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Theater Army Operations

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THEATER ARMY OPERATIONS

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Preface

ATP 3-93 discusses the organization and operations of the theater army headquarters, including its role as the Army Service component command (ASCC) to the combatant commander and the relationships among the theater army headquarters, the theater enabling commands, and any other forces potentially provided by the Army Service. This publication also discusses theater army Service responsibilities (Title 10, U.S. Code [USC], Section 7013b functions and responsibilities), combatant commander's daily operational requirements, theater army responsibilities for setting, supporting, and maintaining the theater and joint operations areas, and the operational employment of the theater army and its contingency command post (CCP).

This publication is most applicable to theater army commanders and staff. It provides relevant information regarding the theater army organization and operations for commanders and staffs at subordinate, theater-level commands and brigades, combatant commanders, and other Service headquarters. The organizational figures and associated staffing levels are derived from an amalgamation of theater army modified tables of organization and equipment and may vary to some degree from modified tables of organization and equipment for each theater army.

The principal audience for ATP 3-93 is commanders and staffs of theater armies and transregional ASCCs; however, members of the profession of arms serving at the combatant command level or within an Army headquarters performing a joint role or similar scenario will greatly benefit from understanding the theater army and its responsibilities. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force (JTF) or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement (see FM 6-27.)

ATP 3-93 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. ATP 3-93 is not the proponent publication for any terms. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 3-93 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 3-93 is the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATZL-MCD (ATP 3-93). 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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Introduction

ATP 3-93 is a revision of ATP 3-93 (November 2014). ATP 3-93 articulates nonprescriptive ways and methods by which a theater army accomplishes missions, performs functions, and performs tasks. ATP 3-93 expands on theater army foundations and tenets found in FM 3-94 (2021), *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*. The development of ATP 3-93 was informed by the multi-domain operations concept.

ATP 3-93 addresses the theater army's role in the Army operating concept. It describes how the theater army performs its role of ASCC to the combatant commander and how that role—with all of its required functions, tasks, and responsibilities—is executed in support of the combatant commander's campaign plan and all phases of a joint operation. It expands the discussion of theater army headquarters organization, theater army forces, Service responsibilities (namely Title 10, USC Section 7013b, referred to as Title 10), Army support to other Services, combatant commander's daily operational requirements, responsibilities for setting the theater and the joint operations area (JOA), consolidating gains in the theater, and performing joint roles. All concepts are integral to a theater army fulfilling its role in the Army operating concept.

ATP 3-93 aligns with FM 3-94 on key topics while expanding on specific topics. These topics include discussions of theater army as an ARFOR, the theater army's execution of Title 10, combatant commander's daily operational requirements, an operational environment, operational variables and mission variables, setting the theater, and setting the JOA.

This edition of ATP 3-93 has the following changes:

- Focuses discussion on theater army tasks in preparation for and in support of large-scale combat operations.
- Examines theater armies performing the function of the theater joint force land component.
- Replaces the sustainment chapter by weaving sustainment discussion through all chapters.
- Introduces the field army as an echelon between corps and theater army.

Although the 2020 Unified Command Plan states that there are combatant commanders, some of which have assigned areas of responsibility, for ease of reading in this publication, the terms geographic combatant commander and transregional combatant commander are used.

ATP 3-93 contains seven chapters:

Chapter 1 provides the fundamental discussion for understanding the theater army. First, it discusses the Army as an echeloned force. Then it discusses the geographic combatant commander, followed by a discussion of the theater army's roles, functions, and responsibilities. Next is the discussions of Service component responsibilities and the theater army's relationship with other echelons above brigade forces. The chapter concludes with a discussion regarding theater army relationship to other Service components.

Chapter 2 discusses the organization of the theater army headquarters and the theater army structure. First, it discusses the theater army headquarters in general. Next, it describes the structure of the headquarters: the main command post (MCP), CCP, and the headquarters and headquarters battalion. The chapter concludes with a description of organic, assigned, and attached subordinate forces.

Chapter 3 discusses the first two functions of the theater army in its role of ASCC. The chapter begins with a discussion of the first ASCC function: fulfilling Service requirements of Title 10 and administrative control (ADCON) of Army forces. The chapter continues and concludes with a discussion of the second function of the theater army, the combatant commander's daily operational requirements.

Chapter 4 discusses setting the theater of operations. First, the chapter discusses how the theater army, in its primary role as the ASCC, helps set the theater. It then covers planning and preparation considerations by warfighting function in consideration to setting the theater. In closing, the chapter links theater security cooperation with setting the theater.

Chapter 5 discusses setting and supporting the JOA. The chapter begins with a discussion on the tasks the theater army conducts in support of setting and supporting a JOA and their relationship with the JOA ARFOR. The chapter then expands on the tasks of theater opening and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Next, the chapter discusses the force tailoring process and its importance to providing the joint force commander with combat power, followed by the theater army's responsibilities to JOA force protection. The chapter concludes with discussions on the theater army's responsibilities to sustain, establish the communications network architecture, and provide intelligence support to the JOA.

Chapter 6 discusses the final two functions performed by the theater army: command and control of subordinate elements and consolidate gains. The first section of the chapter discusses responsibilities of the theater army commander and how the commander uses ADCON, operational control, and tactical control for the control of forces assigned to theater. It then covers responsibilities of the individual ASCCs. The second section of the chapter discusses how the Army assists the combatant commander in actions to consolidate gains within the JOA and across the area of responsibility and offers a number of vignettes on how the theater army has historically managed the consolidation of gains in theater.

Chapter 7 discusses the theater army performing the joint roles of a JTF or joint force land component command. First the chapter discusses the theater army design. Then it discusses the JTF headquarters and examines historical examples and scenarios for which theater army may be a possible headquarters source. Next, the chapter discusses the theater joint force land component command, a command designed to coordinate and synchronize land forces for the combatant commander. The chapter concludes with a discussion of large-scale combat operations.

There are three appendices. Appendix A discusses the field army. Appendix B describes the employment of the theater army CCP. Appendix C discusses theater army tasks and functions in defense support of civil authorities.

This publication is not the proponent for any defined Army terms.

Chapter 1
Theater Army Introduction

Chapter 1 provides the fundamental discussion for understanding the theater army. First, it discusses the Army as an echeloned force. Then it discusses the geographic combatant commanders, followed by a discussion of the theater army's roles, functions, and responsibilities. Next is the discussions of Service component responsibilities and the theater army's relationship with other echelons above brigade forces. The chapter concludes with a discussion regarding theater army relationship to other Service components.

THE ARMY AS AN ECHELONED FORCE

1-1. The Army mission—our purpose—remains constant: to provide trained and equipped forces to joint force commanders for employment during competition below armed conflict, crisis, and conflict. The Army does this by organizing, training, and equipping its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. The Army accomplishes its mission by supporting the joint force and unified action partners in four strategic roles: shape operational environments (OEs), prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale combat operations (LSCO), and consolidate gains.

1-2. Army forces are organized and employed in echelons with each designed toward a specific function or mission. Each sequentially higher echelon organization possesses broader capabilities. This organization provides commanders with great flexibility in selecting the appropriate echelon for the range of military operations.

1-3. The theater army's primary role is as the Army Service component command (ASCC) assigned to a geographic combatant commander (GCC). As the ASCC, it is responsible for administration and support of all Army forces assigned, attached, or under the operational control of the GCC or transiting the area of responsibility (AOR). The theater army provides most of the administrative control (ADCON) and Army support to forces deployed in a joint operations area (JOA).

1-4. In addition, the theater army plays a significant role in coordinating, supporting, and integrating all Army forces committed to the AOR into GCC plans. As ASCC to a GCC, the theater army provides general support to Army and joint forces operating in JOAs within the AOR. The theater army must maintain an AOR-wide focus, providing Army support to all Army and joint forces across the AOR, in accordance with the GCC's priorities of support. The theater army is responsible for AOR-wide distribution, recovery, and redistribution of supplies and equipment.

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS AND THE THEATER ARMY

1-5. Combatant commanders' requirements for Army forces are determined by the National Military Strategy, the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum), other specific campaign plans, and operational requirements forecast by the combatant commander that are sourced through allocation in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (known as GFMAP). To meet these requirements, the Army provides combatant commanders with formations trained and equipped to apply landpower from the theater strategic level, through the operational level, and down to the tactical employment of various corps, divisions, brigades, groups, and battalions. Together the theater army, corps, and division (as echelons above brigade organizations) give combatant commanders tailorable options for employing landpower as part of an interdependent joint force within a geographic AOR.

1-6. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes the GCC's missions and responsibilities, including the delineation of the general AOR for which each GCC is responsible. The UCP provides the framework used to assign forces from each of the Services to the respective GCCs for employment in joint operations. Transregional combatant commanders have trans-regional responsibilities for assigned functions and support (or can be supported by GCCs) or may accomplish missions assigned by the UCP independently.

1-7. The operational chain of command for forces in an AOR normally extends from the combatant commander to a joint force commander (JFC) conducting military operations in a supported JOA or a theater of operations and then to the subordinate joint functional component commands (joint force land component command, joint force maritime component command, and joint force air component command) or subordinate Service component commanders. There are instances when the GCC may place a joint task force under operational control (OPCON) to a Service component, most often a standing joint task force. There are four types of command relationships in the operational chain of command: combatant command (command authority or COCOM), OPCON, tactical control (TACON), and support. Joint force commanders exercise the last three types of relationships as prescribed by law or as the superior commander over the military forces under their command.

1-8. Unless directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, COCOM is reserved for combatant commanders over their assigned forces. Joint task forces (JTFs) and functional component commands, such as a land component, comprise forces that are normally subordinate to a Service component command but have been placed OPCON under the JTF and subsequently to a functional component commander. GCCs frequently manage the risk of rapidly developing crises or conflicts by tasking components (frequently the theater army) to serve as a JTF in an operations plan; most theater armies are also identified as able to serve as a theater joint force land component command, JTF, or joint force land component command, when designated by the GCC and appropriately resourced. However, there is inherent risk of tasking the theater army (or any component) as a JTF because of the strain placed on the theater army's Title 10 United States Code (USC), Section 7013b (referred to as Title 10) and other ASCC responsibilities to the whole theater. In these cases, a theater army should be a JTF for limited scope, scale, or duration. Should the crisis develop into an enduring operation or larger conflict, the JTF role should be transitioned to a dedicated JTF headquarters. In some cases, the combatant commander may not establish a JTF, instead retaining OPCON over subordinate functional component commands and Service components.

1-9. Under joint doctrine, all joint forces include Service components to provide administrative and logistic support to their respective Service forces. A Service component command assigned to a GCC consists of the Service component commander and the Service forces (such as individuals, units, detachments, and organizations including support forces) assigned to that combatant commander. The Secretary of Defense identifies force capabilities to be assigned to combatant commands in the assignment tables of the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum. The theater army—as the ASCC to a GCC—is the command responsible for recommendations to the JFC on the allocation and employment of Army forces within a JOA. (See JP 3-31 for more information on joint force land operations.)

1-10. Service components may only be assigned to a single combatant commander. However, Service component commanders may support multiple combatant commanders in a supporting-to-supported commander relationship, especially in the case of force reductions or resource constraints. The Service determines the proper headquarters to provide support; the Forces for Unified Command Memorandum establishes Service component support relationships for responsibilities assigned in the UCP. Commanders of forces assigned to the combatant commands are under the authority, direction, and control of—and are responsible to—their combatant commander to carry out operational missions, operation plan (OPLAN) responsibilities, joint training and exercises, and logistics. However, Army doctrine distinguishes between the Army component of a combatant command and Army components of subordinate joint forces.

1-11. Under Army doctrine, the theater army is the ASCC to a GCC. There is only one theater army within a combatant command's AOR, and it serves as the combatant commander's single point of contact reporting directly to the Department of the Army (DA). The theater army has OPCON of all Army forces within the AOR unless and until the combatant commander establishes a JOA and places such Army forces under its JFC. The Army component to a joint force operating in an established JOA is the senior Army headquarters OPCON to the JFC and is the ARFOR, which includes ADCON authorities and responsibilities over all assigned or attached Army forces and OPCON of all Army forces assigned to the JTF not assigned to another

service component. The ADCON responsibilities can be delegated or shared. An *ARFOR* is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command (FM 3-94). Regardless of whether Army forces are OPCON to the theater army or OPCON to an ARFOR in the JOA, the theater army commander retains responsibility for ADCON of all Army forces and is the ARFOR for the theater.

1-12. While AORs may vary across the six theaters, the organization of the theater army is tailored to each AOR. A standard theater army design and table of organization and equipment (TOE) allows a better understanding of the organization. The theater army includes the commander, staff, and all Army forces (organizations, units, personnel, and installations) assigned to the combatant command. All theater army headquarters have a standard TOE, based on known requirements to support a fully developed AOR, including military forces either forward stationed or deployed to the AOR on a rotational basis.

1-13. Although the TOE is standard, the Army tailors each theater army to support the specific requirements of its AOR and the GCC to which it is assigned. One of the mechanisms for adjusting the respective designs/TOE requirements to account for the considerable variation between AORs is the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). The MTOE is different for each theater army headquarters, reflecting levels of manning and equipment commensurate with Headquarters, Department of the Army decisions that balance requirements against risk and available resources tailored to the specific requirements of each AOR. A Table of Distribution and Allowance (known as TDA) may further augment the theater army headquarters with additional depth on the staff, based on workload factors reviewed and updated by the Army annually. See Chapter 3 for additional discussion on MTOE and Tables of Distribution and Allowance.

THEATER ARMY ROLES, FUNCTIONS, AND TASKS

1-14. A *role* is the broad and enduring purpose for which the organization or branch is established (ADP 1-01). In accordance with AR 10-87, the theater army's primary role is ASCC to a GCC. However, there are some organizations that serve as the ASCC to a transregional combatant command (see Chapter 6 for more information on ASCCs to transregional combatant commands). Additionally, under certain conditions, the GCC could require the ASCC to serve as a JTF or joint force land component command (joint roles) for immediate response and contingency operations. Serving as a joint headquarters requires significant augmentation and directly impacts the theater army's ability to support its role as ASCC. The associated risks to setting and maintaining the theater and setting and supporting subordinate operational areas must be accounted for prior to establishing the new joint headquarters.

1-15. A *function* is the broad, general, and enduring role for which an organization is designed, equipped, and trained (JP 1). A function delineates the set of executable capabilities that an organization or branch requires to perform its role. The theater army is responsible for seven functions:

- Exercise command and control (C2) over Army forces in the theater (see Chapter 3).
- Execute combatant commander’s daily operational requirements (see Chapter 4).
- Provide ADCON of army forces (see Chapter 4).
- Set and maintain the theater (see Chapter 5).
- Set and support operational areas (see Chapter 6).
- Plan and coordinate for consolidation of gains in support of joint operations (see Chapter 7).
- Perform joint roles in limited scope, scale, and duration (see Chapter 8).

Note. When directed by the GCC to perform operational C2 of Army or joint forces, the theater army retains its primary role as ASCC to the GCC, and remains responsible for all the Service and AOR support functions of that role.

1-16. A *task* is a clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned to an individual or organization that must be done as it is imposed by an appropriate authority (JP 1). A task may be collective or individual. Table 1-1 lists functions and some of the key tasks of the theater army depending on its specific role.

Table 1-1. Theater army role, functions, and tasks

Theater army role, functions, and tasks						
	Role as ASCC includes –					
Execute combatant commander's daily operations requirements by –	Provide ADCON of army forces by –	Set and maintain the theater by –	Set and supporting the operational area by –	Exercise command and control over Army forces in the theater	Planning and coordinating for the consolidation of gains in support of joint operations	*Perform joint roles in limited scope, scale, and duration by –

• Exercising C2 over Army forces in theater
• Maintaining ADCON of Army forces
• Providing ASOS (includes CUL)
• Conducting theater security cooperation
• Assessing and developing infrastructure
• Developing concept and operations planning
• Developing contingency and campaign planning
• Maintaining threat orders of battle and providing indications and warnings of changes in OE
	• Executing Title 10, USC administrative and support responsibilities
	• Providing CUL
		• Supporting base development
		• Supporting the formation of bilateral or multilateral diplomatic agreements
		• Executing RSOI
		• Establishing bilateral or multilateral diplomacy agreements
		• Providing communications architecture
			• Executing RSOI
			• Providing sustainment to include:
			  • Theater opening
			  • Port or terminal operations
			  • Theater integration
			  • Medical operations
			  • ASOS
			  • CUL
			• Conducting force tailoring
			• Conducting force protection
				• Maintain control of army forces attached or assigned within the AOR through ADCON, OPCON, TACON	• Plan and coordinate for critical capability requirements
					• Security cooperation plans
					• Infrastructure assessments
					• Refined logistics estimates
						• Serving as a JTF or JFLCC for immediate crisis response
						• Conducting foreign humanitarian assistance
						• Conducting disaster relief
						• Providing immediate crisis response
						• Replicating corps or division headquarters for major exercises

			**This requires the theater army to serve in a joint role, but it still must perform its ASCC functions.*			

ADCON administrative control
AOR area of responsibility
ASCC Army Service component command
ASOS Army support to other Services
C2 command and control
CUL common-user logistics
JFLCC joint force land component command
JTF joint task force
OE operational environment
OPCON operational control
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SOS special operations support
TACON tactical control
USC United States Code

THEATER ARMY ROLE AS ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

1-17. In the role as an ASCC to a GCC, the theater army fulfills all requirements of a Service component for Army forces assigned or attached to the GCC. Responsibilities of a Service component are determined from Title 10 USC, Section 7013b; DODD 5101.1; DOD Executive Agent Program; and combatant commander's daily operational requirements. See the references for the link to the DOD Executive Agent Program homepage.

Execute Combatant Commanders Daily Operational Requirements

1-18. The combatant commander's daily operational requirements (CCDOR) are tasks that occur on a daily basis across the competition continuum and during all phases of joint operations. This list of tasks reflects the execution of roles, functions, and tasks derived from Title 10; Army support to other Services (ASOS); and other requirements unique to the AOR regardless of other operations.

1-19. Title 10 is the law governing the Armed Forces of the United States and delineating the organization of the Department of Defense (DOD), including the combatant commands. The theater army is responsible for execution of Army-specific Title 10 requirements, as the GCC requires.

1-20. As part of these daily activities, theater armies conduct GCC activities that set conditions for military success in the event that threatened or actual violence is required to deter adversary aggression. This includes execution of key tasks across the competition continuum, to include providing ASOS; conducting theater security cooperation; assessing and developing infrastructure; developing concepts and OPLANs; and maintaining threat orders of battle and providing indications and warnings of changes in an operational environment (OE). Chapter 3 provides more detail regarding CCDOR.

Provide ADCON of Army Forces

1-21. The theater army headquarters is responsible for ADCON of all Army forces in the AOR. This and responsibilities laid out in JP 1 are derived from fulfilling the Army's support function to the GCC. As an ASCC, the theater army retains these responsibilities regardless of tasks delegated to another component commander or a non-Army JFC. ADCON responsibilities include:

- Organization of Service forces.
- Control of resources and equipment.
- Personnel management.
- Unit logistics.
- Individual and unit training.
- Readiness, mobilization, and demobilization.
- Discipline.

1-22. ADCON is not a command relationship but rather the exercise of authority in respect to administration and support. The exercise of ADCON fulfills a military department's statutory responsibilities. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in Title 10. The Secretary of the Army's USC responsibilities are exercised through ADCON. The theater army headquarters is responsible for ADCON of all Army forces in the AOR in peacetime and wartime (See Chapter 4 for further discussion on theater army ADCON responsibilities).

Set and Maintain the Theater

1-23. Setting the theater is a GCC responsibility in which the theater army plays a major role. Generally, this responsibility is driven by the support requirements of specific operation plans, concept plans (CONPLANs), and other requirements established in the combatant command campaign plan. Setting the theater includes whole-of-government initiatives, including bilateral or multilateral diplomatic agreements. These agreements allow U.S. forces access to ports, terminals, airfields, and bases within the AOR to support current and future military contingency operations. Many of these whole-of-government initiatives are the responsibility of non-DOD government agencies, although the resulting requirements are often identified by the senior defense official of embassy country teams within the GCC in consultation with the theater army and its enabling subordinate commands.

1-24. The theater army, in conjunction with its associated theater sustainment command (TSC), prepares sustainment estimates that outline the responsibilities and requirements for setting the theater where U.S. military presence is forward stationed or deployed. The theater army executes many of these responsibilities through the TSC. Setting the theater also includes security cooperation activities intended to improve interoperability with U.S. forces, enhance the legitimacy of the host nation, and improve the host nation's ability to defend itself against internal disorder and external threats.

Set and Support the Operational Areas

1-25. Theater armies set and support specific operational areas for JFCs and execute activities that create conditions of advantage for the joint and multinational force. A GCC or subordinate unified commander may designate an area within the theater of operations as a specific operational area for conducting a specific military operation. Once an area within a GCC's theater is designated, the theater army plays a critical role in multiple tasks, including:

- Force tailoring.
- Opening the JOA.
- Providing force protection support to the JOA.
- Providing sustainment support to the JOA.
- Establishing communications network architecture to and within the JOA.
- Providing intelligence support to the JOA.

1-26. Setting an operational area involves determining the type and level of sustainment and other Army support units needed by the JFC in the JOA. Setting a JOA also involves establishing the command and

support relationships of the sustainment and other support units to the ARFOR within the JOA. This includes planning and coordination to consolidate gains in support of OPLANs as well as ongoing operations.

1-27. Army organizations assigned to the theater army provide theater-level capabilities necessary to perform theater-level tasks as well as to assist and augment subordinate tactical organizations. The theater army commander principally focuses on operational-level theater support involving force generation and sustainment during campaigns and joint operations. The level of support capability required varies from one AOR to another. The theater army commander identifies the specific Army capabilities required to support the combatant commander (force generation) and works with other organizations to tailor assigned Army units to provide specific capabilities to the combatant command. The theater army commander then deploys those capabilities into the area of operations (AO) as required by the joint force. As the situation changes, the Secretary of Defense modifies those resourcing decisions (force generation) as necessary based on the combatant commander's request for forces or previously approved plans.

Plan and Coordinate for the Consolidation of Gains in Support of Joint Operations

1-28. The theater army continuously plans, coordinates, and assesses to consolidate gains across an AOR. The theater army accomplishes this through the execution of Title 10 and executive agent activities that shape the theater and engage other regional actors in promoting long-term stability while deterring aggression.

1-29. Upon request from the GCC or activation of an OPLAN with time-phased force and deployment data, the theater army provides the combatant commander with forces and capabilities specifically tailored to focus on area security and stability. This requires planning and coordination for refined logistic estimates, security cooperation plans, engineer units capable of infrastructure assessments, civil-military requirements, communications, and other critical capabilities essential to consolidate gains in the context of a specific operation or campaign.

1-30. Successful consolidation of gains in a specific operational area requires the theater army to retrograde equipment, redeploy forces, and maintain a continuous presence and security cooperation plan. This facilitates the security conditions required to successfully transition from conflict to competition. The transfer of an AO from U.S. Army forces to a legitimate authority relieves the land force of area security and stability tasks and represents a transition from operations that consolidate gains back to operations that shape the OE. The theater army, unlike other echelons, never totally completes consolidation of gains. Rather it supports the execution of continuous campaigning throughout the competition continuum to maintain relative advantage in support of U.S. national interests on behalf of the GCC, never leaving the AOR while fulfilling its ASCC role and supporting joint functions.

Exercise Command and Control Over Army Forces in a Theater

1-31. The theater army is the ASCC and has the responsibility to control attached and assigned Army forces within the AOR through ADCON and OPCON or TACON. As the Army component of the combatant command, the ASCC is the ARFOR for the theater. Once delegated to the senior Army headquarters in a JOA, the Army component of the subordinate joint force is an ARFOR for the JOA. Army doctrine distinguishes between the Army component of a combatant command and that of a joint force formed by the combatant commander.

1-32. The theater army initially maintains control of all Army units assigned to an AOR until control is passed to the senior army force or ARFOR in a subordinate JOA. As part of controlling Army forces, the ARFOR maintains ADCON of Army forces and addresses service responsibilities such as coordinating ASOS (See ADP 4-0 and Chapter 4 of this ATP for more information on ASOS.)

Perform Joint Roles in Limited Scope, Scale, and Duration

1-33. The function of exercising C2 refers to the immediate response to crises arising unexpectedly anywhere within an AOR. This function derives from theater army's function to serve in a joint role as a joint force land component command or JTF. The theater army's Title 10 responsibilities for the entire AOR stay with the theater army regardless of additional missions. The theater army exists to fulfill Title 10 responsibilities, by law. If called upon to serve in this capacity, the administrative headquarters responsibilities of the theater army will be significantly strained. Serving as a joint force land component command or JTF requires

additional resourcing and clearly established priorities by the GCC due to expected challenges serving successfully as the ASCC and JTF/joint force land component command simultaneously. Theater armies are not organized, equipped, or manned for roles beyond the ASCC. The ASCC responsibility encompasses the requirement to enable theater army commanders to exercise command and control of forces performing their designated roles and functions during small-scale operations such as noncombatant evacuation operations, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), foreign disaster relief (FDR), or peace operations. Once designated a JTF or joint force land component command, these tasks include establishing liaisons at pertinent boards, centers, cells, and working groups as described in FM 6-0, JP 3-31, and JP 3-33.

1-34. Prior to the establishment of a JOA, the GCC may designate the theater army as a theater joint force land component command for advising, coordinating, and supporting joint land operations to shape the theater or prevent conflict during crisis action. The intent is to provide the GCC with the ability to have a central point for synchronization of all land force activities. Examples of tasks the theater joint force land component command executes in support of the GCC include advising the commander on land force capabilities and advocacy for land domain issues; providing coordinated recommendations for land force mission sets, roles, and responsibilities; coordinating with other functional components to assist in campaign planning; and assisting the GCC in planning, coordinating, and executing sustained operations for setting the theater during all operations.

1-35. In the case of FHA, FDR, and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), the theater joint force land component command is a command option used by the GCC to provide C2 for Title 10, land operations for DSCA. This option provides for a single Title 10, functional component headquarters capable of providing general support to achieve unity of effort between federal and state response forces.

THEATER ARMY RELATIONSHIPS WITH ECHELON ABOVE BRIGADE FORCES

1-36. The theater army plays a significant role in coordinating, supporting, and integrating all Army forces committed to the AOR in support of GCC campaign plans for that AOR. The theater army coordinates with the DA, supporting Army commands such as U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), and direct reporting units to integrate combatant commander requirements within the Army force generation process as part of global force management. (See AR 525-29 for more on the Army force generation process.) The theater army coordinates through FORSCOM for theater-specific training and preparation of regionally aligned forces. The theater army commander recommends to the combatant commander the composition, sequence of deployment, and operational chain of command for Army forces deploying to the AOR. The theater army commander exercises OPCON as specified by the GCC and ADCON as specified by the Secretary of the Army.

1-37. The configuration of an echelon above brigade headquarters is determined by its ability to control operations across land areas for which it is responsible and integrate joint capabilities into those operations. Table 1-2 is a graphic display of the roles and functions of the organizations of echelons above brigade.

Roles and functions by echelon

	Theater army	*Corps*	*Division*
Primary role:	ASCC to GCC	Senior Army tactical echelon	Tactical formation
Additional roles:	TJFLCC, JTF, or JFLCC*	JTF or JFLCC or ARFOR joint task force	JTF or JFLCC or ARFOR for small-scale operations
Primary functions:	• Complete combatant commander's daily operational requirements • Set and maintain the theater • Exercise command and control of Army forces • Set and support the operational area ADCON of Army forces • Plan and coordinate for consolidation of gains in support of joint operations TJFLCC, JTF, or JFLCC*	• Conduct shaping operations within the corps AO • Task-organize and employ divisions and brigades • Integrate and synchronize operations of divisions and brigades • Mass effects at decisive points • Allocate resources and set priorities • Leverage joint capabilities	• Conduct shaping operations within the division AO • Task-organize and employ, integrate, and synchronize brigades and battalions • Train and prepare for LSCO • Mass effects at decisive points • Employ joint capabilities • Assume directed Army, joint, and multinational authorities and responsibilities

*Theater army, as one of its seven functions, may serve in a joint role as TJFLCC, JTF, or JFLCC

ADCON	administrative control	JTF	joint task force
AO	area of operations	JFLCC	joint force land component command
ASCC	Army Service component command	LSCO	large-scale combat operations
GCC	geographic combatant command	TJFLCC	theater joint forces land component command

Table 1-2. Roles and functions by echelon

1-38. A corps is normally the senior army headquarters (an ARFOR) inside a JOA. It serves as the Army's deployable level of command required to synchronize and sustain major operations. The corps is tailored to specific missions. Per the recommendation of the theater army, the corps receives assigned subordinate organizations for its employment within a JOA. A corps headquarters has the capability to serve as a JTF, joint force land component command, or an ARFOR. In accordance with FM 3-94, a corps requires significant augmentation from the joint and multinational force to perform joint force land component command or JTF roles successfully.

1-39. An Army corps commander is capable of exercising C2 of two to five Army divisions when a corps serves as the primary senior tactical formation for the Army. The division commands multiple Army brigades and is the Army's primary tactical headquarters for decisive action. When required, a division may serve as a JTF or joint force land component command headquarters in operations limited in scale and scope. As required, the division may be the Army component within a JTF.

1-40. When a corps or division serves in the capacity of a joint force land component command or an ARFOR, ASCC-designated liaisons in theater are tasked to provide support to the ARFOR supporting a JFC. The ASCC has a permanently assigned battlefield coordination detachment at the supporting theater joint air operations center to interface with the commander, Air Force forces (known as COMAFFOR), and the joint force air component commander (JFACC). Additionally, a corps- or division-level ARFOR will not likely be identified in sufficient time to properly dispatch trained liaisons to the joint fires element, joint targeting working group, joint targeting coordination board, and joint collection management board.

1-41. ASCCs normally have digital liaison teams or detachments to interface with other allies or components that require connectivity with selected systems. These systems—including, but not limited to, Advanced

Field Artillery (FA) Tactical Data System, Tactical Airspace Integration System, Tactical Mission Command, Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System, or air and missile defense workstation—enable allies or components to participate in the Army operations process and share the ground common operational picture. When a digital liaison detachment is unavailable or otherwise constrained, a security force assistance brigade (known as SFAB) can offer capabilities and functions akin to digital liaison detachments.

THEATER ARMY RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER SERVICE COMPONENTS

1-42. The theater army must establish support relationships with other Service components (as described in JP 1). This is critical because synchronization of efforts within theater or JOA-wide operations creates complementary and supplementary effects and prevents fratricide. To facilitate synchronization, the GCC establishes priorities that guide or inform execution decisions throughout the theater or JOA, including within the land force commander's areas of operations. Within a joint force, the JFC may designate more than one supported commander simultaneously, and components may simultaneously receive and provide support for different missions, functions, or operations.

1-43. The commander of the Army forces is responsible for identifying requirements—for example, air support operations centers—fulfilled by supporting component commanders. Identifying such requirements can be an extensive process and must be integrated into planning early. For example, the joint planning process for air develops theater-wide GCC guidance and products that impact how the ARFOR operates in theater. It is imperative that the theater army or ARFOR interfaces with the JFACC during exercises, campaigns, and crisis action planning to influence the development of the joint air operations plan. The Army must interface with the airspace control authority and area air defense commander for development of the airspace control plan, area air defense plan, and other products that guide military operations in the AOR or JOA. As part of this process, the commander of the Army forces is given tasking authority of appropriate theater army liaisons in theater. This includes authority to direct the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), and other established liaisons working in direct support to the designated commander of the Army forces.

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Chapter 2

Theater Army Headquarters and Forces

This chapter discusses the organization of the theater army headquarters and the theater army structure. First, it discusses the theater army headquarters in general. Next, it describes the structure of the headquarters: the main command post, contingency command post, and the headquarters and headquarters battalion. The chapter concludes with a description of organic, assigned, and attached subordinate forces.

THEATER ARMY HEADQUARTERS

2-1. Theater armies exist to support their assigned GCC. There is only one theater army within each combatant commander's AOR. The theater army serves as the combatant commander's single point of contact reporting directly to the DA. Each theater army is designed differently to suit the specific needs of its GCC and the aspects of each unique theater.

2-2. All theater armies have some baseline commonalities in the structure of the headquarters and assigned forces. These commonalities are necessary for theater armies to meet their responsibilities (see remaining chapters of this ATP for discussions on the various responsibilities of the theater army). To accomplish its roles and functions, the theater army headquarters is organized with three organic components, each with specific functions:

- **Main command post (MCP)**. A MCP is the primary fulfiller of the CCDOR as well as all of the ASCC functions—Title 10, ADCON, ASOS, common-user logistics, and support to a JOA (see Chapter 4 for more information).
- **Contingency command post (CCP)**. The CCP provides a limited capability to exercise control of forces for small-scale operations in an AOR or serves as the foundation for a joint headquarters.
- **Headquarters and headquarters battalion**. A headquarters and headquarters battalion provides administrative and logistic support for the theater army headquarters and all its organic command post elements.

2-3. When directed by their respective GCC and sufficiently resourced by Headquarters, DA, the theater army CCP may serve as theater joint force land component command, JTF, or a joint force land component command to a JTF in a JOA. The theater army uses the MCP to shape the GCC AOR in order to support operations, develop relationships, assure access, build partner capacity, and deter adversaries, while providing a separate CCP as a C2 capability that can set the theater and execute unified land operations (ULO) in support of combatant commander requirements. Most theater army headquarters are small relative to the breadth and depth of their mission requirements; therefore most theater army headquarters require support from multiple organizations to perform their roles and functions effectively. The theater army headquarters is designed for planning, policy, and coordination, rather than the direction of large-scale or sustained operations. Each theater army is fully employed by its GCC and is not part of the Army's pool of Service-retained forces.


2-4. The theater army MCP and CCP are designed to be configured as separate command posts in order to protect the rapid deployment capability of the CCP. Despite being part of the same headquarters, the MCP is considered an administrative headquarters while the CCP is considered an operational headquarters in the Army Headquarters Management Account. The Army Management Headquarters account is a DA managed and congressionally overseen account of personnel assigned to administrative and operational headquarters with limits for personnel assigned to administrative headquarters. The DA, by law, manages the Army Headquarters Management Account and tracks authorizations for all headquarters. Theater army commanders often reorganize the headquarters by changing the alignment of tasks because of unique theater

requirements, so organizations may look significantly different from the original design. In such cases, the unit's tactical standard operating procedure more accurately depicts the headquarters organization. As an example, the theater army may have an Army corps or division headquarters assigned and available for deployment. In these cases, the theater army commander may opt to create a roster for staffing the CCP and redistributing the personnel throughout the MCP. However, this alternative requires careful consideration of potential impacts on the Army Management Headquarters account. The impact is that it may change the characterization of CCP personnel from operational to administrative, which may breach statutory limitations on the amount of Army-wide personnel assigned to administrative positions and threaten the number of theater army personnel authorizations.

2-5. The MCP is primarily responsible for planning, coordination, Title 10, ADCON, ASOS, and Army executive agent responsibilities in support of the GCC. In most cases, the theater army MCP fulfills these responsibilities by allocating resources and delegating missions to subordinate theater-enabling commands or brigades, which complete the detailed planning and execution (actual delivery of products or services). The MCP also administers Title 10 and CCDOR responsibilities to Army and unified action partners forces deployed to JOAs established within an AOR.

2-6. The MCP is the hub of planning and coordination within the theater army. It develops and maintains OPLANs, CONPLANs, and other Army-specific supporting plans in support of the GCC's theater campaign plan. The MCP collaboratively plans with all Army headquarters designated to deploy within the AOR. This collaborative planning facilitates the transition of existing OPLANs or CONPLANs into the incoming headquarters' operation order.

2-7. Such collaboration enables the theater army to provide regional expertise in support of the planning and execution of operations, exercises, or other theater security cooperation activities. The MCP also provides direct planning support to the CCP when the CCP deploys (as a forward command post) to conduct limited contingency operations (limited in scale, scope complexity, intensity, and duration) or to participate in exercises and other theater security cooperation activities. Figure 2-1 depicts the theater army MCP organization.



AMD	air and missile defense	G-8	assistant chief of staff, financial management
AT/FP	anti-terrorism/force protection	IG	inspector general
AVN SPT	aviation support	IMA	international military affairs
CA	civil affairs	IO	information operations
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, and high explosive	ISD	intelligence support directorate
		ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CEMA	cyberspace electromagnetic activities	KM	knowledge management
CMD	command	LNO	liaison officer
COIC	current operations integration cell	OPSEC	operations security
FDO	foreign disclosure office	ORSA	operations research and systems analysis
FM	force management	PAO	public affairs officer
FUOPS	future operations	PMO	provost marshal office
G-1	assistant chief of staff, personnel	PR	personnel recovery
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence	RM	resource management
G-2X	assistant chief of staff, human intelligence	SECCOOP	security cooperation
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations	SJA	staff judge advocate
G-4	assistant chief of staff, logistics	SSO	special security office
G-5	assistant chief of staff, plans	SWO	staff weather office
G-6	assistant chief of staff, signal		

Figure 2-1. Theater army main command post organization

COMMAND GROUP

2-8. The command group includes the commanding general, deputy commanding general, command sergeant major, chief of staff, secretary to the general staff, enlisted and officer aides to the commanding general and deputy commanding general, administrative staff, and drivers. The theater army command group primarily operates from the MCP. Commanders arrange their staff into staff sections or groupings of subject matter expertise under a coordinating, special, or personal principal staff officer.

PERSONAL STAFF

2-9. The personal staff normally includes the internal review officer, chaplain, public affairs officer, staff judge advocate, surgeon, inspector general, and sometimes the safety officer. The actual composition of the personal staff depends on the OE and the commander's assessment of personal staff requirements. See FM 6-0 for other personal staff officers.

Internal Review Officer

2-10. The internal review officer provides professional internal audit capability and delivers pertinent, timely, and reliable information and advice to the commander. This information and advice evaluates risk, assesses management control measures, fosters stewardship, and improves the quality, economy, and efficiency of business practices. See FM 6-0 and AR 11-7 for more information on internal review officers.

SPECIAL STAFF

2-11. The theater army special staff includes the following staff elements:

- Air and missile defense (AMD) officer.
- Air liaison officer; aviation officer; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) officer.
- Electromagnetic warfare officer.
- Engineer.
- Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officer.
- Equal opportunity advisor.
- Force management officer.
- Foreign disclosure officer.
- Historian.
- Information operations officer.
- Knowledge management officer.
- Liaison officer(s).
- Psychological operations officer.
- Operations security officer.
- Personnel recovery officer.
- Provost marshal.
- Red team officer.
- Secretary of the general staff.
- Staff weather officer.
- Space operations officer.
- Transportation officer.
- Veterinary officer.

2-12. The special staff includes all staff officers not assigned to a primary coordinating staff section. The theater army provides liaisons to the GCC staff, locates other components to support in the GCC's AOR, and locates subordinate joint force commanders in a JOA. The theater army embeds liaisons at pertinent boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working groups, and operational planning teams established by the GCC and the JFC. Liaisons include Army digital liaison detachments; ground liaison detachment at supporting air wings; reconnaissance liaison detachments at supporting reconnaissance squadrons; and liaison officers at the joint targeting working group, joint targeting coordination board, and joint collection management board. Unlike other echelons, theater army command liaison officers are normally organized under the special staff. See FM 6-0 for special staff and liaison discussion and JP 3-31 for liaisons in joint land operations.

COORDINATING STAFF

2-13. The coordinating staff consists of the following:

- Assistant chief of staff (ACOS), G-1—personnel.
- ACOS, G-2—intelligence.
- ACOS, G-3—operations.
- ACOS, G-4—logistics.
- ACOS, G-5—plans.
- ACOS, G-6—signal.
- ACOS, G-8—financial management.
- Chief of fires.
- Chief of protection.
- Chief of sustainment.

2-14. Coordinating staff officers are the commander's principal assistants who advise, plan, and coordinate actions within their area of expertise or a warfighting function. Coordinating staff officers may also exercise planning and supervisory authority over designated special staff officers as the commander chooses.

FUNCTIONAL CELLS

2-15. The functional cells consist of the intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment cells. In the MCP design, coordinating staff is organized by functional cells. Coordinating staff officers coordinate their respective warfighting functions for the commander through functional cells within the MCP. Many of the cells have a habitual working relationship with subordinate and supporting organizations of like function.

Intelligence Cell

2-16. The baseline intelligence cell is composed of the G-2 headquarters section, G-2 operations section, G-2 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance section, G-2 control section, G-2X, intelligence support section, staff weather office, and special security office. These sections can vary from the baseline depending on the particular ASCC. The G-2 leads the intelligence cell and acts as the theater army's senior intelligence officer and principal intelligence advisor to the theater army commander. The intelligence cell should have a close working relationship with the regionally aligned military intelligence brigade-theater (MIB-T) provided by the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. This relationship usually involves sharing workspace for some functions, such as analysis and production. See ATP 2-19.1 for more information.

Movement and Maneuver Cell

2-17. The movement and maneuver cell forms three integrating cells: current operations integration cell, future operations cell, and plans cell. The G-3 is both the theater army operations officer—responsible for integrating all components of the operation into the theater army's single, unified operation—and the chief of the movement and maneuver warfighting functional cell. The movement and maneuver cell is designed with the traditional G-3 operations, support, training, security cooperation, and force management sections with the numerous elements subordinate to them. The plans and security cooperation sections are commonly organized under the G-5.

Fires Cell

2-18. The fires cell is composed of the traditional lethal fires section and non-lethal capabilities to generate cognitive effects, such as the staff for information operations, cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA), psychological operations, civil-military operations, and space coordination staff. The fires cell can create a joint fires section with augmentation of other components (such as joint force air component command or joint force maritime component command liaisons). The fires cell director is the theater army's chief of fires and theater army fire support coordinator. The fires cell commonly has a working relationship with the theater army-assigned BCD and the information warfare task force, when one is designated.

Protection Cell

2-19. The protection cell is composed of the provost marshal; CBRN defense; AMD; antiterrorism; force protection; operations security officer; personnel recovery; and safety staff sections. The chief of the protection cell is usually the provost marshal, but remains a multifunctional officer specialty open to engineer, air defense artillery, military police, chemical, or EOD officers.

Sustainment Cell

2-20. The sustainment cell is composed of the G-1, G-4, G-8, engineer, and surgeon staff sections. The chief of the sustainment cell may be a general officer (usually a deputy commanding general or the commander of the theater sustainment command) appointed by the theater army commander. The sustainment cell has a close working relationship with the theater sustainment command.

THEATER ARMY CONTINGENCY COMMAND POST

2-21. The CCP is the theater army's rapidly deployable command post (CP). As part of the theater army headquarters, it specifically meets the GCC's requirements for limited control during operations. The primary value of the CCP is its immediate response capability, rather than its capability to exercise control of complex or sustained operations. Operations may involve some combat, but it would be limited in scale, scope, complexity, expected intensity, and duration. Maintaining the CCP separately from the MCP facilitates training of assigned CCP staff and enhances its ability for rapid response or deployment. With significant Army and joint augmentation, the CCP has the ability to serve as a—


- JTF.
- Joint force land component command and/or ARFOR for limited contingency operations.

2-22. The CCP was designed to respond to seven types of operations:

- Noncombatant evacuation operations. (See JP 3-68 for noncombatant evacuation operations.)
- CBRN response. (See ATP 3-28.1 and JP 3-28 for DSCA; see ATP 3-11.41 for CBRN response.)
- FHA and FDR. (See JP 3-29 for more information on FHA and FDR.)
- DSCA. (See JP 3-28 for DSCA.)
- Initial stages of peace operations. (See ATP 3-07.31 and JP 3-07.3 for peace operations).
- Theater security cooperation and building partner capacity. (See ATP 3-07.10 for advising foreign security forces, ATP 3-96.1 for security force assistance brigade operations, FM 3-22 for Army support to security cooperation, and JP 3-20 for a broader discussion on security cooperation).
- Respond to crisis and transition to combat operations.

2-23. The CCP can operate independently from the theater army MCP and ASCC headquarters and control small operations limited in scale, scope, intensity, and duration. It may be employed in one of two ways. First, the theater army may be designated as a JTF or joint force land component command headquarters for a limited intervention or stability operation. In this case, the theater army deploys the CCP forward while the MCP remains at home station. The MCP then provides reachback support to the staff in the CCP while continuing to perform theater army's AOR-wide functions. As an organic element of the theater army TOE, the CCP may be commanded by the theater army commander or the deputy commander. The second option is that the CCP becomes the nucleus (personnel and equipment) for a small JTF or joint force land component command for the operation and is detached from the theater army. This involves the GCC tasking the theater army to provide the CCP's equipment and personnel as the nucleus of a small JTF. In this second case, the GCC determines who will command the JTF.

2-24. In both options, the CCP receives augmentation from the GCC staff, the GCC's standing joint force headquarters element, or a joint staffing document tailored to the mission. In the second case, the CCP deploys to complete crisis assessments. The CCP then integrates with forward-based staff in existing facilities to provide the theater army commander with a forward presence. Additionally, the CCP provides the theater army commander a flexible CP to participate in or provide a headquarters for joint or combined exercises. See figure 2-2 for a sample CCP organization.



AC2	airspace command and control	G-4	assistant chief of staff, logistics
AMD	air and missile defense	G-6	assistant chief of staff, signal
AT/FP	anti-terrorism/force protection	G-8	assistant chief of staff, financial management
AVN SPT	aviation support	GO	general officer
CA	civil affairs	IO	information operations
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, and high explosive	ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
		KM	knowledge management
CEMA	cyberspace electromagnetic activities	OPS	operations
CUOPS	current operations	PAO	public affairs officer
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal	PMO	provost marshal office
FUOPS	future operations	PR	personnel recovery
G-1	assistant chief of staff, personnel	RM	resource management
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence	SJA	staff judge advocate
G-2X	assistant chief of staff, human intelligence	SWO	staff weather office
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations	TGT	targeting office

Figure 2-2. Example of contingency command post organization

CAPABILITIES OF THE CONTINGENCY COMMAND POST

2-25. The CCP can perform all required tasks and functions for commanding and controlling limited contingency operations 24 hours a day, seven days a week, within limitations (For limitations see paragraphs 2-29 through 2-35). The CCP and its organic equipment can deploy by C-130 aircraft. The ability to deploy quickly to any area within the AOR maximizes the CCP's utility. The CCP also has the capability to deploy a small assessment team to determine the operational requirements of a crisis, disaster, or other contingency.

2-26. The CCP commander can C2 two to five subordinate units up to brigade size, though the CCP design intended the subordinate units as battalion and brigade size. The CCP increases its span of control for specific mission requirements with augmentation from other theater army troops or joint and interagency personnel, as appropriate. If the theater army commander is commanding the CCP, then the theater army may be employing the CCP as a forward CP and the theater army is the joint force land component command while the GCC is acting as the joint task force. In this case, the theater army would require significant augmentation and staff reorganization to execute its day-to-day responsibilities under Title 10 and the GCC.

2-27. The CCP staff requires augmentation to access and employ joint fires. The combatant command, joint, or Service headquarters provide other joint capabilities and augmentation if necessary. The CCP coordinates additional required capabilities through the MCP.

2-28. The headquarters support company provides the administrative and sustainment support for the CCP. This company provides field feeding, supply, sanitation, field service medical treatment, and field service maintenance to the deployed CCP. The CCP depends on the theater army's headquarters and headquarters battalion for higher echelon support beyond the capability of the headquarters support company.

LIMITATIONS OF THE CONTINGENCY COMMAND POST

2-29. The CCP commander cannot exercise C2 for protracted military operations or combat operations unless appropriately augmented or reinforced. A variety of sources can provide the needed augmentation, including the MCP, the GCC staff, other Service component commands, and a joint manning document (JMD) request. As a planning factor, the CCP may effectively operate without augmentation for a maximum of 30 days of continuous operations, depending on the situation. The CCP further requires support for deployment. While it can be deployed by C-130, it requires assistance loading and unloading the aircraft, as well as ground transportation to the deployment facility and from the port of entry in the area of employment.

2-30. The CCP can conduct operations of limited scope (range of activities), scale (dimensions of the AO, number of units and size of forces), complexity (number of simultaneous, inter-related activities), and intensity (speed, tempo, degree of lethality or destruction within a given timeframe). The CCP must receive augmentation and be reinforced or relieved if the requirements exceed previously stated limitations. The CCP provides the GCC and the theater army commander with a limited, organic operational C2 capability. It is not, however, the preferred or only tool for all contingencies.

2-31. The CCP depends on the theater army MCP for future planning, intelligence support, sustainment coordination, special staff functions, and other staff support required for the conduct of military operations within the GCC's AOR. Although the CCP actively participates with the MCP planning staff in planning, the MCP normally produces the operation orders, and the CCP focuses largely on controlling the execution of the plan, including short-term assessment of operations. Additionally, the command relationships under which the CCP is employed will likely change its relationship with the MCP because the CCP will most likely detach to deploy and fill a joint role while the theater army retains its theater-wide ARFOR responsibilities. The implication is that the CCP may require a support relationship from the theater army MCP to benefit from reachback support or another arrangement must be made by the appropriate authority, usually the joint force commander that holds OPCON over the CCP or organization that formed around the CCP.

2-32. The CCP requires support of the signal command (theater) for up to secret network transport capability and network operations. Based on specific mission requirements, the signal command (theater) provides tailored communication support teams to support the CCP. The CCP has very limited organic communications capability, which is only meant to support assessment teams deployed from the CCP, at most. The CCP does not have organic classified, secret, or higher, digital communications capability for the entire CCP.

2-33. With a small intelligence cell, the CCP relies upon the regionally aligned MIB-Ts and national to tactical intelligence as a whole for regionally focused intelligence collection, analysis, and production. Additionally, the CCP also depends on the MIB-T for expeditionary satellite communications (SATCOM) for Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System network connectivity, if required by the mission. The CCP depends on the military intelligence brigade for top secret and sensitive compartmented information communications and information system support.

2-34. The CCP depends on outside organizations for security and sustainment. The headquarters and headquarters battalion deploys with the CCP to provide supervision over the security detail. The security personnel for that detail come from outside the organization. The CCP has no organic capability for transportation, maintenance, fueling, feeding, life support, or medical support. This support must either be provided as augmentation or through operational contract support.

2-35. For additional information on the theater army CCP, an expanded discussion of its missions, and considerations for augmentation, see Appendix B.

Theater Army Operational Command Post

2-36. Although not resourced with additional personnel or equipment, a theater army may determine a need to internally organize an operational CP. An operational CP is an organization containing a tailored portion of a theater army headquarters to control operations for a limited period or for a small-scale contingency. The operational CP provides a theater army commander or designated individual with the capability to form an Army component, joint force land component, or joint task force headquarters within a JOA. The design of the operational CP will vary, depending on the situation. The operational CP personnel and equipment should be deployable by fixed-wing aircraft from their garrison locations into an operational area. However, the operational CP has limited mobility once deployed into the JOA and typically would occupy a semi-permanent fixed facility. The operational CP would rely on the main CP for detailed planning, analysis, and special staff support

DEPENDENCIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE THEATER ARMY

2-37. The theater army headquarters depends on theater-enabling units for staff functions or supporting capabilities. These enablers vary considerably by size and type between GCCs and may or may not be available to a theater army or tailored to meet its particular needs or mission.

Note. A dependency is when an organization requires another organization to provide a capability to achieve its baseline operational requirements. The difference between a dependency and an enabler is that an enabler resources an organization to achieve a mission beyond its intended function.

2-38. While the theater army is organized with active duty personnel and does not have the same limitations as corps and divisions with the reserve component MCP – operational detachment, it does have a variety of other limitations in terms of reliance on Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve (USAR) organizations. Many of the organizations attached to a theater army, which the theater army relies on for theater operations, reside in the ARNG and USAR. Examples of such organizations may be the theater signal command, civil affairs, command, military police command, or theater aviation brigade, to name a few. The impact of this limitation results in less representation from these organizations on hand in normal, day-to-day operations, which complicates planning and collaboration. Additionally, reliance on National Guard and Army Reserve organizations may introduce time delays in force availability during a crisis or conflict. This is compounded with the possible loss of DA civilian employees during non-combatant evacuation operations in forward-based theater armies.

Theater Signal Command or Brigade

2-39. The theater signal command or brigade provides connectivity to all Department of Defense information network-Army (DODIN-A) services up to secret and not releasable to foreign nationals (known as NOFORN) levels. This connectivity includes establishing and operating the theater network architecture to support the theater army headquarters and all joint and Army forces operating in the AOR. The theater army headquarters has no organic signal capability and depends on the theater signal command or brigade for all network and signal capabilities. This dependence includes regional hub node, joint network node, and CP node elements to support the CCP when it deploys.

Military Intelligence Brigade – Theater

2-40. The MIB-T provides intelligence reach, establishing a gateway for the combatant command to access national- to tactical-level intelligence. This gateway enables theater army access to top secret and sensitive compartmented information communications and information systems used for analytical support. The access enables the theater intelligence unit to provide regionally focused information collection, analysis, and production to support theater army planning (OPLAN or CONPLAN development) and operational

intelligence to support operations of a limited or small scale. When deployed, the MIB-T serves as the theater army analysis and control element for all intelligence collection management, analysis, fusion, and production. The MIB-T provides joint targeting support to the theater army for all phases of the operation for the designated commander of the Army forces (see JP 3-0 for discussion of the six-phase joint operation construct). The MIB-T requires augmentation to fulfill responsibilities to the theater army and to the joint force in a major operation. In addition, the theater intelligence unit may provide regionally focused intelligence collection and analysis in support of JTFs, joint force land component command, ARFOR, and other Army forces operating in JOAs.

UNITED STATES ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND AND THE ARMY FIELD SUPPORT BRIGADE

2-41. The U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) provides support through the aligned Army field support brigade, contracting support brigade, and logistics civil augmentation program. The Army field support brigade provides national-level, materiel-focused sustainment support as well as logistics civil augmentation program planning and management. The supporting contracting support brigade provides theater support contracting, contract administrative services, and operational contract support planning assistance.

THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

2-42. Army Engineers provide infrastructure development support to the theater army commander. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) provides technical engineer support to include engineer reconnaissance, design and planning of projects (including roads, airfields, and buildings), execution of contract construction, real estate acquisition and disposal, and environmental assessments and operations.

GEOSPATIAL PLANNING CELL

2-43. Geospatial planning cell engineering detachments assigned to each ASCC provide geospatial information and services to the theater by generating (collecting), managing, and disseminating Standard and Shareable Geospatial Foundation data in the theater geospatial database. Geospatial planning cells provide a tailored theater geospatial database containing Standard and Shareable Geospatial Foundation data to units assigned to or conducting operations within the theater. Each theater geospatial database contains (at a minimum) elevation data, base map imagery that is scaled and represents true position of features and facilities, vector feature data (in a geospatial data model-compliant data schema), and rasterized finished map products for the theater. The theater geospatial database is used to form the foundational geospatial layers for the theater's common operating picture. This theater common operating picture should serve as a main source of information for subordinate Army units and other Services. The common operating picture is essential for providing the most up to date geospatial information, synchronizing war fighting functions throughout the planning/operations processes, and giving commanders and staffs at all echelons the situational awareness and visualization necessary to make informed decisions. See ATP 3-34.80 for further details.

THEATER SUSTAINMENT COMMAND

2-44. The theater army relies on its assigned TSC for multifunctional sustainment, as required by each theater and its missions, as well as commodity management. The TSC also provides the human resource support center and the financial management support center capabilities to the theater army. See ATP 4-94 for additional information.

MEDICAL COMMAND (DEPLOYABLE SUPPORT)

2-45. The theater army relies on its assigned TSC for the integration and synchronization of sustainment in the AOR. The theater army also relies on the medical command (deployment support) (MEDCOM [DS]) (also assigned to the ASCC) to command and control, integrate, synchronize, and execute Army Health System (AHS) support within the AOR. For additional information, see FM 4-0.

INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT COMMAND

2-46. Installation Management Command (IMCOM) delivers and integrates base support to enable readiness for a self-reliant and globally responsive force. Theater armies rely on IMCOM to maintain and expand, as needed, infrastructure to support the theater army headquarters, its assigned and attached units, and any forward-stationed units in their respective theaters. IMCOM in and outside the continental U.S. AOR is fully integrated with JTF, ARFOR, joint security area, and joint force land component commander (JFLCC) planning and requirements. Outside the continental United States IMCOM regional headquarters and installations are vital to speed of assembly; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI); and joint security area operations and activities. IMCOM manages and modernizes base infrastructure to support Army power projection platforms, mobilization force generation installation, and multi-domain operations in accordance with OPLAN requirements. Outside the continental United States IMCOM installations also support the theater by providing Army pre-positioned stocks infrastructure to support OPLAN requirements. See ATP 3-35.1 and AR 525-93 for more information.


OTHER DEPENDENCIES

2-47. A military police protective services detachment provides close-in protective service details for the theater army commander, deputy commanders, and other designated high-risk personnel, as required. A force protection team assists the theater army antiterrorism or force protection section in protection, physical security, antiterrorism, and response force operations.

2-48. Several unique teams assist the theater army in accomplishing specialized functions. Defense Logistics Agency personnel provide the theater army logistic reach to the national supply system. A civil affairs planning team from a civil affairs brigade or command provides staff augmentation to the theater army G-9 for operations. A weapons of mass destruction coordination team assigned to the theater army establishes a full-time CBRN planning expertise and assessment capability within the headquarters (see ATP 3-11.36 for more information). Public affairs detachments or teams augment the organic theater army staff and establish a media support or broadcast center, if required. An air traffic services command augments the theater army for air traffic services during operational surges. An Army band may be assigned to the theater army to enhance unit cohesion and Soldier morale through musical support. The theater army depends on the human resources sustainment center and financial management center of the theater sustainment command for the execution of specified personnel and financial management activities. Digital liaison detachments provide liaison between the theater army and multinational headquarters or partners during operations and exercises.

THEATER ARMY HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

2-49. The theater army headquarters and headquarters battalion provides sustainment support to the theater army headquarters, including the CCP, when it deploys for any operation. The headquarters and headquarters battalion has a commander, command group, a small battalion staff, and three subordinate companies, described in figure 2-3 on page 2-12.



BN	battalion	HSC	headquarters support company
CCP	contingency command post	I&S	intelligence and support
CMD	command	MAINT	maintenance
CO	company	MED Treat	medical treatment
CoS	chief of staff	OPS	operations
ENG	engineer	PROT	protection
G-1	assistant chief of staff, personnel	S-1	battalion personnel office
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence	S-2	battalion intelligence office
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations	S-3	battalion operations office
G-4	assistant chief of staff, logistics	S-4	battalion logistics office
G-5	assistant chief of staff, plans	SPEC	special
G-6	assistant chief of staff, signal	SURG	surgeon
G-8	assistant chief of staff, financial management	UMT	unit ministry team
HHB	headquarters and headquarters battalion		

Figure 2-3. Headquarters and headquarters battalion organization

2-50. The three subordinate companies of the headquarters and headquarters battalion are the headquarters support company, the operations company, and the intelligence and sustainment company. Together with the staff these companies provide the necessary support to the theater army and the deployed CCP.

2-51. The headquarters support company can deploy with the CCP to provide sustainment support and command the local security section provided by an outside organization. Theater army personnel assigned to the headquarters support company include the commanding general section, the deputy commanding general section, the personal staff, the chief of staff section, the special staff, the headquarters and headquarters battalion headquarters staff, the CCP command group, the CCP special staff, and the CCP support sections.

2-52. The operations company consists of a standard company headquarters element and the personnel from the following main and CCP cells and sections: movement and maneuver, fires, protection, G-6, and G-9.

2-53. The intelligence and sustainment company consists of a standard company headquarters element and the personnel of the intelligence and sustainment cells of the main and CCPs.

2-54. The CCP—and the headquarters support company that supports it—depend on the theater army headquarters and headquarters battalion for all ADCON services and Title 10 support.

THEATER ARMY FORCES

2-55. Theater armies are assigned or provided access to enabling capabilities and an assortment of functional and multifunctional units based on the specific requirements for the area of responsibility. Paragraphs 2-56 to 2-74 describe the majority of organizations that enable theater armies.

Theater Sustainment Command

2-56. The TSC is the Army's senior logistics headquarters within an AOR. The TSC concentrates on strategic- and operational-level sustainment support and management. When directed, the TSC provides lead service sustainment and executive agency support for designated logistics and services to other government agencies, multinational forces, and nongovernmental organizations. The TSC also provides capability to the theater army through the Human Resources Sustainment Center and Financial Management Center for the execution of specified personnel and financial management activities. The command ensures sustainment flow from strategic deployment, distribution, and sustainment partners is accurate, timely, and adequate to support the actions of the theater sustainment forces. Figure 2-4 depicts a TSC assigned to an ASCC. (See ADP 4-0 and FM 4-0 for additional information).




Figure 2-4. Theater sustainment force

Expeditionary Sustainment Command

2-57. The expeditionary sustainment command (ESC) is the expeditionary command for joint logistics. The ESC, as a subordinate element of the TSC, supports the deployed force while the TSC maintains AOR-wide focus. The ESC concentrates on synchronizing operational-level sustaining operations to meet the day-to-day and projected operational requirements of the supported force. It accomplishes this, in part, by establishing mid-range and short-range planning horizons derived from the supported commander's OPLAN, commander's intent, commander's critical information requirements, tempo, and distribution system capacity. The expeditionary capability of ESCs becomes critical when multiple JTFs operate within an AOR.

2-58. The ESC commands attached sustainment units in a land AO defined by the JFC. The ESC extends the ability of the TSC to manage logistics and personnel support by becoming the forward-deployed sustainment headquarters in the JOA. Additional ESCs may be attached to the TSC if the combatant commander

establishes a joint security area or staging base. Depending on the command structure within the theater, ESCs may support specific Army forces within a joint operations area or support other ESCs and sustainment brigades with theater opening or theater distribution capabilities. (See ADP 4-0 and FM 4-0 for additional information).

Signal Command (Theater)

2-59. The signal command (theater) installs, operates, maintains, and defends communication and information systems in support of the theater army headquarters, and as required, joint and multinational organizations throughout the theater. The signal command (theater) commands multiple signal organizations with different capabilities that assist in providing theater communications. Subordinate signal organizations include non-deployable and deployable signal brigades. These may be assigned, attached, OPCON, or in direct support to the signal command (theater). (See FM 6-02 for additional information.)

2-60. A signal command (theater) has one or more assigned theater network operations and security centers that serve as the operational component of network operations. The theater network operations and security centers are OPCON to Army Information Warfare Command for day-to-day defense of the Army's portion of the DOD information networks. (See FM 6-02 for additional information.)

Note. In a theater with no assigned signal command (theater), the theater signal brigade commander and staff or the tactical actions center assume the staff functions normally associated with the signal command (theater). See FM 6-02 for more information.

Theater Signal Brigade

2-61. The theater signal brigades provide operational and strategic support area signal support to serve Army and joint forces in a theater of operations. This support includes long-haul transport, communications infrastructure, automation, and network management. Each theater signal brigade is unique and tailored to support unique communications infrastructure requirements of its theater. The theater signal brigade commands multiple subordinate strategic signal battalions and activities with different capabilities that assist in providing theater communications. The strategic signal brigade is assigned to U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command. See FM 6-02 for more information on signal support.

2-62. The theater signal brigade has one or more assigned theater network operations and security regional cyber centers that serve as the operational component of network operations. These centers provide a single point of contact for Army network services, operational status, service provisioning, service interruption resolution, and service restoral in their operational areas. The theater network operations and security regional cyber centers are OPCON to U.S. Army Information Warfare Command for day-to-day defense of the Army's portion of the DODIN-A. See FM 6-02 for more information on network operations and ATP 6-02.71 for more information about the regional cyber center.

2-63. The theater signal brigade based in the United States includes network enterprise centers (also known as NECs). When stationed outside the continental U.S. (CONUS), a theater signal brigade includes strategic signal battalions that provide communications infrastructure capabilities, including fixed SATCOM facilities, the network enterprise center, and many other strategic capabilities. The theater signal brigades plan, engineer, install, operate, maintain, and defend the Army portion of the global communications synchronization backbone in the form of terrestrial and satellite radio links and cable systems infrastructure. See FM 6-02 for more information on network enterprise centers.

Corps Signal Brigade

2-64. Corps signal brigades and expeditionary signal battalions are the Army signal formations designed for deployment. The corps signal brigades are deployable to support LSCO. Corps signal brigades provide detailed planning, engineering, installation, maintenance, and defense of tactical networks. Corps signal brigades are assigned to the corps and command one or more expeditionary signal battalions or expeditionary signal battalions-enhanced during large-scale operations. Expeditionary signal battalions provide line of sight and beyond line of sight communication links and DOD information network operations capabilities to

extend information services to supported headquarters. These battalions reinforce the DOD information network operations capabilities of an Army corps, division, brigade combat team, and multifunctional support brigade headquarters and provide signal support to other Services component multinational headquarters as required. See FM 6-02 for more information on the theater tactical signal brigade.

Medical Command (Deployment Support)

2-65. The MEDCOM (DS) serves as the senior medical command within the theater. The MEDCOM (DS) commands medical units that provide health care in support of deployed forces. The MEDCOM (DS) is a regionally focused command and provides subordinate medical organizations to operate under the medical brigade (support) or multifunctional medical battalion (medical battalion [multifunctional]). The MEDCOM (DS) includes a MCP and an operational CP. See FM 4-02 for more information about the MEDCOM (DS).

Medical Brigade (Support)

2-66. The medical brigade (support) provides all the control and planning capabilities necessary to deliver medical support in the theater. The medical brigade (support) is a subordinate organization of the MEDCOM (DS). It is tailored with multifunctional and specialized medical units. One or more medical brigades may support Army forces in a JOA. One medical brigade (support) may provide direct support to a division, another may provide Army health service support on an area basis to another division and corps headquarters, and a third may provide area medical support to theater sustainment forces in the joint security area.

2-67. These organizations often provide simultaneous support to interagency organizations and multinational operations occurring within their areas of operations. The medical brigade (support) can provide an early-entry module, an expansion module, and a campaign module. It can be tailored to the operation. As the supported forces grow in size and complexity, the medical brigade (support) can deploy additional modules that build upon one another to support ULO. When required, the commander of a medical brigade (support) may exercise C2 for task-organized medical functional teams, detachments, and companies. See FM 4-02 for more information.

Military Intelligence Brigade - Theater

2-68. Military intelligence brigades are the theater army's collection and information analysis capability. These units range from directly aligned MIB-Ts to globally aligned functional intelligence brigades. The MIB-T is normally attached or OPCON to the theater army. The brigade provides regionally focused collection and analysis in support of theater army operations requirements and limited contingency operations. The theater army headquarters relies heavily on the military intelligence brigade for threat characteristics, intelligence estimates, threat and civil considerations, data files and databases, and all-source intelligence products. These products support theater army planning requirements, including development of Army plans supporting the theater campaign plan and maintenance of OPLANs and contingency plans.

2-69. A theater army and its subordinate MIB-T may provide intelligence support to Army and joint forces in a JOA. The MIB-T's regional focus enhances its capabilities to develop and exploit language skills and cultural insights specific to an AOR. Regional focus also provides the benefits of continuity and cultural context to its analytic intelligence products. The MIB-T can collect, analyze, and track the threat characteristics and doctrine of partner nations, enemies, and adversaries over many years, providing indications and warnings of changes in an OE. These abilities allow the brigade to create, maintain, and access multiple databases at different classification levels, as necessary, of intelligence regarding regional military forces, persons of interest, and evolving doctrine and capabilities of regional military forces. See FM 2-0 and ATP 2-19.1 for more information about the MIB-T.

Aerial Intelligence Brigade

2-70. The aerial intelligence brigade provides C2 for resourcing, managing, and training the Army's manned and unmanned aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to support commanders at all echelons and across all operational phases. The aerial intelligence brigade conducts multi-discipline intelligence operations (imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, and measurement and signature intelligence) and processing, exploitation, and dissemination integration and synchronization. The aerial

intelligence brigade's central task is to exercise C2 of assigned capabilities for the purpose of enabling operations in support of multiple, simultaneous regional contingency operations.

Theater Fires Command/Element

2-71. An Army theater fires command and a theater fires element provides C2 of assigned strategic fires capabilities, serves as the senior headquarters assigned to an ASCC/theater army to integrate theater fires assets, and executes critical fire support functions in all phases of ULO. The organizational difference between these two is that the fires command is an organization, while the fires element is a staff augmentation. The decision to pursue two independent organizational structures highlights how the Army is pursuing differing approaches to the problem sets in different regions and will continue to evolve.

2-72. The theater fires command/element is designed to develop, nominate, and converge effects on joint targets across the theater. This support to joint targeting will support the continuous setting of the theater to enable JFLCC/field army and corps operations during the shape and prevent phases of ULO. The theater fires command ensures the Army's contribution to the joint targeting process is effectively planned and executed during shape and prevent and can seamlessly transition to large-scale ground combat operations in accordance with the ground force commander's priorities. This also provides greater deterrence options for the theater. See FM 3-09 for additional information on theater fires commands/elements.

Civil Affairs Command

2-73. The civil affairs command is the theater army civil affairs capability. The civil affairs command provides theater-level civil affairs planning, coordination, policies, and programs in support of the GCC's regional civil-military operations strategy and stabilization, reconstruction, and development efforts. Each theater army (except for U.S. Army, North) receives support from a civil affairs command. The civil affairs command mobilizes and deploys with one or more civil affairs brigades and civil affairs planning teams. It also has one or more civil-military operations centers.

2-74. One civil affairs brigade normally supports the land component command; a second brigade may support the ESC. A civil affairs brigade with its civil-military operations center can become the core of a joint civil-military operations task force under the OPCON of the JTF. Civil affairs battalions from the civil affairs brigade are task-organized to Army divisions. Civil affairs planning teams augment the GCC, theater army, joint land forces component command, and division, corps, and brigades. Such augmentation provides liaison, coordination, education and training, and area assessment functions. (See FM 3-57 for more information.)

THEATER-LEVEL ARMY FORCES FOR THE EXPANDED THEATER

2-75. Campaigns that include LSCO cause the theater army to expand to support Army and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) forces. This occurs as the combatant commander adapts the joint C2 mechanism to the demands of the campaign. The theater army maintains its AOR-wide focus while developing a mature support structure within the joint operations area. The mature theater could include some or all of the commands described in paragraphs 2-76 through 2-104 plus the joint enablers described after. Figure 2-5 provides an example of Army forces in a mature, expanded theater, possibly during an ongoing contingency.




Figure 2-5. Example of expanded theater forces

Theater Aviation Brigade

2-76. Theater aviation support is provided by an Army aviation brigade. Each theater aviation brigade can conduct assault or general support aviation tasks in support of the theater and its subordinate commands. The theater aviation brigade comes in a general support variant and an assault variant. The theater aviation brigade general support provides accurate and timely reconnaissance in permissive environments; positions personnel, supplies, and equipment; evacuates casualties; conducts search and rescue; and enables C2 in DSCA operations. The theater aviation brigade assault augments other aviation brigades or operates autonomously at the theater level to air assault maneuver forces; position personnel, supplies, and equipment; evacuate casualties and conduct personnel recovery; and enable C2.

2-77. Unlike combat aviation brigades, a theater aviation brigade lacks attack and reconnaissance battalions. The theater aviation brigade has a mix of lift helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The brigade can conduct air assault, air movement, and sustaining operations. It will normally not have attached unmanned aircraft systems. The theater aviation brigade reinforces combat aviation brigades with additional assault, general support, heavy lift, and aeromedical evacuation. If a theater fixed-wing battalion is attached, it can fly fixed-wing sorties for air movement, aerial C2 support, and aerial casualty evacuation in support of the ARFOR, theater army, and JFC. See FM 3-04 for more information.

Theater Airfield Operations Group

2-78. The theater airfield operations group and its subordinate Army air traffic service organizations are an enabling component of the Army aviation force and can support forcible and early-entry contingency missions and sustained theater aviation operations. Air traffic services operations are conducted overseas within contiguous and noncontiguous areas throughout the range of military operations. During competition below the threshold of armed conflict, in certain phases of military operations, theater airfield operations groups must simultaneously navigate a variety of regulations and requirements to enable Army and joint missions. For example, a theater airfield operations group supporting U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) would have to adhere to Army aviation regulations, Federal Aviation Administration regulations, host nation and European Union International Civil Aviation Organization regulations, as well as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) requirements. The circumstances of LSCO may dramatically increase the amount, variety, and complexity of air traffic, which may in turn drive requirements for augmentation to the theater airfield operations group.

2-79. These theater airfield operations groups, with their subordinate airfield operations battalions, establish and operate theater airfields as needed in an AOR. Army air traffic service units at the theater level consist of the theater airfield operations group with its subordinate airfield operations battalions. Advanced operations bases airfield operations battalions can operate a fully instrumented airfield with airport

surveillance radar approach, precision approach radar, and controlling local airspace necessary to support airfield operations. See FM 3-04 for more information on the theater airfield operations group.

Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Group

2-80. The theater aviation maintenance sustainment group provides aviation sustainment maintenance and limited depot sustainment support at the theater level. The theater aviation maintenance sustainment group performs repairs and returns components and end-items to their supported units, or to the supply system through the National Maintenance Program.

2-81. When deployed, the theater aviation maintenance sustainment group is attached to the joint force sustainment headquarters or ESC and sets up at a secure location within an AO. It establishes and provides 24-hour, fixed-base aviation field and sustainment maintenance, logistics, and other essential aviation sustainment support to aviation units. The theater aviation maintenance sustainment group performs field maintenance, depot-level crash and battle damage repair, and sustainment- and depot-level repair of major end items. It also performs sustainment-level maintenance for aircraft and aviation ground support equipment at fixed-land or sea-based locations. The theater aviation maintenance sustainment group assists deploying aviation operational units in port operations. See FM 3-04 and ATP 3-04.7 for more information.

Army Air and Missile Defense Command

2-82. The AAMDC is a headquarters element responsible for the command of all subordinate Army air artillery units as well as the coordination of Army AMD operations for the land component. When required by the GCC, the AAMDC will be attached to the theater army, if not already assigned. AMD units in an AOR are assigned or attached to the AAMDC.

2-83. The AAMDC commander has three primary roles. The commander is the senior AMD commander in theater, theater army air and missile defense coordinator (known as TAAMDCOORD) for the theater army or JFLCC (if established), and deputy area air defense commander (known as DAADC) for AMD, if designated. The AAMDC commander has overall responsibility for planning Army AMD operations in support of the JFC. To accomplish these duties, the AAMDC task-organizes and assigns missions to subordinate brigades. The AAMDC is responsible for balancing the Army counter-air assets and capabilities between the Army and the joint force land component (if established) maneuver units and the theater-level requirements established in the JFC-approved defended asset list and the area air defense plan. It also provides liaison elements to the joint force air component, joint force land component, joint force maritime component, and joint special operations task force, as appropriate, to integrate AMD operations. See FM 3-01 and JP 3-01 for more information.

Theater Engineer Command

2-84. The theater engineer command (TEC) is designed for the operational command of engineer capabilities at echelons above corps, and will often provide C2 for the joint force command if an operational engineer headquarters is required. The TEC is focused on the operational C2 of engineer operations across all engineer disciplines and typically serves as the senior theater or land component engineer headquarters. When directed, the TEC provides C2 for engineers from other Services and multinational organizations and provides technical oversight (quality assurance and surveillance) assistance for contracted construction engineers according to the joint relationships established by the joint force command. The TEC commander receives policy guidance from the theater army based on the guidance from the GCC joint force engineer. This headquarters maintains a collaborative planning relationship with the theater army and joint force staff engineers to help establish engineer policy for the theater. It also maintains coordination links with other Services and multinational command engineering staffs. There are only two TECs, the 412th TEC and the 416th TEC, and they are both in the Reserve Component. For more information, see FM 3-34.

CBRNE Command

2-85. The chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) command is a JTF-capable headquarters that is capable of deployment in support of a wide range of countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) and CBRNE activities. The CBRNE command integrates, coordinates, deploys,

and provides trained and ready CBRN and EOD response forces. It exercises C2 of CBRN and EOD forces in support of joint and Army force commanders. When the CBRNE command operational CP is deployed, it is capable of integrating with the supported command headquarters staff or of operating as a separate element to conduct CBRN, EOD, and CWMD planning and has the capacity to execute simultaneous missions within and outside CONUS across ULO. The CBRNE command maintains technical links with the appropriate joint, federal, and state CBRN and EOD assets and with research, development, and technical communities to assure response readiness. See ATP 3-11.36 and ATP 3-37.11 for more information.

Theater Military Police Command

2-86. The military police command focuses on reinforcing and augmenting tactical-level military police efforts and developing the theater detention or dislocated civilian operations base requirements. A theater military police command is a headquarters element (Regular Army or National Guard) that is normally established and assigned directly to the theater army in a mature theater with several military police brigades and a criminal investigation command group. Once established, the senior military police commander serves as the theater army provost marshal and is normally designated as the chief of detainee operations. The theater army normally receives one military police command when more than one military police brigade is required. See FM 3-39 for more information on military police operations.

Psychological Operations Group

2-87. The U.S. Army Reserve psychological operations group functions as the central coordination point for all conventional force psychological operations (PSYOP) activities conducted by theater army PSYOP elements. The PSYOP group headquarters as the senior conventional Army PSYOP headquarters is also responsible for coordinating and deconflicting activities conducted by special operations PSYOP elements in the AOR to ensure unity of messages and actions. A USAR PSYOP group augments the existing PSYOP planning staff (future operations, current operations) as well as provides the capability to produce and disseminate PSYOP products for the theater army commander. Psychological operations groups contribute to the planning and execution of discreet, precise, and scalable influence activities to achieve the joint commander's overall objectives. See FM 3-05, FM 3-53, and ATP 3-53.2 for more information.

Multi-Domain Task Force

2-88. The multi-domain task force (known as MDTF) provides the joint force a formation capable of employing capabilities from and across multiple domains in support of strategic and operational objectives. It is designed to defeat enemy complex systems through the delivery of multi-domain fires to create windows of opportunity for strategic and operational maneuver. The multi-domain task force may be assigned to the ASCC for day-to-day administrative and operational control when positioned forward outside of the United States, or to a corps when positioned within the United States. When required it can be task-organized to provide capabilities to the JTF or component commander or provide an allocation of assets TACON or in direct support of joint force maritime, air, or land component commanders.

2-89. During competition the multi-domain task force is typically deployed forward in an AOR to conduct activities in support of the operational preparation of the environment. It employs strategic and operational capabilities to provide limited target development against assigned targets. The multi-domain task force headquarters coordinates and synchronizes the information collection operations of its assigned formations with other theater and strategic assets.

2-90. The multi-domain task force is capable of coordinating and integrating CEMA and space capabilities with long-range surface fires to deceive, neutralize, or disrupt enemy formations, C2, and CEMA. It does so to enable Army forces to penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems and exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver. The multi-domain task force is designed to operate dispersed while retaining the ability to converge effects that create opportunities for joint force exploitation. A multi-domain task force requires augmentation by maneuver forces for protection in order to defeat level III threats. Based upon specific mission variables, it may also require additional augmentation such as civil affairs or sustainment assets.

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS FOR THEATER SUPPORT

2-91. For protracted major operations, the theater army may be reinforced by an array of other capabilities. Other functional or multifunctional headquarters and units may be made available to the theater army based on requirements of the AOR such as forward stationing, base operations, security force assistance missions, theater security cooperation activities, or ongoing military operations. These functional or multifunctional units may have either a command or a support relationship with the theater army. In some cases, the DA tasks certain functional or multifunctional battalions to support more than one theater army.

Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation Division)

2-92. Normally a military police group (criminal investigation division) supports a theater army. The group is placed in general support of the theater, but it remains under the OPCON of the Army Criminal Investigation Command. Commanders of criminal investigation command tactical units advise their supported commanders on criminal investigation matters, as appropriate, although no formal operational command relationship exists. The military police group ensures the connectivity between all criminal investigation command units within and external to the theater. See FM 3-39 for more information on the criminal investigation command group.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group

2-93. The EOD group is a C2 headquarters for EOD operations. The group conducts staff planning and technical control of all EOD assets in a theater and provides EOD staff liaison to the ASCC. A theater army supporting major operations is allocated an EOD group. The EOD group is capable of conducting C2 for two to six EOD battalions. The EOD group is attached or placed OPCON, to coordinate counter-improvised explosive device and weapons technical intelligence operations, to a theater army, corps, or JTF in support of a specific operation, operation order, OPLAN, or CONPLAN. The group may also form the core of a specialized combined JTF with a mission of various protection and exploitation enablers such as counter-improvised explosive device, exploitation, or CWMD task forces. The group can also provide enabling support, analysis, and advisement to execute targeting efforts, theater exploitation, and CWMD in order to provide support to Army operations and force protection in all OEs (See ATP 4-32 and FM 3-34 for more information on EOD groups and operations).

Information Operations Elements

2-94. The Army provides information operations support elements to the theater army. These elements are dedicated to helping theater organizations analyze situations and operate within an increasingly complex information environment. These units augment theater forces with deployable mission-tailored support teams and CONUS-based operational planning support, intelligence analysis, and technical assistance. They train to operate within the joint information operations doctrinal construct and the Army's inform and influence construct. These support organizations include the 1st Information Operations Command (Land) from the Regular Army, theater information operations groups from the Reserve Components, as well as other organizations for specialized capabilities. The 1st Information Operations Command (Land) is a major subordinate command of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command and is under the OPCON of the U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER). See FM 3-13 for more information on available information capabilities.

Battlefield Coordination Detachment

2-95. A BCD is a specialized, regionally focused Army element that serves as the senior Army operational commander's liaison with the air component or joint force air component command and enables selected operational functions. A BCD is co-located with the joint air operations center (JAOC), Combined Air Operations Center, or the Air Force air operations center. The BCD is the Army's interface for systems connectivity to the joint air operations center and human and procedural joint interoperability at the operational level with their joint air operations center counterparts. Its tasks include facilitating the exchange of current intelligence and operational data, processing air support requests, monitoring and interpreting the land battle situation, assisting in the coordination of AMD, coordinating airlift, and integrating airspace

requirements. During LSCO, where an echelon between corps and theater army has been established, the BCD supports the theater army as theater joint force land component command in situations where a theater JFACC has been designated. Otherwise, it supports the field army as the ARFOR and/or JFLCC of a subordinated AO where an AFFOR/JFACC has been designated, which may require the sourcing of additional BCDs depending on the scale of conflict and the need for multiple large-scale JOAs in a given theater. See ATP 3-09.13 for more information on the BCD.

Security Force Assistance Brigade

2-96. Security force assistance brigades provide theater army commanders the capability to support theater security cooperation activities and build partner-nation security force capacity. Each security force assistance brigade is organized with a headquarters and headquarters company, two advisory maneuver battalions (either an infantry or combined arms battalion), one advisory cavalry squadron, one advisory FA battalion, one advisory engineer battalion (with embedded signal and military intelligence companies), and focus primarily on tactical and operational advising. Security force assistance brigades have the capability to conduct tactical advisory missions, contribute to theater situational awareness, and liaise with partner or allied armies. See FM 3-22 and ATP 3-96.1 for more information.

Regional Support Groups

2-97. The regional support group is a deployable headquarters that manages base camps or base clusters with a population of 6,000 or more personnel and requires services beyond basic life support. The regional support group headquarters is designed to relieve the burden of base camp management and operations from the combatant commander so that commander can focus on the primary mission. They typically operate in the joint security area, between corps tactical assembly area and the sea/air ports of debarkation in theater. See ATP 3-90.20 for more information.

2-98. The theater army or other supported commands may designate a unit to be responsible for AOs where regional support groups are located. These units are normally either a brigade combat team or, more likely in support areas, a maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB). As such, these brigade combat teams or MEBs have TACON of the regional support group for security operations, serve as their higher headquarters for fire and air support planning, and provide a threat tactical combat force when required.

Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

2-99. The MEB is a multifunctional C2 headquarters designed to conduct its primary task of support area operations for the echelon it supports. The MEB's task organization is based upon its identified mission requirements for the echelon it is supporting. The MEB's AO is the support area and depending on the size of the support area, it may require augmentation. Higher echelon commanders base the MEB's task organization on identified mission requirements for the echelon it is supporting. The MEB can perform military police, engineer, and CBRN missions simultaneously, in addition to all of the doctrinal functions associated with being assigned an AO; however, the MEB is not a maneuver brigade. The MEB performs these tasks within its assigned area of operations:

- Conduct terrain management.
- Conduct information collection, integration, and synchronization.
- Conduct civil-military operations.
- Conduct movement control.
- Conduct clearance of fires.
- Enable security.
- Conduct personnel recovery.
- Coordinate airspace management (needs augmentation for brigade aviation element functions).
- Conduct minimum-essential stability tasks.
- Conduct mobility and countermobility support.
- Integrate rear CP operations.

2-100. The MEB supports echelons-above-brigade Army headquarters. Its headquarters is staffed and organized to conduct combined arms operations, integrating maneuver support, related technical branches and combat forces. It may include a mix of CBRN, civil affairs, engineer, military police, and potentially air defense artillery units as well as a tactical combat force. The number and type of organizations placed under the MEB depends on the mission, threat, and number and type of battalions or companies operating in the brigade's AO. The MEB provides staff planning for and control of the units required to conduct support area operations in support of decisive action. Current Army force structure places all MEBs in the USAR and the ARNG.

2-101. The theater army commander can task-organize parts of a MEB to a corps or division for a specific mission, or a MEB may complement or reinforce Army formations with forces under the MEB's control that are performing selected missions or tasks within their AO. This may include engineers, military police, CBRN, or other units for area protection, CBRN support to a FA unit, the combat aviation brigade, and the supporting sustainment brigade. Although a MEB may frequently attach and detach more units than other support brigades, it must also continually provide integrated and synchronized service like the other support brigades. The MEB can support a specific mission outside its AO or provide forces to complement or reinforce other organizations conducting select missions or tasks that support the main effort. However, specific or select missions does not imply long term. If the MEB becomes a force provider for an enduring period it could become ineffective in its ability to conduct support area operations. See FM 3-81 for additional information on MEB operations.

Digital Liaison Detachment

2-102. A digital liaison detachment provides digital liaison capability to Army units (theater army, corps, and division headquarters for connectivity with allied and multinational force units and other U.S. Services and interagency partners. A digital liaison detachment also provides—

- Functional area expertise via LNOs to joint and multinational headquarters.
- Digital information management and communications interface capability for U.S. systems with a host headquarters.
- U.S. headquarters' representatives inside a supported multinational headquarters to facilitate C2 by clarifying orders, interpreting commander's intent, and identifying and resolving issues. See ATP 3-94.1, JP 3-16, FM 3-16, AR 34-1, NATO STANAG 2281, and the *Coalition Operations Handbook* for more information.

Army Field Support Brigades

2-103. The Army field support brigade's primary contingency mission is to support the USAMC role as a national-level provider and to assist in the coordination of acquisition, logistics, and technology support to Army units worldwide. The Army field support brigade provides this support from the operational to tactical echelons of command across the competition continuum. The Army field support brigade meets its mission requirements through its assigned and attached subordinate organizations, reachback/call forward of USAMC assets, use of contracted support, and close coordination/synchronization with the supporting program executive offices and program managers. See ATP 4-91 for more information.

Army Contracting Command

2-104. The Army Contracting Command is a major subordinate command within USAMC that provides Army forces with both theater support contracting and installation contracting support through its two subordinate commands, the Mission and Installation Contracting Command and Contracting Support Brigade, respectively. The Army Contracting Command also provides support to deployed Army forces via reachback contracting support from its CONUS-based acquisition centers. See ATP 4-92 for more information.

JOINT THEATER ENABLERS

2-105. The joint force provides other capabilities to the theater army and its forces to enable enduring missions or provide forces to augment army forces in the execution of limited contingency or major

operations. In many instances, the theater army will have no formal command relationship with these forces or organizations outside of a major operation, but still must integrate them into contingency planning and will still benefit from collaboration with them.

Theater Special Operations Command

2-106. The theater special operations command is a headquarters element and the subordinate special operations command through which the GCC normally exercises OPCON of all special operations forces (SOF) within the AOR. The commander of the theater special operations command serves as the primary advisor to the combatant commander for applying regionally aligned, Army special operations forces (ARSOF). As directed by the GCC, the theater army provides support to deployed SOF. The special operations commander coordinates with the theater army for sustainment requirements. The ADCON of ARSOF and logistics support of SOF unique items will normally remain in special operations channels. (See FM 3-05 for more information.)

Joint Enabling Capabilities Command

2-107. The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) provides mission-tailored joint C2 communications, planning, and public affairs support to the joint force that will meet the emerging requirements of combatant commands and JTF-capable headquarters. When the theater army is tasked with forming a JTF or joint force land component command, the theater army provides the core of the headquarters, either with an existing Army headquarters or a purpose-built organization. The combatant commander provides it with joint enablers from the JECC of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). The JECC of the USTRANSCOM provides mission-tailored, joint capability packages to combatant commanders to facilitate rapid establishment of joint force headquarters, fulfill global response force execution, and bridge joint operational requirements. The JECC contains the following subordinate organizations:

- Joint communications support element provides rapidly deployable, scalable, en route and early-entry communications capabilities for any type of operation in order to enable rapid action by the joint force.
- Joint planning support element provides ready, tailored, rapidly deployable joint planners and public affairs professionals with expertise to accelerate the formation and increase the effectiveness of a joint force headquarters during emerging operations. The joint planning support element has the following subcommands—
  - Planning.
  - Operations.
  - Logistics.
  - Knowledge management.
  - Intelligence support.
  - Public affairs.

2-108. See JP 3-61, JP 3-31, JP 3-33, and the JECC homepage for more information on the JECC. See the references for the link to the JECC homepage.

Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination

2-109. Standing joint force headquarters for elimination (SJFHQ-E) is a permanent headquarters that integrates into forward deployed headquarters to help manage the weapons of mass destruction elimination mission. It plans and trains to enable the C2 of weapons of mass destruction elimination operations in support of GCCs. It is organized under the command of U.S. Strategic Command and provided to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. When ordered, a GCC may coordinate U.S. military efforts to identify, counter, secure, and eliminate weapons of mass destruction threats. This mission requires special skills forces not normally organic to a GCC staff. When allocated, the SJFHQ-E provides the GCC with the planning, intelligence, and operational capabilities required to eliminate a foreign nation's weapons of mass destruction and related programs. It may deploy to augment an existing headquarters or provide the core of a JTF for weapons of mass destruction elimination operations. It provides a full-time, trained joint C2 element able to integrate

into deployed headquarters to help accomplish the weapons of mass destruction elimination mission. See FM 3-11 for more information.

Captured Material Exploitation Center

2-110. The captured material exploitation center and joint captured materiel exploitation center are technical intelligence elements responsible for intelligence information derived from the collection, processing, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to weapons technical intelligence, captured enemy materiel. This responsibility includes document and media exploitation for the purposes of preventing technological surprise—assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary's technological advantages. A captured material exploitation center normally aligns under the theater intelligence section or a MIB-T organized by the 203d Military Intelligence Battalion (Reserve); a joint captured material exploitation center is staffed by joint Services during joint operations. See JP 2-01, ATP 2-22.4, and ATP 2-91.8 for more information.

Chapter 3

Exercise Command and Control

Chapter 3 discusses C2 of theater army subordinate elements. The chapter begins by discussing responsibilities of the theater army commander and how the commander uses ADCON, OPCON, and TACON for the control of forces assigned to theater. The chapter then concludes with responsibilities of the individual ASCCs.

THEATER ARMY COMMANDER

3-1. As discussed in previous chapters, the theater army is designed to perform the role of the ASCC to a GCC, including the Title 10 USC, Section 7013b and Army executive agent responsibilities. The theater army, with its deployable CCP, has a limited capability to provide direct C2 over operations—limited in terms of scale, scope, intensity, and duration. It is the ASCC's responsibility to exercise ADCON and OPCON or TACON to control all Army forces assigned to theater until they are assigned or attached to an ARFOR within a subordinate JOA.

3-2. The theater army commander sits in a unique role as ASCC commander, reporting to the joint GCC chain of command and the Army chain of command while coordinating with supported JOA commanders. This requires an understanding of how Army forces flow into theater through the theater army to a JFC in a JOA and the command relationships that define the theater army's relationship to those forces. Finally, because the theater army is responsible to support a specific GCC, the responsibilities of each theater army are discussed in brief.

3-3. The theater army commander is the senior Army officer not assigned to the combatant command or other joint headquarters within an AOR. Per JP 1, JP 3-0, and FM 3-0, a theater army commander supporting a GCC must—

- As a supporting component, provide Army support to a supported Service or functional component of the combatant command.
- As a supported component, receive and integrate support from other components of the combatant command.
- Recommend the appropriate use of Army forces to the combatant commander or other JFC.
- Accomplish assigned operational missions as an ARFOR.
- Perform joint training, to include training required by other Service components for which the theater army commander has primary responsibility.
- Inform the combatant commander of planning for changes in Army sustainment support that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability.
- Provide support to the joint operation and exercise plans with necessary force data to support missions that the combatant commander assigns.
- Develop Army program and budget requests that comply with the combatant commander's guidance on warfighting requirements and priorities.
- Inform the combatant commander of program and budget decisions that affect joint operational planning.
- Perform Army-specific functions such as internal administration and discipline, Service training, normal sustainment functions, Army intelligence matters, and specific oversight of intelligence activities to ensure compliance with U.S. laws, policies, and directives.
- Inform combatant commanders of joint nonstrategic nuclear support required by the Army, such as specialized capability to remediate or reduce nuclear devices.

- Ensure signal and information management interoperability with the higher joint headquarters.
- Provide sustainment support to Army forces assigned to JTFs operating in the combatant command's AOR.

3-4. The theater army commander is responsible as the service headquarters for the Army for reporting directly to Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) on matters concerning Army forces within theater. Separately, as ASCC commander, the theater army commander reports to the GCC on matters concerning Army forces. Because the theater army commander retains command authority over Army forces assigned to theater prior to commitment of those forces to a JOA, theater army will also necessarily maintain coordination through the ARFOR receiving the Army forces in the JOA, typically until those forces are integrated. If the CCP is employed, initially the theater army commander may coordinate through another joint chain of command until the CCP is no longer under theater army OPCON.

THEATER FORCE FLOW

3-5. The deployment and redeployment of U.S. forces in support of combatant commander requirements are a series of operational events enabled by logistics. These activities are planned and executed by the supported and supporting commands, Services, National Guard Bureau, and DOD agencies. The capability to deploy forces to the operational area and rapidly integrate them into the joint force, as directed by the JFC, is essential.

3-6. By statute (10 USC 162a), the Secretary of Defense may assign specified forces to combatant commanders. The Secretary of Defense directs the assignment in the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum. The Secretary of the Army then designates the actual unit identification code for the unit in the force registration data in the Defense Readiness Reporting System – Army (known as DRRS-A), which in turn is reflected in the appropriate Army service database. The assignment to a combatant command is established in Defense Readiness Reporting System – Army by the "CSERV" code (combatant command service code). Additionally, the Secretary of the Army established responsibility for ADCON—in accordance with Title 10—in Defense Readiness Reporting System – Army force registration by the "ASMGT" code (assignment for administrative control purposes). Once COCOM and ADCON for the unit identification code are established, the combatant command exercises COCOM, and the ASCC (unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of the Army) executes ADCON.

3-7. The Secretary of Defense has the authority to allocate forces between combatant commanders. The allocation process temporarily adjusts the distribution of forces among the combatant commanders to meet force requirements in support of current operations and campaign plans to mitigate near-term military and strategic risk. The Secretary of Defense publishes decisions to allocate forces in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) annual deployment order (for example, the Global Force Management Allocation Plan and its associated annexes), as well as periodic modifications to the base plan. Combatant commanders usually exercise OPCON over allocated forces; however, the Secretary of Defense will specify the command relationship the gaining combatant commander will exercise and the losing combatant commander will relinquish.

3-8. Supported combatant commanders and their associated ASCCs have three major responsibilities relative to deployment operations:

- Build a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) based on the concept of operations and, subsequently, validate movement requirements in the TPFDD after the unit refined movement data has been entered.
- Determine pre-deployment standards.
- Balance and regulate the transportation flow.

3-9. Select forces may deploy within hours or days from receipt of a deployment order while other units may deploy on a timeline of days to several weeks. Regardless of the deployment timeline, a myriad of pre-deployment activities must be accomplished to deploy the force with their required equipment and supplies. These actions range from the strategic to the tactical level. At the strategic and operational levels, TPFDD sourcing and transportation feasibility may continue well into this phase. At the installation and unit level, activities range from personnel and equipment status confirmed and upgraded to conducting required training. Deployment timelines will dictate available time to conduct prepare the force activities, which

include: activating deployment and C2 support organizations, conducting movement and support meetings, developing a unit deployment list and identifying shipping and handling requirements, and conducting required training.

3-10. The Secretary of the Army allocates forces to the GCC through the TPFDD. The designated joint force provider provides forces to the GCC. USTRANSCOM is the joint force provider for mobility forces, and Military Surface and Deployment Command (SDDC) serves as its ASCC. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the joint force provider for special operations forces; with the Army component command of U.S Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is the joint functional manager for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination forces and missile defense forces; U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC) serves as its ASCC. The Secretary of the Army designated FORSCOM as the Service force provider for all CONUS, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands Army conventional forces.

3-11. FORSCOM analyzes the requirement for conventional forces, coordinates with other Army commands, and nominates recommended sourcing solutions to the JFC. In the event conventional Army forces outside of the CONUS are tasked, tasking actions come from the GCC through the Service component command. See ATP 3-35 for more information on Army deployment and redeployment.

3-12. A GCC retains COCOM to reallocate Army forces within the theater. Based on mission requirements, theater army may maintain control of those forces to support GCC theater security cooperation objectives, support emerging requirements, or employ in accomplishing limited objectives under the command of the CCP. Typically, however, theater army allocates most Army forces to the receiving JFC in a JOA. See Chapter 6 for a more in-depth discussion of setting the JOA.

3-13. Given the challenges inherent with reporting through two chains of command while coordinating with others, the theater army must be fully aware of the command relationships they retain and how to operate within them.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

3-14. The theater army as the ASCC has the responsibility to control attached and assigned Army forces within an AOR through ADCON and OPCON or TACON. The theater army commander uses these command relationships and the authorities that flow through them to C2 subordinate forces within the theater. The theater army initially maintains control of all Army units assigned to an AOR until control is passed to the ARFOR in a subordinate JOA.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

3-15. *Administrative control* is direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support (JP 1). ADCON is not a command or support relationship; it is a Service authority. It is exercised under the authority of and is delegated by the Secretary of the Army. ADCON is synonymous with the Army's Title 10 authorities and responsibilities. Theater army retains ADCON over all units arriving in theater until the ARFOR in a subordinate JOA assumes ADCON responsibility for Army units in that JOA.

3-16. The theater army commander will specify the ADCON responsibilities of the ARFORs. The theater army normally retains control of RSOI, logistics support of the deployed force, personnel support, and medical support. Administrative responsibilities normally retained by the ARFOR include internal administration and discipline, training within the JOA, and Service-specific reporting. The theater army normally retains OPCON of Army sustainment and medical commands operating in the JOA. The theater army commander establishes an Army support relationship between the ARFOR and these units. It commands all Army forces in the region until the combatant commander attaches selected Army forces to a JFC.

3-17. ADCON does not necessarily follow the operational chain of command at echelons above brigade. Unless modified by the Secretary of the Army, administrative responsibilities normally flow from the DA through the ASCC to those Army forces assigned or attached to that combatant command. As the ASCC, the theater army delegates ADCON as required to Army forces assigned or attached by the combatant

commander to a joint (or joint and multinational) task force. The ARFOR commander and associated headquarters exercise ADCON of Army forces within that JTF specified by the theater army commander (see Chapter 4 for more information on theater army ADCON).

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

3-18. *Operational* control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission (JP 1). OPCON may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and may be delegated within the command.

3-19. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. This authority should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations, normally through subordinate JFCs and Service and functional component commanders. OPCON provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander exercising OPCON considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Commanders of subordinate commands, including JTFs, will be given OPCON of assigned forces and OPCON or TACON of attached forces by the superior commander.

3-20. Typically, Title 10 Regular Army and Army Reserve forces arrive in theater under OPCON, which enables the theater army to task-organize as required. During LSCO, it is possible that units from the National Guard Bureau could arrive under OPCON. For enduring operations, these units are activated under Title 10, and are employed as Regular Army units. More often, they arrive to a theater under TACON to preserve unit integrity for operations limited in scope and duration.

TACTICAL CONTROL

3-21. *Tactical control* is the authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned (JP 1). TACON allows commanders below combatant command level to apply force and direct tactical use of logistic assets but does not provide authority to change organizational structure or direct administrative and logistical support.

3-22. Title 32 units most often arrive to theater to accomplish specific TSC-related tasks or other missions short of armed conflict that support the GCC campaign plan and are usually assigned to theater under TACON authorities to preserve unit integrity and prevent changes to the specific and limited missions they deploy to accomplish. This helps prevent a unit from receiving attachments and losing detachments in relatively short duration operations, such as a National Guard horizontal construction engineer unit tasked to build roads in SOUTHCOM or U.S. Africa Command. Units that arrive under Title 32 authorities are generally completing their required annual training while achieving limited objectives in support of the GCC campaign plan.

THEATER ARMY RESPONSIBILITIES

3-23. Currently, the Army has five theater armies supporting five GCCs, as shown in table 3-1. Each of these theater armies is a formation with the ability to C2 subordinate corps and division formations during limited contingency operations as well as tailor the appropriate force to meet the GCC's operational requirements.

Table 3-1. Theater armies

Geographic combatant command	*Theater army*
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command	U.S. Army Pacific
U.S. European Command	U.S. Army Europe and Africa
U.S. Central Command	U.S. Army Central
U.S. Africa Command	U.S. Army Europe and Africa
U.S. Southern Command	U.S. Army South
U.S. Northern Command	U.S. Army North

3-24. The theater army's mission is one of the most diverse and complex of any Army echelon. The headquarters is tailored to a specific GCC AOR with the ability to conduct both operational and administrative C2 over Army forces theater-wide. The following is a brief discussion of each theater army's responsibilities to its respective combatant command.

U.S. ARMY PACIFIC

3-25. U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) is the operational-level Army force designated by the SECARMY as the ASCC assigned to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). USARPAC MCP provides AOR-wide Title 10 responsibilities, ADCON Army support to other Services, and Army executive agent responsibilities in support of the GCC. The MCP also supports forward-deployed Army and unified action partner forces deployed to a JOA established within the AOR. Support includes theater opening; joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI), common-user logistics, and other executive agent responsibilities. The MCP also provides direct planning support and reachback capability to the CCP when the CCP deploys (as a forward CP) to conduct C2 within small-scale limited contingency operations or to participate in exercises and other theater security cooperation activities.

3-26. When directed by USINDOPACOM and resourced by Headquarters, DA, USARPAC may serve as theater joint force land component command, JTF, or a joint force land component command to a JTF in a JOA. USARPAC shapes the USINDOPACOM AOR in order to support operations, develop relationships, assure access, build partner capacity, and deter adversaries, while providing C2 capability that can set the theater and execute ULO in support of combatant commander requirements.

3-27. USARPAC is engaged throughout the Asia-Pacific region, providing trained and ready, Active and Reserve Component combat and enabling forces and supporting USINDOPACOM's TSC programs. It has sent peacekeeping forces to the Sinai Peninsula, Haiti, East Timor, and Bosnia.

3-28. USARPAC is a multi-component ASCC, with support from National Guard and Army Reserve forces from Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and American Somoa.

3-29. USARPAC supports homeland defense and DSCA for Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and Japan, as well as FHA, FDR, and other operations in support of regional allies.

U.S. ARMY EUROPE AND AFRICA

3-30. USAREUR-AF is the operational-level Army force designated by the SECARMY as the ASCC assigned to both U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command. USAREUR-AF perpetuates the linage and honors of Seventh Army. The USAREUR-AF MCP provides AOR-wide Title 10 duties, ADCON Army support to other Services, and Army executive agent responsibilities in support of the GCC. The MCP also supports forward-deployed Army and unified action partner forces deployed to a JOA established within the AOR. Support includes theater opening, JRSOI, common-user logistics, and other executive agent responsibilities. The MCP also provides direct planning support and reachback capability to the CCP when the CCP deploys (as a forward CP) to conduct mission command within small-scale limited contingency operations or to participate in exercises and other theater security cooperation activities.

3-31. When directed by U.S. European Command or U.S. Africa Command and resourced by Headquarters, DA, USAREUR-AF may serve as theater joint force land component command, JTF, or joint force land component command to a JTF in a JOA. It shapes the U.S. European Command AOR in order to support operations, develop relationships, assure access, build partner capacity, and deter adversaries, while providing C2 capability that can set the theater and execute ULO in support of combatant commander requirements.

3-32. USAREUR-AF is responsible for the Georgia Defense Readiness Program-Training and Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine training missions. Additionally, USAREUR-AF participates in more than 50 multinational exercises each year with European partners. Participation in these exercises enhances professional relationships and improves overall interoperability with allies and partners. USAREUR-AF maintains a consistent program of senior leader engagements and regionally focused activities, built on multilateral relationships and supports a shared vision of 54 stable, secure African nations.

U.S. ARMY CENTRAL

3-33. U.S. Army, Central Command (USARCENT) is the operational-level Army force designated by the SECARMY as the ASCC assigned to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and perpetuates the lineage and honors of Third Army. The USARCENT MCP provides AOR-wide Title 10 fulfilment, ADCON of Army support to other Services, and Army executive agent responsibilities in support of the GCC. The MCP also supports forward-deployed Army and unified action partner forces deployed to a JOA established within the AOR. Support includes theater opening, JRSOI, common-user logistics, and other executive agent responsibilities. The MCP also provides direct planning support and reachback capability to the CCP if the CCP deploys to conduct mission command within small-scale limited contingency operations or to participate in exercises and other theater security cooperation activities.

3-34. USARCENT also supports unified action partner elements in the USCENTCOM AOR through ASOS, such as missile defense, logistics management, transportation, fuel distribution, communications, veterinary services, and EOD. Additional protection and sustainment responsibilities include contracting, medical support and evacuation, military postal service, and detainee operations.

3-35. With additional joint augmentation provided by an approved JMD, USARCENT provides a fully functional operational-level headquarters (or JFLCC or JTF) capable of effectively commanding and controlling joint and/or coalition forces engaged in sustained military operations. For example, USARCENT served in this capacity in 2003, during the invasion of Iraq, and from 2014 to 2015, during Operation INHERENT RESOLVE.

U.S. ARMY SOUTH

3-36. U.S. Army South (USARSOUTH) is the operational-level Army force designated by the SECARMY as the ASCC assigned to U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and perpetuates the lineage and honors of Sixth Army. The USARSOUTH MCP provides AOR-wide Title 10 fulfillment, ADCON Army support to other Services, and Army executive agent responsibilities in support of the GCC. The MCP also supports forward-deployed Army and unified action partner forces to a JOA established within the AOR. Support includes theater opening, JRSOI, common-user logistics, and other executive agent responsibilities. The MCP also provides direct planning support and reachback capability to the CCP when the CCP deploys (as a forward CP) to conduct mission command within small-scale limited contingency operations or to participate in exercises and other theater security cooperation activities.

3-37. When directed by USSOUTHCOM and resourced by Headquarters, DA, USARSOUTH may serve as theater joint force land component command, JTF, or a joint force land component command to a JTF in a JOA. It shapes the USSOUTHCOM AOR in order to support operations, develop relationships, assure access, build partner capacity, and deter adversaries while providing mission command capability that can set the theater and execute ULO in support of combatant commander requirements.

3-38. USARSOUTH has responsibility for providing Army support to long-term JTFs, such as JTF-GTMO in Cuba and JTF-BRAVO in Honduras.

3-39. In 1989, USARSOUTH Headquarters became the Headquarters for Joint Task Force-South, the headquarters designated to execute Operation JUST CAUSE, the U.S. military action used to depose Panamanian dictator General Manuel Antonio Noriega. The operation was officially conducted from 20 December 1989 to 31 January 1990. During the Panama Invasion, the total troop numbers increased to 27,000. Of these, 13,000 were already stationed in Panama and 14,000 were flown in from the United States.

3-40. USARSOUTH participates in army-to-army exercises, counterdrug operations, peacekeeping missions, FHA, FDR, senior leader engagements, and subject matter expert exchanges and training with partner nations.

U.S. ARMY NORTH

3-41. U.S. Army, North (USARNORTH) is the operational-level Army force designated by the SECARMY as the ASCC assigned to the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and perpetuates the lineage and honors of Fifth Army. The USARNORTH MCP provides AOR-wide Title 10 fulfillment, ADCON Army

support to other Services, and Army executive agent responsibilities in support of the GCC. The MCP also supports forward-deployed Army and unified action partner forces to a JOA established within the AOR. Support includes theater opening, JRSOI, common-user logistics, and other executive agent responsibilities. The MCP also provides direct planning support and reachback capability to the CCP when the CCP deploys (as a forward CP) to conduct C2 within small-scale limited contingency operations or to participate in exercises and other theater security cooperation activities.

3-42. When directed by USNORTHCOM and resourced by Headquarters, DA, USARNORTH may serve as theater joint force land component command, JTF, or a joint force land component command to a JTF in a JOA. USARNORTH shapes the USNORTHCOM AOR in order to support operations, develop relationships, assure access, build partner capacity, and deter adversaries, while providing C2 capability that can set the theater and execute ULO in support of combatant commander requirements.

3-43. As the Army component of USNORTHCOM, USARNORTH is prepared to assume OPCON of dedicated ground forces anywhere in the continental United States to deter, detect, and defeat threats against the United States and the American people. They are responsible to protect and defend DOD assets and capabilities to maintain the ability to actively project combat power around the globe.

3-44. USARNORTH provides CBRN-specific collective training and external evaluation support to technical support forces allocated to the DOD Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise. USARNORTH provides collective lanes training and external evaluation support to the 54 weapon of mass destruction-civil support teams located in CONUS, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. USARNORTH provides defense coordinating officers and defense coordinating elements to the USNORTHCOM combatant commander to conduct DSCA operations.

3-45. USARNORTH works with interagency and military partners to conduct homeland defense planning, coordinate homeland defense operations, establish force protection conditions, and provide ADCON of the Air and Missile Defense Task Force.

3-46. USARNORTH is prepared to provide DSCA for disaster or emergency response. They plan, exercise, and provide life-saving and life-sustaining capabilities in support of federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners during natural (hurricanes, wildfires, and naturally occurring epidemics and pandemics) or man-made (CBRN) disasters.

3-47. USARNORTH maintains liaison with federal partners to deliberately support national special security events and maintains the operational flexibility to support other federal partners such as the U.S. Customs and Border Protection with the Southwest border security mission.

3-48. USARNORTH conducts TSC activities with Mexico and Canada, including events like the regional commanders' conferences, subject matter expert training, and exercises to strengthen defense relationships.

3-49. Partnership with Mexico fosters increased military capacity and security along a shared border, aiding military-to-military training, FHA, and FDR efforts. USARNORTH works to increase military readiness and interoperability with Canada—ensuring the ability of U.S. and Canadian forces to deploy together worldwide.

TRANSREGIONAL ASCC

3-50. Currently the Army has four functional ASCCs, one for each functional command as shown in table 3-2 on page 3-8. Each of these functional ASCCs is specifically designed to perform a function within the specialty of the functional command they support.

Table 3-2. Transregional ASCCs

Transregional command	*ASCC*
U.S. Special Operations Command	U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)
U.S. Strategic Command	U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC)
U.S. Transportation Command	Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC)
U.S. Cyber Command	U.S. Army Cyber (ARCYBER)
U.S. Space Command	U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC)

U.S. Army Special Operations Command

3-51. USASOC is an operational-level Army command designated by the Secretary of the Army as the ASCC of the USSOCOM. When directed by the commander, USSOCOM, USASOC provides Army special operations forces to support combatant command campaign plans.

3-52. USASOC is comprised primarily of operational organizations and serves as the ASCC to support the commander, USSOCOM's requirements. USASOC has four subordinate commands: the 75th Ranger Regiment, the U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, and the 1st Special Forces Command. The 1st Special Forces Command has the responsibility to provide the core headquarters of a special operations JTF in support of major operations and campaigns. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, two Regular Army psychological operations groups, five Regular Army and two National Guard special forces groups, and the 528th Sustainment Brigade are subordinate to the 1st Special Forces Command. (See ADP 3-05 for more details on USASOC and the command and control relationships of ARSOF). USASOC oversees and evaluates training of National Guard special operations forces in CONUS and ensures that units are organized to accomplish special operations missions and support appropriate OPLANs.

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/U.S. Army Strategic Command

3-53. USASMDC/Army Forces Strategic Command (ARSTRAT) is an operational-level Army force headquarters designated by the SECARMY as the ASCC to U.S. Strategic Command and to U.S. Space Command.

3-54. USASMDC/ARSTRAT conducts space and missile defense operations and provides planning, coordination, integration, and control of Army forces and capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM missions. It serves as the Army force modernization proponent for space, high altitude, and global ballistic missile defense and as the Army operational integrator for global missile defense. It also conducts mission-related research and development in support of Army Title 10 responsibilities and supports, as directed by the commander, USSTRATCOM, and by commander, USSPACECOM all Army and unified action partner elements.

3-55. USASMDC/ARSTRAT provides direct support to the Joint Functional Component Command for Space for identification, characterization, geolocation, trend analysis, and reporting of SATCOM interference events. It provides direct support to USSPACECOM as the designated SATCOM systems expert and consolidated SATCOM systems expert and provides general support to the commander through the USASMDC/ARSTRAT Geospatial Intelligence branch and regional SATCOM support centers.

3-56. USASMDC/ARSTRAT develops policies, procedures, and metrics for the Army space cadre and executes the life cycle management functions of FA40 space operations officers. It provides the Army astronaut detachment to the Human Space Flight Program missions.

3-57. USASMDC/ARSTRAT serves as the global ballistic missile defense and space/high altitude force modernization proponent for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (known as DOTMLPF–P) requirements and is the Army's lead organization for

coordination with and support to the Missile Defense Agency. It supports operational and developmental testing and evaluation of theater/strategic ballistic missiles/interceptors utilizing the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test site. USASMDC/ARSTRAT conducts research and development for USSTRATCOM and other combatant commanders. It integrates technical and operational requirements with materiel developers for Army space, high altitude, and global ballistic missile defense.

3-58. USASMDC/ARSTRAT—

- Exercises functional and transregional coordination of AAMDCs or AAMDC elements in support of combatant commanders.
- Is an advocate for AMD funding and requirements.
- Provides input to Army AMD doctrine, policies, and procedures.
- Identifies AMD capabilities, capability gaps, and concepts.
- Coordinates future ground-based air defense requirements, issues, and programs with combatant commander and joint staff.
- Reviews AMD initial capabilities documents and joint capabilities documentation in support of future requirements.
- Is the Army's implementing agent for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

3-59. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is designated the lead component for USSPACECOM's friendly force tracking mission and provides friendly force tracking capabilities to combatant commands, the Services, government agencies, and as directed, allies and coalition partners. USASMDC/ARSTRAT provides direct support to the Army and USSOCOM missions to positively tag, track, and locate hostile forces on the battlefield.

Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command

3-60. SDDC is an operational-level Army force designated by the SECARMY as the ASCC of the USTRANSCOM and a major subordinate command of Air Mobility Command. SDDC is responsible for providing global deployment and distribution planning, operations, and systems capabilities, and for facilitating global traffic management support to all unified action partner elements.

3-61. SDDC is responsible for providing DOD deployment and distribution management services for freight, unit, and personal property movements worldwide.

3-62. SDDC provides coordination worldwide for origin to destination surface traffic management support; coordinates surface and multimodal transportation contracted functions for all DOD (and other U.S. government entities, as authorized, and designated multinational and interagency elements) freight and unit movements; and provides worldwide management services for DOD personal property.

3-63. SDDC plans and executes oversight of command acquisitions for transportation services to support combatant command requirements for enduring and contingency operations and infrastructure. In coordination with appropriate acquisition authorities, SDDC is the sole DOD negotiator worldwide with commercial service providers on rates and other matters incidental to transportation and storage services of the personal property of all DOD personnel.

3-64. SDDC manages and arranges for the operation of common user ocean terminals in CONUS, and operates or arranges for the operation of overseas ocean terminals under agreements with appropriate commanders and civil authorities. In coordination with the Military Sealift Command, the command books freight on commercial vessels in accordance with contractual agreements, and SDDC provides appropriate support to movements occurring on government ships. In coordination with combatant commanders, SDDC performs water terminal clearance authority functions.

3-65. SDDC is the proponent for transportation engineering support to all DOD components; directs the Highways for National Defense and the Railroads for National Defense Programs to coordinate DOD’s highway and rail needs with civil transportation programs; administers other modal programs for national defense; and assesses DOD intermodal facility needs to identify and maintain the defense essential transportation infrastructure.

3-66. As the Army's transportability agent, SDDC manages the Army portion of the DOD Engineering for Transportability Program to ensure the safe and efficient movement of equipment items and military units by existing or planned transportation assets. SDDC develops, operates, and maintains an integrated transportation information system to support the transportation mission and provides traffic management information and data for DOD components.

3-67. SDDC is DOD's global container manager and provides operational management of defense intermodal common-user containers, and oversees and operates a worldwide DOD surface container management system.

3-68. SDDC controls, manages, and maintains the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet. SDDC performs business intelligence functions to facilitate studies and analyses of transportation requirements, capabilities, organizations, operations, planning, effectiveness, and economies, and recommends improvements for DOD implementation.

3-69. SDDC participates in the planning cycle for overseas deployment, training exercises, and command post exercises directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommends corrective actions when military or commercial transportation assets or procedures cannot support mission accomplishment.

3-70. SDDC establishes standards for, facilitates, and validates training of Regular Army and USAR strategic mobility forces to ensure capable and ready forces to meet SDDC missions and OPLAN support. In coordination with DOD components, SDDC maintains joint Service publications governing installation shipping and receiving capabilities.

U.S. Army Cyber Command

3-71. ARCYBER is an operational-level Army force designated by the SECARMY as the ASCC to the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) for cyberspace operations. ARCYBER plans, coordinates, synchronizes, directs, and conducts integrated cyberspace operations, information operations, and electromagnetic warfare to ensure freedom of action in and through cyberspace and the information environment and to deny the same to our adversaries.

3-72. ARCYBER plans and executes cyberspace-related missions and functions assigned to USCYBERCOM. ARCYBER plans, executes, directs, and synchronizes assigned and authorized joint and Service DODIN-A operations and defensive cyberspace operations across the Army's portions of the DODIN-A and, when directed, on other DODIN-A and non-DODIN-A networks. It plans, executes, and synchronizes offensive cyberspace operations as assigned, authorized, and directed.

3-73. ARCYBER executes C2 of all joint and Service assigned, allocated, and delegated forces and, when directed, serves as a Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber, Joint Functional Component Command, JTF, or other similar joint headquarters.

3-74. ARCYBER organizes, trains, educates, mans, funds, administers, and sustains assigned Army forces as delegated or designated by the SECARMY, and tailors and deploys assigned forces, as required, authorized, and/or directed. It is the Army's primary headquarters responsible for supporting information operations forces and information operations and electronic warfare capabilities. As such, ARCYBER plans, executes, integrates, and synchronizes Regular Army and U.S. Army Reserve information operations units, capabilities, and employment supporting Army and, when authorized, other military forces.

3-75. ARCYBER plans and executes cyberspace operations-related security cooperation activities in support of USCYBERCOM and Army ASCCs. It serves as the Army's principal Cybersecurity Service Provider (formerly Computer Network Defense-Service Provider).

3-76. ARCYBER serves as the focal point for identifying, receiving, integrating, synchronizing, and advocating for operational capability requirements through Service-, joint-, and DOD-level processes in support of joint and Service cyberspace operations, information operations, and electronic warfare.

3-77. ARCYBER implements SECARMY, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Headquarters, DA, staff Title 10, Title 40, and Title 44 policy by executing cyberspace domain-related Service statutory responsibilities. Specifically, ARCYBER—

- Supports the SECARMY, chief information officer, and G–6 in the development of Title 40-related policies and standards associated with the architecture, design, and technology acquisition for the Army's portion of the DODIN-A and then implements those policies and standards through ARCYBER's execution of cyberspace operations.
- Supports the SECARMY, chief information officer, and G–6 in the development of Title 40, Title 44, and chief information officer-specific Title 10-related information management, information resources management, and cybersecurity (formerly information assurance) policies, as well as cybersecurity training and compliance standards, and then implements those policies and standards through ARCYBER's execution of cyberspace operations.

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Chapter 4

ADCON and Combatant Commander's Daily Operational Requirements

Chapter 4 discusses the two functions of the theater army in its role of ASCC. The chapter begins with a discussion of its function fulfilling Service requirements of Title 10 and ADCON of Army forces. The chapter continues and concludes with a discussion of the second function of the theater army, the CCDOR.

ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND ROLE OVERVIEW

4-1. The theater army is the ASCC to a GCC; this is a role it cannot divest. As an ASCC, the theater army performs certain functions that can be found in Title 10; DODD 5101.1; and the combatant commander's requirements. The seven functions performed as the ASCC are—

- Exercise C2 over Army forces in the theater (see Chapter 3).
- Provide ADCON of army forces (see Chapter 4).
- Execute CCDOR (see Chapter 4).
- Set and maintain the theater (see Chapter 5).
- Set and support operational areas (see Chapter 6).
- Plan and coordinate for consolidation of gains in support of joint operations (see Chapter 7).
- Perform joint roles in limited scope, scale, and duration (see Chapter 8).

Note. When directed by the GCC to perform operational C2 of Army or joint forces, the theater army retains its primary role as ASCC to the GCC, and remains responsible for all the Service and AOR support functions of that role.

PROVIDE TITLE 10 UNITED STATES CODE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ARMY FORCES

4-2. Providing Title 10 ADCON of Army forces is a service responsibility. The combatant commander exercises combatant command authority over all Army forces assigned or attached to the command. Per Title 10, DOD civilians and Army forces under combatant command authority of a GCC are attached to the theater army for the purpose of organizing, training, and equipping. The theater army retains administrative responsibility of these forces and therefore it is responsible for Title 10 functions until the functions are formally transferred or delegated.

4-3. Title 10 USC, Section 7013 (formerly 3013), DODD 5100.01, and AR 10-87 include twelve responsibilities, ten of which the theater army performs:

- Organizing.
- Supplying.
- Equipping.
- Training.
- Servicing.
- Mobilizing.
- Demobilizing.

- Administering (includes Uniform Code of Military Justice, all administrative or personnel requirements, morale, and welfare of personnel).
- Outfitting and repairing military equipment (see ATP 4-94).
- The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section.

4-4. The theater army commander is responsible to the SECARMY for execution of assigned responsibilities contained in Title 10 USC 7013b (formerly 3013b). One of these responsibilities is the exercise of ADCON authority and responsibility, on behalf of the SECARMY and, in this regard, the theater army is primarily responsible for the administration and support of Army forces assigned or attached to the GCC. By performing these Service responsibilities for the GCC, the theater army ensures that Army forces deployed within an AOR are adequately trained, equipped, and sustained. The theater army conducts the RSOI of Army expeditionary forces into the AOR for crisis response or other military operations.

4-5. These administrative responsibilities begin with the Service Secretary, and trace through the Service Chief (chief of staff for Army) to the senior Service area commander (usually the ASCC or the ARFOR to a JFC in an established JOA). ADCON extends from the senior Service area commander, through successive subordinate commands, down each individual member of that Service. The myriad responsibilities and tasks included under ADCON are defined by Army regulations rather than doctrine because the ARs assign execution and oversight authorities and are legally binding. The authorities for execution of those tasks reside with the senior area commanders of each Service.

EXERCISE COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER ARMY FORCES IN THEATER

4-6. The theater army is the ASCC and has the responsibility to control attached and assigned Army forces within the AOR through ADCON and OPCON or TACON. As the Army component of a combatant command, the theater army is the ARFOR for the theater, and once delegated to a subordinate Army formation, the Army component of the subordinate joint force is an ARFOR for the JOA. Army doctrine distinguishes between the Army component of a combatant command and that of a joint force formed by the combatant commander. The ARFOR is senior army headquarters in a joint force, by definition.

4-7. The theater army initially maintains control of all Army units assigned to an AOR until control is passed to the senior army force or ARFOR in a subordinate JOA. As part of the controlling of Army forces, the ARFOR maintains ADCON of Army forces and addresses service responsibilities, such as coordinating ASOS. See paragraphs 4-11to 4-12, as well as ADP 4-0 and FM 4-0 for more information on ASOS.

COMBATANT COMMANDER'S DAILY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

4-8. In addition to the statutory responsibilities of Title 10, the ASCC (like the other Service components) may be directly tasked by the combatant commander to perform a myriad of responsibilities based on the specific requirements of the AOR. The role of the theater army is that of the ASCC assigned to a GCC. The ASCC's responsibility is to establish and maintain relationships with FORSCOM and appropriate ASCCs, direct reporting units (known as DRUs), or commands, for mobilization and deployment requirements, as well as for training of forces projected to support requirements from its GCC. The ASCC role is defined mainly under Title 10, stated broadly in the form of requirements placed upon each of the Services, and executed by and through each Service's respective component commands. Most of the Service responsibilities are administrative in nature rather than operational (employing Service forces in military operations). These administrative responsibilities can be summarized as follows: raise (recruit), train, equip, sustain, reconstitute, and discipline.

4-9. The combatant commander assigns tasks based on the unique capabilities of each Service component, and the forces available for use in the AOR. The discussion in this chapter covers typical examples of the tasks theater army might be assigned under the function of CCDOR. There are five primary tasks that the ASCC executes for the combatant commander across the competition continuum and all phases of operations:

- ASOS.
- Provide Army forces to support theater security cooperation.
- Assess and develop infrastructure.
- Develop CONPLANs and OPLANs for operations on land.
- Maintain threat orders of battle and provide indications and warnings of changes in an OE.

4-10. As mandated by the Secretary of Defense, the Army provides ASOS and fulfills certain executive agent responsibilities in support of the combatant commander or JFC and the other Services in the theater. The theater army fulfills additional tasks of ASOS responsibilities through theater army enabling commands. These tasks include, but are not limited to:

- Conduct regional information collection and analysis.
- Provide land-based AMD forces and capabilities to the area air defense commander to support theater ballistic missile defense across the AOR.
- Develop plans and recommend policy for detainee operations and dislocated civilian operations. See the specific doctrine publications for discussions of these tasks.

PROVIDE ARMY SUPPORT TO OTHER SERVICES

4-11. The Army provides certain support to other Services, known as ASOS, during competition, crisis, and conflict, as well as across all phases of contingencies and operations, through several types of authorities. ASOS is a combination of directed executive agent and lead Service designations, inter-Service agreements, and Service support agreements. When designated by the GCC, the Army may also provide common-user logistics (known as CUL), which is also part of ASOS. Army executive agent responsibilities are described in detail by DOD Directive 5100.01 and the DOD Executive Agent Program. See the references for the link to the DOD Executive Agent Program homepage.

4-12. The support requirements the theater army performs as part of ASOS, including during FHA, FDR, and DSCA, as applicable, can include the following:

- Land-based AMD.
- Fire support.
- Base defense.
- Transportation.
- Fuel distribution.
- General engineering.
- Intra-theater medical evacuation.
- Logistics management.
- Communications.
- CBRN defense.
- EOD.

Common-User Logistics

4-13. *Common-user logistics* are materiel or service support shared with or provided by two or more Services, DOD agencies, or multinational partners to another Service, DOD agency, non-DOD agency, and/or multinational partner in an operation (JP 4-09). Title 10 authorizes a GCC to designate a Service (usually the dominant user or most capable Service) to provide common-user logistics for the entire theater, areas within a theater, or specific operations. The GCC frequently tasks the Army component of a joint force to provide sustainment support to other Service components. Sometimes the GCC tasks the Army component to provide specific support to multinational commands or other agencies. See JP 3-16, FM 3-16, AR 34-1, NATO STANAG 2281, and the *Coalition Operations Handbook* for more information.

4-14. The GCC may task the Army component of a joint force with the following responsibilities:

- Wartime Classes I, II, III (B), IV, and IX in-theater receipt, storage, and issue.
- Medical evacuation on the battlefield.

- Transportation engineering in support of road movement.
- Financial management, banking operations, cash management, and currency support.
- Chemical ammunition support, such as transporting captured chemical munitions.
- Airdrop equipment and systems.
- Billeting, medical, and food service support for transient personnel during other than unit moves.

4-15. When the GCC tasks an Army component (the ARFOR) of a joint force with a responsibility, the responsibility involves funding and distribution. For example, the Army provides management of overland petroleum support to U.S. land-based forces of all DOD components. To ensure wartime support, the Army funds and maintains tactical storage and distribution systems to supplement existing fixed facilities. The Army oversees inland distribution during wartime to include providing the necessary force structure to construct, operate, and maintain an inland petroleum distribution system. In an undeveloped theater, this responsibility also includes providing a system that transports bulk petroleum inland from the high-water mark of the designated loading beach or sea port of debarkation.

Directive Authorities

4-16. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the theater army functions as the U.S. military single point of contact and exercises directive authority over all elements of the command in relationships with other combatant commands, DOD elements, U.S. diplomatic missions, other U.S. government departments and agencies, and organizations of other countries in the AOR. Just as with directive authority for logistics (known as DAFL), other directive authorities may expand existing ASOS responsibilities beyond Army support by virtue of the GCC designating the Army component for the broad function. Examples of other possible directive authorities include, but are not limited to, base defense, communication, or CBRN response.

4-17. Directive authority for logistics is an additional authority that combatant commanders use to eliminate duplicated or overlapped sustainment responsibilities. The theater army coordinates with the combatant command staff to determine joint sustainment requirements, identify responsibilities, and provide control of sustainment. The combatant commander uses this directive authority to assign lead Service responsibilities and to make other special arrangements such as assigning common-user support or common-user logistics to a Service or agency. This authority includes peacetime measures to ensure the effective execution of approved OPLANs, effective and economic operations, prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities, and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands. See JP 1 for a discussion on directive authority for logistics.

4-18. Directive authority for logistics, like other combatant command authorities, cannot be delegated or transferred. However, the combatant commander may assign the responsibility for planning, executing, or managing as many common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC or Service component commander as required to accomplish a subordinate JFC's or Service component commander's mission. For some commodities or support services common to two or more Services, the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense may designate one provider as the executive agent.

4-19. The combatant commander formally delineates assigned responsibilities by function and scope to the subordinate JFC or Service component commander. When exercising this option, the combatant commander specifies the control and tasking authorities bestowed on the subordinate joint command for logistics, as well as the command relationships it will have with the Service components.

Conduct Theater Security Cooperation

4-20. The second task of the theater army's CCDOR is conducting theater security cooperation. In the theater of operations, theater security cooperation involves GCCs working to shape regions by cooperating with partner nations. The equipment, training, and financial assistance the U.S. provides to partner nations improve their abilities to secure themselves. This assistance often improves access to key regions.

4-21. *Security cooperation* is all DOD interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime

and contingency access to allied and partner nations (JP 3-20). Security cooperation activities shape the security environment. These activities may include security assistance teams overseas; security force assistance efforts that build partner capacity; security sector reform; civil affairs support for stabilization, reconstruction, and development; foreign internal defense; counterterrorism and support to counterterrorism; and supporting efforts to CWMD. Army forces perform all these activities under ADCON of the theater army.

4-22. Security cooperation communicates U.S. intent and capabilities to potential adversaries in that region. When directed, combat-ready Army units deploy to threatened areas to conduct exercises, communicating unmistakable American intent to partners and adversaries. These are tangible examples of the Army's role during competition. Other examples are less tangible. These other effects develop through face-to-face training involving American Soldiers and the soldiers of partner nations. Working together facilitates interoperability and trust between military partners. The impression American Soldiers make upon multinational forces, local leaders, and other government agencies can produce lasting benefits in the human dimension of an OE. (See FM 3-0, FM 3-22, JP 3-22, and ATP 3-05.2 for more information on shaping, security cooperation, and foreign internal defense.)

4-23. The theater army helps to shape the security environment through security cooperation activities that enable GCCs to assure friendly actors, establish trust, foster mutual understanding, and help partners build the capacity to defend themselves and prevent conflict. The GCC produces a combatant commander's campaign plan, which contains theater security cooperation plans. The Army develops a supporting theater security cooperation plan that enables the GCC theater security cooperation actions and fulfills its objectives.

4-24. *Security assistance* is a group of programs authorized by statute by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, or defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to further national policies and objectives (JP 3-20). These policies and objectives may include rotational deployments for exercises and training, participation at Army institutional training, and senior professional military education. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation, authorized by the Department of State, and administered by the DOD. See JP 3-20 for a detailed discussion of security assistance.

4-25. *Foreign internal defense* is participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). See JP 3-22 and ATP 3-05.2 for more on foreign internal defense.

4-26. *Security force assistance* is the DOD activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20). Theater armies can employ any type of Army formation for SFA, in addition to elements from security force assistance brigades.

4-27. *Security sector reform* is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice (JP 3-07). This program entails a whole-of-government approach.

4-28. Theater army support to security cooperation is derived from DOD policy guidance. Such support to security cooperation helps the GCC shape the security environment to achieve mid- to long-term objectives with partners by performing these tasks:

- Building defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.
- Developing allied and friendly military capabilities for multinational operations.
- Developing capabilities enabling the host nation to provide its own self-defense.
- Providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations to prevent and deter conflict.

See FM 3-22, JP 3-20, JP 3-22, JP 3-16, FM 3-16, AR 34-1, NATO STANAG 2281, and the *Coalition Operations Handbook* for more information on security cooperation, interoperability, multinational operations, and associated tasks.

ASSESS AND DEVELOP INFRASTRUCTURE

4-29. The third task of the theater army's CCDOR is assessing and developing infrastructure. Infrastructure is essential to ensuring effective operations in theater and executing many of the CCDOR. The theater army and its supporting commands assess the adequacy of infrastructure in the AOR to support anticipated military operations, both under ongoing U.S. use, such as permanent bases in Korea, Japan, or Germany, or use as needed, such as port facilities. The theater army and its supporting commands also determine requirements for additional infrastructure and manage infrastructure development programs assigned to Army forces for execution. The theater army develops these plans in close collaboration with its assigned theater sustainment command, the GCC J-4, and the TEC. Infrastructure development activities may include identifying requirements for forward basing and air, land, and sea transit rights through the sovereign territories of partner or neutral nations within the AOR. Identifying such requirements enables the appropriate U.S. government agency to engage the relevant partner or neutral nations.

4-30. The theater army's assigned TEC assists with identification of requirements for basing and transit rights needed to support landpower. Infrastructure assessment and development aims to assess the adequacy of infrastructure in the AOR to support anticipated military operations, determine requirements for additional infrastructure, and manage infrastructure development programs within theater.

4-31. The USACE may provide technical and contract engineer support, integrating its organic capabilities with those of other Services and other sources of engineer-related reachback support. USACE may have assets directly integrated into the military C2 structure and linked to a TEC or senior engineer headquarters or may already be operating under contract in the theater. As part of the USACE field force engineering capabilities, a forward engineer support team is a deployable team that provides infrastructure assessment; engineer planning and design; and environmental, geospatial, and other technical engineering support (from theater army to brigade echelon) and augments the staff at those echelons. The forward engineer support team operates as augmentation either to the supported force engineer staff or to the supporting engineer headquarters.

DEVELOP CONCEPT PLANS AND OPERATION PLANS

4-32. The fourth task of the theater army's CCDOR is developing CONPLANs and OPLANs. A CONPLAN usually is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or operation order.

4-33. CONPLAN and OPLAN development focuses on both deliberate and contingency planning in support of the GCC's long-range campaign plan for the AOR. The GCC's long-range campaign plan for the AOR includes a theater engagement plan, security cooperation activities, and supporting plans from each Service component. The theater army works closely with the combatant command J-5s in this parallel planning effort.

4-34. The theater army develops an Army support plan to the combatant commander's campaign plan. This support plan includes methods to achieve security cooperation, training and exercise programs, and ongoing Army activities within the theater including intelligence, AMD, sustainment, and communications. The theater army also develops specific plans directed by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan supporting plans for contingencies identified by the GCC. These include OPLANs for LSCO, noncombatant evacuation operations, FHA and FDR, and other crises response activities. Theater army planners routinely develop, review, and update supporting plans to numbered OPLANs to ensure they remain feasible. Concept and operational planning is a significant requirement and regularly involves a major part of a theater army staff's time and resources. This includes a review of Army force structure as well as time-phased force and deployment data. These reviews include adjustments to plans based on changes to Army force structure and posture as well as changes to OEs.

4-35. The theater army commander serves as principal advisor to the combatant commander on planning and employing Army forces in the land domain. The theater army also assists both the DA and the combatant commander in shaping the input to major strategic documents for the DOD and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These documents include the UCP, *Defense Planning Guidance* (S), *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, and joint and Army doctrine.

Origin of Planning Guidance

4-36. The UCP, approved by the President, sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders. This plan establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general AOR for GCCs; and specifies global responsibilities for transregional combatant commanders. The theater army does not plan campaigns but plans subordinate and supporting operations to the campaign plan.

4-37. From the UCP and the *2017 National Security Strategy of the United States*, the Secretary of Defense provides the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Planning Guidance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provide the *National Military Strategy* and the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*. These in turn facilitate each GCC providing their respective combatant command campaign plan. These documents provide guidance that allow the theater army with guidance regarding security cooperation and other information and directive planning guidance from the DOD.

4-38. Further guidance for theater army planning and contributions to campaign plans comes from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. This plan provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. From this plan, GCCs—and therefore supporting theater armies—receive directive guidance for joint plan development. The result of the UCP, Defense Planning Guidance, and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is the creation of the combatant commander's campaign plan as well as CONPLANs and OPLANs.

Combatant Commander's Campaign Plan

4-39. The combatant commander's campaign plan is the GCC's vehicle for transitioning the theater strategy into operational objectives. The combatant commander's campaign plan provides a framework within which GCCs work with the whole of government and conduct security cooperation activities and military engagements with regional partners through cooperative security and development, infrastructure development, conflict deterrence, and isolating adversaries.

4-40. The combatant commander's campaign plan includes supporting plans from each Service and theater security cooperation activities. Theater security cooperation activities provide guidance to coordinate cooperation and competition actions with components of contingency planning. The theater army sets the theater for successful military operations throughout the competition continuum (cooperation, competition, and conflict) through security cooperation activities and other actions in the combatant commander's campaign plan and campaign support plan. Actions to deter conflict are built into the combatant commander's campaign plan and the campaign support plan postures the Army to support deterrence.

4-41. Theater army staffs play a critical role in the theater campaign planning process. Effective planning activities include theater army staffs participating in operational planning teams and planning conferences. Combatant commanders use a planning order or tasking order to task theater army staffs to develop supporting plans, to participate in combatant command plan development, and to implement plans. Theater army staff participation in combatant commander's campaign plan development and implementation includes conveying Army functional equities to the combatant command and conveying combatant command equities to the Army. Theater army staff participation also includes assisting with concept design (especially tasks and activities supporting theater-level intermediate military objectives), determining the resources required to execute identified steady-state activities, and developing a synchronization plan for these activities.

4-42. While the bulk of combatant commander's campaign plans address security cooperation during cooperation and competition, they have activities across the competition continuum that address force posture, ongoing combat operations where applicable, and the combatant command's contingency planning. These combatant commander's campaign plans set and support the theater of operations in which the theater army plays a significant role. The actions and objectives in each phase of planning affects others. Commanders carefully balance actions and objectives during cooperation and competition with actions and objectives in conflict planning. Combatant commander's campaign plans that do not integrate all these phases of planning—instead treating them as distinct and unconnected phases of planning—risk that one phase undermines another phase. Such an eventuality could have adverse consequences at both the operational and strategic levels of war that cannot be mitigated with tactical success alone.

4-43. This strategy-centric planning drives a proactive cooperative security approach to prevent conflicts from emerging. Such planning adapts using contingency plans to react to deviations from the plan. A theater campaign plan implements the combatant commander's theater strategy. The Army—through the theater army, major commands, and direct reporting units—plays an integral role in resourcing and sustaining security cooperation activities. The combatant commander's campaign plan identifies force and resource requirements for steady-state activities as well as likely deviations.

4-44. Combatant commander's campaign plans are intended to accomplish the following:

- Integrate shaping activities (during cooperation and competition) directly in support of particular contingency plans with broad shaping and security cooperation activities.
- Ensure combatant commander's strategic communications fully integrate and convey clear messages to partners, friends, and adversaries.
- Connect posture changes to the DOD global campaign plans and provide a vehicle for continuously reassessing posture needs, refining those needs, and updating the DOD and regional posture plans accordingly.
- Enable the DOD to synchronize all GCC theater strategies with current priorities to allocate resources addressed through branch plans (contingency plans).

MAINTAIN THREAT ORDERS OF BATTLE AND PROVIDE INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS OF CHANGES IN AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

4-45. Theater army intelligence operations are continuously conducted to provide information and intelligence used to support land forces. Results from these operations are used to inform plans, policies, and strategic guidance. For the Army's corps and divisions, theater army intelligence operations provide information used in intelligence preparation of the battlefield, intelligence preparation of the battlespace, targeting, situation development, and protection, as well as indications and warnings about adversary activities.

4-46. Identifying threat capabilities, capacities, strengths, weaknesses, and intent accurately is critical to providing commanders the timely indications and warnings necessary to ensure operational success. During competition, the most important role of intelligence is the preparatory work of maintaining an accurate order of battle for adversaries and providing early and accurate warnings of changes to an OE and threats to enable commanders and senior government officials to make timely and informed decisions. During armed conflict, preparatory work of maintaining an accurate order of battle for adversaries will greatly enable joint and land forces to defeat the major threat target systems, such as integrated air defense or fires systems or other capabilities that adversaries use to deny access to areas. The theater army targeting enterprise, which includes intelligence, fires, and other capabilities, conducts continuous target development on identified existing and emerging threats in all operational contexts within the theater. The theater army must therefore be completely integrated into the joint targeting process during competition, crisis, and conflict. The theater army focuses information collection operations to provide early warning of adversary activity, recognize threats, and identify the need to make timely decisions.

4-47. In addition, the theater army focuses national to tactical intelligence on identifying strengths and vulnerabilities of threat capabilities, their area denial strategy or systems, their information warfare and subversion activities, and their ability to achieve parity or superiority across the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains.

4-48. The theater army continuously updates regionally focused intelligence estimates, to include order of battle of adversaries and anticipated threats, for partners and allies in support of contingency planning and theater engagement. This assists in providing refinement and feedback to the theater campaign plan, as applicable, and guiding the actions and messages of theater army forces in pursuit of campaign objectives. Theater armies are well served to maintain awareness of key figures in countries of interest, to include political leaders, and cabinet- and ministerial-level officials. Understanding these figures can, in and of itself, provide an indicator of a shift in the strategic posture or intent of the country in question.

Chapter 5
Set and Maintain the Theater

Chapter 5 discusses setting the theater of operations. First, the chapter sets the context and describes how the theater army, in its primary role as the ASCC, assists the GCC. It then covers applicable planning and preparation considerations by warfighting function. In closing, the chapter links theater security cooperation with setting the theater

SETTING THE THEATER

5-1. The phrase set the theater or setting the theater is used to capture the broad range of functions and tasks conducted to shape the operational area and establish the conditions across an AOR that enable the execution of the strategic plans as established by the combatant command campaign plan. The purpose of setting the theater is to shape conditions to gain access required to facilitate future military operations, sustain Army and joint forces within an AOR, and facilitate the successful execution of the combatant command campaign plan and other strategic plans.

5-2. Setting the theater is a continuous shaping activity conducted throughout competition and conflict, as well as for contingency or crisis response operations. The shaping operations that support setting the theater are characteristically similar in any level of competition or conflict. They continue across an AOR even when armed conflict erupts and a separate JOA or theater of operations is established. These shaping operations include JIIM coordination, military engagement and security cooperation, and other shaping or preventative activities.

5-3. Setting the theater involves significant sustainment, AMD, engineering, information collection, communications, and influence activities focused on setting conditions to counter known or anticipated threats to U.S. strategic interests across the AOR. It begins with the identification and analysis of host and partner nation resources, to include electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) coordination (see AR 5-12 and JP 3-85), and capabilities required to support campaign and contingency plans. Planners leverage whole-of-government initiatives such as bilateral or multilateral diplomatic agreement to allow U.S. forces to have access to ports, terminals, airfields, and bases within the AOR. Diplomatic agreements are necessary to ensure access and supportability to future military operations in support of the combatant command campaign plan or the associated operations and contingency plans.

5-4. As part of joint interdependence, the Army plays a crucial role in setting the theater, especially in terms of posturing forces and capabilities and establishing and maintaining footprints and agreements. The Army, via the theater army, is the Service with the capacity to provide the GCC with the most capabilities for setting the theater. Many of the tasks involved in setting the theater are associated with the Army's statutory requirements as well as its unique sustainment capabilities, enabling its ability to provide common-user logistics and ASOS as directed by the GCC. See JP 3-0 for more on setting conditions for theater operations. See JP 4-0 and FM 3-0 for more on theater army responsibilities for setting the theater.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

5-5. Although setting the theater is considered sustainment-oriented, it involves all warfighting functions and is a continuous, enduring task. In order to execute timely and sustainable operations across the range of military operations in support of the GCC's objectives, theater army commanders must continuously integrate all the warfighting functions. Theater army planners routinely update assessments and work toward establishing or setting conditions for swift implementation of critical capabilities if required.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

5-6. While setting the theater, the theater army helps determine the appropriate mix of Army headquarters and capabilities necessary to fulfill the GCC's objectives and requirements. Army headquarters provide the C2 structure necessary to plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations with the joint force and partner nations. The headquarters develop relationships with host-nation governments and security forces that enables the GCC to continuously set the theater and shape OEs. As part of setting the theater, C2 is focused on the following four things—

- Identifying and providing a headquarters capable of meeting the various joint and multinational C2 requirements of the specified CONPLANs or OPLANs.
- Assisting in tailoring Army forces, to include the forward-stationing and rotational deployment of Army forces, to meet the capabilities required of the specified CONPLANs or OPLANs.
- Establishing a theater communications architecture capable of meeting joint force requirements.
- Establishing links to JIIM organizations that support theater operations.

5-7. The theater army identifies the landpower requirements necessary to support a GCC's operation plans, to include contingency and security cooperation activities. The theater army also recommends the optimum deployment sequence for Army forces to the GCC. The process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment is called force tailoring. The theater army is not the approval authority for the identified force package, but it plays a critical role in the force tailoring process. Whenever possible, the DA identifies regionally aligned forces that concentrate on missions and capabilities required for a particular area of responsibility. Regionally aligned forces begin planning for their potential missions in conjunction with theater army staff. The result of this planning and coordination is a tailored force package ready to support a contingency or planned deployment, such as a rotation of forward-based forces. The theater army is also responsible for recommending command and support relationships.

5-8. The theater army contributes significantly to joint C2 by executing the critical tasks of establishing, maintaining, and defending the communications architecture to support Army and joint forces operating in an AOR. The theater army executes its communications responsibilities primarily through a signal command (theater) assigned to support the area of responsibility. The theater army G-6 must continually update the signal operations assessments in order to refine the theater communications support plan outlining the establishment, maintenance, and defense of the communications and network architecture.

5-9. Signal activities that support setting the theater include—

- Key leader engagements.
- Bilateral and multinational exercises to improve multinational communications interoperability.
- Negotiations to develop bilateral and multinational sharing agreements.
- The use of grants and contracts to improve interoperability and the communications capabilities of partner nations.
- Designing interoperability into acquisition programs.
- Agreements for shared use of the EMS.
- Mapping of adversary capabilities in the EMS.
- Developing guidance and programs for sharing cybersecurity information.

5-10. Inherent to setting a theater is the establishment of several partnerships. The theater army works to establish links to JIIM organizations that support theater operations. Establishing and maintaining these links are important to setting the conditions in an AOR for the execution of strategic plans. These links and partnerships can provide the United States with critically needed access to existing infrastructure and forward base locations that enable theater entry or close gaps in required capabilities or lines of communication. These links include:

- Receiving JIIM direction regarding ground activities.
- Advising the GCC on Army capabilities.
- Establishing liaisons with JIIM organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private organizations focused on or in theater.
- Augmenting JIIM staffs as required.

- Linking with specific JIIM, nongovernmental organizations, and private organization and systems.
- Coordinating intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination with other theater-focused agencies.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

5-11. Ongoing planning for setting the theater within the movement and maneuver warfighting function is centered on mobilization, deployment, employment, and redeployment of forces. All of these elements are encompassed in force projection. Being able to quickly project a force into an operational area is essential to effective operations to prevent conflict. Significant planning and coordination is required to enable force projection to include, but not limited to, use of and operational access to international waters, international airspace, the space domain, the cyberspace domain, and the EMS. Operational access enables freedom of maneuver and underpins force projection. Combined training and exercises assist in establishing theater gateways and access agreements for activities like cross border movements and status of forces agreements and help set conditions for future contingencies, aiding in the planning process; these also serve as a way to reinforce commitment to our partners and allies as well as communicate security commitments to adversaries.

5-12. How the GCC intends to employ forces is the foundation of force tailoring, deployment structure, and timing. Detailed force planning establishes what, where, and when forces are needed for successful outcomes. Force planning ensures only personnel, equipment, and materiel required to accomplish the commander's concept of operations deploy. Force requirements are documented in a notional TPFDD and sequenced during plan development to support the concept of operations. The notional TPFDD depicts force requirements and force flow for assessment purposes and is used to analyze sourcing and transportation feasibility. If developed, the force list will be entered into the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (known as JOPES) as the basis for this analysis. For additional information on the TPFDD development, see CJCS Guide 3122 and CJCSM 3122.02F.

5-13. When conducting deployment planning and TPFDD development, the following operational requirements should be considered and will require synchronization and discussion across multiple warfighting functions to include movement and maneuver, intelligence, and sustainment:

- **Existing distribution plans**. Planners should review USTRANSCOM campaign plans and any applicable theater distribution campaign plans at the onset of deployment planning. USTRANSCOM guidance provides a baseline assessment of the global distribution network capabilities against current and emerging requirements.
- **Threat environment**. An OE and threats to the mission and the force, whether permissive, uncertain, or hostile may affect the order force flow. Planning the proper balance between deploying the force rapidly with the right mix of combat power and materiel is crucial. Planners identify threats and hazards, assessing the threats and hazards to determine risks, develop preventive measures, and integrate protection capabilities into a comprehensive scheme of protection that includes mitigating measures. Initial protection planning requires various assessments to establish protection priorities. Assessments include threats, hazards, vulnerability, and criticality. These assessments are used to determine which assets can be protected given no constraints and which assets can be protected with available resources. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide all assets the same level of protection.
- **Training**. As an element of force planning, the GCC may identify specific pre-deployment training necessary to meet mission requirements. Deployment planning should consider the required time and resources necessary to conduct and validate mission-specific training. The theater army is responsible for the training and readiness of all assigned and attached Army forces in the area of responsibility. The exception is those Army forces transiting the area of responsibility. The theater army commander identifies the pre-deployment training required for a specific mission. The theater army—working with the GCC staff and Department of State—establishes and supports theater training facilities to support forward-stationed units. As Army units deploy to the theater, the training requirements expand rapidly.
- **Infrastructure assessment**. The physical network or transportation infrastructure strongly influences deployment operations. A robust network of modern air and seaports, highways, railroads, petroleum distribution, and inland waterways greatly expedites the throughput of forces,

equipment, and supplies. A lesser-developed, austere, or damaged infrastructure impedes deployment operations; affects port of debarkation or port of embarkation alternatives; and may require an early deployment of support capabilities or engineer units. A thorough assessment of the physical network will lead to better understanding of an OE and more effective planning for what is required for resource and support.

INTELLIGENCE

5-14. The intelligence warfighting function is focused on collecting, producing, and disseminating intelligence during setting the theater. The theater army utilizes all of the intelligence collection capabilities to include signal, geospatial, counterintelligence, human, open source, measurements and signature intelligence, atmospheric, and technical intelligence to support situational understanding of an OE. Intelligence tasks directly related to setting the theater include, but are not limited to:

- Developing regional threat databases and signatures.
- Developing and enhancing intelligence products to support deterrence activities.
- Developing and refining intelligence portions of contingency plans and estimates including threat characteristics, tactics, techniques, procedures, capabilities, orders of battle, and new systems.
- Providing unit access to intelligence repositories.
- Providing warning intelligence.
- Supporting operational preparation of the environment.
- Conducting information collection.

FIRES

5-15. The fires warfighting function is focused on planning and employing, lethal and non-lethal Army and joint fires during setting the theater. The theater army integrates information collection and influence assets into theater-level targeting through the joint targeting process. Commanders and their fire support staff develop deliberate targets for current and future operations. These actions set conditions for future successful combined arms operations during OPLAN execution. In any operational context, the fires warfighting function will engage adversaries in all domains to retain the initiative and set conditions favorable to the joint force.

5-16. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate and synchronize information advantage activities across the range of military operations to focus combat power and gain relative advantage in an OE. In all situations, Army forces conduct information advantage activities in support of a larger JIIM effort based on the combatant commander's campaign plan. As such, to meet the commander's objectives, operations focused on cognitive effects or influence must be fully integrated and coordinated with all other joint force actions and the strategic-political level to achieve a coherent and synchronized approach. Information operations staff and planners contribute to the commander’s understanding by providing an analysis of the information environment, matching the desired information operations effect to the GCC’s objectives, and providing advice for allocating the resources necessary to execute the tasks that achieve the desired effects.

5-17. Military units are organized, trained, and equipped to employ lethal force. Units equipped solely with traditional military weapons have two options to impose their will: threatening deadly force or applying deadly force. The limited options represent a potential vulnerability adversaries may exploit. Integrating non-lethal weapons gives commanders additional options for mitigating this vulnerability while maintaining appropriate force protection and minimizing noncombatant fatalities. Non-lethal weapons may be used with lethal weapon systems to enhance effectiveness and efficiency in military operations. Non-lethal weapons enable target engagement in situations where lethal force may be counterproductive to established objectives and strategic goals. See ATP 3-22.40 for more information.

SUSTAINMENT

5-18. From the sustainment warfighting perspective, setting the theater includes both actively providing sustainment as well as planning and actions in support of sustainment preparation of an OE.

5-19. On a daily basis, the theater army, through the theater sustainment command, provides logistics, financial management, and personnel services to Army forces operating within the area of responsibility; military engagements, and security cooperation as well as other activities in support of Title 10 USC, Section 7013b requirements, contingency operations, and crisis response operations.

5-20. Sustainment support to setting the theater involves theater opening; receiving initial forces, equipment, and supplies and assembling them into mission-tailored units; and transporting them to their final destination. It also includes establishing a distribution network, identifying local procurement requirements, employing the theater gateway personnel accountability team, and setting the conditions for medical operations. More detailed information on providing sustainment support as listed above can be found in Chapter 6 of this publication, ADP 4-0, FM 4-0, and ATP 4-94.

5-21. To facilitate assessment and planning for sustainment, the combatant command J-4 in concert with unified action partners develop a theater logistics analysis (see JP 4-0). In the theater logistics analysis, sustainment planners leverage all interactions with host-nation sustainment professional counterparts during multinational sustainment planning and execution exercises. This written analysis captures and distributes insights into the host nation's capabilities, processes, and policies as well as detailed after action reports.

5-22. Planners prepare for sustainment support to the theater—as part of setting the theater—by identifying potential risks in terms of access, capabilities, and capacities in theater so planners can develop alternatives and mitigating measures. Representative questions planners try to answer include:

- Are any agreements with host nation or multinational partners in place?
- Does the host nation have supply resources available to support U.S. forces?
- Are health threats present in an OE and have mitigation strategies been identified?
- What host-nation facilities are available (airports, sea ports, military facilities, hospitals, barracks, water systems, electrical networks, warehouses, and other storage facilities)?
- Has geospatial information gathering, site reconnaissance, and surveys of ports been conducted?
- What are the contracting options?
- What resources have other U.S. government departments and agencies or unified action partners identified?
- What skills does the local labor force have?
- What host-nation communications capabilities are available?
- What is the entry environment—permissive or nonpermissive?
- Are host-nation banking infrastructure and e-commerce capabilities available?
- Are considerations in place on host-nation postal limitations and restrictions?

5-23. As part of setting the theater, planners must identify and assess critical infrastructure and installation needs and compare the results to current and programmed military construction requirements and authorities. The theater logistics analysis provides a rough detailed country-by-country analysis of key infrastructure. It discusses infrastructure by—

- Location or installation—main operating base, forward operating site, or cooperative security location.
- Footprint projections—locations anticipated for force employment.
- Host-nation agreements that provide logistic support to the theater of operations from peace through contingency operations.

5-24. Identifying infrastructure and capacity to receive personnel, commodities, equipment, and other resources is imperative. Assessing availability of warehouses, cold-storage facilities, production and manufacturing plants, reservoirs, administrative facilities, hospitals, sanitation capabilities, hotels, barracks, military bases, airfields, and rail systems can greatly reduce the requirement for the deployment of U.S. assets. See Chapter 4 for more information on assessing and developing infrastructure.

5-25. Using the theater logistics analysis and in support of setting the theater, the theater army assists in developing the theater logistics overview segment of the combatant commander's campaign plan, which outlines the logistics architecture across the AOR. The theater logistics analysis and theater logistics overview

are analysis products used as the starting point for further sustainment planning for specific operations plans or contingencies.

5-26. Refinement of the sustainment plans in support of operation plans and combatant command campaign plans is a continuous process. The theater army and TSC must interact with strategic and operational commands and organizations essential to setting and maintain the theater. These organizations include the Defense Logistics Agency and the USAMC. Army field support brigades are allocated to a theater army and assist in setting the theater through the employment of USAMC capabilities.

5-27. The Defense Logistics Agency, in coordination with the combatant command and Services, continues to refine its mission analysis and logistics estimates to identify joint logistics requirements and continue to set the theater. Actions may include:

- Changes in stock positioning (for example, locations, quantities).
- Contract reviews for appropriate surge clauses and operational contingency zones.
- Market research to identify local procurement opportunities.
- Discussions with industrial base partners regarding production capacities.
- Identification of potential acquisition policy waivers that may be required.
- Close coordination with the Services on readiness rates and critical weapon systems.
- A readiness review of Defense Logistics Agency deployable capabilities.

5-28. The USAMC provides logistics, technology, acquisition support, and selected logistics support to Army forces as well as USAMC-related common support to other Services and multinational and interagency partners through lifecycle management commands. Lifecyle management commands conduct theater-level contingency planning with USAMC, Army Sustainment Command, and TSCs during set the theater deliberate planning. These USAMC lifecycle management commands include USAMC staff as well as related Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics and Technology program executive office and program management offices. Together, these lifecycle management command USAMC and Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics and Technology elements work to ensure support for fielded weapon systems and equipment for their entire life cycle. During the set the theater planning process, theater army's and their supporting TSCs must coordinate with the Center for Army Analysis and develop OPLAN battle loss and battle damage estimates with USAMC and its subordinate lifecycle management commands that operate the depots. The TSCs, in conjunction with Army sustainment command and USAMC lifecycle management commands, need to plan for the footprint, support requirements, and force protection of depot maintenance forward repair activities.

5-29. The theater army and theater sustainment command have access to logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP) planners. LOGCAP is a performance-based program that provides broad, contracted sustainment support to GCC joint operations, coalition partners, and other federal agencies to address regional and country planning requirements where a military capability is not readily available, in support of setting the theater and theater sustainment. Pre-awarded task orders are regionally aligned for rapid response to emerging events. LOGCAP is designed to support operations to shape and sustainment preparation of an OE. LOGCAP is designated as a preferred source for logistic support, and must be considered before establishing a new contract. See ATP 4-10.1 and AR 700-137 for additional information on LOGCAP.

5-30. The theater army planners identify operational contract support requirements and capabilities within the theater of operations to ensure effective execution of contract support arrangements as required. Areas of consideration include existing in-theater contracting capability, control, and supporting identification of the contracting community of interest, and augmentation.

5-31. The theater army surgeon ensures AHS support is adequately planned and in place through their assigned MEDCOM (DS). The MEDCOM (DS) maintains a regional focus that encompasses the GCC's entire AOR and is critical for the successful provision of AHS support to set the theater. The medical commander's ability to assess host-nation medical capability and the presence of health threats prevalent in the AOR facilitates planning and execution of regional strategies for establishment of the theater joint trauma system and mitigation of identified threats. The MEDCOM (DS) provides the GCC an effective tool to assist in maximizing the use of scarce medical resources, shaping the security environment by building partner medical capacity, and alleviating health conditions that not only impact U.S. military forces, but also multinational partners and particular challenges faced by the host nation. Understanding the roles and

responsibilities of all agencies involved (to include the Department of State, World Health Organization, partner nations, and others) for integration and synchronization of all medical capabilities in the region is critical. The MEDCOM (DS) provides AHS support to set the theater through coordination and integration of strategic medical capabilities from the U.S. sustaining base. It provides support through global health engagements, establishment and maintenance of medical support agreements, deploying medical technical expertise for consultation services and other support, and military medical training exercises as well as the following:

- Executing AHS support to other Services.
- Recommending theater evacuation policy adjustments.
- Providing theater food protection support.
- Coordinating with USTRANSCOM for patient movement plans.
- Ensuring integration and interoperability of theater medical capabilities.
- Providing AHS support to FHA and FDR.
- Conducting medical preparation of an OE.
- Maximizing use of host-nation medical capabilities.
- Establishing and executing occupational and environmental health surveillance programs and countermeasures.
- Coordinating with the National Center for Medical Intelligence, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and other strategic partners for identification and mitigation of regional health threats.
- Planning and coordination for AHS support to noncombatant evacuation operations, RSOI, and theater opening.

PROTECTION

5-32. Protection during operations to set the theater preserve and enable conditions for follow-on operations. Commanders must incorporate the primary protection tasks into their efforts based on their understanding and assessment of the theater. Protection planners who remain synchronized with other warfighting functions to maintain accurate and current assessments of conditions within a country or key locations are better equipped to ensure assets are available or in place to protect U.S. forces, material, or populations, resources, critically required infrastructure, and lines of communication. The following protection tasks are of particular importance when planning operations to set the theater:

- AMD support coordination.
- Antiterrorism measures.
- CBRN operations.
- EOD support.
- Force health protection.
- Physical security procedures.
- Operational security.
- Area security.
- Police operations (to include logistics security).
- Detention operations.
- Survivability.
- Personnel recovery.
- Cyberspace security and defense (to include defense of critical civilian contract providers).
- Electromagnetic protection.
- Risk management.

5-33. Commanders in theaters with significant aerial threat provide continuous land-based theater AMD capabilities to protect forces. Defending force generation assets from air and missile threats is a critical task, especially in the early phases of a major operation. AMD planning begins at the theater level and addresses the various aspects of AMD capabilities and airspace requirements. Air defense artillery staff personnel from the AAMDC participate in the development of war plans to shape specific regions well in advance of conflict;

they ensure the land-based defensive counterair capabilities are integrated with the other domains and performed continuously throughout the operation. AMD planning considerations are based on capabilities of projected air and missile threats, sensor coverage by various AMD air and ground assets, sharing of air picture information, and networking requirements to support and coordinate the engagement of targets.

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION

5-34. Although the Department of State leads and provides oversight for security cooperation efforts through its bureaus, offices, and overseas missions, security assistance and many security cooperation activities are conducted and coordinated throughout the GCC AOR by, with, or through the theater army to—

- Build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.
- Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
- Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

5-35. The theater army provides a regionally oriented, long-term Army presence for military engagement and security cooperation. As part of setting the theater, theater army planners plan and integrate security cooperation activities and articulate how those activities fit within the broader context of an OE and achieve combatant commander objectives. Theater army staffs work in conjunction with the institutional force to develop Allied and partner doctrine and procedures to enable the successful synchronization and integration of Allied land forces during ULO.

5-36. The theater army helps coordinate and provide resources to support security cooperation activities, including those efforts focused towards enhancing land forces interoperability, building capacity and capabilities, and strengthening relationships with allies and partners as directed by the GCC. Theater armies provide the GCC with regionally aligned forces and, in some cases, specially trained forces competent in languages, cultures, history, security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and threat knowledge in areas of potential conflict. These Army forces enable combatant commanders to shape an OE by developing relationships with host-nation senior military leaders and security forces. Ultimately, theater armies direct the activities of theater-assigned forces and regionally aligned forces to achieve U.S. theater strategic and national military objectives. See FM 3-22 for more information on Army support to security cooperation.

Chapter 6

Set and Support Operational Areas

The chapter begins with a discussion on the tasks the theater army conducts in support of setting and supporting a JOA and their relationship with the JOA ARFOR. The chapter then expands on the tasks of theater opening and RSOI. Next, the chapter discusses the force tailoring process and its importance to providing the joint force commander with combat power, followed by the theater army's responsibilities to JOA force protection. The chapter concludes with discussions on the theater army's responsibilities to sustain, establish the communications network architecture, and provide intelligence support to the JOA.

SET AND SUPPORT OPERATIONAL AREAS

6-1. In addition to setting and maintaining the overall theater, theater armies play an important part in setting and supporting specific operational areas for JFCs. Set and support operational areas describes those critical tasks and activities specifically focused on shaping conditions, primarily in the form of providing resources and authorities, for successfully conducting military operations in an operational area. JFCs have six options for designating an operational area: theater of war, theater of operations, JOA, joint special operations area, joint security area, or an amphibious operational area. (See FM 3-0 or JP 3-0 for more on operational areas.) The theater army is most commonly responsible for setting and supporting the JOA.

6-2. In the event that operational requirements (in time, space, purpose, and employed forces) exceed what a JOA can accommodate, a GCC may define a theater of operations. More than one joint force headquarters can exist in a theater of operations and a GCC may establish one or more theaters of operations. Theaters of operations are normally associated with major operations and campaigns and may cross the boundary of two geographical AORs. When this occurs, a determination will need to be made on which ASCC or theater army will be responsible for the theater of operations. A theater army so designated is incapable of additional responsibilities without significant augmentation.

6-3. As the combatant commander shifts priorities to a specific nation or region, the theater army focuses on setting and supporting the identified operational area. They start by refining the OPLANs and estimates developed as part of setting and maintaining the theater. In conjunction with the GCC staff and interagency partners, the theater army identifies locations to develop or improve bases and base camps in the identified operational area for sustainment, protection, and infrastructure development. This includes identifying requirements for ASOS and agencies, expanding the theater distribution network, and petroleum pipeline operations.

6-4. Once a JOA is established, the theater army, as the ASCC, assumes the additional responsibility of setting and supporting the JOA. In particular, setting the JOA involves the ARFOR identifying the requirements for Army capabilities to support the JFC's campaign plan and making recommendations for tailoring those capabilities in appropriate force packages.

6-5. Key tasks typically required to set and support operational areas include force tailoring, theater opening, port and terminal operations, RSOI, force protection, sustainment support, communications network architecture establishment, and intelligence support.

FORCE TAILORING

6-6. *Force tailoring* is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander (ADP 3-0). Force tailoring involves identifying, selecting, and sourcing required Army capabilities and establishing their initial task organization to accomplish the mission. The result of force tailoring is an Army force package matched to the needs of the combatant commander. See FM 3-0 for more information on force tailoring.

6-7. As part of setting the theater, as discussed in Chapter 5, the theater army makes recommendations for initial force packages (the first part of force tailoring) required for a mission based on required capabilities as well as the order of deployment based on the combatant commander's priorities and available lift assets. Once a subordinate JTF is established, the JFC can request additional or different capabilities through the GCC and theater army.

6-8. With the initial deployment of forces, the theater army—based on the mission variables—tailors its organization to provide the required support to joint operations. The theater army's support function has a major impact on the design and conduct of joint operations. The theater army must get the right army forces to the right place at the right time to enable the GCC to concentrate forces and logistics to generate decisive combat power.

6-9. During contingency operations, upon entry into the JOA, U.S. forces may be either opposed or unopposed. Each contingency operation requires a different mix of forces and capabilities. The existence of little or no in-theater support base may require that a large sustainment organization—augmented from strategic and operational-level sustainment organizations—accompany the deploying tactical unit. Synchronizing the deployment of sustainment units and supplies with deployment of combat capabilities ensures adequate resources and support.

SOURCING MISSION REQUIREMENTS

6-10. Upon reviewing the original force package, the established JTF may determine additional or different capabilities are required to support their mission and submit a request for forces. To request Army forces, the JFC in the JOA identifies capability requirements for land operations and submits requests for forces through two channels. The JFC first submits the request for forces for validation through the GCC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JFC submits the same request for forces through the ARFOR to the supporting theater army. The ARFOR notifies the DA and FORSCOM that the request for forces has been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for validation. Once the Joint Chiefs of Staff validates the request for forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasks the DA to provide (or source) the unit to the JFC in the JOA. Headquarters, DA, then tasks FORSCOM to source, mobilize, and deploy the requirement. Under current policy, the Secretary of Defense signs all unit deployment orders.

6-11. The theater army sources mission requirements and requests for forces. Sourcing validated requests for forces entails focusing each rotational unit against future missions as early as possible and assigning each unit to a specific mission requirement. Forces assigned and allocated to the theater army are nominated against a specific mission requirement (operations in a JOA) via the global force management process. Rotational Regular Army and Reserve Component brigade combat teams, multifunctional and functional support brigades, echelons above brigade, and sustainment units are assigned as a deployment expeditionary force or a contingency expeditionary force to balance the need for unit operational deployments with the need to accomplish strategic contingency missions.

FORCE GENERATION

6-12. *Force generation* is how the Army directs the development, preservation, and provision of ready and responsive forces for employment in support of national military objectives, Army Service requirements, and U.S. state and territorial requirements (AR 525-29).

6-13. FORSCOM trains and prepares a combat-ready, globally responsive Army in order to build and sustain readiness to meet GCC requirements. It trains, mobilizes, deploys, sustains, modernizes, and reconstitutes conventional forces. It provides relevant and ready landpower to combatant commanders and theater army commanders in defense of the nation both at home and abroad. FORSCOM serves as the Secretary of the

Army's Service force provider in the global force management process. It recommends sourcing solutions for the institutional force's capabilities that match combatant commander capabilities requirements while weighed against competing requirements from multiple GCCs for multiple missions and other requirements. FORSCOM configures assigned operational Army forces for employment and prepares them for a specific OE and mission to which they will be employed. This preparation includes planning and executing mission readiness exercises and mission rehearsal exercises. FORSCOM also provides those Army forces with maintenance and employment of an exportable training capability.

6-14. Units in the prepare and ready force pools provide depth by retaining the capability to perform decisive action (offense, defense, stability, and DSCA tasks) or respond to theater army and GCC security cooperation requirements.

6-15. Forces are allocated to the JFC from FORSCOM and supporting ASCCs. *Allocation* is the distribution of limited forces and resources for employment among competing requirements (JP 5-0). The theater army makes recommendations to the GCC on the optimal deployment sequence of the allocated forces; however, the GCC can modify in coordination with FORSCOM and USTRANSCOM based upon factors such as available lift, location, readiness of deploying forces, and surface transportation requirements.

FORCE PROJECTION AND EMPLOYMENT

6-16. Once the Army allocates and projects forces into an operational area, FORSCOM, a direct reporting unit, or another supporting theater army detaches the appropriate forces to the gaining theater army.

6-17. The gaining theater army tailors Army forces for employment in the JOA based on the request for forces. Tailoring the force alters the command relationships established for the force. The gaining theater army modifies the existing assignment relationships (when required) by attaching or placing under OPCON of Army forces to one of the following:

- Theater-level command—such as a theater sustainment command or an AAMDC.
- Corps.
- Division.
- Brigade.

6-18. In addition to allocated forces, theater armies provide Army forces from theater-assigned forces. Army forces task-organized to a JFC in a JOA will most likely be task-organized to the ARFOR within the JOA. For example, if the threat to the joint security area is low to moderate, the theater army commander may tailor the ARFOR with a unit specifically task-organized to control the joint security area. Commander, Army forces, when designated as the joint force land component commander, may assign joint security coordination functions and responsibilities to a subordinate Army unit, normally a MEB. A MEB is designed to provide C2 of forces from multiple branches but especially those that conduct support area and maneuver support operations for the force. The MEB's capability to conduct support area operations in the assigned echelon support area provides added security and defense for other units and enhances the freedom of mobility for the supported echelon. The MEB would subdivide and assign specific security areas to appropriate Army units. If assigned, Army MEBs plan, coordinate, control, and execute joint security operations within the joint security area. If the threat is unknown, the theater army may tailor the ARFOR with additional maneuver units to control the joint security area. If hostile conditions exist, the theater army may assign the mission to an Army division with brigade combat teams and one or more maneuver enhancement brigades. See the end of this chapter for further discussion on the theater army and JOA ARFOR.

6-19. Unless modified by a transfer of responsibility agreement, ADCON of Army forces passes to the gaining theater army, then is shared or delegated to the headquarters of attachment during force tailoring as specified. Figure 6-1 on page 6-4 uses a hypothetical situation to show the effects tailoring potentially changes in the organization of a division formation attached for a specific operation. USARPAC is the gaining theater army in this example. USARPAC receives the 53d Division, which deploys with its attached field artillery brigade—the 575th FA Brigade—as part of a deployment expeditionary force. Before it deployed, the 575th FA Brigade consisted of two multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) battalions—the 4-19th FA and the 3-34th FA—and one 155mm battalion, the 5-32d FA. For this campaign, the 53d Division commander requires less MLRS capability but more supporting cannon fire. Therefore, the USARPAC commander requests additional cannon battalions and directs the detachment of the MLRS battalion. The

1-32d FA (155mm SP [self-propelled]) attaches to the 575th FA Brigade while simultaneously detaching the 4-19th FA (MLRS) to another field artillery brigade in CONUS. FORSCOM decides which CONUS-based field artillery brigade to attach the detached MLRS unit. As tailored, the 575th FA Brigade has a command relationship over the 1-32d FA, 5-32d FA, and 3-34th FA battalions. The tailored 575th FA Brigade is in turn attached to the 53d Division, which has ADCON and OPCON authorities. The theater army retains ADCON of the 53d Division.




Figure 5-1. Example of force tailoring

JOINT OPERATIONS AREA OPENING

6-20. Establishing a JOA and setting the conditions to enable the deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces (force projection) requires the coordinated efforts of strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level organizations. Specific tasks involved in establishing a JOA include theater opening, port opening, and RSOI. The theater army executes most of these responsibilities through its assigned TSC.

THEATER OPENING

6-21. *Theater opening* is the ability to establish and operate ports of debarkation (air, sea, and rail), to establish a distribution system and sustainment bases, and to facilitate port throughput for the reception, staging, onward movement and integration of forces within a theater of operations (ADP 4-0). Preparing for theater opening operations requires unity of effort among the various commands and a seamless strategic-to-tactical interface. It is a complex joint process involving the GCC and strategic and joint partners such as USTRANSCOM and the Defense Logistics Agency. Theater opening functions set the conditions for effective support and lay the groundwork for subsequent expansion of the theater distribution system.

Port Opening

6-22. Port opening is a subordinate function of theater opening. *Port opening* is the ability to establish, initially operate and facilitate throughput for ports of debarkation to support unified land operations (ADP 4-0). The port opening process is complete when the port of debarkation and supporting infrastructure is established to meet the desired operating capacity for that node. Supporting infrastructure can include the transportation needed to support port clearance of cargo and personnel, holding areas for all classes of supply, and the proper in-transit visibility systems established to facilitate force tracking and end-to-end distribution.

6-23. Port opening and port operations are critical components for preparing and conducting theater opening. Commanders and staffs coordinate with the host nation to ensure seaports and aerial ports possess sufficient capabilities to support arriving vessels and aircraft. USTRANSCOM is the port manager for deploying U.S. forces (ATP 4-0.1).

Joint Task Force-Port Opening

6-24. The joint task force-port opening is a joint capability designed to rapidly deploy and initially operate aerial and sea ports of debarkation, establish a distribution node (within 10 kilometers [6 miles] of the airfield ramp area), and facilitate port throughput within a theater of operations (JP 4-0). It is a standing task force that is a jointly trained, ready set of forces constituted as a joint task force at the time of need. The joint task force-port opening may be employed to provide early theater facilitation and capability to move the cargo off the airfield ramp to the forward node for eventual theater distribution.

6-25. The Army contribution to the joint task force-port opening is the rapid port opening element that deploys within hours to establish air and sea ports of debarkation in contingency response operations. The rapid port opening element is assigned to USTRANSCOM, and OPCON to the SDDC. The rapid port opening element provides similar capabilities as a movement control team providing in-transit visibility and cargo clearance.

6-26. The joint task force-port opening facilitates joint RSOI and theater distribution by providing effective interface with the theater joint deployment and distribution operations center (JDDOC) and the sustainment brigade for initial aerial port of debarkation operations. It is designed to deploy and operate for up to 60 days. As follow-on theater logistics capabilities arrive, the joint task force-port opening will begin to transfer mission responsibilities to arriving sustainment forces or contracted capabilities.

Aerial Ports

6-27. Aerial ports are airfields that have been designated for strategic air movements (deployment, redeployment, or sustainment). Aerial ports are further designated as either an aerial port of embarkation for departing forces or sustainment, or as an aerial port of debarkation for arriving forces and sustainment. USTRANSCOM, through the Air Mobility Command, is the single port manager for all common-user aerial ports of debarkation. USTRANSCOM performs those functions necessary to support the strategic flow of forces and sustainment supplies into the aerial port of debarkation and hands them off to the designated representative, such as the theater army or TSC.

6-28. The operation of a joint aerial complex can be divided into two parts: air terminal operations and air terminal support operations. Air Mobility Command runs air terminal operations. The theater army has responsibility for air terminal support operations and employs the TSC to facilitate RSOI of deploying forces and materiel to designated tactical assembly areas. Air terminal support operations include port clearance,

operation of holding and marshalling areas, postal operations, personnel processing, movement control, onward movement, security, and life support. The TSC may perform some of these functions at locations other than the joint aerial complex. The SDDC works closely with the TSC to provide a seamless strategic/theater interface to provide for the efficient RSOI of forces and supplies to and from the theater.

Seaports

6-29. USTRANSCOM's ASCC, the SDDC, is the single port manager for all common-user seaports of debarkation. As the single port manager it develops policy and advises the GCC on port management, recommends ports to meet operational demands, and is primarily responsible for planning, organizing, and directing operations at the seaport. The TSC and its subordinate sustainment brigades, terminal battalions and seaport operating companies perform the port operator functions at seaports of debarkation. These functions can include port preparations and improvement, cargo discharge and upload operations, harbor craft services, port clearance, and cargo documentation activities. If the OE allows, SDDC may have the ability to contract locally for port operator support, eliminating or decreasing the requirement for the TSC and its subordinate units.

6-30. When vessels arrive at the seaport of debarkation, the TSC and/or SDDC is responsible for discharging the unit equipment, staging the equipment, maintaining control and in-transit visibility, and releasing it to the unit. This includes minimum standards that are critical for the physical security/processing of DOD sensitive conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives, including non-nuclear missiles and rockets. The theater gateway personnel accounting team and supporting human resource company and platoons will normally operate at the seaport of debarkation as well as movement control teams to facilitate port clearance of personnel and equipment.

Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary)

6-31. The transportation brigade (expeditionary) is an early-entry brigade that supports a theater army in managing and conducting seaport operations. The transportation brigade (expeditionary) provides C2 for Army transportation terminal battalions, seaport operations companies, and Army watercraft units deployed to support the combatant commander. Establishing seaport operations early on ensures a smooth flow of sustainment while processing deploying units and equipment into the port. The TSC commands and controls the transportation brigade (expeditionary).

TERMINAL OPERATIONS

6-32. Army terminal operations are key enablers of the theater distribution system and are conducted at common-user seaports, inland waterway ports, bare beaches (logistics-over-the-shore operations), rail terminals, aerial ports, truck terminals and trailer transfer points, centralized receiving and shipping points, supply support activities, ammunition storage areas, and other distribution nodes throughout the operating area. See ATP 4-0.1 for more detailed information on terminal operations and nodes.

RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION OF ARMY FORCES

6-33. RSOI is the essential process that transitions deploying forces—personnel, equipment, and materiel—into forces capable of meeting the GCC's operational requirements. The four segments of RSOI are—

- Reception.
- Staging.
- Onward movement.
- Integration.

6-34. Reception operations include all those functions required to receive and clear personnel, equipment, and materiel through the port of debarkation. Staging assembles temporarily hold and organize arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces and capabilities. Staging prepares forces for onward movement, tactical operations, or Service reintegration if the theater army is supporting other Services. Onward movement is the process of moving forces, capabilities, and accompanying materiel from reception facilities, marshalling areas, and staging areas to tactical assembly areas at which time they become OPCON

to the ARFOR in the JOA. Integration is the synchronized transfer of capabilities into the ARFOR in the JOA prior to the mission.

6-35. RSOI is the responsibility of the theater army and its TSC. Key responsibilities include:

- Establish theater line of communications nodes and links required to meet the anticipated transportation and throughput capacities.
- Identify, assess, and provide for required physical transportation capacities and capabilities.
- Control all physical facilities and infrastructure, including distribution nodes, under control of the Army.
- Establish the throughput rate for forces and equipment.
- Ensure land transportation is available in oversees areas for all Services.
- Coordinate all planning and requirements for the use of land transportation equipment and facilities controlled by the DOD.
- Synchronize transportation reception activities to facilitate throughput at the ports of debarkation (includes designating marshalling areas).
- Coordinate and manage theater-level common-user land transportation assets.
- Execute movement control as designated by the GCC.

Deploying forces have responsibility for their own security, organization, and movement through RSOI to the extent possible. Outside entities such as host-nation operators and contractors support RSOI.

Reception

6-36. Reception, as the initial step in introducing combat power to the AOR from strategic lift, is implemented at or near designated air and sea ports of debarkation. Reception consists of three primary activities: command, movement control, and port operations.

Command

6-37. Command of reception activities is a GCC function, normally delegated to the theater army for all Army forces. Reception planning and execution responsibilities are routinely further delegated by the theater army to its designated TSC. The theater army retains OPCON of forces through RSOI regardless of functions delegated to the TSC.

6-38. The GCC, through an attached USTRANSCOM element, controls the arrival of strategic air and sea lift during which forces are under OPCON to USTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM's Air Mobility Command and SDDC manage the aerial ports of debarkation and seaports of debarkation where forces arrive. These locations are the point of interface between USTRANSCOM and the supported theater army. The theater army uses these locations to resume OPCON of forces, which it retains until forces arrive in the JOA at which time the ARFOR in the JOA takes OPCON of forces. At this time, the command relationship with the theater army changes to ADCON.

Movement Control

6-39. *Movement control* is the dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating movements according to command priorities to synchronize distribution flow over lines of communications to sustain land forces (ADP 4-0). Movement control balances requirements against capabilities and requires continuous synchronization to integrate military, host-nation, and commercial movements by all modes of transportation to ensure seamless transitions from the strategic to the tactical level of an operation. Proper management of the movement control function aids the JFC, JFLCC, or ARFOR commander in applying control over the depth of the battlefield. It is a means of providing commanders with situational understanding to control movements in their operational area. Movement control responsibilities are embedded in an infrastructure that relies on coordination to ensure transportation assets are used efficiently while ensuring lines of communications are de-conflicted to support freedom of access for military operations. See ATP 4-16 and JP 4-01.5 for more information on movement control.

Port Operations

6-40. Theater army planners consider several factors when assessing a port's capacity to receive the planned strategic flow. Some factors include port capability, state of repair, commercial utilization, congestion, and throughput capacity. (See ATP 3-35 for more information on port considerations for planning.)

Staging

6-41. Staging is that part of RSOI that includes assembling, temporarily holding, and organizing arriving personnel and materiel into units and forces. Staging also includes preparing personnel and materiel for onward movement to a tactical assembly area and employment. These activities occur at multiple sites in areas controlled by movement control boards, an element of TSC, on behalf of the theater army. During staging, the theater army—through the TSC—has responsibility for providing facilities, sustainment, life support, and protection until units are deemed fully mission capable.

Onward Movement

6-42. Personnel and equipment reassembled as combat-ready units move to a tactical assembly area based on the GCC's priorities. Onward movement is a joint or multinational effort using capabilities and organizational structures of other Services, multinational partners, host nations, and other governmental entities. Three primary factors affect onward movement: movement control, transportation infrastructure, and security.

Transportation Infrastructure

6-43. An effective transportation infrastructure contains convoy support centers and trailer transfer points. The TSC establishes convoy support centers and trailer transfer points along main supply routes and other support centers at temporary airfields, rail sites, and waterway drop off points to aid onward movement. These facilities allow units and line haul drivers to rest, eat, perform vehicle maintenance, contact unit personnel, and contact movement control personnel to receive operational updates, revised priorities, and when necessary diversions. During onward movement, mode selection determines whether the commander of the unit in transit maintains control during the move or whether elements of the TSC (on behalf of the theater army) maintain control of the move.

Security

6-44. The onward movement phase can provide the enemy with numerous opportunities to inflict harm to friendly forces and delay the build-up of combat power by exploiting vulnerability of units in transit from the intermediate staging base to the tactical assembly area. Security is the responsibility of the moving force, itself, and the GCC. The theater army has three roles in regards to security. First, the theater army coordinates for host-nation support, resources, and facilities. Second, it acquires contract support as a force multiplier during onward movement. The third role is allocating protection capabilities that enable freedom of movement along routes and tactical assembly areas.

6-45. The theater army coordinates for host-nation support early in planning. Ideally, the theater army obtains support agreements as part of setting the theater and preparing the JOA for combat operations. In addition, the theater army agrees to support agreements as part of setting the theater prior to the conduct of combat operations. Contract support for onward movement is a function performed on behalf of the theater army by the Army Contracting Command. The theater army coordinates contract support for onward movement, like host-nation support, in advance of an actual deployment. In the event of LSCO, host-nation and contract support at the tactical level (division and below) will be limited during combat operations. Thus, the moving unit with the assistance of a theater army unit, based on the threat, provides assistance to secure movements.

Integration

6-46. During integration, combat-ready units transfer to the JFC, appropriate component commander, and ARFOR commander and merge into the tactical plan. Emphasis during integration is on C2 as well as communications of personnel, equipment, and materiel as they enter the JOA. Integration is complete when

the JFC establishes C2 over the arriving unit and the theater army transfers control of that unit to the JFC in the JOA.

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Considerations for Multinational Operations

6-47. RSOI during multinational operations have many challenges. Major differences exist in logistics, doctrine, mobility, resources, interoperability, and language. These differences create challenges when forces coordinate the use of highways, railroads, seaports, and airfields as well as providing support and services. Considerable planning is required to integrate multinational forces requirements for ship berthing and unloading facilities, port staging space, transportation, and labor, which are critical elements of RSOI.

6-48. Logistics is ordinarily a national responsibility. However, even in situations where a multinational support agreement or an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement exists during multinational operations, the U.S. frequently provides strategic lift and logistic support. The U.S. establishes clear responsibilities and identifies support roles early in the planning process. Whenever possible, multinational organizations form to coordinate RSOI. This coordination allows multinational members to use common items and to set up commonly understood control measures.

6-49. Effective plans and operations for multinational RSOI are simple, and use common terms, common procedures, and clear and concise language. Where possible, commanders of multinational coalitions combine staffs of two or more nations to better coordinate RSOI capabilities, facilitate exchange of vital information, and reduce friction, congestion, and duplication associated with multiple users of limited assets.

6-50. Host-nation support is civil and military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war. This assistance is normally outlined in host-nation support agreements mutually concluded between nations. In many cases, U.S. forces rely on host-nation support to supplement or provide services, supplies, and facilities. This reliance is especially significant when the GCC tries to minimize the support forces early in the deployment.

6-51. GCCs benefit when they establish host-nation agreements early in the deployment. When no agreements exist, the GCC's staff and RSOI manager research the RSOI capabilities or resources of prospective host nations and the contractual procedures necessary to obtain them. The GCC's staff also ensure that the host nation understands overall U.S. requirements. Moreover, as early as possible, commanders send representatives—with translators—to negotiate the acquisition of host-nation services.

6-52. Host-nation support, by providing various services and facilities, relieves U.S. forces from establishing and maintaining equivalent services and facilities, thereby reducing the U.S. logistic footprint and RSOI overhead. Additional lift becomes available for transporting combat forces and expediting force closure. Services and facilities that might be considered for host-nation support are as follows:

- Logistic support.
- Medical facilities.
- Construction and engineering.
- Police and paramilitary organizations.
- Transportation assets and infrastructure.
- Labor force.
- Emergency services.
- CBRN protection and decontamination capabilities.
- Fuel and power facilities.
- Communications facilities.

TRAINING

6-53. The theater army selects, funds, and mans training centers and ranges within the theater in coordination with the GCC and host-nation military. For a protracted campaign, the training requirements may expand exponentially. Establishment of a training base often requires housing, maintenance, life support, security,

and medical support. The theater army develops the training infrastructure through combinations of host-nation support and contracting, personnel, and units deployed from the Army institutional force.

6-54. The theater army commander may establish a dedicated training command in addition to the pool of theater-level commands available within operating forces. A training command provides training support to the ARFOR using resources and funding provided by the theater army. If necessary, a training command may expand to support multinational force training and may transfer under the control of a multinational force headquarters. See JP 3-16, FM 3-16, AR 34-1, NATO STANAG 2281, and the *Coalition Operations Handbook* for more information.

FORCE PROTECTION SUPPORT TO THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA

6-55. Theater army staffs have the responsibility to plan and oversee protection requirements. The UCP directs force protection responsibility for all Title 10 DOD forces stationed in, residing in, or transitioning an AOR to the GCC. In support of the GCC, this responsibility falls on the theater army commander for all Title 10 Army forces in the AOR.

6-56. The theater army coordinates force protection for all forces, installations, and operating bases across the JOA. The theater army typically resources the force protection requirements to support Army forces in theater unless otherwise directed. The theater army also resources the force protection requirements to support joint forces, multinational forces, and any designated theater army support area or joint security area.

6-57. In high-threat environments, the GCC may designate a joint security coordinator to focus on joint security operations within a joint security area. Under these circumstances, the GCC normally designates a component commander with the appropriate capabilities and force structure to perform this function. Sometimes the GCC designates the theater army commander as the joint security coordinator responsible for the joint security area. The joint security coordinator coordinates with appropriate commanders on security issues to facilitate sustainment, host-nation support, infrastructure development and protection, and movements of the joint force. (See JP 3-10 for more information.) In this capacity, the theater army assists commanders to establish reliable intelligence support and to practice terrain management within their operational areas while meeting security requirements. The theater army also establishes secure and survivable communications with all forces and commands operating in or transiting the joint security area.

6-58. Priority protection tasks within a joint security area include force health protection, CBRN operations, EOD, AMD, personnel recovery, detention operations, risk management, physical security, antiterrorism, police operations, area security, and operational security. Due to the breadth and depth of key protection tasks within a joint security area, consideration should be given in situations where a theater army is responsible for more than one JOA. In that case, the theater army is most likely not a favorable candidate to serve as the lead joint security coordinator for multiple JOAs as the demands and requirements would overwhelm its staff.

6-59. A theater army protection cell (with augmented unified action partner forces) can provide the nucleus of the joint security coordination center. The joint security coordination center serves as the full-time centralized planning, coordinating, monitoring, advising, and directing agency for operational area joint security operations. It coordinates with other elements on the joint security coordinator staff; with higher, lower, and adjacent command staffs; and with host-nation and partner command staffs.

SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT TO THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA

6-60. In all joint operations, logistics is a Service responsibility except as specified by DOD combatant command support agent directives, combatant commander lead Service designations, or inter-Service support agreements. GCCs direct theater army commanders to provide Army support to other services, agencies, or multinational forces as required and exercise directive authority for logistics to eliminate redundant or overlapping sustainment responsibilities.

6-61. The theater army becomes intimately involved with decisions concerning competing demands for limited resources. The theater army assists the combatant command in developing support priorities, particularly those affecting other Services. To support the ARFOR, the theater army also coordinates the

projection of additional required support from the CONUS, another theater, or an intermediate support base using air lines of communication and sea lines of communication. This becomes particularly important and more nuanced when a theater army is supporting more than one JOA in a theater of operations. The ARFOR in a JOA identifies requirements, establishes priorities of support for Army forces, and coordinates with the theater army and theater sustainment command for identified sustainment requirements.

SUSTAINMENT PREPARATION

6-62. The theater army and TSC conduct the bulk of the planning for Army sustainment in a theater. The theater army planners develop and coordinate means to generate and employ capabilities within the JOA and mitigate capability gaps. They focus on the challenges of geographically large and difficult access areas. Planners consider sustainment by type of support and across a continuum of possibilities to gain capabilities from other military partners, host nations, the sustainment enterprise, operational contract support, and organic capabilities.

6-63. The lead service is responsible for forecasting operational requirements to support all operations from FHA to LSCO. If designated the lead service, sustainment and theater army planners should anticipate increased needs for bulk fuel, ammunition, construction and barrier material, and repair parts to support CONPLANs and OPLANs. The lead Service can also request support from the Department of Logistics Agency to decrease wait time, reduce cost, and improve military readiness.

6-64. Army cross service agreements and operational contract support may be employed to attain several classes of supply, including Class I.

6-65. The use of existing pipelines, military pipelines, assault hose lines, contracts, and enterprise bulk fuel and water agreements are all leveraged to provide bulk fuels and water. The Defense Logistics Agency establishes contracts with local venders in the absence of pre-established agreements with nations in the AOR.

6-66. Planning should include identifying locations within the AOR for a theater storage area and multiple ammunition supply points to provide redundant and robust storage capability in a forward location. It is also important to consider that U.S. forces may be required to receive, store, and dispose of foreign ammunition.

6-67. The DOD assigns the task of recovery and evacuation of personnel remains during joint operations to the Army. Sustainment planners must consider fatality estimates per phase, the flow of allocated mortuary affairs assets in the theater, and the sustainment channels with the most expedient available transportation resources to evacuate human remains. Logistic processes provide for the evacuation of human remains and personal effects out of the operational area. The TSC must work with interagency and international partners for the recovery and evacuation of U.S. citizen, allied or coalition forces, host-nation, or detainee fatalities. See FM 4-0 and ATP 4-46 for more information on mortuary affairs.

6-68. The theater army is a key partner in providing deploying units with detailed sustainment estimate information to enable their sustainment preparation of an OE. Sustainment planners in the TSC use the sustainment preparation of an OE analysis to update and refine sustainment estimates and the concept of support. Analysis products cover such topics as geography and environmental factors; supply and services; facilities; transportation; maintenance; available host-nation support/operational contract support; Army pre-positioned stock availability; banking and economy; non-organic support (especially Reserve Component); and national agreements. The geospatial planning cell is capable of either directly providing or coordinating for the generating and collecting of required geospatial and feature data and information, completing geographic analysis (if required), and disseminating it to all organizations within the theater.

SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES

6-69. The GCC supports SOF within its AOR; therefore, the theater army has responsibility for providing sustainment support to SOF regardless of the organizational structure. The ARSOF logistic planners identify the support requirements during planning. The theater army also identifies the logistic shortfalls and includes them in the GCC's risk assessment. If the theater army cannot support ARSOF, they must raise the shortfall to the supported GCC for resolution.

6-70. The TSC has overall responsibility for sustainment support. Special operations sustainment planners within the theater army concentrate on initial entry, building and integration, and redeployment. For initial entry, planners determine the type of sustainment required, the number of days of accompanying supplies based on the time-phased force and deployment list, and the ARSOF basing needs. For buildup and integration, planners coordinate and integrate ARSOF logistics with the theater of operations support system both before closing the time-phased force and deployment list and while the list continues to mature. In some cases, the theater of operations logistic infrastructure never achieves full maturity. For redeployment, planners focus on meeting support requirements. As units start the redeployment phase, the ASCC ensures the remaining support units are tailored (by host-nation or contract support) to meet stay-behind ARSOF support requirements.

6-71. Conventional logistic support organizations and procedures are usually adequate for ARSOF requirements. Standard procedures exist to address the few ARSOF-peculiar requirements. Some ARSOF differences affect the type of support required for sustainment as well as RSOI. For instance, forward-deployed ARSOF units are usually in isolated and austere locations. For such locations, distribution is the key consideration. SOF prepare to coordinate logistic support through operational contract support and cross-servicing agreements. Another instance that affects support required stems from special equipment. ARSOF equipment differs from most Army equipment. However, organic ARSOF assets can maintain most Army equipment without complications.

6-72. The theater special operations command, Army special operations forces liaison element, and ARSOF sustainment cell logisticians work closely with the combatant command staff and the theater army to articulate the ARSOF requirements. The GCC establishes priorities and allocates available resources to ARSOF to accomplish each mission. The theater special operations command then monitors ARSOF sustainment. See ATP 3-05.40 for details about ARSOF sustainment.

THEATER DISTRIBUTION

6-73. Theater distribution is a method for executing the flow of equipment, personnel, and materials within theater to meet the combatant commander's requirements. Theater distribution is separate and different from the movement of equipment and personnel in support of RSOI actions. A theater distribution network enables theater distribution and is pivotal to obtaining freedom of movement and action. Establishing the theater distribution network is an essential part of sustainment support, providing operational forces with the materiel, supplies, and retrograde of repairable material needed to maintain readiness. Theater distribution involves four networks: physical, financial, informational, and communication.

6-74. Theater distribution involves multiple Services, joint commands, and defense agencies working together via distribution management. *Distribution management* synchronizes and optimizes transportation, its networks, and materiel management with the warfighting functions to move personnel and materiel from origins to the point of need in accordance with the supported commander's priorities (ADP 4-0).

6-75. A JDDOC is established by the GCC at the time of need and is an integral component of the GCC's staff, normally under the staff supervision of the GCC J-4. The JDDOC manages the transition between strategic and intra-theater segments of the distribution system by linking the activities and requirements of multiple organizations with theater logisticians performing theater distribution functions. The JDDOC, in coordination with the TSC, provides visibility of strategic distribution and deployment. The TSC also establishes links with USTRANSCOM's Service components to coordinate seaport and aerial port operations throughout a GCC's specified area of responsibility. The JDDOC supports theater movement control by resolving movement conflicts and assisting the TSC in meeting transportation requirements that exceed TSC capability.

6-76. The JDDOC passes strategic distribution information to the TSC's distribution management center. The distribution management center is part of the TSC's staff and is responsible for developing the theater distribution plan and synchronizing distribution operations for the TSC. The distribution management center also provides location of mode assets and movement of critical supplies along main supply routes. The GCC may assign the responsibility for the planning, execution, and/or management of intra-theater distribution to the Army. In this case, the distribution management center would be involved in actions required to accomplish the mission.

6-77. The TSC uses the distribution plan to execute Army theater distribution, describing how sustainment flows from the theater base to the tactical level—outlining who, what, when, where, and how distribution will be accomplished. The distribution plan supports the combatant commander's priorities by establishing how requirements can be met given available logistic assets, units, transportation modes, and in-theater infrastructure and identifies competing requirements and shortages. It is a living document that constantly evolves as the theater matures and as the campaign plan progresses. See ATP 4-0.1 for more detailed information on theater distribution networks, planning, and execution.

MEDICAL SUPPORT

6-78. The MEDCOM (DS) provides health service support for the deployed joint force on an area basis, accomplishing Title 10 USC, Section 7013b responsibilities and ASOS for the operational area. Army medical units form the backbone of the joint medical support and evacuation system. This system provides advanced medical care to all deployed joint forces, interagency personnel, and multinational forces specified by the GCC. The distribution and capability of medical units depends on the population of U.S. forces, available infrastructure, and evacuation capabilities.

6-79. The MEDCOM (DS) and its subordinate medical brigades are linked to the TSC through the medical logistics management center. When deployed, a forward team from the medical logistics management center collocates with the distribution management center and JDDOC. The medical logistics management center forward team is subordinate to the MEDCOM (DS) and serves as a link between national-level medical logistic support and theater-level distribution.

COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ARCHITECTURE ESTABLISHMENT

6-80. The theater army has two contributions to joint C2 in the JOA. First, it establishes, maintains, and defends the communications and network architecture to support Army and joint forces operating within the JOA. Second, the theater army maintains connectivity between land-based forces and the rest of the AOR. The theater army executes its communications responsibilities primarily through a signal command (theater) assigned to support the AOR.

6-81. Theater communications include DODIN-A operations and SATCOM. DODIN-A operations provide network and information system availability, information protection, and information delivery across strategic, operational, and tactical boundaries. Army space control operations focus on defensive space control activities to protect space-based C2 capabilities.

6-82. At the joint level, cyberspace operations are operational missions accomplished by the commander, USCYBERCOM. The USCYBERCOM commander provides the C2 and situational awareness required to operate and defend the DODIN-A. ARCYBER, as the ASCC for USCYBERCOM, extends the C2 of the network through its OPCON relationship with each regional cyber center and through the Army orders process to each of the signal commands (theater).

6-83. Army forces establish and maintain networks to support Army operations and to participate in airspace control and theater AMD in assigned areas. The theater army enables throughput of messages in the U.S. message text format (known as USMTF) between joint and other component information systems. The theater army maintains Global Command and Control System-Army (known as GCCS-A) connectivity with Global Command and Control System-Joint (known as GCCS-J) connectivity. The resulting connectivity shares the Army ground common tactical picture with the joint common operational picture as well as enables receiving the common operational picture throughout the deployed Army air-ground system.

6-84. The theater army maintains connectivity of the air picture with an air defense systems integrator, data links, and a multi-tactical data link network in support of ULO. Additionally, the BCD located at the standing theater joint air operations center must maintain Army Battle Command System connectivity (through portals) to and from the theater army or other designated ARFOR at all times. The BCD uses the U.S. message text format digital systems to submit Army requirements and receive the daily U.S. message text formatted air tasking order and airspace control order digitally and receive the daily air tasking order or airspace control order digitally through the theater battle management core system.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE JOINT OPERATIONS AREA

6-85. The theater army provides additional intelligence support and resources through the theater military intelligence brigade and other assets. The theater military intelligence brigade possesses capability for processing, exploiting, and disseminating intelligence products, as well as additional theater-level all-source intelligence analysis capability and digital intelligence infrastructure. The theater army uses the capabilities within the military intelligence brigade and other resources to understand the relationship between the JOA and the surrounding areas. This can help identify outside actors countering U.S. interests in the JOA, enabling the theater army commander, GCC, and national-level decision-makers to address the threats appropriately. Intelligence tasks directly related to setting and supporting the JOA include, but are not limited to—

- Refine databases and products to support the mission.
- Conduct extensive mission analysis and in-depth intelligence preparation of the battlefield to support deployment and initial operations.
- Train intelligence and maneuver assets on threat signatures, threat tactics, techniques, and procedures, and potential threat courses of action.
- Develop the intelligence architecture to support deployment and initial operations.
- Conduct, support, and participate in Army and joint targeting processes.

6-86. Army theater-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets act based on the apportionment and direction of the theater army. While the Army owns few airborne intelligence assets, the theater army may task or influence collection from other Army ground-based, space-based, or cyberspace-based collectors, which can support the intelligence needs of forces within the JOA. Additionally, the theater army may request or influence collection from other Service component airborne intelligence assets through the combatant command and increased collection from national agencies. Additionally, should the joint force within a JOA require additional Army intelligence capabilities, the theater army is their advocate for providing validated needs.

6-87. Some authorities to collect intelligence originate at the theater army—depending on the discipline, asset, and circumstance. The theater army delegates authorities to collect and operate intelligence systems through the ARFOR in the JOA.

THEATER ARMY AND THE ARFOR IN THE JOA

6-88. The theater army commands all Army forces in an AOR until the GCC attaches selected Army forces to a subordinate joint headquarters. When this happens, the theater army divides its support between the Army component (the ARFOR) in the JOA and Army forces operating in other parts of the AOR, to include other JOA ARFORs if established.

6-89. A theater army has ADCON responsibilities for Army units within the joint operations area, including those assigned or under OPCON to a joint force. As deemed appropriate, the theater army commander delegates authority to Army component commanders under OPCON of JFCs operating in the JOA to perform specified administrative tasks. An example of an appropriate delegation occurs during geographic separation between the ADCON headquarters and the intermediate tactical headquarters.

6-90. The ARFOR within a JOA exercises OPCON or TACON over all Army forces except those under OPCON to other components. An example of the latter includes AMD units under OPCON to the AMD commander.

6-91. A JTF ARFOR within in a JOA assumes responsibility for all ASOS unless otherwise directed by the GCC, theater army commander, or the subordinate joint force commanders. For example, the GCC may direct the theater army to retain responsibility or control over certain elements of RSOI. In another instance, the theater army may decide it is best to retain all ASOS responsibilities and therefore not delegate them to the JTF ARFOR. Additionally, a JTF commander could realign certain ASOS responsibilities within the JOA to another force commander based on the available assets. In such cases where the JTF ARFOR, or one of its subordinate commands, assumes ASOS responsibilities, they will also receive OPCON of the unit(s) responsible for controlling the selected responsibility.

Chapter 7
Consolidate Gains

Chapter 7 discusses how the Army assists the combatant command in actions to consolidate gains within a JOA and across an AOR and contains a number of vignettes on how the theater army has historically managed the consolidation of gains in theater.

PLAN AND COORDINATE FOR CONSOLIDATION OF GAINS IN SUPPORT OF JOINT OPERATIONS

7-1. Activities to consolidate gains make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment, allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities. Commanders continuously consider activities necessary to consolidate gains and achieve the end state.

7-2. Operations to consolidate gains occur in designated portions of an AO where the crisis or LSCO is passing or is no longer occurring. Activities that assist in consolidating gains are security and stability tasks, to include security assistance, and will likely involve combat operations against bypassed enemy forces and remnants of defeated units. Operations to consolidate gains require the dynamic execution of decisive action based on the desired operational end state that supports the strategic objective of the campaign. In more limited contingencies than LSCO, consolidation of gains for theater army could involve improving or establishing new systems to ensure a more streamlined response for future disaster relief operations, establishing new headquarters to oversee expanded counterterrorism or counterdrug operations, or possibly improving communications with partners after FHA or theater security cooperation.

7-3. The theater army continuously plans, coordinates, and assesses for the consolidation of gains across an AOR. The theater army accomplishes this through the execution of Title 10 and executive agent activities that shape the theater and engage other regional actors in promoting long-term stability while deterring aggression. The theater army provides estimates for consolidating gains requirements in support of OPLAN development.

7-4. Upon request from the GCC or the activation of the TPFDD, the theater army provides the combatant commander with forces and capabilities specifically tailored to focus on area security and stability. This requires planning and coordination for refined logistic estimates, security cooperation plans, engineer units capable of infrastructure development, civil military requirements, communications shortcomings, and other critical capabilities.

CONSOLIDATION OF GAINS DURING COMPETITION

7-5. The Army strategic role of consolidate gains sets conditions for enduring political and strategic outcomes to military operations. Activities to consolidate gains are an integral part of winning across the competition continuum and range of military operations. The majority of activities to consolidate gains undertaken by a theater army are conducted during competition and are largely contained within the theater army functions of setting and maintaining the theater and security cooperation. Additionally, the theater army provides a unique element for theater continuity that can maintain momentum for building and maintaining positive relationships with allies and partners in theater.

7-6. To consolidate gains, Army forces often play a supporting role by reinforcing and integrating the efforts of multiple partners. This enables the joint force to seize an early initiative against competitors, thereby gaining operational and/or strategic time and flexibility. For example, Army units provide military support to governance, rule of law, and law enforcement. Expanded leader and Soldier competencies allow Army forces to consolidate gains in complex environments. Examples include support to law enforcement

and financial actions for intelligence analysts, advanced situational awareness for combat arms, investigative skills for military police, reconstruction skills for engineers, and rule of law advising for staff judge advocates.

7-7. Conventional and special operations forces work together to understand, influence, or compel human behaviors and perceptions. Army commanders understand cognitive, informational, social, cultural, political, and physical influences affecting human behavior and the mission. Leaders exert influence on key individuals, organizations, and institutions through cooperative and persuasive means. For example, when mission accomplishment requires strengthening partner institutions, Army forces exert influence to convince those partners that undertaking necessary reforms and strengthening critical institutions are in their interest. Emphasis on early and effective consolidation activities as a fundamental part of campaign design enables success and achieves lasting favorable outcomes in the shortest time span.

7-8. As the GCC contributes to operations in competition, such as FHA, FDR, or DSCA, consolidation of gains for a theater army is often a matter of building and sustaining relationships with habitual partners, such as non-governmental organizations, federal agencies, allies, partner nations, and others. Best practices should be identified and consolidated as part of enduring documents such as standard operating procedures or battle drills for the theater army. Regular contact should be made by theater army leadership to maintain relationships built during these operations and reassure allies and partners of the U.S. commitment to mutual goals for the region. An example can be gleaned from USARNORTH's response to hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria from August to November 2017 as discussed in Chapter 6. Relationships built during previous operations in CONUS gave credibility and enabled partnerships that contributed to mission success.

7-9. Army forces must analyze the local capability and capacity to provide services as well as determine the ability of other U.S. government agencies, international agencies, NGOs, and contractors to provide support. The goal is to transition responsibility for humanitarian issues to entities other than Army forces as quickly as possible. This requires prior planning and coordination. Once the transition is completed, the theater army should continue to maintain a connection and provide support whenever possible to those lead agencies or other nations within the limits of capability and in support of the GCC theater campaign plan.

7-10. As the GCC and ASCC continuously consolidate gains, they maintain a persistent focus toward supporting cooperative relationships and retaining the initiative for competition on favorable terms with adversaries. This initiative must be focused and endure against ever-adapting adversaries who will continue to resist through all possible means.

7-11. The following vignette describes Operation LIFELINE in relief of the Muzaffarabad earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005. USCENTCOM provided the JTF that assisted the Pakistan government and military with relief efforts and a U.S. Navy expeditionary strike group with elements from throughout the joint community, including U.S. Army planners and medical support personnel, U.S. Air Force special operators, and others. This illustrates that even with two simultaneous JOAs in the USCENTCOM AOR, it is possible to produce TSC gains that ASCCs should seek to consolidate.

Operation LIFELINE Pakistan 2005

On Saturday, 8 October 2005, a 7.6-magnitude earthquake struck northern Pakistan, killing approximately 73,000 people and destroying more than 400,000 homes. The largest earthquake in Pakistan's history displaced an estimated 3 million people and primarily affected two provinces: Northwest Frontier Province and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. These areas are among the most difficult places in the world to reach, with mountainous terrain, limited roadways, and elevations that range from 4,000 to 14,000 feet.

Ambassador to Pakistan Ryan Crocker saw an immediate strategic opportunity, recognizing that a U.S. response could greatly improve relations with Pakistan and ultimately pay dividends in the war against al Qaida waging in Afghanistan at the time. Crocker contacted the commander of USCENTCOM, General John Abizaid, who provided Navy Expeditionary Strike Group-1 under command of Admiral Mike LeFever and contacted Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry at Coalition Forces Command-Afghanistan for military support.

Coalition Forces Command-Afghanistan, having the most direct relationship with Pakistan at the time, helped coordinate for security and space for the Combined Disaster Assistance Center-Pakistan, and provided immediate Army support to the mission, including planners, staff augmentation, and helicopters to transport personnel and relief supplies. USARCENT backfilled the Coalition Forces Command-Afghanistan planners with a team of staff and planners and coordinated the movement of personnel and equipment to Karachi port and north to Muzaffarabad. USARCENT coordination included Army and Marine Corps mobile hospitals, engineer support, and lift support.

The U.S. combined interagency efforts during LIFELINE provided 370,000 people with relief supplies, treated 35,000 people for injuries, and inoculated 20,000 more. American military forces delivered more than 1,000 tons of relief supplies and 107 pieces of engineering equipment, while safely flying more than 5,900 relief missions. The effects of U.S. FHA and FDR on a beleaguered Pakistani population was tangible. The results of 6 months of relief efforts on perception and relationships improved popular opinion of the United States by more than 20 percent and enabled connections between headquarters, leaders, and teams that only mutual goals and efforts can produce.

These gains were consolidated, at least in the short term, by USCENTCOM and USARCENT personnel that supported the operation and had an enduring presence in the region in the form of after action reviews, updated standard operating procedures, and improved involvement in regional TSC with partnerships built during the operation in support of the GCC campaign plan. Following the 6-month operation, Expeditionary Strike Group-1 and the other elements of the Combined Disaster Assistance Center-Pakistan transitioned back to their normal mission requirements. Coalition Forces Command-Afghanistan was ultimately replaced by U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, as the NATO International Security Assistance Force mission to Afghanistan assumed the higher headquarters. USCENTCOM and USARCENT remained as the enduring partners in the region, highlighting the importance of continuity to consolidation of gains.

CONSOLIDATION OF GAINS DURING LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

7-12. During limited contingencies, the theater army supports operations in a JOA to consolidate gains continuously in order to maintain tempo and enable the transition from armed conflict. Activities to consolidate gains are conducted to eliminate the enemy's capability and will to resist and are essential to exploiting tactical success and maintaining the initiative. Like shaping actions, consolidation of gains is a continuous activity with varying levels of intensity and a variety of tasks, including stability, security, and offensive operations against bypassed enemy formations. Theater army continuously plans for and conducts consolidation of gains to reset the conditions for long-term deterrence and as the prelude to creating a new and improved security environment.

7-13. In the event of local government collapse, the theater army supports the establishment of transitional public security and governance and the restoration of essential services. The theater army is essential to the orderly transition of authority to appropriate U.S., international, interagency, or host-nation forces or agencies. Theater army and subordinate forces emphasize the establishment of transitional military authority that promotes or enhances post-conflict or post-crisis stabilization, resilience, civil security, and governance until the transfer of these activities to an appropriate authority.

7-14. The theater army must focus on transitioning rapidly to reinforce and retain positions of advantage gained during armed conflict. Positions of advantage exist in the physical, human, and information dimensions of the operational environment. Consolidation of gains requires friendly forces to retain these positions of advantage to deter a return to armed conflict.

7-15. The theater army is optimized for returning the theater to competition after armed conflict. Already organized for operations below armed conflict, the theater army resets the theater after cessation of hostilities and facilitates the return to competition on favorable terms. The theater army manages security cooperation, simultaneously protecting the delicate security situation by deterring escalation. The theater army seeks to transition areas under military control to appropriate host-nation civil or military authority in support of the JFC.

7-16. Based on the new security environment, the theater army revises its security cooperation plans and conducts security cooperation activities to build or restore partner (old and new) warfighting capabilities able to counter the adversary's renewed subversion campaign (reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, and irregular warfare). These security cooperation activities should influence the opinions and attitudes of the local population in ways that deter a return to armed conflict.

7-17. The theater army manages the uncertain security environment by ensuring combat power remains at appropriate levels within the theater to deter adversary aggression. The speed with which the theater army physically and virtually assists supported partner nations to restore stability and reestablish functioning security, safety, economic, and communications systems and infrastructure provides a cognitive window in which to conduct friendly information environment operations. Restoration of critical infrastructure returns an area to normalcy and helps to isolate adversaries from regaining popular support. The theater army also plans and conducts exercises and tests to demonstrate their capability and commitment to respond rapidly should escalation occur.

CONSOLIDATION OF GAINS DURING LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

7-18. During LSCO, the JTF and JFLCC manage consolidation of gains activities by designing and executing operations to shape security conditions in their OE in support of the JFC and given policy objectives. The theater army is integral to success and contributes to the campaign by providing responsive support from Army capabilities to the joint force, allies, and partners as needed. The theater army, as the enduring presence in the area, builds upon and exploits gains by the JTF and JFLCC after the joint force redeploys. The theater army avails itself of opportunities to develop deeper partner relationships, solidify basing and access agreements, and secure new sources and methods of intelligence collection, among other activities. These opportunities may occur inside the designated JOA or in the broader theater. Nevertheless, the theater army

takes timely advantage of these opportunities for future application in other operational contexts so as to maintain momentum and build upon what was accomplished during earlier operations.

7-19. The theater army anticipates and requests additional combat forces and functional capabilities and plans the mechanisms required to move those capabilities into theater. Critical to the consolidation of gains are consolidating activities that result in the establishment of transitional military authority and transitioning to civil authority. The theater army is the echelon responsible for establishing both. During the final phases of consolidating gains, the theater army retrogrades equipment, closes the JOA, plans and coordinates the redeployment of Army forces, and revises its long-term security cooperation plan for the new post-conflict security environment.

7-20. The transfer of an AO to a legitimate authority relieves the land force of area security and stability tasks and represents a transition from operations to consolidate gains to operations that shape the security environment and prevent conflict. As the theater army headquarters coordinates the movement of most Army forces out of theater, it resumes the tasks necessary to sustain the gains consolidated during LSCO. Conditions on the ground and resources available determine what security and cooperation tasks have priority.

7-21. Successful consolidation of gains activities in a specific operational area require the theater army to retrograde equipment, redeploy forces, and support the GCC long-term security cooperation plan in order to facilitate the transition from conflict to competition on more favorable terms and further consolidate gains during competition.

7-22. It is possible that Army forces occupy long-term garrisons to prevent a recurrence of hostilities, such as the occupation forces following the Second World War in Japan and Germany. Alternatively, there may be a more robust security cooperation arrangement involving training and equipping of forces, such as the arrangement in Kuwait following Operation DESERT STORM.

7-23. The following vignette demonstrates how the theater army supports operations to consolidate gains in LSCO. This example demonstrates how Third Army's presence in Kuwait and support following the Desert Storm campaign ensured stability and basing that led to the theater being set for operations in Iraq during the 1990s, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq during the opening stages of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Post Conflict Security Assistance in Kuwait

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM took place in a political environment marked by a global community, which colored the post-conflict environment. Prior to the war, the U.S. presence in the region primarily consisted of security assistance centered in Saudi Arabia.

In 1982, partially in response to the U.S. challenges faced during the Desert One operation in Iran, the U.S. established USCENTCOM as a unified command. At the same time, the Army reactivated Third Army as the ASCC for USCENTCOM and USARCENT. USARCENT was located in Fort MacPherson, Georgia. During the war, with USCENTCOM acting as the JTF headquarters, USARCENT served as their joint force land component command.

Following the conflict, given widespread destruction in Kuwait and a continuing threat from Iraq, USARCENT established a forward presence in Kuwait. This presence oversaw reconstruction efforts and vastly expanded the security assistance footprint in Kuwait. Although the U.S. military training mission in Saudi Arabia remained a vital element of advisory capacity in the region, USARCENT's expanded involvement in the region enabled Kuwait to rebuild its military infrastructure, reequip, and train.

USARCENT also enabled post-conflict operations to contain Iraq and influence Iraqi behavior, such as Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR in 1994, Operation VIGILENT SENTINEL in 1995, Operation DESRT STRIKE in 1996, Operation DESERT THUNDER in 1997, and Operation DESERT FOX in 1998. During each of these actions, USARCENT provided C2 of U.S. forces working to contain aggressive Iraqi posturing. The relationships built over the period following Operation DESERT STORM and during the enforcement period set the conditions for the rapid deployment and movement of U.S. forces at the onset of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003.

Chapter 8
Perform Joint Roles

Chapter 8 discusses the theater army performing the joint roles of a joint task force or joint force land component command. First, the chapter discusses the theater army design. Then it discusses the joint task force headquarters and examines historical examples and scenarios for which a theater army may be a possible headquarters source. Next, the chapter discusses the theater joint force land component command, a command designed to coordinate and synchronize land forces for the GCC. The chapter concludes with a discussion of LSCO.

THEATER ARMY DESIGN

8-1. The theater army is designed to support the joint force as the ASCC to the GCC. The theater army provides the Title 10 support (specifically Title 10 USC, Section 7013b) discussed in previous chapters, sets and maintains the theater, sets and supports operational areas, and provides continuity in actions to consolidate gains. A GCC may task the theater army to serve in a joint role or to form the nucleus of a joint headquarters. In addition, a GCC may task the theater army to form a theater joint force land component command, which is not in itself a joint role, but a means of improving synchronization and coordination among theater land forces. The theater army must be prepared to perform roles outside of its role as the ASCC to a GCC, despite being designed for only that role and the functions previously discussed. Although designed with a CCP, theater army utilization in joint roles requires the GCC to assume risk with respect to all other theater army functions.

8-2. The theater army is designed to fulfill the Army Service requirements in support of the specific GCC to which it is assigned. Army responsibilities to support joint forces and the GCCs are established by law under Title 10, and are further defined under related U.S. Army Regulations. Therefore, the Army cannot unilaterally decide which of its Title 10 responsibilities it will or will not support. The theater army's primary role is as ASCC to its assigned GCC. The theater army cannot abandon or ignore its ASCC responsibilities, even temporarily, which severely limits its capability to simultaneously C2 other joint operations.

8-3. Theater armies are organized under a standard TOE, which provides the capability to perform all statutory Service responsibilities in support of Army forces assigned to the GCC, as well as Army support to other Services, U.S. government agencies, and coalition forces, as directed by the GCC. A separate table of distribution and allowances resources each theater army specific to the GCC it supports.

8-4. Some AORs have large contingents of U.S. forces forward stationed or conducting training and other GCC-directed activities on a rotational basis. These conditions require a robust ASCC headquarters supported by an extensive communications network. Other theater army headquarters are supporting AORs and GCC requirements that might not include support for forward stationed U.S. forces and security cooperation requirements on a reduced scale. These theater armies might not be resourced for some of the same functions as others, and may not be manned with the same depth in some staff sections.

8-5. A GCC may designate the theater army as the theater joint force land component command. Although a joint force land component command in name, this headquarters is not a joint headquarters by design. It is specifically designed to coordinate and synchronize land forces for the GCC without an authorized JMD. Any joint augmentation required relies largely on ad hoc contributions from other services and the GCC and the relationship of the ASCC to the other service components in the GCC.

8-6. In support of the joint force, the ASCC is the Army's representative to the GCC and is the principal advisor on the requirements and employment of Army forces in support of the GCC campaign plan, including the determination of land forces required to support various CONPLANs and OPLANs. The ASCC role is

largely administrative, dominated by long-range planning, coordination of resources, and developing and implementing Army and GCC policies for land forces operating within the assigned AOR. While the theater army headquarters, like most headquarters, can be reorganized to perform roles beyond the scope of its original design, including C2 of Army or joint land forces conducting operations of limited duration, scope, scale, and intensity. Theater army is not designed to operate as the JTF, joint force land component command, or ARFOR for LSCO.

8-7. GCCs require their supporting ASCC headquarters to be resourced with an operational headquarters capability—an immediately deployable command post that can be dispatched to areas of concern or potential crisis action operations. The theater army TOE design includes a small, deployable CCP. The theater army's CCP provides the combatant commander with C2 capabilities for crisis response and operations limited in scale, scope, intensity, and duration. This command post is a relatively lean, deployable element of the theater army headquarters, designed specifically to meet GCC requirements for operations on land.

JOINT HEADQUARTERS

8-8. The Army may provide a headquarters for joint land operations in the form of a joint force land component command. In addition to a joint force land component command, the GCC may task a headquarters to form the nucleus of a JTF to fill the needs of an emergent crisis such as FHA, FDR, or a contingency operation.

8-9. A joint headquarters' mission, composition, and command relationships with its Service component are based on existing and potential enemies, the nature of the crisis, and the time available to generate forces to address the problem. The preferred option to form a JTF or joint force land component command is an Army corps. However, not all corps are forward deployed. In an instance where a corps is not readily available, the theater army may be required to assume joint headquarters responsibilities for limited contingencies over short durations.

8-10. The theater army CCP could be used to form the core headquarters of a JTF or joint force land component command. The GCC uses the theater army CCP as the core element of a JTF or joint force land component command and augments it with additional personnel, either Army or other Service, to accomplish the mission. Because of its established habitual internal staff working relationship, the CCP poses a viable option to support short notice or limited duration operations.

8-11. The GCC may task the ASCC to provide an operational assessment team or similar ad hoc element to establish the initial core of an appropriate joint headquarters. This situation typically occurs during FHA or FDR emergencies in areas where no U.S. forces are stationed. The theater army's CCP is capable of establishing a small forward command post to assess the situation, determine joint force requirements, and establish liaison with U.S. government and local authorities to coordinate relief operations. See JP 3-31 and JP 3-33 for more information on joint headquarters.

8-12. Regardless of the type of joint headquarters and the nature of the headquarters tasked with filling that joint role, the transition to a joint headquarters is a challenge that a single service headquarters must plan and prepare for. The following discussion concerns various planning considerations identified by previous joint headquarters staffs and should provide an overview of common practices to meet the challenges early and successfully.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

8-13. There are many challenges associated with forming and functioning as a joint headquarters. There is a significant cost in terms of manpower, equipment, training, time to form, and operating and leading in unified action partner operations. Commanders and staffs must plan for the transition and train the CCP to operate as the core command structure for a joint headquarters in order to accomplish the objectives as directed by the senior commander.

8-14. The headquarters element assigned to become a JTF or joint force land component command must plan on the transition to that type of headquarters. Having a base JMD linked to possible theater contingencies assists in this headquarters transition planning. Education of the ASCC and CCP staff on joint doctrine, terminology, the other agencies' abilities, and building an understanding of the inherent value brought by

other Services and agencies is important. Additionally, conducting exercises and training opportunities with joint and interagency partners can build interoperability and habitual relationships between organizations. Training should focus on what the other Services and agencies bring to the mission as well as their unique requirements.

8-15. The joint headquarters staff should reflect the size, composition, and capability of the assigned forces. The headquarters will be required to conduct detailed functional planning and execution. Normally the joint force land component commander will build his staff around the "core" of his existing Service headquarters with augmentees from the other Service components or multinational forces to provide the necessary expertise and representation. As an example, when USARCENT forms the joint force land component command for the USCENTCOM, it is augmented by more than 100 Marines.

8-16. The combined JTF/joint force land component command headquarters should be structured with a command group, command staff, a robust plans team (with near-, mid-, and long-term campaign planning), and an operations section (daily operations, information integration, operations synchronization, and coordination). There should be an interagency coordination and integration cell (for agencies that do not have a daily role in the combined JTF/joint force land component command headquarters operations). Included as well, is an intelligence fusion cell (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyber, information, and influencing operations) and a knowledge and information management section (network management, knowledge management, and assessments). (See appendix D of FM 3-94, JP 3-31, and JP 3-33 for further information).

EXAMPLES

8-17. The next section discusses examples of situations requiring the establishment of a JTF or joint force land component command. These two historical examples illustrate the formation of joint headquarters and the potential uses of the theater army and its CCP under similar circumstances. These examples examine theater army operations, both from the perspective of the ASCC in support of Army and joint forces operating in JOAs within an AOR and as an ARFOR or JTF directly commanding and controlling Army or joint forces conducting operations in a designated JOA. The theater army headquarters, with its organic CCP, is simply one of several tools available to a GCC to address the operational C2 requirements across an AOR.

United States Army North as Joint Force Land Component Command for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria

In response to Hurricane Harvey, commander, USNORTHCOM, designated commander, USARNORTH, in August 2017, as the joint force land component command in lieu of being designated a JTF commander. The use of USARNORTH, as a joint force land component command, had previously been utilized during "Superstorm Sandy" in 2012 and would remain the preferred organization construct for Hurricanes Irma and Maria. As the theater land component command, USARNORTH successfully supported transitions between multiple missions during one of the busiest hurricane seasons on record. With additional authorities authorized by the USNORTHCOM commander, USARNORTH, as the land component command, displayed the capabilities of that organization to accomplish its assigned mission within the joint doctrinal framework.

In August 2017, USARNORTH deployed its CCP forward headquarters, Task Force 51, to Katy, Texas, in support of Hurricane Harvey response operations while maintaining its main command post at USARNORTH headquarters in San Antonio, Texas. Working in conjunction with JTF Texas from the Texas National Guard, USARNORTH coordinated the federal military response in support of the National Guard and the lead federal agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In addition to employment of a large-scale response by U.S. Army forces, a Marine Corps special purpose Marine air-ground task force was attached under TACON to the joint force land component command for employment.

When Hurricane Irma landed in Florida in September 2017, Task Force 51 repositioned significant liaison elements to Florida in order to support JTF Florida from the Florida National Guard and FEMA disaster response operations.

While simultaneously dealing with recovery from Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, USARNORTH continued to support the United Nations General Assembly Meeting, fight wild fires in the western United States, and assist Mexico with earthquake recovery. When Category 5 Hurricane Maria caused catastrophic damage on Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, U.S. Fleet Forces Command was initially designated as the joint force maritime component command to provide a rapid response leveraging naval vessels with embarked Navy and Marine Corps forces.

As understanding of the size and scope of the land devastation in Puerto Rico increased, on 27 September 2017, the USNORTHCOM commander ordered the transition of responsibility as lead component from U.S. Fleet Forces Command joint force maritime component command to the USARNORTH joint force land component command. This included attachment, under TACON, of some remaining Marine Corps capabilities. Because of the devastation and challenges that resulted from Hurricane Maria, Lieutenant General Buchanan, the joint force land component command, and his main command post deployed to Puerto Rico. Despite the challenging and austere conditions, the joint force land component command supported JTF Puerto Rico and local and federal organizations to provide lifesaving support and assist in setting Puerto Rico on the path to recovery.

Despite numerous competing events throughout fall 2017, USARNORTH (as joint force land component command), enabled by authorities from the commander of USNORTHCOM, provided effective mission command of Title 10, DSCA forces to assist local, state, and federal organizations.

U.S. Army Central as Joint Force Land Component Command/JTF in Operation INHERENT RESOLVE

Following the 10 June 2014 seizure of the Northern Iraqi city of Mosul by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (known as ISIL), USCENTCOM was directed to develop military options to help the government of Iraq defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and restore its territorial integrity. USCENTCOM commander General Lloyd Austin's initial priorities included establishing a joint operations center with the Iraqi Security Forces, assessing Iraq's ability to defend its capital, and determining the requirements to rebuild Iraq's military capability for a counteroffensive to secure Iraq. On 24 June, General Austin designated the commander of U.S. Army Central, Lieutenant General James Terry, as the JFLCC and the supported commander for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE.

Over the next two months, the joint force land component command would incorporate staff augmentation and military capabilities to build a coalition of over 60 nations; deploy an additional joint operations center to Erbil (Joint Operations Center-North); establish Iraqi Security Forces; build partner capacity centers at Bessmaya, Taji, Erbil, and Al Asad; establish target engagement authority procedures for the employment of coalition air and long-range surface to surface fires; and assist the Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish forces in rescuing thousands of ethnic Yazidis as they fled from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Additional combat capabilities and enabling forces—sustainment, medical, and attack aviation—deployed to Iraq from formations already in Kuwait in support of Operation SPARTAN SHIELD under the OPCON of USARCENT as the theater army.

On 17 September, USCENTCOM designated the joint force land component command as the combined forces land component commander (CFLCC) and directed the development of a JMD to transition the CFLCC to a joint task force. The JMD was created to sustain a combined JTF while continuing theater army responsibilities for a command that was also designated as a combined joint force land component command by USCENTCOM for operations in the JOA. The timeframe from submission of the JMD until boots were on the ground was anticipated at 120 days from the Secretary of Defense's approval. To mitigate this gap, USARCENT was able to work with joint Service component commands in theater—another USARCENT standing relationship—to assist with joint fills until the respective Service headquarters could assess their requirements. Additionally, the JECC's joint planning support element provided plans augmentation in for both the CFLCC future plans and future operations cells.

On 24 September, the headquarters of the 1st Infantry Division was ordered to Iraq to replace USARCENT elements, then employed in Baghdad and Erbil as the U.S. elements of the joint operations centers. Now a subordinate JOA joint force land component command, designated joint force land component command-Iraq, the division headquarters arrived and assumed its mission in late October. By 17 October, the original CFLCC, the core provided by the USARCENT headquarters, had been redesignated as Combined Joint Task Force, Operation INHERENT RESOLVE.

By mid-2015, Operation INHERENT RESOLVE had stabilized the situation in Iraq to the point where imminent collapse was averted and newly regenerated Iraqi forces were back on the offensive against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. On 19 September 2015, USARCENT conducted a transfer of authority of the mission to

III Corps. In the fifteen months after designation as a joint force headquarters for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, USARCENT never relinquished any of its theater army responsibilities.

THEATER JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND

8-18. The theater joint force land component command is a joint force land component command in the sense that it provides commanders a means of coordinating and synchronizing land forces in the GCC under a single component command. However, the theater joint force land component command is not joint in the sense that it comes with a JMD that sources the command. Whatever augmentation the ASCC receives for the theater joint force land component command comes from the other Service components via coordination or due to GCC direction. The theater joint force land component command in concept and application provides authority to synchronize and coordinate the land domain.

8-19. Prior to the establishment of a JOA or a subordinate JFC, the GCC may designated a theater joint force land component command for coordination and synchronization of operations across the AOR. The most likely candidate for a theater joint force land component commander is the GCC's theater army.

8-20. Normally the theater joint force land component command will be limited to coordinating authority over other land components and provide the GCC with a means to synchronize land force activities. This includes the initial development of an accurate, timely, and persistent common operational picture of all land force activities occurring through the theater. This enhances effectiveness and creates efficiencies across the land domain.

8-21. The primary responsibilities of the theater joint force land component command may include but are not limited to—

- Developing the joint land operations plan.
- Developing OPLANs or operation orders in support of the GCC's concept of operations and optimizing the operations of task-organized land forces.
- Providing pre-hostility coordination with other theater-level functional components.
- Advising the GCC on the prioritization and allocation of land force capabilities.
- Maintaining a land domain common operational picture for inclusion into the joint operational common operational picture.
- Providing general support to subordinate commanders and JTFs within the AOR.
- Conducting and coordinating land component planning.
- Tracking key leader engagements.
- Tracking land-based operations, actions, and activities.
- Conducting JRSOI for land forces.
- Conducting personnel recovery in support of joint land operations and for isolating events occurring within assigned operational area or as tasked by the GCC.

8-22. In the case of joint operations of homeland defense and DSCA in CONUS, the designation of a joint force land component command to provide coordination for unity of effort between state-formed JTFs has become a recurring requirement. A theater joint force land component command commander, normally USARNORTH, is a command option used by USNORTHCOM to provide C2 for Title 10 land operations for DSCA. This option provides for a single Title 10 functional component headquarters capable of providing general support to achieve unity of effort between federal and state response forces. (See JP 3-31 for additional responsibilities)

8-23. To operationalize the theater joint force land component command, USARPAC established the theater joint force land component command Coordination Center. With the change of USINDOPACOM and Service component leadership over time, the theater joint force land component command role has evolved to commander, USARPAC, remaining as the theater joint force land component command but with reduced involvement of the other Service components with land activities as only supporting commands. Commander,

USARPAC, as the theater joint force land component command, does focus on coordination for DSCA as evidenced in support to Typhoon Yutu in Guam in November 2018, land-based homeland defense planning and exercises, and continued synchronization of land component activities. The challenge of unity of effort remains with only coordination authority for day-to-day operations, but in crisis response and contingency planning, USINDOPACOM and its Service components value the synchronization that the theater joint force land component command provides to maximize use of joint land capabilities.

LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

8-24. The theater army is not designed to operate as the JTF, joint force land component command, or ARFOR for LSCO. Rather, the theater army provides the Title 10 support discussed in previous chapters, sets and maintains the theater, sets and supports operational areas, and provides continuity for activities that consolidate gains (see Chapter 7). Were a theater army to assume responsibility for joint roles, the GCC would have to assume risk with respect to all other theater army functions. By contrast, the Army corps headquarters is designed to C2 land forces in LSCO and/or rapidly transition to a JTF headquarters for operations, and is the Army's headquarters of choice for these roles and missions. It should be noted that, while Army division headquarters have capabilities similar to those of the corps and can also serve as the base organization to build JTF or joint force land component command headquarters, the higher grade structure, larger comparative staff with appropriate skillsets, organic equipment, and lower dependencies of the corps makes it the headquarters of choice to form a JTF.

8-25. Under a certain very specific set of circumstances, the theater army could be the logical choice to form the joint force land component command for a limited duration LSCO. For example, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003, USCENTCOM remained the JFC with very heavy augmentation for the invasion of Iraq. In this case, the only logical choice for the component commands under the JTF were the existing service components of the GCC. With the creation of an operational command post, ARCENT/Third Army, as the ASCC/theater army to USCENTCOM, became the logical multi-corps CFLCC for the coalition. This, however, should serve as an exception to the preferred headquarters of choice for a JTF or joint force land component command in theater. Although Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was LSCO in form and function, the GCC had to assume risk in all other lines of effort, specifically Afghanistan, for the duration of the fight. As it was, the duration of the ground occupation of Iraq beyond 15 June 2003, necessitated the return of ARCENT to Kuwait. As its continued focus on Iraq placed all of the support provided by the ASCC to the JOA and the entire AOR at risk.

8-26. The theater army is designed to perform the functions of the ASCC to the GCC, including the Title 10, ADCON, common-user logistics, and Army executive agent responsibilities. These responsibilities extend to the support of any JOAs opened within the AOR, including theater opening, and ASOS.

8-27. As discussed in Chapter 4, Title 10 responsibilities consume the bulk of the staff and administrative capabilities of the theater army. Title 10 is the statutory and primary role of the ASCC, regardless of additional tasks or responsibilities in a contingency. Designation as a joint force land component command or JTF does not remove the Title 10 responsibility of the theater army. This is another primary reason that the preferred joint force land component command or JTF core headquarters, if an Army unit, is a corps.

8-28. LSCO often requires the Army to conduct land operations with multiple corps-sized formations, either as part of a mature theater of war or under a joint or multinational command. LSCO may require a field army or equivalent headquarters to C2 multiple Army corps and a Marine expeditionary force. Existing headquarters, such as a corps headquarters (with augmentation), could form the field army headquarters. (See Appendix A for more information about field armies).

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Appendix A

Field Army

This appendix discusses the field army. A field army is an echelon of command designed to employ multiple corps in operations. The appendix begins with an overview, continues with a discussion of field army roles and functions, discusses the field army in competition and conflict, and ends with the discussion of the army group to operationally C2 multiple tactical field armies.

FIELD ARMY OVERVIEW

A-1. A *field army* is an echelon of command that employs multiple corps, divisions, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades to achieve objectives on land (JP 3-31). Although it employs subordinate units during the course of operations, these units are provided by external Army and unified action partner sources based on the situation, the field army's role, and its mission. The field army is manned and equipped to perform the role of an ARFOR (with limited augmentation) within a joint force for campaigns and major operations.

A-2. Its most important Service role is as the ARFOR during the conduct of operations involving multiple corps-sized formations. The field army is best suited to serve as the joint force land component commander during these operations, but it requires augmentation to perform the role successfully.

A-3. When constituted, the field army provides Army and unified action partner forces with a headquarters capable of performing C2 across the range of military operations. The Army establishes a field army when a JFC or theater army commander perceives a requirement to C2 multi-corps operations. These situations occur when multiple corps-sized formations, including U.S. Army and multinational corps or a Marine expeditionary force, operate or are anticipated to operate in a single operational area.

A-4. Field armies are most likely to be constituted in theaters where adversaries have the capability of conducting LSCO. Currently, those regions include U.S. European Command and USINDOPACOM.

A-5. Field armies may be constituted in a variety of ways, including from a standing force structure or from a contingency headquarters constituted for a specific requirement. When constituted, field armies provide JFCs and allied organizations with additional capability and capacity to counter peer threats. During competition below armed conflict, they deter such threats by being prepared to transition to LSCO when the risk for immediate multi-corps LSCO is high. By focusing on activities that must occur within a subordinate operational area, a field army allows a theater army to maintain its AOR-wide orientation as the ASCC. With joint force augmentation, the field army may also perform joint roles during competition when operations are of such scope that the situation would exceed a corps or division's capability. During armed conflict, the field army could provide the basis for a joint force land component command with the right organizational design.

A-6. As a provisional Army headquarters, a field army does not have an approved organizational design. However, the field army may consist of a headquarters, headquarters company, and a special troops battalion. It may also have two or more corps, an attached ESC, and other attached combat enablers.

A-7. The field army is an operational headquarters. During operations, forces will be assigned or attached to it. Although it may employ subordinate units during operations, these units are provided by external Army and unified action partner sources based on the situation, and the field army's role and mission. When constituted, a field army is specifically tailored to mission requirements and designed to perform operational ARFOR tasks; it is the Army component to the JFC to which it is assigned. The field army can conduct land-based activities in competition against that adversary on behalf of the GCC and, due to its presence, is postured to transition to a warfighting headquarters should conflict occur.

A-8. However a field army is constituted, the GCC incurs risk in theaters with a peer adversary without a standing field army, an authorization document to create a field army, or a forward positioned corps. The time required to transition responsibilities from the theater army to a field army depends on how quickly additional capabilities can reach full operating capability. In OEs where an enemy has significant preclusion capabilities, this could be so long that it may not be possible to deny enemy operational and strategic objectives without incurring unacceptable costs. The same would likely be true if there were no forward positioned corps that could rapidly assume C2 of Army and other land forces within an operational area. However, when constituted, field armies provide JFCs and allied organizations with additional capability and capacity to counter peer threats.

EIGHTH ARMY IN KOREA

A-9. The U.S. Army currently fields one standing field army headquarters, the 8th, which is located in South Korea. The 8th U.S. Army is organized for the extremely mature nature of the Korean theater of operations, and for the robust U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance structure developed over the last 70 years. However, the 8th U.S. Army is an imperfect model for the wide range of activities and responsibilities required of a field army operating in another region, under vastly different conditions.

A-10. Although referred to as a field army, Eighth Army in Korea is serving as ARFOR to a subunified command. The situation on the Korean Peninsula illustrates an enduring military operation for which the United States established a subunified command (U.S. Forces, Korea) as the joint force headquarters, instead of a JTF. Until the situation in the Republic of Korea is further resolved, the U.S. Army will retain a unique structure on the Korean Peninsula. The Eighth Army serves as a forward deployed field army headquarters and the ARFOR to U.S. Forces, Korea or its successor joint and combined forces headquarters. The Eighth Army is configured and staffed to provide an operational capability for Army forces engaged in multinational operations. The Eighth Army remains under the ADCON of USARPAC for most Army Service functions.

THE ROLE OF THE FIELD ARMY

A-11. When constituted, the field army's role is to serve as the ARFOR in a subordinate operational area. Army doctrine distinguishes between the ARFOR of a combatant command and that of a joint force formed by the combatant commander. The ASCC of the combatant command is the ARFOR for the theater, and the Army component of the subordinate joint force, the field army, is the ARFOR for multi-corps operations in the subordinate operational area. The ASCC as the ARFOR maintains control of all Army units in the AOR until such time that control is passed to the field army. As part of controlling Army forces, the ARFOR maintains ADCON of Army forces, and it addresses service responsibilities such as coordinating ASOS. The field army may also and likely will perform the JFLCC role within the JTF, however as the senior Army headquarters within the JTF, it is the ARFOR for the JTF. See appendix B of FM 3-94 for more information on the ARFOR.

FUNCTIONS OF THE FIELD ARMY

A-12. Field armies may execute competition-related tasks as directed by the theater army. However, they primarily facilitate the transition to armed conflict by focusing on activities that must occur within an operational area. This allows the theater army to maintain its AOR-wide orientation as the ASCC. As the ARFOR, the field army performs up to seven functions;

- Execute C2 over multi-corps operations (see paragraph A-13).
- Execute ADCON in the area of operation (see paragraphs A-14 to A-15).
- Execute ASOS in the area of operation (see paragraphs A-16 to A-18).
- Assume directed Army, joint and multinational authorities and responsibilities (see paragraph A-19).
- Shape an assigned operational area (see paragraph A-20).
- Integrate unified action capabilities to support ULO (see paragraphs A-21 to A-22).
- Plan and coordinate for consolidation of gains in an assigned operational area (see paragraphs A-23 to A-24).

Execute Command and Control Over Multi-Corps Operations

A-13. The field army's ability to C2 multi-corps operations is what distinguishes it from other echelons. This function is vital to the joint and multinational force's ability to prevail in LSCO, and is central to the field army's ability to perform the ARFOR role and serve as a joint force land component command. Tasks that the field armies may perform while serving in a joint role to support this function include:

- Assume C2 of designated Army forces from the theater army when directed.
- C2 other Service or multinational land forces when assigned.
- Task-organize assigned forces.
- De-conflict tactical airspace.
- Coordinate operational-level sustainment.
- Coordinate AMD.
- Conduct area security operations.
- Synchronize operational movement.
- Synchronize decisive action to consolidate gains won through competition.
- Transition from competition to armed conflict.
- Prepare to conduct multi-corps ULO to prevail in LSCO.
- Prepare to conduct populace and resource control.

Execute ADCON in the Area of Operation

A-14. As the ARFOR, the field army commander may exercise ADCON over all Army forces in a JTF, including those subordinate to other components. Depending on the JTF organization, the field army commander may exercise OPCON of some or all Army forces assigned to the task force, and remain responsible for ADCON of those forces. However, the exercise of OPCON is a delegation of joint command authority and not a function of ADCON.

A-15. The theater army commander will specify the ADCON responsibilities of the ARFOR, with the theater army normally retaining control of RSOI, logistic support of the deployed force, personnel support, and medical support. Administrative responsibilities normally retained by the field army as the ARFOR include internal administration and discipline, training within the JOA, and Service-specific reporting. The theater army normally retains OPCON of Army sustainment and medical commands operating in the JOA. The theater army commander establishes an Army support relationship between the field army and these units. The ASCC and the field army monitor changes in joint organization carefully, and they may adjust ADCON responsibilities based on the situation. Responsibilities for both training and readiness are inherent in ADCON, and they are exercised by unit commanders for their units.

Execute Army Support to Other Services in the Area of Operation

A-16. The field army provides support to other services in the form of executive agent and lead Service responsibilities, inter-Service agreements, or Service support agreements. This is done to provide common item support in the form of capabilities or resources through common-user logistics or delegated executive agent responsibilities within a designated area of operation.

A-17. When executing ASOS, the field army coordinates with the theater army and JFC staff to determine joint requirements and identify responsibilities. Army support to other Services enables joint forces freedom of action and endurance by reducing redundancy and creating efficiency.

A-18. In order to fulfill these responsibilities, the field army commander focuses on operational- and tactical-level support involving combat power generation and sustainment during campaigns and joint operations. They match support and sustainment requirements for a campaign to the Army combat power capabilities that support the JFC's requirements. Tasks that the field armies may perform while serving in a joint role to support this function include:

- Provide and coordinate sustainment support to assigned U.S. forces.
- Anticipate requirements and develop plans for the employment of Army forces in limited contingency operations, crisis response, major operations, and campaigns.

- Support other government agencies as directed by a JFC.
- Provide sustainment and other directed support to multinational forces as required by the combatant commander.
- De-conflict tactical airspace.
- Coordinate AMD.
- Conduct area security operations.
- Integrate CEMA and space support into operations.
- Lead military deception efforts within the land domain.
- Synchronize cross-domain intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and information collection throughout the operational area.
- Manage the EMS within the operational area.
- Protect Army and unified action partner networks.
- Prepare to execute CWMD tasks.
- Assume directed Army and unified action partner authorities and responsibilities.

Assume Directed Army, Joint, and Multinational Authorities and Responsibilities

A-19. During the course of operations to shape the operational area, the theater army or a JFC may grant the field army commander with additional authorities or responsibilities to facilitate operations. This is especially common during the transition to armed conflict. Although the exact requirements depend on the circumstances, key tasks that field armies may perform to support this function include:

- Serve as the joint force land component command.
- Serve as the multinational headquarters.
- Assume additional directed Army authorities and responsibilities.
- Assume additional directed joint authorities and responsibilities.
- Assume military governance authorities and responsibilities.

Shape an Assigned Operational Area

A-20. During competition, field armies conduct operations to shape assigned operational areas. Although the field army's emphasis is on deterring armed conflict and facilitating the rapid transition from competition to LSCO against peer threats, the field army may also execute operations that achieve competition objectives when properly resourced by the theater army or JFC. Key tasks that field armies may perform to support this function include:

- Plan and prepare for LSCO.
- Refine and conduct detailed planning for major operations to achieve competition objectives.
- Refine and direct intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
- Execute operations to achieve competition objectives.
- Plan and execute flexible deterrent options and flexible response options (see JP 5-0, appendix F).
- Rehearse the transition from competition to LSCO.
- Execute C2 over multiple corps-sized formations and other assigned forces.

Integrate Unified Action Capabilities to Support Unified Land Operations

A-21. During conflict, Army forces within an operational area must integrate unified action partners to achieve objectives effectively. This requires Army forces to both support unified action while also leveraging their capabilities to enhance ULO. Moreover, they must also prepare to synchronize partner capabilities to prevail in armed conflict, if necessary.

A-22. The field army plays a vital part in integrating unified action capabilities within an operational area. Building upon the links that the theater army develops with unified action partners in the course of setting and maintaining the theater, the field army integrates these capabilities into its own combat power within

operational areas to present adversaries with multiple dilemmas, thus creating advantages over opponents. Key tasks that field armies may perform to support this function include:

- Integrate space support into operations.
- Synchronize operational-level ground maneuver with JFACC or ARFOR operations.
- Integrate maritime effects in support of land operations.
- Integrate effects from information-related capabilities to support land operations.
- Integrate CEMA activities to support land operations.
- Integrate unconventional forces into land operations.
- Lead military deception efforts within the land domain.
- Synchronize cross-domain intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and information collection throughout the operational area.
- Manage the EMS within the operational area.
- Protect Army, joint, and multinational networks.
- Liaise with unified action partners in the assigned operational area.
- Integrate unified action capabilities to consolidate gains within the operational area.
- Prepare to integrate land-based capabilities in support of unified action against peer threats.
- Prepare to execute CWMD tasks.

Plan and Coordinate for the Consolidation of Gains in an Assigned Operational Area

A-23. The field army directs and coordinates corps and division operations for consolidation of gains in the assigned operational area. This requires planning, coordination, and execution for the consolidation of gains throughout the operation. As part of this, consolidate gains activities may require the field army to employ forces that perform tasks to:

- Establish area security throughout subordinate AOs.
- Plan offensive and defensive operations to destroy or neutralize remaining threats and protect the civilian population and infrastructure.
- Conduct stability operations necessary to create conditions that allow for the transition to a legitimate authority.
- Request additional follow-on forces and capabilities as required.
- Recommend security force assistance to build the capability and capacity of host-nation security forces.
- Conduct information operations to favorably influence civilian attitudes toward friendly security forces and the eventual transition to legitimate authority.

A-24. As LSCO conclude, the field army reorganizes the AO into areas that facilitate the most rapid consolidation of gains. Operations primarily focus on defeating bypassed enemy forces and remnants, providing area security in high threat areas, and establishing stability in lower threat areas. Ideally, the field army task-organizes echelons to tasks that consolidate gains in the operational area, while coordinating transitions and long-term security cooperation initiatives with the theater army and unified action partners.

FIELD ARMY DURING COMPETITION

A-25. When constituted, field armies assist the theater army commander and JFCs with posturing the joint and multinational force for armed conflict. They do so by relieving the theater army from day-to-day C2 of Army forces operating within the AOR, and by executing competition tasks within the overall framework established by the GCC and the theater army. They provide JFCs with an optional land component command capability for the transition to armed conflict. This enables the theater army to focus on operational-level matters, and allows it to set the theater and set the AOR.

A-26. During competition the field army can deter threats and prepare to transition to LSCO when the risk for immediate multi-corps LSCO is high. With joint force augmentation, the field army may also serve as the JFLCC during competition, when operations are of such scope that the situation would exceed a corps or division's capability.

FIELD ARMY DURING CONFLICT

A-27. During armed conflict, the field army, as the ARFOR, may also serve as the joint force land component. As the joint force land component commander, the field army commander performs C2 of multiple corps to enable synchronization of their maneuver and effects across the land AO. The field army is best suited to serve as the joint force land component command during LSCO that involves multiple corps-sized formations against peer threats, because of its ability to include units of other Services or of allied forces and exercise operational as well as tactical responsibilities.

A-28. As the joint force land component command, the field army requires joint and coalition headquarters augmentation. However, once established, the field army as the joint force land component command becomes the supported commander within the land domain of the JOA. It will incorporate additional multinational units, and designate subordinate corps' AOs. The field army headquarters has the authority to designate target priorities, effects, and timing of fires in order to integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction within the land domain.

A-29. Field armies are primary units of operational maneuver, conducting the decisive operations of a land campaign. When operating as the land component of a joint force, field armies may be charged with planning and conducting operations.

A-30. Field army commanders employ subordinate corps to concentrate combat power, set the terms of battle, and exploit the outcome of tactical actions. Field armies and equivalent organizations are primarily operational headquarters. They may establish priorities for sustainment among their subordinate forces. In contingency operations, the field army may assume responsibility for the logistic support of army forces in the field. In such an operation, the field army would require the assignment of support organizations from the theater army or unified command (see JP 3-31).

ACTIVITIES TO CONSOLIDATE GAINS

A-31. The field army is primarily responsible for orchestrating the consolidation of gains while there is still a significant threat of violence. From the outset of a campaign, the field army plans, coordinates, and continually adjusts the conditions for a return to competition below armed conflict on more favorable terms. The goal of the field army is to immediately reinforce and secure positions of advantage across all domains and quickly reorient to a competitive posture against any residual threat. A corps assumes responsibility for consolidation of gains across the area of operations as the level of violence subsides and the number of committed friendly forces in the area of operations lessens to a corps or less.

A-32. The field army's role in consolidating gains lies mainly in planning, requesting, coordinating, and allocating the required resources and prioritizing efforts across the entire AO. Consolidation activities require additional combat power and should not be drawn from forces in the close and deep fight. The field army is the link for obtaining the additional Army and unified action partner capabilities needed by multiple corps to accomplish the specific activities and conclude operations within their subordinate areas. As Army forces depart the theater, the field army continues longer-term activities to consolidate gains as an enduring part of subsequent activities in the return to competition below armed conflict.

DURING CONSOLIDATION

A-33. During consolidation of gains, properly vetted host-nation military and civilian security forces are reconstituted to assume security roles. This transition is challenging, time consuming, and triggers changes to rules of engagement and other security policies, the development and execution of a comprehensive security force assistance plan, and potential task-specific changes in responsibility from the DOD to the Department of State. With host-nation personnel assuming more responsibility for security, the field army may transition from a joint force land component command to an Army-only unit and return to the control of theater army. As this occurs, U.S. and multinational forces are force tailored and task-organized for the new OE, and the AO is adjusted and reorganized accordingly.

ARMY GROUP

A-34. In the event of another world war or other total war scenario that involves the commitment of multiple field armies or other large forces in conflict across the globe against peer competition or in support of multiple campaigns, it could become necessary to establish an army group as a subordinate command to a JFC. Historically, multiple tactically employed field armies have fallen under the operational command of an army group.

A-35. An army group is a temporary headquarters situationally designed to command two or more field armies simultaneously during LSCO by the U.S. and its allies and partners.

A-36. As a provisional Army headquarters, an army group does not have an approved organizational design. However, as with the field army, the army group may consist of a headquarters, headquarters company, and special troops; a variable number of attached or assigned field armies corps; a TSC; a variable number of separate corps divisions normally attached to corps; and other attached or assigned combat enablers. If established, the army group would normally not have its own sustainment command; but skip echelon to rely primarily on the theater sustainment command of the theater army.

A-37. In LSCO, it is possible to have multiple field armies maneuvering tactically during operations that involve significantly high concentration of land forces. An army group can serve as the senior land command, joint force land component command or multinational land component command to a JTF, multinational commander, or a combatant commander, or can serve as a senior tactical headquarters when multiple army groups are necessary. As such, the army group commander would become the primary operational land commander coordinating directly with other Service or functional components.

A-38. During World War II, it became necessary for the United States to form army groups to command multiple field armies across the allied forces in Europe. The Southern Group of Armies (U.S. 6th Army Group) commanded U.S. Seventh Army and French First Army. 21st Army Group commanded British Second Army, Canadian First Army, and U.S. 9th Army. 12th Army Group commanded U.S. First Army and U.S. Third Army, eventually adding U.S. Ninth Army and U.S. Fifteenth Army by the end of the war, ultimately becoming the largest U.S. formation in history with over 1 million Soldiers under the command of General Omar Bradley. In the Mediterranean theater of operation, U.S. Army General Mark Clark commanded allied land forces in Italy with the 15th Army Group composed of the U.S. Fifth and British Eighth Armies.

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Appendix B

Employment of the Contingency Command Post

This appendix describes the employment of the CCP. The appendix begins with an overview of CCP roles, capabilities, limitations, and missions. It concludes with a discussion on the different types of missions the CCP can fulfill.

CONTINGENCY COMMAND POST ROLES

B-1. With augmentation, the CCP has the ability to serve as a—

- JTF headquarters.
- Joint force land component command and/or ARFOR for operations limited in scale and scope.

B-2. For both roles, the CCP would require a significant amount of augmentation for additional Army capabilities and staff capacity, as well as from other Services and interagency partners. The GCC may provide joint capabilities for communications, planning, operations, logistics, knowledge management, intelligence support, or public affairs to the CCP in its transition into a joint role through the JECC (see the JECC homepage or the link in the references for more information). Planners must also consider other factors, such as linguist support, multinational representation in coalitions, and liaison requirements to name a few. See Chapter 8 of this ATP for more information on the theater army in joint roles, JP 3-31 for more information on joint land operations, and JP 3-33 for information on forming a joint task force headquarters; see FM 3-94 and TC 6-6 for more information on transitions and transitioning to a joint force headquarters.

CONTINGENCY COMMAND POST CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

B-3. The CCP can perform all required tasks and functions for commanding and controlling limited contingency operations 24 hours a day, seven days a week, within limitations. The CCP is designed to deploy its organic personnel and equipment by C-130 aircraft. However, some theater army CCPs are resourced differently and have different deployment capabilities. The ability to deploy quickly to any area within the AOR maximizes the CCP's utility. The CCP also has the capability to deploy a small assessment team to determine the operational requirements of a crisis, disaster, or other contingency.

B-4. The CCP commander can C2 two to five subordinate units up to brigade size. The CCP can increase its span of control for specific mission requirements with augmentation from other theater army command posts' theater troops or joint and interagency organizations, as appropriate. If the theater army commander is commanding the CCP, then the theater army may be employing the CCP like a forward command post; the theater army commander is the JFLCC and the GCC is acting as the joint task force commander. In this case, the theater army would require significant augmentation and staff reorganization to execute its day-to-day responsibilities under Title 10 and the GCC.

B-5. The CCP staff requires augmentation to access and employ joint fires. The combatant command, joint, or Service headquarters provide other joint capabilities and augmentation if necessary. The CCP coordinates additional required capabilities through the MCP.

B-6. The headquarters support company provides the administrative and sustainment support for the CCP. This company provides field feeding, supply, sanitation, field service medical treatment, and field service maintenance to the deployed CCP. The CCP depends on the theater army's headquarters and headquarters battalion for higher echelon support beyond the capability of the headquarters support company.

B-7. The CCP commander cannot exercise C2 for protracted military operations or combat operations unless appropriately augmented or reinforced. A variety of sources can provide the needed augmentation,

including the MCP, the GCC staff, other Service component commands, and a JMD request. As a planning factor, the CCP may effectively operate without augmentation for a maximum of 30 days of continuous operations, depending on the situation. The CCP requires support for deployment. While it can be deployed by C-130, it requires assistance loading and unloading the aircraft, as well as ground transportation to the deployment facility and from the port of entry in the area of employment.

B-8. The CCP can conduct operations of limited scope (range of activities), scale (dimensions of the AO, number of units, and size of forces), complexity (number of simultaneous, inter-related activities), and intensity (speed, tempo, degree of lethality or destruction within a given timeframe). The CCP must receive augmentation and be reinforced or relieved if the requirements exceed previously stated limitations. The CCP provides the GCC and the theater army commander with a limited, organic operational C2 capability. It is not, however, the only or the preferred tool for all contingencies.

B-9. The CCP depends on the theater army MCP for future planning capability, intelligence support, sustainment coordination, special staff functions, and tailored staff support, as required, for the conduct of military operations within the GCC's AOR. Although the CCP actively participates with the MCP planning staff in planning, the MCP normally produces the operation orders, and the CCP focuses largely on controlling the execution of the plan, including short-term assessment of operations. Additionally, the command relationships under which the CCP is employed will likely change its relationship with the MCP because the CCP will most likely detach to deploy and fill a joint role while the theater army retains its ARFOR responsibilities. The implication is that the CCP may require a support relationship from the theater army MCP to benefit from reachback support or another arrangement must be made by the appropriate authority.

B-10. The CCP requires support of the theater signal command for up to secret network transport capability and network operations. Based on specific mission requirements, the theater signal command provides tailored communication support teams to support the CCP. The CCP has very limited communications capability. The CCP communications capability is meant to support assessment teams deployed from the CCP at most. The CCP does not have organic capacity for unclassified and secret digital communications for the entire CCP and no organic capability for top secret or sensitive compartmented information storage or communications.

B-11. With a small intelligence cell, the CCP relies upon the theater-level military intelligence brigade and the intelligence enterprise as a whole for regionally focused intelligence collection, analysis, and production. Additionally, the CCP depends on the military intelligence brigade for expeditionary SATCOM for Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System network connectivity, if required by the mission. The CCP depends on the military intelligence brigade for top secret and sensitive compartmented communications and information system support.

B-12. The CCP depends on outside organizations for security and sustainment. The headquarters and headquarters company deploy with the CCP to provide supervision over the security detail. The security personnel for that detail come from outside the organization. The CCP has no organic capability for transportation, maintenance, fueling, feeding, life support, or medical support. This support must either be provided in augmentation or through operational contract support.

B-13. Figure B-1 on page B-4 depicts a notional JTF headquarters with CCP capabilities and capacities overlaid to show other types of capabilities and capacities that planners should consider when planning to employ the CCP in a joint role. Planners must consider which capabilities at what capacity will be driven by mission requirements. The organization of the joint force headquarters will vary from one mission to another, however some common organizations that provide capability include, but are not limited to—

- The joint enabling capabilities command. It provides global, rapidly deployable, temporary joint expeditionary capabilities across the range of military operations to assist in the initial establishment, organization, and operation of joint force headquarters.
- National intelligence support. It is sourced from intelligence and communications experts from across the national intelligence communications.
- The Defense Threat Reduction Agency. It integrates, synchronizes, and provides expertise, technologies, and capabilities to safeguard the United States and its allies from global weapons of mass destruction and improvised threats.

- The Joint Information Operations Warfare Center. It provides information-related subject matter expertise and advice to the joint staff and combatant commands and develops and maintains a joint information assessment framework that measures and reports performance of information-related capabilities supporting joint operations.
- The Joint Communications Security Monitoring Activity. It provides information security monitoring and analysis support to JTFs.
- The Joint Warfare Analysis Center. It assists in preparation and analysis of joint OPLANs and Service chiefs' analysis of weapons effectiveness.




Figure B-1. Notional joint task force staff organization compared to CCP capability to provide core of, or augmentation, to headquarters

B-14. Some positions that planners may consider in planning staff augmentation to build a joint force headquarters include, but are not limited to—

- Command senior enlisted leaders (equivalent to Army command sergeants major).
- Principal staff officers.
- Political advisors or foreign policy advisors.
- Interagency liaisons.
- Coalition members.
- Other liaison officers as required.
- The commander's action group or commander's initiative group.
- Directorate executive officers.

CONTINGENCY COMMAND POST MISSION TYPES

B-15. The CCP is designed to control small-scale contingencies and other types of operations limited in terms of scale, scope complexity, intensity, and duration. For employment, it will require augmentation for transportation, fuel, maintenance, life support, and other situational requirements. A general planning factor for employment is up to 30 days of continuous 24-hour operations, controlling two to five subordinate organizations. The size of the organizations the CCP is designed to control is battalion and brigade level, though with the appropriate commander and augmentation in the CCP, it could command any echelon of organization. The reason for the 30-day planning factor is the lack of depth in each of the staff functions across the CCP. At the end of 30 days of continuous day and night operations, the staff will simply be exhausted from the tempo of operations and present increasing amounts of risk as a consequence. The CCP can be employed for longer periods with more significant augmentation for staff capability and endurance. As designed, the CCP can be employed in response to seven types of operations:

- Noncombatant evacuation operations.
- CBRN response.
- FHA and FDR.
- DSCA.
- Initial stages of peace operations.
- Theater security cooperation and building partner capacity.
- Respond to crisis and transition to combat operations.

B-16. The CCP will generally be employed under a joint force commander when employed in support of noncombatant evacuation, CBRN response, FHA and FDR, or peace operations. In these cases, the CCP's command relationship to the theater army will change. It will become a separate organization (JTF or joint force land component command) and take on new authorities in its joint role. The CCP will no longer have access to its habitual support from the theater army without specific provisions and authorities. The CCP will require support from theater enablers for transportation, fuel, maintenance, security, life support, and other capabilities that are not organic to the CCP. This can be provided through support relationships or operational contract support.

B-17. If the CCP is employed in a theater security cooperation or building partner capacity mission, then it will likely retain its command relationship with the theater army headquarters. In this case, the CCP retains access to various types of support, to include transportation, funding, and MCP staff reachback. This is especially important as the CCP is reliant on the MCP for long-range planning, assessment capability, and special staff functional support in its organic relationship.

B-18. Theater army planners and CCP staff must be able to make planning adjustments according to the differences between employment in a joint role versus an Army role. While employment in a joint role is the bulk of the discussion on the CCP, the CCP is most frequently employed in a theater security cooperation mission.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

B-19. Noncombatant evacuation operations are conducted by the DOD to assist in evacuating U.S. citizens and nationals, DOD civilian personnel, and designated persons (host-nation and third country nationals) whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven, when directed by the Department of State (JP 3-68). The CCP can respond to noncombatant evacuation operations in permissive, uncertain, and hostile OEs. This response can include missions involving limited combat and security operations (limited in terms of scale, scope, complexity, intensity, and duration). See JP 3-68 and ATP 3-05.68 for more information on noncombatant evacuation operations.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR RESPONSE

B-20. CBRN response can be described generally as the overarching U.S. government's capability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from the effects of a man-made or natural CBRN incident (JP 3-41). The CCP can provide the initial control for CBRN response operations. Specifically, the CCP is trained and ready to control CBRN teams, civil affairs, and sustainment enabler capabilities as part of a larger government response to a CBRN event.

B-21. Domestic CBRN response is a type of support provided within the DSCA mission conducted by DOD forces to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs. International CBRN response (known as ICBRN-R) is assistance provided by the U.S. government to respond to the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRN incident (including the release of toxic industrial materials [known as TIMs]) on foreign territory. DOD CBRN response includes immediate life-saving measures for the affected host-nation population, U.S. citizens, armed forces abroad, and its friends and allies to minimize human casualties and provide temporary associated essential services. See JP 3-41, FM 3-11, and ATP 3-11.41 for CBRN response; see Appendix C of this publication, ATP 3-28.1, and JP 3-28 for more information on DSCA.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF

B-22. The CCP has the ability to C2 FHA and FDR, including those in nonpermissive OEs requiring limited combat or security operations (limited in terms of scale, scope, complexity, intensity, and duration). The CCP can rapidly deploy an assessment team to assess FHA and FDR needs for the theater army or GCC. On order, it can deploy the rest of the command post. A CCP receives additional liaison teams to coordinate with U.S. government agencies, host-nation authorities, and international organizations when conducting disaster relief operations. See JP 3-29 for more information on FHA or FDR.

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

B-23. The CCP can C2 forces to provide DSCA that are limited in scale, scope, complexity, intensity, and duration. The CCP can deploy assessment teams to survey the mission area and coordinate for necessary military capabilities to support the civil mission. On order, the theater army can deploy the remainder of the CCP. The CCP receives additional liaison teams to coordinate with U.S. government agencies when providing DSCA. See JP 3-28 for more information on DSCA.

PEACE OPERATIONS

B-24. The CCP directs subordinate elements in execution of the initial phases of peace operations (that are limited in scope, scale, complexity, intensity, and duration). Peace operations normally involve the deployment of significant military forces for extended periods (as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Sinai) and exceed a CCP's capabilities. However, the CCP's ability to provide immediate response forces lends itself to a limited role CCP in peace operations. This particularly applies when the immediate insertion of U.S. military forces is required to separate two or more antagonists who have consented at some level to cease operations. The command must augment the CCP with a headquarters more capable of conducting sustained operations for consequence management or relieve it with another more capable organization. See ATP 3-07.31 and JP 3-07.3 for more information on peace operations.

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION AND BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

B-25. In support of theater security cooperation and building partner capacity, the CCP will usually control selected Army elements participating in joint and combined exercises with land forces of partner nations. The CCP acts either as an exercise control headquarters or as a participating unit replicating the command post of another Army warfighting headquarters. The CCP can provide a command post with staff capabilities tailored to the requirements of specific bilateral war games, simulations, and command post exercises that focus on building specific partner capacity areas of concern. These capabilities provide an opportunity to promote interoperability between U.S. and multinational military forces. For example, these capabilities promote both forces using common doctrine and standard operating procedures. The CCP can also provide the nucleus of a tailored command post for Army, joint, or multinational exercises, including joint augmentation from other Services. See ATP 3-07.10 for advising foreign security forces, ATP 3-96.1 for security force assistance brigade operations, FM 3-22 for Army support to security cooperation, and JP 3-20 for a broader discussion on security cooperation.

REACT TO CRISIS AND TRANSITION TO WAR

B-26. In the event of a crisis escalating towards armed conflict, a CCP may serve as the initial basis for a land component command until relieved by a more capable headquarters. The transition from crisis through escalation to armed conflict and war can be abrupt and unexpected. Often, there is insufficient time to form a JTF and components. In such an event, a CCP may serve as a short-term solution to controlling combat forces in the early stages of a conflict and enable the transition to LSCO. The CCP is not resourced to serve as the core of a joint force land component command or JTF in such a scenario, though they may be absorbed by the headquarters that relieves it, subject to the authorization by the GCC and theater army commander.

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Appendix C

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

This appendix discusses Army forces supporting civil authorities. The appendix begins with a discussion of federal resources provided as DSCA and concludes with an examination of concerns and planning considerations for C2 of Army forces in a DSCA mission.

ROLE OF DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

C-1. Although exclusive to USARNORTH and USARPAC, the role of DSCA is a critical role filled by the theater army. Usually following declaration of a disaster area, DSCA missions provide military forces, DOD civilians and contractors, and National Guard forces to support civil authorities.

C-2. DSCA is support provided by federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, Army Reserve forces, and National Guard forces in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. National Guard forces are used when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32 status or when federalized.

Note. The term "National Guard" refers to the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, the Army National Guard of the U.S., and the Air National Guard of the United States.

C-3. The military plays a vital role in homeland defense and DSCA missions. A key difference between the two missions is that normally the DOD is the lead agency for homeland defense, and the DOD conducts DSCA missions in support of another primary agency.

C-4. Usually, the commitment of federal military forces for DSCA missions follows a disaster declaration under the Stafford Act. A civil authority, usually a FEMA representative or a federal coordinating officer, coordinates with the defense coordinating officer to prepare a formal request for assistance and submit it to the DOD executive secretary. However, another federal agency may request federal military support. In addition, the President may bypass the usual request process and order the DOD to provide support. See JP 3-08 for the usual process for mission assignment for federal forces.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES

C-5. The Secretary of Defense specifies the command relationship—either OPCON or attached—of federal military forces to the gaining combatant command. The Secretary of the Army may direct modifications to ADCON; if not, ADCON remains with the providing Army headquarters. Command arrangements for federal (Title 10) forces are adjusted to accommodate requirements.

C-6. If ordered by the President, the Secretary of Defense may activate certain National Guard and Army Reserve forces for federal service. Federalized National Guard forces pass to the OPCON of the gaining combatant commander. Federalized Reserve and National Guard forces conducting DSCA in federal service (Title 10 status) become ADCON to the gaining ASCC—usually USARNORTH. However, the ASCC coordinates with the providing adjutant general to continue as much of the ADCON as feasible through the respective states.

C-7. If relatively few federal units are needed, the JFLCC may place them under OPCON of the defense coordinating officer. The JFLCC provides the defense coordinating officer with any additional assets needed.

The defense coordinating officer coordinates missions with the federal coordinating officer and issues orders to the unit commander or commanders.

C-8. It may be necessary to utilize a dual status commander when Title 10 and Title 32 military forces are simultaneously providing DSCA support. A dual status commander is a commissioned officer of the Regular Army or Air Force or a federally recognized ARNG officer authorized by the Secretary of Defense, with the consent of the applicable governor of a state, to exercise command on behalf of, and receive separate orders from a, state chain of command. A commander can only be a dual status commander of the state he or she is affiliated with. In other words, there cannot exist multi-state dual status commanders as a National Guard officer holds commission in only one State's National Guard. Prior to any support request for a dual status commander, a standing memorandum of agreement between the State and DOD is required. For the activation of a dual status commander, the support request process begins with the State Governor providing his or her consent to have a pre-identified trained and qualified officer appointed as dual status commander. The process should coordinated through the military chain of command from the State adjutant general to the commander, USNORTHCOM, and chief, National Guard Bureau. A recommendation for approval of the dual status commander will be provided to the Secretary of Defense via the CJCS and Assistant Secretary of Defense Homeland Defense & America's Security Affairs. With the Governor's consent and the Secretary of Defense's authorizations, the dual status commander is activated. Upon notification (verbal or written) that a dual status commander has been authorized, Joint Force Headquarters–State releases State Command Orders for the appointed dual status commander, if required, and the North American Aerospace Defense Command and USNORTHCOM Manpower and Personnel Directorate provides the federal (Title 10) orders. See JP 3-28 for more information on DSCA.

COMBATANT COMMAND ORGANIZATION

C-9. The President and Secretary of Defense command federal military forces through the combatant commands. Two GCCs have primary DSCA responsibilities: USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM. The other combatant commands provide capabilities to USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM for DSCA when directed by the Secretary of Defense. USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM maintain several standing joint task forces that have primary missions associated with DSCA.

C-10. Two GCCs—USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM—have responsibility for DSCA. Both USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM have standing task forces directly supported by their assigned ASCCs. Most DSCA falls to USNORTHCOM with responsibility for the 48 states of CONUS, Alaska, and the U.S. possessions in the Caribbean. USINDOPACOM accomplishes DSCA missions in Hawaii and U.S. territories and possessions in the Pacific Ocean. The responsibility for DSCA does not directly correspond with an AOR.

C-11. Concurrently with the support request to the Joint Director of Military Support, the appropriate combatant command—either USNORTHCOM or USINDOPACOM—develops the concepts of operations and support and submits a request for forces to the Joint Staff. The Secretary of Defense designates the supported combatant command and any supporting combatant commands. When validated, the request for forces becomes an order to the supporting combatant command to provide the forces. Based on Army force generation (known as ARFORGEN), the ASCC coordinates with the DA and FORSCOM (for most Army units) concerning required capabilities and appropriate ASCCs.

UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND ORGANIZATION

C-12. USNORTHCOM anticipates and conducts homeland defense and DSCA involving federal military forces within its AOR to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests. According to the CJCS standing execute order for DSCA (known as the CJCS DSCA EXORD) the commander, USNORTHCOM, has the authority to alert and prepare to deploy assigned and allocated forces in support of a primary agency such as FEMA. The commander, USNORTHCOM may request, deploy, and employ selected forces upon notification from the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense, in support of a validated request for assistance from a primary agency. USNORTHCOM may deploy a situational awareness team as an advance joint liaison element.

Army Service Component Command Assigned to United States Northern Command

C-13. USARNORTH is the ASCC and theater army assigned to USNORTHCOM. Additionally, USNORTHCOM designates USARNORTH as the standing joint force land component command for the USNORTHCOM AOR. Serving as both the ASCC and standing joint force land component command, USARNORTH commands and controls federal military forces conducting DSCA, homeland defense, and theater security cooperation. USARNORTH maintains a MCP based at Fort Sam Houston and a CCP capable of operating as a JTF with augmentation. The CCP is organized for rapid land or air deployment anywhere in the USNORTHCOM AOR. The CCP has communications systems compatible with joint and interagency partners that use satellite links. In response to an incident, USARNORTH typically deploys the CCP near the joint field office.

C-14. The defense coordinating officers and defense coordinating elements for all ten FEMA regions are assigned to USARNORTH. (Figure C-1 illustrates USNORTHCOM and USARNORTH organization for DSCA.)




Figure C-1. Example of USNORTHCOM and USANORTH organization

Standing Joint Task Forces Assigned to United States Northern Command

C-15. Joint Task Force–Civil Support is a standing JTF headquarters assigned to USNORTHCOM and under the operational control of USARNORTH. It plans and integrates DOD support for CBRN incidents. During support for CBRN incidents (this support includes CBRN consequence management), Joint Task Force–Civil Support forces consist mainly of defense CBRN response force units as provided to USNORTHCOM. The commander, USNORTHCOM, deploys Joint Task Force–Civil Support to establish control of federal military forces supporting a CBRN incident. USNORTHCOM may deploy Joint Task Force–Civil Support to the USINDOPACOM AOR to provide CBRN incident support, when requested.

C-16. Joint Task Force–North is a standing joint task force assigned to USNORTHCOM and under the operational control of USARNORTH. It employs military capabilities in support of federal civilian law enforcement agencies in the homeland.

C-17. Joint Task Force–Civil Support and Joint Task Force–North are under operational control of USARNORTH. Joint Task Force–Civil Support and the USARNORTH CCP can quickly form as a joint task force to C2 federal forces. The joint force land component command, designated as the main supported effort, commands and controls federal military forces and joint task forces operating in small- and medium-scale DSCA missions.

C-18. Joint Task Force-Alaska, headquartered at Elmendorf Air Force Base, is a subordinate command of USNORTHCOM. It is composed of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and DOD civilian specialists. Joint Task Force-Alaska's mission is to deter, detect, prevent, and defeat threats within the Alaska JOA to protect U.S. territory, citizens, and interests, and as directed, conduct DSCA. Within its operational area, Joint Task Force-Alaska plans and integrates DOD homeland defense efforts and provides DSCA to civilian agencies such as FEMA.

C-19. The Joint Force Headquarters–National Capital Region plans, coordinates, and maintains situational awareness in the National Capital Region to safeguard the Nation's capital.

C-20. Other allocated or theater-committed military assets for homeland defense and DSCA include a theater sustainment command, an AMD command, a contracting support brigade, and a human resources command.

U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND ORGANIZATION

C-21. USINDOPACOM conducts DSCA in Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. territories within its AOR. USINDOPACOM conducts DSCA through assigned Service components and designated functional components. It has one standing joint task force (Joint Interagency Task Force–West) that supports civilian law enforcement agencies. It can also activate Joint Task Force–Homeland Defense to perform DSCA and homeland defense missions.

C-22. According to the standing CJCS execute order for DSCA, the commander, USINDOPACOM has the authority to alert and prepare to deploy assigned and allocated forces in support of a primary agency. The commander, USINDOPACOM, may request, deploy, and employ forces upon notification from the CJCS and Secretary of Defense, in support of a validated request for assistance from a primary agency. See JP 3-28 for more information on the CJSC DSCA execute order.

Army Service Component Command Assigned to United States Indo-Pacific Command

C-23. USARPAC is the ASCC and theater army assigned to USINDOPACOM. USARPAC commands Army forces in the Asia-Pacific region. USARPAC includes approximately 80,000 Soldiers spanning from the Northwest Coast and Alaska to the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan. In addition, USINDOPACOM has designated USARPAC as the theater joint force land component command for the USINDOPACOM AOR.

C-24. USARPAC is engaged throughout the Asia-Pacific region, providing trained and ready combat and enabling forces and playing a key role in USINDOPACOM's theater security programs. USARPAC provides training support to ARNG and USAR forces in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and American Samoa, as well as FHA and DSCA.

Standing Joint Task Forces Assigned to United States Indo-Pacific Command

C-25. USINDOPACOM's standing joint task force, Joint Interagency Task Force–West, is the executive agent for federal military support to civilian law enforcement agencies for counterdrug and drug-related activities. This joint task force detects, disrupts, and dismantles drug-related transnational threats in Asia and the Pacific. Joint Interagency Task Force–West supports civilian law enforcement agencies and performs other activities to protect U.S. security interests in the homeland and abroad.

FEDERAL MILITARY COMMAND

C-26. Federal forces providing DSCA remain under the command of the President. Command is exercised through the GCC.

C-27. For any federal force operating in the USNORTHCOM AOR, the joint force land component command (USARNORTH) determines the required capabilities and the appropriate command relationships, depending

on the situation. However, in the USNORTHCOM AOR, the commander, USNORTHCOM, identifies the base support installation.

C-28. Usually, USNORTHCOM directs USARNORTH—as the standing joint force land component command—to deploy a CCP or JTF to provide C2 for federal forces accomplishing DSCA missions. The joint force land component command is designated as the main supported effort. In a large response, separate JTFs could be employed simultaneously, under OPCON of the joint force land component command. Should a catastrophic event occur, a corps headquarters could become the main supported effort, with the joint force land component command under OPCON of the commander, USNORTHCOM. In that case, the joint force land component command sets the theater and provides theater sustainment.

C-29. Both USNORTHCOM and USARNORTH routinely deploy situational assessment teams to disaster areas in advance of a decision to commit federal military forces. These teams deploy to the incident area and come under the operational control of the defense coordinating officer. The defense coordinating officer facilitates coordination and information sharing between the assessment teams and the various emergency support functions. If required, the defense coordinating officer coordinates for information sharing among the assessment team, the state emergency operations center, and the joint force headquarters-state. Once an assessment team provides its findings to its parent headquarters, it becomes part of the defense coordinating element. As part of the defense coordinating element, assessment teams continue to provide situation updates to their former headquarters through the defense coordinating officer's situation report.

C-30. USNORTHCOM or USARNORTH also sends liaison teams to DOD installations nearby to assess the potential basing requirements. If deployment of federal forces is likely, USARNORTH deploys a CCP to the vicinity of the joint (or multi-agency) field office. From there, the CCP usually coordinates requirements between the defense coordinating officer and USARNORTH, assists the defense coordinating element, and begins tying in command of federal military forces with the joint field office.

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAMDC	Army Air and Missile Defense Command
ACOS	assistant chief of staff
ABCANZ	American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand
ADCON	administrative control
ADP	Army doctrine publication
AHS	Army Health System
AMD	air and missile defense
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
AR	Army regulation
ARCENT	United States Army Central Command
ARCYBER	United States Army Cyber Command
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARSTRAT	United States Army Strategic Command
ARSOF	Army special operations forces
ASCC	Army Service component command
ASOS	Army support to other Services
ATP	Army techniques publication
BCD	battlefield coordination detachment
C2	command and control
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive
CCDOR	combatant commander's daily operational requirements
CCP	contingency command post
CEMA	cyberspace electromagnetic activities
CFLCC	combined forces land component commander
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)

CONPLAN	concept plan
CONUS	continental United States
CP	command post
CWMD	countering weapons of mass destruction
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
DODIN-A	Department of Defense Information Network-Army
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
EMS	electromagnetic spectrum
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
ESC	expeditionary sustainment command
FA	field artillery
FDR	foreign disaster relief
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FORSCOM	United States Army Forces Command
G-1	assistant chief of staff, personnel
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-2X	assistant chief of staff, human intelligence
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4	assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-5	assistant chief of staff, plans
G-6	assistant chief of staff, signal
G-8	assistant chief of staff, financial management
G-9	assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
GCC	geographic combatant commander
IMCOM	Installation Management Command
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6	communications system directorate of a joint staff
JDDOC	joint deployment and distribution operations center
JECC	Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (United States Transportation Command)
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JIIM	joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
JMD	joint manning document
JOA	joint operations area

JP	joint publication
JTF	joint task force
LOGCAP	logistics civil augmentation program
LSCO	large-scale combat operations
MCP	main command post
MEB	maneuver enhancement brigade
MEDCOM (DS)	medical command (deployment support)
MLRS	multiple launch rocket system
MTOE	modified table of organization and equipment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OE	operational environment
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
PSYOPS	psychological operations
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
SATCOM	satellite communications
SDDC	Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SECARMY	Secretary of the Army
SJFHQ-E	standing joint force headquarters for elimination
STANAG	standardization agreement
TACON	tactical control
TC	training circular
TEC	theater engineer command
TOE	table of organization and equipment
TPFDD	time-phased force deployment data
TSC	theater sustainment command
U.S.	United States
UCP	Unified Command Plan
ULO	unified land operations
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAMC	United States Materiel Command
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USARCENT	United States Army, Central Command
USAREUR-AF	United States Army, Europe and Africa
USARNORTH	United States Army, North
USARPAC	United States Army, Pacific
USARSOUTH	United States Army, South
USASMDC	United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command

USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USC	United States Code
USCYBERCOM	United States Cyber Command
USINDOPACOM	United States Indonesia-Pacific Command
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command

SECTION II – TERMS

administrative control

Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support. (JP 1)

allocation

The distribution of limited forces and resources for employment among competing requirements. (JP 5-0)

ARFOR

The Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. (FM 3-94)

common-user logistics

Materiel or service support shared with or provided by two or more Services, Department of Defense agencies, or multinational partners to another Service, Department of Defense agency, non-Department of Defense agency, and/or multinational partner in an operation. (JP 4-09)

distribution management

Synchronizes and optimizes transportation, its networks, and materiel management with the warfighting functions to move personnel and materiel from origins to the point of need in accordance with the supported commander's priorities. (ADP 4-0)

executive agent

A delegation of authority by the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. (JP 1)

How the Army directs the development, preservation, and provision of ready and responsive forces for employment in support of national military objectives, Army Service requirements, and U.S. state and territorial requirements. (AR 529-29)

An echelon of command that employs multiple corps, divisions, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades to achieve objectives on land. (JP 3-31)

force tailoring

The process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander. (ADP 3-0)

foreign internal defense

Participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

function

The broad, general, and enduring role for which an organization is designed, equipped, and trained. (JP 1) See: ADP 1-01, FM 1-04, FM 1-05.

movement control

The dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating movements according to command priorities to synchronize distribution flow over lines of communications to sustain land forces. (ADP 4-0)

operational control

The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP 1)

port opening

The ability to establish, initially operate and facilitate throughput for ports of debarkation to support unified land operations. (ADP 4-0)

role

The broad and enduring purpose for which the organization or branch is established. (ADP 1-01)

security assistance

Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation. (JP 3-20)

security cooperation

All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. (JP 3-20)

security force assistance

The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-20)

security sector reform

A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. (JP 3-07)

support

The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. (JP 1)

tactical control

The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (JP 1)

task

A clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned to an individual or organization that must be done as it is imposed by an appropriate authority. (JP 1)

theater opening

The ability to establish and operate ports of debarkation (air, sea, and rail), to establish a distribution system and sustainment bases, and to facilitate port throughput for the reception, staging, onward movement and integration of forces within a theater of operations. (ADP 4-0)

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