61. During planning, the commander and staff describe the current conditions of the OE and the desired conditions at the end state of an operation and identify the barriers that prevent the establishment of the desired conditions. The commander and staff develop an assessment plan to focus and integrate information from various sources to reduce the uncertainty of their observations and conclusions about the OE. This information is gathered and may be derived from interagency partners, multinational partners, the HN government, subordinate commands, NGOs, and various intelligence sources.

3-62. The written products of an operation assessment clearly communicate the effectiveness of the joint activities toward desired end states, describe risks involved in the accomplishment of the plan, and recommend necessary changes to the plan in order to attain a desired end state. Additionally, assessments help the commander to report observations and conclusions about the impacts of the joint activities and to make recommendations to senior commanders or policy makers. The purpose of operation assessment is to enhance the commander's decision making in order to make operations more effective.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

3-63. In order to plan successful CMO, CAO planners must consider all aspects of the civil component, the national security policy and objectives, as well as national and theater military objectives. Planners must engage in a collaborative planning effort. Collaborative planning involves diverse members of the staff but also interagency, intergovernmental organizations, the private sector, and IPI. The following list includes some considerations but is not all inclusive:

- HN and regional legal institutions, customs, social relationships, economic organizations, and concepts of human and fundamental rights.
- Public education.
- Cultural and religious leaders.
- Public health and sanitation.
- Labor, procurement, and contracting leaders.
- DC care and control, civilian supply, public safety, transportation, and humanitarian relief.
- International law, customs, and practice governing the sovereign territory of each nation.
- The relationship to and use of water, air, and land as it relates to the indigenous populations.
- Ability to communicate with IPI.

- Criminal activities and the informal economy impacting the economic environment.
- Competing requirements and agendas of multiple stakeholders.
- Administrative, logistics, and communications support requirements of CMO forces.
- The need for early deployment and employment of CMO forces.
- The coordination of CMO requirements with other appropriate staff functions, the interagency, international organizations, NGOs, HN, and the private sector.
- Additional lead time normally necessary for Reserve Component forces availability.
- CMO input to the targeting process to help reduce destruction of essential civilian capabilities needed in phases IV (Stabilize) and V (Enable Civil Authorities).
- The tactical, operational, and strategic objectives achievable via CMO.

BOARDS, GROUPS, CENTERS, AND CELLS

3-64. Effective operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates. The most common technique for promoting this cross-functional collaboration is the formation of an appropriate organizational structure to manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. Within command posts (CPs), commanders cross-functionally organize their staffs into CP cells and staff sections to assist them in the exercise of command and control. Commanders organize their CPs by functional and integrating cells.

3-65. The basic element of the joint force staff is the directorate. To enable cross-functional collaboration, appropriate organization structures have been adopted to facilitate planning by the staff, decision making by the commander, and execution by the HQ.

3-66. The use of these kinds of staff integrating elements (sometimes referred to as boards, centers, cells, and working groups and operational planning teams) makes staff coordination more routine, facilitates monitoring, assessment and planning, and allows for the management of activities across the three event horizons (current operations, future operations, and future plans). Some of the more common Army and joint boards, groups, centers, and cells are discussed below.

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS WORKING GROUP

3-67. Army commanders may establish a CAO working group. The CAO working group brings all the stakeholders together to focus and synchronize their efforts in achieving the commander's priorities. In addition to the CA working group, the CAO planners ensure that they are actively involved in the IO working group, the intelligence fusion working group, the targeting board and other boards/cells/working groups to conduct collaborative planning relevant to the current operation.

3-68. (+) The composition of the CA working group changes based on the level of command, but the G-9/S-9 should chair the group. Other members of the CA working group may include the following:

- CMOC chief.
- Subordinate CA unit representative.
- IO representative.
- Medical representative.
- Engineer representative.
- Provost marshal or representative.
- SJA representative with expertise in CMO, preferably the unit's senior rule of law officer.
- Political advisor, if applicable.
- Public affairs officer.
- Intelligence (J-2/G-2/S-2) targeting officer representative.
- Operations (J-3/G-3/S-3) current operations representative.
- Logistics (J-4/G-4/S-4) representative.
- Resource management representative.
- Subordinate liaison officer.

3-69. As these lists (and the doctrinal publications that discuss them) are not all inclusive, CA professionals should constantly assess the battle rhythm of the units they are supporting in order to identify those opportunities to engage and provide input to best support the commander's mission. Some additional Army and joint boards, groups, centers, and cells include:

- Rules of engagement or rules for the use of force working groups.
- Emerging planning teams.
- Assessment working groups (plans or future operations cells).
- Operations and intelligence working groups (intelligence cells).
- Protection working groups (protection cells).

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS WORKING GROUP

3-70. Commanders may establish a CMO working group. The CMO working group brings all the stakeholders in CMO together to focus and synchronize their efforts in achieving the commander's CMO priorities. In addition to the CMO working group, the CAO/CMO planners ensure that they are actively involved in the IO working group, the intelligence fusion working group, the targeting board and other boards, cells, or working groups relevant to the current operation.

3-71. The composition of the CMO working group changes based on the level of command but the J-9/G-9/S-9 should chair the group (lead CMO planner). Other members of the CMO working group include:

- Director of the CMOC.
- Subordinate CA unit representative.
- IO representative.
- Medical representative.
- Engineers representative.
- Provost marshal or representative.
- SJA representative with expertise in CMO, preferably the unit's senior rule of law officer.
- Political advisor, if applicable.
- Public affairs officer.
- Intelligence (J-2/G-2/S-2) targeting officer representative.
- Operations (J-3/G-3/S-3) current operations representative.
- Logistics (J-4/G-4/S-4) representative.
- Resource management representative.
- Subordinate liaison officer.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS WORKING GROUP

3-72. The information operations working group is a collaborative staff meeting led by the IO chief. The J-9/G-9/S-9 participates and provides the following information to the IO working group:

- Specific country information.
- Timely update of the civil component of the COP through the CIM process.
- Civil considerations within the OE.
- Concerns of population groups within the projected joint operations area/AO and potential flash points that can result in civil instability.
- Cultural awareness briefings.
- Information on DC movement routes, critical infrastructure, and significant social, religious, and cultural shrines, monuments, and facilities.
- Information impacts on the civil component.
- Key civilian nodes.

TARGETING BOARD

3-73. The targeting board meets according to the unit's battle rhythm to determine methods and resources to achieve desired effects. The J-9/G-9/S-9 should be represented in this critical board to assist with targeting, planning for nonlethal effects, and protection of the civil component. The J-9/G-9/S-9 provides the following:

- Specific country information.
- Civil component update derived from the CA running estimate.

- Information on DC movement routes, critical infrastructure, and significant social, religious, and cultural shrines, monuments, and facilities.
- Recommend restrictive fire areas for population centers and protected targets.
- Coordinate targets that are to be engaged thru CE.
- Timely update of the civil component of the COP through the CIM process.
- Civil considerations within the OE.
- Concerns of population groups within the projected joint operations area/AO and potential flash points that can result in civil instability.
- Cultural awareness briefings.
- Information impacts on the civil component.
- Key civilian nodes.

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Chapter 4
Interagency Planning

OVERVIEW

4-1. Chapters 1 through 3 of this publication focused primarily on CAO planners supporting CAO and CMO for Army and joint forces conducting Army operations and joint land operations respectively. This chapter addresses the interagency planning and execution necessary to achieve unified action. The interagency are entities of or pertaining to USG agencies and departments, including the DOD. The DOD plans and executes activities overseas through interagency coordination. Interagency coordination within the context of DOD involvement is the coordination that occurs between elements of the DOD and participating USG departments and agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. JFCs strive to pursue objectives through unified action. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental entities and NGOs with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

4-2. The interagency represents the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power while the DOD represents the military instrument of national power. Foreign assistance can be composed of all instruments of national power. The President, along with the National Security Council (NSC), wield the instruments of national power to achieve U.S. objectives. This chapter focuses on foreign assistance to include SC and reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) within the competition continuum because the Department of State (DOS) has implementing authority while being supported by the DOD. This chapter also addresses DSCA to a lesser degree, given the coordinating and planning mechanisms established by the federal government, individual states, and the DOD to address planning and coordination for DSCA.

4-3. Interagency planning is constant and perpetual in order to achieve and maintain unified action in governing and protecting the nation. The DOD's role varies within the continuum of conflict. Only in rare circumstances does the military act unilaterally or with primacy as the lead federal agency; yet, the military possesses perhaps the most robust planning capability. When the NSC determines that military capabilities are required, the DOD mobilizes military capabilities to support that action. The DOD uses the joint planning and execution enterprise to mobilize and deploy military capabilities in the homeland and abroad. The CA role varies depending on where the operations occur and the nature of the operations. CJCS Guide 3130 specifically calls out the inclusion of CA and military information support operations (known as MISO) in the joint planning and execution enterprise but does not specify the role or function.

4-4. The Army conducts operations as its contribution to unified action and joint operations. Army forces may participate in interagency operations across the range of military operations. While conducting operations, the Army executes offense, defense, and stability operations tasks or provides DSCA. (See figure 4-1 on page 68.) When executing operations, the coordination, integration, and synchronization with the civil component is constant and perpetual throughout the range of operations but becomes essential when conducting stability operations overseas or providing DSCA within the homeland and territories. CAO planners coordinate, integrate, and synchronize with the civil component as an inherent responsibility during land operations, joint operations, CMO, and CAO.




Figure 4-1. Planning, operations integration, and transitions

DEFENSE SUPPORT TO THE INTERAGENCY

4-5. In the homeland and territories, the military is under civilian authority and provides DSCA during crisis and disasters as well as when conducting homeland defense. When providing DSCA, the relationship with the interagency and state governments is driven by the National Response Framework and the military is subordinated to civilian authority, either a lead federal agency such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (also known as FEMA), or a state's governor. (See JP 3-28 and ADP 3-28.) When the DOD is engaged in homeland defense, both military and civilian authorities are exercised concurrently and extensive coordination with civil authorities is required. (See JP 3-27 and JP 3-08.) Both U.S. Northern Command (also known as USNORTHCOM) and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (also known as USINDOPACOM) have directly assigned homeland defense and DSCA responsibilities. Requests for their support will always come from the civil component.

4-6. On foreign soil, the DOD may be the lead federal agency, or it may be subordinated to the DOS. During the course of a military intervention, the DOD may be the lead federal agency during large scale combat operations and in such cases asserts the will of the United States with military authority. When occupying enemy territory, U.S. forces establish a military government, and the JFC is the de facto military governor until the authority can be transferred to another entity. The strategic objective in the competition continuum is stabilization and a return to a steady state. In foreign countries where a U.S. diplomatic mission has been established, the President appoints an Ambassador, Chargé d'Affaires, or a Special Envoy who is the U.S. lead representative and referred to as the chief of mission (COM).

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

4-7. DSCA is support provided by U.S. military forces, DOD civilians, contract personnel, component assets, and National Guard forces—when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in title 32, United States Code (USC), status—in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. (The role of the DOD in DSCA is directed in DODD 3025.18. The joint force provides DSCA as outlined in JP 3-28 and JP 3-27. The joint planning formats for DSCA are identified in CJCSM 3130.03A-1. The Army provides DSCA as outlined in ADP 3-28.)

4-8. In the homeland, the DOD provides DSCA. CA forces plan for CMI, coordination, and synchronization on behalf of their supported forces; however, the DOD has established civil-military coordination representatives to the individual states and territories and designated Federal Emergency Management Agency regions. CCMDs with DSCA responsibilities have established regional JTFs to manage DSCA activities.

4-9. Regional and state JTFs and emergency operations centers coordinate through these designated liaison officers and centers. The DOD maintains its statutory coordination with civil authorities when providing DSCA by providing emergency preparedness liaison officers and defense coordinating officers with each state and Federal Emergency Management Agency region. CAO planners are not required to plan for CR, CE, CND, or CIM during DSCA unless those capabilities are requested by civil authority. Those CA missions are performed by the civil authorities (police, fire, and emergency management) and the designated defense representatives such as emergency preparedness liaison officers, defense coordinating officers, and National Guard forces under title 32, USC. CAO planners in affected units may need to obtain civil information for their supported commander from the designated defense representatives or local civil authorities in terms of requirements for defense support, but those requirements are specifically requested by civil authorities through the CCMD. (See JP 3-41 regarding emergency operations centers.)

DEFENSE SUPPORT TO STABILIZATION

4-10. The DOD provides support to stabilization. (See DODD 3000.05.) Stabilization is an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning USG efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—to create conditions in which locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence. The DOS is the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization efforts in accordance with National Security Presidential Directive 44. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead implementing agency for non-security U.S. stabilization assistance. The DOD is a supporting element, including providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities.

4-11. The DOD is required to establish a defense support to stabilization process to identify defense stabilization objectives in concert with other USG departments and agencies, convey them through strategic documents, organize to achieve them, and prioritize requisite defense resources. The DOD is also required to ensure annex G (Civil-Military Operations) and annex V (Interagency Coordination) are fully developed and integrated in global campaign plans, CONPLANs, and OPLANs. (See JP 5-0.)

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE

4-12. In most cases when large-scale combat operations are being conducted, the operations are outside the continental United States (OCONUS). In these situations, either the DOD or the DOS have primacy in terms of authority. Authorities can be shifted from the DOD to the DOS during large-scale combat operations depending on whether the operations are considered pre-conflict, conflict, or post-conflict as represented on the competition continuum. (See figure 4-2 on page 70.) During pre- and post-conflict operations OCONUS, the DOS has primacy in terms of managing foreign relations and intercourse; the Ambassadors of given countries represent the interests of the President and the United States. Some countries do not have an assigned U.S. diplomatic mission, or the United States has terminated its diplomatic mission. If military force is committed in any of those locations, the DOD has primacy and the interagency supports DOD actions.

4-13. Prior to a military intervention, the DOS maintains primacy in foreign intercourse. Within the competition continuum, DOS primacy guides both SC prior to conflict and R&S in post-conflict. It is incumbent upon the military to coordinate with the DOS in its support to foreign countries within the continuum of conflict. CAO planners are instrumental in establishing and maintaining civil-military coordination, whether that coordination is performed through CA staff support or in a CMOC, joint interagency coordination group, joint interagency task force, humanitarian assistance coordination center, or humanitarian operations center. (See JP 3-08.)

4-14. The competition continuum depicts two general conditions: pre-conflict (or steady state) and conflict. Pre-conflict conditions are characterized as diplomatic and economic periods of cooperation and competition. In pre-conflict, interagency activities are characterized by diplomacy and foreign assistance and supported by DOD through SC. Interagency operations in post-conflict are characterized as R&S and an eventual return to SC. Conflict represents a departure from “steady state” and post-conflict represents a desired end state to return to a stable “steady state” of diplomacy and economic cooperation.




Figure 4-2. Competition continuum

INTERAGENCY AUTHORITIES

4-15. Interagency planning at the strategic level is performed by the NSC which includes members from multiple cabinet-level departments and agencies. The council also serves as the President's primary mechanism for coordinating national security policies among various government agencies as well as coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military and economic). The National Security Agency (also known as the NSA), the DHS, the DOS, and the DOD are key actors in terms of national security. These cabinet-level departments are provided legal authorities to perform specified security activities in the homeland and territories as well as protect U.S. interests abroad. These authorities are established in the following titles of the USC:

- **Title 6, *Domestic Security*.** Established by the Homeland Security Act. It established the DHS to strengthen U.S. domestic security against terrorism as well as man-made and natural disasters.
- **Title 10, *Armed Forces*.** Established by the National Security Act of 1947, which establishes authorities and responsibilities of the Armed Forces of the United States. Title 10 is modified from time to time by the National Defense Authorization Act.
- **Title 22, *Foreign Relations and Intercourse*.** Codifies the constitutional responsibilities of the DOS. These authorities and responsibilities are modified from time to time by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 (currently amended). The DOS is responsible for establishing and maintaining all relationships with foreign entities.
- **Title 32, *National Guard*.** Establishes the National Guard as a national defense force under the authority of the respective states. The National Guard was established by the Militia Act of 1903 and the National Defense Act of 1916.
- **Title 50, *War and National Defense*.** Established by the National Security Act of 1947, which establishes authorities and responsibilities of the NSC and the National Security Agency.

4-16. When operations are being conducted OCONUS and outside of U.S. territories, the DOS has primacy in terms of addressing the IPI in that land area. When U.S. forces are deployed OCONUS, they operate under their authority assigned under title 10 and title 50 or are operating in a status under DOS title 22 authority. When operating inside the CONUS or U.S. territories, U.S. forces operate under title 10 subordinated to title 6 federal civilian authorities or title 32 subordinated to state authorities. Additionally, in a state of war when executing homeland defense, the DOD executes security functions under title 10 under the authority of the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense. These authorities under the USC permit the executive departments and agencies (including the DOD) to perform assigned security functions under the rule of law.

4-17. CA equities are integrated into defense planning whether in the CONUS or OCONUS through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (also known as ASD[SO/LIC]), who is also responsible for integrating DOD policy with U.S. foreign policy for stability with the DOS and its subordinate undersecretaries, Ambassadors, Special Envoys, special representatives, and coordinators during interagency planning. The DOD uses the guidance from the NSC to establish DOD policy and plans and issues orders and directives through the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

4-18. The country team is the senior USG coordinating and supervising body in a foreign country. Headed by the COM, it includes the senior defense official or defense attaché, heads of all U.S. Embassy sections, and the senior member of each of the other represented USG departments or agencies, as desired by the COM. (See figure 4-3.) The country team issues directives to consulates, tasks action items for DOS offices and bureaus, and works to deconflict/balance all agency programs and priorities within the context of the COM's integrated country strategy (ICS) for that country. Depending on the size of the Embassy and the nature of U.S. interests in the country, each country team may be configured differently, and some may include more than 40 interagency representatives in addition to section chiefs and the head of the local USAID mission. With guidance from the DOS and the COM, the country team develops the ICS regarding the PN, which influences the CCDR's development of a specific country security cooperation strategy (CSCS) for that PN. (See JP 3-07.4 regarding U.S. Embassy country teams.)




Figure 4-3. The country team

INTERAGENCY PLANNING FOR FOREIGN TERRITORY

4-19. When U.S. forces are conducting operations on foreign territory, they may be exercising military authority of the United States under title 10 or title 50, USC, or they may be subordinate to a U.S. Ambassador, Chargé d'Affaires, or Special Envoy under title 22, USC. The U.S. Ambassador has primacy where the United States has an established Embassy or diplomatic mission. In accordance with foreign policy direction established by the DOS, the DOD leads on defense policy issues that involve national security interests with military or defense equities. Presidential Policy Directive 23 details the USG effort to implement security sector assistance more efficiently, including the strategy to build security relationships, partner capacity, and capabilities to achieve national security objectives.

4-20. Pre-conflict is characterized by a state of normalcy in which international interaction manifests through cooperation and competition. The U.S objective before conflict is to prevent conflict. In this state of normalcy, the USG focuses on multinational and PN coordination and cooperation, led primarily by the DOS and each PN's assigned U.S. Embassy and its country team. The DOD supports the USG effort with the U.S. Embassy's security cooperation organization (SCO) or defense attaché. The DOD supports the interagency through SC, military engagement, and deterrence, which is led by the CCMDs implementing their regionally focused theater campaign plan described in chapter 3.

4-21. The implementation of SC, in general, is an interagency activity with the designated lead by U.S. Embassies supported by the DOD. The DOD operates with a combination of title 22 and title 10 USC authority through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The country team, in conjunction with CCMDs and the NSC, uses an interagency coordination process to develop and implement an ICS. (See figure 4-4.)

4-22. In response to U.S. military intervention and conflict abroad in various countries, the USG created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (also known as the S/CRS) in the DOS to better coordinate a whole-of-government approach to conflict transformation, stabilization, and reconstruction. This office established the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (known as the CRSG) for specific countries to assure coordination and integration of the whole of government in R&S. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is now the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff represent the DOD on the bureau, which deploys an integration planning cell with the CCMD and an advanced civilian team is deployed to the U.S. Embassy or JTF in the affected country. An integration planning cell is flexible in size and composition but has the primary objective of integrating and synchronizing interagency actions with those of the military. Field advanced civilian teams are further organized and deployed down to provincial level if necessary. These field advanced civilian teams integrate, coordinate, and synchronize interagency and military activities down to the BCT or division level.

4-23. When supporting a civilian authority overseas, CMO planners must integrate military stability tasks with stability activities within those stability sectors as directed by an interim authority. (See figure 4-10, page 87.) The interagency is not a formal structure, which resides in a specific location and has its own hierarchy and resources; it is a community of agencies that depend on an established process for coordinating executive branch decision making. The USG carries out R&S and appoints the Secretary of State as the coordinator of U.S. efforts in any given country as outlined by National Security Presidential Directive 44, which also directs DOS integration of R&S efforts with DOD and military contingency and operations plans.

4-24. As a result, the DOD instructs all components to perform functions relating to military operations, reconstruction, and stabilization. DOD components are instructed to be prepared to perform the functions that the DOS cannot. In accordance with DODD 5100.01, Army forces are specifically directed to occupy enemy territory and establish temporary military government. In accordance with DODD 2000.13, CA forces are specifically designated to enable the U.S. force to coordinate with the interagency and IPI with the specific aim of promoting stability. Also, these designated CA forces form the required capability to enable a military government.




Figure 4-4. Interagency coordination processes for security sector assistance and integrated country strategy objectives

4-25. CA forces execute CAO to integrate interagency planning into military operations and campaigns as well as to coordinate and synchronize military unified action partner activities. The DOD's former U.S. Joint Forces Command, in conjunction with the DOS, outlined how the interagency address complex operations including R&S in the following series of publications:

- **Unified Action Handbook Series Overview.** 27 January 2016.
- **Unified Action Handbook Series Book One:** ***Handbook for Military Support to Essential Services and Critical Infrastructure*****.** 15 March 2016.
- **Unified Action Handbook Series Book Two:** ***Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media*****.** 19 February 2016.
- **Unified Action Handbook Series Book Three:** ***Handbook for Military Support to Economic Stabilization*****.** 15 March 2016.
- **Unified Action Handbook Series Book Four:** ***Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform*****.** 19 February 2016.

JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN

4-26. The USG's primary tools for foreign affairs are the DOD in cases of conflict and the DOS as the lead federal agent in foreign relations and intercourse. The DOS exercises its title 22 authority for diplomatic authority and in conjunction with the USAID as its implementing partner for international development. Together, the DOD, DOS, and USAID represent defense, diplomacy, and development tools to establish relationships, security, and access abroad.

4-27. As the lead federal agency for foreign relations and intercourse, the DOS prepares the Joint Strategic Plan in conjunction with the USAID. The Joint Strategic Plan outlines the U.S. foreign policy objectives. (See figure 4-5.)




Figure 4-5. U.S. foreign policy objectives

STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE REVIEW

4-28. With support from the NSC, and in addition to the *Joint Strategic Plan*, the DOS, USAID, and DOD publish the *Stabilization Assistance Review* to identify ways the United States can more effectively leverage diplomatic engagements, defense, and foreign assistance to stabilize conflict-affected areas. The *Stabilization Assistance Review* outlines a framework for targeting U.S. resources to stabilize conflict-affected states based on our national security interests. The *Stabilization Assistance Review* establishes a USG definition of stabilization as an inherently political endeavor to create conditions where legitimate authorities and systems can manage conflict and prevent violence. The *Stabilization Assistance Review* makes it clear that stabilization is transitional in nature and meant to establish a foundation for longer-term development.

4-29. The *Stabilization Assistance Review* identifies principles for effective stabilization and lays out a framework for making diplomatic, development, and defense engagements more efficient and accountable to taxpayers and aligning stabilization efforts toward supporting defined political outcomes. The *Stabilization Assistance Review* outlines how the United States can improve the outcomes of our stabilization efforts through more efficient and disciplined bureaucratic structures, processes, and engagements with international partners. In this regard, the *Stabilization Assistance Review* formally defines agency roles for stabilization missions with the DOS as the overall lead agency for stabilization efforts, the USAID as the lead implementing agency for non-security stabilization assistance, and the DOD as a supporting element.

STRATEGIC LEVEL INTERAGENCY PLANNING AND EXECUTION

4-30. The Secretary of Defense represents the DOD on the NSC, and the CJCS is the Military Representative to the NSC. It is the responsibility of the CJCS to integrate the planning of the DOD with the interagency in all matters of national defense. The CJCS has established the JSPS executed using the joint planning and execution enterprise in order to establish a civil-military dialogue with other agencies. Strategy and joint planning are conducted and implemented through joint planning and execution, which is the department-level enterprise of policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and information technology used by the Joint Planning and Execution Community (known as JPEC) to plan and execute joint operations. A focus of enterprise is the interaction between senior DOD and civilian leaders, CCDRs, and the CJCS, which helps the President and Secretary of Defense decide when, where, and how to employ U.S. military forces and resources, and gives the DOD its strategic direction.

4-31. The joint planning and execution enterprise integrates the planning activities of the Joint Planning and Execution Community and facilitates the transition from planning to execution starting with the strategic estimate. The enterprise operates in a networked, collaborative environment, which facilitates dialogue among senior leaders, concurrent and parallel plan development, and collaboration across multiple planning levels. The enterprise provides the Secretary of Defense and the President a range of military options, with associated resource requirements and risk assessments, to address identified threats and opportunities.

4-32. The JPP seven-step process (discussed in chapter 3) aligns with the four joint planning and execution enterprise planning functions. The first two JPP steps (planning initiation and mission analysis) take place during strategic guidance. The next four JPP steps—COA development, COA analysis and wargaming, COA comparison, and COA approval—align under concept development. The final JPP step—plan or order development—occurs during plan development. (See figure 3-6, page 61.)

4-33. The joint planning and execution enterprise facilitates interagency review of plans and appropriate annexes approved by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD[P]) following guidance provided in interagency plan reviews. Interagency plan reviews differ from Joint Planning and Execution Community plan reviews in that those inputs from non-DOD agencies are requested but not required. Additionally, non-DOD agency inputs are advisory in nature and, while a valued part of the process, do not carry veto authority. Nevertheless, a provision is made for participating agencies to follow up on issues surfaced during the review in accordance with guidance from the OUSD(P). This interagency coordination is constant and perpetual and occurs in the J-5 planning staff.

4-34. The Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the CCDRs through the joint planning and execution enterprise to carry out strategic guidance through planning and executing joint operations by publishing PLANORDs, EXORDs and deployment orders. (See figure 4-6. For more on strategic guidance, see JP 5-0.)




Figure 4-6. Strategic guidance to joint operations execution

4-35. CAO/CMO planners support the joint planning and execution enterprise and the orders publication in the enterprise plan development function by drafting the CMO annex to any base order. (See CJCSM 3130.03A. The purpose for the annex G is covered in chapter 5.)

THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

4-36. The JSPS is the primary means by which the CJCS carries out statutory responsibilities assigned in titles 6, 10, 22 and 50 of the USC. The primary roles are to: conduct independent assessments; provide independent advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, NSC, and Homeland Security Council; and assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing unified strategic direction to the Armed Forces. The JSPS is a system that enables the CJCS to effectively assess, advise, direct, and execute in fulfillment of these statutory responsibilities. (See CJCSI 3100.01F.) The JSPS produces several planning products, and CAO planners on the joint staff participate in the production of these strategic planning documents by providing civil considerations from strategic assessments. (See figure 4-7.)



Figure 4-7. The Joint Strategic Planning System

4-37. The DOD and its major components execute assigned responsibilities in USC title 10, title 50 and title 32, as well as those found in DODD 5100.01. The DOD and its major components take strategic guidance from the NSC and the CJCS as well as their own. CAO planners at the DOD, CCMDs and the Services obtain strategic guidance from publications produced through the JSPS. These strategic guidance publications assist unified commands and joint operations planners in developing campaign plans germane to their geographic AOR or their functional support responsibility within the Unified Command Plan. Additionally, when DOD plans for military action, it does so with continual coordination with the interagency. Much of this interagency coordination is performed without CA capabilities within the NSC. The DOD mobilizes and deploys military capabilities in support of unified action through the joint planning and execution enterprise. U.S. national will is exercised through the issuance of orders and directives through the joint planning and execution enterprise passing strategic orders and directives to the unified commands.

4-38. CCMDs conduct joint planning after receiving PLANORDs through the joint planning and execution enterprise. The CCMD's planning may be for contingencies, implementing theater campaigns or named operations. CCMDs do not execute plans until they are directed to do so with an EXORD through the joint planning and execution enterprise. All CCMDs (including functional CCMDs) perform mission analysis and issue orders to regionally or functionally align component commands. CA guidance is passed to subordinate CCMDs with the issuance of the CMO annex with the EXORD if appropriate. CAO planners at CCMDs analyze and evaluate available civil information from the assigned AO and pass CA guidance through the CMO annex. This annex is prepared by the CCMD J-9 or the assigned T-CAPT in conjunction with the CCMD J-5. (See JP 3-57, JP 3-33, and JP 5-0.)

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

4-39. *Foreign assistance* is defined as support for foreign nations that can be provided through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance (JP 3-0).

4-40. The authority to provide U.S. resources to foreign countries and citizens is established in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and has been further codified in title 22, USC. Foreign assistance can also include humanitarian and civic assistance provided by Service components under title 10, USC.

4-41. Foreign assistance is regulated by Congress through periodic amendments of the Foreign Assistance Act and, in some cases, the National Defense Authorization Act. When the amended act has been through appropriations, the DOS and DOD may provide resources in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act to various agencies within the USG that are permitted to render such assistance to foreign countries. This assistance generally includes diplomatic, developmental, economic, or security assistance.

4-42. When provided to PNs, *security assistance* is defined as a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the DOS to be administered by the DOD/Defense Security Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation (JP 3-20).

4-43. CAO planners can operate in support of the interagency in administering the assistance at the discretion of the U.S. Ambassador or COM in each respective country. CA Soldiers can be assigned or attached to the SCO or defense attaché's office. In some cases, Service or functional components can provide personnel to the U.S. diplomatic mission and are usually under the COM's authority when operating within, or stationed in, a foreign country. The defense attaché's office usually has representation from each Service or functional component command as necessary. Service members in a foreign country under title 10 authority are usually under the command of the Service or functional component commands of the CCMD, except those assigned to the defense attaché's office or SCO. Service forces obtain permissions to be stationed in or operate in a foreign country through an international agreement or diplomatic note. CAO planners must be aware of the international agreements and may be required to provide awareness of the available HN support.

4-44. These agreements are the legal instrument that provide permissions to military personnel to operate in a given country apart from asserting military authority, such as forward stationing in a HN. It is incumbent upon CAO/CMO staff or personnel in a defense attaché's office to develop close relationships with indigenous security forces including police, immigration and customs and other port-of-entry authorities. Service-assigned forces are sometimes not fully briefed on their status in a particular HN or PN. When regionally aligned Service forces are forward stationed, their immigration status is usually established by international agreement such as a status of forces agreement (SOFA).

4-45. A SOFA is an agreement between a HN and a foreign nation stationing military forces in that country. SOFAs are often included, along with other types of military agreements, as part of a comprehensive security arrangement. A SOFA establishes the permissions, rights and privileges of foreign personnel present in a given HN in support of the larger security arrangement. Under international law, a SOFA differs from military occupation. During military occupation, the occupying force establishes military government and asserts authority over the population as well as its own forces. The status of forces and their relationship with HN authorities should be addressed in the base order or the CMO annex. (See JP 3-57 and JP 3-84 for more information regarding SOFAs.)

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

4-46. FHA involves DOD activities conducted OCONUS and outside its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA is usually carried out in a steady state but can be carried out in contingency operations, while foreign disaster relief (FDR) is usually carried out as a short-term contingency operation. FHA is usually administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency through the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program. OHDACA project funding is disbursed through the CCMDs and executed by Service components; in many cases, CA Soldiers carry out the project management associated with OHDACA. Service components can also use operations and maintenance funding for minimally funded FHA in conjunction with training or operations. Specific FHA projects are identified in conjunction with the joint targeting process. They are carried out by the theater army, theater special operations command, or land component command through integration and synchronization with the ADM. FHA is carried out in conjunction with the theater campaign plan and can be amplified through the publication of a CMO annex. (See JP 5-0 regarding the CMO annex.)

4-47. FHA is a joint activity and CA is not the lead planner for FHA. FHA involves direct assistance to the IPI. FHA should be reported, evaluated, and monitored through the Socium data base. At the operational level, the supporting sustainment command may have the lead in terms of assembling the material for distribution, but the distribution itself may be executed by subordinate Army units such as CA units, special operations forces or other Services. (See JP 3-20, JP 3-29, ATP 3-57.20, and GTA 41-01-007 for more information.)

FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF

4-48. *Foreign disaster relief* is defined as assistance that can be used immediately to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims that normally includes services and commodities, as well as the rescue and evacuation of victims; the provision and transportation of food, water, clothing, medicines, beds, bedding, and temporary shelter; the furnishing of medical equipment and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services (JP 3-29). CAO planners ensure CAO and CMO adhere to the established authorities and permissions from the DOD to execute FDR. The Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, USAID, is the lead U.S. entity for FDR and is usually supported by the DOD. DOD requirements are usually specified and requested by the COM for any U.S. diplomatic mission, and any DOD support must be approved by the President or Secretary of Defense. CAO planners may ensure the appropriate CR and CE is performed to ensure the required assistance is provided at the right place and the right time. Provision of FDR may be provided in conjunction with a named operation or as an unnamed contingency operation. The CAO planner provides CAO/CMO guidance through the publication of a CMO annex as an attachment to any OPORD or FRAGORD. Additionally, CAO/CMO guidance can be provided as an appendix to a CMO annex that has already been published.

4-49. Generally, supporting foreign assistance is not solely a CA function, but CA personnel and staff support joint and Army commands that are directed by the Secretary of Defense to provide FHA requested by a U.S. Ambassador or a COM. In many cases, a component may be tasked to provide material or to obtain material from the interagency while another component may be tasked to transport it. These activities are often permitted under various authorities established in title 10, USC. All joint directorates perform their doctrinal functions in terms of planning, operations, and sustainment. The J-9's role is to ensure the support rendered is done so under the correct authority, with the correct HN permissions, and to the correct civilian recipients. The J-9 or component G-9 representative may establish coordination on behalf of the supporting command at the HN humanitarian operating center, the CCMD humanitarian assistance coordination center, a CMOC, or other civil-military integrating mechanism to establish coordination with the HN, IPI, or the DOS disaster assistance response team. (For more information, see JP 3-29, ATP 3-57.20, and DODD 5100.46.)

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

4-50. *Foreign internal defense* is defined as participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a HN government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). In addition to the CCMD's CSCS and the COM's ICS, the PN develops an internal defense and development (also known as an IDAD) plan. The COM, along with the CCMD, work together to support the PN's internal defense and development plan. (Figure 4-8 portrays foreign internal defense [FID] in relation to SC and other security assistance.)

4-51. The CAO/CMO planner may plan for CAO or CMO Service capabilities to support the FID effort. All FID efforts are usually coordinated by the country team, and the DOD contribution is usually coordinated by the SCO, unless a JTF or lead component has been established or tasked for that purpose. In addition to CAO staff support and CR, CE, and CIM, the primary task for CA capabilities during FID is support to civil administration when authorized by the President. (See JP 3-05.) CA units have assigned functional specialists that can assist IPI up to the ministerial level depending upon the actual requirement. CAO planners recommend the required capabilities when employed in an OE, which is usually constrained by policy-imposed limits on DOD capabilities. CAO planners coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing with IPI provide civilian-focused inputs and recommendations to the HN's internal defense and development plan. (These inputs may involve the stability activities cited in JP 3-07 or functional areas identified in JP 3-57.)




Figure 4-8. Foreign internal defense within security cooperation

4-52. One of the primary FID activities is security force assistance (SFA). The Army organized SFA brigades (also known as SFABs) to include an S-9. SFA brigades do not have organically assigned CA units and must request augmentation to execute CAO or train foreign security forces with a CAO or CMO capability. In essence, CAO planners and trainers are training the foreign security force on how to plan and conduct CMO. Other conventional and special operations forces units train, assist, and partner with foreign security forces. The unit S-9 may be instrumental in coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing with HN security forces, especially if those security forces are police instead of military. (See JP 3-22.)

MILITARY ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

4-53. Numerous routine SC missions and continuous operations or tasks (such as freedom of navigation) occur globally on a continuing basis under the general heading of military engagement. These activities build strong relationships with partners, increase regional awareness and knowledge of a PN's capabilities and capacity, and can be used to influence events in a desirable direction. Military engagement activities can also increase understanding of an adversary's capabilities, capacity, and intentions and can provide forewarning of undesirable events. In some cases, what begins as a military engagement activity with limited support through a security assistance program can expand to a limited contingency operation or even a major operation when the President commits U.S. forces. Military engagement activities are generally governed by various directives and agreements and do not require a joint OPLAN or OPORD for execution.

4-54. Military engagement is most effective when it is purpose driven, planned as a measure of performance (known as an MOP), and then assessed as an MOE. When military-to-military engagements or civil-military engagements occur in the course of SC, the engagements should be recorded in the Socium data base.

4-55. Socium is the overall collaborative tool and authoritative data source for DOD SC assessment, planning, execution, monitoring, and evaluation. Use of Socium enhances visibility of the range of SC activities (completed, planned, and ongoing) across DOD components, facilitates tracking of resources spent on SC (to include operation and maintenance), and promotes the exchange of best practices.

MAJOR OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS

4-56. When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the U.S. national leaders may decide to intervene. Military intervention could involve the conduct of a major operation or campaign involving large-scale combat. In such cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the United States and its partners.

4-57. Major operations and campaigns feature a balance among offensive, defensive, and stability operations through six phases: shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. The immediate requirement when initiating stability activities is often to assert transitional military authority within the occupied territory, providing the local populace with security, restoring essential services, and meeting humanitarian needs. The long-term goal may be to develop the following: indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy and rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society. Major operations and campaigns typically are composed of multiple phases. (See figure 1-3, page 4.)

4-58. PN governments in R&S are supported by an interim authority of the interagency, usually performed in conjunction with a named military operation. The military intervention could be stability oriented from the outset and in support of a foreign government and its military (as in FID), or it could be stabilization oriented following major combat operations. Relations in these operations are rarely based on standard military command and support relationships; rather, national laws or specific agreements for each situation govern the specific relationships in interagency operations.

4-59. When involved in a crisis, the USG appoints a lead federal agency for operations. The goal is always unity of effort between military forces and civilian agencies, although unity of command may not be possible. Effective liaison and continuous coordination become keys to mission accomplishment. The unity of effort between military and non-military entities is referred to as unified action. Some missions require coordination with NGOs. While no overarching interagency doctrine delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations, the National Response Framework provides some guidance. Effective liaison elements work toward establishing mutual trust and confidence, while continuously coordinating actions to achieve cooperation and unity of effort. (See JP 3-08.) In these situations, liaison officers and their teams require a broader understanding of the interagency environment; responsibilities, motivations, and limitations of NGOs; and the relationships these organizations have with the U.S. military.

4-60. In major operations and campaigns OCONUS, the lead agency is usually either the DOS or DOD. In either case, extensive interagency coordination is necessary in order to achieve unified action. CAO/CMO planners would be required to anticipate such coordinating requirements and identify them in the CAO/CMO annex or annex V (Interagency Coordination). Coordinating nodes could be a joint interagency task force, joint interagency coordination group, joint humanitarian assistance center, CMOC, or participation in the HN or PN humanitarian operations center. The CCMD J-9 or the T-CAPT must plan accordingly for the resourcing and establishment of these coordination nodes. (See JP 3-08 and JP 3-57.) Resourcing these nodes could include the request for forces necessary to augment the JFC staff to man the coordination node(s). The appropriate coordination should be planned to be achieved at each echelon from the CCMD to BCT level. Service or functional components with the required capabilities are tasked to provide manning to these nodes.

THE THEATER STRATEGY AND THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN

4-61. CCMDs are responsible for implementing a theater strategy as it applies to their assigned AOR. Theater strategy outlines the CCDR's vision for integrating resources and synchronizing military activities and operations in conjunction with the application of other instruments of national power to achieve theater objectives. CCMD theater strategies, as reflected in their theater campaign plans (TCPs), typically emphasize military engagement, SC, and deterrence through routine-shaping activities. The strategic estimate, which is continually updated, helps to determine the missions, objectives, and potential activities required in the campaign plan. A significant number of SC activities are conducted as a part of CCMD TCPs but limited contingencies, crises responses, or major operations can also involve some form of SC.

4-62. SC planning is required for each PN where the CCMD intends to apply resources, and SCOs prioritize their PN's requirements identified for SC activities. Once coordination with the OSD and the DOS authorizes and funds SC activities, SC planning for each PN takes the form of mission planning among the CCMD, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the applicable SCO and country team, the Service and special operations component(s), and the PN representatives.

4-63. A theater strategy prioritizes CCMD efforts to satisfy functional, theater and global responsibilities. It also considers all authorities, means, and capabilities available for the planning of the operations, activities, and investments to achieve DOD objectives and complement related USG efforts. CCMD TCPs operationalize the theater strategy, as do the supporting plans of all DOD components. Annually, CCMDs must forecast security force assistance requirements to the CJCS and the Services to ensure those requirements can be met or to assess the risk. The TCP includes a discussion about the resources (especially forces and funding) assigned to and required by the CCMD and addresses the impact of resource shortfalls in terms of strategic and operational risk on achievement of theater objectives. TCPs, with their nested CSCSs/country plans, are the primary documents used to plan, organize, integrate, and execute SC activities in CCMD AORs. TCPs implement CCMD theater strategies and provide a comprehensive framework for integrating SC activities for routine shaping (known as "setting the theater") to achieve U.S. national objectives.

THEATER CAMPAIGN ORDER

4-64. CCDRs may issue an order initiating the execution of their campaign plans; if issued, this order is called a theater campaign order. A theater campaign order may be issued annually or as deemed appropriate by the CCDR, but all such orders should be issued at a consistent point each fiscal year and up to a year before execution to allow the CCMD staff, subordinate commands, components, and supporting agencies time to synchronize their planning, execution, evaluation, and assessment cycles and activities with the strategic planning cycles in the DOD. For coordination and accountability, orders and authorities must be promulgated to all concerned DOD components, especially DSCA, which has DOD responsibilities for accounting and management of certain statutory programs for SC (to include those title 22, USC, funds from the DOS to be administered by the DOD for SC). Thus informed, the SCOs will normally coordinate with their country teams and the PNs in support of the tasked individuals and units, to include facilitation of contracting requirements for U.S. military with PN entities. Normally, execution of specific SC activities requires additional and separate orders or authorities for units through their appropriate chain of command in coordination with the SCOs for the participating PNs.

THE THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION PLAN

4-65. The CCMD carries out theater SC plan responsibilities within the SC planning framework. The framework provides the CCMD the ability to integrate military planning with interagency planning to produce individual country plans in concert with the entire theater SC plan. (See JP 3-20.)

4-66. Figure 4-9 depicts a summary of the SC planning framework with the following actions that correspond to their number (1–12) in the figure:

- (1) The country team (including the SCO) develops an ICS for a PN from national and DOS strategies and policies with COM guidance. Upon approval by the COM and following coordination at the department level (DOS-OSD), the DOS approves the ICS.
- (2) The CCMD develops CSCSs/country plans for PNs based on ICSs and other strategic guidance (Guidance for Employment of the Force, Joint Strategic Campaign Plan, and theater strategy) in coordination with the SCOs and DOD components (special operations forces, components, and other relevant subject matter experts).
- (3) CSCSs/country plans are nested within TCP, which also is informed by ICSs and other national and defense strategies and policies.
- (4) TCP provides objectives and priorities with LOEs that include SC activities and investments.
- (5) The SCO and special operations component subject matter experts develop PN requirements, expressed as specific SC activities, in coordination with CCMD planners and DSCA. They must support USG objectives in conjunction with the CSCS/country plan and TCP.
- (6) DOD components develop TCP supporting plans and anticipate their force, resource, and funding requirements to plan and execute specific SC activities with the PN based on requirements planning. Components support parts of their program objective memorandums based on SC planning requirements.
- (7) SCO and special operations components coordinate with the CCMD to vet and forward SC activities to the OSD and DOS for authorities and funding.

- (8) The geographic CCMD coordinates with the OSD for authorities and funding and with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for management and administration of certain security assistance and other statutory authorities and funding.
- (9) The OSD coordinates with the DOS for security assistance authorities and funding.
- (10) The DOS provides certain authorities and funding (title 22) to the OSD for administration by the DOD or Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
- (11) The OSD provides authorities and funding to CCMDs and special operations forces components and provides planning support to CCMDs on the appropriate and effective uses of such authorities (title 10 and 22, and other statutory authorities).
- (12) Special operations forces and other DOD components complete mission planning and, upon approval by the President or Secretary of Defense, execute SC activities in coordination with the SCO (and PN) and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency; the CCMD and OSD monitor and evaluate SC activities.




Figure 4-9. Security cooperation planning framework

SECURITY COOPERATION

4-67. The DOD conducts SC which encompasses all DOD interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces and their institutions to build relationships that help promote U.S. interests; enable PNs to provide the U.S. access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with U.S. defense objectives. It includes, but is not limited to, military engagements with foreign defense and security establishments (including those governmental organizations that primarily perform disaster or emergency response functions), DOD-administered security assistance programs, combined exercises, international armaments cooperation, and information sharing and collaboration.

4-68. *Military engagement* is defined as routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence (JP 3-0).

4-69. *Security assistance* is defined as a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation (JP 3-20).

4-70. Under peaceful conditions, DOD support is rendered to the DOS and PNs through the SC framework (See JP 3-20 and FM 3-22.) as presented in figure 4-9, page 82, or as direct support to PNs as FID. (See JP 3-22.) SC and FID programs are supported by the military through a specific U.S. Embassy's defense attaché, SCO, or senior defense official. CCDRs coordinate defense activity in foreign countries through the designated defense attaché, who is a member of the Embassy's country team.

SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

4-71. The defense cooperation office or SCO is a DOD element that is part of the U.S. diplomatic mission located in a foreign country to carry out security assistance and SC management functions under the supervision and coordination authority of the senior defense official/defense attaché. (See figure 4-3, page 71, regarding the defense cooperation organization.) CAO/CMO planners support SC planning by providing CMO input into the theater campaign plan, annex G (Civil-Military Operations).

4-72. The CMO input starts with the CMO estimate. The CMO estimate examines each military COA and how best CMO may influence the various COAs the commander is considering. The focus of CMO estimate development is on situation assessment rather than COA development. The purpose is to assemble information underlying a CMO concept of support that can be modified to support the overall CONOPS. CA will also complete area studies where operations are likely. These assessments focus on political, economic, social, informational, or infrastructure factors that relate to the existing OE. These assessments may include analysis and evaluation of local demographics, civil supply chain, public utilities, and population displacement.

4-73. The CMO estimate shows how CMO can best be integrated into the overall operation and supports decision making throughout an operation. CAO/CMO planners provide continuous civil information analysis and evaluation to the CCMD. The T-CAPT, or the CCMD J-9, represent the primary CMO planning capability at the CCMD. Each command may also have assigned foreign area officers and a political advisor assigned on the staff. These staff entities play an intricate part in planning military engagement and diplomatic coordination with U.S. Embassies. The senior defense official or defense attaché may be the senior defense official in a specific country but still maintains coordination with a CCMD-designated lead component in a given country.

4-74. CA personnel may be attached or operating with the U.S. Embassy from either a Service component command or a theater special operations command to augment, maintain or support CA operations and planning capability. Depending on whether the CCMD designates a lead component in a particular country, that component may or may not have responsibilities in performing CAO/CMO. Some international agreements may constrain the ability of either the U.S. Embassies or DOD components to perform CAO/CMO as it may be viewed as interfering in internal affairs.

4-75. Regardless of constraints, CAO planners will still be required to provide civil information to the COP, ensure the establishment of interagency coordination, and inform the command on prohibitions or permissions to perform CAO/CMO and other military operations amongst foreign populations.

4-76. SC encompasses numerous programs and activities; most notably, those programs and activities include FID, FHA, FDR, or other foreign assistance which may involve direct CAO staff support. Security assistance planning is carried out by the DOS at U.S. Embassies and by the DOD at country-specific SCOs and at the CCMD. SC is supported by the Service and functional component commands. CAO/CMO planners at each of these echelons and planning nodes provide civil information to the COP and include civil considerations into the mission analysis. CAO staff support is performed by the G-9 sections at each component command based upon the CAO/CMO requirements of that component. The land component command or the theater special operations command is usually designated as the lead component for CAO/CMO. In countries where a lead component or executive agent is established, that component usually leads the interaction with the SCO and PN for the implementation of SC activities such as exercises, military-to-military engagements, and CEs. The G-9 collaborates with the G-3 and the G-5 on the theater army or land component command staff.

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING

4-77. Any foreign assistance provided to foreign entities is approved and implemented through the DOS. SC planning is performed in the respective CCMDs and U.S. Embassies by the SCO in a specific country's U.S. Embassy. SC is all DOD interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and PN military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied nations and PNs. (See FM 3-22.)

4-78. The Army supports SC as a primary stability task. The Army provides the joint force with CA personnel to support the CCMD theater campaign plan and supporting plans as well as the respective U.S. Embassies and their country specific mission strategic plan. The U.S. Embassy will synchronize its Mission Strategic Plan with the DOS Stabilization Assistance Review and other strategic guidance generated through the NSC, interagency, and JSPS. CAO planners in the CCMD J-9 and CMO directorate are the primary CMO planners for the CCMD. When there is not an organized J-9 directorate at the CCMD, the T-CAPT is responsible for the coordination and publication of CMO plans supporting SC.

4-79. The regionally aligned CACOM may also have planning responsibilities for supporting plans. Those responsibilities may include identifying CA force requirements necessary to carry out CAO, CMO, or contingencies (to support the campaign plan or any supporting plans) and to prepare the forces for the mission. At the theater strategic level, the primary interest of the CAO/CMO staff is to identify, implement, and delegate FHA or, in the case of limited contingencies, FDR and humanitarian and civic assistance. Additionally, Service CA capabilities may be utilized to perform military-to-military training and exercises or military engagement. The J-9, in conjunction with the J-5, prepare the theater campaign plan and the requisite supporting annexes such as annex G (Civil-Military Operations) and annex V (Interagency Coordination). (See JP 5-0, JP 3-57, and JP 3-08.) The template for the CMO annex does not appear in JP 5-0 or JP 3-57. The templates for annex K (Civil Affairs Operations), annex P (Host-Nation Support), and annex V (Interagency Coordination) are found in FM 5-0 for Army orders. Joint doctrine does not provide annex templates.

RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

4-80. R&S is led by the DOS and normally coordinated within the occupied territory, PN, or HN through the COM and country team. The USG conducts stabilization efforts worldwide. Military support of routine USG stabilization efforts is normally part of the shaping activities of a CCDR's campaign plan for security sector issues to prevent conflict and may occur as SC activities or joint combined exercises for training conducted by Service or special operations component units.

DEFENSE SUPPORT TO THE STABILIZATION PROCESS

4-81. The J-5 of the CCMD, JFC, or SCO integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes the interagency and military planning to achieve unified action. CAO/CMO planners produce the annex G and coordinate for other appropriate annexes supporting major operations and campaigns throughout the joint phasing model. (See figure 3-4, page 54.) The focus of CAO/CMO planning is maintaining or the establishment of stability throughout the phasing structure and the transitioning of authority from military to civilian authorities. This is done by performing joint stability functions in support of the overarching stability sectors.

4-82. Individually, the joint stability functions encompass the distinct yet interrelated tasks that constitute stability activities in a stability sector. Collectively, they are the framework through which the USG identifies the possible tasks required in a stabilization effort. Incorporating tasks within each sector into coherent LOEs is required to ensure that efforts are properly aligned to their specific objective and integrated to create cross-cutting effects.

4-83. The stability sectors form a framework for executing stability tasks that represent the five key areas in which civil-military efforts focus on stabilization and building indigenous capacity to govern. Individually, they encompass the distinct yet interrelated tasks that constitute reform activities in a functional sector. The DOS is the lead agency in foreign intercourse and in post-conflict R&S of foreign territory. Collectively, the stability sectors are the pillars upon which the government frames the possible reconstruction tasks required for nations torn by conflict or disaster. Although forces execute some tasks sequentially, success necessitates an approach that focuses on simultaneous actions across the operational area. These tasks are inextricably linked; positive results in one sector depend on successfully integrating and synchronizing activities across other sectors. Stability sectors are similar in purpose and application to the stability LOEs used by joint forces to help focus and unify R&S efforts within specific functional areas of a society. They define and encompass integrated task areas across a broad spectrum of interagency engagement, including the DOD. The stability sectors support the R&S of the occupied territory and the transition of governance in occupied territory to an interim authority. The stability sectors are:

- Security.
- Justice and reconciliation.
- Humanitarian assistance and social well-being.
- Governance and participation.
- Economic stabilization and infrastructure.

STABILITY OPERATIONS TASKS

4-84. Stability operations tasks include military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with or in support of other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability operations tasks typically occur during all phases of an operation/campaign in balance with offensive and defensive operations. Normally, CMO and CAO are essential to stabilization efforts, especially for larger and more complex operations.

4-85. Integrating stability operations tasks into the planning and execution of other joint operations helps avoid unintended consequences, translates short-term gains into lasting progress, and provides a bridge linking operational objectives with broader strategic goals. Stability operations tasks are directed and integrated by the JFC and executed by components. Usually, the land component command, Army Service component command, JTF, or subordinate unified command is tasked to implement stability activities by executing the following stability tasks:

- Establish civil security.
- Establish support to civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support governance.
- Support economic and infrastructure development.
- Conduct SC.

4-86. At the tactical level, SC is executed in conjunction with the other primary stability tasks. CAO/CMO planners at every echelon establish international coordination nodes in order to maintain information collection, sharing, and dissemination. These include coordination nodes such as the S-9/G-9, CMOC, joint interagency task force, joint interagency coordination group, humanitarian assistance coordination center, or humanitarian operations center. (Stabilization is supported at the tactical level through the execution of CAO and CMO as discussed in chapters 1–3.)

4-87. CAO/CMO planners anticipate requirements for functional and military government specialists to support military government operations (MGO) in occupied territory. CA functional and military government specialists enable the commander's transitional military authority being imposed in the occupied territory by performing functions normally fulfilled by indigenous civilian authorities. CAO/CMO planners must also anticipate other Service capabilities necessary to fulfill the commander's CMO intent such as engineer, medical, military police, psychological operations, and so on.

4-88. Army CA units are organized with elements specifically manned, equipped, and trained to coordinate with the interagency and IPI at every echelon, from BCT to theater army; they are also staffed with functional specialists and military government specialists to perform tasks usually performed by civil authorities. CAO/CMO planners must plan for their request, mobilization, and employment for operations requiring these capabilities. This request may come through the CCMD from a subordinate JTF, subordinate unified command or the land component command (tasked with planning and executing the major operation), or campaign and the subsequent occupation of enemy territory.

4-89. Military stability planning efforts are nested with those of the DOS. ADP 3-07 illustrates the nesting of stability tasks with stability activities and with the stability sectors. (See figure 4-10 on page 88.) CA forces provide functional specialists and military government specialists that are also aligned with the stability sectors. CAO/CMO planners must be able to identify the mission's MGO requirements in order to ensure the force has the right capabilities to perform tasks usually performed by civil authorities and ensure that no vacuum in governance occurs. The early joint assessments are critical to informing the area study prior to mission analysis. (For more information regarding CA functional specialists, see FM 3-57.)

4-90. In all planning, from strategic to tactical, the CAO/CMO capabilities mitigate friction between the military and civil component, engage the civil component to set the conditions for stability, and assess civil considerations necessary to achieve understanding of the OE (including civil society). The intent of CAO is to enhance stability, set conditions for the mitigation or defeat of threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing local government capability or enhancing its capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats. The keys to the stability effort are a detailed conflict assessment, an assessment of how the local population perceives U.S. activities, and the support of the emerging indigenous government. Successful stability efforts require a mandate from the populace and confirmation that the U.S. mission and the actions of the emergent government are legitimate in the eyes of the populace. There is no clear mechanism to measure the sentiment of the population other than the outward willingness of the populace to participate in governance through public debate or voting. One clear MOE is the abandonment of armed conflict to impose or shape policy.

4-91. A transition of sovereign authority occurs during a military intervention. When through the course of conflict U.S. forces occupy territory, they assert military authority upon deposing the hostile government. During the occupation of enemy territory, U.S. military forces are responsible for maintaining the continuity of government functions during the transition in governance. CA forces are organized to assist in the imposition of military government in occupied territory and assume responsibility for tasks normally performed by civilian authority. Military government assumes many of the governance responsibilities of the former government while implementing transitional military authority. U.S. forces transfer authority to an interim government or other civilian authorities as soon as possible. The transition to an interim government promotes the legitimacy of the U.S. mission as well as the legitimacy of the emergent government. The execution of joint operations and the achievement of unified action is predicated on the sound application of civil-military operations, which promotes governance and stability. (See figure 4-11, page 89.)




Figure 4-10. Stability



Figure 4-11. Civil-military operations and governance

4-92. CAO planners and the J-9, in conjunction with the interagency, must plan to conduct MGO in support of military government, interim authority, or PN. The transition of governance from a military government to a civilian government compels a shift from transitional military authority to support to civil administration (SCA).

4-93. The primary tasks for governance are aligned by the echelon of governance. At the national level, those tasks align with the stability sectors identified in interagency planning; at the provincial level, they correspond with joint stability activities; at the local district or municipal level, they correspond to the Army's primary stability tasks. By assessing the OE with mission and operational variables, CAO planners assist commanders at every echelon to formulate policy and techniques necessary to accomplish the stabilization including—

- Asserting military authority.
- Establishing transitional military authority.
- Establishing an interim governing authority.
- Promoting governance and participation.
- Contributing to legitimizing an emerging indigenous government, which with the other tasks also promotes stability and the restoration of sovereignty.

4-94. When a military force occupies foreign territory and asserts its military authority over that territory, the transition from hostile government to military government occurs. The transition from hostile government to military government occurs when a military force occupies foreign territory. The transition from military authority to an interim authority occurs when a civilian authority is appointed by the President as the President's representative (Ambassador, COM, or Special Envoy). Transitional military authority continues until IPI are reconstituted to assume the reins of government at all echelons from municipality or district to national level. Military forces may continue to execute transitional military authority at different levels after an interim government is established. The transitional military authority coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes military operations with those of the interagency, IPI (or international organizations if appropriate) and the interim authority until the transition to SCA can occur, and U.S. forces can then provide only an advisory role in governance. The interim authority rules by decree until an indigenous governing body can be established (usually through elections) and total sovereign authority can be restored to the IPI. U.S. forces can continue to provide SCA until such time as the military withdrawals or maintains a forward presence through an international agreement between the USG and the emergent PN. (See the vignette *On the Absence of Military Government in Iraq*.)

On the Absence of Military Government in Iraq

On the eve of invading Iraq, then–Secretary of State Colin Powell famously told President George W. Bush that "If you break it, you own it."

In an interview with The Atlantic, Powell said of his warning that it "was a simple statement of fact… when you take out a regime and bring down a government, you become the government. On the day that the statue came down and Saddam Hussein's regime ended, the United States [became] the occupying power. We might also have been the liberating power, and we were initially seen as liberators, but, we were essentially the new government until a government could be put into place. In the second phase of the conflict, which [began] after the statue fell, we made serious mistakes in not acting like a government. One, maintaining order; two, keeping people from destroying their own property; three, not having in place security forces, either ours, or theirs, or a combination of the two to keep order. In the absence of order, chaos ensues."

Following the invasion of Iraq in April 2003, coalition forces did not completely occupy the territory of Iraq, thus they were unable to dominate the operational environment and did not impose a military government. Civilian factions resorted to violence in order to assert political dominance and, yes, chaos ensued. As a matter of U.S. policy, the United States was not occupying Iraq; it was liberating Iraq. U.S. Diplomat Paul Bremmer was appointed as the Presidential Special Envoy to Iraq and Director for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, which subsequently was renamed the Coalition Provisional Authority in May 2003. As director of the coalition, Mr. Bremmer ruled by decree. Amongst his most notable actions was Coalition Provisional Authority Order #1, the outlawing of the Baath Party in all its forms, which in essence dissolved Iraqi government institutions from national to grassroots level. The absence of any remnants of indigenous government, and the policy of not imposing military government, produced a political/security vacuum in the time between military victory in April and the establishment of an interim authority under Special Envoy Bremmer in May 2003. The inability to enforce local laws in accordance with the law of land warfare allowed sectarian rivals to vie for political and civil control for years to come. These rivalries promoted sectarian civil strife between formerly ruling Sunni Baathists and the majority Shiite population and militias. Civil war erupted.

The Coalition Provisional Authority created the Iraqi Governing Council in March 2004, which coincided with the drafting of a new Iraqi Constitution and status of forces agreement. Sectarian civil war continued as the majority Shiite party gained and assumed the reins of government. The coalition transitioned authority to the Iraqi Governing Council in June 2004. Although the newly elected Iraqi government drafted a new constitution, the fractured government failed to adequately remedy the sectarian/political divisions amongst the populace or achieve civil control.

Failing to obtain a new status of forces agreement following the 2010 parliamentary elections, the U.S. military withdrew in 2012. By 2014, the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government had purged its military along sectarian lines, and civil war again emerged with the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham. By 2018 the Iraqi government, with U.S assistance, recaptured the territory once occupied by ISIS. However, the country remains fractured into three sectarian components: Sunni minority, Shiite Majority, and the independent Kurdish Regional Government.

In 2014 when ISIS forces launched their offensive, Kurdish paramilitary forces withdrew from Nineveh Province and moved to seize the oil rich city of Kirkuk. Kirkuk was supposed to be arbitrated by referendum established in the Iraqi Constitution. The Kurdish Regional Government held an independent referendum in 2017, challenged by the Iraqi government in Baghdad, which responded with military force to retake the city. Iraq's Supreme Court ruled that no province of Iraq was allowed to secede in order to preserve the unity of Iraq. In November 2017, the Kurdish Regional Government announced that it would respect the Supreme Court's ruling. Iraq remains unified but, 16 years after the U.S. invasion, it is evident that the political/security vacuum created when U.S. forces failed to impose military government at the outset of conflict has contributed immensely to the turmoil and the nearly continuous state of insurgency and civil war that still exists in Iraq today.

4-95. When implementing transitional military authority, U.S. forces assume the responsibility of government in accordance with the law of land warfare (See FM 6-27.) and the Geneva Convention regarding belligerent occupation. CAO/CMO planners support stability including activities that establish civil security, provide support to governance, provide essential services, support economic development and infrastructure, and establish civil control for civilian populations in occupied or liberated areas until such control can be returned to civilian or non-U.S. military authorities. CAO planners identify stability sectors that require civilian skill sets required to maintain government by performing functions normally performed by civil authorities. CA forces are organized and manned to provide functional specialists and military government specialists to governance. CA force structure contains civil sector expertise within each of the 16 functional specialties aligned with the five stability sectors.

4-96. Technically qualified and experienced individuals advise and assist the commander and can assist or direct their civilian counterparts. Within their area of specialization, they possess the critical skills necessary to establish, support, or reestablish capability and capacity, as well as understand the regional and local impact of culture on that capability. (See figure 2-3, page 19.) CAO planners plan the required coordination nodes necessary to fully coordinate, integrate, and synchronize with the interagency and the IPI in order to establish transitional military authority and continue SCA once an interim authority is established. These coordination nodes include civil-military teaming with the advanced civilian team. The advanced civilian teams are provided by the interagency and aligned with indigenous institutions from provincial (regional commands, consulates, or major population centers) to national level (U.S. Embassy or JTF) within the OE.

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

4-97. When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the U.S. national leaders may decide to intervene. Military intervention could involve the conduct of a major operation or campaign involving large-scale combat. In such cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the United States and its partners. Major operations and campaigns feature a balance among offensive, defensive, and stability activities, using a phasing structure to shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. Stability activities include military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with or in support of other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Normally, CMO and CAO are essential to stabilization efforts.

4-98. When U.S. forces perform a military intervention, the immediate requirement is integrating joint stability activities into the interagency R&S effort. As offensive activities prevail, the first task is to assert transitional military authority within the occupied territory by providing the local populace with security, restoring essential services, and meeting humanitarian needs. The long-term goal may be to develop the following: indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, democratic institutions, a robust civil society, and the rule of law.

4-99. Transitional military authority is transferred to a civilian authority as soon as feasible. CMO planners focus on the transition of tasks being performed under transitional military authority to civilian counterparts. Civilian counterparts can include U.S. interagency, an international organization, or authorities established with IPI. Major operations and campaigns typically are composed of multiple phases illustrated in the joint phasing construct in ADP 3-0. The transfer of authority can occur over several phases to maintain a governing structure until indigenous civilian government can be fully reestablished. (See figure 3-4, page 54.)

4-100. Stability activities may become more prominent leading up to and during transitions from a U.S. military or civilian authority to a PN lead throughout the “stabilize and enable” phases of a joint operation. These stability activities facilitate the seamless transfer of responsibilities and authorities from the military to the DOS and ultimately to an emerging indigenous government. For example, as part of security sector reform, the United States may provide equipment and training to foreign security forces as well as the supporting ministerial-level institutions, which would enable the PN to accept security responsibilities or to provide support to governance and participation. U.S forces may lend support to local elections in order to promote the legitimacy of the emergent government.

4-101. CAO/CMO planners at the theater strategic level and the operational level plan for the availability of CA forces necessary to align with a military force conducting a military intervention and asserting transitional military authority. CAO/CMO planners use the Army's rules of allocation to plan for the required Army CA forces and other capabilities necessary to support the command and control nodes at every echelon as well as the interagency and governance throughout the area of operations. The Army rules of allocation assign a CA Command at the theater strategic level to support the CCMD, subordinate unified command or the theater army. A CA brigade is assigned to support a corps or JTF. A CA Battalion is designed to support a division or a joint special operations task force and a CA company is designed to support a BCT or maneuver enhancement brigade. CA teams in a CA company can provide direct support to a battalion or operate as an integral component of the CA company. (See figure 2-1, page 15.)

4-102. CAO planners should understand that table 2-1, page 17, shows the baseline rules of allocation for CA employment, but it is not the only model. Urbanization trends will continue to challenge the proper allocation of CA units to ensure mission success. Larger urban areas may require a more robust allocation of CA forces per BCT or to adequately identify and mitigate or defeat threats to civil society. Furthermore, not all operations will be conducted in conjunction with a BCT.

4-103. The nature of the mission may require more CA assets. For example, advising on or conducting the responsibilities normally performed by a civil government such as those MGO will likely require more CA augmentation to succeed.

4-104. The workload rule of allocation shown in figure 4-12 was designed to account for these variables. CA allocation while asserting transitional military authority may drive up the requirement for CA forces necessary to engage with or even fulfill governance requirements with the IPI. While transitioning from transitional military authority to SCA, those CA requirements can be reduced but may still require more CA forces than those projected in the Army rules of allocation to support the joint force.




Figure 4-12. Civil Affairs workload rule of allocation

Chapter 5
Civil Affairs Planning Products

OVERVIEW

5-1. CA personnel prepare area studies, conduct assessments, and create and maintain running estimates to assist in the planning and updating of mission plans and annexes across the range of military operations. CA forces focus on the civil component and strive to promote stability of the civil component in order to achieve a desired end state that includes a stable, civil society. CAO planners produce products within the operations process that enable commanders and their staff to obtain a higher degree of situational understanding of their assigned operational environment. *Situational understanding* is defined as the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the operational and mission variables (ADP 6-0). Building and maintaining situational understanding is essential to establishing the situation's context, developing effective plans, assessing operations, and making quality decisions throughout the operations process. CA forces exercising CKI collect, collate, process, analyze and evaluate, produce, and disseminate actionable civil knowledge products to inform commanders and their staff within the operations process. CKI supports the planning process by enhancing situational understanding, identifying COGs, and supporting the commander's visualization. Commanders continually strive to maintain their situational understanding and work through periods of reduced understanding as the situation evolves.

CIVIL AFFAIRS AREA STUDIES

5-2. The CA area study is the continuous collection of civil information as it pertains to a specific AOR, country or territory. Civil information is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to the joint force and other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. This process ensures the timely availability of raw and analyzed civil information to military, interagency partners, and PN forces throughout the OE. There should be an existent area study for each AOR or country within an AOR in which operations are envisioned. These countries can be identified by existing contingency plans. If an area study does not exist for a CCMD's specific AOR, it is the responsibility of the J-9 or T-CAPT to ensure it is started and perpetuated in support of the theater campaign plan. It is also the responsibility of the J-9 or T-CAPT to ensure the CIM architecture (information system) is established to perpetuate CIM. (See JP 3-57.)

5-3. The CA area study can be the initial publication that is the JFC civil information database, or the database can become the aggregate data to form the area study. The area study is composed of three sections. The first section is general information collated into subjects of interest. The second section is performed after initial and deliberate assessments are conducted in order to gain, clarify or validate information. Section II is not published until the area is designated as a joint operations area or a joint security area and the information is placed into operational context usually using the operational variables—joint forces use PMESII and Army forces use PMESII-PT. (See JP 3-10.) The third section is published after operations have been initiated and uses the stability sectors to collate information, which assists the commander in making decisions that assure the achievement of stability objectives. (See appendix A regarding the CA area study.)

5-4. The primary purpose of the area study is to enhance the understanding of the civil component for CA forces and the JFC. The CA area study is a pre-mission study prepared regionally by country or to a specific subnational area within a country as the baseline research document for CA forces. The CA area study presents a description and analysis of the geography, historical setting, and the social, political, military, economic, health, legal, education, governance, infrastructure, and national security systems and institutions of a country. The CA area study is divided into three sections: the general section, operational variables and the stability section.

5-5. The general section (section I) serves as the base document of the CA area study and is prepared in advance of need. CA forces prepare the base document from available information. The general section presents a description and analysis of civil information of a country or region using a combination of open- and restricted-source materials. The general section addresses geography, history, people, U.S. interests, and HN support.

5-6. This baseline information is used as the basis for the creation of the CAO running estimate during the planning process. If an area study does not already exist, the CAO planner must conduct similar research, analysis, and evaluation required in order to produce the CAO running estimate, area studies, assessments, and running estimates including geo-references. These geo-references allow for future geospatial application of these products into operations and mission planning sequences. These products develop and update the understanding of the civil component for the commander's COP.

5-7. The synthesis of operational variables and civil considerations (section II) is developed using the PMESII-PT/ASCOPE or PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk. It is initiated at the commencement of operations to assist the commander in obtaining the optimal understanding of the OE.

5-8. The stability section of the CA area study is based upon the stability sectors. CAO planners integrate civil information into the operations process in order to facilitate stability tasks and achieve a stable and lasting peace. CA forces organize CA functional specialties along the same lines as the stability sectors. CA forces report civil information from CE, CR, and specific assessments and surveys that continuously update the CIM database as well as the CA area study.

5-9. The information provided to the stability section is generally sourced and provided through the initial and deliberate assessments as well as surveys obtained after the receipt of mission and entry into the operational area. CA forces in the OE may collect and build upon these information requirements in advance of need if the opportunity arises. CA assessments use the same format as the stability section of the CA area study. CA forces require the ability to retrieve accurate and current data on demand. This requirement necessitates a system to capture, store, collate, and produce this data in the form of a report that is comprised from all available collected data at any given time. This system is continuously informed by initial and deliberate assessments and surveys as the operation progresses. This report is composed of the CA area study base document and updates from the CA assessments. The CIM system can produce current area studies, on demand, for CA forces. CA forces align functional specialties with the stability sectors. The CA area study is continually updated through CIM and informed by ongoing CA assessments. (See appendix A.)

CIVIL AFFAIRS ASSESSMENTS

5-10. Staff assessments inform the operations process to prepare, plan, and execute operations. (See chapter 1.) CA assessments are used to inform or establish the initial running estimate by analyzing and evaluating civil considerations as they apply to the mission at hand. The area study informs the initial staff assessments.

5-11. In addition to the staff assessments, CA Soldiers perform three basic types of assessments—the initial assessment, the deliberate assessment, and the survey. Gathering information should not be a haphazard process. Each type of assessment is based upon the information and analysis of the previous assessment and follows the same general format. The CA initial and deliberate assessments are forward looking and organized to inform the stability sectors or primary stability tasks and produce greater fidelity based upon the assessment of the functional specialties. (See figure 2-3, page 19.) Each assessment in the progression becomes more focused, specific, and detailed with an ultimate goal of identifying critical links and nodes within societal systems and civil strengths and vulnerabilities that pose a threat to stability within the OE. The more specific the focus of the assessment, the more inclined planners are to use a diversity of metrics to evaluate the civil component.

INITIAL ASSESSMENTS

5-12. While the area study is done ahead of the need and reviewed and updated prior to deployment, the initial assessment is conducted upon entry into the designated AO. The initial assessment occurs as CAO planners collect, collate, and process information from available resources. Much of the information can be collected from news media, international organizations, NGOs, or social media to formulate an initial assessment. The objective and focus of the initial assessment should be broad enough to allow CA forces to quickly obtain an updated baseline of the general conditions within the entire AO to validate or refute the information and assumptions used in planning as well as to update the CAO priorities and information collection plan. Initial assessments use the stability sectors as a general outline and functional specialties to provide greater fidelity of conditions affecting those sectors.

5-13. CA teams conducting initial assessments must be aware of the security situation at all times in order to provide clarity regarding conditions that hinder stability. The entire CA force reports on civil conditions, and these reports are used within the CIM function to obtain data for the assessment. During continuous operations, the initial assessment requirement may not be necessary for follow-on CA forces due to the transfer of current and detailed operational data during transition. (See JP 6-0 for more on operational data.)

DELIBERATE ASSESSMENTS

5-14. Deliberate assessments are conducted in a methodical manner to enhance the situational understanding and perform an in-depth review of the system within the society. They are a determination of current conditions, capabilities, or attitudes within these defined areas. Deliberate assessments are characterized by firsthand observation, interviews, and other tools to gather information used to make knowledgeable decisions and to determine locations and priorities for follow-on, in-depth analysis and evaluation. The deliberate assessments follow the same general format of the initial assessment but may add virtually an infinite number of subtopics within the functional specialties to obtain more clarity of conditions within the OE.

SURVEYS

5-15. The survey is a detailed assessment in which the object of the assessment is examined carefully, as during an inspection or investigation. Surveys are conducted in a methodical manner in accordance with CAO priorities and the civil information collection plan on specific locations identified as requiring in-depth analysis and evaluation during deliberate assessments. This analysis and evaluation may include people, groups, locations, facilities, or capabilities within a location or part of a critical geopolitical, cultural, or ethnic system. During the survey, the CA team may use a variety of detailed checklists or formats within the CIM construct to ensure it has scrutinized all aspects of the specified entity, location, or facility targeted for survey. Survey development should leverage operations or research analysis and evaluation capabilities if available. The findings of a survey may lead to refined mission statements or reallocation of forces and resources by developing and implementing branches and sequels. There is not a specific format for a survey because of the vast variety of objects or systems that may be surveyed such as municipalities, court systems, specific infrastructure, or a specific functional specialty or area. However, a summarized survey can be included as a subtopic within the initial or deliberate assessment.

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS RUNNING ESTIMATE

5-16. Each staff section maintains a running estimate which provides information, conclusions, and recommendations from the perspective of each staff section. (See ADP 5-0.) Running estimates help to refine the COP and supplement it with information not readily displayed within the COP. Staffs synthesize information and provide it to commanders in the form of running estimates to help commanders build and maintain their situational understanding. Upon receipt or in anticipation of a mission, each staff section begins updating its estimate based on information requirements related to the mission. CA forces record relevant information in running estimates. They maintain a continuous assessment of the civil component as related to current operations as a basis to determine if they are proceeding according to the mission, commander's intent, and COP.

5-17. The CAO running estimate feeds directly into the MDMP, whether conducted unilaterally as part of CA-only operations or integrated into the supported unit's planning process and development of the COP. To focus the estimate process, planners first develop a restated mission statement that delineates CAO tasks necessary to successfully support the commander's mission. The mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph describing the unit's CAO essential task (or tasks) and purpose that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. It contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why as well as the reasons thereof, but it seldom specifies how. The running estimate generally follows the outline of the seven MDMP steps. For ease of conveyance, the information can be displayed graphically, through text, or in a combination of methods. The running estimate may be conveyed as text through the command post of the future, as a storyboard CONOP brief during mission analysis, or for the daily battle update brief. Maintaining the CAO running estimate ensures that the S-9/G-9 as well as CA forces have an in-depth understanding of the civil considerations at any point in time. (Figure 5-1, page 96, shows the MDMP steps with the information in the CA running estimate.)

Military Decision-Making Process Task	CAO Running Estimate
Step 1: Receipt of Mission	Prepare and begin recording information.
Step 2: Mission Analysis	**Paragraphs 1 and 2,** Mission and Situations/Considerations: • CAO Concept of Support. • Enemy Forces. • Friendly Forces. • Assumptions. • METT-TC (I)/ASCOPE.
Step 3: COA Development	**Paragraph 3,** COA Development.
Step 4: COA Analysis	**Paragraph 4,** COA Analysis: • CAO in COA 1. ▪ CAO Concept of Support. ▪ CAO Goals and Objectives. ▪ Analysis. ▪ Risk Analysis. • CAO in COA 2, and so on.
Step 5: COA Comparison	**Paragraph 5,** COA Comparison.
Step 6: COA Approval	**Paragraph 6,** Recommendation and Conclusions
Step 7: Orders, Production, Dissemination, and Transition	Update running estimates to reflect approved COA information.

ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
CAO Civil Affairs operations
COA course of action
METT-TC (I) mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, civil considerations, and informational considerations

Figure 5-1. Military decision-making process—running estimate synchronization chart

5-18. During COA development and wargaming, CA staff officers ensure each COA effectively integrates civil considerations (the "C" of METT-TC [I]) and present a summary of their running estimate to describe how their findings influence or are impacted by other staff functions. The CA staff officer must be able to articulate how operations affect civilians and estimate the requirements for essential stability tasks that commanders might have to undertake based on the capability of the force and that of the interagency, international organizations, and NGO partners. Ultimately, the CA staff officer recommends the best COA from the CAO perspective, even though it may not be the COA the staff recommends to the commander. CAO planners and staff use the running estimate throughout the operations process to assess the current situation, determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent, determine if future operations are supportable, and develop branches and sequels to current operations. (See appendix B for the format of the running estimate.)

ANNEXES

5-19. Staffs support the commander in understanding, visualizing, and describing the OE; making and articulating decisions; and directing, leading, and assessing military operations. (See FM 6-0.) Staffs make recommendations and prepare plans and orders for the commander. Staffs use annexes as attachments to plans and orders to provide more detail and organize information. The CAO staff supports the commander in communicating the commander's decisions and intent through these products. Key information recorded in the running estimate informs the orders process, particularly in the functional annexes. The CAO staff refines the CAO aspects of the plan and order by publishing annex K (Civil Affairs Operations), further amplifying the commander's intent in terms of CAO. In addition to annex K, the CAO staff is involved in the development of annex V (Interagency Coordination) in conjunction with the G-3, the S-3, and operations staff. In addition, the CAO staff must take great interest in annex P (Host-Nation Support).

ANNEX K: CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS (G-9/S-9)

5-20. Commanders and their staff use annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) to describe how CAO (in coordination with other military and civil organizations) support the CONOPS described in the BPLAN or order. This annex follows the five-paragraph attachment format and conveys the commander's intent regarding CA. (See appendix C for the base format of annex K.)

5-21. Additional appendices can be brought forward from the area study in order to clarify the COP and provide understanding of the civil considerations and may include maps depicting social demographics, population centers, resources, and infrastructure. International agreements that reflect U.S. policy as it relates to indigenous populations can also be attached.

ANNEX P: HOST-NATION SUPPORT (G-4/S-4)

5-22. Annex P uses the five-paragraph attachment format. Commanders and staffs use annex P to describe how sustainment operations support the CONOPS described in the BPLAN or order. The G-4/S-4 is the staff officer responsible for annex P. HN support is the civil and military assistance provided by the HN to the forces located in or transiting through that HN's territory. Efficient use of available HN support can greatly aid forces and augment the deployed sustainment structure. Much of any HN support will be derived through a bilateral, multilateral, or other international agreement. International agreements are with the entirety of the HN population and thus have an impact on the IPI. These international agreements often call for additional acquisition and cross-support agreements with the HN or other coalition partners. From these agreements, U.S. forces obtain local resources to support operations. The G-9/S-9 is usually in the best position to coordinate on behalf of the G-4/S-4 for utilization of local resources, which may include water, energy, food, ports, roads, and other resources to sustain the force. (See appendix D for the base format of annex P.)

ANNEX V: INTERAGENCY COORDINATION (G-3/S-3 AND G-9/S-9)

5-23. Annex V follows the five-paragraph attachment format; however, some subparagraphs are modified to accommodate communication with the interagency. The G-3/S-3, in conjunction with the G-9/S-9, develops annex V, though the G-3/S-3 likely leans heavily toward the G-9/S-9 to draft and/or publish the document. Annex V provides military and interagency personnel with detailed information (mission, scheme, and tasks) to direct the necessary coordination and interaction between Army forces and interagency organizations. It describes how the commander intends to cooperate with, provide support to, and receive support from interagency or international organizations or other unified action partners throughout the operation. The G-9/S-9 is the primary staff entity for contact with the interagency as well as other entities within the civil component for civil-military matters.

5-24. Interagency partners may require the establishment of coordination mechanisms, and these coordination mechanisms must be addressed in annex V. (See JP 3-08.) They may include exchanges of liaisons and the establishment of a CMOC, humanitarian assistance coordination center, humanitarian operations center, joint interagency task force, joint interagency coordination group, or other interagency coordination entities. (See appendix E for the base format of annex V.)

ANNEX G: CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (J-9 OR JOINT STAFF CIVIL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR)

5-25. Joint operations use a different annex designation protocol. Joint doctrine directs the use of annex G to convey CMO guidance. Annex G promulgates CMO requirements in a formal plan or OPORD. CMO require coordination among CA, logistical, maneuver, health support, military police, engineer, transportation, and special operations. CMO involve cross-cutting activities across staff sections and subordinate units. Annex G identifies, consolidates, and de-conflicts the activities of the various sections and units. Planning and coordination at lower echelons require significantly more detail than discussed in annex G. (JP 5-0 describes annex G as the CMO annex but provides no format.)

5-26. CAO planners supporting the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the strategic level utilize the joint planning and execution enterprise. While CJCS GDE 3130 provides no specific guidance on the conveyance of civil information at the strategic level, JP 3-57 provides information on the use and publication of annex G.

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Appendix A

Civil Affairs Area Study

OVERVIEW

A-1. The basic evaluation of an area by CAO planners is the CA area study. The CA area study establishes baseline information relating to the civil components of the area in question. The CA area study is composed of three sections. The first section is performed in advance of need and is a general description and analysis of the area in question. The second section is performed after initial and deliberate assessments are conducted to gain, clarify, or validate information as well as obtain the optimal understanding of the OE. The third section aligns information based upon stability sectors or stability operations tasks (depending on echelon) to assist the commander in understanding what measures are needed to maintain or establish stability.

A-2. Section I presents a description and analysis of the geography, historical setting, and the social, political, military, economic, health, legal, education, governance, infrastructure, and national security systems and institutions of a country using a combination of open- and restricted-source materials. (See figure A-1.)

A-3. Section II presents analysis and evaluation of civil information of the OE based upon the operational variables (PMESII or PMESII-PT) and civil considerations (ASCOPE). The information is presented as a PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk. (See figure A-2, page 103.)

A-4. Section III presents analysis and evaluation of the operational environment based upon the stability sectors: security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure. (See figure A-3, page 104.)

SECTION I: GENERAL INFORMATION

A. Geography:
   1. Location and size:
      a. Location in relation to neighboring countries.
      b. Total land area (square miles or kilometers [size in relation to a U.S. state]).
   2. Physical features:
      a. Waterways and ports.
      b. Topography.
      c. Natural resources.
      d. Road and rail nets.
   3. Climate:
      a. Seasonal abnormalities, temperature, atmospheric pressure, humidity, rainfall, and prevailing winds.
      b. Characteristics and statistics.
   4. Political geography:
      a. Politically organized areas and regions.
      b. Effectiveness of administration of political areas in relation to geographic boundaries.
      c. Cities and towns.
      d. Boundaries.
      e. Sources of raw material.
      f. Principles or traditions that command loyal support.
      g. State of industrial development.

B. History:
   1. Brief history of—
      a. The development of the area.
      b. Influence exerted by major powers in development.
      c. Divisions or partitions resulting from wars and treaties.
      d. Major geographic or political factors to the status of the area.

Figure A-1. Civil Affairs area study section 1

e. Present form of government and previous forms of government.
f. Extent of political control over other areas.
g. Degree of control over the population exercised by government.
h. Susceptibility of existing government toward major powers.
i. Political organization of the area.

2. Brief coverage of each—
a. International treaty to which subject area or country is signatory.
b. Status of forces agreement.
c. Summary pronouncement of national policy pertinent to the subject area or country.

C. People:

1. Population:
a. Numbers.
b. Distribution and density.
c. Birth and death rates.
d. Biographical sketches of prominent personalities:
Name.
Address.
Business, profession, or occupation.
Political affiliation.
Education.
Religion.

2. Culture and social structure:
a. Culture:
History, government, and geography as they affect the cultural makeup of the people.
Events and facts considered most important.
Traditionally conducted activities, beliefs, or situations.
Heroes and leaders of groups, with reasons for special esteem.
Majority or minority groups (unique challenges or conditions).
Ethnic groups (racial, tribal, or religious) and population distribution (rural or urban with ratios of age, sex, and imported or exported labor forces).
Moral codes.
Attitudes toward age, sex, race.
Influences on personality development.
Individuality.
Privacy.
Nature of the people's perceptions.
Clothing.
Fatalism or self-determination.
Values in economic philosophy (cooperation, competition, respect for personal and private property).
b. Social structure:
Status of male and female, by age.
Humor, entertainment.
Community participation.
Exchange of gifts.
Public displays of emotion.
Lines of authority.
Cooperation versus competition, including economics.
The family:
Roles and status of family members.
Nuclear or extended.
Authority, obedience, place, and expectations of members.
Place in society.
Inheritance customs.

Figure A-1. Civil Affairs area study section 1 (continued)

Entrance rites and rituals.
Markers of social change, adulthood, special activities.

c. Dating and marriage:
Age standards.
Influence of family and peers.
Common dating practices, courtship activities.
Chaperones, group dating.
Engagement customs.
Divorce, separation, aloneness.
Sexual mores.

d. Greetings:
Conversation and gestures on meeting.
Distinctive approaches for greetings.
Compliments given or received.
Space and time (standing, sitting, distance between people).
Farewell and leave-taking.
Use of first name versus titles.
Favorite, familiar, or pleasing phrases.

e. Visiting practices:
Conversations.
Gifts.
Compliments on possessions, family, and children.
Parties and other social events.
Business discussions.
Mannerisms, gestures, posture, eye contact, and facial expressions.

f. Eating practices:
Table manners (before, during, and after the meal).
Average diet, meal size, and scheduling.
Specific foods reserved for special occasions or rituals.
Forbidden foods.
Social and other occasions.
Unique problems and challenges.

g. Work and recreation:
Age, sex, status, and hierarchy.
Schedules.
Obligations, successes, or failures.
Business codes.
Bribes.
Family, cultural; and social recreation; vacation; and sports.
Individual recreation (age and sex exclusions and variations).
Distinctive arts and sciences.
Well-known artists, athletes, and others.

h. Dos and don'ts:
An item or area that could embarrass or hurt the commander's mission if handled improperly.
Include a quick reference for the commander and a starting point for briefing troops.
This section may include items previously mentioned.

3. Languages:
a. Map showing distribution.
b. Minority groups.
c. Standardization of languages.

4. Religion:
a. Religious sects (number, key leaders, and geographic locations).
b. Funeral and burial practices.
c. Religious problems.

Figure A-1. Civil Affairs area study section 1 (continued)

d. Eating and dietary habits.
e. Sexual mores, including interrelations and intermarriages with alien personnel.
f. Written and unwritten laws of conduct and human behavior.

D. U.S. interests:
1. U.S. military units and teams in the area and their activities.
2. U.S. Government organizations in the area and their interests.
3. U.S. civilian organizations and interests in the area.
4. Legal agreements and treaties.
5. Trade and commercial interests.

E. Host-nation support:
1. Command and control:
a. Space and facilities at echelons above corps.
b. Command and control of other functional areas.
c. Area security.
d. Dislocated civilians.
e. Battlefield circulation control communications.
f. Use of communications systems.
g. Repair of communications systems.
h. Cable construction repair.
2. Sustainment:
a. Use of host-nation buildings.
b. Use of host-nation transportations and distribution systems, including highways, railways, waterways, and ports (public and private).
c. Civilian services (laundry, bath, bakery, food, water).
d. Depot operations and depot maintenance.
e. Material-handling equipment.
f. Labor:
Skilled.
Manual.
Agricultural.
Male or female.
Draft exemption for U.S. employees.
Third country (labor necessity, availability, and quantity).
Screened by counterintelligence.
Linguists and interpreters.
Salary (standard wages).
Workday.
3. Mobility and survivability:
a. Repair of railroads, highways, and pipelines.
b. Obstacle construction.
c. Contract guard services.
d. Decontamination.
e. Port facilities and repair.
f. Barrier and construction materials.
4. Medical:
a. Hospitals (facilities and beds).
b. Medical evacuation.
c. Medical supplies and equipment.
d. Backup electrical systems (generators).
5. Host-nation point of contact for U.S. forces and procedures.
6. Impact of U.S. presence on the host-nation economy.

Figure A-1. Civil Affairs area study section 1 (continued)

SECTION II: OPERATIONAL VARIABLES AND CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS CROSSWALK

A. Political:
   1. Areas.
   2. Structures.
   3. Capabilities.
   4. Organizations.
   5. People.
   6. Events.

B. Military:
   1. Areas.
   2. Structures.
   3. Capabilities.
   4. Organizations.
   5. People.
   6. Events.

C. Economic:
   1. Areas.
   2. Structures.
   3. Capabilities.
   4. Organizations.
   5. People.
   6. Events.

D. Social:
   1. Areas.
   2. Structures.
   3. Capabilities.
   4. Organizations.
   5. People.
   6. Events.

E. Information:
   1. Areas.
   2. Structures.
   3. Capabilities.
   4. Organizations.
   5. People.
   6. Events.

F. Infrastructure:
   1. Areas.
   2. Structures.
   3. Capabilities.
   4. Organizations.
   5. People.
   6. Events.

Figure A-2. Civil Affairs area study section 2

SECTION III: STABILITY SECTORS

A. Security:
   1. Law enforcement:
      a. National investigative service.
      b. National police.
      c. Highway police.
      d. District or municipal police.
   2. Border enforcement:
      a. Customs.
      b. Immigration.

B. Justice and reconciliation:
   1. Rule of law:
      a. National body of law.
      b. Provincial body of law.
      c. National Courts.
      d. Provincial Courts.
      e. District Courts.
      f. Magistrate courts.
   2. Systems of law:
      a. Civil and criminal codes.
      b. Origins.
      c. Procedures.
      d. Penalties.
      e. Political crimes.
   3. Administration of justice:
      a. Historical development.
      b. Agencies (national and local).
      c. Courts and tribunals (types of jurisdiction, including administrative tribunals).
      d. Judicial procedures.
      e. Personnel.
      f. Judiciary.
      g. Prosecutors.
      h. The bar.
      i. Legal training.
      j. Political controls.
   4. Corrections:
      a. National penitentiaries.
      b. Provincial penitentiaries.
      c. Jails.
   5. Public safety:
      a. Crime.
      b. Civil defense.
      c. Fire service.
      d. Emergency medical service.
      e. Paramilitary/militia.
   6. General conditions and problems. The primary consideration in this area is whether the existing institutions (police, fire, and penal) may be used to carry out the combat commander's primary mission and to provide the day-to-day control and bodily protection of the local population.
   7. Police system:
      a. Organizations at all levels:
         Types of police forces and criminal investigative agencies.
         Organization.
         Areas of responsibility and jurisdiction.

Figure A-3. Civil Affairs area study section 3

Chain of command.
Names and biographical sketches of key personnel.

b. Equipment:
Arms and special equipment.
Modern crime-fighting equipment.
Traffic-control equipment.
Riot-control equipment.
Police communications.
Transportation.

c. Personnel:
Strength.
Method of selection.
Political, racial, and religious requirements.
Reliability.
Morale and state of training.
Promotion basis.

d. Functions and authority:
Criminal action.
Civil ordinances.
Disorder and disaster control.

e. Police regulations that differ from the U.S. concept of law and order.
General.
Identification system.
Restrictions on travel, gatherings, and curfews.
Restrictions on ownership of firearms.
Miscellaneous.
Other methods of enforcing law and order, such as the influence of religious leaders, family ties, and the role of the military.
Psychological effects on the local population.
Penal institutions.

f. National and local:
Prisons and jails (number, location, and capacity).
Concentration camps and labor camps (number, location, and capacity).

g. Organization.

h. Government agency exercising control.

i. Inmate breakdown:
Political (reliability and future use in the U.S. cause).
Criminal.
Juvenile.
Sex.

j. Adequacy (sanitary and health conditions).

k. Treatment of prisoners:
Probation.
Parole.
Fire protection.

l. Organization (in general, the same as for the police).

m. Equipment:
Type, location, and adequacy of existing equipment and facilities.
Adaptability of local military firefighting equipment.

n. Personnel:
Strength and mode of selection.
Training status and efficiency.
Names and political reliability of key personnel.

Figure A-3. Civil Affairs area study section 3 (continued)

o. Miscellaneous:
Particular problems in certain areas, such as overcrowded cities, narrow streets, and local water pressure.
Possible use of equipment in controlling riots and other public disasters.

C. Humanitarian assistance and social well-being:
1. Public education:
a. Organization:
National level.
Other levels (province, state, district, and so on).
Biographical sketches of key personnel.
Philosophy guiding the educational system.
b. General conditions and problems:
General development of the area's educational system.
Requirements placed upon individuals.
Significant achievements in recent years.
Educational level of population.
c. Agencies, institutions, and programs:
Government agencies and policies.
Educational systems and facilities:
Administration and controls.
Preschool, kindergarten, and primary schools.
Secondary schools.
Vocational and special schools.
Higher education.
Teacher education.
Private schools.
Adult education.
Evaluation of educational system.
Private and public organizations.
Influence and pressure groups.
Youth organizations.
Religious groups.
Influence of politics on education.
2. Public health:
a. Organization:
National level.
Other levels (province, state, district, and so on).
Biographical sketches of key personnel.
b. General conditions and problems.
c. Agencies and institutions.
d. Hospitals:
Amount.
Capacity (number of beds).
e. Other medical facilities:
Location and condition of facilities.
Public.
Private.
Numbers (doctors and nurses).
Location.
Medical equipment and supplies.
Surgical and dental equipment.
Testing equipment.
Medical personnel.

Figure A-3. Civil Affairs area study section 3 (continued)

f. Drugs:
    Availability.
    Shortages.
    Other supplies.
g. Diseases:
    Predominant types.
    Control programs.
h. Environmental sanitation:
    Regulations regarding food and drugs.
    Water control and supply.
    Disposal of sewage and waste.
i. Public welfare:
    Organization.
    National level.
    Other levels (province, state, district, and so on).
    Biographical sketches of key personnel.
j. Major social problems:
    Juvenile delinquency.
    Alcohol and narcotics abuse.
    Unemployment.
    Poverty and dependency.
    (+) Sexual based violence.
k. Public assistance:
    Basis for granting assistance.
    Types of relief and medical care provided.
l. Agencies, institutions, and programs:
    Social insurance.
    Health insurance.
    Accident insurance.
    Old age, disability, and survivors' pensions.
    Unemployment.
    Family assistance.
    Other.
m. Welfare services (government and private):
    Child welfare (adoption, maternal).
    Emergency and war relief.
    Relief and public assistance:
        For mentally and physically handicapped.
        For aged and indigent.
n. Institutions:
    Orphanages (number, location, and capacity).
    Homes for the aged (number, locations, and capacity).
    Physical therapy (number and location).
o. Programs:
    Recreational.
    Vocational.
    Health.
    Childcare.
p. Welfare personnel:
    Professional standards.
    Volunteer assistance.
    Number available by type of organization.

(+) Figure A-3. Civil Affairs area study section 3 (continued)

q. Financial and legal:
Financial plan (how funds are obtained).
Laws and regulations.
Organizational structure.
r. Regulations governing public welfare.
3. Civilian supply:
a. General conditions and problems such as peculiarities of climate and geography that might influence civilian supply.
b. Storage, refrigeration, and processing facilities:
Storage space, available and required.
Food.
Other supplies.
Refrigeration, available and required.
c. Distribution channels:
Food.
Clothing.
Essential durables.
d. Dietary and clothing requirements and customs:
Food:
Available.
Required.
Clothing:
Available.
Required.
Customs that might influence civilian supply.
e. Production excesses and shortages.
D. Governance and participation:
1. Public Administration:
a. General system of public administration:
Political traditions.
Political stability.
Standards and effectiveness.
Constitutional system.
Civil rights and practices.
Political factions, movements, and dynamics.
b. Structure of national government:
Executive branch:
Organization.
Powers.
Policies.
Administration.
Legislative branch:
Organization.
Powers.
Composition of membership.
Pressure groups.
Judicial branch:
Organization.
Powers.
c. Methods of selection of key officials.
d. Biographical sketches of key officials:
Name.
Address.

Figure A-3. Civil Affairs area study section 3 (continued)

Position in government.
Political affiliation.
Education.
Religion.
Former business, profession, or occupation.
Attitude toward the United States.

e. Potential officials and biographical sketches.
f. Structure of government at other levels:
Province or state.
District.
City.
Relations with national government.
g. Biographical sketches of key officials, potential officials, and other influential persons.
Name.
Address.
Position.
Political affiliation.
Education.
Religion.
Former business, profession, or occupation.
Attitude toward the United States.
h. Armed forces:
Historical background.
Organization, size, and mission.
Defense establishment.
Army.
Navy.
Air force.
Paramilitary forces.
Political control and effectiveness.
i. General military policy.
j. International treaties.
k. Foreign influence.
l. Military establishment and the national economy:
Defense budget.
Percentage of total budget.
Military pay.
m. Quality and source of manpower:
Key officers and qualifications.
Recruitment.
Conscription.
Reserves.
Training.
Mobilization plans.
n. Logistics.
o. Weapons and equipment.
p. Ranks, uniforms, and insignia.
q. Loyalty and morale factors.
r. Military justice.
s. Political parties.
t. Strength and capabilities.
u. Organization.
v. Policies and objectives.

Figure A-3. Civil Affairs area study section 3 (continued)

w. Biographical sketches of leaders.
x. Training.
y. Role in international communist movement.
z. Relation to domestic government.
aa. Internal party politics.
bb. International affairs.
cc. Agencies.
dd. Foreign relations.
ee. Relations with international organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

2. Public information:
   a. General conditions, problems, and stage of development.
   b. Effect of geographic, social, economic, and political factors.
   c. Reading, listening, viewing habits.
   d. Rural-urban differences.
   e. Anticommunist appeal.
   f. International outlook.
   g. Techniques to measure impact.
   h. Newspapers, periodicals, and publishing firms.
      Name.
      Location.
      Ownership.
      Circulation.
      Publication.
      Language.
      Editorial policies (political persuasion).
      Procedures.
      Employees.
      Equipment.
      Sources of supply.
      Revenue.
   i. Miscellaneous means of communications:
      Private printing facilities.
      Advertising agencies.
      Others.

3. Cultural relations:
   a. General conditions and problems.
   b. Cultural affairs.
   c. Religions in the area:
      National.
      Organized.
      Unorganized (sects).
      Relations among religions and religious leaders, indigenous and missionary.
   d. Clergy:
      Number, location, and education of clergymen.
      Influence of religious leaders.
      Religious beliefs.
   e. Major tenets of each religion, including such concepts as—
      Faith.
      Impact of faith on life.
      Concept of the hereafter.
      Means of salvation.
      Rites of cleaning and purification.
      Impact of religions on value systems.

Figure A-3. Civil Affairs area study section 3 (continued)

f. Degree of religious conviction in lives of indigenous populace.
    Worship.
    Forms and significance of worship of each religion.
    Places of worship.
    Frequency of worship.
g. Relationship between religion and transcultural communication.
    Socioeconomic influence of religion.
    Influence of religions on society.
    Economic influence of religions.
h. Religious ownership of property and other possessions.
i. Teachings of religions about private property.
j. Interrelation with government:
    Relationship of religious leaders and government officials.
    Role of religions and religious leaders in armed forces.
    Political influence of religious leaders.
k. Religious schools:
    Location, size, and attendance.
    Influence.
    Relationship to nonsecular schools.
l. Arts, monuments, and archives:
    Description of conditions of the arts and monuments.
    Advancements over the past 10 years.
    Influence of outside countries.
m. Arts:
    Location, type, use, and significance of the fine arts.
    Population attitude toward art treasures.
    Government policies and agencies dealing with the arts.
    Agencies through which arts are performed.
n. Private.
o. Government.
p. Advancements in science.
q. Artists' organizations and government control.
r. Monuments:
    Location of historic monuments and sites.
    Present significance of historic monuments and sites.
s. Archives.
    Location of archives.
    Varieties of archives.
    Public archives.
    Semipublic archives.
    Ecclesiastical archives.
    Private or family archives.
    Contents or category of archives.
t. Historical:
    Current documents.

4. Environmental management:
a. General conditions and problems.
b. Pollution control and environmental management organizations.
c. Laws and regulations.
d. Sources of pollution:
    Air.
    Water.
    Soil.

Figure A-3. Civil Affairs area study section 3 (continued)

e. Health hazard:
Immediate and present threats.
Near term.
Mid term.
Long term.

E. Economic stabilization and infrastructure:
1. Economic development:
a. General conditions and problems.
b. Public finance.
c. Organization:
National level.
Other levels.
Biographical sketches of key personnel.
d. Policies:
Fiscal and economic policies.
Special conditions and policies.
Accounting systems used.
e. Monetary system:
Currency.
Reserves or backing of currency.
Issuing authorities.
Stability of currency.
Controls.
Exchange rates.
Government authorities.
Other legal instruments of exchange.
Other means of exchange, such as the black market.
f. Budgetary system and current budget:
Current budget.
Budgetary analysis.
Governing authorities and controls.
Analysis of budgetary procedures.
Patterns of expenditure and distribution.
g. Sources of government income:
Analysis of taxation (amount of taxes collected, method of collection, and type of taxes).
Formulation of tax policies.
Investments.
Other sources of government income.
h. Financial institutions:
Banking institutions (facilities, location, capital, and credit policies).
Investment institutions.
Stock institutions.
Controlling authorities and control exercised.
Miscellaneous investment companies.
Insurance companies (number, size, and location).
Specialized savings institutions.
Foreign exchange (balance of trade, controls, and restrictions).
i. Applicable laws and regulations:
Economics and commerce.
Description of economic system.
Private enterprise.
Public enterprise.
Biographical sketches of key officials and business leaders.
j. National economic policy and controls.

Figure A-3. Civil Affairs area study section 3 (continued)

k. Goals and programs:
    Short range.
    Intermediate range.
    Long range.
l. Summary of important trade agreements and extent of participation in world trade.
m. Resources:
    Natural.
    Developed.
    Human.
    Self-sufficiency, dependency, substitution.
n. Extent of development:
    Capabilities of infrastructure.
    Capabilities of industry and power.
    Capabilities of agriculture.
    Capabilities of service sector.
o. Statistics:
    Per capita (income, savings, consumer spending).
    Aggregate (gross national product, national income).
    Ratios (unemployment, productivity, occupations).
    Validity of statistics (when compiled).
p. Internal movement of goods.
q. Exports and imports:
    Type.
    Quantity.
    Market.
    Influence.
r. Commerce:
    Domestic trade.
    Wholesale and retail distribution system.
    Markets and fairs.
    Weights and measures standards.
    Cooperatives and public markets.
s. Foreign trade:
    Principal items of export and import.
    Tariff system, customs, and duties.
    Trade agreements.
    Balance of payments.
t. Industries:
    Location of main industrial centers.
    Names of important companies.
    Labor (skills and distribution).
    Power sources and capacities.
    Manufacturing industries.
    Types (machinery, chemical, or textile).
    Locations (province or city).
    Processing industries (types, locations, and capacities).
u. Agencies, institutions, and programs:
    Government organization.
    Trade associations and chambers of commerce.
    Laws governing commerce and industry.
    Subsidies and monopolies.
v. Price control and rationing:
    Stabilization.
    Variation of prices.

Figure A-3. Civil Affairs area study section 3 (continued)

Control measures and techniques.
Commodities under price control.
Distribution.

w. Essential commodities:
Imports and exports.
Ration controls.
Production and distribution.
Effect on demands.
Types and status of markets.
Control systems.
Price-control program.
Rationing program.
Raw materials.
Financial.
Legislation.
Price-control legislation and items subject to price control.
Rationing legislation and items subject to rationing.
Labor.

x. Organization:
National level.
Other levels.
Key personnel with biographical sketches.

y. Labor force:
Employment data and trends.
Available manpower and labor supply by special classes.
Ages and distribution.
Unemployment.
Labor productivity.

z. Agencies, institutions, and programs:
Government labor policy.
Labor laws and working conditions.
Role of government.
Government job placement controls.
Wages and other incentives.
Labor organizations.

aa. Organizations (type, size, location, leaders, and political influence).

bb. Membership.

cc. Relations with foreign or international labor organizations.

dd. Total potential labor force (type, distribution, mobility, and ages):
Social insurance.
Labor disputes, including mechanisms for settling.
Wages and standards, including hours and working conditions.

2. Food and agriculture:

a. General conditions and problems:
Importance of agriculture in total economy.
Extent of agricultural productivity and self-sufficiency.
Principal problems.
Attitude of farm population.

b. Agricultural geography:
Locations of principal farm areas.
Types of soil.
Influence of climate and topography.
Types of crops.
Farm to market road net.

Figure A-3. Civil Affairs area study section 3 (continued)

c. Agricultural products and processing:
    Livestock and dairy products such as types, amounts, methods of processing, refrigeration, and warehousing.
    Crops (types, amounts, methods of processing, storage).
    Poultry (types, amounts, methods of processing, storage, refrigeration).
d. Agricultural practices:
    Extent of mechanization.
    Improvement programs.
    Conservation programs.
    Pest and disease control.
e. Land-holding system and reform programs.
f. Fisheries:
    Commercial information such as number, companies, location, type of fish, type of crafts, fishing areas, methods of processing, storage, annual production.
    Private (policy, rules, regulations, type of fish, fishing areas).
    Restocking program.
    Problem areas.
g. Forestry:
    Reforestation program.
    Importance of forestry to the country.
    Forestry services or administration.
    Hunting (controls, laws, regulations, and types of game).
    Products and their processing.
h. Agencies, institutions, and programs:
    Government.
    Private.
i. Food products:
    Type.
    Quantity.
    Processing.
    Location, size, and ownership of warehouses.
    Types and quantity of food supplies stored.
    Applicable laws and regulations governing food and agriculture.

3. Public works and utilities:
a. General conditions and problems.
b. Public works:
    Public buildings, including hospitals (use, size, and location).
    Roads and streets.
    Bridges.
    Port facilities (harbors).
    Airports and railroad terminals.
    Mass housing.
    Dams (flood control).
c. Public utilities:
    Power system, including nuclear reactors and power-generating plants and distribution systems.
    Water system (source dams, degree of pollution, filter plants, and ownership).
    Gas works (size, location, source, and ownership).
    Sewage-collection systems and disposal plants.
    Radioactive waste, garbage, and refuse disposal.
    Storm drainage systems.
    Items of general importance to all public works and utilities:
        Ownership.
        Regulating and licensing agencies.

Figure A-3. Civil Affairs area study section 3 (continued)

Financial structure.
Administration.
Operations and revenues.
Maintenance.
Trade associations.
Personnel and labor relations.

d. Elements relative to each specific public works or utility in detail:
Locations of plants, line systems, nets, and connecting grids.
Condition.
New construction requirements.
Available resources for construction.
Priority of usage.

4. Public communications:
a. General conditions and problems.
b. Postal system:
Extent and frequency of service.
Metropolitan.
Rural.
Censorship.
Private carriers.
Parcel post service.
Other functions.
Postal savings.
Money order service.
Issuance of licenses.
Tax information service.
c. Telephone:
Exchanges and local service.
Long-line systems and connecting grids.
Priority of usage.
Censorship.
Private systems.
International and intercontinental wire and submarine cables.
d. Telegraph:
Exchanges and local service.
Long-line systems and connecting grids.
Priority of usage.
Censorship.
Private systems.
International and intercontinental wire and submarine cables.
e. Radio and television:
Transmitting stations (number, type, and location).
Channels, frequencies, and trunk lines.
Hours of operation.
Censorship.
Propaganda usage.
Foreign influence.
Foreign broadcasts.
Programming.
Applicable laws governing communications systems.

5. Public transportation:
a. General conditions and problems.

Figure A-3. Civil Affairs area study section 3 (continued)

b. Rail transport:
    Railroad by type, gauge, and miles or kilometers.
    Type, number, and condition of rolling stock.
    Location of switchyards.
    Major rail terminals (number, size, location, and condition).
c. Vehicular transportation:
    Road (type, condition, and miles or kilometers).
    Street systems and condition.
    Vehicles and public conveyances by type, number, and ownership.
d. Water transportation:
    Size, location, type, use, and ownership of all floating vessels.
    Location of all port facilities and services.
    Identification of sea routes.
    Location and use of inland waterways.
e. Air transportation:
    Location, size, and use of all airfields.
    Number, size, use, and ownership of all aircraft.
f. Pipelines.
g. Travel:
    Status of tourist travel.
    Restrictions.
    Regulations.
    Volume by geographic area of people leaving and entering.
    Items of general importance common to all transportation systems.
h. Ownership:
    Regulatory agencies and licenses.
    Financial structure.
    Administration.
    Operation and revenues.
    Maintenance.
    Trade associations.
    Personnel and labor relations.
i. Elements relative to each specific transport system in detail:
    Location and mileage.
    Condition.
    Effect of seasonal variation.
j. Special traffic hazards and problems.

Figure A-3. Civil Affairs area study section 3 (continued)

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Appendix B
Civil Affairs Operations Running Estimate

OVERVIEW

B-1. This appendix provides fundamental considerations, formats, and instructions for developing the CAO running estimate. This estimate is generally guided by the seven-step MDMP. (See figure B-1.)

B-2. Staffs use knowledge management and information management (as defined by the Army) to extract knowledge from the vast amount of available information. This enables staffs to provide knowledge to commanders in the form of recommendations and running estimates to help commanders build and maintain their situational understanding.




Figure B-1. Civil Affairs operations running estimates

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Appendix C

Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations)

OVERVIEW

C-1. The following format is provided for use in creating a CAO annex. (See figure C-1.) The basic format of the annex is in black text. The helping text is captured in *italics* and should be deleted or replaced with information specific to the plan or operation. The text in [brackets] should be replaced with information specific to the plan or operation. (For more information regarding the annex K format, see FM 5-0.)

[CLASSIFICATION]

Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the attachments. Place the classification marking at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph in parentheses. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions.

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Use the heading only when the BPLAN or order issues the annex and its attachments separately.

Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations [CAO]) to OPLAN or OPORD [NUMBER], [CORPS/DIVISION/BRIGADE], [CODE NAME], [CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE].

References. *List documents essential to understanding the OPLAN or OPORD. List references concerning a specific function in the appropriate attachments. List the documents in the following order:*

a. **Maps and charts.** *Map entries include series number, country, sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale.*

b. **Other references.** *Label these references in subparagraphs, and label them in the same manner as the following examples:*
   (1) CAO annex of the HHQ.
   (2) Relevant civilian agency operations guides and standard documents.
   (3) Relevant plans of participating civilian organizations.
   (4) Coordinated transition plans.
   (5) International treaties and agreements.
   (6) Operational CA database (CIM, reachback, and so on).
   (7) Others, as applicable, such as the Bilateral Mutual Defense Agreement between the United States and Republic of Korea, 15 January 2004; OPORD 49991-14, Joint Task Force (JTF) Kaspan (Kaspan Alert) [CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE], 15 June 2009.

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD. *State the time zone used in the AO during execution. When the OPLAN or OPORD applies to units in different time zones, use Greenwich Mean Time (ZULU [Z]); for example, Z or local.*

1. **Situation.** *Include items of information affecting CA support that paragraph 1 of the OPLAN or OPORD did not address and any information that needs expansion. The situation paragraph describes how the CAO or CMO environment may affect friendly, adversary, and other operations. It should discuss how CAO/CMO would influence friendly operations. The situation paragraph describes the conditions and circumstances of the operational environment that affect CAO in the following subparagraphs:*

   a. **Area of Interest.** *Describe the area of interest. Refer to annex B (Intelligence) as required.*

   b. **Area of Operations.** *Describe the AO. Refer to the appropriate map by its subparagraph under references; for example, "Map, reference (b)." Refer to appendix 2 (Operations Overlay) to annex C (Operations) as required. Include the following:*

Figure C-1. The Civil Affairs operations annex

(1) **Terrain.** *Describe the aspects of terrain that affect operations. Refer to tab A (Terrain) to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to annex B (Intelligence) as required. Examples of considerations include indigenous population centers and likely movement corridors of DCs that may affect military operations (terrain that channelizes DCs) and identification of civil-related COGs.*

(2) **Weather.** *Describe the aspects of weather that affect operations. Refer to tab B (Weather) to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to annex B (Intelligence) as required. Examples of weather considerations include seasonal events (rain, flooding, windstorms, and snow) that may affect commercial mobility or agricultural production, farmer-to-market access capability, planning PRC, and any inclement weather that affects time.*

c. **Enemy Forces.** *Identify enemy forces and appraise their general capabilities. Describe the enemy's disposition, location, strength, and probable COAs. Identify known or potential terrorist threats and adversaries within the AO. Refer to annex B (Intelligence) as required. Examples of enemy force considerations include maintaining continuous coordination with the intelligence staff to develop potential effects of enemy forces on the CAO mission. Address enemy capabilities by considering sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, and movement of DCs. Consider enemy use of civilians as shields, enemy sympathizers, and PRCs to deny the enemy access to the civil populace and deny materiel to the enemy.*

d. **Friendly Forces.** *Outline the plan of the HHQ as it pertains to CAO. List the designation, location, and outline the plans of higher, adjacent, and other CAO assets that support or affect the issuing HQ or require coordination and additional support. Include additional information on interagency, international, and NGOs that may affect CAO.*

(1) **Mission and Intent of Higher Headquarters.** *Identify and state the CAO mission and commander's intent for the HHQ of the issuing HQ.*

(2) **Missions of Adjacent Units.** *Identify and state the CAO missions of adjacent units and other units whose actions have a significant effect on the issuing HQ.*

e. **Interagency, International, and Nongovernmental Organizations.** *Identify and state the objective or goals and primary tasks of non-DOD organizations that play a significant role in the AO. Refer to annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required. Do not repeat information listed in annex V. Consider all organizations with interests in the AO; for example, the HN (including the HN military), multinational agencies and organizations, IPI, and, to a lesser degree, the private sector.*

(1) **Interagency Organizations.** *Assess the ability of key interagency organizations operating in the AO to support the unit's CAO mission. Include the agency's missions, capabilities, capacity, and coordination points of contact (POCs) if not listed in annex V. Identify known unit requirements to support interagency operations.*

(2) **International Organizations.** *Assess the ability of key international organizations, especially United Nations (UN) agencies, operating in the AO to support the unit's CAO mission. Include the missions, capabilities, capacity, and coordination POCs of the agencies. Identify known unit requirements to support intergovernmental cooperation.*

(3) **Nongovernmental Organizations.** *Assess key NGOs operating in the AO to support the unit's CAO mission. Include the missions, capabilities, capacity, (such as the ability to support civil relief systems, and coordination POCs of the agencies. Identify known unit requirements to support nongovernmental operations.*

f. **Civil Considerations.** *Describe the critical aspects, strengths, and weaknesses of the civil situation that affect operations. Liaise with the G-2/S-2 and refer to tab C (Civil Considerations) to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to annex B (Intelligence) as required. Address the general overview of civil considerations for the AO (described by the mnemonic ASCOPE). Review the critical aspects of the civil situation by applying each of the operational variables (PMESII-PT) that could affect the civil considerations analysis.*

Figure C-1. The Civil Affairs operations annex (continued)

(1) **Areas.** *List the key civilian areas in the supported commander's operational environment. This paragraph approaches terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Commanders analyze key civilian areas in terms of how they affect the mission as well as how military operations affect these areas. Examples of key civilian areas are areas defined by political boundaries such as districts within a city or municipalities within a region, locations of government centers; social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves; agricultural and mining regions, trade routes, and possible sites for the temporary settlement of DCs or other civil functions.*

(2) **Structures.** *List the locations of existing civil structures (critical infrastructure) such as ports, air terminals, transportation networks, bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams, which are traditional high-payoff targets. List churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals as cultural sites, which international law or other agreements usually protect. List other infrastructure, including governance and public safety structures such as national, regional, and urban government facilities; record archives; judiciary, police, fire, and emergency medical services; and economic and environmental structures (banking, stock and commodity exchanges, toxic industrial facilities, and pipelines). List other facilities with practical applications such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants, which may be useful for military purposes.*

(3) **Capabilities.** *Describe civil capabilities by assessing the population's ability to sustain itself through public safety and emergency services as well as food and agriculture sources. Include whether the populace needs assistance with public works and utilities, public health, public transportation, economics, and commerce; for example, "Limited restoration of law enforcement exists and requires support from UN or coalition forces. HN basic emergency and medical services are reportedly adequate to support the local populace." Base the analysis of the existing capabilities of the AO on the 14 CA functional specialties (refer to the preliminary area assessment developed during mission analysis).*

(4) **Organizations.** *List civil organizations that may or may not be affiliated with government agencies such as church groups, ethnic groups, multinational corporations, fraternal organizations, patriotic or Service organizations, and NGOs. Do not repeat those listed in annex V or paragraph 1e (Interagency, International, and Nongovernmental Organizations) listed above. For example: "There are several charitable organizations in the AO. Religious groups provide minimal support but lack internal transportation." Include HN organizations capable of forming the nucleus of FHA programs, interim governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.*

(5) **People.** *List key personnel and linkage to the population, leaders, figureheads, clerics, and subject-matter experts such as plant operators and public utility managers. This list may extend to personnel outside of the operational environment whose actions, opinions, and influence can affect the supported commander's operational environment. Categorize groups of civilians such as local nationals (town and city dwellers, farmers, other rural dwellers, and nomads), local civil authorities (elected and traditional leaders at all levels of government), expatriates, tribal or clan figureheads and religious leaders, third-nation government agency representatives, foreign employees of NGOs, contractors (U.S. citizens, local nationals, and third-nation citizens providing contract services), the media (journalists from print, radio, and visual media), and the DC population (refugees, displaced persons, internally displaced persons, evacuees, expellees, migrants, stateless persons).*

(6) **Events.** *Determine what events, military and civilian, are occurring and provide analysis of the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, moral, and legal implications. Categorize civilian events that may affect military missions. Civilian events may include harvest seasons, elections, riots, voluntary and involuntary evacuations, holidays, school year, and religious periods. For example: "The school year has been suspended. The HN does not have the assets to enforce a curfew. This is not an electoral year."*

Figure C-1. The Civil Affairs operations annex (continued)

g. **Attachments and Detachments.** *List units attached to or detached from the issuing HQ. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the OPLAN/OPORD. Do not repeat information already listed in annex A (Task Organization). This paragraph includes all military and nonmilitary organizations participating in CMOC operations and CAO or CMO. Identify other CA resources attached and detached, and include effective times of transfer, if appropriate.*

h. **Assumptions.** *Only list assumptions when preparing a CAO annex to an OPLAN. (When preparing a CAO annex to an OPORD, omit this step.) Include invalidated assumptions developed while preparing the CAO running estimate. List key assumptions used in the development of the OPLAN/OPORD if they pertain to the CAO/CMO mission.*

(1) *Identify critical planning considerations and unknown conditions that personnel must confirm during the initial assessment(s). Examples: "Military and interagency support will be available. Personnel and facilities of relief and welfare organizations will continue to provide a basis for civilian relief programs; and the civilian populace will continue to offer resistance to the opposing force."*

(2) *Provide a statement describing the operational risks of not engaging the civil component(s) of the AO.*

2. **Mission.** *Include a clear, concise statement of the CA task that includes the following:*

a. **Who.** *The type of forces that will execute the tasks.*

b. **What.** *The tasks personnel must accomplish.*

c. **When.** *The date and time the tasks are to occur.*

d. **Where.** *The location the tasks are to occur.*

e. **Why.** *The reason each force will conduct its part of the operation.*

f. **Prioritize multiple CA tasks.** *Include a task and a purpose in all mission statements. Personnel can obtain the mission statement from paragraph 1 of the CAO running estimate or can extract it from the estimate verbatim. Examples of mission statements include the following:*

(1) *The 360th Civil Affairs Brigade plans, coordinates, and supports DC operations in support of the XVIII Airborne Corps in AO Eagle by minimizing civilian interference with military operations to protect military resources and the civilian population while minimizing human suffering and commencing upon receipt of this order in an effort to save lives and restore the HN to presituational conditions.*

(2) *The 422nd Civil Affairs Battalion plans, coordinates, and conducts CAO in support of the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division in AO Eagle to assist in shaping the operational environment through population control and providing security to the local populaces from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals. On order, assist in implementing DC operations and support to NEOs.*

3. **Execution.** *The execution paragraph provides the necessary direction to synchronize the effects of CAO/CMO efforts and related activities. It outlines the effects the commander wants CAO to achieve while prioritizing CA tasks. It describes the activities of the force conducting CAO/CMO in enough detail to synchronize them with an execution matrix. The execution matrix is an appendix to the CAO annex. The matrix shows when each element executes each CAO task. The execution matrix helps the G-9/S-9 representative in the current operations integration cell of the command monitor and direct CAO during execution. The execution matrix is a tool to effectively execute CAO without incurring unanticipated interference or duplication of effort. The G-3/S-3 execution matrix—tab A (Execution Matrix) to appendix 3 (Decision Support Products) to annex C (Operations) incorporates and synchronizes CAO tasks. The CAO execution matrix is not a tasking document. The CAO tasks are detailed under tasks to subordinate units in paragraph 3b of the CAO annex or in the appropriate appendices. The activities needed to synchronize the CAO/CMO elements and related activities include the following:*

Figure C-1. The Civil Affairs operations annex (continued)

a. **Scheme of Support.** *The scheme of support describes how CAO supports the commander's intent and the command's CONOPS. It details the CAO CONOPS supporting the approved COA, which comes from paragraph 4 (Analysis) of the CAO running estimate developed during MDMP. This item includes the required principal tasks and explains how the principal tasks complement each other. This paragraph should include a discussion of civil-military objectives, civil decisive points, measures of performance and measures of effectiveness, transitions for each phase of the operation, and a general timeline for the operation. The appendices, which further define key relationships, should discuss each phase of the operation in greater detail. If there are no appendices, personnel must finitely detail this paragraph of the annex.*

b. **Tasks to Subordinate Units.** *State the task assigned to each unit that reports directly to the HQ issuing the order. Each task must include who (the subordinate unit that the HQ assigned the task to), what (the task itself), when, where, and why (purpose). Use a separate subparagraph for each unit. List units in task-organization sequence. Place tasks that affect two or more units in paragraph 3c (Coordinating Instructions). Example: "Provide assessment of needs. Provide liaison and staff expertise to the CMOC in the AO. Plan and coordinate military civic action projects."*

c. **Coordinating Instructions.** *List only instructions that apply to two or more units. Do not list instructions that unit SOPs cover.*

(1) **Commander's Critical Information Requirements.** *List CCIRs that pertain to the CAO mission.*

(2) **Essential Elements of Friendly Information.** *List essential elements of friendly information that pertain to the CAO mission.*

(3) **Rules of Engagement.** *List rules of engagement (ROE) affecting the CAO mission. Refer to appendix 12 (Rules of Engagement) to annex C (Operations) as required. For operations within the United States and its territories, title this paragraph "Rules for the Use of Force."*

(4) **Risk Reduction Control Measures.** *Refer to annex E (Protection) as required. Consider physical, personnel, computer security and force health protection, as well as issues affecting the continuity of operations, particularly those associated with the CMOC; for example, HN and NGO facilities. Do not omit the situation threat and vulnerability assessment to determine security requirements.*

(5) **Environmental Considerations.** *Refer to appendix 5 (Environmental Considerations) to annex G (Engineer) as required. Review environmental planning guidance and, if available, the Environmental Management Support Plan for implied CAO/CMO tasks that support environmental activities. Consider the infrastructure and projects, such as the establishment of and support to DC camps' environmental standards for air, water, (drinking and waste), hazardous waste, and materials, as well as solid and medical waste planning needs. Considerations may include noise, pesticides, historic and cultural resources, toxic industrial chemicals and toxic industrial material (such as asbestos) associated with civil industrial sites. Other elements may have already addressed these considerations. Use the ASCOPE analysis methodology to determine need.*

(6) **Stability Operations.** *The coordinating instructions subparagraph details CAO support of the command's minimum essential stability operations tasks (civil control, civil security, and restoration of essential services). Units responsible for an AO must execute the minimum essential tasks with available resources if no civilian agency or organization is capable. Address CAO support to governance and economic stability if required by HHQ mission tasking.*

4. **Sustainment.** *This paragraph provides instructions and details concerning the service support relationship between the CAO elements and the units they support. Identify priorities of sustainment for CAO critical tasks, and specify additional instructions as required.*

a. **Logistics.** *Refer to appendix 1 (Logistics) to annex F (Sustainment) as required. For CAO/CMO considerations, address items one through three below (if not covered in unit SOPs).*

(1) **Maintenance.** *List locations and capabilities of military and nonmilitary maintenance facilities that can or will support CAO/CMO, including locations of civil maintenance facilities capable of supporting CAO and locations of nonmilitary agencies in the AO that have maintenance facilities or are capable of providing maintenance to CAO assets. Do not repeat information contained in tab B (Maintenance) of appendix 1 (Logistics) of annex F (Sustainment) or annex P (Host-Nation Support).*

Figure C-1. The Civil Affairs operations annex (continued)

(2) **Transportation.** *List locations and capabilities of military and nonmilitary transportation assets that can or will support CAO/CMO, including locations of civil transportation assets capable of supporting CAO and of nonmilitary agencies in the AO that have transportation assets or are capable of providing transportation for CAO resources. Do not repeat information contained in tab C (Transportation) of appendix 1 (Logistics) of annex F (Sustainment) or annex P (Host-Nation Support).*

(3) **Supply.** *List locations and capabilities of military and nonmilitary supply facilities that can or will support CAO/CMO, including locations of civilian logistical facilities; for example, ice houses, refrigerated storage facilities, warehouses, and port facilities; and of nonmilitary agencies in the AO that have logistical facilities or can provide logistical support. For each location, list the class of supply and commodities available. Do not repeat information contained in tab D (Supply) of appendix 1 (Logistics) of annex F (Sustainment) or annex P (Host-Nation Support).*

b. **Personnel.** *Refer to appendix 2 (Personnel Services) to annex F (Sustainment) as required. For CAO/CMO considerations, address items one through four below (if not covered in unit SOPs).*

(1) **The Country Team.** *List the location and contact information of the U.S. COM (or Ambassador), country team, and affiliated U.S. Government civilian response corps such as advance civilian team, field advanced civilian team, and so on.*

(2) **Special Staff.** *List the location and contact information of the staff judge advocate, contracting officer, media information bureau, and so on.*

(3) (+) **Local/Foreign Nationals.** *List the location and contact data of key nonmilitary personnel supporting CAO/CMO. Include sex, age, politics, demeanor, and influence, if applicable. Personnel in this category may include the mayor, police chief, religious leaders, local military leaders, school leaders, tribal leaders, and other leaders, NGOs, and interagency in the area. List all entities providing assistance and include a POC and the type, quantity, and frequency of assistance if not listed elsewhere.*

(4) **Reachback Capability.** *Include CA functional specialist reachback capability that may affect CAO/CMO. Identify any capabilities, such as high frequency, very high frequency (VHF), and satellite communication frequencies, channels, and cryptographic requirements for CONUS network reachback communications systems that are not covered in annex H, (Signal). Include known email addresses, if applicable.*

c. **Health Service Support.** *Refer to appendix 3 (Health System Support) to annex F (Sustainment) as required.*

(1) **Facilities.** *List locations, capabilities, and capacity of nonmilitary medical facilities that can or will support CAO/CMO.*

(2) **Challenges.** *Detail unique problems, challenges, and legal considerations of providing medical system support to the indigenous population.*

(3) **Capabilities.** *HN medical support capabilities, if not addressed elsewhere (annex P). Examples include identifying the local resources, facilities, and support available for U.S. operations.*

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. **Command.**

(1) **Location of Commander.**

(a) *State where the commander intends to be during the operation (by phase, if applicable).*

(b) *List the locations of key CAO/CMO planners and staff (G-9/S-9).*

(c) *List the locations of CMOCs including military grid reference system, latitude/longitude, by exception intersection, street, and so on.*

(2) **Succession of Command.**

(a) *State the succession of command, if not covered in the unit's SOP.*

(b) *Identify command and support relationships of all units conducting or supporting CAO.*

(3) **Liaison Requirements.**

(a) *State CA liaison requirements not covered in the unit's SOP.*

(b) *List military requirements such as other Services and adjacent units and nonmilitary requirements such as interagency, international organizations, NGOs, the HN government, and the private sector.*

(+) Figure C-1. The Civil Affairs operations annex (continued)

b. **Control.**
   (1) **Command Posts.** *Describe the employment of CPs, including the location and operating hours of each CP as appropriate. State the primary controlling CP for specific tasks or phases of the operation; for example, "CMOC will be collocated with the division main CP."*
      (a) *List the location and alternate locations of CA CP or command CMOC.*
      (b) *List the location and alternate locations of higher, adjacent, and subordinate CMOCs.*
      (c) *List the location of key CAO leaders (G-9/S-9).*
   (2) **Reports.** *List reports not covered in SOPs. Designate CAO/CMO reporting requirements for subordinate units. Refer to annex R (Reports) as required.*

c. **Signal.** *List signal operating instructions information for CAO/CMO, as needed, as well as primary and alternate means of communications with both military and nonmilitary organizations conducting CAO or CMO.*
   (1) **Monitoring.** *Describe the nets to monitor for reports.*
   (2) **Reporting.** *Designate critical CAO reporting requirements.*
   (3) **Requirements.** *Address any CAO-specific communications or digitization connectivity requirements or coordination necessary to meet functional responsibilities. Consider telephone listing. Provide instructions regarding maintenance, and update of the CIM database.*
      (a) **Instructions.** *List signal operating instructions information for CAO.*
      (b) **Contingencies.** *Determine CAO/CMO primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency means of communications with military and nonmilitary organizations. Consider all aspects of operations security when conducting CAO/CMO.*

ACKNOWLEDGE: *Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.*
[COMMANDER'S NAME]
[COMMANDER'S RANK]
The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of attachment. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the HQ's files.
OFFICIAL:
[AUTHENTICATOR'S NAME]
[AUTHENTICATOR'S POSITION]
Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.
APPENDICES:
Appendix 1—Execution Matrix
Appendix 2—Populace and Resource Control Plan
Appendix 3—Civil Information Management
Additional appendices such as Project Management or Funding may be included as required.
ATTACHMENT: *List lower-level attachments (appendices, tabs, and exhibits).*
DISTRIBUTION: *Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment. Note that in some cases the CAO annex may have to stand alone.*

[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure C-1. The Civil Affairs operations annex (continued)

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Appendix D

Annex P (Host-Nation Support)

OVERVIEW

D-1. This annex provides fundamental considerations, formats, and instructions for developing annex P (Host-Nation Support) to the BPLAN or order. This annex uses the five-paragraph attachment format. The basic format of the annex is in black text. The helping text is captured in *italics* and should be deleted or replaced with information specific to the plan or operation. The text in [brackets] should be replaced with information specific to the plan or operation. (See figure D-1.)

D-2. Commanders and staffs use annex P (Host-Nation Support) to describe how sustainment operations support the CONOPS described in the BPLAN or order. The J-4, G-4, or S-4 is the staff officer responsible for annex P (Host-Nation Support). The J-9, G-9, or S-9 should coordinate closely with the J-4, G-4, or S-4 to publish annex P.

D-3. HN support is the civil and military assistance provided by the HN to the forces located in or transiting through that HN's territory. Efficient use of available HN support can greatly aid forces and augment the deployed sustainment structure. (See JP 4-0.)

[CLASSIFICATION]

Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the attachments. Place the classification marking at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph in parentheses. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions.

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Use the heading only when the BPLAN or order issues the annex and its attachments separately.

Annex P (Host-Nation Support) to OPLAN or OPORD [NUMBER], [CORPS/DIVISION/BRIGADE], [CODE NAME], [CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE].

References. *List documents essential to understanding the OPLAN or OPORD. List references concerning a specific function in the appropriate attachments. List the documents in the following order:*

a. **Maps and charts.** *Map entries include series number, country, sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale.*

b. **Other references.** *Label these references in subparagraphs and label them in the same manner as shown.*

c. **Doctrinal references.** *The doctrine for host-nation (HN) support includes FM 3-16 and FM 6-0.*

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD. *State the time zone used in the AO during execution. When the OPLAN or OPORD applies to units in different time zones, use Greenwich Mean Time (ZULU [Z]); for example, Z or local.*

1. **Situation.** *Include items of information affecting HN support that paragraph 1 of the OPLAN or OPORD did not address and any information that needs expansion.*

a. **Area of Interest.** *Describe the area of interest as it relates to HN support. Refer to annex B (Intelligence) as required.*

b. **Area of Operations.** *Describe the AO. Refer to the appropriate map by its subparagraph under references; for example, "Map, reference (b)." Refer to appendix 2 (Operations Overlay) to annex C (Operations) as required. Include the following:*

(1) **Terrain.** *Describe the aspects of terrain that affect HN support operations. Refer to tab A (Terrain) to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to annex B (Intelligence) as required.*

(2) **Weather.** *Describe the aspects of weather that affect HN support operations. Refer to tab B (Weather) to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to annex B (Intelligence) as required.*

Figure D-1. The host-nation support annex

c. **Enemy Forces.** *List known and templated locations and activities of enemy HN support for one echelon up and two echelons down. List enemy maneuver and other area capabilities that will impact friendly HN support operations. State expected enemy COAs and employment of enemy HN support assets. Refer to annex B (Intelligence) as required.*

d. **Friendly Forces.** *Outline the HHQ HN support plan. List designation, location, and outline of plans of higher, adjacent, and other HN support assets that support or impact the issuing HQ or require coordination and additional support.*

e. **Interagency, International, and Nongovernmental Organizations.** *Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may impact the conduct of HN support operations or implementation of HN support–specific equipment and tactics. Refer to annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required.*

f. **Civil Considerations.** *Describe the aspects of the civil situation that impact HN support operations. Refer to annex B (Intelligence) and annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.*

g. **Attachments and Detachments.** *List units attached or detached only as necessary to clarify task organization. Refer to annex A (Task Organization) as required.*

h. **Assumptions.** *List any HN support–specific assumptions that support the annex development. State assumptions concerning HN support and the operational impact if the assumptions are inaccurate.*

i. **Host-Nation Support Agreements.** *List any HN agreements, unreliable or doubtful agreements, and presumed HN support agreements.*

2. **Mission.** *State the mission of HN support in support of the BPLAN or order.*

3. **Execution.**

a. **Scheme of HN Support.** *Describe how the commander's intent and CONOPS is supported by HN support. Cover the overall status of negotiations and agreements, including customs requirements, by country or treaty organization, presumed HN support, and the reliability of HN support. Identify peacetime and pre-conflict military information support operations that would develop support in foreign countries for the provision of HN support. Establish the priorities of support to units for each phase of the operation. Refer to annex C (Operations) as required.*

b. **HN Support Considerations.** *The subparagraphs below are not an all-inclusive list. Each HN agreement is unique. Refer to annex F (Sustainment) as required.*

(1) **Accommodations.** *Describe HN accommodation considerations for the following: billeting, offices, stores and warehouses; workshops, vehicle parks, gun parks; medical, hardstands, fuel, weapons and ammunition, transportation including aircraft, firing ranges, training areas and facilities, recreational areas and facilities, and laundry and dry-cleaning facilities.*

(2) **Ammunition and Weapons.** *Describe HN considerations for ammunition and weapons security, storage, and collection or delivery.*

(3) **Communications.** *Describe HN considerations for local and international communications and security.*

(4) **Finance.** *Describe HN considerations and payment for accommodations, supplies, communications, equipment, local labor, maintenance, medical treatment facilities, movement facilities, emergency facilities, and personnel facilities.*

(5) **Fuel.** *Describe HN fuel considerations for aircraft, vehicles, ships, methods of delivery, storage, interoperability of refueling equipment, and common use of refueling installations.*

(6) **Local Labor.** *Describe HN local labor considerations for method of hiring, method of payment, and administration.*

(7) **Maintenance.** *Describe HN maintenance considerations for accommodations, vehicles, ships, equipment, roads, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, provision of assembly areas, damage control, emergency facilities for visitors' vehicles and equipment, and evacuation of disabled vehicles and equipment.*

(8) **Medical.** *Describe HN medical considerations for medical treatment facilities, emergency facilities, reciprocal national health agreements, and availability of medical equipment and supplies, standards of care, public health facilities, accessibility to care, and medical and casualty evacuation.*

Figure D-1. The host-nation support annex (continued)

(9) **Movement.** *Describe HN movement considerations for airheads (facilities, alternates, equipment, and refueling), ports (facilities, alternates, ships, draft, bunkering/fueling, and repair), road and rail movement (personnel, equipment, security, and traffic control), and pipeline movement.*

(10) **Rations.** *Describe HN rations considerations for fresh food, packaged foods, and potable water.*

(11) **Supplies and Equipment.** *Describe HN supplies and equipment considerations for common use items other than ammunition, fuel, or rations.*

(12) **Translation.** *Describe HN translation considerations for interpreters, linguists, language specialists, and document translation.*

(13) **Transportation Equipment.** *Describe HN transportation equipment considerations for use of HN military vehicles, equipment, ships, and aircraft; locally hired vehicles and equipment, ships, and aircraft; and the policy on drivers and handlers of the military and locally hired vehicles.*

(14) **Water.** *Describe HN water considerations for production and purification capability such as municipal and other water treatment systems, distribution capability such as trucks, pipeline, and hose line, storage capability, receipt and issue capability, available water sources such as wells, surface, and subsurface, and HN water quality standards.*

c. **Tasks to Subordinate Units.** *List HN support tasks assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order. Identify the office of primary responsibility for each type of HN support managed separately within the command.*

d. **Coordinating Instructions.** *List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the BPLAN or order.*

4. **Sustainment.** *Identify priorities of sustainment for HN support key tasks and specify additional instructions as required. Outline support limitations that are due to lack of HN water agreements, operational impact, status of any current negotiations, and prospects for availability of the required support on an emergency basis. Refer to annex F (Sustainment) as required.*

a. **Logistics.** *Identify unique sustainment requirements, procedures, and guidance to support HN support teams and operations. Specify procedures for specialized technical logistics support from external organizations as necessary. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instructions for HN logistics support. Refer to annex F (Sustainment) as required.*

b. **Personnel.** *Identify HN support unique personnel requirements and concerns, including global sourcing support and contracted linguist requirements. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instructions for human resources support, financial management, legal support, and religious support. Refer to annex F (Sustainment) as required.*

c. **Health Service Support.** *Identify availability, priorities, and instructions for medical care. Determine if locally available medical supplies and equipment meet U.S. and Food and Drug Administration standards for use with U.S. forces. Determine if the HN blood supply is tested and considered safe (if not, where will blood products be obtained), and determine the availability of medical equipment repairers. Refer to annex F (Sustainment) as required.*

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. **Command.**

(1) **Location of the Commander and Key Leaders.** *State the location of the commander and key host-nation support leaders.*

(2) **Succession of Command.** *State the succession of command if not covered in the unit's SOPs.*

(3) **Liaison Requirements.** *State the HN support liaison requirements not covered in the base order.*

b. **Control.**

(1) **Command Posts.** *Describe the employment of HN support-specific CPs, including the location of each CP and its time of opening and closing.*

(2) **Reports.** *List HN support–specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to annex R (Reports) as required.*

c. **Signal.** *Address any HN support–specific communications requirements or reports. Refer to annex H (Signal) as required.*

Figure D-1. The host-nation support annex (continued)

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[COMMANDER'S NAME]
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[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure D-1. The host-nation support annex (continued)

Appendix E

Annex V (Interagency Coordination)

OVERVIEW

E-1. This annex provides fundamental considerations, formats, and instructions for developing annex V (Interagency Coordination) to the BPLAN or order. This annex follows the five-paragraph attachment format. The basic format of the annex is in black text. The helping text is captured in *italics* and should be deleted or replaced with information specific to the plan or operation. The text in [brackets] should be replaced with information specific to the plan or operation. Some subparagraphs are modified to accommodate communication with the interagency. (See figure E-1.)

E-2. Annex V (Interagency Coordination) provides military and interagency personnel with detailed information (mission, scheme, and tasks) to direct the necessary coordination and interaction between Army forces and interagency organizations. It describes how the commander intends to cooperate, provide support, and receive support from interagency organizations throughout the operation. The J-3, G-3, or S-3, in conjunction with the J-9, G-9, or S-9, develops annex V (Interagency Coordination).

E-3. Interagency organizations of the U.S. Government include the following:

- Central Intelligence Agency.
- Department of Commerce.
- Department of Defense.
- Department of Energy.
- Department of Homeland Security.
- Department of Justice.
- Department of State.
- Department of the Treasury.
- Department of Transportation.
- Environmental Protection Agency.
- National Security Council.
- Peace Corps.
- United States Agency for International Development/Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance.
- Department of Agriculture.

[CLASSIFICATION]

Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the attachments. Place the classification marking at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph in parentheses. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions.

Copy [#] of [#] copies
[ISSUING HEADQUARTERS]
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[DATE-TIME GROUP (DTG) OF SIGNATURE]
[MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER]

Use the heading only when the BPLAN or order issues the annex and its attachments separately.

Annex V (Interagency Coordination) to OPLAN or OPORD [NUMBER], [CORPS/DIVISION/BRIGADE], [CODE NAME], [CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE].

References. *List documents essential to understanding the OPLAN or OPORD. List references concerning a specific function in the appropriate attachments. List the documents in the following order:*

a. **Maps and charts.** *Map entries include series number, country, sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale.*

b. **Other references.** *Label these references in subparagraphs and label them in the same manner as shown.*

Figure E-1. The interagency coordination annex

c. **Doctrinal references.** *The doctrine for interagency coordination includes JP 3-08, ADP 3-07, and FM 6-0.*

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD. *State the time zone used in the AO during execution. When the OPLAN or OPORD applies to units in different time zones, use Greenwich Mean Time (ZULU [Z]); for example, Z or local.*

1. **Situation.** *Include information affecting interagency coordination that paragraph 1 of the OPLAN or OPORD does not cover or that needs expansion.*
   a. **Area of Interest.** *Describe the area of interest as it relates to interagency coordination. Refer to annex B (Intelligence) as required.*
   b. **Area of Operations.** *Describe the AO. Refer to the appropriate map by its subparagraph under references; for example, "Map, reference (b)." Refer to appendix 2 (Operations Overlay) to annex C (Operations) as required. Include the following:*
      (1) **Terrain.** *Describe the aspects of terrain that affect interagency coordination. Refer to tab A (Terrain) to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to annex B (Intelligence) as required.*
      (2) **Weather.** *Describe the aspects of weather that affect interagency coordination. Refer to tab B (Weather) to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to annex B (Intelligence) as required.*
   c. **Political-Military Situation.** *Describe the political-military situation in the area of interest and AO. Identify U.S. national security objectives and interests applicable to the plan or order.*
   d. **Enemy Forces.** *Summarize the threat to interagency personnel. Identify enemy forces and appraise their general capabilities and effects on interagency coordination operations. Refer to annex B (Intelligence) as required.*
   e. **Friendly Forces.** *Outline the HHQ interagency coordination plan. Identify and state the objectives or goals and primary tasks of those interagency organizations involved in the operations in subparagraphs below.*
   f. **Civil Considerations.** *Describe the aspects of the civil situation that effect interagency coordination. Refer to annex B (Intelligence) and annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.*
   g. **Attachments and Detachments.** *List units attached or detached only as necessary to clarify task organization. Refer to annex A (Task Organization) as required.*
   h. **Assumptions.** *List any interagency coordination-specific assumptions that support the annex development.*
   i. **Legal Considerations.** *List any legal considerations that may affect interagency participation, such as applicable international law or the authorities established under title 10 and title 50, USC.*
2. **Mission.** *State the mission of interagency coordination in support of the CONOPS in the BPLAN or order.*
3. **Execution.**
   a. **Scheme of Interagency Coordination.** *Summarize the CONOPS in the BPLAN or order including an outline of the primary objectives and desired effects of each phase. Describe the concept of interagency coordination and how it supports the CONOPS. Describe the AORs from U.S. Government agencies by major areas of response: humanitarian, economic, political or diplomatic, and others as required. The operational variables are another method to organize major areas of response.*
      (1) **Humanitarian.** *Define, in broad terms, the desired actions and responsibilities for U.S. Government agencies in rebuilding and shaping the humanitarian structure and health of the affected nation. Coordinate these requested actions with the commander's phase development.*
      (2) **Economic.** *Define, in broad terms, the desired actions and responsibilities for U.S. Government agencies in rebuilding and shaping the economic structure and health of the affected nation. Coordinate these requested actions with the supported commander's phase.*
      (3) **Political/Diplomatic.** *Define, in broad terms, the desired actions and responsibilities for U.S. Government agencies in rebuilding and shaping the political and diplomatic structure of the affected nation. Coordinate these requested actions with the supported commander's phase development.*
      (4) **Others.** *Describe other areas of response as required.*
   b. **Tasks to Subordinate Units and Milestones.** *Identify tasks and required milestones of the issuing HQ and interagency organizations during the conduct of operations.*

Figure E-1. The interagency coordination annex (continued)

c. **Coordinating Instructions.** *List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the BPLAN or order. Identify and list general instructions applicable to other U.S. Government agencies such as agreements with the HN and multinational forces.*

4. **Sustainment.** *Identify priorities of sustainment for interagency coordination key tasks and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to annex F (Sustainment) as required.*
   a. **Logistics.** *Use subparagraphs to identify availability, priorities, and specific instructions for interagency coordination logistics support. Refer to annex F (Sustainment) and annex P (Host-Nation Support) as required.*
   b. **Personnel.** *Use subparagraphs to identify availability, priorities, and specific instructions for human resources support, financial management, legal support, and religious support. Refer to annex F (Sustainment) as required.*
   c. **Health Service Support.** *Identify availability, priorities, and instructions for medical care. Identify specialized medical and veterinary requirements for interagency operations. Identify availability, priorities, and instructions for medical care. Refer to annex F (Sustainment) as required.*
5. **Command and Signal.**
   a. **Command.** *Identify any unique command relationships established for the purpose of interagency coordination. Identify any interagency coordination forms or bodies such as an interagency coordination working group.*
      (1) **Location of Interagency Coordination Leaders.** *Identify current or future locations of key interagency coordination leaders.*
      (2) **Succession of Command.** *State the leader succession plan if not covered in the unit's SOPs.*
      (3) **Liaison Requirements.** *State the interagency coordination liaison requirements not covered in the base order.*
   b. **Control.** *List the locations of key interagency leaders and contact information.*
      (1) **Command Posts.** *Describe the employment of interagency coordination CPs, including the location of each CP and its time of opening and closing.*
      (2) **Reports.** *List interagency coordination specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to annex R (Reports) as required.*
   c. **Signal.** *Describe the communications plan used among the issuing force and interagency organizations to include the primary and alternate means of communications. Consider operations security requirements. Refer to annex H (Signal) as required.*

ACKNOWLEDGE: *Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.*
[COMMANDER'S NAME]
[COMMANDER'S RANK]
The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of attachment. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the HQ's files.
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[AUTHENTICATOR'S NAME]
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Figure E-1. The interagency coordination annex (continued)

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Glossary

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADM	Army design methodology
ADP	Army doctrine publication
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
AR	Army regulation
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events [civil considerations]
ATP	Army techniques publication
BCT	brigade combat team
BPLAN	base plan
CA	Civil Affairs
CACOM	Civil Affairs command
CAO	Civil Affairs operations
CAPT	Civil Affairs planning team
CCDR	combatant commander
CCMD	combatant command
CE	civil engagement
CIM	civil information management
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CKI	civil knowledge integration
CMI	civil-military integration
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
CND	civil network development
CNDE	civil network development and engagement
COA	course of action
COG	center of gravity
COM	chief of mission
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	concept plan
CONUS	continental United States
COP	common operational picture
CP	command post

CR	civil reconnaissance
CSCS	country security cooperation strategy
DA	Department of the Army [form]
DC	dislocated civilian
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
EXORD	execution order
FDR	foreign disaster relief
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual
FRAGORD	fragmentary order
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4	assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-5	assistant chief of staff, plans
G-9	assistant chief of staff, Civil Affairs operations
GTA	graphic training aid
HHQ	higher headquarters
HN	host nation
HQ	headquarters
ICS	integrated country strategy
IO	information operations
IPI	indigenous populations and institutions
IPOE	intelligence preparation of the operational environment
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
J-9	civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff
JFC	joint force commander
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JP	joint publication
JPP	joint planning process
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JTF	joint task force
LOE	line of effort
MDMP	military decision-making process

METT-TC (I)	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations [mission variables] (Army)
MGO	military government operations
MOE	measure of effectiveness
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSC	National Security Council
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OE	operational environment
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid [appropriation]
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUSD(P)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
PLANORD	planning order
PMESII-PT	political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [operational variables] (Army)
PN	partner nation
PRC	populace and resources control
R&S	reconstruction and stabilization
S-1	battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
S-2	battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3	battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4	battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-6	battalion or brigade signal staff officer
S-9	battalion or brigade Civil Affairs operations staff officer
SC	security cooperation
SCO	security cooperation organization
SFA	security force assistance
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
TC	training circular
T-CAPT	theater civil affairs planning team
TCP	theater campaign plan
TLP	troop leading procedures
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United States Code
USG	United States Government
WARNORD	warning order

SECTION II – TERMS

area of interest

That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent to it, and extending into enemy territory. (JP 3-0)

area of operations

An operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 3-0)

area of responsibility

The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. (JP 1, Vol 1)

Army design methodology

A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. (ADP 5-0)

Army Service component command

Command responsible for recommendations to the joint force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within a combatant command. (JP 3-31)

assessment

1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. 3. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. 4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or "agents." (JP 3-0)

assign

1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (JP 3-0)

campaign

A series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

campaign plan

A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

center

An enduring, functional organization, with a supporting staff, designed to perform a joint function within a headquarters. (JP 3-33)

center of gravity

The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (JP 5-0)

chief of mission

The principal officer in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual temporarily assigned to be in charge of such a facility. (JP 3-08)

civil administration

An administration established by a foreign government in friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government or in hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 3-05)

civil affairs

Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. (JP 3-57)

civil affairs operations

Actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. (JP 3-57)

civil authorities

Those elected and appointed officers and employees who constitute the government of the United States, the governments of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, insular areas, and political subdivisions thereof. (JP 3-28)

civil considerations

The influence of man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. (ADP 6-0)

civil engagement

A deliberate or spontaneous activity or interaction between civil affairs forces and nonmilitary individuals or entities, designed to build relationships; reduce or eliminate civil interference and causes of instability; gather, confirm, or deny information; foster legitimacy, or promote cooperation and unified action. (FM 3-57)

civil information

Relevant data relating to the civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of the civil component of the operational environment used to support the situational awareness of the supported commander. (JP 3-57)

civil information management

Process whereby data relating to the civil component of the operational environment is gathered, collated, processed, analyzed, produced into information products, and disseminated. (JP 3-57)

civil knowledge integration

The actions taken to analyze, evaluate, and organize collected civil information for operational relevance and informing the warfighting function. (FM 3-57)

civil-military integration

The actions taken to establish, maintain, influence, or leverage relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions to synchronize, coordinate, and enable interorganizational cooperation and to achieve unified action. (FM 3-57)

civil-military operations

Activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. (JP 3-57)

civil-military operations center

An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the commander. (JP 3-57)

civil-military team

A temporary organization of civilian and military personnel task-organized to provide an optimal mix of capabilities and expertise to accomplish specific operational and planning tasks. (JP 3-57)

civil network

A collection of formal and informal groups, associations, military engagements, and organizations within an operational environment that interact with each other with varying degrees of frequency, trust, and collaboration. (FM 3-57)

civil network development

The planned and targeted action in which civil affairs forces develop networks within the civil component of the operational environment to influence populations and manage local resources in order to extend the operational reach, consolidate gains, and achieve military objectives. (FM 3-57)

civil network development and engagement

The activity by which the civil network capabilities and resources are engaged, evaluated, developed, and integrated into operations. (FM 3-57)

civil reconnaissance

A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events. (JP 3-57)

collaborative planning

Two or more echelons planning together in real time, sharing information, perceptions, and ideas to develop their respective plans simultaneously. (ADP 5-0)

combatant command

A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1, Vol 2)

combatant commander

A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 3-0)

commander's estimate

The commander's initial assessment in which options are provided in a concise statement that defines who, what, when, where, why, and how the course of action will be implemented. (JP 5-0)

commander's intent

A clear and concise expression of the purpose of an operation and the desired objectives and military end state. (JP 3-0)

commander's visualization

The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state. (ADP 6-0)

common operational picture

A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. (JP 3-0)
(Army) A display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest tailored to the user's requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command. (ADP 6-0)

component

1. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. (JP 1, Vol 1) 2. In logistics, a part or combination of parts having a specific function, which can be installed or replaced only as an entity. (JP 4-0)

concept of operations

A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. (JP 5-0)
(Army) A statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state. (ADP 5-0)

concept plan

An operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order. (JP 5-0)

continental United States

United States territory, including the adjacent territorial waters, located within North America between Canada and Mexico. (JP 1, Vol 2)

contingency operation

A military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of Defense as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of law. (JP 1, Vol 1)

contingency plan

A branch of a campaign plan that is planned based on hypothetical situations for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions outside of crisis conditions. (JP 5-0)

country team

The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission. (JP 3-07.4)

course of action

1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A scheme developed to accomplish a mission. (JP 5-0)

crisis

An emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)

decision point

A point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action. (JP 5-0)

decision support matrix

A written record of a war-gamed course of action that describes decision points and associated actions at those decision points. (ADP 5-0)

decisive point

A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 5-0)

defense coordinating officer

Department of Defense single point of contact for domestic emergencies who is assigned to a joint field office to process requirements for military support; forward mission assignments through proper channels to the appropriate military organizations; and assign military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated emergency support functions. (JP 3-28)

defense support of civil authorities

Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. (DODD 3025.18)

deployment order

1. A directive for the deployments of forces for operations or exercises. 2. A directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that authorizes the transfer of forces between combatant commanders, Services, and Department of Defense agencies and specifies the authorities the gaining combatant commander will exercise over the specific forces to be transferred. (JP 5-0)

disaster assistance response team

A team deployed by the United States Agency for International Development, if a large-scale, urgent, and/or extended response is necessary, to provide specialists to assist the chief of mission and the United States Agency for International Development mission (where present) with the management of the United States Government response to a disaster. (JP 3-08)

dislocated civilian

A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. (JP 3-29)

domestic emergency

Civil defense emergencies, civil disturbances, major disasters, or natural disasters affecting the public welfare and occurring within the United States and its territories. (JP 3-27)

effect

1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 3-0)

emergency operations center

A temporary or permanent facility where the coordination of information and resources to support domestic incident management activities normally takes place. (JP 3-41)

emergency preparedness liaison officer

A senior reserve officer who represents their Service at the appropriate joint field office conducting planning and coordination responsibilities in support of civil authorities. (JP 3-28)

estimate

1. An analysis of a foreign situation, development, or trend that identifies its major elements, interprets the significance, and appraises the future possibilities and the prospective results of the various actions that might be taken. 2. An appraisal of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and potential courses of action of a foreign nation or combination of nations in consequence of a specific national plan, policy, decision, or contemplated course of action. 3. An analysis of an actual or contemplated clandestine operation in relation to the situation in which it is or would be conducted to identify and appraise such factors as available as well as needed assets and potential obstacles, accomplishments, and consequences. (JP 5-0)

evaluating

Using indicators to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists. (ADP 5-0)

execute order

1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a decision by the President to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. (JP 5-0)

execution

The act of putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and adjusting operations based on changes in the situation. (ADP 5-0)

execution matrix

A visual representation of subordinate tasks in relationship to each other over time. (ADP 5-0)

foreign assistance

Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment and support for foreign internal defense to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters that may be provided through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. (JP 3-0)

foreign disaster

A calamitous situation or event that occurs naturally or through human activities, which threatens or inflicts human suffering on a scale that may warrant emergency relief assistance from the United States Government or from foreign partners. (JP 3-29)

foreign disaster relief

Assistance that can be used immediately to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims that normally includes services and commodities, as well as the rescue and evacuation of victims; the provision and transportation of food, water, clothing, medicines, beds, bedding, and temporary shelter; the furnishing of medical equipment and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. (JP 3-29)

foreign humanitarian assistance

Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. (JP 3-29)

foreign internal defense

Participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

functional component command

A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1, Vol 2)

governance

The state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society. (JP 3-24)

homeland

The physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, United States territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace. (JP 3-28)

homeland defense

The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. (JP 3-27)

host nation

A nation which receives forces and/or supplies from allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 3-57)

host-nation support

Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 4-0)

humanitarian and civic assistance

Assistance to the local populace, specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities, provided by predominantly United States forces in conjunction with military operations. (JP 3-29)

humanitarian assistance coordination center

A temporary center established by a geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning during the early planning and coordination stages of foreign humanitarian assistance operations. (JP 3-29)

indigenous populations and institutions

The societal framework of an operational environment including citizens; legal and illegal immigrants; dislocated civilians; and governmental, tribal, ethnic, religious, commercial, and private organizations and entities. (JP 3-57)

information collection

An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. (FM 3-55)

information management

The function of managing an organization's information resources for the handling of data and information acquired by one or many different systems, individuals, and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that data or a right to that information. (JP 3-0)
(Army) The science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products. (ADP 6-0)

instruments of national power

All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military. (JP 1, Vol 1)

intelligence preparation of the operational environment

(Army) The systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. (FM 2-0)

interagency

Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 3-08)

interagency coordination

The planning and synchronization of efforts that occur between elements of Department of Defense and participating United States Government departments and agencies. (JP 3-0)

internal defense and development

The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

internally displaced person

Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters and who has not crossed an internationally recognized state border. (JP 3-29)

international organization

(NATO) An intergovernmental, regional or global organization governed by international law and established by a group of states, with international juridical personality given by international agreement, however characterized, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims. (STANAG 3680/AAP-6)

interorganizational cooperation

The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (JP 3-08)

joint

Organizations, activities, or missions, in which two or more significant elements of Military Departments operate under a single joint commander or leader. (JP 1, Vol 1)

joint force

A force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. See also joint force commander. (JP 3-0)

joint force commander

A general term applied to a combatant commander, subordinate unified commander, or joint task force commander. (JP 1, Vol 1)

joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment

The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence estimates and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision-making process. (JP 2-0)

joint operations

Military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 3-0)

joint operations area

The airspace, land area, and maritime area defined by a combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander directs military operations to accomplish a specific mission. (JP 3-0)

joint planning

Planning activities associated with military operations by combatant commanders and their subordinate commanders. (JP 5-0)

joint planning and execution community

Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, mobilization, deployment, employment, support, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of military forces assigned or committed to a joint operation. (JP 5-0)

joint planning process

An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission, select the best course of action, and produce a campaign or joint operation plan or order. (JP 5-0)

joint security area

A specific area to facilitate protection of joint bases and their connecting lines of communications that support joint operations. (JP 3-10)

joint special operations task force

A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. (JP 3-05)

joint staff

1. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department), that includes members from the several Services comprising the force. 2. (capitalized as Joint Staff) The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that assists the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities. (JP 1, Vol 2)

Joint Strategic Planning System

One of the primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out the statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces. (JP 5-0)

joint task force

A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander to accomplish a specific mission. (JP 1, Vol 1)

land domain

The area of the Earth's surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals. (JP 3-31)

lead agency

The United States Government agency designated to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. (JP 3-08)

lead federal agency

The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal response to an emergency. (JP 3-41)

line of effort

In the context of planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions.(JP 5-0)
(Army) A line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state. (ADP 3-0)

line of operation(s)

A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). (JP 5-0)
(Army) A line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives. (ADP 3-0)

major operation

1. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. 2. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. (JP 3-0)

measure of effectiveness

An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. (JP 5-0)

measure of performance

An indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 5-0)

military decision-making process

An iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a courses of action, and produce an operation plan or order. (ADP 5-0)

military engagement

Routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. (JP 3-0)

military government

The supreme authority the military exercises by force or agreement over the lands, property, and indigenous populations and institutions of domestic, allied, neutral, or enemy territory, therefore, substituting sovereign authority under rule of law for the previously established government. (JP 3-57)

military government operations

Operations executed by civil affairs to provide expertise in the civil sector functions in order to establish transitional military authority or conduct support to civil administration. (FM 3-57)

military intervention

The deliberate act of a nation or a group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy. (JP 3-0)

military occupation

A condition in which territory is under the effective control of a foreign armed force. (JP 3-0)

mission

1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. (JP 3-0) 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. (JP 3-0) 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (JP 3-30)

mission variables

Categories of specific information needed to conduct operations. (ADP 1-01)

multinational

Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP 5-0)

multinational force

A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for a specific purpose. (JP 1, Vol 2)

multinational operations

A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16)

national security

Policy and actions to defend United States interests at home and abroad using the instruments of national power. (JP 1, Vol 1)

noncombatant evacuation operations

An operation whereby noncombatant evacuees are evacuated from a threatened area abroad, which includes areas facing actual or potential danger from natural or man-made disaster, civil unrest, imminent or actual terrorist activities, hostilities, and similar circumstances, that is carried out with the assistance of the Department of Defense. (JP 3-68)

nongovernmental organization

A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08)

occupy

A tactical mission task in which a unit moves into an area to control it without enemy opposition. (FM 3-90)

operation

1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1, Vol 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0)

operational approach

A broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission. (JP 5-0)

operational area

An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms (such as area of responsibility and joint operations area) for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. (JP 3-0)

operational art

The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs--supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment--to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0)

operational concept

A fundamental statement that frames how Army forces, operating as part of a joint force, conduct operations. (ADP 1-01)

operational control

The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP 1, Vol 2)

operational data

Information created by, used in, or used in support of a military operation by the headquarters, its components, and operating forces that supports planning, analysis, and assessment of friendly, adversary, and enemy activity. (JP 6-0)

operational design

The conception and construction of the framework that underpins planning. (JP 5-0)

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operational framework

A cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations. (ADP 1-01)

operational level of warfare

The level of warfare at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. (JP 3-0)

operational pause

A temporary halt in operations. (JP 5-0)

operational variables

A comprehensive set of information categories used to describe an operational environment. (ADP 1-01)

operation assessment

1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations to achieve stated objectives. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, changing a condition, or achieving an objective. (JP 5-0)

operation order

A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (JP 5-0)

operation plan

A complete and detailed plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment list. (JP 5-0)

operations process

The major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. (ADP 5-0)

operations security

A capability that identifies and controls critical information, indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations, and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities. (JP 3-13.3)

partner nation

1. A nation with which the United States cooperates in a specific situation or operation. (JP 1, Vol 1) 2. In security cooperation, a nation with which the Department of Defense conducts security cooperation activities. (JP 3-20)

personnel

Individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the assigned mission. (JP 1-0)

planning

The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and determining effective ways to bring that future about. (ADP 5-0)

populace and resources control

Operations which provide security for the populace, deny personnel and materiel to the enemy, mobilize population and materiel resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of civilians. Resource control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (for example, road blocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities. Most military operations employ some type of populace and resources control measures. (FM 3-57)

preparation

Those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation. (ADP 5-0)

prepare to deploy order

An order to a force provider to have a unit ready and to deploy within a specified response time. (JP 5-0)

private sector

An umbrella term that may be applied to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations. (JP 3-57)

reachback

The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. (JP 3-30)

rule of law

A principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles. (FM 3-07)

rules of engagement

Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 3-84)

running estimate

The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable. (ADP 5-0)

security

1. Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. (JP 3-10) 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. (JP 3-10) 3. With respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. (JP 2-0)

security assistance

Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation. (JP 3-22)

security cooperation

All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. (JP 3-22)

security cooperation organization

A Department of Defense element that is part of the United States diplomatic mission located in a foreign country to carry out security assistance and cooperation management functions under the supervision and coordination authority of the senior defense official/defense attach. (JP 3-22)

security force assistance

The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-22)
(Army) The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of legitimate authority. (FM 3-07)

security forces

Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state. (JP 3-22)

security operations

Those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the forces being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their protected forces. (ADP 3-90)

security sector reform

A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. (JP 3-07)

seize

(Army) A tactical mission task in which a unit takes possession of a designated area by using overwhelming force. (FM 3-90)

Service component command

A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1, Vol 2)

situational understanding

The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the operational and mission variables. (ADP 6-0)

sociocultural factors

The social, cultural, and behavioral factors characterizing the relationships and activities, informal and formal power structures, laws and policies, access to resources, and decision making of the population of a specific region or operational environment. (JP 2-0)

special operations

Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. (JP 3-05)

special operations forces

Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. (JP 3-05)

stability activities

Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

stability operation

An operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (ADP 3-0)

stabilization

The process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in the law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development. (FM 3-07)

staff estimate

A continual evaluation of how factors in a staff section's functional area support and impact the planning and execution of the mission. (JP 5-0)

standard operating procedure

A set of instructions applicable to those features of operations that lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. (JP 3-31)

status-of-forces agreement

A bilateral or multilateral agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. (JP 3-16)

strategic guidance

The written products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic direction. (JP 5-0)

strategic level of warfare

The level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives. (JP 3-0)

subordinate command

A lower-echelon command consisting of a commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the establishing authority. (JP 1, Vol 2)

subordinate unified command

A command established by commanders of unified commands, when so authorized by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. (JP 1, Vol 2)

supporting plan

An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander, a subordinate commander, or an agency to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan. (JP 5-0)

support to civil administration

Assistance given by U.S. armed forces to stabilize or enhance the operations of the governing body of a foreign country, by assisting an established or interim government. (FM 3-57)

synchronization

1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. (JP 2-0) 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operation plan to answer intelligence requirements in time to influence the decisions they support. (JP 2-0)

tactical level of warfare

The level of warfare at which forces plan and execute battles and engagements to achieve military objectives. (JP 3-0)

theater army

An echelon of command designated as the Army Service component command responsible for recommendations of allocation and employment of Army forces to the geographic combatant commander. (JP 3-31)

theater of operations

An operational area defined by the geographic combatant commander for the conduct or support of specific military operations. (JP 3-0)

theater special operations command

A subordinate unified command established by a combatant commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations. (JP 3-05)

time-phased force and deployment data

The time-phased force, non-unit cargo, and personnel data combined with movement data for the operation plan, operation order, or ongoing rotation of forces. (JP 5-0)

transitional military authority

A temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. (FM 3-07)

unified action

The synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1, Vol 1)

unified action partners

Those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. (ADP 3-0)

unified command

A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander, composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1, Vol 2)

Unified Command Plan

The document, approved by the President, that sets forth basic guidance to all combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates geographical areas of responsibility; and specifies functional responsibilities for designated combatant commanders. (JP 1, Vol 2)

unity of effort

Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization that is the product of successful unified action. (JP 1, Vol 2)

Universal Time

A measure of time that conforms, within a close approximation, to the mean diurnal rotation of the Earth and serves as the basis of civil timekeeping. (JP 5-0)

warning order

1. A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. 2. A planning directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military courses of action by a commander. (JP 5-0)

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29 July 2025

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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General, United States Army
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