ATP 3-96.1

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE

JUNE 2025

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SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE

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Preface

ATP 3-96.1 provides techniques for the Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) to conduct security force assistance (SFA). ATP 3-96.1 provides techniques for leaders who plan, prepare, execute, and assess SFA operations. The information in this Army techniques publication is consistently reviewed and analyzed against real-world observations of SFABs.

The principal audience for ATP 3-96.1 is the commanders, staffs, officers, noncommissioned officers of the brigade, battalions, squadrons, and advisor teams within the SFAB. The audience includes the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command institutions and components as well as joint and Army commands that employ the SFAB in conventional operations. The publication serves as an authoritative reference for personnel developing doctrine, materiel, institutional and unit training, and standard operating procedures for the SFAB.

To understand ATP 3-96.1, the reader must first understand: operational art, the principles of war, and the links between the operational and tactical levels of war (described in JP 1, Vol 2, JP 3-0, and ADP 3-0); strategic relationships and environments (described in FM 3-0); how offensive, defensive, and stability operations form the foundation of multidomain operations (described in detail in ADP 3-07, ADP 3-90, FM 3-0, FM 3-22, FM 3-96, ATP 3-90.1, and ATP 3-90.5); the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) and how that process relates to the Army's military decision-making process (MDMP) and troop leading procedures (described in ADP 5-0); multinational operations, the Army's role in large-scale combat operations and the Army's approach to mission command and interoperability within multinational operations with mission partners (described in JP 3-16 and FM 3-16); and the concepts associated with mission command (described in ADP 6-0). Reviewing these publications assists the reader in understanding ATP 3-96.1.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Service members operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27 for legal compliance.)

This publication contains copyrighted material.

ATP 3-96.1 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-96.1 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. When first defined in the text, terms for which ATP 3-96.1 is the proponent publication are boldfaced and italicized, and definitions are boldfaced. When first defining other proponent definitions in the text, the term is italicized with the proponent publication designator and number at the end of the definition. Following uses of the term are not italicized.

ATP 3-96.1 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/the Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent is the United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. The preparing agency for ATP 3-96.1 is the Department of Tactics, Training, and Doctrine, United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028, (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, United States Maneuver Center of Excellence and Fort Benning, ATZK-TDD (ATP 3-96.1), 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5410; by email to usarmy.benning.mcoe.mbx.doctrine@army.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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The Will to Win, Gibby, Bryan R, UA Press has granted permission to the Department of Tactics, Training and Doctrine, United States Maneuver Center of Excellence, to use multiple quotes from the listed book, with the stipulation that UA Press is cited as the source of the quote.

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Introduction

SFA is a fixture in U.S. Army history which advisors have proved is vital to the strategic aims of the United States. The Army's history is full of SFA. Examples range from training police in Bosnia, large-scale combat operations in China during World War II to training the South Korean and South Vietnamese forces during the Korean War and Vietnam War, to training Iraqi and Afghan forces during the War on Terrorism.

The increasing complexity of the modern security environment increases the need for persistent contact and engagement with allies and partners. SFA is an economy of force method for the United States to win in or prevent conflict, reassure partners, and compete with adversaries.

The SFAB allows the Army to set the theater effectively and shape the security environment across the range of military operations, in cooperation with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners' efforts. The SFAB complements the U.S. Department of State, foreign area officers, special operations, the National Guard State Partnership Program, regionally aligned forces, security assistance team, digital liaison detachments and other joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partner activities to expand access and create options for senior military and civilian leaders.

The SFAB conducts all three doctrinal security cooperation missions to include security force assistance (Title 10), security assistance (Title 22), and military engagement. The SFAB facilitates information flow, develops training, and prepares Soldiers, leaders, and formations to conduct effective regional engagement. The SFABs provide the combatant commander and the Army Service component command a responsive, expeditionary force with region-specific training. It has appropriate institutionalized training to support small and distributed operations and provide subject matter expertise regarding multinational military training. Through regional engagement and maintaining continuous relationships, the SFAB builds increased trust, rapport, and confidence with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. The SFAB serves as an institutionalized force that coordinates military-to-military conventional training missions and collective training exercises at a variety of levels based on need. The SFAB also allows the U.S. military to increase regional understanding and preserve unified action in the theater of operations across the breadth of the competition continuum.

ATP 3-96.1 contains seven chapters:

Chapter 1 addresses the operational requirement, environment, and key concepts, but primarily focuses on the internal operations and organization of the SFAB.

Chapter 2 describes SFAB mission command and its operations framework.

Chapter 3 describes the brigade's deployment considerations from receipt of mission through post-deployment activities.

Chapter 4 describes the advisor team activities (both developmental and conflict integration) and advisor team employment planning considerations.

Chapter 5 describes augmentation considerations for permissive and hostile environments. This chapter also describes the various capabilities that may be available through augmentation by warfighting function.

Chapter 6 discusses the protection warfighting function considerations through the competition continuum and how advisor teams shape protection advising for foreign security forces partners.

Chapter 7 describes the SFAB's sustainment advising battalion and its responsibility of the coordination of the SFAB sustainment requirements across the competition continuum.

Appendix A provides elements and ideas for what commanders may use for advising guidance, as well as some examples of advising guidance.

Appendix B illustrates common terminology and terms the SFAB use to clarify organizational roles.

Appendix C provides an advisor assessments tool which can be used to assist in the assessments process.

Summary of changes:

- Throughout the manual, there has been a thematic shift to focus on the SFAB in the context of large-scale combat operation.
- Adds proponent term, advisor network. Advisor network is the system for the integrating and consolidating partner force capability and capacity improvements over time at multiple echelons. Advisor networks are essentially the connective tissue to gain shared understanding across employed advisor teams at echelon across the foreign security force. The network produces effects by and through advisor employment at scales across the depth and breadth of a partner organization over time. It also enables expertise and counsel at echelon.
- New acronyms include battalion advising team, maneuver battalion advising team, maneuver company advisor team, maneuver advisor team, fires company advisor team, fires advisor team, engineer company advisor team, engineer advisor team, logistics company advisor team, and logistics advisor team.

Chapter 1
Organization and Capabilities

SFABs are a conflict force trained and validated to assess, support, liaise, and advise partner nations at echelon, ready to enable winning the Nation's wars.

Brigadier General Kevin J. Lambert,

4th Commanding General,

Security Force Assistance Command

Chapter 1 addresses the operational requirement, environment, and key concepts, but primarily focuses on the internal operations and organization of the Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB).

SECTION I – ORGANIZATION OVERVIEW

1-1. The SFAB is a unique and purpose-built force. Through focusing on security force assistance (SFA) missions, SFABs allow Army divisions and brigade combat teams (BCTs) to focus on preparing for large-scale combat operations (LSCO). In the event of LSCO, SFABs provide comprehensive linkage, amplifying allied and partner integration into a multinational force (MNF).

1-2. SFABs, regionally aligned to the combatant commands (CCMDs), can deploy elements during competition to develop allies and partners, can surge in support of crisis, and can conduct conflict integration activities during armed conflict in support of multinational operations.

MISSION

1-3. The purpose of the SFABs is to enable allies and partners in conflict. SFABs increase the capability, capacity, and interoperability of our allies and partners. Supporting CCMD theater security cooperation (SC) objectives, SFABs conduct worldwide SFA at the operating and generating levels to develop the capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions during competition. In transition from crisis to conflict, advisors can respond quickly and embed with partner force headquarters. This enables U.S. Forces to mobilize, deploy, and have access to partner forces at echelon

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

1-4. Threats to U.S. and allied interests occur along a competition continuum (see figure 1-1 on page 2). The SFAB operates along the entire continuum.




Figure 1-1. Security Force Assistance Brigade in the strategic environment

COMPETITION

1-5. The SFAB supports theater SC objectives, preserves conventional force readiness, strengthens alliances, and builds lasting partnerships. An SFAB uses the SFA developmental activities to improve the partnered force and build interoperability with U.S. Forces. The SFAB also relieves conventional BCTs of SFA missions, allowing them to modernize and build readiness in preparation for LSCO. An SFAB organizes and equips to operate in austere environments with minimal force footprints. The SFAB advisor teams provide a flexible, tailorable, and credible force providing a constant presence while engaged with allies and partners. SFABs build relationships and partner capabilities and develop trust during competition. The advisor team must be equipped to handle the unique requirements for competition. This includes expeditionary sources of

power generation and power management, water purification, tailorable solutions to personal protective equipment, and any other mission- or regional-specific equipment required.

CRISIS

1-6. Crisis is a possible transition point between competition and armed conflict. Advisor teams need to work parallel efforts with unified action partners (UAPs) to determine the necessary action required. The action may include advisor teams' redeployment or change in authorities to continue to support partners and allies. Critical to this phase is an advisor team's capability to communicate ground truth and requirements across multiple layers of command. SFABs during crisis can have a deterrent effect to allow a return to competition.

ARMED CONFLICT

1-7. SFABs assess, support, liaise, and advise (ASLA) at critical points of need, filling partner capability gaps. Based on hostile development, SFABs bring mission partners together to deter and influence the hostile environment. This builds capability, increases capacity, enhances interoperability, enables visualization, and informs decision points for the joint force commander.

REGIONAL ALIGNMENT

1-8. The SFAB is the Army's dedicated conventional organization for conducting SFA. The organization operates in a wide variety of threat environments, geographic locations, legal agreements, and command structures across the competition continuum. SFABs will be deployed forward continuously in theater to support SC, enabling and enhancing interoperability, enhancing situational awareness, and setting favorable conditions for future multinational operations if diplomacy and deterrence fail.

1-9. An SFAB can rapidly deploy, conduct SFA activities and missions, and assist with theater entry operations. The SFABs are aligned regionally while remaining an Army service-retained organization. Regional alignment allows an SFAB to gain a deeper appreciation and understanding of FSF organizations, languages, and cultures (see figure 1-2 on page 4). Habitual rotations within an area of responsibility (AOR) allow an SFAB to make gains continually in developing capabilities and capacities. The benefit of access, placement, and influence within an AOR are a primary byproduct of regionally aligned advisor forces.

1-10. While in theater, SFABs fall under the authority of their respective Army Service component commands (ASCCs). While in garrison, SFABs predominately fall under United States Army Forces Command's authority with further delegation to the Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC). SFAC further issues its own guidance and policies when it comes to SFAB training, mission readiness, and deployment readiness. While in support of joint operations, the SFAB may be tactical control (TACON) or operational control (OPCON) to the joint task force (JTF) or the land component command. Command relationships are mission dependent and tailored to allow SFAB to advise at the point of need and accomplish the higher headquarters' desired end state for the AOR.

1-11. During competition, the SFAB preserves conventional force readiness, and strengthens alliances. SFABs, comprised of globally network- enabled, combined arms teams, are agile and designed to operate in austere environments with minimal force footprints. SFABs are an economy of force mission; their size, agility, and network connectivity provide the joint force commander with a flexible, tailorable, and credible force that can be employed dynamically with allies and partners to shape the strategic environment. Conceptually, the SFABs gain and maintain contact to provide time and maneuver space for the main body at the strategic level. Simultaneously, commitment of the SFAB for SFA requirements, whether predictably or dynamically, relieves conventional forces of SFA missions, allowing them to build and preserve their readiness for conflict or to modernize and increase their lethality.

1-12. Soldiers who volunteer for the SFAB must possess strong leadership, endurance, effective communication skills, be adaptable, dependable, and deployable, and exhibit teamwork, empathy, initiative, and discipline. Advisors in the SFABs possess a cultural acuity and specialized training that can unleash tremendous potential in a "whole-of-government" approach, incorporating the synergy of UAPs that is essential to winning future wars and creating lasting outcomes.




Figure 1-2. Security Force Assistance Brigade regional alignment

UNIQUE TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1-13. The following key doctrinal terms and definitions are used throughout this and the other chapters and appendices. They are unique to the SFAB, and their advisor missions set and warrant nuanced explanation as they will occur frequently. Refer to the publications listed in the References for additional information.

ADVISOR ACTIVITIES

1-14. Advisor activities increase host-nation capability through joint exercises and mil-to-mil engagements and support the partnered force's operations and modernization in conjunction with other instruments of national power. Advisor activities include the SFA developmental activities and the SFA conflict integration activities.

FORCE PACKAGES

1-15. Force packages are an allocation of personnel and equipment to the CCMDs to complement the U.S. Department of State, Security Cooperation Offices, Army special operations forces, regionally aligned forces, security assistance teams, State Partnership Program, liaison detachments (including theater and digital liaison detachments [DLDs]), and other UAP activities.

ADVISOR NETWORK

1-16. **The *advisor network* is the system for the integrating and consolidating partner force capability and capacity improvements over time at multiple echelons.** It functions as the connective tissue to gain shared understanding across employed advisor teams at echelon across the FSF. The network also produces effects created by and through advisor employment at scales across the depth and breadth of a partner organization over time. It can take on the characteristics of either being direct (running parallel to the partner

chain of command to solve problems rapidly) or indirect (leveraging previous advisor personalities and experiences to build trust).

INTEROPERABILITY

1-17. Interoperability is the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. An SFAB is designed to integrate effectively with host-nation forces for training and operational activities while providing U.S.-specific linkages back into theater and JTF mission command systems. An SFAB can effectively bridge current human dimension interoperability challenges with host-nation formations through their direct liaison officer capability. During LSCO, the advisor network is particularly effective at solving interoperability shortfalls by bridging interoperability gaps at echelon across the breadth and depth of an allied/partner formation.

COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE

1-18. A *common operational picture* is a display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest tailored to the user's requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command (ADP 6-0). In the context of the SFAB, advisors must build and maintain a common operational picture (COP) containing both their own information as well as that of their partners. Information on advisors and other U.S. units operating in the operational environment (OE) is referred to as the *blue* COP. Information pertaining to the FSF is referred to as the *green* COP. A critical function of the SFAB is to ensure that information on the green COP is integrated into the blue COP.

ADVISOR DICHOTOMY

1-19. The advisor dichotomy is described as the tension between advisors executing their advisory tasks and supporting their own warfighting function tasks, either internally within the team or externally to higher headquarters. For example, when team signal advisors are actively providing signal support to their own element and their equipment, the time available to actively advise the FSF is reduced. In another example, an intelligence advisor must balance time spent communicating FSF intelligence, sensor, and analysis reporting to higher echelons, relaying higher intelligence reports to the FSF, and ensuring lateral shared understanding within the team, all while advising on information collection and maintaining operations security (OPSEC). Advisors at all levels must recognize and account for the advisor dichotomy for both them and their team, plan accordingly, and work to strike a balance between advising and operating.

SECTION II – SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE IN CONTEXT

1-20. Each SFAB has advisors organized into three maneuver advising battalions (two Infantry battalions and a Cavalry squadron), a fires advising battalion, an engineer advising battalion, a sustainment advising battalion, and a brigade headquarters and headquarters company (HHC). The SFAB's companies have a higher rank structure than conventional BCTs. This increased rank structure intends to provide the SFAB with more experienced personnel and allows SFAB personnel to effectively advise organizations at the same echelon or up to two levels higher.

1-21. Soldiers in SFABs must understand the broader context of U.S. foreign policy and Integrated Country Strategies in the specific countries in which they operate. The SFA mission is critical to achieving U.S. national security objectives and continues to be an effective tool when developing FSF capability and capacity in support of shared U.S. and partner security interests.

Stilwell in China 1942

Discipline and administration rested with Chinese officers. But technique and training were American responsibilities. Hundreds of Chinese student interpreters paired off with American instructors to teach Chinese soldiers all things from how to fix flat tires to how to load a mule pack artillery. Friction developed on every level-from differing American and Chinese methods of using a rifle sling to the ultimate questions of whose name was signed to basic orders-American or Chinese.

For the Americans, Ramgarh was Siberia, only one thin cut above jungle duty itself. Ramgarh was hot, dusty, itchy, far from anything green or pleasant. The food was bad, and the barracks cramped. The movies were old and Red Cross hamburger parlors and recreation rooms mocked rather than relieved the loneliness and exhaustion of the GIs. The task of explaining American machines to Chinese soldiers whose tradition of tool handling went no deeper than a buffalo drawn plow was exasperating and embittering; and to most Americans, unaware of its historic necessity, it seemed futile.

For the Chinese soldiers Ramgarh was a wonderland. They were fed, for the first time, as much food and meat as they could stuff into their hungry bodies. They gained an average of twenty pounds each in weight. They practiced on the ranges with live shells and real bullets. Hospitals doctored them for everything from malaria to foot ulcers. And most important of all-they were paid. Payment of troops was taken out of the hands of their commanding officers, who had previously received the division payroll and cut into convenient morsels and made directly on the parade ground into the hands of the individual soldier in hard cash.

Between 1942 and 1944, four Chinese divisions were created and equipped here of an effectiveness never before known in Chinese history.

Joseph W. Stilwell
The Stilwell Papers

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE DOCTRINE

1-22. SFA doctrine exists for joint, multinational, and Army forces. The two primary doctrinal publications applicable to all SFAB Soldiers are this publication and ATP 3-07.10. This publication provides the doctrinal guidance on the SFAB's organization and employment, and ATP 3-07.10 provides guidance for the individual advisor.

1-23. At the operational level, FM 3-22 provides helpful tools to plan and execute SFA. This includes SFA activities, goals and functions, planning, and a discussion on other aspects of SC to include security assistance and foreign internal defense. ADP 3-0 and ADP 3-07 describe multidomain operations and how the SFAB nests within the larger Army and defense enterprise. (See figure 1-3 for a graphic depiction of these doctrine relationships.)

Note. Joint SFA and SC doctrine include JP 3-0, especially chapter 4; JP 3-07; JP 3-16; and JP 3-20.




Figure 1-3. Security Force Assistance Brigade doctrine

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE CAPABILITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS

1-24. The SFAB is a conflict force, capable of operating in an expeditionary capacity. Using the advisor network, teams leverage the body of knowledge across the network to solve complex problems. Advisor teams can advise up to two levels above echelon to tailor the team's employment strategy to the need of the advised force.

EXPEDITIONARY

1-25. An SFAB is specifically designed with minimal large equipment to facilitate rapid deployment. SFAB teams are capable of task organizing for persistent, semi-persistent, and non-persistent missions in a CCMD AOR. SFABs will attempt whenever possible to use host-nation support—to include transportation support. The use of host-nation transportation assets is critical because parts and mechanics will not be available for U.S equipment—as well as minimizing the signature for enemy observers. The use of the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) will be critical to set sustainment conditions during competition, which can then be in place indefinitely in the case of crisis or conflict.

THE ADVISOR NETWORK (DIRECT)

1-26. The SFAB, when employed across echelons of FSF, can solve complex problems outside of normal channels due to its structure. By placing advisor teams at echelon throughout an FSF, the SFAB may guide the synchronization of their foreign counterpart's mission as well. For example, if a maneuver advisor team (MAT) is advising a battalion and the battalion advising team (BAT) is advising a division or corps, that

MAT can work within the SFAB chain of command to reduce friction and solve problems. This concept is referred to as the advisor network. It is essentially the connective tissue to gain shared understanding across employed advisor teams at echelon across the FSF. When the advisor network is used in this way, it is called the advisor network (direct).

THE ADVISOR NETWORK (INDIRECT)

1-27. The advisor network (*indirect*) establishes a personal and a professional relationship where trust and confidence define how well the teams will be able to influence the partner FSF across multiple advisors over time. For example, if an advisor is having difficulty establishing rapport with an FSF partner, another advisor from a previous mission or at a different echelon can be leveraged to re-establish trust. The concept of advisor support coming from a previous advisor mission or different advisor echelon is known as advisor reachback.

1-28. Another facet of the advisor network (indirect) stems from the FSF's previous experience being on the receiving end of advice or giving advice themselves. For example, some of the partner forces could have United Nations or African Union peacekeeping experience and/or other multinational military training. This experience should be accounted for during an advisor's initial meetings with their partner force.

TWO LEVELS UP ADVISING

1-29. Advisor teams capabilities allow them to advise up to two levels above echelon. Teams and headquarters deliberately assess the appropriate team-to-FSF echelon pairing. Teams advising a less experienced FSF generally advise at higher-than-echelon to advise at the point of greatest practicable need. The advisor teams working with an experienced, professional, and well-established FSF focus at-echelon while performing other advisor activities at higher echelon. During mission analysis, commanders and staffs must weigh the FSF experience level, the effects the SFAB is trying to achieve, resources and time available, and other relevant factors to determine the best distribution of the advisor teams. Commanders must assess risk, which includes considering whether the teams have the appropriate experience to advise their counterparts versus being able to influence the maximum number of FSF organizations.

1-30. Advisor teams during competition can—

- Build partner force capabilities and capacities across the SFA developmental activities.
- Work with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational organizations to support theater SC and associated shaping activities.
- Provide economy of force to the supported theater or assigned JTF and Army Forces commander.
- Detach task-organized, mission-tailored, cross-functional advisor teams to support embassy or theater-directed SC activities as required.
- Develop access to host-nation support services and classes of supply.
- Coordinate with the U.S. Embassy to leverage ACSAs to codify a host-nation support plan.

1-31. Advisor teams during crisis can—

- Facilitate consolidating gains and setting conditions for operational transitions because of the mission-tailorable nature of SFAB formations.
- Assist in setting the theater when already on the ground:
  - Provide access to host-nation logistics elements, port infrastructure, and other assets needed to support conventional force reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI).
  - Confirm or deny the theater ASCC's, combatant commander's (CCDR's) and SC offices' understanding of the crisis (to include both friendly and enemy situation).

1-32. Advisor teams during armed conflict can—

- Execute the SFA conflict integration activities.
- Provide assessments of FSF partner capabilities and gaps to the joint force commander.
- Integrate and employ joint enablers to support FSF and self-defense.
- Task-organize to provide liaison teams in support of LSCO.

- Advise FSF on offense, defense, and stability tasks.
- Share information with other service and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational intelligence and collection organizations to facilitate targeting and support situational awareness.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE LIMITATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS

1-33. The SFAB is not a BCT. SFAB teams requires sustainment augmentation from external organizations. Advisor teams do not have the operational capacity to conduct BCT operations.

1-34. Each brigade will have common vehicles and individual equipment; however, SFAB battalions will not have the capability-specific equipment that accompany a fully operationally capable Infantry or Armor BCT. The maneuver, engineer, and field artillery battalions will not have their own branch-specific vehicular capabilities. The sustainment advising battalion will retain essential equipment sets (such as electronic equipment tool kits), combat service support, and combat automated information systems interface equipment needed to repair vehicles, weapons, and communications systems.

1-35. SFABs become more effective with access to higher echelon enablers, such as space and cyberspace, in sufficient capacities to execute SFA operations successfully. These enablers allow for effective monitoring of the OE and increase security of the advisor team.

1-36. SFABs during competition are generally employed according to the following principles:

- SFABs are normally allocated to CCMDs on an annual basis and will only deploy the required capability.
- The remainder of the brigade remains at home station unless requested through the United States Army Forces Command.
- Forces already deployed in theater must be prepared to transition from crisis to conflict while remaining in theater.
- SFABs are an enabler and do not have the capability to act as the immediate response force.
- SFABs can deploy on short notice to conduct SFA in crisis or conflict.
- ASCCs will normally manage the utilization of SFAB advisor teams in coordination with the corresponding SFAB.
- An SFAB normally does not have mission responsibility in more than two CCMDs simultaneously.
- A force package may be detached from one SFAB and attached to another in a different AOR during conflict or episodically as in the case of the 54th SFAB.
- Advisor teams function best through the collocating of team members to maximize the multiplicative effects of the advisor network.
- Teams may be disaggregated or distributed, when necessary, based on specific CCMD AOR and U.S. personnel constraints.
- Advisor teams are cognizant of the minimal mission critical personnel needed to have advisor effects.
- ASCCs are normally required to provide security, logistical and sustainment support to SFAB advisor teams while deployed in the respective CCMD AOR.
- SFAB units will deploy and redeploy with organic communication systems.
- SFABs may be TACON to the JTF.
- SFABs may be OPCON to the land component commander.
- Unless otherwise designated, by mission requirements, the highest echelon SFAB element retains OPCON of lower SFAB elements.

1-37. The 552 trained advisors in an SFAB can be task-organized to form an advisor force package. These force packages are centered around one of the three maneuver battalions, one of the three enabling battalions, and a brigade headquarters element. When employed on an 8-month cycle, the force package will typically be one-third of the maximum available number of the advisor teams. The various advisor teams available to each SFAB include the following:

- 1 BAT.
- 3 maneuver battalion advising teams (MBATs).
- 6 maneuver company advisor teams (MCATs).

- 18 MATs.
- 3 enabling BATs:
  - Fires battalion advising team (FBAT).
  - Engineer battalion advising team (EBAT).
  - Logistics battalion advising team (LBAT).
- 2 fires company advisor teams (FCATs).
- 4 fires advisor teams (FATs).
- 2 engineer company advisor teams (ECATs).
- 4 engineer advisor teams (EATs).
- 2 logistics company advisor teams (LCATs).
- 4 logistics advisor teams (LATs).

1-38. The MBAT will be sourced from either the two Infantry battalions or one Cavalry squadron (1st and 2nd Battalions as well as 3rd Squadron), while the enabling BAT will be sourced from either the fires advising battalion, engineer advising battalion, or sustainment advising battalion. These enabling battalions are commonly referred to as the 4th, 5th, and 6th Battalions.

1-39. Advisor teams are often distributed widely across the operational area, with large physical distances between other advisor teams and their higher headquarters. Particularly in a joint operations area (JOA), higher headquarters should assign support relationships to other U.S. or allied units that are collocated with or near an advisor team. Due to the likely geographic dispersion, a single advisor team can conduct mission planning, mission command, and advisor activities, but not all simultaneously. Teams specialize in advisor activities. These can be general or direct support including functions that a typical BCT staff would provide its subordinate units, such as intelligence, fires, sustainment, movement, and other support as required.

1-40. Because of the dispersed way in which the SFAB typically operates, command and support relationships should be codified into operation orders, so supporting organizations clearly understand their responsibilities. It is worth noting that an additional security element is not organic to the SFAB. The mission variables mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations (METT-TC-[I] will dictate if one is required to be sourced by the ASCC.

SECTION III – SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE ORGANIZATION

1-41. SFAB formations provide a cross-functional advisory capability to support theater SC activities and build partner capability and capacity. Advisor teams can operate semi-independently with host-nation FSF with augmentation or support to garner effects against threats. The SFABs' combination of diverse warfighting functions and ability to facilitate partner forces' access to cross-domains effects, provides a unique capability to the theater commander. SFABs' ability to serve across echelons builds effective FSF formations that provide the foundation for long-term host-nation stability and security. The FSF prolonged, persistent engagement capabilities keeps continuous pressure on U.S. adversaries in regions around the world and helps the United States and its partner nations achieve their goals.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE STAFF

1-42. A *staff section* is a grouping of staff members by area of expertise (FM 6-0). The SFAB staff has a responsibility to manage information and resources communicated through the advisor network to inform the commander of required decisions, in addition to normal staff functions (see FM 6-0).

SUPPORT

1-43. The SFAB staff supports the commander and assists subordinate units, which typically involves organizing advisor teams, assigning partner relationships, coordinating advising themes and messages, managing assessments, and coordinating other relationships in support of their teams and the SFA mission. Staffs are also critical to guiding the advisor team command and support relationships early in a deployment and monitoring those relationships throughout the mission. As with most SFAB entities, more emphasis placed on advising the FSF results in less capacity to perform other tasks. Due to the size of the SFAB staff,

it can conduct SFA with counterparts, in the military decision-making process (MDMP), or during command and control (C2), but likely not simultaneously.

ADVISORY FUNCTIONS

1-44. Before the mission, staff members advise foreign counterparts in preparing staff estimates and assess courses of action for essential tasks. The staff helps write tentative plans and/or orders based on foreign counterpart commander's planning guidance and their FSF standard operating procedure (SOP). Depending on the situation, plans may include primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans.

EXECUTION FUNCTIONS

1-45. During execution, the staff helps foreign counterparts coordinate and assess task execution. The staff assists in the dissemination of FSF plans and/or orders to senior and adjacent staff sections and supporting elements as required. The staff helps notify higher, lower, or adjacent staff sections of modified estimates and plans. The staff—led by the operations staff officer (S-3), intelligence staff officer (S-2), and their foreign counterparts—help update the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) with the latest information and future requirements.

COORDINATING STAFF

1-46. Coordinating staff officers are the commander's principal assistants who advise, plan, and coordinate actions within their area of expertise or warfighting function. Coordinating staff officers may also exercise planning and supervisory authority over designated special staff officers. Coordinating staff officers are the personnel staff officer (S-1), S-2, S-3, logistics staff officer (S-4), signal staff officer (S-6), financial management officer (S-8), and the civil affairs (CA) operations staff officer (S-9).

Personnel Staff Officer

1-47. The S-1 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning human resources support (military and civilian). Specific responsibilities include manning, personnel services, personnel support, and headquarters management. The S-1 has coordinating staff responsibility for the civilian personnel officer and the equal opportunity advisor and prepares a portion of Annex F (Sustainment) to the operation order. When planning an operation, the S-1 provides accurate information regarding replacement personnel and ensures the rest of the staff includes all attachments or other assets into any plan or operation. (See FM 1-0 and ATP 1-0.1.)

1-48. When working with foreign counterparts, the S-1 provides advice, guidance, and recommendations related to human resources. The S-1 monitors the FSF' strength, personnel accountability, disposition of casualties, unit morale, and possibly postal activities. The S-1 may provide guidance concerning the foreign pay system, leave procedures, and casualty pay procedures.

Intelligence Staff Officer

1-49. The S-2 is chief of the intelligence warfighting function. The S-2 is the principal staff officer responsible for providing intelligence to support current operations and plans. The S-2 gives the commander and the S-3 the initial intelligence synchronization plan, which facilitates reconnaissance and surveillance integration. The S-2 helps the S-3 develop the initial reconnaissance and surveillance plan. The S-2 is responsible for the preparation of Annex B (Intelligence) and assists the S-3 in preparing Annex L (Information Collection). The S-2 helps the staff, executive officer (XO), and commander determine which courses of action the enemy might choose. The information collection plan solves gaps in intelligence, further shaping the planned friendly course of action. The S-2 attempts to see into the minds of the enemy forces to identify enemy tactics based upon their disposition and friendly actions. (See FM 2-0 for more information.)

1-50. The S-2 monitors FSF OPSEC to protect classified and sensitive material and operations provides OPSEC recommendations to the FSF as needed. By helping the foreign counterpart update the situation map, the S-2 helps to keep both commands up to date on the current situation. The S-2 assesses and recommends improvements to the SOPs of the command post communications framework, so the intelligence section receives situation reports. The S-2 helps the counterpart monitor the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and the dissemination of information. The S-2 assists in examining captured insurgent documents and material. The S-2 helps gather and disseminate intelligence reports from available sources to ensure the

exploitation of all unit operations assets. The S-2 works with operations advisors to develop reconnaissance and surveillance plans with their counterparts.

1-51. The brigade S-2 serves as the brigade's senior intelligence officer. As the senior intelligence officer, the brigade S-2 maintains tasking authority of intelligence personnel assigned to the military intelligence (MI) company. The senior intelligence officer is responsible for task-organizing the SFAB's intelligence personnel in support of C2, advising, and augmentation according to mission requirements.

Operations Officer

1-52. The S-3 is responsible for coordinating movement and maneuver warfighting function activities. The S-3 is the primary staff officer for integrating and synchronizing operations for the commander. The S-3 integrates reconnaissance and surveillance during plans and operations. The S-3 synchronizes reconnaissance and surveillance throughout the operations process and develops plans and orders and determines potential branches and sequels. The S-3 coordinates and synchronizes warfighting functions in all plans and orders. The S-3 is also responsible for and prepares Annex L (Information Collection) and Annex V (Interagency Coordination). The S-3 prepares Annex A (Task Organization), Annex C (Operations), and Annex M (Assessment) for the operation order. In conjunction with the knowledge management officer, the S-3 prepares Annex R (Reports) and Annex Z (Distribution). The S-3 ensures proper dissemination of the plan. The S-3 also identifies key intersections in canalizing terrain and timed events for key transitions in phases or decision points. (See FM 6-0 for more information.)

1-53. The S-3 helps the foreign counterpart to prepare tactical plans and orders using estimates, predictions, assessments, and information. The S-3 monitors command and communications nets, assists in preparing all plans and orders, and helps to supervise the training and preparation for operations. The S-3 assists FSF in engaging friendly, neutral, and threat networks through the operations process. (See ATP 5-0.6 for more information.) The S-3 monitors the planning process and makes recommendations consistent with the FSF' objectives and goals.

Logistics Staff Officer

1-54. The S-4 is the principal staff officer for sustainment planning and operations, supply, maintenance, transportation, services, field services, distribution, and operational contract support (OCS). S-4s determine supply priorities and coordinate for requisition, acquisition, and storage of supplies and equipment. The S-4 develops, monitors, and actions the unit's sustainment status reports and develops plans for intra-theater movement and the deployment of personnel and equipment. The S-4 prepares Annex F (Sustainment), Annex P (Host-Nation Support), and Annex W (Operational Contract Support) to the operation order. The S-4 works closely with the sustainment advising battalion support operations (SPO) officer to integrate the SFAB into the theater sustainment plan. The S-4 identifies requirements for external and higher echelon support requirements and, along with SPO, coordinates for those assets. (See FM 6- 0 for more information.)

1-55. The S-4 conducts SFA activities alongside their foreign counterpart to maintain equipment readiness, monitor the support provided to the foreign unit, and recommend improvements. The S-4 helps to supervise the use of transportation assets.

Signal Staff Officer

1-56. The signal staff officer (S-6) is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning network operations, jointly consisting of Department of Defense (DOD) information network operations and applicable portions of the defensive cyberspace operations. The S-6 provides network transport and information services, conducts network operations to operate and defend the network, enables knowledge management, manages land warrior and combat net radio assets in the area of operations (AO), and performs spectrum management operations. The S-6 prepares Annex H (Signal) of the operation order and participates in preparing Appendix 12 (Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities) to Annex C (Operations) with input from the S-2 and in coordination with the S-3. (See FM 6-02 and ATP 6-02.70 for more information.)

1-57. The S-6 advises and assists the foreign counterpart for all matters concerning network operations, network transport, information services, and spectrum management operations within the SFAB's SFA mission. The S-6 monitors communications security (COMSEC) throughout planning, preparation, and

execution of SFA and FSF activities. The S-6 trains personnel in the protection of sensitive communications equipment and cryptographic materials during the execution of SFA operations. The S-6 identifies communications requirements, obtains communications resources for austere locations, and ensures redundant and backup systems are available and tested.

1-58. The S-6, in coordination with the higher headquarters' signal officer, continuously assesses and refines information management coordinating, archiving, and sharing among participating interagency partners and other organizations. The S-6 assesses the communications synchronization plan between the SFAB, its foreign counterparts, and other UAPs. The S-6 uses foreign disclosure procedures and information sharing processes to disseminate information with interagency partners and other organizations.

Financial Management Officer

1-59. The S-8 is the principal staff officer responsible for financial management within the SFAB. The S-8 is the focal point in planning financial management support that allows the SFAB to accomplish its mission. The S-8 prepares a portion of Annex F (Sustainment). (See FM 4-80 for more information.)

1-60. The S-8 is the principal financial management advisor to the SFAB commander. The S-8, in coordination with legal representatives, advises the commander regarding laws and financial management regulations governing obligations, expenditures, and limitations on the use of funds within SFAB's SFA mission. The S-8—

- Coordinates financial management policies and practices with U.S. counterparts in the contracting command.
- Identifies, certifies, and manages funds available for immediate SFA operations expenses.
- Integrates all financial management requirements into SFA planning.
- Analyzes total cost to develop SFA funding requirements and submit requirements to the division or higher headquarters.
- Monitors and reports status of funding and spending plans.
- Coordinates contracting and financial management disbursing support for field ordering officers (FOOs) and pay agents.
- Monitors execution of the contract expenditures.

Civil Affairs Operations Staff Officer

1-61. The S-9 CA operations staff officer brings CA core competencies to the SFAB. The S-9 focuses on the interests, functions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of indigenous populations, institutions, government apparatus, and UAPs that reside or operate in and around an AO. The core competencies are the following:

- Transitional governance.
- Civil network development and engagement.
- Civil knowledge integration.
- Civil military integration.

1-62. The SFAB S-9 is not manned and equipped to perform all the traditional functions of an S-9 as described in FM 6-0 and FM 3-57. The S-9 ensures civil considerations are integrated into mission analysis by performing civil preparation of the battlefield. The S-9 considers tactical and sustainment support issues by engaging the civil component, ensuring freedom of movement, mitigating civilian interference, obtaining host-nation support, and planning for the establishment performance of stability operations tasks if required. The S-9 maintains civil military integration with interagency partners and UAPs to promote unified action. The S-9 coordinates with the country team or in-theater CA elements to assess the civil component and its impact on the advisor mission.

1-63. The S-9 is the dedicated principal staff officer responsible for all matters concerning CA operations. The S-9 enhances the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and personnel in the AO to ensure mission success. The roles of the SFAB S-9 include the following:

- Evaluating civil considerations during mission analysis and integrating civil knowledge into the Army's integrating processes.
- Recommending augmentation of additional CA operations capabilities based on the advisory mission.

- Developing and engaging civilian networks to extend the advisor network into the civil component of the OE, including interagency and interorganizational partners.
- Advising the commander and staff on the effect of military operations on civilians in the AO.
- Advising the commander on options for producing desired effects in the civil component of the OE.
- Advising the commander on employing CA units within the command and support structure to engage and influence civil networks and the population, see chapter 2, section IV for more on employment considerations.
- Preparing Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) of the SFAB operation order.
- Assisting in civil military integration between U.S. Forces, FSF, and civilian authorities supporting an operation when employed in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments.
- Assisting and advising FSF in establishing a civil-military operations (CMO) capability and enabling their battleplan.
- Supporting other requirements necessary to support the SFAB mission.

SPECIAL STAFF

1-64. Special staff in the SFAB include the brigade engineer; air liaison officer; aviation officer; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) officer; psychological operations officer; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officer; cyber electromagnetic warfare officer (EWO); fire support officer (FSO); and provost marshal. Paragraphs 1-65 through 1-85 describe special staff officers' responsibilities as well as considerations when advising mission partners. (See FM 6-0 for additional information.)

Air Liaison

1-65. The air liaison officer is the senior U.S. Air Force officer with each tactical air control party if assigned. The air liaison officer plans and executes close air support according to the SFAB commander's guidance and intent. The air liaison officer coordinates aerospace assets and operations, such as close air support, air interdiction, air reconnaissance, airlift, and joint suppression of enemy air defenses. (See JP 3-09.3, FM 3-52, and ATP 3-52.1 for more information.)

Aviation Officer

1-66. The aviation officer is the airspace control officer for the SFAB S-3 who plans and synchronizes aviation into the commander's scheme of maneuver. The aviation officer standardizes unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) employment for the SFAB and advises and plans the use of reconnaissance, attack, air assault, air movement, sustainment, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). As the aviation subject matter expert, the aviation officer is responsible for advising the commander and staff on the status and availability of aviation assets, their capabilities, and limitations. The aviation officer recommends and helps coordinate priorities and allocations of aviation assets, helps determine the priorities for their employment, and participates in targeting. The aviation officer helps prepare portions of Annex C (Operations) and portions of Annex D (Fires) of the operation order. (See FM 3-52 and ATP 3-52.1 for more information.)

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Officer

1-67. The CBRN officer advises the commander and staff on operations in CBRN environments and employment of CBRN defense capabilities. A CBRN NCO is authorized in the S-3 current operations cell. CBRN staff shares information and makes recommendations to the operations and other staff sections. The CBRN staff prepares a portion of Annex E (Protection) and a portion of Annex C (Operations) of the operation order. (See ATP 3-11.36 for more information.)

Cyber Electronic Warfare Officer

1-68. The cyberspace EWO is the principal advisor to the commander on all issues concerning offensive and defensive cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare (EW). The cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA) cell plans, synchronizes, and integrates CEMA functions into the concept of operations. In LSCO, the CEMA cell assesses organic and partner force cyber and EW capability gaps. Through detailed

coordination with other staff members, the partner force staff, and the ASCC, the CEMA cell fills capability gaps with theater-level assets. The CEMA cell is responsible for advising the partner force on EW protection efforts and tactics, techniques, and procedures for host-nation EW equipment. The CEMA cell develops Appendix 12 (Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities) to Annex C (Operations) to the operation order and contributes to any section that CEMA support. (See ATP 3-12.3 for additional information.)

Brigade Engineer

1-69. The brigade engineer is the senior engineer on staff responsible for coordinating engineer support. The brigade engineer integrates specified and implied engineer tasks into the plan. Engineer officers ensure mission planning, preparation, execution, and assessment activities integrate with supporting engineer units. The brigade engineer prepares Annex G (Engineer) to the operation order and synchronizes any mobility, countermobility, survivability, and protection requirements. (See FM 6-0 for more information.)

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer

1-70. The EOD officer is responsible for activities in support of FSF EOD operations and supporting enablers (see ATP 4-32). The EOD officer leads the development of manning, equipping, training, and policies based on FSF enabler capabilities at echelon to support EOD operations. EOD officers coordinate with the Joint EOD Technical Support Center Division for technical intelligence support, research and development and foreign military sales support. The EOD officer is responsible for ensuring the transfer of FSF weapons technical intelligence to theater exploitation laboratories during LSCO. EOD officers also provide subject matter expertise to planning, preparing, executing, and advising SFA missions for EOD. EOD officers also aid in reporting and tracking explosive hazards, to include counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) efforts across the range of military operations. The EOD officer leads efforts and coordinates with ASCC EOD staff to determine requirements and develop training programs to build partner-nation capacity. The EOD officer enables SFAB counter-explosive hazards efforts through exploitation, operations, weapons technical data and information, targeting, and force protection. The EOD officer provides expertise on explosives safety for foreign ordnance and weapons systems employed by the FSF.

Fire Support Officer

1-71. There is no organic FSO on the SFAB brigade staff. The brigade staff uses the fire support coordinator in the SFAB field artillery battalion when required.

1-72. The FSO serves as the special staff officer for fires and integrates fires into the scheme of maneuver for the commander. The FSO leads fire support planning for the delivery of fires to include preparation fires, harassing fires, interdiction fires, suppressive fires, destruction fires, and deception fires. The fire support coordinator leads the brigade's targeting process, synchronizing effects across all domains with SFAB and partner security force operations in achieving the commander's objectives. The FSO leads the fire support cell (when established), prepares Annex D (Fires) of the operation order, and coordinates with the cyber EWO and the air liaison officer. The S-3 coordinates this position. (See ADP 3-19 for more information.)

Force Management Officer

1-73. Force management officers are trusted advisors who serve as subject matter experts on the technical processes of force management. Force management officers are experts at force development, designing operational and institutional force structure, identifying and allocating authorized resources, and force integration.

Mobility Warrant Officer

1-74. The mobility warrant officer plans, organizes, and supervises the preparation and execution of advisor team movements and distribution operations. Mobility warrant officers coordinate deployment and distribution actions with multinational, joint, Army, and commercial agencies through the Joint Logistics Enterprise. They prepare and validate deployment and redeployment plans, orders, and SOPs. The mobility warrant officer provides training in unit movement operations and supervises the use of joint and Army

transportation systems to document Army redeployment and distribution operations. They assist commanders in planning and conducting unit movement operations by land, sea, and air.

Property Book Officer

1-75. The property book officer is the primary advisor to the command and supported units on all property accountability and organizational-level supply matters. Property book officers develop, execute, monitor, and provide input to the budget. They coordinate funds availability and oversee the small purchase program for standard and nonstandard equipment. They manage materiel through record adjustments, issues, turn-ins, property losses, and status reports. The property book officer applies for, coordinates, and manages the unit DOD Activity Address Codes.

1-76. The mission of the property book officer is to ensure all authorized equipment is on-hand or on requisition for all units to accomplish their mission. Typically, all property (except real property) requires continuous detailed accounting from the time of acquisition through an item's lifecycle until the property is disposed of or consumed. The property book officer maintains the property records for all accountable assets issued to supported units. The officer controls all input to and output from the automated processes supporting the property book system. The property book officer processes documents such as financial liability investigations, adjustment reports, statement of charges, cash collection vouchers, and managerial reports the command requires.

Provost Marshal

1-77. The provost marshal is responsible for planning, coordinating, and employing all organic, assigned, or attached military police assets. Usually, provost marshals are the senior military police officers in the command. They augment the staff, typically within the S-3. The provost marshal develops antiterrorism, and force protection, assisting the S-3 and personnel recovery officer in planning personnel recovery operations. The provost marshal prepares a portion of Annex C (Operations) and a portion of Annex E (Protection) to the operation order (see FM 3-39 for additional information).

Psychological Operations Officer

1-78. The psychological operations (PSYOP) officer synchronizes the military information support operations for the SFAB. The PSYOP officer's efforts enable information advantage (for more on information advantage, see ADP 3-13). They may be the primary advisor to the commander on shaping the OE to degrade enemy and adversary decision making, on information activities, and on planning, synchronizing, and coordinating influence activities with other staff, higher headquarters, and foreign counterparts. The PSYOP officer assists in adversary information analysis and exploitation, and as necessary, coordinates for division or higher-level influence support to counter or exploit adversary information activities. They are responsible for synchronizing and deconflicting information-related capabilities that are employed to support operations. The PSYOP officer coordinates and integrates information-related capabilities for information operations in the SFAB, including military information support to operations, OPSEC, and deception activities. They are the lead planner for information activities and offensive and defensive psychological effects capabilities.

1-79. The PSYOP officer, assisted by the staff psychological operations NCO, prepares Appendices 13 (Military Information Support Operations), 14 (Military Deception), and 15 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to the operation order (see ADP 6-0 and FM 3-53 for more information).

Staff Weather Officer

1-80. The staff weather officer is a U.S. Air Force officer or NCO subject matter expert who coordinates operational weather support and weather service matters through the S-2 and other staff members. Staff weather officers are augmented to the SFAB as needed during LSCO. In the absence of aligned staff weather officer support, weather requests can be made at the supporting echelon. Staff weather officers lead a team of Air Force weather personnel that collect and analyze environmental intelligence to produce and disseminate mission-tailored products. These products can include an environmental running estimate, mission execution forecasts, and weather watches, warnings, and advisories. They integrate weather effects into planning and execution along with responding to requests for weather information. Weather effects

information and products contribute to the SFAB commander's situational understanding, decision making, and risk management. Although aligned to the SFAB, U.S. Air Force weather personnel remain under administrative control and OPCON to the air component commander. The SFAB, through the S-2, ensures aligned U.S. Air Force weather personnel receive required Army equipment. The staff weather officer prepares Tab B (Weather) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) and should be included in reviews of operation orders. (See FM 2-0 for additional information.) Although they are not permanently assigned, they are on the modified table of equipment and attached prior to LSCO.

Surgeon

1-81. The surgeon coordinates health service support and operations within the command. The surgeon is the lead medical advisor and responsible for establishing medical advising efforts in support of the commander, synchronizing the medical advising efforts, and developing the partnered force capability and capacity.

1-82. The surgeon provides and oversees medical care to Soldiers, civilians, and detainees. The brigade surgeon is responsible for the technical supervision of all medical activities in the command. As part of the special staff, the surgeon provides advice to the commander on all medical or medically related issues. The surgeon informs the commander of external medical capabilities available to the unit, the health of the command to include the foreign counterparts, plans for medical training with the FSF, and an assessment of the medical training status. (See ATP 4-02.6.) The surgeon prepares a portion of Annex E (Protection) and Annex F (Sustainment) of the operation order. The surgeon provides the S-4 with recommendations on the medical plan and subordinate unit plans for air and ground MEDEVACs, medical facility locations, and other considerations regarding health service support. (See FM 4-02 for more information.)

1-83. The brigade surgeon plans and coordinates for the following activities:

- Medical intelligence requirements.
- Local population assessment.
- Development of the FSF medical capabilities and capacity.
- MEDEVAC by organic assets.
- Area support MEDEVAC provided by the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, or U.S. Navy resources or resources from the civilian community (contract).
- MEDEVAC using host-nation and multinational resources.
- Medical treatment facilities afloat including hospitalization in Role 3 medical treatment facilities established by the Services, MNFs, or host nation.
- Dental services.
- Veterinary public and animal health services, which includes the following:
  - Food protection.
  - Animal care.
  - Zoonotic disease prevention and control.
- Civic assistance programs within the local community.
- Medical advise and assist missions.
- Operational public health services.
- Medical laboratory services.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance (HA) programs.
- Behavioral health and combat and operational stress control programs.
- Army Health System assessments, estimates, and plans.

1-84. The surgeon advises the foreign counterpart in health service support and force health protection (FHP) activities including the deployment of medical assets, establishment of tactical- and operational-level medical treatment assets, development of patient evacuation routes, procurement and distribution of medical supplies, and implementation of FHP measures to reduce disease and nonbattle injury. Medical planners work with their counterparts and the civil military advisor to train the FSF on the development and employment of health service support and FHP capabilities.

1-85. The surgeon's staff includes a medical operations officer, an environmental science engineering officer, a medical sustainment officer, a clinical psychologist, a physical therapist officer, a nurse officer, and a senior healthcare NCO. If possible, the team should be mixed gender to ensure it can provide culturally appropriate

care to both men and women. While assigned to the brigade sustainment advising battalion, these personnel retain the responsibility to perform their respective medical functions under the supervision of the surgeon. The surgeon's staff is responsible for assisting the unit surgeon with planning, coordinating, advising, and synchronizing Army Health System SPO and requirements. The section is also responsible for assessing the FSF medical requirements including medical training and support in the brigade's AO. When augmented by external medical assets, the brigade surgeon's section coordinates through the higher echelon headquarters with the medical force provider in the AO.

PERSONAL STAFF

1-86. Personal staff officers work under the immediate control of, and have direct access to, the brigade commander. They advise the commander, provide input to orders and plans, and interface and coordinate with entities external to the SFAB headquarters. They also serve as advisors to their counterparts in the FSF. Examples of personal staff officers include the command sergeant major, the brigade judge advocate, the surgeon, the public affairs officer, and the chaplain. Personal staff responsibilities are described in paragraphs 1-87 through 1-94.

Command Sergeant Major

1-87. The command sergeant major is the senior NCO who advises the commander on issues related to the enlisted ranks. They provide a wealth of knowledge, experience, and advice to the commander and other Soldiers within the unit. The command sergeant major carries out policies and enforces standards for the performance, training, and conduct of enlisted Soldiers. During operations, a commander employs the command sergeant major throughout the AO to extend command influence, assess the morale of the force, and assist during critical events.

Executive Officer

1-88. XOs observe and provide advice to their foreign counterpart regarding organizational analysis of the foreign unit and coordinating their staff sections to ensure efficiency during the planning process. With the counterpart, XOs assist foreign staff sections as they develop estimates and plans. The XO advisor also coordinates and liaises with the FSF's higher headquarters. The XO also functions as the de facto chief-of-staff.

Chaplain and Unit Ministry Team

1-89. The unit ministry team consists of a chaplain and a religious affairs specialist. The chaplain serves as a personal staff officer with direct access to the commander. The unit ministry team provides religious support to all assigned or attached Service members, family members, and authorized civilians. The team provides religious, moral, and ethical advisement to the command as they impact both individuals and the organization's mission. They coordinate with higher, subordinate, and adjacent unit ministry teams and chaplain sections for area and denominational coverage requirements. The unit ministry team prepares a portion of Annex F (Sustainment) to the operation order. (See FM 3-83 and ATP 1-05.01 for additional information.)

1-90. When appropriate, the chaplain provides advice to the foreign commander and staff on issues related to ethics, morality, and religion as it influences their forces, operations, and the local population. Understanding the impact of religion upon the operations, FSF, and the local population is pivotal to the success of the SFA objectives. Chaplains train to conduct leader engagements with key religious leaders as well as foreign military counterparts. Chaplains also provide guidance regarding religious affairs both directly and via reachback capability through supervisory channels as well as networked relationships with the CCDR and the ASCC chaplain offices.

Judge Advocate

1-91. The judge advocate is the senior legal advisor to the SFAB commander. The judge advocate advises the commander and staff on national security law, international agreements, military justice, administrative

law, fiscal law, and other areas of the law as required and ensures the delivery of legal services to the brigade across the core legal disciplines of the Judge Advocate General's Corps.

1-92. The roles of the brigade legal team include the following:

- Advising SFAB commanders at all echelons on legal issues or priorities that impact their commands.
- Deploying with the brigade headquarters to support SFAB operations and exercises.
- Serving as the appointed ethics counselor for the brigade and managing the brigade's ethics and Office of Government Ethics program where applicable, using OGE Form 450 (*Confidential Financial Disclosure Report)*.
- Overseeing all brigade investigations to include the following:
  - AR 15-6 investigations.
  - Financial liability investigations of property loss.
  - Line of duty investigations.
  - Safety investigations.
- Coordinating for outside legal review of investigations where necessary.
- Serving as the brigade representative to military and civilian law enforcement agencies and prosecutorial offices.
- Drafting, maintaining, and executing military justice actions to include the following:
  - Article 15 punishments.
  - Reprimands.
  - Separations/eliminations.
  - Courts-martial where the chain of command possesses both convening and referral authority.
- Coordinating with local Special Trial Counsel offices on any investigations or adverse actions that involve one or more covered offenses.
- Participating in all brigade-level operational planning events whether for real-world operations or exercises.
- Reviewing all concepts of operation originating from their respective SFAB for legal sufficiency prior to submission to higher headquarters for review/approval.
- Advising SFAB commanders at all echelons on lethal and nonlethal fires effects before employment of said effects.
- Executing annual training for all SFAB personnel on the law of armed conflict and on government ethics.

- Assuring, with the assistance of SFAB leaders and in coordination with their servicing ASCC, that all SFAB personnel employing as part of a force package, deploying to support exercises or operations, or participating in other overseas training or advising missions with FSF partners, receive a pre-employment/predeployment brief consisting of the following:
  - Overview of the law of armed conflict.
  - Any applicable rules of engagement.
- Operational authorities relevant to the upcoming mission:
  - Applicable Status of Forces Agreements or other status protections.
  - Local laws that may impact the mission.
- Providing legal reviews of any contracting actions if not expected to occur at supporting contracting or field support brigades.
- Maintaining a repository of international and domestic legal resources for the brigade.
- Serving as the brigade representative to legal entities affiliated with joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational partners.
- Preparing portions of Annex C (Operations) and Annex F (Sustainment) to the operation order. (See AR 27-1 and FM 3-84 for more information.)

1-93. The legal team consists of one judge advocate and one paralegal NCO. The legal team can perform advising tasks for FSF legal personnel at the direction of the SFAB commander. As available and approved by the SFAB command, the legal team may also participate in predeployment site surveys (PDSSs), American Embassy engagements, and other in-theater legal interactions which may support the ability of the SFAB to accomplish its mission. The legal team may, on an occasional basis, also perform nonlegal advising tasks for nonlegal FSF personnel consistent with receiving proper training, concurrence of legal leaders as expressed under AR 27-1, and approval by the SFAB commander. Such duties, however, will not supersede the legal team's legal support responsibilities to the command. In service of these legal and nonlegal advising tasks, the legal team will also coordinate with their immediate ASCC legal offices to apprise them of forecasted advisement missions and, as necessary, other military legal organizations with equities impacted by the legal team's in-country advising missions. While the legal team may discuss matters of law and policy with foreign commanders or personnel, they will not provide legal advice to any foreign commanders or personnel.

Public Affairs Officer

1-94. The public affairs officer develops strategies, leads, and supervises the conduct of public information, community engagements, and command information. The public affairs officer's principal role is providing advice and counsel to the commander and the staff on how affected external and internal publics will accept and understand the unit's operations. The public affairs officer understands and coordinates the flow of information to Soldiers, the Army community, and the public and prepares Annex J (Public Affairs) to the operation order. The public affairs officer coordinates closely with the CCMD, country team, or theater command public affairs office, and the SFAB information operations officer to publicize SFA activities as appropriate to achieve specific effects within the information domain. (See FM 3-61 for more information.)

SUBORDINATE UNITS

1-95. An SFAB can deploy 18 multifunctional and 18 functional advising teams. Each team is a bespoke and tailored unit, capable of performing the conflict integration and developmental advisor tasks alongside mission partners to advise and coordinate mission success in austere environments within the entire gamut of the strategic environment.

SUBORDINATE UNIT ROLES

1-96. The two most important roles of the brigade, battalion, and squadron headquarters are to advise FSF and coordinate the SFA mission of their subordinate advisor teams. This includes task-organizing advisor teams, assigning partner relationships, coordinating advising themes and messages, managing assessments, and coordinating other relationships in support of their teams and the SFA mission. By placing advisor teams at echelon throughout the FSF, the SFAB may guide the synchronization of their foreign counterpart's mission as well.

1-97. The SFAB brigade and battalions manage, coordinate, and organize advisor teams, in addition to supervising the SFA mission of their subordinate organizations. They have the capacity to conduct SFA operations alongside their FSF counterparts while managing the larger SFA mission. However, these organizations do not have the capacity or capability to conduct independent operations outside of their assigned SFA mission. Therefore, the SFAB should generally not be assigned an AO. The exception is when an FSF formation with embedded SFAB advisors is assigned an AO. For example, this would occur in the context of a multinational LSCO where the SFAB was embedded with a partner nation force conducting LSCO adjacent to a U.S. Force, and both the U.S. Force and partner force (with embedded SFAB elements) have distinct separate boundaries. Graphically, the organizational boundary could show the FSF with a note that the SFAB has the same boundaries. Ultimately, this depends on the C2 arrangement within the MNF.

SUBORDINATE UNIT STRUCTURE

1-98. The brigade commander determines the task organization for employment to execute operations across echelons, time, and terrain, depending on the CCDR's SFA requirements. These teams are designed to advise and operate at the tactical level—company, battalion, brigade, division, or corps—as directed by the CCDR. The six battalions' cross functional design within an SFAB facilitates the brigade commander's ability to task organize and tailor trained advisor teams to meet mission requirements. Each Infantry battalion and Cavalry squadron have an HHC or a headquarters and headquarters troop, and two maneuver companies or troops. The fires advising battalion has a headquarters and headquarters battery and two fires advisor batteries. The engineer advising battalion has one HHC, two engineer, one signal, and a MI company. The sustainment advising battalion has an HHC that has limited distribution, maintenance, and medical capabilities (See figure 1-4 on page 22.)




Figure 1-4. Organization

Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company

1-99. The brigade HHC can task-organize to provide a BAT to meet its advising requirement at the tactical level at a variety of FSF echelons and types. This BAT is fully capable of advising in either the FSF generating or operational force based on CCDR or chief of mission (COM) guidance. The SFAB HHC coordinates the SFA activities of subordinate battalions and manages functional companies and attachments. The HHC prepares to develop the capability and capacity of its foreign counterparts—generally at division level—to plan, coordinate, and synchronize operations. The brigade staff provides limited capabilities in support of various missions and tasks. The staff also coordinates with echelons above brigade for additional assets and capabilities as required.

Military Intelligence Company

1-100. The MI company works closely with the brigade S-2 and provides additional limited capabilities including counterintelligence (CI), signals intelligence, geospatial intelligence, human intelligence, all-source intelligence, open-source research, and division or corps aligned U.S. Air Force reachback weather

support. The MI company has no dedicated advisor teams, however, as necessary, Soldiers in this company may be task-organized to augment advisor teams and the brigade intelligence section to provide technical expertise. Task organization decisions must balance the tensions inherent in the advisor dichotomy.

1-101. The MI company contains the brigade intelligence support element. The brigade intelligence support element provides the SFAB S-2 with limited processing, exploitation, and dissemination, all-source analysis and production, and intelligence reach and dissemination capabilities. The MI company has limited personnel, equipment, and times to analyze and process single-source intelligence. The brigade intelligence support element also assists the brigade S-2 with the development and evolution of the CCIRs.

Signal Company

1-102. The signal company works closely with the brigade S-6 to provide the SFAB with voice and data transmission expertise for its tactical radio network and worldwide digital voice and data communications using organic and external assets. These capabilities allow SFAB commanders to conduct C2 of their SFA missions. The signal company has no dedicated advisor teams. When necessary, and accounting for the risk inherent in the advisor dichotomy, commanders may task-organize Soldiers of this company with advisor teams to provide technical expertise to the team or the FSF.

1-103. Through small communications support teams, the signal company provides beyond line-of-sight voice and data transmission capability to SFAB advisor teams. The signal company has limited organic radios, but the support teams can employ the SFAB's multiband, multimission radios that allow broadband voice and data transmission. The support teams also maintain and employ digital voice and data systems to provide flexibility in a mission partner environment.

Medical Support Section

1-104. SFAB commanders may task-organize advisors in the medical support section (MSS) to other advisor teams across the brigade to provide specialized medical advising capability. When appropriate, the MSS may also establish a medical advisor team. The medical advisors develop foreign medical treatment units or facilities that provide Role 1 through Role 3 care. Medical advisors retain the responsibility for providing basic medical care to advisors within their formation.

Distribution Section

1-105. The distribution section is a subordinate unit of the sustainment advising battalion and contains sustainer specialties which are not assigned to the battalion's other advisor teams. Members of the distribution section task organized episodically to the advisor teams in order provide specific sustainment expertise. When a force package requires a deeper understanding of liquid logistics, ammunition handling and supply management, or like specialty, the distribution section personnel are aligned to the need as dictated by mission requirements.

Maintenance Section

1-106. The maintenance section of the sustainment advising battalion can advise on most materiel maintenance needs including but not limited to wheeled vehicle maintenance, weapons maintenance, generator maintenance, and supply processing capabilities. While the maintenance section seldom deploys as a standalone team, the maintenance section members are habitually aligned to force packages to provide tailored maintenance and materiel ordering expertise to the FSF or partner forces.

The Advising Battalions

1-107. The SFAB advising battalions coordinate the SFA activities of subordinate companies or troops, conduct advisor activities alongside their assigned foreign counterparts, and task staffs to develop capacity and capability of counterparts. The advising battalion must be prepared to execute tasks with FSF at the same, one-up, and two-up level(s) across the range of military operations across the competition continuum. In addition to their advisor duties, advising battalion staffs plan, coordinate, and synchronize operations while managing the COP of the SFA operation.

Maneuver Advising Battalions and Squadron

1-108. The SFAB Infantry battalions and the SFAB Cavalry squadron form the SFAB's MBATs. MBATs coordinate the SFA activities of subordinate companies or troops while their designated battalion or squadron advisor teams conduct advisor activities alongside their assigned foreign counterparts. The MBAT must be prepared to execute tasks with FSF across the range of military operations including military engagement, SC, deterrence, limited contingency, crisis response, and LSCO. The MBATs' staffs develop the capability and capacity of their counterparts to plan, coordinate, and synchronize operations in addition to managing the COP of the SFA operation. MBATs should be prepared to execute advising at both the one-up (FSF brigade) and two-up (FSF division) levels.

Fires Advising Battalion

1-109. The SFAB fires advising battalion forms the SFAB's FBAT. The FBAT develops the fires capability and capacity of FSF to conduct targeting, deliver fires, and integrate fires at multiple echelons within the OE. Advisor teams advise, train, organize, rebuild, build, and assess FSF within the fires warfighting function. Advisor teams are prepared to support FSF with indirect fires through coordination of joint fire assets, if necessary. The fires battalion headquarters forms a functional advisor team that has subject matter expertise of the fires warfighting function across echelons. The fires battalion is not equipped with organic cannon or rocket artillery systems to conduct the fires function for the FSF.

Engineer Advising Battalion

1-110. The SFAB engineer advising battalion forms the SFAB's EBAT. The EBAT develops the engineering capability and capacity of FSF to SPO by overcoming and enhancing the effects of terrain in the OE through the engineer disciplines of combat, and general and geospatial engineering. The EBAT and its corresponding ECATs and EATs train the FSF on construction tasks and construction operations as necessary. The engineer battalion also has a small MI company and a signal company that, in addition to their advising role, provide limited technical support to the brigade. These companies work with and provide support to the brigade staff. The engineer battalion has limited capability and capacity to facilitate friendly mobility without significant augmentation of personnel and equipment.

Sustainment Advising Battalion

1-111. The sustainment advising battalion forms the SFAB's LBAT. The LBAT provides advisor teams to develop the logistics capability and capacity of the FSF. In a JOA, the SPO section may coordinate sustainment support between the advisor team and the theater support structure. The sustainment advising battalion consists of a headquarters support company, two LCATs, with four LATs, and the MSS. The MSS provides a medical advising capability for Role 1 through Role 3 medical facilities and assets. The sustainment advising battalion and subordinate advisor teams can advise FSF on sustainment operations from brigade through theater level. The LBAT can be custom-built from the members of the headquarters support company based on the recommendations of the battalion commander and accounting for the advisor dichotomy. The LBAT can provide C2 of advising teams when needed.

SECTION IV – ADVISOR TEAM: ADVISING ECHELON AND TASK ORGANIZATION

1-112. Advisor teams provide the knowledge and experience to develop FSF across the warfighting functions for any OE. Composed of technically and tactically competent Soldiers, these advisor teams must be creative, flexible, resilient, and prepared to conduct decentralized operations in austere environments located far away from U.S. support bases. As distinct from the organizational diagram depicted in figure 1-4 (on page 22), figure 1-5 depicts the available advisor teams, by type, at echelon.




Figure 1-5. Advisor teams by echelon

TASK ORGANIZATION

1-113. Individual advisor teams are organized with different responsibilities based off warfighting function experience and intended level of FSF partnership. While these teams are ostensibly separated based on maneuver, fires, engineer, and sustainment, they can and should be regrouped into cross-functional teams as the mission dictates. An effective team will be able to utilize the skill set and training of each of their advisor team members to achieve operational success. Figure 1-6 on page 26 depicts examples of advisor team nomenclature and graphical depiction at a few possible echelons after they have been apportioned to a partner force.




Figure 1-6. Advising at echelon

1-114. Task-organized advisor teams include all the necessary enablers to accomplish their assigned mission. This includes receiving any required augmentation from outside the SFAB, security elements being the most common. Other common members include sustainment, signal, engineer, fires, and other technical experts in their specific fields (see figure 1-7). Chapter 5 describes augmentation considerations in more detail.




Figure 1-7. Advising team composition

BRIGADE AND BATTALION ADVISING TEAMS

1-115. The BAT concentrates its advising effort on advising brigade and above echelons. The BAT is the only advisor team formation capable of providing robust advising support to levels above the brigade and contains advisors with unique skills and proficiencies due to the brigade-level modified table of organization and equipment positions such as judge advocate general, geographic information system, and provost marshal personnel. When included in a force package, the BAT also supervises, and task organizes its subordinate teams at the company and team level to disperse in accordance with the CCMD advisor guidance.

1-116. The BAT and MBATs have numerous trained advisors that provide the core of the advisor teams. The fires, engineer, and sustainment battalions have fewer personnel and are generally task-organized to provide technical expertise to other advisor teams. Using U.S. Force structure as a guide, specialty MBATs operate at the battalion, brigade, or division level, while the BAT can advise up to the corps or even ministry of defense (MOD) level if no MOD-specific advisors from the CCMD are available.

1-117. Mission analysis determines the structure of the brigade and battalion advisor teams. After assessing the SFA mission and FSF requirements, the SFAB organizes these higher echelon brigade and BATs. These task-organized teams may include security or other external augmentation required for the specific mission.

1-118. The BAT and MBATs are charged with managing the flow of information requirements utilized through the advisor network and advisor reachback capabilities that exist within the SFAB. Their ability to track and manage these information requirements directly informs the commander's ability to achieve mission success within SFA objectives.

1-119. The FBAT provides technical expertise and advisor activities to fires elements of FSF at the battalion and above levels. The FBAT can provide specialized advising capabilities to FSF fires units, personnel, and integrators.

1-120. The EBAT provides technical expertise and advisor activities to engineer and protection elements of the FSF at the battalion and above levels. The engineer advising battalion is also uniquely capable of providing robust signal and military intelligence advising augmentation to other teams through their military intelligence and signal companies.

1-121. The LBAT is the greatest source of sustainment advising capability and contains subordinate advising teams, the MSS, and sustainment functional sections manned for maintenance and distribution advising. The MSS, distribution, and maintenance sections also augment other advising teams as dictated by the mission. The LBAT is assigned a robust package of sustainment specialties but possesses insufficient manning and materiel to serve as a brigade support battalion.

COMPANY ADVISOR TEAMS

1-122. Company and troop advisor teams (MCATs, FCATs, ECATs, and LCATs) perform C2 and advisor activities in addition to management, coordination, and supervision of SFA mission of their subordinate teams. Company advisor teams are led by a company commander, or company team leader and are usually responsible for the employment and C2 of two advisor teams plus the company advisor team itself. Paragraphs 1-123 through 1-127 detail the employment of company advisor teams within each specialty.

MANEUVER COMPANY ADVISOR TEAM

1-123. The companies and troops of the Infantry battalions and Cavalry squadron make up the core of the MCATs. MCATs manage, coordinate, and supervise the SFA mission of their subordinate advisor teams while developing their assigned FSF. Outside of SFA activities, in conjunction with FSF, these teams do not have the capacity or capability to conduct independent operations. MCATs may perform duties typical of a conventional command post, however, this will be at the expense of their advising capability. (See chapter 4, section I, for more information on organizational reporting structures.) MCATs must be prepared to execute tasks with FSF across the range of military operations including SC, limited contingency operations, crisis response, and LSCO. MCATs should be prepared to execute advising at both the one-up (FSF battalion) and two-up (FSF brigade) levels.

1-124. Advisor teams are the primary SFAB organizations that influence FSF through the execution of SFA activities. The SFAB contains maneuver, fires, engineer, and sustainment advisor teams along with trained medical advisors in the MSS. Advisor teams conduct activities alongside their foreign counterparts in support of their assigned SFA activities. Advisor teams operate at echelon or up to two levels higher. At each echelon, advisor teams generally organize into an operations and support section to facilitate C2 while executing operations (see figure 1-5 on page 25).

FIRES COMPANY ADVISOR TEAM

1-125. The FCATs can advise at the company, battalion, and brigade levels. While the FCAT is not assigned indirect fire assets, they provide substantial fires functional knowledge and experiential expertise. FCAT personnel cannot provide a full fires cell capability to the FSF but can enhance preexisting fires infrastructure within FSF capabilities as well as conduct gap-analyses to directly foster interoperability across echelons and multinational targeting.

ENGINEER COMPANY ADVISOR TEAM

1-126. ECATs can advise on engineer functions at the company through brigade levels and are versed in protection, horizontal and vertical construction, and mobility-countermobility-survivability operational tasks. ECATs are routinely included in force packages to develop FSF and partners on engineering actions which involve cross-functional mission requirements at scale.

LOGISTICS COMPANY ADVISOR TEAM

1-127. The LCAT can advise on logistics functions at the company through brigade echelon, and are versed in maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, and distribution operational tasks. The LCATs of the sustainment advising battalion are the smallest footprint advisor team by modified table of equipment, however, they are habitually augmented with sustainment advisors organic to the LBAT in a modular fashion to advise at the point of need. Versed in the multifaceted functions of sustainment, LCAT employment ranges from tactical logistics operations advising to wide-scale sustainment operations. LCAT advisor team members must be versed in staff operations processes.

ADVISOR TEAMS

1-128. Advisor teams comprise the majority of SFAB personnel and are uniquely equipped among conventional Army formations to perform the advisor role. Company advisor team commanders leverage the unique personalities, interpersonal and military skills, and experiences of the advisor teams to advise at the point of need. Advisor teams are led by a team leader who advises his commander on gainful employment of his team, considering operational and mission variables. The assistant team leader, who is the most senior NCO, assists the team leader and shares the responsibility of leading the team in the team leader's absence or as determined by necessity.

MANEUVER ADVISOR TEAMS

1-129. The MATs—located in companies and troops of the Infantry battalions and Cavalry squadrons—have a greater variety of advisors already assigned to their teams relative to other battalions. These teams are a four-advisor, cross-functional team with three primary advisors and seven enabling advisors. These teams span all warfighting functions, to include advisors from sustainment, signal, fires, medical, maintenance, and other fields, providing these advisor teams with organic flexibility and depth. The fires, engineer, and sustainment advisor teams are specialized in their requisite skills and do not have the same breadth of specialties as the MATs. SFABs generally task-organize their advisor teams with the MATs to provide their required technical expertise for the specific mission. MATs must be versed in staff operations and these MATs conduct operations at the company, battalion, or brigade level.

1-130. MATs are the base element in the SFAB and are unique among conventional Army formations. Commanders and team leaders assign personnel to the advisor team based on operational and mission variables. Once higher headquarters assigns personnel to the team, the leader organizes the element to facilitate C2 while executing operations. Figure 1-8 on page 30 depicts an example of a task-organized MAT.




Figure 1-8. Maneuver advisor team, example

FIRES ADVISOR TEAMS

1-131. FATs provide technical and tactical fires and targeting expertise to their FSF counterparts. The FATs do not have the same depth of organic advisors as MATs. SFABs should generally task organize their FATs with MATs to provide their required technical expertise for the specific mission. For example, FATs augment BATs aligned against division to provide more robust fires cells. When operational and mission variables allow, they may operate independently as well. FATs must be versed in staff operations. These advisor teams have the capability to conduct operations at the company, battalion, or brigade level.

ENGINEER ADVISOR TEAMS

1-132. EATs provide technical and tactical expertise in mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering to their FSF counterparts. EATs have familiarity with commercial and military geospatial tools and have an additional reachback capability to the United States Army Corps of Engineers Reachback Operations Center for additional technical engineering expertise.

1-133. The EATs do not have the same depth of organic advisors as MATs. SFABs should generally task organize their EATs with MATs to provide their required technical expertise for the specific mission. When operational and mission variables allow, they may operate independently as well. EATs must be versed in staff operations or employ a battle staff graduate. These advisor teams conduct operations at the company, battalion, or brigade level.

LOGISTICS ADVISOR TEAMS

1-134. LATs develop FSF sustainment processes, procedures, and systems. LATs advise FSF at the platoon through battalion echelons (or equivalent) on full spectrum of logistic activities defined in FM 4-0. The substantial difference between a typical advisor team and a LAT is the emphasis given to the sustainment advising capability. These advisor teams must be versed in staff operations.

SECTION V – ADVISOR TEAM MEMBER DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

> Your MOS gets you in the door, but your job is to be an advisor.
>
> Major General Donn H. Hill
> 3rd Commanding General
> Security Force Assistance Command

1-135. SFAB operations require leaders, staffs, and advisors to operate in unfamiliar situations influenced by a substantial number of variables. Therefore, it is not possible to generate a list of all-inclusive duties and responsibilities for all positions and situations. This section provides a basic framework for typical duties and responsibilities for advisors and staff. Units should further refine these responsibilities through direction, SOPs, and task organization. Refer to appendix A for a list of common types of teams used by the SFAB and the number classification system to identify each SFAB team member.

1-136. Advisor teams conduct advising activities through continuous assessments. It is the team's responsibility to update their assessments on the FSF repeatedly and routinely.

1-137. Advisor functions are divided into two areas, internal and external, as described in the following:

- Internal functions directly support the advisor teams and include planning, operations, administrative, maintenance, and supply.
- External functions pertain to the advisor team's mission as it relates to the FSF and may be narrow in scope or apply across warfighting areas:
  - External functions illustrate a method of dividing responsibilities among advisors.
  - External functions are not all-inclusive or appropriate for all situations.

Note. While the normal duties and responsibilities of advisors are discussed further, advisors may have to fill more than one position at a time. All advisors should cross train and understand other positions on their respective teams and always seek to advise to the need.

> **Korean Military Advisory Group – The Advisor Mentality**
>
> In the execution of his advisory mission, the advisor begins with considerable prestige which he must continually endeavor to maintain. With finesse and intelligence many advisors have made recommendations to their counterparts so logically and effectively that United States military doctrine stands out clearly in the issuance and execution of orders by Korean counterparts.
>
> Advisors Handbook, 1951

COMPANY ADVISOR TEAM MEMBERS

1-138. The following duty positions exist in the company level advising teams and are only present in with the MCAT, FCAT, ECAT, and/or LCAT, respectively.

COMMANDER (TEAM LEADER)

1-139. The company, troop, or battery commander also functions as the team leader for the company, troop, or battery advisor team. The team leader is directly involved with advising the FSF commander and senior staff. The team leader is responsible for leading the team through the execution of battle drills.

The team leader performs the following internal functions:

- Leading all team operations, planning, and actions.
- Taking responsibility for the deployment/redeployment readiness of the team.
- Taking responsibility for the collective training of the team.
- Assessing the FSF capabilities.
- Approving all outgoing reports.
- Providing input for, and submitting, the FSF training and readiness reports.
- Ensuring the establishment of requisition and tracking systems.
- Conducting operations in a safe manner through the integration of risk management (see ATP 5-19).
- Accounting for team equipment.
- Educating self and team on the culture, region or country, history, and key figures in the OE.

1-140. The team leader performs the following external functions:

- Advising the counterpart commander within their functional specialty.
- Liaising with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.
- Conducting cross-cultural negotiations with foreign counterparts.
- Supporting the FSF with capabilities.

1-141. The team leader will generally organize the team to include at least two subordinate leaders, usually a senior advisor in charge of an operations and support section. This method facilitates control and provides efficiency when working with the FSF.

FIRST SERGEANT (ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER)

1-142. The company, troop, or battery first sergeant also functions as the assistant team leader on the company, troop, or battery advising team. The assistant team leader is the senior NCO on the advisor team. The assistant team leader is responsible for monitoring daily operations of the advisor team. Assistant team leaders fill the team leader role in the latter's absence. The assistant team leader performs the following internal functions:

- Accounting for all personnel assigned to the team both administratively and for training.
- Developing the foundational training cycle in accordance with SFAC's annual training guidance.
- Assisting the team leader in the collective training cycle in accordance with SFAC's annual training guidance.
- Assisting the team leader with team deployment/redeployment readiness requirements.
- Leading the team in the absence of the team leader.
- Planning training to ensure the team's combat efficiency, discipline, administration, and welfare.
- Reviewing the team's operations and training calendars.
- Coordinating staff actions before they reach the team leader.
- Directing the team's budget.
- Managing and directing interpreters.
- Writing outgoing reports and messages.

1-143. The assistant team leader performs the following external functions:

- Representing the team in the absence of the team leader.
- Advising FSF leaders.
- Assisting the senior NCO counterpart with enforcing the commander's intent, maintaining discipline, and conducting precombat checks.

- Providing input for the FSF assessments.
- Reviewing training prior to execution.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

Training and Advise Noncommissioned Officer

1-144. The training and advise NCO at the MCAT level performs duties and functions like the training and advise NCO at the MAT level. (See paragraphs 1-168 through 1-169 for more information.)

Intelligence Advisor

1-145. The intelligence advisor at the MCAT level performs duties and functions like the intelligence advisor at the MAT level. (See paragraphs 1-170 through 1-172 for more information.)

Fire Support Noncommissioned Officer

1-146. The fire support NCO at the MCAT level performs duties and functions like the fires advisor at the MAT level. (See paragraphs 1-173 through 1-174 for more information.)

Signal Advisor

1-147. The signal advisor at the MCAT level performs duties and functions like the signal advisor at the MAT level. (See paragraphs 1-175 through 1-176 for more information.)

Logistics Advisor

1-148. The logistics advisor at the MCAT level performs duties and functions like the logistics advisor at the MAT level. (See paragraphs 1-177 through 1-178 for more information.)

1-149. The LCAT also has two logistics advisors who advise on the functions of their military occupational specialty (MOS) as per the duties and responsibilities of the sustainment advising battalion distribution section.

Mechanic Advisor (Maintenance Advisor)

1-150. The mechanic advisor, or maintenance advisor, at the MCAT level performs duties and functions like the maintenance advisor at the MAT level. (See paragraphs 1-179 through 1-180 for more information.)

1-151. The LCAT also has a maintenance advisor who advises on the functions of the MOS as per the duties and responsibilities of the sustainment advising battalion maintenance section.

Explosive Hazard Advisor

1-152. The explosive hazard advisor at the MCAT level performs duties and functions like the explosive hazard advisor at the MAT level. (See paragraphs 1-181 through 1-183 for more information.)

Health Care Sergeant (Medical Advisor)

1-153. The health care sergeant, or medical advisor, at the company advisor team level performs duties and functions like the medical advisor at the advisor team level. (See paragraphs 1-184 through 1-185 for more information.)

Fires Support Advisor

1-154. The FCAT fires support advisor has duties and responsibilities similar, but not limited to, the duties and responsibilities of the MAT fire support NCO and the FAT senior fire control NCO, but at the company/battery and higher levels. (See paragraphs 1-173 through 1-174 as well as paragraphs 1-194 through 1-195 for more information.)

TEAM ADVISOR (ENGINEER SUPPORT ADVISOR)

1-155. The ECAT team advisor, or engineer support advisor, has duties and responsibilities similar, but not limited to, the duties and responsibilities of the brigade engineer and the EAT advisor, but at the company level. (See paragraph 1-69 as well as paragraphs 1-202 through 1-203 for more information.)

SUPPLY ADVISOR

1-156. The LCATs have a supply advisor. The supply advisor is versed in support and supply operations like the LAT supply advisor but at the company level. (See paragraphs 1-215 through 1-216 for more information.)

LOGISTICS (PETROLEUM SUPPLY) ADVISOR

1-157. The LCATs have a logistics (petroleum supply) advisor. Much like the supply advisor (paragraph 1-154), the logistics (petroleum supply) advisor is versed in general supply discipline and operations. However, this advisor also has technical training in the supply chain, evaluation and testing, dispensing, and ecological preservation measures regarding fuel logistics operations.

LOGISTICS WARRANT OFFICER ADVISOR

1-158. The LCAT has the logistics warrant officer advisor serve as the LCAT's and LBAT's technical expert. They serve as the senior technical advisor to the advisor team leader and the FSF, specifically regarding logistics systems and processes. They are responsible for the integration of systems and processes across the tactical and operational domain and facilitate support relationships with higher echelon sustainment organizations. The logistics warrant officer advisor provides the following internal functions:

- Assisting the LAT's leaders or commanders in developing the advising strategy and objectives for the FSF.
- Synchronizing sustainment support between sustainment advisors in supported SFAB organizations and the higher echelon of sustainment.
- Serving as the XO for LCAT by managing systems and processes that support the organization.
- Developing and providing logistical analysis and running estimates to support the logistics advising company.
- Tracking and analyzing sustainment trends and issues for the sustainment advising company and other supported organizations.

1-159. The logistics warrant officer develops and provides logistical analysis and running estimates to support the logistics advising company and performs the following external functions:

- Serving as the senior technical advisor for sustainment systems and processes for the FSF.
- Providing input and guidance on maintaining readiness to foreign counterparts.
- Adhering to the principles of cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supporting the FSF with capabilities as appropriate.

ADVISOR TEAM MEMBERS

1-160. The following details the cross-functional advisor teams which contain the bulk of the advising capabilities and personnel within the SFAB.

MANEUVER ADVISOR TEAMS

1-161. MATs provide the bulk of the SFAB's tactical operations advising capability and capacity. These flexible, scalable, and well-rounded advisor teams provide the expertise to advise and assist the FSF across the warfighting functions. These teams often receive additional augmentation, to include security, EATs, FATs, or other external enablers. They often receive direct or general support (GS) from other organizations outside the SFAB to include contracting, sustainment, and even external staff support for processing intelligence, requesting fires, and submitting movement requests. Section IV describes the command and support relationships in more detail.

1-162. A MAT is task-organized to meet specific requirements identified through initial or ongoing assessments of the FSF. The team leader and the task organization will determine the specific duties and responsibilities of each member. The following personnel in paragraphs 1-163 through 1-185 form the typical MAT.

Training and Advise Team Leader (Team Leader)

1-163. The training or advise team leader, or team leader, is directly involved with advising the FSF commander and senior staff. The team leader leads the team through the execution of battle drills. The team leader performs the following internal functions:

- Leading all team operations, planning, and actions.
- Maintaining responsibility for the deployment/redeployment readiness of the team.
- Maintaining responsibility for the collective training of the team.
- Assessing the FSF capabilities.
- Approving all outgoing reports.
- Providing input for and submitting the FSF training and readiness reports.
- Ensuring the establishment of requisition and tracking systems.
- Conducting operations in a safe manner through the integration of risk management (see ATP 5-19).
- Accounting for team equipment.
- Accounting for the *advisor dichotomy* in planning and striking an operational balance.
- Educating self and team on the culture, region or country, history, and key figures in the OE.
- Planning team force protection considerations.
- Monitoring family readiness and maintaining a team social roster.

1-164. The team leader performs the following external functions:

- Advising the counterpart commander.
- Advising the counterparts on operations to include—
  - Current and future operations planning.
  - Battle tracking.
  - Reporting.
- Liaising with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.
- Conducting cross-cultural negotiations with the foreign counterparts.
- Supporting the FSF with capabilities.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Populating the green COP ensuring FSF positions are understood at higher friendly echelons.

1-165. Generally, the team leader will organize the team to include at least two subordinate leaders, usually a senior advisor in charge of an operations and support section. This method facilitates control and provides efficiency when working with the FSF.

Training and Advise Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (Assistant Team Leader)

1-166. The training and advise noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), also called the assistant team leader, is the senior NCO on the advisor team. The assistant team leader is responsible for monitoring daily operations of the advisor team. Assistant team leaders fill the team leader role in the latter's absence. The assistant team leader performs the following internal functions:

- Accounting for all personnel assigned to the team both administratively and for training.
- Developing the foundational training cycle.
- Assisting the team leader in collective training cycle.
- Assisting the team leader with deployment/redeployment readiness requirements of the team.
- Leading the team in the absence of the team leader.
- Planning training to ensure the team's combat efficiency, discipline, administration, and welfare.
- Reviewing the team's operations and training calendars.
- Coordinating staff actions before they reach the team leader.
- Directing the team's budget.

- Managing and directing interpreters.
- Writing outgoing reports and messages.
- Supporting planning of team force protection.
- In most cases, serving as the advisor team pay agent according to CCMD guidance and procedures.
- Ensuring team members are administratively ready to deploy with the following:
  - Wills.
  - Powers of attorney.
  - Insurance.
  - Record of emergency data.
  - Emergency notifications.
  - Theater entry requirements.
- Preparing personnel accountability and morning reports.
- Maintaining a team administrative records book.
- Managing promotions, reenlistments, pay issues, mail, and awards.

1-167. The assistant team leader performs the following external functions:

- Representing the team in the absence of the team leader.
- Advising FSF leaders.
- Advising the FSF staff in base defense, traffic control posts, detainee operations, and other relevant operations.
- Assisting the senior NCO counterpart with—
  - Enforcing the commander's intent.
  - Maintaining discipline.
  - Conducting precombat checks.
- Providing input for FSF assessments.
- Reviewing training prior to execution.
- Advising the foreign counterparts on human resource operations including military pay and personnel accountability.
- Assisting the FSF in developing personnel procedures.
- Training counterpart administrative personnel.
- Assessing the FSF' personnel systems and operations.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- If team leader is unavailable, populating the green COP to ensure FSF positions are understood at higher friendly echelons.

Note. While the modified table of equipment breaks out certain positions as belonging to the "operations section" or "support section," advisor team size requires constant overlap between the sections and a collaborative effort from everyone on the team in pursuit of the team's advisor mission.

Training and Advise Noncommissioned Officer

1-168. The training and advise NCO is responsible for advising the FSF on the support functions that generally include medical, maintenance, sustainment, and signal. This position controls the support section while executing battle drills. The training and advise NCO performs the following internal functions:

- Leading and controlling the support section.
- Assisting the team leader with developing a training and support plan to include the following:
  - A training schedule, consolidating the information into the team synchronization matrix.
  - Inputting training into the Digital Training Management System.
- Supporting the assistant team leader with deployment/redeployment readiness requirements of the team.
- Maintaining a weekly training and operations calendar.
- Supporting the assistant team leader with writing and reviewing required reports.

- Ensuring all team members can train and advise FSF.
- Managing the team's driver training program.
- Coordinating for team religious support.
- Ensuring team equipment is serviceable.
- Ensuring uniform standards are met.

1-169. The senior support advisor performs the following external functions:

- Advising and supporting the FSF support plans.
- Advising foreign counterparts on the basic tenets of troop welfare.
- Consolidating and coordinating the FSF's external religious support requests.
- Providing input on the counterpart training plans and execution.
- Adhering to the principles of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

Intelligence Advisor

1-170. The intelligence advisor's responsibilities vary throughout the competition continuum and are SC authority dependent. Intelligence tasks include, but are not limited to the following:

- Preparing team intelligence reports.
- Advising on intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE).
- Advising on building an information collection plan.
- Requesting external resources.

1-171. The intelligence advisor assists the FSF with the same tasks. Intelligence advisors generally serve as an operations team member and report to the senior advisor of the operations section. The intelligence advisor performs internal functions that include the following:

- Advising the team leader on intelligence.
- Monitoring routine situational updates (weather, road conditions, civil considerations, and recent activities).
- Providing reachback capability to leverage multidiscipline, multiechelon intelligence enablers in support of advisor team operations using existing intelligence programs of record.
- Maintaining the cultural calendar and advising the team of key dates and significant activities.
- Training and advising the team in the use of biometric and forensic equipment used in tactical site exploitation.
- Advising on the IPOE to SPO.
- Advising on the preparation of the information collection plan.
- Assisting the team with collecting information for required reports during missions.
- Coordinating through higher headquarters for CI support for vulnerability assessments regarding insider threat, international terrorism, and force protection assessments.
- Providing input for intelligence training evaluations.
- Assisting with monitoring the accountability for, and welfare of, interpreters.

1-172. The intelligence advisor performs the following external functions:

- Advising the foreign counterpart intelligence section.
- Advising the counterparts on using intelligence assets.
- Advising the FSF on processing tactical information into predictive analysis.
- Supporting intelligence for the counterpart's combat operations.
- Supporting intelligence briefings to the FSF commander.
- Integrating intelligence reporting with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners' intelligence enterprises, where allowed.
- Advocating for sharing of intelligence and information with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners by pursuing Advanced Affirmative Disclosure Determinations (also called A2D2s) and emphasizing writing for release (see ATP 3-16.02).
- Receiving and distributing the green COP and green intelligence picture and assessments.

- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supervising and enabling team participation in Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activities (also called FORMICA), when possible.

Fires Advisor

1-173. The team fires advisor is responsible for developing a fires plan through integrating and synchronizing Army, joint, and multinational fires, and managing clearance of fires to enable and enhance FSF targeting objectives. The fires advisor assists the FSF with many of the same functions. Fire advisors usually serve in the operations section and report to the operation section's senior advisor. The fires advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Assisting the team leader with fires planning and coordinating with higher headquarters, verifying and requesting the availability of fire support assets.
- Requesting Army indirect fires and joint fires assets through the advisor network, including but not limited to the following:
  - The lethal effects of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.
  - Naval surface fire support.
  - Artillery.
  - Rockets and missiles.
  - Nonlethal effects of some information operations.
  - Cyber operations.
  - Electromagnetic activities.
  - Space control operations.
  - Other nonlethal capabilities.
- Providing team training on fire support procedures, assets, and capabilities.
- Assisting the team leader with tracking all partnered force elements in the AO.
- Providing input for training evaluations.

1-174. The fires advisor performs the following external functions:

- Assisting with planning, coordinating, and employing fire support for the counterparts.
- Training and assisting the FSF with improving their fire support processes.
- Supporting counterparts with U.S. fires within the scope of the mission and assets available.
- Assisting foreign forces in the clearance of U.S. or joint fires prior to execution.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

Signal Advisor

1-175. The signal advisor is responsible for establishing and maintaining communication networks for the team while advising foreign counterparts on building a communications network, developing communication contingency plans, and conducting communications maintenance. Signal advisors generally serve as a support team member and report to the senior advisor for the support section. The signal advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Providing input for training evaluations.
- Advising on radios and communications capabilities.
- Providing communications maintenance support for the advisor team's vehicles and communications equipment status utilizing the advisor network.
- Verifying faults, requesting Class IX (repair parts and components for equipment maintenance) parts, and maintaining maintenance records of communications equipment.
- Ensuring communication readiness for deployment in specific AORs.
- Managing teams signal minimization and emissions control appropriate for AOR.
- Managing COMSEC.

1-176. The signal advisor performs the following external functions:

- Advising the FSF on communications planning, training, management, and COMSEC.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supporting counterparts with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

Logistics Advisor

1-177. Logistics advisors are responsible for managing the team's sustainment and advising the FSF on issues that include property accountability, managing funds, and processing external support requests. They generally serve as a support team member and report to the senior advisor for the support section.

The logistics advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Advising the team leader on sustainment.
- Collecting, processing, and coordinating for team sustainment support through the next higher headquarters.
- Maintaining equipment accountability and conducting periodic inventories of team equipment.
- Supporting the assistant team leader with managing team funds.
- Assisting with tracking and monitoring contracts and deliverables.
- Coordinating with the supporting contracting organization on service delivery.
- Serving as the team armorer.
- Providing input for training evaluations.
- Maintaining and updating the green logistics common operational picture (LOGCOP).

1-178. The logistics advisor performs the following external functions:

- Advising the FSF on sustainment, specifically supply and transportation.
- Assisting counterparts with establishing and maintaining a system to track their deceased Soldiers.
- Advising the FSF on how to track and monitor contract deliveries.
- Adhering to the principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supporting the counterparts with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.
- Updating daily logistics statistics utilizing the advisor network.
- Informing the joint force on FSF combat power status.
- Communicating details on the green LOGCOP as required.

Mechanic Advisor (Maintenance Advisor)

1-179. The mechanic advisor, or maintenance advisor, is responsible for verifying faults, ordering parts, and conducting repairs on the team's vehicles. Maintenance advisors assist the FSF with developing a maintenance SOP, establishing service schedules, ordering parts, and training their maintenance personnel. They serve as a support team member and report to the senior advisor for the support section. The maintenance advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Providing input for training evaluations.
- Providing limited field-level maintenance support and services for the advisor team vehicles and equipment, other than medical and communications equipment.
- Verifying faults, requesting Class IX (repair) parts, and maintaining maintenance records other than medical and communications equipment utilizing the advisor network.
- Collecting, processing, and coordinating for team maintenance requests through the advisor network.

1-180. The maintenance advisor performs the following external functions:

- Assisting FSF with developing a maintenance program to include routine maintenance and service schedules, mechanic training, troubleshooting, and ordering parts.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supporting counterparts with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

Explosive Hazard Advisor

1-181. Explosive hazard advisors are EOD NCOs and EOD officers (MOS 89D/E). These advisors are responsible for providing explosive hazard technical and tactical advice to the advisor team leader. They serve as an operations team member and report to the operations officer and operations senior enlisted advisor. The explosive hazard advisors perform these internal functions:

- Providing input for training.
- Providing explosive hazard technical and tactical advice.
- Managing the team's CBRN equipment.

1-182. Explosive hazard advisors perform the following external functions:

- Provide explosive hazard technical and tactical advice to the FSF, increasing their ability to identify, render safe, and exploit explosive ordnance and other explosive hazards.
- •Assess FSF EOD vulnerabilities.
- Coordinate FSF external EOD requests for support with U.S. or mission partner EOD.
- Identify weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for FSF in support of the CCDR's countering-WMD mission.
- Adhere to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

1-183. SFAB EOD advisors have limitations and restrictions. EOD advisors are limited in that they may not render safe explosive hazards; they lack the equipment and publications required to render safe explosive ordinance. EOD advisors are restricted in that they can provide immediate action to mitigate an explosive hazard but only to prevent the loss of life when no other EOD capability can reasonably respond.

Health Care Sergeant (Medical Advisor)

1-184. The health care sergeants (also called medical advisors) are responsible for providing medical support to the advisor team and advising the FSF on triage procedures, first responder medical training, field sanitation, medical logistics, medical planning, and FHP. They serve as a support team member and generally report to the senior advisor for the support section. The medical advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Providing input for training evaluations.
- Assisting the advisor team leader with medical planning.
- Maintaining principal responsibility to procedures, principles, and fundamentals of the following:
  - Point of injury care.
  - Self-aid.
  - Buddy-aid.
  - Combat lifesaver.
  - Tactical combat casualty care.
- Training casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and MEDEVAC concepts from point of injury through continuum of care.
- Assessing, conceiving, and implementing mass casualty concepts.
- Gathering and disseminating information on known health threats within the AO.
- Advising on medical capabilities of nearby assets.
- Stabilizing patients and prepares them for MEDEVAC.
- Training and assisting the team in managing field sanitation.
- Maintaining Class VIII (medical) supply utilizing the advisor network.
- Verifying faults.
- Requesting Class VIII parts.
- Maintaining maintenance records of team medical equipment.

1-185. The medical advisor performs the following external functions:

- Training the FSF on the following:
  - Rapid trauma assessment and trauma medicine.
  - Point of injury care.
  - CASEVAC.

    - MEDEVAC.
    - Mass casualty operations.
    - Concepts of far-forward medical care.
- Maintaining a medical COP with the foreign partner that supports medical advising efforts.
- Stabilizing patients and preparing them for MEDEVAC.
- Advising counterparts on maintaining Class VIII supplies and equipment.
- Training and assisting the FSF on field sanitation, field hygiene, and personnel protective measures.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of the following:
    - Effective cross-cultural communication.
    - Problem solving.
    - Conflict resolution.
- Supporting the FSF with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

FIRES ADVISOR TEAM MEMBERS

1-186. FATs enhance the SFAB's capability and capacity to advise FSF on targeting and fires proficiencies. The internal and external responsibilities of FAT positions in paragraphs 1-185 through 1-193.

Platoon Leader (Team Leader)

1-187. The platoon leader, or team leader, is directly involved with advising the FSF commander and senior staff. The team leader is prepared to assume the role of FCAT team leader in the absence or loss of the commander, according to the succession of command. The team leader is responsible for leading the team through the execution of battle drills. The team leader performs the following internal functions:

- Leading all team operations, planning, and actions.
- Having responsibility for the deployment/redeployment readiness of the team.
- Having responsibility for the collective training of the team.
- Assessing the FSF capabilities.
- Approving all outgoing reports.
- Providing input for and submits the FSF training and readiness reports.
- Ensuring the establishment of requisition and tracking systems.
- Conducting operations in a safe manner through the integration of risk management (see ATP 5-19).
- Accounting for team equipment.
- Educating self and team on the culture, region or country, history, and key figures in the OE.

1-188. The team leader performs the following external functions:

- Advising the counterpart commander.
- Liaising with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.
- Conducting cross-cultural negotiations with foreign counterparts.
- Supporting the FSF with capabilities.
- Informing the joint air-ground integration cell or SFAB effects integration cell on FSF partner fires capability.

Section Chief (Assistant Team Leader)

1-189. The section chief, or assistant team leader, is the senior NCO on the advisor team. The assistant team leader is responsible for monitoring daily operations of the advisor team. Assistant team leaders fill the team leaders' role in their absence. The assistant team leader performs these internal functions:

- Accounting for all personnel assigned to the team both administratively and for training.
- Overseeing the developing of the foundational training cycle in accordance with SFAC's annual training guidance.
- Assisting the team leader in collective training cycle in accordance with SFAC's annual training guidance.
- Assisting the team leader with deployment/redeployment readiness requirements of the team.
- Leading the team in the absence of the team leader.
- Planning training to ensure the team's combat efficiency, discipline, administration, and welfare.

- Reviewing the team's operations and training calendars.
- Coordinating staff actions before they reach the team leader.
- Directing the team's budget.
- Managing and directing interpreters.
- Writing outgoing reports and messages.

1-190. The assistant team leader performs the following external functions:

- Representing the team in the absence of the team leader.
- Advising FSF leaders.
- Assisting the senior NCO counterpart with—
  - Enforcing the commander's intent.
  - Maintaining discipline.
  - Conducting precombat checks.
- Providing input for the FSF assessments.
- Reviewing training prior to execution.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

Gunnery Sergeant Advisor

1-191. The gunnery sergeant advisor is responsible for howitzer operation considerations within the FAT. The gunnery sergeant advisor assists the FSF with firing unit advanced party operations.

Howitzer Operations and Other Internal Functions

1-192. The gunnery sergeant advisor performs these internal functions:

- Assisting the team leader with mission planning.
- Forecasting and requesting necessary classes of supply.
- Managing the team's maintenance program.
- Providing team training on MOS-specific tasks to include—
  - Laying platoons and batteries.
  - Defense.
  - Degraded operations.
- Providing input for training evaluations and programs of instruction for towed, self-propelled, and rocket weapon systems.

External Functions

1-193. The gunnery sergeant advisor performs the following external functions:

- Assisting with planning, coordinating, and employing fire support for counterparts.
- Training and assisting the FSF with improving their fire support processes.
- Supporting counterparts with U.S. fires within the scope of the mission and assets available.
- Assisting the foreign forces in the clearance of U.S. or joint fires prior to execution.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

Senior Fire Control Noncommissioned Officer (Advisor)

1-194. The senior fire control advisor is responsible for all aspects of fire direction for the FAT. The senior fire control advisor assists the FSF with fire direction operations. The senior fire control advisor performs these internal functions:

- Assisting the team leader with the advising scheme.
- Providing team training on the fundamentals of fire direction to include manual and automated processes.
- Assisting the team leader with training management.
- Providing input for training evaluations.

1-195. The senior fire control advisor performs the following external functions:

- Assisting with planning, coordinating, and employing fire support for the counterparts.
- Training and assisting the FSF with improving their fire control processes.
- Supporting counterparts with U.S. fires within the scope of the mission and assets available.
- Assisting the foreign forces in the clearance of U.S. or joint fires prior to execution.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

ENGINEER ADVISOR TEAM MEMBERS

1-196. EATs enhance the SFAB's engineer advising capability and capacity with the FSF. The internal and external responsibilities of these positions are described in paragraphs 1-195 through 1-205.

Team Leader

1-197. The team leader is directly involved with advising the FSF commander and senior staff. The team leader is responsible for leading the team through the execution of battle drills. The team leader performs these internal functions:

- Leading all team operations, planning, and actions.
- Having responsibility for the deployment and redeployment readiness of the team.
- Having responsibility for the collective training of the team.
- Assessing the FSF capabilities.
- Approving all outgoing reports.
- Providing input for, and submits, the FSF training and readiness reports.
- Ensuring the establishment of requisition and tracking systems.
- Conducting operations in a safe manner through the integration of risk management (see ATP 5-19).
- Accounting for team equipment.
- Educating self and team on the culture, region or country, history, and key figures in the OE.

1-198. The team leader performs the following external functions:

- Advising the counterpart commander.
- Liaising with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.
- Conducting cross-cultural negotiations with foreign counterparts.
- Supporting the FSF with capabilities.

1-199. Generally, the team leader will organize the team to facilitate control and provide efficiency when working with the FSF.

Team Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (Assistant Team Leader)

1-200. The train and advise NCOIC, also called the assistant team leader, is the senior NCO on the advisor team. The assistant team leader is responsible for monitoring daily operations of the advisor team. Assistant team leaders fill the team leader role in the latter's absence. The assistant team leader performs the following internal functions:

- Accounting for all personnel assigned to the team both administratively and for training.
- Developing the foundational training cycle in accordance with SFAC's annual training guidance.
- Assisting the team leader in collective training cycle in accordance with SFAC's annual training guidance.
- Assisting the team leader with deployment/redeployment readiness requirements of the team.
- Leading the team in the absence of the team leader.
- Planning training to ensure the team's combat efficiency, discipline, administration, and welfare.
- Reviewing the team's operations and training calendars.
- Coordinating staff actions before they reach the team leader.
- Directing the team's budget.
- Managing and directing interpreters.
- Writing outgoing reports and messages.

1-201. The assistant team leader performs the following external functions:

- Representing the team in the absence of the team leader.
- Advising FSF leaders.
- Assisting the senior NCO counterpart with enforcing the commander's intent, maintaining discipline, and conducting precombat checks.
- Providing input for the FSF assessments.
- Reviewing training prior to execution.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

Team Advisor (Combat Engineer Advisor)

1-202. The team advisor (more accurately called the combat engineer advisor) is responsible for providing mobility, countermobility, and survivability technical and tactical advice to the team leader. Combat engineer advisors provide the same advice to their foreign counterpart, which includes training the foreign engineer personnel when appropriate. The combat engineer advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Providing input for training evaluations with limitations/restrictions.
- Providing mobility, countermobility, and survivability technical and tactical advice upon completion of foreign disclosure review.
- Providing survivability support within their explosive ordnance clearance agent (EOCA) capability to mitigate blast and fragmentation danger areas of certain identified explosive ordnance.

1-203. Combat engineer advisors perform the following external functions:

- Providing mobility, countermobility, and survivability technical and tactical advice to the FSF.
- Assisting coordination for external EOD assets when the explosive hazard advisor is not available.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supporting the FSF with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

Note. Engineer advisors are not organically filled positions on MATs. However, they are often used in place of an explosive hazard advisor.

Construction Engineer Advisor

1-204. The construction engineer advisor is responsible for advising FSF on vertical and horizontal construction projects management and construction-related training. The construction engineer advisor assists the FSF with revising, planning, resourcing, and executing construction projects. The construction engineer advisor also provides basic light and heavy equipment training. The construction engineer advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Assisting the team leader with advising FSF on their construction projects.
- Requesting status of equipment and materials for the foreign partner's construction projects.
- Providing team training on technical construction equipment and processes.
- Assisting the team leader to understand foreign partner construction requirements, and any climate or terrain-specific construction methods.
- Providing input for training evaluations.

1-205. The construction engineer advisor performs the following external functions:

- Assisting with training, planning, resourcing, and execution of construction requirements.
- Training and assisting the FSF with light and heavy construction equipment.
- Supporting counterparts with planning and preparation of construction projects.
- Assisting the foreign forces in the execution of construction projects and training.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

Technical Engineer Noncommissioned Officer (Advisor)

1-206. The technical engineer advisor is responsible for advising FSF on construction site development in areas such as technical investigation, surveys, drafts, and construction plans and specifications. They also advise FSF on conducting land surveys, map making, and preparing detailed plans for construction projects. The technical engineer advisor assists the FSF with project management. The technical engineer advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Requesting geodetic and construction surveys and results.
- Providing team training for survey and design work as well as construction site management.
- Assisting the team leader with technical designs.
- Providing input for training evaluations.

1-207. The technical engineer advisor performs the following external functions:

- Assisting with training, planning, designing, resourcing, and executing construction projects.
- Training and assisting the FSF with survey and design tools.
- Supporting counterparts with construction site development.
- Assisting the foreign forces in conducting land surveys, mapmaking, and preparing detailed plans for construction projects.
- Utilizing the United States Army Corps of Engineers Reachback Operations Center and other reachback capabilities for supplemental technical expertise.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

LOGISTICS ADVISOR TEAM MEMBERS

1-208. The LAT enhances the SFAB's sustainment advising capability and capacity with the FSF. While several team members have the same or similar functions as described above, there are a few positions that are unique to LATs. The internal and external responsibilities of those positions are described in paragraphs 1-209 through 1-218.

Logistics Advisor Team Leader (Team Leader)

1-209. The LAT leader, or team leader, is directly involved with advising the FSF commander and senior staff. The team leader is responsible for leading the team through the execution of battle drills. The team leader performs the following internal functions:

- Leading all team operations, planning, and actions.
- Having responsibility for the deployment/redeployment readiness of the team.
- Having responsibility for the collective training of the team.
- Assessing the FSF capabilities.
- Approving all outgoing reports.
- Providing input for and submits the FSF training and readiness reports.
- Ensuring the establishment of requisition and tracking systems.
- Understanding, updating, and communicating the green LOGCOP.
- Conducting operations in a safe manner through the integration of risk management (see ATP 5-19).
- Accounting for team equipment.
- Educating self and team on the culture, region or country, history, and key figures in the OE.

1-210. The team leader performs the following external functions:

- Advising the counterpart commander.
- Liaising with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.
- Conducting cross-cultural negotiations with the foreign counterparts.
- Supporting the FSF with capabilities.

Logistics Advisor Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (Assistant Team Leader)

1-211. The logistics advisor NCOIC, or assistant team leader, is the senior NCO on the advisor team. The assistant team leader is responsible for monitoring daily operations of the advisor team. Assistant team

leaders assist fill the team leader role in the latter's absence. The assistant team leader performs the following internal functions:

- Accounting for all personnel assigned to the team both administrative and for training.
- Overseeing the developing of the foundational training cycle in accordance with SFAC's annual training guidance.
- Assisting the team leader in the collective training cycle in accordance with SFAC's annual training guidance.
- Assisting the team leader with deployment/redeployment readiness requirements of the team.
- Leading the team in the absence of the team leader.
- Planning training to ensure the team's combat efficiency, discipline, administration, and welfare.
- Reviewing the team's operations and training calendars.
- Coordinating staff actions before they reach the team leader.
- Directing the team's budget.
- Managing and directing interpreters.
- Writing outgoing reports and messages.
- Collaborating with team leader to maintain the green LOGCOP.

1-212. The assistant team leader performs the following external functions:

- Representing the team in the absence of the team leader.
- Advising FSF leaders.
- Assisting the senior NCO counterpart with enforcing the commander's intent, maintaining discipline, and conducting precombat checks.
- Providing input for the FSF assessments.
- Reviewing training prior to execution.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

Maintenance Advisor

1-213. The mechanic advisor, or maintenance advisor, is responsible for verifying faults, ordering parts, and conducting repairs on the team's materiel. Maintenance advisors assist the FSF with developing a maintenance SOP, establishing service schedules, ordering parts, and training their maintenance personnel. They serve as a support team member and report to the senior advisor for the support section. The maintenance advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Providing input for training evaluations.
- Providing limited field-level maintenance support and services for the advisor team vehicles and equipment, other than medical and communications equipment.
- Verifying faults, requesting Class IX (repair) parts, and maintaining maintenance records other than medical and communications equipment utilizing the advisor network.
- Collecting, processing, and coordinating for team maintenance requests through the advisor network.

1-214. The maintenance advisor performs the following external functions:

- Assisting FSF with developing a maintenance program to include routine maintenance and service schedules, mechanic training, troubleshooting, and ordering parts.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supporting counterparts with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

Supply Advisor

1-215. Supply advisors are responsible for managing the team's sustainment and advising the FSF on issues that include property accountability, managing funds, and processing external support requests. They generally serve as a support team member and report to the senior advisor for the support section. The logistics advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Advising the team leader on sustainment.

- Collecting, processing, and coordinating for team sustainment support through the next higher headquarters.
- Maintaining equipment accountability and conducting periodic inventories of team equipment.
- Supporting the assistant team leader with managing team funds.
- Assisting with tracking and monitoring contracts and deliverables.
- Coordinating with the supporting contracting organization on service delivery.
- Serving as the team armorer.
- Providing input for training evaluations.
- Maintaining and updating the green LOGCOP.

1-216. The supply advisor performs the following external functions:

- Advising the FSF on sustainment, specifically supply and transportation.
- Assisting counterparts with establishing and maintaining a system to track their deceased Soldiers.
- Advising the FSF on how to track and monitor contract deliveries.
- Adhering to the principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supporting the counterparts with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.
- Updating daily logistics statistics utilizing the advisor network.
- Informing the joint force on FSF combat power status.
- Communicating details on the green LOGCOP as required.

Health Care Sergeant

1-217. The health care sergeants (also called medical advisors) are responsible for providing medical support to the advisor team and advising the FSF on triage procedures, first responder medical training, field sanitation, medical logistics, medical planning, and FHP. They serve as a support team member and generally report to the senior advisor for the support section. The medical advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Providing input for training evaluations.
- Assisting the advisor team leader with medical planning.
- Maintaining principal responsibility to procedures, principles, and fundamentals of the following:
  - Point of injury care.
  - Self-aid.
  - Buddy-aid.
  - Combat lifesaver.
  - Tactical combat casualty care.
- Training CASEVAC and MEDEVAC concepts from point of injury through continuum of care.
- Assessing, conceives, and implements mass casualty concepts.
- Gathering and disseminating information on known health threats within the AO.
- Advising on medical capabilities of nearby assets.
- Stabilizing patients and prepares them for MEDEVAC.
- Training and assisting the team in managing field sanitation.
- Maintaining Class VIII (medical) supply utilizing the advisor network.
- Verifying faults.
- Requesting Class VIII parts.
- Maintaining maintenance records of team medical equipment.

1-218. The medical advisor performs the following external functions:

- Training the FSF on the following:
  - Rapid trauma assessment and trauma medicine.
  - Point of injury care.
  - CASEVAC.
  - MEDEVAC.
  - Mass casualty operations.
  - Concepts of far-forward medical care.
- Maintaining a medical COP with the foreign partner that supports medical advising efforts.
- Stabilizing patients and preparing them for MEDEVAC.
- Advising counterparts on maintaining Class VIII supplies and equipment.
- Training and assisting the FSF on field sanitation, field hygiene, and personnel protective measures.
- Adhering to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of—
  - Effective cross-cultural communication.
  - Problem solving.
  - Conflict resolution.
- Supporting the FSF with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

Chapter 2

Security Force Assistance Brigade Operations

The character of war has probably changed more in the last couple of years, and it's a more complex environment, than certainly I've seen for 35 years.

General Randy George, 41st Chief of Staff of the Army

Chapter 2 describes the SFAB role in multidomain operations across the competition continuum.

SECTION I – MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS AND SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

2-1. This section introduces the framework of multidomain operations as established by FM 3-0. It also describes how SFABs and their advisor teams conduct operations as part of a multinational and multidomain force across the competition continuum.

MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS

2-2. Multidomain operations fracture the coherence of threat operational approaches by destroying, dislocating, isolating, and disintegrating their interdependent systems and formations, and exploiting the opportunities these disruptions provide to defeat the enemy in detail (see FM 3-0). SFABs support the joint force in four strategic roles: shaping operational environments, countering aggression on land during crisis, prevailing during LSCO, and consolidating gains. The Army fulfills its mission and clarifies the overall goals in multidomain operations with allies and partners (see FM 3-22). Figure 2-1 describes how SFABs conduct their activities of ASLA during multidomain operations across the competition continuum.




Figure 2-1. Security Force Assistance Brigade in the competition continuum

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

2-3. *Security force assistance* is the Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20). FSF include both military and nondefense ministry forces and their supporting institutions.

SECURITY FORCE INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS

2-4. Organizationally, a security force institution performs three functions: executive, generating, and operating (see FM 3-22). This construct enables SFA planners to identify the gaps in a partner nation's

capability and capacity within the executive (ministerial) function, the force generation function, or within the partner nation's security forces (operating) function.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION

2-5. The executive function includes strategic direction that provides oversight, policy, and resourcing for FSF generating and operating functions. The executive function occurs at the MOD level generally and encompasses administrative efforts and processes and disseminates resources to direct and support the FSF. Executive functions also include formulating policy, advising political leaders, strategic planning and budgeting, assessing readiness, reviewing and analyzing current and future capability and capacity gaps, coordinating with other departments or agencies, and supervising intelligence activities.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE WITHIN THE GENERATING FUNCTION

2-6. The generating function occurs across the air, land, and maritime components to develop and sustain the capabilities of the operating force. SFA efforts assist the host nation by identifying, resourcing, and resolving capability gaps in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P).

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE WITHIN THE OPERATING FUNCTION

2-7. The FSF employ the dynamics of combat power during operations. *Combat power* is the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time (JP 3-0). SFA enhances the skills of FSF to use this combat power. The dynamics of combat power are leadership, firepower, information, mobility, and survivability. All warfighting functions contribute to generating and applying combat power. The green COP is a tool used during operations to communicate FSF combat power disposition to relevant headquarters and mission partner elements. A *warfighting function* is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (ADP 3-0).

SECTION II – SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE IN THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

2-8. The combined force is never solely in one section of the competition continuum. Campaigns iterate through mixtures of competition, crisis, and armed conflict calculated to achieve the desired strategic objectives. (See figure 2-2.) Adversaries will contest the combined force in all domains of operations to include land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace. Adversaries will also contest advising.




Figure 2-2. Security Force Assistance Brigade during competition

COMPETITION

2-9. During competition, Army forces deter malign adversary action, set conditions for armed conflict on favorable terms when deterrence fails, and shape an OE with allies and partners in ways that support U.S. strategic interests and policy aims. Persistent competitive advantage requires shifting competition into areas where the United States has enduring relative advantages over its adversaries, such that U.S. actions deter adversarial action, keep them on the defensive, or force them to take actions that are relatively costly or counterproductive in pursuit of their strategic goals.

2-10. Strategic guidance calls for a renewal and strengthening of partner relationships to ensure national and global security. SFA activities provide the "ways" to accomplish this end state by nurturing current alliances, building new partnerships designed to increase partner capability and capacity, and enabling interoperability in joint, multidomain, and multinational operations. SFA activities enable the Army to protect and advance U.S. national interests, deter aggression, counter adversarial competitive strategies, and set the conditions for armed conflict if deterrence and competition fail.

REGIONAL ALIGNMENT

2-11. SFABs in competition are regionally aligned to a CCMD. The SFAB staff works in close cooperation with the CCMD and the theater ASCC to develop an employment plan to fit the theater campaign plan.

2-12. SFABs maintain a persistent presence in their assigned theater through force package rotations. Typically, a force package consists of a task force combining a maneuver advisor battalion headquarters with an enabling advisor battalion headquarters. The composition of the teams in the force package are determined by the SFAB staff working in conjunction with the ASCC staff.

2-13. Typically, force packages will rotate on a 24-month cycle. Task forces spend 8 months in an individual training cycle, followed by 8 months of collective training and mission-specific preparation, and 8 months employed in theater.

MISSION COMMAND

2-14. Multiple stakeholders contribute to the mission intent of an advisor team. The weight of each stakeholder changes as the situation develops from competition to crisis and possibly to conflict. Stakeholders include ASCC, country offices of defense co-operations, regionally aligned forces, the SFAB itself, and partner FSF. In competition, an advisor team derives its commander's intent largely from the offices of defense co-operations for the country it is assigned to in partnership with the SFAB command. As the situation develops into crisis and conflict, the SFAB commander or ASCC commander may assign command relationships between advisor teams and other U.S. Forces or allied forces. Leaders for any specific mission must balance the intent of the various stakeholders when making decisions.

GAINING AND PROVIDING IMPROVED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

2-15. SFAB teams expand situational awareness of the Army in their AOR through their presence and access to key land, areas, and populations. SFAB team's presence assures mission partners, enables interoperability and agility of the MNF, and enhances cooperation throughout their AOR. Establishing effective liaison with multinational partners through embedded teams, collaborative systems, and leader contact is critical to establishing a COP and maintaining situational understanding (see FM 3-0). SFABs maintain the green COP to provide a vital and accurate picture of friendly forces in their AOR.

2-16. By consistently conducting and writing assessments of their partnered force, SFABs enable all echelons of Army leaders in a theater to understand the capabilities of FSF at every level. This is vital to inform the CCMD campaign plan.

BUILD PARTNER CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY

2-17. SFA consists of those SC activities tied directly to the capability and capacity of a partner FSF. Army SFA activities develop the capability and capacity of partner nation security forces to defend against internal and external security threats, contribute to and enable multinational and multidomain operations and interoperability, and assist other countries to provide for their own security. Capability is the ability to

complete a task or execute a course of action under specified conditions and levels of performance (outputs), while capacity is the measurable aspect of capability and describes the scale and duration to which a task can be performed (outcomes). See FM 3-22 for more information on outputs and outcomes.

2-18. Developing partner capability is not an end state but rather an interim step toward building partner capacity. Developing partner FSF capabilities can affect a region's balance of power, and building a partner FSF capacity to permanently maintain that power may or may not be a desired strategic end state. For example, a partner FSF trained to defeat an insurgency, once defeated, may turn on a bordering neighbor or launch a military coup to overthrow the existing government. Therefore, depending on U.S. strategic objectives, SFA activities may be planned and executed to provide a temporary or limited enhancement of partner FSF capability in the near term, a more involved institutional program that builds enduring capacity over the long term, or a hybrid combination of both. In any scenario, SFA planners and practitioners should have a clear and thorough understanding of strategic guidance and intent, partner nation requirements, and U.S. legal authorities for developmental activities. (see FM 3-22). Advisor teams deploy under various SC authorities (see figure 2-3 for examples of Title 10 SC authorities).

TYPE	AUTHORITY	TITLE	PROVIDES THE AUTHORITY TO:
MIL-TO-MIL ENGAGEMENTS	311	Exchange of Defense Personnel Between United States and Friendly Foreign Countries: Authority	Conduct International defense personnel exchange agreements
	312	Payment of Personal Expense Necessary for Theater Security Cooperation	Pay expenses related to senior foreign defense officials, liaison officers (LNOs), conferences, seminiars, and other meetings
TRAINING WITH FOREIGN FORCES	321	Training with Friend Foreign Countries: Payment of Training and Exercise Expenses	Train with the military/security forces of a friendly foreign country and pay training and exercises expenses. - Primary purpose of a training and exercises shall be train United States forces.
	322	Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces	Pay training expense of special operations forces (includes civil affairs and military information support operations) - Primary purpose of training shall be to train the special operations forces of the combatant command.
SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS AND CAPACITY BUILDING	331	Friendly Foreign Countries: Authority to provide support for conduct of operations	Provide logistics, supply, and service support to friendly nations conducting operations wth or in support of U.S. Forces. Allows training in connection with deplotment of foreign forces to a U.S. supported operation.
	332	Friendly Foreign Countries: International and regional organizations: Defense Institution Building (DIB)	Assign Department of Defense civilians and Service Members as advisors to the ministries of defense of foreign countries or regional organizations with security missions.
	333	Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity	Provide training and equipment to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building the capacity to conduct one or more of nine detailed mission types.
EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING ACTIVATES	341	DoD State Partnership Program	Establish a program of activities between members of the National Guard of a State or territory and the military/security forces or governmental organizations of a foreign country responsible for disaster response or emergency response.
	345	Regional Defense Combating Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program	Pay costs associated with education and training of foreign military officers or ministry of defense officials at military or civilian educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, seminars, or other training programs conducted for purposes or regional defense in connection with terrorism or Irregular warfare.

LEGEND

DoD DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE U.S. UNITED STATES
MIL MILITARY

Figure 2-3. Security cooperation authorities

2-19. Activities that SFABs conduct to build partner capability and capacity in competition include the following:

- Training and developing FSF leaders.
- Assisting FSF to develop doctrine and training methods.
- Developing integrating processes in partner staffs.
- Supporting the FSF in developing tactics, techniques, and procedures.

SFA in South America – Bigger is not always better

The US counterinsurgency effort, to be effective, must have security, advisory, and training assistance experts who can assess the situation, advise the host country forces on the proper counterinsurgency techniques and training, and equip those forces to do the job.

In the 1960s, with our help, most guerilla movements in the region were effectively neutralized by Latin-American armies….In 1967, for example, a 15-man Special Forces mobile training team trained the Bolivian Rangers that made short work of Ernesto "Che" Guevara's adventure.

Colonel John D. Waghelstein
Military Review

ACHIEVING INTEROPERABILITY

2-20. The success of allied forces relies on their ability to work together effectively and efficiently, mitigating mission command complexities and shortfalls. Interoperability priorities include Army, Joint, inter-organizational, and multinational cooperation. Allied joint operations must be planned and executed to optimize the unique strengths of each nation's forces. The integration and collaboration of participating countries' forces at the operational level are crucial for achieving consistency across stakeholder efforts within the theater and country objectives of the CCMD and the COM's integrated country strategies (see AR 34-1). (See AJP-01 [Edition F, Version 1]; Center for Army Lessons Learned interoperability reference guides No. 16-18, and No. 20-12 for more information.)

2-21. Army forces conduct operations in support of joint campaigns which (for the most part) occur as a part of a larger coalition operation. They must employ and leverage the capability and capacity of mission partners in any future conflict and across the competition continuum which requires an interest in interoperability. However, the mission partners' objectives will influence the desired level of collaboration and collective interoperability for specific multinational operations. (See FM 3-16 for more on multinational operations.)

Exchange of Information

2-22. The use and exchange of technology, information, tactics, techniques and procedures, and the employment of support and liaison elements during crisis and conflict can enhance interoperability to enable the integration of lethal and nonlethal effects between allies and partners. The Army recognizes four levels of standardized interoperability with UAPs as depicted in Table 2-1 on page 54, and the levels are described in more detail in AR 34-1 and DA Pam 11-31.

Table 2 1. Levels of interoperability

Level	*Description*
0-Not interoperable	UAPs have no demonstrated interoperability. Command and control interface with the Army is only at the next higher echelon. UAP formations must operate independently from U.S. Army formations and operations.
1-Deconflicted	U.S. Army and UAPs can co-exist but do not interact. Requires alignment of capabilities and procedures to establish operational norms, enabling UAPS and the U.S. Army to work together.
2-Compatible	U.S. Army and UAPs can interact with each other in the same geographic area in pursuit of a common goal. U.S. Army and UAPs have similar or complementary processes and procedures, and they can operate effectively with each other.
3-Integrated	U.S. Army and UAPs can integrate upon arrival in theater. Interoperability is network-enabled to provide the full range of military operations capability. UAPs can routinely establish networks and operate effectively with or as part of U.S. Army formations.
Legend: UAP—unified action partner; U.S.–United States	

Three Dimensions of Interoperability

2-23. SFABs recognize three dimensions of interoperability: human, procedural, and technical (see FM 3-16). SFAB teams enable interoperability across each.

Human

2-24. The human dimension relates to the mutual understanding of culture, values, language and perspectives. SFAB teams can enable gaining understanding of shared experiences, education, and training as partners. Such a force is better attuned to operate within a dynamic technological and information environment.

Procedural

2-25. The procedural dimension relates to the simplicity and standardization of concepts, doctrine, organizations, policies and procedures. Simplicity and standardization increase the ability to C2 and harness the full resources of the organization. To achieve interoperability, forces gain commonality through application of common doctrine and procedures (SOPs). Minimally wherever possible, C2 data, and information and knowledge management procedures must be interchangeable.

Technical

2-26. The technical dimension relates to the interoperability of hardware, software and systems. Technical interoperability enhances the effectiveness of the force elements and sets conditions for interchangeability requirements. Interoperability requires forces that are technically capable of aggregating and applying power with partners. Minimally, technical capability must exist to develop communications architecture to support primary, alternate, contingency and emergency plans interchangeable with U.S. systems. If a partner does not have equipment to be interchangeable with the United States, SFAB teams are equipped to transition information from partner systems to U.S. systems.

TRANSITIONING TO CRISIS

2-27. Current host-nation and partner FSF capability and capacity assessment data are integral to the planning process, especially if there is a transition to crisis. These assessments may include quantitative and qualitative

performance measures and estimates based on assessing, monitoring, and evaluating best practices. Key partner FSF entity variables may include the force's purpose, structure, their will to fight, strengths and weaknesses by warfighting function and domain. This information builds the green COP.

2-28. During competition, SFAB force packages typically operate on specific Title 10 authorities section codified in the CCMD's theater SC mission (for example, section 311, section 321, section 332). Should competition transition into crisis and a change of mission be warranted, an authorities change will occur through the CCMD's theater SC office. This change will likely appear in the form of a specific execution order communicated by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) through the appropriate CCMD.

2-29. Typically, crisis response and limited contingency operations are focused on scope and scale and conducted to achieve a specific strategic or operational level objective in an operational area (see FM 3-0). In figure 2-4 on page 56, during a crisis, SFAB units increase the ratio of support and liaison activities, making them proportionately even with the amount of advising they do. In these limited contingency operations, SFAB units may accompany a partner force in operations.

Advisors in Korea—Counter-Guerrilla Operations

From KMAG's [Korean Military Advisory Group] perspective in mid-1949, the primary reason for ROKA's [Republic of Korea Army] failure to train was the need to counter increased (both in quality and quantity) guerrilla activity in the latter half of 1949. Unfortunately, the pressing issue was how to tame the guerrilla problem before sustained operations wore the army down to impotence. For most ROK [Republic of Korea] units, antiguerrilla and counter-infiltration operations had displaced formal training. This condition became so normal that KMAG attempted to make a virtue out of necessity. Based on the ROKA's combat performance to date, Roberts (Brigadier. General. William L. Roberts, Chief of KMAG from August 1948-June 1950) realized that the crisis moment had arrived. He pushed additional resources (mainly advisors) down to the battalion level with an increased focus on specific assistance to counterguerrilla operations. Under Roberts's advice, the ROKA established specialized task forces to deal with guerrillas in the Chiri-san and Taebaek-san regions; a similar tasks force was organized on the Ongjin peninsula with a specially designated KMAG detachment assigned to it. In this way, Roberts hoped to keep his finger on the pulse of the ROKA by getting a continuous stream of filed reports of ongoing combat operations and any training opportunities that arose. Perhaps even more significant for the long-term health of the ROKA, these initiatives, for the first time, put the advisory effort on a clearly directed focus to observe, advise, and report. The advisors were also largely successful in helping the ROKA to subdue guerrillas and hold its own against North Korean security forces that became increasingly aggressive along the 38th parallel. If Roberts perhaps went overboard with his public statements about the ROKA's progress, at least he had reason to be proud of both KMAG and the ROKA. By March 1950, they had suppressed the guerrilla movement and defeated North Korean infiltrations and attacks along the 38th parallel boundary.

Bryan R. Gibby
The Will to Win: American military advisors in Korea, 1946-1953




Figure 2-4. Security Force Assistance Brigade during crisis

CRISIS

2-30. A *crisis* is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives. (JP 3-0). A crisis can be long in duration, but it can also reflect a near-simultaneous and rapid transition to armed conflict if deterrence fails (see FM 3-22).

ACTIONS DURING CRISIS

2-31. The strategies used for SFA while in crisis will vary depending on the circumstances, but successful action will have distinct traits. The first step is to have a thorough understanding of how relevant actors will view or respond to an SFA action. Second, the SFAB and partner FSF should carry out a wide range of tasks, such as establishing access to critical areas, forward positioning of forces, establishing an appropriate and timely presence, organizing exercises, sharing intelligence, continuous operational preparation of the environment, and conducting information operations to counter and undermine the adversarial narrative. Third, the SFAB and the partner FSF should ensure that these tasks can be carried out in a creative and flexible manner and are adaptable to changes in the strategic environment. Finally, the SFAB should conduct continuous assessment and evaluation of adversarial capabilities and intent.

2-32. The collective military capability and capacity generated during competition sets the conditions and provides the leverage to win in crisis or resolve the situation with conditions favorable to the United States and its allies and partners. In crisis, SFA enables the joint and MNF to present credible and integrated deterrent options that demonstrate the ability to impose costs on malign action. During crisis, SFA personnel may provide unique capabilities to advance partnerships, influence adversarial behavior, and support partner FSF and defense ministry crisis response operations (see FM 3-22).

2-33. It is possible that at the emergence of a crisis, SFAB elements may already be on ground in the AOR and thus, represent an inside force for the CCMD and ASCC to assist in setting the theater. For instance, the forward deployed SFAB force packages could already be inside an adversary's antiaccess area denial which can both mitigate the risk to the mission presented by the adversary's antiaccess area denial assets, but also increase the risk to the force in terms of the advisors themselves.

2-34. The following are additional critical questions and concepts for SFABs to anticipate when possibly transitioning to crisis:

- What is the plan and status of weapons and equipment?
  - Are weapons/ammunition/communications equipment pre-positioned?
  - What are the considerations for doing so?
  - What if the antiaccess area denial approach prevents further equipment inflow?

- If the antiaccess area denial approach cuts off the force, are sufficient ACSAs in place to draw supplies/equipment from the host nation?
- How does the SFAB mitigate risk to the advisor force while in transition?
- What needs to be done during competition to set conditions for success if there is a transition?
- What role does the embassy see for the SFAB?
  - Will the SFABs be considered noncombatants being evacuated?
  - Do they use their organic communications to assist in manning collection points?
  - Do they coordinate with FSF to ensure outer security of collections point?
  - What should be done during competition to facilitate this?
  - Do they know the noncombatant evacuation coordinator at the embassy?
- What advantage can the SFABs provide in intelligence gathering and dissemination?
  - What is the role for the SFAB in providing ground truth to the CCMD and intelligence community during a crisis?
  - What is the role for the SFAB to disseminate information from the CCMD and intelligence community to the host nation?
- What is the SFAB's role if the crisis is a natural disaster?

TRANSITIONING TO CONFLICT

2-35. During crisis response, the SFAB may or may not be involved in FSF tactical operations. It is critical that if the U.S. Army's response transitions from crisis to conflict, SFAB task forces manage that transition by providing U.S. commanders with timely and accurate information of on-the-ground actions and assessments of FSF units they may operate alongside. A suitable adjustment of legal authorities will be required.

2-36. SFAB personnel deployed under SC authorities cannot conduct combat operations unless authorized to do so by Congress or the President of the United States. This authorization is the mechanism by which the legal authorities are changed. Regardless of the legal authorities' issue, Soldiers in any and every capacity always retain the right to self-defense.

2-37. As in the transition to crisis, the transition to conflict will likely take the form of a specific execution order communicated by SecDef through the appropriate CCMD. This execution order will operationalize the theater SC section of a theater campaign plan.

2-38. In most cases, the CCMD will form a JTF as authorized by SecDef to address the crisis. The SFAB may be TACON to the JTF for the purpose of integrating the FSF into the wider command structure thru the liaising or supporting of FSF. They may also be OPCON to the coalition forces land component commander (CFLCC) to execute coordination and synchronization of the FSF for direct action.

2-39. In all phases, but especially in a transition to conflict, advisors must ensure that information pertaining to the green COP is communicated to, and understood by, the JTF, CFLCC, or whatever command authority is providing direction. SFABs improve the shared understanding and enhance the visualization of these command authorities by pushing up the green COP, rather than requiring the command to pull it.

2-40. During LSCO, SFAB teams may engage in all the activities previously listed during competition and crisis. As figure 2-5 on page 58 shows, however, the balance of SFAB activities becomes more heavily involved in liaise and support functions. (See chapter 4 for more discussion of how SFAB units conduct liaise and support during LSCO.)

ARMED CONFLICT

2-41. Armed conflict occurs when a state or non-state actor uses lethal force as the primary means to satisfy its interests. The emergence of armed conflict can be an extensive and comprehensive effort in terms of scale, scope, and totality. In conflict, success depends on the effectiveness of cooperative and competitive activities (see JP 3-0). LSCO are at the far right of the competition continuum and associated with outright war. Battlefields in LSCO have historically been more chaotic, intense, and highly destructive than those the Army experienced in the 2000s and 2010s.




Figure 2-5. Security Force Assistance Brigade during armed conflict

LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

2-42. SFABs in LSCO may support and liaise with the partner FSF to converge joint and multinational effects to achieve operational objectives. SFAB teams provide unit commanders with more options to exploit both strategic and operational indirect approaches in a globally integrated operation against a peer adversary. SFABs can also enable and leverage partner FSF capability and capacity to strike in-depth with lethal and nonlethal cross-domain effects to create overmatch (see FM 3-22).

2-43. SFAB teams may collocate or embed with the partner FSF to support and enable synchronization of activities, fill key capability gaps, and help to ensure unity of purpose and mutual support during combat operations.

The Security Force Assistance Brigade in Large-Scale Combat Operations: Liaison During Forward Passage of Lines

The 4th SFAB, consisting of a brigade headquarters, two Infantry maneuver, one Cavalry maneuver, a field artillery advising battalion, an engineer advising battalion, and a sustainment advising battalion are conducting an advising mission with partner forces in their geographic CCMD's AOR (see organizational chart in figure 2.6). At the present time, and given increasing regional tensions, one advisor task force is physically present in the AOR. The advisor task force on the ground consists of the brigade advisor team, one MBAT, one enabler BAT, and 12 subordinate advisor teams.




Figure 2-6. Passage of lines organizational chart

The partner force, the 1st Atropian Armored Division, is in established defensive positions within Atropia based on provocations from their Donovian neighbor. During the advising mission, a crisis occurs resulting in a decision to forward deploy U.S. Army conventional forces to Atropia. The 4th Infantry Division subsequently deploys under a MNF with the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 4th Infantry Division (3/4 ABCT) pushed forward into the AO in support of the defense of Atropia. Donovian forces cross the border into Atropia, resulting in continuous contact with the 1st Atropian Armored Division's defensive line. The defensive line holds with considerable losses on both sides.

The multinational force land component commander (MNFLCC), in the attempt to seize the moment of relative advantage makes the decision to conduct a forward passage of lines with 3/4 ABCT through the 1st Atropian Armored Division's defensive positions. To do this, the MNFLCC directs the already present elements of the 4th SFAB to act as liaisons to facilitate the passage of lines.

The Security Force Assistance Brigade in Large-Scale Combat Operations: Liaison During Forward Passage of Lines (continued)

Upon receiving the mission, the brigade advisor team and MBAT identify internal advisor team members with the relevant experience, skill sets, and doctrinal knowledge to execute the mission. After ensuring the MNFLCC's guidance is understood, advisor teams then re-task organize as identified by the brigade advisor team and MBAT to accomplish the mission. Utilizing advising guidance of "accompany and enable" allows for clear and precise execution of the forward passage of lines. Advisors then provide information and recommendations on the specific FSF partner units within the 1st Atropian Armored Division to execute the stationary unit responsibilities as well as building points of contact within 3/4 ABCT. (While the primary responsibility for planning and execution remains between the Atropians and 3/4 ABCT, the SFAB experience and knowledge of the FSF acts as the glue to bind together conventional U.S. units with an unfamiliar partner.

With the exact units identified for the operation, the advisor teams will commence building shared understanding of which technique will be utilized between the stationary and passing units. Advisors will ensure that the stationary FSF units understand the assembly area location of 3/4 ABCT. Once established, the FSF will need to understand where the passage point will be executed, route management, contact points, the estimated transit time, and the near and far recognition signals. Advisors will also assess and relay the combat support and combat service support assets available from the FSF which could support the passing unit in an emergency. For the passing units, advisors will relay information that pertains to partner force defensive arrayment. They will then share their partner's internal capabilities and assessments of the enemy situation in the close fight. Advisors will also ensure 3/4 ABCT understands the FSFs terrain observations, ensure shared understanding of the location for the battle handover line, ensure all parties clearly understand the responsibilities once battle handover has occurred, inform on obstacle or contaminated areas, confirm the routes through obstacles, the lane marking systems, and the accuracy of 3/4 ABCT's overlays. They will also propose alternate routes and articulate stationary unit traffic control procedures.

At the completion of the planning stage, the advisor teams continue with their liaise task and accompany and enable advising approach through the execution of the passage of lines. Advisors embed at the points of greatest friction to ensure redundancy in the FSF partner manning of passage lanes and contact points, confirm the lane is open, confirm the number of vehicles by type, ensure the FSF displays recognition signal, and assist as needed. Advisors moving with 3/4 ABCT provide redundancy with the two units making contact and display of the recognition symbols, confirming arrival at correct passage lanes, reporting progress through passage lanes, and confirming for FSF once the 3/4 ABCT passage is complete. Of particular concern will be to ensure that the FSF provide covering fires to the greatest extent possible to support the 3/4 ABCT passage while ensuring the blue (U.S.) and green (FSF) COPs are understood by all to reduce the risk of fratricide.

With the completion of the passage of lines, advisor teams confirm that all restrictions placed on 3/4 ABCT while passing through the FSF are lifted and ensure the FSF understand this change. The advisor teams then stand down from the more robust liaising task as well as the accompany and support posture required by this specific mission and return to the advising posture they were in before the mission.

(See FM 3-98 and ATP 3-20.98, chapter 3, paragraph 3-133 for more on passage of lines operations.)

BUILD AND MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

2-44. Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to available information and knowledge. As such, commanders, staffs, and advisor teams seek to build and maintain situational understanding (in the form of the blue and green COP) throughout the operations process. *Situational understandin*g is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables (ADP 6-0). Commanders, staffs, and advisors continually strive to maintain their situational understanding and work through periods of reduced understanding as a situation evolves. Effective commanders accept that uncertainty can never be eliminated and train their staffs and advisors to function in uncertain environments.

2-45. As commanders, staffs, and advisors build their situational understanding, they share their understanding across the force and with UAPs. Creating shared understanding is a principle of mission command and requires communication and information sharing from higher to lower and lower to higher. Higher headquarters ensures subordinates understand the larger situation to include the operation's end state, purpose, and objectives. Staffs and advisor teams from lower echelons share their understanding of their situation and provide feedback to the higher headquarters on the operation's progress. Communication and information sharing with adjacent units and UAPs is also multidirectional. Several tools assist leaders in building situational understanding and creating a shared understanding across the force to include the following:

- Operational and mission variables.
- DOTMLPF-P analysis.
- Running estimates.
- Collaboration.

Mission Variables and Operational Variables

2-46. Mission and operational variables are categories of relevant information commanders and staffs use to help build their situational understanding. For an advisor team, the mission variables (see table 2-2 on page 61 and page 62) and operational variables (see table 2-3 on page 63) are used to understand the country or region in which it is assigned.

2-47. Commanders, staffs, and advisor teams use METT-TC (I) to help understand the mission environment. *Mission variables* are categories of specific information needed to conduct operations (ADP 1-01).

2-48. Commanders, staffs, and advisor teams use the eight interrelated operational variables—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT)—to help understand an OE. Operational variables are those aspects of an OE, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations. (See table 2-3 on page 63).

Table 2-2. The mission variables

METT-TC (I) Variable	***Description***
Mission	Commanders and staffs view all the mission variables in terms of their impact on mission accomplishment. The mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason. It is always the first variable commanders consider during decision making. A mission statement contains the "who, what, when, where, and why" of the operation.
Enemy	The second variable to consider is the enemy's dispositions (including organization, strength, location, and tactical mobility), doctrine, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.
Terrain and weather	Terrain and weather analysis are inseparable and directly influence each other's impact on military operations. Terrain includes natural features (such as rivers and mountains) and man-made features (such as cities, airfields, and bridges). Commanders analyze terrain using the five military aspects of terrain that include: observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles and cover and concealment (OAKOC). The military aspects of weather include visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, and humidity.

Table 2-2. The mission variables (continued)

METT-TC (I) Variable	*Description*
Troops and support available	This variable includes the number, type, capabilities, and condition of available friendly troops and support. These include supplies, services, and support available from joint partners, host-nation partners, and unified action partners. It also includes support from civilians and contractors employed by military organizations, such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the Army Materiel Command.
Time available	Commanders assess the time available for planning, preparing, and executing tasks and operations. This includes the time required to assemble, deploy, and maneuver units in relationship to the enemy and conditions.
Civil considerations	Civil considerations are the influence of man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics including areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE).
Informational considerations	Informational considerations reflect that all operations and missions are conducted in the context of the information environment. Commanders assess how their operations will be perceived or could be perceived and how that perception affects the information narrative.

2-49. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders and staffs filter information categorized by the operational variables into relevant information with respect to the mission. They use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to refine their situational understanding and to visualize, describe, and direct operations. Commanders, staffs, and advisors view all the operational and mission variables in terms of their impact on mission accomplishment.

2-50. Culture, as part of the social operational variable, is particularly important to the mission of advisors. Commanders and advisors consider how culture (their own, their counterparts,' and the local population) affects operations when building situational understanding and conducting operations. Cultural understanding is paramount to the SFAB's success. Culture is composed of shared beliefs, values, norms, customs, behaviors, and artifacts members of a society use to cope with the world and each other. Advisor teams must consider how culture, and in particular gender dynamics, influences their actions and the actions of their counterparts and the local population. Making decisions through a strictly U.S. Army viewpoint may inhibit mission success. Understanding the culture of other UAPs is also crucial to building mutual trust and shared understanding (see table 2-3 on page 63).

Table 2-3. The operational variables

PMESII-PT Categories	*Sample Considerations*
Political	How do the political leaders influence the military? How do the area's leaders control the population? How widespread is government support among the people? Was the government democratically elected? What are the current domestic political issues?
Military	What is the current status of military facilities and equipment to train with the FSF? What foreign weapon systems do they employ? What is the frequency, proximity, and intensity of the OE in which I am partnering with the FSF?
Economic	How are the pay/benefits of the FSF in comparison to the local population? How is the military procuring military equipment? What is the basis of the economy?
Social	How do the people perceive their government? What is the language and ethnic makeup of the OE? What is the major religion? What is the demographic percentage of males aged 14 to 40?
Information	What is the source of information influencing the local population? What is the best means to disseminate plans and orders with the FSF?
Infrastructure	What is the status of sewer, water, electricity/power, and medical capacity is within the OE? What facilities are available to conduct OTEBA or ASLA? What transportation networks exist within the AO?
Physical terrain	Is there enough manpower to support the organization? What types of terrain exist within the OE?
Time available	Is there sufficient time for the activities, events, or conditions to take effect? Will partner forces or host-nation stakeholders feel rushed? Are there any key dates or events within the AO?
Legend: AO—area of operations; ASLA—assess, support, liaise, and advise; FSF—foreign security forces; OE—operational environment; OTEBA—organize, train, equip, build, and advise	

The Army Capabilities Based Assessment Framework

2-51. DOTMLPF-P is a framework for analysis used by the U.S. Army for assessing itself. It can also be used to assess FSF partners. Advisors can use this framework to create shared understanding of how the FSF operates. This analysis includes DOTMLPF-P governing the partner unit. Understanding these elements guide how advisors may exert influence in their partner (see table 2-4 on page 64).

Table 2-4. The Army capabilities-based assessment framework

Category	*Defined*
Doctrine	The way U.S. Forces and partners fight (for example, emphasizing maneuver warfare, combined air-ground campaigns).
Organization	How U.S. Forces and partners organize to fight, such as divisions, air wings, Marine air-ground task forces.
Training	How U.S. Forces and partners prepare to fight tactically (basic training to advanced individual training, unit training, joint exercises).
Materiel	All the items necessary to equip U.S. Forces or allies and partners that *does* or *does not* require a new development effort (for example, weapons, spares, test sets that are "off the shelf" both commercially and within the government).
Leadership and Education	How U.S. Forces' leaders and FSF counterparts are prepared to lead the fight (squad leader to four-star general/admiral—professional development).
Personnel	Availability of qualified personnel for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency operations.
Facilities	Real property, installations, and industrial facilities (such as government-owned ammunition production facilities).
Policy	DOD, interagency, or international policy that impacts the other seven non-materiel elements.
Legend: DOD—Department of Defense; FSF—foreign security forces; U.S.—United States	

Running Estimate

2-52. A *running estimate* is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). Running estimates assist commanders and staffs with understanding situations, assessing progress, and making decisions throughout an operation. Effective plans and successful execution hinge on current and accurate running estimates.

2-53. Each staff section and advisor should maintain a running estimate within their specified area of expertise and advisor role. When building and maintaining a running estimate, staff sections and advisors monitor current operations and continuously consider the following in context of the operations:

- Facts.
- Assumptions.
- Friendly status including location, activity, and combat power of subordinate units and FSF.
- Enemy status including composition, disposition, and strength.
- Civil considerations.
- Conclusions and recommendations.

2-54. Running estimates cover essential facts and assumptions, including a summary of the current situation. Running estimates always include recommendations for anticipated decisions. During planning, commanders and advisor team leaders use these recommendations to select valid (feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete) courses of action for further analysis. During preparation and execution, leaders use recommendations from running estimates to inform their decision making.

2-55. Advisors use running estimates primarily as a tool to understand themselves (blue COP) and their partners (green COP). Advisors maintain running estimates for their warfighting function to know what assets are available to their current mission among all organizations with whom they interact.

Collaboration

2-56. Commanders, staffs, and advisors actively build and maintain shared understanding within the force and with UAPs by continually collaborating throughout the operations process. Collaboration is more than coordination. It is multiple people and organizations working together towards a common goal by sharing knowledge and building consensus. It requires dialogue that involves a candid exchange of ideas or opinions among participants and encourages frank discussions in areas of disagreement. Throughout the operations process, commanders, advisors, staffs, and UAPs collaborate, share and question information, perceptions, and ideas to understand situations and make decisions.

2-57. Throughout the planning process, commanders, staffs, advisor teams, FSF counterparts, and other UAPs actively collaborate to understand the situation and make decisions. When possible, they conduct collaborative planning during mission analysis, course of action development, and wargaming to resolve conflicts before issuing the operation order. Through collaborative participation, they improve situational understanding and develop common priorities and objectives upon which to build future efforts and mutual trust.

INTEGRATING PROCESS

2-58. Throughout the operations process, commanders, staffs, and advisor teams integrate the warfighting functions to synchronize the force according to the commander's intent and concept of operations. Commanders, staffs, and advisors use several integrating processes and continuing activities to do this. The integrating processes are the following:

- IPOE.
- Information collection.
- Targeting.
- Risk management.
- Knowledge management.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

2-59. *Intelligence preparation of the operational environment* is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations (FM 2-0). Led by the intelligence officer or advisor, the entire staff or team participates in IPOE to develop and sustain an understanding of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. IPOE helps identify options available to friendly and threat forces.

2-60. IPOE supports all activities of the SFAB operations process. IPOE identifies gaps in current intelligence. Due to their small size relative to other conventional organizations, SFAB intelligence sections may have difficulty processing large amounts of information into intelligence and may require reachback capabilities. IPOE products help commanders, staffs, and advisor teams understand the threat, physical environment, and civil considerations throughout the operations process. (See chapter 5 for more information regarding augmentation.)

2-61. SFAB staffs and advisor teams conduct IPOE, internally and with their foreign counterparts. Bringing the FSF into the IPOE process can provide both training to their commanders and staffs as well as building trust and shared understanding. Staff and advisors must adhere to the appropriate procedures and SOPs regarding the classification of material shared with foreign counterparts. If necessary, alter the specific inputs and outputs associated with the IPOE based on information-sharing constraints.

INFORMATION COLLECTION

2-62. Information *collection* is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). It integrates the functions of the intelligence and operations staffs that focus on answering CCIRs. Information collection includes acquiring information and providing it to processing elements.

It has three steps that include the following:

- Collection management.
- Task and direct collection.
- Execute collection.

2-63. The SFAB conducts information collection activities in conjunction with their counterpart FSF. Information collection includes information relating to the FSF themselves, to include staffing, equipping, and disposition. This information provides inputs to SFA mission analysis and assessments. Advisors must also maintain an awareness of the FSF operational norms to identify environmental changes that may portend increased risk to mission and force. The intelligence officer develops indicators, which assist teams in identifying and reporting potential internal FSF threats.

2-64. Information collection helps the commander and advisors understand and visualize the operation by identifying gaps in information and aligning reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence assets to collect information on those gaps. The "decide" and "detect" steps in paragraphs 2-65 through 2-67 on targeting tie heavily to information collection. (See FM 3-55 for a detailed discussion of information collection to include the relationship between the duties of intelligence and operations staffs.)

TARGETING

2-65. *Targeting* is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Targeting seeks to create specific desired effects through lethal and nonlethal actions. The emphasis of targeting is on identifying enemy resources (targets) that if destroyed or degraded will contribute to the success of the friendly mission. Targeting begins in planning and continues throughout the operations process. The steps of the Army's targeting process are—

- Decide.
- Detect.
- Deliver.
- Assess.

2-66. The SFAB does not have organic fires capability and must coordinate with higher headquarters for fires support. Brigade and battalion fires cells require augmentation if expected to operate a fires cell in the same manner as a typical BCT. Advisor teams must be prepared to assist their foreign counterparts with employing and deconflicting artillery or other joint fires.

2-67. An important part of targeting is identifying possibilities for fratricide and collateral damage. In addition to their own internal control measures, SFAB commanders and advisors assist the FSF in establishing the control measures to minimize these risks. Control measures (such as fire support coordination lines, no-strike lists, and airspace coordinating measures) are included in operation orders. Control measures should be coordinated with the foreign counterparts and understood thoroughly at all levels to prevent fratricide, reduce collateral damage, and increase the efficiency of the targeting process.

RISK MANAGEMENT

2-68. Risk—the exposure of someone or something valued to danger, harm, or loss—is inherent in all operations. Because risk is part of all military operations, it cannot be avoided. Identifying, mitigating, and accepting risk is a function of command and a key consideration during planning and execution.

2-69. *Risk management* is the process to identify, assess, and mitigate risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). Commanders, staffs, and teams use risk management throughout the operations process to identify and mitigate risks associated with hazards (to include ethical risk and moral hazards) that have the potential to cause friendly and civilian casualties, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness. Like targeting, risk management begins in planning and continues through preparation and execution.

Risk management consists of the following steps:

- Identifying hazards.
- Assessing hazards.
- Developing controls and making risk decisions.
- Implementing controls.
- Supervising and evaluating.

2-70. All staff elements and advisors incorporate risk management into their running estimates and provide recommendations to mitigate risk within their areas of expertise. The operations officer or advisor team leader coordinates risk management throughout the operations process. (See ATP 5-19 for a detailed discussion of the risk management process.)

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

2-71. *Knowledge management* is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making (ADP 6-0). It facilitates the transfer of knowledge among commanders, staffs, and advisor teams to build and maintain situational understanding. Knowledge management helps get the right information to the right person at the right time to facilitate decision making. Knowledge management uses a five-step process to create shared understanding that includes:

- Assess.
- Design.
- Develop.
- Pilot.
- Implement.

2-72. Knowledge management is particularly important to an SFAB's success. Without the ability to aggregate assessments and reports from advisor teams working with FSF, the SFAB commanders and staffs will be unable to manage the larger SFA mission. Therefore, commanders, staffs, and advisor team leaders must emphasize knowledge management plans and SOPs prior to employment. These plans should include a mechanism for archiving assessments and information through higher headquarters for future advisor teams and other organizations that may find themselves in the same operational area (see ATP 6-01.1 for more information on knowledge management).

2-73. Proper execution of knowledge management can enable to track partner force capability and capacity improvements over time. This is useful while the OE remains in competition but can also prove vital to ensuring shared understanding of the green COP during an inflection point or transition to crisis or armed conflict.

BATTLE RHYTHM

2-74. *Battle rhythm* is a deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations (FM 6-0). Commanders and staffs must integrate and synchronize numerous activities, meetings, and reports within their headquarters, with their higher headquarters, and with subordinate units as part of the ongoing operations. Advisors integrate and synchronize their activities with the foreign counterparts. They do this by first understanding the FSF's battle rhythm and then building their battle rhythms to be compatible and complementary with their counterpart's schedule.

2-75. The SFAB battle rhythm sequences the actions and events within a headquarters by sharing information in support of the decision-making process. With significantly less personnel than a typical BCT, the SFAB must carefully plan its battle rhythm, otherwise, information and events will quickly overwhelm commanders, staffs, and advisor teams. An effective battle rhythm—

- Facilitates interaction among the commander, staff, and advisor teams.
- Supports building and maintaining shared understanding throughout the headquarters.
- Establishes a routine for staff and advisor interaction and coordination.

2-76. There is no standard battle rhythm for every situation. Different echelons, types of units, and types of operations require commanders and staffs to develop a battle rhythm based on the situation. During LSCO, where lethality and time constraints require rapid planning and decision cycles, the unit's battle rhythm focuses on defeating the enemy. Daily battle rhythm events may consist of a morning or evening current

operations update brief, a targeting meeting, and a combined plans and future operations update brief. In operations dominated by stability tasks, where headquarters are often static, the battle rhythm may be more deliberate with daily, weekly, and monthly working groups and boards. While the battle rhythm establishes a routine for a headquarters, the unit's battle rhythm is not fixed. Commanders modify the battle rhythm as the situation evolves (see ATP 6-0.5 for a detailed discussion of battle rhythm to include examples of common meetings, working groups, and boards).

2-77. Commanders and staffs plan and develop tracking and reporting tools to anticipate and monitor changes in the environment. Small changes in operational or mission variables in a partner or host nation could have significant impacts. These may include SFAB security and protection requirements and may affect advisor interactions with their counterpart. Advisors maintain situational awareness of the routine activities of FSF counterparts to identify potential leading indicators of a significant event. Base these indicators on FSF accountability, unplanned changes in their protection measures, and other potential indicators. SFAB staffs and advisors must anticipate these events and have contingency plans in place.

2-78. The SFAB plans reporting requirements to account for their reduced personnel involved with receiving and processing reports and to account for the unpredictable nature inherent in working with FSF. Challenges, such as scheduling conflicts, personnel availability, the advisor dichotomy, language difficulties, changing protection requirements, and others, add complexity to these reports. Reporting requirements must assist in quickly and efficiently gathering reports, parsing information, and providing the relevant portions to decision makers.

2-79. Commanders, staffs, and advisors identify critical and routine information requirements and prioritize reporting procedures accordingly. Reports, such as accountability, maintenance status, and the counterpart's training status, should be routine and simplified. Commanders, staff, and advisors should develop reporting criteria that quickly highlights deficiencies and update CCIR regularly in accordance with changes in the OE. Important information needs to be apparent, easily identified, and capable of transmitting through multiple mediums at low cost and low stress on the communication system.

2-80. Build redundancy into reporting systems and procedures within the SFAB. Network, personnel, connectivity, and even electrical power availability limitations may hinder collecting required reports from a single network or system.

2-81. Commanders adjust the unit's battle rhythm as operations progress. For example, early in the operation a commander may require a daily update briefing. As the situation changes, the commander may require an update briefing only weekly. Some factors that influence a unit's battle rhythm include the staff's proficiency, higher headquarters' battle rhythm, reporting requirements, the foreign counterpart's battle rhythm, operating tempo, the current mission, and planning requirements.

2-82. Commanders also adjust the battle rhythm and staff processes based on advising requirements of subordinate echelons. Due to the inverse relationship of C2 capacity and advising responsibilities, brigade commanders may "flatten" the organization and centralize more staff functions at the brigade level if subordinate battalion headquarters have significant advisor responsibilities.

2-83. Meetings typically consume a large amount of a unit's battle rhythm. Meetings are gatherings to present and exchange information, solve problems, coordinate action, and make decisions. SFAB meetings should have an agenda and focus on the meeting's task and purpose. Dispersed locations, lack of personnel, connectivity challenges, and language barriers preclude long detailed, and complicated meetings. This is especially true for those involving the FSF counterparts.

Note. As in all operations, rehearsals are vital. This is even more true for SFABs executing advising operations. In all the battle rhythm meetings and events, it is important to rehearse with the FSF, to include an interpreter, to anticipate problems, cultural objections, and identify new terms that may need translation or clarification.

SECTION III – OPERATIONAL TENETS AND IMPERATIVES

2-84. The tenets and imperatives of operations guide the conduct of operations and provide options for leaders to apply and preserve combat power against challenges posed by peer threats (see FM 3-0). The SFAB is uniquely positioned to enable achievement of the operational tenets through both their own contributions to the joint force and the enhancement of partner force contributions.

OPERATIONAL TENETS

2-85. The SFAB is uniquely positioned to enable achievement of the operational tenets through both their own contributions to the joint force and the enhancement of partner force contributions.

2-86. *Agility* is the ability to move forces and adjust their dispositions and activities more rapidly than the enemy (FM 3-0). SFABs themselves are agile due to their small size and can deploy quickly to establish or increase presence in a prescribed area. SFABs also enable the agility of FSF, U.S. BCTs, and the joint force by increasing the rate of integration and shared understanding by employing the advisor network to relieve the tensions of "first contact" and enable the follow-on missions of their advised and adjacent units. Advisors provide commanders the ability to drive the operations process and improve visualization of the OE by building the green COP and leveraging their preestablished relationships with the FSF.

2-87. *Convergence* is an outcome created by the concerted employment of capabilities from multiple domains and echelons against combinations of decisive points in any domain to create effects against a system, formation, decision maker, or in a specific geographic area (FM 3-0). Achieving convergence in an operation is derived from how well leaders know themselves and the enemy, determine desired effects or opportunities, integrate the joint force, synchronize capabilities, assess interdependent effects, and assume risk. SFABs provide a calibrating effect for commanders, advising them on the capabilities and limitations of the FSF, increasing the effectiveness of FSF contributions, and reducing counterproductive imbalances during operations.

2-88. *Endurance* is the ability to persevere over time throughout the depth of an operational environment (FM 3-0). The SFAB contributes to the creation of endurance through setting the theatre across warfighting functions, improving interoperability with allies and other UAPs, and enabling access to host-nation assets to support the joint force.

2-89. *Depth* is the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results (ADP 3-0). During competition, the SFAB achieves depth by operating in all CCMD AORs, enhancing U.S. posture, and contesting adversary efforts worldwide. In the event of crisis or conflict, SFAB advisor teams (possibly already in theater) hold the unique position of operating in the deep fight, within an adversary antiaccess area denial bubble, to advise a partner force.

OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVES

2-90. The SFAB complies with the imperatives by operating as a purpose-built force to perform the advisor mission throughout the competition continuum. In leveraging the advisor network to synergize U.S. Force integration and partnering with FSF allies, it allows U.S. BCTs to focus on training and deployment to fight and win the Nation's wars. SFABs are subject matter experts of their AORs and not only abide by the imperatives themselves but also allow adjacent U.S. Forces to gain higher fidelity with them as well. SFABs create shared understanding at the tactical, operational, and strategic level within the OE.

2-91. SFABs achieve the imperatives outlined in FM 3-0 in the following ways:

- See yourself, see the enemy, understand the OE:
  - Self—advisor teams build the green COP to enable CCMD visualization of entire MNF.
  - Enemy—advisor team partnership gives them unique access into FSF insight on the enemy as well as allow U.S. Forces access to FSF sensors.
  - OE—because of regional alignment, advisors can study their AOR deeply.

- Accounting for being under constant observation and all forms of enemy contact:
  - Imbedded presence with an FSF partner signals U.S. commitment to the theater and the mission.
  - Small teams mean small target signature.
  - Enables an insider look at the FSF and host-nation perspectives of the OE.
- Creating and exploiting relative physical, information, and human advantages in pursuit of decision dominance:
  - Integrating with the partner force increases information and human advantages by promoting the cohesion of the MNF.
  - Assessing FSF capability and capacity enabling a more thorough visualization and understanding which promotes decision making.
- Making initial contact with the smallest element possible:
  - Enabling the joint force to make adversary during competition.
  - Employing small subcomponents of a force package to minimize risk to force.
- Imposing multiple dilemmas on the enemy:
  - The enemy must contend with partner FSFs enhanced by advisor efforts to build partner capabilities and capacities.
  - Enabling better FSF integration into multinational operations which enhances the combat power of the joint force.
- Anticipating, planning, and executing transitions:
  - Advisor teams facilitating transitions by unburdening conventional forces from SFA activities.
  - Lending inherent expertise and influence on lowering operational load and friction of transitions with partner force.
- Designating, weighing, and sustaining the main effort:
  - Acting as an economy of effort force against SFA activities, freeing other resources.
  - Relying on myriad sustainment sources to lighten operational load on CCMD and raise likelihood of continuous sustainment support.
- Consolidating gains continuously:
  - Enabling immediate consolidation of gains through SFA expertise.
  - Enhancing FSF capabilities and capacities promoting a long run consolidation of gains.
- Understanding and managing the effects of operations on units and Soldiers:
  - Comprising advisor teams with skilled and experienced leaders.
  - Supplementing dedicated regional advisor teams with advisor teams from other regions (to include teams from 54th SFAB) to alleviate advisor workload.

SECTION IV – HIGHER HEADQUARTERS EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

2-92. Higher headquarters employ the SFAB as a capability to conduct SFA activities and missions alongside FSF. This section describes considerations for SFAB operations in and outside of a JOA, various higher headquarters command structures, and describes what command and support relationships should look like.

JOINT OPERATIONS AREA

2-93. SFABs have the capability to operate both inside and outside of an established JOA. Each scenario presents different legal and operational considerations. SFABs may be integral to an operational area transition.

2-94. When operating inside of an established JOA, DOD is usually the lead agency with the U.S. Department of State as the supporting agency. In this scenario, SFAB commanders must operate within DOD-nested concept for SFA. Under most circumstances when operating in an established JOA, DOD gives OPCON of the SFAB to the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or CFLCC for employment. The JFLCC may retain the SFAB for direct employment. When conducting SC activities under the threshold of armed conflict, the SFAB will, in most circumstances, be assigned to the theater army. Operations inside of an established JOA give the joint force commander significant authorities and responsibilities. The joint force commander assigns subordinate organizations to conduct military operations within those areas of operations. The joint force commander assigns tactical or operational level SFA activities to the SFAB.

2-95. The SFAB requires significant staff augmentation, specifically in current operations, to exercise C2 of forces outside of its SFA mission. Due to its lack of capacity, higher headquarters should not assign an AO to an SFAB without significant augmentation. If given responsibilities outside of its primary SFA mission, the SFAB will require augmentation, which can come in the form of other military forces or, in some cases, the FSF, to conduct the following:

- Terrain management.
- Information collection.
- CMO.
- Air and ground movement control.
- Clearance of fires.
- Security.
- Personnel recovery.
- Medical support.
- Other functions based on the environment.

2-96. The SFAB, operating inside an established JOA, needs an established sustainment network for support. The SFAB has no capability to sustain itself while deployed. Inside the JOA, the SFAB formation depends on the supporting command's sustainment network for administration control and life support functions. Chapter 3 and 7 describe these planning considerations.

2-97. In many cases, the SFAB requires additional support for other warfighting functions as well. These often include security, intelligence, fires, and protection. Higher headquarters should clearly define these support relationships for all advisor teams within the SFAB.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

2-98. The various theater command structures and environments worldwide have significant impacts on the SFAB planning and operations processes. Specifically, the differences between operating within a designated JOA and working outside of a JOA are significant.

THEATER COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-99. Political considerations heavily influence the ultimate shape of the C2 structure in which U.S. Forces conduct SFA. However, participating nations should strive to achieve unity of command for the operation to the maximum extent possible. All participants should understand missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities. While well-defined in U.S. doctrine, command relationships are not necessarily part of the doctrinal lexicon of nations with which the United States may operate in coalition or partnered operations.

2-100. The SFAB may be a supported command—from a theater perspective—while at the same time acting as a supporting command for the FSF. For example, an SFAB may support a joint interagency task force conducting international police training. Another example is a joint command supporting an SFAB with joint fires, intelligence, surveillance, CMO, and reconnaissance; or other capabilities while the SFAB supports the FSF in training or operations. The basic structures for multinational operations fall into one of three types: lead nation, integrated, or parallel command. Alliance and coalition commands use these structures (see JP 3-16).

2-101. A lead-nation command structure exists when all member nations place their forces under one nation's control. The lead-nation command has a dominant lead-nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. The command may have an integrated staff and multinational subordinate forces. Integrating the staff allows the commander to draw upon the expertise of multinational or coalition partners in areas where the lead nation may have less experience.

2-102. An integrated command structure provides unity of effort in a multinational setting. An integrated, combined command has several distinguishing features. The staff consists of representatives from all member nations underneath a designated single commander. To maximize effectiveness, integrate subordinate commands and staffs to the lowest echelon possible.

2-103. A parallel command structure does not designate a single force commander. The coalition leaders develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort by using coordination

centers. A parallel command structure is the least effective when conducting SFA due to the lack of a single commander.

ALLIANCE COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-104. Alliance commands address national political objectives within MNF objectives at the alliance treaty level. Alliance command relationships often reflect either an integrated command structure or a lead-nation command structure. In alliance operations, such as SFA, these structures should be used to the maximum practical extent. Alliance command and force structures often mirror the degree of allied member participation. Senior military officers from member nations often lead subordinate commands. Effective operations within an alliance require senior political and military authorities to agree on the type of command relationships that govern the operations of the forces. Potential political sensitivities associated with SFA can influence command relationships and operating procedures.

COALITION COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-105. Coalitions often form in response to unforeseen crises that occur outside the area of an established alliance, which is often the case for SFA. Coalition command relationships routinely evolve as the coalition develops. For SFA, all participating coalition members should augment the partner nation's headquarters staff with liaisons. These representatives might include designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. Such staffing provides the coalition commander with representative leaders, accessible expertise on the capabilities of the coalition members, and facilitates the planning process. Integrating multinational command elements into the coalition planning process should occur as early as practical.

ARMY OR JOINT FORCE COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-106. The corps and division are the U.S. Army's unit of action in LSCO with either headquarters potentially acting as the JFLCC during operations. Whether it is an Army or a joint headquarters, the SFAB may be the assigned to augment this headquarters while deployed in a JOA. SFAB advisor teams allow such headquarters to integrate an FSF partner force more completely into operations and advise at the point of need. The SFAB advisor team may be assigned to liaise between the FSF and the corps and division staffs to link the efforts of the U.S. Forces and the FSF and allow allied and partner forces to be incorporated into achieving convergence.

OPERATING OUTSIDE A DESIGNATED JOINT OPERATIONS AREA

2-107. When operating outside of a JOA, the SFAB operates at the invitation of the partner nation. The COM (ambassador) facilitates the invitation through the CCDR under the auspices of SC. The partner nation, the ambassador, and the status-of-forces agreement establish the laws and rules under which military personnel conducting SFA operations outside of a JOA operate. Unless otherwise specified, the partner nation is responsible for the security of the personnel assigned to the SFAB formations; however, SFAB personnel always have the right of self-defense.

2-108. The SFAB formation will not have a well-established sustainment network. The SFAB formation depends on the ASCC and the partner nation for many administrative control and life support functions (field feeding, all classes of resupply, and field-level and sustainment-level maintenance of all equipment), as well as some religious, legal, FHP and health service support, finance, postal, personnel, and administrative services. In some cases, the American embassy country team contract support or the contracting support brigade provide sustainment via contracting support in the supporting ASCC's AO. To facilitate SFA operations, SFAB headquarters elements may be collocated with American embassies, the ASCC, a theater special operations command, or as directed by the CCDR based on operational and mission variables.

COUNTRY TEAM

2-109. The country team plays a vital role with respect to SFA. Figure 2-7 depicts the typical country team structure. The *country team* is the senior, in-country United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission (JP 3-07.4). The COM is the highest U.S. civil authority in a foreign country. As the senior U.S. Government

official permanently assigned in the partner nation, the COM is responsible to the President for policy oversight of all U.S. Government programs.




Figure 2-7. Country team structure

2-110. The senior defense official is the principal DOD official in an American Embassy as designated by SecDef. This individual serves the following roles:

- Acting as the diplomatic mission's principal military advisor on defense and national security issues.
- Filling the role of the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission.
- Serving as the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy.

2-111. The senior defense official is the chief of both the SC organization and the defense attaché (DATT) office in the embassy. The country team works with the partner nation to develop measures to promote security by developing a yearly theater security cooperation plan (TSCP).

2-112. The TSCP links the CCDR's regional strategy to military operations. The Foreign Service Act assigns the mission chief to a foreign country with the responsibility of directing, coordinating, and supervising all

government executive branch employees in that country, except for U.S. Service members and employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander (see FM 3-22 and JP 3-07).

COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

2-113. Properly established command and support relationships are critical to the success of the SFAB and its SFA mission. The SFAB's higher headquarters should consider specific SFAB traits prior to establishing their command relationships. The SFAB—

- Is optimized to operate at the advisor-team level because breaking teams apart degrades their ability to conduct advisor team activities.
- Can task-organize advisor teams from across the brigade against unique FSF requirements by location.
- Is designed to manage, coordinate, and adjust the SFA activities and missions at the tactical and operational level in support of strategic goals.
- Has limited capacity to C2 in an AO without significant augmentation.
- Cannot conduct independent combat operations against an enemy force.
- Has limited ability to sustain themselves.

2-114. The SFAB works best when its higher headquarters, in coordination with the partnered nation or security force, gives it objectives for developing FSF. Usually, this is done through a TACON relationship between senior SFAB commanders and their next higher headquarters. This allows the SFAB commanders and staffs to utilize their advisors and resources against those objectives in a manner best suited to accomplish the SFA mission.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

2-115. *Operational control* is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission (JP 1, Vol 2).

2-116. OPCON normally includes authority over all aspects of operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions. It does not include directive authority for sustainment or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and operational areas of subordinate joint force commanders (see FM 6-0).

2-117. In almost all circumstances, it is preferred for senior SFAB commanders to maintain OPCON of their own forces. Building effective advisor teams requires that SFAB commanders and staffs task-organize teams from across the brigade as necessary to achieve the objective that the ground force commander has requested. FSF advising requirements vary by each location and mission. This requires a flexible organization, much of which is lost when subordinate units are under the OPCON of other commands.

TACTICAL CONTROL

2-118. TACON is inherent in OPCON. Commanders at any echelon at or below the level of CCMD may delegate and exercise TACON. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive (see FM 6-0).

2-119. In most cases, the SFAB's higher headquarters should direct its operations through a TACON relationship. This allows the higher headquarters to direct the required effects while enabling the SFAB commanders and staffs to task-organize and apply their advisor teams to meet the SFA mission. Used in this manner, the SFAB provides an advising capability to its higher headquarters. The SFAB forces will be able to focus on completing the SFA mission with FSF instead of other external requirements potentially distracting them from their primary mission. Figure 2-8 illustrates how these command relationships may look when the SFAB is providing an advising capability to a theater.




Figure 2-8. Command relationships

SUPPORT

2-120. Support is a command authority in joint doctrine. A superior commander establishes supported and supporting relationships between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Designating supporting relationships is important. It conveys priorities to commanders and staffs planning or executing operations. Many of the typical staff supporting functions do not exist in sufficient capacity to accomplish the same tasks as would a typical BCT, so ensuring the correct point of contact is identified within the SFAB element receiving support is vital. Designating a support relationship does not provide authority to organize and employ commands and forces, nor does it include authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support (see FM 6-0).

2-121. Advisor teams are likely to receive support from other organizations. This support can include items like security, intelligence, fires, protection, and sustainment. Every advisor team must understand from where they could theoretically receive this support. In a JOA, this will generally come from a support relationship with sustainment brigades and BCTs. In a non-JOA environment, coordination through the ASCC, embassy

country team, contracting support brigade, or other methods provide the required support. During LSCO, advisor teams likely both provide and receive direct support from their FSF counterparts.

2-122. *Direct support* is a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance (JP 3-09.3). Of note, joint doctrine considers direct support as a mission rather than a support relationship. A unit assigned a direct support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit but is positioned by and has priorities of support established by the supported unit. Advisor teams could theoretically be on either end of a direct support relationship. In LSCO, an SFAB could surge to support a U.S. or partner force directly with advising expertise for a specific mission. Alternatively, an SFAB could receive direct support from a logistics or transportation unit to help move it around the AOR to advise at point of need.

2-123. *Reinforcing* is a support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit (FM 3-0). Only like units can be given a reinforcing mission. A unit assigned a reinforcing support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit but is positioned by the reinforced unit. A unit that is reinforcing has priorities of support established by the reinforced unit first, and then by the parent unit. This type of relationship could occur when multiple units support a single SFAB's activities, or when another SFAB (like 54th SFAB) is tasked to support another SFAB's typical AOR.

2-124. *General support-reinforcing* is a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole and to reinforce another similar-type unit (FM 3-0). A unit assigned a GS-reinforcing relationship is positioned and has priorities established by its parent unit and secondly by the reinforced unit.

2-125. *General support* is support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof (JP 3-09.3). Units assigned a GS relationship are positioned and have priorities established by their parent unit. For example, while advising an FSF, a combined JTF commander may place the SFAB in a GS role over all partner forces in an AOR and allow the SFAB leaders the ability to allocate their teams accordingly. Alternatively, a partner force being advised might be placed in GS of a U.S. BCT in the same scenario. In that case, the U.S. BCT commander would not direct the actions of the advisor teams or the partner force.

2-126. While the application of the different types of support relationships may or may not be relevant to the advisor teams themselves, they are especially worth understanding should a partner force be given a similar type of task or relationship.

Chapter 3
Predeployment, Deployment, and Redeployment

Given the nature of the threats we face today and the challenges we are likely to face in the future, I cannot imagine a scenario in which the United States would not be standing alongside allies and partners across the globe.

General Joseph Dunford, 19th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chapter 3 describes the brigade's deployment considerations from receipt of mission through post-deployment activities. See TC 3-22 for more information.

SECTION I – PREDEPLOYMENT

3-1. Planning for deployment is one of the most crucial phases of an operation. Personnel shortages, time and equipment limitations, language differences, cultural differences, dispersed operating locations, and fragile lines of communication challenge units as they begin preparations to deploy. Within the SFAB, deployment planning must be a multiechelon and collaborative effort among commanders, staffs, and advising team leaders. SFA missions occur across the range of military operations and the competition continuum. Figure 3-1 on page 78 shows the recurring steps in the SFAB's mission cycle.




Figure 3-1. Mission cycle

3-2. A typical mission cycle begins when the CCDR issues guidance to the ASCC, which then submits a request for forces to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The joint staff, through the Department of the Army, issues the deployment order to United States Army Forces Command/SFAC, and ultimately to the designated SFAB. The order includes the plan for the SFAB's RSOI and includes details on base support, communications, and sustainment. SFAB parallel planning during the request for forces process is critical to maximizing the predeployment planning and coordination time available, as many planning tasks can be accomplished prior to request for forces approval and force allocation. When possible, the SFAB conducts PDSSs and subsequent coordination for clearance to the theater to facilitate mission planning and sustainment for the duration of the mission.

3-3. SFAB subordinate organizations and elements begin detailed preparations immediately upon receiving their mission. Using known requirements, the unit begins task-organizing and predeployment training immediately. The unit tailors the training to mission specifics gathered during PDSS and or reconnaissance. The unit obtains supplies, equipment, and training materials to conduct individual, leader, and collective training to prepare for deployment. Units may request or be granted direct liaison authorized with UAPs as required. The SFAB's higher headquarters approves direct liaison authority between the supported ASCC and the projected SFAB as early as possible to facilitate parallel planning ahead of force allocation.

INITIAL COORDINATING AND PLANNING EVENTS

3-4. Through mission analysis, SFAB leaders and staffs determine if the unit is sufficiently organized and equipped to meet the mission parameters stated in the order. SFAB staffs refer to the order for the necessary

information to begin coordination for entering the country with their required equipment. Leaders and staffs generate information requests for information not contained in the order.

MULTIECHELON PLANNING

3-5. The SFAB identifies the initial command and support relationships for the deploying element to determine their command and support relationships while in transit and in theater. The CCDR provides the ASCC with exercises, training terms, and funding lines available for the deployment and the conduct of the mission. The information provides operational requirements, funding, and authorities linked to the assigned exercise or training missions.

3-6. The SFAB reviews the TSCP and the relevant regional or country plans to conduct detailed planning. SFAB commanders and staff define success by focusing on long-term and sustainable goals in support of the TSCP. With long-term goals in mind, the SFAB develops measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for each potential course of action. This is part of the integrating process of operational assessment covered in chapter 4. The theater and country plans may contain MOPs and MOEs, but the SFAB must do more than merely refine the higher headquarters' plans. SFABs must conduct their own analysis and nest their plan with higher guidance ensuring both are conducive to lower-level execution.

FUNDING AUTHORITIES

3-7. The CCMD identifies funding under Title 10 or Title 22 of the U.S. Code and coordinates with the American Embassy and U.S. Department of State to facilitate SFAB deployment and mission support as required by the mission variables of METT-TC (I). The SFAB S-8 coordinates with the ASCC assistant chief of staff of financial management to identify lines of accounting for deployment-related expenses. DOD determines if the SFAB executes SFA under Title 10 or Title 22 authorities, which has implications for authorized SFA activities. If under Title 10 authority, the ASCCs (or a designated JTF) receive funds through the established base budget, overseas contingency operations funding, or funds otherwise appropriated by Congress. If required, the CCMD, in conjunction with the country team, negotiates an ACSA with the host nation to ensure the host nation receives payment for logistical support services. Other bilateral agreements may also exist, ensuring the availability of appropriated host-nation resources. These agreements may include payment to the United States through foreign military sales.

PRE-MISSION PLANNING

3-8. In preparation for deployment, the SFAB identifies and reviews existing campaign plans and country plans from the CCMD, the ASCC, and the COM, as well as other documents critical to U.S. interests and strategic goals in the region. The SFAB cross-references and compares these plans to operational and environmental assessments to identify potential gaps in FSF capability or capacity. This early information is included in the SFAB's mission analysis. (See figure 3-2 on page 80 for a graphic depiction of how these plans influence each other.) (See FM 3-22 for more information.)




Figure 3-2. Relationship between country plan, theater campaign plan, and integrated country strategy

PRE-MISSION ACADEMICS

3-9. Staffs develop and distribute study materials and briefings on the operational area to leaders and Soldiers. These products emphasize host-nation culture and language and provide cultural tips for developing good rapport with foreign personnel. Advisors reach out to the country team and other regional experts to gain a better understanding of the history, culture, motivations, and politics of the host nation.

3-10. This information provides the inputs into early environmental and institutional assessments of the FSF. These initial assessments help the SFAB to identify FSF capability or capacity gaps and cross-reference these potential gaps to existing campaign plans and their tentative mission.

3-11. Since battalions and below can be assigned missions widely dispersed across a geographical CCMD, each advisor team must be prepared to leverage the expertise of its members to conduct its own academics for its mission, rather than relying on staffs at higher echelons. The persistent presence that each SFAB has in its assigned AO provides materials for teams to build their pre-mission academic programs. Teams must leverage assessments from previous teams that have conducted missions in their region, focusing on operational variables and DOTMLPF-P analyses.

HOST-NATION APPROVAL AND COUNTRY CLEARANCES

3-12. The SFAB can expect delays during the visa application process. Some countries may require a letter of introduction through the supported embassy's SC organization. An approved visa is often required for country clearance and can delay the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System approval process. The SFAB S-1 or S-2 is usually responsible for planning and monitoring the visa process. However, due to the small staff, subordinate leaders and advisor team leaders must track this information as well. (The U.S. Passports and International Travel website provides additional information and specific requirements for each country.) The SFABs are likely to require formalized support from their installation passport office to process

a high density of passport requirements that are uncommon for conventional forces. Personnel assigned to SFABs must receive a special authorization to request official passports prior to receipt of mission.

3-13. The SFAB submits proposed PDSS dates to the ASCC or country team. The proposed dates include time spent going to and from the CCMD headquarters for briefings and guidance, as well as travel to the host nation. Staff planners must consider encountering delays when transiting through foreign countries. Planners must anticipate passport and visa requirements in those countries as well. Lastly, planners must consider using commercial aircraft or U.S. military aircraft. (See the DOD Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide website for a list of country clearance requirements and the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System website for country clearance issuances.)

Pre-mission Legal Briefs

3-14. Prior to employment, the brigade Judge Advocate of the deploying SFAB provides a brief to ensure understanding of the rules of engagement, standing rules of force, or status-of-forces agreements of the countries where they are deploying to. Any pre-mission questions about local area laws and customs can be answered through the brigade judge advocate.

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY

3-15. The PDSS aims to present information accurately based on the existing mission variables. The PDSS also provides detailed information on the C2, support, protection, and sustainment relationships for the follow-on unit's mission. The site survey coordinates the in-country reception of the SFA forces. The coordination requires all units, outgoing and incoming, to apply a comprehensive approach at all levels of command.

3-16. The SFAB conducts a PDSS 180 to 270 days prior to deployment. This gives the unit adequate time to plan, conduct, or alter its existing training plan to accommodate the country and theater-specific requirements of its mission and tailor SFA missions to the needs of the FSF or host nation. The PDSS provides an opportunity to gain the information required to address planning requirements and confirms the partner FSF expectations. Ideally, SFAB units will be afforded multiple opportunities through initial planning and coordination events, host nation and country team communication and ASCC contact to accomplish PDSS goals and objectives. It is difficult to accomplish all pre-mission analysis in a single PDSS event. Depending on the maturity of the theater, multiple PDSS events may be required or authorized. Paragraphs 3-17 through 3-22 describe SFAB-specific information requirements that should be determined by the unit to ensure it can properly prepare and train upon return.

Theater Medical Requirements

3-17. In addition to coordination with supporting host-nation and FSF medical assets during the PDSS, consider the in-theater medical capabilities and compare them to the SFAB's requirements. The SFAB mission may require Soldiers to operate outside the capability of conventional force medical support. Key medical considerations for SFAB planners include—

- Individual and collective FHP measures, including immunizations and chemoprophylaxis.
- Suitability, capacity, and capability of local medical facilities and assets.
- Time and distance factors associated with patient evacuation.
- Availability and suitability of civil and military casualty and MEDEVAC assets (including airframe use authorization).
- Suitability of Class VIII supplies and blood products.
- Legality, foreign clearance requirements, or acceptable substitutions for prohibited or controlled substances, for example, narcotic medical supplies.

Echelon of Advising

3-18. The partner nation's description of its security forces may not align with the SFAB's assessment during the PDSS. The SFAB updates information during the PDSS and makes recommendations for changes to the chain of command. Advising at higher echelons requires a focus on staff processes and a knowledge of the partner nation and the FSF systems and processes. The SFAB aligns its personnel to the appropriate rank structures with the FSF given the mission-specific requirements (for example, a U.S. major could advise the

foreign equivalent of a colonel). The SFAB identifies any cultural risks associated with the possibility of giving offense or injuring the partnership based on advisor pairings (considerations include rank, gender, age, cultural background, personality, religion, race, and ethnicity).

FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES TRAINING REQUIREMENT

3-19. FSF operational assessments provide initial training and mission requirements. This information provides data for the SFAB's mission analysis. The level of proficiency, equipment, and resources may vary widely from mission to mission or even unit to unit. The FSF needs shape advisor team task-organization and augmentation requirements. The SFAB conducts mission analysis to support a wide variety of SFA activities including force generation, institutional instruction, or operational assistance. Examples include the development of national-level schools or academies for initial entry Soldiers, professional military education for staff officers, or field expedient tactical training for squads. Chapter 4, section II, describes initial and continuous assessment in more detail.

EXPECTED DEGREE OF UNIT SEPARATION

3-20. Unit dispersion in theater significantly influences the SFAB mission. Units may consolidate at a single location or spread out across an entire AO with advisor teams significantly separated from other U.S. Forces. The expected degree to which forces separate affects the risk associated with the mission. Commanders and staffs must consider this separation when determining augmentation and support requirements.

3-21. In the regional alignment and force package rotation model, individual advisor teams must be prepared to operate in a separate country independently of their higher headquarters. Unit separation by international borders increases the complexity of lines of communication for the task force. Prior to deployment, the SFAB task force must ensure that all subordinate units are prepared to sustain themselves independently. Considerations may include the following:

- Uniform Code of Military Justice authority.
- Host nation or local laws.
- Agreements with the host nation for support (for example, ACSA).
- Contracting enablers:
  - Pay agent.
  - Contracting officer's representative.
  - FOO.
  - Government purchase card and cardholder.
- Unit deployable trained advisors:
  - Unit movement officer.
  - Central control officer.
  - Hazardous materials officer.
  - Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movement System.
- Unit prevention leader.
- Defense Travel System reviewer.
- COMSEC custodian.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

3-22. During the PDSS, the designated SFAB personnel recovery officer coordinates with the personnel recovery coordination section at the next higher headquarters or the regional security officer of the American Embassy to assess, coordinate, and develop the unit's personnel recovery plans and procedures. SFAB teams review and update these plans as necessary prior to each mission. SFAB teams should expect to refine personnel recovery plans at their level to provide bottom-up refinement to the theater personnel recovery plan in geographically dispersed deployments outside of a JOA.

ADVISOR TEAM TASK ORGANIZATION

3-23. Upon completion of the PDSS, SFAB commanders task-organize advisor teams to the identified requirements. If possible, this should include any external augmentation such as security forces. These task-organized advisor teams conduct the necessary mission-specific training, preparing themselves for the upcoming operation. SFAB commanders and their higher headquarters will determine the deployment

certification guidelines for each mission. These will often vary greatly from one region to another. Once certified to deploy, commanders should refrain from breaking up the task-organized advisor team until the mission is complete.

PORTS OF EMBARKATION AND DEBARKATION

3-24. When the planning for the deployment is routine, the SFAB will primarily plan against use of the most logistically efficient aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) and seaports of embarkation (SPOEs) to their home station. When the destination OE is permissive, SFABs will plan against the most logistically efficient aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs) or as prescribed by the host nation. When planning is not routine, decisions concerning choices of APOE and SPOE will be determined by mission-specific details. When the destination OE is not permissive, APOD and SPOD decisions will also be case by case as informed by the theater campaign plan and mission-specific details.

SECTION II – DEPLOYMENT

3-25. For each deploying element, the SFABs must provide a C2 element to oversee the movement of forces and make coordination with higher echelons and parallel organizations. Mission variables determine the composition of the C2 element (see TC 3-05.3).

RECEPTION

3-26. The advance party establishes contact with the forward deployed force package, or U.S. and FSF commanders in a non-persistent AO, to conduct final pre-mission planning activities. The advance party procures secure working, storage, and living areas for the unit. It also coordinates and prepares initial training sites. The advance party coordinates for special support equipment to unload heavy supplies and transport the supplies and personnel to the training site.

3-27. The advance party may be tasked to make initial contact with host-nation partners and liaisons. They may arrange for meetings between their element leaders and the host-nation or partner leaders.

STAGING

3-28. The main body of the SFAB force package deploys after completing its planning and when the commander determines the main body has met all predeployment training requirements. The unit processes through customs and immediately notifies the higher headquarters of its arrival and status. The unit obtains the proper identification, documentation, and weapons permits as required. Members of the advance party meet the main body on its arrival and brief the main body on any required changes to the operation order.

3-29. The commander or team leader is ultimately accountable for the advisor team's physical and personal security. The commander or team leader ensures personnel stay with the equipment to guard it. Depending on the threat situation, the commander ensures protective measures are in place to safeguard personnel and equipment.

3-30. The SFAB force package uses in-theater preparations to finalize critical requirements. From confirming support relationships to establishing personal relationships with the supported higher headquarters, this preparation time is critical for the force package and can set the conditions throughout the deployment. Local conditions may require the SFAB force package element to establish C2, support, and sustainment relationships from outside the AO.

ONWARD MOVEMENT

3-31. Upon arrival in the theater of operations, the SFAB may be received by a host-nation greeting party. The greeting party may come from a higher military command, embassy or country team representative, FSF, or the local leaders. In most cases, the advance party has established protocol procedures. When met by a host-nation greeting party, the SFAB prepares to receive the party in accordance with cultural norms and customs. This could involve ceremonies, exchange of gifts, meals, and commemorations.

3-32. The unit immediately establishes OPSEC procedures to support its mission execution and establishes its force protection plan. The leader determines the appropriate level of force protection depending on how

permissive the environment is. Once protection procedures are in place, the SFAB main body proceeds to confirm relationships and mission requirements, adapting the plan and vulnerability assessments as required. SFAB advisor teams then begin movement to their respective locations.

3-33. The unit establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation and synchronization. In support of this effort, the unit—

- Identifies the location of key partner or U.S. Government facilities and agencies.
- Coordinates interpreter support and linkup.
- Confirms or establishes other coordination protocols as necessary.
- Incorporates the newly established or changed procedures into the mission-execution plans.

INTEGRATION

3-34. After receiving a detailed briefing and further guidance from the advance party, unit personnel continue developing rapport with the FSF commander and counterparts. They also assess their working, storage, and living areas for security and verify the location of training sites, suitable communications node locations, medical nodes, and the FSF headquarters. The team leader—

- Makes requests for a counterpart linkup.
- Makes initial introductions and begins establishing rapport.
- Briefs the unit's mission, capabilities, restrictions, and limitations.
- Analyzes the foreign unit's status to finalize the SFA plan, which can include task-organization, staff functions, and other considerations.
- Prepares and briefs the plans for training, advising, and assisting.
- Begins the assessment process.
- Manages necessary and vital rehearsals for CASEVAC and MEDEVAC routes and procedures, including contingency planning.

3-35. Based on the geographical location and operational variables in that location, the unit determines the level of internal security required based on present or anticipated threats. Some considerations are improving defensive positions, establishing an internal guard system, implementing communication redundancy, and disseminating defensive plans. The unit may coordinate defensive measures with its foreign counterparts to develop a mutual defensive plan.

3-36. Advisors discuss security measures with foreign counterparts. After analyzing the FSF security posture and facilities, the advisors encourage the FSF to adopt additional security measures as needed. Advisor teams conduct rehearsals of defensive plans with the FSF. If unable to conduct a rehearsal with its counterparts, the advisors conduct security plans rehearsals internally.

MISSION EXECUTION AND MONITORING ACTIVITIES

3-37. As soon as advisor teams have integrated with their foreign counterparts and have clearly established command and support relationships, they begin conducting advisor team activities and refining their initial assessments. These assessments will play an important role in guiding future advisor team planning efforts and missions. Chapter 4 describes the advisor team activities and the assessment process in more detail.

SECTION III – REDEPLOYMENT

3-38. The nature of SFA missions does not provide clearly defined completion points. Historically, the Army and other organizations conduct SFA missions over months and years. The SFABs must be prepared to transition, transfer, or terminate specific missions at any time. This may include replacing advisor teams from within the organization, transferring responsibility to an external U.S. or allied organization, or transitioning responsibility back to the partner nation. In all cases, take care to ensure a deliberate and thorough transition takes place to maintain gains and provide the best chance of future success for the partner nation and incoming organization.

3-39. To capture all lessons and experience from the redeploying team's activities, advisor teams will—

- Prepare a final evaluation report showing their estimate of the foreign unit's capabilities, which provides an assessment for the relieving U.S. unit and the foreign leaders.
- Be prepared to discuss the foreign unit's performance with its commander and submit a copy of the foreign unit's final evaluation to the next higher FSF military commander.
- Provide the following to the relieving U.S. unit:
  - Training schedules.
  - Lesson plans.
  - Foreign operational records.
  - The foreign unit's final evaluation.
- Present debriefings, after action reviews (AARs), and foreign unit final evaluations to the higher in-country U.S. commander and country team as required.

3-40. The unit foreign disclosure officer ensures commanders, staffs, and advisors understand disclosure requirements by country, category, and classification level and that the authorities and procedures are in place to facilitate this process. Coordinate with the foreign disclosure officer to ensure that the assessment of the country is prepared for the deployment team.

3-41. Redeployment is the return of forces and materiel to home station or a mobilization site. Before redeployment, inventory all supplies and equipment to pass on to a relieving unit or to ship back to home station. Account for all items and ensure the chain of custody for property and equipment is uninterrupted.

Note. It is highly advisable to train two personnel in every staff section and advisor team on foreign disclosure. Interaction with host nation, FSF, and even North Atlantic Treaty Organization or other coalition allies, requires foreign disclosure officer approval.

TRANSFER TO FOLLOW-ON FORCES

3-42. A relief in place is an operation directed by higher headquarters in which an incoming unit replaces all or part of another unit and its mission. The authority for determining mission handoff lies with incoming commanders or team leaders since they assume responsibility for the mission. SFAB units most often conduct relief in place with a follow-on force package from within their unit but must be prepared to transfer responsibilities to other U.S. Forces, joint military forces, or to not be relieved at all.

3-43. SFAB unit commanders may elect to replace teams, elements, or subordinate units for a variety of reasons to provide continuous Army support to SFA. Host-nation operational variables, situations, or operations changes may require reshaping force packages. In addition, internal administrative concerns might prompt or support a commander's decision to rotate teams or units. For example, an incoming unit may field new equipment that the outgoing unit lacks. Regardless of the reason, mission handoff is necessary and defined as the process of passing an ongoing mission from one unit to another with no discernible loss of continuity.

3-44. A relief in place may affect the conditions under which the mission continues. In SFA, this may not entail an in-country relief or transfer of authority. While executing the SFA mission, advisor teams are encouraged to record all relevant information and share it with incoming units. This historical record should serve as part of an initial briefing to incoming units. This information can be disseminated through virtual meetings, video teleconferences, or (preferably) face-to-face commander and staff meetings between

transitioning teams or units. This assists with achieving continuity of operations. These briefings are ideally executed in conjunction with an introduction to the FSF. When it is not possible to do a direct transition to a relieving unit, lessons learned and post-mission debriefings provide a historical record that assist in bridging the gap between activities and operations. These assessments, training plans, briefings, and other relevant topics assist the incoming unit with assuming SFA activities. Units review previous post-mission debriefings prior to conducting their PDSS.

TRANSITION OF ACTIVITIES

3-45. The transition of all activities to the FSF occurs incrementally at multiple echelons over time. Success is defined by fulfillment of the mutually agreed upon objectives of the United States and the partner nation. In cases where SFAB activities represent contributions to building a sovereign partner nation's existing capacity, transition may occur at the SFAB's completion of a specified, relatively short program of instruction to the FSF. When stabilizing or rebuilding societies post-conflict, SFAB transition may be only one small part of a lengthy, large-scale stability campaign. The intent of SC is to change the security environment by enabling the host nation to provide its own internal defense and development. This leads to strengthening regional security through mutual defense in conjunction with U.S. priorities established in the mission performance plan.

TERMINATION OF ACTIVITIES

3-46. While SFABs maintain a persistent presence in a CCMD, once established and agreed upon mission objectives are met, they may discontinue the relationship with a particular partnered force. This determination is made through a collaborative decision between the CCMD and the SFAB commander. Terminating or transitioning a specific activity enables the SFAB to rededicate teams or combat power to other partner nations or units in the CCMD.

CUSTOMARY FAREWELLS

3-47. Upon departure, the host-nation representatives may bid farewell to the SFAB. Representatives may come from a higher military command, the embassy or country team, FSF members, local leaders, and other dignitaries. The SFAB prepares to receive the party and acts in accordance with cultural norms and customs. This could involve ceremonies, gift exchanges, meals, and commemorations.

Note. Submit any gift exchanges for legal review.

POST-EXECUTION EVALUATION ACTIVITIES

3-48. Advisor teams conduct post-deployment debriefs providing an overview and analysis of the mission and outcome, communicating the information at the appropriate levels of clearance with respect to the audience. The brief includes an overview of operational and mission variables, MOPs, MOEs, and an assessment of the tasks the SFAB performed.

3-49. Redeployment is not the mission's end as the unit undergoes extensive debriefing. The debriefing may occur prior to redeployment or once back at home station. The S-2 typically coordinates with higher echelon intelligence organizations to conduct the returning unit's debriefing. All deployed personnel, to include attachments, should be available for the debriefing. The Defense Strategic Debriefing Course provides the training to conduct these debriefings.

POST-MISSION DOCUMENTATION

3-50. After the debriefing, advisor teams and staffs prepare three documents: an AAR, a lessons learned report, and an assessment. The purpose of these documents is to add to the SFAB and Army-wide Knowledge Management program. The documentation should describe tasks, missions, operations, and capabilities of both the SFAB units and the FSF. This information provides valuable historical information to units deploying to the same region, higher headquarters, the partner nation, and other SFA organizations. Post-mission documentation provides consistency during intermittent operations.

After Action Review and Lessons Learned

3-51. Lessons learned validate knowledge and experience derived from observations and the historical study of military training, exercises, and combat operations. Lessons learned, when further validated, eventually lead to a change in behavior at the tactical level (such as tactics, techniques, and procedures), the operational level, the strategic level, and in one or more of the DOTMLPF-P domains. Shortly after completion of the AAR, or simultaneously with its submission, the unit submits a report of lessons learned. The report documents the commander and staff's reflections of the operation and recommendations for the future. Units often prepare the lessons according to the elements of combat power: C2, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, leadership, and information. This method addresses what did and did not work during the operation and why. It also recommends changes or substitutions for tactics, techniques, and procedures in the FSF.

Submission and Archiving

3-52. Per AR 11-33, the SFAB will also submit AARs to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (Combined Arms Center) no later than 90 days after returning to home station after participating in a major Army, joint, or joint combined (multinational) exercise training or SC mission. Units completing combat training center rotations may submit a copy of the relevant portions of their take-home package. Submit all the post-mission documentation to the office of the SFAB's Army Capabilities Manager via email usarmy.benning.cdid-mnvr.mesg.sfab@army.mil for archiving and further dissemination.

SECTION IV – ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ACROSS THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

3-53. Across the competition continuum, the predeployment, deployment, and redeployment cycle should, resemble the routine practices which occur throughout standard Army unit rotational deployments as much as possible. For all deployments, the needed level of detailed planning remains high, but the complexity of the destination AOR can vary. While deploying to a zone of competition, the complexity can be low, while executing deployment into a crisis or conflict zone there is an obvious increase in complexity.

PREDEPLOYMENT IN COMPETITION

3-54. When executing predeployment in competition, SFABs should seek to achieve the greatest level of fidelity with established best practices, regulations, and doctrinal principles. The following steps of host-nation approval must not be neglected:

- Requesting and receiving country clearances.
- Initial coordination and planning events.
- PDSS.
- Pre-mission planning.
- Task organization.
- Predeployment assessment activities.
- Mobility planning and certification.
- Movement training and certification.

3-55. Predeployment decisions should weigh the efficiency of deployment method highly and select the most effective APOE, SPOE, APOD, and/or SPOD for their transit from home station to the mission location. Predeployment planning during competition is the SFABs most routine iteration of the deployment cycle and functions as a developmental device to prepare SFAB personnel and organizations for deployment in more rigorous, uncertain, and austere environments. During predeployment activities, advisors should consider accessing the advisor network as part of building their understanding of the mission specific details.

DEPLOYMENT IN COMPETITION

3-56. In competition, SFABs deploy to their AORs most frequently and with the highest relative level of regularity. The lessons learned from previous iterations of SFAB deployment apply most cleanly and should be consulted to deploy effectively. Competition provides a relatively permissive environment for SFAB

teams to establish the SOPs and tactics, techniques, and procedures which best suit the specific mission. RSOI, mission execution, and monitoring activities, provide the framework for all deployment operations. In competition, SFABs leverage a wide variety of deployment methods to reduce the inefficiencies within their deployment framework, acknowledging that these procedures might not transfer to a less permissive OE. While deployed in competition, advisors have the greatest access to the advisor network.

REDEPLOYMENT IN COMPETITION

3-57. Redeployment in competition is the process by which SFAB teams conduct a relief in place with the incoming SFAB element or leave their FSF with all the necessary tools to continue performing at a high level. SFABs consolidate the gains created by their mission and make efforts to reduce the regression of the partner force by concretizing the benefit their mission provided. Successful SFAB advisor team redeployment in competition protects and propagates deployment gains even after the advisors have redeployed. SFAB advisor team redeployment includes the following:

- Post-execution evaluation activities.
- Transition to follow-on-forces.
- Relief(s) in-place/transfer of authorities.
- Reverse RSOI.
- Post-deployment AARs.
- Continued contributions to the advisor network.
- Reset activities.

3-58. During redeployment in competition, maintaining the relationship and the interpersonal and interorganizational rapport with the partner force is of great value and can be easily damaged by poorly conceived redeployment. Remaining available and active after redeployment is an expectation of the advisor network.

THE COMPLACENCY OF COMPETITION

3-59. During competition, routine activities occur at a predictable pace and day-to-day operations are often in a lower risk to force, direct effort-to-output gains environment. The stability and repetitive nature of competition invites complacency. Some efficiencies and techniques used in competition that are outside of approved SOPs may present little apparent risk in that OE. However, the use of such methods (for example, a reliance on unencrypted civilian cell phones for official meetings and reports) represent tremendous risk to mission and force while in crises or conflict. Such methods, while expeditious, should still be avoided even in competition. Avoiding complacency while in competition prevents the accumulation of bad habits and will allow for quicker adaptation when routines change and enable enduring advisor success.

PREDEPLOYMENT IN CRISIS

3-60. In the event of a crisis, SFABs may get very little notification or time to execute predeployment activities. SFABs may be required to significantly alter their predeployment timeline or desired predeployment details because of resource constraints or the inherent uncertainty of the AOR. Some priority recommendations from ATP 3-07.10 include the following:

- Redeployment is a collaborative effort and selecting the most effective practical method of collaboration is key.
- Follow OPSEC when collaborating with all external parties.
- Consult with legal advisor, plan, and identify necessary authorities; discuss use of force, intel sharing, targeting, hostile actor handling, and medical support.
- Identify, prioritize, and plan for risk; implement deliberate risk mitigation measures for risk to force, mission, and political risk.
- Develop an assessment plan and use the Joint Planning Process to reinforce DOD's Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation policy and guidelines.

DEPLOYMENT IN CRISIS

3-61. RSOI remains critical to successful movement to, within, and out of an AOR. While a purposeful and deliberate RSOI is desirable, because of the wide array of complexities and breadth of challenges created by crisis, an SFAB team must be willing to accept uncertainty and risk to get into position. Leaders within SFAB

can excel in crisis by learning deeply about the emerging OE, anticipating likely resource shortfalls, and adapting the existing deployment framework to the specific complexities of the AOR and the nature of the crisis.

3-62. RSOI in crisis differs from RSOI in competition by the degree of uncertainty that must be considered and accepted. Simplicity is paramount. RSOI must be tailorable to fit multiple uncertainties within both the realm of host-nation requirements and the diversity of risks to mission and force that crisis poses.

3-63. The planned APOE, SPOE, POD, SPOD may be untenable because of the constraints of the crisis and the SFAB should consider multiple contingencies to get where they are needed. SFABs must compete with conventional Army elements within the AOR to use whatever logistics and transportation networks are available. SFABs must consider the unavailability of these resources and consider ACSAs as an alternative method to ensure RSOI is successful.

Redeployment in Crisis

3-64. Redeployment operations in crisis may differ greatly from redeploying in competition. SFABs that initially deployed while in competition must consider the possibility of redeployment out of an AOR in crisis. Understanding the critical steps of the previous redeployment plan before the crisis is essential to execute an effective departure from the AOR. SFABs must deliberately prioritize the essential redeployment tasks and options to mitigate the risks therein. Transfers of follow-on forces or conducting a hasty relief in place may be essential to advisor team safety and mission success of the incoming U.S. personnel. For example, administrative and evaluation subtasks may be abbreviated in-country or occur predominantly after arrival at home station. In the case of escalation, SFABs may be forced to transition to a conflict-centric redeployment plan. Contingencies for both possibilities should be incorporated into the initial plan and ongoing evaluation criteria.

Predeployment in Conflict

3-65. During conflict, advisors consider the risks to mission and force of a contested entry into the AOR. Predeployment considerations in conflict require the SFAB to consider the ramifications of bringing military equipment and personnel into a contested AOR and joining the partner force amid ongoing combat operations. SFABs deliberately plan for predeployment by learning not just about the FSF they will join, but also the adversary and the conflict itself. An emphasis on the legalities of SFAB personnel engaging in combat operations and the use of force is necessary to prepare for a successful entry into a conflict zone.

3-66. Considerations also include the fact that the SFABs will have to compete for transportation and mobility resources. SFABs will likely be lower in priority than conventional BCTs and may need to exploit ACSA channels if other methods are unavailable. An in-person advanced echelon element site survey may be untenable in predeployment to conflict; as a result, leveraging U.S. intelligence assets in garrison is the SFAB's primary means to gather required information. A secondary source for this information is the host nation itself. Communications with the partner force should be direct, specific, and followed-up in writing acknowledging the partner's decreased bandwidth to answer information requests during conflict.

Deployment in Conflict

3-67. SFAB deployment in conflict must account for the almost certain unavailability or absence of U.S. Forces to conduct formal RSOI. Robust communication with partner forces will be vital to a successful deployment. RSOI in conflict must be conducted with force protection in mind and will likely occur in a disaggregated fashion to mitigate the risk of allowing the adversary to detect large arrivals of SFAB personnel. Disaggregated RSOI in conflict relies heavily on a thorough understanding of the OE and the partner force to enable rapid and deliberate integration into the conflict zone.

Redeployment in Conflict

3-68. Redeployment in conflict is when an SFAB returns from the AOR while the partner force is still engaging in conflict operations. The SFAB may return alongside conventional U.S. units or independently. Redeployment in conflict can occur with either follow-on advisors executing a relief in place or with a termination or reduction of the advisor mission. If an advisor team arrives to continue the advising mission, a relief in place must be conducted to consolidate the gains the departing team created. As in crisis, other

redeployment tasks like administrative and evaluation tasks may be abbreviated or occur predominantly after arrival at home station.

Chapter 4
Advisor Team Activities and Employment

It is my assessment, and the assessment of the Secretary and the assessment of the Army staff, that we are likely to be involved in train, advise, and assist operations for many years to come.

General Mark Milley, 39th Chief of Staff of the Army

Chapter 4 describes the advisor team activities (both developmental and conflict integration) and advisor team employment planning considerations.

1st SFAB in Tunisia

The 1st SFAB's Tunisia Advising Team arrived in country in August 2020 with the goal of achieving positive effects and setting follow-on conditions for the next SFAB unit by October 2020. It was a tall order, but one that was achievable with a good plan. The task force commander immediately determined that the key to success would be starting with an in-depth assessment of the partner's situation, with follow-on efforts focused on quick wins before the end of the fiscal year.

What BAT 120 discovered was a mismatch between the amount of U.S. investment into Tunisia and the ability of the U.S. Embassy Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) to take advantage of it. In summary, the small OSC staff of six to eight U.S. military personnel did not have the capacity to address the rapidly expanding U.S. materiel and systems commitments coming in from both U.S. Africa Command and the U.S. State Department. This had resulted in experimental elements like the Tunisian Joint Operations Command Center possessing U.S. technical solutions but lacking both in purpose and in Tunisian military personnel to man it. The BAT further identified a command structure that was stove-piped between three separate Tunisian JTFs, none of which reported to any convening higher headquarters, which prevented a common operating picture and unity of effort between the three of them. Between these observations and other, more tactical observations regarding air-to-ground integration (AGI) processes, military intelligence education, and C-IED training opportunities for the Tunisian Groupe des Forces Speciales (GFS), BAT 120 was able to provide a course-correction recommendation to the U.S. Embassy and the Tunisian military.

As a result of BAT 120's efforts, the defense attaché (DATT) and the OSC combined efforts to promote a strategic shift for the Tunisian military to achieve “readiness for current and future threats, synchronize investments to achieve optimal return, and cultivate efforts to achieve regional and U.S. interoperability.” The DATT and OSC announced this strategic shift to the Tunisian military leaders on 6 October 2020 at the 34th annual Joint Military Commission. With this announcement, the U.S. Embassy team and Tunisian military charted a new path forward that would build on each other's strengths and make full use of the resources available.

Major Christopher R. Thielenhaus
Infantry Magazine

SECTION I – SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE DEVELOPMENTAL ACTIVITIES

4-1. The SFAB's greatest strength is flexibility of advisor employment to problem solve and develop solutions to the needs of FSF partners and support the CCDR's SFA requirements to advance U.S. interests. This section describes SFA developmental activities. The developmental activities are primarily used during competition. However, commanders may decide to conduct the developmental activities in conjunction with the conflict integration activities is when the mission variables and OE permit. This section also describes the additional employment considerations for staff and advisor team leaders when planning for SFA developmental activities.

4-2. SFA is meant to provide a capability that a foreign defense establishment does not have the ability to provide on its own. SFA activities and missions are planned, coordinated, and executed across the executive, generating, and operational functions in permissive and uncertain environments. In some cases, the United States provides SFA as a bridging solution until the host nation organizes and develops the capability on its own. The United States can provide SFA until U.S. objectives are met, or until the foreign defense establishment addresses the capability shortfall. In other instances, the United States may provide SFA to meet specific U.S. and foreign defense establishment requirements without the intent of organizing that capability within that host nation's foreign defense establishment. In these cases, an enduring foreign defense establishment capability is neither required, nor is it in the best interest of the United States.

4-3. The general SFA developmental activities are organize, train, equip, build, and advise (OTEBA). Each element of these activities can be used to develop, change, or improve the capability and capacity of the partner FSF, as well as enable overall interoperability. By assessing the FSF through the lens of U.S. interests and objectives, coupled with shared interests of multinational partners, U.S. Forces can determine which area or areas within the OTEBA construct can improve the FSF to the desired capability and capacity. SFA planners should determine what is in the best interests of the multinational partners involved, or "what is good enough" to achieve shared objectives. Most critically, U.S. Forces assess the partner FSF against desired capabilities and then develop an OTEBA plan to help them build capability and capacity (see FM 3-22).

4-4. An initial baseline assessment of partner FSF capability and capacity is essential to the design of the OTEBA approach. Assessment activities are critical in determining quantitative and qualitative progress of the partner FSF toward a desired end state.

ORGANIZE

4-5. Organization of partner FSF includes all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit or organizational design, mission command and staff processes, and methods and policies for recruiting and manning (see FM 3-22). This includes adopting policies and plans that allow for meaningful participation of women in the FSF.

4-6. The organize task should address the whole of the partner FSF from the executive level to the smallest tactical formation. The goal of the organize task is to improve the partner FSF organizational structure, processes, institutions, and infrastructure. To meet this end state, SFA planners and practitioners should understand the existing FSF organizational structure. Consideration should be given to how the partner FSF conduct operations before determining the best methods to address new and emerging security requirements. SFA planners and practitioners should be knowledgeable in all aspects of OTEBA, as these related tasks will likely play an important role in the organizational development of the partner security establishment.

> ***Note.*** SFA can be used to develop the capability and support the development of the foreign defense establishment's ability to generate forces through the establishment of processes, institutions, and infrastructure. SFA can also be used to develop and improve partner FSF organizational processes in force development, force integration, capabilities integration, budgeting, and personnel management.

PLAN

4-7. The partner nation's social and economic conditions, cultural and historical factors, and security threats have significant implications for the organizing effort. SFA objectives should be tailored to support the SC goals between the United States and the partner nation in accordance with the TSCP. In some cases, this is relatively limited, short duration training and assistance to competent and well-established partners. In other cases, it entails long-term, comprehensive joint and interagency efforts to rebuild fractured societies, which aim to support the creation of an efficient organization with appropriate staff structure and supporting institutions. In addition to developing a standard unit structure across the partner forces, the doctrine, policies, systems, and SOPs should ideally be uniform among their units as well. As the partner force matures, U.S. leaders and trainers should expect and encourage independent organizational decisions. Ultimately, the partner nation determines the structure of its security forces including approving all organizational designs. These may include changing the numbers of forces, types of units, equipment, and internal organizational designs.

4-8. Supporting infrastructure that provides the organizing and generating requirements of the partner forces are key to long-term success. SFAB commanders and advisor teams may work with various ministries and organizations that are responsible for the partner nation's national security. The supported nation may have a variety of representatives participate in organizational planning, including representatives from the MOD, finance, interior, justice, public works, transportation, culture, economic development, and international relations and cooperation, for example. SFAB commanders may request augmentation from ministerial advisor teams to assess strengths, weaknesses, and joint requirements of the ministerial-level organizations. When gaps are identified, the joint and multinational ministry teams assist the partner nation in developing the appropriate systems and capabilities. These efforts could include collaboration with other joint and multinational advisor teams and may include several topic areas, including procurement, personnel, intelligence, finance, legal, and other national-level management systems.

PREPARE

4-9. Organizing partner forces generally involves assessing and developing several areas. The list is not all-inclusive. (See FM 3-22 for more information.) The following information is only relevant when building a partner force from the ground up:

- Recruiting and hiring.
- Promotion screening and selection.
- Pay and benefits.
- Leader recruiting and selection.
- Personnel accountability.
- Demobilizing security force personnel.

EXECUTE

4-10. During the execution and monitoring of the organize task, advisor teams must exercise patience. This can be an enduring task and may take several years to reach the desired end state. Advisor teams should establish intermediate goals to track the effectiveness of the organizing plans and continually assess progress toward these milestones. SFAB elements should accumulate data pertinent to the task and measure that information through appropriate MOPs and MOEs. As the advisor teams monitor the security force actions while executing this task, they may have to adjust their guidance to the partner force as they work towards their stated goals and end state.

ASSESS

4-11. SFAB advisor teams conduct end-of-mission assessments at the conclusion of key organizing tasks and phases. Due to the long-term nature of this process, it may be appropriate to establish recurring quarterly reviews to evaluate progress.

Some considerations for assessing the organizing tasks by the advisor teams are as follows:

- Identifying the organizing end state and ensuring that the SFAB personnel and the foreign security personnel share the same vision.
- Establishing a battle rhythm with the partner force for reviewing the organizing tasks, including the following:
  - Updating assessments.
  - Reviewing and adjusting milestones.
  - Instituting new planning efforts.
- Documenting and reporting the following to the next-higher U.S. commander:
  - Incidents of corruption.
  - Gross inefficiency.
  - Violations of human rights.
  - Actions of the partner force or government officials who habitually hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or suspected sympathy for the enemy or adversary groups.
  - Sexual and gender-based violence.

4-12. The advisor team completes an AAR and submits it to its higher headquarters. The SFAB staff reviews and submits it to the country team and higher headquarters to assist in the continued development of the partner forces' capabilities.

Training in the Philippines

USAFFE [U.S. Army Forces Far East] was concerned by the slow pace of training in the mobilized regiments. "At the rate they're moving," said Vic Collier, [MAJ James V. Collier, Assistant G-3, USAFFE] "the regiments won't be ready to receive divisional inductees on 15 November! I don't know how we can speed things up—we just don't have the trained leaders.

The inductees need training time," said Col Irwin [Col Constant L. Irwin, G-3, USAFFE]. "Though they all received five and a half months training at one time, few fired more than five rounds of live ammunition! Fewer still remember much of their training. Yet in eight weeks we expect them to master the use of tanks, flame-throwers, self-propelled artillery, and radio!"

In response to Irwin's appeal, Sutherland [BG Richard K. Sutherland, Chief of Staff, USAFFE] said, "The Old Man [MacArthur] would like to give you more time, but the world situation won't let him. In spite of the risk of weakening some American combat units, he is sending 500 officers to the training regiments. This should help."
On 15 November 90,000 [Filipino] reservists were ordered to report at ten partially completed mobilization centers. USAFFE crossed its fingers.

Stephen M. Mellnick
Philippine Diary, 1939-1945

EQUIP

4-13. Equip refers to all activities to create, improve, and integrate materiel and equipment, procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life cycle management. Security assistance is the primary means to enable the equip task and SFA activities support this by focusing on the development of partner FSF processes for new equipment fielding, employment, operational readiness, maintenance and repair, and recapitalization.

4-14. The country team, senior defense official/DATT drives this objective through the foreign military sales program. Advisor teams can provide points of reference or facilitate the communication of specific needs.

PLAN

4-15. Advisor teams are responsible for identifying shortfalls in the foreign capability, communicating those shortfalls higher, assisting the FSF in requesting the appropriate equipment to correct those shortfalls, and ensuring the end user receives the proper equipment and training. The TSCP should guide equipment requirements. Equipment should be affordable, sustainable, and suitable for combating the threat. Foreign forces must be able to train on the equipment. Consider interoperability with other UAPs as well.

PREPARE

4-16. The requirements under the equipping task may be as simple as assisting with maintaining existing weapons or as extensive as providing everything from a Soldier's individual military gear (including female-specific gear) to an entire combat vehicle fleet. The FSF should be supplied with equipment that is comparable, or preferably better than, the enemy's equipment. Their equipment should also be interoperable with the U.S. Forces and multinational partners. This may be challenging for military and law enforcement agencies in uncertain environments, who are often lightly armed and vulnerable to well-armed enemies.

4-17. Primary considerations should include maintainability, ease of operation, and long-term sustainment costs. Few developing nations can support highly complex or expensive equipment. In many cases, having a larger number of versatile vehicles with simple maintenance requirements is often better than having a few highly capable armored vehicles or combat systems that require extensive maintenance. Contractors often perform FSF maintenance processes for new equipment. Develop the foreign sustainment and maintenance programs through training, guidance, and supervision.

EXECUTE

4-18. Materiel and equipment sources include U.S. foreign military sales, multinational or third-nation resale, contracts with internal suppliers, or purchases on the international market. The organizations responsible for equipping the FSF should obtain equipment that meets their needs for quality, timeliness, and cost. As part of their training, they should teach the FSF property accountability procedures to reduce corruption and to safeguard resources, as well as recommend that the FSF maintain and safeguard their equipment according to their laws and regulations. In the absence of defined foreign procedures, they should advise the foreign leaders on the implementation of basic accountability and security procedures using U.S. policies as an initial framework.

4-19. The SFAB should monitor and assist the FSF with new equipment training. This may include assisting the FSF to establish the appropriate contracts with external organizations, monitoring the FSF's internal new equipment training program, and, in some cases, providing trainers from the SFAB.

ASSESS

4-20. Advisor teams continuously assess the FSF and team effectiveness during the developmental activities. Advisor teams provide a written summary of these continuous assessments at the conclusion of key equipping tasks and phases. Some considerations for conducting an equipping task assessment are discussed in paragraphs 4-21 through 4-22.

Identify the Foreign Security Forces Equipping End State

4-21. This should include a comparison of the foreign equipment relative to the enemy's equipment, identifying gaps, and presenting possible solutions to the foreign and U.S. higher headquarters.

Review of Equipping Tasks and Plans

4-22. A schedule for reviewing the equipping tasks should be established with foreign leaders. The equipping plan should also be adjusted in conjunction with the foreign leaders.

Documentation of Wrongdoing

4-23. Document and report the following to the next-higher U.S. commander:

- Incidents of corruption.
- Gross inefficiency.
- Violations of human rights.
- Actions of the FSF or government officials who habitually hinder operations through—
  - Incompetence.
  - Self-interest.
  - Suspected sympathy for the enemy or adversary groups.
- Sexual and gender-based violence.

Complete After Action Review

4-24. Advisor teams complete an equipping AAR and submit it to their higher headquarters. The SFAB staff reviews and submits it to the country team or higher headquarters, assisting in the continued development of FSF's capabilities.

TRAIN

4-25. Train refers to all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education across the executive-generating operating functions. These may include SFA activities to develop partner FSF execution of programs of instruction, training events, and leader development activities.

4-26. Advisors develop partner FSF training programs and enable sustainability in training and leader development institutions. These training efforts should consider the unique character and leader requirements of the host nation. The training approach should be tailored to meet FSF objectives and priorities and should also consider the preservation of the partner's own DOTMLPF-P system versus recreating an unfamiliar and potentially unsustainable U.S. Government-style model.

4-27. Advisors train partner forces on the knowledge, skills, and attributes appropriate to their level of function, organization, and equipment. SFABs should develop tailored programs of instruction that are appropriate for partner FSF. They should include a comprehensive assessment of the partner FSF being trained.

4-28. As the capability and capacity of the FSF increases, SFABs can conduct combined training to develop the capacity for foreign force and U.S. Force interoperability. The goal of combined training is to develop partners with the capacity to function as part of a combined multidomain force with multinational objectives. Combined training exercises familiarize both forces with the capabilities and shortfalls of the other force and help develop procedures to leverage capabilities and mitigate shortfalls.

PLAN

4-29. Advisor teams aim to assist partner forces in reinforcing the legitimacy of their government and building confidence in the local population. When providing support to the partner force, advisor teams should first identify all resources, systems, institutions, and capabilities that are available to the partner forces and themselves in theater. Advisor teams should also understand the mission and operational variables that may influence their operations and ability to provide support. Understanding these factors allows advisor teams to plan for the likely support requirements that their foreign counterparts may ask them to provide. OE conditions can rapidly change. Therefore, advisor teams should anticipate potential support requests as the operation persists.

4-30. Providing support to SFA operations often involves an array of UAPs, making unity of effort essential for success. SFA can include U.S. conventional and special operations forces, the partner force, nongovernmental organizations, and other civilian and military joint and multinational organizations. When planning, staffs and advisor teams pay particular attention to coordinating the various external capabilities integrating them into one cohesive effort. Network engagement tasks can assist SFAB commanders, staffs, and advisor teams with integrating the various entities found within the OE into the planning process.

PREPARE

Advisor teams receive training on the legal, technical, and tactical considerations for providing support to partner forces. Among others, training should include the following:

- Information regarding current partner force capabilities.
- Theater sustainment and support assets available.
- Rules of engagement for employing fires and attack aircraft.
- Rules or legal guidance for providing supplies, food, and medical support.

4-31. Advisor teams and SFAB staffs must become familiar with the partner force organizations and equipment, particularly the capabilities of weapons and equipment not found in the U.S. inventory. SFAB commanders, advisor teams, and ASCC headquarters should consider incorporating the following support-related topics into their training plans:

- Legal responsibilities and procedures when providing medical care to the partner forces, local civilians, and other personnel.
- Financial obligations and limitations when providing logistic and contracting support.
- Regulations and procedures regarding the employment of joint fires in support of foreign counterparts.
- Understanding of legal reporting requirements, specifically regarding the following:
  - Human rights violations.
  - Corruption.
  - Sexual and gender-based violence.
  - Activities that may be detrimental to mission success or violate U.S. and international laws.
- Understanding of foreign weapon system capabilities and limitations to provide appropriate implementation guidance to the partner force while conducting operations.
- Understanding of Leahy vetting and human rights violations, such as the Child Soldier Protection Act.

4-32. Like any other operation, advisor teams conduct rehearsals prior to providing support to the partner force. These rehearsals will often involve the foreign counterparts and representatives from other organizations that are providing the capability in addition to the advisor teams. For example, if a BCT is providing indirect fires in support of the advisor team's operations with the partner forces, the fires staff of that BCT should be involved in the rehearsals prior to execution.

EXECUTE

4-33. Significant legal review and coordination is required prior to providing support to a partner force. SFAB commanders and staffs establish clear guidance and SOPs to the advisor teams to clarify requirements, reduce confusion, and expedite the support that is often critical to the success of a particular operation.

4-34. Support provided to the partner force can vary across the competition continuum given the specifics of the OE. Support to the partner force generally decreases as capabilities and capacities increase. While success on the battlefield is critical, especially for the Soldiers conducting the fight, SFAB commanders and advisor teams must continuously assess the tactical need of the support for the current fight versus the long-term operational and strategic development of the capability within the partner force. If advisor teams provide external support every time a partner force makes a request, the partner force is less likely to develop its own capability.

ASSESS

4-35. Advisor team members continuously assess their advised counterparts, the outputs of this continuous assessment are commonly recorded in formal and informal written reviews in the form of AARs, reports to higher headquarters, and the team's internal recordkeeping. In training assessments after providing support to their foreign counterparts are an essential part of the advisor's role.

When conducting AARs, consider the following:

- Was the provided support or capability organic to the partner force organizations?
  - If yes, why was it not used?
  - If not, is the capability being developed?
- How often did the foreign counterparts request similar support in the past 30 days and how often was the support provided?
- How significant was the support on the operation?
  - What were the effects?
  - Could those effects have been achieved with another asset or capability?
  - Does the partner force have access to support that provides similar effects?
- Document and report to the next-higher U.S. commander:
  - Incidents of corruption.
  - Gross inefficiency.
  - Violations of human rights.
  - Actions that hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or suspected sympathy for the enemy or adversary groups.
  - Sexual and gender-based violence.

4-36. The advisor teams complete the AARs and submit them to their higher headquarters. SFAB leaders review AARs and submit them to the country team to assist with the continued development of the partner force.

Training in the Philippines, continued

The locations of Bounce's [MAJ William "Bounce" Ball, Acting Commander of the 86th Field Artillery Battalion (Philippine Scouts) in the Luzon Force] units violated every rule in the book. Normally, 155mm guns are sited three miles in the rear of the front line. But the terrain and the single road forces Bounce to place them near the front line! "That makes or exciting living," he said philosophically. "We ring out guns with barbed wire so that crews can defend themselves. And we don't wait for snipers and patrols to attack us; we go out at night and ambush them as they leave their line. Our big worry is "Photo Joe" the Japanese reconnaissance pilot. He smothers us with artillery if we're the least bit careless."

While crawling in and out of gun pits, I observed numerous indications of a disciplined fighting machine. Could Bounce have created it out of raw Filipino recruits in less than five months? He did. A tense atmosphere pervaded the units. Hard-faced men spoke briefly and rapidly; they had no time for pleasantries. They moved with catlike stealth and with weapons at the ready. Their eyes searched the jungle shadows constantly. They were lean, taut, super-alert killers.

"We live under a strain," said Bounce simply. "It's the price we pay to survive. The enemy probes constantly; some get through in spite of our care. Then a bullet sings and someone dies. Sometimes I wonder why we try so hard. I guess it's pride. The enemy will take over eventually, I suppose. My men suspect it. But we'll both be double-damned before we let them win by default! You feed us and we'll hold on till the Navy shows up."

I felt humbled by Bounce's calmness and dedication. And I envied the magic he used to inspire his men. Though I had read books on leadership and listened to many lectures on the subject, I rarely saw that quality demonstrated so effectively.

Stephen M. Mellnick
Philippine Diary, 1939-1945

Building the Korean Army

The Officers and men who constituted America's commitment to a Korean army beginning in 1946 had invented the ROK's military organization from scratch. The ROKA (and its predecessor, the Korean Constabulary) was their creation. With much effort the Americans gave it identity and nurtured it during a truly forgotten civil war that flared up in April 1948 and was not extinguished until March 1950. They trained it, supported it, and watched it nearly die in the summer of 1950 and again a year later. Over the following twelve months, under new leadership and with a new emphasis to train and mentor, KMAG reformed itself and its protégé. The results were impressive- a holistic administrative strategy from new-soldier recruitment to individual and unit training that made ROK units tougher; a revamped leadership committed to professionalism and learning how to wage modern war; sixfold expansion carefully managed that resulted in increasing ROK manpower just when the Communists had peaked out; the formation of combat-ready divisions capable of entering the line and slugging it out with veteran Communist units. When the ROKA-KMAG partnership produced a state of military equilibrium capable of withstanding the hammer blows of the Chinese armies, the Communists had to acknowledge the full implications of military deadlock.

Bryan R. Gibby
The Will to Win: American military advisors in Korea, 1946-1953

BUILD AND REBUILD

4-37. Build and rebuild refers to all activities creating, improving, and integrating facilities. This may include SFA activities to develop partner FSF capability and capacity to construct or repair physical infrastructures such as bases and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures.

4-38. Specific tasks will vary according to the mission's goals, objectives, and desired end state. The host-nation's priorities and their ability to sustain what is constructed should be carefully assessed and included in the plan. Since the build and rebuild task often involves physical construction and protection of facilities, effectiveness will also depend on the allocation of adequate resources by the host nation.

PLAN

4-39. The build and rebuild task refers to all activities related to restoring and developing FSF capability, capacity, and supporting infrastructure (see FM 3-22). This task requires an in-depth analysis of the capability, capacity, and structures required to meet the desired end state. The specific tasks vary according to the mission's goals and objectives in addition to the partner nation's priorities, resources, and its ability to maintain the infrastructure. This task often involves construction of facilities, transportation networks, communication systems, utilities, and a wide variety of other infrastructure projects that support the nation. While every situation is unique, success largely depends on long-range planning, prioritizing projects, and allocation of sufficient resources through the partner nation or the international political process. Advisor teams might be asked to assist or advise in complex project management tasks that support build and rebuild projects.

PREPARE

4-40. The FSF need facilities for storage, maintenance, training, and shelter. This includes secure facilities that allow for classified information storage, planning, and communications and other facilities such as barracks, ranges, and motor pools. Training centers and unit garrisons require a long-term security force-basing plan. The partner nation government and its senior ministries will make these determinations and provide the required resources. As part of their initial assessment, advisor teams may review their foreign counterpart's security infrastructure.

EXECUTE

4-41. Construction takes significant time; therefore, it is ideal if the partner nation invests early in building or rebuilding key facilities. Advisor teams assist the FSF with developing plans to protect and maintain infrastructure. Recommend prioritizing facilities for protection and allocating resources accordingly. Key facilities include headquarters buildings, major sustainment facilities, barracks, political institutions, major utilities, police stations, and culturally significant landmarks. The partner nation may need to make large investments in time and resources to restore, create, and maintain the local and nationwide infrastructure necessary to command, control, and maintain its security forces effectively.

ASSESS

4-42. Advisor teams should provide assessments on relevant infrastructure in their counterpart's AO. After the initial assessment, monitoring the building and rebuilding tasks generally consists of sending occasional progress reports higher. The advisor teams should consider the following list of considerations (in paragraphs 4-43 through 4-45) when assessing these two tasks.

Assess Infrastructure Capability Gaps

4-43. Alongside their foreign counterparts, advisor teams discuss and prioritize infrastructure capability gaps. These priorities are then submitted through the appropriate channels, resources requested, and resulting build and rebuild activities monitored.

Documentation of Wrongdoing

4-44. Advisor teams document and report to the next-higher U.S. commander incidents of—

- Corruption.
- Gross inefficiency.
- Violations of human rights.
- Incidents of sexual and gender-based violence.
- The actions of the FSF or government officials who habitually hinder operations through the following:
  - Incompetence.
  - Self-interest.
  - Suspected sympathy for the enemy or adversary groups.

Complete After Action Review

4-45. The advisor teams complete an AAR and submit it to their higher headquarters. The SFAB reviews and submits the AAR to the country team or higher headquarters, assisting in the continued development of FSF capabilities.

ADVISE

4-46. Advise refers to all SFA activities that provide subject matter expertise, guidance, advice, and counsel to partner FSF while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit or organization. Advising may occur across the executive, generating and/or operating functional structure. Advising can also occur under combat or administrative conditions, and in support of individuals or groups. SFA advisors provide expertise to the partner FSF in the development, sustainment, and employment of their security enterprise to meet their national security needs, in support of U.S. interests. Advising establishes a personal and a professional relationship where trust and confidence define how well the advisor will be able to influence the partner FSF.

PLAN

4-47. While advisor teams may be capable of advising two levels higher, the mission analysis determines whether that would be appropriate. An experienced, professional, and well-established FSF generally only require pairing at the advisor team's organic level or perhaps one level higher. A less experienced foreign force allows the advisor teams to advise one, or even two, echelons higher. For example, an SFAB company commander should be able to advise a foreign brigade commander, while a brigade staff could advise a foreign corps staff. This capability drives the increased rank and experience requirements for serving in the SFAB. During mission analysis, commanders and staffs must weigh the foreign experience level, the effects the SFAB is trying to achieve, resources and time available, and other relevant factors to determine the best lay down for the advisor teams. As with all missions, commanders must assess risk. That includes considering whether the advisor teams have the appropriate experience to advise their counterparts versus being able to influence the maximum number of FSF organizations.

4-48. Planned operations are coordinated with the FSF. An indication of an effective advising effort is the amount of personal involvement the FSF takes in its own operations. The civilian population should see that its own security forces secure it. This promotes the legitimacy of the host-nation government and builds trust and confidence in the security forces.

4-49. SFAB advisor teams teach, coach, and advise in a cycle. As the FSF become proficient in a skill, the advisor can move on to other skills and tasks. Whether the FSF struggles and requires retraining on a specific task or quickly learns another task, the advisor team can adjust the training plan in conjunction with the foreign leaders. As the proficiency of the FSF increases, the advisors spend less time conducting training and more time coaching, advising, and monitoring the FSF training.

4-50. Advisors must understand the organization of the local government and the influence of their advising activities. Advisor teams commonly operate in complex environments via interdependent operations. Interdependent operations require near-seamless integration of agencies representing the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Usually, a set of agreements exists between various local agencies, security forces, and the national government. These agreements provide a

coordinated effort in servicing the various needs of civilian populations. If necessary, the advisor may work with other agencies to assist in getting such agreements made. The brigade staff (including CA, strategic planner, SPO, S-8) in conjunction with the country team and the ASCC headquarters may work together to develop required agreements. If such agreements already exist and they are conducive to mission success, advisors and ASCC planners should recognize and strengthen them.

4-51. Advisors will need to remain flexible and able to problem solve outside their MOS, especially in cases of first contact with a partner force and establishing groundwork for future operations. Advisors are building relationships to advance U.S and partner force interests.

4-52. Legitimacy is a concept that goes beyond a strict legal definition; it includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government, group, or organization. A government's legitimacy is built upon the local and international community perceptions, which are critical in developing and maintaining local and international support. The United States may not be able to sustain a long-term relationship with a nation if it lacks a legitimate government.

PREPARE

4-53. Defining success in an SFA environment is difficult. Tracking and measuring progress on a day-to-day basis is not easy. Achieving a tactical objective does not, in and of itself, equate to mission success. Advisors achieve success when the FSF achieve the goals and objectives as described in their commander's vision. The FSF should plan and execute their own training and operations with an advisor providing advice, coaching, and oversight.

4-54. Advisors prepare for operations by reviewing internal and FSF SOPs. They study relevant U.S. doctrine, foreign doctrine, and collective tasks. Advisors must be subject matter experts on a variety of subjects.

4-55. Advisor teams study their foreign counterparts, to include cultural norms, history of the region and people, and other relevant information that allows them to establish rapport. This includes understanding leadership processes, human nature, social and ender dynamics, and motivations. Information may take the form of books, staff rides, videos, reports, discussions, previous operational reports, professional speakers, and other research materials. Qualitatively measure rapport through advisors' abilities to motivate their counterparts to take a desired action.

Avoiding Advisor Dilemmas

4-56. Advisor dilemmas are difficult situations in which advisors receive guidance from commanders that causes undue tension with either their partner forces or higher headquarters. Without resolution or amendment, these dilemmas cause advisors to fail to either meet the commander's intent or compromise their credibility and rapport with their counterparts. The following are six types of common advisor dilemmas:

- Conflicts of capability occur when the partnered FSF lacks the capability or capacity to accomplish the commander's intent of the advisor team's higher headquarters.
- Conflicts of intent occur when the commander's intent of the advisor team's higher headquarters contradicts the FSF commander's intent.
- Conflicts of direction occur when the commander's intent of the advisor team's higher headquarters contradicts the explicit direction of the FSF's higher headquarters.
- Conflict of authority occurs when the FSF lacks the authority to accomplish the commander's intent of the advisor team's higher headquarters.
- Conflict of responsibility occurs when the commander's intent of the advisor team's higher headquarters falls outside the FSF's scope of responsibility.
- Conflicts of priority occur when the commander's intent of the advisor team's higher headquarters is inconsistent with other SFA priorities and guidance received by the advisor team.

4-57. Advisors and their commanders share responsibility for avoiding or resolving advisor dilemmas. Advisors and their commanders avoid advisor dilemmas through clear and open communication, understanding FSF capabilities, limitations, intentions, norms, and priorities, and fostering an environment conducive to advisor-commander dialogue.

Advising Guidance

4-58. Commanders and other stakeholders (for example, senior defense official/DATT, ASCC) should provide clear intent to their advisors to allow them flexibility to execute their mission with the FSF. The proximity of the advisors, intensity of the conflict, frequency of contact, and various legal considerations will provide the broad context for the SFA operations. These criteria generally do not change quickly or dramatically. However, advisor teams will often adjust their integration into the FSF's tactical formations and the support provided, sometimes from one mission to the next.

4-59. Advising guidance allows commanders to specify their intent to their subordinate advisors by describing how they visualize the advisor team operating alongside the FSF. Like reconnaissance guidance, advising guidance allows commanders to specify quickly and adjust their intent regarding whether the advisors are maneuvering within the foreign tactical formations and whether advisors are actively providing access to external U.S. capabilities. The following are the four general conditions under which advisors operate:

- Accompany and enable.
- Separate and enable.
- Accompany and refrain.
- Separate and refrain.

4-60. Accompany and separate—when authorized to accompany, advisors integrate themselves into the FSF' tactical formations during the mission. Guidance to separate directs advisors to monitor the foreign operations often from a command post or another location outside of their foreign counterpart's tactical formation.

4-61. Enable and refrain—enable directs the advisors to plan, coordinate, and provide actively other external U.S. capabilities in support of the FSF and their mission. This external assistance often comes in the form of—

- Intelligence.
- Surveillance and reconnaissance.
- Fire support.
- Vertical lift assets.
- MEDEVAC.
- Other logistical support.

4-62. Refrain directs the advisors to withhold external U.S. capabilities to the FSF. This is often because those resources are not available, the FSF have those capabilities, or as part of a larger effort to reduce the foreign counterpart's reliance on U.S. capabilities.

Note. Refrain does not restrict external resources that may be available to support advisor teams themselves.

4-63. Advising guidance is not meant to be static. Review and update advising guidance frequently to account for changing operational and mission variables. Figure 4-1 on page 104 provides additional detail and context.




Figure 4-1. Advising guidance

EXECUTE

4-64. Advisors must know the doctrine, rules, and regulations that govern their actions while working with the FSF. U.S. advisors are masters of U.S. Army doctrine while understanding the doctrine, rules, and regulations that guide their foreign counterparts. Done well, the advisor can readily detect departures from both and recommend adjustments.

4-65. It is important to remember that advisor teams do not command foreign personnel or units. Advisors provide advice, training, and when required, access to coalition resources via the support task discussed in paragraphs 4-153 through 4-165. Advisors do not lead FSF in combat. Advisor teams are responsible for C2 within their own team. Advisors should be prepared to coach the commander of the foreign unit, which could include working side-by-side during a combat engagement.

4-66. Advisors have no command authority over the FSF and depend on credibility and relationships to influence foreign operations. Advisors often work with counterparts of higher rank than themselves. Advisors should consider the foreign unit's experience and capabilities and carefully choose opportunities to inject or impart knowledge. Advisor teams must be confident in the information they present. Trust and rapport can be quickly lost if advisors provide incorrect information. Generally, foreign units value advisors who are subtle in their teaching, coaching, and mentoring. Advisors who create a climate in which foreign personnel feel they are teaching themselves often prove the most effective.

4-67. Advisor teams achieve success by accomplishing their mission through their counterparts. They must establish rapport, trust, and relationships with their foreign counterparts to build influence. This requires advisors to focus on the Army doctrinal attribute of intellect, which includes an emphasis on mental agility, sound judgment, innovation, interpersonal tact, and expertise. Successful advisors have a genuine interest in other people. They smile, adhere to cultural norms, use proper names and titles, actively listen, discuss their interests, and make the other person feel important.

4-68. Advising the counterpart to select a particular course of action is effective only if the counterpart trusts the advisor's professional competency. Counterparts may question the advisor's competence if they perceive the proposed solution as unrealistic. When laying out courses of action or recommendations, the advisor takes time to explain why the recommendations are executable and effective.

4-69. As the FSF achieve success from its efforts and proficiency increases, it will naturally take a greater role in its own matters. The advisor may sometimes feel the foreign leaders want to assume more responsibility than they can effectively manage. Advisors ought to appreciate this growing confidence. Long-term success requires the foreign leaders accept more responsibility. Advisors adjust to the growing desires of the FSF to manage themselves and adjust their advising plans accordingly.

4-70. Trust is a fundamental building block of human relationships and at the core of leadership. Followers must trust their leaders. This is especially true in combat, when subordinates must follow orders immediately to succeed on the battlefield. However, trust cannot be mandated; it must be earned. Advisors must earn the trust of their counterparts and trust them in return. Advisors build this trust over time through consistent, principle-centered behavior and actions that demonstrate honesty, integrity, trust, dignity, and respect for all people.

4-71. The advisor teams must support the morale and confidence of the FSF. Committing poorly trained and badly led forces in combat may result in high casualties and invites tactical defeat. While defeat in a small operation may have little strategic consequence, these cumulative effects of numerous small tactical defeats may have serious strategic consequences. If the FSF fail, the local populace may begin to lose confidence in the host-nation government's ability to protect it. As much as possible, the foreign counterparts begin with simpler operations. As their confidence and competence grows, the foreign counterparts will naturally assume missions that are more complex. Collaborating with joint, multinational, or other foreign units can help new forces build confidence in adjusting to combat stress.

4-72. Advisor teams carefully monitor and evaluate the operational performance of an inexperienced organization to correct weaknesses quickly. If needed, the employment plan for the FSF must allow time for additional training after an operation to address training shortfalls. Gradually introducing units into combat allows advisors and the foreign leaders to identify poor leaders, conduct retraining, or take other actions. Advisors identify competent leaders and recommend them for greater authority and responsibility.

ASSESS

4-73. The AAR is an essential element of building FSF capabilities. The foreign commander, with assistance from the advisor team, should conduct the AAR. The AAR begins with a review of the operation or training goals. Advisor personnel guide the foreign leaders to ask leading questions, identify important tactical lessons, explore alternative courses of actions, keep to the teaching points, and make the AAR positive. Key personnel should be present. Guide the foreign commander to discuss not only what happened, but also why it happened. They should discuss the important tactical lessons learned, alternate courses of action the unit could have taken, and other important teaching points. (See The Leader's Guide to AAR on the Army Training Network website.)

4-74. Advisor teams coach the foreign commander to discuss activities and key decision points (sustain and improve) for each phase of the operation including information operations, battle drills, contingencies, and implied and specified tasks. Advisors guide the foreign commander to discuss general positive points with the group. The purpose of the group AAR is not to single out a leader, staff member, Soldier, or unit to criticize. Conclude with a plan to follow up and make improvements as necessary.

4-75. The U.S. military culture of AARs to discuss all mistakes works for the U.S. military because its culture accepts the technique. However, many cultures do not accept criticisms of one person or group relative to another. Prior to conducting an AAR, advisors should discuss these issues with the foreign leaders to avoid

embarrassing group situations. The advisor should encourage a productive environment for the member or unit to discuss improvements. When an issue is unit-wide or recurring, the advisor discusses the issue with the foreign leaders to find a solution. The foreign leader implements the agreed upon solution.

4-76. Advisors should never take credit for an idea; they should empower their counterpart instead. They discuss the issue and come to a solution together, even if the advisors think they have the solution beforehand. Advisor teams mentor their foreign counterparts towards operational independence. Empowering foreign counterparts builds confidence within their organization, and advisors build trust with their counterpart. As a result, the foreign counterpart will likely seek advisors' guidance and more readily accept their view in the future.

4-77. Advisors conduct an internal AAR, focusing on what the team can sustain and improve. Internal AAR (advisors only) topics include the following:

- Conduct of advisors.
- Conduct of the FSF (done prior to the foreign AAR if possible).
- Review rules of engagement, escalation of force, and other protective MOEs.
- Review effectiveness of parallel planning efforts.
- Where did the advisors develop, sustain, and improve foreign capabilities or capacities?
- Where were advisors located during the operation and was the arrangement successful?
- Were advisors prepared for the operation, such as equipment, knowledge of mission, integration with FSF?

4-78. The advisor team builds, submits, and archives the AAR. The advisor team then reviews and adjusts the assessment and development plan for the FSF as necessary. Finally, advisor teams deliver the report to their higher headquarters along with their analysis of the event relative to the assessment and development plan for the FSF. They compile and report acts of corruption, gross inefficiency, foreign personnel who hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or sympathy (proven or suspected) for the threat to the higher U.S. headquarters.

SECTION II – SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE CONFLICT INTEGRATION ACTIVITIES

> Advising needs two things; an advisor and a means of communication.
>
> Major General Donn H. Hill
> 3rd Commanding General
> Security Force Assistance Command

4-79. This section describes the SFA conflict integration activities. The conflict integration activities are primarily used in the conflict space but can be performed in response to crisis or to demonstrate partner force capabilities in competition. ASLA are the advisor team conflict integration activities as illustrated in figure 4-2. These activities are executed with partner forces and other UAPs in OEs spanning the competition continuum and, on order, can enable combat operations with partner forces. Whether demonstrating foreign partner capacity to deter armed conflict or fighting alongside the advisor team counterparts in LSCO, SFAB advisor teams play an important role in supporting U.S. objectives.




Figure 4-2. Security force assistance conflict integration activities

4-80. Advisor teams conduct the conflict integration activities (ASLA) in lieu of the SFA developmental activities (OTEBA) when dictated by the situation and the needs of the partner force. Figure 4-3 on page 108 shows the relationship between the FSF functions, SFA developmental activities, SFA conflict integration activities, and the resources available for the mission. An advisor team's mission statement commonly includes one of (or multiple) SFA activities, the same way the terms "movement to contact," "ambush," and "raid" may be used when giving a mission to a conventional maneuver platoon.

4-81. Through ASLA, but particularly through the liaise and support activities, SFABs build interoperability, maximize the availability of partner assets for the fight, enable joint force commanders' visualization, and inform decision points. SFABs facilitate transitions.




Figure 4-3. Security force assistance functions and advisor team activities

ASSESS

Assessing the training of the Korean army

In the summer of 1949 Roberts (Brigadier. General. William L. Roberts, Chief of KMAG from August 1948-June 1950) began a peninsula-wide tour of Korean army units from the southeastern port city of Pusan to the Ongjin peninsula in the northwest to inspect and evaluate the "dispositions and status of training" of the ROKA. He also directed inspection teams to visit the various KMAG detachments and their associated Korean units. These were not courtesy visits. They were in-depth inspections under the direction of the KMAG G-3, with each team led by a lieutenant colonel. These teams wrote comprehensive reports detailing their observations, unit status, and recommendations. Roberts used these evaluations and his personal observations to formulate a series of policy and procedural memoranda to his senior advisors, which KMAG headquarters then consolidated into a booklet called the *Advisor's Handbook*, issued to the filed specifically to disseminate Roberts's guidance regarding training and advisorship.

Bryan R. Gibby
The Will to Win: American military advisors in Korea, 1946-1953

4-82. Assess refers to all activities for determining progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective using MOEs and MOPs to evaluate partner force capability. Once an objective is achieved, the focus should shift to sustaining it. (See FM 3-22.) Assess is both an SFA and advisor team activity.

4-83. Assessment is an important and continuous activity for all advisor teams. Advisor teams assess partner forces by evaluating, monitoring, and reporting on their foreign counterpart's activities. Assessments provide information that allows commanders and staffs to properly task-organize advisor teams and weigh efforts to complete the assigned SFA mission. Regardless of the SFA function or task, advisor teams conduct assessments in support of their operations. These assessments form the foundation for the other advisor team activities. They also provide insight for their higher headquarters and external organizations.

4-84. During armed conflict, operations usually reflect combinations of conventional and irregular warfare approaches. Leaders apply doctrine for LSCO during limited contingencies that require conventional warfare approaches. Irregular warfare includes counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, which other publications specifically address. The initial actions of LSCO will likely overlap with actions initiated during competition and crisis (see FM 3-0).

ASSESS CONSIDERATIONS THROUGH THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

4-85. *Assessment* is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations (JP 3-0).

Crisis

4-86. Crisis focuses on short-term capabilities and capacities specifically needed to address the emerging crisis and either return to a state of competition or properly prepare for conflict.

Armed Conflict

4-87. Armed conflict focuses on expanding advisor integration and interoperability to succeed in the ongoing conflict.

Large-Scale Combat Operations

4-88. The assessment process does not end if the situation transitions into LSCO. In fact, SFAB teams may be even more relied upon to provide assessments to (and on) partner forces during the execution of LSCO. The primary purpose in conducting LSCO assessments is to identify the risk associated in operational planning and assess the changes in the OE. OE conditions can change rapidly and those planning and those executing SFA activities must assess these changes continuously (see FM 3-22).

4-89. While conducting assessment in LSCO, it is important that the planners for both U.S. Forces and multinational partners develop shared end states for both individual objectives and the wider mission. In essence, U.S. Forces assess the partner FSF against desired capabilities and then develop an OTEBA and/or ASLA plan to help partner FSF build that capability and capacity (see FM 3-22).

4-90. The assessments process as executed by the SFAB is of particular use during armed conflict and LSCO by affording the JFLCC an additional method in which to consolidate gains.

Competition

4-91. Competition focuses on long-term capability and capacity development to increase the lethality, legitimacy, and professionalism of the FSF partner.

INITIAL ASSESSMENT

4-92. The SFAB continues assessing the theater planners by elaborating on the initial findings and continuing the work of a previous partnered force. The assessments are a part of a continuous process that incorporates input from the higher command, previous partnered forces, subordinate component commands, appropriate country teams, agencies outside DOD, and post-mission reports from previous U.S. military operations and training missions. (See FM 3-22.)

4-93. Assessments require a command-wide effort, with the commander's support and leadership being critical for success. Advisors must be the subject matter experts or have input from the appropriate subject matter experts from across the entire staff. For SFA missions, assessments may require close collaboration

with members from various U.S. country teams within embassies, other U.S. stakeholders at the CCMDs and other Army commands, and possibly the partner nation government and other multinational partners.

4-94. Assessment should be integrated into the planning and execution of SFA. While planning is top-down, assessments are conducted bottom-up (see figure 4-4). SFAB staff planners and the advisor teams conducting the SFA mission must work together ensuring that they task and properly develop appropriate MOEs, MOPs, and indicators. Executing these tasks creates effects that achieve objectives to attain end states. Without the proper MOEs, MOPs, and indicators, commanders have difficulty determining if the tasks accomplished their intended purpose.

4-95. SFAB commanders, staffs, and advisor teams ensure assessments have both quantitative (numerical) and qualitative (narrative) metrics. Conducting assessments is both an art and science. Advisors must examine the OE through multiple perspectives and solicit quantitative and qualitative input from a wide assortment of information and people.




Figure 4-4. Assessment interaction

PLANNING FOR ASSESSMENT

4-96. Assessments evaluate and measure the progress of SFA activities toward a strategic end state. Assessments inform and assist commanders to make appropriate decisions pertaining to plans, resources, and execution. More specifically, assessments—

- Allow commanders to gain situational understanding of the OE.
- Outline how conditions have changed over a defined period.
- Are used by commanders and staffs to determine objectives and requirements for mitigating and managing risk.
- Assist commanders in determining progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.

ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS

4-97. Determining what is the appropriate balance of qualitative and quantitative assessments within the campaign plans and country plans is necessary to begin the assessment process. At the strategic and operational levels, assessments typically become more qualitative. The availability of hard data may drive the frequency of quantitative assessments.

4-98. Understanding how the specific SFA assessment nests within the theater campaign or country plan assessments helps to leverage and integrate government assessment efforts and to drive the demand for additional missions to support those plans. Understanding the balance between the assessments of task achievements (inputs), progress toward intermediate military objectives (outputs), and progress toward theater strategic end states (outcomes) is vital.

4-99. Determining the best way to leverage or shape subordinate elements and external stakeholders to inform a holistic assessment is beneficial. Some methods of achieving this are the following:

- Involving commanders in the assessment process to include assessment requirements in plans and orders.
- Explaining the importance of assessments.
- Involving everyone in the assessment process and findings.

4-100. While conducting assessments, advisor responsibilities include the following:

- Providing candid feedback, objective reports, direct observations, and detailed assessments to commanders.
- Clearly distinguishing between reports, observations, and assessments.
- Avoiding bias and pessimism.
- Avoiding embellishment, undue optimism, and equivocation.
- Protecting sensitive and confidential partner force information and sources.
- Considering the source of information.
- Maintaining a healthy skepticism of partner force information and intent.
- Demonstrating prudent initiative in the face of adversity or uncertainty.
- Avoiding intellectual paralysis or apathy.

4-101. When receiving assessments, the higher headquarters should—

- Respect the difference between reports, observations, and assessments.
- Acknowledge natural blind spots in advisor awareness.
- Conservatively manage expectations.
- Be patient in pursuit of SFA objectives.
- Avoid creating advisor dilemmas.
- Faithfully relay advisor reports, direct observations, and assessments.
- Reengage advisors to clarify or update reports as needed.
- Protect sensitive foreign information and sources.
- Consider the source of information.
- Maintain healthy skepticism of partner forces' information and their intent.

4-102. In addition to the considerations listed above, staffs must remember that assessments serve the commander. Commanders must ultimately provide guidance and buy-in to the methodology. Proper assessment training across all staff elements, extensive time and effort, and rigorous investment in assessment resources are crucial to ensure success.

ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES

4-103. The situation and type of operations affect the characteristics of assessment. During LSCO, assessment tends to be rapid, focused on the level of destruction of enemy units, terrain gained or lost, objectives secured, and the status of the friendly force to include sustainment. In other situations, such as counterinsurgency, assessment is less tangible. Assessing the level of security in an area or the level of the population's support for the government is challenging. Identifying what and how to assess requires significant effort from the commander and staff.

4-104. Whether conducting LSCO or stability operations, the process of continuous assessment consists of the following activities:

- Monitoring the current situation while collecting relevant information.
- Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions.
- Identifying problems.
- Achieving objectives.
- Performing tasks.
- Recommending or directing action for improvement.

Monitoring

4-105. Monitoring is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation. Monitoring allows staffs to collect relevant information, specifically that information about the current situation described in the commander's intent and concept of operations. Commanders cannot judge progress nor make effective decisions without an accurate understanding of the current situation.

4-106. Staffs and advisor teams monitor and collect information from the COP and friendly reports. This information includes operational and intelligence summaries from subordinate, higher, and adjacent headquarters and communications and reports from liaison teams. Staffs and advisor teams also identify information sources outside military channels and monitor their reports. These other channels might include products from civilian, host-nation, and other government agencies. Apply information management and knowledge management to facilitate disseminating this information to the right people at the right time.

4-107. Record relevant information in running estimates. Staff sections and advisor teams maintain a continuous assessment of current operations as a basis to determine if operations are proceeding according to the commander's intent, mission, and concept of operations. In their running estimates, staff sections and advisor teams use this new information and these updated facts and assumptions as the basis for evaluation.

Evaluating

4-108. Advisor teams and staffs analyze relevant information collected through monitoring to evaluate an operation's progress. Evaluating is using indicators to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists. Evaluation is at the heart of the assessment process where most of the analysis occurs. Evaluation helps commanders and advisor teams determine what is working and what is not working, and it helps them gain insights into how to better accomplish the mission.

4-109. An *indicator* is, in the context of assessment, a specific piece of information that infers the condition, state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness (JP 5-0). Indicators should be—

- Relevant—bearing a direct relationship to a task, effect, object, or end state condition.
- Observable—detecting, measuring or evaluating changes.
- Responsive—signifying changes in the OE in time to enable effective decision making.
- Resourced—identifying collection assets and staff resources to observe and evaluate.

4-110. The two types of indicators commonly used in assessments are MOPs and MOEs. A *measure of performance* is an indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 5-0). MOPs help answer questions such as "Was the action taken?" or "Were the tasks completed to standard?" A MOP confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed. MOPs are commonly found and tracked at all levels in execution matrixes. MOPs help to answer the question, "Are we doing things right?"

4-111. At the most basic level, every Soldier assigned a task maintains a formal or informal checklist to track task completion. The status of those tasks and subtasks are MOPs. Similarly, operations consist of a series of collective tasks sequenced in time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions. Staffs and advisor teams use MOPs in execution matrixes, checklists, and running estimates to track completed tasks during current operations. Staffs and advisor teams use MOP as a primary element of battle tracking with a focus on the partner force. Evaluating task accomplishment using MOP is relatively straightforward and often results in a yes or no answer.

4-112. A *measure of effectiveness* is an indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time (JP 5-0). MOEs help measure changes in conditions, both positive and negative. MOEs help to answer the question, "Are we doing the right things?" MOEs are commonly found and tracked in formal assessment plans.

4-113. Evaluations include analyzing progress. Commanders and staffs propose and consider possible causes. They address the question of whether changes in the situation can be attributed to friendly FSF actions. Commanders, staffs, and advisor teams consult subject matter experts, both internal and external to the organization, on whether they have correctly identified the underlying causes for specific changes in the situation. These experts challenge key facts and assumptions identified in the planning process to determine if the facts and assumptions are still relevant or valid.

4-114. Evaluating also includes considering whether the desired conditions have changed, are no longer achievable, or are not achievable through the current operational approach. Staffs and advisor teams continually challenge the key assumptions made when framing the problem. When an assumption is invalidated, reframing is likely required.

Note. See ADP 5-0 and JP 5-0 for more detailed information on the assessment activities of monitor, evaluate, and recommend or direct action.

Recommending or Directing Action

4-115. Monitoring and evaluating are critical activities; however, assessment is incomplete without recommending or directing action. Assessment may reveal problems, but unless it results in recommended adjustments, its use to the commander or partner force is limited. Ideally, recommendations highlight ways to improve the effectiveness of operations and plans by informing all decisions.

4-116. Based on the evaluation, the staff and advisor teams brainstorm possible improvements to the plan and make preliminary judgments about the relative merit of those changes. Staff and advisor team members identify those changes possessing sufficient merit and provide them as recommendations to the commander or partner force or adjust them within their delegated authority. Recommendations range from continuing the operation as planned, executing a branch, or making unanticipated adjustments. It is also important to integrate recommendations from the staff, advisor teams, and the partner forces to decide if and how to modify the operation to better accomplish the mission.

4-117. Assessment helps identify threats, suggests improvements to effectiveness, and reveals opportunities. The staff and advisor teams present the results and conclusions of their assessments and recommendations to the commander as an operation develops. Just as the staff and advisor teams devote time to analysis and evaluation, so too must they make timely, complete, and actionable recommendations.

ASSESSMENT PROCESS

4-118. The assessment process must start with an understanding of the OE. Specifically, the theater campaign plan and the TSCP. The process must encourage unity of effort among UAPs, guide the efficient use of resources, and anticipate potential counterpart needs. The desired end state accounts for the goals and priorities of the U.S. Government, the partner forces, the host nation, and other regional factors and concerns. (See ATP 3-07.10.) Use the assessment steps and framework described in figure 4-5 on page 114.




Figure 4-5. Assessment framework

Step 1: Assess Objectives and End State

4-119. Assessment begins once the SFAB receives the mission. Specifically, it is necessary to assess objectives, end states, and the need for the effort. The SFAB advisor teams must remain engaged with the SFAB battalion staffs who interact with brigade planners to ensure that objectives, effects, and activities are measurable as a means of evaluating initial resource allocation. Once the SFAB establishes measurable objectives and associated effects, the MOE and MOP development begins.

Step 2: Identify Variables of Interest

4-120. The next step in this objective-led process is identifying variables of interest, which in the case of the SFA OE are usually PMESII-PT-based metrics. Other frameworks may be useful as well, to include the warfighting functions, DOTMLPF-P, or the mission variables.

4-121. This step entails a characterization of the OE by teams of planners, operations research analysts, intelligence analysts, and various experts. Resources available (or desired) to accomplish this understanding may include academia, media, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, subject matter experts, social network sites, and other publicly available information. Step 2 creates the foundation for the baseline assessment. The assessment team identifies relevant assessment products (classified or open source) that civilian and military organizations produce. With the desired condition established, the assessment teams can generate which metrics to measure to indicate progress towards the planned end state.

Step 3: Data Collection and Examination

4-122. After the assessment team identifies the variables of interest for either the MOP or the MOE, the next step is collecting and examining the data. The assessment team generates a baseline and hypotheses related to the OE through careful examination of data. Each variable requires information to populate the data. The team incorporates data collection plans into the operations planning process. This way, data requirements are known prior to the commencement of activity. The plan includes the timing and frequency of data collection, organizations, or personnel responsible for collection, and required special tools, reporting formats, hardware, and software.

Step 4: Develop a Baseline, Hypothesis, and Test

4-123. Step 4 is an assessment of the environmental design and a proposal theory of effort to test that design. The team develops a desired future state to create a baseline model of the OE. This desired future state is a baseline reference point for future comparisons. Advisors should assess and compare activities, desired effects, and objectives to this baseline. A baseline assessment includes ensuring that stated objectives are clear, understandable, and measurable. A baseline assessment enables the team to assess progression from the baseline to the end state using the stated objectives. A baseline assessment is an opportunity for assessors to apply design theory to the plan by stressing the need for a forward-thinking approach to the objectives. Step 4 includes mapping out the design theory (to the best of the assessors' abilities) to drive MOP measurement and develop hypotheses as to which MOE these activities influence. Mapping the nonlinear design of the environment and potential effects of activities allows for anticipation of the possibility of the team performing activities well, but not having the desired outcome.

Step 5: Analysis and Assessment

4-124. The analysis and assessment step emphasizes the all-important evaluation of the MOE and MOP relationship analysis. Armed with sufficient data, observations, and hypotheses, assessment teams can begin analysis. The team identifies and highlights gaps in the assessment plan to identify and assign actions needed to adjust collection and analysis plans to improve the assessment process. Understanding current and desired conditions requires acknowledging the underlying assumptions. During the analysis step of the assessment process, staffs continually challenge assumptions they identify during planning. If they subsequently disprove assumptions, then reframing the problem may be appropriate. This step requires tactical patience. Conducting SFA is a complicated undertaking, with expected analysis and assessment taking some time. If the success threshold for the MOE criteria is not met, yet the corresponding (theorized) MOP criteria were met, the assumption as to the impact of those efforts may be false.

Step 6: Roll Up

4-125. When rolling up assessment data, account for the fact that the MOPs and MOEs at each assessment level may vary. As lessons and trends emerge, incorporate the analysis of these MOPs and MOEs into higher-level assessment processes (if applicable). Tactical and operational assessment metrics are likely different from theater-level assessment metrics. However, the effects of various missions feed into a theater-level assessment that must account for all operations within the plan.

Step 7: Report and Recommend

4-126. Following an AAR, the team develops an assessment summary that includes recommendations for future operations, training, follow-up assessments, and factors, which require further analysis. Submit and archive summaries at the conclusion of assessments. When applicable, personnel conducting the assessment consult with all staff members to validate recommendations prior to reporting to the commander.

ASSESSMENT TYPES

4-127. The SFAB performs four types of assessments: operational, organizational, environmental, and institutional (see figure 4-6). Assessments occur at all levels of the partner force and are continuous, collaborative, and simultaneous in nature. As explained in paragraphs 4-128 through 4-148, the four types of

assessments seem separate and distinct but may occur simultaneously while a unit is assessing the partner force progress and its mission daily.




Figure 4-6. Foreign security forces assessments

Organization

4-128. The organizational assessment compares the current organizational structure and operational state of the partner force to the designed or intended capabilities and capacity to execute directed missions. To determine what the organization is designed to do, the organizational assessment answers these questions:

- What are the partner forces' roles?
- What are the partner forces' missions?
- What are the partner forces' developmental goals and objectives?
- How reliable are the partner forces' leaders?

4-129. The SFAB starts the organizational assessment during the predeployment phase. Commanders and staffs must focus on objectives and end states of the partner force's higher governing body first rather than the organization. Starting with the organization first is often a planning pitfall. Commanders often make the mistake of organizing their units with the partner forces based on similarities of size and capabilities. This is common when the partner forces are conducting operations other than military, such as policing or humanitarian aid, for example.

4-130. As the SFAB conducts MDMP and continues its organizational assessment, task-organization becomes clearer to the commander. The commander, advised by staff, determines who is best able to gather the data and complete the remaining steps of the assessment process and advising mission.

4-131. Figure 4-7 provides an example of an organizational assessment rubric. As with other examples in this chapter, this rubric is not all-inclusive and serves as a starting point for advisor teams as they develop their assessment tools.

ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT RUBRIC					TACTICAL LEVEL
Warfighting functions	**C-0** *Incapable*	**C-1** *Marginally capable*	**C-2** *Capable*	**C-3** *Fully capable*	**Remarks**
Command and Control	Poorly resourced or untrained staff. Lack of command purpose and direction.	Staff lacking resources but understands basic responsibilities. Commander provides basic direction and purpose.	Most resources available, trained staff but lacks experience. Commander provides purpose and direction.	Fully resourced, fully staffed, and commander provides thorough guidance for current and future operations.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.
Movement and Maneuver	Unit lacks resources to employ subordinate elements.	Unit resourced but incapable of employing forces, or unit capable of employing forces but not resourced.	Unit achieves tactical objectives regardless of resource shortfalls.	Commander able to employ combat power to decisively defeat an enemy.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.
Intelligence	Intelligence collection poorly executed, intel products do not facilitate understanding, collection assets do not exist.	Intel collection limited by lack of collection assets or lack of training, intel products provide minimal understanding.	Intel collection results in products that facilitate basic understanding of the operational environment.	Intel collection, products, and understanding facilitate understanding and enable commanders to make timely decisions.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.

LEGEND

C- **CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY LEVEL** **INTEL** **INTELLIGENCE**

SAMPLE

Figure 4-7. Organization assessment rubric, example

Operational

4-132. The operational assessment reveals strengths and gaps in the partner forces' ability to perform their missions, roles, or functions. It shows how well the partner forces can conduct their missions. A clear understanding of the partner forces' operational mission serves as the starting point for the operational assessment.

4-133. Effective partner forces display certain characteristics and capabilities described in paragraphs 4-134 through 4-144.

Proficient Partner Forces

4-134. Proficient partner forces—

- Are tactically and technically proficient, can execute their national security mission, and integrate with allies.
- Can conduct basic offensive and defensive collective tasks in support of military operations.
- Can work with adjacent organizations to suppress lawlessness and insurgency.
- Are competent in maintaining civil order, enforcing laws, controlling borders, and detaining criminal suspects.
- Are trained with a modern police ethos to include security procedures, investigation basics, evidence collection, and court and legal procedures.

Self-Sustained

4-135. Partner forces that can manage their own equipment throughout its lifecycle (procurement to disposal) and conduct administrative support.

Professional and Competent Leaders

4-136. Partner force leaders at all levels possess sound professional standards and appropriate military values and are selected for promotion based on competence and merit.

Professional Traits

4-137. Professionalism traits include the following:

- Partner forces that are honest, impartial, and committed to protecting and serving the entire population, operating under the rule of law, and respecting human rights.
- Partner forces are loyal to the central government and serve national interests, recognizing their role as servants of the people and not their masters.
- Partner forces are integrated into society:
  - A population is less likely to see a security force that represents the nation's major ethnic groups as the instrument of just one faction.
  - They observe cultural sensitivities toward the incorporation of various groups and ethnicities.

4-138. The capabilities and characteristics described in paragraph 4-137 support the overall campaign design. Evaluations of the partner force's capabilities and characteristics reflect its ability to influence the OE to reinforce the overall design. The success or failure of a partner force may ultimately rest more on its overall influence in an operations area rather than its ability to execute specific tasks.

4-139. Figure 4-8 provides an example of an operational assessment worksheet that an advisor team may use when conducting an operational assessment of a partner force. Use this worksheet when designing an evaluation for a partner force during the conduct of an operational mission. Advisors use the worksheet as a tool to record key data, observations, and other notes while observing a partner-force operation. After the operation, advisors use this information to build a more detailed assessment summary per their SOP.

4-140. SFABs must establish standard assessment rubrics, worksheets, summaries, and reports in their SOPs that will aid the advisor teams and facilitate a common understanding across the various echelons of advisors with the partner force. Tailor these products to specific countries or regions and their related SFA goals.

MISSION ENVIRONMENT OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT RUBRIC

SECTION I

a. UNIT INFORMATION:	**b. UNIT NAME:**	c. 1BN, Atropian Land Forces						**OVERALL CAPABILITY RATING** (C-#)	
	PURPOSE:	d. INFANTRY						C-0 **C-1** C-2	C-3
e. DATE OF OPERATION: 01/07/2019	**ECHELON**	**Individual**	**Team/ Crew**	**Squad/ Section**	**Platoon**	**Company**	**Battalion**	**NOTES: Overall rating is assessed as an aggregate of individual ratings. Methodology must be explained in Assessment Summary.** Organizational structure exists from battalion to platoon level but, unit is manned at 80% total strength. Not all crews are manned as a result.	
[redacted]	% PERSONNEL PRESENT	80%	70%	70%	100%	80%	80%	Methodology: Ratings were averaged across the four steps of the Operations Process. Each step was equally weighted.	
MISSION TYPE: Stability operations/area security			**CONDITIONS:** Day and night dismounted patrols.						
MISSION PURPOSE: Prevention of poaching/illegal ivory trade (Desired outcome of event (End state))					**OPERATIONAL RISK**	**LOW**	**MEDIUM**	**HIGH**	**EXTRA HIGH**

SECTION II

OPERATION CYCLE		**STRENGTHS**	**WEAKNESSES**	**RESOURCES NEEDED**
A. PLAN	**RATING**	Planning met commander's intent, task and purpose were articulated through use of foreign security force (FSF) doctrinal guidance.	Fires were not included in plan, and therefore, no targeting was available to support maneuver plan.	Training staff understanding of warfighting functions was limited due to newness of doctrine. No sand tables were used to ensure support concepts were followed.
Failed to plan	C-0			
Incomplete plan	C-1			
Sufficient plan	C-2			
Plan meets intent	C-3			
B. PREPARE	**RATING**	Extensive use of rehearsals ensured all echelons (company/ platoon/squad) understood commander's intent.	Even though well rehearsed, lack of evaluation aids did limit some leader's ability to achieve understand of the commander's intent.	Institutional–More resources that can assist subordinate leaders with visualizing the intent of the operation will greatly enhance future operations. Operational–At the platoon level and below, most leaders (at 80%) experience limited literacy. Because of this, more time was needed to explain the operation, and written orders are minimally effective. Recommend basic education for recruits to offset literacy issues.
Failed to achieve understanding	C-0			
Inadequate resources	C-1			
Adequate resources/ partial understanding	C-2			
Fully resourced/ shared understanding	C-3			
C. EXECUTE	**RATING**	Platoons and squads responded well to threats. Company and battalion were able to communicate and track operations.	Communications infrastructure limited range of operatons, all tracking was done analog.	Units lack sufficient Digital Mission Command platforms, which limits ability of commander to assess situations rapidly. No intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance was available throughout entire operation.
Failed mission	C-0			
Marginal mission accomplishment	C-1			
Partly met commander's intent	C-2			
Achieved endstate	C-3			
D. ASSESS	**RATING**	Battalion and company leaders routinely assessed effects of operation with subordinate leadership.	No time was allotted to correct issues during future training events.	Units must take time to retrain on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and multiple scenarios in order to perform better in the future. Unit leaders are unaware of a formal training strategy to assist with fixing operational issues.
Unaware of shortcomings	C-0			
Aware/ Inadequately resourced solutions	C-1			
Aware/ Partially resourced solutions	C-2			
Aware/ Fully resourced solutions	C-3			

LEGEND

%	PERCENT	C-	CAPABILITY RATING
BN	BATTALION		

SAMPLE

Figure 4-8. Operational assessment worksheet, operational mission, example

4-141. DA Pam 11-31 uses the C ratings in figure 4-9 on page 120 when describing the strategic capability and capacity of a foreign military. They provide a useful framework for building effective country plans and managing resource tradeoffs in assessing foreign partners' capabilities and capacities to perform military missions and their interoperability with the U.S. Army. At a strategic level, the capability and capacity of a foreign partner can be delineated using four levels—C-0, C-1, C-2, and C-3 (see table 4-1 on page 121).

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT RUBRIC					TACTICAL LEVEL
Area Assessed	**C-0** *Incapable*	**C-1** *Marginally capable*	**C-2** *Capable*	**C-3** *Fully capable*	**Remarks**
Mission	Mission is outside the scope of the foreign security forces' (FSF) purpose.	FSF lacks capacity to perform assigned mission.	FSF has capability but lacks capacity to perform all aspects of assigned mission.	Mission is appropriate, FSF has capabilty and capacity to perform all aspects of mission.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.
Enemy	FSF cannot provide an appropriate response to threats.	FSF responds to threats but lacks capacity to assume the initiative.	FSF counters enemy actions and is able to assume the initiative with external support.	FSF aggressively counters enemy actions and has the resources required to gain the initiative and take the fight to the enemy.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.
Troops	FSF does not possess required combat power for assigned mission.	FSF is manned for assigned mission but does not have a reserve.	FSF manned, has tactical reserve, but cannot project combat power.	FSF fully manned, possesses a reserve force, and is able to project combat power outside the current operations area.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.
Terrain	FSF cannot conduct movement and maneuver without external support.	FSF can conduct limited movement and maneuver over most terrain.	FSF conducts movement and maneuver over all terain but lacks quick response capability.	FSF can maneuver over all terrain and has quick response capability.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.
Time	FSF cannot perform continuous operations more than 24 hours.	FSF can perform continuous operations between 24 and 72 hours.	FSF can perform continuous operations up to 96 hours.	FSF can perform continuous operations without regard to duration.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.
Civilians	Local civilians has negative perception of the FSF.	Local civilians have a neutral perception of the FSF.	Local civilians have limited trust in the FSF and generally support their operations.	Local civilians have a positive perception of the FSF and believe the security forces have their best interests in mind.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.

LEGEND

C **CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY LEVEL**

SAMPLE

Figure 4-9. Environmental assessment rubric, tactical level, example

Table 4-1. Foreign partner capability and capacity levels

Foreign Partner Capability and Capacity Levels	
Level	***Description***
C-0	Partner force has no demonstrated interoperability with the U.S. Army; C2 interface with the U.S. Army is only at the national level or the foreign force has no regular engagement with the U.S. Army.
C-1	Partner force shares information or situational awareness through liaison teams with the U.S. Army, requires alignment of capabilities and procedures to establish operational norms, and has some routine engagement with the U.S. Army.
C-2	Partner force has digital C2 capabilities, actively participates in information operations with the U.S. Army, and partner force has digital C2 capabilities, actively participates in information operations with the U.S. Army and routinely exercises or operates with the U.S. Army.
C-3	Partner force's interoperability is network-enabled through shared situational awareness, mobile C2, collaborative planning, networked fires, combat identification, intelligence, and reconnaissance.
Legend: C–capability and capacity level; C2–command and control; U.S.–United States	

4-142. In addition to the capability and capacity ratings, DA Pam 11-31 also describes MNF interoperability ratings. *Interoperability* is the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives (JP 3-0). There are four levels of interoperability—I-0, I-1, I-2, and I-3 (see table 4-2).

Table 4-2. Levels of interoperability

Four Levels of Interoperability	
Level	
I-0	Partner force has no demonstrated interoperability with the U.S. Army; C2 interface with the U.S. Army is only at the national level or the foreign force has no regular engagement with the U.S. Army.
I-1	Partner force shares information or situational awareness through liaison teams with the U.S. Army, requires alignment of capabilities and procedures to establish operational norms, and has some routine engagement with the U.S. Army.
I-2	Partner force has digital C2 capabilities, actively participates in information operations with the U.S. Army, and routinely exercises or operates with the U.S. Army.
I-3	Partner force's interoperability is network-enabled through shared situational awareness, mobile C2, collaborative planning, networked fires, combat identification, intelligence, and reconnaissance.
Legend: C—capability and capacity level; C2–command and control; U.S.–United States	

4-143. The criteria used in the ratings shown above and found in DA Pam 11-31 may not be relevant to an advisor team's mission and their assessments. However, they provide an example of what these criteria may look like. Assessment criteria and ratings must be established through the advisor team's chain of command and in conjunction with the partner force to provide the most useful and relevant information for future planning and operations. The operational assessment example in figure 4-9 defines C ratings that may be more relevant at the tactical level.

4-144. When evaluating a partner force during training events, a similar worksheet can be used to the one shown in figure 4-8 on page 119. However, instead of using the operations cycle of plan, prepare, execute, and assess, an advisor team may use the eight-step training model as the framework to evaluate the foreign unit.

Environmental

4-145. This assessment considers current conditions in the environment and their effects on partner force organization. (See ATP 3-07.10.) The environmental assessment validates the suitability of a partner force's directed missions. This may also reveal the requirement to develop additional capabilities or capacities in the partner forces beyond those normally associated with a similar type of security force. A tactical-level environmental assessment generally uses the mission variables of METT-TC (I) as a framework. A higher level or operational-level environmental assessment uses the operational variables of PMESII-PT as a framework to answer the following questions: What are the PMESII-PT impacts on the partner force? What are the threats? Are there any geographical considerations?

4-146. Most of the information contained within the environmental assessment is gathered during IPOE. SFAB staffs and advisor teams constantly update this information and exchange information with the partner forces to the extent possible without violating security procedures. Figure 4-9 on page 120 gives an example of what a tactical-level environmental assessment rubric, using METT-TC (I), may look like.

Institutional

4-147. The institutional assessment evaluates the partner force's capabilities by examining DOTMLPF-P, or a similar construct, to close existing capability gaps. The institutional assessment answers the following questions: Why does the organization have capability and capacity gaps? The best framework to assess partner forces' institutions is the DOTMLPF-P framework.

4-148. Figure 4-10, on pages 123 and 124, provides an example of an institutional assessment rubric, which uses the DOTMLPF-P framework and can assist advisors in preparing their assessments. The statements in the rubric provide an initial frame of reference to help evaluate the partner force institutions. The rubric contains both objective and subjective analysis and requires the advisor's interpretation and sound judgment. This rubric is not all-inclusive and is only an example (in this case, an institutional assessment of a foreign military education course).

INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT RUBRIC				PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION	
Area Assessed	**C-0** *Does not meet requirements*	**C-1** *Meets some requirements*	**C-2** *Meets most requirements*	**C-3** *Meets all requirements*	**Remarks**
Doctrine	Program of instruction (POI) does not support doctrine.	POI partially supports doctrine, but does not prepare students for operations.	POI follows doctrine and prepares students for operations.	POI updated and reflects doctrinal changes; meets the needs of the force.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.
Organization	No formal chain of command (CoC) in place.	CoC does not meet the needs of the students or facility.	CoC meets the needs of the students and facility with external assistance.	Well-formed CoC adequately addresses needs of students and facility.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.
Training	POI not sequenced or poorly phased. Does not facilitate skill mastery.	Parts of POI improperly sequenced or phased. mitigates skill mastery.	Most portions of POI are properly phased and sequenced. Skill mastery increased.	Students achieve mastery through use of academic rigor, appropriate phasing and logical sequencing of POI.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.
Material	Limited or no access to training aids or books. Test materials are not controlled.	Limited access to books and training aids. Test materials minimally controlled.	Increased access to books and training aids, test integrity and exams controlled.	Full access to books and full integrity of testing materials maintained. Foreign texts translated.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.

LEGEND

C- **CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY LEVEL**

SAMPLE

Figure 4-10. Institutional assessment rubric, example

INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT RUBRIC				PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION	
Area Assessed	**C-0** *Does not meet requirements*	**C-1** *Meets some requirements*	**C-2** *Meets most requirements*	**C-3** *Meets all requirements*	**Remarks**
Leadership and Education	No process for instructor certification. No formal facility selection process.	Facility formally selected. Certification process unevenly applied.	Cadre formally selected, certified, and monitored against established standards.	Formal cadre selection and cerfification process exists and international cadre exchanges occur.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.
Personnel	Institution cannot achieve student throughput due to a shortage of cadre.	Staffing shortfalls exist but institution capable of meeting minimum throughput goals.	Minimal staffing shortfalls, institution is capable of achieving objective throughput goals.	Fully staffed institution meets needs of the force and can expand or contract to meet new requirements.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.
Facilities	Inadequate training space and classrooms, poorly designed training areas.	Training area, test sites, or classrooms do not achieve their intended function.	Training and test spaces are properly resourced.	Training and test spaces are fully resourced and support digital instruction.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.
Policy	No policy or procedures in place or existing policies and procedures not followed.	Policies and procedures are in place by only partially followed.	Policies followed, SOPs updated and followed.	Policy, guidance, SOP, and standards rigorously enforced and followed by all personnel.	Filled in by unit to explain assessment.

LEGEND

C- **CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY LEVEL** **SOP** **STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE**

SAMPLE

Figure 4-10. Institutional assessment rubric, example (continued)

Continuous Assessment

4-149. Advisor teams evaluate partner forces on a continuous basis. Metrics for evaluating success change as the operational conditions shift. An advisor team's ability to learn and adapt leads to a more accurate assessment of the partner forces.

4-150. Assessments are a continuous process of examining inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and the impact on objectives. As the assessments are being done, planners and assessors ask the following questions:

- Has the objective been achieved?
- If the objective has not been achieved, are we measuring the objective correctly?
- If the objective has been achieved, what are the impediments to achieving the objective?

4-151. It is important to delineate assessment responsibilities across several stakeholders to account for differing levels of organizational authority and expertise and to maximize the level of objectivity into the assessment process. It is possible for an individual and staff section to have several different assessment roles and responsibilities. Some of the roles and associated responsibilities are the following:

- Data collectors who attend the SFA events and collect relevant information.
- Advisors who perform formal assessments of programs and activities.
- Designated personnel who review the assessments and certify those assessments as legitimate.

- Staff and advisor team members who aggregate assessments to determine where assessment gaps and redundancies exist.
- Advisor teams that develop recommendations to the commander and staff, based on the assessment findings of the SFA plans and missions for possible solutions or capability requirements.

4-152. Advisor teams conduct assessments in support of each SFA activity. SFA activities should not begin, progress, change, or cease without conducting assessments. The SFAB staffs and advisor teams, in partnership with the partner forces, should spend considerable time updating assessments to shape the operation, consolidate gains, and prevent wasted time and resources on activities that are not reaching the SC objectives.

LSCO Support in Burma

In December, 1943, it could be truthfully said that never in history had Chinese troops launched a successfully strategic offensive against a modern enemy. In the second Burma campaign, Stilwell proposed to rewrite history, staking his reputation on the unproven thesis that, given proper equipment and training, Chinese soldiers were, man for man, as good as any in the world. In his belief in Chinese valor, Stilwell stood alone. Not only did the British and overwhelming portion of the U.S. Army staff in Asia believe it was impossible for the Chinese to attack and destroy battle-proved Japanese divisions of roughly equal strength in northern Burma, but the Chinese general staff in Chungking held the same low opinion of its soldiery.

What Stilwell proposed to do was this: to take raw troops, divorce them from the possibility of retreat, abandon fixed supply lines as completely as did Sherman in Georgia, make them dependent on air drops alone, drive them two hundred miles through jungle, swamp, and mountain to conquer a skillful, entrenched, and desperate enemy.

The bare outlines of the campaign were simple enough. The great objective was the open lowland of north-central Burma, where the meter-gauge railway wound its way through the linked towns of Mogaung and Myitkyina. If these two towns could be seized, a road might be built through the jungle from India to reach them, and then pushed on toward the Chinese border of Yünnan, to end the great blockade.

Joseph W. Stilwell
The Stilwell Papers

SUPPORT

4-153. Advisor teams support partner forces with capabilities and capacity to facilitate mission success. As an advisor team activity, support specifically refers to lethal, nonlethal and tactical support provided to the partner force at the tactical or operational level.

4-154. During mission planning, advisor teams may identify capability gaps within the partner force that hinder the ability of the foreign counterparts to achieve mission success. Support may include providing access to capabilities such as MEDEVAC, fire support (specifically Joint Air-Ground Integration Center capabilities), or specialized engineer resources. The amount of support should be based upon the conditions, resources, and time available. Advisors must responsibly coordinate and provide support to the partner force to help achieve success but not to create a reliance on U.S. Forces. Building the green COP and feeding it into the JTF/combined joint task force blue COP will allow for sufficient communication and support for joint operations and coordination between mission capabilities.

SUPPORTING CONSIDERATIONS THROUGH THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

4-155. *Support* is the action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action (JP 1, Vol. 2). Advisor considerations while executing the support activity include competition, crisis, and armed conflict.

4-156. Advisor teams should receive training on the legal, technical, and tactical considerations for providing specific support requests to FSF. This training should include information regarding the current foreign security force capabilities, sustainment, and support assets available, rules of engagement for employing fires and rules or legal guidance for providing supplies, food, medical support, among other considerations. Advisor teams and SFAB staff must become familiar with the foreign security force organizations and equipment, particularly the capabilities of weapons and equipment not found in the U.S. inventory.

4-157. Support provided to a foreign security force can vary across the competition continuum, but generally is substantial while in conflict and lessens as the situation transitions to competition or as the FSF's capabilities and capacities increase. While success on the battlefield is critical, especially for the Soldiers conducting the fight, SFAB commanders and advisor teams must continuously assess the tactical need of the support for the current fight versus the long-term operational and strategic development of the capability within the foreign security force. If advisor teams provide external support every time a foreign security force makes a request, the foreign security force is less likely to develop the capability on its own.

Competition

4-158. Competition support focuses on the long-term development of multiple FSF capacities and capabilities.

4-159. Advisor teams aim to assist FSF in reinforcing the legitimacy of their government to the local populace as well as building confidence within the FSF itself. When providing support to the FSF, advisor teams must first identify the resources, systems, institutions, and capabilities that are available to the FSF and themselves in theater. Additionally, advisor teams should understand the mission and operational variables that may influence their operations and ability to provide support. Understanding these factors allows advisor teams to plan for the likely support requirements that their foreign counterparts may ask them to provide. OE conditions can rapidly change; therefore, advisor teams should anticipate potential support requests as operations persist.

Crisis

4-160. Crisis support changes to focus on short-term reactions and developmental needs to address the specific crisis at hand. This could include C2 systems, logistics support, or whatever the specific crisis might dictate.

Armed Conflict

4-161. Support in armed conflict focuses on only the most immediate requirements to defeat or reduce the current threat. This should focus on specific warfighting capability gaps that are needed to survive and thrive in the execution of LSCO. During execution, the most highly sought after support capabilities that SFAB advisors can access for the partner force are communications systems, joint fires, and the detailed allied and partner (blue and green) COP.

Supporting in Large-Scale Combat Operations

4-162. Support in LSCO can vary widely from discrete foreign military sales cases to U.S. and FSF formations fighting side by side on the battlefield. In all cases, the SFABs have an important role to play in interpreting and communicating the wants and needs of both the U.S. and the partner forces. Embedded SFA advisors, with their unique knowledge of the region and partner FSF capabilities, support and enable an agile response by the joint force in the rapid transition to combat operations and during execution of those operations. Whether it is a capabilities shortfall a partner force needs (for example, short-range air defense, antitank guided missiles, or C2 systems) or an immediate effect (for example, joint fires, resupply, or MEDEVAC), a joint force commander will likely seek out the advice of SFAB personnel to validate FSF's requests for support.

4-163. When engaged in large-scale training exercises or combat operations, the SFAB advisor team's knowledge of U.S. Army maneuver doctrine can substantially mitigate the friction of U.S. formations working alongside a foreign security force. For example, the complexity of an operation like a passage of

lines can be significantly reduced from the integration of advisors at echelon and at the contact and passage points between U.S. conventional formations and the FSF.

4-164. SFA advisor teams support the partner FSF with capabilities and capacity to enable mission success. Effective support can provide sustainment and protection to partner FSF allowing for an effective transition to armed conflict.

4-165. In the transition to armed conflict, embedded security force advisors, with their unique knowledge of the region and partner FSF capabilities, support and enable an agile response by the joint force in the rapid transition to combat operations (see JP 3-0 for more information). SFA forces collocated or embedded with the partner FSF support and enable synchronization of activities, fill key capability gaps, and help to ensure unity of purpose and mutual support in offensive operations (see FM 3-0 for more information).

Liaison between the 8th Army and the ROKA

While the ROKA officers reorganized their remaining regiments as best as they could by re-integrating stragglers as they caught up with their parent units, KMAG headquarters assumed a new role to act as a liaison between Walker's (Lt Gen. Walton "Bulldog" Walker, Commander of Eighth Army, [September 1948-December 1950]) Eighth Army and the Koreans. For the moment, KMAG—thanks to its field advisors—was in a position to provide the situation awareness Walker desperately needed. KMAG also became responsible to ensure that Walker's directives were passed to the Korean Army and followed. This was a significant change in focus for advisors, as they now were held responsible for the performance of their units in discharging Eighth Army orders. Among these were directives to standardize personnel, logistics, and operations reporting in accordance with accepted American practices. It took a few months, but by September, KMAG could report that the Korean army at least was operating along recognizable principles in conducting its military operations.

Bryan R. Gibby
The Will to Win: American military advisors in Korea, 1946-1953

LIAISE

4-166. *Liaison* is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action (FM 6-0). Advisor teams should be able to liaise with a U.S partner, especially during shifts between competition, crisis, and conflict. Liaison teams work to increase understanding of mission and tactics with other forces, convey information, enhance mutual trust, and improve teamwork. (See JP 3-08 for more information.)

4-167. When advisor teams are working with foreign counterparts and there is a U.S. unit in the same or adjacent AO, the advisor teams have a responsibility to liaise and coordinate with the U.S. unit. In addition to the informal liaison via the SFAB advisors, formal liaison and coordination should occur between the partner force and the other U.S. units. This is true regardless of the context. For example, the U.S. unit and the partner force may be partners in a MNF answering to the same commander. In another case, the U.S. unit may have a unilateral mission under a different chain of command. In either of these examples, the partner force and the U.S. unit may have exchanged liaison officers at their echelon or between their higher headquarters. Neither of these situations removes the responsibility of the advisor teams to conduct liaison and coordination. From the perspective of the other U.S. unit, the SFAB advisor teams have expert knowledge of the partner force that they do not have. This can be critical to avoid misunderstandings and misperceptions. Through liaisons, advisor teams conduct, coordinate, and share information gained from assessments, information analyses, and commanders' guidance.

4-168. The ability to monitor and coordinate are the two most essential specific tasks for proper liaison functions. SFA advisors must be able to monitor the partner FSF unit to which they are assigned, as well as their own parent organization. Monitoring should track combat power status, enable situational understanding, and synchronize lethal and nonlethal effects. As a representative of the commander, SFA

advisors must understand their own commander's intent, guidance, mission, and concept of operations. They must also be technically and tactically competent to coordinate on behalf of their own commander, and with the partner FSF for tactical matters to achieve and maintain unity of effort.

4-169. As the need for formal liaisons can change frequently, every operation that SFABs engage in will have differing liaise task requirements. As such, SFABs should train all advisors to conduct the liaise activity captured in paragraphs 4-170 through 4-182.

LIAISING CONSIDERATIONS THROUGH THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

4-170. Advisors execute liaise through the competition continuum by both monitoring and coordinating activities between the two forces. An effective liaison aggressively seeks to develop an understanding of ongoing operations and does not passively wait for information to arrive.

Competition

4-171. Liaising efforts are widely spread across numerous FSF entities, both MOD and executive functions, and are focused on relationship building, identification and sharing of best practices, and long-term capability and capacity goals.

Crisis

4-172. Liaising efforts tailor to the specific area of crisis and focus on identifying and communicating the most current information on the crisis to build the widest COP for both the United States and the FSF.

Armed Conflict

4-173. Liaising efforts tailor very closely to monitoring and reporting on the ongoing conflict. Special attention should be given to ensuring the same COP is understood at both the parent and liaised organizations.

4-174. The complexity of the liaising activity increases dramatically as the situation moves from competition and crisis to conflict. As such, liaising in LSCO might look drastically different than liaising in competition.

LIAISING IN LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

4-175. SFAB advisors may be asked to perform the liaison activity with a partner force during LSCO. In this scenario, the SFAB advisor teams may provide direct support to a partner force and serve as an embedded link between the foreign force and other U.S. organizations. For example, if a foreign division is serving within a combined JTF during LSCO, SFAB advisor teams may be placed within the division, brigade, and even battalion headquarters of the foreign military division. This increases the capability of the foreign force to integrate into the larger operation, tie into U.S. enablers, and provide greater situational understanding to both the foreign and U.S. Forces. When operating in this role, SFAB advisor teams will likely have contact with liaison detachments which may include DLDs and theater liaison detachments (TLDs).

LIAISON DETACHMENTS

4-176. Liaison detachments, including DLDs and TLDs, provide SFA to the partner FSF by bridging C2 system interoperability gaps over a short time horizon. Liaison detachments assist subordinate, parallel, joint, or multinational headquarters in an operational area by providing digital information management and communications interface capability between U.S. systems and otherwise non-interoperable systems (see FM 3-22 for more information). The DLD or TLD allow the FSF to communicate on a multinational network, filling an interoperability gap. TLDs and DLDs provide SFA by supplementing a foreign security force's military and civilian senior leaders' ability to expand access and create options for FSF C2. While DLDs and TLDs fill short-term gaps, SFABs assist with longer-term development of partner capabilities and capacities to, over time, close interoperability gaps (see ATP 3-94.1 for more information on TLDs and DLDs).

4-177. During LSCO, a theater army provides liaison detachments to foreign militaries or government agencies to rapidly deconflict a C2 interoperability gap. For example, the tactical equivalent of a DLD occurs when temporarily attaching a radiotelephone operator with a filled radio to an adjacent leader when they have lost (or never had) the ability to communicate during the mission at hand. At the upper tactical and operational levels, liaison detachments possess the necessary network and communications architecture to assist with

necessary coordination and communication for synchronizing operations between a multinational land force and the U.S. CCDR or coalition component commander. Moreover, TLDs and DLDs ensure communications interoperability across the joint force. When adjacent units lack adequate communications capabilities, TLDs or DLDs may ensure consistent and reliable COP sharing. In this case, the liaison facilitates sharing the green, blue, and purple COP between the partnered unit and U.S. Forces.

Note. When used in this capacity during LSCO, the SFAB typical guidance of advising at echelon or two levels higher may not apply.

FUNCTIONS OF A SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE LIAISON OFFICER

4-178. Liaisons, whether individually or in teams, perform several critical functions that are consistent across the range of military operations. The skill set, rank, and experience requirement for an advisor acting as a liaison is a deliberate decision made by the commander. Liaisons should never be the person the organization can spare; it needs to be a critical trusted advisor. Liaisons should be prepared to perform four functions.

Monitoring Operations

4-179. Liaison officers must monitor the operations of both the unit of which they are a liaison officer and the advisor team or SFAB that sent them and understand how each affects the other. As a minimum, the liaison officer must know the current situation and planned operations, understand pertinent staff issues, and are sensitive to parent commanders and the organic SFAB commander's desires.

Coordinating Operations

4-180. Liaison officers facilitate synchronization of current operations and plans between the sending organization and the unit at which they are acting as a liaison officer. The liaison officer does this through coordination with other liaison officers, members of the adjacent staff, and the parent command. Liaison officers should meet routinely with staff officers and commanders in the headquarters and readily know how to contact them. The understanding and procedures liaison officers build while monitoring the situation help facilitate the synchronization of the SFAB's operations and plans with those of the unit at which they are conducting liaison by coordinating the communication process.

Advising Commands

4-181. The liaison officer is the receiving headquarters' expert on the SFAB's capabilities and limitations. Liaison officers must be able to advise the commander and the staff on the optimal use of the command they represent.

Assisting Levels

4-182. The liaison officer must assist on two levels. First, the liaison officer must act as the conduit between the SFAB and the receiving headquarters. Second, by integrating into the receiving headquarters and attending various boards, meetings, and planning sessions, liaison officers can answer their questions and ensure they make informed decisions with the SFAB, their advisor teams, and with the partner force requirements in mind. (See JP 3-33 for more information.)

Advising during Combat Operations in Korea

During the retreat toward Pusan, the KMAG advisors had been forced on many occasions to drop their advisory roles and become operational. Faced with a desperate situation, they insisted that their suggestions be followed, and in the field they virtually commanded ROK Army formations. The methods were sometimes harsh but frequently were the only means of slowing the rout and making the ROK forces take up defensive positions along the way south. Had the KMAG advisors not employed such measures in the time of crisis, the U.S. aid from Japan and the United States might well have arrived too late to have saved South Korea.

ADVISE

4-183. Advising is an extension of diplomacy and professionalism maintaining long-lasting relationships between mission partners. This has the capacity to exist and leverage through competition, crisis, and armed conflict with the possibility of future operations and continued support. Therefore, advise exists both as a developmental activity, and a conflict integration activity.

4-184. As an advisor team conflict integration activity, advise refers to the process of providing guidance, coaching, counseling, and mentorship to a counterpart to make their operations or activities more successful. Advisor teams conduct this role with their counterparts throughout all stages of training, operations, and execution of SFA activities. This section describes how SFAB advisor teams fulfill their advising function alongside partner forces while addressing each of the remaining SFA activities.

4-185. Partner force development through SFA requires effort over time. Measure success by the increase in the partner forces' capability, capacity, competency, commitment, and confidence in areas in which U.S. Forces are assisting them. The SFA activities include plan, resource, generate, employ, transition, and sustain. Through SFA, the partner forces' capability and capacity to execute these activities should improve over time.

ADVISING CONSIDERATIONS THROUGH THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

4-186. The scope of advising begins with the broadest scope in competition and narrows into more focused missions as it progresses into crisis and conflict. For example, in competition when the price of suboptimal FSF adaptation is low, advisors conduct holistic unit advising potentially encompassing many tenants of operations within their team specialties valuing interpersonal gains more highly than proficiency; however, in crises and conflict, the risk of neglecting specific advising such as base security or tactical mission task proficiencies is much higher and advisors transition to a more assertive method of advising. This dynamic is depicted in figure 4-11.




Figure 4-11. Advisor assertiveness framework

Competition

4-187. Freedom of movement is very permissive; force protection considerations are minimal and driven by guidance from the embassy. Command relationships remain linear and direct. Advising efforts may be focused on training management and specific collective training exercises.

Crisis

4-188. SFA advising actions shift to de-escalating and returning to the competition phase. Freedom of movement is more restrictive, security posture is heightened, and command relationships may shift to a more JTF or multinational structure. Advising efforts may be focused on deployment operations, initial operational planning, and ensuring shared understanding of the status of the crisis.

Armed Conflict

4-189. Freedom of movement is severely restricted and must be specifically directed from higher headquarters. Security posture is at its highest level; command relationships and reporting are cumbersome. Advising efforts may be focused on battle tracking and planning future tactical operations.

Advising in Large-Scale Combat Operations

4-190. In certain situations where it is both desired and supportable, advisor teams may provide advising capabilities to partner forces while actively engaged in LSCO. The nature of the advice provided could range from institutional questions outside of the active LSCO fight, employment considerations of assets or capabilities in the fight, or questions as to coalition plans and how to execute certain tactical maneuvers.

4-191. When coordinating with partner forces, the advising team should take translation requirements into account to be sure the proper orders and intent are relayed and understood. Even when there is not a language barrier, the "English to English" translation of U.S. Army or joint doctrine to FSF doctrine might necessitate an advisor to ensure the nuanced commander's intent is understood by the partner.

SECTION III – ADVISOR TEAM EMPLOYMENT

4-192. The ability to task-organize and employ advisors in a variety of ways and across a wide range of environments is the SFAB's greatest contribution to the CCMD. This section describes additional employment considerations for commanders, staffs, and advisor team leaders when planning for operations.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

4-193. Commanders and staffs must deliberately consider and plan against the operational considerations listed in paragraphs 4-195 through 4-206. These factors will influence the right and left limits within which advisor teams can operate.

4-194. SFABs maximize their personnel to capitalize on engagements of opportunity to advance U.S. interests. SFAB teams act as a force multiplier and problem-solving entity enabling independent operations for the partner force. Commanders can seek to decentralize teams in country to maximize advising efforts across the AOR. Commanders must take into consideration the separate existing lines of effort and ensure that team operations do not interfere with other ongoing operations.

Decentralized Operations

4-195. The SFAB can expect missions that require multiple advisor teams across multiple countries. Additionally, the SFAB has the capacity to deploy an entire brigade to a single country or subordinate battalions to a specific region. The requests generated from the embassy, ASCC or the CCMD determine the requirements. Advisors are encouraged to leverage disciplined initiative and the advisor network in mitigating the communication challenges associated with decentralized operations. Decentralized forces require additional sustainment support.

Proximity, Frequency, and Duration

4-196. The proximity of advisors to the partner force is an important planning factor. The SFAB's mission, authorities, rules of engagement, status-of-forces agreements, risk assessments, and other factors determine how closely the advisor teams work with their counterparts. These factors determine the initial advising proximity and frequency and will be adjusted as advisor teams complete their initial assessment and as they continue monitoring activities over time. Frequent contact may help develop trust between the two forces; however, advisors must view their relationships with their partners as a separate line of effort. A relationship should be intentional in nature; it does not just happen. The relationship can span from advisors living with their counterparts, periodic visits in preparation for specific events or operations, or even advising through video teleconferences.

4-197. Advisor activities, advisor team mission, and advisor location are categorized into three levels which describe the degree of interaction with their mission partner over time.

Level 1 – Persistent

4-198. Advisor teams develop their counterparts on a continuous, persistent (usually daily) basis either from an embedded footprint or in proximity to facilitate required frequency of engagements. Engagements range from daily to weekly depending on partner requirements. Duration is long-term covering multiple force package rotations.

Level 2 – Episodic

4-199. During level 2, episodic advising, advisor teams work with their counterparts on a less frequent basis to enable their continued development. The duration of this interaction varies, usually 2-3 months, depending on partner requirements. Proximity and frequency remain similar to level 1 advising.

Level 3 – Short Duration

4-200. Advisors provide advice from a centralized location (such as at a regional training center or school), during a battlefield circulation, or a staff assistance visit.

CONFLICT INTENSITY

4-201. Conflict intensity plays an important role in determining the placement and access of SFAB units alongside the partner forces. Acknowledging the current position along the competition continuum (competition, crisis, and conflict) is a joint decision between the U.S. Department of State, DOD, and the partner force.

4-202. In a permissive environment, the SFAB can disperse advising teams across a larger geographic area. In a less-permissive environment, the SFAB may experience limited operational access associated with higher risk and increased threat. The rules of engagement, legal authorities, and the status-of-forces agreement with the host nation guides the advisor team's higher headquarters operations under various conflict intensities.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

4-203. The advisor team's higher headquarters will develop and disseminate rules of engagement. When necessary, SFAB commanders and staffs request modifications to the rules of engagement through the appropriate channels. SFAB leaders must ensure advisor teams understand how the rules of engagement affect the type of support they can provide to their counterparts. Advisors must communicate these limitations to the partner forces to manage expectations and maintain credibility. SFAB members must also understand the application of self-defense and collective self-defense as it applies to their counterparts. Finally, the SFAB members must understand the variations and caveats to the law of armed conflict and rules of engagement that the partner forces operate under.

4-204. Higher echelons of the partner force typically develop their rules of engagement. SFAB members may train and advise their counterparts to follow the tenants of the law of armed conflict and rules of engagement. This is particularly during partner training or operations. Violations must be reported through higher headquarters in accordance with established SOPs.

NATIONAL CAVEATS

4-205. National caveats are a nondoctrinal concept that describes the limitations or restrictions imposed by a nation on the use of its military forces, assets, or capabilities as part of a MNF or other UAPs. They are established to ensure that national interests, policies, and legal obligations are mutually respected during multinational operations. National caveats present unique challenges and can result in a partner force being unwilling or unable to execute certain tasks even if similar U.S. Army units would face no restriction. Conversely, U.S. law may restrict active participation in activities that the FSF are expected to execute based off the laws of their own country. It is not the responsibility of the advisor to enforce U.S. laws or U.S. Army norms upon FSF; however, all possible violations of the law of armed conflict must be immediately communicated to the higher headquarters. It is important for advisors to identify and understand when national caveats might be present and to communicate those details.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

4-206. SFAB commanders, staffs, teams, and advisors must adhere to or consider several legal agreements. These may include authorities under U.S. law, status-of-forces agreements with host nations, ACSAs, law of armed conflict, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, host-nation laws, and other forms of legal authority under which the SFAB operates. National-level legal agreements should be started early in the planning process prior to advisor teams arriving on location or else advisor team activities may be delayed. Advisors also act in an ethical manner always as representatives of the U.S. Government. When questions of legal authority, obligation, or ethical conflicts arise, advisors contact their brigade judge advocate for further guidance.

ORGANIZATIONAL REPORTING STRUCTURE

4-207. The SFAB employs advisor teams in a variety of configurations based on assigned tasks and the operational and mission variables. Each of the following configurations provides benefits and drawbacks:

- Horizontal.
- Vertical.
- Mixed.

4-208. These reporting structures describe how the SFAB commanders and staffs manage advisor teams conducting SFA. This includes coordinating themes and messages, coordinating information among the echelon of advisors, gathering and archiving assessments, resolving conflicts between advisor teams, and supporting elements or the partner forces, and other functions directly related to the success of the SFA mission. They do not describe the various command and support relationships that may be in place.

4-209. Organizational reporting structures apply to the SFAB advisor teams regardless of how many teams are employed. Well-established organizational reporting structures depict how each advisor team communicates with other SFAB units and organizations in-theater. This should include guidance on what reports, requests, and other information SFAB elements share between each organization. For example, an advisor team operating in a non-JOA environment may receive its missions through the country team, submit administrative reports through its organic higher headquarters, and request contract support through the supporting ASCC. All these considerations should be established and clearly articulated to each advisor team and its supporting organizations.

4-210. Take care when establishing reporting structures to promote maximum decision-making authority at the advisor team level. An overly complex process or onerous requirements may risk the credibility of the advisor and slow the decision-making process.

HORIZONTAL

4-211. The horizontal reporting structure is the most challenging arrangement to exercise C2 over during the SFA mission, however, it is the most useful reporting structure while employing large numbers of advisor teams. Horizontal reporting is characterized by the dispersal of company, battalion, and brigade leaders throughout one or multiple AO. This limits personnel at the command post to receive and disseminate reports, manage current operations, plan for future operations, and to battle track SFA operations.

4-212. When using the horizontal reporting structure, subordinate elements report SFA-related information directly to their battalion main command post. The battalion main command posts serve as the first echelon to receive SFA-related reports directly from advisor teams. For example, if a single Infantry battalion has seven advisor teams dispersed across an AO, the battalion main command post becomes C2 node where all seven advisor teams send their SFA mission-related reports.

4-213. The horizontal reporting structure allows the SFAB to apply maximum influence through their approximately 36 advisor teams when operating in one or multiple AOs. However, since many of the advisor teams consist of key SFAB leaders, the command post assumes a greater responsibility for receiving reports than the other reporting structures. The command post must also remain capable of conducting planning for current and future SFA operations, controlling information collection activities, and assisting with emergencies as required.

VERTICAL

4-214. Vertical reporting structures provide the most traditional flow of information and reporting. When using this structure, the SFAB operates command posts in every company and higher organization. Use this structure when the SFAB is less concerned with employing the maximum number of advisor teams and is more concerned with maintaining C2 of its SFA mission. Vertical reporting structures are particularly effective when synchronized at echelon with the partner force.

4-215. When using this reporting structure, no more than one brigade or battalion-level advisor team is away from the command post at any given time. This allows senior leaders to be present for issuing guidance for current or future operations as required. At the company level, the advisor teams cannot conduct advising operations and maintain a command post without additional augmentation. However, units may organize individual members of the company advisor teams with subordinate advisor teams to provide limited duration technical support.

MIXED

4-216. The mixed structure is a combination of both the vertical and horizontal structures and is used within the same SFAB, at either the battalion or brigade level. For example, one Infantry battalion could establish a horizontal structure with all seven of its advisor teams reporting to the battalion command post. Another battalion could establish a vertical reporting structure that limits the number of advisor teams to approximately four within its AO.

4-217. In another scenario, the Infantry battalion designates one company to establish a command post. The other company does not operate a command post and instead organize into MATs. In this case, the Infantry battalion may have two advisor teams reporting directly to the battalion command post while the remaining two report through their company command posts to battalion. There are situations that may result in advisor teams, within subordinate battalions, reporting directly to the brigade command post due to location, priority of effort, available resources, assets, and other considerations. These situations fall under the mixed reporting structure. Figure 4-12 on page 136 shows an example of a mixed brigade reporting structure along with vertical, horizontal, and mixed battalion reporting structures.




Figure 4-12. Organization reporting structure

ADVISOR TEAM ORGANIZATION

4-218. When working alongside partner forces, the SFAB may arrange advisors in a variety of ways. It is important to note whether the team is focused on improving capacity, capability, or interoperability. Advisors generally find themselves working with tactical partner force commanders and staffs, providing guidance and assistance during planning and operations. However, there are cases when other relationships may be appropriate, to include augmentation and sometimes partnership arrangements. This section describes these relationships.

4-219. After identifying initial SFA requirements, commanders and staffs assign advising teams against those requirements. Augment advisor teams with the necessary personnel to complete the assigned mission. Typically, this includes personnel with technical knowledge such as signal, logistics, maintenance, and other functions. Advising teams coordinate with their assigned counterparts to begin SFA operations. As the mission persists, the advisor force package will likely change as the advising team refines the partner force requirements.

4-220. Advising teams maintain continuity with their counterparts during planning and mission preparation. As elements of the partner force become more capable, the advisor relationship can shift between different tasks of OTEBA. The advisor may assist in coordinating resources and assets, as well as oversee some processes, such as close air support, joint fires, MEDEVAC, EOD, employment of joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, and engagements with other UAPs. These outside enablers may provide capabilities absent in the partner force.

SPECIAL AREAS OF CONCERN

4-221. SFAB employment should remain flexible in nature to adapt to the environment and cater to the needs of the partner force. Advisors problem-solve by finding and generating solutions for their partners regardless of MOS. SFAB units may not align precisely with the task organization of their partner force, for example, perhaps their counterparts do not have an engineer battalion or field artillery battalion. These BATs can be task-organized and used to address other areas of concern (or that same area of concern but with an alternate partner). Paragraphs 4-222 through 4-228 are examples of utilizing advisor teams in specific areas of concern.

Advise Higher

4-222. Advisor teams may be tasked to augment a higher SFAB element or to advise a higher echelon within their specific functional expertise. Advising higher than two-levels up occurs most often when the assigned mission partner's organization does not contain a like-element to advise. For example, when advising FSF that does not have a dedicated engineer organization, or wholly lacks engineer capabilities, the EBAT may augment the brigade advisor team and focus on advising brigade staff. In a second example, an EAT, which is typically aligned with a partner engineer battalion or brigade, may advise at the division staff level. In this case, the EAT augments a brigade advisor team and aligns with staff elements responsible for the protection warfighting function

Advise a Nonstandard Partner

4-223. If the partner forces do not have a singular individual responsible for a function, the advisor can find a nonstandard partner who is capable of handling that function. For instance, if a partner force lacks a formal SPO section, the LBAT could find whoever is integrating logistics, regardless of their formal position within the partner force, and advise them.

Weight the Advisor Allocation

4-224. If one region or sector is permissive and the counter partner force is competent, the commander can decide to task-organize a smaller advisor force for that area while creating a more robust capability in another sector.

PARTNERING WITH COMMANDERS

4-225. By accompanying the partner commander during the receipt of mission from their higher headquarters, the team leader can provide necessary guidance to other advisor teams needing to plan and prepare for potential missions. Team leaders may provide counsel and guidance to the partner commander regarding mission planning. The advisor monitors how the subordinate partner forces comprehend their commander's intent and all specified or implied tasks. Team leaders continuously compare the information that they receive through their advisor network versus what their partner counterparts receive through their chain of command. This continuous comparison is a method of analysis that allows team leaders and their counterparts to operate with a shared understanding and resolve potential issues before they become serious issues.

PARTNERING WITH STAFF

4-226. Staff advisors assist the partner force with developing operational plans, managing current operations, and integrating warfighting functions. SFABs should organize staff advisors across the warfighting functions and augment with specialty advisors as necessary based on assessments of counterpart partner forces and their requirements. Advisors may also be assigned to partner force integrated cells, such as current operations and future operations planning. Regardless of the formal structure, advisors should be nested with how the partner force runs their operations process. Prior to assigning advisors against staff advising requirements, ensure those personnel have the appropriate experience and training to provide value to the partner forces and their mission. This can be challenging, even when advising only one echelon higher. (See FM 6-0 for more information on MDMP and individual duties and responsibilities.) Figure 4-13 on page 138 shows an example of how advisor team leaders may array their advisor team to fulfill typical staff roles for internal planning or operating alongside a partner force staff.

Advisor Position	*Warfighting Function*	*Typical Staff Role*
Team Leader		Executive Officer
Assistant Team Leader (NCOIC)	Movement and Maneuver	S-3
Train and Advise NCO	Movement and Maneuver	Assistant S-3
Intelligence Advisor	Intelligence	S-2
Fires Advisor	Fires	Fires Support Officer
Signal Advisor	Command and Control	S-6
Logistics Advisor	Sustainment	S-4
Mechanic Advisor	Sustainment	Assistant S-4
Explosive Hazard Advisor	Protection	Engineer Officer
Medical Advisor	Sustainment and Protection	Medical Officer

LEGEND

NCO	**NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER**	**S-3**	**OPERATIONS STAFF OFFICER**
NCOIC	**NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER IN CHARGE**	**S-4**	**LOGISTICS STAFF OFFICER**
S-2	**INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER**	**S-6**	**SIGNAL STAFF OFFICER**

Figure 4-13. Advisor team staff roles, example

4-227. While aligning a specific advisor position against a particular warfighting function or staff section can be effective, advisors should ensure that they maintain awareness of the whole operation and understand the interaction of the warfighting functions and staff sections. The partner force may not have a counterpart for that advisor, and that is when that advisor is expected to exhibit flexibility and identify other engagements of opportunity to advise partner force.

Partnering with Companies

4-228. Advisors sent to elements below battalion level help their partner force counterparts analyze the mission and commander's intent from higher headquarters. They assist the partner force in executing the partner force equivalent of the troop leading procedures, the eight-step training model, and training management. Advisors also assist their counterparts in analyzing the mission variables. From these variables, advisors help their foreign counterparts develop a course of action that meets the higher headquarters' concept of operations and commander's intent. The advisors report assessments to their higher headquarters. Through their understanding of the broader plan, they identify discrepancies between the lower and higher echelons and resolve issues through coaching their counterparts. Finally, advisors provide guidance and assistance during the conduct of operations.

ADVISOR TEAM PLANNING MODELS

4-229. Through the planning process, advisor teams have an obligation to help the partner force achieve their objectives in support of U.S. national interests (for example, as described by the integrated country strategies, and theater campaign plans). The advisor team must understand the U.S. rules of engagement, higher headquarters and national caveats, the assigned mission from the CCMD and the relevant partner force authorities. Within this context, advisor teams must develop their foreign counterparts and ensure their long-term success using local, feasible, and sustainable solutions.

4-230. Different sources can generate advisor team missions. Advising teams receive some missions through OPCON or TACON command relationships. At other times, adjacent units, the partner force, or the advising team themselves generate missions. Regardless of the origin, the planning process must account for the higher headquarters with tasking authority, the partner force, and the advisor team capabilities. All planning steps require a continuous assessment and communication with the partner force and higher headquarters.

4-231. When an advisor team receives an order from their higher headquarters, a variation of the following steps occur:

- Higher headquarters issues an order.
- The advisor team receives the mission and begins mission analysis.

- The advisor team develops an initial course of action and nests the plan with the higher headquarters' mission intent, national objectives, and partner force objectives.
- The advisor team executes a course of action analysis and comparison with the partner force, communicating the results back to orders-issuing-authority, including any partner force constraints.
- Higher headquarters issues a fragmentary order or new operation order upon the advisor team receiving course of action approval.
- The advisor team and the partner force execute orders production.
- The assessment continues.

PARTNER FORCE PLAN ASSISTANCE

4-232. When a partner force plans a mission that is outside the scope of the advisor team's assigned mission, the advisor team requests permission from their higher headquarters to participate. While the partner force does not control the advisor team, the advisors want to support their partners whenever possible. When planning a mission that is initially generated from the partner force, the advisor team generally follows these steps:

- The partner force issues a plan (advisor team receipt of potential mission).
- The advisor team continues to conduct advisor team activities with the partner force and assists with their planning process.
- In parallel, the advisor team requests permission from higher headquarters to participate in the mission and requests resources (mission analysis).
- The advisor team supports the partner force course of action development, analysis, comparison, approval, and orders production.
- Advisor teams reach back to their higher headquarters for any adjustments to their orders and guidance.
- At a minimum, advisor teams battle track the partner force, maintain a green COP, communicate to their higher headquarters, and continue to request resources in support of the partner force mission.
- Upon mission completion, advisor teams update their partner force assessments and then recommends the following:
  - Follow-on missions.
  - Training plan adjustments.
  - Refining support requirements.

4-233. The process for partner force planned operations can differ and change between competition, crisis, and conflict. The relationship and rigor of previous advising efforts in (intentional or unintentional) preparation for partner-planned-operations will be a major determinant of the viability, efficiency, and permissions of participation.

ADVISOR TEAM PLAN

4-234. When advisor teams generate a plan at their level, that plan is constrained by both the support of the partner force and the higher headquarters. Receiving concurrence for these plans is more difficult since they require both the UAPs and the advisor team's higher headquarters approval. They can be the most useful, however, since these plans are in direct response to identified capability gaps within the partner force. When generating a plan at their level, advisor teams follow a variation of several steps described in paragraphs 4-235 through 4-242.

CAPABILITY GAP

4-235. While conducting advisor team activities, the advisor team identifies a capability gap within the partner force.

COURSE OF ACTION FOR FUTURE OPERATION

4-236. The advisor team leader proposes the course of action to the partner force to generate buy in for the future operation to be conducted. (It must mesh with what the partner force wants; the partner force cannot be simply compelled by the demands of the advisor team.)

INITIAL PLAN

4-237. The advisor team develops an initial plan to help the partner force correct the capability gap. For example, the advisor team's receipt of potential mission.

PARTNER FORCE ASSISTANCE FROM ADVISOR TEAMS

4-238. Advisor teams then guide the partner force to use their doctrine and resources to fill that gap. If the gap is due to a lack of doctrine or resources, the advisor team requests support from the appropriate headquarters (mission analysis).

VALIDATE REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. SUPPORT

4-239. Before giving U.S. doctrine or additional resources to the partner force, the advisor team conducts a full foreign disclosure review and assessment to validate the requirements (course of action development, analysis, and comparison).

COMPLETE PLAN SUBMISSION

4-240. Upon completion of the foreign disclosure review, the advisor team develops and communicates a suitable, feasible, distinguishable, and complete plan between the higher headquarters and partner force to fill the capability gap (course of action approval).

ORDERS PRODUCTION AND EXECUTION

4-241. Advisor teams then work with their higher headquarters and the partner force during orders production and execution.

RISK MANAGEMENT

4-242. Risk management has a pronounced role when planning advisor team missions. Because of the nature of these missions, deliberate thought and planning must take place to ensure advisor teams and their higher headquarters have implemented the appropriate contingency plans and risk mitigation steps appropriate to the competition, crisis, and conflict.

PARALLEL PLANNING

4-243. When planning with a partner force, it is crucial to understand their objectives to solicit buy in. Regardless of the U.S. picture (integrated country strategy, TSCP, national security plan), the planned mission will not likely go forward if the partner force is not bought in.

4-244. The specifics of the SFAB's mission determine the character of its parallel planning relationship with the partner force. When planning with the partner force, the SFAB team leader and subordinates will provide advice and guidance to their counterparts. Advisors must understand the vision and goals of their higher headquarters and partner force to do this effectively. While advisors operate in an environment with unique variables, understanding the broad context of their SFA mission allows them to provide advice and guidance to the partner force that is consistent with U.S. goals and objectives.

4-245. When planning with a partner force, advisors must understand their counterpart's priorities and end state, higher headquarters' goals and objectives, and other operational variables. Advisor teams must then understand, visualize, and describe their desired goals, objectives, and an end state in relation to their foreign counterparts. Providing this information to subordinate advisors gives them the necessary context for planning with their counterparts in support of a common vision and allows them to execute disciplined initiative.

4-246. When advising a partner force, advisor teams conduct parallel planning at all appropriate echelons as dictated by the mission. The SFABs must develop their own internal advising plans while being prepared to coach their counterparts through operations and staff processes.

4-247. Staff sections conduct continuous mission analysis. They analyze the SFA goals against their task organization, authorities, limitations, and potential problems. Staffs use warfighting functions as a guide to organize this analysis. In some cases, the nature of SFA may require a different model to analyze operations.

Staffs may determine they cannot accomplish the mission through cross-leveling resources or task organization and that it requires augmentation. The advisor team submits a request for forces to its higher headquarters as necessary. Chapter 5 describes augmentation considerations in more detail.

4-248. The advisor team should always conduct an abbreviated mission analysis prior to mission planning with the partner forces at a minimum. Mission analysis by the SFAB organizations allows the following:

- Giving time to do prior coordination to avoid potential conflicts between the partner forces and other UAPs.
- Providing updated SFA themes and guidance to the advisor team.
- Providing the advisor team time to develop effective teaching and mentoring tools to foster counterpart understanding of the operation.
- Allowing advisors to stay with their counterpart throughout the partner force planning process, which requires preplanning and coordination between the advisor team and the foreign counterpart unit.

4-249. SFAB priorities may differ from the partner force. Within the boundaries established by the SFAB's higher headquarters, operational plans should be responsive to the priorities of the partner forces and coordinated with other UAPs through reporting and liaisons. Advisors coach their counterparts to also account for other organizations and their priorities in the AO. Some aspects of planning include the following:

- Selecting the application of combat power to minimize population casualties.
- Coordinating regional and provisional plans.
- Disseminating this information to subordinate units.
- Providing time for subordinates to plan and prepare for operations.
- Developing situational estimates.
- Coordinating plans with other advisors in the AO, including those outside of the SFAB.
- Synchronizing both FSF and U.S. COPs in addition to both shareable enemy operating pictures to develop a shared understanding with the partner force.

4-250. The outcome of advisors planning with the partner force counterparts should be a plan or an order that—

- Fosters mission command through a clear commander's intent.
- Assigns tasks and purposes to subordinates.
- Contains the coordinating measures necessary to synchronize the operation.
- Allocates or reallocates resources.
- Directs preparation activities and establishes times or conditions for execution.

4-251. The principles of mission command enable advisor teams to provide broad guidance to their subordinate elements and facilitate disciplined initiative. Building an environment of trust, communication, and initiative among subordinate commanders, staffs, and advisors facilitates mission command and leads to successful deployment operations, as discussed in chapter 5.

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Chapter 5
Augmentation

It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them.

T.E. Lawrence

Chapter 5 describes augmentation considerations for permissive and hostile environments. This chapter also describes the various capabilities that may be available through augmentation by warfighting function.

SECTION I – AUGMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

5-1. Commanders at all levels assess requirements for augmentation based on operational and mission variables and coordinate for the necessary forces. These could include joint, component, civilian agencies, or contractor support. Commanders and staffs evaluate criteria and requirements due to changing conditions involving the civilian population, enemy forces, and infrastructure. The main determination for the type and amount of augmentation required will be in the initial mission analysis determining whether the environment is permissive or hostile. When requesting augmentation, SFAB and advisor team commanders must plan for deliberate integration and synchronization of augmented personnel and equipment. The augmented personnel should be included in the SFAB predeployment or home station training whenever possible.

PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT (COMPETITION – CRISIS)

5-2. Support and augmentation requirements for a permissive environment can be very different from those required in a hostile environment. A *permissive environment* is uncontested conditions in which joint forces have freedom of movement (JP 3-0). The SFAB is purpose-built to self-deploy and conduct partner engagement without augmentation in a permissive environment with a few notable exceptions. First, the SFAB does not possess organic non-tactical lift or mobility. All movements of advisors will have to be coordinated with an outside agency. Second, the SFAB possesses limited logistics and medical capabilities; some logistics and medical support will need to come either from the host nation or off the local economy. Conduct a thorough mission analysis upon receipt of mission to identify all external support requirements. Permissive environment support and augmentation requirements may include the following:

- Interpreter support.
- Housing.
- Field feeding.
- Mobility.
- Medical support.
- Security augmentation.

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT (CRISIS – CONFLICT)

5-3. Defining the needed support requirements when entering or transitioning into a hostile environment will be the most crucial outcome of mission analysis. A *hostile environment* is an operational environment where the freedom of movement is contested (JP 3-0). Forces available will largely determine augmentation and support availability and whether the SFAB is entering a mature or new JOA. SFABs possess the capability to self-deploy to a hostile environment, but they have limited ability to self-secure, move, or sustain themselves without augmentation or FSF assistance. Hostile environment support and augmentation may include the following:

- Security augmentation to include protection assets such as—
  - CBRN.
  - Engineer.
  - Air defense.
  - UASs.

  - Counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS).
- Interpreter support.
- Sustainment.
- Communications.
- Intelligence.
- Mobility.
- Medical support.
- Fires.
- Access to quick reaction force.

COORDINATION

5-4. Augmentation coordination involves higher headquarters, contributing organization staffs, SFAB staff, subordinate advisor teams, and UAPs. Coordination needs to be as thorough and detailed as possible. All parties should understand the concept of the operation, including detailed coordination instructions. If necessary, coordination includes an interpreter to facilitate explanation and understanding.

5-5. Coordination with higher headquarters involves requests for augmentation, identification of contributing organizations, liaisons with identified organizations, and notification upon arrival. Coordination with subordinate advisor teams involves determining how the augmented support is task-organized within subordinate units and clearly stating the intent and objectives for the augmentee.

5-6. Units determine force requirements when requesting augmentation from UAPs. Units conduct an analysis to determine additional requirements for working with U.S. Forces. The requirements can include the following:

- Personnel considerations, including—
  - Personnel status.
  - Health records.
  - Accountability rosters.
  - Battle roster numbers.
  - Survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training requirements.
  - Threat briefings.
  - Interpreter support.
- Medical requirements, including—
  - Immunizations.
  - Medical records.
  - Specific theater medical training and health requirements.
- Training requirements, including—
  - Technical certifications.
  - Weapons qualifications.
  - Vehicle training.
  - Training under simulated CBRN conditions.
- Logistics considerations, including—
  - Transportation.
  - Fuel.
  - Ammunition.
  - Recovery.
  - Food.
  - Any unique requirements including the means to recover, fuel, arm, and repair vehicles and equipment that are not organic to the requesting unit.

MULTINATIONAL AND FOREIGN SECURITY AUGMENTATION

5-7. Each multinational military or foreign force has unique capabilities, methods, and force structure. Conducting allied, foreign, and U.S. Forces comprehensive capabilities briefs aids in understanding these variables across the organizations. Previous experience working with one nation does not translate to working with another.

5-8. Detailed communications are key when planning reconnaissance and security operations with a multinational or foreign military partner and begin immediately upon receipt of the mission. Confirmation briefs during planning aid in reducing language, cultural, and military capability barriers. Exchange of liaison personnel, with interpreters as necessary, occurs as early as possible in the planning process. SFAB units and staffs can consider ways to begin planning for operations with a multinational or partner force including but not limited to the following discussion points:

- C2:
  - Compatibility of radios and digital systems.
  - Multinational radios encryption capabilities.
  - COMSEC requirements (North Atlantic Treaty Organization key).
  - Multinational radio capabilities and limitations affecting the United States' ability to conduct retransmission.
  - MNFs' retransmission capabilities.
  - Digital versus analog effective communications planning.
  - Digital collaboration capabilities.
  - Secret Internet Protocol Router Network capabilities.
  - Placement and use of liaison officers and planners.
  - Type and frequency of rehearsals.
  - Rules of engagement.
  - National caveats that may restrict the force.
  - Task organization.
  - Command relationship authorization.
- Maneuver:
  - Exchange of tactics, doctrine, and SOPs.
  - Maneuver assets, capabilities, and limitations.
  - Explain operational terms and graphics (and rank structure as applicable).
  - Work to reduce the language barrier to the greatest extent possible.
  - Task-organize changes and impacts of command relationships (if authorized).
  - Incorporate route clearance, mobility, and countermobility.
- Intelligence:
  - Classification and authority to release information.
  - Intelligence sharing in both directions.
  - U.S. and multinational information collection capabilities.
  - U.S. and multinational information collection priorities such as CCIR.
  - Interrogation procedures and restrictions, which vary widely from nation to nation.
- Fires:
  - Assets, capabilities, and limitations.
  - Integration of all warfighting functions to maximize effectiveness.
  - Cross-boundary fires (approval authority).
  - Call for fire and counterbattery procedures and authorities.
  - Use of precision-guided munitions.
  - Clear understanding of fire support coordination measures and airspace coordinating measures.
  - Established fires and quick-fire radio frequencies.
  - Include in rehearsals.
- Protection:
  - Multinational CBRN defense capabilities to assess, protect against, and mitigate CBRN threats and hazards.
  - Multinational air defense artillery and tactical ground-to-air radar systems detection and integration, to include C-UAS capabilities.
  - Multinational EOD and survivability capabilities.
  - Detainee operations and procedures.
  - Priority assets that require engineer support to increase survivability, such as command posts and communications platforms.
- Sustainment:
  - ACSAs, which determine national financial obligations.

- Types of command support relationships and nesting with ACSAs.
- Resupply of nationally distinct items (specifically Classes III, V, IX, and CBRN defense equipment).
- Transportation and distribution capabilities or requirements.
- Medical capabilities.
- Fuel requirements and compatibility for foreign equipment.
- Power generation requirements (220/110-volt international adapter and transformer options).

SECTION II – AUGMENTATION ANALYSIS

Advisor functions in Korea

Though technically the advisors' least important role, participation in combat operations was the one assignment that carried the most risk and had the potential for the greatest gain. How much an advisor had to do personally was a good gauge of a Korean officer's or unit's competence. General Roberts (Brigadier General. William L. Roberts, Chief of KMAG from August 1948-June 1950) made it very clear that the advisor's role was to prepare their counterparts to do for themselves what they could no longer rely upon the Americans to do—defend their country. Advisors had no official combat role to perform, and they had no command authority over Korean troops; nevertheless, many found themselves participating in actual operations against Communist guerrillas, bandits, and even North Korean security and army forces. In June 1949, just a month after the most severe fighting along the 38th parallel, and in the midst of a concerted antiguerrilla campaign, Roberts reminded his advisors that though their chief task was training, they needed to be prepared to assume a wartime function. "This army," he told them, "Even to do its [national] defense mission, will, in my opinion, need your stabilizing advice."

5-9. SFAB commanders and staffs use the six warfighting functions of C2, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection as a framework for conducting analysis and determining what additional augmentation may be required. The warfighting functions are a proven framework to assist the unit with determining augmentation requirements, but staffs can use any framework with which they are comfortable., The purpose is to identify requirements and gaps regardless of the framework chosen. The augmentation examples provided in paragraphs 5-10 through 5-68 are thorough, but not all-inclusive.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

5-10. The SFAB has a C2 structure that integrates warfighting functions into its organization. The structure does this through direct integration (placing team members directly with their counterparts) or decentralized methods (placing various team members throughout the partner force at key locations). Direct integration is most useful when the intensity of conflict is high and information requirements drive quick reactions, such as counterfire missions. Use decentralized methods when the SFAB is in regional support or as part of a coalition supporting various nonintegrated forces. Successful mission accomplishment in decentralized methods of augmentation relies on task execution at lower echelons and emphasizes leader initiative and involvement.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

5-11. CMOs are the activities performed by military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions. CMO support U.S. objectives for host-nation and regional stability (see JP 3-57). In an SFAB context, CMO augmentation may reduce civil-military friction, allow access to additional support channels, or enhance unity of action between civilian and military entities. The advisor team's mission may be a portion of a joint force commander's plan regarding the civil component; however, the U.S. Department of State and host-nation civil authorities may preclude advisors from directly influencing the civilian population. In this case, the SFAB commander may request civil-military operation capabilities from the U.S. Department of State, joint force commander, or

other authorities to engage the civil component of the OE. SFAB commanders may leverage FSF existing structure to coordinate with the interagency and indigenous institutions within their AOR.

INFORMATION

5-12. Information plays a significant role in the FSF executing its mission. From information management to activities in cyberspace, to public diplomacy and international messaging, how the FSF view and employ information likely permeates everything they do. Therefore, the SFAB must prepare to support the FSF's information functions.

5-13. The SFAB has a sparse information capability that does not include specialists outside of communications technicians. During mission analysis, when the SFABs determine their own capability gaps and request external support, they request appropriate personnel or units. These may include cyberspace, public affairs, information operations (Functional Area 30) personnel, and psychological operations or other units and capabilities. The desired capability and capacity of the FSF and the analysis of the SFAB's organic capabilities drives the need for external capabilities.

NETWORK AND COMMUNICATIONS

5-14. Signal operations support the SFAB by providing communications and the digital network enabling C2. The three network operations tasks of enterprise management, network assurance, and content management, provide the SFAB with the ability plan, conduct, and sustain operations effectively. These capabilities provide the SFAB with access to cyberspace, higher and lower organizations, DOD information network, the FSF, and other UAPs as necessary. Since the SFAB often operates in austere environments, augmentation may be required to ensure reliable communications.

5-15. Network and communication augmentation support is scalable and flexible. The SFAB S-6 anticipates, plans, and coordinates for additional signal capabilities as necessary. (See FM 6-02.) The competencies of the Signal Corps are the following:

- Electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) access.
- Network transport.
- Network and systems management and integration.
- Network and data security.
- Data architecture and engineering.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

5-16. The SFAB may require additional maneuver forces to enhance the advisor team's physical security or to support the FSF mission. In an established JOA, the SFAB requests additional maneuver support through the higher headquarters. In some cases, its higher headquarters may direct the SFAB to coordinate directly with UAPs or the FSF for additional maneuver forces. When deployed to a theater that does not have an established JOA, the SFAB coordinates with the host-nation FSF or government via the embassy country team for additional maneuver forces.

AVIATION

5-17. Army Aviation conducts air-ground operations as the aerial maneuver force of the combined arms team or as an independent maneuver force to support ground forces conducting unified action tasks. Army Aviation executes its seven core competencies through the following tactical, enabling, and sustaining tasks (see FM 3-04):

- Provide accurate and timely information.
- Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
- Destroy, defeat, disrupt, divert, or delay enemy forces.
- Provide air assault ground maneuver forces.
- Provide air movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.
- Evacuate wounded or recover isolated personnel.
- Enable C2 over extended ranges and complex terrain.

5-18. When supporting the SFAB mission, attack, lift, and UAS capabilities are the most probable aviation augmentation requirements. When available, Army Aviation augmentation provides the SFAB with the ability to conduct air movement of personnel, leaders, critical supplies, equipment, and systems as well as attack aviation support to combat operations. Due to the flexible nature of aircraft, short-duration and short-notice augmentation can be requested through supporting aviation units. For example, a UAS may be able to provide observation on a suspected enemy indirect fire site while flying back from another mission.

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

5-19. The UAS is a feature of the OE throughout the world and the competition continuum. A UAS can enhance movement and maneuver by providing situational awareness. SFABs and FSF also employ UASs to enhance targeting, gather intelligence, conduct rehearsals, assess protection planning, deliver supplies and myriad other applications across the warfighting functions. SFABs are assigned small UASs at the MBAT, MCAT, and MAT level but should seek additional support from the partner force and their higher headquarters to either augment their internal capabilities or fill capability gaps. This augmentation may include equipment familiarization training, AOR legalities advising, emissions detection and reduction information and techniques, and additional training on employment tactics, techniques, and procedures.

SECURITY FORCES

5-20. The SFAB requests additional security elements when conducting operations in many environments. Due to the SFAB's limited organic capacity for maneuver against an enemy force, the SFAB requests additional security to provide the appropriate level of combat power necessary to conduct operations alongside the FSF. These additional security elements may come from other U.S. Forces, contractors, or allied nations. If required, advisor teams should be prepared to provide a security force. In a non-JOA environment, the SFAB may receive additional protection through local police forces.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

5-21. The SFAB may request special operations forces' support for a wide variety of operations or tasks. Special operations forces conduct a wide variety of missions and activities including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, SFA, counterinsurgency, direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, military information SPO, CA operations, countering WMD, foreign HA, and hostage rescue and recovery. (See JP 3-05.)

5-22. Army special operations forces conduct most missions and activities with and through indigenous, foreign, irregular, and regular partners. Army special operations forces engage with many of the same partners and populations SFAB Soldiers encounter. Army special operations forces often conduct similar activities to those of the SFAB but with different partners, at a different scale of operations, and for specific, specially defined purposes. Army special operations forces frequently have pre-established relationships and influence in foreign partner nations. Army special operations forces and the SFAB should be natural and complementary partners.

5-23. Numerous criteria determine when conventional forces, special operations forces, or combinations are appropriate to conduct SFA. Military-force levels, force characteristics, and other factors present planners with optimal, acceptable, and persistent force package options when resourcing SFA missions. Deployment of a regionally aligned force for an SFA mission depends on the validated requirement of the CCDR. Often, special operations forces are already conducting missions in areas where a nation is requesting SFA. In many cases, the host nation may be expanding the parameters of its SFA request and the SFAB may find itself relieving special operations forces of its mission to allow special operations forces to transition to other tasks. The SFAB and the special operations forces conduct operations independently but collaborate and coordinate when it is determined they have shared interests.

5-24. U.S. operations generally involve both conventional and special operations when conducting SFA. Army doctrine defines command and support relationships of both forces operating in the same area. Recent operational experience has shown that, in improving the effectiveness of the FSF, the supported commander conducting SFA may be either a conventional force or special operations forces commander. Subordinate commanders and staffs of both conventional forces and special operations forces may act in the supporting role to the U.S. ambassador. Typically, the SC organization or the DATT at the American Embassy manages this relationship.

INTELLIGENCE

5-25. The SFAB commander may require additional intelligence capabilities to support the mission. The SFAB intelligence officer has limited resources, specifically in personnel and time, to analyze and process intelligence. As such, intelligence advisors are especially affected by the advisor dichotomy. During mission analysis, the SFAB staff analyzes organic intelligence capabilities, restrictions of intelligence activities within the AO, available augmentation capabilities, and sustainment requirements of additional intelligence resources. The seven intelligence disciplines are human intelligence, CI, signals intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, geospatial intelligence, and technical intelligence. In addition to these seven disciplines, there are other complementary intelligence capabilities as well, refer to ATPs in the 2-22 series, for example, ATP 2-22.6, ATP 2-22.7, and ATP 2-22.31.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

5-26. *Human intelligence* is the collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities (ADP 2-0). HUMINT uses human sources as a tool to gather information about the plans, intentions, capabilities, and operations methods of threat military forces. While the SFAB does not have a full team, it does have a human intelligence technician and collector. The Army human intelligence collectors (MOS 35Ms) are assigned to the MI company and may perform limited human intelligence functions. If required, SFAB commanders may request human intelligence collection teams to support and assist with SFA. Prior to requesting or employing human intelligence collection teams, however, staffs must examine status-of-forces agreements, rules of engagement, and political conditions that may enable the employment of human intelligence collection teams and human intelligence operations to support foreign forces or environments. Human intelligence tasks include the following:

- Conducting source operations.
- Debriefing U.S. and allied forces and civilian personnel including dislocated civilians, third-country nationals, and local inhabitants.
- Interrogating detainees.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

5-27. *Counterintelligence* is information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities (JP 2-0). The SFAB is assigned CI personnel within the MI company that may perform CI functions and, if needed, may be augmented with external capabilities. CI focuses on the detection, identification, analysis, neutralization, or exploitation of foreign intelligence entities, foreign terrorist organizations, and insider threats to protect Army and designated DOD forces, information, and technologies worldwide. Army CI applies its resources to four primary mission areas—counterespionage, CI support to force protection, information collection to identify and counter threat intelligence collection targeting Army equities, and CI support to technology and critical infrastructure protection. MI company CI agents gain additional authorities to execute CI collections, investigations, and operations in support of the SFAB through the ASCC or Army Counterintelligence Command CI technical channels, as required. CI support is available in a JOA but may require additional coordination in a non-JOA environment. Legal guidance can enable or prevent certain CI activities within the AO.

The activities that CI agents conduct within covering agent program activities include:

- Foreign intelligence entity focused research and analysis.
- Blunt-force operational profiles development.
- Foreign intelligence entity threat education.
- CI portion of vulnerability assessments.
- Intelligence, security, law enforcement, CI, and supported organizations liaison.
- Foreign intelligence entity threat countermeasure development.
- Insider threat detection support.
- CI lead development.
- CI focused debriefing.

5-28. *Signals intelligence* is a category of intelligence comprising all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted, individually or in combination (JP 2-0). Signals intelligence is one of several military functions operating within the EMS; it provides EW support when used in military operations for threat warning, combat information, and situational awareness. Signals intelligence provides technical intelligence information, complements intelligence derived from other sources, and is often used for cueing other sensors to potential targets of interest. For example, signals intelligence may identify information used to cue the SFAB or the FSF to confirm potential enemy activity. The discipline is subdivided into three subcategories: communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (see FM 2-0).

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE

5-29. *Measurement and signature intelligence* is information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to detect, characterize, locate, and identify targets and events; and derived from specialized, technically derived measurements and signatures of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event (JP 2-0).

5-30. Depending on the OE assessment, the SFAB commander and staff may consider measurement and signature intelligence information to support the SFAB and FSF missions. Measurement and signature intelligence information and capabilities are available through the theater or regional intelligence channels by requesting the required information.

OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

5-31. *Open-source intelligence* is publicly available information collected, exploited, and disseminated to address a specific requirement (JP 2-0). Open-source intelligence is derived from publicly available information collected by trained and certified open-source intelligence collectors/practitioners, who use tools, processes, and analytics to generate operationally relevant intelligence from the vast amounts and variety of publicly available information. SFAB elements will coordinate with ASCC intelligence staff to identify open-source intelligence support requirements. (See ATP 2-22.9-1 and ATP 2-22.9-2 for more information on open-source intelligence.)

GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE

5-32. *Geospatial intelligence* is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on or about the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information (JP 2-0).

5-33. The SFAB could require geospatial intelligence capabilities to support assigned missions. An example of using geospatial intelligence personnel to support the FSF may be providing it with detailed graphics to conduct operations. As with measurement and signature intelligence and the other more technical capabilities, the information these assets provide is generally available for request through theater or regional intelligence channels.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

5-34. *Technical intelligence* is intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing

technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an enemy's technological advantages (JP 2-0). Technical intelligence is an intelligence reach capability that ensures the Army understands the threat's full technological capabilities as well as its limitations and vulnerabilities. This enables friendly forces to adopt the appropriate countermeasures, operations, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. The SFAB S-2 establishes accounts to technical intelligence databases and data portals to access the reports, countermeasures, and other specific tactics, techniques, and procedures for the SFAB to utilize during its operations.

COMPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

5-35. JP 2-0 recognizes the following intelligence activities and applications: identity intelligence, biometrics-enabled intelligence, forensics-enabled intelligence, and document and media exploitation. The Army also recognizes various specialized capabilities that can contribute to all-source or single-source intelligence through intelligence coordination with other warfighting functions and branches. These specialized and technical capabilities, many of which are not typically conducted by military intelligence units, can provide valuable insight into threat activities and intentions and can fill intelligence gaps. In some instances, they can provide critical information that supports security, consolidating gains, and rear area operations. These capabilities include but are not limited to the following:

- Biometrics.
- Cyberspace.
- Document and media exploitation.
- EW.
- Forensics.
- Identity activities.
- Space.

FIRES

5-36. The *fires warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the adversary or enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations (ADP 3-0). Generally, the SFAB relies on nonorganic fires capabilities. While many diverse fires systems and processes exist, understanding the intricacies of each system will be fruitless without understanding the JOA and organizational relationships between sensor, shooter, and target. Advisors prioritize understanding the relationships and authorities to enable interoperability across UAPs within the AOR. When operating in a JOA, the SFAB may request Army fires systems for specific lethal and nonlethal effects to support offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. The fires warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Delivering fires.
- Integrating all forms of Army, joint, and multinational fires.
- Conducting targeting.

5-37. Due to the organization of the SFAB and the absence of organic indirect fires systems, it is critical to establish the fires support communication channels with supporting theater elements to ensure that fire support is available when necessary. Additionally, due to the nature of their mission working with FSF, the clearance of fires, rules of engagement, fire support coordination measures, and airspace coordination measures ought to be well defined and communicated between all the organizations involved in the operations. (See JP 3-09, FM 3-09, FM 3-96, and ATP 3-09.42.)

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL FIRES

5-38. Joint or multinational fires are fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components or nations in a coordinated action to produce the desired effects to support a common objective (see JP 3-16). Developing policy, guidance, and plans to employ operational and strategic fires are primarily joint activities. Joint fires include surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-surface fires.

5-39. When integrating joint and multinational fires, coordination and synchronization responsibilities are heightened and requests for indirect fire support are elevated to a higher headquarters element. It may be necessary to establish a liaison with the supporting unit, especially with multinational units.

5-40. Fire support coordination in multinational operations requires special arrangements with MNFs and local authorities. Some mission partners may not use fire support coordination measures, or such measure may not be transposable with other partner's systems. In a lack of transposable coordination measure, building and maintaining the blue and green COP is crucial to effective and expedient fires at echelon. Special arrangements include implementing communications and language standards, exchanging liaison personnel, and adopting processes and procedures to enable and enhance interoperability.

FIELD ARTILLERY

5-41. *Field artillery* is the equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of cannon, rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers (JP 3-09). Field artillery contributes to operations by massing fires on single or multiple targets with precision, near precision, and area fire capabilities. Field artillery can rapidly shift fires throughout the AO to support the scheme of maneuver and to counter unforeseen enemy reaction to achieve the maneuver commander's desired effects.

5-42. The SFAB has a field artillery advisor battalion that is not equipped with cannon or rocket batteries. In a JOA, SFAB fires personnel must coordinate with a component field artillery headquarters (field artillery brigade and division artillery) or a field artillery unit that has been assigned a support relationship with the SFAB.

CLEARANCE OF FIRE PROCEDURES

5-43. Advisors can increase the timeliness of fires clearance through fire support coordination measures and execution of battle drills. They can do this by rehearsing these battle drills frequently alongside their partners. Through timely reporting, the FSF and SFAB advisor teams maintain situational awareness to clear their AO of both blue forces and green forces. The SFAB uses its command systems to relay that information to coalition forces to coordinate and clear the fires.

TARGETING

5-44. Targeting is a critical component of the fires warfighting function. The SFAB must assign a fires support coordinator to lead the brigades' targeting process, as required, to integrate lethal and nonlethal effects with SFAB and FSF operations. The SFAB and advisor teams should be prepared to synchronize multiple targeting cycles with multiple partner forces when conducting multinational operations, which may require additional targeting expertise within the advisor teams. The SFAB staff structure has limited targeting personnel, much of this capability resides on the advisor teams. The SFAB staffs rely heavily on subordinate advisor teams to provide targeting information and recommendations to the staff. This can result in field artillery teams integrating with SFAB staffs to facilitate targeting, instead of partnering with a FSF unit. Higher headquarters can request additional support as necessary. (See JP 3-60 and FM 3-60.)

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY

5-45. The SFAB has no organic or assigned air defense personnel or equipment. In a JOA environment, the SFAB falls under an area air defense plan. When air defense artillery personnel are assigned or attached to the SFAB as augmentation, air defense artillery commanders and staffs brief the supported commander and staff on the capabilities and limitations that the air defense artillery personnel and equipment can provide.

5-46. When necessary, based on the enemy threat assessment, the SFAB considers integrating air defense artillery throughout all phases of major operations. The air defense artillery performs the following essential tasks:

- Integrating air defense artillery assets according to the area air defense plan.
- Allocating available assets throughout the operational area.
- Deploying early warning systems.
- Coordinating airspace control activities with theater, corps, and subordinate air defense artillery cells.
- Recommending air defense artillery tactics and techniques to best counter air and missile threats.

PROTECTION

5-47. The *protection warfighting function* is the related tasks, systems, and methods that prevent or mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards to preserve combat power and enable freedom of action (FM 3-0). Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatant and noncombatant) and physical assets of the United States and UAPs, including partner nations. Protection is a critical consideration for the SFAB given its potential employment in areas where established protection infrastructure may be limited. The SFAB may receive greater support from theater protection assets within a JOA. Outside of established JOAs, comprehensive, integrated, layered, redundant, and enduring protection planning and coordination are required to ensure sufficient protection. Every OE has unique protection planning considerations.

5-48. Protection is an essential consideration for SFAB commanders and staffs and could require significant augmentation based on assessed threats and mission requirements. In permissive environments, the SFAB relies on protection capabilities and security provided by the FSF. In uncertain or hostile environments, the SFAB may require augmentation with complementary protection capabilities. An *uncertain environment* is a condition in which the joint force's freedom of movement may be contested (JP 3-0). Chapter 6 describes protection advising in much greater detail but listed in paragraphs 5-49 through 5-59 are key protection augmentation elements that may be available to SFABs.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

5-49. CBRN units and personnel provide critical support through the core functions of assess, protect, and mitigate. Information obtained through these core functions is linked through the integrating activity of hazard awareness. The proliferation of WMD signifies a growing worldwide threat and the SFAB must prepare to operate in this environment. The SFAB has individual protection and decontamination equipment but limited detection equipment and no unit decontamination equipment. The SFAB must assess the threat environment and request CBRN augmentation based on risk assessment. The CBRN capabilities will typically be sourced by FSF or the ASCC.

ENGINEERS

5-50. Engineers provide technical expertise across their disciplines of combat, general, and geospatial engineering. The SFAB contains an EBAT, however, the assigned engineer advisors lack most capabilities outside of advising. If an engineer advisor were to be assigned a mission which would require significant support activities to the partner, then specialized equipment would have to be augmented to that team (for example, a bulldozer, soil analysis equipment, surveying equipment). Engineer advising battalion individual members have technical expertise in reducing explosive hazards within their EOCA capability (limited conventional) to enable and maintain SFAB advisor team mobility. As the situation dictates, especially when the SFAB encounters significant construction requirements, commanders and staffs must consider augmentation of the SFAB with additional engineer capabilities or contracted construction support. The EBATs provide the SFAB with the experience necessary to provide recommendations on engineer support required.

5-51. When available, various types of engineer organizations can provide capabilities and augmentation to an advisor team to include the following:

- General engineering:
  - Restores damaged areas, constructing, and maintaining lines of communications, establishing base camps, repairing or restoring infrastructure.
  - Provides engineering assessments (United States Army Corps of Engineers, Forward Engineer Support Team).
  - Provides master planning for facility and design support, developing and maintaining facilities.
  - Provides power generation and distribution and contracted construction oversight.
- Combat engineering:
  - Mobility support.
  - Countermobility support.
  - Survivability support.
  - Additional enabling capabilities.
- Geospatial engineering:

- Terrain analysis and terrain visualization.
- Tailored map products.
- Geospatial foundation data.
- Theater geospatial data.
- ASCC geospatial planning cells.

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY

5-52. Air defense artillery participates in protection activities by using active and passive intervention techniques to defend both mission and force from aerial threats. The air defender views operations through a trained eye with a focus on preventing detection from manned and UASs, satellite imaging capabilities, and enemy air defense capability relative combat power analysis. SFABs are not assigned air defense artillery personnel, however, and must request necessary augmentation if additional systems or personnel are required to accomplish the air defense tasks. Some areas for consideration are radar detection systems, aerial sensor system signature detection, relative air defense combat power systems analysis, enemy and friendly UAS capabilities, and C-UAS capabilities of the stakeholders within the OE. Air defenders do not just focus on conventional military aircraft systems but also consider commercial and consumer-grade UAS capabilities that are available within the SFAB's AOR.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

5-53. SFAB explosive hazard advisors may provide immediate action to mitigate an explosive hazard to prevent the loss of life when no other EOD capability can reasonably respond. However, EOD advisors lack the capability and capacity of an EOD team. Therefore, if advisor teams do or may encounter explosive hazards, they must request EOD augmentation.

5-54. EOD staff and unit augmentation may provide the following capabilities:

- Supporting disposal.
- Developing EOD plans.
- Coordinating EOD operations.
- Supervising EOD operations.

MILITARY POLICE

5-55. Military police provide police, detention, security, and mobility support capabilities that may augment SFAB protection capabilities to enhance security and preserve combat power. Given the core competencies of policing, investigations, and corrections, military police should be requested to augment the SFAB with police advisors when requirements exist to advise and assist partner nation police or corrections organizations. In recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, military police provided scalable and flexible police development training teams critical to accomplishing police advise-and-assist missions. (See FM 3-39, FM 3-63, and ATP 3-39.10.)

5-56. Military police provide a unique mixture of capabilities across the military police disciplines that may augment SFAB protection or advisor capabilities including the following:

- Police operations:
  - Law enforcement.
  - Forensics and biometrics support.
  - Criminal investigations.
  - Civil disturbance control.
  - Evidence response teams.
  - Host-nation police training support.
  - Customs support.
  - Support to border control and boundary security.
- Detention operations:
  - Confinement of U.S. military prisoners.
  - Detainee operations.
  - Host-nation corrections training and support.
- Security and mobility support:
  - Area security.

- Base and base-camp defense.
- Response force operations.
- Critical asset security.
- High-risk personnel security.
- Route and convoy security.
- Antiterrorism and physical security support.
- Military working dogs.

SUSTAINMENT

5-57. The *sustainment warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADP 3-0). Sustainment considerations for the SFAB are like protection in that SFABs have access to established theater infrastructure in established JOAs but require significant augmentation when employed outside of a JOA.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

5-58. The SFAB may also require augmentation that does not necessarily align with the warfighting functions. Higher headquarters may direct that augmentation, or it could take the form of UAPs or ministry liaison teams.

UNIFIED ACTION PARTNERS

5-59. Augmentation from UAPs depends on the specific requirements of the SFAB's mission and the participation of other nations' forces. In uncertain environments, the presence of nonmilitary UAPs may be limited. Many civilian, law enforcement, and other agencies require a permissive or semi-permissive environment before agreeing to participate in SFA operations in theater.

5-60. Potential UAP augmentation may include—

- Joint and multinational military partners.
- U.S. federal agencies like the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
- International governmental organizations like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Health Organization, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
- Nongovernmental organizations like Doctors Without Borders, Human Rights Watch, and the Mines Advisory Group.

LANGUAGE SUPPORT

5-61. SFAB operations are highly dependent on foreign language support. Exploiting enemy documents, communicating with the foreign partner, host-nation organizations, and local populations necessitates using interpreters and linguists.

5-62. Advisor teams must analyze linguist needs to determine the minimum level of foreign language proficiency needed including additional requirements for security clearances, specific ethnicities, genders, or other considerations. The FSF might already have some English proficiency which may reduce the requirement for linguists. If they do not, interpreters (categories I or II) may be requested. This includes determining the translation accuracy requirements. The national-level documents and agreements (for example, statement of requirement, ACSA) that are done to enable an advisor team to be in country will require linguist support from a category II or III interpreter. (See ATP 3-07.10.)

MINISTRY LIAISON TEAMS

5-63. The ministerial liaison team serves as a single unit collocated with the host-nation MOD, interior, or other institutions to provide continuous advising support to host-nation personnel and leaders. Higher headquarters determines whether to augment the SFAB with a ministerial liaison team.

5-64. The ministerial liaison team may include subject matter experts on OCS, budgeting, strategic plans and policy, foreign area officer, provost marshal, strategic intelligence, logistics, force modernization and design,

human resources, medical, and legal advisors. SFAB teams work with the ministerial teams to assist in building core institutional capacity, competencies, and capabilities to support defense-related processes.

ADDITIONAL AUGMENTATION

5-65. Augmentation requirements may change as the advisor teams and partner force transition between competition, crisis, and conflict. Commanders require augmentation when they determine they can no longer accomplish the mission with assigned force structure or equipment. Augmentation allows commanders to accomplish tasks and enables success. In addition to pre-mission planning, commanders must constantly assess operations to determine what augmentation capabilities are required and integrate those forces into their operations as seamlessly as possible. As with any SFAB function, augmentation requires careful consideration with the foreign partners. Two areas requiring continuous augmentation analysis are the protection and sustainment functions which are discussed in chapters 6 and 7.

Chapter 6
Protection

Now, integrated deterrence means using every military and non-military tool in our toolbox, in lockstep with our allies and partners. Integrated deterrence is about using existing capabilities, and building new ones, and deploying them all in new and networked ways… all tailored to a region's security landscape, and in growing partnership with our friends.

Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III, 28th Secretary of Defense

Chapter 6 discusses the protection warfighting function considerations through the competition continuum and how advisor teams shape protection advising for FSF partners.

SECTION I – PROTECTION ACROSS THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

6-1. Protection during competition, crisis, and conflict all regard preserving the available assets and synchronizing them in concert to mitigate the risks to mission and force. Accounting for the severity and probability of various outcomes, commanders, staffs, and protection warfighting function personnel assess and devise protection measures for present and likely future risks. Protection across the competition continuum may change in the ratios of efforts directed to prioritized assets or the protection method application, however protection remains conceptually coherent throughout the continuum.

PROTECTION DURING COMPETITION

6-2. Army operations during competition below armed conflict bring together the activities intended to promote regional stability and to set conditions for a favorable outcome of a military confrontation. Army Forces can protect the force by understanding and effectively preventing and mitigating adversary threats and hazards. Commanders and staffs mitigate and prevent threats and hazard effects by directing, coordinating, and synchronizing protection capabilities in support of Army operations during competition below armed conflict that—

- Harden key facilities, including fighting positions, bomb shelters, C2 nodes, motor pools, and other critical infrastructure that may be vulnerable during crisis and armed conflict.
- Incorporate mitigation measures to reduce operational risk to missions (risk management).
- Implement measures to enable a healthy and fit force:
  - Preventing injury and illness.
  - Protecting the force from health hazards (FHP).
  - Improving protection capabilities during competition below armed conflict preserves combat power during armed conflict.
- Establish defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian law enforcement.
- Add personal security and defensive measures to protect Service members, high-risk personnel, civilian employees, family members, DOD facilities, information, and equipment (antiterrorism).
- Integrate physical measures designed to safeguard the following:
  - Personnel.
  - Prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents.
  - Safeguard against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft (physical security).
- Identify, control, and protect critical information and indicators that would allow enemies and adversaries to identify and exploit friendly vulnerabilities (OPSEC).
- Conduct security operations to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, and activities within a specific area (area security).
- Protect information networks (cyberspace and electromagnetic protection).

- Maintain a safe and secure environment by countering criminal, terrorist, and hybrid threats, reducing crime, establishing order, preserving readiness, and enforcing the rule of law (police operations).
- Safeguard and preserve Army resources (to include Soldiers, DA Civilians, and Army property) against accidental loss.
- Provide for public safety incidents during Army operations and activities.
- Protect civilian networks or groups identified by Army Forces as critical in facilitating the provision of essential services and overall governance (populace and resources control).
- Establish security measures and deception measures to protect indigenous natural and man-made materiel resources of a nation-state, deny threats access to resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of criminal activity.
- Protection of U.S. assets to deny or defeat enemy and criminal activities against them (populace and resources control).
- Prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel (personnel recovery).
- Conduct activities to protect against air and missile threats, including threats from small, UASs using active or passive measures (air and missile defense support).
- Correct misinformation and counter disinformation (public affairs).
- Assess threat CBRN capabilities and FSF vulnerabilities.
- Advise on implementation of CBRN defense measures to reduce risk.

6-3. During competition below armed conflict, protection considerations also include unit home station activities, such as maintaining operational readiness, training, and contingency planning. Combined exercises and training, military exchange programs, and foreign military member attendance at Army schools are examples of home station shaping activities. At home stations, commanders employ force protection measures. These measures, along with the primary protection tasks and the synchronization and integration of the Army Protection Program, maintain safe and secure environments. They further enable commanders to generate and preserve combat power during training and deployment tasks that are associated with Army sustainable readiness requirements that support multidomain operations.

PROTECTION DURING CRISIS

6-4. Army operations during a crisis are those activities designed to deter an adversary's undesirable actions. Commanders are generally focused on actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners and to indicate U.S. intent to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation. Army protection capabilities SPO to prevent armed conflict during mobilization, during the transit of Army Forces and cargo, along movement routes, at initial staging areas, and at subsequent assembly areas where uncertain threat conditions require a delicate balance between protection and building combat power. Protection cells coordinate closely with staff personnel to identify information and assets that need protection and to apply appropriate protection and security measures consistent with the collective threat analysis.

6-5. Army operations to consolidate gains during a crisis correspond with, stabilize, and enable the civil authority phases of a joint operation. Commanders continuously consider the coordination, synchronization, and integration of protection capabilities necessary to consolidate gains and achieve the desired end state. Consolidate gains activities include populace and resources control, SC, law and order reestablishment, HA, and critical infrastructure protection and restoration. (See FM 3-0 for a discussion on consolidating gains.)

PROTECTION DURING ARMED CONFLICT

6-6. As the conflict emerges or intensifies, protection considerations take on increased importance to preserve advisor and FSF combat power. Those considerations include the following:

- Reinforcing the relationship with the partner force following escalation.
- Adapting the protection mindset to the inherently more dangerous and deadly nature of the conflict.
- Identifying what protection capabilities and capacities were developed in crisis and competition that can be used in conflict (or what should be disregarded).
- Identifying the changes in legal authorities that did not apply below armed conflict.
- Expanding protection considerations to include awareness of nongovernmental organizations operating within the AOR/OE to preempt misallocating resources or targeting a neutral element.

- Recategorizing threats based off the change of situation.

6-7. Advisors maintain an amenable relationship when working with the partner force whenever possible, deescalating internal conflicts and proactively mitigating interpersonal friction without complicating the advisor-advised relationship. These relationship maintenance measures may incentivize partner forces to positively intervene when an SFAB protection gap exists. Commanders and advisors plan for and implement protection capabilities, to include de-escalation techniques. Advisor teams avoid physical and lethal engagements with their foreign counterparts while maintaining their right to self-defense. Maintaining honest, yet respectful, relationships with the foreign counterparts is one of the best ways for advisor teams to maintain their own physical security. (See ATP 3-37.15 for more information on foreign security force threats.)

PROTECTION IN LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

6-8. During LSCO, Army leaders must anticipate that joint support will be limited and must use a combination of measures to protect the force. Commanders and staffs deliberately plan and integrate protection capabilities to preserve combat power, mitigate identified vulnerabilities, and exploit opportunity.

6-9. Protection can be derived inherently from combat operations (such as security operations), or it can be deliberately applied as commanders direct, coordinate, and synchronize tasks and systems that comprise the protection warfighting function to apply maximum combat power. Leaders also implement protection measures to complicate the targeting of their units during armed conflict by moving irregularly, using camouflage, and maintaining dispersion. They coordinate, synchronize, and integrate enabling operations and enabling tasks with the primary protection tasks to prevent or mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards.

6-10. Information activities throughout the range of military operations may deter enemy actions, prevent escalation of tensions, and prevent the civilian populace from participating in a resistance when a military intervention occurs. Effective information activities are essential to protection efforts from competition below armed conflict to conflict to ensure the protection of the mission, of the force, and the populace.

6-11. Commanders continuously direct, coordinate, and synchronize protection capabilities necessary to consolidate gains and achieve the desired end state. Protection capabilities are focused on security tasks to stabilize the area and protect the force, routes, sustainment assets, and critical infrastructure. Activities to consolidate gains also include minimum-essential stability operations tasks (populace and resources control, detainee operations, law and order reestablishment, HA, and critical infrastructure protection and restoration).

SECTION II – PROTECTION IN SUPPORT OF SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

6-12. Protection focuses on preserving combat power and enabling freedom of action. Commanders and staffs manage protection efforts throughout the operations process to protect the force and enable freedom of action by identifying and counteracting potential threats and hazards. In general, protection planning consists of a continuous assessment of the following: what threats or hazards jeopardize assets, how critically assets are affected, and how vulnerable the assets are to the identified adverse effects. Protection safeguards the force, personnel (combatants and noncombatants), systems, information, and physical assets of the United States, allies, and partners. The SFAB must consider all aspects of protection to include internal, external, and foreign security force protection capabilities. Advisor teams will focus on the following categories of protection considerations in all stages of the conflict continuum:

- Protecting the SFAB and friendly forces.
- Advising FSF partners on how to think about risk and vulnerability as it pertains to their forces and critical support nodes (for example, terminals, and critical commodities like Class III, Class V, Class VII, for example).
- Leveraging the advisor network for coordinating and augmenting FSF protection capabilities.

6-13. SFAB leaders must consider protection throughout every Army operation. Military engagement and SC require commanders and their staffs to consider protection measures commensurate with potential threats and hazards, even in a permissive environment. The friendly force protects itself through its own actions. Friendly force protection includes measures or tasks executed by the SFAB to preserve combat power. These

tasks include establishing internal security measures, implementing a field sanitation program, establishing internal SOPs for conducting operations with the foreign security force, executing preventative medical checks and inspections, conducting risk assessments prior to operations or training events, cyber awareness, and ensuring all personnel are aware of the identified risks.

CRITICALITY ASSESSMENT

6-14. The criticality assessment provides the SFAB with a list of key assets and infrastructure based on the necessity for mission success. Criticality is continuously assessed based upon the impact of temporary or permanent asset loss on both the enduring and episodic mission. Criticality is assessed according to a four step range from most catastrophic to least, according to the degree of mission impact: Catastrophic, Critical, Marginal, and Negligible (see ADP 3-37 for more information on criticality). The advisor team conducting a criticality assessment also analyzes the replacement time for the assets. This factor is particularly applicable for SFABs within the competition continuum because teams often operate within nonpermissive environments that preclude speedy replacement or repair parts delivery. As transitions in mission or locale occur, protection cell or working group members recognize the ramifications of these changes and update the criticality assessment.

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

6-15. A vulnerability assessment is an evaluation tool to determine the magnitude of a threat or hazard's effect on installations, personnel, units, exercises, ports, ships, residences, facilities, information, or other assets. It identifies the areas of improvement required to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or terrorism or attacks against threats (see ADP 3-37). The SFAB coordinates with the FSF staff to address specific public and private sectors and how they are vulnerable against threats. Continuous assessments are used to identify the characteristics and procedures that make assets, areas, infrastructure, and events vulnerable. The general sequence of a vulnerability assessment is the following:

- Step 1—list assets and capabilities and the threats against them.
- Step 2—determine the common criteria for assessing vulnerabilities.
- Step 3—evaluate the vulnerability of assets and capabilities.

6-16. DOD has created several decision support tools, including criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER), to perform critical assessments in support of the vulnerability assessment process to include the following:

- Assessing mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability, population, and proximity is a targeting analysis tool that is geared toward discovering personnel vulnerabilities.
- Assessing CARVER is a targeting analysis tool that identifies a potential target from a terrorist perspective, highlighting what the enemy might perceive as a soft or valuable target.

6-17. Evaluation criteria allow teams and commanders to develop lists and assessments that will enable robust evaluation in asset vulnerability. Vulnerability evaluation criteria may include the degree to which an asset may be disrupted, the quantity of the asset available (if replacement is required due to loss), dispersion (geographic proximity), and key physical characteristics (see ADP 3-37).

PROTECTION LISTS

6-18. The SFAB works with their FSF partner to develop protection prioritization lists. The protection prioritization lists help commanders identify or assess assets that require protection prioritization within their assigned areas (see ADP 3-37). These lists are a fighting product that commanders, teams, and staffs employ to wisely align critical assets and their defenses. The FSF commander prioritizes intent and impacts on mission planning to determine critical assets (see figure 6-1 on page 162).

6-19. A *critical asset* is a specific entity that is of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of a nation to continue to function effectively (JP 3-26). Critical assets can be people, property, equipment, activities, operations, information, facilities, or materials. For example, important communications facilities and utilities, analyzed through criticality assessments, provide information to prioritize resources while reducing the potential application of resources on lower-priority assets. Stationary weapons systems might be identified as critical to the execution of military operations and receive additional protection. The lack of a replacement may cause a

critical asset to become a top priority for protection. (See ADP 3-37 for more information on the protection prioritization list.)

6-20. Advisor teams have the responsibility to advise the FSF on the best practices for protecting the FSF's assets, the team, and the mission. The Army's approach to these practices is represented in the process of producing and maintaining the protected asset list (PAL) according to the assessed risks and mitigation measures. Critical assets are materiel, personnel, or infrastructure (both military and non-military) that are critical for mission success, prioritized in order of criticality. Another best practice is identifying critical assets by assessing the criticality of the asset, vulnerability to relevant threats, and probability a threat or hazard may occur. The protected asset list is a listing of critical assets and is prioritized according to the commander’s guidance; the PAL indicates protected assets and the specific mitigation or protection measure.

6-21. The PAL is the primary tool used to assign the protection assets available for the protection tasks. The conflicts of the late 2010s and early 2020s show that adequate protection requires commanders to make decisions regarding prioritization and asset dedication; there will never be sufficient resources to defend everything. The process of developing the PAL provides a framework for advisors to coach their FSF partners in deliberate protection measures. For example, the commander may assess a high risk of tactical UAS threats and deliberately assign a C-UAS asset to protect the battalion tactical operations center.

REC PRIORITY	ASSET	LOCATION	NOTES	THREAT	UNIT TASKS	MITIGATION
1	DIVARTY Q53 (RADAR)	DL43562766 / PL BOBCAT	CRITICAL FOR COUNTERFIRE MISSIONS, 4X	ENY AIR, IDF (9A51, 9A52, 2519), SPF, EW JAMMING	SPF, A, 3-265 1-172 CAV 233 MP CO	SURVIVABILITY POSITION, PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE, CAV SQDN & MP CO SECURING
2	DIVARTY Q36 (RADAR)	DL43682799 / PL BOBCAT	CRITICAL FOR COUNTERFIRE MISSIONS, 3X	ENY AIR, IDF (9A51, 9A52, 2519), SPF, EW JAMMING	A, 3-265 1-172 CAV 233 MP CO	SURVIVABILITY POSITION, PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE, CAV SQDN & MP CO SECURING
3	DIVARTY Q37 (RADAR)	DL44172950 / PL BOBCAT	CRITICAL FOR COUNTERFIRE MISSIONS, 3X	ENY AIR, IDF (9A51, 9A52, 2519), SPF, EW JAMMING	A, 3-265 1-172 CAV 233 MP CO	SURVIVABILITY POSITION, PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE, CAV SQDN & MP CO SECURING
4	3-197 MLRS	DL43562765 / PL BOBCAT	BN ASSIGNED TO DIVARTY, 16X	IDF (9A51, 9A52, 2519), CHEMICAL ATTACK	A, 3-265 1-172 CAV 233 MP CO	SURVIVABILITY POSITION, PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE, CAV SQDN & MP CO SECURING
5	2-18 HIMARS	DL43682779 / PL BOBCAT OBJ VIKING	BN ASSIGNED TO DIVARTY, 16X	IDF (9A51, 9A52, 2519), CHEMICAL ATTACK	A, 3-265 1-172 CAV 233 MP CO	SURVIVABILITY POSITION, PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE, CAV SQDN & MP CO SECURING
6	1-201FA BN	DL44172960 / PL BOBCAT	FIRES SUPPORT DIVARTY, M109A6 BTYs	ENEMY AIR, IDF (9A51, 9A52, 2519)	1-172 CAV	SURVIVABILITY POSITION; PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE; AREA SECURITY
7	1-82FA BN, 1-7FA BN	DL44172980 WITH ORGANIC BDE	FIRES SUPPORT TO MANEUVER UNITS, M109A5 BTYs	ENEMY AIR, IDF (9A51, 9A52, 2519)	3 / 1MP CO(-)	SURVIVABILITY POSITION; PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE; AREA SECURITY
8	CL III, V, & VII RE-SUPPLY MISSIONS	PL GIANTS	TACON FOR CONVOY SECURITY	SPF, IDF (9A51, 9A52, 2519)	7 MP CO	PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE; AREA SECURITY
9	DIVISION SUPPORT AREA	DL43562765 / PL BOBCAT WITH 404MEB	OPEN ADDITIONAL GLOC	SPF, IDF (9A51, 9A52, 2519)	1MP CO(-)	PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE; AREA SECURITY

PROTECTED ASSET LIST- THOSE CRITICAL ASSETS PROTECTED BY ACTIVE DEFENSE MEASURES

CRITICAL ASSETS WITH UNITS DESIGNATED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SECURITY BEYOND SELF-SECURE

LEGEND

1SBDE	FIRST STRYKER BRIGADE		
ABCT	ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM	GLOC	GROUND LINES OF COMMUNICATION
ADA	AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY	HIMARS	HIGH MOBILITY ARTILLERY ROCKET SYSTEM
AMD	AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE	IDF	INDIRECT FIRE
BDE	BRIGADE	MEB	MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE
BN	BATTALION	MLRS	MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM
BTY	BATTERY	MP	MILITARY POLICE
CAV	CAVALRY	MRBC	MULTI-ROLE BRIDGE COMPANY
CL	CLASS	OBJ	OBJECTIVE
CO	COMPANY	PL	PHASE LINE
CP	COMMAND POST	PLT	PLATOON
DSB	DIVISION SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE	PPL	PROTECTION PRIORITIZATION LIST
DIVARTY	DIVISION ARTILLERY	REC	RECOMMENDED
DMAIN	DIVISION MAIN COMMAND POST	SPF	SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCES
EN	ENGINEER	SQDN	SQUADRON
ENY	ENEMY	TACON	TACTICAL CONTROL
EW	ELECTRONIC WARFARE	UAS	UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM
FA	FIELD ARTILLERY	VIC	VICINITY
FLOT	FORWARD LINE OF TROOPS		

Figure 6-1. Priority protection list, example

COORDINATING AND ADVISING PROTECTION CAPABILITIES

6-22. The prioritization of protection assets is situationally dependent and resource informed. The integration of protection capabilities provides strength and structure to the overall protection effort. Integration occurs vertically and horizontally and includes UAPs throughout the operations process. Protection task integration throughout the operations process helps establish control measures against potential threats and hazards. SFAB teams use the advisor network at echelon to advise and assist FSF in the allocation, prioritization, and layering of protection capabilities to mitigate or assume risk for all identified and prioritized vulnerabilities.

The collaboration, integration, and synchronization between the advisors at echelon assist in identifying threats and hazards. Advisors need to articulate and advocate for why not all assets listed on the protection prioritization list receive continuous protection. Some critical assets only receive protection assets based on available resources. Determining and directing protection priorities may involve the most important decisions commanders make and their staff support.

6-23. The SFAB will have to coordinate with their supported FSF, multinational division or corps, or JFLCC for the augmentation of non-FSF organic protection units or capability. Army SC activities develop the ability of partner countries to operate with U.S. and allied military forces across the warfighting functions (see JP 3-0).

SECTION III – PROTECTION ADVISING

6-24. Protection advising is a facet of all SFAB operations and along the entire competition continuum. While protection provides an overall approach to preserving combat power, there are additional protection considerations that the SFAB must address to achieve comprehensive and layered protection. The integration and synchronization of security and security operations with the protection tasks enable commanders to protect forces, critical assets, and information. SFABs leverage the limited organic protection capabilities within an advising team to advise FSF partners in the application of protection principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Table 6-1 on pages 164 through 166 provides a list of Army publications that advisor teams may reference prior to training FSF partners on protection tasks.

Table 6-1. Army publications on protection tasks

Primary Protection Task	*Tasks*
Conduct Risk Management (ATP 5-19)	• Identify hazards. • Assess hazards. • Develop controls. • Implement controls. • Supervise and evaluate.
Conduct Survivability (ATP 3-37.34, ATP 3-34.20, ATP 3-90.4)	• Employ camouflage, cover, and concealment. • Establish fighting positions. • Harden facilities. • Construct protective works for explosive hazards. • Clear routes and areas of explosive hazards.
Coordinate Air and Missile Defense Support (FM 3-01, FM 3-27)	• Plan ballistic missile defense. • Conduct ballistic missile defense. • Manage system configuration. • Perform asset management. • Provide global missile defense capabilities.
Conduct CBRN Operations (FM 3-11, ATP 3-11.32, ATP 3-11.33, ATP 3-11.36)	• Prepare and share CBRN information collection plan. • Provide CBRN hazard awareness and understanding. • Conduct CBRN protection. • Conduct CBRN contamination mitigation.
Provide Force Health Protection (FM 4-02, ATP 4-02.8)	• Provide operational public health. • Provide veterinary services. • Provide combat and operational stress control. • Provide preventive dentistry. • Conduct area medical laboratory support.
Conduct Electromagnetic Protection (FM 3-12, ATP 6-02.70)	• Conduct electromagnetic protection attacks. • Conduct defensive electromagnetic attack. • Conduct electromagnetic spectrum management.

Table 6-1. Army publications on protection tasks (continued)

Primary Protection Task	*Tasks*
Implement Physical Security Measures and Procedures (ATP 3-39.32)	• Deter. • Detect. • Assess. • Delay. • Respond.
Conduct Personnel Recovery (FM 3-50)	• Apply the fundamentals of Army personnel recovery. • Support the commander and staff organization and operations. • Coordinate knowledge management. • Manage the unit personnel recovery program.
Conduct Area Security (JP 3-10, ADP 3-90)	• Conduct area and base security operations. • Conduct critical installation and facilities security. • Provide protective services for selected individuals. • Conduct response force operations. • Secure supply routes and convoys. • Conduct support area operations. • Establish local security.
Apply Antiterrorism Measures (ATP 3-37.2)	• Establish an antiterrorism program. • Collect, analyze, and disseminate threat information. • Assess and reduce critical vulnerabilities. • Increase antiterrorism awareness. • Maintain defenses. • Establish civil-military partnerships. • Conduct terrorist threat/incident response planning. • Conduct exercises and evaluate/assess the plan.
Provide EOD Support (ATP 4-32.1, ATP 4-32.3)	• Identify and collect information on explosive ordnance hazards. • Render safe and dispose of explosive ordnance and hazards. • Conduct post-blast investigations.
Conduct EOD Operations (JP 3-42, ATP 4-32, ATP 4-32.2)	• Conduct deliberate exploitation of captured enemy ammunition and weapon systems. • Render safe and dispose of explosive hazards which restrict friendly freedom of action. • Perform limited clearance operations to improve freedom of maneuver. • Perform hasty clearance of key terrain and critical infrastructure required for sustainment, C2, and other operations (see appendix A and ATP 4-32 for additional information on EOD support).
Conduct Police Operations (ATP 3-39.10)	• Perform law enforcement. • Conduct criminal investigations. • Conduct traffic management and enforcement. • Employ forensics capabilities. • Conduct police engagement. • Conduct customs operations. • Support host-nation police development. • Conduct civil law enforcement support. • Conduct border control and boundary security support.

Table 6-1. Army publications on protection tasks (continued)

Primary Protection Task	*Tasks*
Conduct Detention Operations (FM 3-63)	• Conduct detainee operations. • Confine U.S. military prisoners. • Conduct host-nation corrections training and support.
Conduct Populace and Resources Control (ATP 3-39.30, ATP 3-57.10, ATP 3-07.6)	• Support dislocated civilian operations. • Support noncombatant evacuation operations. • Protect and maintain critical infrastructure. • Enforce resource control measures.
Conduct Area Security (JP 3-10, ADP 3-90)	• Conduct area and base security operations. • Conduct critical installation and facilities security. • Provide protective services for selected individuals. • Conduct response force operations. • Secure supply routes and convoys. • Conduct support area operations. • Establish local security.
Perform Cyberspace Security and Defense (JP 3-12, FM 3-12, FM 6-02, ATP 6-02.71)	• Perform cybersecurity activities. • Conduct defensive cyberspace operations internal defensive measures.
Conduct Electromagnetic Protection (FM 3-12, ATP 6-02.70)	• Conduct electromagnetic protection attacks. • Conduct defensive electromagnetic attack. • Conduct electromagnetic spectrum management.
Implement Operations Security (JP 3-55, ATP 3-13.3)	• Conduct operations security. • Analyze threat. • Implement measures and countermeasures
Legend: ADP–Army doctrine publication; ATP–Army techniques publication; C2—command and control; CBRN–chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear; EOD—explosive ordnance disposal; FM–field manual; JP–joint publication	

RISK MANAGEMENT

6-25. Commanders and advisor team leaders must manage and mitigate risk in every operation. Due to the nature of SFAB operations, the advisor team may operate under an increased level of operational risk relative to other conventional units. Advisor teams may be employed in areas without established infrastructure, geographically dispersed, and alongside FSF. Team leaders and assistant team leaders must identify potential risks, prioritize those risks, and then implement mitigation measures to reduce the likelihood and danger of those risks. If properly managed, accepting a higher level of risk may lead to tactical opportunities. They can reduce the risk through careful planning and foresight. *Risk* is the probability and severity driven chance of loss, caused by threat or other hazards (ATP 5-19). Commanders assess associated risks by the degree to which the incident affects combat power or mission capability. Risk can never be fully eliminated however, so commanders must be prepared to accept some level of risk in their operations.

6-26. SFAB commanders and staff use the protection warfighting function to assist mitigating risk when employing advising teams. The SFAB will leverage internal capabilities to assist advising teams in respect to protection. These include but are not limited to; EOD, cyberspace operations, EW, information operations, military police, CBRN, and engineering. These listed organic forces are limited in capability and cannot perform all tasks traditionally associated with their MOS or branch. The advisor network will provide a

mechanism for assessing operational risk during employment and provide a method for commanders to allocate resources during transitions.

6-27. Employment with FSF should inherently reduce potential incidents that adversely affect both forces' readiness to execute missions. Since SFAB advisor elements are generally much smaller than the FSF they work with, the FSF can provide significant capability and capacity to the SFAB element to enable SFAB-internal protection and thereby mitigate inherent risks to the SFAB team (for example, using foreign heavy equipment operators and their equipment to construct protective earthworks for the SFAB team's tactical or sustainment areas). Leveraging FSF assets, the SFAB preserves organic combat power and mitigates the residual risk.

SURVIVABILITY

6-28. SFAB leaders assess survivability as the ability of a friendly force to withstand enemy effects while remaining mission capable. It represents the degree to which a formation is hard to destroy. Survivability consists of two aspects—avoiding and withstanding. Avoiding seeks to prevent an enemy attack, surveillance, or accurate targeting. Withstanding is minimizing or preventing degradation after having been attacked. Survivability operations conducted by the SFAB seek to avoid and withstand threats and hazards from enemy forces and insider threats. Friendly survivability operations include constructing fighting positions, hardening facilities, and employing camouflage and concealment. In an advisor-specific context, avoiding includes de-escalation and conflict negotiation.

6-29. FSF survivability operations allow them to avoid or withstand threats and hazards. Due to their close working relationship, advisor teams indirectly benefit from the increased FSF survivability measures. Advisor teams should discuss the importance of improving survivability with their foreign counterparts and assist them in conducting assessments, developing improvement plans, and prioritizing resources and projects. When appropriate, advisor teams can provide and coordinate additional U.S. and other agency resources in support of the FSF efforts.

6-30. Without augmentation, advisor teams do not have the organic structure to create more than rudimentary protective works for themselves. Therefore, additional resources provided by the FSF are essential to the survivability of advisor teams. These operations are typically resource-intensive and require heavy equipment and significant labor. (See ATP 3-37.34 for more information of survivability.)

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, OR NUCLEAR

6-31. CBRN protection measures mitigate CBRN threats and hazards from having an adverse effect on military operations and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, and facilities. CBRN weapons can cause mass casualties and large-scale destruction. Many nation-states and nonstate actors possess, seek to possess, develop, and proliferate such weapons.

6-32. Development of the FSF's CBRN protection capability allows the FSF to preserve combat power. The SFAB EOD advisors assist FSF CBRN training. The CBRN training may include self/team decontamination, identify CBRN threats and ordnance, emergency decontamination, point detection and monitoring, and leak, seal, and package of CBRN explosive ordnance. EOD advisors are not trained or equipped for mass decontamination or area detection. The FSF also supports advisors by preventing enemy acquisition of these weapons as well as assessing, protecting, and mitigating CBRN threats and hazards.

6-33. The SFAB EOD and CBRN advisors along with UAPs, leverage the advisor network to prepare for CBRN operations. Specifically, they assist the FSF in planning decontamination for both FSF and SFAB advisor teams who have been affected by CBRN hazards. They coordinate with FSF, U.S. Forces and UAPs to ensure decontamination and protection equipment are available. This includes level 2 mission-oriented protective posture gear, water and decontaminants are pre-positioned for forces that have the highest probability of encountering CBRN effects. (See FM 3-11 for more information on CBRN operations.)

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

6-34. While FHP is an aspect of the protection warfighting function, there is substantial overlap with the sustainment warfighting function. See chapter 7 for discussion of FHP.

ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM

6-35. The EMS is a physical medium in which all branches of the government and partner nations conduct activities. EMS signature is the sum of detectible emissions from equipment such as radios, information technology systems, GPS, and wireless electronic materiel and personal effects (for example, cell phones). EMS signature detection is a predominant means of location finding and targeting for military forces. Advisor teams evaluate the EMS signature that their equipment emits and adopt appropriate measures to minimize or eliminate unnecessary emissions. Advisor teams also use available resources to continually evaluate the cumulative EMS signature of the team, FSF, and other adjacent units. When the environment is nonpermissive, advisor teams are responsible to protect themselves and FSF by using best practice signature management tactics, techniques, and procedures.

6-36. In addition to protection by means of signature management, advisors consider protecting the EMS itself from illicit or hazardous interference. Protecting frequencies used by friendly and partner forces is as important as protecting any other critical asset. Failure to protect friendly frequencies and deny the enemy EMS interference, can result in the exploitation, geolocation, and denial of numerous friendly systems. Advisor teams know what jammers/spoofers are prevalent in their AO and can identify interference indicators. National, criminal, or violent extremist entities use jammers and spoofers throughout the competition continuum. Many EMS interference systems are low cost, easy to obtain, and prolific. Advisor teams must make a robust communication contingency plan, understand the joint spectrum interference resolution process, and report interference to S-6 for deconfliction in the event of friendly or enemy jamming. Advisor teams should also coordinate with their cyberspace electromagnetic activities cell to locate any active threats and assist in the development of their electronic protection plans.

6-37. Nation States and criminal organizations may possess sophisticated EMS equipment that represent a prominent security risk to the SFAB enterprise. Adversaries use data acquired by these systems to develop a pattern of life to exploit SFAB and FSF. An example of a sophisticated system is a rogue base station, also known as international mobile subscriber identity catchers. These exploit cell phones and may not only geolocate and target team and FSF members, but also provide a means to employ cyberweapons and deny the use of friendly capabilities. Hobbyists and criminal organizations may pose a similar risk through use of less sophisticated commercial tools. Advisor teams must be educated on the risks involved while using their government and personal devices. Teams who suspect EMS interference coordinate with their cyberspace electromagnetic activities cell or signals intelligence counterparts to acquire systems and training to identify threats and locate the enemy transmitters.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

6-38. *Physical security* is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft (JP 3-0). The Army employs physical security measures in-depth to protect personnel, information, and critical resources in all locations and situations against various threats by developing and implementing effective security policies and procedures. This approach is based upon continuing evaluation and employment of protective measures including physical barriers, cleared zones, lighting, access and key control, intrusion detection devices, defensive positions, and nonlethal capabilities. (See ATP 3-39.32.)

6-39. SFAB commanders, staffs, and team leaders consider physical security throughout the planning and operations cycle to ensure that critical areas are secured against likely threats. Within the SFAB, the provost marshal may provide critical expertise to develop physical security plans, direct physical security measure implementation, and coordinate for assets to facilitate physical security. The U.S. Army Military Police School's Physical Security course enhances the ability of military police to perform physical security inspections and assessments. Critical areas the SFAB may consider for extensive physical security measures may include—

- Bases or base camps.
- Access or entry control points.
- Key command posts, communication nodes, or sustainment facilities.
- Weapons, arms, ammunition, and explosive storage areas.
- Troop housing areas or other high concentration areas, such as dining facilities.

6-40. The SFAB can influence the FSF's ability to secure its critical assets against unauthorized access, damage, or criminal activity by supporting the foreign partner with physical security inspections and assessments and providing support to implement physical security measures. FSF that can protect their critical assets can apply greater combat power to the mission. For instance, poor physical security of the foreign bases, weapons, command nodes, and housing areas can severely compromise the SFAB's mission success by threatening the FSF' readiness through enemy attrition of personnel, morale, and equipment.

6-41. Physical security measures implemented by both the SFAB and the FSF complement each other and produce an enhanced security posture. Due to the interactive basis of the relationship, the security of one force is directly related to the security of the other. Advisors rely on their foreign partners when they collocate within the foreign bases, operate from their partner's facilities, or depend on foreign infrastructure to enhance their own protection.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

6-42. *Army personnel recovery* is the military efforts taken to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel (FM 3-50). U.S. Army forces work together with DOD and other UAPs to recover individuals and groups who become isolated. Isolation refers to persons separated from their unit or in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape. U.S. Army forces also support the recovery of other persons designated by the President or SecDef. The personnel recovery mission includes preparing Soldiers, other Service members, DA Civilians, and contractors in danger of isolation while participating in any activity or mission sponsored by the United States. The personnel recovery task is particularly important to the SFAB as additional maneuver forces may or may not be present in the operational area where the SFAB is located (within or outside of a designated JOA).

6-43. The SFAB commander assesses the operational variables and typically considers personnel recovery from three perspectives: United States and foreign partner together in tactical isolation, foreign or host nation-led recovery of U.S. and FSF combined element, or U.S.-led recovery of U.S. Forces only, because foreign forces are incapable or untrustworthy. The SFAB commander provides personnel recovery planning guidance and isolated Soldier guidance prior to executing all missions. The commander considers the following four general approaches (sometimes referred to as methods) to conduct personnel recovery:

- Unassisted.
- Immediate.
- Deliberate.
- External support.

6-44. Effective guidance addresses the challenges of isolation within a unit's AO. Effective guidance is concrete enough for Soldiers to implement. Isolated Soldier guidance applies to the entire command since the uncertainty and complexity of military operations expose everyone to risk of isolation, regardless of rank. Isolated Soldier guidance must include the set of circumstances (isolation criteria) under which Soldiers or small elements execute their isolated Soldier guidance and their mission changes from their primary mission to one of evasion (see FM 3-50 for more information).

6-45. The FSF or host nation may also employ national police in response to personnel recovery requirements. When foreign or host-nation forces are in the lead, personnel recovery assistance provided by the foreign force to the SFAB facilitates rapid initiation of personnel recovery. The mission is incredibly time-sensitive and high priority. As part of their training and rehearsals with the FSF, SFAB commanders, staffs, and advisor team leaders should incorporate these types of operations into the training plan. The FSF are generally more familiar with the OE and population, therefore, a well-trained foreign partner has a higher chance to recover the missing personnel.

AREA SECURITY

6-46. *Area security* is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, and activities within a specific area (ADP 3-90). The SFAB has no organic capabilities to perform area security. SFAB advisors enhance the area security operations of the partner FSF. Inside a JOA, area security is usually the responsibility of the commander assigned to an AO. The SFAB relies on mutual support from U.S. and foreign maneuver forces for its protection. Outside a JOA, the SFAB’s protection

beyond its own inherent local security capabilities relies heavily on the success of partnered area security. Area security often focuses on the following activities:

- Base or base camp defense.
- Critical asset security.
- Node protection.
- High-risk personnel security.
- Response force operations.
- Lines of COMSEC.
- Checkpoints and combat outposts.
- Convoy security.
- Port area and pier security.
- Area damage control.

6-47. Partnered area security is complementary to local security and extends the reach of the SFAB to protect itself beyond the extent of its local security. Advisor teams often operate in austere environments; therefore, their protection often relies on their ability to defeat local threats. In conjunction with their foreign partners, advisor teams defeat threats in the surrounding areas before potential threats can generate combat power and present an overwhelming threat. Advisors are significantly limited (as well as constrained in non-JOA environments) in their ability to perform area security beyond the extent of their local security. Advisor teams achieve protection by collaborating with the FSF to perform partnered area security operations. Partnered area security leverages the strengths of each and thereby achieves synergy to defeat threats in the area beyond the reach of the advisor team capabilities or authorities.

6-48. As part of partnered area security, advisors provide the FSF with capabilities that facilitate their area security operations. For instance, while the FSF may provide the bulk of the combat power through ground maneuver forces, the advisors provide linkage to U.S. joint or multinational enterprises (such as joint fires, intelligence, or logistics). The ability of the advisors to coordinate support (for example, aviation, EOD, special operations forces) to the FSF enhances its ability to accomplish security in areas and populations. The objective of U.S. military operations is to protect partner nation political, economic, and social institutions against immediate threats, and to stabilize the OE so the FSF can gain and maintain area security. Preserving the legitimacy of the partner nation by developing the FSF to solve their own internal security problems is of strategic importance and essential to attaining long-term security outcomes.

LOCAL SECURITY

6-49. *Local security* is the low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy (ADP 3-90). Local security is an inherent responsibility of every individual, organization, and commander. Local security involves efforts taken to defeat local threats to provide immediate protection to the friendly force. The SFAB contains local security capabilities to retain the ability to defend itself no matter the OE. Security tasks—outside of local team security—are beyond the capability of the advisor team and must be performed by another security force, which may be the FSF. The FSF contribute to the SFAB local security by providing personnel, equipment, and facilities to the SFAB.

6-50. Local security includes observation posts, local security patrols, perimeter security, overwatch positions, and other measures to provide close-in security for a force. The SFAB must always place local security in the forefront of its considerations, as the ability to continuously secure itself is critical to its ability to perform its assigned tasks and fulfill its mission. The SFAB routinely works with the FSF in small teams and minimal additional security personnel. When necessary, the advisor team employs its own members to provide overwatch during foreign engagements. The designated member(s) are disengaged from the meeting or training, focusing on the environment and participants. The overwatch personnel must remain vigilant to the behavior and actions of everyone present. The designated member(s) must also be cognizant of customs and courtesies of the foreign counterparts as not to mistake normal behavior and action with aggressive action or conversation tone.

6-51. On those occasions when SFA operations are politically sensitive, successful insider attacks may have a greater strategic effect than a conventional force-on-force attack. Therefore, these attacks are a goal of many enemy organizations and must be considered while planning and conducting SFAB operations. In such cases of increased risk of attack, security measures must be modified accordingly. All SFAB members have

a responsibility to contribute to local security. Unless augmented with a dedicated security force, SFAB team members collectively share the responsibility to contribute to continuous local security through constant observation, awareness, and rotational security duties, as necessary.

6-52. The FSF should have the ability to secure themselves and provide for their own local security. Advisors teach their foreign partners the five fundamentals of security:

- Provide early and accurate warning.
- Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
- Orient on the force or facility to be secured.
- Perform continuous reconnaissance.
- Maintain enemy contact.

6-53. FSF operating consistently with the fundamentals of security detailed in FM 3-90 develop basic local security competencies. Once proficient at these fundamentals, they begin to perform additional forms of security operations, which allow them to prevent surprise and preserve reaction time for commanders and advisors.

ANTITERRORISM

6-54. Antiterrorism is related to physical security and consists of proactive defensive measures used to deter, detect, delay, deny, and defend individuals and property against terrorist acts. These measures include limited response and containment by security forces. The SFAB antiterrorism resources include risk management, antiterrorism planning, awareness training, command information programs, validation of defensive plans, CI, security considerations, and other resources.

6-55. Insider attacks can jeopardize mission success and damage the relationships between the advisor and FSF. As such, advisor teams should be cognizant of the FSF's ability to train, monitor, and assess their antiterrorism measures and update the dynamic risk assessment, as appropriate.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

6-56. The officer and NCO in the SFAB EOD cell serve as the explosive hazard advisors. SFAB EOD provides explosive ordnance technical, tactical, and operational recommendations to the advisor team leader. Using the advisor network and UAPs, SFAB EOD can assist in improving the EOD readiness of FSF partners.

6-57. SFAB EOD provides explosive ordnance technical and tactical advice to foreign EOD counterparts which increases FSF ability to detect, identify, render safe, and dispose of, explosive ordnance. SFAB EOD provide limited EOD operational support to FSF.

6-58. The SFAB EOD officer will procure EOD equipment, including training aids, and will advise FSF on developing an EOD training program. This program often includes an EOD team leader validation program and instruction on accountability and maintenance of EOD equipment.

6-59. EOD personnel have access to law enforcement sensitive data which is beneficial to intelligence personnel. EOD personnel can provide analyses which should be disseminated through intelligence channels on common explosive tactics, techniques, and procedures, ways to detect explosive threats, and methods to reduce risk to mission and force (see ATP 4-32).

6-60. The increased global production of insensitive munitions and next generation antiaccess area denial systems will impede FSF and U.S. operations. SFAB EOD will be a key enabler to help protect the force and ensure critical infrastructure, lines of communication, and C2 nodes remain operational. Partner EOD capacity will be critical to offset the density of next generation dispensable insensitive munitions which can be expected at key nodes such as APODs and SPODs.

JOINT EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER

6-61. As the executive agent for EOD, the U.S. Navy's Joint EOD Technical Support Center is the approval authority for what EOD information can be shared with and what material can be sold to FSF. SFAB EOD collaborates with the Joint EOD Technical Support Center to identify information that is releasable to FSF. The Joint EOD Technical Support Center is the approval authority for foreign military sales of common EOD render-safe tools, sets, kits and outfits. Working with this office, SFAB EOD can nominate foreign military

sales of EOD material through the ASCCs to FSF partners to increase FSF survivability thus reducing allies and partners support requirements during LSCO.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CLEARANCE AGENTS

WARNING

EOD forces are specifically trained in render-safe procedures and the disposal of explosive ordnance. While other forces can destroy limited explosive ordnance by detonation, they are not properly equipped, trained, or authorized to perform render-safe procedures or other disposal procedures.

6-62. EOCAs are combat engineers trained to perform limited disposal operations on limited explosive ordnance, for which they are trained and authorized, on the battlefield. The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Proponent Office—EOD publishes the EOCA ordnance list, and the joint EOD theater commander publishes the EOCA ordnance supplement list as part of their ordnance order or battle. EOCAs may assist EOD in the disposal of explosive ordnance per the EOCA identification guide.

Explosive Ordnance Clearance Agents Capabilities

6-63. EOCA personnel may perform a reconnaissance of suspected explosive ordnance to be able to positively identify the ordnance using the EOCA identification guide and supplemental EOCA ordnance list. Leaders should use the EOD nine-line report to report the items. EOCA personnel can only teach FSF ordnance identification of non-U.S. ordnance in accordance with Naval School Explosive Ordnance Disposal (NAVSCOLEOD) foreign disclosure procedures.

6-64. EOCA personnel can support survivability efforts to mitigate the blast and fragmentation danger area of an identified explosive ordnance using protective works. Commanders should increase survivability efforts to protect personnel and equipment from the blast effects and fragmentation when personnel must remain in the hazard area.

Explosive Ordnance Clearance Agents Limitations

6-65. EOCA personnel cannot move or destroy multiple explosive ordnance (such as a cache). EOCA personnel cannot conduct a reconnaissance of an improvised explosive device (IED) or handle IEDs. EOCA personnel can only work with captured enemy ammunition under the direct supervision of EOD personnel. EOCA personnel cannot be used for explosive ordnance response calls. EOCA personnel cannot teach ordnance demolition procedures without an EOD team leader certified by a NAVSCOLEOD foreign disclosure officer. To provide C-IED identification awareness training to non-EOD FSF, the advisor must complete a course like the Army’s Dismounted C-IED Tactics Master Trainer course or the C-IED Training Integrator course.

POLICE OPERATIONS

6-66. Police operations advising focuses on peacetime policing actions and institutional development. Military police operations involve the application of control measures and enforcement mechanisms within an AO to maintain law and order, safety, and other matters affecting the general welfare of the population. The Army conducts military police operations to maintain order within its communities and formations. When directed, the Army also applies military policing activities to civilian populations to restore order when the rule of law has broken down or is nonexistent. Police operations include law enforcement, forensic analysis and biometric support, criminal investigations, customs support, support to civil security and civil control (including host-nation police training and support), police engagement, crowd control, traffic management and enforcement, and evidence response team support (see ATP 3-39.10). Police operations advising may be necessary when the SFAB's mission includes increasing the capability and capacity of FSF law enforcement organizations. While other UAPs (such as the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs) are often responsible for assisting FSF law enforcement organizations, through interagency support, DOD may be required to lead the effort when civilian agencies are unable to perform these missions based on the security environment.

6-67. Given the technical skills required in training police organizations (escalation of force, evidence collection, preservation and storage, forensic analysis, and criminal investigations), the SFAB commanders and staffs should request additional military police support when working with FSF law enforcement agencies. Assessments may lead to training the FSF law enforcement organizations to prevent, investigate, and disrupt transnational organized criminal activities that threaten order and stability in the host nation or geographic region A host nation's ability to maintain civil order and police its population according to the rule of law is critical to SFAB protection. Nations undermine their stability and legitimacy when their police organizations fail to achieve order, enforce laws, and minimize corruption. Failure to achieve public security can significantly degrade the SFAB's protection and threaten its ability to focus on its primary mission. (See ATP 3-39.10 for more information on police operations.)

UTILIZING NONLETHAL OPTIONS

6-68. There is a wide range of scenarios in which nonlethal capabilities may be employed. They may be used to disperse dangerous mobs or deny access to critical facilities such as weapon storage sites, embassies, enemy prisoner of war facilities, nuclear power plants, troop lodgments, and so forth.

6-69. Nonlethal capabilities are employed with the intent to compel or deter adversaries by acting on human capabilities or materiel while minimizing fatalities and damage to equipment or facilities. This concept describes required capabilities that enable the FSF to employ nonlethal capabilities which provide alternatives to, or raise the threshold for, application of lethal force; augmenting lethal capabilities; and protecting friendly forces across the combined operation. Nonlethal capabilities will provide FSF with the necessary means to control populations, enforce mandates, and protect themselves in consonance with the specified rules of engagement for the operation. The successful accomplishment of any operation in which nonlethal weapons are employed requires extensive preparation, of which individual and unit training are vital. Training should be designed to give individuals an understanding of the entire subject area and enable them to function efficiently as members of a unit or independently. This training must be intensive and realistic. Training with nonlethal weapons capabilities is critical to ensure employment of these capabilities with confidence and proficiency.

DETENTION OPERATIONS

6-70. The primary advisor to oversee detention operations is the provost marshal, however, the technical details and procedures required to perform detention operations to standard may require augmentation by military police correction and detention specialists or designated law enforcement professionals. The SFAB should maintain oversight and awareness of its counterpart's detention operations to include the following:

- Ensuring humane treatment of detainees.
- Monitoring and enforcing pretrial correction standards consistent with the host nation rule-of-law.
- Improving and maintaining gender appropriate health, hygiene, and social services.
- Establishing and maintaining the appropriate oversight of the corrections system.
- Promoting the rehabilitation and reintegration of detainees back into the population.

6-71. While the SFAB has limited or no requirements to perform detention operations itself, it is imperative that its counterpart FSF perform their detention operations according to their nation's rule-of-law, while abiding by international laws, norms, and standards. When the SFAB's counterparts conduct detention operations, the SFAB commanders and staffs coordinate through the provost marshal to provide technical oversight to prevent violations of human rights and the laws of armed conflict. The provost marshal should coordinate with the staff judge advocate advisor and host nation law enforcement professionals to provide accurate oversight and have a shared understanding of the applicable laws and regulations. Failure to treat detainees humanely may lead to negative operational and strategic outcomes.

6-72. FSF detention operations contribute to the SFAB's protection by removing potential threat populations from the operational area. The effectiveness of the host nation's criminal justice systems (police, corrections, and judicial) to adjudicate civil disputes, prosecute violations of criminal laws, and incarcerate convicted criminal offenders is critical to the overall stability and order of the nation and region. In places where

legitimate criminal justice systems exist, the SFAB benefits from the protection provided by maintaining stable social and political conditions. When the criminal justice system is undermined by insurgent or criminal activity, corruption of government personnel and institutions, or the presence of competing governance structure (criminal, terrorist, or insurgent), the SFAB's protection is significantly reduced by the surrounding instability, disorder, or criminalized power structures. The ability of the host-nation FSF to achieve legitimate civil order is essential to preventing conflict and consolidating gains to achieve long-term U.S. strategic objectives.

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

6-73. Populace control provides security for the indigenous populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy access to the population, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. It involves establishing public order and safety, securing borders, protecting population centers and people, holding individuals accountable for criminal activities, controlling the activities of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablishing essential civil services, and setting conditions in the operational area that support stability through unity of effort. Populace control may become necessary because of military operations or man-made or natural disasters. International law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local population.

6-74. During times of conflict, traffic on main supply routes may encounter dislocated civilians that could hinder military traffic. The FSF assist and divert dislocated civilians from main supply routes and other areas to dislocated civilian camps. They may also deny the movement of civilians whose location, direction of movement, or actions may be a threat to themselves or to the evolving combat operation. The host-nation government is responsible for identifying routes for the safe movement of dislocated civilians out of an AO. The military police assist CA and the host nation in redirecting dislocated civilians to alternate routes. Military police coordination to FSF enhance their ability to reduce confusion and congestion along key ground lines of communication during a conflict. The FSF’s ability to perform straggler and dislocated-civilian-control operations, prevent possible infiltration of the enemy, return stragglers to military control as part of the combined operation, and provides security from the rear area to the forward line of own troops. (See ATP 3-39.30 for more information on dislocated civilian operations.)

6-75. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency's HA, Disaster Relief and Emergency Management Advisor team provides advising for coordination of program management over DOD HA activities. DOD conducts HA to provide relief and aid for conditions such as human suffering, disease, and hunger. Emergency management activities aim to save lives, avert crises, and strengthen SC relationships between partner nations and the United States. Emergency management advising enables the five HA activities that equip, train, and build the capacity of a FSF government to provide essential humanitarian services.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

6-76. OPSEC is a form of security, as defined by JP 3-10. OPSEC is a significant challenge during SFA activities because of the diverse nature of parties interacting with the advisor team and advised element. The need to protect critical information about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities from hostile elements facilitates the SFAB's overall security. The nature of SFA implies that many host-nation officials and the population have information regarding some U.S. activities before they occur, which increases operational risk. However, critical information and key activities can be protected by identifying the operational risk associated with certain types of information, designating the appropriate people with which information can be shared, monitoring the success of the OPSEC program, and implementing changes as necessary.

6-77. Advisors must consider the possibility of informants within the FSF when designing the OPSEC program. Adversaries may have members or sympathizers within the FSF acting as informants.

6-78. Higher headquarters should provide extensive OPSEC in support of their advisor teams and their foreign partners. COMSEC is an implied subcomponent of OPSEC. COMSEC is essential throughout the planning and execution of SFA activities. Advisors must be trained to protect sensitive communications equipment and cryptographic materials. COMSEC between the SFAB and the foreign partner can be challenging, as they may not have compatible systems. In cases where the FSF lack capability, advisors establish alternative communications methods in conjunction with the FSF. Regardless of how advisors communicate with their foreign partners, they must protect sensitive information.

SECTION IV – ADDITIONAL THREATS AND HAZARDS

6-79. While protection provides an overall approach to preserving combat power, there are additional protection considerations that the SFAB must address to achieve comprehensive and layered protection. The integration and synchronization of countering explosive hazards, fratricide avoidance, and local security with the protection tasks enable commanders to protect forces, critical assets, and information. Developing the FSF allows the advisor teams to leverage the FSF capabilities to provide additional force protection. The advisor teams are particularly concerned with SFAB's primary protection tasks follows—

- Survivability.
- CBRN.
- EOD.
- C-UAS.
- Emergency medical service.

COUNTERING EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS

6-80. Countering explosive hazards reduces casualties and damage and enables the commander's freedom of action. IEDs can provide the enemy with a tactical advantage in ways that other weapons cannot. Engineer and EOD units enhance protection through the execution of countering explosive hazards. Engineers enhance protection through route clearance patrols, and breaching and clearing obstacles enables freedom of maneuver. EOD enhances protection through the identification, render safe, exploitation, and disposal of explosive hazards, weapons systems, and related materiel. Countering explosive hazards by render-safe procedures allows the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter the threat. This includes technical and forensic exploitation to improve functions that include intelligence, targeting, force protection, materiel and non-materiel solutions.

COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

6-81. IEDs can compensate if an adversary lacks heavy weapons by providing greater target lethality and survivability to the adversary than small arms. IEDs provide a countermobility capability against mounted and dismounted units and a means to attack hardened targets, such as armored vehicles and fortifications. Like landmines, IEDs often canalize friendly movement into ambushes. IEDs provide standoff that reduces bombers' vulnerabilities by keeping them out of range of U.S. weapons and sensors. The IED's indiscriminate nature and anonymity make it a psychological weapon, heightening the combat stress of friendly forces.

6-82. SFAB commanders and staffs include C-IED in their planning and training at home station to reduce unit vulnerabilities and take proactive measures to identify and target the IED networks when deployed to reduce the IED threat. The SFAB assists FSF to integrate their activities with UAP's C-IED efforts.

6-83. At a minimum, C-IED activities should focus on the three lines of efforts of the C-IED framework: network engagement, train the force, and defeat the device. The level of effort may vary by phase throughout the course of the operation. The SFAB should develop and execute appropriate C-IED plans to ensure comprehensive support to an operation (see ATP 4-32.2).

FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE

6-84. SFABs conduct combat identification before and during target engagement. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of LSCO, increase the potential for fratricide. The primary preventive measures to limit friendly fire incidents are combat identification training, command emphasis, disciplined operations, coordination measures, close coordination among component commands, rehearsals, reliable and interoperable coordination systems, battle tracking, and enhanced situational awareness. Risk management is also fully integrated with planning and executing operations. Commanders identify and assess situations that increase the risk of friendly fire incidents.

FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES THREAT

6-85. An FSF threat is the potential for violence posed by FSF working with, or granted access to, U.S. service members, civilians, or contractors. An FSF threat attack is a violent act perpetrated against a U.S.

service member, civilian, or contractor by an FSF member or members who have access to U.S. service members, civilians, or contractors. When operating in an expeditionary, multi-partner environment, the potential for a violent attack by FSF increases significantly since they operate alongside U.S. service members and civilians. Advisors must be able to de-escalate tensions when working with FSF.

6-86. Commanders and advisors plan for and implement protection capabilities, to include de-escalation techniques. Advisor teams avoid physical and lethal engagements with their foreign counterparts while maintaining their right to self-defense. Maintaining honest, yet respectful, relationships with the foreign counterparts is one of the best ways for advisor teams to maintain their own physical security. (See ATP 3-37.15 for more information on foreign security force threats.)

COUNTER-UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

6-87. UASs proliferate modern society and range from large government-owned devices to simple and easily obtainable commercial models. These systems provide an adversary the means to detect, observe, and target friendly forces. The enemy will attempt to identify friendly strengths, weaknesses, and key C2 elements. The enemy attempts to identify and target key communication nodes or critical capabilities that will disrupt the U.S. Forces' ability to maintain security and limit the U.S. Forces' freedom of maneuver. Therefore, advisor teams must consider the impact these devices may have on their operations. Mitigation measures may include using camouflage and concealment, requesting specialized equipment and training to C-UAS, increase dispersion, interdict threat launch points with aggressive patrolling, or simply maintaining awareness of the potential UAS threat while conducting operations.

6-88. There is no single solution to countering the low-slow-small, UAS threat. Training the force to recognize and neutralize low-slow-small UAS threats prior to an attack is the preferred method but is not always feasible. If an air attack is imminent, the commander should use the most efficient method available to protect the unit and minimize effects. Combined arms forces must maintain flexibility in their options to quickly recognize and counter the effects from an enemy low-slow-small UAS. Ultimately, achieving the best C-UAS defense is through proper planning, training, coordination, and execution of unit training strategies. The maneuver force must plan, train, and execute operations as an integrated combined arms team employing all forms of passive air defense techniques when active air defense is limited or not available. Friendly forces should treat a downed UAS as a potential IED, subject to the same protection and exploitation concerns.

WARNING

When approaching a downed UAS, take necessary precautions for unknown possible threats to include explosive, absorption, thermal, heavy metal, and inhalation hazards.

Chapter 7
Sustainment

There is nothing more common than to find considerations of supply affecting the strategic lines of a campaign and a war.

Carl von Clausewitz

Chapter 7 describes the SFAB's sustainment advising battalion, the levels of LATs, sustainment SFA activities and the collective responsibility to coordinate SFAB sustainment requirements to facilitate shared sustainment understanding across the competition continuum. It also details sustainment operations within the advisor teams.

SECTION I – SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE SUSTAINMENT ADVISING BATTALION MISSION AND SCOPE

7-1. The primary function of the sustainment advising battalion's subordinate elements (the LBAT, LCAT, and LAT) is to develop the sustainment capability and capacity of FSF. The secondary function is coordinating sustainment support between the SFAB advisor teams and the theater support structure. The LBAT, LCAT, and LAT utilize the advisor network to ensure the accuracy of logistics status reporting and logistics package requirements.

7-2. When an SFAB operates inside a CCDR's designated JOA, the brigade nests with established sustainment structures. Inside a JOA, the expeditionary sustainment command oversees the distribution management, transportation operations, materiel management, personnel services, and OCS. The SFAB S4, along with the SPO section, will initially coordinate sustainment support through their higher headquarters or from a maneuver brigade support battalion or division sustainment support battalion (DSSB) through its area support mission and responsibilities. Operating inside a JOA allows the LBAT, LCAT, and LAT to utilize established sustainment systems and distribution networks. The SFAB receives its sustainment support from one or more of the following entities: the host nation, OCS, the ASCC, an embassy country team, area support from a contracting support brigade, a brigade support battalion, and DSSB.

7-3. When an SFAB operates outside a CCDR's designated JOA or when there is no JOA established, the brigade may not have traditional Army sustainment systems and distribution networks to rely on for resupply, distribution, maintenance, transportation, and medical SPO. With no other conventional forces in the JOA, the SFAB S4 and the LBAT SPO section must coordinate sustainment support through their higher headquarters to access contracting support, host-nation support, or support from the Defense Logistics Agency, American embassy, or the ASCC for their location. These entities support administrative, sustainment, and life support functions.

SECTION II – SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE SUSTAINMENT ADVISING BATTALION ORGANIZATION

7-4. The sustainment advising battalion can force generate an LBAT and two LCATs each with two LATs (see figure 7-1 on page 178). Within the sustainment advising battalion, the headquarters support company contains a SPO section, MSS, maintenance section, and distribution section. The SPO may advise as augmentation to an advising team when additional sustainment advising capabilities are required. The MSS can provide a medical advising capability to the LAT for the FSF from Role 1 through Role 3. LATs can advise FSF on sustainment operations from brigade through theater level. The LCAT and LATs may also provide internal sustainment support to the SFAB when aligned with a force package.




Figure 7-1. Sustainment advising battalion task organization

BRIGADE SUSTAINMENT STAFF

7-5. The SFAB sustainment staff plans, directs, controls, and coordinates sustainment in support of operations. Key members of the SFAB's sustainment staff include the S-1, S-4, property book officer, brigade surgeon, and the S-8. These staff sections perform common staff responsibilities described in chapter 1. The staff develops internal brigade policies and plans in its respective technical areas and provides guidance, priorities, and allocations to subordinate commands.

7-6. Due to the limited organic sustainment capability within the SFAB, the brigade S-4 and SPO section have unique roles relative to other conventional BCTs. The brigade S-4 conducts mission analysis, consolidates sustainment requirements, maintains and monitors the green LOGCOP, and communicates those requirements through their higher headquarters or other sustainment entities. Once the required support relationships are established, the SPO section or force package S-4 assists in synchronizing the support provided by these external sustainment organizations. When employed as part of a force package, the S-4 must be prepared to synchronize support requirements in-lieu of the SPO. Force package commanders and staffs acknowledge the advisor dichotomy during mission analysis realizing that if the support and coordination requirements place a high level of demand on these staffs, their advising capacity decreases.

SUPPORT OPERATIONS

7-7. *Support operations* is the staff function of planning, coordinating, and synchronizing sustainment in support of units conducting decisive action in an area of operations (ATP 4-92). The SPO section provides centralized and integrated planning for all SPO within the brigade. SPO functions generally include transportation, maintenance, ammunition (see ATP 4-35.1), supply and field services, and distribution operations. the SPO section may develop FSF in sustainment operations.

7-8. The SPO is the principal staff section responsible for coordinating and synchronizing distribution, transportation, replenishment, and maintenance support from across the sustainment enterprise for all units assigned or attached to the SFAB. The SPO collects green LOGCOP information from the advisor teams and collates them into a cohesive AOR logistics picture. The brigade S-4 identifies requirements through daily logistic status reports, running estimates, and mission analysis.

7-9. SPO is responsible for the short-range to mid-range (future operations) planning and focus on coordinating the execution of the sustainment plan. The SPO section also develops the concept of support in coordination with the brigade S-4.

HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT COMPANY

7-10. The headquarters support company's primary mission to develop FSF in sustainment operations. Their secondary mission is to plan, coordinate, and synchronize logistics and Army Health System support for the SFAB. The sustainment advising battalion's headquarters support company provides SFA-related C2, administrative, and logistics support for all organic units to the SFAB.

MEDICAL SUPPORT SECTION

7-11. The primary mission of the MSS is internal medical support. Second, is advising, supporting, liaising, and assessing FSF medical elements. The MSS is required to have a thorough knowledge of other services and partner forces' medical capabilities, limitations, organizations, and procedures. The MSS serves as the medical subject matter experts for the SFAB advisor teams.

SECTION III – EXTERNAL SUPPORT COORDINATION AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR ADVISOR TEAMS

7-12. The LBAT's task is not to provide sustainment support to the SFAB, although they are a part of the advisor network and can counsel teams on sustainment operations. Rather, the SFAB is dependent upon theater sustainment forces, host nation, or OCS to meet team support requirements. Logistics support relationships are critical to the SFAB's success and must be defined, managed, and updated as necessary. SFAB units often receive support from other theater logistics units tasked with area support responsibility.

SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

7-13. As described in chapter 1, command and support relationships establish clear responsibilities and authorities between higher headquarters, subordinate, supported, and supporting units. Clearly defined support relationships are critical for advisor team success. Recognizing that the conventional logistics framework typically applies to that organization's own units, when external support is needed, the advisor team should work with the BAT-level S-4 to include support in the supporting unit's governing operation plan, operation order, or JOA. When it is not in a designated JOA, the SFAB must rely on support relationships with adjacent conventional units or other entities, such as host-nation support, the Defense Logistics Agency, a contracting support brigade, or an embassy's COM.

7-14. Support relationships determine the flow of logistics reports and requests. The senior logistician and SPO section must clearly define these processes throughout all echelons of the SFAB in conjunction with the supporting sustainment organizations. Teams may coordinate external requests: team-to-support-organization; team-to-S-4; or team-to-SPO; other communication chains are less common but allowed.

AREA SUPPORT

7-15. Area support is a task assigned to a sustainment unit directing it to support units within or passing through a specified location. SFAB elements request access to the LOGCOP or participate in AOR stakeholders' logistics synchronization event to understand and coordinate with area supporting units. As a caveat, area support applies to a set geographic boundary which may cross multiple unit boundaries or stop short of these boundaries. These boundaries should be considered in the sustainment rehearsals both in predeployment planning and in-theater operations planning.

7-16. Area support may be habitual or conducted on a limited basis depending on mission variables and orders. The senior SFAB logistics section primary, generally the S-4, projects and communicates support requirements to the supporting or DSSB so they can provide the required support. When an SFAB requires resupply through area support from a BCT or a DSSB, the SPO section coordinates with the supporting unit's SPO section, S-4, or other sustainment planner to integrate their requirements into the concept of support and to synchronize SPO (see ATP 4-90).

DISTRIBUTION, REPLENISHMENT, AND RESUPPLY OPERATIONS

7-17. Advisor team leaders gather the external logistics requirements that their advisor teams generate and relay the requests to the SFAB S-4 and SPO. The SPO officer coordinates and synchronizes distribution operations with external assets as dictated by the theater sustainment structure. These assets are provided by a DSSB, sustainment brigade, expeditionary sustainment command, contract logistics support, or other means.

7-18. Resupply operations require continuous and close coordination between the advisor team and the supporting units when operating in a JOA. The SFAB may establish accounts and relationships with additional sustainment units in the JOA such as an expeditionary sustainment command, sustainment brigade, or a DSSB to receive additional transportation, ammunition resupply, supply and field services, and distribution support. Advisor teams assess the required days of supply for each class of supply in the predeployment planning cycle and continuously develop the logistics status picture to mitigate risks of delayed or degraded logistic support availability.

TRANSPORTATION

7-19. Advisor teams are assigned internal transportation equipment to facilitate training while in the continental United States and to enable operational reach during the advising mission in a deployed environment. The SFAB's organizational equipment provides the necessary vehicles, repair tools, and sustainment vehicles to provide limited sustainment for their personnel and equipment. However, the force structure is intended to fall under an established support relationship from a higher headquarters. The assigned equipment is likely unsuitable for an expeditionary or austere environment, especially in a crisis or conflict zone. The OE may also inhibit deployment of part or all of these transportation assets, limit sustainment capabilities available to the team, or inordinately delay the arrival of Class IX repair parts or the Class III petroleum, oil, and lubricant products necessary to execute operations with the assigned vehicles. SFABs perform cost-benefit analysis to weigh the time and financial burden of operating the assigned equipment vice acquiring equipment or transportation services in theater. FSF and embassy personnel can advise the advisor teams on logistical support for transportation systems available within the AOR. Additional transportation contract support may be coordinated through ACSAs, foreign military sales, or FOO/pay agent activities to provide the required transportation capabilities.

MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

7-20. Maintenance personnel and commanders, on advisor teams, must stress the importance of crew and operator preventative maintenance checks and services to keep equipment in an operational status and make every practicable attempt to repair nonmission-capable equipment. The maintenance advisor uses the advisor network to coordinate with the battalion S-4, who coordinates with a designated maintenance activity or the SPO for additional support. If authorized by the commander, maintainers can also utilize battle damage assessment and repair, or request/suggest operation of the equipment below fully mission capable status for a limited time while Class IX parts are awaiting arrival. In this case, a thorough risk assessment must be provided to the signing commander.

7-21. In a location where a JOA and traditional military echelons of support have not been established, the SFAB may need to contract additional maintenance personnel, purchase, and adapt local Class IX repair parts, request unique part fabrication from host-nation machinists. They may also have to request replacement equipment, end items, and repair parts through the ASCC to the contracting support brigade or other Army contracting organizations. These techniques may not be applicable to all situations when operating outside of a JOA.

RECOVERY OPERATIONS

7-22. *Recovery* is actions taken to extricate damaged or disabled equipment for return to friendly control or repair at another location (JP 3-34). SFAB commanders must emphasize the use of self- and like-vehicle recovery methods to the greatest extent possible. As FSF and indigenous civilian recovery assets may be inadequate to handle military vehicle recovery, advisor teams request recovery assets from their S-4 for external support. Vetting of indigenous recovery support is prudent in predeployment planning; if such vetting is impractical, escorting the recovered equipment from the incident site to its destination is recommended.

OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

7-23. OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of CCDR-directed operations (see ATP 4-10). The austere nature of the SFAB creates a tremendous need for this capability. Part of planning an SFAB's mission, when host nation, embassy, or adjacent unit GS is unavailable, is determining which type of contracted support best meets the brigade's sustainment needs. In any contracting support option, the SFAB is required to provide contracting officers' representatives and receiving officials for contracted logistic services and commodities.

ACQUISITIONS AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS

7-24. ACSAs provide U.S., allied, friendly nations, and international organizations access to material and services on a short-term basis. When leveraged by the SFAB, ACSAs provide the mechanism for logistics support during operations and exercises. The senior logistics advisor will be prepared to access ACSAs for life support when applicable. If a pertinent ACSA is not in place, the senior logistics advisor is encouraged to request one through the U.S. Embassy. Changing or superseding an ACSA requires U.S. Embassy approval. Training is provided through the Defense Acquisition University. (See FM 3-22 and AR 11-31 for more details on executing ACSAs.)

CONTRACTING OFFICER'S REPRESENTATIVE, FIELD ORDERING OFFICER, AND PAY AGENT

7-25. The contracting officer representative is an employee, military or civilian, of the U.S. Government, a foreign government, or a North Atlantic Treaty Organization coalition partner appointed in writing by a warranted contracting officer and serving in the position as an extra duty. Contracting officer representative responsibilities include monitoring contract performance and performing other duties specified in their appointment letter (see ATP 4-92).

7-26. The FOO's role is to procure authorized, urgently needed supplies and services from local sources during operations because normal supply channels are either not available or cannot provide them in a timely manner. FOOs derive their purchasing authority from a warranted contracting officer. FOOs have authorization to purchase supplies or nonpersonal services immediately available up to the established micro-purchase threshold.

7-27. A pay agent is an extension of the finance office's disbursing officer at the unit level. The deputy disbursing officer or disbursing agent trains the pay agent to account for government funds and make payments in relatively small amounts to local vendors. The pay agent is paired with a FOO and cannot be appointed as a FOO or certifying officer, may not order or request goods or services (such as contract for), nor hold other accountable positions such as a property book officer as this would be a conflict of interest (see ATP 1-06.1).

SECTION IV – HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

7-28. Army and joint force medical assets provide healthcare to U.S. Soldiers across the entire competition continuum. Commanders, with the input of their medical support staff, are responsible for the operational management of the health service support and FHP missions for training, predeployment, deployment, post-deployment, and where applicable, advising and training the FSF.

7-29. Although some features of the SFAB's medical capabilities are common to maneuver BCTs, there are many differences. SFAB medical planners and team medics must conduct a detailed medical support assessment prior to operations in a new AO. At the least, this includes a review of lessons learned from prior SFA missions and the associated elements to ensure successful medical support for the brigade and its mission (see FM 4-02 and ATP 4-02.2).

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

7-30. Health service support encompasses all medical support and services performed, provided, and arranged by the Army or the joint force. These services include organic and area medical support, hospitalization, treatment aspects of dental care, behavioral and neuropsychiatric treatment, clinical laboratory services, and treatment of CBRN patients (see FM 4-02 and ATP 4-02.2).

MEDICAL SUPPORT SECTION

7-31. The MSS can provide limited Role 1 Army Health System support to SFAB advisors and medical advising to foreign partner Role 1 to Role 3 capabilities. The MSS can provide limited routine medical care and trauma management, behavioral health, physical therapy, medical logistics, and medical maintenance for advisors. The section can also support SFAB brigade elements that do not have organic medical support. When providing medical support to the brigade, the dispersed nature of SFAB operations may make it difficult to physically support each advisor team. However, they may employ alternative methods of care, such as telemedicine, to bridge the gap. The MSS may provide medical care within its scope of capability to partner FSF in emergency situations to save life, limb, or eyesight.

7-32. The MSS officer in charge (OIC) is responsible for operational activities the section conducts and serves as the brigade medical operations officer. Additionally, the MSS OIC determines the general set-up and security of the MSS's AO in consultation with the force package commander and appropriate medical leaders. They direct, coordinate, and supervise team operations based on the brigade's medical support plan. The MSS OIC provides assessments of the medical support and training requirements of the FSF to higher headquarters and requests appropriate materiel and personnel support from higher, adjacent, and subordinate elements to support the mission. The MSS OIC assists the other medical sections in planning, coordinating, and monitoring medical SPO.

7-33. The MSS NCOIC assists the OIC and supervises the operations of the section and advises their assigned foreign counterpart. The MSS NCOIC is vital to effective supervision of the medical section activities including maintenance of section equipment, calibration of diagnostic tools, requests for general categories of supplies, and Class VIII supplies. They also prepare reports of medical section activities and functions with the MSS OIC.

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

7-34. FHP encompasses measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental or physical well-being of Soldiers, such as operational public health, veterinary services, combat operational stress control, dental services, and laboratory services. The amount of health service support and FHP available depends on the AO, OE, advisor force package JOA status, and whether the subordinate advisor teams are operating within or outside a designated JOA. Operations outside a designated JOA may not have a well-established medical support network and depend on the ASCC and the host nation for life support functions, health service support, FHP, air MEDEVAC, and other health service support requirements.

7-35. FHP encompasses all the preventive activities that promote the physiological and psychological well-being of Soldiers. FHP measures create and maintain a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards.

7-36. Preventing friendly health issues preserves the effectiveness of the SFAB by keeping its members available. Methods to prevent disease begin with personal hygiene and field sanitation (in accordance with TC 4-02.3), food and water sanitation, waste management, and pest control. Every region has unique health hazards that must be identified and analyzed by the SFAB medical personnel: preventing and controlling communicable diseases, illnesses (including vector, food, and waterborne diseases), injuries, and diseases, protects the health and readiness of Soldiers. Assessing these hazards summarizes acute or immediate risk mitigation actions, such as identifying which, if any, vaccines are required prior to deployment.

7-37. The SFAB surgeon cell is involved in the early planning stages of each operation to perform health-threat-assessments and to identify effective personnel protective measures to counter these threats. Advisor teams and the MSS own a mutual responsibility to ensure adequate operational public health resources are used in deployed environments to prevent disease among early-entry forces and to prepare the way for follow-on forces.

7-38. Preventive medicine personnel and units provide essential information, services, and recommendations for countermeasures to the SFAB medical officers as well as to commanders, team leaders, and individual Soldiers to sustain the health of the force. The MSS will brief deploying advisor teams on existing diseases friendly forces may bring with them to their AO, which could be transmitted to the local population or their foreign partners. The MSS will provide advisor teams health surveillance and medical intelligence, information which addresses occupational and environmental health threats from industrial hazards, air and water pollution, endemic disease, CBRN, and directed-energy device weapons (high-powered microwaves, particle beams, lasers). Preventative medicine is a team effort, both the MSS and advisor team working together, with team members ensuring candid and honest reporting to the MSS.

7-39. When possible, and in accordance with ATP 4-02.8, during the PDSS, preventive medicine personnel will conduct an occupational and environmental health site assessment, documenting environmental conditions, identifying potential occupational and environmental health threats, guiding the occupational and environmental health data collection activities, and informing risk assessments. The occupational and environmental health site assessment will serve as a comprehensive baseline assessment, followed by periodic reassessments. Food and water risk assessments are also conducted outside the continental United States at food facilities where SFAB personnel eat, such as host-nation military dining facilities, caterers, and hotels. In accordance with JP 4-02, food and water risk assessments are performed by veterinary or public health personnel to identify and mitigate risk from intentional and unintentional food contamination. The assessments are conducted to associate a risk level to food facilities with mitigating practices for dining safety, not to inspect a facility instructing them how to operate. Medical officers should also conduct a hospital assessment and/or identify medical capabilities within the AOR.

7-40. It is critical that all advisor teams working with a foreign partner, advocate for the continuous improvement of FHP processes. This will support the FSF's overall health and well-being. Advisors may have a resistance to diseases that the foreign personnel have not encountered, the opposite is also a possibility. SFAB medical planners account for all these considerations during the planning process. This is briefed to advisors during the predeployment medical threat brief as a part of their Soldier readiness processing. Deployed advisors' medical representatives will reach back to the MSS at home station with additional concerns, including requesting additional health surveillance including air, soil, water, and vectors.

7-41. Regardless of conditions, advisor teams attempt to maintain its internal standards of health protection according to the Army and U.S. Government policy. While modern technology may provide significant defense against disease and hazards, the inability to access technology solutions may require SFAB personnel to adopt rudimentary practices developed by local inhabitants to combat health hazards. In these cases, the SFAB medical personnel identify and adopt these local practices to share among unit Soldiers. Medical surveillance will continue through the deployment to characterize and counter threats to the Soldiers' health, well-being, and performance and provide commanders appropriate information to take appropriate risk management actions. Each team will also have at least one field sanitation-trained personnel to assist with medical surveillance.

MEDICAL AND CASUALTY EVACUATION

7-42. *Medical evacuation* is the timely and effective movement of the wounded, injured, or ill to and between medical treatment facilities on dedicated and properly marked medical platforms with en route care provided

by medical personnel (ATP 4-02.2). The SFAB has very limited organic MEDEVAC resources and is highly dependent upon the JOA medical units for augmentation.

7-43. Due to the lack of dedicated MEDEVAC platforms, advisor teams are encouraged to utilize nonmedical vehicles or aircraft for CASEVAC. Advisor teams can mitigate risk to casualties by conducting creative and adaptable CASEVAC rehearsals and augmenting CASEVAC platforms with a medic, combat lifesaver, and medical equipment.

7-44. When deployed outside a JOA, coordination with the appropriate nodes—American Embassy, ASCC, host nation, and other capability providers—are critical prior to and during deployment. To ensure that the brigade receives timely evacuation of casualties, a continuous assessment of available capabilities is required. Area evacuation assets are preplanned, coordinated, and synchronized outside of a JOA, such as through various U.S. entities, host-nation assets, multinational, or contract evacuation assets. Early coordination and communication are vital to the success of MEDEVAC support to advisor team operations. Evacuation assets must be assessed, verified, and re-verified consistently during an advisor team's deployment. Advisor teams and medical treatment providers need to familiarize themselves with the process for nonstandard MEDEVAC augmentation from both governmental and private sources

Appendix A
Advisor Guidance and Mission Statement

This annex provides the format and elucidates the thought process that higher commanders must consider in employing SFAB advisors most effectively.

A-1. Commanders issue standardized guidance to allow relevant subordinate elements to begin their mission before orders production and dissemination is complete or to initiate lengthy processes early to synchronize effort. Some examples of standardized guidance are special instructions to staffs, reserve planning priorities, and reconnaissance guidance. Advisors, being a tailor-built force, also require like guidance to maximize their effectiveness within the force structure and orders production process. Using the below standardized advisor guidance and mission statement, commanders provide timely and meaningful direction to SFAB elements within MDMP, allowing advisors to carry out the advising mission and achieve the commander's end state in a timely manner.

A-2. A *mission* is the essential task or tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for the action (JP 3-0). A *mission statement* is a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task(s), purpose, and action containing the elements of who, what, when, where, and why (JP 5-0). Advisor guidance (whether from a theater sustainment command office to an advisor force package, a higher-level advisor team to a lower-level advisor team, an MNFLCC or CFLCC, to an advisor team embedded with an FSF partner formation) is uniquely oriented toward the advisor mission and capability and retains a similar structure to the tactical mission statement; commanders use this format to maintain familiarity with advisors of all ranks, relevant staff members, and subordinate commanders.

A-3. The advisor mission statement contains the following:

- An advisor activity—developmental (OTEBA) or conflict integration (ASLA)—used in the style of a tactical mission task.
- A type of advising guidance (like the focus and tempo decision provided in reconnaissance guidance (see figure 4-2 on page 107 for types of advising guidance).
- A decision on organizational reporting structure (see paragraphs 4-207 through 4-217 for more information).
- Plug-and-play format: [Who: Advisor Team] performs [What: advisor activity], [How: advising guidance (see figure 4-2 on page 107 for types of advising guidance)], organizational reporting structure] in [Where: location] at [When: time requirement] in order to [Why: purpose].

A-4. Advisor mission statement examples:

- MAT 1234 Trains and Advises, using separate and enable & vertical reporting structure, in South America NLT 30FEB20XX in order to build partner capability and capacity.
- BAT 400 Assesses, Supports, Liaises, and Advises, using accompany and enable & mixed reporting structure, the 1st Atropian Mechanized Division in Atropia, NLT 30FEB20XX in order to enable 1st Atropian Mechanized Division ability to defend in Atropia.
- BAT 520 Organizes, Trains, Equips, Builds/Rebuilds, Advises, separate and refrain & horizontal reporting structure in Gabal NLT 30FEB20XX in order to build partner capability and capacity; be prepared to execute ASLA using accompany and enable & horizontal 1st Gabal Infantry Division NLT 31FEB20XX in order to defend Gabal territorial integrity.

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Appendix B

Common Security Force Assistance Brigade Terminology

B-1. SFAB teams are identified by a four number system shown on their uniform, highlighted in figure B-1. The first number identifies brigade, the second is battalion, third is the company, and the final number is the team.




Figure B-1. Security Force Assistance Brigade classifications

B-2. SFAB operations utilize different teams to accomplish operational goals for U.S. Forces and FSF within each operational theater as referenced in table B-1 on page 188.

Table B-1. Security Force Assistance Brigade teams

Common Team Types	
BAT	(nonspecific) battalion advising team
MBAT	maneuver battalion advising team
FBAT	fires battalion advising team
EBAT	engineer battalion advising team
LBAT	logistics battalion advising team
MCAT	maneuver company advisor team
FCAT	fires company advisor team
ECAT	engineer company advisor team
LCAT	logistics company advisor team
MAT	maneuver advisor team
FAT	fires advising team
EAT	engineer advisor team
LAT	logistics advising team

Appendix C

Advisor Assessment Tools

What follows is a standardized example of a wholistic assessment framework. The tools represented in this appendix are *a way* for SFAB teams and leaders to communicate both objectively and subjectively the status of a partner force's capability and capacity data. The utility of the frameworks is primarily derived from the conversations and correspondence that advisor teams and stakeholders have in creating, maintaining, and communicating the framework from observer/assessor to stakeholders rather than the completed assessment rubric itself. The assessment methods and tactics, techniques, and procedures advisor teams use may include these or others, as prescribed by CCMD, ASCC, or other higher headquarters assessment requirements.

INTEROPERABILITY ASSESSMENT RUBRIC

C-1. The Interoperability Assessment Rubric is modified from the American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCANZ) interoperability metrics and assesses how well the FSF partner unit implements interoperability standards and the relative difficulty of incorporating the partner force into a NATO or other multinational formation.

C-2. The ABCANZ interoperability program is an effects-based, outcome-focused organization founded on deliberate analysis of interoperability gaps and the development of human, procedural and technical interoperability solutions required by armies to close or mitigate interoperability gaps.

C-3. The Army, as part of ABCANZ, recognizes four levels of interoperability for use with the partner to assess interoperability gaps against the three domains of interoperability (human, procedural, and technical). These levels are:

- Level 0 (Not Interoperable).
- Level 1 (Deconflicted).
- Level 2 (Compatible).
- Level 3 (Integrated).

C-4. Level 0 *(Not Interoperable):* Partners have no demonstrated interoperability. C2 interface with the U.S. Army is only at the next higher echelon. Partner formations must operate independently from U.S. Army formations and operations.

C-5. *Level 1 (Deconflicted):* U.S. Army and partners can coexist but do not interact. Requires alignment of capabilities and procedures to establish operational norms, enabling partners and the U.S. Army to complement each other's operations.

C-6. *Level 2 (Compatible):* U.S. Army and partners can interact with each other in the same geographic area in pursuit of a common goal. U.S. Army and partners have similar or complementary processes and procedures and can operate effectively with each other.

C-7. *Level 3 (Integrated):* U.S. Army and partners can integrate upon arrival in theater. Interoperability is network-enabled to provide the full range of military operations capability. Partners can routinely establish networks and operate effectively with or as part of U.S. Army formations.

Note. See AR 34-1 for more information on the U.S. Army's levels of interoperability.

C-8. Tables C-1 through C-3, on pages 190 through 195, further show the relationship of SFABs to partner interoperability.

Table C-1. Assessment rubric

Interoperability Assessment Rubric				
Characterization of the Principles	Not Interoperable	Deconflicted	Compatible	Integrated
	Partner force has no demonstrated capability for interoperability with other partnered nations. No commonality of procedure or compatibility of equipment. Coordination is a factor of personalities and chance contact. No command relationships.	Human intervention at the point of friction enables alignment of dissimilar procedures and technical capabilities to address operating differences between partnered nations. Procedural and technical friction solved by providing capability through LNO package. Command characterized by detailed (tight) control of subordinate units.	Human interaction facilitates standardized procedure and temporary technical bridging solutions, synchronizing dissimilar capabilities between partners to establish situational operating norms across multinational formations. Command characterized by situational mix of detailed (tight) and directive (mission command) control of subordinate units.	Common doctrine and SOPs reduce the need for LNOs as human interface. LNOs center on advising and assisting gaining units to fill knowledge/experiential gaps. Permanent technical bridging solutions assimilate partner equipment across multinational formations. Command characterized by mission command (directive control) of subordinate units.
Legend: LNO—liaison officer; SOP—standard operating procedure				

Table C-2. Domain

Interoperability Definitions by Domain				
Dimension	Not Interoperable	Deconflicted	Compatible	Integrated
Human Domain Criteria	No LNOs present. No ability for higher headquarters to C2 lower. No common language.	LNO functions as an RTO only, relaying information from the gaining unit to the sending unit. Command functions through tight control of subordinate units (no autonomy/initiative possible). Communication through interpreters only.	LNOs push and pull common orders information. LNOs incorporated into warfighting functions as parallel chain to organic staff. Communication facilitated through a common language (could be the second language of both partners). Mission command possible through face-to-face interaction only.	LNOs fully integrated into unit operations to facilitate command decisions. LNO functions as a member of the gaining unit staff in both CUOPS and FUOPS roles. Communication through fluent usage of a common language. Mission command possible through direct and indirect interaction (for example, OPORD/radio).
Procedural Domain Criteria	No common doctrine. No commonality of procedures. No SOPs exchanged.	No formalized commonality of procedures. SOPs exchanged, but not drilled. No common doctrine for framework for combined training or operations. LNO serves as the swivel chair between dissimilar procedures	Common SOP established for purposes of situational mission. Common doctrinal framework facilitates baseline shared understanding for combined training or operations.	Common SOPs shared across formations. Common doctrinal framework supports combined training and operations. Institutionalized common training background facilitates rapid integration of dissimilar formations.
Technical Domain Criteria	Technical incompatibility of equipment completely prevents interface.	No direct compatibility of equipment; LNO serves as “technical” bridge between separate, discrete technical capabilities. Communications facilitated only through LNO package equipment.	Indirect compatibility of equipment; communication facilitated through temporary bridging solutions. LNO equipment required to complete combined PACE.	Direct compatibility of systems; communications architecture facilitated through permanent and common bridging solutions. LNO equipment package not needed to facilitate complete PACE.

Legend: C2—command and control; CUOPS—current operations; FUOPS—future operations; LNO—liaison officer; OPORD—operation order; PACE—primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency; RTO—radio telephone operator; SOP—standard operating procedure

Table C-3. Dimension and warfighting function

Conditions by Dimension and Warfighting Function					
Focus Area	Dimension	Not Interoperable	Deconflicted	Compatible	Integrated
Maneuver	Human Domain Criteria	Ad Hoc	LNOs facilitate information exchange to deconflict force disposition.	LNOs push and pull common orders information, push and pull SITREPs both up and down the chain of command, and coordinate partnered forces.	LNOs fully integrated into unit operations to facilitate command decisions along transition points, seams, or gaps between units; as opposed to manually channeling information.
	Procedural Domain Criteria		LNO Command Guidance.	Common vehicle identification standards and marking standard operating procedure prevents fratricide; common reporting guidance and manual common operational picture (COP) provides location of friendly and enemy forces.	Institutionalized reporting SOP details common unit reporting requirements and methods; fully standardized common operating picture facilitates shared understanding and integrated real-time maneuver of partnered forces.
	Technical Domain Criteria		LNO Equipment		Common positional location information or enables automated friendly COP; identification friend or foe systems positively identify friendly forces.
Focus Area	Dimension	Not Interoperable	Deconflicted	Compatible	Integrated
Communication information systems/information	Human Domain Criteria	Ad Hoc	Multinational forces provide liaison officer (LNO) support for COP.	LNO integrated within warfighting functions. Manual information exchange between MC Systems.	LNO fully integrated overseeing unit organization as a whole. Influences the rest of staff.

Table C-3. Dimension and warfighting function (continued)

Conditions by Dimension and Warfighting Function					
Focus Area	Dimension	Not Interoperable	Deconflicted	Compatible	Integrated
Communication information systems/information	Procedural Domain Criteria		COP achieved via ad-hoc procedures.	Forces exchange agreed information (versus formalized methods/processes at point of friction).	Forces utilize established common information exchange procedures between MC systems (for example, communications SOP). Common automated records management
	Technical Domain Criteria				Common network achieved. Shared digital COP. Tactical radios linked through TVB; operators use common language.
Fires	Human Domain Criteria	Ad Hoc	LNOs applied at points of friction to solve shortfalls and create interoperability.	LNOs applied to points of friction and convert analog data to digital data.	LNOs applied at points of friction and fires LNO package that supports digital fires.
	Procedural Domain Criteria			Standardized calls for fire and standardized fire support products across the formation.	Standardized calls for fire and standardized fire support products across the formation.
	Technical Domain Criteria				Implementation of ASCA capable fire direction system or a digital system capable of processing technical firing solutions.

Table C-3. Dimension and warfighting function (continued)

Conditions by Dimension and Warfighting Function					
Focus Area	Dimension	Not Interoperable	Deconflicted	Compatible	Integrated
Intelligence	Human Domain Criteria	Ad-hoc intelligence sharing	LNOs facilitate as-needed intelligence pull via RFIs.	LNOs facilitate as-needed intelligence pull via RFI, but also push intelligence through the orders process, intelligence summaries, and intelligence reporting.	LNOs fully integrated across unit intelligence and information collection operations to maximize shared understanding between units, as opposed to manually channeling information.
	Procedural Domain Criteria		LNO command guidance.	Manual foreign disclosure processes facilitate intelligence sharing across classification levels; tear lines enable manual intelligence sharing via intelligence push.	Write-to-release employed to streamline cross-domain, multinational intelligence sharing.
	Technical Domain Criteria		LNO equipment resourcing.	Common digital network established to enable manual multinational intelligence sharing; requires manual data entry across systems due to lack of automated interface between systems.	Automated mission partnered environment enabled integration of DCGS-A and other multinational intelligence systems to facilitate automated push and pull between partners; tear lines automated, enabling cross domain intelligence push and pull.

Table C-3. Dimension and warfighting function (continued)

Conditions by Dimension and Warfighting Function					
Focus Area	Dimension	Not Interoperable	Deconflicted	Compatible	Integrated
Sustainment	Human Domain Criteria	Ad Hoc	Multinational (MN) sustainment LNO in BSB SPO, human solution at points of friction.	MN sustainment LNO in BSB SPO, human solution at points of friction. combined FSCs able to support U.S. and MN units.	MN sustainment LNO in BSB SPO, human solution at points of friction. combined FSCs able to support U.S. and MN units, integrated MN support units at the BSB level.
	Procedural Domain Criteria			Utilize identical class of supply categories, LOGSTATs, resupply timeline (72 hours), analog LOGCOP, and FSC SOPs.	Utilize identical class of supply categories, LOGSTATs, resupply timeline (72 hours), analog LOGCOP, and FSC SOPs.
	Technical Domain Criteria				Utilize compatible vehicle platforms (LHS/PLS Flat racks), maintain /utilize compatible fuel truck nozzles, utilize same fuel type (F24, DF2), operate compatible data systems for digital LOGCOP.

Legend: ASCA—Artillery Systems Cooperation Activities; BSB—brigade support battalion; DCGS-A-Distributed Common Ground System-Army; FSC—forward support company; LHS—load handling system; LOGCOP—logistics common operational picture; LOGSTAT—logistics status; MC—mobile communications; MN—multinational; PLS—palletized load system; SOP—standard operating procedure; SPO—support operations; TVB—tactical voice bridge; U.S.—United States

ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT RUBRIC

C-9. The Organizational Assessment Rubric (see tables C-4 through C-13 on pages 196 through 205) is modified from the U.S. Army's Unit Status Reporting (reporting system). It measures the capability of a partner unit as assessed on the warfighting functions in the OE.

Table C-4. Assessment rubric

Warfighting Functions	*C-0: Incapable*	*C-1: Marginally Capable*	*C-2: Capable*	*C-3: Fully Capable*
Mission Command Purpose/Direction	Poorly resourced or untrained staff. No or little understanding of art of command/ science of control.	Resources or staff lacking. Commander provides some purpose or direction.	Most resources available, staff is trained but lacks experience. Commander provides purpose and direction.	Fully resourced, fully staffed, all aspects of MC warfighting functions met. Commander provides clear purpose and direction.
Movement and Maneuver Achieve tactical advantage	Unit lacks resources to employ subordinate elements relative to enemy.	Unit resourced, but incapable of employing forces. Unit capable of employing forces but is not resourced.	Unit achieves most tactical advantages regardless of resource shortfalls.	Commander, assisted by the staff, employs combat power to achieve advantage.
Intelligence Understanding of OE	Intelligence collection poorly executed, intel products do not facilitate understanding, collection assets do not exist.	Intel collection limited by lack of collection assets or lack of training. Intel products provide minimal understanding.	Intelligence collection results in products that facilitate basic understanding of operational environment.	Intelligence collection, products and understanding facilitate understanding and enable commander to make timely decisions.
Fires Coordinated use of targeting process	No targeting process, fires assets not coordinated, provides no support to maneuver.	Targeting process limit's ability to coordinate fires assets effectively.	Fires assets are coordinated and support some maneuver of elements. Basic targeting process exists.	Targeting process results in fires coordinated fires assets that support maneuver.
Protection Preserve force, maximize combat power	Commander incapable of applying combat power due to lack of related protection systems (EOD, AMD, CBRN, PR, risk assessment).	Protection systems marginally resourced leading to decreased combat power/readiness.	Combat power preserved through the application of available protection systems.	Combat power maximized by fully resourced, functioning protection systems. Enemy incapable of interfering with ongoing operations.
Sustainment Support services extended operational reach and endurance	Resources poorly allocated to support logistics, personnel support or health services.	Planning and coordination of assets limited to either logistics, health services, or personnel support.	Logistics, health services, and personnel support are planned and coordinated to extend operational reach and increase endurance.	Robust sustainment planning and coordination are resourced and executed. Operational reach and endurance maximized.

Legend: AMD—air and missile defense; C—capability and capacity level; CBRN—chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear; EOD—explosive ordnance disposal; MC—mission command; OE—operational environment, PR—personnel recovery

WILL TO FIGHT ASSESSMENT RUBRIC

C-10. The Will to Fight Assessment Rubric (see tables C-5 through C-13 on pages 197 through 205) is a metric which attempts to quantify the assessed morale of partner formations and measure a unit's predicted capacity to endure in the OE. The W-rating is assessed in four tiers: W-1, unwilling and unable; W-2, marginally unwilling and unable; W-3, willing and able; W-4, very willing and able.

Table C-5. Will to fight

Will to Fight Assessment Rubric	
Variables	***Overarching Questions***
Military Education System	Is the officer education system and noncommissioned officer education system equitably available, or are slots distributed in an unfair manner? Is there a leader development program outside of the institutional domain? What is the process to evaluate Soldier performance? Does a "train the trainer" function exist?
Recruiting and Retention	How does the military gain new members—compulsory service, draft, volunteer, and so forth? How does the organization incentivize recruitment and retention? Are recruiting and retention centrally controlled by a dedicated cadre or distributed to lower echelons to manage? Are recruiting and retention governed by civilian policy? Does the unit conduct public visibility/public relations events in their communities?
Organizational Trust and Cohesion	How is the relationship between adjacent units and how well do they cooperate? Do the members of the organization believe their leadership works on their behalf? What is the relationship between the military and government? Does the unit have accountability programs—SHARP, EO, DEOCS, for example? Do the members of the organization both provide and integrate performance feedback?
Sustainment & Medical	Does the sustainment enterprise allow for timely logistics and repair operations? Are there adequate sustainment personnel on hand to ensure fleets are maintained to standard? Are sustainment operations included in operations plans and trained during maneuver training? What is the quality and reliability of food, clothing, and housing?
Training Realism	Does the unit conduct METL and mission-focused training with progressively more challenging conditions (night, CBRN, contested, and so forth.)? Does the military have a professional OC/T capability and institutionalized doctrine process? How often is doctrine assessed and updated based on emerging threats? Is there a dedicated CTC or formal system for EXEVALs?
Soldier Quality of Life	How does military compensation (all pay plus benefits) compare to the comparable civilian population? What is the comparative quality of life between service members and general population? Does promotion and pay keep pace over time with comparable civilian population? Are Soldiers adequately equipped for their operational environment? Is there a system to record and resolve concerns?
History	Does the partner unit have recent operational experience, and is it a source of pride? Does the partner unit have a deeper history and is it a source of pride for the service members and the organization? How has the partner unit performed in past conflicts? Does the partner force have a history of warfare or violence (either by or against) their adversary?
Societal Cohesion	Are people in the country able to peacefully co-exist between ethnic, religious, economic, or other factors? What is the political climate of the nation? How does the political climate impact the military? Is there recent political violence? Are most people tied to a national identity or one related to their religion, ethnic group, or region?
Legend: CBRN—chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear; CTC—Combat Training Center; DEOCS—Defense Organizational Climate Survey; EO—equal opportunity; EXEVALS—external evaluations; METL—mission-essential task list; OC/T—observer, coach, trainers; SHARP—Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention	

Table C-6. Military education systems

W-0 Unwilling and Unable	*W-1 Force is Likely Marginally Willing*	*W-2 Force is Likely Willing*	*W-3 Force is Likely Very Willing*
Institutional leader development (OES, NCOES) POI is not standardized by national doctrine. Attendance at national-level PME is not based on time-in-service or performance in previous assignments. No formal performance evaluations/counseling process exists. There are no standards/doctrine to outline expectations for evaluating subordinates.	Institutional leader development POI is not standardized by national doctrine but is standardized/managed at the division level or below. Attendance at PME is performance-based but determined by higher level commanders. Standards/doctrine exists for evaluating officers/NCOs in a leadership role, but they are not conducted on regularly scheduled intervals. Junior enlisted do not receive performance evaluations.	Institutional leader development POI is standardized by national doctrine and managed by trained instructors but largely focuses on officer/senior NCO development. Attendance at PME is performance or time based but scheduling is inconsistent, or availability does not meet demand. Standards/doctrine exists for evaluating officers/NCOs in a leadership role at least once a year. Junior enlisted receive sporadic performance evaluations	Institutional leader development POI is standardized by national doctrine and managed by trained instructors but largely focuses on officer/senior NCO development. Attendance at PME is performance or time based but scheduling is inconsistent, or availability does not meet demand. Standards/doctrine exists for evaluating officers/NCOs in a leadership role at least once a year. Junior enlisted receive sporadic performance evaluations
Legend: NCO—noncommissioned officer; NCOES—noncommissioned officer education system; OES—officer education system; PME—professional military education; POI–program of instruction; W—will to fight assessment			

Table C-7. Recruiting and retention

W-0 Force is Likely Unwilling	*W-1 Force is Likely Marginally Willing*	*W-2 Force is Likely Willing*	*W-3 Force is Likely Very Willing*
No formal nationwide recruitment procedures exist. Recruitment is managed by brigade or below and not by trained cadre. No retention incentives exist. The military does not conduct public visibility/public relations events in the community.	Mandatory conscription exists and with no alternatives. Recruitment is managed at echelons above brigade by trained cadre. Retention incentives exist but are not standardized by occupation, rank, or re-enlistment time. The military only conducts public visibility/public relations events at national level parades/celebrations.	Conscription exists, but with alternatives. Most recruits volunteer. Recruitment is managed by a directorate at the national level but is limited to physical recruiting centers and local advertisements. Retention incentives exist and are standardized by specific criteria, but the force is missing retention goals. The military is encouraged to conduct local public visibility/public relations events, but the partner unit has not.	All new members of the force join voluntarily. Trained and centrally managed recruiters are present and active in the community. National- level digital recruiting campaigns exist. Retention incentives exist and are standardized by policy. The force at least meets its retention goals. The partner unit and the military in general have a robust public visibility/public relations campaign. Events are frequent and popular.
Legend: W—will to fight assessment			

Table C-8. Organizational trust and cohesion

W-0 Force is Likely Unwilling	*W-1 Force is Likely Marginally Willing*	*W-2 Force is Likely Willing*	*W-3 Force is Likely Very Willing*
Information is withheld from subordinates intentionally and access is restricted to select individuals. No knowledge management systems exist, or they are completely restricted. No battle rhythm or training schedules shared until day of execution. The unit does not have a structured after action review and does not conduct a similar process. No unit accountability or feedback programs exist [equivalents: SHARP, EO, DEOCS]	Information is distributed in a limited fashion. Some knowledge management systems exist but access is restricted. Battle rhythm not clearly defined, and training schedules change day to day. The unit does not have a structured after action review process but conducts reviews sporadically. Unit has equivalent SHARP or EO programs but no DEOCS or similar bottom-up feedback procedures.	Information is available to all but not distributed effectively. Knowledge management systems exist but lack shared understanding. Battle rhythm inconsistent and training schedules are published in advance. The unit conducts structured after action reviews only after training exercises organized by their HICOM. Unit has equivalent SHARP or EO programs and a bottom-up feedback procedure, but their DEOCS equivalent is only open to certain ranks/grades.	Members are informed in a routine fashion and leaders are empowered to distribute and share information. Knowledge management systems are readily available to all individuals. Clearly defined battle rhythm and training schedules approved well in advance. The unit conducts structured after action reviews after all training. Feedback is integrated into future planning. Unit has equivalent SHARP or EO programs and a bottom-up feedback process open to all members.
Legend: DEOCS—Defense Organizational Climate Survey; EO—equal opportunity; HICOM—higher command; SHARP—Sexual Assault/Assault Response and Prevention; W—will to fight assessment			

Table C-9. Sustainment and medical

W-0 Force is Likely Unwilling	*W-1 Force is Likely Marginally Willing*	*W-2 Force is Likely Willing*	*W-3 Force is Likely Very Willing*
The unit cannot sustain or maintain itself without outside support. Sustainers/maintainers do not train outside of a garrison environment. Tactical/point of injury medical training is limited to combat medics. Medics do not train with maneuver formations. Unit OR rate is <50 percent and lacks accurate reporting procedures.	The unit can sustain/maintain itself for 48 hours of combat without outside support. Sustainers/maintainers only participate in large-scale training exercises (>BDE). Soldiers receive minimal tactical medical/point of injury training. Medics only participate in large-scale training (>BDE). Unit OR rate is between 50 to 60 percent and lacks accurate reporting procedures.	The unit can sustain/maintain itself for 72 hours of combat without outside support. Sustainers/maintainers only participate in BN or above training. Medics are embedded at the company level and train their Soldiers on at least a required minimum of skills. Unit OR rate is roughly 75 percent and reported accurately.	The unit can sustain/maintain itself for >72 hours of combat without outside support. Sustainment and maintenance continuously go to training and participate in their roles alongside their maneuver forces. Medics are embedded at the platoon level or below. All Soldiers are trained at the TCCC equivalent. OR rate is above 80 percent and is reported accurately.
Legend: <—less than; >—more than; BDE—brigade; BN—battalion; OR—operational readiness; TCCC—tactical combat casualty care; W—will to fight assessment			

Table C-10. Training realism

W-0 Force is Likely Unwilling	*W-1 Force is Likely Marginally Willing*	*W-2 Force is Likely Willing*	*W-3 Force is Likely Very Willing*
OPFOR actions are not based in threat doctrine and are completely controlled by exercise controllers, as opposed to a force able to make decisions dictated by BLUFOR actions. The organization does not have or train with formal tasks, conditions, and standards. The organization does not train during periods of darkness, in a CBRN environment, or in an electronically contested/denied environment. The organization does not conduct external evaluations of any training.	OPFOR is not based in threat doctrine but maintains the ability to make limited autonomous tactical decisions. Formal tasks, conditions, and standards exist but are not routinely used. Only certain select units (Infantry, reconnaissance) train during POD or in a contested environment. Enablers/ sustainment do not.	OPFOR actions are based in threat doctrine and "red" commanders maintain the ability to take autonomous actions within the parameters of the exercise. However, they lack the capacity to challenge BLUFOR at night, electronically, with CBRN, or with robust enablers. Formal tasks, conditions, and standards exist and are used routinely but do not include training in degraded/challenging conditions. All units within the organization train in contested/challenging environments, but only at national/higher-level exercises [not regularly]. The organization relies on adjacent units to conduct evaluations and maintains formal OC/T standards and certifications.	OPFOR actions are based in threat doctrine and commanders are empowered to take actions within the parameters of the exercise. OPFOR can realistically challenge BLUFOR across all domains. Formal tasks, conditions, and standards exist and account for degraded conditions. These outlines are used every time training is conducted. All units within the organization regularly train in contested/challenging environments. The organization annually conducts multiple evaluations observed by formally trained OC/Ts external to the organization.
Legend: BLUFOR—friendly forces; CBRN—chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear; OC/T—observer coach/trainer; OPFOR—opposing force; POD—period of darkness; W—will to fight assessment			

Table C-11. Soldier quality of life

W-0 Force is Likely Unwilling	*W-1 Force is Likely Marginally Willing*	*W-2 Force is Likely Willing*	*W-3 Force is Likely Very Willing*
Member pay is not competitive with comparable civilian populations and is not consistent with inflation. The unit does not provide meals in garrison or a field environment for their Soldiers. The unit does not provide a barracks or housing stipend for any members. Promotions are not based on merit/performance, instead largely based on time in service. Soldiers are not adequately equipped for their operational environment.	Member pay is lower than comparable civilian populations but is consistent with inflation. The unit only has the capacity to provide meals in a garrison *or* a field environment for their Soldiers. The unit provides barracks for junior, single Soldiers but no housing stipend. Barracks conditions are subpar. Some promotions are based on merit/performance, but most, especially into leadership, are based on time in service. Only Soldiers of specialized units or occupations are adequately equipped for the operational environment.	Member pay is lower than comparable civilian populations but are augmented by benefits. The unit has inconsistent capacity to provide meals in a garrison and a field environment for their Soldiers. The unit provides barracks for junior, single Soldiers and a housing stipend that is below the average rent for the region. Most promotions are based on merit/performance. Some leadership roles are based on time in service. All Soldiers are equipped for their operational environment but with equipment that was fielded more than 15 years ago.	Members pay and benefits are competitive with comparable civilian populations. The unit can consistently provide meals in garrison and in the field for their Soldiers. The unit provides quality barracks for junior, single Soldiers and a housing stipend that is aligned with the average rent for the region. All promotions and leadership roles are based on merit/performance, with only high-level leadership/promotions based on time in service. All Soldiers are equipped for their operational environment with equipment fielded within the last 15 years.
Legend: W—will to fight assessment			

Table C-12. History

W-0 Force is Likely Unwilling	*W-1 Force is Likely Marginally Willing*	*W-2 Force is Likely Willing*	*W-3 Force is Likely Very Willing*
Partner military has not participated in armed conflict within the last 20 years. The unit does not maintain a formal history. The nation does not have any shared history with an adversary. The nation does not model their training OPFOR off a nation they have a history of armed conflict with.	Partner military has minor operational history within the last 20 years but not including the partner unit/military occupation. The unit recognizes and promotes national participation in historical events. The nation has had conflict with an adversary within the last century. The nation models their training OPFOR off a nation they assess as a likely adversary, but they do not have a history of armed conflict with this nation.	Partner unit has operational history within the last 20 years, but <25 percent of the participants remain in organization. The unit recognizes and promotes past and recent accomplishments at the brigade or equivalent levels. All members of the unit learn this history. The nation has had conflict with an adversary within the last half century. The nation models their training OPFOR off a nation they assess as a likely adversary, but they do not have a recent [50 years] history of armed conflict with this nation.	Partner unit has operational history within the last 20 years and >25 percent of the participants remain in organization. The unit acknowledges and recognizes both past and recent accomplishments. All members learn and understand the significances, especially regarding BN and below histories. A well-documented and shared piece of this nation's history are atrocities committed by an adversary. The nation models their training OPFOR off a nation they assess as a likely adversary, and they have a well-established history of armed conflict with this nation.
Legend: >—more than; BN—battalion; OPFOR—opposing force; W—will to fight assessment			

Table C-13. Societal cohesion

W-0 Force is Likely Unwilling	*W-1 Force is Likely Marginally Willing*	*W-2 Force is Likely Willing*	*W-3 Force is Likely Very Willing*
The unit's society is violently divided along ethnic, religious, economic, regional, political, or other organizational factors. Societal power is consolidated entirely based on ethnicity, religion, or ideology, often at the expense of other demographics. Localized affiliation trumps any centralized, national affiliation. Political violence is common, often with the military playing a role. Income inequality exists at >45 points on the Gini coefficient.	The unit's society is divided along ethnic, religious, economic, regional, or other organizational factors. Groups are largely peaceful but there is a struggle for influence/power. Societal power is consolidated entirely based on ethnicity, religion, or ideology, but isn't used to actively repress other demographics. Loose national framework of local affiliations. Politics are contentious in a dysfunctional government system. The military is frequently critiqued by civilians/externally as being political. Income inequality exists between 35 and 45 points on the Gini coefficient.	Diverse sections of the unit's society can peacefully coexist with one another, but only certain sections of society join the military. Historically, societal power had been consolidated but modernization/democratization efforts have been underway for at least a generation. Strong national identity occasionally challenged by regional affinities. Politics are contentious but in a functional government system. The military is largely apolitical. Relatively balanced working, middle, and upper economic classes. Military is predominately made up of working class.	Diverse sections of the unit's society can peacefully coexist with one another, and the military is a relatively even cross-section of society. All citizens are viewed as equals and have the same democratic rights. Universal pride in national identity supersedes other demographic/cultural identifiers. No recent history of political violence. The peaceful transfer of power is an expectation. Relatively balanced working, middle, and upper economic classes. Military is predominately made up of middle class.
Note: Gini coefficient—The Gini Index is a summary measure of income inequality. The Gini coefficient incorporates the detailed shares data into a single statistic, which summarizes the dispersion of income across the entire income distribution.			
Note: W-0—unwilling and unable; W-1—force is likely marginally willing; W-2—force is likely willing; W-3—force is likely very willing			
Legend: >—more than; W—will to fight assessment			

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which ATP 3-96.1 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	after action review
ABCANZ	American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand
ABCT	armored brigade combat team
ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
ADP	Army doctrine publication
AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AGI	air-to-ground integration
AJP	Allied joint publication
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
APOE	aerial port of embarkation
AR	Army regulation
ASCC	Army Service component command
ASLA	assess, support, liaise, and advise
ATP	Army techniques publication
BAT	battalion advising team
BCT	brigade combat team
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CARVER	criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability
CASEVAC	casualty evacuation
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander’s critical information requirement
CCMD	combatant command
CEMA	cyberspace electromagnetic activities
CFLCC	coalition forces land component commander
C-IED	counter-improvised explosive device
CI	counterintelligence
CMO	civil-military operations
COM	chief of mission

COMSEC	communications security
COP	common operational picture
C-UAS	counter-unmanned aircraft system
DA	Department of the Army
DA Pam	Department of the Army pamphlet
DATT	defense attaché
DLD	digital liaison detachments
DOD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF-P	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy
DSSB	division sustainment support battalion
EAT	engineer advisor team
EBAT	engineer battalion advising team
ECAT	engineer company advisor team
EMS	electromagnetic spectrum
EOCA	explosive ordnance clearance agent
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EW	electromagnetic warfare
EWO	electromagnetic warfare officer
FAT	fires advisor team
FBAT	fires battalion advising team
FCAT	fires company advisor team
FHP	force health protection
FM	field manual
FOO	field ordering officer
FSF	foreign security forces
FSO	fire support officer
GFS	Groupe des Forces Speciales
GI	U.S. Soldier
GS	general support
HA	humanitarian assistance
HHC	headquarters and headquarters company
IED	improvised explosive device
IPOE	intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JFLCC	joint force land component commander
JOA	joint operations area
JP	joint publication
JTF	joint task force
KMAG	Korean Military Advisory Group
LAT	logistics advisor team
LBAT	logistics battalion advising team
LCAT	logistics company advisor team

LOGCOP	logistics common operational picture
LSCO	large-scale combat operations
MAJ	major
MAT	maneuver advisor team
MBAT	maneuver battalion advising team
MCAT	maneuver company advisor team
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MCTP	Marine Corps tactical publication
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication
MDMP	military decision-making process
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
METT-TC (I)	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations and informational considerations
MI	military intelligence
MNF	multinational force
MNFLCC	multinational force land component commander
MOD	ministry of defense
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
MOS	military occupational specialty
MSS	medical support section
NAVSCOLEOD	Naval School Explosive Ordnance Disposal
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NCOIC	noncommissioned officer in charge
NTRP	Navy tactical reference publication
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OCS	operational contract support
OE	operational environment
OGE	Office of Government Ethics
OIC	officer in charge
OPCON	operational control
OPSEC	operations security
OSC	Office of Security Cooperation
OTEBA	organize, train, equip, build, and advise
PAL	protected asset list
PDSS	predeployment site survey
PMESII-PT	political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time
PSYOP	psychological operations
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

S-1	battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
S-2	battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3	battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4	battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-6	battalion or brigade signal staff officer
S-8	battalion or brigade financial management officer
S-9	battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
SC	security cooperation
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SFA	security force assistance
SFAB	security force assistance brigade
SFAC	security force assistance command
SOP	standard operating procedure
SPO	support operations
SPOD	seaport of debarkation
SPOE	seaport of embarkation
TACON	tactical control
TLD	theater liaison detachment
TSCP	theater security cooperation plan
UAP	unified action partner
UAS	unmanned aircraft system
U.S.	United States
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
XO	executive officer

SECTION II – TERMS

***advisor network**

The system for the integrating and consolidating partner force capability and capacity improvements over time at multiple echelons.

agility

The ability to move forces and adjust their dispositions and activities more rapidly than the enemy. (FM 3-0)

area security

A type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, and activities within a specific area. (ADP 3-90)

Army personnel recovery

The military efforts taken to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. (FM 3-50)

assessment

A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations. (JP 3-0)

battle rhythm

(Army) A deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations. (FM 6-0)

combat power

(DOD) The total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time. (JP 3-0)

common operational picture

(Army) A display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest tailored to the user's requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command. (ADP 6-0)

convergence

An outcome created by the concerted employment of capabilities from multiple domains and echelons against combinations of decisive points in any domain to create effects against a system, formation, decision maker, or in a specific geographic area. (FM 3-0)

counterintelligence

Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. (JP 2-0)

country team

The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission. (JP 3-07.4)

crisis

An emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)

critical asset

A specific entity that is of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of a nation to continue to function effectively. (JP 3-26)

depth

The extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results. (ADP 3-0)

direct support

(DOD) A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. (JP 3-09.3)

endurance

The ability to persevere over time throughout the depth of an operational environment. (FM 3-0)

field artillery

(DOD) Equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of cannon, rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers. (JP 3-09)

fires warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the adversary or enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations. (ADP 3-0)

general support

Support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. (JP 3-09.3)

general support-reinforcing

(Army) A support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole and to reinforce another similar type unit. (FM 3-0)

geospatial intelligence

The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on or about the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. (JP 2-0)

hostile environment

An operational environment where the freedom of movement is contested. (JP 3-0)

human intelligence

(Army) The collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities. (ADP 2-0)

indicator

In the context of assessment, a specific piece of information that infers the condition, state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness. (JP 5-0)

information collection

An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. (FM 3-55)

intelligence preparation of the operational environment

The systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. (FM 2-0)

interoperability

The ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)

knowledge management

(Army) The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making. (ADP 6-0)

liaison

That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (FM 6-0)

local security

The low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy. (ADP 3-90)

measurement and signature intelligence

Information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to detect, characterize, locate, and identify targets and events; and derived from specialized, technically derived measurements and signatures of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event. (JP 2-0)

measure of effectiveness

An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. (JP 5-0)

measure of performance

An indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 5-0)

medical evacuation

The timely and effective movement of the wounded, injured, or ill to and between medical treatment facilities on dedicated and properly marked medical platforms with en route care provided by medical personnel. (ATP 4-02.2)

mission

The essential task or tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for the action. (JP 3-0)

mission statement

A short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task(s), purpose, and action containing the elements of who, what, when, where, and why. (JP 5-0)

mission variables

Categories of specific information needed to conduct operations. (ADP 1-01)

open-source intelligence

Publicly available information collected, exploited, and disseminated to address a specific requirement. (JP 2-0)

operational control

The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP 1, Vol 2)

permissive environment

Uncontested conditions in which joint forces have freedom of movement. (JP 3-0)

physical security

That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (JP 3-0)

protection warfighting function

The related tasks, systems, and methods that prevent or mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards to preserve combat power and enable freedom of action. (FM 3-0)

recovery

Actions taken to extricate damaged or disabled equipment for return to friendly control or repair at another location. (JP 3-34)

reinforcing

A support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit. (FM 3-0)

risk

Probability and severity driven chance of loss, caused by threat or other hazards. (ATP 5-19)

risk management

The process to identify, assess, and mitigate risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. (JP 3-0)

running estimate

The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable. (ADP 5-0)

security force assistance

(DOD) The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-20)

signals intelligence

A category of intelligence comprising all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted, individually or in combination. (JP 2-0)

situational understanding

The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables. (ADP 6-0)

staff section

A grouping of staff members by area of expertise. (FM 6-0)

support

The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. (JP 1, Vol 2)

support operations

The staff function of planning, coordinating, and synchronizing sustainment in support of units conducting decisive action in an area of operations. (ATP 4-92)

sustainment warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. (ADP 3-0)

targeting

The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0)

technical intelligence

Intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an enemy's technological advantages. (JP 2-0)

uncertain environment

A condition in which the joint force's freedom of movement may be contested. (JP 3-0)

warfighting function

A group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. (ADP 3-0)

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Chief of Staff

Official:



MARK F. AVERILL
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