ATP 3-92

CORPS OPERATIONS

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CORPS OPERATIONS

Contents

Page

Preface ..... **vii**
Acknowledgements ..... **ix**
Introduction ..... **xi**
CHAPTER 1 ..... **1**
THE CORPS **1**
Section I — Corps Overview and Strategic Consideration **1**
Corps Operations in Multiple Domains 2
Operations in the Army Strategic Contexts 3
The Corps' Roles 6
Section II — Senior Tactical Formation **7**
Section III — Functions **7**
Set Priorities 8
Task-Organize and Allocate Resources 8
Enable Subordinate Division and Brigade Freedom of Action 9
Maneuver Divisions and Other Combat Formations 10
Section IV — Additional Roles of The Corps **11**
ARFOR 11
Joint Task Force Headquarters 11
Joint Force Land Component Command 12
CHAPTER 2 ..... **15**
THE CORPS STRUCTURE **15**
Section I — Corps Headquarters **15**
Corps Headquarters Composition 15
Corps Command Posts 19
The Corps Staff 23
Section II — Corps Units **26**

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Subordinate Formations 26
Section III — Joint Force Capabilities 36
U.S. Air Force 36
U.S. Space Force 37
U.S. Navy 37
U.S. Marine Corps 38
U.S. Cyber Command 38
U.S. Special Operations Command 38
U.S. Space Command 39
U.S. Strategic Command 39
CHAPTER 3 41
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPS OPERATIONS 41
Section I — Large-Scale Combat Operations Challenges 41
Defend Against Initial Attacks 41
Defeat Enemy Forces 41
Section II — Command and Leadership 43
Operations Process 44
Risk 46
Section III — Operational Framework 46
Assigned Areas 46
Deep, Close, and Rear Operations 50
Main Effort, Supporting Effort, and Reserve 51
Section IV — Corps Movement and Force Projection 51
Movement of Large Units 51
Force Projection and Integration 54
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration 56
Section V — Other Considerations 58
Planning and Rehearsal Considerations 58
Knowledge Management Considerations 59
Information Considerations 59
Operations Security 60
CHAPTER 4 61
INTEGRATING CORPS OPERATIONS 61
Section I — Challenges For the Corps During Operations and Overcoming the Challenges 61
Nature of Corps Operations 61
Overcoming the Challenges 62
Section II — Synchronizing Deep, Close, and Rear Operations 62
The Commander’s Visualization and Concept of the Operation 63

Close Operations 64
Deep Operations 64
Rear Operations 70
Warfighting Function Considerations During Current Operations and Future Operations 74
Section III –— Synchronizing Deep, Close, and Rear Operations During Offensive Operations 78
Deep Operations 79
Close Operations 79
Rear Operations 79
Section IV — Synchronizing Deep, Close, and Rear Operations During Defensive Operations 79
Deep Operations 80
Close Operations 80
Rear Operations 81
CHAPTER 5 83
CORPS OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 83
Section I – Corps Offensive Operations 83
Overview of Corps Offensive Operations 83
Forms of Maneuver 84
Primary Offensive Operations 88
Encirclement of an Enemy Force 98
Section II – Defensive Operations 99
Organization of the Defense 99
Friendly Force Encirclement 105
Transitioning to the Offense 110
CHAPTER 6 113
ENABLING OPERATIONS 113
Overview of Enabling Operations 113
Reconnaissance 113
Security 114
Troop Movement 115
Relief in Place 117
Passage of Lines 120
Countermobility 123
Mobility 123
Tactical Deception 128
Linkup Operations 129
CHAPTER 7 133
CONSOLIDATING GAINS WHILE FIGHTING 133
Consolidating Gains and Its Relation to Operational Success 133

Defeating Bypassed Enemy Forces and Establishing Area Security 135
Reconstitution Operations 135
Performing Minimum Essential Stability Operations Tasks 136
Transitioning to Post Conflict Stabilization 137
APPENDIX A 139
ARFOR 139
APPENDIX B 149
TRANSITIONING THE CORPS TO A JOINT HEADQUARTERS 149
APPENDIX C 159
THE CORPS IN A JOINT ROLE 159
APPENDIX D 167
CORPS OPERATIONS IN HISTORY 167
Source Notes 181
Glossary 183
References 191
Index 195

Figures

Figure 2-1. Corps Headquarters Organization 16
Figure 2-2. Corps Command Posts 20
Figure 2-3. Corps Forces and Enablers 26
Figure 3-1. Depths and Frontages of an Operational Framework 47
Figure 3-2. Corps AO with Noncontiguous Divisions 49
Figure 4-1. Synchronization of Deep, Close, and Rear Operations 63
Figure 5-1. Single envelopment 85
Figure 5-2. Double Envelopment 85
Figure 5-3. Frontal Attack 86
Figure 5-4. Penetration 87
Figure 5-5. Turning Movement 88
Figure 5-6. Corps Movement to Contact Organization 90
Figure 5-7. Corps Attack 92
Figure 5-8. Corps Attack Followed by Exploitation 96
Figure 5-9. Corps Pursuit 97
Figure 5-10. Corps Encirclement 98
Figure 5-11. Corps Mobile Defense 102
Figure 5-12. A Delay 104
Figure 5-13. Types of Withdrawal 104
Figure 5-14. Encircled Corps Defense 106
Figure 5-15. Corps Breakout Operation 108
Figure 5-16. Corps Exfiltration 110
Figure 6-1. Relief in Place in a Corps Area of Operations 120
Figure 6-2. Passage of Lines in a Corps Area of Operations 122
Figure 6-3. Corps Mobility in World War II 125
Figure 6-4. Example of a Corps Wet Gap Crossing 128
Figure 6-5. Corps Linkup of Two Divisions 130

Figure A-1. Possible Joint Task Force Components 140
Figure B-1. Corps Staff Efficacy While Aligned as a Joint Task Force 151
Figure B-2. Corps Augmentation to Form a Joint Task Force 152
Figure C-1. Land Component Command Relationships 163
Figure D-1. Corps Maneuver to Manila 169
Figure D-2. Division Attack in Manila 170
Figure D-3. Corps Withdrawal Under Pressure 172
Figure D-4. From Defense to Breakout 173
Figure D-5. Corps Mobility in World War II 174
Figure D-6. VIII Corps Area Defense. 176
Figure D-7. OPERATION DESERT DRAGON Phase I and II 179
Figure D-8. OPERATION DESERT DRAGON Phase III 180

Tables

Table 4-1. Integrated Sustainment and Maneuver Planning for Large-Scale Combat Operations 76

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Preface

ATP 3-92 discusses the roles, functions, structure, organization, and operations of the corps. This publication discusses the corps as a tactical formation and operational headquarters during operations. This publication contains copyrighted material.

This publication is most applicable to corps commanders and staffs. It provides relevant information regarding the corps organization and operations for commanders and staffs at subordinate divisions and brigades, corps, theater armies, other Service headquarters, and combatant commands. The organizational figures and associated staffing levels are derived from an amalgamation of corps and main command post-operational detachment modified tables of organization and equipment, and may vary to some degree from individual modified tables of organization and equipment for different corps.

The principal audience for ATP 3-92 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the competition continuum and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States (U.S.), international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of armed conflict and applicable rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27 for more information on the law of war.) They also adhere to the Army Ethic as described in ADP 6-22.

ATP 3-92 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. ATP 3-92 is not the proponent publication (the authority) for any terms. For other terms defined in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 3-92 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard of the U.S., and U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 3-92 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATZL-MCD (ATP 3-92), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@army.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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Introduction

This revision of ATP 3-92 articulates nonprescriptive ways and methods a corps accomplishes missions, performs functions, and executes tasks. ATP 3-92 expands on corps foundations and tenets found in FM 3-94 and incorporates changes to the Army's operational concept found in FM 3-0.

ATP 3-92 addresses the corps' role in Army operations. It describes how the corps performs as a tactical formation and as a headquarters.

ATP 3-92 nests with FM 3-94 on key topics while expanding on specific topics. These topics include convergence; the corps' role and function as a tactical formation; the corps' operational environment (OE); the corps' structure and capabilities; the operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time; the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations of [METT-TC (I)]; and operational-level headquarters considerations.

Corps have been a critical part of Army operations since the Civil War. Since that time, corps demonstrated their value in both World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam. Ably commanded and properly organized, corps demonstrated their value as maneuver forces capable of significant independent action during large-scale combat operations. Starting in the 1970s, as the Army sought to improve command and control (C2) by realigning and reducing headquarters, the responsibilities and functions of the field army were divided between the theater army and the corps. It was during this period that the corps became capable of operating at the tactical or operational level depending upon the mission. While they are organized, manned, trained, and equipped as a tactical formation, corps were routinely called upon to become joint headquarters for operations. Between 1975 and 2004, Army corps were called upon to operate as the senior tactical headquarters in large-scale combat or as joint headquarters in various limited contingency operations.

Today, corps must possess the ability to execute current warfighting doctrine in contact with a peer threat capable of contesting their operations in all domains. An *Army corps* is an echelon of command and tactical formation that employs divisions, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades to achieve objectives on land (JP 3-31). Corps are the largest tactical formation in the Army. They must be flexible enough to conduct simultaneous operations throughout their assigned operational area with a faster tempo than previously required. They are also the echelon best positioned and resourced to achieve convergence with Army and joint capabilities. Corps design their operations on land to take advantage of the opportunities created by other components of the joint force, preserving combat power to maximize their ability to exploit future opportunities and create future opportunities for the joint force.

ATP 3-92 contains seven chapters and two appendices:

Chapter 1 provides an introduction of a corps and its operation as a tactical formation and operational headquarters. First, it provides an overview of the corps. Next, it discusses the corps as a senior tactical formation and its associated functions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the additional roles that a corps could fulfill for the joint force in operations other than large scale combat.

Chapter 2 describes how a corps is structured. It begins with an overview of a corps headquarters. Next, it discusses corps assigned and provided units. The chapter concludes with a discussion of joint capabilities to support corps operations.

Chapter 3 discusses the fundamentals of corps operations. It begins with discussion on the challenges to a corps as the senior tactical formation during large-scale combat operations, followed by command and leadership considerations. Next, the chapter discusses the operational framework and considerations for movement and maneuver. This chapter concludes with a discussion on other considerations for corps operations.

Chapter 4 expands on the application of the deep, close, and rear operations framework introduced in chapter 3. It provides an overview of general friendly and enemy challenges facing a corps during operations and

describes how a corps synchronizes deep, close, and rear operations to overcome those challenges. The chapter concludes by providing considerations for synchronizing deep, close, and rear operations during offensive and defensive operations.

Chapter 5 addresses considerations for a corps when conducting offensive and defensive operations. The information in this chapter pertaining to corps operations is meant to augment FM 3-90, not summarize it. The chapter begins with an overview of the offense and vignette, followed by a discussion of the operational framework in the offense. Finally, it discusses the defense.

Chapter 6 covers enabling operations. It begins with an overview of enabling operations. Then, the chapter discusses reconnaissance, security, and troop movement, followed by relief in place. Next, the chapter discusses passage of lines, countermobility, mobility, and tactical deception. The chapter concludes with a discussion of linkup operations.

Chapter 7 addresses what a corps is required to do to start consolidating gains while still fighting. This chapter begins with an overview of stability operations and consolidating gains followed by a discussion of the challenges inherent in consolidating gains during combat operations. It then discusses the types of activities and operations that a corps would be responsible for in their area of operations. The chapter concludes with some planning considerations when planning for these operations.

Appendix A discusses the role of the ARFOR. While an ARFOR controls forces operationally, this appendix discusses the ARFOR's administrative and support responsibilities to subordinate Army forces and to other Services in a joint force.

Appendix B describes the types of Joint Task Forces, the formation authority, and planning considerations when transitioning a corps headquarters into a Joint Task Force Headquarters.

Appendix C expands on the discussion from chapter 1 by describing corps considerations when performing other roles.

Appendix D provides additional context for specific content in the manual and illustrates key concepts.

Chapter 1
The Corps

This chapter introduces a corps starting with an overview. Next is a discussion of a corps as a senior tactical formation and its associated functions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the additional roles that a corps could fulfill for the joint force.

SECTION I — CORPS OVERVIEW AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATION

[The corps] can engage on an extended front and can carry on a battle until a decision is reached… In actions of long duration, the divisional units are relieved by fresh units; but the corps remains until a decision is reached or the strategical plan is changed.

A Manual for Commanders of Large Units

1-1. The Army's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. It supports four strategic roles for the joint force: shape operational environments, counter aggression on land during crisis, prevail during ground combat, and consolidate gains. The Army provides forces for joint campaigns to fulfill these roles. The corps is a critical contribution capable of conducting sustained combat operations, leveraging multidomain capabilities in pursuit of objectives, or providing the nucleus of a joint headquarters for short duration or limited contingency operations.

1-2. An *Army corps* is an echelon of command and tactical formation that employs divisions, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades to achieve objectives on land (JP 3-31). The Army maintains and employs corps for two reasons. Primarily, corps exist to prevail during large-scale combat operations against peer threats. Secondarily, the employment of an Army corps offers civilian policy makers and senior military leaders options to compete effectively against threats, above or below the threshold of overt armed conflict.

1-3. Corps are the largest tactical units in the Army. Corps are both an echelon of command and a combined arms formation capable of sustained, independent operations. They are the instruments by which higher echelons of command conduct operations at the operational level. They are the Army's most versatile echelon, functioning as one of the principal integrators of landpower into joint campaigns. When a field army is constituted, a corps is the primary link between the operational- and tactical-levels of warfare.

1-4. Corps operations are inherently combined arms operations distinguished by their scope and scale. Corps tactics use simultaneous and sequential attacks across a broad front to break the enemy's cohesion and disrupt their entire defensive system. A corps focuses on shaping conditions for its divisions by using its assets and enablers and by leveraging joint capabilities to disrupt the enemy in depth. Corps integrate capabilities from multiple domains and echelons against multiple decisive points achieving convergence outcomes that their subordinates can exploit.

1-5. Corps commanders and staffs focus on operations in their deep areas to shape future close operations while protecting their rear operations. The corps headquarters synchronizes maneuver, fire support, and effects with protection and sustainment to set conditions for subordinate forces, and it accomplishes tactical objectives to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Command at this echelon requires operational art, tactical expertise, and complementary employment of Army and joint capabilities. In addition to shaping the environment for their subordinate formations, corps commanders ensure the timing of division and brigade actions, commit reserves, and modify current and future operations to adjust to the situation. The corps commander prescribes the tactics for the corps in their concept of operation and statement of their intent.

1-6. Operational and mission variables determine how a higher echelon tailors or task organizes a corps with specific capabilities to achieve its assigned objectives. Corps operations possess several key characteristics. Corps operations are conducted in multiple domains, requiring the synchronization of joint and multinational capabilities. They require forces tailored during force projection in response to crisis situations. Corps operations are conducted across the competition continuum from competition below armed conflict, through

crisis and ultimately armed conflict. The corps is the senior tactical echelon where the commander integrates and synchronizes joint and Army capabilities.

1-7. The corps headquarters is flexible and adaptable, and it requires an experienced, capable staff. It needs the ability to expand and contract its structure and modify it to create forward operational elements as needed. The corps staff is a cross functional team, integrating warfighting functions to generate combat power at multiple decisive points to achieve objectives. (See Chapter 3 for more information on warfighting functions.) The Army intended corps to be highly versatile, designing them with senior, experienced, and varied staffs and making corps capable of performing different tactical- or operational-level roles.

1-8. There are currently four corps in the Army. They are—

- I Corps.
- III Armored Corps.
- V Corps.
- XVIII Airborne Corps.

Note. Each corps has particular focuses and characteristics, but each can exercise command and control (C2) over any division type, and each can control operations anywhere in the world.

1-9. Each type of corps conducts operations to set conditions across multiple domains for its formations to exploit. Setting the right conditions for success is critical. When fighting a peer adversary, the corps must focus its available combat power on those operations that maximize its divisions' ability to execute close combat. The corps headquarters conducts and coordinates operations to provide divisions with the freedom to maneuver ground forces by employing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), electromagnetic warfare (EW), space operations, and cyberspace operations. The corps employs air and missile defense (AMD), engineers, and other capabilities to preserve combat power as it maneuvers its divisions and other subordinate formations to execute the corps' scheme of maneuver to achieve objectives and defeat enemy forces. *Combat power* is the total means of destruction and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time (JP 3-0).

CORPS OPERATIONS IN MULTIPLE DOMAINS

1-10. The Army's operational concept is multidomain operations. *Multidomain operations* are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders (FM 3-0). Army forces, enabled by joint capabilities, attack enemy forces and protect friendly forces through all domains. Army forces provide the lethal and resilient landpower necessary to defeat threat standoff approaches and achieve joint force objectives.

1-11. Below the threshold of armed conflict, multidomain operations are how Army forces set advantageous conditions for future conflict, demonstrate readiness, and deter adversaries while assuring allies and partners. During conflict, multidomain operations are how Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces, defeat enemy formations, seize critical terrain, and control populations and resources to deliver sustainable political outcomes. (See FM 3-0 for an expanded discussion of multidomain operations.)

1-12. Corps are designed to conduct sustained operations against a peer enemy as part of a larger joint force. An *operation* is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1, Volume 1). Operations vary in many ways based upon the physical environment, the scale of forces involved, their objectives, and their duration. With appropriate support, corps can plan and conduct multiple successive operations against an enemy force, allowing them to create an expanding cycle of opportunities. Corps align their operations on land to take advantage of opportunities created by the effects generated by other components of the joint force. This allows corps to preserve the combat power essential to exploiting future opportunities over time. Corps likewise design and conduct operations that create opportunities for the joint force to exploit.

1-13. Enemy forces able to contest the joint force and allies or partners in all environments means that the corps cannot rely on capabilities in only a few domains. A corps commander and staff leverage all available capabilities to overcome threat advantages during competition or conflict. By employing capabilities from

multiple directions and domains, Army corps present threats with multiple interrelated dilemmas that are difficult to overcome.

1-14. Echeloned Army forces provide the landpower component necessary for the depth of maneuver required to defeat threat standoff approaches. As a tactical headquarters, a corps headquarters employs divisions simultaneously to overwhelm enemy forces or in sequence to extend the duration of operations. A corps provides the C2 and enabling capabilities required for the endurance to achieve necessary depth for the land component. A corps integrates and synchronizes joint and Army capabilities, fighting as a formation to create opportunities for the joint force and its subordinate formations. Corps commanders employ joint and Army capabilities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative with their divisions.

OPERATIONS IN THE ARMY STRATEGIC CONTEXTS

1-15. Joint doctrine describes the strategic environment in terms of a competition continuum describing three broad categories of relationships—cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. At the national strategic and theater strategic levels, cooperation, competition, and armed conflict commonly occur simultaneously in different parts of the world.

1-16. The Army strategic contexts generally correspond with the joint competition continuum with two key differences. Army doctrine considers cooperation a part of competition because it is generally conducted with an ally or partner to counter an enemy or adversary. Additionally, Army doctrine adds crisis to account for the unique challenges facing military forces that often characterize transitions between competition and armed conflict. Army forces at the corps echelon and below typically conduct operations in one context at a time. The following discussion will briefly discuss the Army strategic contexts from the perspective of a corps' contributions. (See FM 3-0 for more information on the strategic contexts.)

COMPETITION BELOW ARMED CONFLICT

1-17. Competition exists when a specific adversary's national interests are incompatible with U.S. interests. An *adversary* is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). An adversary operates just below the conflict threshold to achieve its aims, and the tension between adversary and friendly groups creates potential for violent escalation. During competition, a corps trains and prepares for large-scale combat operations. Preparation includes activities such as building interoperability with allies and partners and training to execute the contingency plans that a corps is likely to support. When directed, a corps supports a theater army in executing missions and tasks in support of a combatant commander's (CCDR's) campaign plan. Corps preparation for large-scale combat operations contributes to deterring adversaries, since exercises and training events serve as demonstrations of capability and will. During competition, a corps focuses on consolidating gains won on land during previous conflicts and ongoing security cooperation activities to maintain an operational environment (OE) that is advantageous to U.S. interests.

1-18. When directed, a corps may participate in operations and activities intended to promote regional stability in a particular area of responsibility (AOR) and set security conditions favorable to U.S. interests. These activities include military engagement, security cooperation, and forward presence to promote U.S. interests, to develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and to provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. A corps enables theater armies to set their theaters by using existing partnerships or developing new ones to improve interoperability, enable forward basing or theater access, assure partners and allies, or other purposes in support of the CCDR's campaign plan and the theater army's campaign support plan. (See the vignette DEFENDER-EUROPE and V Corps for a description of a corps' contribution to shaping an OE.)

DEFENDER EUROPE and V Corps

DEFENDER-EUROPE is an annual large-scale U.S. Army Europe and Africa-led, multinational, joint exercise designed to build strategic and operational readiness and interoperability between U.S., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and other partners. DEFENDER-EUROPE 21 included more than 30,000 multinational forces from 27 nations conducting nearly simultaneous operations across more than 30 training areas in a dozen countries. The 2020 activation of V Corps headquarters provided the needed level of command and control (C2) focused on synchronizing U.S. Army, allied, and partner-nation tactical formations operating in Europe. The exercise enhanced the capabilities of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, and U.S. European Command as they worked alongside allies and partners to promote regional stability and security.

CRISIS

1-19. Regardless of the capabilities and forces employed by a corps, there are two broad outcomes from a crisis. Either the corps maintains deterrence and the situation is deescalated, or armed conflict occurs. A *crisis* is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives (JP 3-0). During crisis, there are indications and warnings that conflict is a distinct possibility that requires rapid response by forces prepared for conflict. A corps may be deployed during crisis to provide C2 as the senior tactical formation in support of a joint commander. The corps serving as the senior tactical echelon of Army forces in a theater will be responsible for ensuring effective support to the other Services, especially in the initial stages of a conflict. Corps also provide force packages as part of joint flexible deterrent options or flexible response options. During a crisis, a corps may be tasked to form the core element of a joint task force (JTF) or joint force land component commander (JFLCC) headquarters at the direction of the combatant commander. If this happens, the corps requires significant joint and Army augmentation.

1-20. Army operations to prevent conflict or escalation of conflict include all activities to deter an adversary's undesirable actions. Corps commanders usually emphasize the protection of friendly forces, assets, and partners when conducting operations to prevent conflict and to indicate U.S. intentions to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation. In December 1989, General Manuel Noriega announced the Republic of Panama was in a state of war with the United States. This was a buildup of tensions involving election fraud, harassment of U.S. military personnel and their families, and continued corruption in Panama. General Noriega increased anti-American rhetoric and communications with the Soviet Union. General Noriega's comments and role in drug trafficking and treaty violations set the tone for U.S. military intervention in Panama. (See the vignette OPERATION JUST CAUSE — Crisis Intervention on page 5 for a description of the intervention in Panama.)

Note. While the invasion of Panama seems contrary to preventing conflict, conventional forces were necessary to prevent further aggression and corruption and to protect U.S. interests. The focus of the vignette is on the corps' ability to set the theater, conduct planning, and develop tailored force projection to prevent further escalation on terms favorable to the adversary.

OPERATION JUST CAUSE — Crisis Intervention

The military intervention in Panama had four objectives: to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty.

XVIII Airborne Corps planners were uncomfortable with OPERATION PLAN 90-1 because its deliberate buildup of forces assumed provocation by General Noriega, which clearly threatened American lives and the security of the Canal Zone. The planners revised OPERATION PLAN 90-1 to develop OPERATION PLAN 90-2 (after an attempted coup) to increase the speed of deployment. They assigned the 82nd Airborne Division as the lead assault force and the 7th Infantry Division as the secondary assault force. As tensions continued in Panama, U.S. Southern Command commander and XVIII Airborne Corps planners realized any military action would have to be swift and decisive.

Units in the United States and Panama increased training tenfold; OPERATION SAND FLEA training exercises demonstrated the U.S. resolve to ensure the treaty rights affecting the Canal Zone and U.S. installations were preserved. Numerous command post (CP) exercises with the corps headquarters (and division headquarters and special operations forces [SOF]) elements) allowed the commanders and their deputies to play specific roles in a training exercise replicating a joint task force (JTF) deployed overseas. The CP exercise was a replication of the actual military operation in Panama. The training exercises in the Canal Zone desensitized the Panamanian Defense Forces to U.S. movements, and they allowed U.S. forces to see on the ground their future objectives in OPERATION JUST CAUSE.

XVIII Airborne Corps, established as JTF South, exercised both tactical and operational level command. The JTF divided its subordinate elements into four conventional ground forces against 27 different objectives. The thorough planning, training, and deliberate use of military power enabled the planners to set conditions favorable to a swift and decisive strike through surprise and rapid tempo. At the end of OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the corps had secured all 27 objectives, protected U.S. interests, and removed General Noriega from power.

ARMED CONFLICT

1-21. Armed conflict occurs when a state or nonstate actor uses lethal force to achieve its political goals. Armed conflict can occur as a limited contingency operation or progress into large-scale combat. *Large-scale combat operations* are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives (ADP 3-0). In a large-scale conflict, corps are generally the senior tactical formations on the battlefield under the control of a land component commander (LCC). Corps are required to conduct offensive and defensive operations to close with and destroy enemy forces, exploit success, and break an enemy force's will to continue to conduct operations.

1-22. During large-scale combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat and destruction of enemy forces as part of the joint team. Corps close with and destroy enemy forces in any terrain, exploit success, and break an enemy force's ability to resist. Corps attack, defend, perform stability tasks, and consolidate gains to accomplish national objectives. During large-scale combat operations, corps operate as a formation, controlling the operations of two to five divisions and multiple functional and multifunctional brigades, enabled by supporting theater-level organizations. A corps can transition to serve as an operational-level headquarters (for example, the land component or JTF). However, using a corps as the basis of an LCC or joint headquarters will render them incapable of function simultaneously as an Army tactical headquarters in

combat operations. The ability to prevail in ground combat is a decisive factor in breaking an enemy force's capability and will to continue a conflict.

1-23. Army operations to *consolidate gains* are activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Corps conduct a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations to consolidate gains. Consolidation of gains is an integral and continuous part of armed conflict, and it is necessary for achieving success across the range of military operations. At the conclusion of hostile activities in OPERATION JUST CAUSE, JTF South forces faced an even larger problem with a limited government, infrastructure, and civil support. Enabling legitimate leaders and opening commerce were critical to sustain Panama's economy and protecting U.S. interests. XVIII Airborne Corps worked with the Panamanian Security Forces (many of whom were former Panamanian Defense Forces just a few days prior) to conduct policing operations and establish security. (See the vignette OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY — Transition to Stability Operations for a description of stability operations in Panama.)

OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY — Transition to Stability Operations

Upon the completion of major combat operations in Panama, Lieutenant General Stiner and his team (JTF South and the XVIII Airborne Corps) had a unique challenge. Most of the Panamanian people supported removing General Noriega from power, but they needed to rebuild the entire government with a focus on training, stability, and safety.

The first order of business was reopening the Panama Canal, the Bridge of Americas, and the associated roads to allow personnel and supplies to move. Before this could happen, XVIII Airborne Corps conducted a rigorous campaign to remove any remaining Panamanian Defense Forces that affected stability.

XVIII Airborne Corps planners discussed consolidation plans, but more as an afterthought to ousting General Noriega and restoring Panama Canal operations. The JTF carefully selected targets to limit destruction of critical infrastructure to protect the roads, economy, and local population. Upon cessation of combat activities, infantry Soldiers assumed policing missions within the cities because there simply were not enough other security forces available to restore order.

The next order of business was to establish order and security; the JTF reconstituted some Panamanian Security Forces to serve as police liaison officers (LNOs) and collaborated with military police from the 16th Military Police Brigade for patrols.

Planning for all phases of the operation proved critical. OPERATION JUST CAUSE created a displacement issue; the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion arrived with approximately 100 personnel to establish a camp and coordinate relief resupplies for displaced civilians. XVIII Airborne Corps and JTF South rapidly evolved to conduct consolidation activities that facilitated the transition of power and responsibility to legitimate local authorities while protecting U.S. interests.

THE CORPS' ROLES

1-24. The effective integration of landpower across the competition continuum requires an expeditionary, scalable, and operationally flexible headquarters able to exercise command in a variety of roles. The corps is foundational to the joint and multinational forces' ability to conduct sustained operations on land because it provides the JTF commander capabilities and capacity that exist nowhere else. The roles of the corps include operating as the—

- Senior Army tactical formation in large-scale combat, commanding two to five Army divisions together with supporting brigades and commands. (See Chapter 1 Section II along with Chapters 3 through 7 for an in-depth discussion of this role.)
- ARFOR (with augmentation) within a joint force for campaigns and major operations when a field army is not present. (See paragraphs 1-52 and 1-53 and appendix B for a detailed discussion of this role.)
- JTF headquarters (with significant augmentation) for crisis response, limited contingency operations, or for campaigns and major operations when a field army is not necessary. (See paragraphs 1-54 through 1-57 and appendix A for a detailed discussion of this role.)
- Joint force land component command (with significant augmentation), commanding Army, United States Marine Corps (USMC), and multinational divisions together with supporting brigades and commands when a field army is not present. (See paragraphs 1-58 through 1-63 and appendix A for a detailed discussion of this role.)

SECTION II — SENIOR TACTICAL FORMATION

1-25. Large-scale combat operations will likely require a corps headquarters to function as a tactical headquarters within a land component command or subordinate to a field army equivalent. An example of this would be the relationship between a corps and a Republic of Korea Army if war recurred on the Korean peninsula. In this case, the corps would operate in a theater of war or theater of operations as a tactical headquarters under a joint command or land component. Recent historical examples of Army corps operating as a senior tactical headquarters include OPERATION DESERT STORM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM I.

1-26. When operating as a tactical echelon, the corps formation is task-organized for an operation. The corps commander and staff consider the operational variables and mission variables when planning and conducting operations. The number and type of additional divisions or brigades assigned or attached to a corps is dependent on the relative combat power of the enemy formations that the corps engages.

1-27. A corps executes the following three tasks to accomplish tactical objectives and meet mission requirements and the commander's intent:

- Engage enemy forces to set conditions in the corps' deep and close areas with available Army and joint capabilities.
- Exercise C2 over Army divisions and other formations to gain positions of advantage, close with and defeat enemy forces, and compel their surrender or withdrawal in the corps' close area.
- Initiate, execute, implement, ensure, and support consolidation activities to set conditions for transition to a sustainable security end state.

1-28. A corps receives its mission and tactical direction in operation plans or other formats, both verbal and written. An operation plan provides details and tactical directions necessary for a corps to execute the first phase and prepare to execute the subsequent phases of a campaign plan. A corps commander translates the strategic objective of the tactical action into tactical objectives and phases for accomplishment.

1-29. A corps can conduct continuous and simultaneous tasks (including offensive, defensive, stability operations, or defense support of civil authorities) through a series of synchronized division and separate brigade operations. These operations create and exploit relative advantages across multiple domains to defeat an enemy force and achieve the operation's overall purpose. Chapters 3 through 7 discuss various operations a corps conducts, and they include an in-depth discussion of the corps' role in large scale combat operations.

SECTION III — FUNCTIONS

1-30. In each of the roles described in Section II, a corps enables subordinate formations to achieve assigned objectives. As a JTF, a corps develops the scheme of fires to support the scheme of maneuver and employs joint fires to create conditions to allow freedom of maneuver. (See Chapter 3 for more information on setting conditions.) As the land component, a corps employs joint fire support systems and reconnaissance and surveillance assets in accordance with the JTF's mission objectives. As the senior tactical formation, a corps

plans, prioritizes, and employs capabilities from multiple domains in its efforts to create opportunities for subordinate formations to exploit.

1-31. During large-scale combat operations, a corps will likely fill its role as the senior tactical formation in a land component command or be subordinate to a field army equivalent established under a multinational force (including an alliance or coalition). Within this role, the corps synchronizes the employment of joint capabilities in conjunction with ground combat operations to achieve assigned objectives. Corps operate in depth over long distances requiring substantial support to support and extend land operations.

1-32. Corps accomplish their assigned missions and achieve their objectives by performing some fundamental functions. The six primary functions of a corps are to—

- Set conditions in the corps' assigned area.
- Employ joint capabilities.
- Allocate resources and set priorities.
- Task-organize and employ divisions and brigades.
- Integrate and synchronize operations of divisions and brigades.
- Mass effects at decisive points.

1-33. Corps will usually fight as part of a larger multinational coalition or alliance with multinational forces task organized as part of the corps. Corps must understand the national caveats for their employment along with their capabilities to effectively employ them in combat operations.

SET PRIORITIES

1-34. Corps employ Army and joint capabilities to achieve objectives and set conditions for subordinate echelons' success according to the corps commander's priorities. Corps planners arrange the employment of these capabilities based on the commander's visualization of the operation. From that visualization, the commander, with the staff's assistance, sets priorities regarding main and supporting efforts, objectives, fires, information collection, movement, protection, and sustainment. These priorities account for all joint and multidomain capabilities available to the corps.

1-35. Subordinate unit commanders and their staffs, in conjunction with the corps planners, recommend priorities to the corps commander. The corps fire support element (FSE) develops a fire support concept and prioritization that includes supporting joint fires capabilities. Corps staff disseminates a close air support (CAS) distribution decision to provide guidance for the use of air to ground fires in its area of operations (AO). The corps protection cell identifies and establishes protection priorities and synchronizes and integrates protection tasks, systems, and methods that prevent or mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards. This preserves combat power and enables freedom of action. The corps engineer cell assesses engineering capabilities against the terrain, mission, and requirements for prioritization and employment. The assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4) recommends sustainment priorities that align with the corps' main effort. These assessments enable the corps commander to employ combat power and determine any gaps in capabilities (including joint capabilities).

1-36. Setting priorities provides clear visualization and direction to staff members, allowing them to continue planning, preparing orders, or making timely decisions within their warfighting functions. Staff members shift efforts to facilitate phase changes, transitions, or new missions. (See Chapter 3 for more information on visualization.)

TASK-ORGANIZE AND ALLOCATE RESOURCES

1-37. The exact task organization of subordinate divisions and multifunctional brigades depends on corps mission requirements and what the main or supporting efforts are during an operation. Corps do not typically distribute all available combat power to the divisions. Commanders retain control of some assets, such as aviation, fires, engineers, and intelligence units, to allow corps to conduct deep operations or maintain flexibility for future operations. Corps commanders adjust throughout the course of operations as necessary, allocating Army and joint capabilities to accomplish objectives that achieve their higher echelon headquarters' purpose. They weight the main effort and exercise economy of force where appropriate.

1-38. Commanders task organize corps resources to subordinate divisions and brigades based on mission requirements. Corps resources may include fire support assets, cyberspace capabilities, and attack aviation; EW capabilities; protection capabilities such as AMD, military police, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) elements; Army space support teams; sustainment capabilities; and engineering capabilities.

1-39. The corps staff must identify unique, scarce capabilities and determine how best to task-organize to maximize effectiveness. Resource allocation balances requirements for deep, close, and rear operations to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. As the corps commander and staff develop and refine their plan and task organization, they may significantly reduce the combat power of one formation to weight the main effort. The corps commander reviews the task organization as the situation evolves and forces flow into theater to make sure that currently available resources align with operational priorities. This applies to functional or service components and the capabilities of joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners.

1-40. During contingency operations, a corps submits support requests to the theater army when mission requirements exceed its capabilities. As the corps headquarters directs its divisions, the theater army apportions additional capabilities to ensure the corps can accomplish its tasks. During large-scale combat operations, a corps submits requests to the JFLCC or JTF when mission requirements exceed its capabilities.

Note. The theater army is the senior Army command in an area of responsibility. The theater army provides the corps' force and sustainment requirements, regardless of the corps' role. Depending upon the situation and command-support relationship, the corps may address those support requests through the CCDR or directly to the theater army.

ENABLE SUBORDINATE DIVISION AND BRIGADE FREEDOM OF ACTION

1-41. As corps task-organize their subordinate divisions and brigades and allocate them resources, they also consider how to enable freedom of action for those forces. A corps enables freedom of action by employing the mission command approach to C2, employing corps, joint, and subordinate formation capabilities, orchestrating division and supporting brigade operations across the operational framework, and through the effective use and distribution of additional available resources.

1-42. While corps commanders and their staffs develop plans to maximize a subordinate's ability to use initiative and take advantage of opportunities, they also identify phases of operations where more detailed control is necessary. River crossings, passages of lines, the commitment of the corps reserves, and employment of aviation battalions and brigades are examples of operations that require tight control to ensure their success. (See Chapter 7 for more discussion of these operations.)

EMPLOYING ARMY AND JOINT CAPABILITIES

1-43. A corps integrates and synchronizes all available capabilities during operations because it is the senior Army or joint headquarters, and it is best suited to effectively employ the full range of possible capabilities to greatest effect. As a corps combines Army and joint capabilities for employment using two or more defeat mechanisms, the complementary and reinforcing nature of each friendly capability presents multiple dilemmas for enemy forces. This produces an overall effect that is greater than the sum of each individual effort.

1-44. Corps employ capabilities from multiple domains in ways that defeat or disrupt enemy forces long enough for friendly forces to effectively exploit created opportunities. Corps balance the principles of mass, objective, and economy of force, massing combat power on some parts of an enemy force while employing different techniques against other decisive points to create cumulative effects that an enemy force cannot overcome.

1-45. During large-scale combat operations, a corps must be able to simultaneously and continuously execute operations in depth. The degree to which a corps integrates Army and joint capabilities in an operation depends on how well the commander and staff can—

- Develop an understanding of the enemy system, its capabilities, requirements, decision processes, and vulnerabilities through effective surveillance that provides mixed, redundant, and overlapping coverage.
- Employ Army and joint capabilities at the echelons, times, locations, or in the domains where they are most effective.
- Consider all domains and redundant methods of attack to increase the probability of success.
- Assume risk and rapidly exploit the opportunities provided by layering Army and joint capabilities at decisive points.

1-46. Corps enable their divisions by integrating Army and joint capabilities to defeat enemy integrated air defense systems and portions of the enemy's integrated fires command according to the joint force commander's (JFC's) plan and priorities. Corps commanders apply capabilities to achieve combinations of sequential, simultaneous, and enduring effects to maintain tempo and consolidate gains. They do this by conducting deep operations against appropriate corps targets (for example enemy armored formations) to shape the conditions for their subordinate brigades and divisions. (See Chapter 3 for more on the corps' deep, close, and rear operations.)

ORCHESTRATING OPERATIONS

1-47. An *operational framework* is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). Corps organize and synchronize their deep, close, and rear operations. A corps then assigns areas (AOs, zones, or sectors) to its subordinate formations. Finally, commanders designate a main effort, supporting effort, and reserve for the operation. All three models are commonly used to build an operational framework. However, commanders and staffs may use any model they find useful as long as they remain synchronized with their higher headquarters' operational framework. (See FM 3-0 for more information on the operational framework.)

1-48. Corps commanders conduct the operations process to understand, visualize, and describe an OE and end state. The corps staff integrates and synchronizes the operations of its assigned divisions and brigades through targeting priorities, effects, and timing. With the help of the corps staff, commanders then direct, lead, and assess military operations that accomplish the mission. Corps commanders express their vision of how the corps orchestrates operations through their concept of the operations and associated commanders' intent. The concept of operations is the simplest guide to assigning missions to subordinate units binding everything together and establishing the relationship between deep, close, and rear operations.

1-49. All echelons above brigade conduct deep operations designed to set favorable conditions for their subordinate formations in their close area. Corps destroy enemy systems, such as components of the enemy's integrated fires command or integrated air defense systems, their reserves and lines of communication, to facilitate current and future operations and to ensure protection. Additionally, corps use a combination of joint fires and other capabilities such as counterfire, AMD, movement capabilities, and route allocation to reinforce efforts and enable freedom of action for their divisions. Corps position subordinate units to exploit the results of convergence and the dilemmas these results cause the enemy. Success during operations usually depends on how quickly and effectively friendly forces can create and exploit relative advantages over enemy forces. (See Chapter 4 for an in-depth discussion of the relationship between corps deep, close, and rear operations.)

MANEUVER DIVISIONS AND OTHER COMBAT FORMATIONS

1-50. As combined arms formations, each of the echelons above brigade direct the broad scheme of maneuver of their subordinates. Corps commanders maneuver to seize objectives, using divisions and separate brigades to gain positions of advantage, to close with and defeat enemy forces, and to control terrain. Through its actions, a corps compels enemy surrender or withdrawal, synchronizing the maneuver of divisions and brigades to reduce friction and coordinating the simultaneous maneuver of multiple formations in time and space.

1-51. Corps maneuver divisions and separate brigades to avoid enemy strengths and create opportunities to bring greater Army and joint firepower on enemy forces. The objective of maneuver at the corps level can be to—

- Exploit weaknesses or vulnerabilities in enemy dispositions.
- Increase the amount of combat power applied against an enemy force at specific decisive points.
- Exploit the effects of convergence with a division or divisions.
- Position divisions for close operations.

1-52. Effective maneuver allows the corps commander to dictate the time, manner, and tempo of operations to the enemy. While the corps' subordinate combat formations focus on planning and executing tactical movement and maneuver, corps must focus on operational movement and maneuver in addition. Corps must position divisions and separate brigades to achieve a decisive outcome in the context of a campaign or major operations. Once forces are deployed into an operational area, corps maneuver their forces through the depths of their assigned area for offensive and defensive purposes. (See Chapter 3 for more on movement and maneuver.)

SECTION IV — ADDITIONAL ROLES OF THE CORPS

1-53. Corps are often called upon to fill roles other than, or in addition to, senior tactical command. The nature of an operation and level of augmentation required dictate whether a corps can simultaneously perform more than one role. Generally, a corps serving in the JTF headquarters role should not perform as a senior tactical formation, ARFOR, or joint force land component. As a JTF headquarters, the corps commands joint forces, transforms to a joint staff, and follows joint doctrine (see Appendix A). These changes require significant augmentation, and performing additional roles presents extreme challenges for the command. Nevertheless, with significant augmentation, a corps can perform the joint force land component and ARFOR roles during competition and crisis. With less augmentation, a corps can be the senior tactical formation and ARFOR. However, during large-scale combat operations, corps require significant additional augmentation to perform more than one role.

1-54. A corps requires a specific planning and staffing process to transition to different roles. Transitioning a corps headquarters to a joint headquarters requires a deliberate plan by the corps' higher headquarters. Filling a joint role requires augmentation and delegation of authorities to account for and mitigate corps capability gaps and limitations. Simultaneously conducting joint and Service roles during operations can quickly overwhelm a corps commander and staff. Appendix C provides a vignette during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM to show the complexity and challenges when a corps assumes more than one of these roles simultaneously.

ARFOR

1-55. An *ARFOR* is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command (FM 3-94). As the ARFOR for the JTF or land component command, a corps serves as an operational-level headquarters, conducting land operations as the Service component headquarters. The theater army provides the corps with theater-level assets as required. Appendix B expands the discussion of a corps headquarters as an ARFOR and the United States Code (USC) Title 10 and Army support to other Services (ASOS) responsibilities. (See FM 3-94 for additional information on an ARFOR.)

1-56. A corps does not require significant augmentation to operate as an ARFOR, but the commander must organize the formation to execute specific functions effectively. For example, when operating as an ARFOR, a corps headquarters assumes significant responsibilities during the onward movement phase of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). Additionally, corps commanders may task a subordinate element to execute the administrative control (ADCON) functions for its subordinate divisions, brigade combat teams (BCTs), functional brigades, and multifunctional brigades. (See Appendix B for more on the corps as an ARFOR.)

JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

1-57. The corps headquarters is the optimal Army echelon to serve as a core element for forming a JTF headquarters. However, this requires significant training and joint augmentation, accomplished by adding joint, unified action partner, and additional Army capabilities. The resulting JTF headquarters controls actions during competition, crisis, and armed conflict.

1-58. The staffing of a JTF formed around a corps headquarters normally follows the JTF headquarters design in JP 3-33. The corps-based command organization progresses to a joint structure to provide the required augmentation. The corps (as a JTF) receives many additional resources from the headquarters that establishes the JTF, such as the combatant command, to augment the corps. (See JP 3-18, JP 3-31, JP 3-33, JP 3-57, and JP 5-0 for more information on staffing a JTF.) The corps tailors its organization for specific situations that require augmentation, such as—

- Joint and special staff sections and activities.
- Specific functional area augmentation, such as psychological operations, civil affairs, or movement control.
- Headquarters life support functions.
- Communications support (including personnel and equipment).
- Security support for the JTF headquarters.

1-59. A JTF organizes into packages based on the nature of operations, the tempo of developments, and the existing capabilities of the corps headquarters designated as a JTF. These three packages are—

- Quick response cells to augment the JTF headquarters with joint and operational area expertise during the early stages of a crisis.
- Functional area augmentation to provide the JTF with expertise not organic to its staff.
- Joint staff augmentation to provide the coordinating and special staff sections expertise in joint procedures and Service-unique capabilities.

1-60. When serving as a JTF commander, the corps commander integrates and synchronizes joint force operations. The JTF commander exercises specified authority and direction over JTF elements in the accomplishment of JTF missions. When performing a joint role, the corps uses joint doctrine. (See Appendix D for more on the corps as an JTF.)

JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMAND

1-61. The JFC designates the corps commander as the JFLCC in a U.S. operation or as the multinational force land component commander (MNFLCC) in an allied or multinational operation when the Army provides most of the land forces. In these circumstances, the corps headquarters functions as a joint operational-level headquarters. When serving as a JFLCC, the corps commander has significant responsibility for operational C2 and is the single focal point to integrate and synchronize land force operations for a JTF. Upon approval of the land force plan, the JFLCC exercises specified authority and direction over land forces in the accomplishment of land force missions. The JFLCC's responsibility is to control land operations to accomplish the JTF's campaign and major operations objectives.

Note. Large-scale combat operations normally involve multinational land forces. JP 3-16 identifies a land component command which includes multinational forces as a MNFLCC.

1-62. When a corps commander is designated as the MNFLCC, the corps commands multiple division-size or smaller formations and exercises control over USMC and multinational forces made available for tasking by the JTF. As the senior Army echelon within the JTF, the corps headquarters is the ARFOR headquarters with the additional responsibility of ADCON over all attached Army forces. As required by the JTF, the corps headquarters receives a special operations liaison element, and it supports special operations forces (SOF) throughout the land operational area. Control of multinational units is stated in the agreement between the United States and partner nations. Task organizations for multinational units vary, and they include all types of control. (See JP 3-16 for a discussion of the organization and FM 3-94 for additional information on the roles and primary tasks performed by a multinational force land component command headquarters.)

Note. A JTF may place a small USMC element under the operational control (OPCON) of the corps. However, a JTF normally specifies a tactical control (TACON) relationship when the USMC element is a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF).

1-63. The land component of a JTF is seldom composed of purely U.S. forces. Thus, the corps headquarters, as a multinational force command, functions as the MNFLCC. In most cases, the MNFLCC exercises TACON over multinational brigades and divisions.

1-64. A corps headquarters has many functions suitable for transition to a land component command headquarters for a JTF without significant augmentation, but it has additional responsibilities that may require specific additional resources. The corps headquarters coordinates with other JTF-level commands, coordinates with the Service component headquarters of the JTF establishing authority for administrative and logistics support, plans and conducts operations within the JTF commander's guidance and plans, and may be required to provide liaison personnel to the JTF. The corps commander and chief of staff allocate key positions so that all Services are appropriately represented. When a JTF forms a joint force land component command using an Army corps headquarters, the deputy commander or chief of staff may come from an ally, partner, or the USMC. The commander may repeat this practice of distributing C2 duties throughout the headquarters staff, ensuring multinational staff members understand all unit capabilities and that all units and nations are included in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. However, this should not be done to the extent that it puts unity of effort or shared understanding at risk.

1-65. A corps often partners with multinational forces and coordinates with interagency organizations that bring a wide range of resources and capabilities which enhance the lethality of the corps. Command of multinational forces is complicated and politically sensitive. Multinational force headquarters must create a mission partner environment framework under which all multinational forces operate with U.S. peers, under the condition of interoperability. *Interoperability* is the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives (JP 3-0).

1-66. Commanders and staffs operating as a multinational headquarters must work to resolve interoperability challenges because they often add a layer of complexity to planning and execution. Multinational exercises and training with technical solutions at home station improve interoperability across the competition continuum. (See JP 3-16 and FM 3-16 for more information on multinational operations.)

Note. To improve interoperability during multinational and joint operations, the liaisons from the theater liaison detachment (TLD) command serve as the commander's representative (at the corps headquarters) promoting interoperability and building a healthy mission partner environment. Chapter 2 provides information regarding the role and capability of the TLD.

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Chapter 2

The Corps Structure

This chapter describes how a corps is structured. It begins with an overview of a corps headquarters. Next is a discussion of corps units. This chapter concludes with a discussion of joint capabilities to support corps operations.

SECTION I — CORPS HEADQUARTERS

2-1. A corps headquarters is organized and equipped for sustained combat operations. A corps is designed to operate in its primary role as a senior tactical formation, and the Army provides a corps headquarters with the CPs and staffs necessary to accomplish its missions. A corps requires augmentation to perform as an ARFOR, joint force land component command, or JTF headquarters.

CORPS HEADQUARTERS COMPOSITION


2-2. A corps headquarters provides a corps commander with several capabilities. A corps headquarters can—

- Plan, prepare, execute, and assess military operations.
- Direct, control, and coordinate the operations of subordinate combat and combat support units.
- Coordinate sustainment support with supporting sustainment organizations.
- Plan, coordinate, integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, intelligence, sustainment, and protection operations for the corps.
- Install, operate, and maintain the corps' network enterprise in support of 24-hour operations for corps-level functions.

2-3. A corps headquarters is organized with a main CP, a tactical CP, and a rear CP. A corps can form a mobile command group and an early entry CP by task-organizing capabilities from the main or tactical CPs. The functions of the CPs are—

- Building and maintaining the situational understanding necessary for effective decision making.
- Controlling operations through coordination, synchronization, and integration of the actions of all the corps' subordinate elements.
- Assessing operations.
- Coordinating with external organizations (including higher echelon headquarters and adjacent units).
- Conducting knowledge and information management.

2-4. The composition of the corps headquarters allows the corps commander and chief of staff flexibility to structure the organization according to the demands of the situation and plans and operations across the staff sections, cells, CPs, and echelons. Flexibility is enhanced by a network and suite of C2 information systems to enhance collaboration and synchronization. A corps commander and enabled key subordinates may control operations from any of the CPs. A corps headquarters receives its battalion-level life support and field-level maintenance from the headquarters and headquarters battalion. (See figure 2-1 on page 16 for a depiction of a corps headquarters organization.)



The headquarters and headquarters battalion (and subordinate companies and reserve component augmentation) provide the personnel and equipment for the command posts.
The main command post-operational detachment is typically a reserve component augmentation to the headquarters and headquarters battalion. When activated, these personnel supplement the main command post.

HHBn	headquarters and headquarters battalion	MCP-OD	main command post–operational detachment
HSC	headquarters support company	SIS	signal, intelligence, and sustainment company

Figure 2-1. Corps Headquarters Organization

COMMAND GROUP

2-5. The corps structure includes up to four general officers: the commanding general, deputy commanding general, chief of staff, and assistant chief of staff, operations (ACOS G-3). The corps commander uses the deputy commanding general and chief of staff to synchronize operations between the CPs in the corps' close and support areas. The commander retains a mobile capability to exercise C2 on the move. The deputy commanding general serves as the commander's second in command and often has oversight of rear area operations. The deputy commanding general does not have a staff but interacts with the chief of staff and the corps staff to maintain situational understanding to assume command when necessary. The chief of staff has supervisory authority over the staff and manages the staff actions to achieve the commander's guidance and directives. The G-3 manages the corps movement and maneuver functional cell while synchronizing operations in the corps' deep and close areas. (See FM 6-0 for more information on the duties of the staff.)

Note. Corps headquarters typically have an additional general officer from one of the U.S.'s key allies. The presence of general officers from allied nations greatly enhances interoperability with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, bilateral affairs, host-nation coordination, and C2 during multinational operations. Depending on the circumstances during an operation, the commander may use this senior officer as either the deputy commanding general for operations or deputy commanding general for support.

2-6. The corps commander's location depends on the situation. A routine mission on the less violent end of competition—such as a joint or multinational training exercise—may place less of a demand on the corps commander for rapid decisions and necessary situational understanding. Conversely, large-scale combat

operations may demand frequent guidance and dynamic decision-making. The level of trust the commanding general has in the staff sections and their level of training influences the commander's location. Well-trusted senior leaders on well-trained staffs allow corps commanders greater latitude for deciding where to place themselves during operations.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

2-7. The headquarters and headquarters' battalion provides the personnel and equipment used to support the corps CPs and mobile command group (MCG). A headquarters battalion operates as a tactical and administrative headquarters for two organic companies: a headquarters and support company and a signal, intelligence, and sustainment company. It also has a main command post-operational detachment (known as MCP-OD). Generally, Reserve Component personnel man the MCP-OD, but it may consist of Title 10 active-duty personnel in unique cases. Each company consists of staff sections organized into three deployable CPs: the main CP, tactical CP, and rear CP. The main CP and the tactical CP are supported by elements of the headquarters and headquarters' battalion providing the administrative and logistics support to the CPs.

Battalion Command Group

2-8. The battalion command group provides supervision and exercises administrative command functions over all personnel assigned to the corps headquarters. The command group consists of a commander, an executive officer, and a command sergeant major. The battalion command group functions are—

- To provide supervision and C2 of the corps' headquarters personnel.
- To plan, direct, control, and supervise headquarters battalion operations.
- To plan, direct, supervise, and assign the soldiers and resources of the command.
- To allocate forces, assign missions, and subordinate areas of operation.

Headquarters Battalion Staff

2-9. The headquarters battalion staff consists of six staff sections:

- Battalion personnel staff officer.
- Battalion intelligence staff officer.
- Battalion operations staff officer.
- Battalion logistics staff officer.
- Maintenance.
- Unit ministry, and battalion medical treatment.

They provide administrative support, human resources, logistics support, religious support, and life support to the corps' headquarters elements in garrison and during operations. When deployed, the battalion staff sections and companies are responsible for unit-level communications support, property accountability, transportation (including the mobility of the corps CPs), medical, food service, and maintenance support for the three CPs. The subordinate elements of each company report to their company chain of command. The company commander, in turn, reports to the headquarters and headquarters battalion commander.

Battalion Personnel Staff

2-10. The battalion personnel staff section provides support to the battalion commander. This section—

- Provides administrative and personnel (human resources) support to the headquarters battalion personnel.
- Performs strength accounting, reporting, and the assignment of personnel.
- Performs personnel actions for organic and assigned units.
- Provides battalion-level legal assistance to the headquarters battalion commander with the disposition of offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and adverse administrative separation actions.
- Maintains liaison with human resource elements of the main CP.

Battalion Intelligence Staff

2-11. The battalion intelligence staff officer and battalion operations staff officer sections provide support to the battalion commander. These sections—

- Form the battalion's tactical operations center to monitor the operational overview and situation.
- Conduct liaison with the main CP's command and tactical CP's maneuver and intelligence elements to monitor the common operational picture and anticipate and adjust future planning requirements.
- Establish priorities, allocate resources, and coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the efforts of all organic and supporting assets to support current operations.
- Direct the management and dissemination of intelligence within the battalion staff and support activities.
- Synchronize the functions of the battalion to support the CPs when deployed.
- Prepare and issue warning and fragmentary orders to support garrison operations as the single planning element within the battalion structure.
- Operate the operational network control station.

Battalion Logistics Staff

2-12. The battalion logistics staff section provides logistics support to the corps commander. It—

- Provides logistics support to the battalion.
- Performs property accountability functions and organizational property books.
- Maintains the nontactical vehicle and government service agency fleet vehicle accounts.
- Provides oversight of international merchant purchase authority card programs.
- Manages supply services for the battalion support and personnel.
- Maintains liaison with logistics section in the main CP.
- Operates the administrative and logistics log net control station.

Battalion Maintenance Section

2-13. The battalion maintenance section provides maintenance support to the corps commander. It—

- Coordinates maintenance support for all the equipment of the headquarters and headquarters battalion, main CP, the tactical CP, rear CP, and the mobile command group.
- Coordinates with main CP, tactical CP, and rear CP maintenance sections to oversee field-level maintenance of vehicles, power generators, and air conditioners assigned to the CPs.

Unit Ministry Team

2-14. The unit ministry team provides religious support to the commander. It—

- Coordinates with the corps chaplain section to provide unit level religious support to all battalion and headquarters personnel assigned or attached to the battalion.
- Provides unit level support to all nondenominational coverage and ministry for mass casualties and hospitalized members of the battalion.
- Advises commander and staff on religious, moral, and Soldier welfare issues to include the impact of indigenous religions on operations.
- Establishes liaison and maintains contact with the chaplain section of the main CP and other unit ministry teams from higher echelon and adjacent units.

Battalion Medical Treatment Section

2-15. The battalion medical treatment section provides medical support to the corps commander. It—

- Plans, coordinates, synchronizes, integrates, and provides force health protection to the corps headquarters.
- Coordinates and conducts combat stress control training for the corps headquarters' personnel.
- Collects and records the social and psychological data of the corps headquarters' personnel.
- Provides emergency medical treatment, advanced trauma management, sick call services, and preventive medicine support to the main CP and tactical command post.

2-16. The headquarters and headquarters battalion are responsible for the tactical mobility of the corps headquarters. *Mobility* is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (JP 3-36). A field feeding company is assigned to the battalion for the feeding of the corps headquarters CPs and any additional units assigned to the headquarters. Based on the mission variables, a corps headquarters requires additional security elements to secure the headquarters and headquarters battalion and each of the corps' CPs. The security elements require the mobility, survivability, and combat power necessary to secure all the CPs while moving and when stationary.

Headquarters Support Company

2-17. The headquarters support company provides C2 and limited company-level administration and life support to the headquarters and headquarters battalion, corps headquarters, and organic staff cells of each of the corps' CPs. The headquarters support company contains all members of the headquarters battalion staff in addition to the company headquarters. The functions and tasks of the company are—

- The administrative, maintenance, legal, and supply functions in support of the corps headquarters.
- Oversight, coordination, and synchronization of administrative and logistic support for assigned, attached, or OPCON units to the corps headquarters.
- Task-organization to support the CPs.

Signal, Intelligence, and Sustainment Company

2-18. The signal, intelligence, and sustainment company installs, operates, and maintains corps network enterprise communication and computer systems in support of 24-hour operations for corps-level functions. It also provides the planning, coordination, integration, analysis, and synchronization of the intelligence and sustainment operations of the corps headquarters. It contains the Soldiers assigned to the corps headquarters intelligence and sustainment functional cells. The organic functional intelligence and sustainment cells plan, coordinate, integrate, synchronize, and execute specified functions and activities across their warfighting functions and support the coordination and synchronization of warfighting functions and forces across the three planning-horizon integrating cells (current, future, and plans). The company headquarters primarily supports the tactical CP when it is deployed. The staff elements operate from the tactical, main, and rear CPs.

2-19. The signal, intelligence, and sustainment company headquarters provides company level administrative and logistics support to Soldiers in the corps headquarters intelligence and sustainment functional cells, corps surgeon section, the corps assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6) staff section, and the two signal platoons that support the corps main CP, tactical CP, and rear CP. The company receives its ground vehicle and generator maintenance support from the battalion's headquarters support company. The corps headquarters and headquarters battalion commander normally employ this company's headquarters element as the base around which a task-organized life support organization is formed to support the corps tactical CP when that command node deploys.


Main Command Post-Operational Detachment

2-20. The multicomponent nature of the corps imposes certain limitations on the corps' capability to rapidly deploy and initiate large-scale combat operations. A corps has multiple Reserve Component organizations that require time to mobilize, deploy, and integrate into their respective roles and responsibilities. A main command post-operational detachment is required to staff the corps CPs. The main command post-operational detachment (MCP-OD) provides additional depth to the corps staffs for sustained operations. When a corps is preparing to deploy, commanders, staffs, and planners must take care to coordinate for Reserve Component mobilization with enough time to assemble the formation for deployment. Alternatively, a corps may lack adequate time, and then it must assemble the formation in theater to conduct operations before the Reserve Component is mobilized. This requires the corps to secure resources and capabilities from other formations or operate without the Reserve Component elements of the formation.

CORPS COMMAND POSTS

2-21. Corps echelon their CPs to control deep, close, and rear operations appropriately for a specific operation, based upon mission variables and the specific functions the commander requires during the

operation. The Army organizes a CP staff section's cross functionally into CP cells. A *command post cell* is a grouping of personnel and equipment organized by warfighting function or by planning horizon to facilitate the exercise of command and control (FM 6-0). Functional cells group personnel and equipment by warfighting function. Integrating cells group personnel and equipment by planning horizon.



Note. The corps headquarters (and headquarters battalion) is designed to split into a main command post, a tactical command post, and a rear command post. The corps commander can direct the establishment of two ad hoc command posts: an early entry command post and a mobile command group (if needed) to control operations.
Note. The headquarters and headquarters battalion (and subordinate companies and reserve component augmentation) provide the personnel and equipment for the command posts.

CP	command post	MCG	mobile command group
EECP	early entry command post	TAC	tactical command post

Figure 2-2. Corps Command Posts

2-22. Generally, the main command post is the primary command post that plans and synchronizes the employment of corps combat power across the entire AO. The corps' tactical command post usually focuses on controlling critical close operations so that the main command post may focus on deep operations and identifying opportunities to exploit. In certain situations, the corps commander may direct the tactical command posts to control a specific deep operation. The rear command post is deployed to assist the commander with controlling rear operations, managing terrain, and the overall support of the operations. The rear command post coordinates with the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) to ensure that critical assets in the corps support area are protected. The mobile command group provides the corps commander with the necessary situational awareness to make critical decisions when moving between command posts or subordinate units. These CPs and the MCG are discussed in paragraphs 2-23 to 2-40. (See figure 2-2 for a depiction of the corps CPs.)

MAIN COMMAND POST

2-23. The *main command post* is a portion of a unit headquarters containing the majority of the staff designed to command and control current operations, conduct detailed analysis, and plan future operations (FM 6-0). The main CP is the primary CP that the corps uses to control operations, and it is positioned and physically distributed in ways that minimize its signature and vulnerability to enemy fires. The main CP is responsible for the sustained conduct of current operations, future planning, analysis for current and future operations, targeting, and other staff functions. The staff at the main CP operates under the general supervision of the chief of staff. The main CP can accomplish its C2 responsibilities without the tactical CP. Main CP responsibilities include—

- Synchronizing corps operations with adjacent units and the higher echelon.
- Controlling all corps operations.

- Planning operations.
- Monitoring and assessing current operations for impact on future operations.
- Executing supporting efforts in the deep and close areas.
- Producing operation and contingency plans.
- Preparing and maintaining corps running estimates, plans, and orders to support future operations.
- Integrating intelligence operations into both current and future operations.
- Coordinating and managing force structure, to include requests for forces and equipment.
- Synchronizing a corps' targeting process.
- Managing airspace.
- Preparing all reports required by higher echelon headquarters.

2-24. The main CP plans and synchronizes the employment of capabilities across all warfighting functions. If the corps commander decides to deploy the tactical CP to control current operations in the close area, the main CP conducts the deliberate targeting process. It plans and executes deep operations, and it coordinates with the next higher echelon of command for joint and Army capabilities to support the corps' operations.

2-25. The main CP includes the command group and most of the coordinating, special, and personal staffs. The main CP contains five functionally focused cells (intelligence, movement and maneuver, fire support, protection, and sustainment) with broad responsibilities for controlling operations across the corps by warfighting functions. The movement and maneuver cell, augmented by subject matter experts from across the staff sections, organizes into the three integrating cells: the current operations integration cell, future operations cell, and plans cell. The integrating cells coordinate or unify actions across all other functional cells. The movement and maneuver cell also includes several specialized elements, including the airspace element. It also receives United States Air Force (USAF) elements structured to support the headquarters' assigned role. Because there is no C2 functional cell, staff elements responsible for C2 tasks either receive direction and priorities from the chief of staff or work within an integrating cell. Liaison elements from higher echelon, adjacent, and subordinate units locate at the main CP. The main CP also includes the corps surgeon section, which is responsible for advising the corps commander on the health of the corps and coordinating, synchronizing, integrating, planning, and assessing operational medical support within the corps. If provided, the SOF coordinating element also locates here.

TACTICAL COMMAND POST

2-26. The corps tactical CP is resourced as a stand-alone capability replicating the main CP's functionality, albeit with less depth and redundancy. It provides a place from which the commander can exercise C2 while the main CP deploys or displaces. The tactical CP should be physically offset from the main CP to provide redundancy in the event of an attack on the main CP. The tactical CP may be designated the primary CP to control division operations in the close area. The corps commander may task the deputy commander, but typically the corps G-3 controls operations from the tactical CP as directed by the commander.

2-27. The tactical CP is designed for short-term combat requirements and is manned accordingly. The CG or corps chief of staff can position any staff necessary for the situation in the TAC.

2-28. A corps employs a tactical CP to control specific operations. It contains many of the same C2 systems as the main CP. It maintains continuous communication with subordinates, higher echelon headquarters, other CPs, and supporting joint organizations. The G-3 section is usually responsible for its operation, supported by other staff sections as required by the mission. When not employed, the corps prepares for the next operation by establishing the tactical CP at a separate location.

2-29. The tactical CP focuses on specific actions, activities, or tasks within a larger operation. It requires augmentation from the main CP to control continuous operations for periods of time extending beyond 48 hours. Its potential roles include—

- Controlling forces committed to a specified operation.
- Temporarily controlling corps operations.
- Serving as the headquarters of a multidivisional task force organized from corps units for a mission.
- Distributing control of the main effort and supporting efforts.
- Employing and deploying forces simultaneously with the main CP.
- Augmenting the main CP.

These roles are discussed in paragraphs 2-30 through 2-35.

2-30. A tactical CP may control forces committed to a specified operation. Examples of these types of operations include gap crossings and passage of lines involving multiple subordinate units. A *passage of lines* is an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force's combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy (JP 3-18).

2-31. A tactical CP may serve as the headquarters of a multidivisional task force organized from corps units for a mission. For example, during an offensive operation, the corps commander may establish the tactical CP to control forces eliminating bypassed enemy forces along a line of operations, while the main CP maintains control (and focus) on other operations in the corps' deep and close areas.

2-32. A tactical CP may distribute control of the main effort and supporting efforts. A corps may distribute control of main and supporting efforts between CPs during complex operations. For example, the tactical CP may control a division and supporting units in a covering force mission, while the main CP controls defensive preparations in the main battle area (MBA).

2-33. A tactical CP may employ and deploy forces simultaneously with the main CP. During protracted operations, the main CP can control the deployment of forces into an assigned area, while the tactical CP is forward in the corps' assigned area controlling initial operations. These roles could be reversed over time, with the main CP controlling operations within the corps' assigned area and the tactical or rear CP managing the onward movement and integration of forces into the corps' assigned area.

2-34. A tactical CP may augment the main CP. During protracted operations, the commander may combine the tactical and main CPs to increase the capacity to control particularly complex tasks or as part of reorganization after suffering losses.

2-35. The tactical CP is mobile, and it can control corps operations for a limited time and form the core element of a forward-deployed early-entry CP (sometimes designated as an assault CP). Factors that influence the movement of the tactical CP include the flow of operations, the threat of enemy action, the ability to C2 subordinate units, and the desires of the commander. Based on the threat environment and the typical proximity of the tactical CP to the close area, frequent displacements are typically required for survivability.

REAR COMMAND POST

2-36. Corps commanders have a rear CP to assist in controlling rear operations. The rear CP disperses the corps signature and enables the corps commander to exercise C2 over disparate, functionally focused elements operating between the close area and the division and corps rear boundary that may exceed the effective span of control of the main CP. The corps deputy commanding general, or the corps commander's designated senior staff officer leads the rear CP. The rear CP enables a corps by unifying the efforts of the various units, both under corps control and not under corps control, that operate in the rear area. When synchronized, these efforts enable a corps to maintain freedom of action, tempo, and operational reach. A rear CP performs six functions to C2 the rear area. The six functions are—

- Managing terrain and controlling movement in the rear area.
- Defeating threats in the rear area to support areas, other base camps or clusters, and lines of communication.
- Enabling sustainment operations.
- Enabling consolidation of gains.
- Enabling transitions.
- Coordinating and synchronizing rear area security.

2-37. The complexity of elements in the rear area creates additional challenges for the corps rear CP. One of the most important tasks for the rear CP is the management of terrain and route/air corridors. The rear CP requires significant augmentation with personnel and equipment, and authorities and responsibilities must be clearly identified in the corps order or corps standard operating procedures (known as SOPs). Additionally, the planning and organization of the rear CP is critical to ensure protection and life support and to account for the corps signal structure. The rear CP also provides the corps commander an alternate command post and assists in integrating protection operations throughout the corps assigned area.

EARLY-ENTRY COMMAND POST

2-38. The *early-entry command post* is a lead element of a headquarters designed to control operations until the remaining portions of the headquarters are deployed and operational (FM 6-0). Commanders can establish an early-entry CP to assist them in controlling operations during the deployment phase of operations and to coordinate the RSOI of subsequent corps forces. The deputy commander, chief of staff, or G-3 typically leads the early-entry CP. The early-entry CP normally consists of personnel and equipment from the tactical CP with additional intelligence analysts, planners, and other staff officers from the main CP based on the situation.

MOBILE COMMAND GROUP

2-39. The MCG enables the commander to command from anywhere in an AO. It normally consists of the commander, intelligence personnel, fires personnel, and maneuver personnel, as determined by the commander. It allows a corps commander to—

- Provide personal leadership, intent, and guidance directly to subordinate commanders.
- Circulate to make a personal assessment of situations on the battlefield.
- Maintain situational awareness while moving around the corps' assigned area.
- Avoid being fixed in vulnerable fixed CPs.

2-40. The MCG moves within the AO to interact with subordinate commanders and different staffs, assess the operation, make decisions, and issue guidance. What corps commanders learn and see helps them mentally visualize adjustments needed in current and future operations. The MCG is not capable of exercising C2 to the same degree as the CPs but is sufficient for providing subordinates direction and guidance. Its primary purpose is to assist the commander with maintaining the necessary situational understanding to make critical decisions while moving between CPs or subordinate units during the conduct of operations. The MCG requires a security force. Usually, a company-sized unit is tasked from a subordinate BCT to secure the main CP, headquarters and headquarters' battalion, and the MCG. (See FM 6-0 for additional information on CPs and CP placement considerations.)

THE CORPS STAFF

2-41. Staff sections assist commanders in planning, coordinating, and supervising operations. A *staff section* is a grouping of staff members by area of expertise (FM 6-0). Not all staff sections reside in one of the functional or integrating CP cells. These staff sections maintain their distinct organizations. They operate in different CP cells as required and coordinate their activities in meetings (including working groups and boards) established by the unit's battle rhythm. For example, the corps FSCOORD ensures that the corps fire support system supports the corps commander's guidance for fire support, meets joint force requirements, and reacts responsively to changing battlefield conditions.

2-42. There are several key aspects of corps staff activities. First, the corps staff has extensive interface with multinational forces, host-nation forces and agencies, and other Services; there are multiple liaisons working at the corps. Second, the coordination with USAF, USMC, U.S. Navy, and SOF is critical at the corps level. Third, the corps continuously plans to set the conditions for large-scale combat operations by moving forces and assembling resources. The corps staff sections consist of the chief of staff, coordinating staff, special staff, personal staff, staff augmentation, command liaison, functional liaison, and other sections as required.

CHIEF OF STAFF

2-43. The corps commanding general delegates supervisory authority of the corps staff sections to the chief of staff. As the key staff integrator, the chief of staff frees the corps commanding general from routine details of staff operations and the management of the headquarters. The chief of staff is responsible for the conduct of efficient and prompt staff actions within the corps headquarters. The secretary of the general staff and the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion commander, acting as headquarters commandant, assist the corps chief of staff in managing the corps headquarters.

2-44. The chief of staff directs, supervises, and trains the staff sections. All corps principal staff officers—coordinating, special, and personal—conduct their staff functions under the supervision of the chief of staff. The chief of staff also serves as one of the commanding general's principal advisors. An effective working

relationship helps the chief of staff, and the commanding general transmit and share information and insights. The chief of staff normally remains at the main CP. (See FM 6-0 for a list of the chief of staff's responsibilities.)

COORDINATING STAFF

2-45. Coordinating staff officers advise, plan, and coordinate actions in their areas of expertise. They also exercise planning and supervisory authority over designated special staff officers, as described in FM 6-0. The corps staff principals are responsible for integrating individual and small team staff augmentees into the corps' existing staff structure to form the staff structure needed to support the corps mission. The coordinating staff should participate in all integrating processes as required. The corps coordinating staff are—

- Assistant chief of staff, personnel (G-1).
- Assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2).
- Assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3).
- Assistant chief of staff, sustainment (G-4).
- Assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5).
- Assistant chief of staff, communications (G-6).
- Assistant chief of staff, financial management (G-8).
- G-9.
- Deputy fire support coordinator.
- Chief of Protection

SPECIAL STAFF

2-46. Special staff officers help commanders and other staff members fulfill their responsibilities. The number of special staff officers and their duties vary, and corps commanders organize them according to professional or technical responsibilities. The commander delegates planning and supervisory authority over each special staff function to a coordinating staff officer. The special staff should participate in all integrating processes as required.

2-47. While special staff sections are not always integral to a coordinating staff section, they usually share areas of common interest and habitual association. Special staff officers routinely work with more than one coordinating staff officer. For example, the engineer officer is involved in planning and operations with more than just the protection cell. Mobility and countermobility are part of movement and maneuver, general engineering is part of sustainment, and geospatial engineering supports the intelligence warfighting function. The information operations officer coordinates with various other staff members, such as the psychological operations officer, public affairs officer, operations security officer, cyber electromagnetic warfare officer, and others to synchronize information activities. The information operations officer also contributes to the overall intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) by assisting the G-2 in identifying and evaluating threat information capabilities and the means to influence the population. The members of the special staff can change depending on the capabilities available to the corps commander and on the situation. (See FM 6-0 for additional information on special staff officers.)

2-48. The corps special staff includes many different officers with different skills. They include the—

- AMD officer.
- Air liaison officer (LNO).
- Aviation officer.
- CBRN officer.
- Civilian personnel officer.
- Cyberspace electromagnetic warfare officer.
- Dental surgeon.
- Engineer.
- Equal opportunity advisor.
- EOD officer.
- Force management officer.
- Foreign disclosure officer.
- Historian.

- Information operations officer.
- Knowledge management officer.
- LNO.
- Military deception (MILDEC) officer.
- Operations research officer.
- Operations security officer.
- Personnel recovery officer.
- Provost marshal. This officer is also part of the coordinating staff when designated as chief of protection.
- Psychological operations officer.
- Secretaries of the general staff.
- Space operations officer.
- Staff veterinary officer.
- Staff weather officer.
- Surgeon. This officer is also part of the commander's personal staff.
- Transportation officer.

PERSONAL STAFF

2-49. Personal staff sections perform special assignments as directed by the corps commander. The personal staff sections advise the commander, provide input to orders and plans, and interface and coordinate with entities external to the corps headquarters. Army regulations and public law establish special relationships between certain staff officers and the commander. For example, AR 20-1, AR 27-1, AR 165-1, AR 360-1, and AR 385-10 require the inspector general, staff judge advocate, safety, chaplain, surgeon, and public affairs officer to serve as members of the commander's personal staff. Additionally, the command sergeant major and aides are part of the commander's personal staff. (See FM 6-0 for additional information on personal staff officers.)

2-50. The corps personal staff includes the—

- Aide-de-camp.
- Chaplain.
- Inspector general.
- Internal review officer.
- Public affairs officer.
- Safety officer.
- Staff judge advocate.
- Surgeon.

STAFF AUGMENTATION

2-51. Depending on the situation, teams and detachments with special expertise augment the corps headquarters. Available capabilities include civil affairs operations, additional Army space personnel, combat camera, operational law, detention, history, operational public health, and safety.

LIAISON ELEMENTS

2-52. Command and functional liaison elements vary in size and overall staffing depending on the situation. The corps and higher echelon, lower, and subordinate headquarters exchange command liaison elements. Host nation, joint, multinational, and nonmilitary entities may also exchange command LNOs, such as the special operations C2 element. Functional liaison elements work with organizations that provide services to the corps such as intelligence, signal, and sustainment. The corps headquarters selects, trains, and equips liaison elements from the corps staff. The corps headquarters houses, provides life support, and trains liaison elements from outside the corps headquarters. (See FM 6-0 for more information on the roles and responsibilities of LNOs and liaison considerations when the corps conducts operations with unified action partners.)

SECTION II — CORPS UNITS

2-53. There is no standard configuration for a corps, although each corps has similar types of assigned forces. Corps are provided with additional Army and multinational forces and joint enablers dependent on mission variables in a specific theater.

2-54. A corps consists of its headquarters battalion and assigned divisions, brigades, and a sustainment command. A corps formation may also include provided forces, such as attached divisions or attached functional support capabilities operating under OPCON or in direct support to the corps or its subordinate divisions. Functional support units operating in the corps AO as general support, but not assigned or attached to the corps, are not normally included in the corps formation.

SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS

2-55. The Army typically assigns corps with divisions and other forces, such as field artillery, aviation, military police, engineers, CBRN, military intelligence, signal, and sustainment. Corps augmenting forces provide a capability to accomplish assigned missions. The corps commander exercises command, OPCON or TACON, over a mix of Service, multinational, and division headquarters and brigades appropriate for the mission. (See figure 2-3 for an example of corps forces and enablers. Paragraphs 2-55 through 2-108 include descriptions of forces potentially available to support a corps.)

2-56. A corps routinely controls multinational forces in accordance with their individual national caveats. The organization, support, and sustainment capabilities of these units varies. The corps commander pays particular attention to the national capabilities, caveats, and limitations of each multinational partner. Some limitations are tactical while others may be political. Normally, a corps receives a TLD to facilitate multinational interoperability.




Figure 2-3. Corps Forces and Enablers

ASSIGNED FORCES

2-57. The corps routinely has units attached or assigned to it. These forces include—

- Two to five divisions.
- A combat aviation brigade (CAB).
- One or more separate BCTs.
- A maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB).
- An expeditionary military intelligence brigade (E-MIB).
- An artillery brigade.
- An engineer brigade.
- A corps sustainment command (CSC).
- A military police brigade.
- A corps signal brigade.

2-58. A corps commander task-organizes the formation, assigns tasks, and determines appropriate command and support relationships for subordinate divisions and brigades. A corps commander may retain a division to consolidate gains concurrently with other operations.

Divisions

2-59. Divisions are the major subordinate tactical units for a corps, and they are the Army's principal tactical warfighting formation during large-scale combat operations. A division's main role is as a tactical headquarters, employing brigades during offensive, defensive, and stability operations in an AO assigned by its higher echelon headquarters, normally a corps. A division commander task-organizes subordinate forces to accomplish missions. During large-scale combat operations, a division operates as a formation.

2-60. In addition to its BCTs, each division controls a tailored array of multifunctional support brigades and functional brigades. Not all types of brigades are available for every division. In some operations, divisions control multiple brigades of the same type. They can also control functional groups, battalions, or separate companies, which are often task-organized to a brigade. Division organizations vary for each operation based upon context and whether they are the main or supporting effort. (See ATP 3-91 for more information on division organization.)

Brigade Combat Teams

2-61. BCTs are normally subordinate units for a division; however, a corps may control a BCT or similar organization and task-organize it for a specific role such as a corps reserve or tactical combat force for area security. There are three types of BCTs: armored, infantry, and Stryker. BCTs maneuver against, close with, and destroy enemy forces. BCTs have organic combined arms capabilities, including battalion-sized maneuver, field artillery, reconnaissance, and sustainment units. Each BCT has organic Role 1 and Role 2 medical support.

2-62. A corps or division commander can task-organize a BCT by adding or subtracting its subordinate units. Higher echelon commanders may augment BCTs with additional combat power for specific missions. Augmentation might include aviation, armor, infantry, field artillery, air defense artillery (ADA), military police, civil affairs elements, military information support elements, engineers, CBRN elements, EOD elements, or other forces or capabilities. Some of this augmentation may come from other BCTs. Multifunctional and functional brigades can support BCT operations. (See FM 3-96 for additional information on BCT operations.)

Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

2-63. Corps commanders typically assign responsibility for the support area to a MEB headquarters when available. When assigned the mission of supporting echelons above division, joint, or multinational forces, a MEB could be task-organized with other Service or national units and integrated staff augmentation to provide C2 for a variety of elements necessary to support those forces.

2-64. MEBs are multifunctional brigade headquarters designed to control forces from multiple branches, but especially organizations that conduct tasks enabling support area operations. Corps commanders organize MEBs for support area operations based on identified mission requirements. A MEB also performs doctrinal functions associated with AO responsibility.

2-65. A MEB may support an Army, joint, interagency, or multinational headquarters. A MEB headquarters is staffed and optimized to conduct combined arms operations that integrate a wide range of functional branches and forces. A MEB organizes, provides, or employs battalion task force and company team combined arms technical experts to conduct tasks that enable maneuver across all OEs. A MEB may include a mix of CBRN elements, civil affairs elements, engineer elements, military police elements, ADA units, and a tactical combat force. With a tactical combat force, the MEB can provide command and control for assigned forces to defeat Level I, II, and III threats within an assigned AO.

Note. The MEB can support specific missions outside of its AO or provide forces to complement or reinforce other formations when necessary. However, serving as a force provider for enduring periods risks its ability to conduct support area operations.

2-66. The number and type of organizations placed under a MEB depends on the mission, threat, and number and type of battalions or companies operating in the brigade's AO. A MEB provides staff planning and exercises command relationships with units conducting support area operations, especially for base camp and base cluster defense operations. Army force structure places all MEB headquarters in the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. (See FM 3-81 for additional information on the MEB. See ATP 3-37.10 for more information on base camps.)

Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade

2-67. The Army designed E-MIBs to support the emerging requirements of field armies, corps, and divisions conducting large-scale combat operations across all domains. An E-MIB conducts multidiscipline intelligence operations and provides processing, exploitation, and dissemination, analysis, and multidiscipline information collection capability and capacity to the corps and subordinate divisions' multidomain operations. This facilitates situational understanding for the corps and division commanders and critical pieces of the sensor-to-shooter linkage necessary for the corps to execute deep operations.

2-68. E-MIBs are organized with a headquarters, one intelligence and electromagnetic warfare (IEW); battalion (at corps echelons), and one IEW battalion (at division echelons) per each priority division. The IEW battalions conduct and provide direct support multidiscipline intelligence analysis and processing, exploitation, and dissemination in support of the corps G-2; multidomain intelligence analysis and targeting support, combat assessments, processing, exploitation, and dissemination; and collection in support of corps multidomain effects. They also provide counterintelligence, human intelligence, signals intelligence, and EW capabilities to the corps. They also execute C2 of all allocated, nonorganic military intelligence forces assigned or attached to the G-2. Additionally, the IEW battalion (at corps echelons) conducts multidomain deep sensing, analytics, and effects capabilities in support of corps operations during large-scale combat operations. The headquarters is responsible for the training and readiness of the assigned IEW battalions and can serve as the senior military intelligence C2 headquarters for field armies or other deployed operational Army headquarters.

2-69. The E-MIB staff works closely with the corps G-2 analysis and control element. The E-MIB commander and staff also assist the corps commander with information collection management. The IEW battalion (at corps echelons) is responsible for overseeing and executing ISR operations in support of corps operations. ISR operations personnel are co-located with the corps G-2 current operations on the current operations integration cell floor. (See FM 2-0 for more information on intelligence and ATP 2-19.3 for more information on E-MIB capabilities and operations.)

Corps Artillery Brigade

2-70. The corps field artillery brigade's primary task is conducting corps-level strike operations. It is the primary executor of Army long-range, indirect fires within the corps AO. The field artillery brigade gives the

corps or a designated supported commander the ability to plan, prepare, execute, and—with proper augmentation—assess long-range, indirect fires.

2-71. The field artillery brigade can employ Army rocket and cannon fires and incorporate EW. It can detect and attack targets using a mix of its organic target acquisition and fire support capabilities, a supported organization's information collection capabilities, and access to higher echelon headquarters information collection capabilities.

2-72. Corps typically employ their assigned field artillery brigade as the force field artillery headquarters and the corps artillery brigade commander is the corps fires coordinator. A *force field artillery headquarters* is a battalion size or higher unit designated by the supported commander who specifies its duration, duties, and responsibilities (FM 3-09). However, in the case where there are two field artillery brigades assigned, attached, or OPCON to the corps and no operational-level field artillery command available, one field artillery brigade can serve as the counterfire headquarters, and the other can service the corps commander's targeting priorities and support division operations. (See FM 3-09 and ATP 3-09.24 for additional information on field artillery brigade operations.)

Corps Engineer Brigade

2-73. The corps engineer brigade controls the mission-tailored engineer battalions that are not task-organized to subordinate divisions and brigades. These battalions typically have capabilities from the three engineer disciplines: combat engineering, general engineering, and geospatial engineering. Their purpose is to enhance mobility, countermobility, protection, and sustainment.

2-74. An engineer brigade develops plans, procedures, and programs for engineer support. These include, but are not limited to, requirements determination, mobility and countermobility, general engineering, power generation, area damage control, military construction, geospatial engineering, engineering design, construction materials, and real property maintenance activities. The corps engineer brigade integrates and synchronizes engineer capabilities across the corps AO, and it reinforces subordinate corps units in the execution of engineer tasks by allocating mission-tailored engineer forces.

2-75. Engineer tasks shape terrain to overcome obstacles (including gaps); create, maintain, and improve lines of communications; create fighting positions; improve protective positions; and build structures and facilities (including base camps, aerial ports, seaports, and utilities). An engineer brigade is also capable of rapid deployment in modular elements to support the needs of the operational commander. These elements can provide a wide range of technical engineering expertise and support. (See FM 3-34 for additional information about engineer operations.)

Corps Signal Brigade

2-76. A corps signal brigade is a headquarters and staff intended to design and control signal support for corps and division operations. In large-scale combat operations, the corps signal brigade will command one or more attached expeditionary signal battalions or expeditionary signal battalions-enhanced. Corps signal brigades provide communications transport to a corps headquarters, the corps' subordinate units, and, as required, to joint and unified action partners throughout the corps AO. The corps signal brigade and its attached units install, operate, maintain, and secure their portions of the communications network. Each corps signal brigade leverages network extension and reachback capabilities to provide connectivity to CCDRs and subordinate commanders to support C2 and enable the other warfighting functions. (See FM 6-02 for more information on the corps signal brigade.)

Corps Sustainment Command

2-77. The Corps Sustainment Command (known as CSC) integrates and synchronizes sustainment operations in the corps area. Assigned to the corps and task-organized with one or more sustainment brigades, it commands and controls sustainment units operating in the corps rear area. The sustainment brigades task organized under the CSC comprise functional and multifunctional units providing general or direct support within the corps' AO. (For more information on sustainment brigades, refer to ATP 4-92.) *Sustainment* is the provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until mission completion (ADP 4-0). In addition to sustainment brigades, a CSC typically

includes enablers such as an Army field support brigade (which provides a corps logistics support element when deployed), petroleum group, and movement control battalion. Depending on missions it may also have an attached transportation brigade expeditionary and corps aerial delivery company as required.

2-78. The CSC assists the corps sustainment cell with planning and coordinating sustainment, planning for near-term operations, and synchronizing operational-level sustainment operations to meet current operations. The CSC is dependent on the corps staff for long-range planning capability. It also relies upon a corps for additional security, signal, and medical support. (See FM 4-0 and ATP 4-92 for more information on the CSC.)

Army Field Support Brigade

2-79. An Army field support brigade enables readiness and power projection in direct support of the corps and its subordinate organizations at home station through its Army field support battalions (on divisional installations) and logistics readiness centers. An Army field support brigade deploys a corps logistics support element OPCON to the corps when it deploys which provides a single interface to all Army materiel command, acquisition, logistics, and technology and materiel enterprise capabilities. These capabilities include expert technical support through logistics assistance representatives, the logistics civil augmentation program, Army pre-positioned stocks, and many Army Material Command call forward capabilities, particularly sustainment maintenance. (See ATP 4-98 for more information on the Army field support brigade.)

Military Police Brigade

2-80. A military police brigade is a functional brigade capable of planning, integrating, and directing the execution of military police missions conducted by up to five mission-tailored military police battalions, integrating capabilities from all three military police disciplines (police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support), and integrating police intelligence operations. It may also C2 other assigned or attached subordinate headquarters and units supporting military police operations. A military police brigade is required to allocate, synchronize, control, and provide technical oversight of military police operations when there is a requirement for more than two military police battalions within a corps or division AO. When designated, executes the duties of the Commander of Detainee Operations (CDO) and exercises command and control of all assets performing detainee operations. (See FM 3-39 for additional information on the military police brigade and military police operations.)

PROVIDED FORCES

2-81. Based upon a corps' role and mission, it can receive a variety of forces to assist it in matching capabilities to requirements. Forces provided to a corps may consist of functional brigades, multifunctional brigades, and smaller units and enablers. These forces can be attached, under OPCON, or under TACON of the corps. The forces commonly provided to corps are—

- CAB.
- Expeditionary CAB.
- ADA brigade.
- Civil affairs brigade.
- Medical brigade (support) (MEDBDE).
- SOF.
- CBRN brigade.
- EOD group.
- Psychological operations group.
- Army space support team.
- Army space control planning team.
- Military history detachment.
- Mobile public affairs detachment (MPAD).
- Cyber and Electromagnetic Warfare (CEMA) forces.
- Security force assistance brigade.
- Chaplain detachment Charlie.

- Theater liaison detachment (TLD).

Note. SOF may have a supporting or coordinating relationship with the corps.

2-82. A corps receives general support from the signal and air defense brigades commanded by the theater signal command and Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), respectively. A corps commander employs subordinate brigades under corps command to reinforce divisions or to conduct deep operations, which set conditions for its maneuver forces. These brigades also support the corps. Depending on the situation, a corps may receive direct or general medical support from a MEDBDE or a theater medical command.

Combat Aviation Brigade

2-83. A CAB synchronizes multiple aviation battalions' operations to support corps or division operations. A corps commander can reorganize a CAB in response to the situation. It can provide tailored support to adjacent, supported maneuver commanders at the BCT echelon and below. A CAB commander is normally the senior Army aviation officer in the corps or division structure and the corps aviation coordinator. A CAB commander advises adjacent and higher echelon commanders on manned and unmanned aviation system employment.

2-84. A CAB provides a corps or division commander with a maneuver advantage that can overcome the constraints of limiting terrain and extended distances. During large-scale combat operations, attack, reconnaissance, utility, and cargo aircraft may maneuver under corps or division control in the deep area or within an assigned AO with appropriate joint support from the air component. Alternatively, a CAB's attack, reconnaissance, utility, and cargo assets may be under OPCON, TACON, general support, or direct support to another brigade as situationally appropriate. Furthermore, a CAB may receive OPCON of ground maneuver forces to conduct security or reconnaissance operations or to accomplish other economy of force missions. The use of aviation assets requires detailed planning of synchronized timelines, aviation task and purpose, and airspace management.

2-85. A Gray Eagle company is organic to a CAB, and it is dependent on the CAB attack battalion or air cavalry squadron for staff planning, integration, and coordination in joint and combined arms operations. The Gray Eagle company provides dedicated multimission tactical unmanned aircraft systems capability and normally operates as a division or corps asset. The Gray Eagle company conducts surveillance; zone, route, and area reconnaissance; attack; battle damage assessment; and C2 support. (See FM 3-04 for additional information on Army aviation operations.)

Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade

2-86. An expeditionary CAB is a multifunctional unit designed to air assault maneuver forces; position personnel, supplies, and equipment; evacuate casualties; conduct personnel recovery; and provide C2. The expeditionary CAB is designed to be modular and tailorable, and it is typically task-organized as required to support offensive, defensive, and stability operations in support of ground maneuver forces or during defense support to civil authorities.

2-87. When task-organized with an attack battalion or air cavalry squadron, expeditionary CABs also provide accurate and timely information collection; provide reaction time and maneuver space; and destroy, defeat, disrupt, or delay enemy forces. An expeditionary CAB does not have organic attack helicopter assets. When augmented, an expeditionary CAB may perform additional tasks such as movement to contact, attack, reconnaissance, and security. An expeditionary CAB is an Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve organization. (See FM 3-04 for additional information on Army aviation operations.)

Air Defense Artillery Brigade

2-88. ADA brigades are structured to perform several functions supporting the AAMDCs and designated CCDRs. ADA brigade functions include C2 activities, integration, planning, and liaison with joint, higher echelon units, and subordinate battalions. ADA brigades are the force providers for the AAMDCs, meeting the commander's AMD objectives. ADA brigades must be prepared to integrate a mix of active and reserve

component forces. ADA brigades from the AAMDC support corps by providing air battle management of subordinate units. The ADA brigade commander is the corps AMD coordinator.

2-89. ADA brigades deploy early to protect aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, early arriving forces, and critical supplies. As a lodgment expands, ADA forces may reposition to better protect critical assets, communications, transportation, and maneuver forces. ADA brigades and any available joint and multinational AMD forces combine to form integrated defenses after completion of deployment operations. Echelon commanders, with staff support, designate their prioritized critical assets. The JFC and joint staff consider these prioritized critical asset lists during the development of an adjusted JTF-defended asset list. A JFC's requirements and mission considerations may allow an ADA brigade to operate under the OPCON or TACON of a corps. Corps may assign or attach short-range air defense battalions to divisions or other headquarters to accompany maneuver forces and protect critical static assets. Support relationships, such as direct and general support, may enhance AMD of maneuver echelons. Corps may integrate ADA firing units and radars into their defense plans, ensuring that they integrate into local security measures and adjust them based on the results from the joint theater AMD board and working groups. (See FM 3-01 for additional information on Army AMD and ADA operations.)

Civil Affairs Brigade

2-90. A civil affairs brigade mitigates or defeats threats to civil society and conducts actions normally performed by civil governments across the range of military operations. A civil affairs brigade engages and influences the civil population and authorities through planning and conducting civil affairs operations or enabling civil-military operations to shape the civil environment and set the conditions for military operations.

2-91. The civil affairs brigade headquarters provides a control structure and staff supervision of the operations of its assigned civil affairs battalions or other attached units. Civil affairs force structure contains expertise in five functional specialty areas. These specialty areas include security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization. Within each functional specialty area, civil affairs functional specialists advise commanders and help or direct their civilian counterparts. Civil affairs brigades can establish or support civil-military operations centers during operations. (See FM 3-57 for additional information on civil affairs.)

Medical Brigade (Support)

2-92. A MEDBDE is a subordinate command organization of the theater medical command. It serves as the headquarters for all assigned and attached echelons above brigade operational medicine forces. The MEDBDE is not always subordinate to a theater medical command. It may be assigned or attached to a corps or division providing medical support to an operational commander for the full range of military operations. In an operational area where the theater medical command is not yet deployed, a MEDBDE may serve as the senior medical command.

2-93. The corps-aligned MEDBDE serves as the corps medical command and provides a corps commander with a medical headquarters tasked to organize, resource, train, sustain, deploy, and support assigned and attached operational medicine forces. It is also responsible for coordinating with the corps surgeon section on the synchronization, coordination, integration, planning, and assessment of corps operational medicine support. (See FM 4-02 for more information on the MEDBDE and ATP 4-02.55 for Army Health System support planning.)

Special Operations Forces

2-94. Within a corps' AO, conventional forces and SOF operate near each other to accomplish the JFC's mission. ARSOF provide capabilities that expand the options available to a corps commander. When deployed, Army SOF are directly subordinate to a joint theater special operations command or general officer or flag officer-level joint special operations task force, which may be established by the JFC to focus on a specific mission region within the joint operations area (JOA). During mission planning, the corps staff and SOF planners include options regarding how to integrate conventional forces and special operations ground elements. A corps may receive a special operations C2 element which provides the capability to coordinate

unilateral special operations with a conventional ground force headquarters and with a supported conventional force commander. (See JP 3-05 and FM 6-05 for more information on SOF integration.)

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Brigade

2-95. A CBRN brigade typically provides support to a corps. CBRN brigades consist of a headquarters and two to five battalions with a range of CBRN capabilities, which may include CBRN reconnaissance, decontamination, biological detection, and other specialized countering weapons of mass destruction mission capabilities. (See JP 3-40 and ATP 3-90.40 for more information on countering weapons of mass destruction.) With the advice of the staff and the supported unit CBRN section, the CBRN brigade commander evaluates and determines the CBRN unit support requirements of the supported unit. The CBRN brigade commander advises the supported unit commander on the employment and sustainment of CBRN assets. A CBRN brigade depends on other organizations for administrative, logistic, medical, and maintenance support. A CBRN battalion typically supports a division. However, if a CBRN brigade or CBRNE command is not assigned, a CBRN battalion may be assigned to or support a corps or echelon above corps. (See FM 3-11 and ATP 3-37.11 for more information on CBRN units.)

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group

2-96. An EOD group is typically assigned or attached to a corps. An EOD group commander exercises C2 of a headquarters detachment, two to six Army EOD battalions, and enablers. An EOD group may also control joint and multinational EOD forces. The group directs EOD operations, including counter-improvised explosive device operations in an AO. The EOD group manages, integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes Army exploitation functions regarding detection, collection, processing, exploitation, and analysis of explosive hazards and associated components. An EOD group may also form the core of a specialized combined JTF with the mission to integrate protection and exploitation enablers to conduct counter improvised explosive devices, exploitation, or counter-weapons of mass destruction task forces. An EOD battalion typically supports a division. However, if an EOD group or CBRNE command are not assigned, an EOD battalion can be assigned to or support a corps or echelons above corps. (See JP 3-42, ATP 4-32, and ATP 4-32.1 for further information on EOD.)

Note. When a corps is operating in its JTF, LCC, or ARFOR role, it may receive a CBRNE command. It provides force-tailored and task-organized CBRN and EOD force packages to conduct counter weapons of mass destruction missions, CBRN response, counter-explosive ordnance assets and operations, or other CBRN and EOD missions. (See ATP 3-37.11 for more information on the CBRNE command.)

Psychological Operations Group

2-97. Psychological operations groups are trained, organized, and equipped to support corps-level operations. They support corps with military information support operations across the range of military operations. They can also support the staffing and augmentation of a psychological operations task force in a mature theater of operations. The psychological operations battalions are task-organized to support divisions. (See FM 3-53 for more information on military information support operations.)

Army Space Support Team

2-98. If requested, an Army space support team deploys to provide additional capacity for the corps organic space support element if the corps is serving as a JTF or joint force land component command headquarters. An Army space support team plans, coordinates for, and integrates joint space capabilities in support of corps lines of effort. (See ATP 3-14.3 for more information on Army space support teams.)

Space Control Planning Team

2-99. Army space control planning teams deploy to a corps serving as a JTF with OPCON of space control systems. The primary function is target development and nomination to negate the adversary use of the space domain. They also coordinate with theater space components and U.S. Space Command to synchronize

timing and tempo of space control capabilities in support of corps C2, movement and maneuver, fires, and protection. Planning for space control capabilities should be conducted by space operations professionals who are subject matter experts on space control. (See ATP 3-14.3 for more information on space control planning.)

Military History Detachment

2-100. Military history detachments are small teams of officers and enlisted Soldiers who carry out directed collection of historical material during combat and contingency operations for use when writing official history. They are trained and equipped to gather historical documents and materials, conduct oral interviews, photograph events, and advise supported units about preservation and proper disposition of historical information and potential artifacts. The military history detachment provides expertise, advice, and assistance to the designated corps historian or unit historical officer. (See ATP 1-20 for more details on the military history operations.)

Mobile Public Affairs Detachment

2-101. An MPAD provides public affairs support to corps units during operations. An MPAD is assigned, attached, or under the OPCON of echelons above brigades. It may support the Army Service component command, theater sustainment command, or corps public affairs staff sections.

2-102. An MPAD increases the public affairs capabilities of the corps organic public affairs section, and it can establish or support a media operations center in support of corps operations. An MPAD has limited capability to conduct independent public affairs activities, and it requires higher echelon command guidance, administrative support, and life support. Because of its limited capability, the corps public affairs officer exercises planning and supervisory authority over the MPAD. (See FM 3-61 for more details on public affairs operations.)

Cyber and Electromagnetic Warfare Forces

2-103. The corps G-3 contains a CEMA section. The CEMA section plans, coordinates, and integrates offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and EW in support of the commander's intent. The CEMA section collaborates with numerous staff sections to ensure unity of effort in meeting the commander's total operational objectives such as collaborating with the G-2 to attain situational awareness and understanding of friendly, enemy, and neutral actors operating within an AO. The CEMA section is responsible for providing regular updates to the commander and staff on offensive cyberspace operations and other supported operations conducted in an AO. The CEMA section is responsible for synchronizing and integrating cyberspace operations and EW with the operations process and through other integrating processes.

2-104. The cyber electromagnetic warfare officer is the commander's designated staff officer responsible for integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing actions in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. The cyber electromagnetic warfare officer is responsible for understanding all applicable classified and unclassified cyberspace and spectrum-related policies to assist the commander with planning, coordinating, and synchronizing cyberspace operations and EW with combined arms. The corps commander selects organic EW capabilities to create desired effects on targets identified for electromagnetic attack. If the corps' organic EW capabilities do not fulfill the targeting requirement to support the commander's intent, or if the commander does not have the authority to employ a particular EW capability, the CEMA section requests support from the next higher echelon.

2-105. Local network defenders assigned or attached to the corps conduct defensive cyberspace operations-internal defensive measures within their capabilities. A corps does not have organic capabilities to conduct defensive cyberspace operations-response actions or offensive cyberspace operations missions. The G-6 and the CEMA section coordinate to request defensive cyberspace operations internal defensive measures augmentation after determining that a threat in friendly cyberspace is beyond the scope of local network defenders. Defensive cyberspace operations-internal defensive measures are enablers for defensive cyberspace operations response actions. The CEMA staff may request defensive cyberspace operations-response actions upon deciding that threat activities in cyberspace require a defensive attack beyond friendly

cyberspace. Offensive cyberspace operations are used to create desired effects on targets identified for cyberspace attacks on the integrated target list. Defensive cyberspace operations-response actions and offensive cyberspace operations are similar except that defensive cyberspace operations-response actions are used to affect a threat offensive cyberspace capability, whereas offensive cyberspace operations are used to project power. (See JP 3-85 and FM 3-12 for more information on cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare.)

Security Forces Assistance Brigade

2-106. Security force assistance brigades conduct, advise, support, liaise, and assess activities to achieve their missions of improving foreign security forces capacity and capability, generating multinational interoperability, and expanding the global landpower network. During campaigning, security force assistance brigades employ force packages of task-organized advising teams. Advising teams operate at the battalion, brigade, or division echelons, while brigade advising teams can advise up to corps level. The security force assistance brigades conduct advise, support, liaise, and assess activities to achieve their missions of improving foreign security forces capacity and capability, generating multinational interoperability, and expanding the global landpower network. Security force assistance brigades shape the security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests in accordance with the CCDR's intent.

2-107. A security force assistance brigade can support a corps by providing liaisons with planning or functional expertise and communications capabilities. This provides the commander with representative leaders and accessible expertise about partner capabilities, facilitates planning, and improves joint force positional and information advantage. Through support activities, security force assistance brigades increase partner force access to joint fires and effects. They also increase a partner force's lethality, survivability, and operational endurance by maximizing its inherent position as an inside force. A security force assistance brigade can also facilitate RSOI, and it may deploy as an advanced party to the host-nation or partner organization to conduct pre-deployment activities and coordinate necessary travel documentation and country clearances. This advance party establishes contact with U.S. and foreign security force commanders for final pre-mission planning activities. A security force assistance brigade establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation and synchronization, and it develops relationships with foreign security force commanders. (See ATP 3-96.1 for additional information on the security force assistance brigade capabilities and employment.)

Chaplain Detachment Charlie

2-108. The primary mission of the chaplain detachment Charlie is to provide augmentation to a corps chaplain section. The chaplain detachment Charlie normally locates with the corps chaplain section, and they may operate independently to provide support to religious support tasks and Soldier and leader engagements functions. Chaplain detachment Charlies provide unit and denominational religious support during multidomain operations and a liaison capability to faith-based nongovernmental organizations. The chaplain detachment Charlie provides assets required to enable the corps chaplain section to conduct 24-hour and split-based religious support planning, coordination, and execution. (See FM 1-05 for more information on religious support operations.)

Theater Liaison Detachment

2-109. TLDs enable liaison and interoperability. They provide liaison capabilities between Army, joint, and multinational headquarters to ensure communications, mutual understanding, and unity of purpose. A TLD provides a coalition partner with the interoperability link to integrate U.S. C2 systems and synchronize the common operational picture. TLDs are assigned or attached to selected theater armies and further attached to the ARFOR for employment in support of corps and division echelons in a JOA. TLDs are normally comprised of 30 functional staff experts capable of aiding supported units and ensuring rapid and accurate communication between multinational headquarters.

2-110. A TLD provides representation inside a coalition partner headquarters to assist in clarifying orders, interpreting the commander's intent, and identifying and resolving problems involving plans, policies, and procedures. Guidelines of allocation distribute five TLDs per committed theater army for major operations, and one TLD per corps and division serving as a JTF headquarters. A corps may receive a TLD when serving

as a senior tactical formation based on its mission and TLD availability. (See ATP 3-94.1 for additional information on the TLD.)

SECTION III — JOINT FORCE CAPABILITIES

2-111. Joint force capabilities are critical to providing most of the means available to a corps commander in setting conditions for division operations. Joint force capabilities allow a corps commander to apply specific assets and resources against adversary targets through a combination of activities in the air, space, cyberspace, or maritime domains. CCDRs apportion joint force capabilities directly to a corps when it is performing its JTF role or indirectly when a corps is the land component or senior tactical formation. The capabilities come from a mix of Services and combatant commands including the Air Force, Space Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Cyber Command, Special Operations Command, Space Command, and Strategic Command. (See JP 1, Volume 2 for more information on the joint force.)

U.S. AIR FORCE

2-112. The USAF's contributions to joint operations include a range of missions and capabilities that meet DOD mandated Service responsibilities and functions. Missions that directly affect corps operations include—

- *Counterair* is a mission at the theater level that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of control of the air and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch (JP 3-01). Suppression of enemy air defenses is part of counterair.
- Air interdiction is conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military surface capabilities before they can be employed effectively against friendly forces or to otherwise achieve objectives that are conducted at such distances from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.
- Close air support (known as CAS) is air action by aircraft against hostile targets that are near friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.
- Special operations to influence the accomplishment of strategic or tactical objectives through either overt, covert, or clandestine military actions.
- Airlift to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces.
- Reconnaissance and surveillance to collect information from airborne, space-based, and surface-based sensors.
- C2.
- Combat search and rescue.

2-113. How the USAF interfaces with a corps depends on the corps' role. As a tactical headquarters, a corps receives a corps tactical air control party (known as TACP). As a JTF or land component command in a limited contingency operation, a corps headquarters may not retain the tactical air control party, but instead it receives a joint air component coordination element as the joint force air component commander's (JFACC's) liaison to the JFLCC or JTF. The ability to conduct deliberate and dynamic targeting is a critical capability of a corps, regardless of its assigned role. A corps depends on joint fires and maneuver provided by fixed-wing aircraft to support its deep, close, and rear operations. This includes the air component functions of ISR, CAS, air interdiction, CEMA, and airlift missions.

2-114. The USAF performs specialized tasks to enhance the execution of its missions. Tasks that most often enhance corps operations include—

- EW to control selected parts of the cyber and electromagnetic spectrum in support of large-scale combat operations.
- Warning, command, control, and communications to provide warning and characterization of an actual or impending enemy attack, and the C2 of forces through the sustained ability to communicate with those forces.
- Intelligence to acquire, correlate, analyze, and apply intelligence data to provide essential information to the corps commander on when, where, and how to engage and attack enemy forces.

- Weather service to provide timely and accurate environmental information to support the decision process for employing forces in combat operations.

2-115. As currently organized, trained, and equipped, USAF air support operations centers (known as ASOCs) support divisions. An ASOC resides in the current operations integration cell co-located with the FSE and other staff functions to form a joint air-ground integration center (known as JAGIC). Upon compliance with the requirements of the theater airspace control plan, a division may request a volume of airspace to control from the JFC's designated airspace control authority. A joint air-ground integration center is capable of specific functions that include control of joint fires, airspace control, interdiction coordination, friendly force identification, and information collection in division-assigned airspace, but a joint air-ground integration center can be positioned to support corps operations as a tactical headquarters. A corps tactical air control party would continue its complementary planning and execution functions. The USAF does not position ASOCs subordinate to other ASOCs because they are decentralized execution nodes that directly coordinate with the air operations center (known as AOC). Positioning an ASOC at the corps echelon creates problems with its ability to efficiently control airspace and joint air operations across the corps AO in support of the corps and subordinate units. (See ATP 3-91.1 for more information on the joint air-ground integration center.)

2-116. The commander, Air Force forces should consider co-location with the ground element most capable of integrating fires and effects and executing airspace control when determining ASOC placement. Placement of an ASOC is dependent upon the mission variables of METT-TC (I). Aligning an ASOC at the corps echelon to execute airspace management and control responsibilities requires detailed planning and analysis of capabilities, personnel, and equipment. This analysis includes systems interoperability, range capabilities, and the ability to manage and integrate large numbers of fire support and air missions. Generally, the tasks associated with controlling airspace at the corps level will overwhelm the staff and hinder operations at both the division and corps echelons. Therefore, maintaining the ASOCs within the divisions is typically the optimal arrangement during tactical operations and especially during large-scale combat operations.

U.S. SPACE FORCE

2-117. The U.S. Space Force contributes to joint operations through the C2 of all DOD satellites and provides the force-multiplying effects of continuous global coverage, low vulnerability, and autonomous operations. Satellites provide essential in-theater secure communications; weather and navigational data for ground, air, and fleet operations; and threat warning. The U.S. Space Force is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping Guardians to conduct global space operations that enhance the way joint and multinational forces conduct operations while also offering decision makers military options to achieve national objectives.

2-118. Surface-based and space-based systems monitor ballistic missile launches around the world to guard against a surprise missile attack on North America. A global network of ground and space surveillance sensors provide vital information on the location of satellites and space debris for the nation and the world. Maintaining space superiority is an emerging capability required to protect U.S. space assets from hostile attacks. (See JP 3-14 for more information on joint space operations.)

U.S. NAVY

2-119. The Navy participates in joint operations and conducts a wide range of tasks. DOD-mandated Navy directives that most closely affect the corps include—

- Providing maritime forces (including naval air) to conduct amphibious operations.
- Providing sea-based AMD.
- Providing close air support and naval support for land operations.
- Conducting maritime superiority and sea denial to seize and retain sea lines of communications.
- Providing sea movement of personnel and cargo through the Military Sealift Command.

2-120. During planning and execution phases of amphibious operations, C2 facilities afloat are available to enhance or complement corps operations. These resources include—

- Intelligence.
- EW.
- Naval gunfire support.

- Aerial reconnaissance and photography.
- Airborne early warning.
- Air transport.
- Offensive and defensive air operations beyond CAS.
- Special operations.

2-121. The apportionment decision from the JFC provides the basis for naval aviation support to the corps during joint land operations. The JFC may apportion excess naval aviation assets to various missions or geographic areas to ensure unity of effort in the overall mission. The JFACC plans, coordinates, and tasks these sorties.

U.S. MARINE CORPS

2-122. The USMC conducts operations to fulfill functional areas as mandated by the DOD. Operations that may complement or contribute to a corps' effort include conducting land operations essential to the naval campaign and conducting amphibious operations. The USMC is the proponent for amphibious operations.

2-123. Air and naval gunfire liaison companies support U.S., joint, and multinational divisions and subordinate elements. This support includes—

- Offensive air support, including CAS, deep air support, and airborne EW and communications countermeasures.
- Anti-air warfare to gain and maintain air superiority.
- Assault air support.
- Air reconnaissance.
- EW.
- Airspace management within the AO.
- Special operations.
- Intelligence.

2-124. The USMC's tactical aviation is an organic element of each MAGTF. The MAGTF commander retains OPCON of MAGTF assets during joint land operations. Air sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements are provided to the JFC for JFACC tasking and to support joint operations and requirements or the joint force as a whole. This reapportionment or reallocation of USMC tactical aviation sorties occur when the JFC determines they are required for higher priority missions and to ensure unity of effort.

U.S. CYBER COMMAND

2-125. The U.S. Cyber Command is a combatant command, but since it commands most U.S. cyberspace forces, it also acts like a Service. A subset of the overall Cyber Mission Force, the Cyber Combat Mission Force supports CCDRs with combat mission teams and combat support teams. These teams provide support to the corps upon receiving support requests, typically forwarded to the JTF by the JFLCC. Army Cyber Command is the Army Service component command for U.S. Cyber Command. (See Chapter 3 for more information on cyber support to a corps.)

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

2-126. SOF are organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces for special operations to achieve diplomatic, information, military, and economic objectives. SOF operate generally in unconventional means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. SOF conduct missions throughout the full range of military operations, either independently or with Service, joint, or multinational forces. Special operations differ from conventional forces by—

- Their degree of acceptable strategic, physical, political, and diplomatic risk.
- Their employment and operational techniques.
- Their relative independence from larger echelon support systems.
- Their dynamic interdependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.

2-127. SOF allow a corps commander to maximize conventional forces' and SOF's core competencies and therefore optimize the efficiencies and effectiveness of the joint force. This level of interdependence requires ongoing integration and interoperability of both SOF and conventional forces communications, weapons, ISR systems, and other systems. SOF can operate independently or with conventional forces, performing critical, relatively small-unit missions that directly strike or engage the aim or object of their operational design. The Army Special Operations Command is the Army Service component command for U.S. Special Operations Command.

U.S. SPACE COMMAND

2-128. U.S. Space Command conducts operations in, from, and to space to deter conflict and, if necessary, defeat aggression, deliver space combat power for the joint force, and defend U.S. vital interests with allies and partners. The Army Space and Missile Defense Command is the Army Service component command to U.S. Space Command.

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

2-129. The U.S. Strategic Command integrates and coordinates the necessary C2 capability to provide support with the most accurate and timely information for the President, the Secretary of Defense, other national leaders, and CCDRs. The mission of the U.S. Strategic Command is to deter strategic attack and employ forces, as directed, to guarantee the security of the U.S. and its allies. The command enables joint force operations, and it is the combatant command responsible for strategic deterrence; nuclear operations; nuclear command, control, and communications enterprise operations; joint electromagnetic spectrum operations; global strike; missile defense, analysis and targeting; and missile threat assessment. The Army Space and Missile Defense Command is the Army Service component command to U.S. Strategic Command.

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Chapter 3

Fundamentals of Corps Operations

This chapter discusses fundamentals of corps operations. The chapter begins with a discussion of the challenges to a corps as the senior tactical formation during large-scale combat operations followed by command and leadership considerations. Next, the chapter discusses the operational framework and considerations for movement and maneuver. This chapter concludes with a discussion on other considerations for corps operations.

SECTION I — LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS CHALLENGES

3-1. Large-scale combat operations present unique challenges for a corps in its primary role of senior Army tactical formation. A corps overcomes these challenges through creative tactics and operational approaches, employing an operational framework, integrating its echelons to create relative advantage, and synchronizing the application of its combat power.

3-2. A corps and its subordinate formations prepare for tactical-level operations in contested environments prior to and during armed conflict, including in the United States. Corps do this in accordance with the tenets and imperatives found in FM 3-0. Corps and their subordinate formations must be ready to deploy on short notice to austere locations and be capable of immediately conducting combat operations.

DEFEND AGAINST INITIAL ATTACKS

3-3. Peer enemies will engage in armed conflict when they view that the rewards are worth the risk. They will employ combinations of methods to render U.S. military power irrelevant whenever possible and inflict unacceptable losses on the U.S., its allies, and its partners.

3-4. During the initial phases of conflict, corps forces will likely contend with adversaries enjoying combat power, geographic, and other advantages. Forward-stationed and first-deploying units require the capabilities to defend themselves and continuously collect information on threat activities, as they provide reaction time and freedom of maneuver for follow-on forces. These forces may have limited joint support and will likely be under attack from enemy long-range fires.

3-5. Forward-stationed and early-deploying corps elements may defend critical terrain alongside multinational forces in support of the theater commander's response to enemy offensive operations. Some forces under corps control may defend joint bases to mitigate the impact of enemy attacks against strategic and operational lines of communications. In both cases, Army forces under corps control must be prepared to fight while relatively isolated in the early stages of an enemy attack.

DEFEAT ENEMY FORCES

3-6. Corps and their subordinate divisions are central to the conduct of large-scale combat operations aimed at defeating enemy forces of a peer adversary. *Defeat* is to render a force incapable of achieving its objectives (ADP 3-0). Defeat has a temporal component and is seldom permanent; defeating an enemy attack does not always prevent a subsequent attack in a different location with other forces, for example. When developing an operational approach, corps commanders consider methods to employ a combination of defeat mechanisms and stability mechanisms. Defeat mechanisms relate to offensive and defensive operations; stability mechanisms relate to stability operations, and security. Both types of mechanisms are relevant to consolidating gains in an AO.

3-7. Corps avoid attacking enemy strengths directly unless they enjoy overwhelming combat power advantages. They create their own advantages to defeat enemy forces in detail by sequencing the application of combat power to overwhelm portions of the overall enemy force using a series of rapid transitions. Corps seek to create cascading dilemmas and defeat the enemy's operational approach through the employment of the units they control and the joint capabilities they are allocated.

3-8. Corps attack, defend, and consolidate gains to accomplish objectives as part of a larger campaign. Corps set conditions for defeating enemy forces by reducing enemy integrated air defense and fire support systems, enabling subordinate formations to defeat or destroy enemy forces, and conducting exploitation and pursuit to achieve land component objectives. The corps has deeper target sets, operations planned deeper in terms of time and geography, and broader sustainment considerations than divisions do.

3-9. The purpose of corps operations is to direct, sequence and sustain the battles and engagements of its subordinate formations linked to the attainment of operational and strategic objectives. Corps look deeper in time and space to extend the fight beyond the focus of divisions concentrating on the success of their brigades during close combat. The commander decides on the tactics that the corps will use and provides their subordinates with a concept of operation and commander's intent. Then the corps task organizes divisions, coordinates for joint capabilities, and positions units in ways that anticipate the requirements of future operations. The corps prioritizes resources for its subordinate formations and ensures that the tasks it assigns are commensurate with the resources it allocates. The corps sets conditions for the success of its divisions and brigades by enabling their freedom of action.

3-10. Corps operations seek to disrupt the enemy's ability to synchronize forces, deceive enemy forces about the timing and location of the main effort, and delay the employment of enemy reinforcements against the main effort. Principally, corps sets conditions for the success of its main effort using Army and joint fires, as well as supporting efforts that prevent the enemy from fixing and massing effects against its main effort. When planning to set conditions, the corps looks beyond its assigned AO. Enemy formations and capabilities in adjacent areas that can influence the corps fight must be accounted for during coordination with friendly forces on the flanks and the land component command. Corps coordination with the appropriate headquarters is necessary to facilitate rapid adjustments and fire support during operations.

3-11. *Lethality* is the capability and capacity to destroy (FM 3-0). Corps achieve and exploit lethality by maneuvering divisions and separate brigades into positions of relative advantage where they can employ weapon systems and mass effects to destroy enemy forces or place them at risk of destruction.

3-12. Corps multiply their lethal effects as they execute the corps commander's plan, altering it flexibly to maintain momentum and destroy enemy forces. They do this by employing combinations of capabilities to create, accrue, and exploit relative advantages—imposing multiple dilemmas on enemy forces and overwhelming their ability to respond effectively through employment of the defeat mechanisms. Doing so requires—

- Integrating joint capabilities across echelons.
- Employing capabilities in a combined arms approach to create exploitable opportunities.
- Preserving combat power to maximize endurance and achieve depth.

INTEGRATE JOINT CAPABILITIES ACROSS ECHELONS

3-13. The corps is the primary tactical echelon focused on integrating joint capabilities to enable operations on land and maneuvering land forces to support the objectives of the JFC. A corps creates conditions to do this by allocating resources, sequencing division maneuver, and incorporating joint capabilities in support of ground operations. A corps consolidates and prioritizes requests for joint capabilities and then apportions its allotment to the divisions based on the commander's intent and concept of the operation.

3-14. A corps contributes to the joint force by establishing C2 on land, countering air and missile threats, controlling key terrain, and defeating components of enemy integrated fires complexes. For example, corps-controlled fire support assets may suppress enemy air defense while friendly air operations target enemy long-range fires systems. Corps vary the focus of their operations on enemy systems, formations, or geographical objectives over time.

3-15. Corps have organizations which support operations from different domains, such as engineer brigades, tactical air control party, E-MIB, space support elements (SSEs), and cyber support elements. These air, land, space, and cyberspace elements provide a corps mobility, intelligence, space, and cyber support and fire support that must be integrated into staffs, formations, and planning.

COMBINED ARMS APPROACH

3-16. Corps operations employ U.S. and multinational ground forces as part of joint combined arms team. While divisions and BCTs regularly synchronize and apply Army ground, aviation, and indirect fires capabilities in complimentary ways, corps are critical to exploiting joint capabilities from all domains. Corps maneuver their divisions in a manner that both supports and is supported by joint operations throughout a JOA. It maintains flexibility to exploit windows of opportunity by synchronizing and employing combat power from multiple domains at decisive points and times as part of the larger joint team.

3-17. A corps headquarters is critical to synchronizing joint, cyber, space, or electromagnetic capabilities that are not typically found within subordinate formations. Understanding the strengths and dependencies of joint capabilities in each domain is fundamental to a multidomain, combined arms approach. For example, corps may synchronize the employment of cyberspace, space, or electromagnetic warfare capabilities to isolate enemy maneuver forces during close operations, while simultaneously integrating joint and Army long-range fires to attack the cohesion of enemy C2, integrated fires commands, and integrated air defense systems.

COMBAT POWER

3-18. Corps commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of how to generate and maintain combat power. *Combat power* is the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time (JP 3-0). A corps generates, sustains, and employs combat power to accomplish objectives during competition, crisis, and armed conflict. Combat power comes from a combination of dynamics that include leadership, lethality, information, mobility, and survivability. All warfighting functions contribute to generating and applying combat power.

3-19. Leaders account for the requirement to build and preserve combat power while sustaining people, systems, and formations over the time and distance necessary throughout the depth of an AO. Although Army forces can respond rapidly to regional and global crisis, the ability to build and project corps combat power can take months. As forces deploy, corps employ sustainment and protection capabilities to build and preserve combat power.

3-20. During large-scale combat operations, consumption rates of all classes of supply significantly increase, especially Classes III, V, VII, VIII, and IX. Corps planners must take these facts into account as they sequence and sustain battles over time. The consumption of precision long-range munitions will need particular attention. These challenges will be even greater as corps move further from theater sustainment nodes.

3-21. A corps and its subordinate echelons align their operations on land with the opportunities created by the effects generated by the other service components of the joint force, preserving combat power to maximize their ability to exploit opportunities. One way corps preserve combat power is by maintaining dispersion to the greatest degree possible. Corps mass combat power and generate effects without concentrating forces any more than is necessary. (See FM 3-0 for additional information on combat power and the warfighting functions.)

SECTION II — COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP

3-22. Command requires corps commanders to exercise judgment, leverage experience, and use intuition when leading their units. They provide leadership, delegate authority, allocate resources, and make decisions. Corps leadership is executed through personal engagement with the corps staff sections and subordinate formation commanders. A corps commander influences and directs the corps staff to deliver clear, concise plans in line with the commander's intent to support the divisions' and separate brigades' operations.

Corps commanders lead their units in person. They add the power of their personal example to maximize the corps' tactical effectiveness. They position themselves and their chief assistants where their presence makes the greatest difference.

3-23. A corps commander must be able to translate the strategic or operational concept into understandable plans that subordinate division commanders can execute. As conditions develop and change, commanders use operational art to employ joint and Army capabilities as they direct the tasks for their divisions.

OPERATIONS PROCESS

3-24. Corps commanders synchronize actions and effects through C2 and the operations process. This includes how they understand, visualize, and describe their approach; how their corps sustains operations, synchronizes timelines, and sets conditions for division operations; moves and maneuvers its forces; and generates combat power. Operational environments are dynamic and contain vast amounts of information that can overload C2 systems and impede decision making. Corps commanders simplify information collection and decision making by focusing on how they see their corps, how they see enemy forces, how the enemy forces see themselves, and how the enemy see corps forces. This aids the corps commander with understanding the totality of the operational environment.

3-25. Commanders and their staffs apply operational art throughout all phases of the operations process. As part of the operations process, Army leaders use different methodologies to understand and weigh options. Applying operational art and science is a key characteristic differentiating corps from divisions and lower echelons. Regardless of the role a corps is fulfilling, it operates at a level where the skillful application of operational art—and the science that informs it—is essential in accomplishing its assigned objectives.

3-26. Operational art and science are interrelated. A corps cannot effectively generate sufficient combat power without them. The art of conceptualizing effective operations includes knowing capabilities and limitations of the force thoroughly and continually. The means for conducting warfare are the warfighting functions and combat power. Corps commanders, supported by their staffs, direct the collection of information and allocate capabilities to do so. They use operational and mission variables, intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and running estimates to help understand how capabilities in each domain affect operations on land and vice versa. Corps commanders must be comfortable with a certain degree of uncertainty and ambiguity within an operational environment—delaying action while seeking perfect understanding may prevent a unit from exploiting a fleeting opportunity or make it vulnerable to enemy attack.

COMMANDERS' VISUALIZATION

3-27. The *commander's visualization* is the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state (ADP 6-0). Corps commanders provide their visualization to their staff sections; the staff sections then start planning to develop force projection and arrangement of activities and forces in time, space, and purpose. Corps commanders should share their visualization with subordinate division and enabling brigade commanders early in the process. This helps the corps assesses its capabilities and the capabilities of its subordinate divisions and brigades to determine where the main and supporting efforts should be and how the corps can support the theater army or combatant command objectives.

Note: While analysis of all domains and their impact on operations informs the development of the commander's visualization, it is centered on a thorough analysis of the geography within a theater of operations and the terrain within the corps' assigned area. Corps are land combat formations and the impacts of terrain on potential operations must be understood before incorporating the other domains.

3-28. A corps allocates combat power to accomplish assigned missions. In determining the allocation of combat power to the divisions, a corps commander visualizes how each division can achieve assigned objectives within its AO. The corps commander's visualization of the employment of combat power is essential to the planned allocation. The actual disposition of the divisions and their attachments and the planned employment of other support allocated to the divisions are the division commander's responsibilities. However, the corps commander's visualization and operational approach set the conditions for the success of those subordinate formations.

3-29. Accounting for combat power—and the commander's visualization for how to employ it—determines how a corps operates and its success. Visualization and the development of an operational approach allows a corps to close with and destroy enemy forces, defeat enemy formations, seize critical terrain, and control populations and resources. Finally, the commander's visualization identifies decisions the corps commander

expects to make and focuses their staffs' running estimates. (See ADP 6-0 for additional information on commander's visualization.)

OPERATIONAL APPROACH

3-30. It is through the elements of operational art that corps commanders develop and translate their operational approach into courses of action. An operational approach is the result of the commander's visualization of what needs to be done in broad terms to solve a military problem. A corps commander considers all these elements (friendly and enemy centers of gravity, end state and conditions, lines of operation or effort, tempo, risk, basing, phasing and transitions, operational reach, and culmination) to understand the operational environment and determine courses of action. (See ADP 5-0 for an overview of planning and operational approach.)

3-31. The operational approach is the main idea that informs detailed planning. When describing an operational approach, commanders—

- Consider ways to defeat enemy forces in detail and potential decisive points.
- Employ combinations of defeat mechanisms to isolate and defeat enemy forces, functions, and capabilities.
- Assess options for assuming risk.

3-32. Armed conflict requires the need to defeat enemy forces. When used as a desirable outcome for operations, defeat provides maximum flexibility to the commander in how to accomplish the mission. While defeat as a purpose may appropriately be given to a corps, it is too vague for tactical echelons below corps level, where more specific outcomes are necessary to ensure the overall intent of operations is met. During large-scale combat operations, peer threats, by definition, possess a scale and quality of warfighting capability that is too extensive to attack all at once. Therefore, commanders identify weaknesses in enemy formations and dispositions that provide opportunities to defeat them in detail.

3-33. Defeating in detail requires evaluation of enemy forces in the context of all the relevant domains and dimensions of an OE. Corps commanders must understand the various parts of an enemy force and its vulnerabilities and then discern the best ways to apply combat power against those vulnerabilities. By comparing enemy weaknesses to friendly advantages, leaders begin to see opportunities and formulate options. Sometimes enemy vulnerabilities and friendly advantages intersect at a decisive place and time in a way that can be exploited to achieve objectives. Decisive points help commanders select clear, conclusive, attainable objectives that directly contribute to achieving an end state through convergence and other means.

3-34. Defeat and stability mechanisms help corps commanders visualize how to employ their forces. A *defeat mechanism* is a method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition (ADP 3-0). Therefore, defeat mechanisms are most relevant in combat operations against enemy forces. The four defeat mechanisms are destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate. Like stability mechanisms, combining them produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable through a single mechanism.

3-35. A *stability mechanism* is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADP 3-0). The four stability mechanisms are:

- Compel,
- Control,
- Influence.
- Support.

Stability mechanisms are rarely used in isolation from each other. Combining them produces complementary and reinforcing effects helping to shape an OE more effectively and efficiently.

3-36. All operations combine stability and defeat mechanisms to a greater or lesser degree. The corps commander and staff sections translate these mechanisms and desired effects into discreet tasks for subordinates arranged in time, space, and purpose to achieve the desired end state and objectives. During combat operations, most tasks focus on defeating enemy forces through an AO while initial stability tasks will be focused on the minimum-essential tasks and limited stability operations to set conditions for future operations as combat ends. Corps commanders and staffs do this by planning for the current operation while fully developing branches and sequels to their operations.

RISK

> *It is my experience that bold decisions give the best promise of success. But one must differentiate between strategical or tactical boldness and a military gamble. A bold operation is one in which success is not a certainty but which in case of failure leaves one with sufficient forces in hand to cope with whatever situation may arise. A gamble, on the other hand, is an operation which can lead either to victory or to the complete destruction of one's force.*
>
> Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

3-37. Commanders delegate risk acceptance to subordinate division and brigade commanders through their commander's intent, orders, and commanders' dialogue. Based on this guidance, refined as necessary by the commander and staff as the situation changes, leaders accept risk during operations by directing a single main effort at each echelon, creating exploitable opportunities by assuming economy of force measures in other areas. Weighting the main effort division may require task organizing it with capabilities taken from other divisions, providing it with priority of fires and other measures. The supporting efforts will be inherently less capable as a result, which means they cannot be assigned the same kinds of tasks as before. Assuming risk at corps level must be informed by a realistic appraisal of enemy capabilities and the mission variables.

3-38. The corps commander must also consider the impact of the corps' actions on higher echelons. Opportunities to exploit a relative advantage are fleeting during operations against a capable enemy that adapts quickly. Delaying action while setting optimal conditions, waiting for perfect intelligence, or achieving greater synchronization may end up posing a greater danger than swift acceptance of significant risk now. Shifting main efforts during execution is less risky than adhering to a plan that is not working.

3-39. Tactical risks are those opportunities arising from planned events, anticipated events, unforeseen events and chance which, if taken, win a battle at hand. Contingency planning, the use of a reserve, and economy-of-force operations are three examples of how commanders accept and account for tactical risk while maintaining flexibility of thought and action. Taking risk must be seen in relationship to an advantage for the unit. The stakes involved in a particular conflict will influence what levels of tactical (and operational) risk are acceptable.

SECTION III — OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

3-40. Corps commanders and staffs use the operational framework to visualize and describe the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources to achieve their goals and objectives. The operational framework also provides the structure for integrating a corps' primary function into the operations process. The framework illustrates the relative physical relationships between deep, close, and rear operations on land. As a visualization tool, the operational framework bridges the gap between a unit's conceptual understanding of the environment and its need to generate detailed orders that direct operations.

3-41. Corps commanders build their operational framework on their assessment of an OE, including all domains and dimensions. They may create new models to fit the circumstances, but they generally apply a combination of common models according to doctrine. The three models commonly used to build an operational framework are—

- Assigned areas.
- Deep, close, and rear operations.
- Main effort, supporting effort, and reserve.

Note. Commanders may use any operational framework model they find useful, but they must remain synchronized with their higher echelon headquarters' operational framework.

ASSIGNED AREAS

3-42. Once the JFC or LCC assigns a corps an AO, the corps commander subdivides that AO into subordinate assigned areas to best support the desired scheme of maneuver. The commander typically assigns areas to

subordinates based on the mission variables. An assigned area that is too large for a unit to effectively control or exceeds a unit's area of influence increases risk, allows sanctuaries for enemy forces, and limits flexibility. An assigned area that is too small constrains maneuver, limits opportunities for dispersion, and creates congested lines of communication.

3-43. Most operations involve a combination of contiguous and noncontiguous assigned areas. Large areas with small forces typically conduct noncontiguous operations which place greater demands on C2 and sustainment. Commanders designate targeting priorities, effects, and timing within their assigned areas to facilitate integration and synchronization. Within their assigned area, units use control measures to assign responsibilities, prevent fratricide, facilitate C2, coordinate fires, control maneuver, and organize operations.

3-44. A corps commonly uses an AO, a zone, or a sector when assigning areas to subordinate formations. Corps commanders designate the types of assigned areas for their subordinate formations based on the primary mission, level of control required, and mutual support considerations. Commanders retain responsibility for any area not assigned to a subordinate unit. (See FM 3-0 and FM 3-94 for further discussion on assigned areas and figure 3-1 for the depths and frontages of AOs in an operational framework.)




Figure 3-1. Depths and Frontages of an Operational Framework

CONTIGUOUS AND NONCONTIGUOUS AREAS OF OPERATIONS

3-45. The framework depicted in figure 3-1 portrays only one formation at each echelon. AOs can be either contiguous or noncontiguous, depending upon the situation. and they can display areas of influence and areas of interest. Figure 3-2 illustrates what a noncontiguous AO could look like for a corps.

3-46. Contiguous AOs usually mean that divisions are in mutually supporting range of each other while avoiding gaps and seams in responsibility. Contiguous AOs may also provide additional security for headquarters, maneuver units, and support units. However, contiguous division AOs can be deceptive, since the forces within those division AOs are seldom themselves contiguous. The probability that an entire division is within mutually supporting range of another decreases as the size of their respective AOs increase.

3-47. In noncontiguous AOs, subordinate divisions are not mutually supporting to each other, and there are gaps between their boundaries. Gaps between divisions and unassigned areas in the corps AO are the corps'

responsibility, and they can present added risks to an operation. This happens most often because geography prevents contiguous movement or positioning. (See FM 3-0 and FM 3-90 for more information on contiguous and noncontiguous AOs.)

3-48. An *area of influence* is an area inclusive of and extending beyond an operational area wherein a commander is capable of direct influence by maneuver, fire support, and information normally under the commander's command or control (JP 3-0). This area is bounded by the ranges of the commander's assigned maneuver and fire support units. It is not dependent upon those capabilities that can be requested from higher echelons but are not assigned to the formation. A commander's area of influence is normally larger than that commander's assigned AO, but it is smaller than that commander's area of interest.

3-49. An *area of interes*t is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent to it, and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. An area of interest will vary in size and shape from operation to operation. It should include all enemy activities that might affect a friendly force throughout the duration of an operation. An area of interest will usually surround an AO, extending forward and to the flanks of the AO. Depending upon the operation, it may also extend rearwards. During offensive operations, portions of the area of interest may become part of an AO as friendly forces advance. (See FM 3-94 for more information on areas of interest.)

3-50. Commanders generally consider noncontiguous, or the combination of both contiguous and noncontiguous AOs based on these factors: insufficient forces to cover the entire AO, available avenues of advance, terrain, or time constraints for completing the mission. The reasons for using a noncontiguous area vary, but they begin with geographic separation of important terrain from the remainder of the AO. A commander's decision to deploy part of a force in noncontiguous AOs is derived from the commander's analysis of operational and mission variables. In particular, the commander evaluates threat forces and their ability to mass sufficient combat power to threaten friendly forces. Second, the commander evaluates the ability of threat forces to sever lines of communication between the noncontiguous AOs. Finally, the commander assesses the risks of having isolated forces defeated in detail against what may be gained in mission accomplishment.

3-51. While a commander can choose to use noncontiguous AOs based upon specific operational variables, the most obvious AOR requiring the use of noncontiguous areas of operations is the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command AOR. The geography and distances involved between island chains force a noncontiguous approach to land combat that relies heavily on joint capabilities. (See figure 3-2 for a depiction of a corps AO with noncontiguous divisions.)




Figure 3-2. Corps AO with Noncontiguous Divisions

MUTUAL SUPPORT

3-52. Commanders and staffs consider mutual support when considering how large an area to assign subordinates, when task organizing forces, and position units. *Mutual support* is that support which units render each other throughout joint operations, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, or their inherent capabilities (JP 3-31). In Army doctrine, mutual support is a planning consideration related to force disposition, not a command relationship. Mutual support has two aspects: supporting range and supporting distance.

3-53. When two units are mutually supporting, their assigned areas are generally contiguous with each other. Units with non-contiguous areas are generally not mutually supporting. *Supporting range* is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit's weapons systems (ADP 3-0). Supporting range depends on available weapons systems, and it is normally the maximum range of the supporting unit's indirect fire weapons, although certain capabilities employed via space and cyberspace can be used at much longer ranges. Terrain, visibility, and weather may limit the supporting range. If one unit cannot effectively or safely fire in support of another, the first may not be in supporting range, even though its weapons have the required range.

3-54. *Supporting distance* is the distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure that it regains control of a civil situation (ADP 3-0). Supporting distances are influenced by the mobility of friendly formations, their assigned missions, the terrain, and the enemy situation.

3-55. Communications are also a consideration when determining whether units are mutually supporting. If two units cannot effectively coordinate the use of indirect fire, then they may not be considered in supporting range of each other. Units are not within supporting distance regardless of their proximity to each other if they cannot communicate or are fixed by enemy forces. Communications should be rehearsed, especially when a partner division or brigade is part of the corps.

3-56. Mutual support provides flexibility and options for the corps commander. In the offense, the corps formation can become over extended or compacted as movement progresses. Maintaining mutual support between divisions and separate maneuver brigades during maneuver requires the attention of corps staff and commanders at all levels. When units can support each other, commanders have more options to combine capabilities across all warfighting functions and multiple domains. A high degree of mutual support reduces the vulnerability of corps forces to defeat in detail. When the corps must operate highly distributed, the composition and positioning of the corps reserve is a critical consideration. The commander and staff task organize the reserve with the necessary mobility assets and then position it where it can maneuver in support of multiple formations if necessary.

ASSIGNED AREAS IN A MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

3-57. Planning and training for the unique considerations of operations in maritime environments is critical, as is an integrated planning approach with the rest of the joint force. A maritime OE adds coordination and synchronization requirements for corps. Army and joint force planning must reflect an understanding of the dynamic nature of the threats and constraints to land forces in maritime regions. Corps movement and maneuver between land masses is almost entirely dependent on joint capabilities, and divisions within a corps may be hundreds of miles or further apart.

3-58. Land forces play a critical role in littoral regions and along coastlines where they can seize and retain key terrain, as well as project fires to deny maritime maneuver. Control of critical land masses is essential to the sustainment and protection of joint forces in a maritime OE. This interdependence has been historically crucial to success during armed conflicts against peer threats in maritime theaters, and it continues to be crucial in the foreseeable future.

3-59. Corps have the requirement to protect and augment the security of the other Services, which is critical in maritime theaters because of the relative isolation of the forces they position forward and the exposure of those forces to threat capabilities that could be employed with few indications or warnings. The following tasks directly support and are critical to the success of joint operations in a maritime environment:

- Seize and secure key terrain.
- AMD against manned and unmanned systems.
- Littoral defense and seizure.
- Area security (base and base cluster defense).
- CBRN defense.
- EOD support.
- Detainee operations (detainee movement coordination)
- General, combat, and geospatial engineering support.
- Oversee the employment of Army watercraft operations.

DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR OPERATIONS

3-60. Corps commanders organize their operations in terms of time, space, and purpose by synchronizing deep, close, and rear operations. The degree to which a corps can set conditions for its subordinate divisions depends on its ability to synchronize close, deep, and rear operations among its subordinate echelons and with the joint force. *Synchronization* is the arrangement of military activities in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0).

3-61. The *deep area* is where the commander sets conditions for future success in close combat (ADP 3-0). The *close area* is the portion of the commander's AO where most subordinate maneuver forces conduct close combat (ADP 3-0). The rear area is that area within a unit's AO extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear boundary of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. It is an area where most forces and assets are located that support and sustain close and deep operations. The *support area* is the portion of the commander's AO designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations (ADP 3-0).

3-62. Within these areas, corps conduct deep, close, and rear operations. *Deep operations* are tactical actions against enemy forces, typically out of direct contact with friendly forces, intended to shape future close operations and protect rear operations (FM 3-0). *Close operations* are tactical actions of subordinate maneuver forces and the forces providing immediate support to them, whose purpose is to employ maneuver

and fires to close with and destroy enemy forces (FM 3-0). *Rear operations* are tactical actions behind major subordinate maneuver forces that facilitate movement, extend operational reach, and maintain desired tempo (FM 3-0). See Chapter 4 for an in-depth discussion on corps operations throughout the operational framework.

MAIN EFFORT, SUPPORTING EFFORT, AND RESERVE

3-63. One way that commanders set priorities is by organizing operations by phases, modifying task organization, and designating the main effort, supporting effort, and reserve. Commanders designate a subordinate unit as a main effort when its mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. Commanders weight the main effort with additional combat power. Typically, commanders shift the main effort one or more times during execution.

3-64. When commanders designate a unit as the main effort, it receives priority of support and resources to maximize combat power. Commanders establish clear priorities of support, and they shift resources and priorities to the main effort as circumstances and the commander's intent require. The decision point to shift resources and priorities to a main effort division should occur before the decision point to shift the main effort occurs so that it is prepared for its assigned tasks.

3-65. A corps task-organizes and echelons its forces based on the mission, concept of operations, available transportation assets, and other resources. Task organization is the process of forming combined arms task forces weighted with specific capabilities to achieve particular types of tasks. Corps typically task organize their divisions and separate brigades, but not the units inside those formations. Commanders resource supporting efforts with the minimum assets necessary to accomplish their assigned tasks, with the understanding that the success of the main effort often comes from the success of supporting efforts. A main effort in an earlier phase can be a supporting effort for a different main effort in a later phase.

3-66. A proper task organization and command relationship provides the corps commander with flexibility and enhances synchronization efforts. Commanders retain flexibility by constituting a reserve and base the size of the reserve on the level of uncertainty in the current tactical situation. In determining the allocation of combat power to the reserve, the corps commander considers the mission of the reserve in relation to its scheme of maneuver. The appropriate allocation of combat power among corps units establishes a balance that enables a corps commander to retain the freedom of action to influence the conduct of the battle.

3-67. As priorities shift through an operation, a corps uses brigade-size units as the basic building blocks for task-organizing its units. Division commanders can expect to receive a portion of the corps' assets to accomplish their missions, depending on the division's role and the corps commander's intent. A corps can task organize divisions with additional maneuver units, AMD assets, CBRN assets, engineer assets, fire support assets, military police assets, signal assets, EOD assets, force health protection assets, civil affairs, and sustainment assets. A corps can also pull those same assets from one or more divisions for employment by another.

SECTION IV — CORPS MOVEMENT AND FORCE PROJECTION

3-68. Corps-sized movements and deployments, which are only successful when anticipated, planned, and disciplined, demand command involvement at all echelons. The ability of corps commanders to posture their forces for large-scale combat operations depends upon their ability to move those forces. Successful corps operations depend upon the ability of the corps to project force, complete RSOI, and reconstitute their forces throughout the duration of an operation.

MOVEMENT OF LARGE UNITS

3-69. The primary consideration of movements is to ensure that forces arrive at the proper place, at the proper time, in the correct formation, and prepared to accomplish their mission. As a result, the mobility of subordinate formations is a major concern for corps planners. *Assured mobility* is a framework—of processes, actions, and capabilities—that assures the ability of a force to deploy, move, and maneuver where and when desired (ATP 3-90.4). Additionally, the quality of roads, terrain, and transportation infrastructure shape how quickly a corps can move formations forwards, rearwards, and laterally inside its AO. Detailed planning that accounts for route use, synchronization, maintenance, refueling, and staging points is critical. Corps engineer,

military police, and sustainment forces are indispensable to making the corps mobile. They enable the corps to clear, secure, and maintain routes, control the movement of subordinate units, and resupply units transiting an AO. (See Chapter 6 for more information on mobility.)

3-70. Operational movement and maneuver are the dispositions of joint or multinational forces to create an operational impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation to achieve operational results. The land component headquarters coordinates operational level movements with the theater sustainment command (known as TSC), which in turn coordinates with whatever military or civilian entities control the routes to the corps' assigned area.

3-71. Corps direct the movement and maneuver of their subordinate divisions and other organizations. Movements can either be tactical or nontactical. The ability to move corps and their divisions during large-scale combat operations often determines the success or failure of operations. For example, the movement of VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps at the beginning of OPERATION DESERT STORM are landmarks in the history of large-unit movements. Such short notice repositioning of large forces to obtain a positional advantage and react to emergencies characterized mobile combat operations of the past and will characterize operations of the future.

STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT

3-72. Movement is generally broken down into two subsets. The first is strategic movement of forces and capabilities from strategic distances or intertheater movement. Intertheater movements involve the movement of forces from outside of an AOR into an AO to conduct operations. Planners consider intertheater movements when planning force projection and force tailoring in setting the theater. The second is operational movement or intratheater movement. Planners consider intratheater movement for positioning or repositioning and shifting forces to conduct tactical actions or operations inside an AO. The movement of corps and divisions over operational distances requires considerable planning and careful control during execution. The corps staff section coordination with movement control elements and staffs are crucial in shaping corps intratheater operational movement.

3-73. Successful corps operations require the ability to move multiple division-sized elements into and through an AO. The subsequent maneuver of those divisions into close combat with enemy forces determines the outcome of an operation. Principally, a corps focuses on positioning its assigned forces in advance of operations to facilitate movement that supports several potential courses of action to gain an advantage over an enemy force. The corps headquarters develops schemes of maneuver that provides its divisions flexibility in close operations, accounting for movement times across variable terrain and axes of advance. The corps also provides the logistical and mobility support necessary to enable the necessary movements and overcome likely friction along the various routes.

3-74. Positioning corps so that they can effectively maneuver requires sustained movement—often over extended distances—prior to the engagement of forces. This places a premium on developing and maintaining lines of communication and alternate movement routes, sustainment, and detailed planning to deconflict movements. Corps do not need to solve maneuver problems for their divisions, but rather corps ensure that divisions and BCTs are positioned to maneuver with the necessary support.

3-75. The commitment of multiple corps with their divisions and supporting formations into AOs with limited road infrastructure makes successful integration of movement with maneuver over time and space an operational imperative. Successful planning accounts for the movement of field artillery, air defense artillery, aviation support, engineers, intelligence, and sustainment elements to ensure uninterrupted support to the commander's scheme of maneuver. Limited and dispersed mobility corridors place a premium on a corps' abilities to synchronize the movement of large units and sustain them, things that must be trained outside of simulation to achieve proficiency.

3-76. Operational movement establishes basic dispositions for forces and limits the range of possible subsequent movements and maneuver. At the operational level, movement involves establishing a base of operations and distributing forces along lines of operations to facilitate their future commitment. The availability of lines of communication (LOCs) exerts a dominant influence on the movement and operation of corps and divisions.

MANEUVER

3-77. Corps maneuver involves the movement of large ground forces in conjunction with fire support, both Army and joint. It is how the commander sets the terms of battle or acts to take advantage of tactical actions. While initial deployment is important, a corps commander postures for subsequent operations based upon an understanding of the higher echelon commander's intent and changing enemy dispositions. Displacing divisions and high-demand functional and multifunctional brigades requires significant effort. Planners need time to effectively position units for subsequent operations.

3-78. Corps-level maneuver demands anticipation, careful planning, and the synchronization of sustainment with operations. Corps sustainment sets conditions for maneuver and depends on preparation well before the movement or maneuver occurs. A corps commander considers the operational reach of the corps in terms of logistics capacity, distribution, evacuation, treatment of casualties, and personnel services. A corps commander and staff continually—

- Assess the sustainment posture of their formation.
- Position and protect logistics and medical units.
- Establish priorities of support.
- Secure and maintain lines of communications with Army and host-nation forces.
- Manage movement of subordinate forces and coordinate across the formation for movement of sustainment units.

SUSTAINMENT DURING MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

3-79. The corps G-3 approves the selection of main supply routes (MSRs) and alternate supply routes (ASRs) to ensure maneuver and other operational issues are considered before detailed route synchronization planning. The corps G-4 and CSC facilitate the movement of divisions and separate brigades on the MSR and ASRs, synchronized in time and space with maneuver, fire support, and protection considerations. The corps G-3 coordinates with the G-4 and CSC on movement plan development and sequencing unit movement. This includes who goes first and how the CSC and G-3 collaborate to plan. To facilitate route synchronization, the G-4 and expeditionary sustainment command (ESC) (in collaboration with the corps G-3) develop and propose a corps movement control schedule. This schedule accounts for checkpoints, pass times, restrictions, and alternate routes. Movement schedules should assume friction.

3-80. The corps G-4 and the corps ESC employ transportation capabilities to enable movement and maneuver. Sustainment planners consider various modalities to support movement, including road, air, rail, and water movement, and how to conduct movement control during large-scale combat operations. Movement control is critical because it facilitates the transition between unit movements and the maneuver of forces to their operational objectives. The G-4 and CSC establish movement control schedules and route movements according to priorities established by the corps in the corps close area (including division close and rear areas). The corps transportation officer (CTO) is essential to linking movement control at the corps with movement control at the division.

3-81. The CTO is the primary technical advisor to the commander on transportation policy, modal operations, movement planning, in-transit visibility, and transportation automation systems. The CTO facilitates corps operational maneuver with reception and onward movement, retrograde, and replacement operations. Additionally, the CTO coordinates with the G-3 for maneuver planning, force tracking, and unit movements. A corps on the move can consist of 42,000 vehicles. The G-3's planned operations and movements may require rapidly projecting forces over significant distances on MSRs. The G-3 and G-4, with the consultation of the CTO, establish priorities for MSRs and implementation of sustainment priorities. (See ATP 4-16 and ATP 4-92 for additional information on sustainment considerations.)

3-82. Prior to crossing the line of departure, the corps G-4 assesses the committed divisions' logistics needs, including consumption of Class 3 supplies (including petroleum and bulk items) from their last resupply point to the next supply point. The G-3 and G-4 identify critical points where restrictions could slow down or stop movement (including bridges, tunnels, checkpoints, border crossings, steep inclines and declines, and MSR and ASR geospatial capabilities) along with congested areas or choke points. These factors are considered and discussed during the corps movement control boards.

3-83. In the corps rear area, the CSC or MEB commander regulates movement control on the corps MSR, ASRs, and connecting networks. The corps G-3 (in conjunction with the G-2, corps engineer section, protection cell, and CTO) determines and publishes MSR and ASR status. Corps typically use the technique of designating MSRs and ASRs with a color-coded status of green, amber, red, or black. (See ATP 5-0.2-1 for more information on designating MSR and ASR status.) Commanders and corps staff sections consider the placement of ambulance control points, refuel and rearm locations, and combat and field trains in the context of synchronizing BCT and division sustainment in AOs and timing between operations.

SUSTAINMENT SYNCHRONIZATION

3-84. The CTO, G-3, G-4, and CSC participate in movement control boards as part of the routine battle rhythm. The board's members possess essential knowledge, based on their positions on the staff and their specific running estimates, which helps to broaden the situational understanding of the board regarding corps movement requirements. The board uses that understanding to make decisions that program movements according to the commander's priorities and allocate the necessary assets based on current transportation capabilities. The movement control board provides the corps current operations and future operations sections with an opportunity to assess maneuver timelines against sustainment capabilities and develop a list of shortfalls. The corps G-4 and ESC coordinate with the theater army and the theater sustainment command to mitigate these gaps and make recommendations to the corps commander.

3-85. Movement control boards include threats and trend analysis; validated transportation movements 24, 48, 72, and 96 hours prior to an operation; convoy security and escort requirements and protection support; current and projected route and weather status; and retrograde and backhaul requirements. The movement control board is updated on the readiness status of the transportation capabilities (including equipment availability by type and licensed and trained operators). The CTO, CSC, G-2, G-3, G-5, MEB representative, and division transportation officer all participate in the theater movement control board (and the corps movement control board) to synchronize and deconflict sustainment timelines and support. (See ATP 4-92 for more information on sustainment synchronization and boards.)

3-86. At the tactical-level, sustainment remains the key to freedom of action. Properly integrated, the support provided by sustainment units allows corps formations to maneuver, concentrate their capabilities, and quickly adjust their task organizations. If poorly coordinated, sustainment becomes an unintended contributor to culmination. Corps staff sections integrate their sustainment units' requirements into their concept of operations. This includes careful selection and security of support areas in their AOs and planning for their displacement based upon adjustments to the tactical AO, particularly during offensive operations. This displacement planning is based on movement, general engineering, security, and protection capabilities. The displacement of the support area normally entails more time and effort than shifting a subordinate formation.

FORCE PROJECTION AND INTEGRATION

3-87. *Force projection* is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater in response to requirements for military operations (JP 3-0). A corps typically deploys from the continental United States or forward locations to conduct operations requiring the C2 of multiple divisions.

3-88. Corps deployments will be challenged by threat forces. Peer threats possess the capability and capacity to observe, disrupt, delay, and attack U.S. forces at any stage of force projection, including while still positioned at home stations in the United States and overseas. Commanders and staffs must therefore plan and execute deployments with the assumption that friendly forces are always under observation and in contact.

3-89. Corps have an important role in planning and preparing for deployment operations. Based on the JFC's guidance for establishing operational capabilities during the initial phases of force-projection operations, the corps commander recommends deployment priorities for subordinate units. Subsequently, the JFC, with the theater commander, develops required delivery dates from which to adjust or develop the time-phased force deployment list. The time-phased force deployment list includes assigned and supporting forces (including USAF airlift control elements and Army terminal operations units) that are to deploy to the operational area. The time-phased force deployment list establishes the joint force's lift priorities.

3-90. The final approved time-phased force deployment list becomes the basis for the corps' development of its marshaling and deployment schedules. During this stage of force-projection operations, the commander might establish an intermediate staging base to pre-position communications and logistics assets, based on the mission variables of METT-TC (I). The decision to establish an intermediate staging base may negate strategic surprise because of global news organizations. Loss of strategic surprise does not necessarily mean loss of the tactical surprise. Tactical surprise is particularly important during opposed-entry operations.

3-91. When the threat environment permits, engineer construction units may be required to prepare aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, and intermediate staging bases for operations. Construction units also prepare for operations by training with potential host-nation engineer and sustainment units, directing contract construction, and conducting home-station construction oversight. The corps engineer staff is responsible for engineer-related requests for forces, coordinating engineer capabilities, establishing engineer work lines, and producing the scheme of engineer operations supporting the corps. The corps engineer staff ensures engineer units assigned are resourced. RSOI for task-organized engineers is coordinated through the corps.

3-92. Requirements are critical to decisions about task organization. The corps staff determines if joint capabilities or enablers are required, and it makes recommendations for their employment. Strategic lift assets, host-nation capabilities, intermediate support bases and assets, and infrastructure requirements influence corps decisions on the priority and timing of unit movements. Corps force projection cannot solely consider maneuver forces. Sustainment and other enabling capabilities are essential to successful force projection and often must be in position early during a deployment. The corps commander can then task-organize in accordance with METT-TC (I).

3-93. The operational movement portion of power projection has three components: strategic deployments into a JOA; conducting intratheater deployment and redeployment of forces; and the conduct of RSOI. RSOI are primarily logistics functions. The integration of new forces into the theater is always an operational function. In the RSOI process, the corps begins to integrate follow-on arriving forces into the C2 structure. The corps staff manages the time-phased force deployment list as later stages of operations occur to determine which forces are critical and how to allocate combat power to support the corps commander's mission objectives.

3-94. Rapidly introducing forces into an operational area requires timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence. The intelligence staff determines the right combination of expeditionary and reach capabilities to best support the corps' mission. Expeditionary intelligence capabilities support the commander and staff planning and decision-making processes to facilitate maneuver, precision engagement, and force protection. Intelligence reach capabilities allow commanders and staffs to access the resources of national, joint, foreign, and other military organizations and units. Detailed planning and training are critical to the success of both expeditionary and reach operations. Requirements development begins as early as possible—in some cases before receipt of mission, when only partial information about the general location or category of a mission is known. Intelligence reach supports distributed analysis, processing, exploitation, and dissemination to answer the commander's critical information requirements and other priority intelligence requirements. Intelligence reach also allows intelligence analysts to retrieve existing information, intelligence products, and data that can support answering critical information requirements and other requirements from outside the unit in a timely manner without waiting for an answer to a request for information or an information collection task.

3-95. While deploying, the corps will initially be reliant on joint and allied information collection assets to provide information to be processed into intelligence. The corps headquarters should consider placing its intelligence staff early in force projection to quickly set up intelligence operations, receive collected information, and support the corps commander. As soon as is feasible, the corps should exploit this initial capability by deploying its organic, attached, and subordinate units' information collection assets to decrease its dependence on joint assets or use joint assets for other requirements. Allied and coalition partners may possess an extensive array of human intelligence and counterintelligence assets to assist the corps, but accessing their information requires significant coordination.

3-96. Anticipatory sustainment planning during this stage is key to successful execution of later stages. Successful force-projection operations require tailorable, flexible logistics. The size of the deploying force, the maturity of the theater, host-nation support capabilities, the availability of in-theater stockage, resources

pre-positioned afloat, and the existing theater infrastructure will all affect the logistics task organization. If there are no port facilities available to the corps, it may have to conduct logistics-over-the-shore operations, which will require early deployment of specialized engineer and logistics units.

3-97. A corps typically requires the early or phased deployment of at least one engineer brigade headquarters to integrate engineer capabilities across the entire formation. Additional engineer brigades may be required to support the corps and its divisions, depending on METT-TC (I). The tailored engineer units are responsible for infrastructure planning, development, construction, and maintenance (See FM 3-0 and ATP 3-95 for more information on force projection and contested deployments).

RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

3-98. RSOI are critical steps for a corps commander in generating combat power. RSOI is a theater level responsibility, but the corps performs a critical role before deployment and during RSOI. Corps commanders typically shape the time-phased force deployment list to affect the force flow of corps units based on power projection and mission requirements. Intelligence, maneuver, and fire support may be prioritized initially, but sustainment, protection, and C2 elements are equally important. Commanders consider their mission objectives and design how they want to generate combat power in theater. The plan must be flexible to accommodate changes to the mission and the realization that building combat capability will be contested from home station to forward assembly areas.

RECEPTION

3-99. Reception is a theater task, but this is where the corps commander's units arrive in theater, and it includes the functions required to receive and clear personnel, equipment, and materiel through the point of debarkation. As the home station C2 element reports force projection, the early entry CP (derived from elements of the tactical CP) plans staging operations and subsequent onward movement. The corps, with its vehicles, equipment, and personnel, relies on the theater to receive and allocate space for staging. The corps early-entry CP is in constant communication with the corps home station C2 element to provide the corps commander with a visualization of forces and capabilities.

3-100. The corps G-4 coordinates with the theater logistics base and establishes large unit supply operations. Divisions and brigades draw equipment and conduct necessary training and marshalling activities to link combat-ready elements with their equipment. Corps training during reception (and continued into staging) includes theater specific rules of engagement, status-of-forces agreements, local customs and basic language training, riot control, negotiation skills, and media interactions. Unit training and preparation also may include configuration of digital C2 systems and validation of communications and intelligence architecture across echelons.

STAGING

3-101. Staging assembles, temporarily holds, and organizes arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces and capabilities and prepares them for onward movement, tactical operations, or reintegration. The corps G-3 works closely with the corps G-4 and theater sustainment command to synchronize movement plans. The corps staff receive updates on units' readiness to move forward. This is a critical point for the corps commander and staff to shape combat power capabilities.

ONWARD MOVEMENT

3-102. The onward movement phase of RSOI is critical because it is typically the first point where the corps' personnel and equipment begin to assemble as a unit and move away from the port of debarkation. Onward movement is moving units from reception facilities and staging areas to the tactical assembly area or other theater destinations, moving nonorganic personnel to gaining commands, and moving sustainment supplies to distribution sites. While the theater army remains responsible for the process, the corps' home station C2 element and the early-entry CP inform it. Three primary factors affecting onward movement are movement control, transportation infrastructure, and security. The corps G-3, G-4, and CTO support the synchronization and development of the movement control plan with the theater transportation officer. This is the corps

commander's opportunity to redistribute combat power based on the expected environment in the tactical assembly area. The most important requirement during this phase is protecting the force through—

- Movement control and transportation infrastructure.
- Control and coordination measures.
- Reconnaissance and security of the MSRs and routes within the corps AO.
- Security.
- Fratricide prevention.
- Employment of air defense measures.
- Exercising and reinforcing operations security (OPSEC).

Note. During large-scale combat operations, corps assembly areas may be in direct contact with enemy forces. Close coordination between the theater army and corps is vital to force protection. The intelligence staff estimate will support the commander's decisions on movement orders, fire support, and protection capabilities.

INTEGRATION

3-103. Integration is the synchronized transfer of capabilities into an operational commander's force prior to mission execution. It begins with corps units in the corps AO, specifically the assembly area for further movement to subordinate AOs. During integration, the divisions and separate brigades finalize preparations, such as completing any mandatory theater training and establishing communications and intelligence architecture. The transfer may require assimilation of provided forces, such as multinational units or additional Army capabilities to ensure they meet certain standards and understand corps standard operating procedures. Consequently, requirements for integration planning and coordination must occur early in the force projection process, and they are modified according to METT-TC (I) until achievement of force closure. Some integration tasks and requirements must be executed early in the RSOI process, particularly the coordination necessary for communications and intelligence architecture.

Note. The arrival of units in an AO does not complete the integration cycle. Integration is a continuous process, and it is the final step before the corps assumes operations.

3-104. The corps commander plans for the employment of assigned forces to support the theater or CCDR's campaign. The corps commander integrates additional units as they become available and determines if augmentation of supporting equipment or personnel is required. The initial force deployments must facilitate the corps support to the theater army or combatant command objectives. The corps commander evaluates the following factors in planning the integration of forces:

- Probable weather conditions.
- Terrain and hydrography in the corps AO.
- Enemy situation, including the locations of main enemy forces and when contact is expected.
- Complex terrain within, and adjacent to, the corps AO.
- Capabilities of the enemy that may interfere with corps operations.
- Time and space to employ available forces effectively.
- Organization and employment of assigned, attached, or supporting forces, including corps air and naval liaisons.
- Reconnaissance and security measures.
- Sustainment support and the means, methods, and routes to support corps operations.
- CCDR orders and any additional training requirements required prior to assuming operations.

3-105. The corps commander's emphasis during integration is reestablishing C2. The corps commander also plans for and considers multinational operations, host-nation forces and requirements, interoperability, and liaison augmentation. For example, as security forces (including the military police brigade and MEB) reestablish capabilities during staging and onward movement, the corps commander relies on joint or multinational protection capabilities while integrating corps formations. Multinational or host-nation partners may have different C2 systems, platforms, and capabilities that must be accounted for in planning and conducting operations. Security force assistance brigades, TLDs, and regional support groups mitigate some

of the C2 issues and facilitate interoperability with multinational forces. (See FM 6-0 for more information on liaison and interoperability; and see JP 4-18, ATP 3-35, and ATP 4-15 for more information on RSOI.)

TRACKING COMBAT POWER

3-106. RSOI is not complete for the corps until the JTF commander determines the corps is ready to execute its mission. The corps commander assesses the corps status and submits a closure report to the theater army or combatant command. Corps commanders track the generation of combat power along warfighting functions. Tracking available combat power and force capabilities facilitates decision making. As the theater army processes the flow of units through RSOI, the corps assesses the progress and coordinates with the theater army when priorities change. The corps brings a tremendous application of force and combat power to synchronize efforts during large-scale combat operations. Corps commanders continually refine and reallocate resources while preparing for continued combat operations.

3-107. In a maritime environment, RSOI activities may need to occur prior to onward movement into a JOA. The process of securing and uploading unit basic loads, addressing life support for personnel, or reconfiguring underway must occur prior to debarking directly into combat. Units that require extensive support for staging, including maintenance or cross-loading of supplies critical to survivability (including Class IV and Class V items) may require an intermediate staging base outside the JOA before continuing to their debarkation point. Additionally, units may execute onward movement out of sequence from reception, staging, and integration. Units may need to conduct integration during embarkation or during a reconfiguration at an intermediate base outside the JOA. (See JP 4-18, ATP 4-13, and ATP 4-15 for more information on watercraft operations.)

SECTION V — OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

3-108. A corps may consider several things in addition to those previously discussed in this chapter. Corps consider planning tools and rehearsals. They incorporate effective knowledge management systems to synchronize corps operations. Finally, a corps must consider how information impacts its operations and develop the means to mask friendly actions from adversaries and seek to deceive them for its own benefit.

PLANNING AND REHEARSAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-109. Corps commanders and staffs plan for the current operation while also developing or refining options for potential enemy actions and friendly opportunities. Several tools are available to the commander and planners to assist in adapting to changing circumstances. These tools include—

- Decision points.
- Branches.
- Sequels.

(See JP 5-0 and FM 5-0 for more information on planning tools.)

3-110. The complexity of corps operations also requires deliberate rehearsals to shape future operations in line with the corps commander's operational objectives. The size of a corps area, the potential branches, sequels, decision points, and the numerous elements related to operating over great distances in a corps area makes this a critical consideration for corps planners.

3-111. The corps staff can conduct rehearsals collectively or by warfighting function. A *warfighting function* is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (ADP 3-0). Rehearsing operations via the integrating cells (in the movement and maneuver warfighting functional cell) provides the corps commander a way to assess the staff's capabilities to operate and synchronize tasks across the warfighting functions in competition, crisis, and conflict.

3-112. When preparing for defensive operations, the corps has a unique opportunity to execute rehearsals on the objective versus simulated terrain. As the corps transitions from defensive to offensive operations, the rehearsals on the battlefield may provide the corps commander (and subordinate division commanders) with an advantage over enemy formations. Corps rehearsals, including staff headquarters rehearsals, are critical to success in execution.

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

3-113. *Knowledge management* is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making (ADP 6-0). Effective knowledge management helps the corps staff identify the necessary information and its relative importance to facilitate the corps commander's decision making. Knowledge management is critical to improve efficiency and shared understanding during operations. Knowledge management uses a five-phase process to create shared understanding. The phases of the knowledge management process include—

- Assess.
- Design.
- Develop.
- Pilot.
- Implement.

3-114. Knowledge management officers contribute to time management, meeting management, content management, and report analysis. They also facilitate the integration of the corps battle rhythm for the corps chief of staff. The corps knowledge management working group helps the corps staff analyze and improve the battle rhythm, which is critical when synchronizing operations for multiple divisions and brigades.

3-115. The corps' battle rhythm supports the commander's effective exercise of C2 and the commander's style of decision making. Events occur in the different staff sections and cells of the headquarters to accomplish simultaneous activities, but they all support the commander's overall battle rhythm. For example, the corps typically conducts a daily synchronization meeting and a battle update briefing to the commander or a designated officer to share the common operational picture and receive guidance.

3-116. Battle rhythms nested by echelon let the corps' subordinate commands offset their events to provide information needed by the corps headquarters. In addition, nested battle rhythms enable the corps CPs to supply necessary information to higher echelon headquarters and provide timely inputs to other joint force supporting components' decision cycles. For example, the JFACC's joint air tasking cycle dictates timely submission of Army preplanned air support requests and target nominations for resourcing on the air tasking order (known as ATO), and it requires the Army to digitally submit airspace coordinating measure requests for deconfliction of airspace coordinating measures on the daily air control order (known as ACO). (See ATP 6-01.1 for a detailed explanation of knowledge management.)

INFORMATION CONSIDERATIONS

3-117. A corps commanders' approach to information changes depending on the role of the corps. Joint commands use joint doctrine in which information is one of the seven joint functions, and there are certain authorities, joint force capabilities, operations, and activities for leveraging information available to the JFC that are typically not delegated or provided to subordinate commanders. Army leaders ensure their information activities are nested with the joint plan while collecting, processing, analyzing, and using information to understand situations, make decisions, and issue orders. (See JP 3-04 for more information on the information function in joint operations.)

3-118. Successful use of information can support corps operations, and commanders continually assess friendly and enemy forces in relation to each other and seek opportunities to exploit enemy weaknesses to achieve mission objectives. Actions are a form of nonverbal communication that have inherent informational aspects and are generally more impactful than verbal communications. Some examples of actions taken by a corps to use information to alter the enemy's situational understanding are—

- Making a feint or diversionary movement by a BCT.
- Positioning divisions so that there is no obvious main effort and corps multiple courses of action are possible.
- Presenting a false gap-crossing site.
- Feeding false indicators to enemy sensors.
- Placing physical and electronic decoys.
- Jamming or dazzling ground, airborne, or space sensors to mask a movement or other action.

3-119. A corps disintegrates enemy systems by corrupting or degrading their situational understanding, degrading their ability to C2 and sustain their forces, and forcing them to react to friendly actions. Depending on the capabilities employed, friendly forces can neutralize sensors or neutralize enemy capabilities to degrade friendly sensors. This can keep enemy forces in a disadvantageous position or deprive them of the time they need to recover from previous actions, while subordinate divisions and brigades maneuver and close with disaggregated enemy forces.

3-120. While divisions and brigades are in contact with enemy forces, the corps continues to exploit information advantages by actively disrupting the enemy force's ability to understand the situation, direct its formations, communicate, or employ joint fires. The ideal result is that enemy formations are isolated from their enabling capabilities and destroyed. Their destruction enables the corps to move on to the next echelon of enemy forces, enabling their ultimate defeat and a faster resolution to combat operations.

3-121. Creative and innovative use of tactical deception (TAC-D), deception in support of operations security (known as DISO), space operations, cyberspace, EW, and integrated joint special technical operations (known as IJSTO) capabilities can conceal some important aspects and signatures of subordinate C2, fires, movements, and other operations or provide false signatures in different locations or times. The IJSTO program, commonly called special technical operations, includes the process and architecture to access, plan, coordinate, synchronize, and employ select joint, Service, and DOD agency special access programs in exercises and combat operations. It can create an information advantage across all Army warfighting functions, all domains, the information environment, and the electromagnetic spectrum. IJSTO represent a special access program portfolio, a security architecture, an information network, and a review and approval process for deployment and execution of special access programs.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

3-122. Effective and disciplined OPSEC is employed during all corps operations. During rear operations, corps elements must consider camouflage, concealment, jamming, and other countermeasures to help prevent enemy or adversary reconnaissance and other information collection capabilities from gaining an advantage. OPSEC contributes to the corps' offensive operations by enabling efforts that slow the adversary decision cycle and affect the quality of the enemy commander's decisions. OPSEC supports the corps' defensive operations by denying enemy forces information that could be used for targeting or attacking the unit. Commanders and staffs implement countermeasures and security measures to identify and protect essential elements of friendly information.

Chapter 4
Integrating Corps Operations

This chapter expands on the application of the deep, close, and rear operations framework introduced in chapter 3. It provides an overview of general friendly and enemy challenges facing a corps during operations and describes how a corps synchronizes deep, close, and rear operations to overcome those challenges. The chapter concludes by providing considerations for synchronizing deep, close, and rear operations during offensive and defensive operations.

SECTION I — CHALLENGES FOR THE CORPS DURING OPERATIONS AND OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES

4-1. A corps fights to win battles, or a series of battles, as part of a larger major operation or campaign. During these battles, a corps overcomes the friendly and enemy challenges present during operations. The challenges arise from conducting operations on a large-scale with finite resources against capable, adaptable threats.

NATURE OF CORPS OPERATIONS

4-2. Corps operations are expansive in terms of size, time, and space. They are expansive in nature due to the number of assigned and attached forces, the time required to employ those forces, and the space needed for subordinate formations to accomplish their objectives. At any given time, a corps employs multiple divisions, multifunctional brigades, functional brigades, and joint capabilities during operations. The integration of these forces and synchronization of their actions, on limited terrain and along restricted lines of communications, creates complexity which the corps manages. In addition to the friendly related challenges, peer threats create another set of challenges for a corps.

4-3. Peer threats possess large operational formations, employ advanced long-range fires and air defense capabilities to provide stand off from friendly ground and air forces, and can typically contest a friendly corps in multiple if not all domains. Large formations provide the enemy with the ability to withstand friendly attacks against a single decisive point. The enemy can reposition, regenerate, or reconstitute forces to continue battles long enough to cause friendly culmination if the corps cannot account for how the threat might adapt.

4-4. Enemy formations dispersed across large frontages and depths can position key capabilities like rocket artillery and AMD systems at extended distances from the corps' forward line of own troops. This makes it difficult for a corps to locate, maintain contact, and strike key enemy forces and capabilities without joint support. Additionally, the distances of enemy second echelon forces and long-range systems may be at distances greater than the range of a corps' land-based capabilities. These factors require a corps to integrate and synchronize the application of joint capabilities with corps capabilities through the LCC.

4-5. The enemy's employment of deception, camouflage and concealment, and decoys limit the ability for friendly forces to locate potential targets in the corps’ deep area. The enemy's ability to hide, combined with the distances these forces are located, complicates information collection and targeting. To overcome this challenge requires the corps to develop and execute a robust information collection plan that incorporates joint ISR with the corps’ information collection capabilities.

4-6. Long-range fires capabilities, supported by tactical unmanned aerial systems, allow enemy forces to observe and attack friendly forces throughout the corps’ AO. With these capabilities, enemy forces can disrupt the corps’ operation by attacking C2 nodes, logistics facilities, and friendly forces moving along lines of communication within the corps’ close and rear areas. Corps must assume that the enemy will maintain observation on every friendly asset of importance. These actions require friendly forces to reduce the effects of long-range enemy fires by dispersing forces, allocating protection assets to support key nodes and forces, and by detecting and destroying enemy forces operating in the corps’ rear area. In addition, the corps must

maintain open lines of communication to ensure the forward movement of maneuver and sustainment forces needed to support the close operations.

4-7. Some peer threats have nuclear and chemical weapon capabilities, and they have expressed their intent to employ these weapons in certain situations. The enemy may choose to employ these weapons to disrupt friendly force deployment or to prevent defeat by friendly forces. Successful operations against CBRN capable threats require units to prepare for the employment of those capabilities and operations in contaminated environments. Planning includes active and passive measures for protection against the effects of these weapons and techniques for mitigating their effects to preserve combat power. This includes greater emphasis on dispersion, survivability, decontamination, and regeneration of communications.

OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES

4-8. Understanding the enemy is foundational to successful operations. The commander and staff develop an understanding of the enemy through IPOE, which informs the commander and staff of how an enemy force organizes, how it employs its forces, how it employs its long-range capabilities, and what the enemy's possible objectives are. The commander and staff gain an understanding of how the enemy wants to conduct close operations, where the enemy may position its second-echelon forces, and the location of its long-range capabilities. Understanding the relationships and interdependencies between enemy echelons and capabilities provides information on vulnerabilities that the corps can exploit.

4-9. Both offensive and defensive operations require a corps to attack and maintain pressure on the enemy force in depth. The corps attacks enemy forces simultaneously, or sequentially, when necessary, to deny enemy forces freedom of maneuver. The corps denies the enemy force sanctuary or respite to regroup, regenerate, or reconstitute. By attacking the enemy force in depth, the corps disrupts the enemy's ability to execute its plan and reduces the enemy force's ability to adapt. The corps synchronizes its attacks against enemy forces for a common purpose—to shape future close operations by its divisions.

4-10. A corps synchronizes its deep, close, and rear operations to employ its forces in an effective manner. A corps links its deep operations with its operations in the close and rear areas to create multiple dilemmas for an enemy force. The linkage between the deep, close, and rear operations ensures that the associated objectives, timing, and activities are mutually supporting. One way a corps links these operations is through the employment of the defeat mechanisms in combination against parts of or all of the enemy force.

SECTION II — SYNCHRONIZING DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR OPERATIONS

4-11. The corps accomplishes its mission through either defensive or offensive operations, or a combination of both, as part of their higher headquarters' plan. The corps must control key engagements. The corps must deny the enemy the ability to concentrate combat power by attacking the enemy's follow-on forces during defensive operations or by attacking the enemy's second echelons and mobile reserves during the corps' offensive operations. These actions deny the enemy the ability to interfere with current close operations while setting conditions for subsequent operations. Finally, the corps must conduct successful rear operations to sustain freedom of action during its close and deep operations. Continuous execution of deep, close, and rear operations is critical for the duration of the attack or defense, since the enemy will continually attempt to concentrate numerically superior forces and fires to defeat the corps. Figure 4-1 depicts synchronization of deep, close, and rear operations.




Figure 4-1. Synchronization of Deep, Close, and Rear Operations

THE COMMANDER'S VISUALIZATION AND CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

4-12. Deep, close, and rear operations require continuous synchronization. The commander and staff must execute current operations while continuously formulating and revising a concept for future operations. They continuously analyze their mission and maintain an updated estimate of the situation. The result of the staff's planning and coordination is an allocation of resources and combat power to support deep, close, and rear operations based on the corps commander's visualization and concept of operation.

The conduct of corps operations is based upon a clear, detailed statement of intent by the commander. This is a prerequisite for effective command and control.

4-13. The commander must visualize the operations of the corps and those of the enemy and project that visualization into the future. Analysis of all domains and their impact on friendly and enemy operations inform the commander's visualization. Because corps are land combat formations, the commander first analyzes the geography within a theater of operations and the terrain within the corps' assigned area to assess their impact on the operations. The impacts are due to the limited number of avenues of approach, mobility corridors, and obstacles within the corps' assigned area. Based on this analysis, the commander visualizes the size and types of forces, tactics, and tempo required to achieve corps' objectives.

4-14. The commander builds on the terrain analysis with analysis of the other domains. The commander determines how friendly and enemy capabilities from the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace can impact the corps operations. The commander then visualizes how the employment of friendly capabilities from other domains can complement and reinforce the corps' scheme of maneuver.

4-15. The result of the commander's visualization is planning guidance that allows the staff to develop plans to support a course of action and the corps commander to synchronize the operations of subordinate commanders. It is particularly important that subordinate commanders clearly understand the corps commander's intent, so they can execute operations in the absence of further guidance.

4-16. The commander's concept of operations describes how the corps will execute operations to achieve the desired defeat mechanisms, the command relationships between units, and the relative priorities over time. The concept of operations includes how the corps conducts deep, close, and rear operations and assigns on

order missions, priorities, and allocating combat power to each of the operations. It should prescribe tactics and forms of maneuver in detail for an operation's first phase and provide guidance for all likely variations in maneuver and support necessary to complete the mission. Contingency and On Order modifications must be part of the initial plan if the corps is to maintain the initiative.

CLOSE OPERATIONS

4-17. Deep and rear operations set conditions for the success of corps close operations. The measure of success of deep and rear operations is their positive impact on increasing the effectiveness of close operations. During large-scale combat, corps close operations will primarily be centered on offensive and defensive operations with stability operations limited to only what is required to be in accord with the law of armed conflict.

4-18. Close operations for a corps include the deep, close, and rear operations of its divisions, and the operations of its separate brigades. Corps close operations comprise the efforts of its divisions to close with and defeat enemy forces during battles and engagements. Divisions and brigades combine direct and indirect fires with movement to destroy and defeat enemy forces. Close operations concentrate overwhelming combat power at the right time and place to create and then exploit windows of opportunity to achieve assigned objectives. In close operations, division commanders complete assigned tactical tasks as part of the corps plan and the corps commander concentrates overwhelming combat power at critical points throughout the operation.

4-19. Activities are part of close operations if their purpose contributes to defeating committed enemy forces that are or will be in direct physical contact with friendly forces. For example, during close operations, engineers mainly facilitate mobility and countermobility operations. They support friendly movement of large, tactical units, and they control enemy movement. They may create time and space between friendly and enemy forces by restricting the enemy force's ability to maneuver in large formations. Activities that comprise close operations include—

- Maneuver of subordinate formations (including counterattacks).
- Close combat (including offensive and defensive operations).
- Fire support (including indirect fire, counterfire, close air support, electromagnetic attack, and offensive space and cyberspace operations against enemy forces in direct physical contact with friendly forces).
- Information collection.
- Sustainment support of committed units.

DEEP OPERATIONS

4-20. Corps deep operations attack an enemy force in depth. Corps deep operations are inherently joint. A corps conducts deep operations to—

- Limit the enemy force's freedom of action.
- Alter the tempo of operations to create relative advantages at critical times and places.
- Deny enemy forces the ability to concentrate and sustain their forces.
- Isolate the close fight to enable the enemy's defeat in detail.
- Destroy the enemy force's will to fight.

4-21. The corps does this by integrating all available joint and Army capabilities to prevent the enemy from effectively employing its reserves, long-range fires, air defense systems, C2 systems, and logistics. Understanding and then attacking the enemy's approach destroys its ability to synchronize operations or maintain a cohesive plan.

4-22. Corps deep operations set conditions for success during close operations and subsequent engagements. The commander determines the conditions needed by the divisions to achieve their objectives. Those conditions are generally related to relative combat power, force ratios, and time. Based on the commander's guidance, corps planners determine which enemy forces to attack, where and when to attack, and how to attack those forces to create the required relative advantages.

4-23. A corps G-2 assesses the location, composition, and disposition of enemy formations and capabilities to determine their impact on close operations. The corps G-2's assessment also accounts for enemy

formations and capabilities located outside of the corps' assigned areas which could impact corps operations. The G-2 focuses their analysis on the enemy's second echelon forces, logistics assets, mobile reserves, air defense, and long-range fires systems. These enemy formations and capabilities are not all inclusive but represent the enablers that underpin how the enemy wants to fight.

4-24. The corps focuses its attacks on the enemy vulnerabilities and capabilities most able to deny the objectives it assigns its divisions and other subordinate formations. The commander selects a defeat mechanism or combinations of defeat mechanisms to apply against those enemy forces. The staff then identifies decisive points critical to employing the defeat mechanisms based on the commander's priorities and available assets. From this prioritization, the staff determines the most effective Army and joint capabilities to employ. The corps also accounts for those uncommitted forces and systems that an enemy may locate at distances greater than the maximum engagement range of the corps' land-based capabilities. The corps staff recommends those distant targets to its higher echelon or to an adjacent formation for attack.

4-25. The corps staff ensures friendly capabilities are available and prepared for employment continuously. To accomplish this task, a corps integrates and synchronizes the employment of friendly capabilities across multiple timelines to create effects against an enemy force. For example, a corps sequences joint air operations during the 24- to 96-hour joint air-tasking cycle, division maneuver on a 72- to 96-hour cycle, and sustainment operations on a 72- to 120-hour cycle. Accounting for these variances ensures conditions are set for continuous operations and the integration of the corps operations process with joint C2 processes.

CORPS ACTIVITIES DURING DEEP OPERATIONS

4-26. Several activities are typically conducted as part of deep operations to achieve the desired defeat mechanism or mechanisms. They include—

- Deception.
- Information collection and target acquisition.
- Interdiction.
- Long-range fires.
- Electromagnetic warfare.
- Offensive cyberspace operations and space operations.
- Military information support operations.

Deception

4-27. Deception is an essential element of achieving surprise. There are multiple forms of deception that the corps must consider. *Military deception* are activities intended to mislead and cause adversary actions or inactions that are beneficial to the friendly force (JP 3-54). *Tactical deception* is a friendly activity that causes enemy commanders to take action or cause inaction detrimental to their objectives (FM 3-90). Deception in support of operations security is a deception activity that conveys or denies selected information or signatures to a foreign intelligence entity. Deception contributes to creating multiple dilemmas, achieving operational surprise, and maintaining the initiative.

4-28. Deception efforts by a corps seek to delay enemy decision making until it is too late to matter or to cause an enemy commander to make the wrong decision. The corps deceives the enemy commander by concealing friendly locations, capabilities, and intent until a time and place of the corps commander's choosing. Late or wrong decisions by the enemy commander creates friendly advantages, such as surprise and favorable force ratios, which the corps can exploit.

4-29. The commander decides on the resources, location, and time to employ deception in support of operations. Deception plans may necessitate the dedication of significant effort and resources. The commander ensures the corps initiates deception measures in sufficient time to allow enemy forces to acquire false or misleading information, analyze the activity or inactivity, and react to the intended deception in the desired manner. The corps information operations officer coordinates with higher echelons to integrate TAC-D plans with the MILDEC plans established by the JTF or CCDR. (See Chapter 6 for more on MILDEC and TAC-D.)

Information Collection

4-30. Intelligence initially drives the selection of defeat mechanisms a commander aims to employ against enemy forces. The corps develops intelligence through information collection. *Information collection* is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets and the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). The corps' information collection effort facilitates deep operations by identifying and tracking threats to the corps' mission.

4-31. A corps has access to joint ISR assets in addition to the corps' organic information collection assets. The joint ISR request process requires prior planning and approval. To receive joint apportionment and allocation for ISR, the theater army and corps intelligence staffs collaborate and coordinate early during the joint planning process. These staffs must understand the various joint ISR scheduling and collection management mechanisms, such as joint targeting, and the air tasking order.

4-32. The corps G-2, with assistance from the E-MIB, manages an information collection effort that allows the corps to rapidly respond to changes in the threat and operational environment. During planning for deep operations, the intelligence staff builds its initial collection plan based on predicted enemy courses of action. As the corps' operation unfolds, the intelligence staff adjusts its information collection plan to gather battle damage assessments, track the movement of enemy forces, and identify changes in the operational and mission variables that may impact close and deep operations. The information gathered to support these requirements must be timely and accurate to inform the commander's decision to restrike a target or transition to begin collection against the next set of objectives for the corps.

4-33. The corps intelligence staff maintains a broad perspective across the corps' AO and continuously looks beyond the close fight. The intelligence staff focuses on information collection deeper, in time and space, than its divisions to identify and track the movement of enemy forces that are out of contact. However, the staff must frequently weigh the need to allocate joint and corps assets to answer subordinate requirements against the need answer requirements for corps deep operations. If the corps becomes overly focused on the close operations of its divisions, it increases the risk of surprise by enemy forces and reduces the corps' ability to set conditions for the next phases, branches, or sequels in the current operation.

4-34. Clearly defined conditions or boundaries for intelligence handover synchronize information collection across echelons and organizations. These conditions or boundaries may be geographic, time-based, or delineated by target set. This allows predictable transitions as the corps and its subordinate divisions make progress during operations. It also enables the corps to look deeper towards the operational and strategic objectives as an operation continues. (See FM 2-0 for more information on intelligence handover lines.)

4-35. The corps and other echelons may generate information collection efficiencies through en route collection and tasking subordinate maneuver elements or assets. For example, a corps may need information about the condition of a bridge. Rather than tasking corps assets, the corps can task the division responsible for the area containing the bridge to answer the request for information. Ultimately, a lower echelon element conducts a tactical reconnaissance task and then generates a report that flows back to the corps. When tasking subordinate formations, the corps must be clear about its specific information requirements and provide adequate time to collect the information. (See Chapter 7 for more information on reconnaissance.)

4-36. Corps may also employ a geospatial intelligence cell to assist with information collection. The corps geospatial engineer in the main CP coordinates with the corps G-2 to form the cell. The geospatial intelligence cell includes geospatial intelligence imagery analysts and geospatial engineers. Combining these skill sets into one cell facilitates an environment for analysts and engineers to create the best geospatial intelligence products to support planning and operations. Geospatial intelligence cells provide a more complete picture of an OE's physical environment and infrastructure, as well as analysis. (See ATP 2-19.3 for more information on the geospatial intelligence cell.)

Targeting

4-37. *Targeting* is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). The FSCOORD leads the targeting working group and is the primary advisor to the commander on fire support.

4-38. In addition to the FSCOORD, the targeting and airspace working groups involve a large portion of the corps staff. It includes the commander, chief of staff, operations officer, intelligence staff from multiple specialties, Army aviation commander, corps targeting officer, EW officer, chief of protection, and other staff members depending upon the situation. The corps G-2 provides the enemy's current situation, event templates, high value targets, and named areas of interest. The G-2 staff provides predictive analysis on the future enemy courses of actions to support targeting. The FSCOORD, working with the maneuver cell and FSE, develops and refines the target development plan for the targeting working group. The targeting working group generates target nominations, preplanned air support requests, airspace control means requests, and collection requirements. In addition, the airspace working group identifies airspace required to support corps operations and integrates subordinate unit airspace plans into the corps' unit airspace plan.

4-39. The targeting working group is a selection of predetermined staff representatives involved with targeting who meet to provide analysis, coordination, warfighting function updates, and running estimates to synchronize the targeting efforts and generate options presented to the commander at the targeting coordination board. The targeting coordination board is generally more formal and is focused on updating the commander, gaining new guidance, and obtaining approval of the collection plan and associated targeting actions. Targeting working group and coordination board sessions should be the minimum length required to present targeting information, situation updates, provide recommendations, and obtain decisions. The targeting coordination board is a temporary grouping of selected staff representatives with delegated decision authority to provide targeting decision recommendations for command approval. When the process or activity being synchronized requires command approval, a board is the appropriate forum.

4-40. The corps provides Army inputs to the joint air tasking cycle as part of its operations process, normally at the conclusion of the targeting working group and airspace working group. The Army inputs support development of the joint air tasking cycle outputs (the air tasking order and airspace control order). The *air tasking order* is a method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities, or forces for targeting and specific missions (JP 3-30). The *airspace control order* is an order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details of the approved requests for airspace coordinating measures (JP 3-52). The corps' inputs into the joint air tasking cycle are critical to ensure the supporting air component understands the corps' priorities for the use of joint airpower in its operational area. The details from the airspace control order are also critical to developing a concept of operations because they include airspace coordinating measures, fire support coordination measures, and air defense measures. (See JP 3-52 and FM 3-52 for more information on airspace control.)

4-41. The corps synchronizes joint fire missions with corps current operations to ensure the corps employs joint and corps capabilities in complementary and reinforcing ways. Additionally, the corps identifies targets and requests for support that are beyond the capability or authority of the corps to engage. The corps passes those targets and requests for support to the higher echelon headquarters for action.

4-42. Close air support is tasked to support ground forces based on the preplanned air support requests submitted to the air component, typically the JFACC. The JFACC provides close air support sorties to support ground forces based on the preplanned air support requests submitted from the LCC. The LCC and corps must submit preplanned air support requests based on the JFC apportionment decision to ensure JFACC allocation of close air support sorties. The FSCOORD, deputy FSCOORD, and air LNO are integral to the process, and they advise the commander on the close air support distribution for publication in the fire support plan. (See FM 3-60 for more information on targeting.)

Joint Fires

4-43. *Joint fires* are fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to create desired effects in support of a common objective (JP 3-0). The corps coordinates and synchronizes joint fires to shape enemy forces during deep operations to set conditions for their subordinate divisions. The JFACC, through consultation with other component commanders in the JTF, provides air apportionment recommendations to the JFC. Subsequently, the JFC makes decisions on apportionment and disseminates guidance and objectives to components providing support to the JTF. The results of apportionment for the corps are effects and sorties published through the air tasking order. Corps FSE planners develop a counterfire plan to enable effective weapons locating radar coverage over critical locations for the specific periods necessary for the successful conduct of operations.

4-44. Typically, a USAF expeditionary air support operations group provides direct support to the corps. This group is OPCON to the commander Air Force forces and under tactical control to the JFACC. When the corps is a tactical headquarters, the Air Force provides it a tactical air control party. When the corps operates as a joint force command or MNFLCC, the JFACC provides a joint air component coordination element, as per the Army-Air Force memorandum of agreement. The joint air component coordination element is not a controlling agency, and it cannot perform certain functions, such as controlling airspace.

4-45. When naval surface fire support is available, naval LNOs advise and assist the commander in the employment of this support. Naval surface fire support capabilities generally include 5-inch guns in littorals and precision guided missiles from extended ranges. The Navy designates ships to provide direct support to specific USMC battalions or furnish general support to Army brigades and divisions. A corps prioritizes which division receives how much support. A corps coordinates maritime surface-to-surface fires through the joint force land component command. Maritime surface-to-surface fires are typically the product of deliberate targeting through the joint targeting process which includes participation by the joint force land component command.

4-46. A corps employs these assets primarily in that portion of the corps' AO beyond the forward boundary of subordinate divisions. The corps FSE coordinates with joint or theater fires elements and synchronizes fire support to enable operational maneuver and destroy enemy forces and capabilities. The corps FSE, in conjunction with the corps field artillery brigades, develops fire support planning and employment considerations to integrate joint and Army fires capabilities. For example, the corps FSE coordinates maritime surface-to-surface fires through the joint force land component command or air effects through the air tasking order (known as ATO) to the JFACC. Air support and maritime surface-to-surface fires are typically the product of deliberate targeting through the joint targeting process.

4-47. Corps can also plan and coordinate for the employment of space control and offensive cyber capabilities in conjunction with traditional fire support during deep operations. The commander's guidance provides specific attack criteria for supporting fire support assets, focusing planning, and execution efforts on critical times and events. (See ADP 3-19 for information on the fires warfighting function.)

Corps Fire Support

4-48. *Fire support* is a rapid and continuous integration of surface-to-surface indirect fires, target acquisition, armed aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal attack/delivery systems that converge against targets across all domains in support of the maneuver commander's concept of operations (FM 3-09). The corps' long-range fires assets enable the corps to disrupt, degrade, destroy, or neutralize enemy forces and resources. These enemy forces and resources include maneuver forces, C2 networks, sustainment nodes, long-range artillery and rockets, and air defense systems. Corps fire support capabilities include cannon, rocket, and missile systems found in the corps' field artillery brigade and the divisions. Additionally, the corps relies on the USAF tactical air control party and support from the JFACC's airspace control elements to support execution of the long-range fires and airspace management schemes.

4-49. Corps, division, and BCT FSEs require nested procedures for identifying, prioritizing, and engaging planned targets and targets of opportunity that meet high-payoff target criteria, such as enemy C2 or long-range fire support systems. These procedures facilitate rapid clearance of fire support and assist in maintaining situational understanding across the joint force during target prosecution. (See FM 3-09 for an in-depth discussion of fire support procedures.)

4-50. The field artillery brigade allocated to the corps augments the fire support of divisions; provides counterfire against enemy indirect fire capabilities and fire support against targets such as enemy CPs, logistics sites, and radars; and performs corps-wide target acquisition functions. Fire support planners at corps develop a counterfire plan to ensure weapons locating radar coverage. The types of missions assigned to field artillery brigades are general support, reinforcing, and general support reinforcing. Corps commanders may attach these units to one or more of their divisions or any BCT under their direct command.

4-51. At the recommendation of the field artillery brigade commander, the corps commander assigns support relationships to the field artillery battalions of any divisions and BCTs in reserve or not yet committed to the fight. Commanders give priority field artillery support to their designated main effort. If an operation is phased, priority for fire support can vary from unit to unit. A corps will usually provide additional field

artillery brigade battalions in a support relationship to the division artillery or field artillery battalions of the BCTs in the main effort. (See FM 3-09 and ATP 3-09.24 for information on the field artillery brigade's support to corps operations.)

4-52. The corps FSE recommends a task organization to the commander that best supports the conduct of successful operations by subordinate divisions. A corps commander may choose to retain OPCON of some field artillery assets to weight the main effort or set conditions for main and supporting efforts.

Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Activities

4-53. *Cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA)* are the process of planning, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace and electronic warfare operations in support of multidomain operations (ADP 3-0). Cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum provide commanders at all echelons the ability to share information, communicate, integrate, and synchronize operations across warfighting functions and echelons. CEMA also provides corps commanders with the ability to gain and maintain an advantage in cyberspace and across the electromagnetic spectrum. The corps implements CEMA via the integration and synchronization of cyberspace operations, EW, and spectrum management operations during course of action development. It does so within the limitations and policies established by national or combatant command authorities.

4-54. While units at echelons corps and below may be able to achieve desired effects in cyberspace through other military capabilities (suck as lethal fires, maneuver, or air support), cyberspace and electromagnetic attack may provide additional capabilities to augment traditional lethal and nonlethal fires. Conversely, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum provide enemies with an effective, inexpensive means for C2, information warfare, electromagnetic attack, and sensor-to-shooter linkages. CEMA staffs provide corps commanders with the ability to gain situational awareness and create advantages in cyberspace and across the electromagnetic spectrum.

4-55. Corps coordinate for offensive cyberspace operations support using the cyber effects request format. A corps G-3 receives cyber effects requests from its divisions, determines priorities of support, and then directs its CEMA section to submit the support request to the JFLCC. Requested cyber effects may include priorities of protection, the delivery of military information support operations against a specific target, cyber exploitation of a target, or a deliberate cyberspace attack in support of operation plan execution. Corps submit the cyber effects request format to their higher headquarters. The combatant command joint cyber center enter the request into the USCYBERCOM request for support portal. Corps prioritize cyber support to divisions in accordance with the specific requirements of their AO and the course of action. A corps may coordinate delivery of cyber effects against an enemy formation through cyberspace using social media while simultaneously employing cyber teams and units to engage with specific elements of a population. (See FM 3-12 for more information on Army cyberspace activities.)

Space Operations

4-56. A corps is the focal point for the planning and execution of Army space operations. The space domain is essential to operations because it supports and enables operations in all other domains. Each corps contains an organic space support element (SSE), usually assigned to the movement and maneuver cell. The SSE plans, coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes space capabilities into operations for corps, division, and subordinate units. All land component space planning coordination runs up to the corps headquarters. The SSE coordinates directly with other space staffs and space coordination authorities for support to meet corps requirements.

4-57. The corps detects and targets enemy space capabilities to disrupt, degrade, and deny the enemy use of space capabilities. The corps employs on space- and terrestrial-based capabilities to detect enemy space nodes and counterspace capabilities for targeting during deep operations. Like friendly forces, the enemy relies on space capabilities for communications; position, navigation, and timing; intelligence operations; and cyberspace operations. So, the corps' disruption, degradation, and denial of space capabilities may create advantages for the corps to exploit.

4-58. Corps are directly dependent on joint space capabilities to plan and execute across their AOs and especially during deep operations. The corps G-3 SSE coordinates for joint space capabilities through

established theater space coordination authority to U.S. Space Command. The primary task for a corps G-3 SSE is to retain freedom of access to the space domain while holding enemy use of the space domain at risk. The corps G-3 SSE receives space support requests from the division SSEs, determines priorities of support, and then submits them to the theater space coordination authority. Space capabilities are in high demand with limited capacity. Effective coordination, integration, and synchronization of space capabilities in all phases of planning is crucial to mission success. (See FM 3-14 for more information on Army space operations.)

Military Information Support Operations

4-59. *Military information support operations* are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives (JP 3-53). Military information support operations (MISO) enable a corps to influence enemy formations through information activities. A tactical psychological operations (forces) (PSYOP) group normally supports a corps to conduct military information support operations. The planners within this group advise commander and staff on how to maximize influence activities and minimize the adverse impact and unintended consequences of friendly operations. Military information support operations focus on the following themes against enemy forces:

- Degrading enemy combat power by encouraging surrender, desertion, and malingering.
- Reducing the will of the enemy to resist.
- Degrading the decision-making abilities and operational effectiveness of the enemy.
- Exploiting and amplifying friendly successes on the battlefield.
- Exploiting and amplifying enemy failures and actions on the battlefield.

4-60. The military information support operations planners participate in the targeting process. They nominate specific targets and target audiences to influence and advise the corps commander on the effects of information activities on target audiences. The planners also assess how corps operations may affect decisions by the targeted population and the subsequent actions of those populations. During deep operations, military information support operations amplify the lethal effects against enemy formations, when properly planned, integrated, and synchronized.

REAR OPERATIONS

4-61. A corps conducts rear operations to support its close and deep operations. Rear operations enable the desired tempo of combat and provides the corps with the agility and endurance to exploit opportunities. Rear operations typically include efforts that consolidate gains to make conditions created by deep and close operations more permanent.

4-62. The corps' rear operations generally occur within a location the commander designates as the corps' rear area. The corps' rear area extends from the forward boundary of its next higher echelon to the rear boundaries of its divisions. The terrain and the organization of the corps dictates the size of the corps' area. In most instances, this area will exceed several hundred square miles.

4-63. The corps' rear CP is typically responsible for rear operations. This responsibility includes establishing protection priorities within the corps' rear area, securing forces operating within the corps' rear area, and securing lines of communications.

CORPS ACTIVITIES DURING REAR OPERATIONS

4-64. Successful rear operations by a corps conducting operations, within an area congested with friendly units and along limited lines of communication, center on its ability to conduct five broad activities. Those broad activities are the following:

- Positioning and repositioning aviation, fire support, and AMD units.
- Conducting support area operations.
- Securing sustainment and C2 nodes.
- Controlling tactical unit movement between the division or corps rear boundary and units conducting close operations.
- Positioning and moving the reserves.

Positioning and Repositioning Aviation, Fire Support, and AMD Units

4-65. Army aviation is typically positioned in the rear area, and it integrates into corps operations by conducting air-ground operations throughout the corps' assigned area. Army aviation forces position maintenance, forward arming and refueling points, and unmanned aircraft system launch locations forward to enable close and deep operations, while employing protection measures against an enemy force's long-range fires. Army aviation forces are positioned based on their mission requirements, speed, range, and the enemy threat to support corps operations. (See FM 3-04 for more information on Army aviation core competencies.)

4-66. The corps AMD element plans and works with subordinate divisions and other headquarters to synchronize the placement of ADA capabilities and the use of the airspace and to protect the force. ADA assets may be further directed by the AAMDC or ADA brigade commander to protect facilities located within the corps' AO. The senior officer in the corps AMD section advises the corps commander on how the corps can best counter air and missile threats and is also responsible for nominating the realignment of ADA forces to protect defended asset list assets to the joint theater AMD board. The corps AMD section is responsible for synchronizing and positioning AMD forces within the corps commander's scheme of maneuver. (See FM 3-01 for additional information on AMD operations.

Support Area Operations

4-67. Support area operations are a critical part of rear operations. *Support area operations* are the tactical actions securing lines of communications, bases, and base clusters that enable an echelon's sustainment and command and control (FM 3-0). A support area is where units position, employ, and protect base sustainment assets and lines of communications required to sustain, enable, and control operations. Support area operations include sustainment for the echelon and relevant security operations.

4-68. A corps commander designates a support area within the corps' rear area to frame a critical part of rear operations. The support area is where most of the echelon's sustainment capabilities originate. During large-scale combat operations, and depending on the type of operation, commanders may position a portion of their sustainment capabilities in division AOs to facilitate flexibility and timeliness of resupply.

4-69. Support area operations require detailed planning to coordinate among the various units providing sustainment, protection, and security. A maneuver enhancement brigade or BCT typically provides C2 for support area operations for a corps due to the level of security, planning, and integration required. The MEB is responsible for terrain management, movement control, mobility support, clearance of fires, and security. This allows sustainment units to focus on their primary function of sustaining corps operations. Commanders must balance their need to protect rear operations and tempo with the needs of main effort units committed to close and deep operations.

4-70. Commanders consider several items when conducting support area operations. They include—

- The requirements of the desired corps and division tempo.
- Enemy maneuver and fires units that threaten current and future support area operations.
- Additional forces required to protect the support area.
- C2 nodes that will occupy the support area.
- Command and support relationships between units in the support area.
- Transportation networks (road, rail, inland waterways, and air) into and out of the area.
- Protection from enemy indirect fire assets.
- Survivability.
- Dispersion, terrain management, and time-distance calculations between supporting-supported units.
- Displacement considerations based upon the overall operation.
- Movement control into, through, and out of the support area.

Securing Sustainment and Command and Control Nodes

4-71. Sustainment and C2 nodes in the rear area are central to the conduct of rear operations. Every unit and node in the rear area is responsible for its own local security against level I and level II threats. Rear CPs plan

for and direct additional combat power to defeat larger threats. The corps' rear CP also continuously monitors route security and adjusts the amount of combat power dedicated to route security as needed. If the corps' rear area is large enough, or if a significant threat emerges, route security may require additional forces to augment the tactical combat force (known as TCF) provided to the MEB or BCT assigned to C2 the support area. When the MEB does not have a tactical combat force, the MEB commander may organize its military police and combat engineers into a limited tactical combat force to defeat level I and II threats. Displacing sustainment and C2 nodes to ensure continued support for corps operations is a complicated process that requires detailed planning and synchronization for success.

Sustainment Nodes and Considerations

4-72. Rear operations include the development and refinement of the concept of sustainment. The CSC, as the supporting unit, develops the concept of support. Sustainment headquarters at each echelon are also responsible for integrating additional sustainment assets they do not control, such as forward-positioned assets from higher echelon headquarters, into the overall plan. This is typically accomplished in conjunction with division rear CPs or the headquarters of a brigade support area, as these units may occupy a significant amount of terrain and will often require security assistance.

4-73. Sustainment nodes are required to ensure sustainment remains responsive to operational demands. A *node* is a location in a mobility system where a movement requirement is originated, processed for onward movement, or terminated (JP 3-36). Nodes are large and small points of a distribution system or network connected by a line of communications (LOC) where a commander's decision affects the actions of people, equipment, or supplies. Nodes and the LOCs that connect them require combat power to secure.

4-74. Commanders position capabilities in support of protection, such as AMD units, and military police units to ensure uninterrupted movement of sustainment. Movement control, particularly in the corps and division areas, is vital, as distribution of needed materiel forward can be constrained by the availability of transportation or the capacity of the LOCs to accommodate the required traffic. Sustainment planners coordinate movement control with the G-3 to ensure movement plans are nested with maneuver. Constant coordination between the corps and division transportation officers, ESC, division sustainment brigades, and their supporting MEBs is required to prevent shortfalls of critical supplies in close operations. The corps chief of protection or provost marshal participates in the movement control board to facilitate decision making on throughput, capability, and security.

Command and Control Nodes and Considerations

4-75. The corps' main, rear, and tactical CPs synchronize maneuver operations across the three integrating cells for operations at 24, 48, 72, and 96 hours prior to an operation. The corps movement and maneuver cell coordinates with the other functional cells when synchronizing the different timelines to resolve resource issues and to prioritize specific capabilities and assets, including sustainment.

4-76. Depending on the operation, the corps' support area may contain multiple CPs and headquarters such as the corps' main and rear CPs, the corps' CSC, the corps' MEB, and one or more BCTs. It is also likely to contain various companies and battalions with combat support or sustainment missions. These CPs, headquarters, and units may be dispersed across assembly areas within the general area. Conditions in a particular AO may require multiple dispersed assembly areas positioned in a noncontiguous manner throughout the rear area. The corps allocates combat power accordingly.

Controlling Tactical Unit Movement

4-77. Rear operations require a controlled and steady flow of movement over LOCs such as road, rail, air, and waterways. Rear operations rely heavily on information and communications systems embedded in the distribution system. Assuring an uninterrupted flow of movement is essential to operational success. The system must be capable of rerouting and diverting traffic. Maintaining flexibility is one of the biggest challenges facing movement planners and operators during corps operations with shifting conditions and priorities. Establishing procedures for movements that cross boundaries and receiving and analyzing route statuses for corps MSRs and ASRs are essential.

4-78. Corps military police units conduct route regulation and synchronization along the MSR and ASRs to facilitate freedom of maneuver and mobility support. The four key elements supporting MSR and ASR regulation are route reconnaissance, traffic control plan development, dislocated civilian control measures, and straggler control. *Movement control* is the dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating movements according to command priorities to synchronize distribution flow over lines of communications to sustain land forces (ADP 4-0). Military police and sustainment units work together to facilitate movement control. The corps military police units contribute to the corps through prediction, detection, prevention, avoidance, and protection capabilities.

4-79. Military police units plan for events that impede corps movement. Military police detect potential threats, providing insight for best use of available rear area reconnaissance and security assets. Military police units prevent the enemy from hindering corps movements, especially in contested or restricted terrain. Military police watch civilian movement patterns to prevent them from affecting corps mobility. Military police units also provide the corps with the ability to adjust movement and traffic control plans to mitigate the effects of obstacles or other types of interference.

4-80. Working in close coordination with civil affairs elements, military police provide support to civil administration, manage civil disturbances, and establish roadblocks and obstacles to control traffic flow. Military police units enforce movement control through movement corridors to facilitate continuous flow of units, protect critical sites, and ensure local and area security. (See ADP 3-37 for more information on protection and ATP 3-39.30 for more information on mobility support.)

4-81. Engineer resources retained by the corps, such as bridging, explosive breaching, sapper, and clearing units, are task-organized to divisions, the CSC, and brigades to support close and rear operations. During rear operations, engineers improve and maintain routes along corps lines of communication. Engineers also protect critical capabilities by emplacing protective obstacles and digging survivability positions.

4-82. In the rear area, engineers mainly facilitate freedom of movement and enable survivability. Corps engineers build, maintain, and repair roads for ground movements and build airfields to support corps aviation units. As time permits, they replace tactical bridges with support bridging and construct LOC bridges. Additionally, they conduct route clearance missions. Engineers install obstacles to control traffic and restrict movement. They plan and execute situational obstacles, when necessary, to counter threat forces operating in the rear. When time and resources permit, corps engineers construct survivability positions for critical nodes and facilities. They coordinate with the Corps of Engineers and host-nation agencies to keep railroads, waterways, and transportation nodes like airports or seaports operating.

4-83. The corps engineer also supports and collaborates with the theater engineer staff on the theater basing strategy and other facilities required to refine the planning and execution of construction and other general engineering requirements. The assistant corps engineer participates across the staff and planning horizons to synchronize the engineering disciplines. The corps engineer works closely with the theater engineer for requests for forces, capabilities, and capacities for mobility, countermobility, and survivability to shape operations for the division.

Positioning and Moving Reserves

4-84. The location of units and capabilities does not determine how they align with corps deep, close, or rear operations. Commanders position forces as part of rear operations where they can be most lethal, effective, mutually supporting, and survivable. Corps commanders and staffs also consider branch plans, sequels, or changing priorities that will require the repositioning of supporting capabilities. Positioning the corps reserve or other uncommitted units is a planning consideration for branch plans and sequels.

4-85. The commander generally positions the reserve where they can easily reinforce the main effort and, whenever possible, beyond the enemy force's direct fire range. This positioning is to the rear of the divisions, in a location that provides maximum protection from enemy observation and fire. The corps considers several factors when determining the exact location for the corps reserve. These factors include—

- Orientating on the most likely mission or their most important mission.
- Response time to various planning priorities.
- Access to MSRs.
- Locations of probable enemy penetrations.

- Terrain.
- Availability of cover and concealment.

4-86. A corps reserve is usually a division sized element requiring individual positions for every brigade-sized element. When the reserve is committed by the commander, the staff must make major changes in rear area movement and air defense extending into subordinate division rear areas as the corps reserve moves to its attack positions.

4-87. Operations in a non-contiguous AO may pose a challenge for reserves due to intra-theater mobility concerns. When operating non-contiguously the corps should consider designating and positioning multiple reserves based on the terrain and threat. Positioning multiple reserves, when possible, ensures that employing a reserve is operationally feasible.

Note. When constituted, the corps reserve is normally retained under the control of the corps commander. Circumstance, such as a major threat to the coherence of the defense (such as the commitment of additional enemy forces threatening a penetration) could arise requiring the corps reserve, originally designated for decisive commitment deep, be used to ensure success in the close or rear operations or retain the integrity of the defense.

WARFIGHTING FUNCTION CONSIDERATIONS DURING CURRENT OPERATIONS AND FUTURE OPERATIONS

4-88. At any given time, a corps may have one or more on-going operations and have other operations in various stages of planning. The corps must therefore ensure the success of the current operation while accounting for the requirements needed to set conditions for success during future operations. Future operations include those operations that are in various stages of planning within the corps, intended to be executed in the days or weeks ahead.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

4-89. An effectively organized C2 system allows the commander to command from any point on the battlefield and allows the staff to perform the operations process from the corps' dispersed command posts. This approach allows the commander to monitor the current operation while maintaining contact with the staff planning future operations. The commander designates the roles and responsibilities among the main command post, tactical command post, rear command post, and mobile command group. The commander balances the need to have redundancy within command posts against the need for dispersion and any unnecessary duplication of effort. (See Chapter 2 for more information on command posts in a corps).

4-90. Corps commanders position their command posts to facilitate their ability to command operations, integrate capabilities, and synchronize combat power. They must balance the placement of command posts with the risk of enemy interference or destruction of those command posts. Dispersion, emission control, force protection, and operations security are all critical considerations for determining where the corps establishes command posts and when to displace those command posts.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

4-91. Successful offensive and defensive operations depend on the corps' ability to move and maneuver multiple large, division-sized elements into close combat. The movement and maneuver of the corps and subordinate formations is continuous. The corps is constantly moving forces into and out of close combat to prevent their culmination and maintain tempo.

4-92. Corps maneuver requires sustained movement—often over extended distances—prior to the engagement of forces. Additionally, the quality of roads, terrain, and transportation infrastructure shape how quickly a corps can move formations forwards, rearwards, and laterally inside its AO. Detailed planning that accounts for route use, synchronization, maintenance, refueling, and staging points is critical. Corps engineer, military police, and sustainment forces are indispensable to operations. They enable the corps to clear, secure, and maintain routes, control the movement of subordinate units, and resupply and refuel units transiting an AO. (See Chapter 7 for more information on mobility).

4-93. The potential commitment of multiple corps and divisions with their supporting formations into AOs with limited road infrastructure makes successful integration of movement operations with maneuver an operational imperative. This places a premium on developing and maintaining LOCs and alternate movement routes, sustainment, and detailed planning to deconflict movements. Corps do not need to solve maneuver problems for their divisions; the corps ensures that divisions and BCTs are positioned to maneuver with the necessary support. Successful planning accounts for the movement of field artillery, air defense artillery, aviation support, engineers, intelligence, and sustainment elements to ensure uninterrupted support to the commander's scheme of maneuver. Limited and dispersed mobility corridors place a premium on a corps' abilities to control the movement and sustainment of large units.

4-94. Corps maneuver demands anticipation, careful planning, and the synchronization of sustainment. Corps sustainment depends on preparation well before movement and maneuver occurs.. A corps commander considers the operational reach of the corps in terms of logistics capacity, distribution, evacuation, treatment of casualties, and personnel services. A corps commander and staff continually—

- Assess the sustainment posture of their formation.
- Position and protect sustainment and medical units.
- Establish priorities of support.
- Secure and maintain lines of communications with Army and host-nation forces.
- Manage movement of subordinate forces and coordinate across the formation for movement of sustainment units

4-95. Table 4-1 on page 73 provides general planning horizons for integrating sustainment and maneuver at various echelons.

Table 4-1. Integrated Sustainment and Maneuver Planning for Large-Scale Combat Operations

Organization level	*Maneuver planning horizons*			*Sustainment on hand (including en-route)*	*Sustainment planned*
	Short-range (CUOPS)	Mid-range (FUOPS)	Long-range (Plans)		
BCT	0 to 12 hours	Not Resourced	24 to 48 hours	3 basic loads of all supplies	Continuous replenishment
DIV	0 to 24 hours	24 to 72 hours	72 to 96 hours	3 days	48 to 96 hours
Corps	0 to 48 hours	48 to 96 hours	96 hours to 7 days	5 days	72 hours to 6 days
Field army	0 to 3 days	3 to 7 days	7 to 10 days	7 days	96 hours to 9 days
Theater army				15 to 30 days	30 to 90 days

BCT brigade combat team DIV division
CUOPS current operations FUOPS future operations

Note. Planning horizons are event driven; therefore, the time horizons in table 4-1 are variable.

INTELLIGENCE

From adequate and timely military intelligence the commander is able to draw logical conclusions concerning enemy lines of action. Military intelligence is thus an essential factor in the estimate of the situation and in the conduct of subsequent operations.

FM 100-5, Operations (1941)

4-96. The commander and G-2 ensure the corps' CPs are manned with intelligence staff and each of those staffs have access to information they need. Intelligence staff must be integrated into the intelligence architecture to share information between CPs, as well as to higher and lower echelon command posts. The intelligence staff must support situational understanding for current operations, support targeting, and support planning for future operations.

4-97. In preparation for future operations, the corps G-2 determines the intelligence architecture; processing, exploitation, and dissemination activities; and information collection requirements associated with the transition. (See FM 2-0 for more information on intelligence support to deep, close, and rear operations.)

FIRES

4-98. The corps FSE and the target working group begin target development to support planning for the next operation as they support current operations. The development, nomination, and initial prioritization of targets for the next operation becomes increasingly time sensitive as the corps approaches its objectives in the current operation, since the transition may be rapid.

4-99. Fire support planners identify the sustainment and protection requirements to prepare fire support for the next operation. The planners begin to look at potential positions for artillery units and possible weapons locating radar coverage areas. This includes coordinating routes to move units to new locations that support future operations. It also requires the identification of locations to reposition CLV stocks.

4-100. Underpinning the fire support planners' efforts is the corps G-2 enemy assessment. The intelligence staff continues to develop an accurate picture of the enemy situation facing the corps. The intelligence staff identifies those long-range air defense and fires systems that remain operational and pose a threat to the next corps operation. The G-2, in conjunction with the corps AMD cell, also identify the enemy's high-altitude, long-loiter unmanned aircraft systems (known as UASs) and their supporting systems, to include launchers and ground control stations, that remain operational.

SUSTAINMENT

4-101. The CSC coordinates with the corps G-4 to provide input to necessary orders and assist in development of the sustainment support plan for future operations. The G-4 works closely with the chief of staff and G-3 to ensure shared understanding of priorities and all aspects of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of sustainment support for operations. A corps must have sufficient support to sustain current operations and all planned branches and sequels.

4-102. Sustainment planners at each echelon within the corps must collaborate with their supported headquarters during planning. The time and distances comprising the large and complex supply chains required to sustain large scale combat operations limit their responsiveness. As corps commanders determine future courses of action, sustainers maintain their running estimate, so the commander understands the potential for any critical sustainment capability shortfalls and the options available to mitigate them.

4-103. Movement control is critical and requires detailed planning to ensure success. The corps G-3 approves the selection of MSRs and ASRs to ensure maneuver and other operational issues are considered and coordinates with the G-4 and CSC on movement plan development. The corps G-4 and CSC facilitate the movement of divisions and separate brigades along the MSR and ASRs. The corps G-4 employ all available transportation capabilities to enable operational maneuver. The G-3 and G-4 identify critical points where restrictions could slow down or stop movement (including bridges, tunnels, checkpoints, border crossings, steep inclines and declines, and MSR and ASR geospatial capabilities) along with congested areas or choke points.

4-104. In the corps' rear area, the CSC or MEB commander regulates movement control on the corps' MSR, ASRs, and connecting networks. The corps G-3 (in conjunction with the G-2, corps engineer section, protection cell, and CTO) determines and publishes MSR and ASR status. Corps typically use the technique of designating MSRs and ASRs with a color-coded status of green, amber, red, or black. (See ATP 5-0.2-1 for more information on designating MSR and ASR status.) Commanders and corps staff sections consider the placement of ambulance control points, refuel and rearm locations, and combat and field trains in the context of synchronizing BCT and division sustainment in AOs and timing between operations. (See Chapter 3 for an expanded discussion of corps sustainment.)

Sustainment Synchronization

4-105. At the tactical-level, sustainment remains the key to freedom of action. Properly integrated, the support provided by sustainment units allows corps formations to maneuver, concentrate their capabilities, and quickly adjust their task organizations. If poorly coordinated, sustainment becomes an unintended contributor to culmination. Corps staff sections integrate their sustainment units' requirements into their concept of operations. This includes careful selection and security of support areas in their AOs and planning for their displacement based upon adjustments to the tactical AO, particularly during offensive operations. This displacement planning is based on movement, general engineering, security, and protection capabilities. The displacement of the support area normally entails more time and effort than shifting a subordinate formation. (See Chapter 3 for an expanded discussion of sustainment synchronization.)

Anticipating Future Requirements

4-106. Corps planning horizons require planners to anticipate future requirements, balancing current needs against future plans. An example of such a balance is a corps commander establishing a controlled supply rate (known as CSR) for specific munitions. The *controlled supply rate* is the rate of ammunition consumption that can be supported, considering availability, facilities, and transportation. It is expressed in rounds per unit, individual, or vehicle per day (ATP 3-09.23). The corps' controlled supply rate is influenced by its higher echelon headquarters' controlled supply rate, the required supply rate reports from its subordinates, and the type of operations planned. The *required supply rate* is the amount of ammunition expressed in terms of rounds per weapon per day for ammunition items fired by weapons, in terms of other units of measure per day for bulk allotment, and other items estimated to be required to sustain operations of any designated force without restriction for a specified period (ATP 3-09.23). Each echelon is designed to carry a certain number of days of supply for Classes I, III, and V.

4-107. Commanders typically designate priority for sustainment to units that they anticipate being the main effort. This helps maximize the combat power of a unit before it becomes the main effort. Planning for and anticipating which units are the main effort are essential to establishing required supply rates and controlled supply rates for corps operations. Shifting a priority of sustainment to a new main effort at the same time it is designated is generally too late because of the time it takes to adjust the volumes of supplies from one unit to another.

4-108. The corps retains control of certain sustainment operations based on their complexity and scope. Two major operations of this type are thorough decontamination and reconstitution of large units. These operations will likely require a shift in priorities or the commitment of theater-level assets.

Sustainment in a CBRN-Contaminated Environment

4-109. A CBRN-contaminated environment increases the sustainment burden. It requires resupply of filters, protective suits, and unique challenges for sustaining basic supplies like drinking water. Rapid assessment and decontamination are vital to regain the initiative and continue operations. Units are equipped and manned to conduct initial self-supported operational and thorough decontamination but may require support from a CBRN unit to sustain operations. When units transition out of CBRN environments, a thorough decontamination, including detailed troop and detailed equipment decontamination, is required. A thorough decontamination requires large volumes of water and supplies, including new CBRN protective clothing and equipment, replenished decontamination supplies, and basic tactic supplies to replace items that could not be decontaminated. (See ATP 3-11.32 for more information on CBRN protection and ATP 3-11.33 for information on CBRN contamination mitigation.)

Reconstitution and Regeneration

4-110. Some percentage of corps units will be rendered combat ineffective during large-scale combat operations due to personnel and equipment losses. They require reconstitution when resources allow, and the corps is the lowest echelon capable of conducting reconstitution in most large-scale combat contexts. *Reconstitution* is an operation that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources (ATP 3-94.4). Reconstitution transcends normal day-to-day force sustainment actions. Reconstitution is based on a command decision, typically made two echelons above the unit being reconstituted, and it is conducted across all warfighting functions, using existing systems and units to do so. Thus, a corps can be expected to make reconstitution decisions for the BCTs in its divisions. No resources exist solely to perform reconstitution. Reconstitution requires the full support of the commander and staff sections to achieve the necessary results commensurate with future mission success. (See Chapter 7 for an expanded discussion of corps reconstitution operations.)

PROTECTION

4-111. The corps' execution of deep, close, and rear operations during current operations and posturing forces to support future operations creates potential gaps in protection. These gaps include, but are not limited to, AMD, area security, electromagnetic protection, and populace control. Possible causes for these gaps include low-density capabilities supporting multiple operations, changes in main effort and supporting efforts, or changes in the commander's protection priorities. As an operation progresses or is planned, the protection cell and protection working group remains proactive in identifying potential gaps and the threats or hazards that may exploit those gaps. (See ADP 3-37 for more information on protection.)

SECTION III — SYNCHRONIZING DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR OPERATIONS DURING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

4-112. The application of the deep, close, and rear operations model during offensive operations enables the corps to maintain the desired tempo. The commander visualizes the conditions necessary for the corps and subordinate divisions to sustain momentum, retain the initiative, and exploit success. To accomplish these conditions generally requires the corps to attack or influence enemy forces and capabilities located out of contact with the divisions.

DEEP OPERATIONS

4-113. Corps deep operations ensure subordinate success during close operations. Corps deep operations destroy or degrade enemy combat power, C2 capabilities, and morale while changing the tempo of enemy operations so that it favors friendly forces. Deep operations shift during offense, particularly as the corps advances. Initially the focus is on setting conditions for the first objectives it assigns for its divisions.

4-114. Upon the commander’s decision, the corps shifts the focus of its deep operations to the next set of corps objectives. The shift in focus allows the corps to attrit the enemy second echelon’s line of defense and mobile reserves. The corps prevents, delays, or disrupts the ability of the second echelon to move and maneuver to reinforce the enemy's first operational echelon.

4-115. Detailed planning, coordination, and synchronization across all warfighting functions by all forces involved (including joint and multinational) is required for the successful execution of deep attacks against the enemy’s second echelon forces. (See ATP 3-94.2 for more information on deep operations.)

CLOSE OPERATIONS

4-116. The corps' close operations are primarily maneuvering its divisions while setting the conditions necessary for their employment. The divisions maneuver their BCTs while physically in contact with the enemy forces they intend to defeat and destroy. The corps weights its divisions in terms of support and priorities based upon whether they are main or supporting efforts. The corps form of maneuver affects how the divisions operate. (See Chapter 5 for additional information about corps forms of maneuver.)

4-117. The corps may position other forces it controls within the division AOs, but that does not mean they are part of close operations. When elements of the corps' functional or multifunctional brigades are involved in close operations, they are usually temporarily task-organized to a division or have a supporting relationship. Normally, corps forces not involved in close operations are positioned forward to support the corps' deep operations more effectively. (See FM 3-0 for more information on close operations.)

REAR OPERATIONS

4-118. The fluidity and quick tempo of corps offensive operations strongly influence corps rear operations. The forward movement of units and sustainment, both being essential parts of rear operations, are critical if the corps is to maintain the initiative. Enemy forces look for opportunities to counter the corps' attack and will target anything that could disrupt friendly forces in the corps’ rear area. If its offense is to be successful, the corps must keep supply routes open to ensure the sustainment of its attacking maneuver units, and it must detect and defeat enemy forces that intend to interrupt the corps' rear operations effort.

4-119. Likely threats to the rear area during offensive operations include long-range rocket and artillery fires (including chemical munitions), manned and unmanned aircraft, short-range ballistic missiles, special operations forces, long-range reconnaissance units, and bypassed enemy elements. Their primary objectives will be C2, logistics facilities, and disruption or interdiction of LOCs. Additionally, the corps should anticipate a counterattack into its rear by a ground maneuver force from an adjacent enemy unit not within the corps' AO. This is likely if the corps' AO overlaps the lateral boundaries of different enemy units. Given this situation, the forces allocated to defend the rear area may only be able to contain or block such a force's attack. It may then be necessary to defeat or destroy the force by diverting some of the corps’ combat power or obtaining JFLCC support. The key consideration before diverting any combat power from the main effort is whether the corps can still accomplish its mission given the threat to its rear or not.

SECTION IV — SYNCHRONIZING DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR OPERATIONS DURING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

4-120. During defensive operations, the commander visualizes the conditions necessary to impact the tempo of the enemy forces’ attack and create advantages that subordination formations can exploit during close combat. As in offensive operations, the corps shapes enemy forces out of contact with friendly forces. By degrading, disrupting, or destroying parts of these enemy forces, the corps provides division commanders time and more favorable force ratios. Corps operations in depth also facilitate corps operations creating

advantages for a corps counterattack. The corps organizes its defensive operations in terms of time, space, and purpose by synchronizing deep, close, and rear operations with those of the divisions. It assigns subordinate formations areas to defend and task organizes them in accordance with their missions.

DEEP OPERATIONS

4-121. A corps' defensive scheme in its deep area generally aims to isolate or delay part of the attacking force so that the defensive main effort can succeed. Corps coordinate and employ collection assets from organic, attached, and direct support units; SOF; and joint and multinational assets to gain contact with enemy forces. Deep operations begin before enemy forces close with a corps and continue throughout the battle. A corps uses organic and supporting surveillance assets to locate and track the first and second echelon divisions of an attacking enemy force within the corps' area of interest. As enemy formations approach a corps' AO, the corps identifies and strikes high-payoff targets, disrupts or degrades follow-on forces, and disrupts or destroys support systems. The corps directs its information collection effort at identifying the locations, dispositions, movements, and intentions of specific units and activities that are essential to sustaining enemy momentum and providing support for enemy operations. The timing of these operations is important. For example, a deep operation that prevents enemy forces from being able to employ their reserve is best conducted before the reserve is deployed.

4-122. As attacking follow-on echelon forces move toward the forward line of own troops (FLOT), the corps engages enemy forces with Army and joint fires, in accordance with the commander's intent. In some circumstances, commanders choose not to engage an acquired enemy immediately. The attack decision will depend on its payoff priority and desired result. A corps may also elect to disrupt or influence the target's movement as opposed to its destruction. The use of area denial munitions or terrain shaping can canalize or impede an enemy force's movement. A corps may restrict the engagement of some forces or physical targets within its AO if the corps' plan of defense calls for unimpeded advance of enemy forces on certain approaches or if it is in the interest of the corps to defer destruction of an enemy force as part of a deception effort.

4-123. A corps will generally coordinate initial attacks by joint assets as part of deep operations. These missions will be preplanned, coordinated attacks, which often require the corps to provide suppression of enemy air defenses. A corps conducts battle damage assessment to determine the effectiveness of attacks and inform the decision to re-attack, continue to track, or seek other targets.

4-124. Sustainment of deep operations requires placement of support units in proximity to the forces conducting them, which entails risk. Planners consider the recovery or destruction of damaged combat systems, pre-positioning of ammunition, and changes to the controlled supply rate due to fire support requirements. The duration of the operation, follow-on missions, and possible linkup all affect sustainment organization and execution.

CLOSE OPERATIONS

4-125. Corps close operations mainly include the deep, close, and rear operations of their divisions and can include corps separate aviation, artillery, and engineer brigades. Corps commanders prescribe the tactics that the corps will use, assigning missions to the divisions and brigades with their concept. In all cases, they give their division commanders the greatest possible freedom of action. When visualizing the defense and developing the concept of operations, corps commanders may choose to further delineate defensive operations in their close area into a security area and a MBA.

SECURITY AREA

4-126. A *security area* is that area occupied by a unit's security elements and includes the areas of influence of those security elements (ADP 3-90). It may be located as necessary to the front, flanks, or rear of a protected unit, facility, or location. Forces in a security area furnish information on an enemy force; delay, deceive, and disrupt that enemy force; and conduct counter-reconnaissance. Security areas should be deep enough to make enemy forces displace as much of their supporting forces as possible, such as cannon artillery, sensors, and air defense artillery gun systems, before attacking. All units perform security operations within their AOs, including the support area, to deny enemy reconnaissance and otherwise protect the force.

4-127. A corps defense requires security operations to protect the force, deny enemy intelligence gathering, and support deception operations. This may be done primarily on the ground by the divisions with corps

support. However, the situation may require corps to task-organize security forces and employ them in their security area if the corps commander decides that the combination of division security areas does not provide sufficient depth. Since there are no organizations specifically designed for corps security area missions, commanders base the composition and capabilities of their security forces on mission variables. A corps can access multiple joint capabilities in addition to organic assets to support its security area operations.

4-128. Units conduct security operations to provide their forces time and space to react to the approach of enemy forces by causing enemy forces to deploy prematurely. An enemy force's deployment reveals its main effort and choices of available avenues of approach. Friendly units also conduct security operations to conceal the location of main battle positions and reserves, prevent enemy observation of friendly preparations and positions, and prevent enemy forces from delivering observed fire on these positions. Planners can offset an attacker's inherent advantage of initiative regarding the time, place, plan, direction, strength, and composition of the attack by forcing enemy forces to attack into unexpected, prepared defenses. Friendly forces counter enemy space, ground, and air reconnaissance activities through both active and passive measures. (See Chapter 7 for more information on security operations.)

4-129. Upon an enemy force's commitment of its main effort, and to preserve the security force for subsequent operations, a corps commander may designate a disengagement line or disengagement criteria for it to withdraw or reposition. *Disengagement criteria* are protocols that specify those circumstances where a friendly force must break contact with direct fire and observed indirect fire to prevent becoming decisively engaged or to preserve friendly combat power (FM 3-90). The commander's level of acceptable risk to security forces affects the disengagement criteria. The commander describes the criteria in quantifiable terms or measures that specify friendly conditions for initiating disengagement from an enemy force, such as friendly strength levels or a specific time or event.

Main Battle Area

4-130. The MBA is where the commander intends to deploy the bulk of the corps' combat power and defeat an attacking enemy force. A defending commander's major advantage is the ability to select the ground on which the battle takes place. The natural defensive strength of a position determines the distribution of forces in relation to both frontage and depth. The major disadvantage is that holding ground simplifies enemy targeting and requires measures to protect the defending force from massed fires. Defending units typically employ field fortifications and obstacles to reinforce the terrain's natural defensive aspects; however, the resources for creating fortifications and obstacles are scarce. The corps therefore prioritizes the allocation of engineer assets and CL IV materiel to its divisions based upon which are main and supporting efforts.

4-131. The corps' MBA extends from the forward edge of the battle area (known as FEBA) to the rear boundary of the divisions. Planners place subordinate unit boundaries along identifiable terrain features and extend them beyond the FLOT by establishing forward boundaries. Division boundaries should not split avenues of approach or key terrain. The corps staff recommends the MBA based on the products of the IPOE process and their analysis using the mission variables. The IPOE process anticipates how an enemy force will use the available avenues of approach. (See ATP 2-01.3 for more information on the intelligence preparation of the operational environment process.)

4-132. A corps must take measures to deceive enemy forces as to the location and organization of the MBA. Enemy forces employ sensors allowing them to observe friendly preparation of the defense in detail. A corps must remain as ambiguous as possible when positioning units, and it must build deception positions and obstacles to obscure the design of the MBA defense. (See Chapter 5 for an expanded discussion of corps defensive operations.)

REAR OPERATIONS

4-133. Rear operations maintain freedom of action in the security and MBAs and prevent culmination. The corps' rear CP enables this freedom of action by planning and directing sustainment, conducting terrain management, providing movement control, and ensuring area security of the rear area. The corps reserve is normally positioned in the rear area for maximum flexibility but must be dispersed enough to avoid presenting a lucrative target. This requires detailed planning to ensure cleared routes that allow for rapid movement of the reserve when committed.

4-134. During defensive operations, the CPs in the corps' rear area may be relatively static for extended periods of time. So, leaders must do everything possible to limit enemy detection, increase the survivability of critical nodes, and counter enemy attacks before they can inflict significant losses. Included within the corps' protection measures is the need to conduct effective counter-unmanned aircraft system operations to prevent enemy forces from identifying high-payoff friendly targets.

Chapter 5

Corps Offensive and Defensive Operations

This chapter addresses considerations for a corps when conducting offensive and defensive operations. As the senior tactical headquarters, corps are responsible for sequencing battles and engagements in support of a larger campaign. The information in this chapter pertaining to corps operations is meant to augment FM 3-90, not summarize it. The chapter begins with an overview of the offense and vignette, followed by a discussion of the operational framework in the offense. Finally, it discusses the defense.

SECTION I – CORPS OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

5-1. Corps commanders must be prepared to conduct offensive and defensive operations and ensure that the selected tactics for a specific operation are appropriate to the situation and objectives. *Tactics* are the employment, ordered arrangement and directed actions of forces in relation to each other (ADP 3-90). Corps use tactics to maneuver and position subordinate formations to gain positions of advantage relative to their enemy, reach or accomplish assigned objectives, and defeat the enemy.

5-2. The offense is the decisive form of war. The offense is the ultimate means commanders have of imposing their will on enemy forces. Offensive operations provide opportunities for a corps to exploit the initiative to achieve a variety of enemy- or terrain-oriented objectives. Corps offensive operations, either on their own or as part of a larger campaign, should seek to retain the initiative, to attack the enemy in depth, to strike enemy weaknesses, and create conditions preventing the enemy from organizing a coherent defense.

OVERVIEW OF CORPS OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

5-3. Corps conduct the offense to—

- Defeat or destroy enemy forces.
- Secure decisive terrain, population centers, and resources.
- Fix an enemy force in position.
- Disrupt an enemy force's attack.
- Set the conditions for other future operations.

5-4. Tactically, the corps conducts offensive operations to achieve operational objectives for the land component commander. Offensive operations allow the corps to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive operations require a corps to set conditions for the success of its subordinate divisions. Corps synchronize the employment of joint capabilities to support offensive action by divisions and other lower echelons. The corps employs combinations of joint and Army capabilities to achieve convergence, which provides windows of opportunity for a division or more to exploit. (See Appendix D – XIV Corps and the Battle for Manila for an example of the C2, logistic, and terrain challenges for a corps operating as a tactical formation and as a tactical headquarters.)

5-5. The characteristics of the offense have some unique aspects at the corps level. Audacious attacks require corps commanders to accept substantial risk. Since a JFC assigns corps objectives essential to the success of a campaign, the commander's risk-taking should be commensurate with the stakes involved. Concentrating the effects of combat power without providing the enemy lucrative targets or acting predictably requires significant agility inside and among the corps' formations. The corps is likewise the best positioned and resourced echelon to achieve convergence, which requires thoughtful integration of joint and Army capabilities at echelon, as well as their synchronized concentration in the right times and places. Achieving corps-level surprise is difficult on an increasingly transparent battlefield. Employing deception, like feints or demonstrations, can help divisions

Characteristics of the Offense

- Audacity.
- Concentration.
- Surprise.
- Tempo.

(See ADP 3-90 for an expanded discussion of the offense.)

achieve surprise. Devising courses of action that conceal the actual main effort from the enemy for as long as possible can also create surprise. Corps commanders adjust tempo based on the situation. By deliberately controlling tempo, commanders maintain momentum and retain the initiative while avoiding culmination. Ultimately, it is the ability to sustain an advantageous tempo relative to the enemy that ensures offensive success.

5-6. Ultimately, offensive operations end in a transition, either to different types of operations or a conclusion of conflict. Corps-level transitions between operations are extensive and can take hours to days to occur since they involve multiple divisions and separate brigades moving from one focus to another as part of a larger effort. Even as it manages current operations by its divisions, the corps plans and sets conditions for future operations.

FORMS OF MANEUVER

5-7. The forms describe the arrangement of friendly forces in relationship to enemy forces. The Army has five forms of maneuver—envelopment, frontal attack, infiltration, penetration, and turning movement. Corps synchronize warfighting functions to execute these forms of maneuver. (See ADP 3-90 for more information on the five forms of maneuver.)

5-8. *Forms of maneuver* are distinct tactical combinations of fire and movement with a unique set of doctrinal characteristics that differ primarily in the relationship between the maneuvering force and the enemy (ADP 3-90). Corps commanders use the forms of maneuver as the basis for courses of action to create positions of advantage. A commander directs operations using the forms of maneuver and offensive operations. Employed sequentially and in combination, they effectively apply combat power in ways that create enemy dilemmas. A corps can task organize subordinate organizations for certain purposes, such as a penetration division and an exploitation division.

> ***Note.*** A corps would not conduct an infiltration, but it could task a subordinate division to conduct one with its forces. The corps would then support the infiltration with a supporting deception operation and electromagnetic attack to neutralize enemy sensors.

5-9. Turning movements and envelopments tend to be the preferred forms of maneuver because historically they achieve decisive results at lower cost than penetrations and frontal attacks. Commanders may need to perform frontal attacks and penetrations, especially if the terrain provides few other options or they have an overall superiority of forces across the front. Corps main and supporting effort divisions may execute different forms of maneuver simultaneously.

ENVELOPMENT

5-10. In an envelopment, a corps uses a division or brigade as a supporting effort to fix or deceive enemy forces to keep them from massing against the main effort seeking to attack an enemy flank. A corps can also use a supporting effort to make enemy forces reveal the location of high-value or high-payoff targets, allowing the corps to target them with fires. Depending on the size of the enemy force and its mobility, the corps may keep a brigade or a division as a reserve to maximize the corps' ability to destroy the enemy or exploit other opportunities. Typical risks of this operation are culmination and a too shallow envelopment, which could create a friendly assailable flank. Double envelopments risk fratricide by converging forces and require significant control measures. A corps may mitigate the effects of potential risks with emphasis on sustainment during planning, detailed rehearsals in preparation, and assessment of key indicators during execution. (See figure 5-1 for a depiction of a single envelopment and figure 5-2 for a depiction of a double envelopment.)




Figure 5-1. Single envelopment




Figure 5-2. Double Envelopment

FRONTAL ATTACK

5-11. A corps may attempt to destroy a division or smaller element with a frontal attack, but an envelopment or turning movement are preferred when possible. A frontal attack is used when time and urgency are among the most important factors. It is the easiest form of maneuver to organize and support, but it is the costliest form of maneuver since it is the one the enemy can most easily prepare to defend against. (See figure 5-3 for a graphic depiction of a frontal attack. See FM 3-90 for more information on frontal attacks.)




Figure 5-3. Frontal Attack

PENETRATION

5-12. A penetration is necessary when there is no assailable enemy flank, and the corps commander must create one by creating a gap in one part of the enemy defense that elements of the corps can exploit to envelop or turn the other parts of the enemy defense. Creating a penetration requires the corps to mass overwhelming combat power against a single axis of advance while preventing the enemy from doing the same in response. Massing the combat power of a division through the depth of enemy battalion sized portion of the main defensive zone, while preventing the rest of the enemy division from effectively supporting enemy units in that area, would be an example. Corps normally employ supporting attacks and deep operations to fix or draw off enemy reserves. This includes enemy counterattack forces of regimental size or larger which are either adjacent to or in subsequent echelons outside of the assigned AO of the division conducting the penetration. After the main defensive zone is penetrated, the corps then commits trailing divisions to either further penetrate or envelop subsequent defensive zones of the defending enemy army. (See figure 5-4 for a graphic depiction of a penetration.)




Figure 5-4. Penetration

TURNING MOVEMENT

5-13. Like an envelopment, a corps will generally use a division or brigade in a supporting effort to fix or deceive the enemy main defense. Unlike an envelopment, a turning movement seeks to avoid the enemy's prepared defenses, placing friendly force in positions that directly threaten the enemy's line of communications and compelling the enemy to reposition or retreat to avoid encirclement. This can entail risk, as some corps subordinate units may not be mutually supportive during phases of the operation. If the corps employs a fixing attack as a supporting effort, the main and supporting effort divisions must be sufficiently strong and mobile to operate independently due to the distances separating them. (See figure 5-5 on page 88 for a depiction of a turning movement.)




Figure 5-5. Turning Movement

PRIMARY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

5-14. Corps conduct the four primary offensive operations: movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. An offensive operation can progressively transition from one type to another; for example a movement to contact to an attack, then to an exploitation, and finally to a pursuit. However, not all offensive operations will necessarily include each type. Enabling operations are a critical component of offensive operations that corps commanders must also account for during planning offensive operations. (See Chapter 6 for more information on enabling operations.)

5-15. Corps offensive operations consume large amounts of supplies over ever-lengthening lines of communication that must be secured. Effective support requires forward-positioned sustainment units as mobile as the maneuver units they support, able to provide the volume of support necessary to support the desired tempo of operations. Commanders must synchronize the back-and-forth movement of sustainment units along their MSR and ASR to ensure effective support while accounting for all the other traffic that continuously moves along the routes. (See FM 4-0 and ATP 4-92 for more information on optimizing sustainment operations.)

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

5-16. A *movement to contact* is a type of offensive operation designed to establish or regain contact to develop the situation (FM 3-90). Properly executed, a movement to contact develops the situation while maintaining the corps' freedom of action for subsequent operations. The corps commander is typically less focused on the individual movement and maneuver of subordinates, deferring their C2 to the division commanders. The corps allows the divisions to develop the situation within the commander's intent, which should include guidance about risk and how the divisions should exploit opportunities. The corps focuses on reducing risks to the operation, generally related to intelligence, protection, sustainment, and fire support. To prevent culmination, the corps staff ensures the concept of sustainment provides the logistics necessary for

prolonged movement and the expected results of the movement of contact. The corps likewise assigns responsibility for securing its LOCs. Corps FSEs plan and execute targets that support the divisions and should be prepared to focus on counterfires as enemy long-range artillery units reveal themselves.

5-17. The corps may execute a movement to contact to develop the situation and create favorable conditions for subsequent tactical actions. This generally occurs because an enemy has successfully broken contact or has been able to prevent sufficient friendly information collection. During a movement to contact, the corps focuses on reducing risks to divisions by focusing on intelligence synchronization, protection, fire support, and sustainment. (See figure 5-6 on page 90 for a depiction of a corps movement to contact organization.)

Corps Considerations

5-18. **Command and control:** The corps must strike acceptable balance between decentralized execution through mission command orders with the need to maintain situational awareness with its divisions. This requires in-depth communications planning that includes extending the tactical network as far forward as necessary to maintain contact with the divisions and support their networks if necessary. This helps with the task of maintaining an accurate corps-wide common operational picture. The corps commander must carefully consider the location and movement of corps command posts to best maintain control over the operation. As the divisions advance, their rear areas may expand beyond their ability to control. This requires the corps to plan for shifting division rear boundaries forward as the divisions move.

5-19. **Movement and maneuver:** The biggest challenge for the corps with movement and maneuver will be ensuring that divisions maintain mutual support with each other and mitigating the risk when doing so is not possible. These plans must be flexible enough to account for the initiative that the corps commander expects division commanders to exercise.

5-20. **Fires:** The corps creates a fire support plan that achieves effective balance between deliberate and dynamic targeting in the corps close and deep areas. Since a movement to contact means that the corps does not have extensive intelligence on enemy dispositions, the corps should anticipate weighting its focus dynamic targeting missions, particularly counterfires. The plan must also account for displacing artillery units and their logistics elements to maintain acceptable supporting ranges for both the advancing divisions and division deep operations.

5-21. **Sustainment:** The sustainment concept of support must account for expanding lines of communication that increase security requirements and decrease throughput. It may also require the corps to establish new support areas to support anticipated branches and sequels that support different degrees of division success. Casualty evacuation, fuel, ammunition, and repair parts may require specific emphasis.

5-22. **Protection:** The corps requires a plan to deal with bypassed enemy units and detainees. The movement to contact may deliberately bypass enemy units to maintain tempo and gain contact with the enemy main body. The corps should allocate sufficient combat power to deal with bypassed forces without employing its reserve. The corps submits updates to the JFC's critical asset list if it repositions its support areas and command posts, since the JFACC may need to adjust the air defense coverage scheme to protect them. Depending on the enemy situation, it may be necessary to keep CBRN decontamination assets forward in the corps close area to support the divisions after they make contact.

Organizing the Corps for Movement to Contact

5-23. A corps generally organizes for a movement to contact with forward and flank security forces, a main body, and a rear guard. The reserve, fires, engineers, and sustainment assets are included in the main body. Depending upon the situation, these assets may be placed under the tactical control of subordinate divisions for their movement and protection while the corps commander retains the authority for their employment.




Figure 5-6. Corps Movement to Contact Organization

Security Operations

5-24. Corps security operations refine the intelligence picture and identify exploitable opportunities. A corps has the combat power to create a covering force due to accessibility to joint capabilities and other resources in addition to the divisions, such as its functional and multifunctional brigades. Depending on the mission variables of METT-TC (I), the corps employs a covering force and guard force. A corps may employ a screen to the flank to protect the main body. (See Chapter 6 for additional information on security operations.)

Main Body

5-25. The main body contains the bulk of the corps combat power. The corps staff organizes the units and march columns to facilitate an immediate attack or possibly hasty defense from the march. Elements of the main body may also be committed to reduce pockets of resistance fixed or bypassed by the advance guard.

Reserve

5-26. The commander organizes the reserve to exploit success or prevent enemy forces from destroying a portion of the force. During a movement to contact, the corps reserve is generally a brigade-sized element. Positioning of the reserve is critical, since it may need to move rapidly in any one of multiple directions. Upon commitment of the reserve, the corps commander may give it priority of fires.

ATTACK

5-27. A corps conducts the attack until it creates conditions for exploitation or pursuit. The corps staff may describe an attack as hasty or deliberate, depending on the time available for assessing the situation, planning, and preparing. An enemy defense will likely have several echelons of defending forces arrayed in depth

through which an attacking force must fight. (See TC 7-100.2 for more information on opposing force tactics. See figure 5-7 on page 92 for a depiction of a corps attack.)

Corps Considerations

5-28. **Command and control:** Effective corps control measures synchronize operations while enabling maximum subordinate freedom of action. Detailed, in-depth planning of control measures maximizes flexibility during execution, allowing subordinate divisions to shift from known points to execute branches and sequels. Since the purpose of the attack is to create conditions for exploitation or pursuit, the corps must identify when and where that would occur and then plan for executing them. Corps plan how and when to shift the unit boundaries to accommodate shifts in main and supporting efforts or a transition to exploitation and pursuit. The corps locates its command posts where they will be most effective and displaces one or more of them forward as necessary to maintain C2 of the divisions as they advance.

5-29. **Movement and maneuver:** The corps apportions additional aviation and engineer assets to divisions as required. Aviation may provide mobility to attacking units, thereby increasing the range of options available to the corps or division commanders. Attack aviation can support maneuver and provides the capability to attack additional decisive points to complement ground forces. Engineers provide mobility and gap crossing capabilities to the divisions. The location of the corps reserve is important. The corps commander can reduce risk to the attack by properly positioning the corps reserve where it can quickly support the main effort.

5-30. **Fires:** The corps balances its fires capabilities between the corps' deep and close areas. In particular, the corps will manage the counter-fires fight during the attack and must retain capabilities for that purpose. It also attacks the enemy's air defenses with fires, in support of Army aviation and USAF strikes. While fires are not the sole means of achieving convergence, they provide a significant proportion of the lethal and non-lethal effects the corps can use to set conditions for the divisions to exploit.

5-31. **Sustainment:** Medical evacuation and casualty evacuation will be a major consideration for the corps. For logistics, sustainment planners must carefully consider the Class III petroleum, oil, and lubricant requirements and the Class V ammunition requirements. The maintenance plan for battle damage will be critical to maintaining tempo. Depending on the scope of the attack, a robust Class VII major items resupply plan may be necessary to offset battle loss or battle damages requiring lengthy repairs. Additionally, water resupply will be critical to maintaining the effectiveness of the individual Soldier in combat operations. Finally, the corps must plan for the limited reorganization of subordinate units during the operation followed by larger reconstitution operations prior to the next one.

5-32. **Protection:** The corps protection cell supports the commander by recommending shifts in protection priorities to support the tempo of operations and attacking force momentum. The corps protection cell anticipates changes and reassesses protection priorities throughout operations. In accordance with the corps commander's priorities, the corps staff ensures that all operations are covered to some extent by lethal and non-lethal protection. The corps develops a detainee operations plan (see FM 3-63 for more information on detainee operations), which will require a corps-run detainee holding area. The plan should address how to transport detainees to the theater detention facility. The corps maintains AMD coverage of critical capabilities as they reposition in support of the divisions. During the transition to defense, the divisions will be vulnerable to counterattack and engineer support will be vital to establishing battle and other survivability positions.

5-33. **Intelligence:** The corps G2 confirms the enemy course of action and coordinates to collect against the commander's critical information requirements. Intelligence confirms the enemy disposition, composition, and strength for the corps' attacking divisions. Additionally, the corps information collection plan should prioritize capabilities based upon the commander's intent across the deep, close, and rear framework.

5-34. **Deception:** Deceiving enemy forces is critical to preserving combat power and creating favorable force ratios. Attacking a comparable-sized or larger force requires the corps to accept risks in a part or parts of its AO to achieve concentration at decisive points. TAC-D plans are necessary to ensure that the corps can create ambiguity for enemy commanders seeking to determine the friendly course of action. (See Chapter 6 for more information on TAC-D.)




Figure 5-7. Corps Attack

Variations of Attack

5-35. Variations of the attack for a corps are counterattack, raid, and spoiling attack. The commander's intent and the mission variables guide which of these variations of attack to employ. Corps can conduct the other variations, except for a raid, as either a hasty or a deliberate operation. Because of their complicated nature and necessary synchronization, forces always conduct raids as deliberate operations.

Counterattack

5-36. *Counterattack* is a variation of attack by a defending force against an attacking enemy force (FM 3-90). Units plan and conduct counterattacks to attack enemy forces when and where enemy forces are most vulnerable. The two methods of counterattacks are major and local.

5-37. A major counterattack seizes the initiative from an enemy force through offensive action after an enemy force launches an attack. Local counterattacks are attacks to retake positions lost to enemy action or to exploit targets of opportunity. These attacks may be executed by an entire corps as part of a JFLCC plan or by a subordinate unit of the corps. They may include both air and ground maneuver units.

Raid

5-38. A *raid* is a variation of attack to temporarily seize an objective with a planned withdrawal (FM 3-90). In a corps assigned area, brigade combat teams and smaller-sized units normally conduct raids. Certain SOF

units (including ranger units), attack helicopter units, and air assault units are ideal for conducting raids. (See the vignette Task Force Normandy for an attack helicopter raid example.) Raids within a corps AO may be planned as a phase of an operation or as branches or sequels to an operation. If a raid is preplanned, the raiding force should be an element of the corps reserve.

Note. When raids are conducted using air assault or attack helicopter units, those operations must be coordinated with the JFACC and conducted under conditions of air parity, otherwise they should be planned as deliberate attacks.

Task Force Normandy

OPERATION DESERT STORM was the offensive mission designed to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The offensive began with a massive allied air attack to destroy the Iraqis' air defenses and communications, destroy 50 percent of the occupying Iraqi army, and complete the victory with a ground attack to push the surviving Iraqis out of Kuwait.

The air campaign needed an element of surprise to ensure the first wave of bombers could penetrate Iraqi early warning radar sites undetected. The plan required the destruction of the enemy's outer perimeter of radar sites and the anti-aircraft guns protecting them.

The U.S. Central Command planners proposed a raid to precede the bombers and eliminate the two most critical sites. The task went to 1-101st Aviation Battalion of the 101st Airborne Division, and the name of the force that executed the operation was Task Force Normandy. The task force consisted of eight AH-64 Apache helicopters from the division and four MH-53J Pave Low helicopters from the Air Force 20th Special Operations Squadron. The task force commander split the force into two groups, one group for each radar site. The plan called for the Air Force Pave Lows, with their precise navigation capability, to escort the Apaches. Then, at a precisely coordinated time, the Apaches, each armed with 8 Hellfire missiles, 19 Hydra 2.75-inch flechette rockets, and 800 to 1,000 rounds of 30-millimeter ammunition, would destroy the targets.

The two groups flew nearly parallel routes at an altitude of 50 feet (15 meters) at a 120-knot airspeed and arrived at their firing positions. Just before 0238 hours on 17 January 1991, Task Force Normandy launched its first missiles. The raid was successful. The task force's assault crippled enemy early-warning communications and prevented loss of coalition aircraft at the start of the air campaign.

Spoiling Attack

5-39. A *spoiling attack* is a variation of an attack employed against an enemy preparing for an attack (FM 3-90). The objective of a spoiling attack is to disrupt the enemy force's offensive capabilities and timelines while destroying targeted enemy personnel and equipment. A spoiling attack is not to seize terrain or other physical objectives.

5-40. The extensive number of units operating in a typical corps AO and the density of vehicular traffic sharing available routes can hinder the movement of an attacking ground maneuver unit. Consequently, the corps staff addresses movement during the planning stages, especially if using ground maneuver units in a counterattack or spoiling attack. The corps plan includes positioning of the attacking unit, routes, passage of lines, size of the attacking unit, and C2. (See FM 3-90 for more information on counterattacks and spoiling attacks.)

EXPLOITATION

5-41. A corps exploits the disruptive effects of a successful attack. An *exploitation* is a type of offensive operation following a successful attack to disorganize the enemy in depth (FM 3-90). Exploitations seek to disintegrate enemy forces to the point where they have no alternative but to surrender, retreat, or face complete destruction.

5-42. Exploitations take advantage of tactical opportunities. Planning for exploitations will usually be provisional, normally as branches or sequels. It is difficult to foresee which forces are in position to lead an exploitation until the situation develops. When it does, the choice will be between exploiting with committed forces (which is faster) or using an uncommitted unit. Exploitation is the chief means of translating tactical success into operational advantage.

5-43. When conducting an exploitation, the corps attacks the enemy's cohesiveness as a system. The corps attacks by—

- Securing objectives deep in the enemy rear.
- Forcing critical enemy capabilities to reposition.
- Cutting major LOCs.
- Containing major enemy forces.
- Disrupting, destroying, or dispersing major enemy reserves.
- Destroying critical enemy logistic resources—especially fuel and ammunition.
- Positioning itself to support the land component-level campaign plan against follow-on forces or subsequent objectives.

Corps Considerations

5-44. A corps requires sufficient combat power to destroy organized enemy resistance bypassed by exploiting forces. In addition to the follow and support force, a corps retains under corps control only those follow and support forces necessary to ensure flexibility of operations, continued momentum of the advance, and minimum essential security. An exploitation force and a follow-and-support force must maintain direct communications. The corps staff ensures sustainment elements move and communicate to support the overall corps operation. (See figure 5-8 on page 96 for a depiction of a corps attacks followed by an exploitation.)

5-45. **Command and control:** As during a movement to contact, the corps must control subordinates enough to prevent fratricide and premature culmination without inhibiting subordinate initiative. Proper graphical control and fire support coordination measures are vital to success. The conditions for conducting an exploitation may present themselves quickly, so the initial guidance to a division may be commander to commander, supplemented with fragmentary orders as the situation develops. The corps commander will use these fragmentary orders to establish the corps limit of advance, provide a framework for the scheme of maneuver (such as zones, routes, and objectives), adjust the operational framework boundaries, and communicate the conditions for transition to subsequent operations. One other critical consideration is the management of command posts and the overall corps C2 system. The corps must plan for the extension of tactical networks to support advancing corps units, as well as the movement of subsequent tactical command post locations.

5-46. **Movement and maneuver:** Maximizing the effect of an exploitation requires accepting some risks for a significant reward. The corps may need to shift which division is the main effort and will likely need to reposition forces to reinforce success on a particular movement corridor. This may require one or more hasty passages of lines and rapid changes to task organization based upon the situation on the ground. Subordinate formations may find themselves outrunning their fire support and sustainment if the corps is not quickly anticipating requirements and shifting priorities to seize opportunities as the situation develops. Speed of movement can reduce risk during a successful exploitation, but commanders must account for the risk of units moving so far from their sources of support that they become vulnerable to counterattacks when they halt.

5-47. **Fires:** The corps adjusts its employment of deep fires with its support to the divisions as the situation develops. Corps deep fires should focus on solving enemy problems that threaten exploitation objectives and reducing risk in places where the divisions are most exposed, which may be on the flanks of the penetration.

Corps close fires in support of the divisions should focus on counter-fires and providing reinforcing mass. Due to the fluidity of the situation, the corps should plan for more dynamic targeting during an exploitation. The advance of subordinate divisions likely requires a displacement plan for corps artillery units to ensure adequate support for the exploitation and good positioning for transitions to other operations.

5-48. **Sustainment:** The sustainment focus is supporting rapid movement and maneuver for the exploiting forces. This includes emphasis on Class III, V, and IX, as well as a maintenance plan that prioritizes mobility capabilities and conducting maintenance as far forward as possible. The corps may need to establish new support areas to maintain throughput to exploiting forces. The medical support plan should be adjusted for the transportation of patients along longer lines of communication than previously anticipated. Examples include adjusting the ambulance shuttle system or establishing new Role 2 locations.

5-49. **Protection:** Withdrawing enemy forces will attempt to delay the friendly advance with blocking positions supported by fires. As the exploitation develops, the corps must be prepared to dynamically shift protection priorities to mitigate risks. The corps protects subordinate divisions by targeting enemy fires capabilities and by providing air defense for lead elements of the corps that are beyond the original planned AMD umbrellas.

5-50. An exploitation may result in large numbers of enemy prisoners placing a burden on lead friendly maneuver forces. The corps should position military police as far forward as possible to take control of enemy prisoners ensuring freedom of maneuver in the exploitation. Populace and resource control must also be considered to protect civilian areas that were previously isolated from the FLOT that may suddenly be exposed to retreating enemy and advancing friendly forces. The corps should plan for the positive control of civilians to minimize interference in friendly operations, deny bypassed enemy forces from concealing themselves among civilians, and sustainment of civilians as necessary when conditions allow. Civil affairs units will be essential to this. (See FM 3-57 for more information on civil affairs operations.)

5-51. **Intelligence:** The nature of an exploitation requires the corps to prioritize intelligence capabilities against providing the divisions situational awareness and supporting dynamic targeting. The corps and division commanders must understand the rapidly changing enemy composition, disposition, and strength. Enemy attempts to re-establish a coherent defense, the location of major obstacles and reserves, and the repositioning of significant capabilities that can influence the depth of the penetration are examples of focus areas. Corps should also have a detailed plan for collecting processing, exploiting, and disseminating information from detainees, civilians, and recovered enemy equipment.

5-52. During exploitation or pursuit, corps units normally move much more rapidly over greater distances than during an attack. Extended distances make it difficult for a corps-controlled reserve to provide responsive support to leading elements during these operations unless it is trailing those elements within supporting distance on the ground or they are air mobile (attack helicopter or air assault) forces. The commander prioritizes the positioning of the reserve to reinforce the success of the main effort first, then to counter the worst-case enemy counterattack.




Figure 5-8. Corps Attack Followed by Exploitation

PURSUIT

5-53. Pursuits are conducted to catch or cut off enemy forces attempting to escape, with the intent to destroy or capture them and prevent their reorganization into an effective force. Pursuit along a wide front requires the complete collapse of the enemy's defense. This normally follows a successful exploitation and completes the destruction of an enemy force that has lost the means or the will to defend and is attempting to retreat as quickly as possible. Unlike an exploitation, in which the corps seeks to avoid enemy combat units to defeat the enemy support systems, the corps conducting a pursuit focuses on destroying the fleeing enemy force. Although the plan may designate terrain objectives, destruction of the enemy force is the goal.

5-54. A corps focuses on reducing the risks of a pursuit, since there is a high probability of outrunning sustainment support. Unless the corps staff planned the pursuit as a sequel, the commander may delay its execution until properly prepared. However, time spent on additional preparation gives the enemy time to get away and can result in a missed opportunity. If the corps staff planned the sequel, its goal would be to maintain pressure on the fleeing enemy formation by staying in contact. Successful completion of such a plan demands responsive sustainment and continuous fire and AMD support.

5-55. Pursuit operations require a direct pressure force and normally an encircling force. An *encircling force* is the force that maneuvers to the rear or flank of the enemy to block the enemy's escape (FM 3-90). Although armored forces are normally preferred as encircling forces, motorized, attack helicopter, airborne, and air assault forces can also encircle. During pursuit operations, a corps may encounter encircled enemy forces, and it should plan for their defeat. The pursuing forces must clearly understand what size of an enemy force to bypass and what size to destroy. (See figure 5-9 for a depiction of a corps pursuit.)




Figure 5-9. Corps Pursuit

5-56. During pursuit operations, sustainment arrangements must be flexible and capable of rapid response. Priority of support typically goes to the main effort, and fuel and ammunition are commonly the chief logistic requirements. Planners can alleviate some problems created by road congestion and route disruptions through other means of resupply such as air transportation. Nevertheless, securing LOCs suitable to support the transportation of adequate supplies is essential to a successful pursuit. The pursuit, even more than the exploitation, is a transportation-intensive operation.

5-57. During exploitation and pursuit, corps deep operations normally focus on preventing the introduction of the enemy maneuver forces not already engaged by its divisions. They can also be used to prevent enemy

units out of contact with friendly divisions from establishing a coherent defense. At the conclusion of a pursuit, corps deep operations should focus on preventing any sort of effective enemy counter-attacks.

ENCIRCLEMENT OF AN ENEMY FORCE

5-58. Corps conduct encirclement operations to isolate and destroy enemy forces. *Encirclement* is where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communications and reinforcement (FM 3-90). Encircling operations seek to cut off evacuation and reinforcement routes. A corps may plan offensive operations with the express intent of encircling enemy forces. However, enemy forces may also become encircled by circumstance, such as when bypassed during an exploitation, rather than deliberate planning.

5-59. An encircling command should identify and set the conditions of an encirclement before it develops to deny enemy forces as many advantages as possible before surrounding it. If an unexpected encirclement occurs, enemy forces may have the opportunity to occupy advantageous terrain or secure a better position. This would make reduction much more difficult for the encircling force.

5-60. The corps staff should also understand that bypassed and encircled forces can behave in several ways. They may—

- Surrender, remain stationary, and cause no interference.
- Remain stationary and, by virtue of their position, interrupt friendly operations.
- Move (attack) to rejoin their own lines.
- Move (attack) with the intent to interrupt friendly operations.

Enemy forces may also execute a combination of these options. (See figure 5-10 for a depiction of a corps encirclement.)




Figure 5-10. Corps Encirclement

5-61. Encirclements can occur because of an operational action, a tactical action, or a combination of both. Regardless of how an encirclement occurs or the size of the forces involved, its reduction is strictly a tactical action. Once a commander decides to reduce an encirclement, the next decision is typically the reduction method: reduction by fire or reduction by maneuver. Reduction by maneuver has four different techniques: squeeze, hammer and anvil, wedge, and escape route. (See FM 3-90 for reduction techniques.)

SECTION II – DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

5-62. The purpose of a corps defense is to create conditions for the offensive that allow the corps to regain the initiative. A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. The defense cannot be purely passive. A defender must seek opportunities to attack enemy forces throughout the depth of their formations. Corps commanders incorporate counterattacks and spoiling attacks into their overall plans. Plans should be flexible enough in concept and task organization to permit rapid changes.

5-63. Corps usually conduct a combination of area and mobile defenses, even if part of a larger retrograde. The reasons a corps typically conducts the defense include—

- Countering enemy action
- Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to an enemy.
- Attriting or fixing an enemy as a prelude to the offense.
- Increase an enemy's vulnerability by forcing an enemy commander to concentrate subordinate forces.

Characteristics of the Defense

- Disruption.
- Flexibility.
- Maneuver.
- Mass and concentration.
- Depth.
- Preparation.
- Security.

(See ADP 3-90 for an expanded discussion of the defense.)

ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE

5-64. During large-scale combat operations, the corps is most likely to conduct a mobile defense due to the size of the AO, the number of subordinate formations, and the purpose of the corps' operations. A corps area defense (with all forces) is unusual. Normally a corps has its divisions conduct different forms of the defense simultaneously. One division can conduct an area defense while another division conducts a mobile defense, based upon terrain and the composition of the divisions. While one or two divisions are attacking, another division could be conducting an area defense. One division could conduct a mobile defense, while another conducts a retrograde. Organization of a corps defense is therefore situationally dependent, and it is critical for the corps to understand that the corps' approach will not mirror that of each subordinate echelon during an operation. A division that is part of a corps mobile defense may have a brigade defending key terrain from a fixed battle position to facilitate friendly maneuver.

AREA DEFENSE

5-65. An *area defense* is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADP 3-90). A corps may conduct an area defense when directed to hold key terrain by their higher headquarters or in the event of becoming surrounded by an attacking enemy force. They may use an area defense to transition to offensive operations, retrograde, or stability operations.

Corps Considerations

5-66. **Command and control:** The corps provides general guidance to the divisions and ensures that their plans are integrated into the overall defensive scheme. The corps is responsible for synchronizing the area defense and accounting for any areas not assigned to a subordinate unit. Because the divisions are largely terrain focused, the commander and staff should focus on reducing vulnerabilities to massed enemy fires. The corps must also anticipate and plan for transition points to other types of enabling, defensive, offensive, or stability operations.

5-67. **Movement and maneuver:** With an eye to retaining flexibility, the corps should ensure that the defense plan preserves desired maneuver corridors into and out of the MBA. The corps allocates engineer

capabilities to build defense and engagement areas in support of corps and division requirements. Additionally, the corps needs to develop a relief-in-place plan for extended area defenses. Replacement operations are complicated, likely to be necessary during an extended defense, and especially difficult to conduct under contact.

5-68. **Fires:** The corps' focus for fires will be on attriting attacking forces and their supporting elements throughout the depth of their echelons. The corps must dynamically synchronize joint capabilities to provide advantages to its divisions. Additionally, the corps must have a positioning and protection plan for its firing units to ensure their survival while also ensuring that they can support the divisions.

5-69. **Sustainment:** Large quantities of Class IV construction materials will be essential to preparing the defense. The corps should anticipate increased Class V ammunition consumption during a defense and plan for resupply. Depending on the duration of the area defense, Class VII major items may become critical to offset battle loss or battle damage capabilities. Since the area defense is relatively static, the corps has an opportunity to maximize the efficiency of Role 2 and Role 3 facilities but must protect them.

5-70. **Protection:** Protection priorities in the defense will have an increased focus on survivability measures to avoid and defeat enemy detection, complicate enemy targeting, and withstand enemy attacks in multiple domains. Engineers can significantly enhance the survivability of command posts and viability of MSR and ASR. Depending on the threat, the corps may need a decontamination plan for the MBA to enable units to continue the defense after a CBRN attack. It must also allocate air defense resources to protect the MBA in accordance with the defended asset list and the corps' prioritized protection list and interdict airborne threats, especially those originating from the deep area, such as ballistic missiles, large unmanned aerial vehicles, and aircraft. Protection operations must also account for enemy cyber or electromagnetic warfare attacks.

5-71. **Intelligence:** Intelligence capabilities focus on understanding the enemy course of action. They also prioritize developing situational understanding in accordance with planned branches and sequels or other transitions as the corps commander directs.

5-72. Based on what the terrain allows, the commander chooses a variation of area defense that is most appropriate: defense of a linear obstacle, perimeter defense, or reverse slope defense. The commander also has the option of defending forward or defending in depth. (See FM 3-90 for an expanded discussion of the area defense.)

MOBILE DEFENSE

5-73. A *mobile defense* is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (ADP 3-90). A mobile defense defeats or destroys enemy forces by allowing them to advance to a point where the striking force can conduct a decisive counterattack. The corps' focus for a mobile defense is ensuring the assigned area for its divisions is suitable for and prepared enough to support the mobile strike force. A mobile defense requires an assigned area with considerable depth. Corps planners set conditions with obstacles and fire support to cause enemy forces to overextend their LOCs, expose their flanks, and dissipate their combat power. Then, the corps maneuvers friendly forces to cut off and destroy them, typically from a flank or the rear. Employing part of the corps in an area defense to block the main attack and the remainder as the striking force is the most effective form of mobile defense since it makes enemy forces maneuvering against or around a fixed area vulnerable to counterattack.

5-74. For the mobile defense, a corps assigns its divisions and BCTs one of three basic roles: striking force, fixing force, or reserve. A corps may use deception to lure enemy forces into attacking the defense at a place and time most advantageous to the corps' plan. The corps maneuvers the striking force and fixing forces into the best possible terrain to execute the defense. The corps then supports these maneuvers with fire support and sustainment to prevent culmination. (See figure 5-11 on page 102 for a depiction of a corps mobile defense.)

Corps Considerations

5-75. **Command and control:** A significant priority for the corps is identifying the conditions necessary for employing the strike force, then validating those conditions are met. The corps needs an accurate, real-time common operational picture (known as COP) shared with the divisions to synchronize the activities of the

fixing and strike forces. The difficulties of maintaining an accurate common operational picture increase once the strike force maneuvers. The corps needs a robust communications plan for the strike force, which may include augmenting them with long-range communications. The corps should also develop a plan for the fixing force to counterattack. This is a complicated part of the mobile defense as it involves a transition from defense to offense, potentially while the strike force is also still maneuvering and friendly forces are moving toward each other. Finally, the mobile aspect of this form of defense will require boundary adjustment considerations for the divisions.

5-76. **Movement and maneuver:** Mobility is essential to the mobile defense. The corps must ensure that the strike force has adequate mobility to move along the necessary timelines determined during planning. The fixing force will rely on engineers to assist with countermobility and development of engagement areas. The strike force will likely require mobility augmentation (such as obstacle reduction). Accurately predicting how long it takes the strike force to maneuver into direct contact with the enemy is essential, as does ensuring that it is prepared to move to the right place at the right time to meet the commander's intent.

5-77. **Fires:** The corps will likely focus on disrupting enemy follow-on forces to prevent them from interfering with the strike force. The corps may also assist divisions with disrupting the enemy attacking force to assist the fixing force. A unique challenge in this situation is ensuring the enemy attacking force maintains sufficient momentum to get deep enough to expose their flanks to the strike force. At the same time, fires should degrade enemy attack force capabilities before they make full contact with the fixing force.

5-78. **Sustainment:** The strike force's lines of communication may rapidly extend from its original position, requiring additional sustainment capabilities and planning. In particular, the strike force will likely require increased Class III and maintenance support in preparation for its attack and to maintain tempo. Meanwhile, the fixing force will likely require additional Class IV construction materials before the enemy attack and Class V ammunition during it.

5-79. **Protection:** The strike force will likely air defense along its movement routes. Air defense is also an important aspect of the protection of the fixing force. This will likely be accomplished through a combination of area air defense and destruction of enemy long-range strike capabilities. Engineer capabilities are required to support survivability and countermobility efforts of any fixing force. Civil affairs and military police capabilities will assist the corps with managing civilians on the battlefield and preserving the strike force's freedom of maneuver. Military police should take control of detainees from maneuver units as far forward as possible to minimize their impact on maneuver forces.

5-80. **Intelligence:** Intelligence priorities are likely to be split between supporting the fixing force and supporting the decision to employ the strike force. The corps may support the fixing force by identifying enemy composition, disposition, and strength, along with confirming the enemy course of action. Intelligence capabilities will also likely support the strike force by gaining information on the enemy's capabilities along the axis of advance. Finally, corps intelligence will maintain awareness of the corps' deep area to prevent surprise and enable long-range fires.




Figure 5-11. Corps Mobile Defense

RETROGRADE

5-81. A retrograde moves friendly forces away from the enemy to set conditions for another action. The subsequent action could be an operation, such as an attack, or a task, such as conducting reconstitution. During a retrograde, the corps' focus is on maintaining control of subordinate units and protecting the force. There are three variations of the retrograde.

- A *delay* is when a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on enemy forces without becoming decisively engaged (ADP 3-90). In delays, units yield ground to gain time while retaining flexibility and freedom of action to inflict the maximum damage on enemy forces. (See figure 5-12 on page 104 for a visual depiction of a corps delay.)
- To *withdraw* is to disengage from an enemy force and move in a direction away from the enemy (ADP 3-90). Withdrawing units, whether all or part of a committed force, voluntarily disengage from an enemy force to preserve the withdrawing force or release it for a new mission. (See figure 5-13 on page 104 for a visual depiction of a corps withdrawal.)
- A *retirement* is when a force out of contact moves away from the enemy (ADP 3-90).

Corps Considerations

5-82. **Command and control:** Maintaining control of subordinate units and situational awareness is a primary focus for the corps. The retrograde plan incorporates shifting control measures over time. Close

coordination amongst echelons and between organizations is critical to success, which requires a shared common operational picture and understanding of the corps' intent. The corps provides clear engagement and disengagement criteria to ensure forces have maximum flexibility and do not become decisively engaged. Controlling the tempo of the divisions requires a robust commander's dialogue between the corps and division commanders, as well as any part of the corps acting as a covering or guard force between the corps main body and the enemy. If retrograding under contact, ensuring security and support for subordinate units as they maneuver will be essential to success. The slowest units in the corps ideally move first, while the most mobile ones cover their movement.

5-83. **Movement and maneuver:** Lines of communication and movement corridors must be kept open long enough and secured enough to prevent units being decisively engaged by enemy enveloping forces. The corps closely manages movement control teams and transportation assets, ensuring units with limited mobility are accounted for in the plan. The corps needs a transportation asset and movement common operational picture. Routes in the corps AO require two-way traffic to ensure resupply and maintain flexibility. Engineers ensure MSR and ASR remain usable.

5-84. **Fires:** The movement of subordinate forces away from the enemy reduces available combat power in the corps close area. The corps should employ fires to mitigate unfavorable force ratios. The corps balances its employment of fires between committed and uncommitted enemy forces, as well as the counterfire mission. The displacement of artillery units should ensure continuous fires support across the depths the corps commander requires.

5-85. **Sustainment:** Sustainers must be prepared to move support areas and may need to limit on-hand commodities to quantities that can be kept mobile. Maintenance evacuation of vehicles is a significant consideration, as performing maintenance forward will be limited during movement away from the enemy. Prepositioning Class III and V for artillery resupply and aviation forward arming and refueling points, as well as establishing a refueling plan for units on the move, is important. Retrograding units casualty evacuation planning may require longer distances between ambulance exchange points, which should in turn shift as the FLOT moves rearward.

5-86. **Protection:** The corps shifts protection priorities to support the retrograde of its forces. MPs or other units minimize civilian interference along the retrograde movement routes and facilitate the movement of detainees to a corps holding area or the joint security area (JSA) when directed. Engineers ensure that routes remain usable. Air defense units should be echeloned and repositioned to ensure coverage of corps units in accordance with the defended assets list.

5-87. **Intelligence:** Intelligence capabilities focus on confirming enemy locations and their courses of action. Early warning about any enemy attempt to cut off elements of the corps or block the corps retrograde should be considered a priority intelligence requirement .




Figure 5-12. A Delay




Figure 5-13. Types of Withdrawal

FRIENDLY FORCE ENCIRCLEMENT

5-88. A corps assesses that a unit is encircled when enemy action has cut all ground routes of evacuation and reinforcement. A unit may become encircled—

- When ordered to remain in a strong position on key terrain to deny enemy forces passage through a vital chokepoint following an enemy breakthrough.
- When given a mission of becoming encircled as part of a larger plan.
- When cut off from friendly forces unintentionally.

5-89. Enemy forces may not be aware that they have initially encircled a friendly element, so immediate action to break out of the unfavorable situation with support from the corps is imperative. The enemy is likely to be unprepared for a hasty attack.

CORPS ENCIRCLED

5-90. When becoming encircled, the corps must determine whether the next higher commander wants the force to break out or to defend the position. If the force is free to break out, the corps should attempt to break out before enemy forces block all escape routes. Encirclement reduces flexibility, maneuverability, and options for the friendly commander. The corps sustainment situation immediately begins to degrade more quickly once friendly MSR and ASR are cut. Once encircled, there are three possible subsequent operations: perimeter defense, conduct a breakout, or exfiltrate subordinate units.

Perimeter Defense

5-91. Encircled forces may be required to maintain their positions and execute a perimeter defense. Important considerations for encircled perimeter defense are—

- Mission of unit and higher echelon headquarters.
- Terrain available for a defense.
- Availability of reinforcements or relief of the force before enemy forces can eliminate it.
- Enemy forces being more mobile than friendly forces, allowing enemy forces to destroy the encircled forces during a breakout attempt.

(See figure 5-14 on page 108 for a depiction of an encircled corps defense.)




Figure 5-14. Encircled Corps Defense

5-92. The commander must assume control of all encircled forces and rapidly assess their overall defensive posture. In assuming an effective perimeter defense, the commander has the responsibility—

- To reestablish the chain of command in subordinate echelons with heavy losses or in those that have been disorganized.
- To establish a viable defense. The unit must quickly establish an all-round defense on defensible terrain. The force may have to attack to seize the ground. The commander must reorganize and consolidate the unit expeditiously—
  - To establish security by assigning responsibility to divisions, positioning security forces as far forward as possible to provide early warning, initiating vigorous reconnaissance, establishing local security throughout, and insisting on passive measures to maintain operations security.
  - To reestablish communications rapidly with higher echelon headquarters and internally between units.
- To continue to employ intelligence assets. The corps staff must stay informed about the battle outside the encirclement, which assists with planning the breakout and enabling the commander to provide information about the enemy's rear area to higher headquarters.
- To plan for detainees and dislocated civilians.
- To establish a reserve. If mobile forces are available, the commander establishes a centrally located reserve to take advantage of interior lines. If only dismounted forces are available, the commander establishes local reserves to react to potential threats.

- To reorganize fire support. The commander, aided by the staff, centralizes the control of all field artillery, positions aviation assets throughout the area to limit vulnerability to counterfire, and considers available fire support systems, including CAS, from outside the encirclement.
- To reorganize logistic support. After assessing the corps logistics posture, the commander centralizes supplies and establishes strict rationing supply economy procedures. If possible, the commander arranges aerial resupply and casualty evacuation with aviation and established centralized mortuary affairs operations.
- To reorganize medical support. After assessing the corps medical posture, the commander, aided by the corps surgeon section, arranges aerial resupply and medical evacuation with aviation and establishes centralized medical operations.
- To limit vulnerability to CBRN hazards. This may include a plan to attack to break out based on anticipated enemy use.
- To maintain morale.
- To continue the defense. Commanders use engineers to improve the defended area. They preclude enemy forces from splitting the corps through penetrations of the perimeter. An energetic defense, rapid reaction by reserves, and defense in depth can defeat such attempts. Combat losses may force the commander to reduce the size of the perimeter.

Breakout Operations

5-93. A breakout is an operation conducted by an encircled force to regain freedom of movement or contact with friendly units. An encircled force normally attempts to conduct a breakout when one or more of the following is true:

- Opportunity exists to attack.
- An encircled force does not have sufficient relative combat power to defend itself against enemy forces attempting the encirclement.
- An encircled force does not have adequate terrain available to conduct its defense.
- An encircled force cannot sustain itself long enough for forces outside the encirclement to relieve it.

(See figure 5-15 on page 108 for a depiction of a corps breakout operation.)




Figure 5-15. Corps Breakout Operation

5-94. The attack to break out only differs from other offensive operations in that the force must maintain a simultaneous defense in other areas of the perimeter. Critical breakout considerations include—

- Deceive the enemy. If immediate breakout is not possible, friendly forces attempt to deceive enemy force about preparations.
- Exploit gaps and weaknesses. Early in the encirclement, there will be gaps or weaknesses in the encircling force. Reconnaissance will reveal them, and an attack should capitalize on them. An attack over less favorable terrain may be the best course of action if it avoids enemy strength and increases the chance for surprise. The breakout should not take the obvious route toward friendly lines unless there is no other alternative.
- Exploit limited visibility.
- Organize the breakout force. The commander normally reorganizes the force so that armored units lead the attack while the remainder of the force fights a delaying action or defends the perimeter during the initial stage of the breakout. After penetrating the encirclement, the main body moves out of the area behind the attacking force, followed by a rear guard. Other organization considerations are—
  - Ensure sufficient engineer mobility support of the breakout force.

  - Integrate the sustainment elements into the main body.
  - Organize a diversionary attack if sufficient forces are available.
- Coordinate internal and external supporting attacks.
- Concentrate combat power. The commander directs overwhelming combat power at the breakout point. Forces left in contact must fight a delaying action on the perimeter so enemy forces do not cut off any friendly forces. Fire support, including tactical air support, is concentrated at the breakout point. The rear guard may receive priority of fire support once the breakout occurs.
- Provide for forces left behind. When it is not feasible to move patients, commanders leave medical personnel and sufficient supplies to attend to the wounded.
- Prepare for linkup operations. As part of a breakout toward friendly forces, commanders plan where and how to regain contact with friendly forces outside of the perimeter to ensure support, deconfliction of fires, and mutually understood control measures.

5-95. A corps or division that is temporarily encircled may be able continue the attack. The encircling force may not be capable of containing the friendly force. A corps could conduct such an operation similarly to the breakout toward friendly forces during the Korean War. (See Appendix D for an illustration of the Pusan breakout in 1950.)

Exfiltrate

5-96. If there is no intention of a relief operation, or a breakout appears too risky, and there is significant risk to the defense being overwhelmed, exfiltration could preserve some of the corps. *Exfiltrate* is a tactical mission task in which a unit removes Soldiers or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means (FM 3-90). Corps units returning from a raid, an infiltration, or a patrol behind enemy lines might also need to conduct an exfiltration. A corps or division exfiltrates an encircled force to preserve as much of it as possible. Prior to exfiltration, the commander of the encircled force ensures the destruction or incapacitation of left behind equipment (except medical equipment). If capture of an entire force is imminent, a commander may leave its casualties in place with supplies, chaplain support, and medical personnel.

5-97. An exfiltrating force first establishes its rally points and exfiltration lanes. The corps staff designates exfiltration lanes as restrictive fire areas or no-fire areas. The exfiltrating force uses preparation fire to cover its movement and to expend stockpiled ammunition. *Preparation fire* is a brief, intense bombardment on selected targets or a prolonged effort over time covering a large number of targets (FM 3-09). Corps commanders and staffs plan how to support the encircled force with commitment of additional forces and fire support, including close air support provided by Army and other Service aviation elements. (See figure 5-16 on page 110 for a depiction of a corps exfiltration with one division exfiltrating while the other two divisions continue to defend.)




Figure 5-16. Corps Exfiltration

TRANSITIONING TO THE OFFENSE

5-98. Before a defensive battle begins, the corps staff plans for the eventual transition to the offense. The transition to offensive operations must be rapid to keep enemy forces from establishing prepared defenses and receiving reinforcements. A primary corps objective is to prevent enemy forces from breaking contact. The corps uses its security forces to maintain contact with enemy forces and its information collection capabilities to stay abreast of their movements and composition. If necessary, the corps commander may commit the reserve to maintain direct contact as the initial counterattack. These actions set the conditions for the subsequent offensive operations by the divisions.

5-99. A defending corps commander anticipates when and where the enemy force will culminate and links the transition to offensive operations to a decision point supported by commander's critical information requirement. The staff then uses fragmentary orders to rapidly assign division objectives as they transition to offense.

TRANSITION TIMING AND CONSIDERATIONS

5-100. There are several signs that can indicate an enemy force is becoming overextended, such as enemy forces become less aggressive and are defeated in most engagements. (See FM 3-90 for a more complete list of indicators.) As a force transitions from the defense to the offense, the commander directs several actions, such as designating the main effort or a shift in protection priorities. (See FM 3-90 for a more complete list of commander actions during transition.)

TRANSITION TECHNIQUES FOR THE OFFENSE

5-101. Corps commanders generally have two options for designating the attacking element when transitioning to the offense. They can use uncommitted forces or committed forces. Each option or technique has pros and cons. The corps must initially determine the subordinate units that will be required for the attack. This will be dependent on the concept chosen to achieve the attack objectives.

Uncommitted Forces

5-102. The generally preferred technique is to attack using forces not previously committed to the defense, such as reserves or reinforcements. There are several advantages of using uncommitted forces: defending MBA units may still be decisively engaged, and since uncommitted forces have not recently been actively involved in combat, they are more likely to—

- Be at authorized strength levels.
- Enjoy a higher combat system operationally ready rate.
- Have leaders and Soldiers who are more likely to be rested and thus capable of prolonged, continuous operations.
- Have a complete basic load of supplies.
- Have the time and energy to plan and prepare for offensive action.
- Be able to maneuver out of physical contact with the enemy.

A drawback to the use of this technique is the requirement to conduct a forward passage of lines. Additionally, enemy reconnaissance and surveillance assets are likely to detect the arrival of significant reinforcements.

Committed Forces

5-103. The second technique is to conduct offensive actions using the currently defending forces. This technique generally has the advantage of being more rapidly executed and thus more likely to catch enemy forces by surprise. Speed of execution in this technique results from not having to conduct an approach or tactical road march from reserve assembly areas or, in the case of reinforcements, move from other AOs and RSOI locations. Speed also results from not having to conduct a forward passage of lines and perform the liaison necessary to establish a common operational picture that includes knowledge of the enemy force's patterns of operation. The primary disadvantage of this technique is the risk of early culmination and the need for quick replacement due to fatigue.

5-104. If units in contact participate in the attack, the commander must retain sufficient forces in contact to fix enemy forces. The commander concentrates the attack by reinforcing select subordinate units so they can execute the attack and, if necessary, maintain the existing defense using economy of force approaches that assume some risk. The commander can also adjust the defensive boundaries of subordinate units so entire units can withdraw and concentrate for the attack.

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Chapter 6
Enabling Operations

This chapter covers enabling operations. It begins with an overview of enabling operations. Then, the chapter discusses reconnaissance, security, and troop movement, followed by relief in place. Next, the chapter discusses passage of lines, countermobility, mobility, and TAC-D. The chapter concludes with a discussion of linkup operations.

OVERVIEW OF ENABLING OPERATIONS

6-1. An *enabling operation* is an operation that sets the friendly conditions required for mission accomplishment (FM 3-90). Enabling operations do not directly accomplish the commander's end state and are not decisive. However, they are required to conduct successful offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Enabling operations are complex enough that they require either a deliberate planning effort or a well-developed standard operating procedure to execute.

6-2. A corps may conduct independent enabling operations or combine them with other operations. Corps enabling operations include—

- Reconnaissance.
- Security.
- Troop movement.
- Relief in place.
- Passage of lines.
- Countermobility.
- Mobility.
- Deception.
- Linkup.

While the concept and basic goals of enabling operations remain constant, actual methods for their conduct will change based on the mission variables of METT-TC (I).

RECONNAISSANCE

6-3. *Reconnaissance* is a mission undertaken to obtain information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area, by visual observation or other detection methods (JP 2-0). Reconnaissance occurs continuously at all levels. Corps may direct specific reconnaissance missions within its AO, but divisions and brigades should reconnoiter their own assigned areas aggressively and continually. Reconnaissance is one part of information collection, along with security, intelligence operations, and surveillance. The five forms of reconnaissance operations are—

- Zone reconnaissance.
- Area reconnaissance.
- Route reconnaissance.
- Reconnaissance in force.
- Special reconnaissance (SOF only).

6-4. Corps commanders depend on situational understanding to seize and retain the initiative. A corps requires reconnaissance formations capable of developing the situation to determine enemy intentions, strength, and disposition. The corps commander normally designates and task-organizes a BCT to support the requirement for reconnaissance, but the size of the force depends on the mission variables.

6-5. Reconnaissance is usually executed prior to and as part of a corps attack or during a movement to contact. A corps' primary objective is to acquire information regarding the enemy force's situation and identify or confirm weaknesses in its defense. A reconnaissance may focus along select points of the enemy force's

defense, to confirm the feasibility of attacking through or against those points, or along the entire front to determine the best points of attack. Reconnaissance in the corps AO includes repetitive checks to assure that roads and key infrastructure in the support area such as bridges, tunnels, and defiles remain secure and unobstructed.

6-6. A corps may conduct reconnaissance or task subordinate divisions to conduct reconnaissance. In either instance, the corps must plan to either exploit success or extricate reconnaissance forces. The headquarters controlling the operation must have sufficient units (usually reserves) in position to accomplish either of these tasks. If the corps conducts the operation, its concept of operations normally assumes that the divisions executing the operation require all their forces to achieve the reconnaissance objectives. Consequently, the corps must plan for another division with suitable mobility and firepower to either exploit success or extricate the unit executing the reconnaissance operation.

6-7. Aviation units are useful for corps reconnaissance operations because of their mobility. Employing manned and unmanned aviation capabilities as part of the reconnaissance force speeds movement and improves scouting. However, it requires a command relationship between aviation and ground commanders. (See paragraphs 6-10 through 6-13 for more information on security.)

6-8. The corps needs to prioritize its reconnaissance objectives early in the planning process. This will enable reconnaissance forces to support the staff's mission analysis during military decision-making process (known as MDMP).

6-9. During a movement to contact, a corps covering force may also elect to develop the situation by reconnaissance in selected parts of its AO. A properly organized covering force should have the capabilities necessary to conduct reconnaissance. (See FM 3-98 and FM 3-90 for more information on reconnaissance.)

SECURITY

6-10. *Security operations* are those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the forces being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their protected forces (ADP 3-90). The main difference between the performance of security operations and reconnaissance operations is that security operations orient on the force or an area, while reconnaissance operations orient on enemy and terrain.

6-11. Corps conduct security operations to prevent surprise and reduce uncertainty. Security operations are dynamic efforts that anticipate and thwart enemy collection efforts. All maneuver forces can conduct security operations, and they usually perform security operations to the front, flanks, or rear of their own formations. Security operations prevent surprise and allow the corps to maintain the initiative. Commanders assign security missions based on the degree of security desired and the amount of combat power required. There are four types of security operations: screen, guard, cover, and area security. (See FM 3-90 for additional information on security operations.)

6-12. As with reconnaissance, the corps must consider security operations at the beginning of planning. Corps units should already be executing security operations during the planning process since execution of security operations is inherent to transitions between most types of operations. For example, when completing an attack and transitioning to the defense, units typically deploy security forces while establishing the defense. Security operations are part of the preparation phase to execute all corps operations. For example, security forces protect the main effort and prevent enemy observation of friendly activities at the beginning of a corps attack.

6-13. Commanders must be aware of the inherent risk of defeat in detail of corps units conducting security operations. When security operations are economy of force efforts, commanders typically minimize the amount of combat power apportioned for the mission. Security forces are often the first element to make significant contact with the enemy and, depending on the mission, may even fight the enemy's main body. They also can make contact away from the direct support of the friendly main body. As a result, security forces may be at risk of being isolated or defeated in detail. Commanders mitigate this risk by assigning the type of security operation appropriate to the enemy situation. Different types of security operations provide more combat power to security forces. Commanders also mitigate risk by ensuring the corps has contingency plans for reacting to situations where the security forces are isolated or overwhelmed.

TROOP MOVEMENT

6-14. *Troop movement* is the movement of Soldiers and units from one place to another by any available means (FM 3-90). The essence of battlefield agility is the capability to conduct rapid and orderly movement to concentrate combat power at decisive points and times. Successful movement places troops and equipment at their destination at the proper time, ready for combat. The corps must successfully move large numbers of forces to conduct operations.

6-15. There are two types of troop movement: nontactical and tactical. Units only conduct nontactical movements in secure areas, such as the continental United States. There are five methods of troop movements described in FM 3-90. The method employed depends on the situation, the size and composition of the moving unit, the distance the unit must cover, the urgency of execution, and the condition of the troops. It also depends on the availability, suitability, and capacity of the different means of transportation.

6-16. The goal of all movement planning is to retain flexibility to execute a variety of plans to meet ever-changing conditions. A corps-size movement is inherently complicated. Detailed plans are necessary to maintain order and to account for the lack of lift to move all corps elements simultaneously.

6-17. Movement planning should incorporate an extensive IPOE and be heavily influenced by terrain and the disposition of enemy forces, including aviation and long-range fires. Consequently, the plan should include contingencies for actions during the movement. The movement plan must also incorporate a fire support plan that includes joint capabilities, coordinated with the JFACC. Depending on the corps' role, the corps will coordinate directly with the JFACC or submit requests through the land component commander. Corps artillery should be moved as far forward as possible during the move to ensure lead units have fire support when needed. Fluid movement and the ability to react to contingencies is critical to a large-unit movement. The corps employs echeloned logistics, tactical deception, and air missile defense along its routes.

6-18. The corps must consider executing combat operations in its scheme of maneuver. The corps should anticipate locations along the movement route where contact with the enemy is more likely. It is critical that the corps arrive at anticipated points of contact prepared for maneuver and in formations suitable for combat. Corps units should end the movement in formations capable of conducting offensive or defensive operations.

6-19. Security must be maintained during the movement and in assembly areas. This is accomplished through a combination of tactics and apportionment of critical enablers, such as air defense units. Mobile task forces should be capable of responding to the most dangerous anticipated enemy courses of action. This may require the corps to apportion corps-level capabilities to divisions most likely to make initial enemy contact.

6-20. The corps should develop detailed understanding of the transportation network in its AO. In addition to the availability, suitability, and capacity relative to each means of corps transportation, the transportation network should be assessed for traffic regulation and control and the impact of civilian vehicles and dislocated civilians. Sound corps planning should prevent disruption to resupply of ongoing operations by other units using the transportation networks for the movement.

6-21. The movement plan will also emphasize command and control. The corps must account for terrain management and the operational framework. Besides identifying the location of command posts, the plan must clearly designate the conditions for moving command posts and transferring command functions between them, if the plan requires corps CPs to displace as part of the movement. The corps is responsible for route designations, ground and air traffic control, and establishing timelines for the movement. The corps may need to employ additional signal capabilities to enable long-range communications. A corps-size movement can easily cover hundreds of kilometers. Maintaining communication from all ends of the movement formation is essential to the corps' situational understanding.

6-22. The corps should carefully consider the information aspects of a large-unit movement. The movement plan should consider techniques to protect friendly information by securing and obscuring it and conducting security activities. A common historical example of protecting friendly information is moving at night to reduce enemy observation of unit movements. (See ADP 3-13 for more information on the protect information activity.)

6-23. Tactical deception reduces overall risk to the corps and preserves combat power. The corps commander should drive the tactical deception portion of the movement plan, which should include the six principles of

planning deception. Besides benefitting the movement itself, tactical deception can enhance the chances of success for the operation conducted after the movement. (See FM 3-90 for additional information on tactical deception.)

6-24. Corps organization during a movement should facilitate rapid transitions to maneuver, change of direction of march, provide flank protection, and utilize all available roads and other transportation routes. The preservation of freedom of maneuver until the corps engages in close combat is essential. Consequently, the corps must designate the main and supporting efforts during the movement to preserve the ability to complete the move and transition to subsequent operations.

6-25. Weather can impact the overall operation, the transportation network, and personnel. Weather may also impact the timing of the movement. The corps should be aware of severe weather that may damage the transportation network and require engineer support to repair.

6-26. Typically, the corps positions command and control elements, logistics, maintenance, and route maintenance and route support capabilities to facilitate the move once it begins. If the plan directs the use of liaison elements, they should be in position prior to the beginning of the movement. Movement control teams and military police provide essential control over the movement routes. They enable maneuver units to focus on conducting offensive and defensive operations. Engineer assets support route improvement and maintenance. They are also necessary for improving assembly areas or attack positions at the end of the movement. The corps should carefully consider engineering requirements throughout the depth of the movement area and, if necessary, request additional support.

6-27. Sustainment is essential to a successful corps-size move. Logistics should be pre-configured and pre-loaded onto vehicles before the move begins. Additionally, sustainment support, such as convoy support centers, are typically pre-positioned along the route when possible. These actions are critical to enabling throughput and maintaining the tempo of the movement, particularly by providing adequate fuel and maintenance support. (See FM 4-0 for additional information on sustainment of troop movements.)

6-28. The route must receive thorough reconnaissance and may need to be improved before the execution of the movement. It may also be necessary to improve signs, or otherwise mark the route, before execution.

6-29. The corps plan must permit adequate preparation time for subordinate units. Affected units require sufficient notification to enable them to complete their internal preparation activities, which may be extensive depending on the type of unit (especially those that are not fully mobile) and the extent of the movement.

6-30. Initial execution may begin with seizure of key terrain to prevent enemy attempts to delay the movement. The corps may also employ specialized capabilities, such as SOF, or conduct airborne or air assault operations to establish conditions for the movement of the corps' main body.

6-31. March discipline will heavily impact the success of a corps-size move. The corps is focused on the planning aspect of the march, such as the synchronization matrix, but it must also clearly articulate the march standards to subordinate units. Failure to conform to the corps plan by a lower echelon unit can disrupt the entire corps movement.

6-32. Execution requires aggressive supervision and precise reporting. Just as commanders observe named area of interest (known as NAI) in other operations, they make deliberate provisions to watch key points or areas during a march. Units must quickly and accurately report enemy interference or mobility problems on the route. Accurate, timely reporting enables the corps to maintain situational awareness.

6-33. The corps commander must be continuously informed of the location, strength, dispositions, and movement of the enemy. The corps leverages Army and joint ISR capabilities to assist with this. The commander must also be kept apprised of the staff's interpretation of enemy courses of action prior to and during the movement.

6-34. The corps commander determines where to assume risk during movements. The overall risk decision addresses the tension between speed and security. Organizing for speed will simplify control, facilitate rapid movement, and reduce sustainment difficulties. However, organizing for speed reduces flexibility and, depending on the scheme of maneuver, likely increases some vulnerabilities to enemy action. Organizing for security presents the inverse of the benefits and challenges of organizing for speed.

6-35. There are multiple specific considerations for a corps-size movement that impact risk. The selection of different methods of transportation will affect speed and security. Capabilities that are loaded into trains, vessels, and aircraft are unavailable to the commander during movement and may not arrive to their destination on time or at all. Movement is dependent on enemy force capabilities. Historically, the U.S. enjoyed nighttime supremacy, but in the era of persistent surveillance and reconnaissance coverage this is no longer universally true. Night offers some level of concealment but typically slows the rate of march. March standards also impact risk. Commanders may sacrifice speed to increase tactical spacing, use alternate routes, and impose restrictions to how many units may move at a time.

6-36. Security operations are inherent to tactical large-unit movements. The corps designates the main body for the movement. The corps will then assign and apportion security forces for the main body. Depending on the mission variables, the corps may employ a covering force, advance guard, flank or rear guards, and screening forces to support the main body. The covering force and advance guard (if used) will depart before the main body.

6-37. Reconnaissance precedes unit movement. Reconnaissance units can conduct route and area reconnaissance for the movement, along with area reconnaissance of the assembly areas or attack positions at the termination of the movement route. The main body reconnaissance units will cross the line of departure prior to the main body. The main body then crosses the line of departure to execute its movement. The elements of the main body will be further subdivided into march columns, march serials, and march units. (See FM 3-90 for more information on reconnaissance operations.) The corps' quartering party acts on behalf of the corps headquarters. Each subordinate unit is responsible for its own quartering party. The rear guard (if used) will then be the last element of the corps' movement to cross the line of departure. Depending on the plan, the advance of the rear guard past predetermined locations or checkpoints may be the condition necessary to adjust the corps' close and rear boundaries.

6-38. The corps may employ any of the movement techniques from FM 3-90; however, they are most likely to deploy their divisions in columns along parallel axes based upon terrain and available maneuver corridors. Those columns may be organized in depth in formations that resemble a wedge, vee, or diamond to maintain flexibility with a smaller covering force out front to gain time and secure freedom of maneuver for the rest of the force.

6-39. A corps movement requires the corps to coordinate with the field army or JFLCC for boundary adjustments in the same way that it coordinates for boundary shifts for its divisions. As the movement occurs, the lines of communication will increase (unless it is a rearward movement). The corps' rear command post must oversee the security and management of the LOCs. The movement may also require establishing new support areas or closing existing ones. This requires detailed management to ensure minimal disruption to logistics to the forward elements and main body.

6-40. The corps requires engineer gap crossing capabilities to facilitate movement in most theaters. These are unlikely to be permanently assigned to the corps. Their use must be anticipated, and their support requested. Movement and positioning of bridging units, as well as their security, requires extensive planning. Typically, a division conducts a wet gap crossing as part of a larger corps operation.

6-41. Corps sustainment units may require additional support to manage the requirements of a movement. Depending on the methods of transportation employed, along with command and support relationships at areas of embarkation and debarkation, the corps may need additional materiel handling, transportation, and maintenance support. The corps should deconflict sustainment requirements with the land component command or the theater army.

RELIEF IN PLACE

6-42. A ***relief in place*** **is an operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit.** Units conduct a relief in place as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the combat effectiveness of committed forces. While a corps may be relieved by another corps, a corps will more often be focused on conducting reliefs in place between divisions.

6-43. As an operation involving hand-off of combat responsibility from one force to another, relief operations are extremely complex and involve higher risk. To minimize risk and to ensure synchronization, successful relief in place operations require detailed, centralized planning and decentralized execution. Reliefs may be characterized as hasty or deliberate. The entire corps may participate in a relief in place mission as the incoming or relieved force. In addition, corps offensive and defensive operations often include subordinate division relief in place operations. There are three variations of a relief, which are described in FM 3-90. If forward elements can defend the AO, it is preferable to execute the relief in place from rear to front. This facilitates movement and terrain management.

6-44. For a corps-level relief in place, a higher echelon will direct key aspects of the operation. When the corps is the headquarters directing subordinate relief in place, the corps will direct key aspects of the operation. Key aspects of a relief in place operation include—

- Deception plan.
- Priorities for routes.
- Information collection plan.
- Fire support plan.
- Air defense plan.
- Sustainment plan.
- Control measures with effective times.
- Rearward assembly areas.
- Airspace control.
- Command relationships with forces remaining in the transferred area.
- Subsequent missions for the incoming and relieved forces.
- Apportionment of enablers.

6-45. When the corps is directed to conduct a corps-level relief by a higher echelon, it focuses its planning on coordination with the other force and guidance to subordinate units conducting the relief. These are done simultaneously. Any decisions made between coordinating corps are immediately passed to subordinates. However, it is typically at the division echelon or below that detailed planning and coordination occurs.

6-46. Units conceal relief in place operations from enemy forces for as long as possible. As a result, the tactical deception plan is vital. As soon as units receive an order indicating a pending relief in place, they should initiate a deception plan. Central to deception will be operations security measures. The protect information activity will be the foundation of a tactical deception plan (See ADP 3-13 for more information on the protect information activity).

6-47. The air defense plan must balance two competing requirements. The first is to maintain protection of forward committed forces. The second is to provide coverage over the primary relief routes. The incoming and relieved commands must jointly develop the air defense plan to ensure force protection. Whenever the plan impacts the coverage of the Joint Force Commander's defended asset list, the corps must request a change through the Area Air Defense Commander.

6-48. The relief plan may require the exchange of certain weapons, supplies, equipment, or vehicles between the incoming and relieved units. When necessary, the headquarters directing the relief in place operation must designate what is exchanged. Equipment exchanges should be controlled and documented to the extent the situation allows.

6-49. Corps may conduct relief operations with or between multinational forces. Additional planning consideration for such situations include—

- Special adjustments of assigned sectors if the unit organizations are dissimilar.
- Special liaison for fire support control.
- Increased use of guides to overcome language challenges.
- Special arrangements for using communications equipment and spectrum management.
- Ammunition and equipment incompatibility may make exchange difficult.

6-50. Command and control are facilitated by close coordination by all commanders involved. Properly locating command posts to support operations and the exchange of liaisons is critical. The liaisons must have

the ability to always communicate with their organic headquarters. (See FM 6-0 for more information on liaison.)

6-51. Relief operations are vulnerable to enemy attacks. Any unnecessary delays during execution provide the enemy additional time to acquire, target, and mass fires. Units must complete relief operations as quickly as possible to protect the force. Units must consider their electromagnetic spectrum signature during a relief. Whenever possible, the incoming unit should use the relieved unit's networks and communications band to minimize the risk of alerting the enemy of an ongoing relief operation.

6-52. The fire support plan for a relief in place should account for both units' fires capabilities and ensure that there is no interruption of fire support when the relieved units withdraw. This requires synchronization of fire support responsibilities over time, decision points, shared fire support coordination measure (known as FSCM), and the allocation of adequate position areas for artillery.

6-53. Commanders must carefully synchronize the transfer of command relationships. Units in the assigned area must fall under the operational control of a single commander. Typically, the commander of the relieved force retains TACON of the incoming force until a pre-designated time or condition is met. Then, the incoming commander assumes TACON of the relieved force until the operation is complete. When command is transferred, the units must be notified as quickly as possible to limit confusion. The commander's use of TACON over the other unit is typically limited to responding to enemy attacks and controlling movement timing.

6-54. Commanders mitigate risk by executing the relief operation as quickly as possible. Units are vulnerable to attack during a relief in place operation, especially if temporary gaps in defensive coverage occur due to miscommunication. Commanders should mitigate this risk through their deception plans and fire support plans. Apportionment and employment of joint capabilities is a significant risk mitigator during relief.

6-55. Commanders must also focus on risks associated with fratricide. Force intermingling is inherent in a relief since units will be conducting forward and rearward passages of lines at some point during the relief. Commanders establish risk mitigation primarily through control measures. The corps is responsible for maintaining a common operational picture for corps or division relief in place operations. A significant portion of this is accomplished through reporting and graphic control measures.

6-56. The corps will likely inherit the relieved corps-equivalent unit's deep area during a relief. Transfer of responsibility must be carefully coordinated between commanders. There may be actions the corps desires to assist with the tactical deception plan, such as disrupting enemy long-range ISR and fires. However, activities in the corps' deep area remain generally unchanged from what the relieved unit was conducting until the relief is complete.

6-57. During a defense, a corps would likely sequence activities to maintain OPSEC and defensive continuity. A sequential relief in place that occurs from rear to front is preferred. This provides the best security for the operation. Regardless of the sequencing of succession, a sequential relief or staggered relief maintains security but requires more time than a simultaneous approach. For both sequential and staggered relief in place operations, the incoming corps' subordinate echelons occupy dispersed assembly areas prior to moving forward into the forward unit's assigned area. The relieved units then must conduct a rearward movement to their new assembly areas. The corps command may use the tactical CP to control the operation. In the case of sequenced operations, the tactical CP may move from one division AO to another.

6-58. A simultaneous relief in place is unlikely at the corps level. However, it may be possible to execute this type of relief operation if the relieved corps is no longer in contact with the enemy and there are enough movement corridors to support moving the divisions in brigade columns. In this case, the incoming corps simultaneously departs its assembly areas in the rear area and executes a corps-size movement to the AO. Once in place, the relieved corps will conduct a rearward corps-size movement out of the AO. Command and control of this form of relief at this echelon is especially challenging because of the scope and speed of the relief. (See figure 6-1 on page 120 for a relief in place in a corps AO. In the figure, divisions A and C are relieved by divisions B and D, and they move rearward on ROUTES SILVER and GOLD to their assembly areas in the corps rear. The corps commander placed the tactical CP between the two operations to enhance control.)

6-59. The corps will likely inherit the relieved corps-equivalent unit's rear area during a relief. The corps may assume the existing support areas. This will limit disruptions to sustainment, minimize protection lapses, and facilitate transfer of equipment and supplies (if required). However, this may increase the vulnerability of the support areas to enemy attacks. If the corps creates new support areas, the inverse of the preceding risks and benefits is true. If the higher echelon's plan directs the relieved corps to occupy assembly areas in the incoming corps' rear area, every effort should be made to adjust rear boundaries to minimize the presence of a second corps in the corps' AO. If necessary, clear command and support relationships, along with control measures, must be established by the higher echelon.




Figure 6-1. Relief in Place in a Corps Area of Operations

PASSAGE OF LINES

6-60. A *passage of lines* is an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force's combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy (JP 3-18). Units may perform a passage of lines to sustain offensive tempo, maintain the viability of the defense, transition from the performance of delay or security operations to the defense, or transition a unit for another mission or task. Commanders may designate a passage of lines as a forward or rearward passage of lines. (See FM 3-90 for more information on passage of lines.) To minimize risk and to ensure synchronization of the operation, successful passage of lines operations require detailed, centralized planning and decentralized execution. The entire corps may participate in a passage of lines as the passing or stationary force. In addition, corps offensive and defensive operations often include subordinate passage of lines operations.

6-61. Command and control are the driving consideration for a passage of lines. After receiving a warning order directing an operation that requires a passage of lines, the passing commander and staff establish liaison with the unit in contact. Close coordination and understanding between commanders and staff are essential for the smooth transfer of control during a passage of lines.

6-62. Commanders must carefully synchronize the transfer of command relationships. Units in the assigned area must fall under the operational control of a single commander. During a forward passage of lines, the

commander of the stationary force typically retains TACON of the passing force until a pre-designated time or condition is met. Then, the passing commander assumes TACON of the stationary force until the operation is complete. When command is transferred, the units must be notified as quickly as possible to limit confusion. During a rearward passage of lines, passing unit commanders retain control over their forces.

6-63. Typically, the fire support capabilities of the stationary corps will support the passing corps until completion of the operation. For a forward passage of lines, this allows the passing corps' fire support assets to continue to move forwards into firing positions that support an attack and maximizes the amount of artillery available for counterfire during a hazardous operation. For a rearward passage of lines, this ensures coverage during the displacement of the passing corps' artillery.

6-64. Units are vulnerable during a passage of lines to attack, especially if temporary gaps in the defensive front occur. Commanders mitigate risk with intelligence, deception, and as many passage points as possible. In a forward passage of lines, the stationary force maintains contact with the enemy and shares situational understanding for the passing unit commander. In a rearward passage of lines, if the passing unit is in contact with the enemy, maintaining a rear guard force is important to prevent enemy direct fire against passing units and penetrations at the passage points.

6-65. A passage of lines presents significant risk of fratricide. A forward passage of lines exposes the passing force to the risk of fratricide, especially when initially passing forward of the passage point. A rearward passage of lines exposes both forces to the risk of fratricide during initial contact at the passage point. Commanders establish risk mitigation for fratricide, primarily through control measures. Commanders must ensure that they deconflict direct and indirect fires with graphic control measures.

6-66. The stationary corps continues to conduct deep operations during the passage of lines until battle handover. In a forward passage of lines, corps employ fires to protect the passage of lines and set conditions for the passing corps' subsequent attack. The stationary force intelligence collection plan primarily supports the passage of lines by providing situational understanding between the passage points and the objectives of the passing force. For a rearward passage of lines, the passing corps hands over its deep operations responsibilities in stages to the stationary force. If it is in contact with enemy forces and executing a retrograde, the passing corps focuses its deep operations on disrupting follow-on enemy forces to create enough stand off to ensure it can break contact. The stationary corps should provide fire support that facilitates the passing corps movement, based upon a mutually agreed upon division of responsibility for counterfire and specific essential fire support tasks.

Forward Passage of Lines

6-67. In a forward passage of lines, the passing corps conducts a troop movement from assembly areas through the stationary corps through passage lanes without halts or bunching up along the routes. This requires considerable planning and significant gaps between march units and march serials to account for friction, but gaps should be small enough to preclude units from becoming unsupported on the far side of the passage lanes. Divisions execute their respective passage of lines, synchronized and supported by the corps. The corps determines timing and sequencing of the division passages and provides specific guidance about when corps-controlled assets supporting the divisions move. Once predetermined conditions agreed to by the two corps commanders are met, the passing corps assumes responsibility of the AO and continues operations.

6-68. In a forward passage of lines, the stationary corps must accommodate the passing corps' movement from their assembly areas to the passage point. This may require adjusting sustainment operations from the support areas, as the passing corps will have priority on the planned movement routes. If necessary, the stationary corps adjusts its protection activities in the rear area prior to departure of the passing corps from their assembly areas to ensure adequate coverage of the passing corps. The passing and stationary corps will conduct rear operations in close proximity to each other and likely share MSR and ASR, depending upon the number and quality of routes available, until the passing corps expands its AO enough to no longer be intermingled with the stationary corps. Support areas will likely be in close proximity to one another, since the passing corps should consider establishing its support area forward in the stationary corps rear area before it begins forward movement.

REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

6-69. In a rearward passage of lines, the passing corps most likely executes a retrograde operation through a stationary corps. The passing corps maintains contact with advance enemy forces and continues its operation while simultaneously executing the passage of lines. The passing corps commander oversees the rearward passage of lines, which is primarily executed by subordinate divisions. The corps will likely transition to a large-unit movement that terminates in assembly areas after passing through the stationary corps. (See paragraph 6-14 to 6-41 for more information on troop movement.). The corps usually passes its sustainment units through the passage point first. The passing corps continues to manage the retrograde fight with the enemy until the predesignated battle handover. This includes controlled displacement of its fire support capabilities to enable them to support their forces in contact while simultaneously retrograding. At battle handover, the stationary corps assumes responsibility for fighting advancing enemy formations, which includes control of fire support.

6-70. In a rearward passage of lines, the passing corps' units conducting rear operations displace first, while those responsible for support operations follow to the degree that they can continue to support in preplanned locations along the routes. The stationary corps will retain control over its rear area during the passage operation, although priority of designated routes will shift to accommodating the requirements of the passing corps. Once the passing corps completes the passage of lines and occupies its assembly areas, the passing corps may re-establish a rear area coordinated with the LCC to ensure it doesn't hinder the stationary corps lines of communication. In this case, the passing corps must establish new support areas and assume protection and security activities.

6-71. Ideally, a passage of lines does not interfere with the stationary unit's operations. In figure 6-2, Divisions A and C are assembled in the corps rear area and then moved forward to the division areas using ROUTES SILVER and GOLD in preparation for passage through Divisions B and D. The corps commander can use the tactical CP to control the operation.




Figure 6-2. Passage of Lines in a Corps Area of Operations

COUNTERMOBILITY

6-72. *Countermobility* is a set of combined arms activities that use or enhance the effects of natural and man-made obstacles to prevent the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver. (ATP 3-90.8). Countermobility supports the execution of corps offensive and defensive task operations. Corps units capable of conducting countermobility include combined arms maneuver forces, military police, AMD, and engineer units.

6-73. Countermobility adds depth for the corps by denying an enemy force's ability to maneuver. Enemy forces are more vulnerable when their movements are disrupted, fixed, or blocked, since doing so provides additional time for engagement by direct and indirect fire systems. Turning an enemy force makes it vulnerable to attack from a flank.

6-74. The corps engineer advises the commander on how to integrate obstacles, coordinates for the obstacle emplacement authority, establishes obstacle control, recommends directed obstacles, supervises the employment of obstacles, and maintains obstacle status throughout the operation. The corps engineer must have representation on the targeting board to prevent destruction of key infrastructure essential to corps future operations. The corps engineer develops the corps obstacle plan and refines it based on the commander's guidance and feedback from the divisions.

6-75. Combatant commanders have the authority to emplace obstacles in their area of responsibility. This authority is delegated down to an appropriate level to maximize flexibility to execute tactical missions. Depending on the context, the corps may or may not receive authority to emplace obstacles. Even when authority is delegated to the corps, there may be specific restrictions on types of obstacles or methods of employment. The corps commander must also carefully consider implications for obstacle emplacement if delegating authority to division commanders.

6-76. Corps countermobility considerations include balancing risks to the friendly mission and forces with those to neutral actors, especially civilians. When the corps seeks to increase security for friendly forces through lethal obstacle emplacement, it should mitigate the risk to neutral actors from the measures it takes. For example, the corps may need to use command-detonated, self-deactivating, or nonexplosive obstacles in certain situations.

6-77. The corps must also consider future operations whenever conducting countermobility operations. Denying enemy access to routes and avenues of approach with obstacles can deny future friendly access as well. For example, if conducting countermobility operations in support of a defense with the expectation of launching a counterattack, the corps may need to preserve mobility along their anticipated movement corridors.

MOBILITY

6-78. *Mobility* is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (JP 3-36). The focus of mobility operations is to enable the corps to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield.

6-79. A corps focuses on different aspects of mobility depending on its role. When acting in a joint role, a corps considers how the combatant command (known as CCMD) has set the theater and what capabilities it must improve the mobility within its JOA. When acting as a tactical headquarters, corps mobility considerations focus on its assigned AO.

6-80. The quality of roads, terrain, and transportation infrastructure shape how quickly a corps can move formations. Improving and maintaining routes is critical. Detailed planning that accounts for route use, maintenance, and management is a fundamental corps responsibility.

6-81. Corps engineer, military police, and sustainment units enable mobility operations. They allow the corps to clear, secure, and maintain routes; control the movement of subordinate units; and resupply and refuel units transiting an AO. Engineers conduct infrastructure assessments of existing bridging and roads, obstacles, and terrain against the corps' capabilities. Engineering support may include major construction, designing and building roads and road networks, repairing and clearing routes, and improving trafficability to facilitate movement. The corps provides haul capacity augmentation to its engineers for these tasks.

GAP CROSSING

6-82. Corps-level gap-crossings have been historically important operations. An example is XII Corps' crossing of the Moselle River during World War II near the town of Nancy, France, as discussed in the Multiple Bridgeheads vignette and shown in figure 6-3. The ability of the corps to manage multiple, widely dispersed division crossing sites was instrumental in Third Army's advance across France. Although gap-crossings are not historically decisive, they are still foundational to corps-level maneuver that supports offensive and defensive operations.

6-83. A *gap crossing* is the projection of combat power across a linear obstacle (wet or dry gap) (ATP 3-90.4). Examples of gaps include ravines, mountain passes, and rivers. Gap crossing enables friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield across terrain typically not trafficable by most corps' units. There are three types of gap crossings: deliberate, hasty, and covert. Larger gap crossings are typically conducted by divisions and planned in detail at division level as part of a larger corps operation. The corps performs fundamental planning and resourcing responsibilities while setting conditions for division success before and during execution. A critical part of setting conditions is to ensure that the enemy cannot effectively employ fires against friendly forces crossing the gap. (See ATP 3-90.4 for further information on gap crossing operations.)

Multiple Bridgeheads

Over a week-long period in September 1944, Lieutenant General George S. Patton's Third Army attempted to cross an assault force at several points across the Moselle River to establish a bridgehead and then encircle three German Army divisions in the city of Nancy, France. With a plan that closely followed U.S. river-crossing doctrine, Third Army's XII Corps executed a wet-gap crossing south of the town of Nancy with the 35th Infantry Division as the bridgehead force and 4th Armored Division as the breakout force. As planned, the successful wet-gap crossing opened the southern route to Nancy and allowed the 80th Infantry Division to initiate a similar crossing north of the city. The establishment of multiple bridgeheads at Nancy demonstrates how mobility played a significant role in the Third Army's successful march across France. (See figure 6-3 for a map of the operations.)




Figure 6-3. Corps Mobility in World War II

6-84. Corps seize existing bridges and fording sites whenever possible since it reduces the amount of bridging its engineer brigade must emplace. Speed is important since the enemy understands the importance of crossing sites in the same way friendly forces do. The corps typically controls an engineer brigade with bridging companies and other enablers that it allocates to support its divisions, in accordance with the roles of its main and supporting efforts inside a specific scheme of maneuver.

6-85. The corps determines if its subordinate divisions will cross the river on a wide front, involving two or more divisions, or on a narrow front, involving one division. While a crossing on a wide front is preferred because it projects combat power more rapidly across the obstacle and keeps the corps more dispersed, terrain and the scarcity of bridging assets may limit options. The corps might cross on a narrow front if the scheme

of maneuver requires it or if the corps does not have the equipment it needs for multiple division crossing points. The fewer the crossing points, the more important protecting the crossing points becomes.

6-86. The corps determines whether subordinate units can execute simultaneous or sequential crossings based on the enemy situation and available resources. The corps assigns divisions mission objectives and bridgeheads, also providing the deception plan and terrain and enemy analysis. The corps commander clearly articulates the main and supporting efforts and priorities of support, so limited resources, such as engineering, fire support, air defense, sustainment, and movement control assets, are distributed appropriately.

6-87. The corps ensures that the divisions do not crowd their assigned crossing sites by allocating them AOs large enough to disperse forces outside of medium artillery range. The corps should help the divisions synchronize crossings as continuous movements across the gap. This allows the divisions to move crossing units without stopping at a series of assembly areas or attack positions that are vulnerable to massed fires.

6-88. The corps designates the bridgehead(s) for an offensive gap crossing, which is graphically depicted with a bridgehead line. The bridgehead must provide space for all units needed on the far side of the gap for the corps to continue the attack. The bridgehead should be defensible and large enough to allow dispersion and maneuver for the bridgehead commander. If the division(s) conducting the crossing continues the attack beyond the bridgehead, the corps establishes a shallow bridgehead. If the corps intends to pass a follow-on division through the bridgehead, it requires more depth. In instances where the bridgehead force is expected to defeat substantial enemy forces short of the bridgehead line, the corps establishes intermediate division objectives.

6-89. During a retrograde gap crossing, planning considerations remain generally the same. However, command and control will be more difficult if the corps is executing retrograde operations in contact with the enemy. Units unable to break direct fire contact with enemy forces are unlikely to survive a crossing attempt, so the corps should set conditions for the bulk of its forces to cross out of direct fire contact. The crossing sites available to friendly forces will likely be limited, making the corps more vulnerable while crossing. Tactical deception should be employed to conceal the location of crossing sites and the timing of the crossings.

6-90. Corps and division reconnaissance forces assist with the selection of crossing sites. They gather and refine information about the nature of the gap. For example, reconnaissance forces measure the width, depth, and flow rate of a river. They develop the situation on the opposite side of the gap to inform the commander's decision-making. Reconnaissance forces can perform initial security operations during the crossing of a gap. The corps further ensures that all available joint and Army reconnaissance capabilities are employed early in the gap crossing planning process.

6-91. In a retrograde gap crossing, the commander must get all nonessential support forces across the gap early and disperse them in locations that can support the remainder of the operation. Units may need to destroy equipment they cannot quickly recover and that is in danger of being captured. When possible, units should recover bridging equipment early and use other means to cross the last units on the far side.

6-92. The corps must develop contingency plans for the gap crossing operation. An example of a corps-level contingency is the loss of a crossing site, whether through friendly or enemy actions. These plans should include specific conditions that commit to different branches of the plan. For example, if a small percentage of the force is across the gap when a crossing site is interdicted, whether by accidental friendly actions or enemy attack, then the corps executes branch A. If most of the force is across the gap when it is closed, then the corps executes branch B.

6-93. The primary risk for the corps commander is the failure of a gap crossing that is partially complete, isolating a portion of the corps on the far side of the obstacle. To mitigate this risk, the corps prepares contingency plans and expends maximum effort to complete the crossing once forces are committed. Speed is essential to the operation. Corps commanders enhance the tempo of operations by using multiple crossing sites, higher capacity crossing capabilities, and limiting the complexity of follow-on objectives in the bridgehead to enable divisions to mass combat power on the far side of the gap. Corps commanders also pay close attention to the mobility of subordinate units, maximizing mounted movement and maneuver however possible. Commanders also mitigate the risk of partial corps isolation by ensuring the security of the crossing sites. It may be more important to allocate protection capabilities to crossing sites than to support areas, the bridgehead, or some command posts. Corps commanders also direct divisions to aggressively execute

offensive operations in the bridgehead, forcing the enemy to focus resources in places other than the crossing sites.

6-94. Friendly forces are most vulnerable while in the crossing lanes. The corps mitigates this risk by allocating air defense capability to the crossing site(s), suppressing the enemy's long-range fires capabilities, ensuring security operations are prioritized in the scheme of maneuver, and developing a tactical deception plan.

6-95. Corps artillery may need to be positioned near the crossing sites early in the operation to enable support to the divisions. The corps may also need to reposition air defense capabilities to protect the operation before the divisions begin main body crossing. The corps reconnaissance forces will likely cross early in the operation to allow them to conduct operations on the far side of the crossing and develop the situation. The corps commander will position a corps command post where they can best influence the operation. This will depend on a combination of the mission variables and the scheme of maneuver, particularly on simultaneous or sequential crossing by divisions. The corps tactical command post (known as TAC) may either be positioned to oversee a crossing site, if conducting simultaneous crossings, or cross into the bridgehead early to oversee operations on the far-side of the gap. In a retrograde crossing, the TAC will likely oversee the continuation of the retrograde while the main CP manages the gap crossing. Intelligence activities in the corps' close area prioritize the crossing sites and developing the far-side situation. Sustainment activities during the crossing remain mostly the same as the offensive or defensive operation, depending on whether the corps is attacking or retrograding. (See figure 6-4 on page 128 for a depiction of corps C2 for multiple gap crossings.)

6-96. Operations in the corps' rear area remain generally the same as during offensive or defensive operations. Depending on the scheme of maneuver and follow-on missions, the corps may need to establish new support areas across the gap once the operation concludes. The rear CP oversees the reduction of any temporary gap crossing materials (such as bridges) that are not required to sustain future operations. It will also manage the reconsolidation and reorganization, when required, of units committed to the crossing operation, such as bridging units. In a retrograde gap crossing, the rear CP may be the first corps CP across the gap and manage far-side operations for the corps commander. This will include dispersing sustainment capabilities and establishing support areas.




Figure 6-4. Example of a Corps Wet Gap Crossing

6-97. Bridging units are essential to corps gap-crossing operations, especially the multi-role bridge companies. Due to their low-density, their apportionment must be carefully managed by the corps. The corps may also retain OPCON over these units during gap-crossing operations, delegating TACON to the divisions, to help the corps manage their use over time. The corps needs to consider subsequent gap crossings when making apportionment decisions, retaining some capability for the next anticipated gap.

6-98. Military police and movement control units assist with managing the flow of traffic at the crossing site(s). The corps will make division apportionment decisions for corps-level units. The corps is ultimately responsible for ensuring the development of the traffic control plan with the assistance of these units. The divisions will execute the plan.

6-99. The corps must closely manage air defense capabilities for gap-crossings. Risk mitigation may require the corps to coordinate with the Area Air Defense Commander to adjust the defended asset list during a crossing operation to ensure crossing sites are defended with upper-tier capabilities. The corps will also apportion short-range air defense (known as SHORAD) capabilities to the divisions to support the crossing site(s), especially by defending against level 1-3 unmanned aerial vehicles, indirect fires, and missiles.

TACTICAL DECEPTION

6-100. *Tactical deception* is a friendly activity that causes enemy commanders to take action or cause inaction detrimental to their objectives (FM 3-90). TAC-D operations are designed to support the corps commander's plan by enhancing the probability of mission success. TAC-D allows corps to create windows of opportunity for subordinate units.

6-101. TAC-D concepts do not tie into an overall military deception operation. TAC-D differs from MILDEC in three ways—

- MILDEC is centrally planned and controlled through combatant-command derived authorities, but TAC-D is not. Tactical commanders (at division and corps echelons) with an approved plan can employ TAC-D unilaterally.

- TAC-D actions are tailored to tactical requirements of the local commander and not always linked or subordinate to a greater MILDEC plan.
- The TAC-D approval process differs from the MILDEC approval process. The corps receives approval for division TAC-D from its higher echelon command.

6-102. TAC-D is a commander-driven activity that is structured to set favorable conditions to achieve friendly objectives. Corps commanders decide the location and time to employ deception in support of operations. Corps use the principles, types, means, and variations of TAC-D to conceal friendly locations, capabilities, or intent until a time and place of the friendly commander's choosing. (See FM 3-13.4 for further details.)

6-103. The corps incorporates tactical deception into its planning from the beginning. The corps deception officer, who normally resides in the information operations section, needs to be involved with TAC-D planning at the outset. Deception planners are trained on deception planning process, types and principles of deception, deception policy, and deception security considerations. Deception planners are trained on deception planning process, types and principles of deception, deception policy, and deception security considerations. Each course of action developed during military decision-making process should address the employment of tactical deception. Depending on the scope of the commander's desired deception, tactical deception operations may be force intensive and have an impact on the available combat power for the corps' main effort or other supporting efforts. For example, a feint to support a corps-level operation may require an entire division to complete.

6-104. The timing of tactical deception activities is critical to success. The corps may need to sequence its course of action to enable tactical deception operations to occur prior to the execution of the operation, such as moving forces to deceive the enemy. The corps develops its understanding of the enemy's intelligence collection capabilities and routines and then uses that information to drive the timing of tactical deception operations.

6-105. Commanders must consider the risk of tactical deception operations when planning them. A significant risk is building a plan that is dependent on a certain degree of success from tactical deception to make the risk of the main effort acceptable. To mitigate this risk, commanders may allocate additional resources to the tactical deception operation to ensure success. They must also develop indicators to assess the effectiveness of deception efforts, then apportion resources to collect information against those indicators.

6-106. Tactical deception also creates the risk of unintended consequences. Since tactical deception inherently depends on understanding the enemy commander's decision-making process, success depends on actions outside the control of friendly forces. Planners need to evaluate risks associated with potential compromise of the deception plan, risk of the deception plan failing, and risk that successful deception results in unintended action by the enemy commander. Deception planners need to develop a security plan to prevent the enemy from discovering any planned deception – to include limiting details of the plan to commanders and enablers with a need-to-know. Planners need to identify specific termination criteria for TAC-D, accounting for maintaining security of TAC-D efforts, addressing risks associated with compromise of the TAC-D, and conditions under which TAC-D is terminated due to success.

LINKUP OPERATIONS

6-107. A *linkup* is a meeting of friendly ground forces, which occurs in a variety of circumstances (ADP 3-90). Linkups are conducted to complete the encirclement of an enemy force, assist the breakout of an encircled friendly force, join an attacking force with a force operating adjacent to it, or to join an attack force with airborne or air assault elements following a vertical envelopment.

6-108. A corps may be required to conduct a linkup with another force as part of a directed operation from the joint task force or multinational land force command. A corps may also be required to direct a linkup of subordinate units as a phase of a larger corps operation. In either case, the physical linkup is likely to be conducted initially by one of the corps' divisions. (See figure 6-5 on page 130 for a depiction of a linkup operation of two moving forces.)




Figure 6-5. Corps Linkup of Two Divisions

6-109. The corps staff develops minimum control measures for units conducting a linkup. The commander assigns each unit an AO defined by lateral boundaries and a restrictive fire line that also acts as a limit of advance (known as LOA). The restrictive fire line should be as close to the stationary force (if applicable) as possible to allow maximum maneuver space for the moving force. The corps designates a no-fire area around one or both forces and establishes a coordinating fire line beyond the area where the forces linkup. The linkup forces use the linkup points established by the commander to initiate physical contact.

6-110. The headquarters directing the linkup establishes the command relationships between the converging forces both during and after completing the linkup. At some point during the operation or after the linkup, higher headquarters may elect to combine both forces into a single force under the control of either commander, or both forces can continue to operate separately under the control of the higher commander. The headquarters directing the linkup will also assign the converging forces subsequent missions after the linkup.

6-111. Converging forces will maintain command and staff liaison during the planning phase and throughout the duration of the operation. Command liaison elements must be capable of continuous operations and of communicating directly back to their organic headquarters. This is especially critical during joint or combined operations when communications equipment may not interface. Converging forces also need to establish any additional communications necessary to support the operation, including the exchange of signal operating instructions and physical recognition procedures.

6-112. The corps must reduce the risks associated with fratricide during a linkup. Ideally, one force will be stationary while the linkup force is moving. This will assist with fratricide mitigation. Regardless of whether both forces are moving or not, an important risk mitigator is constant communication with the other force

and, whenever possible, the exchange of liaisons. This enables situational awareness and common graphical control measures. However, the commander seeks acceptable balance between necessary restrictive measures and enabling freedom of action for subordinate units.

6-113. Subordinate units need to have sufficient sustainment to ensure they can reach the linkup point. The corps must also ensure its support areas and sustainment plan support the tempo and depth of operations necessary for the linkup. The corps should employ its reconnaissance forces to fight for information and maneuver its forces with audacity to defeat any enemy counterattacks. If the corps is directing the linkup, it should employ lethal and non-lethal effects to fix or isolate enemy forces and mitigate risk to the flanks of friendly units conducting the attack.

6-114. If the corps conducts a linkup with a formation that is not part of the corps, elements of one division will most likely act as the main effort. The headquarters directing the linkup may dictate conditions for adjusting the respective operational frameworks of the corps and the other unit. If not, then the corps must coordinate with the other linkup force to synchronize operations, maintain a common operational picture, and deconflict fires and airspace.

6-115. If the corps is assisting a friendly breakout, their close area activities are largely METT-TC (I) dependent. Examples include leading reconnaissance and security forces that will affect the linkup, employing fires to destroy enemy forces, and organizing the main body to be able to conduct a defensive operation after linkup. If the corps is the force breaking out from an encirclement, activities in the close area may include a focus on supporting a penetration of enemy defenses, reinforcing the penetration and conducting flank security operations, supporting the defense within the encirclement, and sending lead reconnaissance and/or security forces along the axis of advance to the linkup point.

6-116. When the corps is joining an adjacent attacking force or in a follow and assume role with a friendly force, for example, linking up with airborne or air assault units that have seized objectives, the dynamics of the linkup may have other factors to consider. If there is zero or limited enemy resistance between the corps and the linkup point, the focus will likely be on organizing for the subsequent operation and be executed like a movement to contact. If there is significant enemy resistance between the linkup forces, the corps will organize to defeat or isolate the intervening enemy forces, and then transition to the linkup, followed by the directed subsequent operation.

6-117. Rear operations during a corps linkup operation focus on supporting rapid movement and maneuver. Since linkup operations generally have specific timelines informed by enemy dispositions or the need to relieve friendly forces experiencing difficult conditions, most linkups require corps units to move quickly. The corps must be ready to push sustainment, expand lines of communication, establish new support areas, and displace CPs when necessary. The corps must also be concerned with security, particularly if the linkup forces expect to bypass enemy units to maintain their tempo.

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Chapter 7
Consolidating Gains While Fighting

This chapter addresses what a corps is required to do to start consolidating gains while still fighting. This chapter begins with an overview of stability operations and consolidating gains followed by a discussion of the challenges inherent in consolidating gains during combat operations. It then discusses the types of activities and operations that a corps is responsible for in their AO. The chapter concludes with some planning considerations when planning for these operations.

CONSOLIDATING GAINS AND ITS RELATION TO OPERATIONAL SUCCESS

7-1. Successfully consolidating gains is fundamental to Army operations. Consolidating gains in combat can be challenging, requiring careful planning, execution, and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. A corps initially focuses on the exploitation of tactical success as it begins to consolidate gains in its AO. It does this by reorganizing its forces and defeating any remaining enemy forces to exploit the success of its divisions. Additionally, the corps identifies what is required to perform the Army's two minimum-essential stability operations tasks in their area of operation. These two minimum-essential stability operations tasks are—

- Establish civil security which requires Army units to protect the population from violence and restore public order.
- Provide immediate needs which requires Army units to ensure the population has food, water, shelter, and emergency medical treatment.

7-2. When consolidating gains, commanders balance the competing demands of current and future combat operations with the requirement to begin reestablishing stability for the local population as quickly as possible. Although stability operations to consolidate gains may be economy of force efforts during the initial stages of any operation, they are critical to the long-term success of the corps' and, by extension, the joint forces' success. The corps must deliberately plan for consolidating gains because it can be resource intensive. Depending on the circumstances and assigned objectives, it will also require extensive coordination with unified action partners.

7-3. When consolidating gains during operations, there are several challenges that the corps and its units may encounter. In large-scale combat, the most significant challenge is often enemy forces that continue to resist or counterattack. Consolidating gains in the face of continued enemy resistance can be difficult and may require additional resources. Bypassed enemy forces, special operations forces, and irregular forces can threaten lines of operations for future corps operations. The corps will need to conduct operations to defeat bypassed forces and reduce any remaining enemy fortifications in their AO. Consolidating gains involves occupying, or at least controlling, populated areas which can present additional security challenges. Troops must protect the local population while maintaining control over the area. The enemy might try to regain lost territory by launching counterattacks in the corps' AO.

7-4. The physical features of the terrain can also pose challenges to consolidating gains. For example, mountainous or heavily forested areas can provide concealment for enemy forces, making it difficult to secure and hold. Similarly, urban environments are particularly challenging due to the presence of buildings, streets, and other structures that can be used to hide in or fortify. Maritime environments characterized by limited land areas separated, or surrounded, by large bodies of water can make it difficult for the corps to move the units and equipment necessary to consolidate gains.

7-5. The corps may have to reallocate available forces from other operations to consolidate gains effectively. This is especially true for engineers, civil affairs, military police, medical, and logistics units that provide specialized capabilities but are limited in numbers and availability. The corps may be forced to divert combat power in the form of BCTs and/or functional brigades from active combat operations to conduct area security

and stability tasks until the required units arrive in theater. Additionally, a corps may require additional assets and capabilities, including—

- Additional forces to provide area security tasks.
- Host-nation, partner, and allied security forces.
- ISR assets.
- Engineers.
- Military police.
- Explosive ordnance disposal units.
- Medical units.
- Logistics units.
- Civil affairs units.
- Psychological operations units.
- CBRN units.

7-6. Many of the specialized units required for operations reside in the National Guard or Reserve forces. This presents force projection challenges for their employment that the corps commander and staff must consider during planning. The corps MCP-OD and TLDs are critical for operations because they provide necessary, specialized staff functions. So are various specialized operational medical, engineer, and civil affairs units. Mobilization timelines for these units means that they may not be available in theater for several months. Planners must identify the need for these specialized skills and request them as early as possible.

7-7. Consolidating gains requires effective logistics, including the ability to resupply troops, evacuate casualties, and maintain communications. After prolonged combat operations, many corps' formations will require immediate resupply and maintenance support to consolidate local gains and prepare for future operations. The expeditionary nature of corps operations will place a premium on the corps' ability to prioritize where and how it provides logistics support. The ability of the corps to leverage available means of transportation and lines of communication will be critical to balancing competing demands.

7-8. Large-scale combat operations will almost inevitably result in large numbers of enemy prisoners of war requiring the corps to conduct detainee operations. Detainee operations are logistically demanding and resource intensive, but the failure to secure defeated enemy forces quickly poses the risk that they will reorganize and continue to fight. Large numbers of detainees may require the corps to divert combat power to process and secure them. Large-scale combat operations can also result in large, displaced populations, particularly from areas that were damaged in the fighting. The corps needs to be prepared to address the immediate needs of the local population by ensuring access to food, water, and shelter at a minimum and limited medical care when possible.

7-9. On an increasingly transparent battlefield, protecting units and capabilities performing operations to consolidate gains is a challenge. Constant maneuvering during offensive operations provides a measure of protection that will be largely absent as units slow down and occupy terrain during consolidation. Medical and logistics units are particularly vulnerable. It is impractical to position all the corps critical capabilities far enough behind the FLOT to be out of range of all the enemy's precision munitions. Instead, they should be placed in locations at the outer range limit of the enemy's preponderance of fire support assets whenever possible, dispersed over wide areas, and in positions that offer cover and concealment. Dispersion coupled with concealment and a detailed deception plan is the key to the survivability of critical assets busy consolidating gains. However, the increased distances between formations and capabilities creates additional challenges that the corps staff must account for during planning and execution of any operation.

7-10. Finally, consolidating gains can be time-consuming. It may take time to clear mines, establish defensive positions, and build up logistical support. It also takes time to defeat bypassed forces and establish area security in the corps AO. A corps commander must balance the need to maintain a rapid tempo to defeat the enemy in a timely manner against the risk of overextending lines of communication and culminating before achieving their operational objectives. Operations to contain or defeat bypassed enemy forces can be time-consuming and resource intensive. The corps commander must balance the need to defeat bypassed forces to protect friendly forces and secure terrain with the requirements of current and future operations.

DEFEATING BYPASSED ENEMY FORCES AND ESTABLISHING AREA SECURITY

7-11. Often the corps must continue offensive operations to completely defeat bypassed enemy forces and secure key terrain. After conducting offensive operations, a corps may find its units intermingled with enemy forces as the result of deliberate action and the vagaries of combat with a peer enemy. For example, when lead friendly echelons fix and bypass enemy forces to maintain momentum, follow-on friendly forces must defeat the bypassed enemy forces to secure future operations, key terrain, and infrastructure.

7-12. During attacks of considerable depth, follow and support forces must be provided to protect lines of communications, facilitate the forward movement of supplies, and defeat or contain bypassed enemy forces. Defeating bypassed enemy forces can pose a significant challenge to the corps, as these forces can continue to pose a threat to future corps operations.

7-13. Defeating bypassed enemy forces is the first step towards establishing area security. *Area security* is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, and actions within a specific area (FM 3-90). During the offense, the corps may task a variety of forces to conduct area security operations to protect lines of communication, protect critical capabilities, secure critical infrastructure, and control populations and key terrain. At a minimum, the corps must protect lines of communication, reserves, and displacing support elements as they are logical targets for the enemy's own deep operations. (See FM 3-90 for an expanded discussion of area security.)

7-14. The failure to establish adequate area security during combat operations can have significant negative impacts on corps operations. Friendly forces may be more vulnerable to surprise by enemy forces, which can result in increased casualties and lost/damaged equipment. Finally, security is required to transition responsibility to a legitimate governing authority and the successful completion of combat operations. If the corps is unable to establish this security, they risk prolonging operations, possibly jeopardizing the overall success of operations. At a minimum, it will lead to the increased expenditure of resources and commitment of forces.

RECONSTITUTION OPERATIONS

7-15. Reconstitution is essential to maintain combat readiness and effectiveness. Reconstitution refers to the process of restoring military capabilities after they have been degraded due to combat or other operational reasons. It's critical after a unit has been engaged in combat operations. Large-scale combat operations against capable enemy forces will result in significant losses requiring corps to conduct significant reconstitution operations to rapidly rebuild forces necessary to the subsequent phases of the overall operation. Reconstitution can be a complex process involving multiple interconnected operations including logistical support, personnel management, training, and maintenance. Balancing competing demands requires the corps commander to establish clear priorities for reconstitution operation balancing short-term requirements with long-term requirements.

7-16. Reconstitution has three elements: assessment, reorganization, and regeneration. In most instances, units will undergo some form of reorganization before requiring regeneration. Assessment refers to a commander's estimate of the unit's ability to accomplish its mission. The assessment must include the commander's judgment of all factors. While some factors, such as personnel and equipment availability, are easily and objectively defined, the unit commander is in a unique position to judge the less quantifiable aspects of the unit.

7-17. Reorganization is all measures taken by the commander to maintain unit combat effectiveness or return it to a specified level of combat capability. At any level, reorganization is accomplished internal to an organization, and it does not require significant resources from higher echelons to accomplish. Reorganization does not significantly increase combat power within a degraded unit. An effective reorganization does, however, make the most productive use of available resources and leadership.

7-18. Regeneration is the rebuilding of a unit through large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies, including the reestablishment of essential C2 and the conduct of mission-essential training for the unit. Regeneration of a BCT by the corps can require significant external support and resources from the theater and national level. Personnel and materiel must be integrated into the formation, and the unit must be

trained before being employed in combat. Because of the time required for regeneration activities and the space and resources needed for units to train, regeneration usually occurs at the corps echelon and above, out of contact with enemy forces.

7-19. Reconstituting forces in combat can also be challenging for several reasons:

- Operational tempo: Reconstituting forces in combat often needs to be done quickly to deny the enemy the opportunity to gain an advantage. However, the process of regenerating forces can be time consuming if it involves training new personnel or repairing damaged equipment.
- Logistical constraints: Reconstituting forces in combat requires a steady supply of personnel, equipment, and supplies.
- Personnel issues: Combat takes a significant toll on soldiers, both physically and mentally.
- Technological constraints: Modern equipment can be complex and expensive, and it may not be possible to repair or replace equipment losses quickly or easily. This can limit a corps' ability to reconstitute capabilities.
- Tactical and strategic considerations: Joint force commanders and the corps as the senior tactical formation may need to make difficult decisions about where to allocate resources, which units to reconstitute first, and how to balance the need for immediate combat power with the need to prepare for future operations.

7-20. The resources required to regenerate a unit will likely place severe constraints on a commander's decision to regenerate and the degree to which those units will be restored. To regenerate a severely attrited unit, a commander may have to divert resources from elsewhere in the command, change priorities, or request assistance from higher echelon headquarters. Due to resource constraints, commanders probably will be unable to replace losses in a one-for-one fashion or replace losses in all units. During large-scale combat operations, units that are still combat effective continue to fight understrength. The corps prioritizes units that are no longer combat effective for reconstitution.

7-21. A unit may be attrited to such a point that the resources required to regenerate sufficient combat power and return the unit to an effective fighting force can exceed the resources available to the commander. In such a case, the commander may decide to redistribute the remaining combat power of that unit to other units based upon coordination between corps and division commanders. Redistribution is the reassignment of personnel and equipment among other formations within the command, preferably as units when possible.

7-22. Unit status is key to initiating reconstitution. The corps commander decides to reconstitute a unit when it has become combat ineffective and resources exist to do so. Reconstitution restores the unit to the required level of combat effectiveness to accomplish its future mission. Besides normal support actions, reconstitution includes—

- Removing a unit from combat.
- Using external assets to assess the unit.
- Reestablishing the chain of command.
- Training the unit for future operations.
- Reestablishing unit cohesion.

7-23. Division, corps, and theater army headquarters should designate regeneration task forces in standard operating procedures. While performing regeneration tasks, regeneration task force elements are not performing their normal missions. The commander determines whether scarce resources required to regenerate a unit would be better used elsewhere in the command to accomplish its overall mission. (See ATP 3-94.4 for additional information on reconstitution operations.)

PERFORMING MINIMUM ESSENTIAL STABILITY OPERATIONS TASKS

7-24. Army operations are always conducted with the long-term consolidation of gains in mind. In large-scale combat operations, a corps will most likely be the senior tactical formation and Army headquarters during operations. As such, the corps will be responsible for integrating stability operations across their areas of operations, delegating tasks, and identifying those mission essential stability tasks, and ensuring unity of effort with organizations outside of their formation operating in the same spaces. Corps tactical formations initially limit their stability efforts to the minimum-essential stability tasks. As operations progress and major

combat operations cease in portions of their assigned AOs, stability operations conducted by the corps may increase, requiring additional forces and capabilities to reestablish civil security and begin the tasks of rebuilding as directed.

Note: When conducting operations inside the territory of an ally or partner, the corps should coordinate for as much host nation support for stability tasks as possible.

7-25. Performing minimum essential stability operations tasks during combat operations can be challenging, requiring the corps to balance the need to defeat the enemy with the need to establish a secure and stable environment for the local population. Army forces are morally and legally required to conduct minimum-essential stability operations tasks during all operations. These tasks provide for the immediate protection and well-being of civilian populations to the greatest extent possible based upon the mission. Besides providing immediate assistance, these tasks also set the conditions for future stability operations.

7-26. Generally, during large-scale combat operations, corps retain responsibility to conduct these minimum-essential stability operations allowing their subordinate divisions to focus on close combat. Corps are responsible for identifying and coordinating with local civilian and host nation organizations to ensure that these tasks are being conducted. The corps is also responsible for providing support as necessary to ensure those organizations can complete these two tasks. Where there are no civilian or host-nation organizations present to conduct these tasks, corps commanders are responsible for identifying the requirements and task organizing forces to conduct these tasks in their areas of operation.

7-27. Limitations in resources, security, and logistics challenge the corps' ability to perform these tasks without significant augmentation. Stability tasks often require significant resources, which may not be available during ongoing combat operations. A corps will generally establish a civil-military operations center led by either the corps G9 or the senior civil affairs headquarters assigned to the corps, to coordinate corps support for stability operations. (See FM 3-57 for more information.) A corps may require several additional brigades, or an additional division, depending on the situation. Reestablishing security may be difficult due to bypassed enemy forces that continue to pose a threat or if there are ongoing combat operations in the vicinity of local population. Stability operations also require significant logistical support, competing with other corps priorities for limited logistical support. Finally, the corps commander will have to balance the need to protect their forces with the need to protect the local population.

TRANSITIONING TO POST CONFLICT STABILIZATION

7-28. Transitions are critical events. While planning for transitions is necessary for all operations, it takes on some added significance for stability planning because many of the specialized units required for stability operations reside in the National Guard or Reserve forces, requiring significant mobilization timelines. The corps must identify and request the required force early during operations well before the end of combat operations. Transitions during stability operations have long-term political and practical components that must be accounted for in planning and during execution. Early identification of situations that require the commitment of corps assets to conduct stability tasks is essential.

7-29. As large-scale combat operations transition to a post-combat phase, the corps first focuses on the two minimum-essential stability operations tasks discussed above. Corps planning during this transition must account for the possibility that units engaging in stability tasks can become re-engaged in combat operations.

7-30. Consolidating gains during operations requires detailed planning during all phases of the operation. They may include transitions of authority and control between different military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and host nations. The role of the corps may also change from leading the conduct of stability operations to supporting a new organization executing stability operations. These transitions can create vulnerabilities to the force, to the mission, and to the local population as enemy forces seek to take advantage of any disruptions. The corps commander and staff identify these transitions through deliberate, detailed planning tied to decision points to mitigate risks while continuing the transition back to civilian oversight and host nation control of operations.

TRANSITIONAL GOVERNANCE

7-31. Transitional governance is essential for maintaining stability in periods of competition, promoting resilience in periods of crisis, and assuring continuity of governance during armed conflict. *Transitional governance* is the actions taken to assure appropriate control and continuity of government functions throughout the range of military operations (FM 3-57). The introduction of foreign military forces into sovereign territories often has a destabilizing effect on the integrity of local governance structures and their ability to control activities within defined political boundaries. When U.S. forces deploy to remove threat forces from a friendly country (or to defeat the security forces and governance structures of a belligerent country or non-state actor), they must be prepared to assume certain governance responsibilities over newly liberated or occupied territories until those responsibilities are able to be transferred to another authority.

7-32. A corps must prepare to support joint and Army forces as they establish transitional governments to assure appropriate control and the continuation of government functions during times of destabilization. Army forces assure the effective transition of governance from civilian control to military control and then back to civilian control as smoothly and efficiently as possible. Transitional governance has two primary missions, which are to provide transitional military authority and to provide support to civil administration. Since a corps does not have the resident expertise to conduct these missions, it will typically focus on reestablishing local security and providing forces to perform specific functions as required. Civil affairs formations and staff planning capabilities are critical to these operations. (See FM 3-57 for more information on CAO.)

UNITY OF EFFORT

7-33. Maintaining unity of effort during transitions is critical. The corps commander and staff will devote a significant amount of time communicating with the various stakeholders and organizations involved in the operation to ensure that competition among organizations and diverging objectives doesn't threaten the overall unity of effort. This communication is critical to ensuring continuity and understanding as forces draw down and are replaced, units are task organized into new configurations, and different intergovernmental or host nation organizations assume the lead for operations. Finally, the corps needs to be in continuous communication with the theater army to ensure that they are prepared to receive responsibility for enduring military tasks when the corps redeploys.

Appendix A
ARFOR

This appendix discusses the role of the ARFOR. While an ARFOR controls forces operationally, this appendix discusses the ARFOR's administrative and support responsibilities to subordinate Army forces and to other Services in a joint force.

ARFOR OVERVIEW

A-1. The ARFOR is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. The ARFOR is the Army component of any joint force. Army doctrine distinguishes, however, between the Army component of a combatant command and that of a joint force formed by the combatant commander. The Army component of a geographic combatant command is called the Army service component command (ASCC), and the Army component of the subordinate joint force is an ARFOR.

Note. The Army's designation for an ASCC assigned to a geographic combatant command is the theater army.

ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

A-2. The ASCC is the senior Army command assigned to a combatant command. It consists of the Army Service component commander and all those Army forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command.

A-3. ASCC commanders exercise command authorities, normally OPCON, of assigned and attached Army forces as delegated by the combatant commander, and ADCON as delegated by the Secretary of the Army. ADCON is the Army's responsibility to administer and support Army forces even while in a combatant command AOR. OPCON is the basic authority for command and control of the same Army forces.

A-4. ADCON for Army units in a combatant command normally extends from the Secretary of the Army through the ASCC, through an ARFOR, and then to the Army units assigned or attached to an Army headquarters in that command. However, ADCON is not tied to the operational chain of command. The Secretary of the Army may redirect some or all Service responsibilities outside the normal ASCC channels. In similar fashion, the ASCC may distribute some administrative responsibilities outside the ARFOR.

ARFOR IN A SUBORDINATE JOINT FORCE

A-5. All joint force commands that include Army forces have an ARFOR. JTFs are the organizations most often used by a combatant commander for contingencies. The typical JTF has a combination of service and functional components (see figure A-1 on page 142). JTF commanders normally exercise OPCON of all U.S. forces through functional component commands, Service components, subordinate JTFs, or a combination of these. The senior Army officer assigned to a JTF, other than the JFC and members of the JTF staff, becomes the ARFOR commander. The ARFOR commander answers to the Secretary of the Army through the ASCC for most ADCON responsibilities.




Figure A-1. Possible Joint Task Force Components

ARFOR RESPONSIBILITIES

A-6. The theater army provides sustainment to all Army forces stationed in, transiting through, or operating in an AOR. It also provides most ASOS, common-user logistics, and Army executive agent support to unified action partners in an AO. The theater army executes these sustainment responsibilities through its assigned TSC.

A-7. The ARFOR in a subordinate joint force provides administrative and logistics support to all Army forces and retains OPCON over Army units not subordinate to another component of the JTF. Since the preferred approach to establishing a JTF headquarters is use of an existing Service headquarters, the JTF commander (if an Army headquarters) retains all responsibilities associated with both headquarters (the ARFOR and JTF). This can overload the JTF headquarters unless the commander delegates authority for Service-specific matters to another commander. For example, when a corps headquarters transitions to a JTF headquarters, the corps commander becomes the JTF commander. The corps retains ARFOR responsibilities through the ASCC back to the Army, unless the corps commander shifts Service responsibilities to another headquarters. The corps commander normally designates a subordinate Army commander and staff as the deputy ARFOR commander to perform those duties.

Note. Generally, an Army headquarters that transitions to a JTF headquarters designates a subordinate Army commander and staff as the deputy ARFOR commander for performing ARFOR duties.

ARMY SUPPORT TO OTHER SERVICES

A-8. In addition to controlling Army forces, the ARFOR coordinates ASOS. ASOS includes provisions of common-user logistics and executive agent support to the JTF as required by the JTF establishing authority. ASOS is directed through Title 10, DOD executive agent, and combatant commander directed authorities. The ARFOR headquarters manages support to other Services including, but not limited to—

- Missile defense.
- Fire support.
- Base defense.
- Transportation.
- Fuel distribution.
- General engineering.
- Intra-theater patient movement.
- Veterinary services.
- Logistics management.
- Communications.
- CBRN defense.
- Consequence management capability.
- Explosive ordnance disposal.
- Detainee operations.

A-9. ASOS affords support external to Army forces to increase or improve capabilities. Paragraphs A-10 through A-26 provide descriptions focused on a few key capabilities provided through ASOS. A few of the key examples of ASOS provided at theater and operational levels include sustainment, general engineering, protection, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, AMD, and signal. The ARFOR commander advises the JFC on the employment of Army organizations and their capabilities and ensures a clear understanding of capability requirements and gaps.

Sustainment

A-10. Sustainment operations are critical to enabling operational reach. The Army's sustainment capability provides crucial theater support that further enables the strategic and operational reach of the joint force. Much of this support is provided through ASOS.

A-11. In all joint operations, sustainment is a Service responsibility except as specified by DOD directives, combatant commanders' lead Service designations, or inter-Service support agreements. Each Service retains its responsibility for sustainment. Combatant commanders direct theater army commanders to provide common-user logistics and ASOS, agencies, or multinational forces, as required. However, shared sustainment responsibility or common-user logistics is more effective, especially for joint operations. Title 10 authorizes combatant commanders to assign common-user logistics responsibilities that overlap the military department's prescribed functions. Additionally, directive authority for logistics is the additional authority used by combatant commanders to eliminate duplicated or overlapped sustainment responsibilities. The theater army coordinates with the combatant command staff to determine joint sustainment requirements, identify responsibilities, and enable commanders to exercise command and control for sustainment. Theater army commanders focus on operational-level theater support involving force generation and sustainment during campaigns and joint operations.

General Engineering

A-12. Specialized engineer units are typically employed at theater and operational levels to augment capabilities. The general engineering support is fully coordinated with combat operations, while planners consider and anticipate the impact of geography, force projection infrastructure, and available assets. General engineers perform engineering tasks, including support to construction management, lines of communication, infrastructure development, theater opening and closing, and protection.

A-13. Engineer assets providing support to the theater and field armies focus on those operations that help to set the theater. General engineer units such as echelon above brigade engineer construction companies and

specialized units enable force projection, expeditionary logistics, and the development of the infrastructure needed to support the joint force. Military construction in an AO is characterized by using the minimum necessities when possible, and maximizing the use of host-nation facilities such as ports, airfields, roads, and barracks. Missions include base camps and improving ports and airfields. Engineer assets in the corps and divisional support areas are primarily focused on mobility and limited protection tasks to improve survivability. Theater commanders decide on construction standards early in the planning process. (See ATP 3-34.40 for information on constraints or planning considerations for construction missions.)

Protection

A-14. Combatant commanders must take protection into consideration as large-scale combat operations entail significant operational risk. Protection emphasizes the importance of planning and expanding protection priorities, including protecting mission partners, civilian populations, equipment, resources, infrastructure, and cultural landmarks across the range of military operations. The synchronization, integration, and organization of protection capabilities and resources to preserve combat power from the effects of threats and hazards are essential.

A-15. The ARFOR plays a significant role in setting the theater, which includes conducting activities to ensure protection of the force while preserving combat power and increasing the probability of mission success. Combatant commanders must consider protection requirements for assets such as aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, lines of communication, and critical infrastructure at theater level, and requirements such as support areas, command posts, and signal nodes at corps and division level. The ARFOR anticipates changes to protection prioritization and prepares for reassessment and transition of assets throughout operations to coincide with the commander's priorities.

A-16. Protection occurs throughout all operations, and ARFOR responsibilities include executing key protection tasks such as survivability, coordination of AMD support, CBRN operations, police operations, detainee operations, and populace and resource control.

A-17. If the JFC elects to establish a JSA in the JOA, the ARFOR normally determines its structure and its controlling headquarters. The options for the JSA depend on the threat and the mission variables, particularly the forces available. If the threat to the JSA is low to moderate, the theater army commander may tailor the ARFOR with a MEB specifically for controlling the JSA. The MEB may include additional military police and intelligence assets. If the threat to theater bases and lines of communications is significant, the theater army may tailor the ARFOR with an additional BCT to control that AO. A third option, in the case of very high threat levels, is to assign the mission to an Army division with BCTs and one or more MEBs.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

A-18. CBRN capabilities support operations conducted across the range of military operations by assessing CBRN threats and hazards, providing protection against CBRN hazards, mitigating CBRN incidents, and providing hazard awareness and understanding. All CBRN functions share a common fundamental purpose that fits within the protection warfighting function to achieve or contribute to national objectives.

A-19. The ARFOR staff integrates CBRN considerations as part of protection. They are responsible for understanding the current CBRN conditions and integrating this understanding into the intelligence preparation. Ultimately, the ARFOR commander identifies the need and directs protection considerations and guidance concerning CBRN hazards to the force.

Conduct Detention Operations

A-20. Army forces are responsible for conducting DOD detainee operations. When Air Force, Marine Corps or Navy forces encounter detainees as a result of their operations, they will transfer those detainees to Army military police at the earliest opportunity. Army commanders are responsible for the transfer, backhaul, and safeguarding of all detainees taken by the joint force.

A-21. Although other Services normally play smaller roles than the Army in conducting detainee operations, they can still make significant contributions because of their considerable experience in training their counterparts. The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force should be used, when possible, for training their host-

nation counterparts. Standard joint practices should ensure that the training conducted by all Services is in concert with one another. In the case of corrections officer training, training teams may consist of trainers from more than one Service.

Signal

A-22. As commanders operate across the range of military operations, signal capabilities must be tailorable to meet the commander's requirements. The way signal formations deliver communication services varies based on the mission. Communications requirements during theater security cooperation activities from fixed posts, camps, or stations differ from a BCT commander's requirements during a movement to contact mission in large-scale combat operations. Signal staff officers and leaders need to articulate to commanders what communications capabilities are available during critical points of an operation and how these capabilities support the exercise of command and control.

A-23. Networks enable the exercise of command and control and the conduct of support operations through the wide dissemination of data and relevant information. Networks allow commanders to communicate information and control forces, and they are key enablers of successful operations.

A-24. Signal support is critical to flexibility and redundancy. While SOPs, various communications prioritization efforts, and trained staff personnel can mitigate some of the challenges with C2, effective signal support remains central to the operational success of armies, corps, and divisions. When planning to operate in a degraded or austere environment, these echelons, especially the corps and division, need to build plans from the bottom up. They need to start with single-channel tactical radios and retransmission, and then scale up to beyond line of sight systems and command post networks as conditions permit.

A-25. Operations in degraded environments require units to develop redundant means of communication that are not solely reliant on space-based assets to function properly. Truly redundant primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communication plans mix space- and terrestrial-based systems and networks and non-technical communication means to ensure the greatest possible flexibility.

Air and Missile Defense

A-26. Air and missile defense mutually supports all Services by contributing capabilities necessary for mission success. Unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key elements in countering air and missile threats. Typically, air and missile engagements will be conducted in accordance with guidelines and rules established by area air defense commander who is normally the joint force air component commander. A joint force air component commander is a commander from the Service with the preponderance of air assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint air operations in an AO, generally from either the Air Force or Navy.

A-27. The AAMDC is the Army's lead organization for Army AMD forces. The Army AMD commander in the roles of the theater army AMD coordinator and deputy area air defense commander is involved in this development process by assisting the ARFOR commander and area air defense commander in the planning and coordination of the critical asset list and creating the defended asset list.

A-28. The ARFOR plays a significant role in identifying the priorities for AMD operations. As part of the planning and development of the Air and Missile Defense Appendix of the operations order, the ARFOR details a prioritized list of critical assets in coordination with the AAMDC. This coordination extends to collaborative and exhaustive planning with joint and multinational AMD partners.

THEATER ARMY SUPPORT TO THE ARFOR

A-29. The theater army assists the combatant command in developing support priorities, including those affecting other Services. To support the ARFOR, the theater army also coordinates the projection of additional required support from the continental United States, another theater, or an intermediate staging base using air lines of communication and sea lines of communication. (See ATP 3-93 for more information on theater army support.)

A-30. The theater army is the ASCC and has the responsibility to control attached and assigned Army forces in the AOR through ADCON and OPCON or TACON. As the Army component of the combatant command

the ASCC is the ARFOR for the theater, and once delegated to a subordinate Army formation, the Army component of the subordinate joint force is an ARFOR for the JOA.

A-31. The theater army commander will specify the ADCON responsibilities of the ARFORs with the theater army normally retaining control of RSOI; logistic support of the deployed force; personnel support; finance operations support; and medical support. Administrative responsibilities normally retained by the ARFOR include internal administration and discipline, training in the JOA, and Service-specific reporting. The theater army normally retains OPCON of Army sustainment and medical commands operating in the JOA. The theater army commander establishes an Army support relationship between the ARFOR and these units. It commands all Army forces in the region until the combatant commander attaches selected Army forces to a JFC.

A-32. The theater army initially maintains control of all Army units assigned to an AOR until that control is passed to the senior Army force or ARFOR in a subordinate JOA. As part of the controlling of Army forces, the ARFOR maintains ADCON of Army forces and addresses Service responsibilities such as coordinating ASOS. (See ADP 4-0 for more information on ASOS.)

FIELD ARMY AS AN ARFOR

A-33. Large-scale combat operations often require the Army to conduct land operations with multiple corps sized formations as part of a joint or multinational command. Large-scale combat operations could require a theater army headquarters to expand and transform into an operational land headquarters (field army equivalent) exercising command over multiple Army corps and a Marine expeditionary force.

A-34. A field army (when constituted) performs operational ARFOR tasks and is the Army component of the joint force to which it is assigned. A field army, specifically tailored to mission requirements, may be assigned to a joint force command with an enduring operational requirement. Typically, a subordinate unified command is established instead of a JTF when a military operation is anticipated to be enduring. In this case, a field army would be appropriate as the Army component or ARFOR to the subordinate unified command. The theater army exercises ADCON over the field army and its subordinate Army forces, and it provides the field army and its joint force command with all Army Service functions.

CORPS AS AN ARFOR

A-35. The corps headquarters is organized, trained, and equipped to serve as the ARFOR during campaigns and major operations. This is done when commanding two or more Army divisions, while also coordinating with supporting theater-level organizations, across the range of military operations. As the ARFOR for the JFC, the corps serves as an operational-level headquarters, conducting land operations as the Service component. A corps commander and staff should not attempt to simultaneously perform the roles of a JTF and an ARFOR headquarters during major operations. The workload associated with simultaneously conducting these two roles can overwhelm the commander and staff. The corps can control up to five Army divisions in large-scale combat operations. The corps normally has an assigned ESC and one MEDBDE in direct or general support. Other theater-level assets are attached as required. The corps allows other theater-level assets to adapt to operational- or tactical-level roles depending upon the combatant commander's requirements.

A-36. In addition to operational requirements, the corps has extensive ADCON responsibilities as the ARFOR. When it serves as the ARFOR, the corps is responsible through the theater army commander for the Service-specific support of all Army forces in a JOA and for providing any ASOS with forces deployed in a JOA. The Army force package attached to the ARFOR receives the sustainment necessary to conduct land operations effectively and indefinitely. The corps commander must balance responsibility for Service component actions while communicating requests for support from various theater-level commands and units.

A-37. The JTF commander sets priorities for Army sustainment and support to other Services while delegating most Title 10 tasks and ASOS to these commands. Sustainment is assigned to the corps ESC. Echelons above brigade medical units remain under the C2 of a MEDBDE or theater medical command in a direct or general support role to all forces in an AO. Air units require centralized control of AMD engagements through the joint air operations center, and signal units must integrate into an AOR-wide

network. Therefore, these units may remain attached to the theater commands and provide direct or general support. Attachment of units—such as the civil affairs, engineers, military police, and aviation—allows the corps commander to allocate their capabilities among the division, corps, and multinational units.

A-38. A corps as an ARFOR organizes the assigned force to accomplish three operational-level tasks in support of the JTF mission. While subordinate Army commanders can perform all or part of these tasks within a JOA, they remain the responsibility of the ARFOR commander. The three tasks are—

- Conduct operations in support of the joint headquarters.
- Establish linkages among unified action partner organizations.
- Conduct sustainment operations.

CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINT HEADQUARTERS

A-39. The first task of the ARFOR commander in a JOA is to conduct operations in support of the joint headquarters. The ARFOR commander advises the JFC on the employment of Army organizations and their capabilities. The ARFOR commander ensures that subordinate commanders and staffs are trained, agile, and versatile to meet this requirement. The JFC seeks the nomination and selection of Army-apportioned or assigned units for assignment to subordinate joint commands from the ARFOR commander.

A-40. A corps headquarters, when serving as the ARFOR for a JTF, includes the headquarters controlling multiple subordinate tactical formations and the Army forces placed under a joint or multinational headquarters. The ARFOR within a JOA exercises OPCON over all Army maneuver, fires, and maneuver support forces. The Army commander is responsible to the JTF commander for these operational requirements. The corps, as the ARFOR for a JTF, establishes what is needed first—for example, construction engineers or infantry, and tanks or trucks—connected to the mission's success or failure. These analyses require a full assessment of the operational and mission variables and an understanding of risk considerations. The ARFOR commander designates, sustains, and shifts priorities of subordinate ground forces to support the joint or multinational plan. The corps staff's understanding of operational art is essential when the corps is the ARFOR.

A-41. The ARFOR commander's guidance includes subordinate commander's missions and tasks expected to contribute to the JFC's plan. This guidance includes the assignment of forces and sequencing of subordinate units' assigned missions and tasks. The ARFOR commander's guidance also includes any delegated authority, other information pertinent to the situation, and any changes that modify subordinate missions and tasks.

ESTABLISH UNIFIED ACTION PARTNER LINKAGES

A-42. The second task of the ARFOR commander in a JOA is to collaborate with the JTF headquarters to establish linkages to unified action partners and organizations operating within that area. The ARFOR commander leverages existing relationships and partnerships established by the theater army commander with unified action partners.

A-43. Army forces coordinate with unified action partner organizations located within the JOA. This liaison can also include organizations located outside the JOA that have the capability to influence activities within the ARFOR's AO, which includes establishing lateral liaison with other Services, and higher and lower echelon liaison with the appropriate joint or multinational force staffs and any subordinate joint or multinational organizations as required. The ARFOR commander needs to understand the capabilities that other organizations can provide and any support they require from the ARFOR to enable their operations. This understanding enhances the opportunity for synergy within the force.

A-44. Like the exchange of liaison teams, the ARFOR augments a joint force staff or receives augmentation from joint forces when Army forces form the core of a joint staff headquarters. The ARFOR interfaces with joint force command's information systems. These systems require specific hardware that are unique to the joint force headquarters and require special Army efforts for effective joint coordination.

A-45. Army intelligence elements closely coordinate with unified action partner organizations to establish the mutual supporting intelligence structure required to support the ARFOR and JTF's operations. The intelligence staff assigns collection capabilities consistent with available assets, conducts timely all-source analysis, and provides rapid dissemination of available combat information and intelligence.

CONDUCT SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS

A-46. The third task of the ARFOR commander is to execute Title 10 responsibility by supporting operations. Most operational considerations are logistics, but they can include significant general engineering efforts, depending on existing infrastructure. In the force-projection mode, decisions made early are highly significant as the time for combat operations approaches. Decisions such as the sequencing of arriving forces and equipment are often not reversible.

A-47. The JTF commander is not responsible for Service-specific matters involving administration and support of Army forces. The ARFOR commander answers to the Secretary of the Army through the theater army for Service-specific matters, whether it is a theater army or functional command (for example, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command of the U.S. Transportation Command). A theater army provides ADCON or Title 10 authorities and responsibilities for all Army units in a JTF, including those not under OPCON of the headquarters. In certain circumstances, such as geographic separation between the ADCON headquarters and the intermediate tactical headquarters, the theater army commander can delegate authority to execute specified administrative tasks to Army component commanders under OPCON of different JTFs operating in JOAs within the supported CCDR's AOR.

A-48. The ARFOR in a JOA identifies requirements, establishes priorities of support for Army forces, and coordinates with the JTF providing sustainment. The theater army is always the ARFOR to the combatant command. In this case, each subordinate commander potentially has subordinate Army forces, while the theater army exercises ADCON of all Army forces across the AOR. The theater army provides ASOS, (including common-user logistics), assignment eligibility and availability, and sustainment to interagency elements and Army, joint, and multinational forces in a JOA.

A-49. Each joint or multinational organization with Army forces has an ARFOR commander who ensures that delegated ASOS requirements are met. These support requirements, which include logistics, personnel services, finance and comptroller, and health service support flow through the chain of command.

A-50. In some limited contingency operations, the JTF commander may elect to employ Marine Corps and Army forces as Service components, instead of creating a functional joint land component headquarters. In that case, the ARFOR and Marine Corps forces would exercise OPCON and ADCON over their respective Service forces. This arrangement may occur in a forcible entry operation due to the complexity of vertical insertion, or during amphibious operations with limited time available for joint integration. As soon as the JOA matures with the arrival of follow-on forces and headquarters, the JTF commander may establish a land component command.

DIVISION AS AN ARFOR

A-51. A division commands multiple Army brigades and is one of the Army's tactical headquarters for decisive action. When required it may serve as a JTF or joint force land component headquarters in a limited contingency operation. As required, a division may be the ARFOR and the joint force land component in a JTF. When the division headquarters serves as a JTF headquarters or a joint force land component headquarters, it requires joint augmentation.

A-52. A division headquarters may serve as a joint force land component headquarters with staff augmentation in a limited contingency operation. With extensive joint augmentation, it may serve as a JTF for a limited contingency operation. When serving as the ARFOR or joint force land component, a division is primarily concerned with the conduct of operational tasks. The theater army provides most of the ADCON and Army support to forces deployed in a JOA. Joint manning documents specify other Service augmentation according to the role determined by the combatant commander, either as a JTF or as a joint force land component headquarters. When serving as a JTF headquarters, the division headquarters organizes and operates in accordance with joint doctrine. (See JP 3-33 for doctrine for the JTF. See JP 3-31 for doctrine for the joint force land component command.)

A-53. When it is the joint force land component, an Army division becomes the ARFOR. As the ARFOR, the division retains OPCON of all Army forces not subordinated to another component of the JTF. To function effectively as both the joint force land component and the ARFOR, the division headquarters requires strong coordination with the TSC. This enables the division to oversee logistic and administrative

support to all Army forces while also providing logistic support to other Services and multinational units. Without it, the ARFOR responsibilities for sustainment would degrade the operational focus of the division.

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Appendix B

Transitioning the Corps to a Joint Headquarters

This appendix describes the types of Joint Task Forces, the formation authority, and planning considerations when transitioning a corps headquarters into a Joint Task Force Headquarters.

SECTION I — JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Joint Formations

The individual Services have evolved capabilities and competencies to maximize their effectiveness in their respective domains. Even more importantly, the ability to integrate these diverse capabilities into a joint whole that is greater than the sum of the Service parts is an unassailable American strategic advantage.

Admiral M. G. Mullen
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

B-1. Joint task forces operate in a complex strategic environment that consists of a variety of national, international, and global factors. As such, the formation authority for JTFs is relegated to senior levels of the DOD. Combatant commanders have the authority and are the most probable headquarters to establish a JTF within their AOR. However, the Secretary of Defense, a subordinate unified command commander, and a commander, joint task force (known as CJTF) may also establish subordinate JTFs.

B-2. During limited contingency and crisis response operations on land, a corps headquarters is the preferred Army unit to form a JTF headquarters. Corps have senior general officers and staff with extensive military experience. Additionally, corps are trained and ready to respond rapidly, but they require significant personnel and equipment augmentation from the other service departments, the CCDR, multinational forces, and other United States Government agencies. The scope of augmentation is largely dependent on the mission for which the JTF was formed.

Note. Joint and Army doctrine states that the Army corps is the preferred option for forming a JTF, while CCDRs often see theater armies as the preferred option. The Army has limitations in terms of the number of corps available and in the required pre-deployment preparation.

TYPES OF JOINT TASK FORCES

B-3. Operational JTFs are the most common types of JTF and are established in response to a Secretary of Defense approved military operation or crisis. The establishing authority normally disestablishes an operational JTF when the mission is complete; however, an operational JTF can transition to a standing JTF.

B-4. Contingency JTFs are identified and designated, as needed, to support operation plan (known as OPLAN) execution or specific on-call missions, such as national special security events. These JTFs normally remain in a cadre or reduced manning status for planning purposes until activated via a SecDef execute order (known as EXORD).

B-5. Standing JTFs were established as an operational JTF and remained in place due to the enduring nature of their mission. Examples include JTF Bravo (USSOUTHCOM), JTF-N (USNORTHCOM), and JIATF-West (USINDOPACOM).

B-6. Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters are multinational, joint force headquarters created by agreement through Allied and partner nations. The purpose of creating a commander, joint task force is to provide the Alliance with flexible and efficient means to generate coordinate military and governmental efforts across an array of nations, and military services, under one, unified headquarters.

B-7. Joint Task Force-State is a National Guard headquarters that can provide C2 over all National Guard forces in the establishing state for the governor and can act as a joint HQ for national-level response efforts during contingency operations.

B-8. A land component command is a component of a unified command, subordinate unified command, or JTF. It is responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and available land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. An annually updated memorandum from the Secretary of Defense assigns forces to CCDRs. For limited contingencies, the corps is the preferred echelon to form the land component command. The land component headquarters performs the staff actions necessary to translate the operational directives of the JTF commander into definitive tactical actions for subordinate unit execution.

SECTION II — FORMING THE JOINT HEADQUARTERS

B-9. Once the corps is designated in a joint role, the commander has the authority to form a joint headquarters under a named operation. Through this authority, the commander establishes subordinate commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate command relationships, and establishes coordinating instructions for the component commanders. This contributes to the forming of a joint headquarters.

B-10. Forming a joint headquarters provides for unity of command, centralized planning, and direction. Unity of command is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning and direction are essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of friendly forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of many units or individuals.

B-11. The ability to task-organize a corps based on the scope and scale of the operation makes it suitable to serve as the nucleus for JTFs. A corps habitually trains personnel and exercises missions to perform C2 in large-scale combat operations. Therefore, with augmentation, a corps has the expertise, knowledge, and staff organization to form and transition to a JTF headquarters. (See JP 1-0, JP 3-0, and JP 3-33 for additional information on JTFs. (See figure B-1 for a depiction of a notional JTF headquarters established from an Army corps.)

B-12. The corps headquarters can assume the role as a joint headquarters for joint operations but requires augmentation to expand the operational effectiveness of the headquarters. Placement of Air Force, Navy, and SOF personnel into key staff positions will make that staff less capable of conducting land operations but more capable of conducting joint operations. Identifying joint gaps and capabilities early sets conditions for assets and enablers necessary to handle the scope of a joint mission and identifies critical capabilities, timelines, and requirements to reorganize the Army headquarters into a joint headquarters.

B-13. When a corps organizes as a joint headquarters, the commander incorporates multinational forces into planning, executing, and assessing areas of training and operations. Corps train to share information and understanding across multinational forces and echelons, and they prepare tactical formations to conduct operations as part of a multinational force. The corps staff utilizes LNOs to best understand and employ the capabilities of multinational forces, and other mission partners, across all domains to support mission requirements within the Joint Operation Area. The corps then allocates resources to multinational organizations or synchronizes the application of those multidomain effects in its main or supporting efforts.




Figure B-1. Corps Staff Efficacy While Aligned as a Joint Task Force

SECTION III — JOINT HEADQUARTERS AUGMENTATION

B-14. A Corps staff may not have the required expertise to fill all JTF positions based on the mission. The JTF mission dictates the skills required by the staff. Some skill sets are readily available from the CCDR and Army sources, but others require lead time and must be formally requested, especially one-of-a-kind, national-level assets such as the Joint Communications Support Element. (See JP 3-33 for more information on joint force headquarters. (See figure B-2 for a depiction of corps augmentation to form a joint headquarters.)




Figure B-2. Corps Augmentation to Form a Joint Task Force

B-15. The JTF determines the augmentation requirements needed for the task and coordinates support through the establishing headquarters. Augmentation of the corps staff is essential in transitioning the corps to a JTF structure. Augmentation is organized using a modular concept to address the various staff entities such as—

- Command and staff.
- Headquarters support and sustainment (life support functions).
- Signal support.
- Security support for the joint headquarters.
- Augmentation in technical areas, such as civil affairs and psychological operations.

B-16. Augmentation in these areas ensures linkage between the JTF staff and the combatant command staff concerning access to information and capabilities available at the combatant command level. Mission analysis conducted during pre-deployment or deployment identifies personnel requirements. These requirements are documented on joint manning documents with the personnel requirements filled based on priority. The Joint Force Headquarters Training website provides JMD examples with a variety of situations such as disaster relief, counterterrorism, noncombatant evacuation, and humanitarian assistance.

B-17. A notional JMD for small-scale contingency operations requires roughly 650 personnel. A corps headquarters can fill roughly 480 of these positions. U.S. Army Forces Command and other Army resources provide other required resources, such as regional language and cultural experts, in addition to public affairs, civil affairs, and operational contract support experts. However, there are roughly 35 positions that must be filled by subject matter experts from the other Services, in addition to other governmental agencies operating within the JOA.

B-18. Augmentation for each JTF staff section is available from agencies and organizations that support the joint community. Each staff section has two key tasks for mission analysis. First, it forecasts the required fill of its authorized positions. Second, it identifies the vacancies to be filled by external sources. Corps Headquarters can, as a pre-crisis planning effort, identify the gaps within their organization that would need augmentation to assume responsibility as a JTF during a large-scale contingency operation. This would generate the running estimate needed by the supported CCDR's staff to determine resourcing solutions.

INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION

B-19. Newly formed JTF headquarters receive individual augmentees, including Army personnel identified and requested by the corps commander and principal staffs to fill slots in the JMD. Once individual augmentees are identified and join the corps staff, they may require additional training or certification before executing their duties. Frequently, individual augmentees are functional experts who chair, provide guidance, or serve in meetings (including working groups and boards), centers, cells, and planning teams associated

with joint operations. (See CJCSI 1301.01G for additional information on joint individual augmentation procedures.)

JOINT ORGANIZATIONAL AUGMENTATION

B-20. Several joint organizations exist to augment the joint community in the execution of military operations. In addition to deployment support, many of these organizations support Service training exercises as resources allow. They also support other forecasted training exercises to include in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise program. Some joint enabling capability entities are self-supporting, while others require support from the supported headquarters. The entities listed in JP 3-33 are valuable assets to a newly formed corps JTF headquarters.

JOINT ENABLING CAPABILITIES COMMAND

B-21. The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) is a subordinate command of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). It provides mission-tailored, ready, joint capability packages to CCDRs to facilitate rapid establishment of joint force headquarters and, as available, provides support to other validated CCDR requirements. This command provides the commander of a JTF with short-duration (less than 120 days) support to rapidly establish, organize, and operate a JTF headquarters. The command consists of two subordinate elements: the Joint Communications Support Element and the Joint Planning Support Element. The U.S. Transportation Command deploys forces from this command in the form of a joint enabling capability package. By design, this package is modular, scalable, and tailored to the mission. It consists of active and Reserve Component forces, and it includes elements from one or more of the command's subordinate elements.

B-22. The JECC combines the capabilities of seven unique functional areas to deliver tailored, mission-specific support: operations, plans, logistics, intelligence support, knowledge managements, communications, and public affairs. These capabilities are embedded in the JECC's two subordinate joint commands. While a standard ready package can include up to 74 personnel (a combination of active, Reserve, and civilian personnel), the JFC can tailor the package to meet specific needs. (See JP 3-61 for more information on joint public affairs.)

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FORCE

B-23. The Immediate Response Force (formerly known as the Global Response Force), consists of forces ready to deploy to proactively shape the strategic environment, rapidly transition to combat, and, in conflict, contest enemy objectives until follow-on forces arrive. The Immediate Response Force is built around a BCT of the 82d Airborne Division and U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command assets. This rotational organization is kept at a high alert to allow it to deploy on 18 hours' notice without warning. The Secretary of Defense delegated to the commander of the U.S. Transportation Command the authority to deploy JECC capabilities with the Immediate Response Force Executive Order. (See CJCSI 4120.02F for more information on the DOD transportation movement priority system.)

CONTINGENCY RESPONSE FORCE

B-24. The contingency response force is composed of personnel and assets that are trained and equipped to secure after seizure, assess, open, and initially operate airfields. The contingency response force provides the engineer, security, communications, and airfield support assets needed to support the forcible entry effort. Special capabilities that are not present in every contingency response force include airborne, air assault, and pathfinder elements; expanded combat communications; and expeditionary engineering elements. (See JP 3-18 for additional information on forcible entry and the contingency response force.)

JOINT EXERCISE PROGRAM

B-25. Each JECC subordinate command participates in priority combatant command exercises. JECC support for joint exercise program events is requested through the Joint Training Information Management System process. The commander, U.S. Transportation Command, in accordance with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise priorities, approves requests for JECC exercise support on a case-by-case basis. JECC forces may be requested for other joint operational requirements via routine temporary duty travel orders.

These requests are approved on a not-to-interfere basis with JECC primary mission requirements. The requesting combatant command may use informal channels for this type of support.

JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT ELEMENT

B-26. The Joint Communications Support Element provides rapid, reliable, and interoperable communications that link the JTF commander and staff to the President and the Secretary of Defense, CCDRs, their component headquarters, joint special operations task forces, and multinational partners. This element's tactical communication packages vary in capability from small initial-entry and early-entry teams that enable rapid formation of a JTF headquarters to significantly larger deployable joint C2 systems. They can provide en route communications support. As a low-density, high-value asset, the Joint Communications Support Element may not remain in support of a JTF headquarters for the duration of its mission. (See JP 3-33 for more information on) joint communications support elements.)

THEATER PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT ELEMENT

B-27. A theater public affairs support element (known as a TPASE) provides direct public affairs support through planning, coordination, execution, and supervision of public affairs operations in support of theater army, joint and unified action partner operations. This element, when assigned to the corps JTF headquarters, provides the public affairs staff with media operations center capabilities. It provides advice and counsel, conducts public affairs planning, conducts public affairs training, facilitates media relations, and facilitates public communication and community engagement. The theater public affairs support element is the lead element for the corps to facilitate media operations in theater. The corps commander may task and deploy the theater public affairs support element in teams according to the mission and gaining command public affairs augmentation requirements. (See FM 3-61 for more information on the communication strategy and public affairs operations.)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAM

B-28. A national intelligence support team (known as a NIST) provides a rapidly deployable and mission tailored national intelligence reachback capability to provide a national-level, deployable, all source intelligence team to meet a JTF's intelligence requirements. National intelligence support teams are nationally sourced and composed of expert intelligence and communications analysts, communicators, and managers from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and other agencies. Requests for this national asset are coordinated with the Director of National Intelligence in cooperation with the supported geographic CCDR.

DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

B-29. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (known as DTRA) is a DOD agency providing subject matter expertise on countering weapons of mass destruction (known as CWMD) and CBRNE operations. This agency provides capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter weapons of mass destruction threats and mitigate their effects. It supports CCDRs and JTF staffs with 24/7 reachback via the Defense Threat Reduction Agency operations center or forward deployed counter weapons of mass destruction experts.

JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MONITORING ACTIVITY

B-30. The joint communications security monitoring activity (known as JCMA) provides information security monitoring and analysis support to a JTF. This activity is a Joint Chiefs of Staff-sponsored organization operating under the auspices of the National Security Agency. Its mission is to conduct communications security monitoring (including collection, analysis, and reporting) of DOD-encrypted and unencrypted telecommunications signals and automated information systems and monitoring of related noncommunications signals. The purpose is to identify vulnerabilities exploitable by potential adversaries and to recommend countermeasures and corrective actions. (See DODI 8560.01 for more information on communications security monitoring and JP 3-55 for more information on operations security.)

JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY AGENCY

B-31. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-controlled activity that reports to and receives guidance from the Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development. This

agency provides joint guidance, develops and conducts joint training, provides support to deployed forces, collects joint lessons learned, and supports joint policy and doctrine development. The agency provides exercise support to JFCs and staffs as requested and supports operational implementation of joint personnel recovery policy. (See CJCSI 3270.01C and JP 3-50 for more information on personnel recovery.)

JOINT WARFARE ANALYSIS CENTER

B-32. The Joint Warfare Analysis Center assists in preparation and analysis of joint operation plans and Service chiefs' analysis of weapons effectiveness. It supports both crisis operations and contingency planning. The center provides this support to JTFs through the supported combatant command. It is a functional component of the U.S. Strategic Command.

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

B-33. The Defense Logistics Agency supports the JTF by providing various capabilities, including Defense Logistics Agency contingency support teams and other experts embedded physically or virtually with the JTF. These teams provide LNOs and functional experts with logistics planning experience, logistics surge, and sustainment expertise to the agency. Team capabilities include logistics assistance teams to address supply management issues, disposal remediation teams to manage disposal of hazardous waste, distribution operations teams to provide expertise in distribution management, and fuel support teams to serve as a liaison in bulk fuel operations.

U.S. CYBER COMMAND

B-34. U.S. Cyber Command plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities to direct the operations and defense of specified DOD information network. It conducts, when directed, military cyberspace operations to enable actions in an OE and to facilitate U.S. and unified action partner freedom of action in cyberspace while denying freedom of action to adversaries.

POSSIBLE ARMY AUGMENTATION FROM THEATER ASSETS

B-35. Wherever deployed, the corps headquarters serving as a JTF headquarters falls under the ADCON of a theater army. Depending on the type and duration of the mission, the supported geographic combatant command may direct certain Army organizations. These Army organizations, in the combatant command's AOR, provide individual or unit augmentation to enable the JTF headquarters to accomplish its mission. These Army organizations include—

- Theater sustainment command.
- Signal command (theater).
- Military intelligence brigade–theater.
- Military police brigade.
- Psychological operations battalion.
- Civil affairs brigade or command.
- Theater medical command.
- Theater aviation command.

B-36. Other potential augmenting organizations include a battlefield coordination detachment, AAMDC or air defense artillery brigade, and other functional organizations. Corps often work with theater assets including contracting elements, CBRN elements, EOD elements, engineering assets, military police elements, information operations elements, aviation elements, and space operations elements. (See Chapter 2 for additional information on provided forces. See ATP 3-09.13 for information on the battlefield coordination detachment. See ATP 4-10 and ATP 4-71 for more information on operational contracting and contract requirements development.

OTHER SERVICE AND LIAISON OFFICERS

B-37. The JTF headquarters provides trained and knowledgeable liaison teams, and it receives liaison teams. Both the required number and skilled composition of these teams are maintained throughout the mission. Liaison detachments have four functions: monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist. Each team sent to superior, subordinate, adjacent, or supporting organizations has enough staff members to provide 24-hour coverage and sufficient highly ranked personnel to gain access to the appropriate echelon at the receiving command.

Each liaison team received from a sending unit is integrated into the staff and provided workspace, communications, protection, life support, and sufficient access to the commander and appropriate staff members to accomplish its mission. Each corps liaison team experiences challenges when assigned to distant locations. Often, liaison teams have limited transportation assets, and they need assistance to receive guidance, supplies, mail, and morale support.

B-38. Upon designation as a JTF headquarters, during either a short- or no-notice contingency or upon activation in support of a planned, deliberate operation, the corps commander deploys liaison teams to the supported CCDR. The primary tasks of the liaison team are to coordinate operational plans and orders, determine joint communications requirements and gaps, and coordinate joint staff augmentation to the corps headquarters. The JTF commander may also deploy liaison teams to supporting or subordinate Service commands assigned to the JTF.

B-39. The JTF establishes liaison with any theater special operations command or task force currently or projected to have forces operating within the JTF's JOA. (The theater special operations command has a support relationship with its geographic CCDR, but it is assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command. It does not have a command relationship with the supported CCDR.) This liaison is in the form of the JTF headquarters receiving a liaison team for the special operations command or task force. In some rare situations, the JTF sends a liaison team to the special operations command or task forces headquarters.

B-40. Current doctrine identifies the chief of staff as the central point of contact for liaison operations. However, the number of liaison teams in joint operations with a large military, intergovernmental, and multinational force may make this requirement impractical. An alternative solution is to establish a liaison office in the main CP associated with the movement and maneuver cell. This office contains a director and a small staff to control liaison operations which is sent from and received by the corps headquarters. An individual of sufficient rank directs and staffs the office to control the operation. This individual has ready access to corps senior leaders to facilitate information exchange. Liaison office functions include maintaining liaison rosters, managing status reporting and accountability, serving as an information clearinghouse, and providing communications systems. The liaison office also acts as the point of contact for life support and other liaison support operations, such as protection, medical assistance, and security.

B-41. A corps headquarters transitioning to a joint headquarters during critical situations requires liaisons. Liaisons are required during pre-deployment academic and training exercises, during RSOI, before new equipment training, and during the first few weeks as a joint headquarters.

OTHER AUGMENTATION OR COLLABORATIVE CAPABILITIES

B-42. Modern OEs contain more than just military organizations, especially if the JTF is engaged in the conduct of stability or defense support of civil authority tasks. These organizations provide the JTF with capabilities not found in the military. Capabilities are augmented or collaborative. The joint enabling capabilities are a type of augmentation. Interagency enabling capabilities, such as linguistic, interpreter, and cultural support, do not augment the JTF staff. Rather, they are collaborators focusing on the same objectives. They often join a corps headquarters serving as a JTF headquarters after it arrives in the joint AO.

B-43. Reaching out to joint and unified action partners during the initial formation of the JTF headquarters is important, so those partners have the time they need to provide these collaborative capabilities. The corps leverages pre-existing relationships where possible to expedite the inclusion of these partners. When working with these partner organizations, the commander influences their personnel selection processes when and where necessary. Maintenance of current and accurate billet descriptions helps ensure that the personnel provided by those joint and unified action partners have the right qualifications.

Interagency Enabling Capabilities

B-44. Interagency enabling capabilities provide skills that military forces lack to support mission accomplishment. The interagency representative provided by non-DOD activities of the U.S. Government may not have the skills needed for the mission. JTF leaders must identify knowledge shortfalls and provide orientation and training to JTF members. This orientation and training may involve providing equipment to facilitate access to the common operational picture and JTF databases.

B-45. An Army corps headquarters designated as a JTF headquarters can expect to interact with, receive, and provide direct support to other government agencies. These agencies include the American embassy country team, the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, and Department of Transportation. The list expands considerably when state and local government entities are included.

B-46. Overseas, the JTF headquarters encounters representatives of international organizations, such as the United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and hundreds of nongovernmental organizations. While many of these organizations try to remain neutral by not associating directly with the JTF, many interact with it as they pursue their specialized missions. Host-nation governments, whether they welcome U.S. presence or not, do interact with the JTF headquarters, and they need accommodations. (See JP 3-08 for further information on interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental coordination.)

Linguist, Interpreters, and Cultural Support

B-47. The corps coordinates with the theater army G-2 or combatant command intelligence directorate of a joint staff for appropriate linguist support. Interpreters transfer the meaning of one spoken language into another spoken language. Translators render the meaning of one written language into another written language. Linguists can provide valuable training to the JTF staff and key personnel for a specific JOA. Early in the planning and forming stages of the JTF's lifecycle, staff members identify and resource the requirements for linguists, interpreters, and translators.

B-48. Integrating interpreters and translators into the JTF occurs as soon as possible to obtain security clearance and finalize contractual agreements. The corps headquarters develops procedures to vet interpreters and translators to uncover biases. The corps staff considers the possibility that they may not have the best interests of the JTF foremost in their minds. Other positions are sourced through vetted, contracted interpreters. In the event of a shortage of linguists, translators, and interpreters, JTFs may use machine foreign language translation devices as a stop-gap measure for translation needs.

B-49. Cultural support goes beyond the use of local interpreters and local hires to perform life support tasks. Inserting U.S. forces into a different culture creates a dynamic situation for commanders to address. Each JTF requires cultural understanding to successfully deal with the local population. Knowledge of the local culture in terms of the social, political, economic, and demographic factors contributes to understanding a people's culture or a nation's history, institutions, psychology, religious beliefs, and behaviors. Increasing cultural awareness using Department of State regional experts, assigned civil affairs forces and staff sections, or SOF and civilian academics with regional expertise, language, and cultural understanding facilitates the planning, preparation, and execution of military operations. Additionally, foreign area officers from the security cooperation division of the theater army headquarters or internal staff personnel from the corps assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations, may serve as political or cultural advisors to the corps or subordinate commanders.

JOINT TASK FORCE STAFF EQUIPMENT AUGMENTATION

B-50. A joint headquarters formation also involves acquisition and distribution of joint mission-essential equipment. Equipping a JTF headquarters, formed around an Army corps headquarters, is closely associated with augmentation. A corps headquarters designated as a JTF headquarters works with the theater army and the joint community to meet shortfalls through requisitions and redistribution. The joint enabling capabilities command can supply shortfalls in equipment, either permanently or on a temporary basis. Most of the equipment necessary to give corps headquarters full JTF capabilities is acquired from other sources (including commercial sources).

B-51. The joint mission-essential equipment list includes equipment and capabilities the JTF needs to function. Additional equipment is added in incremental blocks to the JTF headquarters to meet the projected mission demands. For a corps, the foundation block consists of its organic Service-provided capabilities, followed by equipment received from the theater army and the theater signal command or brigade. Usually, these capabilities are internal systems that consist of computers with software applications, operating systems, office applications and security, associated peripherals, and servers. To fill equipment gaps, units

identify any continuing shortfall between needs and capability, refine a joint mission-essential equipment list, and submit a request through joint or Army channels

B-52. The theater army for the supported CCDR is partially responsible for equipping a transitioning corps headquarters. The equipment available in theater comes from three sources: theater property, Army pre-positioned stocks (with Secretary of Defense-level authorizations in those locations where they exist), and theater sustainment stocks. Some equipment may not be available. In these cases, the corps staff initiates and processes an operational needs statement through the theater army.

B-53. The JTF logistics directorate is responsible for the sustainment of the JTF in coordination with the combatant command logistics directorate. The Military Departments' contributing forces to the JTF are responsible for the sustainment of their forces within the JTF. Therefore, the theater army has Title 10 responsibilities for Army forces within the JTF. (See JP 4-0 for further joint logistics information and requirements.)

B-54. A corps headquarters often uses its own information systems when designated as the base for a JTF headquarters. The corps G-6 considers numerous unified action partner information systems and their associated databases. Integrating these systems and establishing interoperability or workarounds with the corps' currently fielded information systems presents training, technical, and operations security challenges for the corps exercise of C2. Corps planners account for the security challenges (for example, foreign disclosure and network access) with integrating unified action personnel and systems into the corps headquarters. A significant part of the pre-deployment preparation in the corps' CPs involves training in using these systems. (See JP 6-0 for information on the joint communications system and planning and operational considerations associated with joint communications.)

B-55. With hundreds of potential applications and thousands of potential users, the JTF staff establishes and monitors the corps and joint network infrastructure architectures for reliability. Operations security is an important consideration for systems using an air gap to transfer voice and data from one control node to another. Commanders and staffs understand the levels of security and security classifications of all the systems in the corps CPs.

Appendix C

The Corps in a Joint Role

This appendix expands on the discussion from chapter 1 by describing corps considerations when performing other roles. The chapter begins with an overview and then discusses the corps headquarters when serving as joint task force. Next, it discusses the corps as the land component command. The chapter concludes with a discussion of operational considerations in support of joint operations.

SECTION I — OVERVIEW OF THE CORPS IN A JOINT ROLE

C-1. During competition and crisis, an Army corps is uniquely designed to perform joint roles—when required—such as a land component headquarters or JTF headquarters. A corps can fill these roles during conflict for limited periods, but it requires significant augmentation to be effective during continuous operations. During crises, the Army may deploy a corps headquarters and select units as part of a U.S. response.

C-2. The corps is the preferred Army echelon for use as a JTF headquarters because of the seniority of its staff and its deployability. Additionally, corps are trained and ready to respond rapidly, but they require augmentation. CCDRs transform a corps into a JTF or LCC by augmenting it with personnel and units from SOF and other Services. This augmentation does not include the personnel needed to augment the battalion network capability for the corps headquarters.

Note. Joint and Army doctrine states that the Army corps is the preferred option for forming a JTF or LCC, while CCDRs often see component commands as the preferred option. The Army has limitations in terms of the number of corps available and in the required pre-deployment preparation.

C-3. For limited contingency operations, a corps may find itself serving in a joint role depending on the size and duration of operations. These operations typically have a multinational component like those in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Depending upon violence levels, a corps may not have many nonmilitary organizations operating in its assigned operational areas, although there will usually be some.

C-4. A corps headquarters designated as a JTF headquarters requires a separate ARFOR headquarters because of the differing roles and responsibilities inherent in each. For example, a corps JTF would focus on the operational level of warfare and use joint doctrine whereas a division ARFOR headquarters would focus on tactical operations and use Army doctrine.

SECTION II — CORPS AS A JOINT TASK FORCE

C-5. A corps headquarters designated as a JTF headquarters requires a separate ARFOR headquarters because of the differing roles and responsibilities inherent in each. For example, JTFs focus on the operational level of warfare and use joint rather than Army doctrine. The JTF commander normally exercises OPCON over most forces and other resources in the JOA. A JTF can include functional and Service components and multinational forces from allied and coalition partners.

JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

C-6. The corps headquarters can assume the role as a joint headquarters in joint operations, but augmentation is necessary to limit degradation of capabilities in directing land operations. Placement of Air Force, Navy and SOF personnel into key staff positions will make that staff less capable of conducting land operations. Identifying joint gaps and capabilities early sets conditions for assets and enablers necessary to handle the scope of a joint mission and identifies critical capabilities, timelines, and requirements to reorganize the Army headquarters into a joint headquarters.

C-7. A JTF headquarters is constituted and designated by an establishing authority, such as the Secretary of Defense, a CCDR, a subordinate unified command commander, or a state governor (for JTF-state) in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, Title 10, U.S. Code, and Title 32, U.S. Code. A JTF commander establishes a JTF headquarters when the scope, complexity, or other factors of an operation require capabilities from at least two military departments operating under a single JTF commander. JTF commanders are responsible for establishing command relationships between subordinate commanders and accomplishing any operational missions.

C-8. When a corps organizes as a JTF headquarters, the commander incorporates multinational forces into planning, executing, and assessing areas of training and operations. Corps train to share information and understanding across multinational forces and echelons; and they prepare tactical formations to conduct operations as part of a multinational force. The corps staff understands and employs the capabilities of multinational forces and other mission partners across all domains to support mission requirements in the corps AO. The corps then allocates those resources to multinational organizations or synchronizes the application of those multidomain effects in its main or supporting efforts.

C-9. Based upon the decision of the establishing authority, the commander may exercise OPCON or TACON over assigned and attached forces. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and JTFs normally direct the delegation of OPCON over forces attached to those subordinate commands. A JTF commander with OPCON forces (assigned or attached) can task-organize these forces to accomplish the mission. The commander's intent, concept of operations, and other Service considerations dictate organization of these forces. If commanders have TACON of assigned or attached forces, they can task, but not reorganize these forces. (See FM 3-0 for additional information on command relationships.)

C-10. Mission requirements drive the JTF headquarters' responsibilities. When a corps operates as a JTF headquarters, these additional responsibilities drive the required capabilities of the staff, and ultimately the organization and staffing needed to support the CCDR. For example, the JTF staff must have awareness of joint terminology and familiarity with joint staff processes.

Note. The establishing authority (the CCDR) designates a Service headquarters as a JTF-capable headquarters once that authority is satisfied with its level of training and readiness.

C-11. The ability to task-organize a corps based on the scope and scale of the operation makes it suitable to serve as the nucleus for JTFs of various sizes and durations. A corps habitually trains personnel and exercises missions to perform C2 in operations requiring unified action. Therefore, with augmentation, a corps has the expertise, knowledge, and staff organization to form and transition to a JTF headquarters. (See JP 1-0, JP 3-0, and JP 3-33 for additional information on JTFs

SECTION III — CORPS AS A LAND COMPONENT COMMAND

C-12. A land component command is a component of a unified command, subordinate unified command, or JTF. It is responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and available land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. (For simplicity, this chapter refers to the JTF as the land component establishing authority, but it acknowledges that a CCDR or subordinate unified command commander can also be the establishing authority.)

C-13. A JTF commander establishes a Service headquarters as the land component headquarters if a single Service (for example, the Army or Marine Corps) will conduct land operations in support of JTF operations. A JTF commander may establish a functional land component headquarters when the scope, complexity, or other factors of an operation require capabilities from two military departments or a multinational force operating in the land domain. When designated as a JFLCC, the corps commander exercises TACON or OPCON over Marine Corps forces, as required by the JFC, in addition to the attached Army forces. The land component headquarters, at the direction of the JTF, is responsible for establishing command relationships for subordinate forces to accomplish assigned operational missions and coordinating with other JTF component commands (for example, the JFACC and joint force maritime component commander).

C-14. When organizing joint forces, simplicity and clarity are critical. A JTF can enhance synchronization of operations not only between U.S. ground components, but also with multinational land forces by providing a single commander for land operations. Forming a land component headquarters builds unity of effort, an integrated staff, a single voice for land forces and land control operations, a single concept and focus of effort for land control operations, and a synchronized and integrated land force planning and execution.

C-15. A JTF's land operations support the commander's operation or campaign objectives or support other components of the joint force. Joint land operations require synchronizing and integrating the instruments of national power to achieve strategic and operational objectives. The forces conducting joint land operations include the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy forces operating on or from land to accomplish missions and tasks. Joint land operations also involve multinational land forces. Joint land operations include land control operations which employ land forces, supported by or supporting naval and air forces (as appropriate), to accomplish military objectives in vital areas of an AO.

C-16. During crisis planning, forces allocated to CCDRs may differ from those apportioned for contingency planning. The CCDR or an established JTF commander selects an Army or USMC organization with which to form the land component headquarters.

FORMING THE LAND COMPONENT HEADQUARTERS

C-17. A corps will require significant augmentation to form an LCC. The headquarters that provides a base for the LCC headquarters may retain its Service Title 10 responsibilities (or delegate to one of its assigned divisions) as the senior Service headquarters for all Army or USMC forces assigned to the JTF. In rare cases, the LCC is resourced with a separate senior Army or USMC commander, and the LCC's headquarters is responsible for the ADCON of the respective Army or USMC forces in the LCC. If this does not occur, the LCC maintains responsibility over its parent Service component functions (ARFOR in the case of a corps headquarters), which requires the corps staff to split its focus. This arrangement has the potential to overwhelm the LCC's staff as it performs a dual role. An LCC (who is also the corps commander) can delegate as many ARFOR duties as practical to a subordinate Army headquarters to facilitate the corps' operations.

C-18. Within the headquarters, the corps commander, deputy corps commander, chief of staff, and key members of the staff fully integrate with representation from the forces and capabilities made available to the LCC. The LCC's staff includes the work force and personnel directorate of a joint staff through the communications system directorate of a joint staff in addition to personal and special staff sections and the standing and on-call meetings as required by the situation. A corps commander, when designated as the LCC, provides the core elements of the corps staff to assist in planning, coordinating, and executing functional land component operations. (See CJCSI 3100.01F for information on the joint strategic planning system and how the DOD assigns forces.)

C-19. The corps organizes as an LCC's headquarters in accordance with the JTF's implementing directive. The directive establishes the roles and responsibilities of the LCC and designates the LCC's mission and the forces that constitute the LCC's battle rhythm. Commanders usually build the LCC's staff around the corps staff and augment it with members of other Service components and interorganizational and multinational partners. As required by the JTF, the LCC's staff receives a special operations liaison element. The LCC and chief of staff allocate key staff billets, so the staff appropriately represents all Services. Ideally, for an LCC's headquarters built around an Army corps headquarters, the deputy LCC or chief of staff comes from the USMC. Replicating this construct throughout the LCC's staff ensures all leaders understand the distinct capabilities of the Army and USMC to optimize employment of the LCC's forces.

C-20. The primary functions of the LCC and staff are planning, preparing, executing, and assessing the conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks that achieve the JTF's campaign plan. In addition, the LCC plans large-scale operations, coordinating with the JTF's other functional and Service components to establish necessary conditions within the JOA. The LCC also directs the maneuver of subordinate forces. The LCC plans for offensive tasks to secure or retain the initiative, to exploit or pursue enemy forces, and to prevent enemy forces from regrouping and regaining the initiative. The LCC plans defensive tasks to gain time or space to conduct decisive offensive actions. Even in the defense, the LCC seizes opportunities and plans for offensive maneuver, counterattack, and other operations that enable the tactical success of

subordinate commanders whenever possible. Simultaneously, the LCC conducts stability tasks to meet the immediate needs of civilians in the AO until the LCC transfers responsibility for the conduct of tasks to appropriate authorities.

When designated as a joint force land component command, the corps follows joint doctrine. As a joint force land component headquarters, the corps staff has tasks that include, but are not limited to—

- Coordinating the planning and execution of joint land operations with the other components and supporting agencies.
- Designating the target priorities, effects, and timing for joint land operations.
- Providing mutual support to other components by conducting operations within the JOA.
- Coordinating with other functional and Service components in support of achieving the JTF commander's objectives.
- Providing a deputy to the area air defense commander (normally the commander of the AAMDC) for land-based joint theater AMD operations as determined by the JFC. The AAMDC provides inputs to the JTF commander's joint area air defense plan and the airspace control plan for the joint force land component command.
- Supporting the JTF commander's information operations by developing requirements that support land control and synchronize land force information operations assets when directed.
- Integrating the joint and Army networks within the DOD information networks throughout the AO. Performing this function may require joint and Service augmentation.
- Performing joint security functions.
- Establishing standard operating procedures and other directives based on the JFC's guidance.
- Supporting SOF throughout the land AO.

C-21. To facilitate joint security operations, the JFC may establish a joint security element with a designated joint security coordinator to coordinate operations in a joint security area. If the JTF commander gives the LCC responsibility for a joint security area, the corps commander may elect to delegate some corps headquarters functions to subordinate commanders. The deputy corps commander—with part of the corps staff, augmentation from theater echelon units, and an Army maneuver enhancement brigade—receives TACON of the theater units in the joint security area for protection and movement. The deputy corps commander becomes the joint security coordinator. Alternatively, the commander may designate and organize a subordinate task force to focus solely on operations in the joint security area.

C-22. An associated requirement of the corps headquarters controlling U.S. land forces is for the corps headquarters to function as a multinational joint force headquarters for units operating in its AO. In most cases, the corps exercises TACON over multinational brigades and divisions. However, in this case, the corps commander becomes a multinational force LCC. National caveats often exist on the use of multinational forces. Commanders and staff operating as a multinational headquarters must be aware that multinational brigades normally lack compatible digital communication capabilities. The digital liaison detachment is uniquely adapted to bridge this communication gap with liaison personnel at the corps headquarters. The corps also trains in multinational exercises as part of theater engagement and security assistance managed by the theater army.

Note. National caveats are political directives regarding the employment of allied or partner forces during multinational security operations. Nations offer their forces, but they use caveats to limit their forces to approved activities. Countries can have specific caveats for their operations or forces.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE JOINT TASK FORCE

C-23. The LCC reports directly to the JTF and advises on the proper employment of land forces. A JTF commander has the full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among JTF subordinate commands. The JTF commander allows Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function as designed. The intent is to meet the JTF's needs while maintaining tactical and operational integrity

of Service organizations. (See figure C-1 for a depiction of land component command relationships. See figure 2-3 on page 27 for a broader example of the corps forces and enablers.)




Figure C-1. Land Component Command Relationships

SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS WITH JOINT TASK FORCE FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS

C-24. The JTF also establishes supporting and supported relationships between components. The CCDR can determine not only how to organize the joint force into components, but also how the components relate to each other. The CCDR directs support between Services for other than maneuver functions. Support relationships are an effective way to achieve unity of effort and to weight the main effort properly. Components receive and provide support at the same time. CCDRs designate the range and scope of the provided support in the directive or order that established the support relationships. However, the personal relationships between the supporting and supported commanders are more important than the doctrinal support relationship established.

C-25. The JTF directs support authority within the joint force. A JTF can direct four different support relationships: general support, mutual support, close support, and direct support. Regardless of the organizational and command arrangements within joint commands, the ARFOR commander is responsible for Service-specific functions and other matters affecting Army forces, including internal administration, training, logistics, and Service intelligence operations. (The directive authority for logistics can override this Title 10 responsibility. See JP 1, for additional information on support relationships.)

SECTION IV — OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

C-26. As described earlier, the corps can function at the operational level as a JTF headquarters or as a land component command. Joint doctrine covers the structure and operations of joint force headquarters in detail. This appendix discusses some of the main offense-related aspects when the corps is in the role of a land component command.

ASSEMBLE OPERATIONAL FORCES IN THE JOA

C-27. The assembly of operational forces involves the concentration of designated large forces with the necessary sustainment support into those areas where the land components' launch major operations.

Operational concentration enables the land component to assemble the necessary forces required to support the JTF's campaign plan before the initiation of actual operations.

C-28. Along with the physical grouping of forces, operations involve the assembly of any special technical means that enhances the probability of success. Such means include the assembly of new weapons and equipment, capabilities, and organizations (for example, thermobaric warheads, EW operations, and a Stryker BCT). The JFLCC employs available capabilities decisively at the time and place necessary to gain maximum advantage and surprise during the land operations portion of the JTF's campaign. Occasionally, a JFLCC directs using a new weapon or organization alone to produce a psychological effect intended to destroy the enemy's will or capability to resist.

C-29. The JFLCC establishes a solid sustainment foundation in the desired concentration area early in the JTF's campaign. Staff planners coordinate sustainment support using Army resources and available joint, multinational, host-nation, or contract facilities. Speed and secrecy in concentration, followed by bold, rapid execution of the plan may be a decisive factor in the defeat of the enemy. By concentrating forces, the JFLCC takes the first step in executing the JTF's campaign plan.

C-30. When selecting locations of assembly areas and their distances from the enemy, planners consider mission variables, including physical factors such as the transportation system capacity and enemy capabilities. Additionally, planners control the assembly of the operational force through early arrival of echelon tactical CPs, information systems, signal communications systems, and using parallel and collaborative planning. (See JP 3-31 for additional information on joint land operations.)

C-31. The land component headquarters reviews its task organization daily as forces flow into and throughout the theater to ensure that contingency plans reflect current available resources. The commander protects ground LOCs, their supporting infrastructure, and critical installations, in addition to providing for the security of assembling forces. This protection is enhanced by—

- Selecting operational assembly areas that protect (wholly or in part) land component LOCs from ground attack with natural obstacles.
- Locating operational assembly areas between potential sources of danger and LOCs.
- Denying an enemy time to offer serious interference through rapid assembly, followed immediately by decisive action.
- Adhering strictly to camouflage discipline, emission control, and antenna and emitter offset.
- Placing troop units and operational force protection assets where they can secure LOCs and critical installations.
- Developing an integrated AMD system that defends corps assets against enemy air and missile reconnaissance and attacks throughout the AO.

C-32. Conducting constant and intensive information collection operations throughout the assembly process is essential to force security efforts. Accurate knowledge of enemy capabilities, dispositions, and intentions forms the basis for effective friendly security operations.

ASSEMBLY OF LAND COMPONENT COMMAND FORCES IN THE JOA

C-33. Troops march into assembly areas or reach them by rail, water, motor, or air transport-or a combination of these methods. The methods employed are determined by—

- Locations and types of forces assembled.
- Capabilities of transportation facilities.
- Time and space factors.
- Proximity of enemy forces and the danger of interference with the concentration.

C-34. The mission variables govern the sequence in which JFLCC forces arrive in their assembly areas. Normally, each echelon's forward or tactical CP elements arrive early in this process. Other considerations affecting the sequence of arrival are security, phasing, unit integrity, and adequate sustainment assets. Convenience, efficient use of transportation assets, and the need to provide support to arriving combat units

largely govern the order of arrival of elements—other than CP elements—when assembly areas are secure, and time is not pressing.

POSTURE FORCES FOR OPERATIONS

C-35. Before conducting offensive, defensive, and stability tasks, the land component headquarters, in conjunction with the JTF, positions its forces to influence the enemy. A JFLCC—

- Positions forces and sustainment assets to support the JTF's next campaign or major operation plan before assembly of the land component is complete.
- Visualizes the JTF's campaign or major operation from the beginning of the operational assembly to the completion of the mission.
- Selects its final objectives and determines a concept of operations for the obtainment of these objectives.
- Determines the different operational and tactical tasks that its forces need to perform, including determination of the forms of maneuver or defense necessary to accomplish its assigned missions.
- Arrays available forces within the operational assembly areas to support the preferred course of action yet maintain flexibility to respond to enemy actions and changes in the operational and mission variables. In rare cases, this occurrence requires the JFLCC to designate the combat formations used by subordinates.
- Postures forces for not only the initial operations but also subsequent operations based on the visualization and understanding of the JTF's intent and operational end state.
- Conducts ISR operations to refine planning and achieve positional advantage.

C-36. The land component's initial force deployments support the JTF's entire campaign because it is difficult to change the lines of operation of operational forces after their establishment. The JFLCC evaluates the following factors that can impact operations either favorably or unfavorably in the planning process:

- Probable weather conditions.
- Terrain and hydrography.
- Presence or absence and the condition and carrying capacity of railroads, roads, waterways, pipelines, airfields, and communications nodes used to establish land LOCs.
- Enemy situation, including location of main enemy forces, where and how to meet enemy forces, and when contact is expected.
- Complex terrain, such as mountains, major urban areas, and fortified areas.
- Capabilities of enemy forces to interfere with friendly operations.
- Means for attaining and maintaining air superiority.
- Time and space to effectively employ available forces.
- Organization and employment of assigned, attached, or supporting forces, including air and naval.
- Reconnaissance and security measures.
- Sustainment support and the means, methods, and routes by which it flows to support land component combat forces.

C-37. The land component constantly updates previously conducted troop-to-task analysis since it will continuously receive new tasks, which also requires the JFLCC to reassess subordinate unit command and support relationships. The JFLCC and staff need to think and operate at the operational level of warfare. They need to know and understand the elements of operational design in addition to—

- Time and distance factors associated with both inter- and intra-theater movement.
- Joint and Army doctrine so that they use appropriate doctrinal terms without needlessly inventing new ones when interacting with other components.
- Advantages and disadvantages of collaborative versus parallel planning.
- Operational risk assessment and mitigation.

CONDUCT OPERATIONAL MANEUVER

C-38. The land component moves and maneuvers large forces to obtain a positional advantage or in reaction to an enemy operational maneuver. These activities include directing the movement of subordinate forces during each phase of a major operation. This positioning enables land component forces to perform a rapid transition to subsequent phases of the JTF's major operation or campaign. These tasks make their maximum contribution when the JTF synchronizes its conduct with air superiority and interdiction operations. (See Chapter 3 for more on operational movement and maneuver.)

COORDINATE TRANSITION OF JOINT FORCES TO AND FROM TACTICAL BATTLE FORMATIONS

C-39. The land component's ability to posture forces to conduct operations depends on the command's ability to effectively move the forces from their assembly areas into combat formations and employ these formations in the various types of offensive and defensive tasks and forms of maneuver. Combat formations allow a unit to move on the battlefield in a posture suited to its commander's intent and mission. There are seven combat formations—column, line, echelon (left or right), box, diamond, wedge, and vee. The land component uses these combat formations to—

- Overwhelm enemy forces with one or more unexpected blows before they have time to react in an organized fashion.
- Make contact with the smallest possible force in situations when and where the command's common operational picture does not clearly show the enemy situation.
- Mass the effects of combat power against designated small portions of the known enemy forces to defeat them.

C-40. The basis of the land component's ability to use combat formations is the force's mastery of the forms of tactical and nontactical troop movement. Commanders link troop movement with rapid transition into situationally appropriate combat formations. The advantages and disadvantages of combat formations at the tactical level also apply at the operational level. A JFLCC initiates changes in the tactical battle formations of subordinate units only when such change is necessary to facilitate the execution of current operations, with due consideration to the impact on future operations. (ADP 3-90 discusses combat formations and FM 3-90 discusses troop movement.)

C-41. When at the operational level, the corps directs offensive-focused operations against an operational center of gravity, such as a visible mass of enemy forces or something more abstract, such as the cohesion of enemy forces. The commander may also direct operations at a critical vulnerability of the enemy, such as the boundary between two of its major combat formations, a vital C2 center, a logistic base, LOCs, or the mental and psychological balance of a key enemy commander.

C-42. Types of joint force maneuvers include forcible entry, sustained action at and from the sea, sustained action on land, and sustained air operations. Joint doctrine addresses Navy and Marine Corps sustained action at and from the sea and USAF sustained air operations. (See JP 3-32 and JP 3-30 for more information on joint operations.)

C-43. *Forcible entry* is the seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition or forcing access into a denied area to allow movement and maneuver to accomplish the mission (JP 3-18). In some situations, forcible entry is the only method of gaining access to an operational area or for introducing decisive forces into a region. Forcible entry operations are normally joint operations, and they may include a combination of airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations. A corps typically takes part in forcible entry operations with airborne and air assault forces that seize a lodgment. A corps may also conduct amphibious operations to seize a lodgment when required. A corps also contributes protective and sustainment capabilities to support the forcible entry.

Appendix D

Corps Operations in History

This appendix is organized to provide additional context for specific content contained within the manual. The vignettes contained herein are presented in the order in which their related content is presented in the manual.

PURPOSE OF THE VIGNETTES

D-1. The purpose of these vignettes is to provide context for specific content in the manual and illustrate key concepts. They are purposely short, descriptive historical examples. Some will have maps where necessary to add to the discussion. They are included here to provide practical examples of corps operations and assist the reader's understanding by providing deeper context. The individual sources for this material are provided at the back of the manual. Military professionals are encouraged to conduct deeper self-study as needed.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 2003 — OVERTAXING THE ARMY CORPS

D-2. C2 of land forces during the initial days of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM was just as tumultuous as it had been in previous conflicts. At the outset of crisis, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, Commander of Third U.S. Army, was dual hatted as an Army Service component commander and the LCC. For these tasks, McKiernan's staff grew to some 1,300 personnel. Following the successful invasion and removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, McKiernan briefly became commander of Combined Joint Task Force-Iraq and was responsible for overseeing the military occupation of Iraq.

D-3. Unfortunately, in June 2003, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, V Corps commander with only about 328 staff members, transitioned his headquarters to Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7). This task force replaced the Third U.S. Army as the operational headquarters because the U.S. Central Command commander directed McKiernan to focus on the entire theater of operations. Although not manned, trained, or equipped for the mission, Sanchez found himself in command of all U.S. and multinational forces in Iraq. Virtually overnight, Sanchez's staff grew to roughly 1,300 personnel. Tasked to continue planning and conducting combined arms operations and wide area security at the tactical-level, Sanchez had the additional responsibility of managing the war at operational and strategic levels. Sanchez and his staff had immense responsibility managing three levels of warfare. Sanchez's staff not only dealt directly with the host nation to train and certify the Iraqi Armed Forces, but it also reported to the Coalition Provisional Authority, U.S Central Command, and politicians in Washington.

D-4. The political-military aspects consumed the staff, and six months passed before Lieutenant General Sanchez could convince Washington to establish an adequate C2 structure. Moreover, the rotation of U.S. combat forces and the employment of III Corps as the operational and tactical headquarters slowed the transition from CJTF-7 to the four-star Multinational Force-Iraq for another six months. By that time, the war had changed from a conventional war to a counterinsurgency, and the first year of combat was essentially lost. Although ground-centric, CJTF-7 desperately needed a subordinate land component to plan and synchronize land operations. Had Lieutenant General Sanchez had a subordinate land component to assume all the operational and tactical tasks associated with securing Iraq, it is probable that CJTF 7 could have better managed its resources and responded more quickly to its allies, partners, and politicians in Washington.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS — BATTLE FOR MANILA, 1945

D-5. XIV Corps, commanded by Major General Griswold, initially consisted of the 37th and 40th Infantry Divisions when tasked to seize Clark Airfield and the ports of Manila. On 18 January, XIV Corps moved south facing little resistance. On 23 January, XIV Corps reached the outskirts of Clark Field, and on 24 January, Griswold regrouped his divisions for a coordinated advance. 17 days after landing, XIV Corps had advanced 59 miles (95 kilometers [km]) to reach forward positions extending 124 miles (200 km); 77 miles

(124 km) held by the 40th ID and 47 miles (76 km) controlled by the 37th Infantry Division. After a week of intense fighting, the 40th Infantry Division remained at the U.S. controlled airfield to control enemy advances from the north or west, and the rest of XIV Corps continued toward Manila.

D-6. To support the advance, the 11th Airborne Division was attached to the corps on the 26th of January and inserted 70 miles (113 km) to the south of Manila at Nasugbu Beach. The 1st Cavalry Division was attached on 31 January joining the 37th Infantry Division to advance toward Manila from the north to seize the city. The 37th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division moved at glaringly different paces. The Japanese had destroyed almost every bridge and roadway along 37th Infantry advance, whereas 1st Cavalry advanced rapidly at times reaching speeds of 40-50 miles per hour (63-80 km per hour). Synchronizing the pace of the divisions was critical to protect XIV Corps flanks. Constant C2, mobility and engineer support and intelligence updates from XIV Corps staff were essential. The 11th Airborne Division moved north quickly but faced Japanese resistance in Imus (five miles [8 km] south of Manila). The division secured the bridge over the Zapote River to Las Piñas and attempted to advance further. On 4 February, the 11th Airborne Division reached the Japanese main defenses on the south side of Manila near Nichols Field and were stalled. (See figure C-1 for a map of the operations.)

D-7. Manila was a large city with reinforced concrete buildings, huts, and stone fortresses. Over 800,000 people and roughly 18,000 enemy troops were entrenched in the city. On 4 February, 1st Cavalry to the north of Manila, and 11th Airborne to the south reported increased Japanese resistance. On 5 February, Griswold divided the northern section of the city into two parts: 37th Infantry was responsible for the western half, and 1st Cavalry was responsible for the eastern half. By 8 February, 37th Infantry had cleared most of the resistance from its sector, but there was extensive damage to the residential districts. 1st Cavalry cleared the suburbs east of Manila, and on 10 February 1st Cavalry extended control south of the river. On 10 February, the 11th Airborne moved under XIV Corps control. The 11th Airborne had been halted at Nichols Field since 4 February under a constant barrage of artillery. On 11 February, the airfield was secured and on 12 February, the 11th Airborne Division completed the U.S. encirclement of Manila.

D-8. For the next few weeks, Griswold's XIV Corps cleared out remaining enemy forces, and on 4 March Manila was liberated. Securing Manila was important to extend the logistics operations for supply lines that were at a breaking point. XIV Corps, along with I Corps and XI Corps were critical in subsequent operations in Luzon. (See figure D-1 and D-2 on pages 169 and 170 for a map of the operations.)




Figure D-1. Corps Maneuver to Manila




Figure D-2. Division Attack in Manila

RETROGRADE (WITHDRAWAL) OF THE X CORPS IN KOREA, 1950

D-9. Lieutenant General "Ned" Almond's X Corps included the 1st Marine Division, 3d Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Division, and the 1st Republic of Korea Corps. The X Corps focused on destroying North Korean and Chinese forces in support of 8th Army's northern advance.

D-10. General Ridgway ordered Almond to advance toward the Chosin Reservoir along 8th Army's East Flank to facilitate 8th Army's operations. The Chinese forces, including the 9th Chinese Army with eight divisions, intended to destroy the allied forces at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni (near the reservoir); the 9th Chinese Army planned this after assuming that X Corps would move into the garrisons, and the Peoples Volunteer Army could destroy X Corps in the reservoir. Greatly outnumbered, taking extensive casualties, and with horrible weather conditions, General Ridgway directed Lieutenant General Almond to plan for a withdrawal and retrograde from the port of Hungnam on 30 November. Almond directed Major General Soule (of the 3d Infantry Division) to withdraw from Wonson and link up with X Corps in Hungnam. Major General Smith (of the 1st Marine Division), and Major General Barr (of the 7th Infantry Division) were to conduct a withdrawal from the reservoir and subsequent movement to the port of Hungnam. Barr's 7th Infantry Division and Smith's 1st Marine Division faced continuous attacks in and surrounding the Chosin Valley terrain from several division-sized Peoples Volunteer Army elements. These commanders would have to conduct a phased withdraw from the reservoir to prevent X Corps, and adjacent Corps boundaries, to avoid being overrun. (See figure D-3 for a map of the operations.)

D-11. X Corps deployed to Korea through three ports over a period of two months and then had to depart through one port in two weeks. To facilitate C2, X Corps headquarters in Hamhung facilitated communication between the ground units and the amphibious commander and staffs in the port of Hungnam. On 9 December, X Corps established an embarkation control group, including control group members from each division, to provide supervision of the corps withdrawal. X Corps divisions provided a readiness for loading report to the embarkation control group to synchronize operations with capacity, resourcing, and shipping availability. Once consolidated in Hungnam, the 1st Marine Division loaded out of Hungnam first, while the 3d Infantry Division and elements of the 7th Infantry Division provided perimeter and port security for the retrograde until the 1st Republic of Korea Corps cleared the port. The 7th Infantry Division commenced loading on 15 December, and the 3d Infantry Division assumed primary security operations in the port. On 20 December, 3d Infantry Division forces began loading their final personnel and supplies, and naval gunships assumed force protection to support final loading operations before destroying the port on 24 December.

D-12. The X Corps retrograde was a successful joint-multinational operation supported by airpower, naval assets, and extensive C2 collaboration. In total, over 105,000 U.S. and Republic of Korea Soldiers, 17,500 vehicles, 350,000 tons of supplies and equipment, and 91,000 civilians were evacuated.




Figure D-3. Corps Withdrawal Under Pressure

BUSAN (PUSAN) BREAKOUT IN KOREA, 1950

D-13. Lieutenant General Walton H. (Bulldog) Walker led Eighth Army in the summer of 1950. Following the North Korean surprise attack on 25 June south of the 38th parallel, on 7 July, the United Nations Security Council recommended the establishment of a unified command in Korea, under a U.S. commander. President Truman appointed General Douglas MacArthur as commander in chief, United Nations Command and Walker as commander of all United Nations ground forces in the Republic of Korea.

D-14. The United Nations forces were initially unprepared, saw many difficult battles, and had to fight a series of delaying actions, but by early August, Walker ordered a final stand along a 140-mile perimeter around the well-stocked port of Pusan. A combination of great courage and defensive tactics, a somewhat weakened North Korean force, and friendly reinforcements resulted in the United Nations forces holding the line. Their success allowed MacArthur's staff to remain focused on preparing for OPERATION CHROMITE, launched on 15 September.

D-15. Key to that plan was for Walker's forces to launch a breakout soon after the landing to linkup with the forces that landed at Inchon. CHROMITE was a success. The North Korean forces were split and forced to retreat north. (See figure D-4 for a map of the operations.)



Figure D-4. From Defense to Breakout

XII CORPS CROSSING THE MOSELLE RIVER IN FRANCE, 1944

D-16. Over a week-long period in September 1944, Lieutenant General George S. Patton's Third Army attempted to cross an assault force at several points across the Moselle River to establish a bridgehead and then encircle three German Army divisions in the city of Nancy, France. With a plan that closely followed U.S. river-crossing doctrine, Third Army's XII Corps executed a wet-gap crossing south of the town of Nancy with the 35th Infantry Division as the bridgehead force and 4th Armored Division as the breakout force. As planned, the successful wet-gap crossing opened the southern route to Nancy and allowed the 80th Infantry Division to initiate a similar crossing north of the city. The establishment of multiple bridgeheads at Nancy demonstrates how mobility played a significant role in the Third Army's successful march across France. (See figure D-5 for a map of the operations.)




Figure D-5. Corps Mobility in World War II

RECONSTITUTION OF XIV CORPS ON GUADALCANAL, 1942-1943

D-17. Guadalcanal was primarily a Navy and USMC operation. Major General Vandegrift (of the First Marine Division) commanded the landing forces, and Army troops were commanded by Major General Harmon (Commanding General, South Pacific). In October 1942, the 164th Infantry Regiment arrived at Guadalcanal, and it reinforced the First Marine Division until the remaining units under the command of Major General Patch arrived. Major General Vandergrift initiated the Matanikau offensive on 1 through 4 November 1942 against forces of the Japanese 17th Army around the Matanikau River and Point Cruz. As a result of this operation, U.S. Marines and Soldiers inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese. The Japanese forces suffered over 400 casualties, compared to 70 casualties for U.S. forces. In December 1942 reinforcements were supposed to arrive, but sickness and disease were rampant in the First Marine Division, and it required immediate reconstitution. This left all American ground forces under the command of Major General Patch.

D-18. Army forces continued to grow on Guadalcanal, and the Americal Division was formed. Commanded by Major General Patch, the Americal Division included the 132d, 164th, and 182d infantry regiments, in addition to artillery, engineer, and other support units. During three months of fighting, most of these units became combat ineffective from disease or injuries. Near the end of 1942 to early 1943, reinforcements arrived. Major General Harmon activated XIV Corps (including the 25th Infantry Division, Second Marine Division, and the Americal Division) under the command of Major General Patch. XIV Corps prepared for offensive operations while it was short of supplies and personnel. Every division was suffering from combat losses and malaria. To remain effective, Major General Patch reorganized the remaining regiments of XIV Corps into the Composite Army-Marine division consisting of two Army regiments, one USMC regiment, and artillery battalions from the Americal Division and Second Marine Division.

D-19. Several factors contributed to the reconstitution and reorganization of XIV Corps. XIV Corps Soldiers were enthusiastic but hesitant and inexperienced in combat. Supply delivery required extensive transfers that consumed valuable time. As fighting progressed, the distance between supply dumps lengthened; ship-to-shore logistics could not keep up with the demands. Disease was rampant; for every casualty to combat, five fell to malaria. These problems notwithstanding, joint Service collaboration among Army, Navy, and USMC units was necessary to successfully consolidate and reorganize.

VIII CORPS AREA DEFENSE AT BASTOGNE, FRANCE 1944

D-20. The World War II Battle of Bastogne provides an example of a corps area defense. VIII Corps was responsible for an 88-mile front that stretched along eastern Belgium and Luxembourg when the German army initiated its offensive in December 1944. Due to the German breakthrough, VIII corps, headquartered in Bastogne, needed reinforcements to defend this vital node in the highway system. 12th Army Group, through the First Army, reassigned the 101st Airborne Division and the 10th Armored Division from adjacent corps, as well as the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion to VIII Corps to augment its defenses. The use of these reinforcements to hold critical supply routes limited further German advances in Belgium and enabled the Allied counterattack in January 1945. (See figure D-6 on page 176 for a map of the defense of Bastogne.)




Figure D-6. VIII Corps Area Defense.

XVIII CORPS AND THE AFTERMATH OF OPERATION JUST CAUSE

D-21. Ongoing disagreement between the United States and General Manuel Noriega culminated in the fatal shooting of U.S. Marine Corps First Lieutenant Robert Paz on 18 December 1989, and the violent harassment of Navy personnel by members of the Panamanian Defense Force. As a result of escalating tensions, OPERATION JUST CAUSE had been approved as a contingency operation by President Bush a month earlier. It was unique because it was a unilateral military operation conducted entirely by U.S. forces. This simplified the planning and execution of operations, but it created issues later in the transition to stability operations. Additionally, interagency partners such as the U.S. Department of State or U.S. Agency for International Development, were not involved in the contingency planning and this complicated military efforts later. The final operation plan included U.S. Army and Marine Corps forces commanded by the XVIII Airborne Corps, designated JTF-South, and it was supported by a joint special operations task force.

D-22. OPERATION JUST CAUSE began with a combined airborne and ground assault on 20 December 1989. Major combat operations were over by 3 January 1990, although some units began transitioning to stability operations earlier. The transition from combat operations to stability was beset with problems. Contingency planning provided a concept for stability operations, but no detailed planning, and it did not account for the needed Army Reserve forces, primarily civil affairs elements, early enough for them to be available. The larger stability plan, OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY, was not approved until 21 December 1989, the day after the invasion began. Because civilian agencies had not been involved in the planning, they were not prepared to assume responsibility for post-combat stability operations. All of this resulted in the initial combat forces having to conduct stability operations which they had not planned for, including traffic control; garbage disposal; and providing food, water, and medical care to the local population. Efforts to establish the Military Support Group in late January 1990 helped to focus subsequent efforts, although rapidly changing command relationships continued to create challenges. JTF-South shut down in early February 1990, and responsibility for the military support group, along with the fractured

stability plan, transitioned to U.S. Army South. By the time Reserve forces and civilian agencies were able to operate in force throughout Panama, crime was rampant and there was an almost complete breakdown of civil authority. Stability operations focused on combating this crime while slowly rebuilding Panamanian governmental institutions and overseeing free elections in 1994.

D-23. Stability operations can include several types of transitions that require detailed planning. They may include transitions of authority and control between different military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and host nations. The role of a corps may also change from leading the conduct of stability operations to supporting a new organization executing stability operations. These transitions can create vulnerabilities to the force, to the mission, and to the local population as enemy forces seek to take advantage of any disruptions. The corps commander and staff identify these transitions through deliberate, detailed planning tied to decision points to mitigate risks while continuing the transition to civilian oversight and host-nation control of operations.

D-24. Maintaining unity of effort during transitions is critical. The corps commander and staff spend a significant amount of time communicating with the various U.S., host-nation, and foreign agencies and organizations involved in the operation to ensure that friction between organizations or diverging objectives does not threaten the overall unity of effort. This communication is critical to ensuring continuity and understanding as new forces relieve U.S. forces, units are task-organized into new configurations, and different intergovernmental or host-nation organizations assume the lead for operations. Finally, the corps must continuously communicate with the theater army to ensure it is prepared to receive responsibility for enduring military tasks as the corps redeploys.

OPERATION POWER PACK, 1965-1966

D-25. The Dominican Republic experienced three years of turmoil starting in 1962 after elections and culminating on 24 April 1965, when communist guerrilla forces deposed the Dominican leader and overwhelmed Dominican security forces. President Lyndon Johnson ordered the U.S. military deployments to intervene. The purpose of the deployment was to stabilize the country and prevent its fall to the communists.

D-26. Lieutenant General Palmer, commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, commanded a JTF composed of U.S. Marines and elements of the 82d Airborne Division tasked with restoring and supporting the duly elected government of the Dominican Republic. Additional SOF from 7th Special Forces Group and psychological operations forces also participated.

D-27. Initial forces deployed on 28 April 1965 to secure critical infrastructure, link up with local government forces, and regain control of the capital, Santo Domingo. These initial forces included Marines from the USS Boxer and elements of the 82d Airborne Division. By the end of May, the entire 82d Airborne Division along with a battalion of Marines was deployed in country. Palmer directed the start of stability operations in support of host-nation forces. They focused on security and alleviating human suffering, the two minimum-essential stability tasks mandated by doctrine and law today. U.S. military forces conducted constabulary operations in Santo Domingo and continued distributing food, water, and medical supplies to both factions.

D-28. U.S. military forces continued these operations while the Organization of American States helped to establish a provisional government in preparation for elections to reestablish a legitimate government. By September 1965, most security operations had been transferred to a Latin American military task force led by Brazil, and U.S. military forces began to redeploy to the United States. By September 1966, all American forces had departed the Dominican Republic.

D-29. During crises, the Army may deploy a corps headquarters and select units as part of a U.S. response. The corps is the preferred Army echelon for use as a JTF headquarters because of the seniority of its staff and its deployability. A corps acting as a JTF headquarters requires a separate formation to assume the role of ARFOR because of the differing roles and responsibilities inherent in each. The emphasis on the other instruments of national power during these operations requires increased integration of nonmilitary and multinational partners in operations. Ideally, a corps partners with local host-nation forces whenever possible in the conduct of operations.

D-30. A corps deployed as part of a U.S. crisis response operates as part of a joint command and in most instances a multinational one. This requires an awareness of political and military considerations for operations. The corps rapidly integrates liaisons and staffs from multiple sources while simultaneously beginning operations. This places a tremendous burden on staff processes that must be accounted for during initial planning. The nature of crises means the involvement of multiple nations in the development of long term solutions even if they may not have been involved in initial operations to stabilize the operational area. Clearly identifying the requirements for future solutions, where they may be coming from, and integrating them into the transition efforts is critical for success. (See OPERATION POWER PACK for an example of corps operations during crisis.)

D-31. In many respects, stability operations conducted during crises are the most difficult to plan and execute. Because speed is important, a corps will often deploy during the initial stages of planning with broad directives and missions from its higher headquarters. Those broad directives can be difficult to translate into action with limited resources. The stability needs of a developing crisis can be difficult to determine in advance, and they may change during operations. Additionally, other nations may also respond to the crisis with military forces. These forces may or may not be working towards the same objectives, presenting an additional challenge.

D-32. International crises also attract the attention of nongovernmental organizations seeking to help; all of which are competing for workspace and access to supplies and resources. Finally, international media attention creates the demand for immediate action and quick resolution which does not always account for long-term impacts in the region. All this places unique demands on the corps commander and staff as they deploy corps formations, develop requirements, and execute their assigned mission.

OPERATION DESERT DRAGON – ESTABLISHING THE DEFENSE AND BUILDING COMBAT POWER

D-33. On 8 August 1990, the XVIII Airborne Corps assault CP and the lead elements of the 82d Airborne Division deployed to Saudi Arabia initiating OPERATION DESERT SHIELD. The corps deployed three divisions within 60 days (the 82d Airborne, 101st Air Assault, and the 24th Infantry Division [Mechanized]). The remainder of the corps (3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, 75th Field Artillery Brigade, and the 212th Field Artillery Brigade) arrived by 1 November. The corps defense increased in capability with the arrival of each unit in theater. As additional units arrived, corps plans (called DESERT DRAGON I, II, and III) were revised.

D-34. DESERT DRAGON I was the initial corps lodgment defense to protect the air and seaports of debarkation at Dhahran and Ad-Dammam with a reinforced airborne brigade. DESERT DRAGON II expanded the lodgment area to include the port of Al-Jubayl to protect the arrival of the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. During DESERT DRAGON I and II, the lodgment defense was heavily outnumbered by the Iraqi's armored forces. The airborne brigades optimized four factors to enhance their defensive combat power:

- They situated their defenses at points along the coast roads closely bordered by sabkhas (coastal salt flats), which minimized off-road maneuver by enemy armored forces. (See figure D-7 for a depiction of the defense.)
- They optimized their direct-fire range advantage over the Iraqis with tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missiles and Sheridan tanks.
- The defense was supported by attack helicopters and joint and multinational air component aircraft flying CAS and air interdiction sorties.
- The Soldiers were disciplined and sufficiently confident in their units to withstand the shock of an armored attack.




Figure D-7. OPERATION DESERT DRAGON Phase I and II

D-35. Shortly after the arrival of the lead elements of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the corps transitioned to Desert Dragon III. This also signaled an end to any reasonable chance of success for an Iraqi attack into Saudi Arabia. The plan took its final form with the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division. The corps conducted a mobile defense in sector with a division-size striking force. A provisional Arab mechanized division conducted the initial defense of Saudi Arabia forward of the corps covering force. The Marines conducted an area defense of the Al-Jubayl coastal region. (See figure D-8 on page 180 for a depiction of the AO.)

D-36. The 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division, augmented by the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 12th Aviation Brigade, conducted covering force operations in AOs Carentan and Normandy. The 24th Infantry conducted an area defense within the MBA. The 82d Airborne Division conducted an area defense of critical installations and facilities.

D-37. The 1st Cavalry Division was designated as the corps striking force (called the reserve at that time) with the principal mission to counterattack into flanks and rear of the trailing echelon brigades and divisions, presumably the Republican Guard forces. Corps deep operations focused on attacking select high-value targets and follow-on Iraqi echelons to attrit and disrupt them.

D-38. On 17 January 1991, corps units transitioned to offensive operations. Attack helicopters from the 10lst Airborne (Air Assault) Division conducted a deep attack in conjunction with joint forces and destroyed a critical ground control intercept radar in Western Iraq to open the air campaign of OPERATION DESERT STORM.

D-39. The corps remained in eastern Saudi Arabia until shortly before the initiation of the ground offensive to deceive the Iraqis as to the true location of the coalition’s attack.




Figure D-8. OPERATION DESERT DRAGON Phase III

Source Notes

This division lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it lists the page number followed by the paragraph number.

Chapter 1

1 "[The corps] can…": A Manual for Commanders of Large Units (Provisional), Vol. I, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1930 [obsolete]), 40.

4 DEFENDER Europe and V Corps. Vignette adapted from "V Corps to Participate in DEFENDER-Europe 21". U.S. Army Europe and Africa press release, 3 June 2021, https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/ArticleViewPressRelease/Article/2643341/press-release-v-corps-to-participate-in-defender-europe-21/

5 Operation Just Cause – Crisis Intervention. Vignette adapted from *Operation Just Cause: The Incursion Into Panama Publication 70-85-1* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History Publication), 11–14, 34–35, https://history.army.mil/Publications/Publications-Catalog/Publications-by-Number/#.

6 Operation Promote Liberty – Transition to Stability Operations. Vignette adapted from *Operation Just Cause: The Incursion Into Panama*, Pub No. 70–85–1 (Washington, DC: Center for Military History Publication), https://history.army.mil/Publications/Publications-Catalog/Publications-by-Number/#.

Chapter 3

43 "It is my…": Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, trans. Paul Findlay, ed. B.H. Liddell-Hart (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1953), 201.

Chapter 4

73 "From adequate…": FM 100-5, *Operations*, 22 May 1941 (obsolete).

Chapter 5

90 Task Force Normandy. Vignette adapted from Charles Toomey, *XVIII Airborne Corps in Desert Storm; From Planning to Victory*, (Hellgate Press, 2004).

Appendix B

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent publication for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I — ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAMDC	Army Air and Missile Defense Command
ADA	air defense artillery
ADCON	administrative control
ADP	Army doctrine publication
AMD	air and missile defense
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
AR	Army regulation
ASCC	Army service component command
ASOC	air support operations center
ASOS	Army support to other Services
ASR	alternate supply route
ATP	Army techniques publication
BCT	brigade combat team
C2	command and control
CAB	combat aviation brigade
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives
CCDR	combatant commander
CEMA	cyberspace electromagnetic activities
CP	command post
CTO	corps transportation officer
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
E-MIB	expeditionary military intelligence brigade
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
ESC	expeditionary sustainment command
EW	electromagnetic warfare
FLOT	forward line of own troops
FM	field manual
FSCOORD	fire support coordinator
FSE	fires support element
G-1	assistant chief of staff, personnel

G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4	assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-5	assistant chief of staff, plans
G-6	corps assistant chief of staff, signal
G-8	assistant chief of staff, financial management
G-9	assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
IEW	intelligence and electronic warfare
IPOE	intelligence preparation of the operational environment
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JECC	Joint Enabling Capabilities Command
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JOA	joint operations area
JSA	joint security area
JTF	joint task force
LCC	land component commander
LNO	liaison officer
LOC	line of communications
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MBA	main battle area
MCG	mobile command group
MEB	maneuver enhancement brigade
METT-TC-(I)	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support availability, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations
MILDEC	military deception
MNFLCC	multinational force land component command
MPAD	mobile public affairs detachment
MSR	main supply routes
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OE	operational environment
OPCON	operational control
OPSEC	operations security
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SOF	special operations forces
SSE	space support element
TAC-D	tactical deception
TACON	tactical control
TLD	theater liaison detachment

TSC	theater sustainment command
U.S.	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USINDOPACOM	U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USNORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command
USSOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command

SECTION II — TERMS

adversary

A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 3-0)

air tasking order

A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities, or forces for targeting and specific missions. (JP 3-30)

airspace control order

An order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details of the approved requests for airspace coordinating measures. (JP 3-52)

area defense

A type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. (ADP 3-90)

area of influence

An area inclusive of and extending beyond an operational area wherein a commander is capable of direct influence by maneuver, fire support, and information normally under the commander's command or control. (JP 3-0)

area of interest

That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent to it, and extending into enemy territory. (JP 3-0)

area security

A type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, installation routes and actions within a specific area. (FM 3-90)

ARFOR

The Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. (FM 3-94)

Army corps

An echelon of command and tactical formation that employs divisions, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades to achieve objectives on land. (JP 3-31)

assured mobility

A framework—of processes, actions, and capabilities—that assures the ability of a force to deploy, move, and maneuver where and when desired. (ATP 3-90.4)

close area

close area is the portion of the commander's area of operations where the majority of subordinate maneuver forces conduct close combat (ADP 3-0).

close operations

Tactical actions of subordinate maneuver forces and the forces providing immediate support to them, whose purpose is to employ maneuver and fires to close with and destroy enemy forces. (FM 3-0)

combat power

The total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time. (JP 3-0)

command post cell

A grouping of personnel and equipment organized by warfighting function or by planning horizon to facilitate the exercise of command and control. (FM 6-0)

consolidate gains

Activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities. (ADP 3-0)

controlled supply rate

The rate of ammunition consumption that can be supported, considering availability, facilities, and transportation. It is expressed in rounds per unit, individual, or vehicle per day. (ATP 3-09.23)

counterair

A mission at the theater level that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of control of the air and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. (JP 3-01)

counterattack

A variation of attack by a defending force against an attacking enemy force. (FM 3-90)

countermobility

A set of combined arms activities that use or enhance the effects of natural and man-made obstacles to prevent the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver. (ATP 3-90.8)

crisis

An emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)

cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA)

The process of planning, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace and electronic warfare operations in support of unified land operations. (ADP 3-0)

deep area

Where the commander sets conditions for future success in close combat. (ADP 3-0)

deep operations

tactical actions against enemy forces, typically out of direct contact with friendly forces, intended to shape future close operations and protect rear operations. (FM 3-0)

defeat

To render a force incapable of achieving its objectives. (ADP 3-0)

defeat mechanism

A method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition. (ADP 3-0)

delay

When a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on enemy forces without becoming decisively engaged. (ADP 3-90)

disengagement criteria

Protocols that specify those circumstances where a friendly force must break contact with direct fire and observed indirect fire to prevent becoming decisively engaged or to preserve friendly combat power. (FM 3-90)

early-entry command post

A lead element of a headquarters designed to control operations until the remaining portions of the headquarters are deployed and operational. (FM 6-0)

enabling operation

An operation that sets the friendly conditions required for mission accomplishment. (FM 3-90)

encirclement

Where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communications and reinforcement. (FM 3-90)

encircling force

The force that maneuvers to the rear or flank of the enemy to prevent the enemy's escape. (FM 3-90)

Exfiltrate is A tactical mission task in which a unit removes Soldiers or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. (FM 3-90)

exploitation

A type of offensive operation following a successful attack to disorganize the enemy in depth. (FM 3-90)

fire support

A rapid and continuous integration of surface-to-surface indirect fires, target acquisition, armed aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal attack/delivery systems that converge against targets across all domains in support of the maneuver commander's concept of operations. (FM 3-09)

force field artillery headquarters

A battalion size or higher unit designated by the supported commander who specifies its duration, duties, and responsibilities. (FM 3-09)

force projection

The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater in response to requirements for military operations. (JP 3-0)

forms of maneuver

Distinct tactical combinations of fire and movement with a unique set of doctrinal characteristics that differ primarily in the relationship between the maneuvering force and the enemy. (ADP 3-90)

gap crossing

The projection of combat power across a linear obstacle (wet or dry gap). (ATP 3-90.4)

information advantage

A condition when a force holds the initiative in terms of situational understanding, decision making, and relevant actor behavior. (ADP 3-13)

information collection

An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets and the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. (FM 3-55)

interoperability

The ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)

joint fires

Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to create desired effects in support of a common objective. (JP 3-0)

knowledge management

The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making. (ADP 6-0)

large-scale combat operations

Extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives. (ADP 3-0)

lethality

The capability and capacity to destroy. (FM 3-0)

linkup

A meeting of friendly ground forces, which occurs in a variety of circumstances. (ADP 3-90)

main command post

A portion of a unit headquarters containing the majority of the staff designed to command and control current operations, conduct detailed analysis, and plan future operations. (FM 6-0)

military deception

Activities intended to mislead and cause adversary actions or inactions that are beneficial to the friendly force. (JP 3-54)

military information support operations (MISO)

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. (JP 3-53)

mobile defense

A type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attach by a striking force. (ADP 3-90)

mobility

A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. (JP 3-36)

movement control

The dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating movements according to command priorities to synchronize distribution flow over lines of communications to sustain land forces. (ADP 4-0)

movement to contact

A type of offensive operation designed to establish or regain contact to develop the situation. (FM 3-90)

multidomain operations

The combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders. (FM 3-0)

mutual support

That support which units render each other throughout joint operations, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, or their inherent capabilities. (JP 3-31)

node

1. A location in a mobility system where a movement requirement is originated, processed for onward movement, or terminated. (JP 3-36)

operation

1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1, Volume 1)

operational framework

A cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations. (ADP 1-01)

passage of lines

An operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force's combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy. (JP 3-18)

preparation fire

A brief, intense bombardment on selected targets or a prolonged effort over time covering a large number of targets. (FM 3-09)

raid

A variation of attack to temporarily seize an objective with a planned withdrawal. (FM 3-90)

rear operations

Tactical actions behind major subordinate maneuver forces that facilitate movement, extend operational reach, and maintain desired tempo. (FM 3-0)

reconnaissance

A mission undertaken to obtain information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area, by visual observation or other detection methods. (JP 2-0)

reconstitution

An operation that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. (ATP 3-94.4)

***relief in place**

An operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit.

required supply rate

The amount of ammunition expressed in terms of rounds per weapon per day for ammunition items fired by weapons, in terms of other units of measure per day for bulk allotment, and other items estimated to be required to sustain operations of any designated force without restriction for a specified period. (ATP 3-09.23)

retirement

When a force out of contact moves away from the enemy. (ADP 3-90)

security area

That area occupied by a unit's security elements and includes the areas of influence of those security elements. (ADP 3-90)

security operations

Those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the forces being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their protected forces. (ADP 3-90)

spoiling attack

A variation of an attack employed against an enemy preparing for an attack. (FM 3-90)

stability mechanism

The primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. (ADP 3-0)

staff section

A grouping of staff members by area of expertise. (FM 6-0)

support area

The portion of the commander's area of operations designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations. (ADP 3-0)

support area operations

The tactical actions securing lines of communications, bases, and base clusters that enable an echelon's sustainment and command and control. (FM 3-0)

supporting distance

The distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure that it regains control of a civil situation. (ADP 3-0)

supporting range

The distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit's weapons systems. (ADP 3-0)

sustainment

The provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion. (ADP 4-0)

synchronization

1. The arrangement of military activities in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. (JP 2-0)

tactical deception

A friendly activity that causes enemy commanders to take action or cause inaction detrimental to their objectives. (FM 3-90)

tactics

The employment, ordered arrangement and directed actions of forces in relation to each other. (ADP 3-90)

targeting

The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0)

troop movement

The movement of Soldiers and units from one place to another by any available means. (FM 3-90)

warfighting function

A group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. (ADP 3-0)

withdraw

To disengage from an enemy force and move in a direction away from the enemy. (ADP 3-90)

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Index

Entries are by page number.

A

adversary, *2*, *3*, *4*, *33*, *36*, *41*, *60*, *113*, *185*, *189*

air defense measures, *57*, *67*

air tasking order, *59*, *66*, *67*, *68*, *185*

airspace control order, *67*, *185*

area defense, *99*, *100*, *175*, *176*, *179*, *185*

area of influence, *47*, *48*, *185*

area of interest, *48*, *80*, *116*, *185*

area security, *22*, *27*, *73*, *78*, *81*, *114*, *133*, *134*, *135*, *167*, *185*

ARFOR, xii, *7*, 11, 12, 15, 33, 35, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 159, 161, 163, 177, 185

Army corps, *xi*, *1*, *3*, *7*, *13*, *144*, *149*, *150*, *157*, *159*, *161*, *185*

C

CEMA, *30*, *34*, *36*, *69*, *183*, *186*

close area, *7*, *10*, *21*, *22*, *50*, *53*, *80*, *89*, *103*, *127*, *131*, *185*

close areas, *7*, *16*, *21*, *22*, *91*

close operations, *1*, *11*, *20*, *43*, *50*, *52*, *62*, *64*, *66*, *70*, *72*, *79*, *80*, *186*

combat power, *xi*, *2*, *7*, *8*, *9*, *10*, *11*, *19*, *20*, *27*, *39*, *41*, *42*, *43*, *44*, *45*, *46*, *48*, *50*, *51*, *55*, *56*, *57*, *58*, *62*, *63*, *64*, *70*, *72*, *74*, *78*, *79*, *81*, *83*, *84*, *86*, *89*, *90*, *91*, *94*, *100*, *103*, *107*, *109*, *114*, *115*, *124*, *125*, *126*, *129*, *133*, *134*, *135*, *136*, *142*, *166*, *178*, *186*, *187*, *189*, *190*

combatant commander, *3*, *4*, *139*, *141*, *144*, *146*, *183*

command post, *xi*

command post cell, *20*, *186*

consolidate gains, *1*, *2*, *5*, *6*, *10*, *27*, *42*, *70*, *133*, *134*, *186*, *188*

controlled supply rate, *77*, *80*, *186*

corps commander, *1*, *2*, *7*, *8*, *9*, *11*, *12*, *13*, *15*, *16*, *18*, *20*, *21*, *22*, *23*, *24*, *25*, *26*, *27*, *28*, *29*, *31*, *32*, *34*, *36*, *39*, *42*, *43*, *44*, *45*, *46*, *50*, *51*, *53*, *54*, *55*, *56*, *57*, *58*, *59*, *63*, *64*, *65*, *68*, *69*, *70*, *71*, *74*, *75*, *77*, *81*, *86*, *88*, *89*, *90*, *91*, *94*, *100*, *103*, *110*, *113*, *115*, *116*, *119*, *122*, *123*, *126*, *127*, *128*, *134*, *135*, *136*, *137*, *138*, *140*, *144*, *145*, *152*, *154*, *156*, *160*, *161*, *162*, *177*, *178*

corps operations, *xi*, *xii*, *15*, *20*, *21*, *22*, *28*, *34*, *36*, *37*, *41*, *42*, *51*, *52*, *57*, *58*, *59*, *60*, *63*, *65*, *67*, *69*, *70*, *71*, *72*, *78*, *79*, *83*, *114*, *133*, *134*, *135*, *167*, *178*

counterair, *36*, *186*

counterattack, *79*, *80*, *86*, *91*, *92*, *93*, *95*, *100*, *101*, *110*, *123*, *133*, *161*, *175*, *179*, *186*

counterattacks, *64*, *92*, *93*, *94*, *99*, *131*, *133*

countermobility, *xii*, *24*, *29*, *64*, *73*, *101*, *113*, *123*, *186*

crisis, *1*, *3*, *4*, *7*, *11*, *12*, *43*, *58*, *138*, *149*, *152*, *155*, *159*, *161*, *167*, *178*, *186*

D

deep area, *31*, *50*, *61*, *80*, *100*, *101*, *119*, *186*

deep operations, *8*, *10*, *20*, *21*, *28*, *31*, *50*, *62*, *64*, *65*, *66*, *67*, *68*, *69*, *70*, *71*, *79*, *80*, *86*, *89*, *97*, *121*, *135*, *179*, *186*

defeat mechanisms, *9*, *41*, *42*, *45*, *62*, *63*, *65*, *66*

delay, *31*, *36*, *42*, *54*, *65*, *80*, *95*, *96*, *102*, *104*, *116*, *120*, *186*

disengagement criteria, *81*, *103*, *187*

E

early-entry command post, *23*, *187*

enabling operations, *xii*, *88*, *113*

encirclement, *87*, *98*, *99*, *106*, *107*, *108*, *129*, *131*, *168*, *187*

encircling force, *97*, *98*, *108*, *109*, *187*

exploitation, *28*, *33*, *42*, *55*, *66*, *69*, *76*, *84*, *88*, *90*, *91*, *94*, *95*, *96*, *97*, *98*, *133*, *187*

F

fire support, *1*, *7*, *8*, *9*, *21*, *24*, *29*, *37*, *42*, *48*, *51*, *53*, *56*, *57*, *66*, *67*, *68*, *70*, *76*, *80*, *88*, *89*, *94*, *100*, *107*, *109*, *115*, *118*, *119*, *121*, *122*, *126*, *134*, *183*, *185*, *187*, *See* capability

force field artillery headquarters, *29*, *187*

force projection, *1*, *4*, *44*, *52*, *54*, *55*, *56*, *57*, *134*, *141*, *142*, *187*

force protection, *55*, *57*, *74*, *118*, *164*, *171*

forms of maneuver, *64*, *79*, *84*, *165*, *166*, *187*

G

gap crossing, *91*, *117*, *124*, *125*, *126*, *127*, *128*, *174*, *187*

gap crossings, *22*, *124*, *127*, *128*

I

information, *vii*, *xi*, *xii*, *2*, *3*, *7*, *8*, *10*, *11*, *12*, *13*, *15*, *16*, *23*, *24*, *25*, *27*, *28*, *29*, *30*, *31*, *32*, *33*, *34*, *35*, *36*, *37*, *38*,

Entries are by page number.

39, *41*, *43*, *44*, *45*, *48*, *52*, *53*, *54*, *55*, *56*, *58*, *59*, *60*, *61*, *62*, *65*, *66*, *67*, *68*, *69*, *70*, *71*, *72*, *73*, *74*, *76*, *77*, *78*, *79*, *80*, *81*, *83*, *84*, *86*, *88*, *89*, *90*, *91*, *93*, *95*, *101*, *106*, *110*, *113*, *114*, *115*, *116*, *117*, *118*, *119*, *120*, *122*, *124*, *126*, *129*, *131*, *136*, *137*, *138*, *142*, *143*, *144*, *145*, *150*, *152*, *153*, *154*, *155*, *156*, *157*, *158*, *160*, *161*, *162*, *163*, *164*, *166*, *185*, *187*, *188*, *189*

information collection, *8*, *28*, *29*, *31*, *37*, *44*, *55*, *60*, *61*, *66*, *76*, *80*, *89*, *91*, *110*, *113*, *164*, *187*

intelligence operations, *21*, *28*, *30*, *55*, *69*, *113*, *163*

interoperability, *3*, *4*, *13*, *16*, *26*, *35*, *37*, *39*, *57*, *158*, *187*

Interoperability, *13*, *194*

J

joint fires, *7*, *8*, *10*, *35*, *36*, *37*, *42*, *60*, *67*, *80*, *187*

joint task force, *vii*, *4*, *5*, *129*, *140*, *149*, *152*, *159*, *184*

JTF, *4*, *5*, *6*, *7*, *9*, *11*, *12*, *13*, *15*, *32*, *33*, *35*, *36*, *38*, *58*, *65*, *67*, *139*, *140*, *141*, *144*, *145*, *146*, *149*, *150*, *152*, *153*, *154*, *155*, *156*, *157*, *158*, *159*, *160*, *161*, *162*, *163*, *164*, *165*, *166*, *176*, *177*, *184*

K

knowledge management, *58*, *59*, *188*

L

large-scale combat operations, *xi*, *1*, *3*, *5*, *8*, *9*, *11*, *17*, *19*, *23*, *27*, *28*, *29*, *31*, *36*, *37*, *41*, *43*, *45*, *51*, *52*, *53*, *57*, *58*, *71*, *76*, *78*, *99*, *136*, *137*, *142*, *143*, *144*, *150*, *188*

lethality, *13*, *35*, *42*, *43*, *188*

linkup, *xii*, *80*, *109*, *113*, *129*, *130*, *131*, *172*, *188*

M

main command post, *vii*, *17*, *19*, *20*, *74*, *188*

MEB, *20*, *27*, *28*, *54*, *57*, *71*, *72*, *77*, *142*, *184*

military deception, *128*, *184*, *188*

mobile defense, *99*, *100*, *101*, *102*, *179*, *188*

mobility, *xii*, *17*, *19*, *29*, *30*, *42*, *43*, *49*, *50*, *51*, *52*, *63*, *64*, *71*, *72*, *73*, *74*, *75*, *84*, *91*, *95*, *101*, *103*, *108*, *113*, *114*, *116*, *123*, *125*, *126*, *142*, *168*, *174*, *185*, *188*

movement control, *12*, *30*, *52*, *53*, *54*, *56*, *71*, *72*, *73*, *77*, *81*, *103*, *126*, *128*, *188*

movement to contact, *31*, *88*, *89*, *90*, *94*, *113*, *114*, *131*, *143*, *188*

multidomain operations, *2*, *28*, *35*, *69*, *188*

Multidomain operations, *2*

mutual support, *47*, *49*, *50*, *89*, *162*, *163*, *188*

N

node, *19*, *71*, *72*, *158*, *175*, *188*

O

operation, *xi*, *1*, *2*, *4*, *5*, *6*, *7*, *8*, *9*, *10*, *11*, *12*, *16*, *17*, *19*, *20*, *21*, *22*, *23*, *27*, *36*, *42*, *45*, *46*, *48*, *51*, *52*, *54*, *58*, *61*, *63*, *64*, *66*, *68*, *69*, *71*, *72*, *74*, *76*, *78*, *80*, *83*, *84*, *87*, *88*, *89*, *91*, *92*, *93*, *94*, *97*, *99*, *100*, *102*, *107*, *108*, *109*, *111*, *113*, *114*, *116*, *117*, *118*, *119*, *120*, *121*, *122*, *123*, *124*, *126*, *127*, *128*, *129*, *130*, *131*, *133*, *134*, *135*, *137*, *138*, *143*, *144*, *146*, *149*, *150*, *152*, *155*, *156*, *160*, *161*, *165*, *166*, *171*, *174*, *176*, *177*, *185*, *187*, *188*, *189*

operational concept, **xi**, **2**, **43**

operational framework, *xi*, *xii*, *9*, *10*, *41*, *46*, *47*, *51*, *83*, *94*, *115*, *189*

operations. *See* combat
limited contingency, *1*

P

passage of lines, *xii*, *22*, *93*, *111*, *113*, *120*, *121*, *122*, *189*

R

raid, *92*, *93*, *109*, *189*

rear operations. *See* employing army and joint capabilities

reconstitution, *78*, *91*, *102*, *135*, *136*, *174*, *175*, *189*

relief in place, *xii*, *113*, *117*, *118*, *119*, *189*

required supply rate, *77*, *189*

retirement, *102*, *189*

risk, *10*, *13*, *38*, *41*, *42*, *45*, *46*, *47*, *66*, *70*, *74*, *80*, *81*, *83*, *84*, *87*, *88*, *89*, *91*, *94*, *109*, *111*, *114*, *115*, *116*, *117*, *118*, *119*, *120*, *121*, *123*, *126*, *127*, *129*, *130*, *131*, *134*, *135*, *142*, *145*, *165*

RSOI, *11*, *23*, *35*, *51*, *55*, *56*, *57*, *58*, *111*, *144*, *156*, *184*

S

security area, *80*, *81*, *103*, *162*, *184*, *189*

security operations, *71*, *80*, *81*, *90*, *114*, *120*, *126*, *127*, *131*, *135*, *162*, *164*, *171*, *177*, *189*

spoiling attack, *92*, *93*, *189*

staff section, *17*, *18*, *19*, *23*, *24*, *52*, *152*, *190*

support area, *20*, *27*, *28*, *50*, *54*, *70*, *71*, *72*, *77*, *80*, *114*, *121*, *190*

support area operations, *28*, *70*, *71*, *190*

supporting distance, *49*, *95*, *190*

supporting range, *47*, *49*, *190*

sustainment, *1*, *8*, *9*, *15*, *17*, *19*, *21*, *22*, *24*, *25*, *26*, *27*, *29*, *30*, *33*, *34*, *42*, *43*, *47*, *50*, *51*, *52*, *53*, *54*, *55*, *56*, *62*, *65*, *68*, *70*, *71*, *72*, *73*, *74*, *75*, *76*, *77*, *78*, *79*, *80*, *81*, *84*, *88*, *89*, *91*, *94*, *95*, *96*, *97*, *100*, *101*, *105*, *109*, *116*, *117*, *120*, *121*, *122*, *123*, *126*, *127*, *131*, *140*, *141*, *144*, *145*, *146*, *147*, *152*, *155*, *158*, *163*, *164*, *165*, *166*, *183*, *185*, *190*

synchronization, *1*, *15*, *19*, *32*, *35*, *46*, *47*, *50*, *51*, *53*, *54*, *56*, *59*, *61*, *62*, *63*, *69*, *70*, *72*, *73*, *74*, *75*, *77*, *79*, *89*, *92*, *116*, *118*, *119*, *120*, *142*, *161*, *190*

T

TAC-D, *60*, *65*, *91*, *113*, *128*, *129*, *184*

Entries are by page number.

TACON, *12*, *13*, *26*, *30*, *31*, *32*, *119*, *121*, *128*, *143*, *160*, *162*, *184*
tactical deception, *xii*, *60*, *115*, *118*, *119*, *127*, *129*, *184*, *190*
tactics, *1*, *41*, *42*, *63*, *64*, *80*, *83*, *91*, *115*, *172*, *190*
the corps staff, *10*, *16*, *23*, *25*, *30*, *32*, *43*, *59*, *67*, *88*, *91*, *93*, *96*, *110*, *134*, *152*, *158*, *161*, *162*
transportation, *17*, *30*, *32*, *51*, *53*, *54*, *56*, *57*, *72*, *73*, *74*, *77*, *95*, *97*, *103*, *115*, *116*, *117*, *123*, *134*, *153*, *156*, *164*, *183*, *186*, *188*
troop movement, *xii*, *113*, *115*, *121*, *122*, *166*, *190*

W

warfighting function, *20*, *24*, *58*, *67*, *68*, *142*, *186*, *190*
withdraw, *81*, *102*, *111*, *119*, *171*, *190*

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ATP 3-92

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