SOLDIERS ARE OUR CREDENTIALS

The Collected Works and Selected Papers of the Thirty-third Chief of Staff, United States Army



DENNIS J. REIMER

SOLDIERS ARE OUR CREDENTIALS

THE COLLECTED WORKS AND SELECTED PAPERS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD CHIEF OF STAFF UNITED STATES ARMY



DENNIS J. REIMER
GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF
JUNE 1995–JUNE 1999

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James Jay Carafano



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INTRODUCTION

In concert with the Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff supervises the execution of the Department of the Army's mission. This mission is often referred to as the fulfillment of "Title 10" responsibilities: recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, and mobilizing the Army's Active and Reserve Component forces in support of the "warfighting" Commanders in Chief (CINCs). In addition to this role as the Army's senior military leader, the Chief of Staff also serves as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the principal military advisers to the National Command Authority (the President of the United States and Secretary of Defense). As presidential military adviser and as force provider to the CINCs, the Chief of Staff plays a central role in all decisions and issues shaping the force. His collected works provide a useful and reliable starting point for exploring the history of America's Army during his tenure. This volume, assembling the works of General Dennis J. Reimer, follows a quarter century tradition of formally gathering and presenting the speeches, articles, and other material of Army Chiefs of Staff as a guide to the vital issues and historic events of their four-year terms.

General Reimer's papers will be of particular interest to researchers interested in how the Army changed when on the edge of the 21st century. Along with the papers of former Army Chiefs of Staff Generals Carl E. Vuono and Gordon R. Sullivan (also published by the Center of Military History), it completes a "trilogy" of works describing the transformation from a Cold War Army to a post–Cold War force. General Reimer's tenure marked the conclusion of a decade of rapid change that began in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. The decade of the 1990s marked the largest downsizing of the American Army since World War II. In addition, it was a period of unprecedented activity. During the Cold War, the U.S. Army participated in ten major operations. Since 1989, the Army has conducted over thirty major deployments. The Reimer years marked the culmination of an unprecedented decade of strategic challenges and opportunities. This collection of papers provides a valuable guide to these historic times.

Those who wish to explore beyond these published sources may want to consult General Reimer's papers held at the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI) in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. In addition to nonrecord copies of official papers and correspondence, this collection includes the "raw material" of history—private papers, outlines, rough drafts, and e-mail correspondence. At MHI researchers will also find oral histories and the private papers of other significant Army figures of this period. A systematic analysis of the history of America's Army during the years of 1995–1999 could begin with this volume; move on to the Reimer papers, oral history, and other collections at MHI; and then proceed to the official records at the U.S. National Archives. Those who choose to follow this trail will come to grips with one of the most remarkable and eventful chapters in the history of the United States Army.

JOHN S. BROWN
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History

Soldiers Are Our Credentials



The History Behind the Words

There is a fundamental truth about our Army. The Army is people. More than any other organization I know, the Army is people. General Creighton Abrams used to say, "The Army is not made up of people, the Army is people." He was right then, it is right now, and it will be right well into the 21st century. I am reminded of a story from the 8th Infantry Division in World War II. In September 1944, on the Crozon Peninsula, German Major General Hermann Ramcke asked to discuss surrender terms with the American Army. General Ramcke was in his bunker. His staff brought the 8th Division's assistant division commander, Brigadier General Charles Canham, down the concrete stairway to the underground headquarters. Ramcke addressed Canham through his interpreter. He said, "I am to surrender to you. Let me see your credentials." Pointing to the American infantrymen crowding the dugout entrance, Canham replied, "These are my credentials."

That sentiment is true today: *Soldiers are our credentials!*

DENNIS J. REIMER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
17 October 1995

PREFACE

Our Army has defended the American people for 224 years—one year longer than the age of the nation. Our martial traditions go back even further to the first muster of the Colonial Militia in 1636. The one million men and women serving in today's Army—Active, U.S. Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, and Department of the Army civilians—are part of this great legacy of service. The last four years were about taking care of these outstanding men and women. It was an honor to serve them. These pages are really their story—their challenges, victories, sacrifices, and accomplishments. They truly are our credentials. I hope these writings will help preserve the story of how this generation of soldiers extended the legacy of America's Army to the doorstep of the 21st century.

This story is primarily about change, changing from an industrial-age force designed to stand off the Soviet Union in a Cold War to an information-age force that could harness the power of new technology and secure America's place in a free and prosperous world. This was no simple challenge. The years 1995–1999 were a remarkable period, culminating 13 straight years of steady decline in real spending on defense and eight years of continuous drawdown in the Army's military and civilian workforce. While resources were constrained America's Army was also busier than ever. On any given day, more than 150,000 soldiers, Active and Reserve, were deployed or forward stationed in up to a hundred countries around the world—serving in peace and conflict. During these years, the Army remained unrelentingly committed to experimentation and transformation. Throughout this welter of challenge and change the Army stayed a trained and ready force. We accomplished our missions in a professional manner—a tribute to the soldiers and civilians of America's Army.

I think there is a powerful lesson in this story. America's soldiers will always give the nation their very best. At the same time, our soldiers can never do it alone. If I have learned anything in these last four years, it is that building a great Army takes a national effort. It needs the support and sacrifice of great Army families. It demands strong national leaders in the presidential administration and the Congress who understand the challenge of keeping an Army trained and ready. It requires the understanding and commitment of America's employers who make it possible for our citizen-soldiers, the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve, to also serve. It relies on our dedicated civilian workforce and our partners in industry who work with us to provide our soldiers the best possible equipment. It draws on our veterans and retirees, who inspire us with their example and continue to serve the Army and their fellow veterans in so many ways. And, of course, the Army's success is the product of being part of a joint team—a team of Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Army professionals. Finally, without the support of the American people there could be no Army. They entrust us with their most precious assets—their sons and daughters. They depend on us and they support us. The success of our men and women in uniform is truly a reflection of all of these components. They are all part of the great "Team America" that makes up our Army.

As long as we have this team we will always have the Army our nation needs and deserves. The greatest danger is complacency. We have done our job so well and been so successful that some may be lulled into the belief that victories can be easily or cheaply won—they can't. Winning requires a quality force of great men and women, well led, superbly trained and armed with the most modern weapons and equipment. Building this kind of force requires the best from all the members of Team America—a great Army demands nothing less.

Soldiers are our credentials!

DENNIS J. REIMER
General, United States Army

EDITOR'S FOREWORD

The publication of the works and papers of General Reimer marks an important event in documenting the history of the United States Army. I want to take this opportunity to briefly outline the contents of this volume, their significance, and how they were assembled.

These papers represent more than a collection of documents. Readers will find here a narrative history of the major events and issues that occurred during General Reimer's tenure as Army Chief of Staff, told in his own thoughts and words. For that reason, the papers have been organized chronologically to reveal how ideas and events unfolded during the period of 1995–1999.

In the almost 100 documents included in this collection, readers will find many recurring ideas and themes. This reiteration in part reflects General Reimer's commitment to strategic communications. He realized that telling the Army story was no easy task—and that to get the message through to the soldiers in the field, to Congress and the American people, he needed to be clear, focused and consistent in his communications.

General Reimer's recurring themes, however, represent more than just repeatedly "spreading the word." They reflected the key ideas that he believed were fundamental to the Army. Thus, readers will see his focus on values, standards, traditions, discipline and leadership emerge again and again throughout his writings. Certain events and memories served as his touchstones for evoking these timeless imperatives, including General Douglas MacArthur's historic 1962 address at West Point (which Reimer attended as a cadet), General John M. Schofield's 1879 Definition of Discipline (which Reimer memorized as a plebe at West Point) and the words of former Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams (with whom Reimer served as aide-de-camp from 1972–1974).

General Reimer was also an avid student of history. He once said, "History is a great teacher. It teaches us who we are by reminding us of who we were." He frequently drew on his favorite historical examples to illustrate points. In particular, he often recalled the service of General John J. Pershing during World War I, General George C. Marshall in World War II, the tragic fate of the soldiers forced to undertake the death march from Bataan, the defeat of Task Force SMITH in the opening days of the Korean War and the deaths of Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart and Master Sergeant Gary Gordon during the 1993 firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia. For General Reimer, these events served as a powerful reminder of the service and sacrifice of the American Army and the grave responsibilities of providing for the nation's defense.

Throughout his speeches, articles and letters, General Reimer constantly referred back to his soldiers. In his 1998 address to the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) he said, "Whatever we do—wherever we go—we must never forget it is all about the American soldier." General Reimer's favorite vignette was the story of Brigadier General Charles Canham's acceptance of the German surrender at Brest, France, during World War II. From General Canham's remarks Reimer derived the saying "Soldiers are our credentials." These words became his trademark as Chief of Staff.

Another constant in the Reimer papers are his frequent references to foreign affairs and his many visits to his counterparts in the armies of our friends and allies around the world. General Reimer believed the Army played a key role in the way the United States "engaged" with other nations on security issues. He took every opportunity to draw attention to the Army's important but often overlooked role in shaping the international environment.

General Reimer's continuous emphasis on employing the best business practices and improving logistics was also a consistent thread throughout his years as Chief of Staff. Reimer eschewed the old debate about "leadership vs. management." He believed that for senior leaders good management was a part of good leadership. General Reimer continually emphasized that the future success of the Army depended on a revolution in logistics and a revolution in business affairs. Remarks on his key initiatives in these areas are found throughout the documents in this volume.

Reimer's papers also reflect his belief in the importance of maintaining a close working relationship with national, regional and local media. In addition, to the documents here, researchers will find many TV and radio transcripts and published interviews with the thirty-third Chief of Staff.

Finally, appearing frequently throughout his papers are the key ideas and mechanisms that drove the Army's change process. General Reimer believed one of his most important tasks was to change the Army into an information-age force. He invested a great deal of effort describing how and why the Army was changing. As a result, readers will find innumerable references to Force XXI, Army XXI, Advanced Warfighting Experiments, division redesign, information operations, digitization, the Six Imperatives, spiral development and Officer Professional Management System XXI (OPMS XXI).

In describing change, General Reimer's constant touchstone was the National Military Strategy. "Strategy comes first," he often said. "Strategy drives requirements—requirements then determine force structure and everything that follows." For General Reimer it was strategy, rather than resources, technology, interservice competition or any other "external" pressures, that was the great engine driving change within the Army.

In addition to describing the National Military Strategy and the Army's role in supporting that strategy, General Reimer frequently spoke of the environment in which the Army had to conduct its dramatic change. In particular, the documents in this volume reveal that post–Cold War downsizing was the dominant "fact of life" throughout his term. Reimer continually reminded audiences that in the wake of the Cold War, the Army was downsized by "over 600,000 men and women" and "closed over 700 bases." At the same time, he pointed out that the Army was busier than ever, averaging on any given day about "30,000 soldiers deployed to 70 different countries." In addition, defense resources (until the last year of his tenure) were in a constant state of decline. Reimer often quoted Norm Augustine, the former CEO of Lockheed-Martin, who pointed out that "Americans spend more on beer and pizza [each year] than they do on the United States Army."

While there were many constants in General Reimer's thoughts and views, equally important for tracing the narrative of his years are the ideas and issues that emerged and evolved over the course of his tenure as Chief of Staff. Without question one of the most important of these was General Reimer's participation in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR did much to shape the final form of the post–Cold War drawdown of the armed forces and map out a modernization strategy for the future. Reimer spent much of his tenure explaining and defending his decisions, as well as dealing with the ramifications and consequences of implementing the QDR's findings.

One of the most contentious outcomes of the QDR was a reduction in the size of the Army's Reserve Components. The mandate sparked a bitter debate, which at its core demonstrated the need to fundamentally rethink the role and requirements for Active and Reserve Components in a post–Cold War world. As a result, readers will find that the emphasis on Reserve Component issues dramatically increases in the documents covering the second half of the Reimer years.

Other watershed events were the investigations of sexual misconduct by members of the training cadre at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Sergeant Major of the Army Gene McKinney and Major General David Hale. These cases, though unrelated, drew wide media attention to the Army's treatment of gender-related issues. In response to the charges, and the resulting public concern, the Army devoted significant effort to reviewing its programs on sexual harassment, equal opportunity, fraternization and gender-integrated training.

The state of readiness was another issue that demanded considerable attention during the second half of General Reimer's term. The President and Congress agreed to a balanced budget amendment that placed a ceiling on defense spending, even as the Army's operational tempo continued to increase with new missions and deployments around the world. By 1998 the tension between the pace of operations and the resources available to sustain them appeared to be at the breaking point. Commands reported a dramatic decrease in the days available for collective training, and observer-controllers (OCs) found that units arriving at the Combat Training Centers did not appear as well prepared as they had in the past. In addition, for the first time since the beginning of the drawdown, the Army faced a serious challenge in recruiting soldiers for the force. The culmination of these factors resulted in renewed congressional interest in Army readiness and General Reimer played a pivotal role in making the case for additional resources.

Despite the day-to-day demands on the Army throughout his tenure, General Reimer never lost his focus on driving the Army's change process forward. These papers describe how he institutionalized many Force XXI initiatives. He implemented a Strategic Management Plan to guide the Army's use of resources and track efficiencies. General Reimer created the Army After Next project to inform the force's long-term developments. He also introduced the Strike Force concept to serve as the vanguard of the next evolution in the Army's transformation. Finally, Reimer focused the Army on "knowledge, speed, and power" as the key attributes of the 21st century force.

Readers will find that the ideas sketched out here are woven throughout the documents in this collection. The largest group of the papers presented are General Reimer's speeches. Reimer was an excellent public speaker. He prepared seriously for each speech. He believed every audience was important. He had a sense of humor—he always began speeches with a joke (to save space the jokes have not been reproduced in the transcripts). His delivery was calm, even and usually unemotional (without the slightest hint of an accent from his native Oklahoma). As a speaker he evoked the image of an unpretentious, trustworthy, intelligent, caring and well-informed leader. He always made people feel that the Army was in good hands.

Among his speeches, General Reimer's annual addresses to AUSA at the Dwight David Eisenhower Luncheons were unquestionably the most notable. These served as the equivalent of the Army's "State of the Union" address and he used these opportunities to map out his key ideas and initiatives. Unlike his other speeches, which he usually delivered from a brief outline that he memorized or carried in his pocket and casually referred to during the course of a talk, General Reimer wrote out his AUSA address in full text, often going through multiple drafts over several weeks. As a result, he always delivered a carefully crafted speech laying out his direction for the Army in the year ahead. In total, his AUSA addresses, as well as his other speeches, provide an excellent start point for understanding the Chief of Staff's role as a strategic communicator.

Another important category of documents is General Reimer's testimony before congressional committees. Normally these statements, which were routinely reviewed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the President's Office of Management and Budget before being submitted, were slightly more restrained than his oral testimony. These documents have not been included in this collection, but those wishing to review General Reimer's complete testimony should consult congressional records.

Also in this collection are most of the articles General Reimer authored as Chief of Staff. Of particular note are the October "Green Book" articles in Army magazine. These articles, like his annual

AUSA addresses, were designed to describe the current "State of the Army." Noteworthy as well are the several articles General Reimer wrote for Military Review. Reimer saw his articles in this journal as one of his key tools for communicating with "field grade officers," the mid-grade leaders who would be the brigade, division and corps commanders of the Army in the 21st century. Not surprisingly, leadership was the subject of many of his Military Review articles.

Additionally, this volume includes a number of letters to the Army's general officers. These were often simply called "Yellows" because they were reproduced on yellow paper (a tradition dating back to the World War II Army Staff). Each related to an issue of particular importance to the Chief of Staff. Covering a wide variety of subjects, "Yellows" were normally drafted by a member of the Chief's staff group and then approved by General Reimer. They were distributed to general officers and Senior Executive Service Department of the Army civilians in both hard copy and through electronic updates via the internet.

The last category of documents in this collection is a selection of e-mails from General Reimer. These e-mails were popularly called "Random Thoughts While Running (RTWR)." In fact, that is exactly what they were. An avid runner, General Reimer would compose his e-mail while running, dictating into a small hand-held tape recorder. His secretary, Lillian Cowell, would transcribe the tapes and then General Reimer would edit them himself. General Reimer put a great deal of effort into his RTWRs and he considered them an important part of his effort to keep up a constant dialogue with senior leaders throughout the Army. He often used these e-mails as an opportunity to expand on controversial decisions, key ideas and important topics. They are an indispensable source for understanding his term as Army Chief of Staff.

The reader will soon discover that taken together, these materials provide a rich resource for exploring the Reimer years. For those interested in a particular subject, I suggest the best guide is to first consult the accompanying chronology and the subject index, which I compiled, at the end of the volume. They should provide a ready finding aid for significant issues and events.

As a final point, I must note that this volume contains "selected" works and papers. It does not include every speech, article or correspondence that crossed General Reimer's desk. The process for selecting the papers to be included was relatively straightforward. I chose those documents that had the greatest historic significance, best illustrated General Reimer's ideas and decisions and helped round out the narrative of the key events of his tenure. Those readers who wish to pursue subjects in greater detail should consult General Reimer's private papers at the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and his official papers at the National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

In closing, I would like to make a special thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Michael Galloucis, who helped develop the chronology and select the illustrations, to Sergeant First Class Kirby Olson, who collected and archived the Reimer papers, and to General Brown and his excellent staff at the Center of Military History, particularly Mrs. Diane S. Arms, Ms. Joanne M. Brignolo, and Ms. Beth MacKenzie, who did such an outstanding job producing this volume.

JAMES JAY CARAFANO
Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff
Editor

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Illustrations

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Troops Cross the Sava River Bridge
Observing ROTC Cadets Conducting an After Action Review
A Soldier in the Brigade Advanced Warfighting Experiment
Talking With a Soldier of the Czech Army on a Visit to Poland and the Czech Republic
Briefing the Pentagon Press Corps
Running the Annual "Army Ten-Miler"
Talking With a Captain From the 40th Infantry Division of the California Army National Guard
Receiving an Operational Update From the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) Deployed to Kuwait
With Director Steven Spielberg
At the 1998 Army-Navy Game

Illustrations from the Dennis J. Reimer Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa.


RANGER

General Dennis J. Reimer
Chief of Staff, United States Army

General Dennis J. Reimer served as the 33d Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, on June 20, 1995, to June 21, 1999. Prior to that, he was the Commanding General of the United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia. Graduating with a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Military Academy in 1962, he began his career as a Field Artillery Officer. He received a Master of Science degree from Shippensburg State University. General Reimer's military experience spanned command positions at all levels and service on staffs up to Headquarters, Department of the Army.

General Reimer's commands included an infantry company at Fort Benning, Georgia, an artillery battalion at Fort Carson, Colorado, the division artillery for the 8th Infantry Division in Germany, the corps artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson. He served in a variety of joint and combined assignments. He served two combat tours in Vietnam—one as an advisor to a battalion of the South Vietnamese Army and the other as an executive officer for an artillery battalion in the 9th Infantry Division.

He also served in Korea as the Chief of Staff, Combined Field Army, and Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command.

He served three other tours at the Pentagon as aide-de-camp to the Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams, as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans for the Army during Desert Storm, and as Army Vice Chief of Staff.

General Reimer's awards for peacetime and combat service include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Distinguished Service Medal, two Legions of Merit, the Distinguished Flying Cross, six awards of the Bronze Star Medal (one with "V" device for valor), the Purple Heart, and the Combat Infantryman Badge. He also wears the Parachutist Badge, the Aircraft Crewman Badge, and the Ranger Tab.

Resume of Service Career
General Dennis J. Reimer

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

12 July 1939, Enid, Oklahoma (hails from Medford, Okla.)

YEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE

Over 37

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Army Command and General Staff College
United States Army War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

United States Military Academy, B.S. Degree, Military Science
Shippensburg State College, M.S. Degree, Public Administration

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

From	*To*	*Assignment*
Aug 62	Oct 62	Student, Field Artillery Officer Orientation Course, United States Artillery and Missile School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
Nov 62	Jan 63	Student, Ranger Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Jan 63	Jun 64	Assistant Executive Officer, later Executive Officer, 20th Artillery, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Jun 64	Jul 65	Assistant Battalion Advisor, Advisory Team 60, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

Jul 65	Jun 66	Student, Artillery Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas
Jun 66	Jun 67	Commander, Company C, 11th Battalion, 3d Brigade, United States Army Training Center, Fort Benning, Georgia
Jun 67	Sep 67	Executive Officer, 11th Battalion, 3d Brigade, United States Army Training Center, Fort Benning, Georgia
Sep 67	Sep 68	Aide-de-Camp to Commandant, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia
Sep 68	Feb 70	Executive Officer, later S–3, 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery, 9th Infantry Division, United States Army, Vietnam
Feb 70	Jul 70	Instructor, United States Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
Jul 70	Jun 71	Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jun 71	Oct 72	Personnel Management Officer, Assignment Section, Field Artillery Branch, Office of Personnel Operations, Washington, D.C.
Oct 72	Dec 74	Assistant Executive/Aide, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, D.C.
Jan 75	Jun 76	Executive Officer, later S–3, Division Artillery, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Jul 76	Jan 78	Commander, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Jan 78	May 78	Commandant, Training Command, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Aug 78	Jun 79	Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Jul 79	May 80	Deputy Commander, later Special Assistant to the Commander, V Corps Artillery, United States Army Europe, Germany
May 80	Oct 82	Commander, Division Artillery, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe, Germany
Oct 82	Oct 83	Chief of Staff, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe, Germany
Oct 83	Jan 84	Deputy Assistant Commandant, United States Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
Feb 84	Jun 86	Commanding General, 3d Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
Jun 86	Dec 86	Chief of Staff, United States Army Element, Combined Field Army, Republic of Korea
Dec 86	Jun 88	Assistant Chief of Staff, C–3/J–3, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command
Jun 88	May 90	Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Carson, Fort Carson, Colorado
May 90	Jun 91	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army/Army Senior Member, Military Staff Committee, United Nations, Washington, D.C.
Jun 91	Mar 93	Vice Chief of Staff, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, D.C.
Apr 93	Jun 95	Commanding General, United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia
Jun 95	Jun 99	Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, D.C.

PROMOTIONS	DATES OF APPOINTMENT
2LT	6 Jun 62
1LT	6 Dec 63
CPT	5 Nov 65
MAJ	27 Sep 68
LTC	1 Jun 75
COL	1 Aug 79
BG	1 Sep 84
MG	1 Sep 87
LTG	1 Jul 90
GEN	21 Jun 91

U.S. DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device (with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Purple Heart
Meritorious Service Medal
Air Medals
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Combat Infantryman Badge
Parachutist Badge
Aircraft Crewman Badge
Ranger Tab
Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge

FOREIGN DECORATIONS RECEIVED AS CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY

Grand Officer Order of Merit (Italy)
Order of the Rising Sun (Japan)
Tong-Il Medal (Republic of Korea)
Medal of Merit (Portugal)
Germany Grand Cross of Merit with Star (Germany)
French Legion of Honor Medal (France)
Turkish Order of Merit (Turkey)
Commendation Star of Merit (Greece)
Hilal-I-Imtiaz Award (Pakistan)

Chronology of General Reimer's Tour as Army Chief of Staff June 20, 1995–June 21,1999

June 20, 1995: General Reimer sworn in as 33d Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, by Secretary of the Army Togo West, Jr.

October 17, 1995: On the occasion of addressing the annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army in Washington, D.C., General Reimer relates for the first time the story of Brigadier General Charles Canham, who in September 1944 was asked by a German general for his credentials as the German officer prepared to surrender. Canham pointed to a small group of dirty, unshaven infantrymen behind him and said, "These are my credentials." Throughout his tenure as Chief of Staff General Reimer used the saying "Soldiers are our credentials" as a constant reminder that the individual soldier is the heart, muscle and soul of America's Army.

November 6, 1995: General Reimer addresses the Conference of American Armies in Barteloche, Argentina, noting the important role U.S. Army forces have played in the region, supporting humanitarian operations and counterdrug efforts and encouraging the growth of democracy and the principle of civilian control of the military.

November 6–18, 1995: Exercise WARRIOR FOCUS, an Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) involving a digitally equipped light infantry brigade from the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, takes place at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. This AWE was a key event in the ongoing Force XXI process, the Army's comprehensive strategy for transforming today's Army into the digitized information-age Army of the 21st century.

December 30, 1995: The 1st Armored Division bridges the Sava River and joins the Implementation Force (IFOR) conducting peace-keeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Dayton Peace Accords (Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR).

January 12–20, 1996: General Reimer makes his first of many visits as Army Chief of Staff to U.S. soldiers in Europe and Southwest Asia. This trip marks the first of five visits General Reimer makes to soldiers serving in Bosnia and also is the first of many counterpart visits with military leaders of other nations around the world. During his tenure, the Chief of Staff frequently visited U.S. soldiers stationed throughout the United States and overseas and training at the Army's Combat Training Centers.

January 11, 1996: General Reimer issues his first "Random Thoughts While Running," a series of e-mails to the Army's general officers—a pioneering effort to harness the power of information-age technology to enhance strategic communication among the Army's senior leadership.

April 13, 1996: General Reimer participates in the commissioning ceremony in San Diego, California, for the USNS *Shughart* named in honor of Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart who received the Congressional Medal of Honor posthumously for heroic action during a firefight

in Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3, 1993. Shughart's heroism becomes a cornerstone for General Reimer's continuing emphasis on the importance of Army values.

April 15, 1996: The first Chief of Staff White Paper, *Force of Decision*, is released. It articulates the Army's relevance to the national security challenges of the post–Cold War world.

May 17, 1996: Army announces conversion of up to 47.3K of Army National Guard combat structure (12 brigades and two division slices) to combat support/combat service support structure. The decision impacts up to 38 states and territories.

July 4, 1996: General Reimer participates in the commissioning ceremony in Newport News, Virginia, for the USNS *Gordon* named in honor of Master Sergeant Gary Gordon, who received the Congressional Medal of Honor posthumously for heroic action during a firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3, 1993.

November 7, 1996: At a Pentagon press conference, the Army announces investigation of sexual misconduct in Basic Training at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland.

November 12, 1996: At a press conference in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the Chief of Staff releases *Army Vision 2010*, the Army's blueprint for supporting the emerging operational concepts laid out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in *Joint Vision 2010*.

November 13, 1996: General Reimer announces implementation of the Army's Strategic Management Plan, an executive management tool to guide the Army's use of resources in supporting the transformation from an industrial-age to an information-age force.

November 20–23, 1996: General Reimer makes first of several visits to U.S. forces in Korea, observing the results of U.S. efforts to significantly upgrade the combat power and quality of life at this key strategic outpost.

January 13, 1997: General Reimer inducts World War II veteran and Medal of Honor recipient First Lieutenant Vernon Baker and six deceased soldiers into the Pentagon's "Hall of Heroes," reserved for U.S. service members who have earned the nation's highest award for valor. The seven men are the only African American soldiers who received the Medal of Honor for World War II service. The Pentagon ceremony followed an earlier White House ceremony led by President Clinton, who presented the Medal of Honor to Mr. Baker and family members of the six deceased soldiers.

January 27, 1997: Army holds its first Army After Next (AAN) Wargame at the United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, adding another key component to the Army's Force XXI change process. The objective of the AAN project is to define the requirements for implementing *Army Vision 2010*.

March 8–29, 1997: A brigade from the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Hood, Texas, conducts the Task Force XXI brigade-level Advanced Warfighting Experiment at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.

March 15, 1997: Recognizing his more than 50 years of support to U.S. service members deployed throughout the globe—in peace and in combat—General Reimer speaks at the christening ceremony of the USNS *Bob Hope* in New Orleans, Louisiana. After its trial period, the USNS *Bob Hope* was loaded with Army equipment, supplies and materiel and became part of the Army War Reserve Pre-positioned Stocks.

May 16, 1997: Release of the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR], which defined a new post–Cold War National Military Strategy, objective force levels for each of the services and the Department of Defense's modernization strategy.

May 23, 1997: Reflecting the complexity of the post–Cold War world, on this date and for the first time in the Army's 221-year history, the Army has soldiers deployed in 100 countries. At this time,

the Army had 33,300 soldiers and Department of the Army civilians performing 1,200 missions in 100 of the world's 197 countries.

May 26, 1997: General Reimer visits the Chief of Staff of the South African Army, observing the Army's transition from the Apartheid-era force to a fully democratic national institution.

June 17, 1997: General Reimer proposes a joint experimentation program in an address to the Armed Forces Communications and Electronic Association, Washington, D.C.

July 27–31, 1997: General Reimer visits Poland and Czech Republic assessing the accomplishments of the NATO Partnership for Peace Program and the future of NATO expansion.

September 4, 1997: The Army announces the Fort Hood–based 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and III Corps will be the Army's first digitized division and corps. Projected fielding dates are Fiscal Year 00 and Fiscal Year 04, respectively.

September 8, 1997: General Reimer addresses the National Guard Association of the United States Army in Albuquerque, New Mexico, on the concerns and controversies of the reductions in Reserve Component forces directed by the QDR.

September 11, 1997: Army releases two reports based on comprehensive service-wide assessments done by a Senior Review Panel and the Department of the Army Inspector General in the aftermath of sexual misconduct investigations at Aberdeen Proving Ground and other locations. At the same time, the Army releases its Human Relations Action Plan that addresses equal opportunity and sexual harassment.

September 12, 1997: Army releases White Paper, *Leadership and Change in a Values-Based Army.*

September 25, 1997: General Reimer addresses the Chinese War College in Nanjing, China. The first Army Chief of Staff to visit China since General John Wickham in the mid-1980s, General Reimer notes the continuing importance of U.S. Army forces for providing stability in a region of increasing importance to the United States. This is one of several trips he makes to nations through Asia and the Pacific.

October 1, 1997: The Army creates its newest major command, the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC). In its new role, SMDC serves as the Army Component Command to the joint U.S. Space Command, the Army's proponent for space and national missile defense, the materiel developer for assigned programs, and the Army's integrator for theater missile defense.

October 1, 1997: Army begins use of its first new officer evaluation report (OER), DA Form 67–9, since 1979. General Reimer helped develop the new OER, approved its implementation, and the "masking" of 2LT and WO1 OERs in an effort to eliminate the systemic inflation that occurred during the 1990s drawdown and to combat a perception of "zero defects."

October 17, 1997: General Reimer participates in the opening of the Women in Military Service for America Memorial, Arlington, Virginia.

October 21, 1997: Robert E. Hall appointed as the 11th Sergeant Major of the Army after Sergeant Major Gene McKinney was relieved of duty.

November 3–14, 1997: Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment conducted by the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Hood, Texas.

November 14, 1997: Release of the Defense Reform Initiative by Office of the Secretary of Defense, to achieve fundamental reform in how the Department of Defense conducts business.

December 15, 1997: Congressionally mandated National Defense Panel releases recommendations for long-term U.S. national security requirements.

February 18, 1998: Chief of Staff visits soldiers of the 3d Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, as they prepare to deploy to Kuwait in support of Operation DESERT THUNDER I to deter Iraqi aggression.

March 13–15, 1998: General Reimer visits the 40th Infantry Division (U.S. Army National Guard) at Camp Roberts, California. The visit becomes the catalyst for initiatives to bring the Active and Reserve Components together as a seamless force.

June 1998: The Chief of Staff approves plan to implement Army Knowledge Online (AKO) as an Army intranet designed to enhance the capabilities of the institutional Army to operate in the information-age Web-based environment.

June 2, 1998: Chief of Staff announces implementation of Officer Professional Management System XXI (OPMS XXI), Phase II. Key provision of Phase II is redesignating the officer corps into a career field–based management system. General Reimer made the decision to initiate Phase I, the initial implementation of the program, the previous summer.

June 9, 1998: Army announces the redesign of the heavy division, reducing the size of the division while embedding new information systems, improving lethality and deployability, and integrating for the first time over 500 Reserve Component spaces into the structure of an Active Component division. The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas, becomes the first unit to implement the new design.

June 18, 1998: Army releases White Paper, *One Team—One Fight—One Future*, on the further integration of Active and Reserve Component forces.

July 3, 1998: General Reimer visits 1st Cavalry Division troops at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, as the first CONUS-based troops prepare to deploy to Bosnia, assuming the role of Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

July 24, 1998: General Reimer participates in a ceremony in Washington, D.C., marking 50th anniversary of the integration of the armed forces.

August 1998: Soldiers of the 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia, deploy to Southwest Asia in support of DESERT THUNDER II, a show of force operation to deter Iraqi aggression.

September 11–12, 1998: Chief of Staff hosts the Army's first ever Senior Leader Media Conference at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. This event is attended by key senior leaders in the Army and prominent print and broadcast journalists. The forum gave the leadership an opportunity to discuss Army's unique role in National Military Strategy, preparations for the Army After Next, and ways to improve relations between the Army and media.

September 17, 1998: Chief of Staff participates in ceremony in Arlington, Virginia, to award movie director Steven Spielberg the Army Distinguished Civilian Service Award for making the movie "Saving Private Ryan," a World War II epic generally considered one of the best and most realistic war movies ever made and a great tribute to the American soldier.

September 29, 1998: Chief of Staff testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee in a contentious hearing that focuses renewed attention on the readiness of the U.S. military and need for additional resources.

December 14–15, 1998: General Reimer visits Recruiting Battalion in Houston, Texas—the first of series of visits that focused on the importance and challenges of Army recruiting in the wake of the drawdown.

December 10, 1998: General Reimer sends an e-mail message to Lieutenant Colonel Nancy Currie, an Army officer and NASA astronaut, while she is in space. Currie was serving as a crew member on the space shuttle *Endeavor*, the first U.S. mission to begin assembly of the international space station; she operated the shuttle's robotic arm. This is believed to be the first time two U.S.

military officers communicated with each other between earth and space via e-mail.

December 16–19, 1998: Army units from 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia, and Patriot units from Fort Bliss deploy to Southwest Asia in support of Operation DESERT FOX, enforcing United Nations sanctions against Iraq.

February 16, 1999: General Reimer announces implementation of the Strike Force concept employing the Fort Polk–based 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment at a land warfare symposium in Orlando, Florida.

February 16, 1999: Chief of Staff visits U.S. troops in Honduras participating in Operation STRONG SUPPORT, providing humanitarian operations throughout Central America in response to Hurricane Mitch.

April 4, 1999: Task Force HAWK begins deploying to Albania in support of NATO Operation ALLIED FORCE.

April 5, 1999: Army announces formation of two integrated division headquarters, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley, Kansas, and the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Carson, Colorado. Each division will consist of three Army National Guard enhanced separate brigades.

June 3, 1999: Publication of Field Manual 22–100, *Army Leadership*, culminates effort by the Army Chief of Staff to ensure Army leadership doctrine reflects the needs and challenges of the post–Cold War Army.

June 21, 1999: General Reimer's departure ceremony at Fort Myer, Virginia, marking his last day as Army Chief of Staff.

June 21, 1999: General Eric Shinseki sworn in as Army's 34th Chief of Staff by Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera.

1995–1996
The First Year

1995–1996: The First Year

Let me share with you our vision of the Army. A vision that is a direct legacy of the bloody lessons learned on the battlefield. A vision that is rooted in the tradition of 221 years of selfless service and mission accomplishment—it is a vision which—will ensure our ability to meet the Nation's needs of the 21st century . . . trained and ready . . . a force of quality soldiers and civilians . . . values based . . . an integral part of the joint team . . . equipped with the most modern weapons and equipment . . . able to respond to our nation's needs . . . changing to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow, and the 21st century.

Dennis J. Reimer, General, United States Army

"Where We've Been—Where We're Headed: Maintaining a Solid Framework While Building for the Future"

Army

October 1995

The Army has provided 220 years of selfless service to our Nation. Millions of Americans have served in this great Army. They have accomplished a great deal and have made many sacrifices. Our Army—America's Army—has undergone—and continues to undergo—an important transformation. The Army of yesterday is not the Army of today. The Army of tomorrow will be vastly different from the Army we see today. Our core competencies have not changed but our methodology is changing. The uncertainties of the world we live in demand this.

Throughout our history, even in uncertain times, one thing has remained constant . . . the high quality of men and women serving in our Army. The great spirit, courage, selfless dedication, and commitment, so clearly demonstrated by American soldiers throughout history, have passed from generation to generation to the talented people that make up today's Army. Today's soldiers continue to make this the finest Army in the world.

On 23 June, I was honored to be the Reviewing Officer at the Sixth Army Inactivation Ceremony at the Presidio of San Francisco. It was an emotional experience to furl and encase the colors of a unit that had made history for more than half a century. During this final roll call for the Sixth Army, one could feel the strength and spirit of America's Army at this historic post, even while we ended a glorious chapter in the history of one of the Army's proudest units. This scene, of course, has been replayed many times throughout the Army in the last six years a testimony of the Army's strength and resiliency—a testimony of the U.S. Army changing to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow and the 21st century.

I am excited about the future and what it holds for America's Army. As we rapidly approach the 21st century, America's Army faces tremendous opportunities and significant challenges. The first and foremost of these, is making sure that the Army stays trained and ready. While current readiness is good, turbulence, high OPTEMPO (operational tempo), and funding shortfalls are challenges for the long term.

Second, we need to provide stability after the myriad of changes brought about by the drawdown.

Finally, we have the opportunity to make changes that will make us more efficient and result in smarter ways, of doing business. These

challenges are mutually supporting, not mutually exclusive. How we deal with these challenges and opportunities will define the Army of the future. No one knows exactly what warfare in the 21st century will be like. However, one thing is certain, future battlefields will be far different and more complex than 20th century battlefields. We must be ready.

Quality soldiers have been and will continue to be the foundation of a trained and ready force. The focal point of the Army's leadership will continue to be recruiting and retaining quality soldiers—those possessing the intelligence and strength of character necessary to meet the challenges of defending our nation and furthering its peacetime security interests.

The more our nation demands of our Army, the more pressing is our need for soldiers that have the abilities and desire to meet this challenge. We must continually emphasize the importance of quality young men and women and their development into the outstanding leaders the Army will need in the future.

As we near the conclusion of an unprecedented drawdown, the Army remains trained and ready to fight and win our Nation's wars. This, in my opinion, is attributable to two things: first, to our leadership—officer and NCO—past and present—for providing a sound framework for tailoring the force while maintaining a strategic focus on the 21st century; second, to the dedicated men and women that make up this great Army who, while serving during this turbulent time, were always ready to answer our nation's call.

As a smaller Army, it is more important than ever that we leverage the capabilities of entire force (Active, Reserve, and civilian), our Nation's industrial base, and the academic genius of our learning institutions. We are one Army whose sum is far greater than any of its parts. We must maximize the unique capabilities and talents each component brings to the warfighting table.

We have come far in integrating our training and capitalizing on the strengths of each component. The concept of Ground Force Readiness Enhancement, Enhanced Brigades, and the restructuring of the Reserve components have streamlined operations, reduced operating expenses and most importantly improved our go to war readiness posture. What we need to do now is build on our successes, refine the missions of the active and reserve components, and continue to build our partnerships with industry to support our force projection Army. We will continue to improve our pre-mobilization and post-mobilization training programs for the National Guard and Reserve units. Equally important, we'll continue to look for greater training opportunities to enhance our warfighting capabilities.

The operational pace for our people is at an all time high. In fiscal year 1995, the Army saw an average of 22,200 soldiers operationally deployed to over 70 countries on any given day. In the last year, American soldiers helped the nation promote democracy in Haiti, deterred a new threat to regional stability in Southwest Asia, provided relief supplies to Rwandan refugees in Zaire, conducted peacekeeping exercises in Russia, reinforced peace in the Sinai, supported refugees in the Caribbean, protected United Nations operations in Somalia, treated wounded in Croatia, demonstrated resolve in Macedonia, and deterred aggression in Korea.

In addition to these operations, the Army reinforced and maintained US overseas presence with 125,000 troops based outside the continental United States in places like Europe, Korea, Japan, and Panama. Soldiers have also taken on disaster relief missions at home—providing earthquake relief in California, fighting forest fires in the American West, assisting flood victims in the midwest and south, and helping stem the flow of illicit drugs across the borders of the United States. We could never have accomplished this multitude of missions without the total team effort of active and reserve soldiers and their civilian counterparts.

For many soldiers this has meant back-to-back deployments and extended separations from their families. The average American soldier now spends 138 days a year away from home. I emphasize this point because we ask an awful lot of our soldiers and their families. If we want to retain these fine men and women, we must take care of them.

These missions also reflect the continued development of our Joint doctrine. The Army is—and always has been—a strategic force, playing a

central role in Joint warfighting. The Commission on Roles and Missions Report has further emphasized the importance of our role in the joint war fighting community. I see us as an integral part of the Joint Team. The Army is the nation's historical force of decision—the force of necessity. We provide unique capabilities and staying power to the warfighting CINC's. Our superior land combat force, our logistical sustainability, communications, intelligence, tactical psychological operations, civil affairs, SOF capabilities and military police operations are critical in war and essential to win the peace.

The Army will always fight as part of a joint and/or combined team. Therefore, we will continue to train in a joint environment with maximum participation in Joint training exercises that foster our joint family relationships.

Today's global security environment remains complex and full of unknowns. No longer are we confronted with "a clear and present danger." Instead we find ourselves facing a wide spectrum of unpredictable dangers and threats. We find ourselves confronted with new challenges such as regional conflicts involving the use of advanced conventional weapons, ballistic missiles, and chemical and biological weapons as well as peace keeping, and peace making operations.

We recognize that warfare is changing and that America's Army must stay ahead of the changes. Force XXI is our process for managing institutional change and exploiting the revolution in military affairs. Right now Force XXI is underfunded. Much has been done, but much remains to be done.

Our challenge is to define Force XXI in terms of our doctrine and focus our available resources to provide our soldiers with the best possible organization, training and equipment. This is done by capturing emerging technologies and integrating them into the force in an orderly and systematic manner. We must harness the capabilities of our weapon systems and coordinate employment through a seamless information system, thus dramatically improving our ability to bring to bear overwhelming combat power and conduct high tempo operations inside our adversaries' decision cycles. Finding ways to exploit our competitive advantages—quality people and advanced technology—is part of our future readiness challenge.

In the midst of an era of change and turbulence, we must not lose sight of the continuity and stability required to preserve our long term readiness—stability in terms of quality of life, stability in terms of expectations, and stability in terms of what the future holds for our people.

I join our senior leadership, Secretary of Defense William Perry, Army Secretary Togo West, and JCS Chairman General Shalikashvili in their efforts to revitalize the quality of life programs for our people. As the Chairman has said . . . "No single investment we make is more important than our people . . . . We will not continue to attract quality young people if incentives and benefits subside. If we don't take care of our people in uniform, our civilians and their families, we will not retain the career professionals we need to lead our forces into the next century."

I am particularly concerned about the erosion of benefits for our junior enlisted soldiers. I pledge my very best efforts to improve quality of life programs particularly for housing, pay and health care . . . for single soldiers as well as married soldiers. I will continue to be a supporter of retired soldier benefits as well. I believe the fate of our retirees' benefits will have a long term impact on our recruiting and retention efforts. If we allow the benefits of our retired soldiers to erode, what confidence will our younger soldiers have that their benefits will not disappear after they've completed their service to our Nation?

We are a values based organization. Values are the foundation of this institution . . . always have been, always will be. Loyalty, duty, selfless service, courage, integrity, respect for human dignity, and a sense of Justice are all part of the Army's identity.

My experience is that three things are essential for success. First, we must empower our people to do what is right, every day, legally and morally. Second, we must create an environment where people can be all they can be. Third, we must treat others as we would have them treat us. If we do these three things, there are no problems too complex, no challenges too great for us to handle.

One of my top priorities is to generate funds to resource America's Army into the 21st century.

The Nation's resources available for defense are limited, but the uncertainties of today require a ready force capable of responding quickly and decisively to protect our Nation's needs. We must work hard at our reengineering efforts to help fund future modernization needs while maintaining our core competencies. This does not necessarily mean do more with less.

We have the opportunity to make changes that make us more efficient. We must demonstrate, in everything we do, that we are good stewards of the Nation's resources and the taxpayers' investment in us. This is everyone's responsibility. We must find new and innovative ways to help ourselves.

My guess is there are considerable efficiencies out there—and we can harvest them if everyone focuses on this issue. This requires a major change in the way we've run our "business practices" for the past two decades. We must find smarter ways to do business, streamline our management processes, reduce overhead, leverage outside resources, and use what we have more efficiently in order to be more effective.

By eliminating dollars spent on non-value added programs, we can help close the modernization funding gap. Reengineering efforts are already underway. The tremendous reengineering efforts that are ongoing at the MACOM level have the goal of improving quality of life without degrading readiness. Similarly, the logistics community is working to create efficiencies that save dollars and provide a tremendous capability to the warfighting CINCs. We need those dollars spent on non-value added programs to be reinvested in our future. We owe that to the taxpayers—but most of all we owe it to our soldiers. Bottom line is we will either become more efficient or smaller.

Thirty-three years of service have led me to believe that although the Army is a large complex organization there are a few fundamental truths about the Army. General Abrams taught us, "The Army is not made up of people—the Army is people." That is as true today as it was when he said it. It will continue to be true in the 21st century.

The changes we make in peacetime must transition to war. They must serve us on the battlefield. The one thing that all leaders must never forget is that we will someday, somewhere, be called on to put our soldiers in harm's way. We must ensure that they are trained and ready for victory. In this we must not fail.

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Where We've Been—Where We're Headed

Address at the Dwight David Eisenhower Luncheon, Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army, Washington, D.C.

October 17, 1995

Thank you very much for that kind introduction. I must say that I have been on the dais for this luncheon for the last five years but not in this particular spot. I also want to say that it's a great view from up here.

This vantage point gives me the opportunity to recognize America's Army—Active, United States Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and DA civilians—and what a great group they are—what a wonderful group and I'm honored to be part of such an organization.

It also gives me the opportunity to tell our allies who are here today in great numbers that your presence is important to us. Most of all, we appreciate your support and willingness to carry your share of the load. To our supporters from Capitol Hill, the members of Congress, the professional staff members, let me say how much we appreciate all you've done. I know that your choices are not easy but you need to know that all of us are inspired by your willingness to stand up and be counted and your example of dedicated service to our nation. To corporate America, thanks for being here. You've been here with us through the good times and the bad and I would just simply say that we need you more now than ever. To AUSA, 45 years old this year, I must also say thanks for being such a great friend. And thanks most of all for your efforts to improve the quality of life for our sol-

diers. You have helped us recruit and retain the best soldiers in the world.

And, finally, to all our friends—friends of the United States Army, let me say that your friendship means everything to us.

This is my first opportunity as Chief to address such a large and important audience and I want to share with you some thoughts on today's Army and where we are headed in the future. As this audience certainly knows, the primary mission of the Army is to be trained and ready to defend the nation's security and freedom. Clearly, the fundamental responsibility of any Chief of Staff is to ensure that the Army is ready to execute this mission.

Recently I participated in two events which highlighted for me the importance of maintaining a trained and ready Army. I was in Hawaii in early September for ceremonies celebrating the 50th anniversary of the end of the war in the Pacific. I was also fortunate to participate in a ceremony dedicating the Korean War Memorial in late July. The contrast between these two events, separated by less than five years in history, was striking. I could not help but reflect on the differences the five years between the end of World War II and the outbreak of the Korean War had made on our Army. In August 1945, the American Army was the largest and most powerful Army in the world. Its 89 divisions had been instrumental in destroying the military might of the Axis powers—a tribute to the millions of brave men and women who served and the tremendous capabilities of corporate America. However by June 1950, America's Army had been reduced to a shell of its former self. We had rapidly gone from 89 divisions and eight million soldiers to 10 divisions and less than 600,000 soldiers.

As a consequence, at 0730 on 5 July 1950, a hastily assembled, ill-trained, and poorly equipped group of brave American soldiers waited in the cold rain, just north of Osan, Korea, as 33 North Korean tanks advanced toward their position. Behind these 33 tanks on the highway, in trucks and on foot, was a long snaking column stretching for over 6 miles. Due to poor weather the American soldiers had no air support. Due to the rapid drawdown they were poorly trained and undermanned. They were called Task Force Smith because we had to take soldiers from other battalions to make a battalion-size organization. Their equipment reflected the lack of maintenance which is inevitable when readiness is not the top priority.

In the next few hours of fighting, these conditions were starkly played out on the battlefield. Our weapons could not stop their tanks—but they tried. One young lieutenant fired 22 rockets—from as close as 15 yards, scored direct hits on the tanks—but could not destroy them. Courage alone could not stop those tanks. Rifles and bayonets were no match for tanks and the wave of infantry behind them. In this short engagement, 185 courageous young Americans were killed, wounded, and captured; and the history of Task Force Smith was burned into the institutional memory of our Army forever.

In the summer of 1950 we were not prepared. We sent poorly equipped and untrained soldiers into battle to buy time for the Army to get ready. It certainly wasn't the fault of these soldiers or their leaders that they weren't ready—the system had let them down. Once again we were surprised and once again we paid a very steep price for our unpreparedness. As General Abrams said to this same gathering in 1973, "We paid dearly for our unpreparedness during those early days in Korea with our most precious currency—the lives of our young men. The monuments we raise to their heroism and sacrifice are really surrogates for the monuments we owe ourselves for our blindness to reality, for our indifference to real threats to our security, and our determination to deal in intentions and perceptions, for our unsubstantiated wishful thinking about how war could not come."

In the harsh crucible of combat we relearned the lessons of tough training, good organization, and proper equipment. We must never again learn these lessons on the battlefield. As I shook hands with those veterans—at the dedication of the Korean War Memorial—I was reminded that that monument is not the only tribute to their courage, selfless service, and dedication. The real legacy can be seen in America's Army today. Our quality soldiers—Active, Reserve, and Guard—have the best equipment that the nation can pro-

vide; and our tough, realistic training program has resulted in our status as the world's best Army—trained and ready for victory. No one with a lick of common sense really disputes this. As a footnote to this chapter, let me cite a personal experience. In 1987 when I was serving in Korea, General Brad Smith, that brave battalion commander whose courageous soldiers fought so well in 1950, came over and conducted a battlefield tour of where his task force fought. When he returned he sent me the handwritten training guidance that he had given to the battalion after the Korean War—that guidance talked about tough, realistic training and lots of livefire.

There are similarities between 1950 and the situation we face today.

In 1950 we lived in an uncertain world.

The U.S. was the world's greatest economic power.

The U.S. was the world's greatest superpower.

The U.S. had a virtual nuclear monopoly.

The U.S. had the world's best Air Force and the most powerful Navy.

The next war was expected to be a push-button war with new weapons and machines taking over from men; and because of that we felt we could greatly reduce the size of our ground forces—and we did so very rapidly.

Today . . .

We continue to live in an uncertain world.

Again, the U.S. is the world's greatest economic power and the greatest superpower.

The U.S. has the largest Navy in the world, capable of sweeping any conceivable adversary off the seas in a matter of days, assuring us access to all the world's oceans. The nation also has the most powerful Air Force in the world, capable of sweeping any adversary from the sky in a matter of hours. It is right, and proper, and necessary for the U.S. as a world superpower and leader to have these naval and air capabilities. I wouldn't want it any other way.

However, today the active Army is the eighth largest in the world. Size by itself is not the most important thing, and America can still take pride in having the world's best Army because what we lack in quantity we more than make up in quality. Our world-class young men and women—who receive tough, realistic training and are equipped with the best equipment and weapons systems in the world—thanks in large part to what many of you here have done and continue to do—are the envy of every nation. But no amount of training or abundance of sophisticated equipment will suffice if we do not have enough quality soldiers to carry out the nation's bidding.

Numbers matter.

To accomplish our missions many of our soldiers have had back-to-back deployments and extended separations from their family. The average American soldier assigned to a troop unit now spends 138 days a year away from home—and many special units such as MPs [military police], air defense and transportation have been carrying a heavier load. To accomplish the requirements of our national security strategy, we must be a credible and effective ground fighting force. Peace is the harvest of preparedness. We must, however, temper our desire for peace with the realities of history. In 1950 we learned that deterrence is in the eye of the beholder. The North Koreans looked at South Korea and were not deterred by the 10 understrength and ill-equipped American divisions. We must always have an Army of sufficient quality and size to deter potential adversaries and meet our international obligations. While the quality of today's force is unquestioned, I must tell you in all candor that I am concerned that we have reached the limit on how small our Army can be and still credibly accomplish the tasks currently assigned to us.

Today we do not have the luxury of time—nor will we in the future. We must be ready to deal with the world as it is now, not as we wish it to be. We have paid the price—in blood—too often to relearn that lesson. With your help, we will not have to pay that price again.

The best example that the lessons of history are sinking in is that during the past six years—under the leadership of Generals [Carl] Vuono and [Gordon] Sullivan—we have reshaped ourselves and still remain trained and ready. It's been over five years since Operation DESERT STORM and in many ways it is tempting to pat ourselves on the back and rest on our laurels. But we cannot afford to do that. We must build the Army of tomorrow, the Army that will be required to meet the needs of a vastly different world.

Let me share with you our vision of that Army. A vision that is a direct legacy of the bloody lessons learned on the battlefield. A vision that is rooted in the tradition of 221 years of selfless service and mission accomplishment. It is a vision which will ensure our ability to meet the nation's needs of the 21st century.

In our vision we see the world's best Army—trained and ready for victory . . .

- A force of quality soldiers and civilians
- A values-based organization
- An integral part of the joint team
- Equipped with the most modern weapons and equipment the country can provide
- Able to respond to our nation's needs
- Changing to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow, and the 21st century

It's not just the words but the meaning behind these words. Let me explain. The world's best Army. A bumper stick that has been earned by our soldiers. Trained and ready for victory. The most important job for any army, a job in which we must not fail. A total force of quality soldiers and civilians. We tend to take for granted, I think, the dedication, selfless service and sacrifice of our great citizen-soldiers in the National Guard and Reserves. We are also fortunate to have a quality civilian force that embodies the best of this great nation. This recognizes that as General Abrams said the "Army is not made up of people, the Army is people."

A values-based organization. Values are important to us; selfless service, dedication, sacrifice, duty, honor, country are not just words but a code by which we live.

An integral part of the joint team. We recognize the tremendous contributions of our sister services and are happy to stand shoulder to shoulder with them as we keep this great nation free.

Equipped with the most modern weapons and equipment the country can provide reflects our realization that we must invest in a modernization program for the 21st century.

Able to respond to our nation's needs. We must be relevant to the needs of our country. And changing to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow, and the 21st century simply reflects that the only constant in the world today seems to be change. We are dealing with it, we are growing more comfortable with it every day, and we will continue to have to deal with it in the 21st century.

Our vision is set against the world as we see it. It reflects an environment in which missions are expanding both in terms of quantity and diversity. It reflects decreased resources, a loss of 34 percent of our buying power since 1989. It recognizes, as President [William J.] Clinton said, a world in which the line between domestic and foreign policy has becoming increasingly blurred. We live in a global village. It recognizes a modernization program that is currently at the irreducible minimum and badly in need of more resources. Today the Army allocation of the DOD modernization dollars is only 13 percent. We have the smallest piece of a small pie.

Our vision recognizes that we must not repeat the Task Force Smith scenario. We must realistically face the challenges of today. Sacrificing our youth is not the solution. We will build no new monuments to our blindness to reality. We are trained and ready today, but our ability to dominate land warfare is eroding. And our modernization plan does not forecast filling the gap fast enough.

We have a plan to make this vision a reality—Force XXI. Simply stated Force XXI projects our quality people into the 21st century and provides them the right organization, the most realistic training, an adequate and predictable sustainment package during both peace and war, and the best equipment and weapons systems our nation can provide given the resources available. We intend to leverage technology in order to arm our soldiers with the finest most lethal weapons systems in the world. The power of information will allow the ultimate weapon—the individual soldier—to successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century and achieve decisive victory. Force XXI provides the framework for the decisions we must make today so that tomorrow's force will remain as trained and ready as we are right now.

That vision is very clear in my mind—however, achieving our vision is not preordained. We face a number of resource challenges as I have alluded to already. The basic challenge is to balance near-term readiness, quality of life, and future modernization. Internally we will do our share to ensure the most effective use of our limited resources. We

will continue to improve our operational and institutional efficiency in order to ensure we devote as many dollars as possible to modernization. In this regard, we intend not to be bound by traditional approaches. We are willing to make profound changes in the way we do business as long as they increase our efficiency and do not degrade our core competencies. Efficiencies such as velocity management, total asset visibility, integrated sustainment maintenance, and improved force management are all keys to becoming more effective.

Most people talk about the four tenets of the revolution of military affairs. I believe the Army, in order to be successful in this revolution, must embrace a fifth tenet: efficiencies. We must get the most bang out of every buck. We owe that to the taxpayer—but, more importantly, we owe it to our soldiers.

The key to achieving this vision—as it has been since 1775—is high-quality soldiers. We must never forget that quality soldiers are the essence of our Army—always have been and always will be. For the past two decades we have demonstrated that an All Volunteer Army can be the world's premier fighting force. Quality soldiers attracted by a profession that allows them to be all they can be deserve adequate pay and compensation. They deserve to have their entitlements and benefits safeguarded from erosion. They deserve a quality of life equal to that of the society they have pledged their lives to defend. We must never allow our commitment to quality soldiers to diminish.

As I travel around the world I am continually impressed by the sacrifice and dedication of our soldiers. The state of readiness of the Army is more than its weapons, equipment, and doctrine. A key but intangible part is the spirit of our soldiers. General Patton said, "It is the cold glitter in the attacker's eye not the point of the questing bayonet that breaks the line. It is the fierce determination of the drive to close with the enemy not the mechanical perfection of the tank that conquers the trench." Today nothing has changed. When I met the survivors of the Bataan Death March in Hawaii they still had that glint in their eye and you could feel the indomitable spirit that allowed them to fight on against overwhelming odds. In Germany, Korea, Hawaii, at the Combat Training Centers, I see the same thing in our soldiers today.

When I see those soldiers doing their job so magnificently I'm reminded of a story from the 8th Infantry Division in World War II. In September of 1944 on the Crozon Peninsula the German Major General Hermann Ramcke asked to discuss surrender terms with the American Army. General Ramcke was in his bunker when his staff brought in the 8th Division's assistant division commander, Brigadier General Charles Canham. Ramcke addressed Canham through an interpreter and said, "I am to surrender to you. Let me see your credentials." Pointing to the American infantrymen crowding the dugout entrance, Canham replied, "These are my credentials."

This is as true today as it was then. Soldiers are still our credentials. Yesterday we honored some of these magnificent soldiers and we are fortunate to have some of them with us today. I would like for you to have a good look at the heart and soul of America's Army.

Sergeant First Class Anita Jordan, the Active Duty Drill Sergeant of the Year from Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Sergeant Jordan said that the reason she entered the Army was "I knew I wanted to do something and be somebody." As a drill sergeant, she coaches, teaches, and develops soldiers—one at a time—24 hours a day. She is somebody.

Sergeant First Class Bruce Clark, the Reserve Drill Sergeant of the Year from Fort Knox, Kentucky. He is a real estate developer and a law student. Successful in two careers, he is indeed twice the citizen.

Sergeant First Class Cory Olsen, the Active Duty Recruiter of the Year from the Denver, Colorado, Recruiting Battalion. An infantryman, he was deployed to Panama, Honduras, Scotland, and the Sinai. He understands selfless service.

Sergeant First Class Alan Fritz, the Reserve Recruiter of the Year from the Syracuse, New York, Recruiting Battalion. A military policeman, he served on active duty in both Germany and Korea before he joined the Reserves. He illustrates the seamless blend we seek for America's Army.

Specialist Hellema Webb, the Soldier of the Year from Eighth Army in Korea. A mortuary affairs specialist, she deployed in 1992 to Mogadishu and now serves with distinction across the world. She received a max score of

200 on the promotion board and is presently on the Sergeants Promotion Standing List. A model NCO who will help lead soldiers into the 21st century.

Specialist Troy Duncan, the Soldier of the Year at U.S. Army Europe. A military policeman, he has already served his 6-month tour of duty in Macedonia, is married with a 3-month-old daughter, and voluntarily teaches bicycle safety classes and assists young children in learning the sport of bowling. He understands the true meaning of commitment to the nation and service to the community.

Specialist Anthony Costides the Forces Command Soldier of the Year. Born in Greece, he is a tracked vehicle mechanic in the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas. He found an environment where he could be all he could be.

Sergeant Christopher Uhrich, the Virginia National Guard Soldier of the Year. A fuel handler who served in the United States Air Force prior to transferring to the National Guard in Virginia, he has over seven years of service to his nation. He embodies the sacrifice, dedication and commitment of our citizen-soldiers.

Ladies and Gentlemen, these soldiers represent the best of America's Army. They are indeed special. They ask for so little. We owe them a great deal and I couldn't be more proud to say to you—these are our credentials.

Thank you very much.

★★★★

Memorandum for Army Leaders

November 3, 1995

Senior Leader Communications

Periodically, I will send out letters like this to share my thinking on subjects requiring your personal and ongoing attention.

The Communications Challenge

In my early days as Chief of Staff, I have been struck by the enormity of the communications task for myself and for the Army. It is clear that I alone cannot reach all key audiences. Our success as an institution depends on the degree to which all senior leaders communicate clearly to the American people why we need an Army and why we must remain the best Army in the world.

Key Audiences

We have some common audiences to deal with—the media, local, state, and nationally elected officials and external groups. To be effective institutionally, we must work together on common themes with messages tailored to the audience and venue.

Key Messages

Another element of effective corporate communications is developing and constantly refining key messages. Some are universal Army messages that we will develop at my level and send out as needed. Other messages are specific to your area of responsibility. The key is taking every opportunity to transmit focused messages to appropriate audiences. We cannot afford scattered, diffuse messages. They have no positive impact downrange.

The News Environment

Today, news is transmitted instantaneously. CNN and other global news organizations are everywhere before we are. What were once local stories are now national or international news in real time.

For this reason, it is absolutely crucial for each senior leader to personally set the example by taking a proactive rather than reactive approach to dealing with the media. We cannot, on the other hand, foresee all circumstances that affect the Army. In this regard, there is a place for reactive public affairs to face crisis situations that arrive unannounced. But, in either case, if we are not responsive, someone else will seize the initiative and speak for the Army, and may not be well informed or supportive.

Stay current on what is happening "outside the perimeter," and understand the issues your key audiences are facing. Also, get a feel for the time pressures and other realities of the news business. Understanding both of these factors

helps frame our messages and methods to get the Army story out early in both good times and bad.

Building a Reputation

Good press relations are good human relations. Good community relations are good human relations. Good congressional relations are good human relations. There is a pattern here. The return on investment we get is in direct proportion to the quality time and effort we invest in these relationships.

Our corporate reputation is earned over months and years of contact with the media, outside influential groups, and higher headquarters. There are no quick-fix ways to develop relationships in times of crisis. When a crisis is looming, it is too late to make an initial foray into the relationship. Developing these relationships takes work and should not be delegated to the public affairs officer only.

The basis of our reputation is the truth that we have the best Army in the world. We aren't perfect, but America's Army is the best trained, best led, and best equipped ever.

In order to let the American people know about their Army, your role as the chief communicator for your command, post, or staff agency is not optional.

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Remarks to Conference of American Armies

Barteloche, Argentina

November 6, 1995

The purpose of this conference is to achieve close integration and cooperation among all our armies for the joint study of problems of mutual interest. We all want the same thing—peace, security, democracy and freedom for the member countries on the American Continent. Achieving this goal is difficult in this era of rapid change.

Each of us face similar challenges. We live in an era of diminishing resources. If you look at what has happened to the U.S. Army, you see our resources have been reduced 40 percent in terms of the budget. That is a big gap. We must be able to cross it.

Obviously, we cannot do "business as usual," because our resources are decreasing faster than the size of our forces. We must become more efficient and do things differently.

We have removed about 450,000 people from the Army's force structure, which includes the Active and Reserve Components and Army civilians. That number, 450,000, is about the population of Tucson, Arizona. When you think about it in terms of human beings involved—the children who had to leave school in the middle of a school year, the people we had to move from Europe to the U.S.—you start to realize how much pain has resulted from this drawdown over the past five years.

We have closed over 650 installations—mostly overseas. Some of those were not small. On a recent visit to Germany, I flew over an abandoned brigade-size post. You get an eerie feeling seeing that great facility sitting there with no soldiers around. I think the Germans get that feeling too. We have drawn down very dramatically overseas. We have closed major installations in the United States as well.

At the same time, there has been no pause in operations while the Army reduced in size. In fact, our missions have expanded. We not only have the traditional missions of providing regional security and stability and deterrence; we have also picked up additional missions such as Haiti, Guantanamo Bay, Macedonia, Somalia and Rwanda, just to name a few.

There are about 28,000 soldiers deployed away from home station each day. Our soldiers spend an average of 138 days a year deployed away from home station. That is a lot of turbulence.

There has been a 300-percent increase in our operational deployments overseas—and that is important. Today, we all live in a global village. What affects one country has an impact on us all. That is why this conference is so vitally important. It provides a forum to share ideas and to learn from each other.

The United States Army has changed from a forward-deployed force with a strategy of con-

tainment to a power projection force with the ability to move to a crisis very rapidly. Multinational operations will be the norm in the future. We need to know and understand each other better. We need to train more with our allies in the future. Doctrine must be developed for mutual understanding. Again, this conference provides an excellent opportunity for the discussion of training, equipment and doctrine.

Every nation at this conference has the same challenge—to do more missions with fewer resources. I am concerned with the future—building the Army of tomorrow, the Army that will be required to meet the needs of a vastly different world.

Let me share with you our vision of that Army. A vision that is rooted in the tradition of 221 years of selfless service and mission accomplishment. It is a vision that will ensure the United States Army's ability to meet the needs of the 21st century.

In our vision we see the world's best Army—trained and ready for victory . . .

- A total force of quality soldiers and civilians
- A values-based organization
- An integral part of the joint team
- Equipped with the most modern weapons and equipment the country can provide
- Able to respond to our nation's needs
- Changing to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow, and the 21st century

It's not just the words but the meaning behind these words. Let me explain. Our goal is to strive to be the world's best Army—trained and ready for victory. This is the most important job for any army, a job in which we must not fail. A total force of quality soldiers and civilians. This recognizes that adage of a former, great Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Creighton Abrams, who said the "Army is not made up of people, the Army is people." We are blessed by the dedication, selfless service and sacrifice of our great citizen soldiers in the reserve forces of the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. We are also fortunate to have a quality civilian force that embodies the best of this great nation . . . a values-based organization. Values are important to us; selfless service, dedication, sacrifice, duty, honor, country are not just words but a code by which we live.

An integral part of the joint team. We recognize the tremendous contributions of our sister services and are proud to stand shoulder to shoulder with them as we keep our nation free. Equipped with the most modern weapons and equipment the country can provide reflects our realization that we must invest in a modernization program for the 21st century. Able to respond to our nation's needs. We must be relevant to the needs of our country. And changing to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow, and the 21st century simply reflects that the only constant in the world today seems to be change. We are dealing with it, we are growing more comfortable with it everyday, and we will continue to have to deal with it in the 21st century.

In order for this vision to be successful, the United States Army had to identify what our critical processes are—what it is that makes us what we are. For the U.S. Army those core processes—we even have a name for them, we call them "the Imperatives"—are these: accessing, training, and retaining *quality people*; *developing leaders*; *training* units; *modernizing* our equipment; writing *doctrine*; and *organizing* the *force*. We knew that the intersection of these six processes is a trained and ready force. Together the processes produce a force which is more powerful than the sum of the parts. Putting it together is our competitive advantage.

The key to achieving this vision—as it has been since the Army was first organized in 1775—is high-quality soldiers. We must never forget that quality soldiers are the essence of our Army—always have been and always will be. The best technology and weapons in the world are meaningless, if we do not recruit and retain high-quality soldiers. We must never allow our commitment to quality soldiers to diminish.

Leader development is a twenty-year investment. To lead the United States Army in the 21st century, we will have to develop leaders with values. We will have to create a leader educational system which produces men and women who are dedicated, selfless, committed, flexible and self-confident. They must value people and nurture them as their most important investment.

Doctrine is our collective wisdom about the conduct of war. It is the core process that gives us

a better common understanding of both new missions and capabilities. Doctrine is how we think about the conduct of war. We have rewritten our basic doctrine for operations, peacekeeping and deployment. We want to work with you in this area so that we will have a common language, philosophy and purpose. Doctrine assures a unity of effort.

Given new and emerging doctrine, we must develop a capabilities-based strategy for modernizing our equipment and redesigning the force. Our plan to accomplish this is called—Force XXI. Simply stated, Force XXI looks at our quality people in the 21st century and provides them the right organization, the most realistic training, an adequate and predictable logistical support during both peace and war, and the best equipment and weapons systems our nation can provide given the resources available. We intend to take advantage of technology in order to arm our soldiers with the finest, most lethal weapons systems in the world. The power of information will allow the ultimate weapon—the individual soldier—to successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century and achieve decisive victory. Force XXI provides the framework for the decisions we must make today so that tomorrow's force will remain as trained and ready as we are right now.

We are creating organizations that can simultaneously execute, plan, and recover from operations. We will continue to train these organizations under the toughest, most realistic conditions possible. We will stress them, in a variety of missions, at the Combat Training Centers.

We will focus on these Six Imperatives mentioned earlier as we prepare to meet the challenges of the 21st century. In the future, a source of strength will be our institutional values which define the fundamental character of the United States Army. The United States Army is an army of citizen-soldiers; it is the Army of the people of the United States. The soldiers, civilians, and families who make up the Army are dedicated to selfless service to the nation. They embody the values of duty, honor, country. The commitment of the United States Army to a mission is a commitment of the character, will, and citizens of our nation. The strength of the United States Army is more than the number of rifles, tanks, artillery pieces, and helicopters. We are the army of a democracy, and our strength is derived from the very soul of our nation.

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Memorandum for Army Leaders

December 8, 1995

Media Coverage of Operations and Deployments

As we come to the end of the calendar year, it is a good time to stop and reflect on our efforts to communicate the Army's story and a good time to take a look at how we can better implement some of the principles outlined in my August 3d Senior Leader Communications letter.

Be Positive and Proactive

I believe strongly that we, as America's Army, must be accountable to the American people. To this end, we have an obligation to communicate what and how we are doing around the world. It is essential that all senior leaders set the example by taking a positive forward-looking approach to dealing with the news media and other interested outside audiences like members of Congress and their staffs. This approach applies to routine home station training, rotations at the Combat Training Centers, and contingency operations around the world.

Activities and training preparatory to worldwide deployments and operations must also include dealing with the media. We are currently seeing a number of very good stories coming out of Europe and here in [Continental United States] CONUS as units prepare to deploy in support of the NATO mission in the Balkans. In the real time news environment, the degree to which our story is told is the degree to which we are open to accommodating the needs of the media. If we do not speak for the Army,

others will. My goal is to have the Army speak for the Army.

Incorporate the Media in Operations

I expect commanders to incorporate dealing with the media into planning and execution of training and operations at all levels. With ongoing operations in such places as Haiti, Macedonia, and Bosnia, we must train and plan to provide open access and independent coverage by the media.

Bosnia

There is an immense media presence in Bosnia. Many more U.S.-based and international media can be expected to join those already there as unit movements continue. Any unit called to go there should be prepared to accept and assist accredited reporters referred through the unit chain of command.

During operations and training, guidelines concerning force protection and operational security should be clearly established and exercised so as to guard against compromising troop safety and operations. Every soldier should be prepared to answer questions pertaining to his/her area of responsibility.

Develop Relationships With Reporters

I charge each of you to invest personal time to develop relationships with the reporters who cover your area of responsibility. You should resist the temptation to acquire a "safe reporter" who gets all your attention. To be truly effective, and to develop fruitful relationships with the press, your cooperation must reach to reporters across a broad spectrum of publications and media outlets. In the process of being open with reporters, we must be prepared to take the bad with the good. Remember, it is during times of crisis that our reputation and credibility is really built.

Invite Reporters To Travel With You

I frequently take reporters along with me when I travel. This provides an opportunity to show them what we are doing outside Washington and to gather insights into the reasons behind Army requirements. Where it is practical and appropriate, senior leaders should make every effort to invite the media to travel along.

Let the Soldiers Speak

I understand that reaching out to external audiences contains an element of risk. However, I have great faith in our soldiers, and truly believe they are our best spokespersons. Furthermore, I am confident that good news will predominate.

We are part of the best trained, best led and best equipped Army in history. We owe it to the American people, our soldiers and their families to ensure their story—the Army's story—is told to the nation.

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"Leadership for the 21st Century: Empowerment, Environment and the Golden Rule"

Military Review

January/February 1996

> At a staff meeting one morning, the colonel reprimanded the post quartermaster because the parade-ground flagpole was not perpendicular. Then, pointing to a lieutenant, he snapped: "Lieutenant, if I told you to put up a flagpole and get it straight, how would you go about it?" "I'd say, sergeant, erect the flagpole," the lieutenant replied.[1]

The lieutenant in this story, Samuel Sturgis, went on to become a lieutenant general and the chief of Army engineers. This anecdote about him is not unique. Incidents like this happen every day in America's Army and help explain the essence of US Army leadership.

> Secretary of Defense William Perry likes to relate a story about General Andrei Nikolayev, deputy chief of the Russian General Staff,

[1] Lewis Sorley, "The Leader as Practicing Manager," in *Military Leadership*, edited by James H. Buck and Lawrence J. Korb (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1981), 187.

> when Nikolayev was on a two-week tour of military bases in the United States. After visiting the first base and seeing our noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in action, he told one of his aides, "I know that these men and women wearing sergeants' uniforms are really officers in disguise.[2]

But as he went from base to base and talked with the NCOs, Nikolayev came to realize they really were not officers. He was stunned and after two weeks told Perry that, "No military in the world has the quality of NCO . . . found in the United States." He went on to say, "That's what gives America its competitive military advantage." Our NCOs are one reason we have the best military in the world.

As the Army chief of staff, my fundamental duty is to ensure America's Army is trained and ready to defend the nation's security and freedom. I am also concerned with creating stability within the force after a long and significant drawdown. I want to create an environment in which all soldiers can "be all they can be."

Countering "Zero Defects"

Recently, I reviewed the Army Research Institute's (ARI's) command climate assessment, which was based on responses from more than 24,000 Active, Reserve and National Guard soldiers and civilians. While none of us will agree with all the assessment's findings, all of us will be troubled by the perceptions it portrays. Some excerpts from this report follow:

- The state of ethical conduct is abysmal. Few battalion commanders can afford integrity in a zero defects environment. Telling the truth ends careers quicker than making stupid mistakes or getting caught doing something wrong. I have seen many good officers slide into ethical compromise.
- There is a return to the "zero defects" and ticket-punching mentality of the 1960s and 1970s that nearly destroyed the officer corps.
- The Army is a zero defects organization.
- My concern is with some officers' attitudes. The problem is not division of officer and NCO duties. Granted, some duties are and should be interchangeable. Some officers, however, want to do it all. They want to conduct training, micromanage and have junior soldiers and civilians report directly to them. They are basically giving their NCOs responsibility and titles but not authority. I do not believe they do this because the NCOs or civilians cannot do their jobs. It is more of an officer efficiency report support form thing and crisis management.

These attitudes are disturbing—but not unexpected. The drawdown has been difficult for the Army. Since 1989, we have cut 450,000 people (Active and Reserve) out of the force. This has been hard on soldiers and their families. What is amazing is that through the drawdown, we have remained trained and ready. We successfully executed missions in Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti and we have not repeated the mistakes of past drawdowns. In his 1948 annual report, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall noted that "the enormous turnover of personnel made effective unit training virtually impossible."

Creating Positive Leadership

Now, as the drawdown ends, we must display positive, creative leadership, stamp out this zero defects mentality and create an environment where all soldiers can reach their full potential. I would like to share some ideas on how to create this leadership environment.

I recommend Major General John M. Schofield's concept of leadership to all leaders. I first learned his concept 37 years ago, and it is as true today as when Schofield said it in 1879.

> The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh and tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an Army. It is possible to impart instruction and to give commands in such a manner and such a tone of voice to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard

[2] Secretary of Defense William Perry, speech (Fort Polk, LA: August 1995)

> for himself, while he who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.[3]

The fundamental truth, as General Creighton W. Abrams used to say in the mid-1970s, is that the Army is not made up of people. The Army is people. Every decision we make is a people issue. An officer's primary responsibility is to develop people and enable them to reach their full potential. All our soldiers are volunteers. They come from diverse backgrounds, but they all have goals they want to accomplish. We must create an environment where they truly can be all they can be.

Good leaders know their soldiers' strengths and weaknesses. This is the key to success. People's names are important. Commanders should learn the names of their people. Nothing impresses soldiers more than leaders who know their soldiers' names. I recall an incident that impressed me following a battalion change of command several years ago. At the reception, the outgoing battalion commander greeted each soldier, officer and spouse by name. He made a point of asking a question about each soldier's family. The division commander remarked, "He may be the only battalion commander in the Army who can do that. . . . And I guarantee you that not one member of his battalion will ever forget him, and many will seek to serve under him again."

Taking Care of People

My leadership philosophy is very, very simple. It can be summed up in three basic points. First, if we empower people to do what is legally and morally right, there is no limit to the good we can accomplish. That is all I ask of anyone: Do what is right. Leaders must look to their soldiers and focus on the good. No soldier wakes up in the morning and says, "Okay, how am I going to screw this up today?" Soldiers want to do good and commanders should give them that opportunity. An outstanding soldier, Command Sergeant Major Richard Cayton, the former US Forces Command (FORSCOM) sergeant major, summed up a leader's responsibility this way: "Your soldiers will walk a path and they will come to a crossroad; if you are standing at the crossroad, where you belong, you can guide your soldiers to the right path and make them successful."

The second point of my leadership philosophy is to create an environment where people can be all they can be. Many soldiers enlisted under this recruiting slogan, and we have a responsibility to assist them in developing mentally, physically, spiritually and socially to their full potential. It is essential that leaders develop the initiative of subordinates.

Our doctrine values the initiative, creativity and problem-solving ability of soldiers at all levels. Valuing these traits has always been the hallmark of America's Army. In the Civil War, General Ulysses S. Grant's instructions to Major General William T. Sherman reflect this concept: "I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign. . . . But simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way." During World War II, Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. allowed his subordinates to be all they could be by being tolerant of their errors. He said, "Never tell people how to do things, tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity."[4]

Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower's guidance for the invasion of Europe remains the classic example of this concept. He was told, "You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces."[5]

The third point of my leadership philosophy is to treat others as you would have them treat you. A leader must have compassion—a "basic

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[3] MG John M. Schofield, address to the US Military Academy (USMA) corps of cadets (West Point, NY: 11 August 1879).

[4] John T. Nelsen II, "Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Leadership," in *The Challenge of Military Leadership*, edited by Lloyd Matthews and Dale E. Brown (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brasseys International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1989), 26–39.

[5] Gordon A. Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951), 457.

respect for the dignity of each individual; treating all with dignity and respect."[6] This is a simple restatement of the Golden Rule—but it is a critical issue. Every soldier must feel he is being treated fairly and that you care and are making an honest attempt to ensure he or she reaches full potential. Initiative will be stifled and creativity destroyed unless soldiers feel they have been given a fair chance to mature and grow.

There is nothing extraordinary about these three points. They are very simple, but I challenge you to think about them.

Building Character

The perceptions in ARI's assessment can only be overcome by positive leadership. The individual leader's character is key to the climate within the command. A good leader must have compassion, courage, candor, competence and commitment. I have already talked about compassion—the Golden Rule. By courage, I mean both physical and moral courage. The history of America's Army is full of examples of physical bravery and courage. Examples of moral courage are equally as important but not as well known.

The perceptions expressed in *Army Assessment 95* are not new. The fear of delegating authority to subordinates is not a new phenomenon. The zero defects mentality—where a commander feels his command must be error free—is not new. But we must possess the moral courage to deny this damaging philosophy that says it is worse to report a mistake than it is to make one. This lack of moral courage in peacetime can have disastrous results in battle. General Matthew B. Ridgway described this as a challenge of moral courage, saying, "It has long seemed to me that the hard decisions are not the ones you make in the heat of battle. Far harder to make are those involved in speaking your mind about some harebrained scheme which proposes to commit troops to action under conditions where failure seems almost certain, and the only results will be the needless sacrifice of priceless lives."[7]

Courage

General George C. Marshall, echoing Ridgway's sentiment, described the need for leaders with the moral courage to tell their superiors when they are wrong. "It is hard to get men to do this, for this is when you lay your career, perhaps your commission, on the line."[8]

Accurate readiness reporting may require a measure of *moral courage*. Nobody is going to tell you how to report your unit's readiness. You must make that call. I ask that you make that report as honestly and realistically as you can. Tell us what is wrong. I can assure you that I read the readiness reports that come up from the divisions.

When I was the FORSCOM commander, three divisions fell below the C2 readiness level.[9] I am not proud of that, but I was proud of a system that allowed those commanders to tell it like it was. They reported readiness as they saw it. They did not compromise their standards and were willing to stand up and set an example. I ask all leaders to do the same.

Candor

Another character trait closely associated with courage is *candor*. Candor is a two-way street. Honesty is as important to a subordinate as it is to a superior. Mentoring and coaching are the best ways I know of to stamp out the zero defects mentality. Soldiers must grow and learn from their mistakes. We must allow subordinates to have the freedom to fail. We must give them the benefit of the doubt if they are honestly trying.

We must coach and mentor our young officers and NCOs and spend time with subordinates, talking with them face-to-face about their performance. Everyone wants feedback. We need to tell soldiers when they make mistakes and then coach them to succeed. Nothing is more important than taking the time to mentor subordinates. General Wilbur Creech, a great Air Force innovator and leader, said it best: "The first duty of any leader is to create more leaders."[10]

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[6] US Army Field Manual 100–1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1994), 9.

[7] GEN Matthew B. Ridgway, "Leadership," in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, edited by Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), 27.

[8] Ibid.

[9] C2 is a unit readiness level based on personnel, equipment and training. A C2 level means it would take 29 days or more for a unit to become combat ready.

[10] James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1995), 333.

Part of mentoring is listening to soldiers. You can always learn from them. As a battalion commander, I had a problem in recovery operations. It always took an inordinately long time to refuel the battalion's vehicles after field operations. One day, the fuel truck driver told me how it could be done in one-fourth the time. His solution was so simple I am embarrassed to reveal it. He suggested that instead of having the fuel truck go through the motor pool to top off each vehicle, the vehicles should drive through a refueling station before going to the motor pool. The soldier closest to the issue solved a major problem.

Competence

A third character trait of good leaders is *competence*. As General Douglas MacArthur said, "There is no substitute for victory."[11] The public trusts us with their most precious asset—their sons and daughters. They do not question what we do with them. They trust us to train them to survive on the battlefield. This is a tremendous responsibility and we, as leaders, must continue to earn that trust by our professionalism and competence. I count on leaders to not only know their jobs, but to strive to be the best in their respective fields.

America's Army must be trained and ready for victory, which entails more than defeating the fourth largest army in the world in less than 100 hours. Victory is also providing military support to civilian leadership in other operations. Leaders must conduct tough, realistic training, and we will continue to focus on the National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center and Combat Maneuver Training Center. We do not need to get more out of less, but we must get more out of what we do. I would like to do fewer training events but ensure we get the most out of each one we do conduct.

To accomplish our missions, many of our soldiers have had back-to-back deployments and extended separations from their families. On average, American soldiers assigned to a troop unit now spend 138 days a year away from home. Many special units, such as military police, air defense and transportation, have been carrying a heavier load. Operations tempo is high. Thus, leaders must help reduce stress in units. One way to do this is by predictability. The duty roster must be kept in line with US Army Field Manual (FM) 25–100, *Training the Force*. Some soldiers contend they do not know what is going to happen two weeks out because the duty roster has not been published yet. They do not know if they are going to work on the weekend or not.

Leaders must correct this unpredictability. FM 25–100 training doctrine allows us to plan in advance. We should lock in training events five weeks in advance, and soldiers should know a month out if they are off on a weekend—and we must honor that commitment to them. Improved predictability for our soldiers must be a goal.

Commitment

The final character trait of a good leader is *commitment*. MacArthur had the best definition of commitment—"Duty, honor, country. These three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be."[12]

Leaders today should be devoted to selfless service. Marshall said, "It is amazing what gets done when nobody worries about who gets the credit." Leaders should take their guidance from the top but focus on their soldiers. If your focus is on soldiers, then you are doing the right thing. Focusing on "the boss" leads to the attitudes we are trying to stamp out today.

Leaders create command climate. Positive leadership can eliminate micromanagement, careerism, integrity violations and the zero defects mind-set. These attitudes are an unfortunate side effect of the turmoil created by the downsizing of our Army. These attitudes have appeared in the past—but we defeated them. We will do so again.

America's Army is unique in the world. Our advantage is the creativity, initiative and ingenuity of our soldiers. To foster this advantage, we must be willing to underwrite honest mistakes, focus on soldiers and mentor the next generation of leaders.

Major General James Utino once said that morale exists when "a soldier thinks that his army

[11] GEN Douglas MacArthur, address to Congress (Washington, DC: 19 April 1951).

[12] MacArthur, Thayer Award address to the USMA corps of cadets (West Point, NY: May 1962).

is the best in the world, his regiment is the best in the army, his company is the best in the regiment, his squad the best in the company, and that he himself is the best damned soldier in the outfit." Our job as leaders is to foster that attitude and morale.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

January 10, 1996

During this past week I had two opportunities to see how good our Army really is. We held the Active Component BG [Brigadier General]/SES [Senior Executive Service] Conference in Washington this week and despite adverse weather we were able to get the conference under way. I was terribly impressed with the quality of people in attendance. We are extremely fortunate to have such a deep bench and it bodes well for our future. As I looked at that group and saw the diversity we had there as well as the quality, I am really optimistic about our future. During the same week I had the opportunity to talk to the Pre-Command Course at Fort Leavenworth. I try to make that for each course and find it very rewarding for me. The composition of that class really represents America's Army—it includes Active, United States Army Reserve, and Army National Guard commanders as well as key acquisition executives. These are the people who really have an opportunity to influence what we are doing where the rubber meets the road. It's always an uplifting experience to see the experience that we bring together in one classroom and to have the opportunity to dialogue with them. As I told both groups these are interesting times. They are also challenging and exciting. I think we know full well the challenges—OPTEMPO [operational tempo], undermanning, resources, zero defects, etc.—and we are starting to deal with them in a meaningful way. I am less convinced, however, that we have fully captured the excitement that exists in today's Army. I think our soldiers feel good about what they are doing. By and large they are doing meaningful work and are making important contributions to society. The recent deployment of 20,000 soldiers to Bosnia, I think, illustrates that point very well. The mere presence of U.S. soldiers has seemed to have a calming effect upon all factions. We truly have an opportunity to stop the slaughter. I am convinced that if we had not made that deployment that slaughter would continue. At the end of the day we may or may not be successful, but I think all of us should take pride in the fact that our credentials are so well respected that merely committing them to a mission has such a positive impact. That fact in itself is just part of the excitement that I think exists in the Army today. All of us—particularly this audience—have an opportunity to make history. Some of us are going to be on the blame line more than others but all of us deeply feel this responsibility. We have an opportunity to do it right. When the stakes are this high the risks are great but so are the opportunities. We must avoid getting too bogged down in the near battle. While we must do the Somalias, the Haitis, the Bosnias right, we must not forget that our future depends upon how we reshape the world of the 21st century. There are countries—e.g., Russia, China, Japan, most in Europe, ASEAN, etc.—that will either be competitors or allies in that 21st century world. What we do today will help determine what camp they are in tomorrow. We must make sure that in all of our actions we continue to push ourselves to look to the future and some of those countries who are not on our homepage right now.

Shortly, we will convene our next BG and MG [major general] promotion boards. We have selected those that will sit on both of these boards. I consider both boards to be extremely important and have put an awful lot of time into this selection process. I have trust and confidence in those we've selected to ensure that we pick the right leaders for the 21st century. I let you know that because I want the process to be as pure as we can possibly make it. All board members are asked to ensure that they bring no list—either written or unwritten—with them to the board and they come prepared to select the best available. I assure you that we have plenty of quality in both of these areas. I mention this to all of you

because with the selection of these board members it is now appropriate for all conversations concerning officers in the zone of consideration for each of these boards to cease. Board members will be instructed to come with an open mind and prepared to do what is right for the Army in the 21st century. I know you understand the sensitivity of this issue and I also know that I can count on your support in keeping the selection processes as fair as we can possibly make them. This one is extremely important.

We just went through our major budget issues with the leadership of OSD [Office of Secretary of Defense]. The Secretary and I argued hard for the resources we think necessary to keep the Army trained and ready in '97. Unfortunately, we still have an MPA problem in '97 which will require some migration from OMA to fix.

In terms of modernization we seem to have bottomed out and are on the upswing but not as fast as anyone would like. I certainly would like to see $3B–$4B more in our modernization account but right now that's not in the cards. We need to continue to focus on our modernization accounts and we're going to face some tough decisions in that area. As I've indicated we're going to try to retire some old equipment and capture the O&S costs associated with that retirement and plow that back into modernization. I know there are some risks associated with that but it is one of the ways that we can start to make the pot right. There are obviously some other things out there that we can do and I would ask each of you to focus on them at your level. If you have other thoughts on things that need to be done that can improve the modernization account, I would appreciate them also. In the outyears BRAC [base realignment and closure] is somewhat of a mixed bag. Granted it's costing us more than we thought and our savings are less, but once the installation is closed or realigned we are saving some recurring costs. Of course, our macro strategy was to plow these savings into the modernization program and, to the extent we can, we will. Those of you involved in the BRAC process can provide an invaluable service by keeping costs as low as possible and harvesting savings as quickly as we possibly can. I know there are rules and regulations in this area and I don't want anybody to do anything dumb, but my guess is that like anything else there are efficiencies that we can gain in this area. If so, we need to take advantage of them. My analysis of '97 is that it's going to be a tight year but that it's going to be doable. Obviously, a lot will depend on what happens to us on the Hill with this budget but I'm satisfied that we gave it our best shot and we need to concentrate our efforts on ensuring that we get about $60B worth of readiness out of that budget. The message here is that we cannot afford to let up in terms of efficiencies. The bottom line is the more that we can save in areas like TDY [temporary duty], the better we can take care of our people and the quicker we can modernize. Your support and personal example are very much appreciated.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

January 22, 1996

I just came back from a trip to six countries in 8 days and had an opportunity to see your Army in action and I want to share some of my observations with you. I was impressed with the diversity of the missions and most of all with the great talent we have. We have put together a Yellow which captures most of this and it will be distributed but I wanted to give you more details on what I saw. I wish that each of you would have been able to accompany me because I think you would have been pleased. I know I won't be able to do this justice but I want to try to give you a feel for how great your Army really is.

My first three stops were in Jordan, Israel, and Egypt. Here I got a chance to see up close and personal the people who really man the front lines for the U.S. Army in the new world order. A couple of things come through loud and clear. First, these soldiers of all ranks are a critical member of our country team. I noticed that the ambassadors in each of those countries relied very heavily upon them. Everywhere I'd go the ambas-

sadors were very complimentary about the support they were receiving from the U.S. Army. Secondly, the training program that we have for our Foreign Area Office program is world class. No other service, no other nation comes close. Our people because of their training not only know the country but in most cases know the people. In many cases that is a function of having trained together with many of their key leaders either in the United States or in a foreign country. Everywhere I go I find a key leader who is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College or the Army War College and I find many of our people who have been trained in their country. As we look to the future I can't help but believe the importance of these training programs will increase. However, I am also conscious of the fact that future quality is not preordained. We must ensure that we have an adequate number of Mike Shaws, Pete Murrays, and Jeff Jeffreys in the future. This has some important ramifications for things like the Officer Personnel Management Study and the development and implementation of a new OER [officer evaluation report]. These two initiatives are linked together in a very meaningful way and I will ensure that as we proceed the issue of the developing leaders with these broad skills is addressed. I think it will be more important to leverage these people in the future and we must ensure that this is a viable and healthy career path. I am committed to make that happen, but I need your help. First, when you're visiting foreign countries don't forget to say thank you to the U.S. Army personnel who represent us so well. Second, we need to look for those people who are ideally suited for this type of work and encourage and identify them. I'm convinced they are out there but I doubt if we have them identified in sufficient quantities at this point. I submit the success of the U.S. Army in the 21st century is just as much dependent upon our ability to identify these people as it is dependent upon our ability to identify great warfighters. In some cases the two may be the same but the good thing is they don't necessarily have to be. We have an enormous pool of talent.

The second part of my visit was to Bosnia, Hungary, and Germany. Here I had the opportunity to visit IFOR [Implementation Force] and talk to a large number of soldiers. I was struck by how much had been accomplished and the positive attitude I saw. There is much still to be done and I know there will be some down days ahead but this was all up. The chaplains had arranged 4-Star weather, so consequently I was able to see a lot in a very short time. The first impression when you fly into Tuzla [Hungary] is how much has been accomplished in such a short period of time. Contrary to the initial press reports about being behind schedule I think it is truly amazing to see all that has been done. You don't get that feel from the press reports and that isn't necessarily their fault because it's hard to capture the magnitude of an operation like this in a series of short sound bites. You all can envision this because you have a frame of reference. CPs [command posts] were up and functional and living conditions for our soldiers were improving on a daily basis. Like all of our other operations so far—Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, etc.—this one is unique. We don't have a cookie cutter for it and the commanders are blazing new trails. They are dealing with the challenges of how you separate warring factions and build trust in an environment previously devoid of it. There are no school solutions about any of these problems and in fact the people on the ground are writing the book. Yet, no one seems daunted by the challenge. There are a lot of reasons for that. First and foremost, the soldiers have been well trained. They are confident. I talked to a number of them and they all told me that they had not experienced any surprises. Pre-deployment training had been tough but realistic. This is the proof of the pudding and Bosnia validates the need for tough, realistic training. Second, our NCO corps is superb. They do so much and we sometimes tend to take them for granted. In my mind it will continue to be important to differentiate between the functions performed by officers and NCOs but we must never forget the real importance of a well trained NCO corps. If we as general officers ever let that slip then I'm afraid we'll lose the edge. Third, the emphasis we put on taking care of soldiers pays great dividends—intangible but vital. All you have to do is look in those soldiers' eyes in Bosnia to know how much they appreciate the emphasis we are putting on taking care of them and their families. In that

regard, I appreciated USAREUR's [United States Army Europe's] emphasis on rear detachment commanders. Their requirement was that one of the top officers in the battalion had to be left behind as a rear detachment commander. I believe this is a model for the future and the system must recognize that fact when we go through our selection and promotion process. I am also convinced that we need to continue to perfect our training package for rear detachment commanders. We need to build on the lessons learned from this experience and share with others because everyone agrees with the fundamental principal that soldiers perform better when their families are taken care of. Although I did not land at the Sava River I did get a feel for the extraordinary accomplishment of this bridging operation. I can't imagine more adverse peacetime conditions than those for that bridge. The fact that it was accomplished without accident or injury makes this a truly remarkable accomplishment. In Hungary, I saw why we are the policemen of the global village. No one else could put together that type of logistical infrastructure and develop such a power projection platform in less than 30 days. Here I saw our professionals—Active, Guard, and Reserve—working together to make it happen. Synchronizing trains and airplanes ain't necessarily easy. Pushing them down to a bridge and into theater at the right time and with the right equipment ain't either. I talked to one staff sergeant who told me the toughest part of this for her personally was having to leave her 12-year-old son behind. She is a single parent and left him with a German family. She had confidence in them to take care of her son and was not complaining but it underscored some of the human emotions associated with operations like this. Lots of moving parts here but they're all coming together like a well-oiled machine. In Germany, I saw what I consider the unsung heroes of this operation. I certainly don't take anything away from IFOR but I know they would agree that without the USAREUR and V Corps staff and the 3d Infantry Division, they would never have been able to get done all that they had to do prior to deployment. For me this illustrated the importance of establishing the priority mission and working together to make it happen. There were lots of examples of people volunteering meaningful contributions without even being asked. Again, it's one of the intangibles that really makes our Army the world's best.

There were lots of things for me to chew on that came out of this trip, but by far the overriding issue was making sure we continue to have a leadership development program that develops these types of leaders. What I saw was people who wanted to be in the game when the game was on the line. You can't have too many of these people and the challenge that we face is to develop the captains and lieutenants of today to be the same type leaders in the 21st century.

I started out by saying I wish each of you could have been with me. I tried, but I didn't do this one justice. I would say, however, if you could have been there, you, like me, would have been damned proud of our soldiers. What a great Army.

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Letter to Army General Officers

January 22, 1996

Observations From the Middle East, Bosnia, and Germany

My recent trip to the Middle East, Bosnia, and Germany brought a few points home to me that are worth sharing with you. What I saw and heard from many soldiers and senior leaders from many countries brought into sharp focus three fundamental truths about our world and our Army.

First, the world continues to change at an increasingly fast pace but remains extremely complex and dangerous. I spoke with King Hussein of Jordan, Prime Minister Peres of Israel, and Defense Minister Tantawi in Egypt. All agreed that the Middle East peace process is moving quickly but has a way to go. All are amazed by the pace and amount of change, much as we were when the Wall came down. While I was waiting to cross the Allenby Bridge connecting Jordan to Israel, my Israeli hosts drove across the bridge

and were welcomed into my meeting with my Jordanian host. The last time one of the Israeli officers crossed that bridge was as an armor commander during the '67 War.

But the journey has a long way to go. I visited the grave of Prime Minister Rabin after walking through the Holocaust Museum in Jerusalem. The Israelis took me to a high hill overlooking the West Bank and showed me the intertwined patchwork of Palestinian villages and Israeli settlements that somehow have to belong to two separate national entities, one Israeli, one Palestinian. I also visited the Israeli division deployed north along the Lebanese border and saw how Israeli small unit ambushes and sniper tanks fight a nightly duel with hunter-killer teams of Hezbollah guerrillas.

In Bosnia I spoke with our soldiers from Task Force EAGLE as they professionally but firmly enforced the new peace treaty, strengthening the fragile hopes for peace in that war-torn land. As we stood on the taxiway at Tuzla, we watched IL–77s bringing in the Russian brigade that will serve with the 1st Armored Division. How far we've come and how far yet to go.

The second truth, and the good news, is that we have the best Army in the world. Everyone is the Middle East was eager to work with our Army, to profit from our knowledge and expertise. We're truly the benchmark for the world's armies. That's really brought home when you visit Bosnia. No other army could have even attempted what USAREUR [U.S. Army Europe] has achieved there.

General Bill Crouch showed me the whole operation, working from the front to back. Starting in Tuzla and then moving to the forward brigade CPs [command posts], we saw how professionalism and dedication and pure grit allowed our soldiers to cope with challenges ranging from hip-deep mud, to rogue commanders, to mines, rock slides, and raging rivers, winning the respect and admiration of all the warring parties. Flying over the twin float bridges on the still-swollen Sava River, you realize that no other Army in the world would have even attempted to bridge that river when the water level was at a hundred-year high. The Center of Military History says the first bridge was the longest float bridge in military history and certainly its installation was the most watched in the history of military operations.

We also care for soldiers better than anyone else. General John Abrams and the Victory Corps [V Corps] have set up a tremendous log base at Taszar in Hungary where soldiers rest and refit after the days-long train ride from Germany and prepare for onward movement by convoy into Bosnia. It's complete with facilities that would be the envy of many other armies in garrison. In no other Army do you see so many senior leaders so concerned with the welfare of soldiers and the soldiers know it. The bond is there.

In Germany, we visited Seventh Army Training Center and 3d Infantry Division and saw the tremendous training program that prepared and certified each and every soldier before they deployed to Bosnia. And the proof of the effectiveness of that program was there on the ground in Bosnia and soldiers said there were no surprises, training was tougher than the real thing. V Corps Command Sergeant Major John Beck compared it to swinging a heavy bat in practice. The 3d Division had helped train and deploy the force and was right back training itself—a great example of unselfish commitment to getting the job done.

Caring for soldiers and families was also clearly evident in the superb effort that went into preparing for the deployment. Soldiers' household goods went into civilian storage for safekeeping, cars to humidity-controlled warehouses. Family support organizations trained to demanding standards. Fewer than two percent of families opted to return home.

The third truth is that we're the greatest army in the world because we have the greatest soldiers in the world. In all the countries of the Middle East I saw the thin line of attaches and training assistance field teams that link us to the key armies of the region and play a tremendous role at the national level. All of these great soldiers, all true professionals are worth their weight in gold.

From Bosnia through Hungary to Germany I saw what I always see in our great junior soldiers and officers performing at levels far above any reasonable expectation, cheerful and willing under the most trying of circumstances, innovative and hard working to the extreme. At the 1st Division, Sergeant Zuckermann gave me a hip-

pocket briefing on the Mujahedeen terrorist situation that would have done credit to a senior CIA analyst. At the 1st BCT [Brigade Combat Team] TOC [tactical operations center], Specialist Fourth Class Johnson, the S–2 analyst, gave me the Serbian Order of Battle briefing. Looking at the Sava River bridge, you can only marvel at the 12C NCOs and soldiers who beat the river at its worst. And so it went throughout the trip.

The challenge that we senior leaders face, especially now that we've downsized, is that it's too easy to treat the fortitude and can-do attitude of our great soldiers as an inexhaustible resource. It's not. It's too common to find the sergeant who had been to DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and Haiti, had done a tour with the OPFOR [Opposing Forces] at the National Training Center, and is now deployed to Bosnia. When we throw in the fast pace of training, the average soldier is away from home for over 160 days a year.

I believe we're looking at the red line. Like the star pitcher who starts one game too many, our great soldiers can be pushed too far. We need to train and encourage all leaders at all levels to keep a fine eye on the pace of soldiers and units. And we need to learn to say no when too many requirements get piled on the plate and none come off. We owe this to our soldiers and their families. They're truly our most precious resource. Without them we won't have the best army in the world.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

January 29, 1996

Cancellation of the Armored Gun System

Recently we made the decision to terminate the Armored Gun System [AGS] Program. This was a tough decision for a lot of reasons. First, the AGS was designed to replace the aging Sheridan fleet and to be the primary weapon system for our light cavalry regiment. Second, it was a well run program. The contractor was doing a good job and we had no major complaints with the way that program was being administered. Third, we are looking at how we can build up our modernization program, not reduce it. For these reasons and many more, some may question our judgment, but I would like to explain to all of you our rationale.

First and foremost, we still have an affordability problem with which we must deal. Our analysis of the future, given the emphasis on a balanced budget, indicates that the best we can hope for in terms of money for defense is a straight line projection of what we are currently receiving. The worst case would reduce money for defense considerably and I believe we have to deal with this reality. Specifically, we have run out of options for dealing with the MPA [military personnel account] problems associated with 1996 and 1997. Given the fact that in our case we can only pay bills like this from three major areas—MPA, OMA [operations and maintenance account], and RDA [research and development account]—and coupled with the fact that our greatest readiness challenge appears to be an adequate number of people in the TOE units, I really felt we had to take this drastic measure. The money saved from this termination will help us get through the 96–97 years without a significant degradation of funds for MPA or training. We certainly aren't plush in either of those years but through careful management I think we can make it. We must still address the outyear MPA problems but we intend to do that with the 98–03 POM build. The bottom line is that in order to keep the equation (near-term readiness, quality of life, far-term readiness) balanced in terms of affordability, we had to make a tough choice.

I am concerned about the signal this sends in terms of enhancement of our light forces. However, our analysis indicates that we can compensate for the loss of AGS, particularly, in the 82d Airborne Division. The C–17 aircraft enhances our capability to deploy a heavy package with light forces when required. We've demonstrated that a number of times already and I'm comfortable that is a viable option and we will continue to train that way at the JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center]. In addition, we believe we can accelerate JAVELIN somewhat and that will enhance the antitank capa-

bilities of our light forces. Finally, we have been conducting an ACTD [Advanced Concepts Tactical Demonstration] with the EFOG-M [enhanced fiber-optically guided missile] system and are looking at the possibility of fielding that to replace the Sheridans in the 82d Airborne Division. I hasten to add there are a lot of details to be worked out on this one, but our initial cut indicates that that is a viable possibility. However we won't be able to replace the infantry support weapon that the AGS was designed to fill.

We haven't forgotten about the 2d ACR [Armored Cavalry Regiment], but as you know, that's not an easy problem. We are looking at a number of solutions to include some restructuring options for the regiment. I know that introduces more uncertainty into the lives of the soldiers of that regiment, but I am committed to fixing that as soon as we can. They have done a great job for us in Haiti and I know they will continue to live up to their motto—"Always Prepared."

The initial program was for a buy of 234 systems and by terminating it we will reinvest approximately $1B. Our intent is to roll as much of that money as possible into other high payoff modernization programs. We have done a value-added analysis and will attempt to accelerate those programs which are most badly needed in the near term. I must again add, however, this action is far short of a total solution. We have applied a Band-Aid in order to stop the bleeding. We still have a lot of work to do if we're going to achieve the right balance for the future.

I'm sure many of you had questions about this decision and I don't know whether I've been able to answer them all or not. I've tried to give you the rationale because I need your support in helping explain this to the internal Army. These are complex issues with no easy solutions and the soldiers need to know we will continue to do what's right.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

February 5, 1996

Army Business Practices and Efficiencies

Last week I spent some time with the Army Materiel Command [AMC] getting an update on their activities. This is the heart and soul of the Army business operations. They control about $16B worth of resources each year either through direct or indirect funding. When you have the opportunity as I did to sit down and concentrate on what they're doing and how they're doing it, you can't help but be impressed. They have been recognized numerous times over the past few years for their efforts in quality management and reengineering—a tribute to a visionary plan developed and executed by the leadership of this organization. Although the prices of their services have increased over time, the rate of increase has been significantly below the rate of inflation. This is truly a remarkable achievement given the constraints under which they have to operate. They have reduced admin/production lead time—the time in advance they have to order an item—from over 700 days to slightly over 300 days, thus saving the Army approximately $375M. There are other examples like that far too numerous to cover in this message. Suffice it to say they continue to fine-tune a very complex system to make it as efficient as they possibly can.

The bad news is that most of those savings have already been accounted for in our current program and we still have significant challenges ahead. I'm basically an optimist and tend to focus on the fact that the U.S. Army has always faced challenges and one of the things that's made us great is our ability to solve them. I certainly don't underestimate the magnitude of this challenge but I also know that a 20 percent increase in efficiency in this area alone will solve most of our current problems. A $3B efficiency savings would not only pay current MPA bills in the outyears but also provide a significant amount for recapitalization and modernization of the force. Basically, we have no choice except to take this challenge on because the only alternative is to pay the bill in end strength. Although I'm committed to do whatever is neces-

sary to keep the force trained and ready, I believe that our force structure is at the minimum level to meet the requirements that come from our National Security Strategy. Consequently, we have to become more efficient.

We will work hard to unshackle some of the requirements we think work against efficiency such as the 60–40 depot maintenance rule and A76. Getting relief from these statutes will open up dramatically the concept of privatization. While I'm not necessarily sold on the idea that privatization is always better, I am convinced we need competition to ensure that we are the most efficient organization possible. The ball is clearly in our court on this one but any opportunity you get to help us, please take it. At the strategic level, we basically need as much flexibility as possible so that we can become as efficient as we need to be. I believe we have to get at least half (10 percent) of our savings through this method.

The other half has to come from reducing the cost of OPTEMPO [operational tempo]. We already stood down some old equipment which have high O&S [operation and sustainment] costs. This has been factored into the Training Resource Model and the field will continue to be decremented in OPTEMPO by the amount of savings associated with this reduction. These savings, in turn, will go toward modernization and recapitalizing old fleets. Sure there's a risk in doing this but I also believe we have a window of opportunity and there's a greater risk in not doing this. As AMC becomes more efficient these savings will be passed to the field in the form of reduced costs for repair parts and services. Again, for us to realize real savings, we must decrement the TRM [training and maintenance] by the amount of reduction in the cost of doing business for AMC and transfer that amount to RDA [research and development account]. We intend to do just that. This is all rather complex and I have no illusions that it will go as smoothly as we'd like, but as I said, we are out of options. We will also continue to explore better ways of doing business such as the single stock fund concept. I am sensitive to the fact that we have always planned for big savings and captured them early on only to find they've never materialized. We must all be on guard against that.

If we're going to succeed I need the help of all of you. We must create a mindset in the Army of becoming more efficient. First and foremost, I need you to set the example in this area. Let's take on the things we can control. We have in place a large amount of video-teleconferencing sites and we need to question the amount of TDY [temporary duty] and travel we are conducting. As you may know, I've been on a personal kick reference cellular telephones and beepers. We need some but I doubt very seriously if we need as many as we have. We need to look hard at the training for our PLL [prescribed load list] clerks and ensure that they are properly trained. They spend an awful lot of our OPTEMPO money and I always am concerned about who is really looking at their training and how well they're doing. My experience is that they are some of the finest soldiers we have, but like most, they will perform better if they know you are interested. While we're talking about this, let's take on the GAO finding about only 30 percent of our PLL/ASL being demand supported. We need to either refute that or fix it. We, in turn, will attempt to accelerate the fielding of such systems as SARRS-O which will allow us to become more efficient in logistical operations. However, if we're going to solve this problem, all of us are going to have to get involved.

The Army is a big business and we need to improve the business practices of the Army. Having been into this now for some time I am convinced this is an exciting opportunity and one in which we can really make a difference. If we don't seize the moment we're going to pay for it with our most precious assets—our soldiers.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

February 26, 1996

I want to update you on a couple of important issues that I participated in last week.

Resources

I participated in a couple of sessions involving resources and requirements. There is no

doubt the two are inextricably linked. Given the resources we see available, we must bring the requirements under control. During the upcoming POM build we intend to look very hard at our requirements because we just don't have the resources to fund everything everybody wants. Prioritization has always been important but it is absolutely vital this time around. We must figure out how to bring our fixed costs under control. The Department of Defense fixed costs consume approximately 65 percent of the budget and if unchecked will go to 70 percent. That means that at a max 35 percent of the dollars we receive really go toward force structure and warfighting requirements. It's often difficult for a variety of reasons to make significant inroads in this area but all the Chiefs [of Staff] have agreed to take it on. Consequently, you're going to see continued interest on how we can best utilize our limited resources. We have received most of the POM letters from the MACOMs [major commands] and intend to discuss them in detail during the upcoming Army Commanders Conference at Carlisle in early March. The Program Evaluation Group chairmen have received draft POM guidance and are starting to build POM 98–03. In essence, the train has left the station and is building up a head of steam. As I've said many times before there are tough decisions ahead and they're ultimately going to be made. If we don't make them, somebody else will and I believe that we who have the greatest interest at stake need to take that on. We will undoubtedly gore somebody's sacred cow. I intend to listen carefully to all aspects of the issue but at the end of the day we have to do what we have to do. I need your support in framing the issues and working inside the system to ensure we arrive at the right decisions. The Army of the 21st century would not be well served without a healthy debate on these key issues. However, it must be done within the system and not in Congress or the open press. There we must speak with one voice or we'll be defeated in detail.

Haiti

I talked to [General] Joe Kinzer in Haiti this week and the U.S. military portion of the United Nations Mission in Haiti is drawing to a rapid and successful close. That is a real success story and it involves America's Army. Many people deserve credit. Among them, people like Hugh Shelton, Dave Meade, George Fisher, and Joe Kinzer; however, as always, the real credit has to go to our soldiers—Active and Reserve. They came from across America's Army. They took on a difficult and often ill-defined mission and they exceeded all expectations. No other Army, indeed, no other service, could have done what they did. Their sacrifices and their performance strengthen all of us.

Women's Military Memorial

Wilma Vaught, the President of the Women in Military Service for America Memorial being built next to Arlington Cemetery, stopped by this week and updated me on her project. The memorial will recognize the accomplishments of military women throughout our great history. I was impressed with the plans and glad to find out that it was on track for a grand opening in October of 1997. I was somewhat surprised to find out from her that many of our soldiers do not know about this memorial. I told her that we would try to help in terms of getting the word out and I ask you to help in this area.

Frocking Officers

The FY 96 Authorization Act drastically limits the number of frockings we are allowed. As you know, under the current system the approval level of frockings is dependent upon the grade level. In order to ensure compliance with the Authorization Act, I intend to move to a more centralized system for frockings. We are talking about very small numbers here compared to what we've had in the past so we will greatly reduce the number of frockings we approve. I understand the ramifications of that but do not think it is a showstopper. We pick brigade commanders based upon their ability not their rank. I'm convinced that a LTC(P) can be just as good as a full COL and I need your help to look carefully at the number of frockings you forward for approval. Most of the numbers that I see will have to go toward those who find themselves in a coalition assignment where rank may be more important. I'm sure we'll work our way through this one but

I need everybody to understand what we're trying to do.

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Letter to Army General Officers

March 1, 1996

"Fighting the Zero Defects Mentality"

As the Army Chief of Staff my fundamental duty is to ensure that America's Army is trained and ready to defend the nation's security and freedom. I am also concerned with creating stability within the force after the long and significant drawdown. I want to create an environment in which all our people can be all they can be.

Secretary of Defense [William] Perry likes to relate a story that occurred last summer when General Nikolayev, the Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, was on a two-week tour of military bases in the United States. After visiting the first base and seeing our NCOs in action he told one of his aides, "I know that these men and women wearing sergeants' uniforms are really officers in disguise."

But as he went from base to base, and talked with the NCOs he came to realize that they were not officers. He was stunned and told Secretary Perry after two weeks that "no military in the world had the quality of NCO that he found in the United States." He went on to say, "That's what gives America its competitive military advantage." That's why we have the best military in the world.

We cannot take the creativity and initiative of our junior officers, NCOs, and civilians for granted. The recent downsizing and subsequent increased OPTEMPO [operational tempo] have resulted in a perception of a zero defect environment. Leaders believe that a less-than-perfect report will result in the termination of a once promising career. They feel that a single mistake will appear in their efficiency/evaluation report. This fear can also result in over supervision—the belief by leaders that if they want something done right, they will have to do it themselves.

The zero defects mindset can make the Army, as an institution, very risk adverse, and it can also create an environment where ethics are easily compromised. I need your help in fighting this growing perception. We need to create an environment where soldiers can all reach their full potential and be all they can be. We must take the time to train subordinates, allow them to make mistakes, and retrain them to standard. Many of us in senior leadership positions today wouldn't be here if our leaders and mentors hadn't done this for us.

Leaders create a command climate. Micromanagement, careerism, integrity violations and the zero defects mindset can all be dispelled by positive leadership. These attitudes are an unfortunate side effect of the turmoil created by the downsizing of the Army. These attitudes have appeared in the past, especially after Vietnam. We defeated them in the past. We must do so again.

America's Army is unique in the world. We are different. Our advantage is the creativity, initiative and ingenuity of our people. To foster this advantage, we must be willing to underwrite honest mistakes, focus on people and mentor the next generation of leaders.

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Force of Decision . . . Capabilities for the 21st Century

United States Army Chief of Staff White Paper

April 15, 1996

> We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world. And peace can only be maintained by the strong.
>
> *George Catlett Marshall, September 1, 1945*

Our Army—Sword of the Republic

America's Army is a capabilities-based force. It always has been. America's Army provides the nation the military power it needs for peace and

war to conduct a wide variety of missions, as it has since 1775. This is what a capabilities-based force is all about—providing options for the nation. The knowledge that the nation can call on its Army—at a moment's notice—to perform tasks ranging from domestic disaster relief to overseas wars is the legacy of more than two hundred years of U.S. Army history.

In the early days of the American state, the Army performed two broad missions—to defend the Republic against enemies and to support the growth of the emerging nation. Both were vital to the nation's future.

After the Revolutionary War, American leaders understood that the young Republic stood without true friends in an international realm where power—particularly military power—determined the fate of nations.

As it defended the nation, the Army supported its growth. The Army was indispensable to early pioneering efforts such as conducting expeditions, building roads and canals, providing civil law enforcement, and laying telegraph lines. Through these efforts the Army provided regional stability, replacing the wilderness with the activities of a complex society.

In the aftermath of World War II and the responsibilities imposed by peace, the nation began using the Army for other purposes. In far away places with unfamiliar names, Army presence deterred aggression and through a variety of peaceful actions, reassured others—and once again provided regional stability.

Since 1775, the nation's fate has often rested in the capable hands of its soldiers. From Yorktown to Gettysburg to Normandy to the Persian Gulf, to discovering and building a nation and protecting others from aggression, ultimately, it is the Army that decides our success in war and peace. The Army is the force of decision.

The National Military Strategy

The National Military Strategy directs that the nation's military forces be capable of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts while acknowledging the need to respond to other contingencies.

The National Military Strategy structures the Army to compel its enemies, but we must be able to do much more than that. Through experience, we have learned that the demands of other operations such as overseas presence, small-scale conflicts, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance, do not decrease in the event of a regional conflict.

The increased frequency and length of these other operations are already a significant challenge to our ability to continuously maintain the desired level of combat readiness necessary to compel. We must closely scrutinize our ability to support the broader aspects of our strategy that could include nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts while at the same time sustaining other operations. The Army must be robust enough to fulfill and sustain all of our international commitments.

The Broader Range of Missions

During the Cold War we optimized the Army to defeat the Soviet armed forces. We created the best Army in the world and won the war we never had to fight. Since then we have learned that we need an Army capable not only of defeating large enemy combat formations with precision engagements but also of meeting a broader range of missions, such as tracking and combating terrorists should the need arise, providing humanitarian assistance, maintaining peacekeeping forces, and helping local and state governments deal with domestic disaster.

Daily, we meet the demands for forward presence while remaining prepared to project power into any situation threatening our nation's interests. The Army remains deployed, as it has been every day for more than fifty years, in Europe, Korea, Panama, and Japan. We also have substantial numbers of soldiers deployed in Kuwait, Haiti, Bosnia, Honduras, Macedonia, and the Sinai. We sustain these efforts for days, weeks, months, years, or decades—whatever it takes to get the job done.

Securing peace and stability requires long-term commitment. The Army is not a "touch-and-go" force. Long-term Army commitment physically demonstrates American intent and contributes to an environment of stability where nations can develop effective government institutions and viable economies. Soldiers on the ground—the most visible sign of deterrence and reassurance—

directly contribute to regional stability. But regional stability does not happen overnight; it is a dangerous and complicated business. It takes time, commitment, and the continuous presence of U.S. forces. Sustained presence, with its resulting regional stability, is a mission that the Army is uniquely structured to carry out.

America's Army sets the example for other countries seeking the proper role of an army in a democracy. In nearly every nation, the dominant armed service is the army. Many armies, however, need to learn how an army serves its nation, without running the nation. By training with U.S. Army units and participating in our institutional training programs, soldiers of emerging democracies receive important lessons in democratic values. Teaching these important lessons and training with others takes significant time and effort, but they are important contributions to regional stability.

> Ultimately, land forces can occupy territory, control populations, and provide on-the-scene assurance that political objectives will be met.
>
> *National Military Strategy of the U.S.*
> *February 1995*

To Fight and Win Our Nation's Wars

America's Army is organized, trained, and equipped to succeed across the full spectrum of military operations—providing the nation a full range of capabilities for a range of threats and challenges. The primary mission remains, as it always has been, to fight and win our nation's wars—some of which are increasingly ambiguous and difficult to define. The pattern of international conflict in the post–Cold War environment requires military forces that can do more than just fight. Our experiences over the past six years prove that the nation's military might is also defined by our ability to deter, reassure, and support.

> Through all this welter of change and development, your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable—it is to win our wars.
>
> *General Douglas MacArthur, May 12, 1962*

The Purpose of Military Power

The Army must always have capabilities to *compel* any adversary to do what he otherwise would not do of his own free will. These same capabilities also contribute to our ability to *deter* adversaries, to keep them from acting inimically to our interests in the first place. The employment of military forces without necessarily engaging in combat to *reassure* allies and friends promotes stability and contributes to our ability to influence international outcomes. Finally, our armed forces use their capabilities to *support* domestic authority in times of natural disaster, civil disturbance, or other emergencies requiring humanitarian assistance.

Using military power for these purposes ultimately requires putting the American soldier in harm's way. The presence of Army troops on the ground constitutes a statement neither an opponent nor the American people can ignore. When America decides to obtain results by employing military power, putting its soldiers on the ground is as unavoidable today as it ever has been.

> You can fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman Legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.
>
> *T. R. Fehrenbach,* This Kind of War

America's Army—Decisive Capabilities

America's Army provides superb light, heavy, and special operations forces to the joint force commander. To *compel* our enemies, the Army is capable of conducting sustained, high-tempo land warfare under all conditions—day and night. In December 1989 President George Bush ordered over 21,000 U.S. Army soldiers to Panama during Operation Just Cause. Their mission: support democracy for the people of Panama and protect American citizens. Less than a year later, over 335,000 U.S. Army soldiers deployed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This deployment culminated in the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. In September 1994 President Clinton ordered over 18,000 U.S. soldiers to Haiti in Operation Uphold Democracy, restoring order and the elected Haitian government to power.

The commitment of American soldiers was the ultimate expression of our national resolve. Success was ensured because of the multiple capabilities built into a force that allows the nation to commit it, without reservation, into any situation—because we know it will succeed.

Another alternative to prevent conflict rests in our armed forces strength and capability to *deter* potential adversaries. Forward-deployed Army forces are America's strongest deterrent signal. They represent U.S. commitment to our allies and friends. With pre-positioned equipment and greatly improved strategic mobility, the Army can move quickly to a theater of operations, establish a presence, and convince potential adversaries that aggression would be too costly. For over fifty years U.S. troops have deterred aggression in Europe and Korea, creating an environment of stability that has benefited the entire world. Today, our power projection Army continues to deter aggression throughout the world. Most recently in 1994, the U.S. Army deployed over 6,000 soldiers to Kuwait to deter Iraqi aggression.

The demands on our armed forces to *reassure* our friends and allies are increasing. Since DESERT STORM, the overwhelming majority of missions to which America has committed its military resources has been done by the Army. These missions range in size from a handful of soldiers to large troop deployments all over the world. To reassure our friends and allies, Army forces provided humanitarian assistance to nations in need or participated in major exercises with our allies, providing visible assurance of America's leadership. In August 1994, following violent tribal conflict, the U.S. Air Force airlifted almost 2,500 soldiers and their equipment to Rwanda. Within hours American soldiers were in the middle of this tragedy, providing assistance to stop the dying. Since 1991, U.S. Army soldiers have provided both aid and protection to the Kurdish population in northern Iraq.

American soldiers on the ground serve as a symbol of undeniable commitment to a cause. U.S. forward presence, such as the small 60-man contingent presently deployed along the border between Ecuador and Peru as a part of a multinational observer force, is an example. America's Army is helping these two countries disengage and prevent confrontation, allowing the region to invest their national resources on growth and cooperation, not squander them on confrontation.

American presence is credible because of our ability to get the job done. For over thirteen years the Army has been a symbol of U.S. commitment to a lasting peace between Egypt and Israel. The 600 soldiers of the Multinational Force and Observers have been in the Sinai, interposed between former belligerents. For the past four years, over 500 soldiers have been deployed to Macedonia to prevent the spread of conflict as a part of a United Nations Observer Force. Today, the almost 20,000 soldiers of Task Force EAGLE in Bosnia are professionally and firmly enforcing the Dayton Peace Accords, bringing peace and hope to that devastated region. When serving as part of international security forces, U.S. Army soldiers have the capability to sustain the effort for as long as necessary.

Our combat, logistics, and special operations forces give unique capabilities to the joint commander. Whether they include construction engineers, medical teams, military police, civil affairs, rotary-wing aviation support, or special forces, these forces enhance military capabilities and buttress American diplomacy where commitment and resolve are necessary. Reassurance is a sound investment.

Domestic crises and natural disasters have always underscored the demand for an Army that can *support* the needs of the nation within its own borders. The Army has played a vital role in the history of the country and has changed to meet the nation's changing needs. In 1992, the Army provided disaster relief to victims of Hurricane Andrew which ravaged portions of south Florida and Louisiana. Over 28,000 soldiers provided long-term assistance to their fellow citizens in need. In 1994, almost 1,800 soldiers supported local and state agencies in fighting fires in the western United States.

Where We Are

On any given day in 1995, in addition to 100,000 soldiers stationed in Europe and Korea, the Army averaged over almost 20,000 soldiers deployed in over 80 countries. In the last year, American soldiers deterred aggression in Kuwait,

restored order in Haiti, shielded the Kurds in Iraq, conducted peacekeeping training exercises with Russia, kept the peace in the Sinai and along the border between Peru and Ecuador, demonstrated resolve in Macedonia, treated the wounded in Croatia, provided humanitarian assistance to refugees in the Caribbean, and supported domestic relief in Oklahoma City and the Virgin Islands. To this list we add almost 20,000 soldiers on duty in Bosnia, with thousands more from all the services supporting them in surrounding countries. What once was extraordinary has become routine. Future demands for Army involvement are unlikely to decrease in number or diversity.

Strength of the Joint Team

The nature of modern warfare is joint warfare with land forces at the core of our joint warfighting capability. We can achieve victory only with the complete integration of air, sea, and land power. The strength of our Army, therefore, is magnified by the synergy achieved through the cooperation and cohesion of a joint effort.

The range of operations that the Army must be capable of conducting in support of the joint team dictates the size and composition of the Army needed to answer the nation's call. The Cold War Army was forward deployed and focused on the ultimate danger to the nation: a global war against the Soviet Union. Today, the challenges to our interests may be less visible but are much more diverse. America's Army not only reinforces forward-deployed forces in a robust or mature theater of war but also provides adequate forward presence, projects power to the most remote areas of the globe, and sustains operations under the most austere conditions—impossible tasks without joint service cooperation.

The Challenge

The Army does not pick its missions and must, therefore, remain capable across the full spectrum of requirements, as a member of the joint team effort. Whether in response to a call for humanitarian assistance in unfamiliar geographic and cultural circumstances, forward deployed in a deterrent role, or engaged in conventional combat, soldiers are at the point of decision. Visible presence on the ground and the inherent capabilities of Army organizations are vital for the satisfactory accomplishment of the mission, however long the task may take.

There is a natural tension in performing these diverse missions. We must sustain a sufficiently robust force that is trained and ready to fight and win a major regional conflict while at the same time using selected capabilities inherent to our Army—combat forces, military police, engineers, psychological operations, civil affairs, transportation, medical—to promote long-term regional stability and support peace operations.

This tension is not new; we have experienced it throughout our history. During the Cold War our missions were not as diverse and our force structure was more robust. Today, our reduced force structure must meet the increased demands imposed by the nation while remaining prepared to fight and win our nation's wars.

The time span of these missions helps define the requirements to sustain these efforts. For example, in Macedonia, while one battalion is fulfilling the peacekeeping mission, another is preparing for the specific peacekeeping requirements in Macedonia, and a third battalion, having just completed the mission, redeploys to its home station and sharpens its skills for combat. This 3:1 ratio represents the numbers required to sustain the pace of our operational commitments worldwide. When you add up all of our operational deployments in places like Bosnia, Kuwait, Haiti, Honduras, Sinai, as well as Macedonia, it means that on any given day the Army commits the resources of approximately four divisions to sustain these efforts.

Because of increasing demands on our soldiers, the size of the Army—Active, Guard, and Reserve—does matter. There is a limit to how small we can be and still remain relevant and able to meet the needs of the nation. We must achieve a balance between the size of the Army and the nation's need to do more. The world environment tells us that our mission requirements are not going to decrease. Our Army must be adequately sized to meet the increased demands imposed by the nation while remaining prepared to fight and win our nation's wars. To date we have borne the strain of handling more missions with fewer people by

mortgaging Army modernization accounts and through the sacrifices of soldiers who spend longer and longer periods deployed. People are important.

The capabilities we need to sustain fighting on the battlefield are also the capabilities needed to reassure our friends and allies and to support our own domestic needs. Presently, our force mix is not in balance with the demands of sustaining the effort across the spectrum of military operations around the globe. Meeting these new challenges without assuming unacceptable risk will require reshaping the total Army—Active, Guard, and Reserve—and the complementary roles that they play. Our Army must not only win multiple, high tech, mid-to-high intensity conflicts but also meet the growing demands for reassurance and support.

> Despite its smaller size, our military must retain an appropriate mix of forces and capabilities to provide the versatility to handle today's challenges and to provide a hedge against unanticipated threats.
>
> *National Military Strategy of the U.S.*
> *February 1995*

Where We Are Headed—Transforming the Army

To meet these challenges our Army is changing aggressively, challenging all the assumptions of the past, leveraging technology to become more efficient and effective in order to remain relevant. But change does not come without risk. The changes that we make today must take us into the 21st century and remain relevant in a future environment that is difficult to predict.

We call this process of adaptation Force XXI. Simply stated, Force XXI projects our quality soldiers into the 21st century and provides them the right doctrine and organizations, the most realistic training, an adequate and predictable sustainment package during both peace and war, and the best equipment and weapons systems that we need and our nation can provide. We are leveraging technology in order to arm our soldiers with the finest, most lethal weapons and support systems in the world. The product of our Force XXI process is a versatile army with the capabilities that America needs for the next century—Army XXI. It is forming right now.

We are adapting our organizational structure, doctrine, and equipment to the environment that we will operate in today and in the years ahead. We are organizing, training, and equipping ourselves to ensure we have the capabilities the nation needs. We are finding ways to exploit our competitive advantages—quality people, advanced technology, and our proven joint warfighting doctrine. Our Army is capturing emerging technology to give us a degree of precision, speed, and battlefield awareness heretofore unknown. We are addressing tomorrow's challenges today.

America's Army, Ready To Meet the Challenges of Today . . . Tomorrow . . . and the 21st Century

Tomorrow's adversaries will no doubt be similar to the ones we face today—their frightening images of terrorism, narco-trafficking, ethnic cleansing, clan murders, and resurgent competitive nationalism appear on the front pages and the TV screens in our living rooms. Our armed forces must be able to defeat an enemy armed with machetes and rifles as well as those armed with tanks, planes, and weapons of mass destruction. American soldiers, versatile enough to operate effectively in any environment as a member of the joint team, remain the very foundation of the national military power. They are the force of decision.

Whatever surprises the new millennium may have in store one thing is certain—we can look to our roots, to our legacy as the "Sword of the Republic" to help us prepare our Army for the future. We must have the capabilities required to win the nation's wars, establish order, prevent conflict, and sustain operations as long as required. Our "battlefields" include humanitarian assistance in Rwanda, peacekeeping in the Sinai and Bosnia, forward presence on the Korean peninsula, and nation building in Haiti. To meet these challenges, the Army must remain trained and ready today and into the next century. Our ability to compel, deter, reassure, and support is the essence of our capabilities-based Army—the force of decision.

Despite the ambiguity of future warfare and the many forms it may assume, the battlefield will always be a dangerous, frightening and lonely

place. Only soldiers of character and courage, well trained, ably led, superbly equipped, and in sufficient numbers, will survive there and win—tomorrow as they have in the past.

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"CSA Counts on NCOs To Keep the Spirit Alive"

NCO Journal

Spring 1996

> We have good corporals and sergeants, and some good lieutenants and captains, and those are far more important than good generals.
>
> *General W.T. Sherman*

America's Army is unique. You—the noncommissioned officer—are the reason. Secretary of Defense William Perry likes to relate a story that occurred last summer when General Nikolayev, the Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, was on a two-week tour of military bases in the United States. After visiting the first base and seeing our NCOs in action he told one of his aides, "I know that these men and women wearing sergeants' uniforms are really officers in disguise."

But as he went from base to base and talked with the NCOs, he came to realize that they were not officers. He was stunned and told Dr. Perry after two weeks that, "No military in the world had the quality of NCO that [he] found in the United States." He went on to say, "That's what gives America its competitive military advantage." That's why we have the best military in the world.

The high quality of our NCO Corps was manifested recently when America's Army bridged the Sava River between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This operation, the construction of the longest pontoon bridge in history, was conducted under the most difficult circumstances. Despite freezing cold, snow, rain, mud, and a 100-year-high flooding of the river the bridge was completed. Again, it was our NCO Corps that stepped in and made it happen. The world media was impressed by the technical competence, drive, determination, and leadership of our NCOs. When one reporter asked how the soldiers endured the cold and went sleepless to complete the bridge, one young leader, Staff Sergeant Robert Butcher of the 535th Combat Support Equipment Company, said that the soldiers felt their reputations were on the line. "They weren't going to let the river win." Sergeant Lawrence Galuski of the 502d Engineer Company said, "We can't be stopped, we've had floods, high water, rain, snow—makes no difference. We still bridged it." Command Sergeant Major Stephen Walls of the 130th Engineer Brigade said building this bridge proves America's Army is the "best in the world."

For 220 years noncommissioned officers have been the guardians of the Republic. In this increasingly complex and technologically advanced world more and more responsibility has been placed in NCOs' hands. The NCO Corps must ensure America's Army remains trained and ready today and adapts to meet the challenges of the 21st century. To accomplish this, I would like to share three fundamental truths with you.

First, the Army is people. General Abrams said, "The Army is not made up of people, the Army is people." The Army can only accomplish its mission if we recruit and retain the best people. Today, we have the best quality soldiers I have observed in my 33 years in the Army. But to keep these high-quality soldiers we must allow them to build their self-respect. I remember reading a message some years ago which always struck me as the essence of the importance of the individual. It reads:

> Remember Me?
>
> I'm the person who goes into the orderly room and patiently waits while the first sergeant or AST [Army Supply Technician] does everything but pay attention to me. I'm the guy who goes into the supply room and stands quietly by while the supply sergeant and his assistant finish his little chitchat. I'm the person who does not grumble while I clean rifles in addition to my own while other people wander aimlessly around the center. Yes, you might say I'm a pretty good person. But do you know who else I am? I AM THE PERSON WHO NEVER EXTENDS MY ENLISTMENT, and it amuses me to see

> you spending many hours and dollars every year to get me back into your unit, when I was there in the first place. All you had to do to keep me was:
>
> GIVE ME A LITTLE ATTENTION,
>
> SHOW ME A LITTLE COURTESY,
>
> USE ME WELL.[1]

I need your help on this. You, the NCO, are closest to our soldiers; therefore your care and concern are most evident. Your personal example will have the most direct effect on our ability to retain the quality soldiers needed to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Second is public trust. By this I mean the trust the American people place in America's Army. Stop and think about what that really means. The American people trust us in a way they trust nobody else. They give us their sons and daughters and they expect us to take care of them. They do not ask what we are going to do with them. They just expect us to do what is right. That is why the opportunity and responsibility to train these young men and women and to ensure they are prepared to do their mission when they deploy is so important. This is your primary responsibility. Every effective NCO leader is a skilled trainer, and every skilled trainer is an effective leader.

But I think it's important that we remind everybody that we have that trust to take care of our soldiers, America's sons and daughters—and that trust is very important to us. I know you take that responsibility seriously.

Third, values are important. We are a values-based organization, and we need to recognize and remember that. Values are not something that automatically happen, especially in today's society. You have to spend time talking about values, explaining to new soldiers coming into the Army what values are all about and reinforce those values to all soldiers on a daily basis.

Duty, honor, country, and selfless service to the nation are more than words—it is a creed by which we live. The actions in Somalia by Master Sergeant Gary I. Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall D. Shughart, both Special Forces NCOs who were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, epitomize the highest Army values.

During a firefight in Mogadishu, October 3–4, 1993, Somali gunfire forced a Black Hawk helicopter to crash land in enemy territory. Sergeants Gordon and Shughart fired their rifles from another helicopter to protect their comrades at the crash site below them, even though they endured a heavy barrage of fire. With Somali gunmen closing on four critically wounded soldiers at the crash site, the two NCOs volunteered to help and fought their way through to the wounded pilot. They provided cover until their ammunition ran out. When Shughart was fatally wounded, Gordon got a rifle from the crash site and handed the weapon and five rounds to the pilot. Gordon said, "Good Luck" and, armed only with a pistol, continued the fight until he was killed.

Values are what made them do what they did, and those are the things you must emphasize to all new soldiers. We need to talk about those values, and I ask you to do that. All of us in leadership positions must be able to exemplify values. Talk is not enough—you must set the example.

These three fundamental truths are terribly important, and I need you as leaders to understand and exemplify these truths. Remember that the Army is people. General Abrams captured the essence of leadership and of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps when he said:

> By people I do not mean personnel. . . . I mean living, breathing, serving human beings. They have needs and interests and desires. They have spirit and will, and strengths and abilities. They have weaknesses and faults; and they have means. They are the heart of our preparedness . . . and this preparedness—as a nation and as an Army—depends upon the spirit of our soldiers. It is the spirit that gives the Army . . . life. Without it we cannot succeed.

I am counting on you to keep this spirit alive.

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[1] Aubrey Newman, *Follow Me: The Human Element of Leadership* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981), p. 106.

Letter to Army General Officers

April 16, 1996

Three Armies in Transition

I recently visited my counterparts in Sweden, Russia, and Ukraine. The situation in each of these countries is significantly different, but their armies face some challenges similar to our own, and we can learn something from their common solutions.

In Sweden General Karl Ake Sagren faces the problem of downsizing the army as part of a major government austerity program. When the end of the Cold War significantly reduced the massive Soviet forces that threatened Swedish neutrality for over fifty years, the Swedish government decided to make major cuts in the size of its forces. General Sagren knows that forming, training, and equipping new units is an exceptionally time-consuming process, particularly in a nation that depends almost fully on citizen-soldiers for its defense. So Sweden continues to train its soldiers hard under the harsh winter conditions of the north.

Sweden also continues preparing its future leaders to meet the unforeseeable challenges of an uncertain future. At Karlberg Castle, surrounded by hundreds of years of military history and tradition, the cadets of Sweden's military academy train mind and body to meet the rigors of the 21st century. Our visit to the Swedish Armed Forces International Center illustrated Sweden's strong commitment to fulfilling its international peacekeeping obligations. Believing that peacekeeping may be the first effort at coping with new forms of conflict, neither hot nor cold, Sweden has devoted significant effort and intellectual energy in meeting the challenges of a more complex new world.

But the Swedish Army also continues to draw strength from the traditions of the past. We dined one evening in the regimental mess of the famous Lapland Ranger Regiment. After walking down the snow-covered, torch-lit path between the ranks of the regimental honor guard, proud in their white arctic smocks, we were met by the regimental commander, Brigadier General Bjorn Lundquist. The words of his welcoming toast reflected his pride in the selfless service of this great regiment, the joy of leading its patrols under the Northern Lights, the satisfaction of inspiring generations of young men to earn the privilege of standing in its ranks.

In Moscow General Colonel Vladimir Alegmedovich Semenov faces the tremendous challenge of forging a new Russian Army out of the remains of the old Soviet Army. He spoke of the enormous difficulty of withdrawing the Soviet Army from Eastern Europe and reducing it drastically while preserving the officer corps and its loyalty to the new state. He pointed out that they had seventy-seven years of experience under the Soviet system, only four under the Russian Republic.

Despite a daunting lack of financial resources—some units haven't been paid in months—Russia, too, continues to prepare its future leaders at the Frunze and Vystrel Academies that provided highly trained leaders to the Soviet Army. But changed curriculums reflect the changing missions of these changing times. The Frunze Academy has added peacekeeping operations and regional and local conflicts to its instruction, and the Vystrel Academy teaches an entire course for Russian and international officers preparing for United Nations military observer missions—Major Tom Haines and Captain Larry Thompson from our Army were there when we visited. They're the first American officers to graduate from any Russian Army course.

General Semenov told me that it's best to be "conservative" in military reform—to conserve and protect the "backbone" strengths of the military institution. Therefore, the new Russian Army also seeks to draw strength from its traditional roots. Pride in its Soviet past is evident in the museum of the Vystrel Academy that traces its Soviet lineage to 1918. But the Russians are working to transcend their recent Soviet past to draw on their rich Czarist history. On 6 June the Vystrel Academy will celebrate the 170th anniversary of its 1826 founding in St. Petersburg.

Pride in Russia's past is nowhere more evident than in the Kremlin, where an extraordinary effort has gone into restoring the brilliance of its imperial era. One monumental reception hall, vaulted ceiling and statuary of the finest white

marble, is dedicated to the Order of Saint George, the highest military order of Czarist Russia. The names of five thousand officers and eleven thousand units are engraved on the walls. As a Russian colonel told me, these names form the link between the Russian armies, past and present.

In Kiev General Sobkov is forming a new army from the massive force structure that Ukraine inherited from the old Soviet Union. He, too, must make dramatic reductions in size to meet the fiscal and strategic realities of new circumstances. The Ukrainians also see the key to future success in the training of their future leaders. They've established a military academy, the Kiev Ground Forces Institute, in the former Soviet Army Higher Armor School. Although struggling with old Soviet-style equipment and facilities, they work very hard to prepare their cadets to lead the new Ukrainian Army into the 21st century.

As the army of a state that only became independent in 1992, the Ukrainian Army has little recent history. However, it pays homage to the tremendous military contribution Ukraine made to the Soviet Union, particularly during World War II.

A common thread running through discussions with all three leaders was their participation in IFOR [Implementation Force] in Bosnia—all have forces there—and the tremendous impression they have of the Partnership for Peace program and the learning experiences it has provided for their soldiers. Throughout all discussions there was a general consensus that peacekeeping operations were the wave of the immediate future and that they'd best be prepared to meet them.

All three armies are willing to change to meet the new challenges of radically different circumstances. We, too, face radically different circumstances, not only strategically but also in terms of available resources. We've either got to get much more efficient in the way we spend our resources, or we'll get smaller. We have to be prepared to make radical changes in organizations and processes to meet new circumstances.

All three armies are depending upon the traditional strengths of their institutions to see them through the tough times ahead. We need to do that, too. We're a values-based organization—always have been, always will be.

Tradition and ceremony are the torch by which we pass the light of our Army values from one generation of soldiers to the next. We need to keep that torch burning brightly to light our way into the 21st century.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

April 21, 1996

Loss of Friends

The past week has been a tough one for me personally. I've had to deal with the pain of losing two close friends. Their contributions were great but their lives were too short and their deaths unexpected. Some of you knew them both and probably share my sorrow. All of you have dealt with things like this before but if nothing else, it will help me if I share some thoughts with you.

Wednesday morning we laid Lieutenant General (Retired) Cal Waller to rest on a beautiful grassy knoll in Arlington Cemetery near Henderson Hall. He was 58 years old, a great soldier—and a buddy. We did battalion- and brigade-level command together at the same time and in the same division. I know how passionately he cared about our soldiers and I saw firsthand how that concern translated into actions. I know that he did everything to the best of his ability. Among other accolades, people have used such terms as "visionary, intelligent, confident, and a leadership example for all" to describe him. He certainly was all of that. But if I were limited to one word in describing Cal it would be "driven." He was literally driven by "doing what's right for his soldiers." He was not afraid to buck conventional wisdom when he thought the Army had lost sight of the cardinal principle that the Army is people. I can tell you from being there up close and personal that you flat unleashed a tiger if he thought you were screwing with his soldiers. I learned a lot from Cal and will miss him deeply.

His untimely death reminds me once again how important our soldiers—of all ranks—really are. His untimely death was also a reminder to me of how important it was for the Army to continue to take care of its own. When it's all said and done it's not what you've achieved but friends and family that really count. Cal had a loving family and lots of friends. I was really proud of how the Army Family rallied to take care of one of its own.

One week almost to the hour later we will have a memorial service for Admiral Mike Boorda [Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy]. This one is even harder to understand because the circumstances are so complex. I had not known him nearly as long as I'd known Cal, but I'm convinced he was driven by the same philosophy. He has been described as a sailor's sailor and I think that is appropriate. He came from the ranks and he never forgot where he came from. I watched with great admiration his positive and upbeat command style despite the fact that the institution was seemingly under siege from all sides. My last session with him was a Readiness Council two days before his death. He seemed his normal self—focused, understanding of the complexities, and willing to do whatever necessary to improve. I certainly make no judgments about what happened Thursday afternoon. As you know, speculation has centered around the ribbons he wore on his chest. That is far too simple an explanation for me to accept. While I know everyone is proud of the medals they received, I think our profession and indeed life are far more about what's in one's heart than what one wears on their chest. Mike was a friend and I deeply admired the way he approached tough issues. The Navy as an institution was his life. He often said in a much more elegant way that it disciplined him, educated him, and took care of him. That was what was in his heart and that's what I'll remember. He was a good man.

There were lots of lessons from this last week for me, but I hope all of you will focus on one also. Basically, it's important to remember that life is indeed short and fragile. Sort out your priorities and adjust to them. High on that priority list must be taking care of yourself. I need you to do it not only just to set the example but also because we can't afford to lose any more good people. All soldiers are important and remember you're a soldier, too.

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Letter to Army General Officers

April 23, 1996

USNS Shughart *Naming Ceremony*

On April 13, 1996, I had the privilege of participating in the naming ceremony for the Army's newest Strategic Sealift Ship—the USNS *Shughart*. It was more than just the commissioning of another Navy ship. It was a very emotional and uplifting experience that reaffirmed that soldiers are our core competency and values are the bedrock of this great institution.

The USNS *Shughart* is the first of 19 large, medium-speed, roll-on, roll-off, and lift-on, lift-off ships that will carry U.S. Army equipment, vehicles and supplies. Strategically pre-positioned near potential areas of conflict around the world, these vessels carry equipment—including armored personnel carriers, tanks, tractor-trailers, helicopters, and HMMWVs [high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles]—and supplies configured in unit sets. By greatly enhancing the Army's power projection capability, they insure that we can move forces throughout the world to reassure and support our friends and deter or compel our enemies. It is a visible sign that we are a changed Army—relevant to the needs of the nation.

This great ship is most appropriately named for a great soldier, Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart, who was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions in Somalia on October 3, 1993. The naming ceremony reaffirmed the importance of the core values upon which our Army is founded and made me more conscious than ever that soldiers are our core competency. Duty, honor, country and selfless service to the nation are more than just words—it is a creed by which we live. By living this creed, Sergeant Shughart personified General Creighton Abrams' belief that "the Army is not

made up of people, the Army is people," people who live—and sometimes die—by the values that have always made this Army great.

On October 3, 1993, when an Army helicopter was shot down near Mogadishu, Somalia, Sergeant Shughart volunteered to be inserted on the ground to protect the helicopter crash site and four critically wounded personnel. Equipped with only his sniper rifle and a pistol, Sergeant Shughart fought his way through intense small arms fire to the crash site. He pulled the pilot and crew from the aircraft, established a perimeter and protected the downed crew until he was killed. An eyewitness said, "Anyone in their right mind wouldn't have done what they (SFC Shughart and his team leader) did." But he passionately believed in the creed that says "I will not fail those with whom I serve."

Values are what made him do what he did, and those are the things you must emphasize to all new soldiers. We need to talk about those values, and I ask you to do that. All of us in leadership positions must be able to exemplify values. Talk is not enough—you must set the example. Talk the talk—but, most importantly, walk the walk.

The heroine of the ceremony, without a doubt, was Sergeant Shughart's widow Stephanie. Wish everyone could have seen the courage and selflessness she imparted to all who were there. She told us that Sergeant Shughart was a firm believer in the Ranger creed that we never abandon fellow soldiers on the battlefield, no matter how extreme the circumstances. She said it takes a "remarkable man to not only read a creed, and memorize a creed, but to live a creed." Her care and compassion for her husband's teammates, who were killed in the battle, were inspiring.

If you personalize such an event and imagine that it could have been your spouse, or the spouse of any one of our great American soldiers who risk their lives every day, you could only hope they could be as strong and as selfless as Stephanie was. It makes you thankful and grateful for the little things in life as well as for the many sacrifices so many of our soldiers make every day. We can never take that for granted. I was truly impressed by Stephanie's courage and quiet integrity. She wanted the audience not to focus only on the heroic actions of her husband but also to remember his "mates as well—a poet, a pianist, a crack shot, and a man who only wanted to work his farm." All four of these teammates were killed in the battle at Mogadishu, and the team had to be rebuilt.

Soldiers—like Sergeant Shughart—are our core competency. They reflect the values of selfless service, dedication, courage, and integrity. As we move into the 21st century, these values will be even more important to the U.S. Army.

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Address at the Acquisition Reform Conference

Atlanta, Georgia

April 23, 1996

This is an important conference and I'm delighted to see we have so many people here. I want to thank everybody that had a part in this, the people, the leaders, industry, the American Defense Preparedness Association, and the Army Materiel Command. It's important to the United States Army, and it's important to our nation.

I looked at the survey that was presented earlier, and noted that it was not quite a year old. The Army came in second place to the Air Force in acquisition reform. That's not good enough for us. When we come back next year, we'll be in first place. We're serious about acquisition reform. I challenge all the people here in green suits and the civilians in the department that we've got to continue to do better.

There's an old Chinese proverb that goes "may you live in interesting times." Somebody told me that's not really a proverb, it's a curse, and I think it is probably applicable to the times that we're living in right now.

Every time I think about that, I'm reminded of Paul Harvey who said, "In times like this, it's helpful to remember there have always been times like this."

Art Buchwald also had something to say. He said, "I don't know if these are the best of times or

these are the worst of times, but I do know that these are the only times we've had."

When you think about the latter two sayings, it kind of puts it in perspective. We have probably always lived in interesting times, and our fate right now is to live in a very interesting time, in which we have a great opportunity, and I think a great challenge. So I'd like to talk about the opportunities and challenges that face the United States Army.

In Orlando in February how many of you would have predicted Liberia? It's been a very small-scale operation. It could have turned into a very large operation. Overnight about 180 soldiers came out of SETAF [Southern European Task Force] and evacuated almost 2,000 civilians out of Monrovia to safety. We did that because we were trained and ready. That could have blown up on us. It could have been a big problem, but it didn't.

While the group out of SETAF was evacuating civilians in Liberia, they were also recovering another company from Bosnia, going through a battle command training program at their headquarters, and getting ready to send the rest of the task force to train at Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels. That is one good example of why the United States Army has to remain trained and ready today. You never know where it's going to come from. You never know how it's going to come at you, but we do know it's going to come. That's why we put so much emphasis on being trained and ready.

The second example I think is in Bosnia. If you just look at what's happening over there, almost 20,000 soldiers are over there doing something we didn't prepare for five years ago. They really started preparing for it in November and December of this year through a tough training program at Hohenfels. They got ready for this mission, they went over there, and they're executing this mission magnificently.

I watch the press reports. They're trying to find something that's wrong out there. They talk about boredom. They talk about the fact that we keep our soldiers in uniform, that we expect them to be prepared for whatever happens, but they really can't find a seam. What you see are trained and ready soldiers doing their jobs.

It's more than that, though. It's a combination of high-quality soldiers and high technology. That's an unbeatable combination. You all saw it when we put the bridge in on the Sava River. I referred to it as the biggest ARTEP [Army Readiness Test and Evaluation Program] ever seen on national TV. You saw soldiers who went over there to do their job, to cross a river that was at a 100-year-high flood point, braving the elements and fighting ice, sleet, snow, rain, and mud. They didn't let anybody rush them. They built the bridge on time and on schedule and they did it with zero injuries. That's what you get when you combine high-quality soldiers and high technology.

I visited soldiers in Bosnia, talking to them about the mission to establish the zone of separation. They were tasked to separate the warring factions and were negotiating to move a tank from the zone of separation. They would produce a picture that was taken from the gun camera of an Apache helicopter and say here is that tank, here are the coordinates, and if you don't have it out of there by ten tomorrow morning, we will destroy it. The tank was gone the next morning. That's the type of thing we're asking those soldiers to do. That's the type of technology we're providing them, and they're doing a magnificent job. It's truly a remarkable accomplishment.

We must have that foundation—high-quality soldiers, high technology. We do today, and we must maintain it in the future. I think we have that combination because we've had balanced programs across the Army and across the military. If you look at what's happened to us, it's not been easy to pull it together, to keep it balanced. We've reduced the resources by 40 percent while reducing infrastructure by 35 percent. You don't have to be a rocket scientist to understand that if you do that type of thing you can't stay with the status quo and expect to keep the equation balanced. So we've had to do some things that are different in order to maintain balance.

I'm often asked as I travel around, where is the Army today and where is it headed? Let me talk to you a little bit about the Army today.

First of all, I think we're a much more versatile Army than we have been in the last six years. I say we're versatile because we've done things that have been different, much different for us.

We've done Somalia and Haiti. We're doing Bosnia, Liberia, and Peru/Ecuador. We've learned a lot from all of those different operations. Each one of those operations has been different, but we've learned from each other and incorporated that into our training program. I would say we're a much more versatile Army than we've ever been in our history.

I would also tell you that the combat training center program that we have across the Army is in top-notch shape. All you have to do is go to the National Training Center and you see the forces that John Tilleli commands here at Forces Command, operating over there against the best opposing force in the world. They're going out there and they're going through a learning experience; they do 12 rotations a year, a great training experience for us. That's the way you maintain the capability for the high-intensity conflict that is so important that we don't lose. The Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk has soldiers training differently than they've ever trained before, trained to deal with the environment we find ourselves in: civilians on the battlefield, media on the battlefield, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

When the 2d ACR [Armored Cavalry Regiment] deployed to Haiti, we gave them a couple of weeks of intensive training to get them ready to do that specific program. The 1st Armored Division trained to go into Bosnia at the CMTC in Europe. Talking to the soldiers in Bosnia, I asked them if there was anything that they hadn't been trained for. They said absolutely not. They said everything that they were trained for they've experienced in Bosnia. There wasn't anything in Bosnia they hadn't been trained for. In fact, they went on to say that they were glad they came to Bosnia because if they hadn't come, they'd have probably run them through another training program and it would have been tougher than going to Bosnia. That is a good accolade to give any training program, and that's why I'm so proud of what we're doing in training.

We've taken the other part of the combat training center program, the battle command training program, and adapted it for different uses. We've used the battle command training program to prepare the forces going into Haiti. We took UN [United Nations] forces and sent them through our training program, the first time they'd ever done that. I was in the UN the other day and they said it was a great team building experience. They got an awful lot out of that. We also took the battle command training program, and again prepared soldiers getting ready to go to Bosnia. That is terribly important, and that's why I think the Army continues to be trained and ready today.

I would say if there's been some slippage, and there probably is, the slippage has occurred in a couple of areas. One is in home station training. Basically we've had a tough challenge over there to try and balance the home station training with providing the quality of life that's so important to our soldiers and families, so consequently, we're still adjusting. We'll have to come up with new and better techniques: cross training and simulations. We can do that. We'll figure out how to do that. The other area is in modernization. If you look at the way we built that program, we knew we were facing a reshaping challenge in the last six years so we mortgaged the modernization account to take care of the people. Now it's time to rebalance that equation. That's where we are today. We're trained and ready, versatile, with the best training in the world.

What about the future? Let me talk to you just a little bit about the vision of the United States for the future. Many of you have heard that, but I want to take you through it again because it's important to remind you where we're headed. We talk about the world's best Army, trained and ready. A total force of quality soldiers and civilians. A values-based organization. An integral part of the joint team. Equipped with the most modern weapons and equipment the country can provide. Able to respond to our nation's needs, and changing to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow, and the 21st century. Let me take you back through each of those because it's important that you understand the meaning behind them.

The world's best Army. We truly are the world's best Army right now. We must maintain that. We must take that to the 21st century. It's not preordained that we will be the world's best Army in the 21st century. The decisions we make

today will impact upon how well we do in the 21st century.

Trained and ready for victory, and never forget that. That's the most important thing we do during peacetime. That's why what we're doing at NTC [National Training Center], JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center], and CMTC [Combat Maneuver Training Center] is so important to us.

A total force of quality soldiers and civilians. We've always known that we have quality soldiers. It has truly been the case since I've been in the Army. What I haven't always realized is the great quality we have in the civilian work force. I saw it during Operation Desert Shield in the desert, working with us, rolling up their sleeves, basically upgrading the tanks that we were sending over there from M1s to A1s. I see them throughout the Army. It's a great strength. We've got to leverage that tremendous strength that we have.

Values-based organization. It's truly important that we continue to keep that tremendous asset, those values that have been so important to us in the past as part of the present-day Army and the Army of the future. Again, it's not preordained. We are a reflection of society. When the values of society change, they'll change in the military. We have to make sure we keep the emphasis on those values that have been so good for us in the past.

An integral part of the joint team simply means we fight together. There's an awful lot of controversy, controversy in terms of jointness while we compete for resources. Yes, we're going to compete for resources, but we will be joint at the very end. What we must do is make the decisions that are best for the nation. That's what we're all pledged to do and I think we have the right forums in which to do that. But it is really in our own interest, our best interest, to assure that we become even more joint, particularly as we're becoming smaller.

The next part of that vision is really the challenge to have the most modern weapons and equipment the country can provide. As I've mentioned, we mortgaged the modernization account in order to take care of our people. I would do the same thing again if I was making that decision. I participated in that decision in 1991. It was important to take care of the people. The Army without people is nothing. But now we know we have to make sure that they have the modern weapons and equipment that they need in the 21st century.

Able to respond to the nation's needs. That's an interesting little phrase that we throw out there. We find ourselves often talking amongst ourselves as to whether we should be saving ourselves for the big one, or whether we can do the Somalias and the Haitis and the Bosnias. My point is that if we're not going to be willing to do the Somalias and the Haitis and the Bosnias, we're going to find ourselves very small. You can argue the policy that gets us in there all you want, but once the decision is made, the United States Army supports the decision and we go in there and do the job, which is what's happening in Bosnia right now.

Then I guess the last part of that simply reflects the fact that we are changing. The world is changing. We have to meet the challenges of that changing world. We're adjusting to change. I think people feel a lot more comfortable with change because they have dealt with it for the last six years.

When I look at the near term, what I see is a world that we've got to deal with that's out there today. It's often called the "new world order." That term isn't used as much as it used to be, but I think it's descriptive of what we find out there. The new world order is long on new and short on order. If you look out there, what you see is a world that consists of a very unpredictable Korea. What's going to happen in Korea? Gary Luck has said they're going to implode or explode, one of the two. We don't know when, don't know how, but something's going to happen over there, and I believe he's absolutely correct, so we watch that very carefully.

We still have Saddam Hussein in Iraq and he's still a very important player. Just this week I was talking to a high-ranking Jordanian officer and I said what's your evaluation of Saddam Hussein? That's their next door neighbor. He said they just don't know. I said why did his son-in-law go back to Iraq? He said because Saddam Hussein convinced him nothing would happen. Well, you know the story. He is a very unpredictable person and you can't rule anything out.

All of you know the issues associated with weapons of mass destruction. They're out there. Are we going to be able to control them? Are they going to proliferate? These are concerns that we have. These are things that we continue to monitor.

We have the former Warsaw Pact countries struggling to embrace democracy, struggling to understand the principles of democracy. I would tell you that that hasn't been institutionalized yet and I would also tell you that I don't think it's past the point of no return. So it's something that we have to be very concerned about as we look at the future.

As I mentioned, I was at the UN last week and discussed the twin pillars of globalization and of fractionalization. What they're really talking about is that the world has become a global village. We're all dependent upon each other much more. At the same time, the way we used to subdivide the global village and the nation states—that is fractionalizing—and those lines that define the nation state mean less and less. What we've done is we've given rise to ethnic and religious tensions that have been suppressed for so many years by the Cold War, and now they're cropping up and we have to deal with it.

What all that means is it's still a dangerous and unpredictable world we live in, and that's why I think it's important for the Army to remain trained and ready.

I've had the opportunity as the Chief to travel a little bit, and I just was in Russia and Ukraine. It's an interesting feeling to be sitting across the table from former enemies and talking about joint training, joint opportunities, and how you deal with civilian control over the military. They're struggling with this because they don't understand it. It's healthy that they're willing to talk and they're willing to discuss those in very real terms. But I would also tell you there's still a lot of work to do, and I'm not sure what the outcome is going to be.

For the United States Army it really means a couple of things. The mission that we have remains the same. It can be summarized in four words. We are there to support, reassure, deter, and compel. And let me just talk to you a little bit about what I mean in that area.

Support. For communities ravaged by Hurricane Andrew that occurred in Florida a few years back; support with missions like Task Force LA when there was unrest and a problem in Los Angeles. That's what we've talked about in terms of support.

Reassure. Putting our troops in Macedonia to make sure that we keep peace in that particular area. Putting our troops in the Sinai with the MFO to make sure that both Israel and Egypt are satisfied with that particular peace treaty.

Deter. Like we did with Saddam Hussein in September of '94 when we sent a brigade task force over to Kuwait, got there in less than seven days; whereas it took us over 30 days to do it earlier in Operation DESERT SHIELD.

Compel. Operation DESERT STORM, when we basically sent the United States Army and the United States military over to Kuwait and were able to kick out Saddam Hussein.

Those are the four major missions that the United States Army has to do. We are able to accomplish those missions today, but I think the fact that we have to do them underscores a couple of points. First of all, the world that I described means that we must remain trained and ready. We have to be trained and ready because we never know what's going to happen.

I think the two major regional conflicts, nearly simultaneously, is a good sizing mechanism. That's what we've sized our Army against. That's what we've sized our military against. I think they will stand us in good stead, and we've got to stay the course.

I also think the other thing that's important is we have to realize that the resources are not there for the status quo. We can't continue to do business as we've always done. When your resources come down 40 percent and your infrastructure comes down 35 percent, if you're counting on the BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure Commission] savings to get you through, and they're not there, then you've got to rebalance that equation.

So we turn to a term that you all use in civilian industry called reengineering. Reengineering has a lot of connotations, but I don't necessarily think it's bad. It's not bad because I think it can help us through some of these tough problems that we

face. When I talk about reengineering I'm talking about the need to reshape and renew the Army.

If you look at what we've done, we've tried to hold our headquarters constant as we went through this reshaping exercise. The downsizing is almost over. Now it's time to tackle the reorganization of headquarters and those other elements that are out there.

We're in the process of doing that with a functional area analysis that is ongoing, led by the Vice Chief of Staff. We're going to streamline the headquarters, we're going to use technology, we'll leverage technology to help us through those particular tough areas that exist out there. But we are very serious about reinventing ourselves and renewing ourselves so that we can balance the equation and put more money into modernization.

We're serious about efficiencies. There is a tremendous effort being led by the Army Materiel Command. We're talking about order to ship time, administrative and production lead times, improved contracting, military and commercial specifications, reducing O&S costs. All of these are important initiatives to allow us to put more money into modernization.

We're also meeting, and I am particularly, with the leaders of industry. I found those sessions very, very helpful and very meaningful to me and I think to the Army. First of all, the leaders that I've talked to have all talked to me about the need to develop a feeling of trust and teaming throughout the organization. I think we have that, but we want to strengthen that.

We've talked about the leadership commitment, the fact that you've got to stay the course, that you've got to be willing to make the tough decisions. I will tell you that we have the structure in place and we are going to make the tough decisions that have to be done. We're going to hold this Army together.

We also talked about why going slow is high risk. I think that's very true. It's a difficult thing for all of us in the Army to get over because this is a very conservative organization, but I will tell you that we understand the risk of not doing something is greater than the risk of doing something, so we're doing them. It's not easy, but we're determined to do it and I think we're going to make it happen.

As we go through this exercise, we've focused on our core competency. I would tell you quite simply, as Johnny [General John E. Wilson] mentioned in the introduction, the core competency of the United States Army is American soldiers. All we do is based upon taking care of them, equipping them, training them, sustaining them. It's that simple. When you keep it in those terms, all the tough decisions kind of boil down to relatively easy decisions from that standpoint.

The sole purpose of what we're trying to do right now, what we see happening out there, is designed to make that soldier better in the 21st century. That's why we're going through a series of advanced warfighting experiments. We've been doing that for about three years. We've learned from each of those. We know where we want to put our money in terms of some technologies that will bring us along and bring us to the 21st century, the information age. That's why we're running about the third or fourth Prairie Warrior at Leavenworth where we're training our officers to fight organizations that do not exist, so that when they learn how to fight those, as we bring that technology in, the two coincide. Bringing them together in a very meaningful way.

We're learning and adapting from each of these operations that I mentioned earlier. Each operation requires an after-action review. We've taken the lessons learned and incorporated them in our structure and our institution. As a result, we become a better Army.

We must ensure that the Army of the 21st century has that right combination that I talked about earlier—high-quality soldiers, high technologies. To do that, we've got to rebalance the equation. All of you know, I think, particularly in this conference, that the Army within DoD is about 13 percent of the modernization budget. The modernization account in the Army only gets about 18 percent. Those figures are too low. We've got to change those by one or two percentage points, and we're dedicated to do that. But I'll tell you, it's not easy, so we're having to make some tough decisions to make that happen.

We need your help. We need your help in terms of partnership. We need your help in terms of best value contracting. And we need your help in supporting some of the tough decisions that we

have to make. Some of you have done that in a very meaningful way, and I want you to know how much I appreciate that.

Let me conclude by saying that recently I was at a ceremony that I think illustrates very well what I was trying to say this afternoon. About ten days ago, I was in San Diego for the commissioning ceremony of the U.S. Navy ship *Shughart*. The *Shughart* is a very special ship. It's a special ship to me and for the United States Army. What the *Shughart* represents is the first of 19 large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships. It is designed to help us implement the new national military strategy of power projection. It is very important.

Equally important, I think, is that it's named after Sergeant First Class Randy Shughart. Sergeant First Class Shughart lost his life in Mogadishu trying to save some buddies that were in danger. For his actions he received a Medal of Honor. His family, his parents, his widow Stephanie were there. Stephanie Shughart, a very gracious lady, said that it takes a remarkable person not only to memorize a creed and to say a creed, but to live a creed. Randy Shughart was that remarkable person. I would tell you that the U.S. Navy ship *Shughart*, if it has the dedication and the personality of Randy or Stephanie Shughart, it will be a great ship for the nation. It will be a great ship for the U.S. Army.

But for me that simple ceremony brought together high technology able to move our equipment and high-quality soldiers rapidly to the point of need. It was a great ceremony, and I think it illustrates what the United States Army is trying to do. We'll keep that combination of high technology and quality soldiers. It's unbeatable.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

April 30, 1996

Congressional Testimony

I just completed my testimony in front of all four defense committees on behalf of the President's 1997 budget and want to share some thoughts with you. I told all four committees that the 1997 budget for the Army complied with the guidance we were given and was as well balanced as we can make it given the money we had to operate with. I told them that it protected near-term readiness and provided an adequate quality of life for our soldiers and families (in fact, family programs were up over the 1996 submission). Modernization was at the irreducible minimum and we have to find ways to increase that in the future. I told them that we as an Army had decided to use modernization to take care of our people during this reshaping process and while I firmly believed that was the right thing to do, it was also right to figure out how to put more money into modernization now that we are through the reshaping. I thanked each of the committees on behalf of our soldiers and families for their support in 1996 and throughout this drawdown. The fact that we remain trained and ready and are demonstrating that on a daily basis is at least in part due to their support. I also told them that life is not without challenges. I told them that commanders tell me through the USR [unit status report] that there are too many shortages in the field and too much turbulence. I also told them that while it is hard to make the case solely on numbers, our soldiers are deploying an awful lot and there is a latent impact of all of that. I mentioned specifically the case of the Patriot noncommissioned officer (NCO) I saw at Fort Bliss on his way to Korea. That was his seventh deployment since Operation DESERT SHIELD. I had the opportunity to talk to the family and they are handling it okay but that my concern centers around the eighth and ninth deployment and when will the family say enough is enough. I told them that I thought the Army needed stability and was delighted in 1997 our end strength stays constant at 495. I also mentioned the fact that we were not the largest Army in the world; in fact, we were the eighth largest and the smallest since Pearl Harbor, but we were certainly the best. That is attributed to the quality soldiers we have at all ranks from the newest private to our highly professional officer corps.

In general, I found all committees supportive of the Army. We have a good news story, we have

been telling it consistently for a number of years and it is starting to be recognized and appreciated. Of course, it helps immensely that our soldiers throughout the world—Bosnia, Korea, NTC—really walk the talk. That I think more than anything else has made our story more believable.

The committees' concerns varied from committee to committee but most of them were identical to ours. They understood the people concerns and all expressed support for an adequate-size Army to meet the needs of the nation. All the CINCs testified in support of adequate Army end strength. Their testimony was deeply appreciated and seemed to resonate with the committees. All committees also seemed to understand the need to recruit and retain quality. I told them that while I thought we were in good shape for 1996, our mission goes up to almost 90,000 in 1997 and there is no doubt that will be a tough challenge. We are aware of it, however, and are prepared to take it on. Although we did not discuss it much, I am starting to pick up a few warning signs on retention, particularly at the middle-grade NCO level. I need for all of you to be sensitive to this and continue to focus on quality. While I don't want to go back to the instant NCO days of Vietnam, I do want to make sure that if it becomes a choice between numbers and quality, we choose quality. The NCO issue is a little complex because over time we've increased the richness of the force in terms of number of NCOs but because of affordability problems we've only been able to promote to 98 percent of the requirement. We understand that and without boring you with the details I want you to know that we have our hands on the controls and will make the appropriate adjustments.

While I detected at least some concern over the extremist issue, I think the way you, the chain of command, handled that was very reassuring to them. When asked, we responded about the findings of the task force and I told the members both publicly and privately about how you were handling the situation. They were extremely pleased. I don't need to tell you that we don't need this issue to crop back up on the screen and how important it is for us to continue to follow through. We talked about it at the proper levels in the Army and I appreciate the way you're handling it. Stay the course.

There was almost unanimous agreement that we had to do something about modernization. Unfortunately, the $60B figure that the Chiefs talked about at the JROC [Joint Readiness Oversight Council] offsite this winter became a political issue and was somewhat blown out of proportion. What we committed to was a mark on the wall of getting about $60B across all services at the projected TOA into our modernization account as quickly as possible. We never talked about doing it in '97 and even though we picked a year, we also indicated that was a goal. In my opinion, we need to put as much into modernization as possible but we can never lose sight of the fact we must keep the program balanced. When you focus so much on modernization you tend to lose sight of the balance issue and that is something we must guard against. However, the bottom line still is that we must plus up modernization.

There was general concern about the end-strength figures for the Army which show 475 to 495 in the outyears. I was repeatedly asked if that indicated we were going to 475. I told them that was also related to the modernization issue. I told them that given the current National Military Strategy, no one I knew was suggesting that the Army should be below ten divisions. That was what we needed to accomplish that strategy. On the other hand, everyone, to include me, agreed we had a modernization problem and we must get more resources into that area. Some made suggestions that we take 20K out of the end strength without cutting the divisions and apply those savings to modernization. I told them I was uneasy about that because we'd already taken considerable cuts in the TDA [table of distribution and allowances] side of the house. In fact, the Army portion of the TDA has been cut almost as much as our TOE [table of organization and equipment]. The part that has not been touched as much is that associated with the joint area and Goldwater-Nichols implementation. I told them the agreement that had been struck was that we would try to become more efficient and to make up through efficiencies the $700M to $1B associated with a 20K end-strength reduction. In fact, I

hope to be able to get more efficiencies than that. But if we cannot make that amount, then we will have to reduce the end strength. They understood but still expressed concern about getting too small. As you know, we are working that very hard. Many of you are concerned about the guidance we've given out for building POM 98–03 but that's a direct reflection of the modernization end-strength challenge. There's no doubt in my mind that we cannot continue to do business as we always have and retain 495K. I personally think given the National Military Strategy, that 495 is the right end strength for the near term, at least until we can get personnel efficiencies with Army XXI. But I know we must keep the program balanced. 495 is not chiseled in stone but I will hold it as long as I can.

Each committee asked what we would do if they gave us additional money. We provided a 1–n list of unfinanced requirements. We also told them that if they were able to provide us any additional money we would ask that at least 70 percent of that go into the modernization program. Our 1–n list reflected programs that will make us more efficient in the outyears and basically accelerated the buy of the weapons and equipment which we think we will need quickest. In addition to modernization, we indicated that we need help in quality of life such as improving barracks, etc. Our approach on the 1–n prioritization was to prioritize highest those things that help our soldiers and that we need soonest. We did not want to incur additional outyear bills. As you would expect, the list was extensive and I'm sure it will not be completely filled, although I do expect some help.

It was a good round of testimony for us this year because basically we had a good news story to tell. Our soldiers are performing magnificently and people recognize that. I found a willingness to help the Army and I think we'll see that. On the other hand, there is a growing realization on everybody's part that there are difficult resource challenges ahead. We will fight for every dime we can get but I think we must also prepare for reality. The [fiscal years] 98–03 program we are building now will reflect that reality. I appreciate your support as we work our way through some of these difficult issues.

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Letter to Army General Officers

May 3, 1996

Army Corps of Engineers—The Environmental Corps

In mid-April, I was in San Francisco visiting the South Pacific Division of the Corps of Engineers, which covers all or part of eight states in the southwest U.S. I was impressed with the full breadth of USACE's [United States Army Corps of Engineers'] responsibilities. The soldiers and civilians of USACE are an integral part of the fabric of America through their flood control, navigation, recreation, regulatory and other civil works activities.

A major USACE responsibility lies in caring for the environment. The Army is the steward for close to 25 million acres of public lands, much of it in the able hands of the Corps of Engineers. We do not own this land; we are caretakers of the land—and the plant and animal species which inhabit it. The American people entrust it to our care, and we must fulfill their trust. We have a responsibility to conserve and preserve the environment for the future. We must preserve our resources and training areas today so that they will be available to train our soldiers for the challenges of the 21st century.

The nation's desire to improve our environment is being put into action by the soldiers and civilians of the Army Corps of Engineers, which is doing more to restore the environment in the southwestern United States than all other federal agencies combined. The men and women of the Corps of Engineers have undertaken many projects that prove that the Army has adopted the philosophy "We did not inherit the earth from our parents, we borrow it from our children."

For example, the Sonoma Baylands Project is currently restoring tidal wetlands on 348 acres along San Francisco Bay that had been converted to agriculture. Over two million cubic yards of dredged material was placed on the site to accelerate the restoration of the lands. This project

demonstrates that dredged material (sand and mud), which was previously treated as a waste product, can be used for beneficial purposes. Consequently, the soldiers and civilians of the Corps of Engineers can continue its navigation mission of dredging federal shipping channels while benefiting the environment by providing valuable habitat for fish and wildlife, including several endangered species—a win-win proposition.

The Yolo Basin Wetlands Project involves restoring approximately 3,300 acres of wetlands and is being constructed entirely within an operational floodway of the Corps' Sacramento River Flood Control Project. The project is an important element of the North American Waterfowl Plan, providing an important link in the Pacific flyway. The restoration is designed to improve waterfowl habitat while not hindering the primary flood control function.

The Corps care for the environment is also evident in military projects, like the Sacramento Army Depot. The rapid conversion of this contaminated installation (it was a Superfund site) to civilian reuse was a direct result of the partnering between the Army and various federal, state, and local government organizations, and the general public surrounding the depot. Working with federal and state environmental regulators, the team aggressively developed and maintained a vision for cleanup and reuse. Thanks to the goodwill and partnership of all parties, 3,000 new civilian jobs were created when the installation was turned over to the city.

By combining proactive environmental leadership in all that they do, the soldiers and civilians of the Corps of Engineers set a great example for the Army—and the nation—to follow. Our children—and our children's children—will be the ones who benefit most from this terribly important work.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

June 7, 1996

Visits with French, British and German Counterparts

I just returned from a 3-day trip to France and England. I attended Eurosatory and had the opportunity to meet with my counterparts in France and England, General Marc Monchal and General Sir Charles Guthrie. Since this was such a short visit, I probably will not publish a trip report but did want to share a few thoughts with you on what both France and England are doing with their armies. One of the good things about trips like this is the opportunity to exchange ideas about the future. In most cases, I am struck by the commonality of the challenges we face and certainly that was the case on this trip.

This was my third meeting with General Monchal since I've been Chief. He is scheduled to retire in August of 1996 and I will miss him because we have become friends both personally and professionally. As most of you know, France has just announced a major restructuring of their Army. Basically, they will go from 230,000 soldiers to 140,000. They will also go from a conscription force to a professional force. This is a major change for them and they are dealing with many of the same issues we dealt with in the mid-1970s when we went to our volunteer force. Their challenge is compounded by some of the results in a recent opinion poll done in France. Less than 5 percent of those surveyed see the military field as a good career option for their sons or daughters. While they do much better in things like traits that people admire, they still feel they must deal with the fundamental issue of uncertainty. Although they never mentioned it directly, there are concerns about their ability to recruit quality and stay in touch with the people of France. It seems to me those are real dangers and for any nation that subscribes to these as bedrock principles, there's a floor in terms of percentage of population below which you dare not go without great risk of shattering one or both of these principles. I'm not sure they know what this does to their abili-

ty to field larger organizations. They gave no indication of backing away from anything they were doing in terms of multinational formations, but the obvious questions of two different type armies (one conscript, one professional) serving together are there. They are on a fast train and hope to have their restructuring done by 2002. I pledged them our support in terms of lessons learned and anything we can help them with to get through this critical period. Obviously, the right TRADOC contacts are in place and we continue to work through the process associated with developing a close relationship with the French Army. They are a proud Army and I think will want to solve most of these problems themselves but they know the offer to help is there.

In London I found a similar situation. The British Army is approximately 170,000, with almost 60,000 of those being in the Territorial Army (reserve component). They have three major commands: AG (PERSCOM-TRADOC), QM (AMC), and Land Forces Command (FORSCOM). They are truly a microcosm of the U.S. Army. You can see our long-standing relationship and our common approach to things like doctrine, training, and readiness. As I told them, I'm not sure whether we have it right or wrong, but one thing is certain, we've got it together. I was truly comforted by what we discussed and our common approach to solutions. They are moving to a greater reliance on a rapid-reaction capability. Their timelines are not exactly the same as ours and they are limited in terms of strategic lift, but the thought process is the same. They feel good about their current equipment and their budget resource allocation is almost identical to ours with civilian and military pay accounting for 57 percent of the total resources they receive. In line with their emphasis on rapid reaction, they have stood up a Permanent Joint Force Headquarters (PJHQ). This will be a permanent planning cell to monitor crises around the world which they are interested in and, if military force is committed, headquarters will be tailored to support that force. It's very similar to our combatant command concept, only on a smaller scale. The idea of a permanent joint task force planning cell is, however, interesting and something we should monitor very carefully. In addition to the PJHQ they have also been developing the concept of the Joint Rapid Deployment Force (JRDF). This force will respond to missions across the spectrum of conflict and is light/heavy tailorable. From what we discussed, I believe their thinking on issues like Bosnia and NATO is very similar to ours. There may be a few small points that may have to be refined, but no major disagreements. As in France, I was impressed by the U.S. personnel assigned to England. Again, I believe the TRADOC links are solid and I expressed our appreciation to Sir Charles for co-sponsoring the International Doctrine Conference with Lieutenant General Willmann, the German Army Chief of Staff, later this year in Berlin.

The thing I took away from both of these visits was the need for us to continue to work closely with both of these strong allies. With the increased pressure throughout the world to reap the peace dividend and in so doing reduce the size of the militaries, it becomes even more important to ensure we have common doctrine, common understanding, and tough realistic training. The Brits were concerned that we not sign up for politically expedient concepts which have limited warfighting utility. With 25 percent of their force deployed at any given time—primarily in Northern Ireland—their PERSTEMPO problems are even greater than ours. They are concerned about the long-term impact of this on retention of a quality, primarily married force. They plan to keep their focus on high-intensity combat operations, maintaining that they can always go from that level of training to a peacekeeping operation, but not vice versa. As I said, I had very little disagreement with what they discussed with me. The French, on the other hand, are dealing with a great deal of uncertainty. They do, however, have unique strengths, particularly in such things as understanding the African continent. We need to stick with them, help them where we can to leverage those unique capabilities, and develop our relationship. I told both that we are very sensitive to their requirement for compatibility between them and us as we develop Army XXI. I reminded them that we have the Army Digitization Office and they are charged

with ensuring that we get this compatibility. I also told them that we have experience in working with different levels of modernization and I did not see the compatibility issue as a show stopper. I asked them to stick with us on this one and let's all shoot for a true revolution in military affairs with the Army After Next. As we look down that road, I think that will be an important objective.

Had the opportunity to also meet with most of the U.S. personnel assigned in France and England. They are truly an impressive group and again we are well served. The more I see of these FAOs [foreign area officers], TRADOC liaison officers, and attaches, the more impressed I am with how well we are served. We need to continue to develop that relationship by sending our people to schools in their nations and developing personal contacts with the leaders of their nations' armies.

While I feel coalition warfare is extremely important, I would never be comfortable totally committing the role of our Army in defending the nation to the strength of our coalitions. We must ensure strong coalitions, but at the same time never forget that our responsibility is to help win the nation's wars. If we can do that with others that's probably easier. But we can never forget that the ultimate responsibility is ours and ours alone.

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"Training: Our Army's Top Priority and Don't You Forget It!"

Military Review

July/August 1996

At 1607 hours on 26 February 1991, Captain H.R. McMaster led a nine-tank formation across a desolate part of the southern Iraqi desert. As McMaster crested a small rise, he encountered nine Iraqi T–72s dug in on the reverse slope. In a short fight lasting only 28 minutes, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment's E Troop destroyed 28 Iraqi tanks, eight BMP Soviet armored personnel carriers and nearly 50 other vehicles.[1]

This action and others like it during Operation Desert Storm and missions in Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia have earned the U.S. Army the reputation as the best-trained army in the world. The execution that earned this reputation, however, was not an accident and did not occur overnight. One of the most important lessons learned from Desert Storm was that the war was not won in 100 hours or nine months. Developing the combination of people and equipment that performed so magnificently in that operation took us more than 15 years.

Desert Storm's success was not magic, but rather the direct result of tough, realistic training honed to a razor's edge at home station and in our Combat Training Center (CTC) program. Starting in 1973, Army Chief of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams set out to break the mold and train the Army in a new way. One of his principal deputies in this training revolution was Lieutenant General William DePuy, who believed that as the Army's composition changed, a new training methodology had to be developed. As DePuy said, "We are moving away from World War II. The Army to which we all belong psychologically and philosophically stems from World War II in which we expanded a 200,000-man Army into an 8 million-man Army . . . and we trained a lot of people before they went overseas, just enough so that the Army wouldn't be tarred and feathered by the populace. And we trained a lot of lieutenants just to the point where it isn't a national disgrace to put them on the battlefield. I was one of them, I know that, and we kind of went to war and let the survival of the fittest prevail . . . if one tank battalion wouldn't do, we used three. Now, we don't have that [recourse] anymore."[2] Today's situation makes this statement even more true.

To ensure America's Army was ready to meet any challenge, training became our top priority.

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[1] Steve Vogel, "A Swift Kick: 2d ACR Taming of the Guard," *Army Times* (5 August 1991), 13.

[2] Paul Gorman, *The Secret of Future Victories* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1992), III–3.

Under the leadership of my predecessors, the Army developed a doctrine for training and vigorously enforced its implementation. As former Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono reminded us so many times, "Training is your most important priority—and don't forget it." We didn't! Training focused on wartime missions. Realistic, sustained, multiechelon and totally integrated combined arms training was stressed at all levels. Our training programs for soldiers, units and leaders are based on the principles found in US Army Field Manual (FM) 25–100, *Training the Force*, and FM 25–101, *Battle Focused Training*. This article will discuss how we train and what impact change will have on how we plan and execute future training.

Sound Training Doctrine

Major General Jimmie Johnson, 82d Airborne Division commander, said FM 25–100 was the gospel in the Gulf. Right after he deployed, he got FM 25–100 out, checked his mission and then went to his METL [mission essential task list] and said, "OK, what adjustments do I have to make?" He made a few adjustments, put out the necessary information and then ran quarterly training briefs. The training paid off. I visited the 82d over there twice and watched them train against their METL. Every division over there did the same thing. The results speak for themselves.[3]

America's Army must be trained to succeed across the full spectrum of military operations. We must be a capabilities-based force that provides options for our nation, which faces a wide variety of circumstances. General Douglas MacArthur stated our primary purpose in 1962: "Through all this welter of change, your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable—it is to win our wars."[4] It was true then, it is true today and it will be true in the 21st century. However, the pattern of international conflict in the post–Cold War environment requires military forces to do more than just fight high-intensity conflicts. Our experiences over the past six years prove that the Army must be prepared to compel, deter, reassure and support.[5] That is a tall order, but thankfully, we have a system in place that allows us to do just that.

The Army must meet diverse challenges across a broad spectrum, and we have training doctrine that enables us to do that. The comprehensive training doctrine contained in FMs 25–100 and 25–101 is very good. We have clearly demonstrated—most recently in our preparation for Bosnia—that it works well and continues to wear well too. It will remain the basis for our training as we enter the next millennium. These manuals give guidance to the Total Army on the development and implementation of training programs at all levels. We will continue to focus our training on the most difficult mission—high-intensity combat—because this focus forms the basis for most tasks required across the full spectrum of military operations. Because the principles outlined in these manuals have universal application, FMs 25–100 and 25–101 are mandatory reading for leaders from squad to division level. We will continue to fine tune them as appropriate, but I do not intend to invest a lot of time rewriting this doctrine. We must spend our time and energy institutionalizing training doctrine to ensure it is implemented the same way across the entire force.

Bosnia—Validating Training Doctrine

Bosnia is just another example of our training doctrine's viability. Before the 1st Armored Division deployed from Germany to Bosnia, General William W. Crouch, commander, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) and Seventh Army, ensured that USAREUR's eight-step training model, based on our training manuals, was followed throughout all pre-deployment training. Their training program was tough, realistic and demanding. It was tested at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany, where USAREUR soldiers conducted Exercise MOUNTAIN SHIELD to prepare for possible missions in support of the UN Protection Force (UNPRO-

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[3] GEN Carl E. Vuono, *A Trained and Ready Army: The Collected Works of the Thirty-First Chief of Staff, United States Army* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], 1994), 435.

[4] GEN Douglas MacArthur, "Thayer Award Speech" (West Point, NY: US Military Academy, 12 May 1962).

[5] Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Force of Decision," *White Paper* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996).

FOR) in Bosnia. In a textbook application of training principles, USAREUR soldiers practiced one of the most difficult of all operations—nighttime air assaults—involving some 119 aircraft from a variety of units over extended distances. They did it safely and conducted hard-hitting after-action reviews (AARs)—and they did not stop until they got it right. Despite the unique nature of the mission, task organization and environment they faced, there was nothing fancy about what they did. They simply executed doctrine to standard. The teaching point for us all is that we must stick with the building blocks of sound training as laid out in FMs 25–100 and 25–101—that way we cannot go wrong.

I have visited Bosnia twice since our troops deployed—once at D+30 and again at D+150. I saw firsthand the results of our training program. At D+30, when I asked soldiers if the training they had received at Hohenfels had prepared them for Bosnia, they told me there was nothing they had experienced that they had not trained for at Hohenfels.

Returning at D+150, I was pleased to see their tremendous progress. Soldiers and leaders alike continue to deal with unexpected, extremely complex issues, but because of such tools as the decision support matrix, intelligence preparation of the battlefield and weekly company training meetings in their kit bags, they are handling these challenges remarkably well. We have reached the point in Bosnia where we are now rotating tank and Bradley crews through sustainment gunnery in Hungary. I was extremely pleased to learn that the degradation of those critical warfighting skills was not as great as some might have expected. Critical warfighting skills' maintenance is a result of the emphasis we are placing on sustaining these skills—even while conducting the mission.

Our soldiers' appearance exudes professionalism. They are respected by all for their readiness and combat capabilities. Clearly, they are the "force of choice" in Bosnia, and the slogan on the coin of Task Force *3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment* (*3–5 Cav*)—"Peace in the POSAVINA or Deal with Us"—says it all. They are living proof that strict adherence to and execution of our doctrine makes a difference.

Our success in Bosnia is a tribute to the fact that our model really does work for all missions. The training doctrine outlined in FM 25–100 must become institutionalized across America's Army—Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC), which includes the US Army Reserve and Army National Guard. We are not there yet, despite the fact that our training doctrine has been in place for many years. We must continue to push it down to the lowest levels. It must be internalized. It must be enforced by higher levels of command.

Good Training Management Execution

FM 25–100 clearly states, "Training briefings produce a training contract between the senior commander and each subordinate commander. The senior commander provides resources and protects the subordinate unit from unprogrammed taskings. The subordinate commander then locks in and executes the approved training plan. This shared responsibility helps maintain priorities, achieve unity of effort and synchronize actions to achieve quality training and efficient resourcing."[6]

The key to training system execution is good command training guidance (CTG) and a good quarterly training brief (QTB) for the AC and yearly training briefs (YTBs) for the RC. Guidance and briefings alone will not guarantee good execution, but I am convinced this is where senior leaders can have the greatest impact. The training brief allows leaders to focus on what is important.

Focus is the key. The training brief is both a leader development program and a contract. It is a time when senior commanders can pass on their experiences, ensure they have considered all possible "bear traps" to execution and ensure they are not trying to do too many things. The training brief is a commander's event, for and by commanders. I encourage you to use it as a leader development program. FM 25–100 notes that the training brief "provides the commander an opportunity to coach and teach subordinates on the fine points of his philosophy and strategies in all aspects of warfighting."[7]

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[6] US Army Field Manual (FM) 25–100, *Training the Force* (Washington, DC: GPO, 15 November 1988), 2–17.

[7] Ibid.

Once the training briefing is over and everybody agrees about what has been discussed, a contract exists. The subordinate commander's part of that contract is to ensure professional execution of the training as briefed. The approving commander, who had the responsibility to lay out and lock in the major events in the annual and quarterly training plans, also must ensure the subordinate commander has adequate resources—to include time—to professionally execute the training program. We often forget our responsibility to protect our commanders from outside interference so they can execute their contracts. Training contracts are meaningless if we cannot do that.

The training brief is also the place to ensure we are not biting off more than we can chew. Most good units can do a limited number of training events well during one quarter. Let's be realistic. At the QTB, if units are trying to do more than they are capable of professionally executing, eliminate the lowest-priority training. We often go from one training event to another without really absorbing the lessons from the first. We must do less, but do it better.

Training meetings are the linchpin to effective training management at battalion and company levels. These are weekly events posted on the training schedule and run by commanders. Although the meeting's focus is to provide input to the training schedule, the potential "value added" is far greater. When conducted properly, these meetings are essential to review past training, plan and prepare future training and exchange timely training information among commanders and other staff participants.

Finally, we must never fall off of standards. Ensure that AARs are conducted after every training event. This is how we learn. The AAR process is what separates us from the world's other armies.

Predictability Is Important

Commanders at all levels must enforce FM 25–100 time lines and principles. At the QTB, commanders must be sensitive to weekend training. Commanders must scrutinize weekend training closely for appreciable return on investment. Given the many events that units must accomplish in our smaller power-projection Army, *predictability* has become a real problem for our soldiers. My experience has been that the fastest way to improve productivity is to provide predictability. High PERSTEMPO (personnel tempo) is a major challenge for the force—we must control it. I believe we can do so without degrading readiness.

The Army can achieve current training standards in units with soldiers and leaders spending less time away from home. Recently, a command sergeant major said, "Our soldiers will always do what we ask them, but the question is will they stay with us [at this high PERSTEMPO]?" He was absolutely right. Former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan's adage that "More is not better, better is better," is true today. I am convinced that we are doing too many events and not deriving maximum benefit from each. We all must accept the challenge of cutting lower-priority training events and doing "less" better. The way to do that is to look at each scheduled training event, determine the value added, and then if we see we are doing too much, eliminate the events that deliver the least return on investment. By milking each training event for every ounce of training value, we will improve both readiness and predictability.

The commander's intent here is to focus limited resources on high-payoff training events, leverage them to the maximum extent possible and eliminate the lower priorities. Give priority to those events that provide the very best training for soldiers. The Army's METL development process can help us through this. FM 25–100 outlines this process: "Commanders analyze the applicable tasks contained in external directives and select for training only those tasks essential to accomplish their organization's wartime mission. This selection process reduces the number of tasks the organization must train."[8]

Carefully assess each training activity's return on investment, particularly the expenditure of our most precious resource—soldiers' time. Allocate time for leader training and retraining. Our training doctrine addresses this need when it talks about amber week training, when we focus on individual training requirements. This applies to

[8] Ibid., 2–3.

leaders as well as individual soldiers. We must not sacrifice leader preparation and training to standard. Focus your efforts on doing a limited number of exercises to standard. Do not accept anything less. Take those high-payoff events, conduct good AARs and restructure your training program based on lessons learned. That is no more than what our doctrine already calls for.

Given the frequency of operational deployments, commanders at all levels must control PERSTEMPO. Eliminate training distractors, enforce the contract and "help stamp out dumbness" wherever you see it. Remember, if we don't slow down the train and reduce PERSTEMPO, good soldiers will vote with their feet. We run a very serious risk of losing good soldiers, noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers who form our core competency. We must address this issue in a meaningful way. I assure you I will do my part.

CTCs—Our Training Program's Foundation

The CTCs are the foundation of our overall training program. FM 25–101 states that the CTCs were designed "to provide the most realistic training short of combat."[9] In this objective, they have been a remarkable success. A television interviewer asked a young soldier who had been wounded in the Persian Gulf if he had been afraid. The soldier said, "Certainly I was afraid. You know I never have been in combat before. Everybody who had been in combat before told me I would be afraid and they were right; I was afraid. But you know, when fear kicks in, training takes over. When I was afraid inside that tank, I operated because my training took over and I did the things that I did in training."[10]

The CTCs are the crown jewels of our training program. The Army is committed to ensuring they stay that way well into the future. The CTCs give us the unique ability to synchronize all elements of the combined arms team in an environment that closely approximates combat. As General Vuono said, "The value of the CTCs cannot be overstated, and the payoff is measured in the performance of our units in battle. In an analysis of the fight in Panama, one battalion commander said that the JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center] was the single most important element in his unit's success."[11]

In 1991, shortly before the start of Operation Desert Storm, I was in Saudi Arabia with [then Army Chief of Staff] General Vuono. As he visited soldiers, we encountered a young company commander training his troops. I will never forget that captain's quiet confidence and professional demeanor. He looked the Army chief of staff in the eye and said, "Don't worry, Sir. I have been to the NTC [National Training Center] three times and we can handle these guys." That confidence is what we gain from vigorous and demanding training at the CTCs. It is invaluable, and we must ensure we retain it.

In the past, we have often looked at home station training and CTC rotations as separate events. All commanders must determine how to leverage scheduled CTC rotations to complement their units' training and readiness. We must continue to strive to get the maximum benefit from CTC rotations. The Army must move more toward a "continuum of training." Training realism must be achieved at home and at the CTCs. CTC rotations should not be viewed as "Superbowl" events. Our Army *never* has an "off-season." Commanders must train within the band of excellence throughout the year. Home station training plays a large role in sustaining readiness within that band of excellence.

We must design our training program so there is a smooth transition from what we do at home station to what we do at the CTCs. An important FM 25–101 premise is that "The analysis of the information provided through evaluations is the key mechanism that commanders use for their [training] assessment."[12] When a unit redeploys from a CTC, leaders must take the time to evaluate the lessons learned and then refine the home station training program to reflect those lessons. The unit must also develop a system for ensuring that those lessons learned are passed on to the soldiers who did not have the opportunity to deploy. Our challenge is to find ways to export

[9] FM 25–101, *Battle Focused Training* (Washington, DC: GPO, 30 September 1990), D–1.
[10] Vuono, 434.
[11] Ibid., 336.
[12] FM 25–101, 5–1.

to the entire Army the tremendous training benefits we receive from limited CTC rotations.

In developing a training strategy, each commander must maximize the appropriate simulations and simulators. We can no longer afford to treat simulations and simulators as enhancements. The Army is committed to getting the most out of each. We must trust simulations and simulators, treat them as trade-offs to other more expensive training and figure out how to get the most training transfer from each training opportunity. Remember, simulations were the foundation of the NASA space training program. They worked fine for NASA. They can work for us too.

A soldier who deployed to Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama said, "Well, we were afraid, but we knew what we were doing; we had trained against this stuff. So it was something that was not alien to us."[13] He said something else that made an impression on me. It is something I think you should be proud of, but it is also a challenge to you: "We were afraid but we were trained; we knew what we were going to do. We had great confidence in our buddies because we had trained together, and we knew our sergeants and officers would take care of us, because we knew that they knew their business."[14]

Training is the most important thing we can do for our soldiers, our units and our Army. Therefore, we must do it right and must do it to standard. We must have the capabilities required to win the nation's wars, establish order, prevent conflict and sustain operations as long as required. To do this, we must all work together to institutionalize the way we train to meet the challenges of an increasingly fast-paced world. We must train our soldiers in a manner that allows them to develop their individual and collective skills and makes them proud to serve in the world's best Army. We must find ways to train that yield maximum readiness for the human and financial resources invested.

[13] Vuono, 434.
[14] Ibid., 434 and 435.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

July 7, 1996

I want to update you on a couple of issues that are on my scope and let you know where we are on them. They are extremely important and we will need your help if we are going to do them right.

The recent bombing in Dhahran illustrated how vulnerable we really are. Luckily we had no soldiers seriously injured or killed. USAREUR [United States Army Europe] had just sent a team to look at the security of their soldiers and I think that helped. But anytime something like this does so much damage and gets so much publicity it is important to take a look at where we are across the force. Accordingly, I have asked the OPS to conduct a comprehensive review of where we are in terms of terrorism/counterterrorism. He will work with many of you on this effort but all of us need to have our antennas up on force protection. This one starts at home and I ask each of you to take a look at your own habits and personal security. I have no indication of any increased threat in this area but I think it's prudent for all of us to be more sensitive. I'm not suggesting we go overboard on this but it might help to take a look at some of our habits and see if they lead to increased vulnerability should the threat assessment change. That's part of the personal responsibility all of us have. Those of you who run installations should, if you haven't already, assess the security of those installations. Again, I don't want to start closing posts but random checks do an awful lot to keep people off balance. Those of you who work in public buildings need to be sensitive to the security signs around you. All of us need to raise the awareness of force protection across the force. As you visit units deployed or units training, make that a point of discussion with the chain of command. What I really want to do is to sensitize everybody to this issue without overreacting. We must take care of our credentials.

Last week I received an update on the work that is being done on the new OER [officer evaluation report]. They have been in communication with the field and are developing a number of options ranging from tightening up the present

system to developing a complete new OER. They've also looked at the systems that each of the other services use and I think have done an extensive data search. There are pros and cons to each of the options. I am pleased with what they have done, appreciate the field's input, and am comfortable that we are on track. Originally, I hoped to bring this on in the summer of '97 but it makes more sense to close out the old form during that timeframe and implement this one on 1 October 1997. This one's critical and the one thing we don't want to do is to field it before it's ready. In the meantime, we will continue to work with the current OER. We monitor very carefully the board feedback after a selection/promotion board and I think we can get one more year out of the system. We really have no other choice so we have to make it work. One of the things I'm convinced we will keep is the requirement for counseling subordinates. In that regard, I would ask each of you to look at your responsibilities on the 67–8–1 and ensure you are fulfilling them. It is important that our subordinates understand what we want from them and I want to make sure we are doing initial counseling sessions with all of those whom we rate. Don't wait for something to happen on the new OER, start doing that now.

Last week I also met with Major General Dave Ohle who heads up our officer personnel management study. This effort is closely aligned and I think complementary to the work we've done on the OER. Although they are separate efforts, they must move down the track together. Dave was present for the laydown on the OER and understands that very well. While the OPMS [Officer Personnel Management System] Task Force is basically just standing up, I want to share with you some of the initial guidance I gave Major General Ohle. I told him that I consider this study absolutely critical to the future of the United States Army. We haven't done a study like this for some time and certainly not since the end of the Cold War. It is important that we look the world of the 21st century directly in the eyes and ensure we are prepared as an institution to meet the challenges that lie ahead. I told him that while much has changed, one thing I didn't want to change was the emphasis we place on warfighting skills. I think General [Douglas] MacArthur had it right in 1962 when he said, "Through this welter of change your mission remains fixed, inviolable—it is to win our nation's wars." Winning the nation's wars does not always mean compelling an enemy to do what we want them to do. It also has a lot to do with deterring and preventing wars. We must ensure that we have a broad base to draw from in terms of people who understand the importance of coalition warfare, how the Army runs, and how to balance the intricate equation of near-term readiness, quality of life, and far-term readiness. All of these in my mind are essential skills we will need for the 21st century. We must develop leaders who are not afraid to take risks—well thought out and sound—and not afraid to act. I told him that he worked directly for me but that I wanted him to seek advice and counsel from the field. In short, I gave him a tall order and he will need your help in accomplishing it. I ask that you be receptive to his task and forthcoming with your advice. I put him on about a year timeline with quarterly IPRs [in-progress reviews]. I told him to use the first quarter to gather as much information about this issue as he could. (He has a computer and knows how to use e-mail.) I know this is an issue which many of you have strong views on and it's important for you to share those views with Dave and me. We're not going to make the decisions alone, but we need maximum input before we can shape the decision issues. As always, I intend to seek input from the chain of command before we finalize these decisions. More to follow.

Just wanted you to know that we are moving out on the human dimensions of the future as well as technology. There's a great deal of effort going on at Fort Hood [Texas] reference the AWE [Advanced Warfighting Experiment] and it is also very important. I believe we'll solve the technology piece because of the data we are accumulating. I intend to devote a lot of my attention to the human aspect of this as well as the institutional values that we deem so important. If we get this one right then we can't go completely wrong.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

July 12, 1996

Reflections on the First Year

Having been in this job for a little over a year, I think I owe you an assessment of where I see the Army now and where I think we need to be headed in the future. I intend to do that in two parts. This "Random Thoughts" will deal with the current assessment and I'll follow it in 2–3 weeks with one on the future. I'm sure there's going to be some repetition with previous Random Thoughts and I hope you'll see a great deal of consistency. I ask you to bear with me on the repetition and work your way through because it's important you know how I see the Army right now. I don't profess to have total clarity of a very large and complex organization, but I do hope my view is balanced and in focus. At least it represents the view from my foxhole.

I continue to be enormously proud of all you have accomplished in reshaping the Army and keeping it trained and ready while still handling new and diverse missions. I don't know of any other time in the history of warfare where what you did was done. It is an unprecedented feat and we not only need to be proud of it but we need to talk a lot about it. You're not bragging when you can back it up with performance and we certainly can do that. Few outside of the Army understand—nor will ever understand—the difficulty of what we've accomplished. It is hard to make the human emotion part of this really come alive with those who have not been a part of it. Most of all, our troops need to feel good about what they've done. One of the reasons I keep talking about soldiers being our credentials is so they will understand how true that is and how much we appreciate them. Every time we've been able to spotlight them, whether it's been on the Sava River, in Korea, at the CTCs [Combat Training Centers], or in Congress, the Army and the nation have been the winners.

Slowly but surely we've evolved to a full spectrum force. We have shed our label as strictly threat-based and moved more to a capability-based force. That doesn't mean that we aren't concerned about threats because we truly are, particularly in areas like Korea and Southwest Asia. In both areas we continue to be vigilant and ready. That must not and will not change. But we have found we can do much more than just that. We are truly a full spectrum force and we highlighted that in the White Paper we put out on the Army "Force of Decision." As you look at the four major thrusts of *Joint Vision 2010*—dominant maneuver, precision strike, force protection, and focused logistics—the only service that has a key role in all four areas is the Army. We have already started to leverage that and I will address that more in detail in the next installment. Right now I want to continue to focus on the fact that we must be and are relevant to the needs of the nation. All one has to do is cite the troops' performance in Bosnia and the security we provided during the Olympics to illustrate how broad, important, and diverse our missions are. When you factor in all we do to prevent war with our exercise program with allies and the commitment of our FAOs [foreign area officers], you can see why I believe the Army is the only full spectrum force and why I'm so proud of what you've done.

I think we're holding our own on training and readiness, but those are areas in which we can never become complacent. I continue to tell brigade and battalion commanders to train against the most difficult mission, high-intensity combat. When you can't do everything, that is the most prudent course of action. It also reflects our experience which has been that there is normally time available to train for these other missions. The mission essential task list concept works fine and we cannot afford to destroy it by making everything mission essential. Many of these tasks are transferable. I was extremely pleased with what we got done at the Senior Leader Training Conference at Fort Polk [Louisiana] this year and plan to have at least two each year. I plan to concentrate my efforts on institutionalizing FM 25–100. TRADOC is doing a good job of incorporating that into the institutional base and we must ensure a seamless transition between the institution and our units. I don't believe that exists in all cases and I challenge each of you to prove me wrong. I won't go into much more detail on training because the *Military Review* is publishing an

article which reflects my views on training and the importance during peacetime. It should be out in the next edition. In terms of readiness, your reports indicate our challenges are primarily in the people area. Operational readiness rates are as high as I've seen them and although I think the Army is somewhere between FMC and 10/20 standards, I am hopeful that we can continue to move closer to 10/20 standards and get there across the Army during my tenure. The common reason given as to why we are not there is shortage of funds. I'm not sure that's the case in all cases. I ask you to challenge that statement. I certainly don't want to do anything that smacks of paper maintenance, but I think we can offset the lack of funds by improving the skills of our people and making the overall system more productive. I have challenged AMC to do just that. The people issue is more complex and it involves shortages and turbulence. Although the personnel folks have done a superb job of managing people, I am still concerned about the overall fill of our units and how quickly we are rotating key personnel, particularly staff officers. Turbulence has two parts to it. One is external to the unit and the other internal. I will continue to work hard to reduce external turbulence and I ask that all of you do everything you can to work the internal piece. In my mind, this is probably the greatest challenge in training and readiness we face. A related issue that's starting to crop up and one I've asked The IG [The Inspector General] to look at is borrowed military manpower. I know you're trying to balance the equation in terms of quality of life for our people, but I don't want this one to get too far away from us. I ask that wherever possible you use the red cycle concept to help offset any degradation in quality of life. We can't afford to let up in training and readiness.

One of the new missions that's back on our screen is terrorism. I can remember discussions we had in the early 1980s when the wave of terrorism hit Europe, about whether terrorism should be considered another form of warfare. Years have passed and the terrorists have become more sophisticated in what they're doing and the U.S. as the world's only superpower has become a primary target for terrorists. Again, I think we have done reasonably well as an institution in addressing this area. Force protection is part of our METL [mission essential task list] and we train for it. When they deploy, our soldiers are in proper uniform and extremely professional. Our no-alcohol policy ensures their head is in the game. All of these things make a difference. In short, we have created a culture in which we are known as professionals—the best in the business. The way we train, the way we live, the way we take care of each other help create that culture. Doing things to standard and living in barracks not dormitories help create the mindset that saves soldiers' lives. We must continue that and, if anything, torque it down a notch or two. We can't become complacent or let our guard down. I fully support our initiative to take care of single and married soldiers, but they must not be counter to our fundamental responsibility to ensure that our soldiers are properly trained for any mission. I believe that developing the proper culture is the bedrock of that training. We must do nothing to degrade the discipline and cohesiveness that are so fundamental to our success. This is a tough one because it's largely intangible and it probably worries me the most. I don't think it's a serious problem right now but it's hard to measure the erosion and you can move quickly from where we are now to people not worrying about whether weapons are zeroed or not and the basic fundamentals of our trade. I simply ask that everybody be sensitive to this issue.

For a lot of reasons, we've seen a rebirth of values in the United States Army and well it should be because they are important now, they always have been, and always will be. We've had considerable discussion about values and it's been healthy. As I get closer to the end, I find myself more and more going back to the beginning. I entered the Army with a concept of duty, honor, country because I spent four years in that environment. Those were the standards, that's the way we did things, and I was extremely comfortable with that code. Over time I don't recall having to give a lot of testimony about what that meant to me and I think I was more like most of you in that I simply tried to live that code. There were certainly times of uncertainty and values were my security blanket. I was extremely fortunate to be associated with others with that same

value base and I think we all took strength from each other. During this period of uncertainty, I think it imperative that we refocus on values. I've seen some warning signs over the last year and I think it important we heed them. The Army has zero tolerance for any type of extremist activities or prejudicial behavior to people because of race or gender. We are a team and we must stamp out those behaviors and attitudes which are detrimental to teamwork. This is an area where we must not only talk the talk but walk the talk.

There is no doubt the Army has done a masterful job with the reshaping we've conducted in the last 6 years. However, that reshaping exercise has created uncertainty which has bred an answer I call zero defects. It is certainly not the zero defects mentality that we lived with in the early 1970's; however, it does pose a threat to developing the type leaders we will need for the 21st century. There is nowhere I know of in the Army where people are saying you have to do everything perfectly. I've been to too many after action reviews to know that is not the case. On the other hand, there is a common perception amongst the subordinates that a less than perfect report severely damages their career. Like so many other issues, this is extremely complex. It touches on the careerism versus professionalism debate and what is our definition of success. There are different views as to how prevalent it is and generally the more senior the less an issue we think it is. I don't necessarily think that's totally bad because people bring different perspectives to this issue. On the other hand, I accept the fact that this exists and we must deal with it. There are no silver bullets—no quick solutions. We must work hard identifying the leaders we want for the 21st century, develop them, and bring them along.

I appreciate the work that all of you have done on resources. I know it hasn't been easy and I think you know we've got much more to do. What I tried to do in '96 is to change our mindset in terms of resources. They are not unlimited and we have to recognize that. We either become more efficient or we become smaller. There are no other courses of action unless we get considerably plussed up on the top line. I don't think it's realistic to think that's going to happen. Regardless, we must plan for the worst and I have tried to focus everyone's attention on how we can do things more efficiently and more productively so that we can save every soldier we possibly can. This is a battle between end strength and efficiency. I come down solidly on the side of being more efficient so that we can save end strength. Quite frankly, we're not there yet and I intend to put even more emphasis on it in the upcoming year. We have faced and conquered tougher problems in the past and I am convinced we can do the same here.

Finally, let me say that everywhere I go and at all ranks I see a lot of pride in what we are doing. It is justifiable. We are the world's best Army, not because it was preordained but because we made it that way. Our job now is to keep it that way. I also see a great deal of excitement about the future. Sure we have challenges but as I've said many times they pale in comparison to the challenge others face. I believe we also have unlimited opportunities. The opportunity to fundamentally reshape an Army doesn't come very often. The opportunity to fundamentally influence the role of land forces in the 21st century is unique. We have all of that and more. It's a great day to be a soldier.

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1996–1997
The Second Year

1996–1997: The Second Year

Probably the most significant event we face in the immediate future is the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR]. As you know, that is a major review of the National Military Strategy. . . . I intend to approach this review in a spirit of willingness to cooperate with other Services. But at the same time, I want to make sure that we bring a healthy dose of skepticism to the critical issues. . . . This effort is probably the most critical effort we will face during the next year and I want to ensure that it is a first team effort and done right.

Dennis J. Reimer, General, United States Army

E-mail to Army General Officers

September 10, 1996

This is Part II of the last Random Thoughts While Running I sent you [July 12, 1996]. In that one I gave you my assessment of the Army based upon my evaluation of last year. In Part II I will give you my perspective on the future for the U.S. Army. While I think there is a potential for significant changes in the future, I believe we are positioned so that these changes will be more evolutionary than revolutionary.

Probably the most significant event we face in the immediate future is the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR]. As you know, that is a major review of the National Military Strategy and it will take place regardless of the results of the election in November. I think a lot of us inside the Pentagon are comfortable with the two MRC [Major Regional Conflict] strategy as a sizing mechanism for the force. On the other hand, I think there's going to be considerable pressure to reduce defense resources. We were already starting to feel the pressure of the "balance the budget by 2002 movement" and when you add on to that the demand for a tax cut, I clearly believe the challenge we face will be to get the most bang for each buck we are given. For me this means that '97 must be a year of execution in terms of efficiencies even though the dollars in 1997 seem adequate for the task. We have to figure out what efficiencies are realistic for the long haul in 1998–2003. Consequently, I intend to drive the ARSTAF [Army Staff] to continue to look for efficiencies in their functional areas. I also hope to be able to put in place an accounting system to allow us to better measure the efficiencies we are getting. In building the program for 1998–2003 we took advantage of efficiencies to a greater extent. If we're unable to realize those efficiencies in 1997 we have some real challenges in the outyears. I am not uncomfortable with this because what we did with the program was prudent, but I don't think we can keep the system on automatic pilot and expect to realize those efficiencies. Look for more emphasis on efficiency and productivity, not less, in 1997.

In terms of QDR itself I think we are properly organized to advocate the Army position in this critical review. I've asked Lieutenant General Jay Garner [Assistant Vice Chief of Staff] to pull together our whole effort in this arena. He will work directly for the Vice and me and will have the full support of the ARSTAF. Obviously, I want this to be a total Army effort and I need all of you to be responsive to his requests. My guess is that this will move very quickly between 1 September–1 January. The issues aren't new and our positions are solid. I intend to approach this

review in a spirit of willingness to cooperate with other services. But at the same time, I want to make sure that we bring a healthy dose of skepticism to the critical issues. I fully appreciate how fortunate we are to be associated with the best Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps in the world and I want to leverage their considerable capabilities where we can. We may no longer need a duplication of some capabilities in the Army. Before I give up anything that we deem critical to our soldiers I want to make sure that we are comfortable with how that capability will be provided. However, it is important that we approach this critical effort in the spirit of cooperation and in the willingness to do what is right for our nation. This effort is probably the most critical effort we will face during the next year and I want to ensure that it is a first team effort and done right. We need all of your best efforts in this regard.

In the area of training and readiness, I hope we will be able to reduce somewhat the turbulence in units. If we can knock off two percentage points on the average in external turbulence it would be extremely helpful. I ask all of you to look at your internal policies to ensure you're doing everything possible to minimize internal turbulence. I believe reducing turbulence is the single most important thing we can do to improve training. I also intend to conduct a detailed TDA [table of distribution and allowances] scrub to ensure we are properly utilizing military personnel. In this regard, I'm not necessarily looking to reduce TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command]. As I've said many times, I think they are at their minimum strength right now, but I am looking at where we might have military personnel doing jobs that could essentially be done by civilians. Most of these, I think, will probably be in the base operations arena. I'm really looking to pick up 2,000–3,000 in this effort because I think that's about what we need in terms of plussing-up shortages in units. We'll look to pick up some of those by reducing the ARSTAF. I think it's important all of us look at headquarters strength. I just looked at some figures on the size of the different headquarters companies and found that most of them are running between 106 percent to 350 percent fill. We can't afford that and I think all of us need to take a look at our own headquarters company and set the example. I intend to do that. I also am well aware that trading military end strength for civilian end strength is problematic at best. I don't have all the answers on that one yet but I'll guarantee you we'll work that one hard. My point simply is that we need to make sure that we are using our quality personnel—both military and civilian—in the best possible manner. I am convinced that we have to get a greater percentage of fill for our units and that's the only way I know.

We will have two SLTCs [Senior Leader Training Conferences] this year and will focus on the continuum of training. I got a lot out of the last one and look forward to the next. With regard to the continuum of training, I'd like to see more emphasis put on low-cost training events at home station to shore up some of the weaknesses identified at the CTCs. Conducting staff drills and working on things like intelligence preparation of the battlefield don't cost a lot of dollars. I've tasked TRADOC to use the National Simulation Center and show us how we can leverage the significant investment we have in simulations. My goal is for a battalion commander to be able to set up his TOC [tactical operations center] in the motor pool and through the use of a 1-800 number be able to conduct a staff drill against a simulated thinking opposing force. This is doable. It's doable now and it won't cost a lot of resources. We just have to set our minds to make it happen. Again, I remind everyone that simulations can't do everything but, on the other hand, we must be more comfortable with what they provide. The goal is to seek the right mix between live and simulation training. I'm also aware that late taskings are really killing the units. I will take this on and work with the CINCs to minimize those requirements and at the same time meet our timelines as prescribed by FM 25–100. Some things, such as deployments, are unexpected and beyond our control. However, on known exercises, I will ask them to battle roster as much as possible and for those they can't battle roster I will ask them to give us the advance notice we need. I intend to make this a major effort this year. I ask those of you in a position to influence training to keep your eye on the ball. I truly believe that training is our most important priority and I don't want anybody to forget that. We will

be mindful of resources but we will take no shortcuts in this area.

I also want everyone to be mindful of the zero defects issue. As I indicated, I think it exists and probably to a greater extent than most of us want to believe. Long term, we're set on having OPMS [officer personnel management system] address this issue. We also are revising the OER [officer evaluation report] with a view toward helping solve this problem but we can't field the OER till it is ready. In the short term, I think it important that we spend a lot of time mentoring and coaching. I ask you to use 67–8–1 as it was intended and ensure your subordinates do likewise. Not only set the example but make it one of the objectives that they not only meet initially with their subordinates but that they review the 67–8–1 on a regular basis with subordinates. I think that's one of the most important things we can do right now and will go a long way toward helping us get through these next couple of years. The new OER will be ready probably in October of '97 and we should be able to implement OPMS about the same time. However, it's going to take a year or two for both of these to take hold so we can't sit on our hands and wait for that to happen. Let's make 67–8–1 a meaningful tool and not only set the example on how it should be used but insist our subordinates do the same. There may be nothing more important to our long-term future.

No matter whether you're talking about near-term or the distant future, values will continue to be important to the United States Army. I am concerned that we may still have some who do not understand the importance we place on consideration of others. We have zero tolerance for those in our ranks who take unfair advantage of others because of race or gender. In my mind, this is an area of near-term training and we must ensure that every member of the Army—both military and civilian, Active and Reserve—understand the seriousness with which we view equal opportunity. The Sergeant Major of the Army has already had the MACOM [major commands] CSMs [command sergeants major] at the equal opportunity course and I intend to ensure that all new corps and division commanders have the opportunity to attend the executive course at Patrick AFB. There is nothing optional or waiverable about that requirement. Starting 1 October that will be a prerequisite for taking the colors. I've also asked the DCSPER [deputy chief of staff for personnel] to put together a chain teaching package on this and we will distribute it to the field very shortly. I want to nip this one in the bud before it becomes too big to handle. We'll stay away from fancy legal definitions because in my mind the standard is very simple. I basically want our people to treat others as they expect to be treated or they would want their son or daughter to be treated. It's no more difficult than that. Beyond that, however, I will insist the chain of command follow up on allegations and where substantiated treat them as a serious breech of discipline. The clear intent is to stamp out any remnants of extremist behavior and sexual harassment in 1997.

We have been conducting a detailed review of values and how we approach them across the institution. We should be able to bring that effort to fruition in '97. I intend to merge that with the OER effort and ensure we evaluate those values we think important. We will fine-tune how we handle values from precommissioning through retirement, if necessary. I basically want to put new meaning into the phrase a values-based organization which is part of our vision.

The 4th Infantry Division has done a remarkable job of getting us off to a great start on the road to Army XXI. The task force has been properly equipped and is in the process of training up for the AWE [Advanced Warfighting Experiment]. There is still considerable work to be done between then and now and a couple of IPRs [in-progress reviews] which will allow us to fine-tune, if necessary. But we are past the point of no return. I intend to leverage to the maximum extent possible the AWE but do not intend for it to become a catcher's mitt for everybody's good idea. I want to make sure we tell our story to the proper people in the media and Congress, but I'm also extremely sensitive to the needs of the unit in terms of time to train and the opportunity to get the job done without outside interference. From that AWE we will make decisions concerning high-payoff investments. Congress will most likely provide us $50–75M for that purpose and we

should use it for just that. We will invest in those systems that give us the highest payoff and proliferate them across the force as fast as we can. We will also get on with the organizational decisions that must be made after we see how the task force performs. I expect these decisions to be more subjective than objective and intend to rely heavily upon military judgment. Basically our intent is to field a full corps of Army XXI units by 2010. Our modernization strategy is based upon this and I think the timelines are realistic. This will also allow us to invest in basic soldier enhancement packages such as flak vests, proper clothing, and field gear, log automation, etc., so that regardless of what mission we receive our soldiers have the best equipment and weapon systems the country can provide. This strategy, I think, will allow us to take full advantage of the window of opportunity we have as the world's only military superpower.

We know a lot about Army XXI. It will be built upon the six imperatives and will provide much improved capabilities. We intend to leverage information-age technology, particularly in the area of command and control, situation awareness, and night-vision devices to the maximum extent possible. By so doing, we should ensure that we maintain the edge over any potential foe. Army XXI will ensure that we continue to have the best equipment in the world by product improving the weapons and equipment currently fielded. We are firmly committed to Army XXI and will continue to look for ways to enhance our systems through the turnover of technology. We have done a lot through acquisition reform but there's still more that can be done. We must figure out a way to field systems faster if we're going to take maximum advantage of technology turnover. We believe this is an important part of the Army After Next and have started the process of determining what the Army After Next should look like. Working with the Net Assessment people out of OSD [Office of Secretary of Defense], we have programmed a series of exercises to look at the capabilities required during the second quarter of the 21st century. A couple of emerging insights include the requirement for greater tactical and strategic mobility; the need for greater lethality in our light forces; the ability to operate in small dispersed units throughout the battlefield; and to mass firepower and maneuver at the critical point in time; and the need for a whole new logistical concept. These are not terribly new concepts but fleshing them out is an exciting challenge. I plan to take a more structured approach to this challenge and to use the military leadership to not only approve the scenarios for these exercises but also to identify the real lessons learned from these scenarios and ensure we are investing in those technologies that offer the highest payoffs. I will ensure that those of you who need to be involved in this effort are immersed in it. Most of you will not have a large involvement initially but it's important that you know what is going on because ultimately you will inherit the products. It is important that as an institution we stay focused on Army XXI. While we will have a planning cell focusing on the deep battle, I see a true opportunity for revolution in military affairs with the Army After Next. Through investing in the tech base, we should be able to bring along the technology we will need and, at the same time, evolve our C2 [command and control] technology and logistical concepts using Army XXI as a carrier. The merger of these two efforts should ensure that we remain the world's best full spectrum force well into the 21st century.

We have made a total commitment to total asset visibility and velocity management. These must be the pillars of our logistical concept. In order to make this work, however, we have to wean ourselves from the iron mountain. Consequently, we will start reducing PLLs and ASLs. Initially, I want to start by removing everything that is not demand supported from both PLLs and ASLs. Proliferation of SARSS-O across the force will give us greater visibility of all parts and should allow cross leveling—a technique that I think will become critical on the future battlefield. Ultimately, I think we need to challenge the requirement for ASLs and PLLs. It's too soon right now but as we continue to gain confidence in total asset visibility and velocity management we should be able to know how much is enough. Couple this with efforts to improve the durability of our equipment and more precise fires, and you start to make real inroads on the strategic mobility problem. The old saying about how important

logistics are to professionals has never been more true. It is important that all of us get involved in this area.

To the extent we prevent wars we win wars. I have become convinced that our foreign area officer program is one of the best investments we have and have instructed Dave Ohle to ensure that his study recognizes that and deals with the future viability of this program. I think it important that we continue to exercise and train with our allies—both individually and as units. We must develop a common understanding and common techniques and procedures. We must continue to train against the most difficult mission—high-intensity combat—but we must also be relevant to the needs of the nation. Although we well may find ourselves involved in more operations like Bosnia than Desert Storm in the near future, it is important that we not forget what General Douglas MacArthur reminded us almost 35 years ago, "Your mission is fixed, inviolable, it is to win the Nation's wars." We demonstrated our ability to do both in '96 and I don't see much change in the next couple of years. One of the enduring aspects of our history has been our relevance to the nation's needs. I don't see that changing in the 21st century.

I also see no major lessening of the requirement to deal with change. Seems to me we've become more comfortable with change over the last 6 years. That is primarily due to the fact that we've dealt with it not necessarily because the magnitude has decreased. There are going to be many changes we're going to have to deal with. Some we know are coming and some we don't. However, I don't think there's ever been a period in history when we've been better prepared to deal with those changes. As I travel around I am convinced we have the talent and experience to handle whatever they throw our way. It's an exciting opportunity and I'm delighted to be a part of it.

One constant will always be—Soldiers are our credentials.

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Letter to Army General Officers

September 13, 1996

Business Outreach

Sometimes the best way to solve a problem or take advantage of an emerging opportunity is to talk to someone who has had experience in a similar situation. A solid business outreach program offers the Army many opportunities to do this. In today's environment of rapid change, information technology and constrained resources, the private sector and the Army are facing very similar challenges. In this new environment, making the right decisions often requires a point of view that goes beyond a single organization or sector. Therefore, by sharing information with the business community, we often find better solutions to common problems.

The Army's Business Outreach Program combines the efforts of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management & Comptroller), the U.S. Army War College Strategic Outreach Program, and the Director of Management. These organizations have combined their efforts to insure that:

- the Army has opportunities to tell its story to the business community;
- Army leaders are exposed to their business counterparts through participation in business membership organizations, such as the Conference Board;
- and the best business practices gained through this exposure are shared among all levels of the Army.

To help the business community understand the Army's mission and issues, the U.S. Army War College hosts an annual CSA/CEO Conference at Carlisle Barracks, Pa. This setting provides an opportunity for business and Army to discuss the Army's approach to national security issues, leadership and management principles. The USAWC has also established a solid relationship with the business and management schools of several prestigious academic institutions, such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Sloan School of Management. This exposes the Army to leading-edge thinkers.

In OASA (FM&C), the Office of the Deputy Assistant for Resource Analysis and Business Practices provides another avenue for business outreach. This effort fosters active participation by Army leaders from the Secretariat and Army Staff on the councils of the Conference Board, a prestigious nonprofit business membership organization located in New York City. Eligibility to participate on these councils is one key benefit of this membership. It provides unprecedented opportunities for Army leaders to meet with business executives to share information, ideas and insights on crucial business issues. These councils are designed to keep executives in front of the latest developments in their fields and fully informed about new management strategies and tactics. Conference Board membership also includes subscriptions to many research publications, access to corporate management practices through their extensive library collection and the availability of ongoing issue oriented conferences.

The director of management will take the results of these efforts and pass them to the field. This should result in a broader understanding of business and adoption of state of the art management practices by all levels of the Army.

I encourage you to open similar avenues of communication between yourselves and members of the business community. This will increase the public's awareness of the Army's contribution to the nation and enhance our understanding of the business approach to management. I can think of many examples within our logistics, engineering, resource management and other functional areas that can benefit from such an open partnership. Soldiers ultimately benefit from such outreach efforts as we seek ways to continually improve the Army.

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Letter to Army General Officers

September 13, 1996

National Guard Association of the United States

I recently had the honor to address the 118th meeting of the National Guard Association of the United States. It was a great opportunity to see and talk with many old friends and great soldiers about the tremendous accomplishments and exciting future of our total army and, in particular, our National Guard.

Everyone recognizes we have been through a period of unprecedented change, yet we have also demonstrated time and again that we remain trained and ready. We are the force of decision because we are a total force leveraging each component—Active, Guard, and Reserve—capitalizing on every opportunity to work together. There is plenty of evidence that the Army is working toward greater levels of integration among the components.

At the end of our reorganization and distribution of capabilities among components, the Guard will have 50 percent of all combat units, 40 percent of all combat support units (including, by FY [fiscal year] 99, almost 70 percent of all field artillery), and 37 percent of all combat service support.

The training and rotation program between Camp Dodge, Iowa, and the National Training Center [NTC] is an excellent example of integrating maintenance training opportunities in the Guard while providing better support for the Active Army at the NTC.

The Guard is leveraging simulators and simulations in training as well as distant learning technologies. Not only do we achieve efficiencies in training, but we eventually will train to a single standard within a single school system that fits all components.

As part of the Army National Guard Division Redesign initiative that redistributes the Army's CS [combat support] and CSS [combat service support] capability, TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] is conducting a detailed assessment of a proposal to form two AC/RC divi-

sions by putting six enhanced readiness brigades under two Active Army division headquarters. This integrated division concept will assign regular officers to key leadership and staff positions in Guard divisions and brigades.

Finally, the Guard is operationally engaged across the spectrum, participating in operations from Operation Joint Endeavor and Partnership for Peace in Europe to stability operations in South America.

Change is never easy; the Guard has made tough decisions. Compromise has been necessary, as in the distribution of CSS capability within the force to right an imbalance. Everyone should understand and take pride in the fact that at the end of the day we have done and will continue to do what is right for the nation.

We still have work to do meeting the challenges of today and tomorrow. We must ensure we keep quality in all we do—recruit, retain, equip and train. We must achieve the proper PERSTEMPO [personnel tempo] in all components. We must keep our eyes on the mission—to fight and win the nation's wars.

Finally, we must achieve balance among Active, Guard and Reserve forces, near-term and future readiness, and the quality of life enjoyed by our soldiers and their families.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

October 13, 1996

Sexual Harassment Case at Aberdeen

I want to take this opportunity to update all of you on where we are on the sexual harassment case at Aberdeen [Proving Grounds, Maryland]. I don't want to get into the details of any specific case because the allegations will have to be worked through the military justice system. Any specific numbers that I give you will turn out ultimately to be wrong because the investigation is still ongoing and has entered into a new and broader phase. However, you're entitled to know the background on why we did what we did and some of the things that went into the timing of the recent announcement.

Allegations of misconduct first surfaced in September and the CID [Criminal Investigation Division] was called in to deal with those allegations immediately. The seriousness of these allegations convinced us that we needed to broaden the investigation and talk to female soldiers who are no longer at Aberdeen but who had trained there. When we completed the first phase of the investigation we decided to make that part public and to broaden our investigation by establishing a 1-800 number for those who had sexual harassment complaints. That number became a lightning rod for many sources. To date, we have received almost 2,000 calls, in which at least 145 will require additional investigation. As you would imagine there's a wide range of opinion being expressed by the callers but each is treated with dignity and concern. Our intent is to follow through as required. Approximately half of the 145 calls pertained to Aberdeen and the remainder had to do with other places.

I know I don't have to tell this group how serious these offenses are. The alleged abuse of authority gets at the very heart and soul of the Army. We cannot function without respect for authority. We intend to protect the rights and privacy of the victims and to ensure that the rights of the alleged perpetrators are also protected. The American people deserve better, our soldiers deserve better, and the Army IS better. The TRADOC chain of command is handling it exceptionally well and they are dedicated to doing what's right.

We have already learned a number of lessons—or I should say, reaffirmed fundamental truths we already knew. Command authority is a sacred trust bestowed upon our leaders. When that authority is abused by one or two individuals it diminishes the whole institution. It's important to reaffirm our dedication to that sacred trust and spend time talking to our subordinates about how important all of that is. I feel very strongly about this. I ask your support in ensuring all of us reemphasize this with our subordinates.

As a former basic training company commander, I know that life in the training center is

stressful, particularly, for those great drill sergeants out there. I have the greatest respect and admiration for all they do and know that 99+ percent are the Army's best. We need to reaffirm that to them and ensure they know they have our full support in their vital mission. We cannot let the alleged conduct of a few detract from the absolutely superb job being done by the finest trainers in the world. It's our responsibility to keep this in perspective.

As you know, the sexual harassment survey which came out last spring indicated the Army had some challenges. I have tasked the DCSPER [Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel] to put together a training package in this area to explain the Army policy on sexual harassment and our zero tolerance for conduct of that nature. That package should be ready for distribution some time in December and we will conduct a chain teaching program to be completed by the end of March 1997. In the meantime, as I tell all the pre-command courses there's not a better guiding principle than the Golden Rule—treat others as you would have them treat you. Let's move from the talking stage to the execution stage.

Major General Bob Foley has put together a Consideration for Others Program in the Military District of Washington. It is patterned after the very successful program at West Point and I've asked him to make a presentation to the Division Commanders Conference next spring. I believe it important we look at proliferating this program across the Army. In the meantime, I think it important to do more sensing sessions with female soldiers and when you find valid complaints we must follow up aggressively. As I indicated earlier in one of my Random Thoughts While Running messages, the thing that bothered me the most about that survey was the fact that too many lacked confidence in the chain of command to follow through and thus did not report the offenses.

We need to instill in our soldiers a basic belief that soldiers take care of each other regardless of race or gender. We must ensure that respect for the chain of command is absolute and that that respect has been duly earned. These are the issues we are dealing with and that is why it is so critical that we do what's right. THIS IS A CHAIN OF COMMAND ISSUE. I know I can count on your support to make it happen.

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Address at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Luncheon, Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army, Washington, D.C.

October 15, 1996

Let me start off by thanking the Association of the United States Army. We are having another great annual meeting. Some people may wonder why we have these annual meetings. I think it has a lot to do with "Spirit." If you were here with us when we started the "Army 10-miler" race on Sunday morning, you saw the great spirit of 9,000 runners, almost all soldiers. That spirit hasn't faded, and we see it in this annual meeting—it was here yesterday, it's here today. My guess is that that spirit will be taken back by the soldiers to the field and will add to their already high-energy level. So my thanks today for such a great annual meeting.

What a great motto for our annual meeting . . . "Army XXI—Decisive Force" . . . says it all. I thank the national chapter, and most of all the local chapters for what you do on a daily basis to make that motto become reality. It is terribly important—the support you provide our soldiers—and my sincere thanks on behalf of all of them for all that you do.

As I was looking out at the audience today, I was reminded that in this audience sit the people who really help make America's Army what it is. I see the soldiers out there—the Active Component, the United States Army Reserve, the Army National Guard—who serve so proudly and do so well. They serve across the world and they represent us so well. I see a large number of DA [Department of the Army] civilians who are also part of our strength—they provide great expertise, they serve in both peace and war. I see members of industry—the industry that has supported

us so very well. As I told you last year, you've always been there when we needed you—and we thank you for your support. We thank you for the equipment and the weapon systems that you provide our soldiers. You do us a great service by being here and you support us so very well.

I know there are also members of the congressional staff here with us. You make a great deal of difference to all of us, and you and the members of Congress you represent have supported the Army in an enormous way during this past year—we thank you for that. We thank you for your support on a daily basis and the example that you set for all of us.

I want to say a special thanks to my friends up here on the front row—they represent the military leadership that makes the Army go. They're also close friends, great advisors, great counselors and I really appreciate the great sacrifice that they make and the advice they give me. I will tell you that we certainly couldn't do it without them and I just publicly want to acknowledge that.

A special warm welcome to all of our allies who are here in great numbers—thank you for being here. I have had the opportunity as the Chief of Staff to travel across the globe last year. I met many of you in your countries and had the opportunity to exchange ideas about the visions and dreams that we have for the future. I benefited enormously from that contact with you. Most of all, I thank you for your willingness to stand up and be counted—for your willingness to shoulder the burden with us. It is deeply appreciated, and your presence here indicates that is the case.

And as I look at this audience, I am also saddened by the fact that we don't see some of the giants of our profession that have been here before, giants who have made a tremendous contribution—like General Max Thurman, General James Woolnough and General Cal Waller and many others. We said good-bye to them last year—but their contributions are very much a part of our Army and they will help take us into the future. I want to publicly express my appreciation for all that they have done and let you all know how much we will miss them.

Last year when I was here I talked about our vision for the future. I talked about our attempt to remain the world's best Army—to remain trained and ready—a full spectrum force—quality soldiers, the Active Component, the United States Army Reserve, the Army National Guard and quality civilians that we have in great numbers. I talked about the Army as a values-based organization and an integral member of the "joint team." I talked about the fact that we needed to be equipped with the best equipment and the most modern weapon systems the country can provide; and that we need to be relevant to the needs of the nation. And, I talked to you about the fact that we are changing to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow and the 21st century.

This past year, we brought that vision into reality—soldiers brought that vision into reality. Our soldiers concluded Haiti, giving that country an opportunity for democracy. After years of devastation, soldiers deployed to Bosnia. Soldiers brought peace—soldiers brought hope for the future to a war-torn country. I can't imagine a greater contribution and I can't imagine a more important mission. Deploying into Bosnia, we also showed the world that the nation means business when we put our soldiers on the ground. Time and time again, the spirit of our soldiers came through in so many ways. But, nothing I think demonstrates that better than the bridge across the Sava River. Not only was that the longest pontoon bridge since World War II—620 meters—but it was also put in under the most difficult and trying of circumstances. We had sleet. We had rain. We had snow. We had freezing cold. We had mud up to our ankles and we had a hundred-year highwater mark. But our soldiers wouldn't be beaten. They put in that bridge. They put it in on the time line established and they insured the successful introduction of our forces into Bosnia. A tremendous accomplishment and a tremendous tribute. It was not only a tribute to technology but more important to the soldiers and their indomitable spirit.

But there were other significant accomplishments throughout the year. The evacuation of Liberia, Operation Assured Response, involved three hundred soldiers—Special Forces, Infantry and Signal units. They were called upon to assist with the evacuation of American citizens from Monrovia. Most of those soldiers came from the 1–508th Infantry in Vicenza, Italy, who had just

returned from Bosnia. They hadn't even turned in their cold weather gear when we deployed them into the heat of Liberia to evacuate the American citizens. They had no time to prepare, but they performed magnificently. They secured all the American citizens and brought them back. They did it without injury—they did it without casualties—a flawless mission.

The Military Observer Mission Ecuador and Peru takes place on the border between Ecuador and Peru. It is a contested border area. We have less than sixty soldiers that are standing guard down there. They're holding together that critical unzip point of the world and they are doing a magnificent job—just a handful of soldiers.

Probably the world's most visible event took place in Atlanta this summer at the Summer Olympics, 1996. Again, it was American soldiers, primarily Army National Guard soldiers, assisted by U.S. Army Reserve and Active Component soldiers, who provided security to the events. They insured that the athletes got to the right place. They insured that officials got to the right place. They earned the accolades of a grateful world.

Task Force VANGUARD consisted of Active Component and Reserve Component soldiers sent to fight the forest fires in the northwestern part of the United States. It's a tough mission, but they are good at it and they were admired by their civilian counterparts because of their organizational ability, their discipline, and the physical ability and endurance that they brought to that particular task.

As recently as last month, we did Operation DESERT STRIKE. Smart weapons from airplanes and ships alone could not deter Saddam Hussein. So we called upon the Force of Decision—and the United States Army deployed over 3,500 soldiers. A brigade from the 1st Cavalry Division, two Patriot missile batteries and other units deployed to Kuwait. Saddam Hussein got the message and the world understood what we meant when we talk about "Power Projection."

"It's the same old thing," said smiling Sergeant David Gonzalez, Company B, 212th Cavalry. He's been deployed 4 times during his six-year career. I think that illustrates what we mean when we say: "Been there, done that, got the T-shirt." But it also exemplifies selfless service.

Private First Class Joseph Weymouth deployed for the first time. He said: "It's my first time out of the country, but the guys over here told me all that I need to know. Don't sleep on the ground, make sure you shake out your boots and drink plenty of water." Teamwork—soldiers taking care of soldiers. We clearly demonstrated during the past year that we are a full spectrum force—a force of decision—a capabilities-based force.

The Army I just described, and the one that I am so proud of, is a legacy to the great leaders and trainers of the past fifty years. Some are in this room today. It was a force built by men of great vision. Men like Marshall, Abrams, Myers, Rogers, Wickham, Vuono and Sullivan. And each brought their special focus, and each was ably assisted by many others, far too numerous to name. But they built an Army on a solid foundation, with clear priorities; the results were amazingly clear and very straightforward. We won the Cold War without firing a shot, and we completed Operation DESERT STORM in less than one hundred hours—minimum time, minimum casualties.

The key to success in my mind has been our willingness to change, to meet the world as it is, without changing the competencies that make us great. Competencies like our values. Words like duty, honor, country, selfless service, sacrifice, competence, confidence—these are not mere words, they're codes by which we live. Competencies like our enduring mission—to conduct prompt and sustained land warfare—to win the nation's wars. General Douglas MacArthur, in 1961, summed it up best when he said: "Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory—and that if you fail, the nation will be destroyed."

But the world has changed. People talk about building bridges to the 21st century. For us the 21st century began in 1989. Think about it. During the time 1950 to 1989, almost 40 years, the United States of America used its military 10 times. Since 1989, we have used our military 25 times, a 15-fold increase. It is interesting to know that during those past seven years, the United States Army has done 70 to 80 percent of the heavy lifting, and we have done it for less than 24

percent of total obligating authority. Less than 24 percent of the budget that is given to the Department of Defense. Ladies and gentlemen, the United States Army is a cost-effective force.

The Cold War may have been more dangerous, but today's geopolitical environment is more complex. We must deal with fractionalization—the crumbling of an empire—the breaking up of nation-states around the world. We must deal with the possibility of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—the sure knowledge that any nation with resources can buy capabilities—instant terror. We must deal with uncertainty throughout the world—what's next, where are we headed? It's out there—you know it—I know it. We must deal with the global village filled with religious and racial tensions released with furor after lying dormant for over fifty years. We have to deal with those difficult emotional issues that have been covered up since World War II. In essence television and the media have taken us back to the future in their time machine. What our soldiers do in dealing with those tensions is played out for us at our breakfast tables and in our living rooms almost instantaneously twenty-four hours a day, up close and personal.

With that as backdrop let me tell you how we have and are changing to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow and the 21st century.

Our generation's responsibility, I believe, is to sustain and pass on an Army that is as good as or better than the one we inherited. Today's Army has evolved to a "full spectrum force." It has shed the label that it is strictly a threat-based force. We have evolved beyond the capability of a threat-based force as we talked about in the White Paper we published last year—"A Force of Decision." We talked about the capability to *reassure* our friends and allies, to *support* civilian authorities in times of domestic crisis, and to *compel* and *deter*, if necessary, potential adversaries.

We've moved out on this exciting journey and we have gone a long way. If you visit Fort Hood like I did last week you would see how far along the journey to Army XXI we are. Army XXI is our first stop. We are bending metal and moving electrons across the battlefield and there is great excitement. You can see it, feel it, touch it. It is an extremely uplifting experience. It is also a model of teamwork—DA civilians, soldiers and members of industry working together, joined at the hip, making it happen, securing our "future."

We are learning the tremendous potential of situational awareness and information dominance. There is a tremendous synergy that you get from being able to know where all the friendly forces are 100 percent of the time and being able to locate a large number of the enemy all of the time. It enables you to do certain things that you never have done before on the battlefield. It is clearly going to allow us to maintain the edge. It is clearly going to allow us to remain the world's best Army. We are in the execution mode of Army XXI and we are changing in a fundamentally different way than we have ever changed before. I believe we are on the verge of something very important and something very big.

Do we have it all right? I doubt it—but we need to test it and we will. We will test it against our world-class opposing force at the National Training Center. It is our most ambitious Advanced Warfighting Experiment to date. The lessons that we learn from this exercise will be integrated into division and the corps exercises that will take place later on and that will produce Army XXI. We intend to have a corps in place by 2010. Make no mistake about it, ladies and gentlemen, Army XXI will give us information dominance.

Army XXI is critical, but it is only an intermediate stop along our journey. The focus of our intellectual efforts has shifted to the Army After Next. The Army After Next is our effort to look as deep as possible into the future, to look at what happens to the world in the 2025 time frame, to evaluate the geopolitics, the technologies, the human resources and the warfighting capabilities that will be available at that time. Army After Next is a totally different force, but we know a lot about it. We know that we want it to have greater lethality. We know that we must have greater strategic and operational mobility. We know that it must be logistically unencumbered. We know that it must have greater versatility—heavy, light, Special Operations Forces, lethal and non-lethal means. Because of these characteristics we are interested in any technology that narrows the gap between our heavy forces and our light forces—anything that makes our heavy forces more

deployable and our light forces more lethal. Army After Next is the objective force, but the road to Army After Next goes through Army XXI. We must insure that we develop the total force design—that we have the training package right, that we have the force structure right, that we validate the doctrine, and that we insure that the technology is there so that we can leverage the tremendous potential of informational dominance.

Bringing together Army XXI and the Army After Next offers us the greatest opportunity for a revolution in military affairs. That revolution is going to require that we make greater use of simulations and simulators. It is going to require that we rely more heavily on distance learning techniques. We will keep the core cultural-based training in-house, but we must be able to expand to just-in-time training as required. We must have a more agile logistics system, and we must have a more businesslike approach to running the daily business of the United States Army.

Technology is absolutely critical to both Army XXI and Army After Next. The technology that you see at this annual meeting is the type that we will embrace very readily. But I will also tell you that there is technology that has not yet been developed. So we're looking for it with the Army Research Office and the TRADOC Battle Labs—and we'll find it.

But I want to make sure that everybody understands that it's false to believe that new technology will automatically result in large-scale reductions to the size of our Army. It takes soldiers with the capability for long-term commitment to separate warring parties, to reassure fearful civilians, to restore public order, to keep criminals from taking advantage of the vacuum in civil order, to deliver humanitarian assistance, to prevent and win the nation's wars. All these capabilities that we talked about—to reassure, to support, to deter, and to compel—are embedded in the United States Army. But they require boots on the ground.

I am convinced that we are on the right track, but the outcome is not preordained. We must work smarter, we must protect our core competencies—our soldiers, our values system and our Six Imperatives: training; doctrine; force mix; leadership development, which is absolutely fundamental; modernization; and, most of all, quality people. We must be willing to take risks. For not to take risks is the greatest risk of all, because we will miss the window of opportunity to leverage the tremendous potential that is there.

We intend to resource our efforts by restructuring organizations—by creating efficiencies in the way we do business and by leveraging technology. Balance will continue to be the key as it always has been, the balance between size, readiness, quality of life and our modernization program. To achieve balance now will require tough decisions—not all will be popular—some will be downright painful but necessary—if we are to remain the world's premier land force. We paid the price too often in blood to back away from these decisions at this time.

I need your help. I need you to help communicate the Army story—to tell the story to decisionmakers and to the American people. It is a great story. Tell them that we are changing to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow and the 21st century. Tell them that we are relevant to the needs of the nation—always have been and always will be. Tell them about our greatest assets—our traditions and history. When we were needed—we were there. You can count on us. Tell them about our soldiers—they truly are our credentials.

Despite the ambiguity of future warfare and the many forms that it will assume, one thing is crystal clear—the battlefield will always be a lonely, frightening and dangerous place. Only soldiers of character and courage, trained to a razor's edge, ably led, superbly equipped and in sufficient numbers will survive there and win tomorrow as they have in past. As I did last year, let me conclude by introducing you to some of these great soldiers. Soldiers who are the primary examples of the quality, courage and confidence that make our Army the best in the world.

Staff Sergeant Jeff Struecker—born and raised in Fort Dodge, Iowa, entered the Army in September 1987, with "Ranger" on his mind. He attended AIT [advanced individual training], Airborne School, Ranger School and then was assigned to the 75th Ranger Regimental Recon Detachment. He has participated in Operation

Just Cause in Panama and served in Somalia. He currently is assigned to the 75th Ranger Regimental Headquarters. He achieved his goal by winning the "Best Ranger Competition." He's one-half of the winning team. That competition is probably the most difficult event that we have in the world. It makes the iron-man competition look easy. Ladies and gentleman, Sergeant Struecker.

His buddy, Sergeant Isaac O. Gmazel—born and raised in Snoqualmie, Washington. He entered the Army in January 1993. He has been an ammo bearer, assistant gunner and machine gunner. He currently is a fire team leader in 1st Platoon "Madslashers," C Company, 2–75th Rangers. I was fortunate enough to be there and presented these two young men the award for the Best Ranger Competition. I am proud of all that they have accomplished and am proud of what they represent. Ladies and gentlemen, Sergeant Gmazel.

Next is Staff Sergeant Sylvia Sexton. She's from Elgin, Texas, and served on active duty from 1980–1983—she is now a member of the United States Army Reserve. In her civilian job she is a Conference Coordinator for the University of Texas Law School. She has deployed to Korea and Japan with the 364th Civil Affairs Brigade. She has deployed on Third Army exercise Bright Star. She deployed to Operation Desert Storm where she was an administrative assistant. Today she is the administrative assistant to the Post Sergeant Major at Fort Dix, New Jersey. The key to her success is the employer support she has received and that is so important to our Total Army. She exemplifies what we mean when we talk about "Twice the Citizen." Ladies and gentlemen, Sergeant Sexton.

Staff Sergeant Barry Robinson, Army National Guard. He is the Florida State and First Army NCO of the Year for 1996. He was born in St. Petersburg, Florida; he has a Masters degree from Florida International University. He began his service in the Army National Guard in 1988, and since 1993 he has operated as an active duty special works soldier with a high-intensity drug area counterdrug program. He has also deployed to support recovery operations after Hurricane Opal in 1995. There is no doubt in my mind that he can handle information dominance on the new battlefield. Ladies and gentlemen, Sergeant Robinson.

Last, but not least, Staff Sergeant Robert L. Butcher. Born in Clarksburg, West Virginia, he entered the service in 1984, and listen to this record. In 1987, he was a member of an Engineer Battalion during the Civic Action Mission deployed in Micronesia. In 1989, he participated in Operation Just Cause in Panama. In 1990, he served with the 642d Engineer Company during Operation Desert Storm. In 1991, he was stationed in the Republic of Korea. And finally, in 1995, he deployed to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. He is one of those who supervised construction of the ingress and egress routes to the pontoon bridge across the Sava River. He just left Bosnia on Thursday. He doesn't need anybody to tell him about mission accomplishment or sacrifice. He understands that. Sergeant Butcher.

Ladies and gentlemen, standing before you today in this room are some of the best of the best. They come from all over America. They represent us so well. They do so much. They ask for so little. They truly are our credentials.

Thank you for your kind attention and God bless you for all you do for America's Army.

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"Count on Us—The U.S. Army: The World's Premier Force"

Army

October 1996

When the Army was needed, we were there. From Lexington Green to the sands of Kuwait, the Army has responded to the nation's calls and preserved the freedom for which our nation is so respected around the world. Today, as throughout history, America's Army stands prepared to respond to the nation's needs—trained and ready to fight and win the nation's wars, to provide stability in an uncertain world, and to aid civil

authorities in times of need. It is a full spectrum force capable of successfully conducting operations in both the joint and combined environments. With our unique ability to compel or deter any adversary, reassure allies and friends, and support domestic authorities, the Army is the world's premier force. As the strategic core of U.S. joint and combined forces, we bring permanence to what are otherwise transitional gains achieved by other forces.

As the Army Chief of Staff, my fundamental duty is to insure the world's premier Army remains fully capable and prepared to meet the nation's needs in this changing world. This goal means we must be trained and ready for high intensity conflict and prepared to successfully execute the broad range of other missions. The Army's vision provides the roadmap for meeting these challenges of today, tomorrow, and the 21st century. It reflects the values and historic spirit of the force, while serving as the azimuth for change. This vision, coupled with the capabilities embedded in our full spectrum force, make the Army unique in its ability to meet our nation's security requirements.

During the Cold War, America's military strategy was one of deterrence and containment. Today's strategy of global leadership, preventive diplomacy, and the promotion of democratic values creates new challenges and opportunities for the Army. On any given day, the Army of this decade has supported America's national interests by committing more than 20,000 active duty and reserve component soldiers to operational missions in as many as seventy-five countries. Today, with support of the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia, that number has swelled to more than 43,000. The imperatives around which our Army is designed and maintained are the pillars of our success in these many operations.

The balance between relevant doctrine, balanced force mix, modern equipment, realistic training, leader development and quality people insures the Army is a force capable of meeting the challenges of today, tomorrow, and the 21st century.

Operations in Bosnia are a perfect example of the rewards reaped by adherence to these imperatives. Well-developed doctrine in concert with mission requirements and conditions, forces properly structured, organized, and equipped for the conditions, and soldiers confident in themselves and their abilities to lead have made America's Army the force of decision.

The commitment of US Army Reserve, National Guard, and individual augmentees is a good illustration of proper force structure. Overall force effectiveness is enhanced through activation of essential skills and capabilities primarily residing in the reserve structure. These citizen-soldiers are providing critically needed skills and making significant contributions to operations in Bosnia, as well as a multitude of other missions around the world. Their involvement is a compelling case for democracy, professionalism, and deference to civilian authority in regions seeking stability, improved quality of life for their citizens, and even return to peace.

Before the 1st Armored Division deployed from Germany to Bosnia, General Bill Crouch, Commander, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), insured that USAREUR's eight-step training model was followed through all pre-deployment training. Prior preparation consisting of tough, realistic, and demanding training conducted to standard paid great dividends. The rewards were first demonstrated when America's Army bridged the Sava River between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This operation, the construction of the longest pontoon bridge in modern history, was conducted under the most difficult circumstances—and with zero casualties or serious injuries. Despite freezing cold, snow, rain, mud, and a 100-year high flooding of the river, the bridge was completed. The world was impressed by the technical competence, drive, and determination of the American soldier. As Sergeant Lawrence Galuski, of the 502nd Engineer Company said, "We can't be stopped, we've had floods, high water, rain, snow—makes no difference. We still bridged it."

At Brcko in Bosnia, a similar story unfolded as Task Force 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment—the BLACK KNIGHTS—restored peace to this critical area of the Posavina Corridor, an area too complicated for the diplomats to sort out at Dayton. Our soldiers' appearance and professionalism clearly demonstrated

that the US Army is capable of meeting the challenges across the full spectrum of conflict. The slogan on the Task Force's coin, "Peace in the POSAVINA or Deal with Us," says it all.

Similar stories have been repeated numerous times in the past year.

From Liberia, Macedonia, Ecuador, Korea and the Sinai, American soldiers, active and reserve, have consistently risen to the occasion and met the many requirements of an uncertain world.

The Army's contributions to the prevention of conflict and world stability have been significant. Our many successes are a tribute to the fact that we are properly organized, equipped, trained, and well-led.

The important army to army relationships we have established with friends and allies are also evident in what we do. As defense resources become more constrained, we continue to look for ways to work more closely with other nations. Partnership for Peace exercises and military to military contacts are just some examples of the Army's involvement in conflict prevention and promoting world order. Our Foreign Area Officers play a critical role in fostering relationships and preventing conflict. The common purpose developed through mutual participation and understanding promotes stability and contributes to our ability to influence the international environment.

It's no secret that we are facing resource challenges. We either become more efficient or become smaller, because personnel accounts compete for the lion's share of the Army budget. Becoming more efficient requires some tough decisions, not all of which will be popular. In order to achieve the right balance, we are pursuing initiatives and efficiencies through the breadth and depth of our whole operation. None of this is without risk, but it's necessary to secure our future.

In an organization in which 70 percent of our total budget goes to either paying or training people, we have to get the most out of every resource dollar we are given. Our efficiency campaign really relates to achieving the right balance among the six Army imperatives, and providing our soldiers confidence in their futures.

In the future, our Army will inevitably be asked to place soldiers in harm's way with little or no notice. We will then expect them to defeat a determined and dangerous foe. When the deployment orders are issued, we must be satisfied that we have done our best to prepare them for the task at hand. Our watchwords continue to be that we will send no soldier into harm's way who is not trained for the mission.

This requirement necessitates an adequate modernization program. The current force design is based on acceptable risk, but further forestalling of modernization greatly increases that risk. We need to modernize to protect our soldiers and meet our objective for quick and decisive victory. The Army must and will maintain the proper balance in terms of size, quality of life, and modernization.

Force XXI, begun in 1992, is the Army's comprehensive approach to modernizing and preparing for the challenges of the 21st century. Enhancing our current equipment set with advanced technology and providing soldiers dominant battlefield awareness will produce a full spectrum force capable of fulfilling America's security needs well into the next century.

The 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas, is the "Point Man" for Army XXI. Designated as the Army's Experimental Force (EXFOR), the 4th ID is the Army's primary means to experiment with information age concepts and technologies. To evaluate the effectiveness of the redesign effort and the infusion of advanced information technologies, we are preparing them for two Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs). The first one, at brigade task force level, will be conducted at the National Training Center (NTC) in the spring of 1997. The second, focused on the division, will follow in FY 98. Following the AWEs, we will assess the enhanced capability afforded by these new technologies and concepts. We will then make the decisions concerning the structure of the division and what equipment gives us the best return on the investment and move on into Army XXI.

This new fighting force will be an improved version of today's Army. It will leverage knowledge, technology, and lessons learned from the numerous AWEs to enhance warfighting capa-

bilities. The process to transform to the Army XXI design is expected to occur between 1996 and 2010.

We are on the leading edge of a whole new way of warfighting. Our current modernization strategy fields a full corps with information technology by 2010. Evolutionary improvements in combat systems will provide enhanced warfighting capabilities to complement the addition of information technology. We are either adding new systems or product improving current ones to ensure we harness the power of information and ensure the proper balance among dominant maneuver, precision fires, focused logistics, and force protection.

As we look to the future we see the opportunity for a real revolution in military affairs. Armed with the lessons of Army XXI and complemented by the technology explosion of the information age, we see an entirely different force—more agile, more lethal, and more versatile. We call this force the Army After Next, or AAN. We have begun to understand the complexities and opportunities of this new era via a wargaming process led by TRADOC. New technologies that may help revolutionize the Army are investigated, then determinations are made on how to get them into the tech base. The Bottom line is we are developing technologies that will be there when we need them. We are committed to forging an Army After Next that continues to handle a broad range of threats and meets the challenges of an uncertain world.

Our current force structure represents the significant accomplishments we have made in force stability. We have completed the drawdown and done something no other Army in history has done—remained trained and ready. This unprecedented accomplishment was achieved through the dedication and selfless service of great soldiers. Army resources have been reduced by about 40 percent and personnel strength by 35 percent. These numbers are important because while we are getting smaller, we must still continue to serve the nation's needs and retain quality soldiers.

Almost 500,000 volunteer soldiers and civilians have left the Army with marketable skills and the dignity earned through honorable service. For those that remain in service to the nation, we must continue our commitment to maintain an environment where soldiers have confidence in their future and potential to be all they can be.

Values also play a critically important role in our many successes. We are a values-based organization, and we need to recognize and remember that in all we do. Values are not learned automatically. We have to spend time talking about values, explaining to new soldiers what values are, and most important, reinforce and live those values on a daily basis.

Duty, Honor, Country and selfless service to the nation are more than words—they are a creed by which we live. Values and strong bonds are what make soldiers successful and allow us to repeatedly meet the demands of our nation. Values must be continually emphasized to all soldiers because all soldiers must be able to exemplify values. The future of our Army is rooted in these values. We must continue to produce soldiers and leaders of character and great moral value. Talk is not enough—this is a message we all must live.

The Army will continue to have many diverse missions. We must be prepared to separate warring parties, reassure fearful civilians, restore public order, keep criminals from taking advantage of a vacuum in civil order, protect and deliver humanitarian assistance, and most important, fight and win our nation's wars. Highly trained, capable, ground forces will be necessary to prevent wars from starting and to decisively end them if they do.

As always, the quality of our leaders and soldiers will be instrumental in preparing the Army for the inevitable challenges of the 21st Century. The greatest asset of the United States Army always has been, is today, and always will be its people. Creating and maintaining an environment where soldiers can rise to the top is essential. That is the way it has been for 221 years, and it will remain that way in the 21st Century. People turn world-class technology into world-class capabilities. People get us where we need to be and perform the critical tasks of defending America's interests.

Soldiers are our credentials. I truly believe that. I am very proud of each and every one of

those soldiers—Medal of Honor NCOs Gordon and Shughart who gave their lives in Somalia, soldiers who stand guard at the demilitarized zone in Korea, those who man our equipment in Kuwait, sergeants like Robert Butcher and Lawrence Galuski, who bridged the Sava River and moved into Bosnia to implement the peace, and those like Staff Sergeant Jeffery Struecker and Specialist Isaac Gmazel who won the Best Ranger Competition in May of this year. Those soldiers and thousands like them will always be our credentials.

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Letter to Army General Officers

October 25, 1996

Strategic Management Planning

Implementing strategic change demands more than senior leaders giving orders or creating Army-wide programs. As the Army confronts the challenges of today's environment, proper strategies must be implemented. The Force XXI process will produce a versatile Army, with the capabilities that America needs for the next century. We call this army Army XXI, and it is forming now at Fort Hood, Texas. In it we are adapting our organizational structure, doctrine and equipment to enhance situational awareness and achieve information dominance. Army XXI is a critical but intermediate stop. We continue to look deep into the future at the evolving geopolitical environment and the demands it will place on the National Military Strategy. In that environment, we envision another end state for the Army in the 2025 time frame as Army After Next (AAN)

In order to ensure that the Army meets the "Changing To Meet the Challenges" portion of the Army Vision, I recently held a series of strategic management planning sessions with senior members of the Army Staff. These sessions enabled us to develop and focus our strategies to lead the Army of today toward Army XXI and Army After Next.

The initial offsite was held 6–7 September at the Xerox University in Leesburg, Virginia. The Army staff principals reviewed the environment facing the Army (economic, political and military), identified major trends and assumptions and developed objectives to focus our efforts toward the Army Vision. As a result of this process, we identified three critical success areas in which the Army must excel:

- Resources: How the Army obtains, distributes, conserves, and accounts for dollar, manpower and time resources to fully resource building Army XXI and Army After Next while maintaining current levels of readiness and quality of life.
- National Strategy Debate: How we ensure the continued relevance of the Army to the future strategic needs of the nation and how we convince critical decisionmakers in the Congress, OSD, and the American public of that continuing relevance as the nation's full-spectrum Force of Decision.
- Current Operations and Training: How we execute current missions while maintaining a trained and ready total force now and into the future.

During the September session, we developed goals and long-term objectives to define the Army's strategic direction in these three critical areas. Later, we developed short-term objectives to focus our near-term efforts and individual courses of action to meet the long-term objectives. Some examples of the goals are:

- Convince key decisionmakers in OSD [Office of Secretary of Defense], Congress and the American public of the increased relevance of the Army as the nation's full-spectrum Force of Decision.
- Maximize readiness while optimizing the expenditure of resources . . . dollars, time and manpower.
- Ensure the appropriate level of funding to support the required force and missions.

On 4 October 1996, I met again with the Army Staff principals at Ft. Myer to review the initial goals and long-term objectives and to discuss the short-term objectives developed by the Army functional staff offices. The short-term objectives are those that will be accomplished

NLT [not later than] 1 October 1997. A quote by Peter Drucker illustrates the importance I place on defining good short-term objectives and taking immediate action to achieve them: "Long range planning does not deal with future decisions, but with the future of present decisions."

I have received very positive feedback about these offsites. We will now engage the MACOMs [major commands] to support the plan and hold quarterly Army Staff review sessions to monitor progress. This Army Strategic Management Plan is a living document, focusing the efforts of the Army Staff and MACOMs. This long-term strategy will assist us in balancing the demands of increasing missions today, while ensuring that the Army will remain ready to meet the rapidly changing challenges of the future, with increased lethality, mobility, versatility and expansibility.

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Letter to Army General Officers

October 28, 1996

Balancing Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement: A Strategy for the 21st Century

At the last CINC's conference, the Chairman asked the combatant commanders and service chiefs for their personal contribution to *Joint Force Quarterly* on critical issues of joint doctrine. I chose to address the controversial subject of balance between dominant maneuver and precision engagement because I believe there is a disturbing trend reemerging in American military thinking. Growing numbers of political and military leaders are becoming enamored with precision-guided munitions and technology at the expense of investments in proven, balanced battlefield capabilities.

It is the belief among many that our new precision strike weapons can, in and of themselves, win almost all our future wars. Regrettably, as much as we desire, history has shown that we cannot counter the human dimension of warfare with purely technological solutions. As much as we may want to, we cannot eliminate the irrational aspects of war through a purely technical solution.

We have been down this road before, sometimes with disastrous results. The price for this wishful thinking has too often been paid by ill-prepared, untrained forces fighting desperately with their valor and their blood to make up for our lack of strategic forethought.

We must strike the right balance between precision engagement and dominant maneuver. By that I mean we must develop a relationship between these capabilities that allows our decisionmakers a wide array of military choices. Balance, at the strategic level, provides our National Command Authority with much needed options. Balance, at the operational level, provides our CINCs with decisive capability. The bottom line—when we've had balance, we've had choices. When we've lacked balance, we've backed the NCA [National Command Authority] into a strategic box—and paid a terrible price in treasure and in blood to get out of it.

In meeting these future challenges, both dominant maneuver and precision engagement bring complementary and unique capabilities to the nation's ability to successfully fulfill its security requirements. Dominant maneuver links maneuver and fires to project combat power. This capability allows forces to move into positional advantage to deliver fires to destroy the enemy's will to fight and obtain decisive victory.

Precision engagement significantly contributes to the successful outcome of operations by allowing us to destroy things and shape the battlespace. By itself, however, it cannot fully dominate battlespace across the spectrum of conflict. While precision engagement can contribute to the successful accomplishment of some missions, it cannot accomplish all operational tasks. Only through decisive victory achieved through the joint application of dominant maneuver and precision engagement can U.S. national interests be assured across the spectrum of military operations.

Like those before us, we must harmonize the relationship between dominant maneuver and precision engagement to meet our national securi-

ty needs and avoid shortsighted and unworkable solutions to solving operational requirements. Our challenge is to avoid dependence on rigid, fleeting, one-dimensional strategies that are overly reliant on either precision engagement or dominant maneuver. Such strategies create imbalance among the operational concepts, reduce national strategic choices, and threaten the possibility of a return to attrition warfare—and its concomitant price in human suffering.

We should never lose sight of the fact that we must keep our investment and application of these operational concepts in harmony. The challenge is getting it as close to right as we can. We don't want to eliminate options for future NCA military decisions. Nor do we want to deny full-spectrum dominance to a future CINC.

To meet this requirement, we are building tomorrow's Army capabilities today. Task Force XXI is the first step in our deliberate process to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Through the integration and leverage of information technology, we will achieve information dominance in Army XXI. The resulting shared situational understanding and real-time force synchronization will support the simultaneous application of combat power across the entire battlespace. Rapid, agile, massed, and lethal employment of dominant maneuver, balanced with precision strike capabilities to achieve U.S. national objectives, will give our Army a quantum competitive advantage over current and future adversaries. We will possess this overwhelming deterrent and destructive capability from the tactical to the strategic level.

To further our advantage and demonstrate the relevancy of our Army to national security, I encourage you to examine and address the critical issue of harmony between dominant maneuver and precision engagement at every opportunity. This will lead to a broader understanding of the relationship between these two operational concepts, a more balanced investment strategy, and a greater awareness of the important contributions that the Army brings to the defense of U.S. national interests.

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Army Vision 2010

United States Army Chief of Staff White Paper

November 12, 1996

Introduction

Army Vision 2010 is the blueprint for the Army's contributions to the operational concepts identified in *Joint Vision 2010*. It is the conceptual template for how the United States Army will channel the vitality and innovation of its soldiers and civilians and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness as the land component member of the joint warfighting team.

Joint Vision 2010 provides a coherent view of the future and the implications for joint operations expressed in terms of emerging operational concepts. *Army Vision 2010* focuses on the implications of that environment for the fundamental competency the Army contributes to joint operations—the ability to conduct prompt and sustained operations on land throughout the entire spectrum of crisis. It identifies the operational imperatives and enabling technologies needed for the Army to fulfill its role in achieving full-spectrum dominance.

Army Vision 2010 also serves as a linchpin between Force XXI, the Army's ongoing process to manage change and advance into the 21st century with the most capable Army in the world, and the Army After Next (AAN), the Army's emerging long-term vision. It is the necessary and intermediate objective en route to the next generation of strategies, soldiers, structures, and systems. While *Army Vision 2010* strives to visualize developing concepts and technologies to improve capabilities circa 2010, the AAN process stretches to conceptualize the geostrategic environment 30 years into the future. Force XXI, *Army Vision 2010*, and AAN work collaboratively to identify the types of capabilities and areas of technology applications that will accommodate their respective environments and the implications for doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers. Force XXI, *Army Vision*

2010, and AAN establish a continuum of orderly change, assuring a disciplined approach to meeting the challenges of an uncertain future and maximizing the innovativeness of the military, academia, and industry.

As the Army progresses along this continuum, aligning its vision with *Joint Vision 2010*, it will serve us well to keep in mind why the nation has an army, the values that distinguish our soldiers, and the bond between the Army and the nation—these things will not change. They are the essence of our being, and neither the geostrategic environment nor technology will break the common threads that tie yesterday's soldiers at Valley Forge to today's soldiers on the demilitarized zone in Korea, or in Bosnia, or elsewhere around the globe, to tomorrow's soldiers in the 21st century.

Why an Army—Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

To Fight and Win the Nation's Wars

The power to deny or to destroy is possessed by each of the military services. The contribution of land forces to the joint warfight is the power to exercise direct, continuing, and comprehensive control over land, its resources, and its peoples. It is this direct, continuing, and comprehensive control over land, resources, and people that allows land power to make permanent the otherwise transitory advantages achieved by air and naval forces.

To Provide a Range of Military Options Short of War—Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

Land forces perform important, and largely unique, functions besides denial and destruction. Because of their versatility, they are distinctly capable of making contributions in a sustained and measured way across the broadest array of national requirements.

Primary among these contributions is the role land forces play in support of preventive defense. Through peacetime engagement, land forces are active and dominant players in preventive defense activities ranging from nation building to military-to-military contacts. Through their presence, they provide a unique capability to impart American/democratic values as they interact with nations' armies and peoples to favorably shape the world environment and help keep potential dangers to our security from becoming full-blown threats.

They are the force that protects and controls populations, restores order, and facilitates the transition from hostilities to peace. It is through this dimension of influence that the land force component, the Army, serves to strengthen the nation's position in security and foreign policy, in negotiating treaties, in dealing with foreign governments, and in establishing alliances.

The land component is also the force of choice to respond to natural and man-made disasters, assist communities during civil disturbances, and perform civic action/nation-building projects as required. In a dynamic and unpredictable geostrategic environment, the U.S. Army provides a full range of choices to the nation and a hedge against uncertainty—a unique asset, a national asset.

To Deter Aggression

The threat of employing fully trained, highly motivated military forces equipped with modern, powerful warfighting systems serves as a credible deterrent to adversaries who might otherwise perceive the risk of conflict worth the spoils of war. The forward stationing of land forces on foreign soil identifies regions of U.S. vital interests and signals the highest degree of commitment that these interests will be protected. The deployment of military forces in times of crisis commits the prestige, honor, and resolve of the nation. The deployment of land forces is the gravest response that can be made, short of war, to demonstrate the national will to prevent conflict.

The Army's Enduring Values—Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

The Army is more than an organization; it is an institution with a unique and enduring set of values. The Army instills these values in its soldiers and civilians, the men and women who are the Army. The terms the Army uses to articulate its values—honor, integrity, selfless service, courage, loyalty, duty, and respect—inspire the

sense of purpose necessary to sustain soldiers in combat and help resolve the ambiguities of military operations where war has not been declared. Leaders of character and competence live these values. They build an Army where people do what is right, treat others as they themselves want to be treated, and can be all they can be.

The Army-Nation Bond—Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

Committing the Army commits the nation. Committing the United States Army makes a strong statement that friends and adversaries alike cannot misinterpret. No other single gesture so clearly demonstrates the ultimate commitment of the U.S. to a particular outcome as placing American soldiers in harm's way. The Army's strength always has been, and always will be, the American soldier. Soldiers are the Army. The Army makes the most significant investment it can make to the nation's security by properly training, equipping, and supporting our soldiers.

The Geostrategic Environment and Its Implications for Land Forces

The Land Force—The Versatile Force

With the end of the Cold War, a prominent theory arose that there would no longer be a need for large land forces, that power projection and national military strategy could primarily be carried out through precision strikes using technologically advanced air and naval forces. This "standoff" approach would reduce the level of U.S. involvement and commitment and thus the requirement for large land forces. Reality proved that theory to be invalid.

During the 40 years from 1950 to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Army conducted 10 notable deployments. Since 1990, in the short span of six years, we have deployed 25 times—an increase in missions by a factor of 16. This new paradigm reflects the significance of land forces in supporting the National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement.

What will the future hold? The significance of land power as the force of decision will continue to rise for several reasons. First, most future operations will occur on the lower and middle portions of the continuum of military operations ranging from disaster relief to global war, where land forces provide unique and essential capabilities, the most options, and the most useful tools. These types of operations require the commitment of U.S. land forces to establish leadership and to enable our allies and coalition partners. They call for soldiers on the ground, directly interfacing with the civilians and/or military involved in the crisis. Should the nation's military be called to take on additional nontraditional missions in support of a broadened National Security Strategy, the utility of land forces will increase even more.

The second reason for the rise in significance of land forces is their direct relevance to the National Military Strategy's strategic enablers: overseas presence and power projection. Without a doubt, all services fulfill critical functions in support of these two enablers; however, two unique characteristics apply to land forces. First, they provide the most visible sustained foreign presence—on the ground, 24 hours a day, person to person . . . cooperating, sharing risks, representing America. Second, land forces not only provide the most flexible and versatile capabilities for meeting CINC force requirements, from humanitarian assistance to combat operations, but constitute the highest percentage of the committed joint force.

Third, land forces are important to the United States' international credibility. The recent past provides a convincing example in the NATO deployment to Bosnia. Recognizing the substantial participation of U.S. air and naval forces over the past three years to support the naval blockade, air supply operations, and a no-fly zone in the Balkans, the NATO peace plan ultimately required a large, visible contingent of U.S. ground troops.

Fourth, U.S. land forces are most suitable for supporting the military's contribution to peacetime engagement and interaction with foreign military forces. The overwhelming majority of military forces throughout the world are predominantly armies. Few countries have the need or resources to maintain significant air or naval forces. Military engagement in these countries

normally means army-to-army contact. Moreover, we see this phenomenon gaining importance. As former army officers ascend to key positions in their national leadership structures, the Army's cooperative ties will increase in significance and continue to provide U.S. leadership with valuable contributions to international engagement.

However, while cognizant of the increased demand for land forces at the lower end of the contingency spectrum in the near term, we must remain vigilant of the fundamental role of the Army—to fight and win the nation's wars as the land component of the joint force.

While the threat of global war may be diminishing, the world continues to be a dangerous place, especially in those regions where traditional conflict is an acceptable means of achieving national interests, specifically the Euro–Middle East and the Asian Arc regions. Within each of these regions lie numerous nation states on their way to participating democracies and/or advanced economies. In this "transitional zone," the inherent instability in the region could evolve into actual war as once dominant states perceive an unfavorable shift in power relative to their neighbors. These states, while less capable militarily than wealthy democracies, have access to the most advanced military technology. This phenomenon creates a new danger in the future, i.e., conflict with a nation having a very sophisticated and asymmetric capability.

The motivations and prosecution of these wars will be varied. In the Euro–Middle East region (west of the Urals to the Persian Gulf to the North Atlantic), oil and radical fundamentalism serve as potential catalysts to armed conflict and will continue to do so into the foreseeable future. In the Asian Arc region (stretching from Petropavlosk to India/Pakistan) half of the world's population resides. In that region the shortage of food and arable land will pose increasingly demanding challenges in the next century. China alone has 1.2 billion people, making the U.S. population, by comparison, "right of the decimal point." Here also, war will continue to be viewed as a viable means of achieving or protecting their national interests. The conduct of war will be equally dissimilar. The general nature of combat notwithstanding, the very essence of conflict prosecuted by nations in the Asian Arc region is unlikely to be the same as that prosecuted by nations in the Euro–Middle East region. Disparate cultures, terrain, and climates will drive significant differences in their force structures, tactics, and warfighting strategies.

Collectively, the geostrategic environment, the near-term increased demand for operations on the lower end of the spectrum of crisis, and the continuing requirement to prepare to win the nation's wars suggest a redefinition of general missions for the military. These missions can be categorized into seven general areas: defending or liberating territory, punitive intrusion, conflict containment, leverage, reassurance, core security, and humanitarian.

Within these seven mission areas lie numerous crises that the military may be tasked to respond to in the years ahead. While the magnitude and frequency of these crises are unpredictable, it is certain that the full spectrum of Army capabilities will be required to contribute to each of these general missions at some time in the next century.

Technology will also play a unique role in defining capabilities as we look to the future. Consequently, we must continue to leverage the superiority of the U.S. industrial base and maintain a decisive advantage across the full range of these mission areas. While at the moment we have technological superiority, advanced warfighting capabilities are available to any nation with the means to procure them. Not coincidentally, the most active customers lie in the "transitional zone."

Implications

- We must have a military capable of deterring or defeating an emerging competitor.
- A regional focus is required for rapid response to crises in the "transitional zone," where the nation's vital interests are most at risk.
- The frequency of demands for land forces will increase as the Army is called upon to support peacetime engagement activities, i.e., multilateral military exercises, training, military-to-military exchanges, as well as crises on the lower end of the continuum, e.g., humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, peacemaking, etc.

- Technology will play an important role in enabling full-spectrum operations.

These implications suggest two primary axes: a regional focus for the traditional role of our Army and a balanced force mix to ensure "full-spectrum capability" to execute the roles and missions most likely to be levied on land forces as we enter the next century. Each of these axes will require leveraging technology to ensure swift victory with minimal casualties across the continuum of crisis.

Joint Vision 2010 provides the directional azimuth for these parallel axes and assists in sizing, organizing, and equipping the Army, and in developing the doctrine for land force operations in support of *Joint Vision 2010*. Leader development and training programs will be continually refined to keep the Army prepared to execute these full-spectrum operations as the force of decision.

The Way Ahead

Historically, we have not had the exact Army we needed when we needed it. Still, we were never truly wrong because we built an Army with a core set of capabilities and infused it with the agility and flexibility to adapt to domestic or international demands as they arose. The future will demand more . . . the modality of agility will be even more essential to our ability to adapt to a dynamic strategic environment. We will need to continuously leverage technology to ensure our force has the requisite advantage to preclude conflict if possible, but to win decisively if necessary, and to leverage the capabilities of our allies and coalition partners. In the aggregate, we must "lighten up the heavy forces and heavy up the capabilities of the light forces." Ultimately, we must always be assured of victory and certain we will never be forced to negotiate from a position of weakness.

At the very heart of this strategy is our continuing commitment to a Total Quality Force. The challenging global security environment, the complexity of emerging technologies, and the diverse missions being assigned to the Army will require men and women of intelligence and dedication, in the Active and Reserve Components, who are able to adapt quickly to the missions at hand. Reductions in the Active force have made the Reserve Component even more essential to meeting the nation's needs across the full spectrum of operations, from disaster relief to war. They are equal partners in meeting the challenges of the 21st century and must be trained and equipped with modern compatible equipment to perform assigned missions with their active-duty counterparts and coalition partners. Consequently, maintaining quality soldiers and civilians throughout the total force is our top priority. To sustain the essential contributions soldiers and civilians make, quality of life programs, a steady flow of promotions, and schooling opportunities must continue throughout their careers.

As we move into the 21st century, we will remain true to our heritage. At the same time, we will adapt our doctrine, force structure, modernization program, training, and leader development to accommodate the evolving world environment and ensure Army capabilities are integrated with those of other services and our allies to achieve maximum operational effectiveness. We will move toward *Army Vision 2010* with a common view of the future. The geostrategic environment and *Joint Vision 2010* provide the construct for that common view and the guideposts to the 21st century.

Achieving Full-Spectrum Dominance

Army Vision 2010 *Enables* Joint Vision 2010

Land component operations in 2010 will be fully integrated with those of joint, multinational, and nongovernmental partners. Recent experience reminds us that Army operations have never been and will never be independent. From initial mission receipt through deployment, operations, and transition to follow-on operations, Army elements will execute their responsibilities through a deliberate set of patterns of operation. These patterns are not phases, nor are they sequential. They serve to focus the many tasks armies have always performed in war and other military operations. The patterns are: project the force, protect the force, shape the battlespace, decisive operations, sustain the force, and gain information dominance. Five of these patterns of operation align precisely with the *Joint Vision 2010* opera-

tional concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection. The sixth, gaining information dominance, is fundamental to each of the other five Army patterns of operation as well as each of the operational concepts in *Joint Vision 2010*. The succeeding paragraphs identify the interrelationship between the Army's patterns of operation and the operational concepts in *Joint Vision 2010*, as well as the enablers and technologies the Army will pursue to fulfill its role in achieving full-spectrum dominance as the land component member of the joint team.

Dominant Maneuver

Dominant maneuver will be the multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, and space forces to accomplish assigned operational tasks.

For the land component, dominant maneuver consists of two elements: strategic and operational. Strategic maneuver equates to the Army's requirement to project the force. It initiates the process of creating an image in the mind of an adversary of an unstoppable force of unequaled competence. American land forces will begin this process of moral domination from points of embarkation around the world just as surely as winning forces have done throughout history. Time and distance change the geometry, but the principles and effects of simultaneity are the same.

Augmented with critical equipment pre-positioned where the need is most likely, air and naval components of the joint force will commence transport of a versatile, tailorable, modular Army within hours of the decision to deploy. This power projection force will be equipped with lighter, more durable, multipurpose warfighting systems, thus reducing the amount of lift required, as well as the size and complexity of the logistics tail needed to sustain the force.

Operational maneuver, the other element of dominant maneuver, equates to decisive operations. Decisive operations force the enemy to decide to give in to our will. They are inextricably linked to shaping the battlespace and precision engagement in that decisive operations are vastly enhanced by the precision fires, precise information, and precise detection capabilities inherent to precision engagement. In combat operations, decisive operations are defined in terms of victories in campaigns, battles, or engagements. In other military operations, decisive operations are defined in terms of accomplishing the military objectives (free elections in Haiti or the absence of war in Bosnia are examples). Within the patterns of operation, decisive operations are the means of achieving success. The Army, armed with situational understanding, will conduct decisive operations by positioning combat power throughout the battlefield. This unique capability—to exercise direct, continuing, and comprehensive control over land, its resources, and people—is the essence of the Army's contribution to the joint force in winning the nation's wars.

Modern technologies will exploit situational understanding phenomena to enable tailored, still undefined combat organizations to task organize quickly and fight dispersed with extraordinary ferocity and synchronization. Fused inputs from manned and unmanned sensors (including satellites) will provide unprecedented battlefield situational understanding to depths well beyond the horizon. Significant advances in avionics, weaponry, vehicle mobility, stealth, survivability, and communication technologies will make the land force truly the force of decision on the 21st century battlefield.

Precision Engagement

Precision engagement will consist of a system of systems that enables joint forces to locate the objective or target, provide responsive command and control, generate to reengage with precision when required.

Shaping the battlespace sets the conditions for success—it is directly linked with decisive operations. Together they allow the force to overcome the enemy's center of gravity and result in the total takedown of an opponent. For land forces, shaping the battlespace is far more than precision strike which, as a lone function, is nothing more than 21st century attrition warfare. Shaping the battlespace is the unambiguous integration of all combat multipliers—feints, demonstrations, limited attacks, command and control warfare (C^2W), mobility/countermobility, decep-

tion, and all available fires—with the scheme of maneuver to achieve simultaneity and thus overwhelm the enemy. It sets conditions in terms not only of what we do to the enemy but also how we posture the friendly force and take advantage of the operational environment (terrain, weather, and infrastructure).

Shaping the battlespace begins with early intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). IPB supports identification of the enemy's main effort and enables the land component commander (LCC) to *decide* on those high-value targets that will facilitate his scheme of maneuver, prioritize and sequence collection assets to *detect* and track those targets, and assign the appropriate weapon system to *deliver* the correct munitions to destroy those targets where and when he chooses.

Shaping the battlespace will be facilitated primarily by sharing real-time information among all services, allies, and coalition partners. This process will be accomplished by effectively exploiting information-age technologies that permit: isolating, tagging, and tracking of the most fleeting enemy forces and targets with precision; processing and fusing multiple sources of information from all involved components; and employing the proper force, munitions, or energy before the target is lost. Immediate and accurate battle damage assessment will facilitate reengagement. As future joint forces combine processes to make virtually any enemy force or target accessible, other technologies will enhance the intelligence and precision of the weapons used to engage them.

Full-Dimensional Protection

Full-dimensional protection will be control of the battlespace to ensure our forces can maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver, and engagement while providing multilayered defenses for our forces and facilities at all levels. This concept has global implications for the joint force. To achieve a multilayered, seamless architecture of protection from the full array of enemy weaponry and electronic systems in both strategic and operational environments, all components of the joint force must evolve concepts and technologies which can be easily coordinated and synchronized.

The Army's approach to force protection will be a holistic one, applying organizational, materiel, and procedural solutions to the challenge of protecting soldiers, information, and equipment across the full spectrum of operating environments. It will complement the capabilities of the other components to assure the joint force freedom of strategic deployment, lodgment, expansion, and maneuver without surprise or significant disruption by any enemy force. These capabilities will include an array of fused sensors and area defenses to protect critical, high-value operational and strategic assets from enemy air, land, and sea attack.

To protect the force, the Army will rely on a technically advanced, operationally simple network of multicomponent intelligence sources capable of detecting and locating forces, active and passive obstacles, in-flight aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles and their launch sites, chemical and biological agents, electronic jamming sources, and a host of still-developing threats. Missile system technologies, to defeat both air-to-surface and surface-to-surface systems, will be leveraged to enable successful engagements at ranges sufficient to provide multiple shot opportunities well before the defended areas are penetrated. Hit-to-kill technologies will neutralize chemical or biological warheads over enemy territory. Manned and unmanned platforms will contribute to the weave of sensor and weapon capabilities so that the reach of full dimensional protection can extend far beyond the horizon. Significantly more sensors will provide refined information to even more elements at lower echelons, enhancing total force situational understanding, enabling greater dispersion, and minimizing the risk of fratricide.

Advanced technologies will provide vastly improved personal armor, chemical and biological protection ensembles, and reduced signature enhancements. Many of those concepts and technologies developed to support dominant maneuver will also contribute to protecting the force.

Both at home and abroad, the Army will contribute to the strategic defense of the United States. Fitting into a detection and command and control architecture with the air and sea compo-

nents, the Army will provide the teeth of the missile engagement capability to protect the U.S. land mass against its most serious external threat-missile attack.

Focused Logistics

Focused logistics will be the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while en route, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations.

For the Army, focused logistics will be the fusion of logistics and information technologies, flexible and agile combat service support organizations, and new doctrinal support concepts to provide rapid crisis response to deliver precisely tailored logistics packages directly to each level of military operations.

Technology, once again, will be a great enabler of the concept of focused logistics. Smaller fighting elements with easily maintainable equipment, made of more durable materials which share repair-part commonality among component-specific equipment and equipment in other components, will significantly reduce the volume and complexity of the resupply system. Precision weapons with increased lethality and survivability and fuel-efficient systems will generate reductions in demands on the sustainment infrastructure. Advanced business solutions for inventory control, materiel management and distribution, transportation and warehousing, and automatic cross-leveling and rerouting will greatly expand current Army total asset visibility and objective supply capability concepts. Semiautomatic built-in diagnostic sensors will anticipate failure and initiate resupply or replacement activities before failures occur.

In the same way that built-in weapon system situational understanding software will be used to train combat crews, the situational understanding logistical network will enable suppliers to train, and will be used to "war game" operations so that supply analysts can develop alternatives and test logistics plans before operations occur. A vast array of advances in human support and medical care technologies, including "internet triage" and "telemedicine," will greatly enhance the survivability of all members of the joint force.

Clearly, focused logistics is the most applicable operational concept across the patterns of operation. No other concept is executable without focused logistics, yet focused logistics is an operation which could stand alone, particularly in humanitarian missions. Inasmuch as the Army is organized and equipped to sustain itself in long-term austere operational environments, it is especially suited to react quickly when called upon to provide logistics support for both domestic and foreign natural or man-made disasters.

Information Superiority

We must have information superiority: the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.

Information operations (IO) conducted to gain information dominance are essential to all the patterns of operation. They consist of both offensive and defensive efforts to create a disparity between what we know about our battlespace and operations within it and what the enemy knows about his battlespace. Army IO is conducted within the context of joint IO, including PSYOPS and deception campaigns to ensure the strategic, theater, and tactical efforts are synchronized and collaborative.

In the aggregate, IO technologies will assist in understanding the battlespace. High-speed processors will fuse information from multiple sources, while rapid generation of high-fidelity databases will enable the commander to visualize current and future operations. Bandwidth on demand will facilitate common understanding at all echelons and new antenna configurations will allow dissemination of real-time information on the move. At the same time, low probability of intercept/low probability of detection signature management will protect friendly information while directed and RF energy will disrupt and deny information to the enemy.

Conclusion

In this unstable and turbulent world, the Army will continually be called upon to meet the nation's needs: from responding to hurricanes,

forest fires and other disasters; to internal security matters at Olympic and inaugural events; to humanitarian assistance; to shaping the future world environment through continuous contacts around the world; to peacekeeping; to nation building; and to conflict resolution. A versatile force is required to respond with little or no notice to this full spectrum of operations.

Army Vision 2010 foresees a capabilities-based Army, with the proper mix of heavy, light, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) focused on the Euro–Middle East and Asian Arc regions of the world—a force trained, ready, and equipped to conduct full-spectrum operations, to do what needs to be done across the entire spectrum of crisis.

This versatile land force of the 21st century must retain the quality soldiers that comprise the Army today and recruit equally competent, motivated soldiers to replace them in the future to achieve a full-spectrum capability. Quality soldiers are essential to the successful execution of the operational concepts of *Joint Vision 2010* as well as *Army Vision 2010*.

America's Army is determined to meet the challenge. The Army in 2010 will be a Total Quality Force consisting of dedicated men and women, military and civilian, in both the Active and Reserve Components. Along the way, we will team with private industry and the academic community at every opportunity as a means of assuring future vitality in the science and technology base, the industrial base, and the power projection base of our Army. The results of this eclectic effort will be a force of decision projected with lighter more durable equipment to facilitate deployment and sustainability.

In the theater of operations, information-age technologies will facilitate shaping the battlespace to set the conditions for decisive operations, resulting in the successful accomplishment of all missions. From deployment through operations, transition to peace and redeployment, the force will be protected by technically advanced, operationally simple sensors, processors, and warfighting systems to ensure freedom of strategic and operational maneuver.

Most importantly, the concepts, enablers, and technologies addressed in *Army Vision 2010* will empower soldiers—not replace them. The Army of today is the product of 220 years of evolutionary change in doctrine, training, and leader development programs. The Army of tomorrow will be borne of that same process—grounded in the values, traditions, and heritage that are uniquely American. We are committed to forging that Army—to conduct prompt and sustained operations on land throughout the entire spectrum of crisis, *and* to do what needs to be done as part of the joint warfighting team envisioned in *Joint Vision 2010*. Stability in the world is assured by the presence and influence of the United States Army—yesterday, today, and tomorrow.

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Letter to Army General Officers

November 20, 1996

The Army: An Instrument of National Power Today, Tomorrow and Into the 21st Century

I recently had the honor of addressing the 1996 Fletcher Conference on the subject of "Strategy, Force Structure and Planning for the 21st Century." The Army co-sponsored this important and timely event. Approximately 300 attendees from the military, academia, defense industry and the media attended. We designed the conference to promote an open debate of the issues that will be considered during the Quadrennial Defense Review. I believe the Army's speakers did a great job and that their message resonated with the audience. I want to take this opportunity to communicate some of the themes developed by the Army.

Army Vision 2010

During the conference, I publicly released the Army's conceptual template for the opening decade of the 21st century—*Army Vision 2010*. *Army Vision 2010* is an important document, and I would like to share with you its most important aspects as we forge our Army for the 21st century.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, recently published *Joint Vision 2010*. *Joint Vision 2010* provides a coherent view of the future and outlines the implications for joint forces and joint operations expressed by four emerging operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection.

Army Vision 2010 is the blueprint for the Army's contribution to *Joint Vision 2010*, as well as reinforcing the relevance of the Army and of land forces in the 21st century. It describes our assessment of the geostrategic environment and establishes an intellectual foundation for the Army's path out to 2010. It articulates the Army's contribution to joint operations—to conduct prompt and sustained operations on land, across the spectrum of military operations. It identifies the operational imperatives and the enabling technologies to achieve full-spectrum dominance. It is an important intellectual linchpin between the Force XXI process, which provides for a continuum of orderly change, and our research into the Army After Next. *Army Vision 2010* articulates an Army that is and will continue to be a powerful and necessary instrument of national power, an Army that is creating its future with evolutionary change to achieve revolutionary results.

Why an Army

If the post–Cold War era has taught us anything, it is that land power will have a fundamentally increased relevance in the 21st century. The demand for adequate land power to support this great nation is established by enduring strategic realities. The United States is and will remain a global power with global responsibilities. The world is no longer as vast as it once was. We live in a global economic village where regional and global interdependencies are growing. The well being of the economy of the United States is dependent upon regional stability elsewhere. Conflict and instability is now land centered, no one else possesses the wherewithal to challenge U.S. dominance on the sea or in the sky. Land-centered conflict is people focused and the ability to decisively control the land, populations, or valuable resources is essential to the resolution of conflict. Conflict prevention and conflict resolution—in this world, both today and tomorrow—requires boots on the ground.

The Army is charged with providing the joint force commander adequate and sustained land power to conduct engagement in support of the National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement, to contribute to conflict prevention and deterrence, and to fight and win if necessary. Joint force commanders require a range of options short of war that support the nation's international interests. On the domestic front, support to the nation, while not a part of the National Security Strategy, is another facet of our responsibility. The Army is the only service that has the capability to provide this support across the broad range of domestic demands.

Clearly we need to maintain an Army with a full range of capabilities. We must have an Army that can concurrently contribute to preventive defense, to the deterrence of adversaries, and if necessary, to fight and win our nation's wars. We do this by helping emerging and unstable states where it is in our national interest, by conducting operations such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, by our ability to develop and nurture growing military-to-military contacts with former adversaries, and by our demonstrated ability to contribute to the rapid projection of overwhelming and decisive combat power. Land forces, adequately supported by air and naval forces, remain as the only certain decisive force.

For the nation to be decisive in war, our enemies must be presented with complex military problems beyond their ability to solve. We must maintain an adequate balance between our capabilities to assure that adversaries cannot and will not solve the military puzzle that we pose. Precision strike is important but it isn't adequate. Balance between precision strike and dominant maneuver is required.

Today's Army contributes to the joint forces commander's requirements through important overseas presence and by rapid power projection. Today's Army has boots on the ground working with our friends and allies to prevent conflict, working to deter potential adversaries, and assuring the stability in regions vitally important for trade to flourish. This is the Army of today. It is vastly different from the Cold War Army. It is a

strategic force of decision engaged in peacetime and ready to respond to crisis and to decide wars. It's our nation's most flexible instrument of national power for what will surely be an uncertain future.

Building the Army of the 21st Century

As I write this, the Army is rapidly changing and creating its future. I want to finish with some thoughts about building the Army of the 21st century—not about Force XXI or Army After Next but about our institution and our core resource, the soldiers and civilians that make up this great Army.

Our vision for the future is that we will continue to have the world's best Army, trained and ready for victory, a full-spectrum force—a total force of quality soldiers and civilians. It's a values-based organization. It's an integral member of the joint team, equipped with the most modern weapons and equipment the country can provide. It's an Army able to respond to the needs of the nation, and changing to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow, and into the 21st century.

There is much talk about what technology is going to give us—and it will—to a point. Technology is critical but it will not change the fundamental principles of war or the foundations upon which the institution of the Army rests. It is also false to believe that new technology will automatically result in large-scale reductions in the size of the Army. In this world it takes soldiers with the capability for long-term commitment to separate warring factions, to reassure fearful civilians, to restore public order, to keep criminals from taking advantage of the vacuum of civil disorder, to protect and deliver humanitarian assistance, to support the nation, and to win the nation's wars.

I am convinced that we are on the right track to building the Army of the 21st century but the outcome is not preordained. We must work smarter. We must protect our core competencies, our quality of soldiers and civilians, and our values. We must maintain the balance between readiness, quality of life, and modernization. We must have stability. We must shift resources from Cold War to post–Cold War requirements and capabilities. We must be willing to take risks. We have a window of opportunity that must be exploited. In creating its 21st century future and in changing to meet its demands the Army as an institution must be as flexible, agile, and responsive as our maneuver forces.

Tomorrow, as has always been the case, your Army will be called upon to compel and deter adversaries, to reassure friends and support our nation's needs in this unstable, turbulent, and uncertain world. Our soldiers will stand guard at the DMZ [demilitarized zone] and the Tomb of the Unknowns. They will continue to serve successfully in places like Bosnia, the Sinai and Macedonia. They will train hard at our Combat Training Centers and elsewhere around the globe. Every place where our soldiers are stationed, regardless of conditions, they will guard their posts and not quit their posts until properly relieved. They will be focused and prepared; they understand they carry upon their shoulders the proud tradition of 221 years of selfless service to the nation. They do so very much, and they ask for so very little. Our nation's soldiers, those tired, cold, dirty, magnificent soldiers, will always be our credentials.

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Letter to Army General Officers

November 26, 1996

The United States Army and the Future of Asia

I just completed a ten-day trip to Australia, Japan, and Korea to visit my counterparts and see our soldiers serving in these countries. While the trip was too short to do justice to the importance of this part of the world, I did gain a few useful insights into the emerging future of this terribly important region and the critical role our Army must play in shaping that future.

The fall of the Berlin Wall was a great strategic earthquake that drastically altered the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Although the Asian-Pacific region certainly felt the shocks of this

earthquake, the great events that will form the strategic future of this region are yet to come.

The most near term of these events is the almost inevitable reunification of Korea. How this will play out is still anyone's guess, but the three probable scenarios are external explosion and attack by North Korea, an internal implosion and collapse of the Communist regime, or possibly a "soft landing" created by economic and political reform in the North. However, two things are clear. First, despite the inevitable victory of the ROK [Republic of Korea]-U.S. Combined Forces Command, a North Korean attack would be a human and economic tragedy of horrific dimensions, not only for the warring parties but also for the region. Second, the key to deterring such an attack in the future will remain as it always has been—a rock-solid Korean-U.S. alliance manifested by our combined combat-ready and determined forces. Our soldiers, their boots firmly planted on the friendly soil of our magnificent ROK allies, will be required to help maintain stability in Korea until the light of freedom shines throughout the entire Land of the Morning Calm.

The more long-range event that will shape the future geopolitical landscape of Asia is the full emergence of China as an economic and possibly military superpower. As Ambassador [Walter] Mondale told me in Tokyo, "How China fits into the equation is the major defining issue over the next many years." Insuring that China fits into the international security system peacefully is in the interest of all our nations. To this end, President Clinton has said that we seek to engage China, not to contain it. And engaging China successfully will require a stable and secure security environment throughout Northeast Asia.

Our soldiers presence contributes enormously to stability and security. Not only does it deter potential adversaries, it also forges strong bonds between our Army and those of our allies and friends. These bonds will be increasingly important as we work together as we must to meet the increasingly diverse challenges of the coming security environment, one that lacks the simplicity and certainty of the Cold War era when threats were clear, missions were straightforward, and unavoidable frictions were submerged by the need to meet a common enemy.

These bonds are not formed by policies and regulations published by higher headquarters. They are forged one by one by good soldiers from different nations, serving, working and training together in common cause. And they pay enormous dividends. This time in Korea I met my good friend, General Do Il Kyu, with whom I'd served in the Combined Forces Command almost a decade ago. General Do is now Chief of Staff of the ROK Army. Last year in Japan I met General Nishimoto, then Chairman of the Japanese Joint Staff Council, equivalent to our CJCS [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]. General Nishimoto and I were classmates at the Army War College. I have also had the opportunity to get to know General Watanabe, my Japanese counterpart, on three occasions, twice now in Japan and once in Washington. The mutual understanding, respect, and friendship we in the U.S. Army share with these great officers and all the others that we have met over the years allow us to accomplish our mission in Northeast Asia—we couldn't do it otherwise.

It's terribly important that we continue to forge these bonds in the future. Defense Minister Kim Dong Jin of the Republic of Korea was once a student at our Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. This week I met three of our officers studying at the ROK Army College, and two ROK Army officers are among the 38 allied officers in this year's CGSC [Command and General Staff College] class. These students may be the Kim's Dong Jin of the 21st century—ours may be our senior leaders of Army XXI. The bonds between our armies will remain as strong and enduring as they are today because of this.

But we must always remember why our allies and friends want to be associated with our Army, to attend our training institutions, to train with our units. It's because we have the best Army in the world—we have to. We're the decisive force for stability and peace around the world, from Bosnia to Korea to Kuwait.

And we have the best Army in the world because we have the finest soldiers in the world. I just had the chance to visit a few units on this trip, but our soldiers in the U.S. Army Japan and the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea do us proud. Our allies and adversaries know that we're serious

about securing the future peace, freedom, and stability of Asia because America cares enough to send our very best.

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Letter to Army General Officers

December 4, 1996

AUSA Symposium—National Missile Defense

I recently had the opportunity to address a very important symposium on missile defense hosted by AUSA in El Paso, Texas. The meeting's importance was underscored by the fact, I believe, that we have a great opportunity here to take care of our nation—to lay a brick or two on the path to the future for the defense of the American homeland. Since 1775 the Army's most important mission and still our reason for being—to "provide for the common defense."

The Army today is very mindful of this legacy; defense of the American homeland is not something we take for granted. Americans have a real rational and uncompromising expectation that their armed forces provide for their security, not just around the world but also at home. We have met these demands for over 200 years; our Active, Guard and Reserve forces' record of success justifiably reinforces these expectations.

I say armed forces for a simple and unequivocal reason: Defense of the homeland has been and will always be an inherently joint mission. No other way assures continued success. Our historical role in defense of the homeland is central to the Army's purpose. Since ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] became a threat 38 years ago, the ground-based active defense portion of national missile defense has been an Army mission as indicated by our past participation in Safeguard and SDI and by today's efforts.

Right now, the U.S. has no defense against long-range ballistic missile attacks aimed at our homeland. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies leaves us uncertain of the sophistication and emergence of such threats. We are, however, certain of one thing. An attack or the threat of an attack in the absence of an adequate defense is unacceptable.

We do have a strategy to develop a treaty-compliant national missile defense system. Consistent with our proud history and current national and Department of Defense policies, *Joint Vision 2010*, and in cooperation with other services and agencies, the Department of the Army will serve as lead service for national missile defense activities, with the ultimate goal of providing a comprehensive ground-based defense against accidental, unauthorized, or intentional launches against the territory of the United States, including Hawaii and Alaska.

This must be a joint effort and the Army is ready to do its part. We can develop, test, deploy, and operate a cost and operationally effective NMD [national missile defense] system consistent with the respective antiballistic missile and strategic arms reduction treaties. We plan to use the existing Grand Forks, N.D., ABM site and testing infrastructure with elements that have been specifically designed for the NMD mission as part of the department's approved "3+3" program.

The Army has development contracts for critical components of the ground-based NMD system, including a ground-based interceptor consisting of Exo Atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) designed to intercept attacking missiles at long ranges. We are on track for an interceptor fly off in FY98. The Army is also working with the Ballistic Missile Defense Office and the Air Force to ensure a fair and rigorous consideration of all reasonable booster alternatives for the ground-based interceptor.

The NMD ground-based radar will acquire, track, and discriminate strategic reentry vehicles in their midcourse phase of flight, as well as provide fire control for the interceptor. This radar will heavily leverage THAAD [theater high-altitude air defense] technology.

The final critical component is battle management, command, control and communications which must provide connectivity between engagement planning, the elements and the oper-

ator. It will also interface with external systems, such as the Integrated Tactical Warning/AJK Assessment System, Defense Support Program Satellites, Space-Based Infrared System, and Early Warning Radars.

The U.S. Army Space Command and the Army National Guard Bureau are aggressively working the manning requirements and concepts of operations in support of the USCINCSPACE execution of the NMD mission. This is an exciting, and potentially rewarding, return of the Army National Guard to its proud historical role in defense of the homeland and its extensive air defense role as in the days of Skysweeper, Nike-Ajax, and Nike-Hercules—a proven distinguished record.

All of this is doable now—nothing magic here. The challenge is to fund the $5B price tag; but, it is still the most cost-effective system we have.

I have said, and I will say again and again—defense of the nation is inherently joint. We—all of us—have no greater responsibility to the people than to ensure that when required we put in place a joint national missile defense system that meets their security expectations. This requires a joint effort that is comprehensive and proactive, incorporating offensive and defensive capabilities. It requires a joint effort that is responsive and ensures an overmatch to threats as they are identified and before they emerge. It requires a joint effort that is efficient and economical to avoid trading away or delaying other necessary capabilities, the loss of which might undermine our full spectrum dominance. Finally, it requires a joint effort that is treaty compliant to avoid delays in development, if so directed and funded.

This must be a joint effort, but make no mistake—the Army will play a key role. We have successfully discharged this mission ever since the threat of missiles emerged. Our workforce at Huntsville and throughout the Army, with their considerable experience in this area, is a national treasure.

The motto of the U.S. Army Air Defense Command—"Vigilant and Invincible"—has been etched in our history through the hard work and sacrifice of countless soldiers and civilians. They have stood as freedom's guardians, with their eyes on the sky. Their success can be measured by the number of attacks on our territory. It is a perfect record so far.

Now as a more sophisticated threat continues to develop we must use our expertise and experience to remain "Vigilant and Invincible."

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Letter to Army General Officers

December 17, 1996

The United States Army—Combining Diplomacy and Force To Meet the Nation's Needs—Today, Tomorrow, and in the 21st Century

I recently received a note from President [William J.] Clinton congratulating our soldiers and acknowledging the enormous success of the Implementation Force (IFOR) mission as it comes to an end. I want to share that letter with you and ask that you pass the word to all of our soldiers. It is through the collective effort of every single soldier in our Army that accomplishments like this are possible.

President Clinton wrote, "I want to take the opportunity to thank personally the soldiers of the United States Army for their stellar performance in Bosnia and around the world." He asked that I pass on both his personal gratitude and professional regard for the men and women who wear the Army green. He pays great tribute to all of our soldiers who stand ready at a moment's notice to defend this great nation and our freedom by stating, "Whenever our nation has called, they have responded magnificently. Who better deserves our appreciation than those Major General William Nash recently described as our . . . 'cold, tired, dirty, magnificent soldiers . . . on the ground.'"

IFOR's accomplishments in Bosnia over the past year have been nothing short of colossal. Put into perspective, for over three years the world's leading nations, under the auspices of the United Nations, tried desperately to bring peace and

order to war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina with little success. Then, last December, NATO, with almost 20,000 American soldiers, deployed into this war-torn land as part of the IFOR to enforce the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords, a seemingly impossible mission to help bring peace to an area of the world hopelessly mired in ethnic hatred and civil war. The soldiers on the ground, well trained and with a clear mission, were able to separate the warring parties and set the conditions for peace to take hold.

Today, some twelve months into this enormous peace enforcement and nation-building effort, our NATO ground forces have successfully implemented and enforced all of the military measures in the Dayton Peace Accords—separation of the Serb, Croat and Muslim forces and demilitarization of a corridor 600 miles long and 2 1/2 miles wide, known as the Zone of Separation (ZOS). Our soldiers unceasingly demonstrated their ability, tenacity and determination to accomplish a difficult mission in an often dangerous and unforgiving environment. Our successes in helping to stabilize and rebuild Bosnia are clear proof that it takes soldiers on the ground, a visible force of well-trained professional soldiers to show warring parties that America means business. Once again the United States Army has been at the forefront, clearly demonstrating to the world that we are a full-spectrum force—a capabilities-based force—a force of decision.

But U.S. Army soldiers are engaged, day in and day out, not just in Bosnia but around the world and at home, combining diplomacy and force to advance America's security interests. On an average day the Army has over 35,000 soldiers deployed away from home station, serving our nation around the world as emissaries reassuring our friends and allies, deterring potential aggressors and showing the nation's commitment to peace and stability. As Secretary Christopher pointed out recently in a speech at West Point, "The world is now more interdependent than ever, the line between domestic and foreign policy has been erased, and our security and economic interests are inseparable. . . . The history of this century teaches us that as America's engagement around the world increases, the likelihood we will be drawn into conflict decreases."

I am extremely proud of the role our Army and its soldiers perform to protect and enhance America's global interests. Our soldiers' ability to combine force and diplomatic skills has been essential for the nation's strategy of engagement and enlargement. As President Clinton said, "America remains the indispensable nation. There are times when only America can make the difference between war and peace, between freedom and repression, between hope and fear . . . and where we can make a difference—America must act and lead."

Our soldiers have demonstrated time and again their ability to act and to lead—to create the conditions and enforce the rules that can bring peace and stability where others have been unsuccessful. President Clinton is absolutely correct when he quoted General Nash; our Army's successes have always been and will always be delivered to a grateful nation by "cold, tired, dirty, magnificent soldiers—the soldiers on the ground." My sincere thanks to all of you for a job well done.

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Letter to Army General Officers

December 20, 1996

United States Army Support to Humanitarian Operations in Cambodia and Laos

Every day, U.S. Army soldiers and Department of the Army civilians do many valuable things for the Army and our nation. I wanted to share with you a real success story of U.S. Army support for two significant ongoing humanitarian operations taking place in Cambodia and Laos. Both are joint operations in which Army soldiers and civilians play important roles as members of dedicated teams, alongside U.S. sailors, airmen and marines.

One of these operations is the work being done by Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTF-FA). Established in 1992, the mission of JTF-FA

is to provide the fullest possible accounting for those Americans still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. JTF-FA is commanded by Army Brigadier General Jim Campbell and consists of about 180 investigators, analysts, linguists and other specialists from all four services and several Department of Defense civilians. They are supported by casualty resolution specialists and anthropologists from the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CILHI), representatives of the Defense POW/MIA Office and augmentees from all of U.S. Pacific Command's component commands.

JTF-FA works closely with the host nations' governments and the local communities of suspected crash sites. The interaction between U.S. personnel and the local Cambodians and Laotians is not limited exclusively to investigative or recovery work. Using engineer personnel from USARPAC [United States Army Pacific] and other U.S. PACOM [Pacific Command] components, JTF-FA has also helped coordinate well drilling, road repair, school construction and the upgrading of a hospital. Additionally, medical personnel from Special Forces and the Tripler Army Medical Center in Hawaii accompany joint field activity teams to crash sites and conduct medical civic action projects in the local community while the investigation/recovery takes place. These humanitarian activities generate a tremendous amount of goodwill, which facilitates ongoing and future JTF-FA operations. They also build and strengthen friendly relations between our countries beyond the scope and duration of the JTF-FA operation.

Another critical humanitarian operation taking place in Cambodia and Laos involving U.S. Army personnel is the Demining Assistance Program. This operation also builds goodwill for our country and indirectly builds support for JTF-FA efforts. The lead agency for this program is the Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC). The small assistance teams performing these missions consist of Army Special Forces soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), from Okinawa and the 3d Battalion of the 1st SFG (A) from Fort Lewis.

Additionally, Army psychological operations specialists from Fort Bragg, Marine Corps explosive ordnance demolition (EOD) experts and augmentees from PACOM components, such as the contracting officer from the 25th Infantry Division (Light), are currently in Laos. The principal mission of these teams is to use the "train-the-trainer" model to create a host-nation capability in demining and in unexploded ordnance disposal. In Cambodia, the problem is almost exclusively with mines. In Laos, unexploded ordnance is the main problem in the northern part of the country; mines are more prevalent in southern Laos.

Our soldiers provide a variety of training: basic demining, mine awareness, medical training, and leadership training on how to command and control demining platoons and sections. However, U.S. Army soldiers do not participate in mine-clearing operations themselves. Their main focus is to teach humanitarian demining to those people who will form the cadre to actually demine their countries. A key part of the training program is an assessment phase, in which the trainers return to check on and assess how well their pupils are employing the skills taught them and whether any refresher trainer is required.

The benefits of the Demining Assistance Program are clear. We build strong ties by helping these countries take care of a serious problem. We also foster professionalism and self-reliance among the Cambodians and Laotians by using the train-the-trainer model. Our demining efforts can also indirectly assist the JTF-FA to fully account for our losses from the Vietnam War.

An additional program which accrues goodwill, both of a long-term nature and for JTF-FA and the Demining Assistance Program, is DoD's Humanitarian Assistance Program Excess Property (HAP-EP). USARPAC soldiers and civilian workers operate HAP-EP on a daily basis for USPACOM. In 1996, under HAP-EP, hospital components were shipped to Laos in support of hospital construction there and HAP-EP funds were used for a variety of in-country support. Two HAP-EP donations to Cambodia were made in 1996 consisting of tools, furniture, clothing, school supplies, food preparation and eating utensils, tents, sleeping mats, ponchos, canteens and medical supplies. Some 134,000 humanitarian daily rations were shipped to Phnom Penh under this program to support Khmer Rouge defectors and their families.

These ongoing operations in Cambodia and Laos are excellent examples of U.S. Army support to critical U.S. missions. We're not only taking proper care for our missing and for their families, but are helping other less fortunate people who can benefit from our resources and expertise. Like you, I'm proud that Army soldiers and civilians are playing such important roles in these meaningful projects.

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Letter to Army General Officers

December 24, 1996

Army–Air Force Warfighter Conference

Recently I participated in the annual Army–Air Force Warfighter Conference at Fort Bliss, Texas. The conference was sponsored by DCSOPS [Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations] and hosted by Major General [John] Costello and the fine soldiers and civilians of the installation. Truly a first-class effort by all. The attendees, thirty general officers, represented the majority of the Army and Air Force's senior leadership.

The objectives of the conference were to provide the senior leadership of both services information on recent operational and doctrinal developments, an open forum for candid discussion and resolution of issues and actions of mutual interest for both services, and an opportunity for directing the respective staffs as they continue to work outstanding issues.

The conference was intellectually stimulating and productive for both services. We conducted information briefings on our respective visions, on efforts being undertaken to meet the challenges of the 21st century, and on issues still requiring resolution. I've highlighted some of those briefings below.

In regards to *Army Vision 2010*, Air Force questions focused on the issues of Guard and Reserve mix and how well it's working and supporting the Active force, how well the LOGCAP concept is working and what problems we have experienced, progress we're making in the revolution in logistics, and what impact calling up Guard/Reserves is having on their retention.

General [William W.] Hartzog's presentation on Army XXI and Major General [Robert H.] Scales' presentation on the Army After Next were well received and generated considerable discussion. Some general concerns from attendees were how we will protect the electronic signature associated with these two efforts and the amount of jointness associated in this process, but the consensus of the Air Force community is we are leading the way in developing our future force structure.

General [Ronald] Fogleman's AF vision presentation focused on their long-range plan, and their intention to produce a manual similar to the Army's FM 100–5. Primary focus of the presentation was on diversity of views and why the Air Force thinks differently. They put a lot of emphasis on denial of the enemy's own airspace.

During the Air Force presentation on imagery support, they committed to meeting our command and control timelines for Predator. The challenge remains in getting the UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] retasked on a timely basis from the element designated in the ATO [air tasking order] to the element requesting support under dynamic retasking. The Air Force has pledged to work hard to address this shortcoming. Additional UAVs and enhancing the ground station's span of control will go a long way towards easing this problem.

After considerable discussion of the doctrinal issues associated with the joint pubs for countering air and missile threats, and joint fire support, we reached agreement on the issue most critical to the Army, primacy in an area of operations. In the area between the FSCL and the surface component commander's (SCC) forward boundary, the SCC is the supported commander. Forward of the SSC forward boundary, the air component commander (ACC) is the supported commander. I think it is also fair to say that we agreed to rename the JFFC and that it would be an option primarily for joint task forces. In sum, I think we are very close on the majority of other issues, and look to wrap up both 3.01 and 3.09 in the near future.

We also made significant headway in several other areas. As a result of the Pope Air Force Base

briefing, we reached agreement to identify that where Army and Air Force facilities are collocated, commonality should be applied to achieve dollar savings and improved performance. In regard to the C–17's ability to meet our unimproved landing and brigade airdrop requirements, equipment enhancements and continued joint testing should reduce or eliminate existing shortcomings. Discussions of TMD [theater missile defense] focused on warning time and capabilities of our force protection TOC [tactical operations center]. Upcoming joint exercises should give us better visibility on these issues. Finally, the Bosnia presentation by Major General [William] Nash demonstrated the tremendous contributions the joint team is making to stability in the region.

Although not all inclusive, this brief summary demonstrates that mutual cooperation contributes to the betterment of both services. My assessment is we met the conference objectives, and welcome the opportunity for future dialogue.

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Letter to Army General Officers

January 13, 1997

Drill Sergeants

Between 3 and 8 January Sergeant Major of the Army McKinney and I talked with drill sergeants and training base cadre at Forts Leonard Wood [Missouri], Knox [Kentucky], Jackson [South Carolina], Lee [Virginia], Eustis [Virginia], Benning [Georgia] and McClellan [Alabama]. Our purpose was to demonstrate the Army senior leadership's pride in their professionalism and value to the Army and the nation. As you would expect, they are inspiring men and women who are charged with the tremendously difficult and absolutely critical task of turning our nation's young men and women into professional soldiers who can fight and win on the battlefield, soldiers who are worthy of being called "our nation's credentials." Drill sergeants do more than touch the future of our Army—they make it.

At each installation I began by reminding them what a great and successful year 1996 has been for the Army. We have completed a complex Active Component drawdown, with funding adequate to our mission. More important, the Army has earned the admiration of the nation and the world. From Bosnia to Korea to Kuwait to the Olympics to forest fires, floods, and storms, soldiers trained by our drill sergeants have performed magnificently. It is easy to understand why we have been so successful. We enjoy the highest quality people at every level of the force, working together as a team, shaped and guided by strong values, operating consistently with the best traditions and history of the Army. The Army's drill sergeants should justifiably feel proud of their part in this success.

I projected for them what we expect for 1997. Simply stated, it is more of the same. Our engagement around the world will not change. CONUS [Continental United States] training will be as important as ever. Given the end of our drawdown and stabilization of the force, we will have to recruit 90,000 plus new soldiers this year—20,000 more than last year. This increase will necessarily impact on the workload among some of our individual entry training installations. Greater stability is our goal for next year. Living Army values will continue to sustain our efforts.

As good as last year was for the Army, we were not perfect. Our problems with sexual harassment, initially identified in the training base, is a force-wide issue. Sexual harassment strikes at the very heart of Army values, so I addressed the issue directly with the drill sergeants, whom we count on to instill these values in our new soldiers. I believe we have handled the problem well so far and we will continue to do what is right for our soldiers and the Army. Our program in this regard will address the problem head-on. Using "Chain Teaching" methods, we want to ensure that everyone identifies and understands the problem, knowing what action to take to prevent or correct harassment, and that all soldiers clearly understand and live by the Army's policy of zero tolerance. I am proud to say no one is waiting for a teaching package to begin dealing forthrightly with this situation.

I told them that they are expected to provide the best possible leadership they can for every soldier. I gave them three simple rules—my command philosophy—as a guide. First, do what is right legally and morally everyday. Second, create in their units an environment in which all soldiers can be all they can be. Finally, practice the "Golden Rule"—treat others as we would like to be treated. Army values are key—respect for each other and respect for the chain of command are essential to everything we do.

As we continue to work through the sexual harassment issue, we must ensure we do not allow a backlash to emerge that creates more problems. First, no one should fear reporting a case of abuse; our soldiers must have confidence that their chain of command will deal effectively with any problem they have. Second, we must not allow our policy of zero tolerance to cause leaders to stop enforcing Army standards because they fear the accusation of harassment. Our superb NCO Corps must never fall off the standards that have made us the great Army we are today.

The Army's NCO Corps is the finest in the world—it sets our Army apart and above every other. Having commanded a BCT [basic training] company, I have a tremendous appreciation for the challenges faced by our drill sergeants. They do the impossible—turn civilians into soldiers—in a very short time and they do it very well. Army veterans across the country remember their sergeants. If they were in combat they remember the squad leader who saved their life; veterans from war and peace remember the drill sergeant who changed their life. Even Secretary of Defense Perry, an enlisted soldier some years ago, remembers his drill sergeant with respect and admiration. As Sergeant Major of the Army McKinney reminded them, they must live the NCO creed: No one is more professional than the NCO, all soldiers are entitled to outstanding leadership, and our NCO's will provide that leadership.

The Army's NCOs, and especially drill sergeants, have earned and deserve the special trust and confidence of the nation. As we talk to soldiers in our units and civilians in our communities, we need to take every opportunity to express our support for them. NCOs are the backbone of the Army—always have been and always will be. The Army's success today and in the future has been and always will be the result of our NCOs' enforcement of the Army standards of mutual respect, teamwork, and honor. Our NCOs are the best in the world. We need to let them, and the rest of the nation, know that we understand and appreciate all that they do for the Army and the country.

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Letter to Army General Officers

February 13, 1997

Army After Next—Winter Wargame
(27 January–6 February 1997)

The purpose of the Army After Next project is to conduct broad studies of warfare to about the year 2025, and frame issues vital to the development of the U.S. Army after about 2010. These issues will then be provided to the senior Army leadership in a format suitable for integration into TRADOC combat development programs.

Embodied in the AAN project are a series of wargames, workshops, and conferences that provide a basis for development and analysis of a long-term vision for the Army. The Army successfully completed an action last week that will help chart the direction of its future development, the first annual Army After Next (AAN) Winter Wargame at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. I, along with senior leadership from all services, attended the one-day senior leaders seminar that summarized the products obtained from two weeks of wargaming. We should be justifiably proud of the efforts put forth by all.

The AAN Winter Wargame represents one of our key efforts in the initial AAN research cycle. It is the first in a continuum that I believe will make the AAN Winter Wargame effort our strategic "combat training center" of the future. The AAN WWG fully accomplished its principal objective of producing insights into the nature of war in 2020, the window well beyond the current POM cycle. While no firm conclusions can be estab-

lished at this early point, repetitive investigations through these wargames will eventually illuminate the direction that the Army must follow to ensure its effectiveness in future warfare.

Each participant was challenged to break free of the inhibitions of 20th century perspectives. By doing so, they made an important contribution to the Army's understanding of the characteristics its forces will require to be successful in war 30 years into the future. Additionally, linkage with similar programs of the other services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense will facilitate the discovery of common ground and the synchronization of our efforts to meet future security requirements.

The game, sponsored by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, was a free-play politicomilitary exercise involving U.S., allied, regional nation, adversary, and special player teams. Blue, red, pink, and green teams came together to grapple with the strategic and policy issues raised by 21st century warfare and the implications of 2020 era forces. At the height of the game, over 430 participants were involved, including such distinguished individuals as Ambassador Richard L. Armitage, Dr. Milton Kovner, Ms. Natalie Crawford, Mr. James McCullough, Mr. Marten van Heuven, Mr. Charles Dick, and a host of retired general officers representing various services.

The objective of the wargame was to provide the Army leadership strategic insights based on analysis of war in 2020. While the year 2020 was chosen more or less arbitrarily, the true focus of our AAN efforts remains on the thirty-year future. The issues and insights surfaced during the game will prove crucial as we establish a foundation for performing additional analysis.

The wargame was intellectually stimulating and productive for the Army, as well as the other services, a number of allied officers, government agencies, and technologists from an array of disciplines. The use of the wargame as a vehicle to inform and stimulate a number of selected technologists and industry representatives will allow us to further focus our efforts to meet the technical challenges associated with the AAN.

Some of the wargame panel briefings are highlighted below. Although not all inclusive, this brief summary contains some of the issues and insights critical to the development of the AAN.

Strategic Panel

- It appears the tempo of future military events may outstrip the diplomatic ability to influence national actions in a crisis.
- Military ties and alliances in certain regions of the world need to be strengthened. This may also require the development of a strategic plan for allies.
- We must protect the dimension of space. That may require a space doctrine, development of options to compensate for space vulnerabilities, and new treaties to address the issues associated with attacks on space-based systems.

Allied Panel

- The ability of the AAN force to transition from conflict to peacetime engagement is an issue that requires further investigation.
- Continuous assessment of the contributions of coalition forces to the AAN force effort is essential.

Theater/Operational Panel

- Space is not universally viewed as national territory. Since a strike in space may not be perceived as an attack on the homeland, preemption in space may not be escalatory.
- Our dependence on GPS [global positioning system] demands either a rapid reconstitution of backup satellites, a surrogate (UAV) system, or a redundant (alternative) system for our POS-NAV/PGM systems.
- Information operations/strategic network attack needs a great deal of intellectual thought and operational ownership at the DoD/NCA [Department of Defense/National Command Authority] level. Such attack should be a national weapon of considerable advantage. However, if we become overly reliant on information operations and strategic networks, it could lead to a disadvantageous trade-off with an enemy that is less reliant. Think of SOF [Special Operations Forces] as global scouts.
- Future operational success is likely to be even more dependent on speed and mobility. Decisions will be assured within days, if not hours.

◆ Perceived view of the NCA is: They want accurate predictions, low casualties, conflicts of limited scope, options kept open, and force used incrementally. Preemption, although always an option, is not desirable.

Space Panel

◆ Full-spectrum dominance is keystone to global AAN success. Space assets are principal contributors to achieving that dominance.

◆ The Army, heretofore, focused on delivering space products to warfighters. Given the importance to AAN, possible issues are: space policy dialog and development of supporting Army doctrine, Army role in USCINCSPACE Space Control Mission, and space literacy across the Army.

My assessment is we met the exercise objectives in thinking about and addressing issues associated with 21st century warfare. I encourage your participation in the process to think, discuss, educate, and determine requirements for future warfare. Your involvement in this effort is critical to the AAN project.

We cannot lose the momentum or let the knowledge gained during this wargame rest. We must make the Winter Wargame series better and include more joint participation. I look forward to your support and the continuing process of analysis, excursions, conferences, and intermediate wargames on the road to Winter Wargame 98.

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Letter to Army General Officers

March 4, 1997

Soldier and Family Programs for the 21st Century

Last weekend I held a board of directors meeting with the Vice Chief of Staff, and the Army Title X four-star commanders. The conference was hosted by Major General Dick Chilcoat and the fine soldiers and civilians of Carlisle Barracks. Truly a first-class effort by all.

The objective of the conference was to inform the senior leadership command teams of the current status of soldier and family programs and their direction for the future. It was an open forum for candid discussion and resolution of issues of mutual interest to both the leadership and the Department-level proponents.

The conference was intellectually stimulating and productive for all. We received information briefings from the Army Surgeon General, USAREUR [United States Army Europe] Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Community and Family Support Center and Director, Army Emergency Relief, on their respective programs, their efforts to meet the challenges of the 21st century, and issues still requiring resolution. The highlights of some of these briefings are as follows:

Regarding TRICARE, we have gone through major changes in how we do medical care. It is important to realize we are not going back. We will continue to experience some growing pains, as with any type of change. We must address these bumps in the road on an individual basis, and we will come out all right in the end. I am convinced that once TRICARE is fully implemented, the quality of health care will be as high as ever and, more importantly, access will be better than ever. Educating the force, dealing with issues and providing feedback remains key. It is incumbent on all of us as leaders to reassure our soldiers and family members that medical care has always been and will remain a priority. We must all be sensitive to the implementation of this critical QOL [quality of life] issue. I ask all concerned to get into the details, review in- and out-processing procedures and to be sensitive to the impact upon the retired communities. This can not be business as usual if we expect the Total Army Family to be properly supported.

The presentation by Colonel Alexander and Diane Devens, from USAREUR ODCSPER [Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel], on the family support system for Operation Joint Endeavor was especially noteworthy. Success at home with the family support system was as important as success in Bosnia-Herzegovina. USAREUR treated the training of rear detachment commanders, Army community services, and caring for families as part of the mission. This opera-

tion emphasized the need to relook the peacetime organization and mission of our community support structure in light of the changing deployment environment.

The HQDA [Headquarters Department of the Army] Installation XXI team outbriefed the results of their symposiums conducted over the last year. During the symposiums, soldiers, retirees, and family members were asked to prioritize programs and services as core, essential or nice to have. It became apparent that many of the services our soldiers, families, and retirees deem most important are at most risk. Medical benefits were deemed core and of greatest priority, along with the commissary, and exchanges. Other programs deemed core were Child Care and Child and Spouse Abuse Prevention Programs, and physical fitness facilities. Other surveys conducted by Forces Command and the Community and Family Support Center support these results as well. It is important that we get this word out to members of Congress and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]. When congressional delegations and members of OSD visit you, it is important that they talk to soldiers and hear their concerns. They will have much more credibility than any of us testifying before Congress. They are our credentials.

Lieutenant General (Retired) Thompson provided an update on Army Emergency Relief (AER). They continue to provide an invaluable service to our soldiers and widows. Their financial status remains strong with 189 million dollars in assets. AER has partnered with the Red Cross to reimburse them for soldier assistance, improving access to assistance for our soldiers and families in remote locations. Red Cross will continue to administer the aid but will be reimbursed by AER for the amount of aid given.

Community and Family Support Center provided several informational briefings on the myriad of programs we have. There has been considerable changes in many of these programs, and it was an extremely educational experience for us all. We will take a hard look at current regulatory requirements. The key is to give installation and garrison commanders maximum flexibility in providing services to their soldiers and families. We will continue to work with OSD to allow us to use resources in ways we deem most appropriate to meet the core needs of our people. We must also take a look at stripping out duplication in programs.

We have several challenges ahead of us given the Quadrennial Defense Review and the current and future fiscal realities. It is imperative that we give our commanders the tools to provide the best quality of life affordable to our soldiers and their families. We will continue to refine the installation commander and garrison commander courses to ensure they know the tools available to them and the breadth of flexibility the law allows.

Retention of quality soldiers is essential to maintaining the world's best Army. We may enlist soldiers, but we retain families. We must make the improvement of the quality of life of our force a top priority. We continue to ask so much of the Army Family everyday—we owe them a quality of life at least as good as that enjoyed by the society our soldiers defend.

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Army Family Action Planning Conference

McLean, Virginia

March 12, 1997

Thank you all very much for such a warm welcome and thank you for what you're doing here with us this week. I always enjoy talking to this great group. This is a special group because of who you are and what you represent. General Creighton Abrams served as our Chief of Staff in the mid-1970s, and he always used to say that the Army is not made up of people—the Army is people. I absolutely believe that, and you really reinforce that to me and all of the Army's senior leadership. Thank you for being here and thank you for the contributions you make. I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to talk to you about the Army and I would like to frame my remarks in the context of "change and continuity," because that is what the Army is really all about.

First, we want to talk about change. For the U.S. Army the 21st century began in 1989 with the crumbling of the Berlin Wall. I understood the importance of this event in our lives, but I had no idea what its magnitude would be. I imagine as we look back on that October nearly ten years ago, very few of us could have predicted how important it would be to the United States Army. That event, and what's happened since then, has changed the Army physically and culturally.

The physical change is pretty easy to quantify and define. You may not know the exact numbers or figures, but you know there has been change because all of us have been part of it in some way or another.

We have taken 620,000 people out of the Army, over half a million people, Active Component, Reserve Component and Department of the Army civilians. We've closed over 700 bases. Over 600 of these bases were overseas, primarily in Europe, which is the equivalent of closing twelve major installations here in the Continental United States. There are emotions associated with that change; it's not just numbers. Army families living in Europe know that very well. In many cases for them the drive to commissaries is longer and kids have to be bused to school over greater distances.

We've realigned or closed a lot of installations here in the Continental United States. It's been terribly, terribly emotional for all of us, but we had to do it because we were dedicated to taking care of people, to keeping the Army trained and ready. We've gone down from twenty-eight divisions in the total force in 1989 to just eighteen Active and Reserve Component divisions today. OPTEMPO [operational tempo], the pace at which we're operating, has increased more than 300 percent. All this with a thirty-nine percent reduction in the resources available to run the Army. That's a lot of change; you can understand the magnitude of the challenges we face and the magnitude of the accomplishments we have seen.

But there's another important part of change, the cultural part. Cultural change is harder for me to describe. I spend a lot of time talking about it to members of Congress and the American people because it's important that they understand that we've not only physically changed the Army but that we've also culturally changed the Army. We've changed it from a threat-based force to a capabilities-based force.

Let me explain. In my thirty-four years in the United States Army, twenty-seven of them have been in that threat-based force. It's was a different type of Army then. In many ways it was a very dangerous time, but it was also simple. We understood what we were doing. We knew what our threat was. We trained against that threat. We knew our doctrine against that threat. We modernized against that threat. It was somewhat simple to know what the threat was doing to make sure that we did what we had to do in order to overcome it. We were very comfortable in that type of environment because it was very defined. We knew what size Army we had to have. We knew it would take the Active Component, the Reserve Component, and DA [Department of the Army] civilians—all very quantifiable. In 1989 we changed from a threat-based force, with four or five years of transition, to what we are now, a capabilities-based force.

When I talk about a capabilities-based force I mean the Army's four fundamental capabilities—what the Army brings to national defense. The first capability that the United States Army has, and must have, is the ability to deter war. Deterring war is hard for people to understand. What we really want to do is to prevent war. Nobody likes to fight wars, but what we must get people to understand is that to deter war we must remain strong. We can't deter war with wishful thinking. Therefore, it's important to stay trained and ready, it's important to stay the right size, and it's important to stay modernized. It starts with this first capability.

If deterrence fails, we still have the responsibility that we've always had, to fight and win the nation's wars. We must be able to protect the United States of America, and that flows very smoothly from our deterrence capability. These are our two essential capabilities.

The third capability we have is to reassure allies. We have found that this global village has moved nations closer together, such that our ability to reassure allies and coalition partners is critically important. We do this with programs like

Partnership for Peace and with other programs as in South America.

The fourth capability that we provide is military support for civilian authorities in a wide range of domestic activities and requirements. From cleaning up after natural disasters like Hurricane Andrew, Ohio River flooding, or fighting forest fires in the northwest part of the United States, your Army provides critical military support to civilian authorities at home.

Let's look back for a moment. Let me take you through some of the things that come to my mind when I talk about 1996. Probably the single event that most epitomizes the Army was crossing the Sava River in Bosnia. It was done in December 1995 and January 1996 under the worst conditions imaginable. The river was at a 100-year high. It was cold, it was icy, it was wet, and it was muddy. Our soldiers put that bridge in without a single injury. The people that live there said, "We can't believe this. We can't believe that you would take on this river at this time of the year." Not only did our soldiers take on that river, but they beat it. I think that represented the spirit of the United States Army. It's the same spirit I saw when I talked to the veterans of the Bataan Death March during the World War II celebrations in Hawaii. Those soldiers convinced me that they would never give up, and they never did give up. That's why they're alive today. I saw that same spirit in our soldiers putting that bridge across the Sava River.

I went back to Bosnia this last Christmas. I talked to many soldiers about what they were doing in Bosnia. We talked about the great contribution they had made to peace in the world. I told them that people may argue about the policy; people debate about whether we should be in Bosnia or not. But what people cannot debate is the fact that through our soldier's sacrifice there are thousands and thousands of people alive today. What a great gift. What a great feeling of satisfaction for having done that. It's wonderful and it's a great news story.

Probably the most visible event in the world in 1996 was the Olympics in Atlanta. It was America's Army that provided the support necessary to make it work. The mission primarily involved the Army National Guard, with the support of the United States Army Reserve and the Active Component, but it was a brilliant total Army effort.

The Partnership for Peace program in Europe has had a tremendous impact on the stability of the region and our forces there. You must understand that every NCO and officer in Europe in 1996 spent 180 days away from their home stations primarily training in the Partnership for Peace program. This is above and beyond what Bosnia adds to their OPTEMPO. Partnership for Peace is preventing wars, helping the people in Eastern Europe become democratic societies, shaping the security environment, and enabling us to trade with those countries. That's the contribution of the United States Army in Europe today.

You don't need me to tell you what a magnificent job the soldiers of the 2d [Infantry] Division and all the soldiers that support them are doing in Korea. About 27,000 U.S. Army soldiers serve in Korea. From the front lines of the DMZ [demilitarized zone] throughout the country the Army is preventing that from becoming a openly hostile environment, providing peace and stability to that region of the world. President Clinton has often talked about the two million American jobs tied to United States trade in the Pacific. I would argue that those boots on the ground, those soldiers in Korea, make some of that regional stability possible. Stability in the Pacific makes trade and jobs in the United States possible.

Another great news story that has not really gotten the credit it probably deserves is the great work of our U.S. Southern Command. It is interesting to note, looking at Central and South America, the fact that all those nations, save one, Cuba, is a democracy. This is not by chance; it happened because we had Reserve Component and Active Component soldiers working with those countries, building roads, building schools, and teaching the importance of democracy.

These are just a few of the Army's contributions in 1996—contributions that are the result of a capabilities-based Army.

When you think about all of the change we have endured, both physical and cultural, you will agree with me that this is truly an unprecedented accomplishment. I challenge anyone to go back in

the history of the world and find any time where an Army has been reshaped, as we have reshaped the United States Army, and done it so well.

It's important that all of you feel proud of that, because you are part of that success. The reason for this success is quite simple. We put our emphasis on people first. We went into this reshaping process in 1989 knowing that the most important thing for us to do was to take care of people—take care of the people leaving the Army and take care of the people staying. That's why, despite all the resource pressures we've been up against, we kept the quality of life for our single and married soldiers as high as we possibly could. I wouldn't do it any differently. It gave us the Army we have today; it gives us the world's best Army. All of you have truly made the difference and I thank you for your contributions. But we're not done changing.

As we look forward, you'll find the Army has a very exciting future. Over the last few weeks I have had an opportunity to get a glimpse of that future. At the National Training Center a brigade-size force called Task Force XXI from Fort Hood, Texas, has taken available new information technology applied to our current equipment and conducted field experiments against the opposing forces. We asked Task Force XXI to figure out how we want to structure, figure out how we want to train, and figure out how we want to fight a future force. It really is exciting to watch those young soldiers with those computers working on situational awareness. Situational awareness is hard to explain. I usually put it in terms of answers to three basic questions: where am I, where are my buddies, where is the enemy? If we can answer these three questions, then we can change the way that we conduct combat operations in very significant and positive ways.

Is everything in the experiment perfect? No, because we're dealing with complex concepts and new technology. But those soldiers have made that experiment come alive and they've worked very closely with the contractors to make every piece of equipment be all it can be. I have great confidence in what's going to come out of Task Force XXI and Army XXI. We'll come out of the NTC with a lot of lessons learned. We'll make decisions that affect the whole Army, taking those technologies and techniques that work well and proliferating them as fast as we possibly can. You're looking at an Army that's moving now from the industrial age to the information age.

If we look further out, we see something called the Army After Next. About a month ago at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, we conducted a wargame to see if we couldn't determine what the Army After Next looks like. It must be a totally different Army. It's going to be a revolution in military affairs. You might find much smaller units in the Army After Next. You might find smaller more mobile equipment in an Army able to project its power anywhere in the world as fast as we need to. We're going to find a different logistical system that can more efficiently and effectively support the Army.

The cornerstone of our future armies, Army XXI and the Army After Next, remains quality people. The ultimate weapon system is still the soldier on the battlefield. You're not going to replace him and we're not going to replace the great support systems that the soldier has and has had.

That leads me to what's not going to change in the United States Army. Our emphasis on recruiting and retaining quality people will continue to be a top priority. Everything we've done in the past, and will do in the future, has been focused on recruiting and retaining quality. That's why this Army Family Action Planning Conference is so very important. You give us the ideas and the feedback that we need in order to make the right decisions and funnel our resources into those areas that impact on recruiting and retention.

If we're going to recruit and retain quality people, we must take good care of them. We've got to focus our resources in four fundamental areas: pay, housing, medical care, and benefits. We're fighting very hard to preserve quality or improve these four fundamental areas. It's not unique to the Army either, the Chiefs of all the other services feel the same way.

First is soldier pay. We need to raise pay to a decent level. We will continue to fight for that in Congress and other forums.

Our next priority is adequate medical care to ensure our soldiers are taken care of from the time

they enter the Army through their service and beyond, including our retirees. I know medical care is very important; you've told us so at this conference and in the field. We understand that.

A third area is housing for both single and married soldiers. We can and will do better. We have put a major effort in our budget this year to improve the housing of our single soldiers. Why? Because we have neglected it for so many years. We can put more money into family housing too; but, it's very, very important that we keep the right balance and that's what we are trying to do.

The fourth priority is to stop the erosion of our benefits. We want to stop the erosion of retirement benefits, commissary benefits, and PX [post exchange] benefits. We must live up to the pledges we make to soldiers when we recruit them.

Throughout this drawdown, this physical and cultural change in the Army, the one thing that I am most proud of is that the level of our support for families has not suffered. We've kept it up as high as we possibly can. I've talked about the importance of keeping it balanced, and we have made quality of life a top priority not only in words but in deeds. Anyone looking at the Army Posture Statement or looking at the budget would find our commitment to quality of life and family support. If anything, what we have learned through this drawdown is that family support is the right priority.

Earlier I mentioned our great success in Bosnia, the great contribution that our soldiers have made there. I would be negligent if I didn't also mention that there was an equally important effort that went into the family support groups and the taking care of the families of those soldiers in Bosnia. U.S. Army Europe did a great job putting all that together. The training provided those soldiers made a difference in Bosnia; the training provided for the support of families made a difference in Germany. Ninety-eight percent of our family members stayed in Europe while their spouses were deployed because they knew we were serious about taking care of them. That is important for everybody to understand, with an Army sixty-four percent married we will continue to take care of families in everything we do.

Another part of the Army that will not change is our emphasis on values. I talk about the Army being a values-based institution and I truly mean it. I talk about honor, integrity, selfless service and courage, loyalty, duty and respect. Those seven values are the core values of the United States Army. They're not just words, they are the code by which we live. We will continue to re-emphasize values as we move towards the future. If we build on our solid tradition of selfless service to the nation and have these seven core values as our guiding stars, then we are going to be able to move the Army into the 21st century. That's what we want to do.

At last year's Army Family Action Planning Conference we talked about four pillars to our Army family action plan. We talked about education, feedback, unit involvement, and community support. This year we have started to institutionalize these pillars.

Let me explain what I mean. First, we have a very good education program, the Army Family Team-Building Program. I see young soldiers entering the Army that already have a family with two kids. The Army Family Team-Building Program has got to start teaching our soldiers and their families at the very beginning, and it has. You have made it come alive; you have made it a reality. I attended a meeting two weeks ago with the Army's most senior leadership and their spouses to talk about family programs. The purpose of this meeting was to provide us a status of family programs and allow us to give guidance on where we want to go. This is a very important part of the education process that we've institutionalized and we'll continue to bring the Army's senior leadership together to teach and review family programs.

The second pillar is feedback; that's this group right here. You're a part of that. You provide us feedback when you come together, as you work on these different committees and different groups and give us your insights and good ideas. That's the kind of feedback we need. As I visit the field one of the things that I always look forward to is talking with soldiers to get their feedback on what's going well and what's not going well. It is important that soldiers continue to tell us the way it really is. The BOSS program is a great program providing the feedback we need.

I couldn't be prouder of what you all have done promoting the third pillar, unit involvement. Family support groups are great organizations. How magnificently they perform providing support for the Bosnia deployment, and all the other deployments of our Active and Reserve Components around the world. What a tremendous accomplishment and all of you deserve the credit for that.

Finally, of course, is community support. Taking care of families would not be possible without the support that we receive, and that you help oversee, from our installations. What great contributions we get from the people that work in the community MWR [morale, welfare and recreation] programs, ACS, and medical facilities.

Today these four pillars are solid, and we intend to keep them solid for the Army XXI and the Army After Next. They are fundamental to the way we do business.

Finally, I want to give you a tasking—your marching orders. Don't let what you say and do stay here—take it with you. Take it back to your installations, talk to others about what went on here. Tell them what we've talked about. Tell them the Army is serious about it's commitment to family programs and family action groups. Make sure they understand we are serious about taking care of Army families. Stay involved and recruit others. We need your help and the help of as many others as possible. Army family programs are a good news story. This is a cause that can sell itself and an opportunity to help ourselves. Be positive, especially during these changing times. This is the world's best Army and you've helped make it so. As I move around the world and people talk to me, it is apparent that they understand what you have done for our Army. I want you to be proud of the unprecedented accomplishments that you have achieved and the tremendous tradition you have established.

As we get into the new millennium and our future with Army XXI and Army After Next, we move forward with our heads held high and with the certain knowledge that we are a family and that we are the world's best Army. Thank you all very much for your kind attention. Thank you for what you do for the Army and God bless you all.

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Letter to Army General Officers,

March 18, 1997

Acquisition Reform

The President and the Congress believe it is essential to streamline government operations and reduce the cost of providing critical services. As part of this effort, the Department of Defense (DoD) is significantly improving its acquisition process, primarily in the procurement of equipment. To meet its warfighting needs, the Department has the goal to become the world's smartest and most responsive buyer of only the best value goods and services.

Last year, former Secretary of Defense William Perry demonstrated commitment to that goal by declaring May 31, 1996, as Acquisition Reform Acceleration Day. The day was designed to increase the Department's awareness of the various acquisition reform initiatives that were under way. U.S. Army activities participated worldwide by sponsoring symposia and group discussions to assess the value of specific reform efforts. Participants highlighted accomplishments and identified new objectives. Subsequent feedback from the Acquisition Reform Acceleration Day showed that acquisition reform was progressing well within DoD, and that this day of concentrated attention was likely to enhance its continued success.

This week I received a memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Dr. Paul G. Kaminski, requesting the Army's support of Acquisition Reform Week, March 17–21. The theme for this week's activities is "Train as We Work . . . as a Team." Using this theme, Dr. Kaminski seeks the support of our installation commanders to reach our local business and industry partners. The intent is to devise a strategy that improves the application of reform initiatives in their daily operations.

I agree with the role that installation commanders play in fostering the growth and sustainment of acquisition reform. It is important that

you tell this story throughout your community, not just during the next two weeks but throughout the year. This will assure that our local business partners will push the reform movement even further. The results will create a win-win situation for both the Army and local businesses. The message is that teaming . . . from the President to the local procurement workforce . . . makes reform initiatives the norm.

Six core themes support the acquisition reform message:

- The acquisition process is changing from a rules-driven bureaucracy to a process of common sense business practices.
- We have the technology to streamline.
- Government leaders continue to play the important and legitimate oversight role.
- Training and education assure a smarter workforce.
- Readiness for the warfighter is also the readiness mission for the acquisition workforce.
- Reform is continuous process improvement.

Thank you for delivering this message. Remember that today's modernization is tomorrow's readiness.

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Letter to Army General Officers

March 26, 1997

Recruiting Quality Goals

I would like to share with you some of our thoughts on how we will maintain a force of quality people. Today's soldiers are the best educated and disciplined in U.S. history. We have been able to recruit high-quality people and all the quality indicators that we monitor tell us that we are continuing to get them at all ranks. Last year Recruiting Command (USAREC) finished the year recruiting 73,000 people, 95 percent high school graduates—high quality. The issue here is our concern about the future. This year, because we stabilized at 495,000 soldier end strength, the recruiting mission went up to 89,700. We're not going to fall off in quality, but I tell you it's a tough mission and we're looking at different ways of doing that.

Recently, the Secretary of the Army approved a change to the high school diploma graduate (HSDG) content of the Recruiting Command mission. The change from 95 percent to 90 percent HSDG ensures that the Army will continue to meet its end strength with a quality force. The criteria during build down crept up to 95 percent high school diploma grad, 67 percent I–IIIA Mental Category, and 2 percent Category IV primarily because of the reduced mission and the great work of Recruiting Command. The goal is now 90/67/2 percent, respectively.

Why change? The change responds to current market conditions, an increased mission and the need for post-drawdown, steady state one-for-one replacements. Recruiting is a tough job made tougher by increased competition, perceived erosion of benefits, a low unemployment rate and continued low propensity for service to country. Additionally, there is an increasing trend in the number of alternative credentialed (GED, home school) individuals.

What does the Army gain by changing the HSDG content? It gains access to the relatively untapped alternative credential market, allows the Army to meet its 495K end strength and provides a force of at least equal quality (90/67/2) than the one that fought and won DESERT STORM (92/63/7). The 10 percent nondiploma high school graduates we recruit will be of the highest mental categories only—Category I–IIIA—and will all have high school degree equivalency. In fact, both the Category I–IIIA and the Category IV content of the force will continue to be higher than what we recruited for the DESERT STORM Army.

Quality people are the cornerstone of today's Army and that will not change for Army XXI or Army After Next. Quality is nonnegotiable. We all must work exceptionally hard to recruit and retain quality people. In my opinion, that is best done by providing them an adequate and predictable quality of life, ensuring they are properly trained and equipped with the best equipment and weapons systems possible. In short, we must allow them to "Be All They Can Be" individually

and collectively. I know I can count on your help to make this happen.

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Letter to Army General Officers

April 15, 1997

Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) XXI—Forging Relations for Peace and Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific Region

I had the opportunity to attend the PAMS XXI Conference from 6–10 April 1997 in Honolulu, Hawaii. This conference clearly demonstrated the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region to the United States and the global economy. It was also an opportunity for me to reaffirm our Army's significant role in providing stability in the region. If you understand that freedom and economic prosperity depend on peace and stability, then you understand why U.S. Army soldiers with boots on the ground—the most visible form of commitment the nation can make—are critical to enhanced relations and friendships.

Watching the flags of 41 nations on parade during the opening ceremony brought home to me the extent of change here in this terribly dynamic and vital region. Ten years ago who would have thought that nations as diverse as Vietnam, Cambodia, China and Nepal would join us for a conference in Honolulu to help build bridges of trust and confidence. Rapid and cascading change in the Pacific is only one aspect of unprecedented change that today's Army must face. We've already changed from a threat-based to a capabilities-based force and are now changing from an industrial-age force to an information-age force to deal with the geostrategic environment we live in today and to remain relevant to the needs of the nation in the future. Conference participants saw a glimpse of the information age and the extent of the change we are undergoing through equipment displays and with a capabilities exercise conducted by the 25th Infantry Division (L). PAMS attendees were awed by a nighttime live fire deliberate attack by soldiers equipped with the latest night vision equipment, supported by indirect fires and a live firing of the Javelin antitank weapon.

Cohosted by the U.S. Army Pacific and the Army of Sri Lanka, the conference focused on "Training Forces for the 21st Century," a subject of universal interest to all armies. The planning and execution was flawless, and I want to thank Lieutenant General Steele and the soldiers of USARPAC [United States Army Pacific] and the "Tropic Lightning" Division for making it such a success. Personal relationships are the key to success in this region, and USARPAC has expended tremendous effort and resources to expand army-to-army relations. That effort is clearly visible in the enormous success PAMS has enjoyed over its short history. It has grown from nine nations in 1978 to 41 nations today—including Vietnam and Uzbekistan that attended this year for the first time.

Seminar and bilateral discussions with my eleven counterpart army chiefs brought home the immense scope and complexity of the Asia-Pacific region. In the wake of the Cold War, the Asia-Pacific region is rapidly becoming the world's economic powerhouse. At the same time, many of these nations are dealing with threats from within and the dynamic changes in the wake of the Cold War. Terrorism, internal strife, masses of refugees, illegal drugs and weapons trade and the difficulties inherent in developing democracies and market economies are some of the monumental issues they face. The bilateral discussions generated among the attendees contributed significantly to a common understanding of the issues and the importance of the United States in the region. It's no secret that the majority of these nations look to the United States for support and reassurance and to help build a strong, durable foundation for peace and prosperity.

Today, we have a unique opportunity to prevent the conditions for conflict from developing and to help create conditions for peace. We must recognize that the United States is a pivotal nation that can contribute to peace in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world. The strategy of "preventive defense" is a strategy to deal with the

post–Cold War opportunities and dangers and can be the framework to bring prosperity to nations that want to embrace democracy and human rights. Our vision for the Asia-Pacific region encompasses a new international community based on cooperative and peaceful relations, open markets and democratic principles.

The U.S. Army has had an active and vital role in the Pacific region for many years and today, as we stand at a crossroads of peace and on the threshold of a new century, that role is more important than ever. Army-to-army contacts are a natural avenue to establish and maintain relations in support of our diplomacy. The fact that the Pacific region is an area of immense concentration of military power, with eight of the world's largest armies, demands that our Army be actively engaged. We can achieve this vision by helping to prevent conditions that may lead to conflict through credible defensive alliances and military-to-military contributions such as PAMS, its supporting conferences, and the Asia-Pacific Center.

In the wake of the Cold War, we are at crossroads of opportunity. It is an opportunity to win unprecedented peace, an opportunity to share in economic prosperity and an opportunity to advance democracy across the world. The PAMS XXI Conference was a historic milestone of Asia-Pacific nations reaching out for these opportunities. I am proud of the Army's role in advancing our National Security Strategy through preventive defense. Soldiers with boots on the ground continue to be the most productive and visible credentials for building and maintaining peace and economic prosperity in an uncertain world.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

May 5, 1997

TRADOC Commandants/Division Commanders Conference

We recently completed two very important conferences. The TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] Commandants/Division Commanders Conference at Fort Leavenworth and the Board of Directors Meeting at the Army War College. I want to share with you some of the information we discussed, as well as some of my thoughts on the important topics that we discussed. The overriding theme in both of these conferences was that we are an Army in transformation. Although I don't think we've completely shed all the vestiges of our Cold War Army, I think it is crystal clear that we are not just a smaller version of the Cold War Army. Clearly we have changed the Army dramatically since 1989—and, in my opinion, for the better—but we still have a long way to go. As I read history, change has always been a part of our Army. I believe our modern Army can trace much of its genesis to [General John] "Black Jack" Pershing and World War I. His decision not to allow American units to be broken up and individual soldiers used as replacement packages drew a critical line in the sand that said we would not allow American soldiers to be cannon fodder. It also placed an awesome responsibility on Army leadership to ensure that we were capable of leading our soldiers in whatever mission we were assigned. All of us feel that very deeply every day. Between the war years, [General] George Marshall and others taught us the importance of training that leadership to ensure that when the inevitable conflict came we would not be caught lacking. In the early forties, both the necessity of being prepared for the next conflict as well as the value of experimentation, such as Louisiana Maneuvers, were brought home to bear. Basically, what we learned was that despite experimentation, if you don't have the essence of the Army—the Six Imperatives—in place, you pay a heavy price at the opening bell. General [William] DePuy described that price as a race between the seasoning process and the casualty process. It's a race we can ill afford to lose. It's a race we don't need to be in. Others have talked about difficulty of training untrained men on the battlefields and the terrible price of unpreparedness. After World War II President Truman reminded the nation that if we are not prepared to pay the price of peace then we will surely pay the price of war. George Marshall talked about, at the end of World War II, how we were now concerned with the peace of the world and that peace can only be maintained by the

strong. Korea taught us how not to reshape an Army after a great victory. The ethical revolution after Vietnam again reminded us of the vital importance of our core values. The training revolution and the modernization program of the mid-1980s taught us that you can only deter war if you are credible. During General [Carl] Vuono's tour as Chief he packaged all of that up in a nice, neat, tidy package we call the Six Imperatives. There are two points to all of this. First, to remind everybody that change is nothing new. We and our predecessors have lived with change all of our careers. In fact, I think it is a real strength of the Army that we have been able to change and adapt. It is also something that I have found makes this career an extremely exciting and rewarding one. I want you to remind our junior leaders of this and share your own personal experiences in terms of what it's meant to you. The challenges we face are no different than others have faced and mastered. The issues are slightly different but so are the times. I believe we have a sound base from which to spring to the future and that's exactly what we intend to do. Second, I want to assure you that as we continue along the path of change the Six Imperatives will remain our strong link to the past. When we couple them with our tradition and history, the future can't help but be anything but bright. With that as an underpinning, let me give you some thoughts on some of the issues we discussed.

We spent a lot of time talking about sexual misconduct/sexual harassment. In my view, the real issue surrounding that topic is the alleged abuse of authority. As I've said many times before, we cannot afford to have the authority of the chain of command eroded. If we are true to our charge in not allowing our soldiers to be used as cannon fodder that authority must be absolute. I believe it is, but when it is abused it is eroded. The issue in the training base is not about taking authority away from drill sergeants, but ensuring they retain the authority they need to accomplish the minor miracle of turning civilians into soldiers in a short period of time. The message for all is that there is strength through diversity and we must treat soldiers with dignity and respect. But my confidence in the chain of command remains undaunted. However, when that confidence is betrayed we have no choice but to come down hard on the side of protecting the thing that has made our Army great. We talked a lot about how we handle the near-term battle in terms of sexual misconduct and sexual harassment. We have zero tolerance for both, but we have better things to do than be on a witch-hunt. The procedures for reporting incidents should be well understood and if not we need to educate our people. In most cases, sexual misconduct should be handled under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In most cases, sexual harassment should be handled through education and training. Obviously, there is no cookie cutter for this and the chain of command must always do what's right. It is equally important that we also address the deep battle in this area. Basically, this is leadership and you all play a key role in the mentoring/coaching process. I expect each of you to take this on and deal with it on a very personal basis. We are obviously refining institutional training to include inspections in this area, as well as incorporating it in the new FM 22–100. Character Development XXI will be out soon and each of the division commanders and TRADOC commandants were issued a copy of our Consideration for Others Program. The point is, we are basically through the examining stage as far as I'm concerned and into the execution stage. There will be tweaks as we go along, but we don't need to wait to embed this type of leadership in our units. We need to get back to the basics on leadership—footlocker counseling, control of the barracks, spending time with the troops, etc.

We had a great discussion concerning the Officer Personnel Management Study and the new OER. Both are scheduled to be implemented in October of this year, and I want to assure all of you that they are not only complementary but joined at the hip. They have been on a parallel developmental track and as we address them during our IPR [in-progress review] process, that was one of the key issues we discussed. We have taken them to the field and sought, evaluated, and incorporated your input. As we get closer to implementation, I see the anxiety level creeping up. It is similar to what we saw when we brought out the 67–8 form. The one thing I know is that if we don't implement these as they are intended to be implemented we run the risk of screwing up the system. The last

time that happened it took us over 10 years to recover. I am hard over in ensuring that we police the system. I expect all of you to set the example and I fully intend to play an active role in the policing of this system. From time to time I hear discussion about how we can "get around" the system. I understand why people do that because they think they are taking care of their subordinates. However, I think our first loyalty has to be to the Army. We have decided to go this way and we must execute properly. How we execute will say much more than any words can about our values. I remind all of you that there are a lot of people who are watching us on this issue. We still haven't worked out all the details in terms of number crunching with the OPMS, but I truly believe this study will meet the Army needs in the post–Cold War world. It reflects our belief that we still need lots of people whose primary skill is warfighting. It also reflects our belief that we need experts in other areas to help the Army execute the new strategy of shaping the environment, responding to crisis, and preparing for the future. I came to this job convinced that the Army was a complex organization and after 35 years I know full well one size doesn't fit all. OPMS 97 recognizes that and will move us in the direction we need to move for the 21st century. Again, that puts a heavy burden on each of us as we implement it. We must coach and mentor subordinates as well as make the tough calls and we can't do that unless we understand fully what OPMS is all about.

We spent considerable time discussing near-term readiness. Most of the discussion centered around how we solve the shortage of people problems and reduce turbulence. As I've indicated before the only way we can do that is to take out force structure and redistribute those people associated with that force structure to higher-priority units. We are in the process of doing that. As we do that we must also adjust Recruiting Command's MOS goals. Obviously this is not a fix that's going to take place overnight. However, the sooner you start the sooner you fix it. We have started the process but I think it's going to be at least September or early FY [fiscal year] 98 before we see the results in the field. I fully realize this will have an impact upon those units who are selected to migrate from the Active to the Reserve Component. Again, those people affected are going to have to take a broader view in terms of what's right for the Army. We will continue to work hard on reducing turbulence. I hold high hopes that OPMS will help us address the officer turbulence. We will continue to push hard to find ways of reducing enlisted turbulence. Embracing concepts like distance learning will certainly help. But my guess is, we'll also need some policy changes. In the meantime, all of you need to do everything you can at your level to minimize turbulence. The CTC [Combat Training Center] commanders talked about trends and we also discussed ways to train commanders and staff. We continue to look for better ways to train at this level because I think it offers us the greatest return on investment. Many of the new systems that we are fielding or are just around the corner have tremendous promise. I don't know of anything that will take the place of a mastery of the fundamentals. From this basic principle we must not stray.

In both conferences we talked an awful lot about the Advanced Warfighting Experiment. As I said in my last RTWR [Random Thoughts While Running], we may not have it totally right yet but we all believe we're on to something big. In most cases we think the technology is mature enough to provide enhanced capability as soon as fielded. We discussed those candidates which we want to buy with the $50M we have set aside in 1997 and have the list about 90 percent complete. We will continue to let 4th Division spearhead this effort and III Corps at Fort Hood will remain the center of the Force XXI process. However, our intent is, where applicable, to field some of these technologies across the force as quickly as we can. Some of these technologies provide significant enhancement across the full spectrum of operations and are not dependent upon the fielding of the full suite of technologies to do so. It is an understatement to say that there is a great deal of excitement about the Advanced Warfighting Experiment and what it really means to the United States Army. In my view, it's every bit as significant as the original Louisiana Maneuvers and it's much more timely. George Marshall in discussing preparations for World War II said, "When we had time we had no money and when we had money we had no time." We are very conscious of that lesson.

During the BOD [Board of Directors] Meeting we spent the majority of our time discussing the division redesign. Major General Bob Scales did a great job of leading us in a review of Doug Macgregor's book, *Breaking the Phalanx*. All members of the BOD had done their homework on this book and the discussion was very meaningful. I think it's fair to say that not any one of the members of the BOD agreed entirely with everything in the book, but all of us found many of the concepts attractive. What was interesting to me was that if you take the concepts put forth in this book and compare them with the separate works that we have done on Army After Next you will find a convergence of thought emerging. There is no doubt that in Army After Next we will need smaller more strategically and tactically mobile units. We must embrace the joint concept to an extent we have never done before. We must "get there firstest with the mostest." "There" refers to anywhere in the global village and "mostest" means overwhelming combat power. For the division redesign TRADOC presented five different designs—all slightly different and well thought out. We chose an interim design based upon lessons learned from the AWE that gives us a smaller division anchored on combined arms battalions, with slightly less systems in each battalion. This will be the design the division will use for the division AWE in November. At the same time, we asked TRADOC to continue their analysis of two separate division designs—one, a strike division, with enhanced aviation assets; and the other, a brigade combat team–based division. In short, I'm not ready to commit to any one division redesign at this time because it's critical we get it right. However, I do believe we are moving in the right direction and this is a serious effort that requires our involvement and, most importantly, our best ideas.

We also spent some time discussing our S&T [science and technology] program to ensure a tight link with Army After Next. As many of you know, we have approximately $1B in this area and we must make sure that those resources are focused in the right direction. We will continue to use the Army After Next wargames to drive these efforts and to work closely with industry in order to leverage our combined assets. Industry tends to be focused a little closer in than 2020, but I think our programs must be complementary. I believe our efforts must be directed not only to better killing systems on the Army After Next battlefield but also to how we unencumber the force logistically. This means we're interested in alternate fuel sources, commonality of parts, greater reliability of parts, and better simulation, etc. These areas seem to me to be something that industry will also be interested in. Our intent is to build upon the partnering effort we saw during the AWE. By driving technology for the Army After Next through our wargames and developing the Six Imperatives through the Force XXI experimentation process, we should ensure that the Army remains the world's best and able to meet the needs of the nation.

This is the game plan as I see it now. It's not locked in concrete and I'm sure we will refine it as we go. It is both an ambitious effort and an exciting opportunity. It is all about change. It incorporates the lessons learned from the change in the past and reflects the way we are changing to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow, and the 21st century. There is obviously a lot more to it than I've outlined here; however, you get the drift and I want you to spend a lot of time discussing our profession with your subordinates. They will be the ones who will be the keepers of the flame for the Army After Next. It is important that they understand where we're headed and have the opportunity to develop the skills and attributes they will need in the 21st century. Change is about leadership and all of us must be involved. Although much will change, one thing will remain constant: Soldiers are our credentials.

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Letter to Army General Officers

May 14, 1997

Army Values

Values are at the core of everything our Army is and does. The Army is more than an organiza-

tion—it is an institution of people with unique and enduring values. We instill these values in the men and women, soldiers and civilians, who are the Army. The terms we use to articulate our values—duty, integrity, loyalty, selfless service, courage, respect, and honor—inspire the sense of purpose necessary to sustain our soldiers in combat and help resolve the ambiguities of military operations short of war. Leaders of character and competence live these values. We must build and maintain an Army where people do what is right, where we treat each other as we would want to be treated, and where everyone can truly be all they can be. I want to ensure that everyone in the Total Army, our soldiers and civilians, Active, Guard and Reserve, has a clear understanding of our values.

Character Development XXI is part of a Total Army program designed to teach and reinforce Army values. As part of this program, I have asked the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to produce a video that:

- Informs Army leaders, military and civilian, about the history of values in the Army and about current societal and organizational conditions that warrant a reexamination of and renewed emphasis on Army values;
- Familiarizes leaders with the terminology proposed to achieve consistency in our Army-wide discussion of values: duty, integrity, loyalty, selfless service, courage, respect, and honor;
- Introduces and promotes long-term systemic changes now in development that will aid leaders in establishing and maintaining ethical climates which teach and reinforce Army values;
- Motivates Army leaders to establish and maintain ethical climates in their organizations and to teach and reinforce the Army values.

Take-home packets that included the video were distributed to division and TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] commanders at our conference in April. By the end of May we will distribute the video Army-wide. I want you to use the video in conjunction with professional development programs as a way to start a dialogue on values and their continued importance to our Army. Using the video as a stimulus for discussion among your leaders should only be a part of your professional ethics education programs. Encourage your leaders to study the emerging leadership doctrine for definitions of values and explanations of the character development model and ethical climate assessment survey (ECAS). Encourage them to start teaching Army values in their units and organizations and to begin using the ethical climate assessment survey. These are important and useful tools for everyone dedicated to the ethical health of their soldiers, civilians, units, organizations and the Army.

We serve in exciting times; everything we do today shapes the Army of the 21st century. Your commitment to living and teaching the Army's core values is critical to our success today and tomorrow. We must get this part of our future right. I know I can count on your help in making this investment.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

May 16, 1997

The Quadrennial Defense Review

The Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] Report is scheduled to be released on the 19th [of May 1997] and without going into the specific details of that report I want to share a few general thoughts with you concerning what I consider the most salient points. First, let me say thanks to all who did so much to help tell the Army story. It was a team effort and all of you played a role. Those of you in the field who ensured that your part of the Army was as strong as possible made the job of those of us in the Pentagon much easier because you added credibility to what we were saying. The final results were in my opinion accurate and defied the going in conventional thinking. Collectively, we made a compelling case for the Army through analysis but most importantly through your execution. My sincere thanks to all—and now to some of the details.

The strategy which came out of this review reflects the military challenges we face. Basically, it rests on three solid pillars: respond, shape, and prepare. In terms of response, we're talking about

global power projection—being able to move the capabilities we possess anywhere in the world, whether that be fighting forest fires or providing military support to civilian authorities, deploying a brigade to Kuwait in order to deter Saddam Hussein, reinforcing Korea in order to compel the North Korean regime, or reassuring new found allies and friends through the Partnership for Peace program. Only the Army has this full-spectrum capability. At the same time, we have a responsibility to help shape the environment for the 21st century. In essence, it is again reassuring our allies in deterring potential adversaries through our FAO [foreign area officer] programs, IMET, and CINC exercise programs. There is nothing less at stake here than making the world safer for our children and grandchildren. Finally, the strategy recognizes that we must prepare for the future by building the Army After Next in a measured, thoughtful way. As you know, our plan incorporates that through our Force XXI process. We will drive the technology for our Army After Next wargames and develop the Six Imperatives through experimentation with Army XXI. The strategy recognizes the world we face in the next 10 years will most likely be very similar to the world we have experienced in the past 8. It strips out some of the questionable assumptions associated with CRM [Commission on Roles and Missions] and the BUR [Bottom-Up Review] and recognizes the world as it is, not as we'd wish it to be. In short, it's a strategy that is well thought out and very realistic.

We spent a lot of time addressing the affordability aspects of their review. Once we got comfortable with the strategy the major issue was resources. These decisions were not easy and were much discussed. To afford this strategy we must have a revolution in business affairs and a revolution in logistics affairs—and the sooner the better. The emphasis we have been placing on efficiency gives us a little momentum; however, we must turn up the heat. If we're unable to find efficiency there's only two places to go—cut more people and/or provide less modernization. Neither is acceptable.

In end strength we had to take some cuts. There was no other way of getting near-term investments for programs that promise long-term savings. We fought hard to keep as many people as possible and will take the cuts in tail not tooth. There will be cuts for all components as well as the civilians. I know these aren't easy but they are necessary. My belief is that we can still protect our wartime requirement of 10 divisions and 15 enhanced brigades, as well as the supporting structure necessary to make them effective warfighting units. Clearly, we're going to have to streamline headquarters and integrate even more closely the total force. In addition to the end-strength cuts we will take this opportunity to rebalance our force structure/end-strength equation. As I have previously stated, we are out of balance by approximately 15K and we need to take out that much force structure in addition to the force structure connected with the end-strength reduction. Doing that should go a long way to solve some of our undermanning challenges, but I must emphasize that will take us a little while to get it done properly. The force structure removed from the Active Component will be transferred to the Reserves and offers us the opportunity for even greater integration of the total force. We intend to work the integration issue through the offsite process and are hopeful that we can come up with a militarily sound approach to leverage the tremendous capabilities imbedded in the total army.

The savings we achieve will help us prepare for the 21st century. We will incorporate the lessons learned from the Advanced Warfighting Experiment and our work on the Army After Next wargames to fine-tune our modernization strategy. Our objective, obviously, is to move modernization to the left—and I think we have the best chance to do that that we've had in the last few years while still keeping all the other imperatives in balance. As we fine-tune the modernization program we'll keep you informed of how that's working out.

Obviously not everybody will be happy with all the results of this review and it is already being criticized in some circles. Tinkering with something as fine-tuned as the way we do our business is indeed tricky business. I think everybody did the best they could to do what was right for the nation. These were tough issues we dealt with and it is now time to get on with the execution of them. We must work together to fully develop the tremendous potential of the total army. The

nation deserves that and most importantly our soldiers deserve that. I know I can count on your total support in this area.

Wanted to give you as much heads up as possible on the issues but would appreciate it if you would keep this close hold until they are officially announced on Monday.

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"Challenge and Change: A Legacy for the Future"

Military Review

July/August 1997

The changes inherent in the Cold War's aftermath are truly dramatic, but they are only the most recent examples of a condition that has been an integral part of the US Army throughout the entire 20th century. In fact, change has been a consistent aspect of our organizational environment since the United States emerged as a world power earlier this century.

General John J. Pershing laid the foundation for the modern Army during World War I. His refusal to allow American units to be broken up and individual soldiers used as replacements established the principle that cohesion and leadership at every level would be an American Army hallmark. U.S. soldiers would not be used as fodder to be consumed in the pursuit of an attrition strategy that relied on the relentless application of techniques which did not reflect an understanding of the strategic and technological environments in which operations were being prosecuted. Pershing established a tradition of responsibility that every soldier understands and exemplifies today: Army leaders must ensure that soldiers are well trained, organized, equipped and led to accomplish whatever mission they are assigned.

General George C. Marshall and others understood that principle and did all they could to ensure that the leaders of American soldiers would be prepared for the next war's demands. The value of experimentation with new doctrine, organizational schemes and operational concepts was demonstrated vividly in the early 1940's *Louisiana Maneuvers*. More important, however, was the lesson that remains with us still: balance is the key to success. What we have come to call the six imperatives—quality soldiers; forward-looking doctrine; the right mix of forces; tough, realistic training; continuous modernization; and competent, confident leaders—are critical for battlefield success. What the interwar years taught us is that without the appropriate balance of these imperatives, U.S. soldiers will pay a heavy price at the opening bell of the next war.

After World War II, President Harry S. Truman reminded the nation that "We must be prepared to pay the price for peace, or assuredly we will pay the price of war." Unfortunately, our experiences in the years after World War II taught us how not to reshape an army in the aftermath of a great victory, and we paid the price of that lesson in blood in the early days of the Korean War. The Cold War's onset focused our efforts on the need for a sustained effort to oppose a committed and capable global competitor.

The Army's experience in Vietnam reminded us of our core values' importance. The 1980s training revolution and modernization programs refocused our attention on the need to balance the six imperatives to produce a credible force capable of carrying out the nation's bidding. Incorporating new technologies and harnessing microprocessor power in the 1990s are but the Army's latest instances of adapting to the environment in which it finds itself.

The point here is simple: change is nothing new. Army leaders throughout the 20th century have lived with change all their careers. The challenges we face today are no different than those our predecessors have faced and mastered. What this century's history teaches us is that the Army's real strength is its ability to change and adapt to the period's requirements. Our ability to change was the key to victory in two world wars and a cold war, and it will be the foundation for our future success.

Change in the Post–Cold War World

The Soviet Union's disintegration removed the paramount security concern of the last half of

the 20th century, but it left other dangers undiminished. Indeed, the demise of Soviet power may even have promoted new and potentially destabilizing trends. The rise of new economic centers of influence, political organizations and regional military powers may presage new competition for territory or resources. The breakup of nation-states, such as in the former Yugoslavia, can have a significant impact on regional peace and stability. Uneven economic development will prolong poverty throughout many parts of the globe, promoting terrorism and malignant drug-based economies. Traditional national and ethnic enmities will sustain the demand for high-technology weaponry, further retarding economic development while raising the cost of conflict. Ethnic divisions that were suppressed by the Cold War can erupt with suddenness and ferocity, as the tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated all too vividly.

A variety of social and economic factors also promote significant changes in the international environment. The gap between rich and poor societies has expanded dramatically, separating nations and continents into fundamentally different worlds. The collapse of communist regimes could leave millions threatened with insecurity and conflict. The United States cannot take for granted the development of democratic institutions and practices in former Soviet Union nations.

International drug trafficking poses a seemingly intractable problem. The drug-producing industry is growing, particularly in Latin America. While the United States has made counter-drug operations a national priority, sustained progress has been elusive. Political, economic and military relations with many of the critical nations of the Western Hemisphere are affected by the drug problems.

Modern military technology proliferation continues, particularly in developing countries. At least 56 countries already are capable of engaging in mid-intensity conflict, each having military forces that include at least 700 tanks or armored personnel carriers, 100 combat aircraft, 500 artillery pieces and more than 100,000 soldiers. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are also more prevalent. At the turn of the 21st century, as many as eight developing countries could have nuclear weapons, up to 30 could have chemical capabilities, 10 could possess biological weapons capabilities and 15 could be producing ballistic missiles.

Long lists of military hardware do not automatically constitute a threat. However, such capabilities in the hands of those who might oppose U.S. national interests, for whatever reason, will be an all too prevalent characteristic of the international environment for the foreseeable future. A number of such regimes already exist; both North Korea and Iraq, for all their internal difficulties, represent states that combine the enmity and modern military capability to threaten US interests and disrupt stability in two vital regions of the world.

Conflict today is marked by increased precision and firepower across expanded battlefield dimensions, increased speed and tempo, the ability to see the enemy at any time and anywhere and the means to take the battle to him continuously. Precision-guided munitions and high-technology weapons proliferation among developing nations will make future battlefields, even in the developing world, high-risk environments. Increasingly lethal weapons, along with enhanced sensors, sophisticated countermeasures and reduced signature platforms, will provide regional adversaries with capabilities that are disproportionate to overall force size or level of economic development.

Steady undercurrents of resurgent nationalism—a source of many conflicts over the past millennium—continue to incite demands to redraw political boundaries or redress ancient grievances. The notion of nationalism based on "ethnic purity" contains the seeds of endless and intractable conflicts. Some fundamentalist religious movements advocate violence and vengeance. While the emergence of a global competitor against the United States in the next quarter-century seems unlikely, regional powers armed with modern weapons certainly will be an international security environment feature, and great powers such as Russia and China may well assert their will in areas they deem within their sphere of influence, thereby challenging U.S. national interests.

The end result of post–Cold War changes is the replacement of the global Soviet threat with an ambiguous and diverse security environment, one filled with the potential for peace and prosperity, but one that also carries significant risks to the interests of the United States and its allies. The world has changed; we know that while there are new opportunities for peace and stability, the world remains an unpredictable and potentially dangerous place.

Strategy Has Changed

U.S. national security strategy has changed to reflect the changes in the international environment. Engagement, a national security strategy, posits three critical objectives for the protection and advancement of US interests:

- Enhancing security by maintaining a strong defense.
- Bolstering prosperity by working to open foreign markets and spur economic growth.
- Promoting democracy by supporting the newly emerging democracies throughout the world.

This emerging defense strategy is based on a strategic assessment that there will be no global peer competitor between now and 2010, the United States will continue to be involved in regional and small-scale contingencies and U.S. forces will be committed to multiple concurrent operations worldwide.

The defense strategy's critical elements are shaping the international environment, responding rapidly to crises wherever they occur with relevant force packages and preparing for the uncertain world of 2020 and beyond.

Shaping Requires Engagement

Shaping requires the United States to be involved, face-to-face with our allies and friends, sharing the hardships and risks while promoting the development of stable regimes and regional stability. The ultimate objective of our shaping efforts is the enhancement of mutual understanding, trust and confidence. The United States has the strategic opportunity to structure an international environment that focuses on economic prosperity and cooperation rather than political confrontation and conflict.

Responding to Crises

Responding with appropriate levels of force requires the sustainment of credible forces that are trained and ready to operate across the entire spectrum of conflict. For the Army, we must be prepared for everything from peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities, to small-scale contingency operations, to major theater wars. Heavy, light and special operations forces (SOF) must be capable of imposing our nation's will on an adversary in a variety of possible operational, geographic and climatic environments.

Preparing to Meet Future Demands

In preparing to meet the demands of 2020 and beyond, planners must recognize that the future geo-strategic environment will be increasingly urbanized, requiring forces that can discriminate between combatants and noncombatants and which can apply appropriate combinations of lethal and nonlethal force. Future forces will also have to deal effectively with asymmetric challenges, including the use of WMD, terrorism, information warfare, special operations or clandestine forces and attempts to deny regional access and allies to U.S. forces. Future adversaries will not try to match their forces directly against ours where the United States has overwhelming superiority. Instead, they will exploit perceived political and operational weaknesses, thereby trying to negate US high-tech systems' advantages.

Requirements Have Changed

U.S. national military strategy (NMS) has changed to reflect the new national security environment's requirements. Whereas the Cold War strategy of containment led to the forward deployment of a sizable portion of America's conventional forces to deter the expansion of Soviet influence, today's military strategy relies on the strategic concepts of overseas presence and power projection to protect US interests in a much less predictable world than its Cold War predecessor.

The three critical components of today's military strategy, peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention and the ability to fight and win the nation's wars, have important consequences for how the Army conducts its responsi-

bilities and how it contributes to the accomplishment of the NMS requirements.

The Army Has Changed

The last eight years have signaled enormous change for the U.S. Army. The Army has transformed itself from being a forward-stationed Cold War force designed primarily to conduct large-scale operations on the plains of Europe, to being a power-projection force capable of rapidly delivering decisive military force anywhere in the world. This transformation came about during a time when the Army participated in 27 operational deployments and when it had been downsized by nearly 40 percent.

Perhaps the most obvious change has been the Army's size reduction. The Active Component has been reduced from 781,000 soldiers in 1989 to 495,000 today; Army Reserve and National Guard strength has gone from 776,000 to 575,000; and our civilian work force has been reduced from 402,000 to 236,000. Active divisions have been reduced from 18 to 10, while Reserve Component divisions have gone from 10 to 8. In 1989, there were 235,000 soldiers stationed permanently in Europe; today there are 65,000. The Army has closed 91 installations in the United States while realigning 15 others. It has returned more than 630 overseas bases to host nation control. All nuclear weapons have been removed from the Army's inventory. Budget resources have shrunk by 39 percent.

While the reduction in size may be the most visible aspect of change in the post–Cold War Army, it is not the most important. At the same time the physical size and structure of the Army were being altered so dramatically, the Army reconfigured itself conceptually and doctrinally to meet the requirements of the new environment and strategy. The Army's full-spectrum, power-projection capability is the greatest indicator of the extent to which the Army has changed to meet the requirements of the post–Cold War era.

The Army has invested heavily in making its forces more strategically mobile, and we have significantly improved our "fort-to-port" infrastructure. The nation's strategic mobility assets, both fast sea-lift ships and transport aircraft, have been upgraded, and the use of pre-positioned equipment reduces the time needed to quickly put capable forces on the ground. The continuing purchase of C–17 strategic transport aircraft and fast, modern sealift ships configured to carry Army equipment ensures that potential adversaries must reckon with the US Army's ability to quickly project decisive combat power anywhere in the world.

A vivid demonstration of the Army's enhanced capability to project credible power quickly over extended distances occurred in December 1994 when Saddam Hussein made threatening gestures toward Kuwait again. Once President Bill Clinton approved the deployment of an armored brigade from Fort Hood, Texas, to Kuwait, the 5,000-soldier brigade from the 1st Cavalry Division was positioned in Kuwait, with its complete combat vehicle set—drawn from pre-positioned stocks, ready to conduct combat operations—in less than 120 hours. Ultimately, the Army will have eight brigade sets of heavy equipment pre-positioned afloat or ashore in critical locations around the world.

Peacetime engagement's purpose is to shape the international environment through a broad range of noncombat activities that demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, bolster prosperity, relieve suffering and enhance regional stability. Toward these ends, thousands of US Army soldiers are engaged daily in activities that promote peace and stability. Military-to-military contact, particularly in the emerging democracies of former Soviet nations, provide opportunities for Army soldiers to teach their counterparts everything from squad tactics to the military's role in a democracy. These contacts take place not only abroad, but at home as well. Currently, the Army is training soldiers from 134 countries at our installations throughout the United States.

Despite the reduction in numbers, soldiers permanently stationed abroad are the most visible symbol of America's commitment to its alliance partners. Forward-stationed soldiers enhance regional stability, thereby providing the opportunity for the growth of democracy and economic prosperity in important world regions. Forward-stationed forces, particularly in Europe and Korea, contribute directly to deterrence in these

vital regions, as do forces participating in peacetime engagement activities.

The presence of Army soldiers also contributes directly to conflict prevention. The Army has provided a 600-soldier contingent to the multinational peacekeeping force in the Sinai for more than 14 years. For the past five years, more than 500 US soldiers have been deployed to Macedonia to prevent the spread of the Balkan conflict. Until recently, more than 20,000 soldiers were deployed in Bosnia to implement the Dayton Peace Accords. Today, 10,000 Army soldiers remain as an integral part of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia. Also, there is a 60-soldier contingent deployed along the border between Ecuador and Peru to prevent that dispute from erupting into violence.

The Army's fundamental purpose is to fight and win our nation's wars as part of a joint team. The NMS requires the Armed Forces to be able to fight and win two major theater wars. To meet that requirement, the Army maintains a mix of heavy, light and SOF that give it the ability to apply decisive force across the entire spectrum of military operations. The combination of quality soldiers, innovative doctrine, realistic training and modern equipment produces a land force without equal, a strategic force capable of imposing its will on an adversary with minimum casualties on both sides. The results of Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and Operation DESERT STORM in the Persian Gulf provide ample evidence of the Army's ability to deliver decisive victory.

However, the Army is not resting on its laurels. Army units continue to train at its combat training centers: National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California; Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Combat Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany. These world-class facilities provide units from squad to brigade, and commanders at every level, the opportunity to operate in the most strenuous simulated battlefield conditions possible.

The Army must be prepared to meet today's requirements and also the demands of the international security environment in the years ahead. The Army XXI initiative is designed to ensure that Army forces are ready to meet the future requirements. In March 1997, we conducted a major Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) at the NTC that tested new organizational structures and the effects modern communications and information-processing capabilities will have on future military operations. The lessons learned from that AWE provide the basis for doctrinal innovation, organizational restructuring and the insertion of information-dominance capabilities in our existing weapon platforms. The Army XXI initiative ensures we retain operational overmatch capabilities against any potential opponent in the years ahead.

The Army Campaign Plan

The Cold War's end provides the United States a strategic window of opportunity. For all of the current international environment uncertainties and dangers, there is no global competitor to challenge U.S. worldwide interests. This strategic situation provides us with the opportunity to think imaginatively about the future as we try to divine what capabilities will be possible and necessary in the decades ahead.

We do know what we want the Army's characteristics to be in 2020. The Army—and our sister services—should be:

- Joint by design, not by accommodation.
- Capable of fully exploiting information-age technologies.
- Led by streamlined headquarters elements.
- Mobile—strategically, operationally and tactically.
- Versatile, with units that can perform multiple, disparate functions.
- Flexible, with units that can deftly transition between the use of lethal and nonlethal force, as the situation dictates.
- Logistically unencumbered—"just-in-time," rather than "just-in-case."
- Capable of implementing the operational concepts of *Joint Vision 2010*: Dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection and focused logistics.
- A force that trains the way it fights.

To develop a military force that reflects these characteristics, we must incorporate the technological advancements and organizational adjustments required to implement a true revolution in military affairs (RMA). All of the services should commit to a force development strategy that

eschews marginal improvements in capabilities that result from the incorporation of "creep-ahead" technologies and focuses instead on an approach which produces revolutionary improvements in capabilities through the incorporation of "leap-ahead" technologies. The Army has developed a campaign plan designed to incorporate just such technologies into its force structure while ensuring we retain our operational overmatch capabilities against any potential adversary as we build the Army of the future.

The campaign plan is based on a two-phase development program. In the first phase, we will develop and deploy digitized units that reflect the lessons learned from the AWE series. This approach defers decisions on major new platform procurement until we identify and sufficiently develop technologies that offer true leap-ahead capabilities.

We will maintain operational overmatch by inserting information dominance technologies into our current family of platforms. We will extend the life of current systems rather than procure creep-ahead systems with only marginal improvements. That approach would divert critical research and development resources to the procurement of Cold War capabilities in ever-smaller force packages, given current fiscal realities. The Army will focus on leap-ahead technological capabilities in propulsion, mobility, weapon systems, reconnaissance and surveillance and protection, to name just a few areas that hold enormous promise in the not-too-distant future.

The first phase of the Army's future campaign plan will take place between now and 2010. The objective of this phase is the fielding of Army XXI, a digitized force that reflects product improvements in current combat systems and the addition of information technology. Army XXI also will reflect force design changes made possible by digitization and validated by our AWEs. Operational doctrine will evolve to incorporate Army XXI's enhanced warfighting and situational awareness capabilities. Our research and development program will focus on identifying and developing leap-ahead technologies that will significantly enhance our capabilities in the years after 2010.

Army XXI will maintain and improve America's warfighting edge. It will be more versatile and flexible than the current force. It will be a power-projection force that is more agile, lethal and, most important, better able to provide the nation full-spectrum dominance. Army XXI will have the capabilities to win the nation's wars, establish order, prevent conflict and sustain operations as long as required. In short, it will be a force capable of shaping the strategic environment as well as responding in decisive fashion to whatever missions it is called on to perform.

The campaign plan's second phase will combine leap-ahead technologies with doctrinal innovations and new organizational concepts. Together, the combination of technological advancements, doctrinal change, and organization redesign will provide the synergistic effects to produce a true RMA. This phase's objective is to field the Army After Next (AAN)—a logistically unencumbered force with greater lethality, versatility and strategic and operational mobility.

The AAN will provide the nation with overmatch capabilities across the spectrum of operations. It will reflect the results of our strategic approach to force structure design and modernization. The critical technological advancements of the next 20 years will be incorporated into new operating systems and weapon platforms, thereby ensuring the AAN's capability to protect the nation's interests against any peer competitor.

Creating the Future Joint Force

The U.S. Armed Forces are at a strategic crossroads. We have the opportunity to fundamentally reshape 21st century Armed Forces in a manner consistent with national strategy and emerging geo-strategic realities. We can chart a clear and steady course that offers the potential for dramatic improvements in defense capabilities and greater returns on investments. This course has three essential components: a process for joint experimentation and integration; a realigned defense modernization strategy; and a revolution in the business practices of the Department of Defense (DOD).

Joint Experimentation and Integration

Each service has established battle labs and has recognized the usefulness of experimentation to effectively manage change and evaluate

new operational concepts, technologies and organizational designs. An integrated approach to experimentation significantly enhances the ability to design, test and field new joint organizations. We can now electronically connect the service battle labs and the southwest United States service training facilities—Fort Irwin; Twenty-Nine Palms, California; Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; and China Lake, California—in a consortium of joint battle labs. A joint experimental force—a Joint Task Force (JTF)—can incorporate the advances the services have already made individually and serve as the testbed for future developments in joint operational concepts and doctrine.

For example, the Deep Attack/Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS) indicates that we can significantly enhance our survivability and lethality beyond what was previously assumed through innovative employment of rotary wing aviation and deep-fire assets. This type of emerging concept and the implied refinements to existing tactics, techniques and procedures would be fertile ground for a standing experimental JTF. The JTF would be equipped with new capabilities developed through a reformed acquisition process that links troops, combat developers, materiel developers, testers and industry for rapid prototype development, experimentation, testing and fielding. The JTF would also provide the vehicle by which we could develop full-spectrum joint training. In the process, the JTF would serve as the catalyst for the cultural changes that will lead to truly integrated joint forces and unequaled joint operational effectiveness. Concurrently, we can expand our partnership with industry to build on these lessons and further reform defense acquisition to reduce costs, technical risks and time required to field new capabilities.

Defense Modernization Strategy

Our current capabilities are adequate—with some focused enhancements—to successfully implement the NMS at least through the year 2010. Accordingly, it appears prudent to delay large-scale modernization of some capabilities during the next decade while we invest more significantly in the development of leap-ahead capabilities. In the near term, we have an opportunity to recapitalize joint capabilities that support the NMS and insert appropriate new technologies that increase operational performance or system cost effectiveness. We also should "product-improve" existing and soon-to-be-fielded systems with "Appliqué" command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to achieve battlefield information dominance across the joint force. We should refocus DOD research and development efforts on high-payoff, leap-ahead capabilities and skip the procurement of next-generation systems that offer essentially incremental improvements in traditional approaches, except where absolutely required to maintain technological overmatch against likely adversaries.

We must identify leap-ahead technologies that make previous generations of equipment and operational concepts obsolete. In so doing, we will at the same time identify those capabilities that ensure we will maintain overmatch capabilities against any competitor for the next 50 years. Refocusing defense modernization on leap-ahead, rather than creep-ahead, systems will contribute directly to effective changes in the way joint forces think, plan, organize, train and fight.

Revolution in Business Practices

We also have a strategic opportunity to bring DOD-wide business practices into the 21st century through an expanded partnership with industry and Congress. DOD must adopt the best possible practices within the framework of free and open competition, consistent with the requirement to sustain critical defense industrial base components. DOD must benchmark the best business practices of American industry to streamline, downsize, outsource and otherwise ensure the best possible return on our investments. We must also undertake efforts to streamline our headquarters, reduce infrastructure and provide incentives for the efficient management of defense agencies. The result of these enhanced business practices will be a joint force with enhanced operational agility, one that can deploy faster, with a smaller logistic tail. It also will be a force that reflects the most effective possible resource stewardship committed by the American public to produce and sustain it.

Army Values Will Not Change

Despite future changes, one thing will not change—the Army will continue to be a values-based organization. The values on which we have created the premier land combat force in the world will also be critical to our success in the years ahead. The Army is and will remain an institution with an enduring set of values. Those values—honor, integrity, selfless service, courage, loyalty, duty and respect—are more than just words. They are the creed by which soldiers live. Common values create the strong bonds that inspire the sense of purpose necessary to sustain soldiers in the brutal realities of combat and help them deal with the demanding requirements of all other military operations. Army values will continue to provide the foundation for everything we do.

Another constant is the need for America's Army to be able to conduct the range of its missions. In the last eight years alone, the Army has conducted operations ranging from theater-level war in the Persian Gulf to humanitarian relief operations in Rwanda. Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Macedonia are but a few of the places Army soldiers have carried out the nation's bidding, while the soldiers of the 2d Infantry Division in Korea continue the vigil begun in 1950 to bring peace to that divided land.

In the end, the commitment of American soldiers is the ultimate expression of national resolve. What will never change is the readiness of America's Army to answer the call, whatever or wherever the challenge.

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Letter to Army General Officers

July 14, 1997

Best Practices for Army Support Functions

I was recently briefed by a study panel chaired by General Jimmy D. Ross, United States Army (Retired), that addressed potential methods for achieving savings from outsourcing various support functions over the next 12 months. I had asked General Ross to review both the Defense Science Board recommendations on outsourcing and privatization and the efforts of the Quadrennial Defense Review and to develop an action plan to identify near-term outsourcing candidates. I was very impressed by the results.

The panel's initial recommendations reinforced my belief that we must thoroughly examine the way we perform our support functions. Today's Army has experienced great change in the past 20 years; to meet the challenges of the 21st century we must be willing to change even more and at a faster rate. Our future success will be based in part on our ability to streamline and optimize the productivity of our infrastructure and support functions. Best solutions begin with best practices. If we do not become more efficient by adapting best business practices, we will not be able to afford the modernization that soldiers need to be trained and ready in the 21st century.

I believe that, when applied properly, outsourcing can be a viable tool for managing our resources and achieving cost savings. Lessons from the private sector have also taught us that outsourcing can be an efficient business practice under the right circumstances.

However, we should all bear in mind that the competitive process itself may show that retaining certain functions in-house, with our civilian workforce, is the Army's best practice. In those cases where contract conversion is the right choice, retraining and rehiring of displaced members of the workforce will make the conversion easier and ultimately more successful. The key to success is fair and open competition so that the Army gets the best business practices and our soldiers get the most bang for the buck. There are numerous instances where the Army is already successfully using outsourcing and privatization to provide support functions.

- The Army's A–76 studies of logistics and public works directorates have resulted in substantial savings.
- The use of private vendors to provide both official and unofficial travel-related services has also generated substantial savings.
- Many training and education programs have been, and will continue to be, outsourced.

• We are running a pilot test of private contractor management of household goods transportation.

• We are currently evaluating several proposals by private contractors to take over family housing at Fort Carson [Colorado]. The selected contractor will take over about 1,824 existing units, revitalize them, and build 840 new ones. Similar projects are in various stages of privatization at a dozen additional installations.

I am also impressed with the concept of "partnering" with industry. Similar to the strategic alliances developed by businesses with their suppliers, we must look for "strategic partners" who provide the best value to our Army. An example is the work sharing arrangement of United Defense Limited Partnership (UDLP) and Letterkenny Army Depot. These organizations share facilities and divide the work to take advantage of each other's expertise to accomplish Paladin upgrades. Partnering arrangements with industry have the potential to strengthen our industrial base and result in better use of resources.

An example is Federal Express, which is running a pilot program with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to warehouse and distribute 3,500 DLA inventory lines worldwide with a 24-hour response. This same partnering concept holds exceptional promise for our theater support.

I will fully support proposed plans to enhance our outsourcing process through legislative and regulatory change. Recognizing that we must leverage every available opportunity and efficiency that we can gain from outsourcing, privatization and streamlined internal operations, I am fully committed to learning from our past successes, benchmarking better industry practices, and taking the broadest view possible. We can only build the quality trained, ready and fully modernized Army of the 21st century if we have the most efficient and capable support possible. Today's leaders owe that to tomorrow's soldiers, our legacy and our credentials.

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Remarks to Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association—TECHNET 97

Washington, D.C.

June 17, 1997

Thank you Dr. Ralph Shrader for that very warm welcome. Welcome to all of you—distinguished guests—ladies and gentlemen. I am truly delighted to be here to talk about the United States Army and to participate in this conference. It is really the world's largest conference devoted to command, control, communications intelligence, electronics and information technology. It is a very special event and I think your theme—"Information Technology in the 21st Century: Meeting the Cyberspace Challenge"—is really a very vital part of what we're all about today in the Army and throughout the military. I believe that the information technology revolution is the major challenge we face and I can sum up the key to success with the word *change* because change is what we're all about.

For the United States Army, the 21st century began in 1989. That was the year the Berlin Wall came down and that was the year that our world turned upside down. Since that time I think we have changed the Army—physically and culturally. Physically, it's very easy to describe, because you know the numbers probably as well as I do. We've taken out over 600,000 people in the Army—Active, Reserve Component, and DA civilians. We've closed over 700 bases, most of those in Europe, but if you add up all the bases, we've closed the equivalent of about twelve Fort Hoods or Fort Carsons or Fort Rileys in the Continental United States. Our resources have come down about 40 percent and our infrastructure has come down about 36 percent. You don't have to be a rocket scientist to understand that we can't do business the way we've done it in the past—we have to make ends meet. So that's the challenge that we face with physical change.

We've also changed the Army culturally. We've changed it from a forward-deployed containment force to a power projection force, able to respond anywhere in the world on a moment's

notice. We've changed it from a threat-based force to a capabilities-based force. The capabilities-based force has four capabilities that are terribly important to us. First, is our ability to deter an enemy—and to deter an enemy we must be strong. Next, is our ability to compel an adversary if deterrence fails. We also must be able to reassure our allies and friends—to work with the emerging countries in central and eastern Europe and teach them about democracy and how important it is to have the military subordinate to a freely elected government. And the last capability is to be able to provide military support to civilian authorities—we do on a continuous basis throughout the United States. The cultural change that has occurred is very difficult to quantify, but it's very real because it affects our people emotionally and it matters to them in terms of quality of life and taking care of our soldiers and their families.

The change that we've experienced in the military in the last seven or eight years has been unprecedented. I don't think you could find any time in military history where we've changed the military force so much and kept it trained and ready seven or eight years later. The reason is no secret; we put people first.

Today, the United States military has a seat in the front row of the world arena. We have an opportunity to fundamentally change the Army and our military forces—to reshape our forces for the 21st century. That's what the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is all about. I'd like to talk a little bit about the QDR because it's terribly important to our military and our Army. The QDR is our third opportunity to restructure the Defense Department since the end of the Cold War. What we tried to do is to project ourselves out into the 2020 time frame and then, look back and analyze the capabilities that we would need at that point in time to be able to respond to the needs of the nation. From the year 2020, we looked back to where you are today and connected the dots. By projecting back from the future we found the path that we want to travel and a path that we must travel if we're going to have the forces necessary for the 2020 time frame.

So if we were historians and we went out to 2020 and we looked back, what would we see if we shaped our forces right? First of all, I think we'd see peace and democracy flourishing around the world. I think we'd have an opportunity to fundamentally set that in place. I think we'd find that the United States remains a global superpower—politically, morally, economically and militarily. Why? Because we got the strategy and the forces necessary to execute that strategy right in 1997 with the QDR. Let me talk for a minute about the strategy.

The strategy that we developed for the QDR really reflects the world as we see it, not the world that we wish it to be. We spent an awful lot of time looking at what we were doing today and projecting that into the future and we came up with three pillars of our strategy. First, we must be able to *respond* to events as they occur. Second, we have an opportunity to *shape* the world we want to live in. And third, we must *prepare* now for the future world. With the *respond* pillar, we're talking about being able to respond to a crisis wherever it occurs around the world, whether it's Korea or Kuwait, wherever it may be. We must be able to move forces very quickly and that requires a total joint effort in terms of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and in many cases the Coast Guard. The second pillar of our strategy is to be able to *shape* the world—it is a tremendous opportunity and a tremendous challenge—to be able to make the world in the 21st century safer for our children and grandchildren. We cannot fail to seize that opportunity. But at the same time, we have to *prepare* our forces for a totally different type of mission, the third pillar of our strategy. To do that, we have to start now by focusing our attention and figuring out what we are going to need in the 2020 time frame. That's what the QDR is all about and that's what the Army has been all about for the last couple of years.

Our analysis for the future points out that we need a capability called strategic preemption. Strategic preemption is the ability to halt or prevent a conflict or crisis before it becomes debilitating or protracted—before it spreads out of control. That means that we must be able to respond quickly; we must be able to get our forces there rapidly. To do that, we must have the right forces and that's why we are trying to build the right

military forces to execute that strategy. We will evolve those forces over time to develop the tactics, techniques and procedures they will need. Let me talk a little bit about what I think those forces will look like.

First of all, I think they must be joint by design. We must embrace a "standing joint task force" because that's the kind of forces we're going to need in the future. They must be small, they must be mobile, and they must be hard-hitting. The forces that we will have must be able to fully exploit the tremendous potential that comes from information-age technology. We have to accept it, we have to learn to use it, and we have to learn to leverage it. We must have streamlined headquarters; we cannot afford the heavy headquarters that we've had in the past so we must be able to streamline those. We must be able to train the way we fight and that means if we're going to fight jointly we must be able to train jointly. We need to figure out how to do that now so that when we're called on we're ready. We must be more strategically and tactically mobile—to be able to move quickly anywhere around the world. And then, once we're on the battlefield, we must be able to move faster and be more agile than any potential enemy. We must be versatile—to be able to handle a large number of different and complex missions and to adjust from one to the other rapidly. We've demonstrated that in Bosnia where the rules of engagement allow us to enforce peace and at the same time we're prepared to go to war in a heartbeat if required. We must be able to transition quickly from lethal to nonlethal means and to be able to deploy that capability on the battlefield in a way that is applicable to each. Logistically, we must be unencumbered. We can no longer afford the large amount of equipment that we traditionally moved from one place to the other during the Cold War. We must be able to move quickly around the world and provide our troops with the supplies and repair parts they need in a timely manner. That means that we're going to have a smaller and more mobile force. In order to do that, we must leverage information technology.

It seems to me that we are at a crossroads today. We know where we must go. We have two paths that we can follow—one is the "creep-ahead" path and the other is the "leap-ahead" path. Let me suggest how we can leap-ahead to the future. I'm sure those of you who heard Lieutenant General Otto Guenther speak this morning know what we did with the Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) at the National Training Center earlier this year. That was an important experiment for us because we caught a glimpse of the future. We know what the future should look like and we're thrilled and excited about the prospects that we have seen. We have an opportunity to move the Army from the industrial age to the information age.

I believe the AWE concept—the Force XXI process—allows us to do that. Information technology provides the opportunity to leap-ahead. Did we do it perfectly during the AWE? No, we didn't, but it was an experiment and we did it very, very well. I'm not swayed by the nay-sayers who say, "Well, you didn't do it right—you had more fratricide than you did in the last rotation." I just simply point out that they didn't see it out there, didn't feel it, didn't taste it, they didn't talk to soldiers. I'm much more influenced by the soldiers I talked to during the AWE than by the analysis from organizations that weren't there looking at it on a daily basis. What we have to do now is to take all of the analysis that we've done and make some firm conclusions about what's important for the future. I think we learned a lot from this experiment.

Let me talk about a couple of concepts that I think are important. First of all, we went into the AWE believing very strongly that we had to have a team concept. We put the developers, the users and the testers together at Fort Hood and we took them to the National Training Center and that worked out very, very well. I'm also convinced that information-age technology works. What we find is the young soldiers that are in our Army today are from what I call the "Pac-Man generation," and they really know how to make information-age technology work. The challenge is for people with gray hair, like mine, who scratch their head and say, I wonder how they did that? I think we have to embrace information-age technology and we have to accept the fact that it really works.

The thing that swayed me the most was when I traveled to the NTC with Secretary of Defense

Cohen and we visited the task force operations centers and the operations officer talked to him about situational awareness. He said, "You know, before we had situational awareness, before we were able to answer the questions where am I, where are my buddies, and where is the enemy, I spent 70 percent of my time gathering information, and 30 percent of my time trying to make a recommendation or give advice to the command. With situational awareness, that's reversed. I now spend 30 percent of my time gathering information and 70 percent analyzing it and making recommendations." That convinced me that we are onto something big—something good.

There were a lot of systems that worked very well during the AWE. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the Apache Longbow, the Javelin and many others all worked well. I'm convinced that we can take these systems and adapt them to information-age technology and get an enhanced capability that we never had before. What we must do is stay the course and seize the opportunity to continue the transformation from the industrial age to the information age.

The principles that should guide our transformation are clear. Our forces—air, land, and sea—must be balanced, appropriate and relevant. The national strategy must be the gauge we measure ourselves by. We must make the generating forces as efficient as we possibly can. Most importantly, we must align defense resources with the national strategy and provide long-term stability in investment programs. If you agree with those principles, then I think we need to seize this opportunity and make the changes that we need for our future.

If we're going to make some changes, I think it requires adjustment in three areas. First, we must establish a process of joint experimentation and integration. Next, we must realign our defense modernization strategy. And third, we must have a revolution in business affairs. Let me talk about each of them.

Joint experimentation and integration is absolutely critical and I don't think it's as difficult to do as one might expect. We fundamentally agree that we must fight as a joint team today. If you look at how the military has been used since 1989, you will see that 25 of the 27 major military operations have been conducted by the joint team. So joint experimentation and integration offers us a mechanism to cross-level ideas, to develop tactics, techniques and procedures and to develop the weapons, equipment and doctrine that the joint force is going to need to fight or handle future operations. In essence, we must make the joint concepts and capabilities envisioned in *Joint Vision 2010* a reality.

We can start by linking the service's training and experimentation centers in the Southwest United States and conduct the experimentation in real time. We can do it by setting up a standing joint task force. It's the best way to conceptualize and develop the truly joint forces for the future. We can do it through the use of simulation technologies because I think we can develop a synthetic battle and we can work synthetic units with real units and develop virtual battlegrounds and really learn a great deal from simulations at reduced costs. What we're really trying to do is to create "virtual veterans," people who will not be experiencing the rigors of combat and the rigors of being under pressure for the first time when we send them on operations. They will be fully prepared because they've been trained at home station or at the joint experimentation center before they deploy. Linking the training centers and experimentation centers is the first step, but it's not the only step.

We must also conduct joint field exercises and maneuvers. We must take good ideas and experiment with them on the ground to see how it works in the hands of our troops. We must try out the promising doctrine and we must develop the tactics, techniques and procedures. Our troops do that better than anybody else. We must validate the concepts that we develop in classrooms and through simulations on the ground. I think this leap-ahead opportunity or leap-ahead approach offers the services' tremendous opportunities.

This leads to the second component that I talked about in seizing the strategic opportunity—that is, to realign our defense modernization strategy. This is an opportunity to make sure that our modernization strategy is complementary—not just a single service modernization strategy—but a joint and combined modernization strategy.

To accomplish this we need to refocus our modernization investment. Our current capabilities, with some focused enhancements, particularly in the area of information dominance, are adequate to take us through 2010. What we need to do now is refocus our science and technology field to pull forward the technology that we will need in the 2020 time frame. When we combine that technology with the tactics, techniques and procedures that we are developing in the experimentation process we will truly have a revolution in military affairs.

Finally, if we're going to have a revolution in military affairs, we must first have a revolution in business affairs. We cannot afford the strategy without a revolution in business affairs; that in my mind is a given. We have to capitalize on the innovation and productivity of American industry. We really need to develop a very strong partnership with industry and the Congress to make all this happen or we're not going to be able to provide the nation with the force that it needs. We need to benchmark the best business practices in industry. We need to streamline our headquarters, reduce the infrastructure, and encourage efficient management. We must leverage corporate America's ability to rapidly adjust to changes in the marketplace and make that part of our military personality. In short, we must substitute information for inventory in the future.

We have a window of opportunity to fundamentally reshape the forces for the 21st century. We must do that consistent with the national strategy and the realities of the geostrategic environment. It requires that we embrace an alternative path, a leap-ahead path as I call it. For it to be a leap-ahead path, we must become more joint and we must embrace joint experimentation and integration. We must define the synergies of the service's modernization plans and transform that into a defense modernization plan. And as I mentioned earlier, we must capitalize on efficiencies that industry has realized and make that part of the military culture.

Geoffrey Perret in his book *There's a War To Be Won* talked about the difficulty of change as the U.S. Army struggled during the pre–World War II time frame to prepare the forces necessary to fight and win that war. He said, "The early 1930's weren't conducive to sweeping reforms; the Army had enough on its hands just trying to stay in business."

Today we have an opportunity to fundamentally change for the future. We have a lot on our hands, but I think we can make sweeping reforms—if we don't, we will miss a golden opportunity. What we have to do is be true to the strategy of respond, shape, and prepare, and we can make the vision that we looked at in 2020 become a reality. We don't want a smaller version of the Cold War force; we want a force designed to meet the strategy and needs of the nation—that's what we're all about and that's what the Quadrennial Defense Review is all about. I thank you very much for your kind attention this afternoon, and I thank you very much for your support of the military. God bless you for that.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

July 1, 1997

Officer Professional Development

There is no doubt in my mind that the most critical aspect of our change process is the human dimension part. People are our core competency and they must understand and be part of the change process for it to be successful. The pace and magnitude of the change we are undergoing make it a difficult challenge and I believe it is one that rests squarely on the shoulders of our General Officer Corps. It is what strategic leadership is all about. Consequently, I want to share a few thoughts with you concerning our approach and my expectations of you.

For the officer corps there are two critical parts of this process—the officer evaluation report [OER] and the Officer Personnel Management System [OPMS] study. In terms of background, I think most of you know that the Army made a decision in 1991 not to change our OER during the downsizing process. We knew inflation would set in during the drawdown but we also knew that

to change the rules in the middle of a drawdown exercise would create great uncertainty. I was a part of that decision process. I fully supported it then and I still feel that it was absolutely the right thing to do given the alternatives. However, we also knew that once we stabilized the force we would have to address the inflation. Most of you have participated in the discussion on the development of this OER and know that it's one of our major objectives. I believe, however, that it is a subset of a larger objective which is to redefine success. Over time, I think we've seen success equated to rank and, in my opinion, that is not a true measure of success. It is time to focus on contributions to the organization and not on individual rank. How we go about doing that is the challenge. I believe we must spend a lot of time mentoring and coaching our young leaders on what we expect in terms of contributions. I have always believed that for leaders to contribute they must focus primarily on what their troops are doing and not on their bosses' schedule. If their focus is down and we truly care about taking care of soldiers, then the contributions naturally flow and success is ensured. As I look back on 35 years of service, I'm most proud of the fact that I've had an opportunity to help some people and I've seen many of those who work for me develop to be all they can be. I know that's what I'll remember most when it's all said and done. The fact that I achieved general officer rank is more a matter of luck—either good or bad depending upon the day nowadays. Seriously, I think it's important that we work hard to redefine success and measure that more in contributions than in rank. Another objective was to reemphasize the importance of values. Consequently, our seven inherent values are listed on the front side of this OER. That didn't happen by chance and I don't want this to be simply a check-the-block drill. If we're going to ensure that we truly are a values-based Army—and we are—then we must breathe new life into these values. This is top-down business, leadership by example. I expect you to exemplify these values and to work with your subordinates so they know your expectations. All too often people tell me that they're concerned about one of their subordinates being too interested in their own career. Invariably, the question that runs through my mind is have they as the coach/mentor/leader of that subordinate confronted the individual with this concern. Unless we do so, we run the risk of not having the best possible leadership for the United States Army in the future. I fully expect leaders at all levels to stress the importance of values. We as general officers must lead the way. Finally, the front side of this OER has an interesting aspect that I think will help us greatly in the future. We are being asked to choose from a menu of traits on the front side to best describe the rated officer. There is no correct answer or cookie cutter here. We recognize that we are a diverse organization in race, gender, and ideas and we also know that there is great strength in this diversity. Over time, we believe this will help describe the officers we need for different career fields. I think it will become a superb management tool for those who have to make career decisions. It will take time to start to build a profile for each individual officer, but I'm absolutely convinced it is the right thing to do. This leads me to OPMS.

Major General Dave Ohle has been working on the officer personnel management study for over a year. Most, if not all of you, have provided critical input. Because of that, we have what I consider a superb product. Let me cover with you the basic guidance I gave Dave when we started. I told him that I wanted to keep the warfighting skills preeminent in whatever we did. That is the primary purpose of the Army and that will never change as far as I'm concerned. I told him that whatever we came up with must fit the National Military Strategy. As that strategy has started to emerge and is built upon three pillars—shape, respond, and prepare—I am comfortable that we have done that. At the same time, I told him that the Army is a complex organization and we need people of diverse skills. We must find a way to leverage the strength that comes from that diversity and ensure that they have a path to success. I have had frequent IPRs [in-progress reviews] on his effort and I've watch it mature over time. I'm very pleased with where we are and I believe we're ready to implement starting the 1st of October. I should just make a few general points. First, as you'll see, almost two-thirds of the field grade officers will remain in the operational career field. We have

added three other fields—information operations, operational support, and institutional support. Each field offers the opportunity for success. Implementation will not occur overnight and, as you can see, it will take us approximately 5 years to fully implement. However, it is important that we work very hard in the next 2 years to explain the new system to the Army. I need your help in this area. We must do it right. Detailed information will be provided in the near future, but I've asked Dave to put together some major talking points so that we are all starting from the same baseline. They are included below.

◆ Decision: I have approved OPMS XXI in concept for implementation. This is a great news story! We have the opportunity to develop better warfighters/operators through deeper and broader operational experience and, at the same time, build a bench of officers with the specialty skills we will need in the coming years. We will have a balanced system that meets all our skill needs to build the Total Army of the 21st century.

◆ About two-thirds of the field grade officer force will serve in the Operations career field.

◆ About one-third of the remaining field grade officers will serve in the other three career fields.

There are still many details to attend to before we implement OPMS XXI, and this work will require a team effort across the Army if we are going to execute the plan efficiently and correctly.

Central Theme: We will implement OPMS XXI through a well-considered, deliberate plan that begins on 1 October 97 but will extend over a 5–year period.

◆ We will take the time to transform from current OPMS in a way that is best for both the Army and the individual officer.

◆ We will execute the plan as quickly as possible, but in a way that the system can handle.

◆ We will allow some time for officers to understand the new system, how they fit into it, and make sound decisions regarding their own future under OPMS XXI.

Transition will take place in two phases:

Phase 1 (FY 98–99)—Setting the Conditions for Success:

◆ Recoding/Restructuring Work: Recode and restructure officer authorizations to address QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] reductions and to build viable branches, functional areas, and career fields that grow the officers the Army will need under the new system.

◆ Proponent Work: Proponents finalize officer AR 600–3 officer life-cycle development for all branch and functional areas, validate BR/FA [branch/functional area] job structure by grade to ensure healthy developmental opportunity for officers, and set in place the appropriate programs and policies to support each BR/FA under OPMS XXI.

◆ Informing the Officer Corps: PERSCOM [Personnel Command] and proponents jointly and thoroughly educate the field on the new system so officers can make career decisions that are sound and appropriate under OPMS XXI.

◆ Board Preparation: PERSCOM designs, plans, prepares, and implements the new board system.

Phase 2 (FY 99–02)—Transitioning the Force by aligning officer inventory and authorizations:

◆ Decision Point: Spring of 1998 is the decision point for initiating the actual transition of YGs [year groups].

◆ Start Point: Actual transition of YGs to OPMS XXI begins in FY 99.

◆ Transition Plan: Transition 9 YGs (3 MAJ, 6 LTC) in 4 years.

Important to remember: the whole OPMS world doesn't change on 1 October 97. Will make long-term decisions about OPMS XXI in the near future and implementation will begin in October, but the actual execution will take place over 5 years. In many respects, officers will see very little immediate, visible change, but much preparatory work will be ongoing to pave the way for an efficiently paced and effective transition.

As you can see, the new OER and the officer personnel management study are joined at the hip. They have been developed concurrently and I believe are fully synchronized. We are getting close to the execution phase and that is a critical phase. I fully expect you and all leaders to implement both of these as we designed them. If they are to work they must be based on credibility and that credibility is gained by implementing both the way they were designed. I know I can count on your help in this area.

I'll probably put out more on this issue in the near future, but I wanted to share some thoughts on what I consider the most important issue we face. As I indicated earlier, this is strategic leadership. We're talking about changing the Army in a very fundamental way to ensure that it remains relevant to the needs of the nation. This is both a tremendous challenge and an exciting opportunity. We must do it right.

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Letter to Army General Officers

July 7, 1997

South Africa: A Nation and an Army in Transition

I recently visited my friend and counterpart, Lieutenant General Reginald Otto, Chief of Staff of the South African Army. Our all-too-brief stay really provided only a glimpse of this magnificent country whose natural beauty is equaled by the friendship of its people.

Many things about South Africa are terribly impressive. The vast tree-studded plains of its national parks sweep from horizon to horizon, preserving for all generations the wonderful richness of Africa's wildlife. Its natural riches are the envy of the world. But nothing is more impressive than the degree of transformation that its social order is undergoing.

After decades of apartheid and racial strife and violence, South Africans of all races are transforming their country into a multiracial democracy based upon democratic values that they share with us. Words like *unprecedented* and *epoch-making* understate the magnitude of this tremendous undertaking.

It is fair to say that General Otto's South African Army has been both a pathfinder and a pacesetter for the entire country as it transforms itself into a multiracial democratic Army. Both the size and complexity of the challenge this evolving Army faces are difficult for Americans to appreciate.

The new South African Army has been molded from the fighting forces of all seven parties involved in the former conflict. As six of these parties were enemies of the apartheid-era government until 1994, successful integration required a tremendous amount of sensitivity and consideration by all concerned. Over 900,000 soldiers, some who had been guerrilla fighters most of their lives, had to be demobilized and reintegrated into society. At the same time, national conscription was abolished and replaced by a volunteer force.

The new Army also had to overcome some major cultural differences. Many of the soldiers came from guerrilla forces; others came from the regular government army. The guerrillas practiced collective decisionmaking and leadership, while the regulars used a European-style hierarchical approach.

Like our Army, the South African Army is also transitioning from a threat-oriented force to a capabilities-based force. At the same time, they are downsizing and carrying an increasing responsibility for meeting many of the challenges now facing the new South African democracy. Just as our nation has often turned to our Army when no one else could do the job, South Africa has asked its soldiers to help deal with waves of illegal immigrants, smuggling, ethnic, racial, and tribal conflict, and increasing crime. They're meeting the challenge.

South Africa is a tremendous country with a tremendous future in the making—a future that its Army is helping to mold. General Otto paid us a great compliment during his dinner toast when he said that our Army is a model for the world's professional armies in terms of professionalism, ideals, and standards, one that they hope to emulate as they build a new South African Army to support the new South Africa.

We offer them our very best wishes and continuing friendship.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

July 25, 1997

Officer Evaluation Report

This one's a little different from most I send you. I want to lay out an issue for you and then get your input. All you have to do is give me your thoughts on the issue by responding directly to Nick Justice. We will then collate your data and factor it into the decision process. The issue is one I consider critical to the leadership of the Army. Consequently, I want your thoughts, not some staff officer or aide. If you do not want to provide input, that's fine too, but at least acknowledge receipt so we know our system works.

The issue has to do with the implementation of the new OER and it specifically centers around senior rater profiles. As you know, we've had a series of IPRs [in-progress reviews] and most if not all of you have provided valuable input to the development of this OER. I'm totally convinced that the proper implementation of this OER is critical to the proper execution of OPMS [Officer Professional Management System]. As I've said many times, the two are joined at the hip and fully complementary, but we had a discussion at the Senior Leaders Training Conference that threw out another option and I want to check signals with you. I also believe that so much of our future is tied into the proper implementation of these two (OER and OPMS) that I get the best advice possible. That's why I'm reaching out to all of you.

Currently, the new OER requires senior raters to put at least 51 percent of their rated officers in the second block or center of mass. This was designed to combat the inflation that had crept into the 67–8 and restore the credibility of the senior rater in the evaluation process. I recognize that makes it tough on all of you in terms of making that cut at the 50-percent mark. In deciding upon that initially we felt that was as big a change as the officer corps could handle for right now. I think that is still an important consideration; however, having discussed this with a number of officers, I know we are all trying to figure out how to take care of our best leaders. Ideally, we would use the top block to identify those real superstars whom we believe are truly destined for the top. However, I think most senior raters will be reluctant to not use the full 49 percent in order to take care of people who are doing their best for them and show considerable potential. In that case we will still be dependent upon the board to make the tough differentiation. That is the system that is currently approved to go into effect when we execute the new OER.

One of the proposals that surfaced was to allow senior raters to put no more than one-third of their officers in the top block. At first this may seem counterintuitive to making the officer corps more comfortable with this new OER; however, a lot of that I think depends upon how we package it and how we execute it—more on that later. The major advantage of this proposal, I think, is that most of our officers recognize that they are high-quality officers and they're doing a good job. Consequently, they are being rated fairly and along with the majority of their contemporaries. We also recognize that there are a small number who are both above and below average. The OER allows senior raters to send a very powerful signal to the board. This proposal would clearly mean that people who have OERs in the center of mass would be selected and promoted for key positions. The days of the so-called perfect file would be over and the selection/promotion process conducted by boards would probably be more heavily weighted on field evaluations. In other words, the senior rater vote truly counts. The down side, of course, is convincing a basically "top block" officer corps that the new rating system truly reflects the high-quality officers we have and does not signal a quality drain.

That gets into how we sell either one of these systems. I don't have the answer for that and certainly would be interested in any of your thoughts on how we do that. What I need from you is how you come down on this specific issue and your rationale for that. From that we will make a decision and craft the underpinning of that decision.

What I hope is crystal clear is that I fully intend to enforce whatever system we adopt. The management information systems we have now allow us to do that and I intend to insist that the officer corps execute properly the systems we

implement. This is too important to our future not to do it right.

I would appreciate your comments ASAP [as soon as possible] but NLT [not later than] 31 July [1997].

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E-mail to Army General Officers

August 6, 1997

Officer Evaluation Report

Thanks for your input on the new OER [see e-mail to Army General Officers, July 25, 1997]. I read every one of your comments and found them extremely interesting. As I expected, they reflect both the complexity of this issue and the high degree of professionalism we have in the General Officer Corps. Now I have a much better feel of where you are on this issue and I believe this effort will result in a better decision. I deeply appreciate your stated support for whatever decision is made. That's important because the real keys to success are ownership and execution.

If I counted votes—which I didn't—the majority came down in favor of a tighter shot group in the top blocks. Most favored the 33-percent cap, while others made valid arguments for even less. My own bias going into this was that was the way to go. I'm sure some of you detected that from the way I sent out the message. I tried to make it as balanced as I could but I'm sure I tipped my hand to many.

However, having read your comments and given considerable thought and prayer to this issue, I believe the Army is best served by the 49/51 system. Let me give you the arguments that weighed most heavily in making this decision.

- Any time you change the evaluation report there is great anxiety about that decision. I can remember well the anxiety in the early eighties when we went to the current form. I detected some of that anxiety in your comments. I know it exists and probably is greatest at the captain through colonel level. That's a group of very talented officers who have been living under a highly inflated system for the last 4–5 years at least. To ratchet down to 33 percent may be a bridge too far. We need to build their confidence in our new OER system.
- I looked at whether there was a way we could focus on 33 percent individual officers vice individual reports and I am convinced the system cannot handle that. My concern here was that by focusing on individual reports with a 33-percent cap and given the multiple ratings that officers receive, senior raters would only be able to rate approximately 20 percent of the officer corps in the top block. I don't think that gives you enough flexibility. As I got into that level of detail I felt that the original analysis we did was even more compelling.
- Finally, I have always been concerned about signaling uncertainty with this report. When you make a major change like that at the 11th hour you have to accept the fact that there is going to be uncertainty amongst the officer corps as to what else is wrong with that report. I firmly believe that the report is too good to risk the doubt and uncertainty that might result from this change. Given all the other change we have going on, that's an unacceptable risk in my mind.

There are valid points on both sides of the issue but, on balance, I believe we are best served by going with the proposed system and, consequently, need your support for that system. As many of you identified, either system will work if we execute it properly. Some have heard me talk on this but let me make sure you understand how strongly I feel about this. I was in the Chief's [General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.] office when the Army sent out the pull up your socks message. It was a disaster primarily because we did not enforce the system, and consequently some people complied with what the Chief said and others didn't. I don't intend for that to happen this time. This is a credibility issue for all of us.

My guess is that an objective of 33 percent in the senior rater block is pretty good guidance and will give you the flexibility necessary. I am convinced that a center of mass rating will not be

career ending, and that we will have officers selected for promotion and key opportunities with more than one report in the center of mass. I assure you with the implementation of OPMS [Officer Professional Management System] and a move to a more requirements-based selection system this is going to happen. We will find a way to make the senior rater's personal compliance with this system a matter of their official file and subject to board review. We have a great officer corps and I don't doubt the integrity of anyone. However, I need to make sure that everyone understands that I expect compliance.

I've asked PERSCOM [Personnel Command] to send a reminder letter when senior rater top block profiles go above the objective 33 percent figure. When the senior rater top block exceeds 49 percent, he or she can expect through the chain of command a general officer letter. I feel so strongly about this that I will personally sign those for general officers. This is what senior leadership is all about—we must walk the walk.

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Letter to Army General Officers

August 1, 1997

Visit to Poland and the Czech Republic

I recently paid a visit to my counterparts in Poland and the Czech Republic. In Warsaw I was hosted by Lieutenant General Zbigniew Zalewski, and in Prague I visited with General Major Jiri Sedivy. Although these visits had been planned for some time, they in fact came at a very fortuitous moment. The trip came on the heels of the historic NATO meeting in Madrid that invited both countries to begin the accession process leading to NATO membership in 1999. This achievement was the result of much hard work on the part of these candidates, and it was great to be able to offer our congratulations to the military and civilian leaders of both countries.

In discussions with the senior leadership in both Poland and the Czech Republic, I was struck by the similarity of the problems all of us face. Like us, both countries are trying to get the best defense they can from the resources available to them. For example, both are downsizing the military establishments they inherited from the Cold War era in order to conserve resources to spend on essential modernization.

They, too, are learning that in a democracy an army ultimately depends on the people to provide the resources necessary for national defense. To be willing to provide this support, the people must understand the need for an army and respect and trust it as an institution. Ultimately, the nation must be willing to trust its army with its most precious resource, its sons and daughters. Both Poland and the Czech Republic have recently suffered from some of the worst flooding central Europe has experienced in almost a millennium, and the magnificent performance of their armies in dealing with the devastation and suffering has won them an even warmer place in the hearts of the Polish and Czech peoples. Like our soldiers when we respond quickly to help Americans deal with disasters, when they were needed, they were there.

This trip also brought home to me how important a role our Army has played in these success stories. Both the Polish Army and the Army of the Czech Republic see us as a valuable role model to follow as they chart their paths to the future and they eagerly seek opportunities to learn from us.

We have already played a significant part in developing their leadership. For example, in the Czech Republic, my counterpart, General Major Sedivy is a graduate of our Army War College. But we're also helping with their up and coming leaders. Visiting the Czech 4th Rapid Deployment Brigade, I met Second Lieutenant Petr Vohralik, who graduated number two in the U.S. Military Academy Class of 1997. In Poland our escort officer, Colonel Admin Misztal attended our Command and General Staff College. When we look at our strategy for shaping the future, it is hard to imagine any possible activity with a better return on investment than inviting these highly professional and dedicated leaders to join us in our professional military education programs.


There are also many unsung heroes in these success stories. Every time I visit foreign armies I'm always tremendously proud of the fine soldiers who represent us overseas in our embassies, liaison teams, and other organizations that we charge with shaping the future security environment. This was certainly true in Warsaw and Prague. Assisted by the tremendous EUCOM [European Command] and USAREUR [United States Army Europe] participation in both NATO's Partnership for Peace program as well as our bilateral military-to-military programs, our attache personnel and military liaison teams performed yeoman work in assisting both these countries in meeting the strenuous requirements necessary to be invited to begin the NATO accession process.


Some soldiers win fame and honor on the battlefield. Others quietly contribute every day to winning the peace for us, our children, and our grandchildren. In central Europe the accession of Poland and the Czech Republic to full NATO membership has been ably assisted by the hard work of our soldiers serving there. No bands, no parades for them—but they know in their hearts that their efforts will help to assure peace in Europe and the world for the next generation. We're so very fortunate to have them. We can proudly say that they are our Army's credentials.

★★★★

With his wife Mary Jo holding the bible, General Reimer is sworn in as the thirty-third Army Chief of Staff on 6 July 1995 by then–Secretary of Defense William Perry in Secretary Perry's Pentagon office. General Reimer had also been sworn in on 20 June 1995 by Secretary of the Army Togo West; *below*, during an August 1995 visit to Japan, the Army Chief of Staff meets with General Tetsuya Nishimoto, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the Japan Defense Agency.








Above, on 30 December 1995, soldiers from the 1st Armored Division cross the Sava River Bridge, a significant engineering feat in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina; *below*, during a July 1996 visit to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Reimer observes ROTC cadets conducting an after action review of a platoon movement to contact, an exercise that teaches a unit how to attack when the enemy situation to its front is uncertain.




A soldier from the 4th Infantry Division, based at Fort Hood, Texas, participates in the brigade Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) at the National Training Center in March 1997.



Talking with Lieutenant Petr Bohralik of the Czech Army during a visit to Poland and the Czech Republic in July 1997. Bohralik graduated second in the West Point class of 1997.



At a press conference on 11 September 1997, Reimer briefs the Pentagon press corps on the results of the comprehensive Army-wide assessments done by the Department of the Army Inspector General and a specially designated Senior Review Panel on the issue of sexual harassment in the Army; *below*, Reimer crossing the Memorial Bridge in Washington, D.C., on 12 October 1997 while running the annual "Army Ten-Miler."





Talking with a captain from the 40th Infantry Division of the California Army National Guard during a 14 March 1998 visit to Camp Roberts, California; *below*, in the spring of 1998 Reimer receives an operational update from the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) deployed to Kuwait in support of Operation DESERT THUNDER I.



Director Steven Spielberg and the Army Chief of Staff sharing a laugh at the 29 September 1998 presentation ceremony in Arlington, Virginia, of the Army Distinguished Civilian Service Award to Spielberg for making "Saving Private Ryan"; *below*, standing on the Navy side at the 1998 Army-Navy game in Veterans Stadium in Philadelphia, General Reimer tips his hat in tribute to the midshipmen as the Naval Academy's song is played at the end of the game. To Reimer's right are former Heisman Trophy winner Brigadier General (Retired) Pete Dawkins and Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera.





1997–1998
The Third Year

1997–1998: The Third Year

You know, and I know, that all is not sweetness and light. We have been hit with a very divisive open debate on the way we have reached some of our decisions. This threatens the very fabric of our seamless force [Active, Guard and Army Reserve]. It is not very helpful for the nation. It is important that we resolve these differences and get them right. The stakes are very high. . . . I rededicate myself to the fundamental principle of the Total Army, and that I am the Chief of Staff of the Total Army. I will spend a great deal more time on Reserve-Component issues.

Dennis J. Reimer, General, United States Army

Remarks to the National Guard Association of the United States

Albuquerque, New Mexico

September 8, 1997

Members of the National Guard Association of the United States, distinguished guests, fellow soldiers, and ladies and gentlemen, it is great to be here. It is great to be out of Washington. It is great anytime I can find the time to get out of Washington and come to a great place like Albuquerque, New Mexico. I am truly delighted to be here.

I have visited here many times and I guess I am always struck by how warm and friendly the great people of Albuquerque are. Whenever I come to Albuquerque, the first thing that comes to my mind, because it is the heart of New Mexico, is the great soldiers that served in the 200th Coastal Artillery Regiment. I had an opportunity to say hello to the veterans of the regiment at the reception this evening. I had an opportunity to thank them for their service to the nation and thank them for the special example they provided for our soldiers today. In my mind they exemplify what we mean when we talk about sacrifice and selfless service.

All of you know that they are the survivors of the Bataan Death March, "The Battling Bastards of Bataan." Some 1,800 soldiers went into captivity and less than 900 of them came back. When I talk to young soldiers about selfless service and sacrifice, the soldiers that come to mind are the people like those of the 200th Coastal Artillery Regiment. I also think they represent that special spirit of the United States Army, the spirit that will not be defeated, no matter what kind of odds, no matter what kind of difficulties, no matter what kind of circumstances. That is the same spirit we want in today's Army and the same spirit we want in the Army of the 21st century.

I also want to congratulate the recipients of the National Guard Association of the United States awards. I have looked at the list of people receiving awards—what a great number of people and what a great recognition that you have provided them. Senator Stevens received one of the awards when he was here yesterday. I am also proud that you have chosen to recognize the governor of my home state of Oklahoma, Governor [Frank] Keating. All the people that you have recognized are very deserving.

A History of Change

This afternoon, I want to spend a little time, as I focus my remarks, on how the Army is changing to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow, and the 21st century. You know, change is nothing new for the U.S. Army. We have a histo-

ry and tradition of change in 222 years of service to the nation. When you look back over that history, you will find that there has been a lot of change over that 222-year history. In fact, for us change is a constant—a constant that has enabled us to meet the needs of the nation.

When I took over as the Chief of Staff of the Army and came back to Washington in June 1995, I asked the historians to take a look at the history of each of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army previous to me. Starting with General [John J.] Pershing, in the early 1900s, I found they all faced challenges, and that all of them had to manage change.

Last week, we hosted a number of the retired generals back in Washington at something we called the Army Leadership Seminar. Many of the former Chiefs were back. I think General [Fred C.] Weyand probably captured it best when he talked about our 222-year history and the 222-year contribution to our nation that our institution has provided. He pointed out that throughout that history, in all those trials and tribulations, the Army has always remained strong. The Army has always been there for the nation. The Army has always made the nation stronger.

Throughout our history of change, there has always been one overriding principle that has always guided us through that change. I think General Douglas MacArthur captured it best in 1962 when he talked to the cadets at West Point. "Through all this welter of change and development," he said, "your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable. It is to win our wars. Everything in your professional career is but corollary to this vital dedication." In these words he set our guidepost—stay fixed on that important objective: to win our nation's wars.

Today I want to share with you how I see my role as Chief of Staff of the Total Army and what I expect of you as valued members of America's Army. First, I think it would be helpful to review where we have been—to take a look at what we have done. To do that, you have to go back to 1989. We won a great victory in 1989—the victory of the Cold War. There were no victory parades. There were no memorials erected to that particular victory. There has really been no recognition of the sacrifices and service that so many gave. But nonetheless, it was a great victory.

It is hard to fully understand the impact of that victory and of the change it brought us. Even 8 years later, it is still hard to grasp what that change has really meant. The numbers are easy to quantify, and you know them as well as I do. We have taken over 600,000 people out of the U.S. Army. That includes the Active Component, the Army National Guard, the U.S. Army Reserve, and dedicated Department of Army civilians.

We closed over 700 bases worldwide, over 600 have been in Europe, primarily in Germany. They range from very small kasernes [posts] to large installations where we had brigade-size units. In Europe, we have drawn down from over 235,000 soldiers to 65,000. The net total of all those reductions equals 12 major installations in the Continental United States—bases like Fort Hood, Fort Carson, Fort Riley, and Fort Stewart.

I have personally participated in the closing of three major bases in the United States—the Presidio, Fort Sheridan, and Fort Ord; I can tell you that it was an emotional experience. We did not want to do it. The people living around the bases did not want us to leave. Yet, at the same time, we had to do it because the resources had gone down and we had to keep the Army trained and ready—focused on the requirements for winning the nation's wars. In 1989, the Department of Defense's share of the federal budget was 27 percent. Today it is 16 percent. The Army total obligation authority is down to 42 percent.

Physically we have changed the Army a great deal. In addition to declining resources we have picked up additional missions in places not familiar to us. They are in places like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Macedonia, Partnership for Peace programs in nations throughout central and eastern Europe.

Fundamentally, we changed the Army physically and culturally. It is much more difficult to explain the cultural changes. We have gone from a threat-based force to a capabilities-based force. We have changed our strategy from containment to engagement. In essence, we have turned the world upside down.

Today's Army and the Total Force

There are fundamental differences between the Cold War Army and the post–Cold War Army

than what we have today. In the Cold War there was one major enemy. That enemy drove our doctrine. They drove our training. They drove our modernization programs. They drove our tactics. We knew an awful lot about that enemy. Most of us spent our entire military lives trying to defeat that enemy. The Total Army's task was understood by all. From 1983 to 1985, I was the III Corps artillery commander. In peacetime, I had a number of artillery brigades assigned to the corps artillery. In total war, what we planned to do was send those brigades overseas to reinforce Europe. The units that I would go to war with and the people I took on terrain walks were the colonels that commanded the Army National Guard artillery brigades in Colorado, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. This was a relationship that had been forged over time—a total force relationship. That relationship was important to us back then and it is important to us now.

The world we lived in back then was very dangerous, but it was also very predictable. Today, we find ourselves requiring a full-spectrum force—a force that can perform a range of missions, all the way from military support to civilian authorities, to peace enforcement, to high-intensity combat and everything in between. It is a tough challenge. In many ways, it is tougher and less focused than the challenges we faced during the Cold War. It requires constant change.

We cannot live in the past. The old organizations, the old tactics, techniques, and procedures do not necessarily lend themselves to the dangers we face. At the same time, we must protect the critical tenets that have made us the guardian of freedom and have made us the most respected military in the world.

We have learned a lot the last 8 years. I want to share some of those insights with you. First of all, the military plays a key role in peace and stability throughout the free world. During the almost 50 years of the Cold War, we used the military 10 times. Since 1989, we have used our military 27 times, performing 60 percent of the heavy lifting in those operations. We have accomplished that with less than 25 percent of the resources given to the Department of Defense. These demands have placed an increased reliance on the total force—greater reliance upon the Reserve Components.

I think our employment of the total force is best exemplified by our forces in Bosnia. We have almost 7,900 soldiers deployed there. That force has been continuously supported by 3,000 Reserve-Component soldiers. These soldiers have been called up for 270 days at a time. These numbers are not surprising because that is the way we built a balanced force. It requires all the components, Active, National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve. When we deploy, we deploy as a total force.

We take on every operation as a total force. Bosnia is the exception. An Army National Guard company will soon deploy to Macedonia, joining Active-Component forces performing an important mission. These soldiers are really holding that part of the world together by preventing refugees from coming out of Kosovo and upsetting stability in the region.

The Multinational Force Observer battalion mission that we have been conducting for 17 years in the Sinai is also a Total Force operation. We have sent an Active/Reserve-Component composite battalion over there. We are now looking at deploying an Army National Guard task force, with 529 soldiers for that mission.

The Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia, was the most visible event to occur in 1996, requiring military assistance to civilian authorities. Over 700,000 man-days of support were provided by Reserve-Component forces. Again, the Army National Guard led the way.

The day-to-day operations, both state and federal missions of the total force, leave no doubt about the contribution of the Total Army. That is what is happening today, but what about the future? Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was traveling by train from Washington, D.C. As the train pulled out of the station, the conductor started his rounds. As he entered the car where Justice Holmes was sitting, the justice started fumbling in his pocket to find his ticket. The conductor recognized him and said, "Justice Holmes, that is all right, we know who you are. You don't have to show us your ticket." Justice Holmes said, "Thank you very much young man. I appreciate the fact that you recognize me, but you don't understand, if I don't find the ticket, I don't know where I am going."

I will tell you that the U.S. Army, the Total Army, has a ticket and we have a plan. That plan started with the work that we have done in reshaping the force beginning with the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Quadrennial Defense Review was our third effort to refine the force structure required for the post–Cold War. I will tell you that it was the most detailed analytical effort that we have undertaken to date. I think it was important to do that. What we focused on during the Quadrennial Defense Review was to make sure that we got strategy right. The strategy was based upon three pillars: respond, shape and prepare. First, we wanted to be able to *respond* to crises wherever they occur—Bosnia, Southwest Asia, Korea.

Second, we wanted to be able to *shape* the environment we would live in the 21st century—to be able to make the world a better place in which to live for our children and grandchildren. What a noble undertaking that is.

The third pillar is to *prepare* the force for the challenges we see deep in the 21st century and to make sure that our soldiers will have at that point in time the best equipment and the best weapon systems that the country could provide.

We took our time on developing this strategy because it was important to get it right. Strategy in our mind is the underpinning of the force.

To implement the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] strategy, the Army is following a path to the future called Force XXI. This is the process by which we are transforming the Total Army to meet the needs of the nation today and the challenges of tomorrow, and the 21st century. Army XXI is the intermediate stop in the Force XXI process. Basically what we will do in Army XXI is take the equipment we have in the inventory today—the Abrams tank and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle—and enhance them with information-age technology. In the Advanced Warfighting Experiment at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California, we could see fundamentally how these innovations would change the way we do business on the battlefield. I believe that our effort in this area will enable us to maintain the edge.

We do not have it completely right, but I am already convinced of a couple of things. First of all, information dominance, information operations, and, particularly, situational awareness are very powerful. There were a lot of testers running around looking at what we did in the Advanced Warfighting Experiment, but I will tell you that the most meaningful moment was a conversation that the S–3 (operations officer) of the Experimental Force from the 4th Infantry Division had with Secretary of Defense Cohen. He brought the secretary into his tactical operations center and showed him the three consoles. He said, "Sir, this is what situational awareness is all about. On these consoles, I have in front of me the order of battle—what's happening out there on the battlespace. You know, Mr. Secretary, before I had situational awareness, I spent about 70 percent of my time trying to get the information on where we were and where the enemy was and about 30 percent of my time analyzing that information and making recommendations to my boss. Now with situational awareness it is reversed. I spend 70 percent of my time analyzing that information, and making recommendations." That is powerful.

Another powerful thing that none of the testers captured, but it occurred to me, was this. I walked into a tactical operation center. As I was looking at the screens of situational awareness, I saw an icon, and I said, "What's that?" The young man that was working the console said, "Sir, that is a fuel tanker." Many of you have been into tactical operation centers. I can tell you that the number of times that I have been able to locate the fuel tanker has been zero. Usually when you ask where the fuel tanker is, someone runs outside and says, "Get the first sergeant and have him try to find it." Not only did we know where that fuel tanker was, but we could talk with that fuel tanker, and we were able to tell that driver, "We don't want you to go to Alpha company. We want you to go top off Charlie company—they are in the attack and they need the fuel worse." Now that is powerful. That saves time, that saves lives. That is what information dominance is all about.

I believe very strongly that the limiting factor of future operations may be human endurance. We found out that computers do not get tired—people get tired. This argues for greater integration between and among the components. We must have multiple crews and systems if we real-

ly want to get the fullest capability out of the force. It is possible that we will have a mirror image of a force or an organization in two components. If you want a capability that allows you to take the fight to the enemy 24 hours a day, you bring in the one component and place it on top of the other for a full 24-hour capability. That is something we have to develop, because the potential is there and it is very, very great.

Our vision for the future does not stop with Army XXI. It includes something called the Army After Next—it is the deep objective. I cannot describe the systems that are going to be part of the Army After Next, but I can tell you a lot about it. I can tell you that it must be strategically, operationally, and tactically more mobile. The whole world has moved closer together and we understand that we get some return on our investment by being able to get the force there very quickly. We must be able to move the force around the globe quickly to demonstrate our force projection capability.

Army After Next must be more versatile. The force must be able to switch quickly between lethal and nonlethal means. We must have more nonlethal capability than we have right now in Bosnia, where we cannot shout down the warring factions. We do not want to use deadly force—lethal force—on the warring factions. There must be something in between. We also need greater lethality. I have said many times we must narrow the gap between our heavy and light forces. We would like the heavy force to become more deployable, but just as importantly we would like the light to become more powerful.

So we are putting our investment in those particular areas, focusing our R&D [research and development] efforts on the kinds of capabilities we will need in the Army After Next. As we move through the Force XXI process, most of all we must leverage the strengths of the three components of today's Army. That is our vision, but it is hazy. We are refining the vision as we go along. I would tell you that we have taken some steps that have taken us closer to that vision and I think it will lead us down that path.

One of those steps is something that is near and dear to you—the Active Component and the Army National Guard Integrated Division. It was proposed by The Adjutant General. Secretary West approved the plan. It places 3 enhanced brigades under a nondeployable Active-Component division headquarters and headquarters company. I think it is the best alternative at this time because it provides two things. It is the least costly, easiest to implement; meets the current Defense planning guidance; facilitates future decisions; and is doable in the near term. There are issues that have to be resolved, but we will take those on. We have to do that, because this initiative will facilitate our transition to the other future alternatives that bring the Army together in a more integrated fashion.

There are many things in America's Army to be proud of. We have won a great victory during the Cold War. We reshaped the force. We have downsized. We have kept the Army trained and ready. That is the first time in our history that such a feat has ever been accomplished. This is truly an unprecedented accomplishment. It is a very exciting time to be a part of the Army.

But you know, and I know, that all is not sweetness and light. We have been hit with a very divisive open debate on the way we have reached some of our decisions. This threatens the very fabric of our seamless force [Active, Guard and Army Reserve]. It is not very helpful for the nation. It is important that we resolve these differences and get them right. The stakes are very high.

Let me again return to the words of General MacArthur. "Yours is the profession of arms," he said, "the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory—that if you fail, the nation will be destroyed." I do not think that is an overstatement. It is not my purpose today to point fingers, to engage in debate of right or wrong, to argue facts, or to display emotions. I am here to ask for your support in helping make America's Army all it can be. I ask that you join ranks with me to declare a new beginning. Let me tell you what I intend to do on my part.

I rededicate myself to the fundamental principle of the Total Army, and that I am the Chief of Staff of the Total Army. I will spend a great deal more time on Reserve-Component issues. To the extent that time will permit, I will go back to a practice that I had at U.S. Army Forces Command, where I will meet with Reserve-

Component leaders on a regular basis. I found that very helpful and I think that it is needed even more in the future years.

During the next two years, I intend to be guided by the following Total Army tenets. First, the protection of the vital interests of our nation is our number one priority—the survival of the nation state.

Second, I believe the link to the American people is critical. I know that the Reserve Component provides the strongest link. Senator Stevens said so very well, "For most Americans, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard are the presence of the Total Army in their communities. That link between our citizenry and our military was of paramount importance to our founding fathers. Their vision has weathered the test of time, and circumstances today make that line no less vital." I could not have said it better. I continue to believe with all my heart that soldiers—Active Component, U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard—are truly our credentials. They do an awful lot. Just like the soldiers of the 200th Coastal Artillery Regiment, they represent us so very well.

That point was driven home to me when I was the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army during DESERT STORM. I traveled to Saudi Arabia and had dinner with some soldiers. Somebody asked the question, "How many of you are in the reserves, how many of you are in the National Guard, how many of you are in the Active Component?" One of the soldiers looked at us and said, "It does not matter. We are all wearing U.S. Army. We are a team, and we are making it happen!" That is the way it has to be.

The third principle is that the soldiers that we have in the Total Army must be adequately trained before they are put in harms way. They must be properly supported and cared for. It does not matter what component they are in. We must keep the Army Six Imperatives—a quality proper force mix, realistic training, modernization, leader and soldier development programs, and doctrine—balanced. As we move to the future, we have to keep the imperatives synchronized. It is important for all of us to understand that quality is first among equals. It is quality people, training, equipment, doctrine—it is quality in everything that we do.

The last tenet is very, very important—that is the total force must be a seamless force. I ask for your support. I ask that you embrace these tenets with me. If you cannot embrace those tenets, I ask that we talk about it and find out what our differences are and why we cannot embrace them. I ask that you help me stop the negative rhetoric that is going on in the open press and the open forums. All of us need to be accountable for our actions. All of us need to be supportive of the Total Army. Most importantly, I ask that you open up the lines of communications and that we talk about these issues and we have a chance to listen to each other. I assure you that I am willing to make that commitment.

In 1973, General Abrams, the father of the Total Army, summarized so well the price that the men from the 200th Coastal Artillery Regiment paid in the Far East when he said, "We paid dearly for our unpreparedness during those early days . . . with our most precious currency—the lives of our young men. The monuments we raise to their heroism and sacrifice are really surrogates for the monuments we owe ourselves for our blindness to reality, for our indifference to real threats to our security, and our determination to deal in intentions and perceptions, for our unsubstantiated wishful thinking about how war will never come."

Yes, the stakes are high, but the cost of failure for the Republic is even higher. I know you care as deeply as I do about structuring our Army. We must do it right and we must take it into the next century. You and I know we can do it—we can make it happen. Let us work together to ensure that future units like the 200th Coastal Artillery Regiment are not remembered for their sacrifice and suffering, but for their preparedness and their capability to deter war. That is what is involved here.

Thank you very much for your kind attention. Thank you for allowing me to talk to you today. Thank you for your support for America's Army. God bless you.

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Address to the Nanjing Command Academy

Nanjing, China

September 25, 1997

I have come to China more to learn than to lecture. America's defense policy is open and transparent. We seek to engage other nations—to promote our common interests—to our mutual advantage. I sincerely believe that before countries and armies can engage each other, they must understand each other. Americans see engagement as a process of sharing ideas—nurturing common interests—and creating relationships where both peoples benefit from the exchange. This process begins with knowing one another. For strong bonds between nations take hold only when they are anchored in understanding. So much like a student here at your academy, I have come here to learn, to engage in an open and honest exchange of ideas, but mostly to listen and to learn about you and your army with an open mind and sincere interest.

From what I do know of your army, I believe that we have much in common. Both our armies have been shaped by the events of the 20th century. As my contribution to mutual understanding, I would like to share with you how the American Army views itself, and where we believe we share common interests with the People's Liberation Army. Although our army is 222 years old, we think of the First World War as the birth of the modern American Army. The United States did not even have a modern design for a combat division until 1906. When the war came no army divisions existed—a certain reflection of the United States' failure to recognize its own emerging global responsibilities.

When America finally entered the war, President [Woodrow] Wilson selected General John Pershing to command the expeditionary force. General Pershing's task was monumental. He had to do more than just command the force in the field. He also had to design, train and supply the American army, frequently over the objection and interference of our allies who wanted to use American troops piecemeal to reinforce their own armies. General Pershing is really the father of our army. By charting an independent course for American forces he took on a great deal of responsibility, a trust to safeguard the nation's interest. We have always had—and will continue—to view that trust as a sacred responsibility. This trust is something I know you understand.

General George Marshall, who served in China, was our great leader in World War II. Significantly, he had General Pershing's portrait hung behind the desk in his office as a constant reminder of the Army's responsibility to the nation. From World War II, when our two people fought as Allies against a common foe, I think we learned that victory in battle really comes from a balance in moral and materiel strength. Our industrial base gave us the weapons of war, but it was the support, and the energy, and the initiative and sacrifice of the American people, and our friends and allies around the world, that enabled us to endure. The failure to understand this point was one of Japan's fatal mistakes in World War II.

To Americans the terrible struggle in Korea, in which both our armies suffered and sacrificed, will always remain foremost for us a lesson in the cost of unpreparedness. The outbreak of the Korean War was a bitter reminder that the lack of a modernized, capable military force in a troubled world is not a good precursor for peace.

In contrast, Vietnam taught us that the lack of strong moral unity, within the nation—within the service itself—with friends and allies—can be equally devastating in war.

After the twin lessons of Korea and Vietnam, the American Army entered the 1980s with introspection and renewed determination. The result was an impressive performance in Desert Storm. This success was a combination of materiel improvement and, equally important, moral reinforcement through training, through an emphasis on values of service to the nation, through closer ties to our citizens, through teamwork with our coalition partners.

And from Desert Storm we have learned more lessons about the balance of materiel and moral forces—both requirements for today and the future. Continued modernization is essential. Desert Storm, for example, offered a significant lesson in logistics. As always logistics proved to

be the lifeblood of war; but, as successful as we were at keeping the supplies flowing, we also learned that there is much we can do to improve our system to make it even more responsive, using modern business practices, inventory tracking and distribution techniques to deliver just the right support to the right place at the right time. The brute force logistics of the past, where we stockpiled massive amounts of supplies, will be inadequate for the military operations of the future.

Modernizing logistics was only one in a long list of lessons and insights we learned during the Persian Gulf War. But once again, DESERT STORM demonstrated that the materiel strength alone is not a guarantor of victory. All weapons have their limitations. Precision-guided munitions, for example, made significant contributions but they are not the solution to every military problem. No thinking opponent would allow a significant technological advantage to go unchecked. They will develop countermeasures. War is constant struggle of action and counteraction between two determined foes. This is a lesson we will never forget.

DESERT STORM also reinforced the importance of the link between soldiers and citizens. For example, during the war we had a critical shortage of tires for our heavy trucks. It turned out there was only one manufacturer for the tires in the whole country. This private company immediately offered to contact its dealers throughout the nation and ask them to ship whatever stocks they had to the nearest airport. In Waco, Texas, there was a local tire salesman named Ken Oliver who had 74 tires. When he heard of the Army's need, he rented a cargo trailer with his own money, hooked it up to his pickup truck, and drove all night to the closest air force base. He said, "He figured our troops must have needed those tires as quickly as possible and he didn't want to waste any time getting them there." DESERT STORM truly reflected the commitment and resolve of the American people when they are behind a noble and just cause. That in essence is how America sees its Army.

Today, we are building on the past as I have just outlined it to you, but we are also looking to the future. Recently we completed a new military strategy for the post–Cold War world based on three principles: shape, respond, prepare.

Shape refers to a constant process of engagement with our friends and allies around the world, shaping the environment in a way that contributes to stability and economic growth.

Respond means maintaining a flexible, adequate capability to respond to a regional crisis or confrontation before it becomes a protracted, debilitating conflict.

Finally, *prepare* means continually modernizing our forces—updating doctrine and leader development programs—so they are prepared to deal with the security challenges of the future, ensuring that America has and retains a strong and capable force.

We have begun the process of preparing by envisioning the capabilities we will need in the year 2020 and then crafting a long-term plan to meet those requirements. We started with a program of experimentation and development that integrates information-age technologies into our current forces. The result will be an improved, modernized force we call Army XXI.

Meanwhile, we are also developing the requirements for what we believe will be the totally new force that we will field twenty years from now. We call it the Army After Next. The Army After Next will be strategically, operationally and tactically more mobile and versatile. It will place a premium on a complete revolution in logistics.

Without question today, as we speak, that is the focus of the American Army, implementing our new strategy, serving around the world, ready to shape and respond to the nation's needs, while preparing for the future.

I hope this brief summary helps you understand better the American Army. To further improve the understanding between us, I would also like to share with you what I know about the People's Liberation Army. What I know leads me to believe that we have much to share with one another. I know that your army has gone through a difficult reduction in force, balancing your need to modernize and constraining military spending to encourage economic growth. The U.S. Army since the end of the Cold War has gone through a similar experience. We have reduced our force by over

600,000 dedicated military and civilian employees and we have had to close over 700 bases around the world. Your military has conducted extensive domestic support operations, particularly in the area of disaster relief. We also conduct such operations as a matter of course—fighting forest fires—support after natural disasters. In fact, recently during a trip to Poland I had the opportunity to visit with some of the over 50,000 Polish soldiers providing flood relief in their country. It seems domestic support has become a fact of life for most modern militaries, and I think only good can come of efforts where the military is used to promote positive developments.

Without question both our militaries have been shaped by the 20th century. We have learned from our past—from our successes and shortcomings. It is our task now to turn that shared knowledge and common understanding toward a better future.

China and the United States share a common strategic heritage and we share common strategic interests. While the threat of global conflict has retreated, the regional stability, the continued economic growth, and the increased opportunities for international cooperation, which we both desire, will not occur without serious effort. Positive regional developments must be nurtured and encouraged. As part of this effort there must be an active and constructive engagement between our countries and our militaries. One thing you must understand about America is our tradition of public debate. Americans place every issue, no matter how trivial, sensitive or vital before the public. You will hear—and no doubt have heard—that some would have us disengage from Asian affairs or that others would argue that China should be contained and limited. This is the essence of the American system where all debates invite a spectrum of views. But, I think it is important to recognize that while we encourage debate, the end result is clear decisive policy. The United States will always act with firm resolve to protect its vital interests. Our stated policies truly represent the consensus of our leadership. America's official policy is a firm commitment to promote stability and prosperity in Asia, and it is our true commitment to promote constructive engagement with China.

As our Secretary of State Madeleine Albright so clearly stated, "The U.S. relationship with China is one of the major relationships that the US now has and will have into the 21st century." The U.S. recognizes China's important role in the future of Asia and in building the international security system that brings peace and prosperity to peoples and nations alike.

Likewise, the United States shares common goals with you. We share an interest in the developments that will reinforce regional peace and stability. Open markets will benefit both our nations and contribute immeasurably to the economic growth of the Asian community. Terrorism, the drug trade, and the unrestricted proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, are our common enemy. For these reasons, and many more, our nations are actively engaged with one another, and this greater understanding of each other can only lead to growing respect and trust.

In the United States we have a flourishing market of futurists—respected thinkers who tell us how the world will be in the next century. But mostly what they do is extend current trends to the future, and depending on which trends they pick, we are either entering a coming age of anarchy or the end of history. But both our military pasts tell us that the future is not a trend. It is something we fashion with our own hands through much effort. Through understanding and engagement we can make a world in which our sons and daughters can look back and find a respected and honorable past. It will not be easy, but we must set the stage upon which they can build their future.

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"Preparing Now To Meet 21st Century Challenges"

Army

October 1997

Reflecting on the decline of the armed forces after World War I, General George C. Marshall captured the essence of the national debate that habitually follows America's strategic victories. Recognizing the military must always make a new case for defense before the American public he wrote:

> In a democracy where the government is truly an agent of the popular will, military policy is dependent on public opinion, and our organization for war will be good or bad as the public is well informed or poorly informed regarding the factors that bear on the subject.
>
> *General George C. Marshall, 1939*

Almost six decades later, General Marshall's insight is still relevant. America has traditionally reduced its military after a major strategic victory in search of an elusive "peace dividend." Today, the United States stands at another strategic crossroads, but this time the American military has devised a strategy that explains to our citizens how we can preserve the peace, now and into the 21st century.

America's Army in Transition—The Foundation for the Future

For America's Army, the 21st century began in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall collapsed and our Cold War world ceased to exist. While the threat of global conflict receded, the potential and pace of technological change has taken off. These two major shifts in the global environment have required the U.S. Army to fundamentally reshape our force. The Total Army—Active, Guard, Reserve and Civilian—has and will continue to evolve in response to change, as change is essential to maintaining our capabilities and relevancy to the security needs of the nation. The hard work, service and sacrifice of our soldiers and civilian employees have made this transformation a success, providing a solid foundation for our transition to the future.

In a few brief years the Army has accomplished the most successful post-war reorganization in its history while supporting numerous fast-paced, diverse missions worldwide. Without question, the stress and turmoil of downsizing, operational deployments and restructuring the force have taken their toll in the human dimension. Since 1989, over 600,000 dedicated, hard working soldiers—Active, Guard and Reserve—and civilians have departed the Army. Approximately 700 military installations worldwide, totaling the size of 12 major posts in the United States, have been closed. In the face of all this—one of the largest drawdowns in Army history—the Army conducted an unprecedented number of deployments and has sustained an unparalleled operational tempo. The task now is to maintain our momentum into the next century. There is much to be proud of and we are optimistic about our future.

To continue the Total Army's transformation we must do something unprecedented in our military history—use the "window of strategic opportunity" currently open to us to embark on a deliberate, reasoned course for preparing our military forces for tomorrow's challenges.

The many missions America's Army has conducted since the fall of the Berlin Wall are a blueprint for the nation's future security requirements. In the past seven years the U.S. military forces deployed twenty-seven times, demonstrating to the nation our relevancy in the modern world. Army forces have contributed 60% of the military forces participating in those deployments. Since October of 1996 the Army averaged over 31,000 soldiers deployed in 91 countries for operations and training missions.

Each operation, and so much of everything we do today, requires a Total Army effort involving Active, National Guard and Reserve soldiers working together. This Total Army effort has been the foundation of our success today as it will be for our future. Today's realities and tomorrow's challenges provide an opportunity to restructure the entire force, develop innovative ways to achieve the seamless integration of our active and reserve components, and ensure the Total Army's continued relevance to the nation's needs. From disaster relief, military-to-military contact pro-

grams, Korea to Kuwait, to the soldiers stabilizing Bosnia, the Total Army continues to do the nation's "heavy lifting." America's Active, National Guard and Reserve soldiers accomplish the Army's mission everyday, providing support to civil authorities at home, establishing forward presence and stability overseas, reassuring allies and at the same time deterring the forces that threaten regional peace and progress.

In the new strategic environment, America's deployments will continue to be both fiscally constrained and personnel limited. As the last decade has demonstrated, the requirements for ground forces and the stability and security they provide will be in constant demand. American soldiers on the ground providing deterrence, stability and, if necessary, combat capability will be needed in areas that have historically been regions of ethnic and cultural friction. The relevancy of the Army experience is clearly evident in the realistic, prudent vision of the future world described in the Department of Defense's (DoD) recent Quadrennial [Defense] Review (QDR). The QDR determined that from the present until approximately 2010, the U.S. can expect to conduct many of the same types of operations it has performed since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. These types of operations include, but are not limited to, peacekeeping, crisis response, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and noncombatant evacuation operations.

In the near to mid-term, the U.S. will remain the preeminent conventional military superpower. At the high end of the military spectrum of conflict, few, if any nations, will view it within their interests to challenge the U.S. While we can never let down our guard against the most dangerous threat of global high intensity combat, the future threats to U.S. interests will cut across the complete continuum of conflict, from "Major Theater Wars" to transnational environmental threats. The U.S. can also expect challenges from rational adversaries that will recognize the preeminence of U.S. forces and expend considerable resources developing asymmetrical capabilities against U.S. forces. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)—chemical, biological and nuclear arms—will be a major concern for U.S. forces in the foreseeable future. America can also expect that regional threats will attempt to bring their conflicts into urban areas more conducive to neutralizing the advantages of superior U.S. capabilities. The increasing attractiveness of urban warfare highlights the great dichotomy of today's geostrategic environment. While there is a general consensus that the receding threat of global conflict has brought a "window of strategic opportunity," this threat has been replaced by a dramatic increase in the number, type and complexity of Army operations.

A Strategy Based Force

The new strategy developed in the QDR clearly lays out the Army's future tasks. This new strategy can be summarized by the of tenets of Shaping, Responding and Preparing. The objective of this strategy is to allow the U.S. to retain the initiative in international affairs with a robust capability for Strategic Preemption, the ability to prevent a crisis or confrontation from becoming a protracted debilitating conflict. Today, with the dramatic changes in the world, our armed forces are at a strategic crossroads. The Total Army has a historic opportunity during this window to "leap ahead" to a 21st century force of unparalleled capabilities. The challenge for the U.S. Army is to balance the day-to-day readiness requirements of a complex and unstable world with the need for change to remain relevant for the future.

Shaping the international environment seeks to structure the geostrategic setting consistent with our national interests and values. Shaping recognizes the increased influence the United States will have during this unique "window" of opportunity to promote regional stability and foster an environment for economic prosperity and growth.

For the Army, shaping takes on many forms. It requires face-to-face engagement with our friends and allies around the world, sharing hardships and risks. Europe's ongoing Partnership for Peace program is an excellent example of shaping the environment. Shaping reassures our allies by creating a more stable political-military environment.

Shaping is not new business for the Army but an extension of many of the operations already an integral part of the today's missions.

Many of the Army's ongoing forward presence operations in the Asian-Pacific theater, Central and South America, Mid-East and South West Asia have shaped and will continue to secure and protect U.S. interests in the years ahead. For example, soldiers from across the Total Army are also involved in maintaining the peace in ongoing operations in the Sinai and Macedonia, areas that could quickly become a regional crisis without the long term commitment of Army forces.

The 11,000 plus soldiers—Active, National Guard and Reserve—supporting peace operations in Bosnia Herzegovina are a classic example of stabilizing regional hot spots of ethnic and cultural division. No other force in the world can provide so effectively the credibility and discipline that is required to overcome such diverse and historic differences caused by years of hatred and animosity.

In the future, the Army will continue to shape regions by employing a diverse set of capabilities. For example, the requirements and importance of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) will increase. In the 21st century, commanders will be inundated with information, and FAOs will play a key role in filtering timely and relevant information. Decision makers will increasingly find that large amounts of information alone cannot provide the inherent cultural and language subtleties needed to appreciate the uniqueness of a particular region. The FAOs' critical skills will also play a vital role in promoting U.S. values and fostering relations that help shape a region. Foreign area experts and their acquired knowledge bases, in partnership with other U.S. agencies, will provide information that is unavailable by technical means. These same knowledge bases and relationships will also be one of the decisive capabilities needed to counter asymmetrical threats against the U.S. because they will give the DoD inside information on threat intentions.

Responding to a full spectrum of crises requires credible and relevant forces, trained and ready for victory. It obligates the Army to be prepared for rapid deployment of its forces anywhere in the world and to sustain them as long as necessary to achieve our national objectives. Our ability to respond rapidly anywhere, across the full spectrum of conflict, contributes to our capability to deter and compel potential adversaries.

Responding to the wide range of national interests and concerns includes ensuring our forces are ready to support the full range of U.S. interests—from vital to humanitarian. In contrast to the Cold War era, our forward deployed soldiers in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific provide the nation with a much broader array of capabilities than in the past. Soldiers in Europe are capable of performing a more comprehensive range of military tasks, now that the Cold War threat of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact is gone. These same forces are prepared to conduct the full range of operations from "Smaller Scale Contingencies" to fighting and winning a "Major Theater War."

The power projection of forces from CONUS is vital in reacting to the needs of the nation worldwide. To build this capability, the Army has expended considerable resources upgrading the infrastructure at major U.S. posts. These upgrades are absolutely essential to meet the demanding timelines expected in projecting ground forces globally. Another vital component of power projection is the strategic placement of the Army's Pre-positioned Stocks. Moving soldiers to pre-positioned Army equipment provides the nation with an unparalleled capability to respond to global crises. The Army clearly demonstrates our power projection abilities in the numerous deployments of ground combat brigades from CONUS to Southwest Asia.

The Army's ability to serve the nation with a full spectrum of capabilities at home and abroad is seen in our continued support to disaster relief operations. Our forces can be used to support civilian authorities in times of crises, such as forest fires, flooding, and other national disasters.

The third pillar of our National Security Strategy, Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future may be the most challenging part of the new strategy for the next century. It will require the discipline and courage to meet the present day requirements of running the Army while at the same time preparing to meet the needs of the future. A guiding rule for this transformation will be the increased emphasis on the development of mental agility before physical agility. This principle ensures that the Army will achieve as much intellectual understanding and consensus as possible before the actual commitment of our scarce

resources to major changes in organizations, institutions and weapon systems.

The Road to the Future

These new security realities require an Army that is the most agile and versatile force in our Nation's history. This force must function with an extended team of partners, including all the non-military agencies of both U.S. and Allied governments, coalition forces, and non-Governmental Agencies in an environment with very complex rules of engagement . . . just as we are doing in Bosnia today. These same soldiers and extended teams must quickly transition from peacekeeping and non-lethal operations to more traditional war fighting, if necessary. Our challenge now is to balance the day-to-day requirements of a complex and unstable world with the requirement to change to remain relevant for the future.

To prepare for the 21st century we began by placing ourselves into the year 2020 and looking back. We took an exhaustive look at the differing paths the world might follow in the first part of the next century. Objectively mapping the world as we expect it to be, not as we would like it to be, provided decision makers a road map of the strategic requirements for the Army. The Army also identified several key waypoints in our journey and the capabilities the Army needs at each point. The process for developing and implementing these changes is called Force XXI.

First, we will field a force called Army XXI, in the early part of the next century. Army XXI will be an improved version of the current force, with modernized systems, enhanced with the latest information technologies. This force will be our "bridge" to the next century. By 2010, the Army will have achieved nothing less than a technological and cultural transformation in Army XXI. By then, after a decade of experimentation and field exercises, we will have created a knowledge-based force, balanced across the Army's traditional six imperatives. Army XXI will possess a clarity of observation, decentralization and pace of decision making unparalleled in the history of warfare. The final step will be to build the Army After Next (AAN), which seeks to give the Army of 2020 the physical speed and agility to complement the mental agility inherited from Force XXI. This force will be revolutionary when compared to the forces of today—a true Revolution in Military Affairs.

A major step in this process was just completed this last spring at Ft. Irwin, California, in the Task Force XXI Army Warfighting Experiment (AWE). This unprecedented experiment focused on enhancing today's systems capabilities with state-of-the-art information technologies to explore how they would increase force effectiveness. The experiment achieved its objective, providing a realistic opportunity to test how our soldiers and available technology can move us toward the next generation of military forces. The AWE provided everyone, from the soldiers in the experimental Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to Army senior leaders, proof of the increased lethality and force effectiveness brought about by improved situational awareness. It also gave us a quick sketch of the magnitude of change and integration that will be required by the Army to incorporate these dramatic improvements.

As the Army prepares for the future, all assumptions of the past will be thoroughly challenged. A fundamental characteristic of tomorrow's force will be the requirement for technological overmatch throughout the spectrum of operations. From peacekeeping operations to traditional mounted warfare, the Army, in partnership with U.S. industry, must have a decisive overmatch in technology against any adversary world wide.

The Army is not alone in its explorations of the future of warfare. DoD's Office of Net Assessment and other service wargames are also evaluating requirements for developing an effective, integrated and complementary Joint capability for the future. In particular, OSD's investigation of Joint Vision 2010's operational concept of "Dominant Maneuver" seems to be converging with many of the conclusions of our Army After Next studies. The overriding need for dominant battlespace knowledge and quantum advances in speed and operational tempos will be a future must.

There is also universal agreement that a revolution in logistics and maintenance must accompany any revolution in warfighting. Global "total asset visibility," in concert with "just when needed" distributed logistics, will provide the major

advancements in combat support and combat service support required by the forces of the future. These revolutionary systems will provide the "just in time" support that will give the Army After Next the speed and agility necessary for strategic preemption and operational lethality.

The QDR reveals a strategic window that gives us the opportunity to fundamentally reshape and prepare the Army for the 21st century. This opportunity is not without its risks. It will require the proper balance between the competing demands of maintaining the readiness required to Shape and Respond to the world today and Preparing our forces to meet the needs of the future.

In the past eight years, the Army has witnessed some of the most dramatic changes in our 222 year history. Throughout this period there has been one constant—the outstanding and selfless service of our soldiers and civilians at home and abroad. As we prepare for the 21st century, we must remain focused on caring for America's soldiers and preparing them for the challenges of the future. The U.S. Army of today and of tomorrow, with its emphasis on developing advanced technology, must give greater emphasis to developing support for the human dimensions of change. Our leaders and soldiers deserve no less. Soldiers remain today, as they have been in the past, our greatest strength. They truly are our credentials.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

October 6, 1997

Visit to China/Testimony on Sexual Harassment in the U.S. Army/Proposed Ban on Land Mines

I just returned from China where we conducted an official visit. The visit was part of our military-to-military contact program and I was the first Chief since General [John A.] Wickham in 1986 to visit China. As you can imagine, it was an extremely interesting visit and I wish to share with you some impressions.

You can't help but get a real sense of time and history when you visit China. We visited the Great Wall and the Forbidden City. The Great Wall, built approximately 2,000 years ago, is a visible tribute to the Chinese people's ability to overcome hardship. The wall stretches for almost 6,000–7,000 kilometers and when you visit it you can't help but marvel at what they did, especially considering the time frame. Hundreds of thousands of people helped construct this wall and many of them gave their lives in doing so. The Forbidden City, on the other hand, was built in 10 years during the early part of the 15th century. Here one sees houses of great beauty and you can't help but feel the calm and serenity of this beautiful place located in the heart of modern Beijing. Palaces, such as the Palace of Supreme Harmony, speak volumes about what took place hundreds of years ago. We saw both the brute force and the fine touch of China.

The part of China we visited—Beijing, Nanjing, Guangzhou—was a country of contrasts. Skyscrapers were scattered across the landscape in ever-increasing numbers. In fact, they joked about the crane being the national bird. Western influence is also very evident. McDonald's and the Hard Rock Cafe are on the same street with the traditional Chinese teahouses. Messages on the majority of the billboards seemed to be written in English. Yet as I ran through the city my mind flashed back to Vietnam in the 60s. I couldn't help but feel this was a country trying to leapfrog two or three decades and move directly into the 21st century. Obviously, that is tricky business.

The Chinese consider 1997 as a significant year in their history. They see the return of Hong Kong to Chinese control, the 70th anniversary of the PLA on the 1st of August, and the recent completion of the 15th Communist Party Congress as important events. Since the 15th Congress just completed it was a major topic of conversation. They feel the 15th Party Congress has firmly committed them to economic reform. In their terms, this is irreversible. From the military side it has given them the vision they believe they need. They intend to reduce the size of their force by 500,000 so that they can modernize—sounds familiar.

The military leaders I met displayed a high degree of professionalism. They know their jobs very well and the common military language between us made it easy to dialogue with them. As I told them, there will always be differences between us but our objective is to establish a relationship so that we can deal with those issues honestly and openly.

Our visit to the various military units did not reveal any great surprises. They were proud of the Chinese equipment they showed us, and the training program they briefed and the results which we saw indicated a sequential training program with little emphasis on multiechelon or joint training.

In Nanjing I had an opportunity to speak to their war college. I spoke on the emerging military relationship between us and China and what that meant for our future. I told them that we had an opportunity to shape that future and I hoped that we were able to do that in a way that would make the world safer for our children and grandchildren. I thought the questions I received reflected the degree of sophistication of these student officers and allowed us to continue our dialogue.

I visited two military regions and the choice of these two regions I think was interesting. The Nanjing Military Region, which sits opposite Taiwan, emphasized the importance of Taiwan to China. It was clearly a topic of conversation throughout the entire trip, but Nanjing put the exclamation point on it. China maintains that there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of China. We of course adhere to the one China policy but insist upon a peaceful resolution. The visit to Guangzhou, which includes Hong Kong, emphasized the return of Hong Kong to Chinese control and in their words "the ending of 100 years of national disgrace." Guangzhou, probably because of its proximity to the gateway to the West, is a bustling city filled with tourists and shoppers. The benefits of economic reform are very evident. The military regions in general have a great deal of autonomy. One of the things that will be interesting to watch is how they control that autonomy as they implement economic reform and move toward the future. To me that's one of the critical indicators.

Finally, and most importantly, I couldn't help but be impressed again by the great work our people are doing in China. Our soldiers are valued members of the Country Team. The depth of their understanding of the complexities of this situation is truly noteworthy. They represent our Army and serve our nation exceptionally well. They are at the point of the spear in terms of helping shape the environment of the 21st century. I couldn't be more proud of them.

This week the Secretary of the Army and I, as well as the chair persons of the two panels dealing with sexual harassment, testified in front of Congressman [Steve] Buyer's House National Security Committee subcommittee. We discussed very openly and honestly the situation we face, with particular emphasis on the action plan. I believe the testimony went well because we had done a lot of work to understand the situation and develop the action plan necessary to improve it. The point I emphasized was that we are approaching this just like we do training. We have done our assessment and completed our after action review. We know the improvements we have to make. Now it is a matter of execution. We can't spend our time making yesterday perfect but we can do a lot about making tomorrow better. That's exactly what we plan to do. Let me share with you the opening comments I made to the subcommittee:

> Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee
>
> The Army is fundamentally sound. We remain a trained and ready force and our soldiers' performance around the world demonstrates our strength and resilience. Our soldiers are a true measure of how good our Army is. They are our credentials.
>
> We recognize we have a serious issue and we are dealing with it as such. The Army brought forth this problem. We chose to deal with this issue openly in order to send a signal both internally and externally. We wanted to let the internal Army know as well as the American people know that this type of conduct was unacceptable in the United States Army.
>
> The report is the most in-depth analysis ever made within the Army. It tells us a lot and gives us a base line assessment. The reports emphasized leadership is the real key. I

agree. Fundamentally this is a leadership issue. Leadership is our greatest strength and that's why I'm confident we can solve it.

It is easy to focus on one issue and ask yourself how could this happen. But let me put all of this in perspective. During the last 8 years the Army has undergone dramatic and far-reaching changes. We have reduced the size of the Army by over 600,000. We have closed over 600 bases. We have transformed the Army from a Cold War force to Army XXI on the way to Army After Next and we've done all this with a 300% increase in PERSTEMPO. These are leader intensive activities. We have done it well, but we have not done it perfectly. The issue of sexual harassment/sexual misconduct must be viewed in that context.

It's important to differentiate between sexual misconduct and sexual abuse. While both are wrong and we have zero tolerance for both, we must deal with them in separate ways. We will continue to come down hard on sexual misconduct as we did and use the Uniform Code of Military Justice where appropriate. Sexual harassment, on the other hand, is more complex and will require a full range of leadership tools, primarily in the area of training and education.

We have not waited to fix the problem. The action plan which you have a copy of addresses three fundamental areas: values, teamwork, and discipline. These three areas are the foundation of our action plan. The plan gives leaders the tools and resources necessary to solve the challenges they face. Treating people with dignity and respect is nothing new. It is a basic principle of good leadership.

This action plan is not about going soft. Our profession requires tough, realistic training. Time and time again we have proved in the long run tough training saves lives. The drill sergeants have a saying "let no soldier scream from the grave that had I been properly trained I wouldn't be 6 feet under." That is absolutely true.

This action plan is not designed to take authority or responsibility away from drill sergeants. They accomplish minor miracles and they need all the authority they currently have to do their job. But it does say to them and all leaders we expect you to treat soldiers with dignity and respect.

The action plan also recognizes that the Army is a diverse organization. There is great strength in this diversity and we can only leverage that strength when everybody feels they are a valued member of the team.

In summary, we got it. We understand the scope of this issue and we are moving out to fix it. This is not a one-shot affair, but a course to which we are firmly and totally committed. We will reemphasize the fundamentals of leadership that made us strong over the last 222 years. I have great confidence in our leadership at all levels to see this through.

Keeping that in mind let's move out with our eyes on the future because it is truly an exciting adventure.

Finally, I want to say a word or two about land mines. This is an issue which I believe the military is being unfairly characterized as dragging its feet. The facts are that we have done a great deal to make the world safe from mines. We have destroyed millions of dumb mines and the only thing we are really holding on to are the smart self-destruct mines. We believe very strongly we need to retain them for protection of our troops. As you know, we only emplace them when needed and we know exactly where they go and how long that minefield will be active. This is a good news story but it's not being told. I'm enclosing some basic facts and I ask each of you to help get the word out. This is one in which the facts speak for themselves but we have to make sure we get the facts out. The facts are:

We have banned since May of 1996 the use of non self-destructing antipersonnel land mines and ordered their destruction. To date, we have destroyed nearly 1.5 million of them and expect to complete destruction of the remaining inventory by 1999.

Since 1992 the U.S. has observed an annual moratorium on the export and transfer of APL. In January 1997, the United States announced that we would observe a permanent ban on the export and transfer of APL. At this same time, we also announced that we would cap our stockpile of APL at the current level of inventory.

Currently, the United States trains and equips military personnel in 15 countries and helps them establish programs they can execute on their own in order to expedite the removal of

land mines. Nearly one quarter of the active deminers in the world have been trained by the U.S.

Over the last 5 years the United States has spent over $153M on this effort and we will spend another $68M under our 1998 budget.

Mine-clearing technologies developed by the Department of Defense are already being produced and adapted for use in five mine-laden countries.

The United States has established a policy to end (except for the defense of Korea) by 2003 the deployment of all antipersonnel land mines, including our safe self-destructing/self-deactivating APLs.

We have established an objective that by 2006 we have developed a suitable alternative that together with our mixed munitions will afford adequate protection for our forces in Korea. We will pursue an aggressive R&D program to enable us to achieve this objective.

Our self-destructing/self-deactivating antipersonnel land mines do not contribute to the humanitarian problem. We will continue to test to ensure and seek to improve the exceptional reliability of our self-destructing/self-deactivating mixed munitions which currently display 99.99-percent and 99.9999-percent reliability, respectively.

We continue to increase the number of countries in which we train de-miners.

Protecting the lives of our men and women in the field must always take precedence. Our antitank and antivehicle mixed systems contain antitank mines which are protected by antipersonnel sub-munitions. Some munitions are critical for this protection. These mines are self-destructing and self-deactivating which do not pose a threat to the civilian population after the hostilities end.

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Letter to Army General Officers

October 6, 1997

The Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel Report on Sexual Harassment and Department of the Army's Inspector General Special Investigation of Initial Entry Training Equal Opportunity/Sexual Harassment Policies and Procedures

As all of you know, the Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment and The Inspector General recently released their respective reports. The Army owes the Senior Review Panel and The Inspector General a debt of gratitude for the great and difficult work they have done. These two efforts collectively represent the largest and most comprehensive assessment of the nature and scope of sexual harassment and abuse the Army has ever conducted. Their thorough research, depth of analysis, study methodology and well-considered recommendations are now our baseline to map and evaluate all our future progress.

After reviewing their reports, the most disturbing findings were instances involving a breach of trust between leader and led. Where the panels found blatant sexual misconduct or harassment, they also found inadequate leadership. What they found in these particular cases—and in too many other instances across the training base and the force—was an erosion of basic dignity and respect.

Sexual harassment and misconduct are intolerable because they undermine the mutual trust and confidence at the foundation of senior-subordinate relationships. As the stewards of America's most precious resource, its sons and daughters, we have a moral obligation to insure that this bond of mutual trust and confidence is protected. This bond is the glue that holds the Army together, and has a direct impact on our readiness. Accordingly, all our soldiers have the fundamental right to be treated with dignity and respect. Ensuring that all soldiers are treated in this manner means that we must commit ourselves to the elimination of sexual discrimination, harassment, and abuse wherever we find it.

The good news in these reports is that the problems they identify can be solved by concerned, caring, and committed leaders. Leaders are the key, and leading is our strong suit. We must inculcate and reinforce our high standards and core values across the Army. I am convinced that the vast majority of our soldiers and leaders understand this and want to do what is right.

I want to take a moment and put leadership in a changing Army into perspective, especially in light of what the Army has accomplished since the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. Over the last eight years, the Army has undergone some of the most dramatic and sweeping changes in its 222-year history—making historic cultural and physical changes that have placed great stress on both leaders and led. Understanding the stresses and pressures is critical to understanding the conditions that have contributed to sexual harassment.

First, we have drawn down the Army by over 600,000 people, forcing us to cut many important positions in the training base for key people like unit chaplains, company executive officers, and administrative personnel. We realize that we drew down too fast and too deep. Second, at the same time we have downsized, we have experienced a dramatic 300 percent increase in the Army's PERSTEMPO [personnel tempo]. The combination of these two factors has caused us to shift many additional responsibilities to unit officers and drill sergeants—leaders who are already extremely busy. The result has been that leaders have spent less time with their subordinate leaders and soldiers.

Finally, we have recognized that many soldiers who are now entering the Army come with a different set of basic values than the Army's. This factor alone commits us to redoubling our efforts to inculcate and reinforce our standards and values, starting the day our soldiers enter the Army and continuing until the day they leave. I believe that these three factors have all contributed to our collectively underestimating the consequences of the human dimension of change. Therefore, our action plan rightly focuses on giving leaders at all levels the tools and resources they need to solve what is fundamentally a leadership issue.

We have not waited for the release of these reports before taking action. We are already implementing recommendations identified in the two reports and outlined in the Army Human Relations Action Plan. Here are some of the actions ongoing or pending.

- New procedures for selecting and training drill sergeants, to include more rigorous background checks.
- Increased human relations training for new drill sergeants.
- Assigning 110 additional lieutenants to training units to ease the administrative burden and free drill sergeants to do their primary job, leading soldiers.
- Redistributing 54 chaplains and adding 9 new chaplain authorizations to the training base.

Our primary initiative for making Army values a way of life for soldiers and DA [Department of the Army] civilians is the Character Development XXI program. It will systematically institutionalize our core values and establish key human relations guidelines in an integrated and comprehensive program. Designed to help leaders in units, it has six pillars:

- values,
- command policy,
- sexual harassment prevention,
- equal opportunity and race relations,
- risk reduction and family advocacy, and
- leadership.

A key element of the Character Development XXI program is the Consideration of Others program. I want to make sure that we are implementing that program across the Army.

Other important initiatives and tools designed to support leaders in the pursuit of our human relations objectives are listed below. I encourage you to become familiar with them and use them regularly in your organizations.

- Once published, a new FM 22–100 that will focus on values-based leadership.
- The revised Officer Evaluation Report, which incorporates Army values.
- The "Living Army Values" video.
- Pocket-size ethical climate assessment and command climate surveys.
- A revised Equal Opportunity Advisor program that better represents the demographics of the Army and enhances the status of these positions.

- An increased focus on human relations in pre-command courses and with prospective command sergeants major.
- The booklet *Leadership and Change in a Values-Based Army*, which I use to frame this whole issue.
- A personal letter from me on leadership to all leaders in the Army.

As I have stated many times in recent months, we need to get back to the basics of leadership. If we practice three basic rules, we will create a leadership environment in which all soldiers can grow and thrive. First, "do what's right every day legally and morally." We are an Army of quality people, and if all of us will do what is right, we will be in good shape. Second, "create an environment where people can be all they can be." The leader's task is to turn that recruiting slogan into reality. Third, "treat others as you want them to treat you." There is great strength in our diversity. We must harness it, and then leverage it. If we do that, then we will build the teamwork so essential to everything we do.

I am firmly committed to the course outlined above. We have a problem, and we will fix it. At the same time, I understand that there are no easy answers. We have 222 years of leadership experience to guide us. In solving this challenge, we will make ourselves a stronger Army.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

October 9, 1997

Reassignment of the Sergeant Major of the Army

As you know, the Military District of Washington announced on Wednesday, 8 October, that based upon the Article 32 recommendation they have filed general court-martial charges against Sergeant Major of the Army Gene McKinney.

This afternoon the Army will announce the reassignment of Sergeant Major McKinney to the Military District of Washington. This reassignment, while terminating his responsibilities as Sergeant Major of the Army, is done without prejudice to the general court-martial proceedings. In other words, we are not taking a position on the guilt or innocence of Sergeant Major McKinney. That is in the hands of the military justice system and I have every confidence that justice will prevail.

I did, however, want to share some thoughts with you on the timing of this decision. For some time I've been receiving feedback from soldiers that they need a permanent representative as the Sergeant Major of the Army. The two acting SMAs have done a magnificent job from the time they agreed to do this until now. However, this was always viewed as a temporary solution. I chose two because I knew this would be a very demanding additional duty and I did not want people to view this as other than a temporary solution. I felt that choosing one would be too much on any one person and would signal that I had a made a decision on Sergeant Major McKinney's case. It is now time to select a new SMA and move on.

Some of you may ask since you delayed this long, why now? That's a valid question and the answer is very simple. In my mind, our soldiers need a full-time senior representative who can represent them in the proper fora. I have missed very much the opportunity to walk across the hall and talk to the senior enlisted soldier, as well as having that soldier available for regularly scheduled meetings. With this move, we move one step closer to correcting that deficiency.

I intend to move as quickly as possible to stabilize the situation. The next Random Thoughts While Running will most likely announce the next Sergeant Major of the Army. [Note: On October 21, 1997, General Reimer announced the appointment of Robert E. Hall as the 11th Sergeant Major of the Army.] That person will be asked to serve until June of 1999—the remainder of my tour. I understand the importance of this decision and I want you to know that over the past few months I have given considerable thought to this issue. I assure you I will choose the person I think best represents all of our soldiers. They deserve no less.

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Leadership and Change . . . in a Values-Based Army

United States Army Chief of Staff White Paper

September 12, 1997

A Leader's Guide

Values are the essence of our Army—like combat skills, they have to be trained, honed, and polished to perfection. This guide addresses the crucial task of preserving our fundamental values and traditions as we complete the transformation from a Cold War force to a 21st century Army. This guide is designed for leaders—to provide focus for training, mentoring, and preparing the next generation of America's Army. The first half of the guide outlines the strategic environment in which we will teach and shape the values of tomorrow's force. The second half of the guide addresses the task at hand—dealing with the human dimension of change. It summarizes the physical and cultural obstacles we faced in transitioning to the post–Cold War world and describes and explains the Army's strategic vision for mastering the challenge. Here leaders will find a frank and honest appraisal of the threats and pressures against the Army's values system and, most importantly, guidance on the crucial process of setting the standards and conditions that will nurture and preserve our values and traditions. In the future, the Army will have more than its share of work in securing America's place in a free, peaceful, and prosperous world. We must be ready to roll up our sleeves and get on with the labor—building on a bedrock of solid, stable values.

Foreword

Change is the one constant in the history of the United States Army. For two hundred and twenty-two years the Army has changed and adapted to insure the security of the nation. Since the end of the Cold War the Army has undergone a great deal of change—both physically and culturally. Despite this change the Army has remained trained and ready. In the past seven years the Army has deployed twenty-seven times and has enhanced its reputation as the world's best army. However, this change has a human dimension—our soldiers are extremely busy. We have accomplished this because of our quality soldiers who have a strong values base. As we prepare for the challenges of the 21st century, America's Army must continue to emphasize the values and traditions that have been the bedrock of this institution.

America's Army is unique because of the quality of our soldiers. As General Creighton Abrams, the Chief of Staff of the Army in the early 1970s, said:

> The Army is not made of people, the Army is people. By people I do not mean personnel. . . . I mean living, breathing, serving human beings. They have needs and interests and desires. They have spirit and will, strengths and abilities. They have weaknesses and faults; and they have means. They are the heart of our preparedness . . . and this preparedness—as a nation and as an Army—depends upon the spirit of our soldiers. It is the spirit that gives the Army . . . life. Without it we cannot succeed.

The High Cost of Change

Physical Change

The twenty-first century began for the United States Army in 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down. Eight years later, the Active Army has completed its drawdown from an Active-Component Cold War strength of 781,000 to a force of 495,000 soldiers. In real terms, the ranks have been reduced by 36 percent, and resources have been reduced by 39 percent. Since the drawdown began in FY 89, the total force has been reduced by 620,000 soldiers and civilian personnel. The Total Army, Active and Reserve, has been reduced in size from 28 divisions to 18 divisions. The Army has closed over six hundred bases around the world. The Army's presence in Europe has been reduced from almost 216,000 people to about 65,000 people. Today's Army is smaller than at any time in the last 57 years. In terms of size, the Army is only the eighth largest in the world.

The hard uncompromising truth is that today we are doing more than we were doing with the

earlier Army—and we do it with far less people. We have added numerous operational deployments while remaining trained and ready. Consequently, the personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO)—a soldier's time away from home station—has increased by 300 percent since 1989.

As the nation's only full-spectrum force, capable of responding across the full range of threats and challenges, the Army is engaged around the world—protecting the national interests, supporting the national security strategy, and assisting the nation at home. We have changed from the threat-based force of the Cold War to a capabilities-based force. The Army has more than 100,000 soldiers and 28,000 civilians stationed around the world, primarily in Europe and in the Pacific. On any given day last year, on average, an additional 35,000 soldiers were deployed away from their home stations, conducting operations and participating in exercises in over 70 countries. Current missions include the Sinai, Macedonia, Kuwait, Haiti, Partnership for Peace exercises in Europe, joint task forces for counterdrug operations, hurricane and flood relief, as well as Operation Joint Guard in Bosnia. Concurrently, units are routinely deployed to our Combat Training Centers, training to maintain readiness for possible regional conflicts.

Cultural Change

Despite this pace, in the past eight years the Army has also experienced a fundamental cultural change. The Army completely rewrote and implemented a new doctrine. This new doctrine was critical because the Army was called upon to implement a new strategy, moving from a strategy of containment to a strategy of engagement and enlargement. The containment strategy was designed to prevent war, and it did that—it won the Cold War. Engagement and enlargement are strategies to ensure success—to help shape the environment—to contribute to global stability and prosperity in the 21st century. The United States Army has been at the forefront of strategic change, clearly demonstrating to the world that we are a full-spectrum force—a capabilities-based force—a force of decision.

In 1996, the Army conclusively proved that it was indeed a full-spectrum force, providing the nation with the capabilities it needed to deter war, compel adversaries, reassure allies, and provide military support to civilian authorities. In Bosnia, America's Army undertook the difficult mission of bringing peace to an area of the world mired in ethnic hatred and civil war. This operation commenced when our soldiers bridged the Sava River between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the Sava River, the American soldier once again displayed the spirit and will to win that has been displayed in every major operation since Valley Forge. Under the most difficult circumstances imaginable, soldiers constructed the longest pontoon bridge in recent history. Despite freezing cold, snow, rain, mud and a 100-year-high flooding of the river, the bridge was completed with zero fatalities and zero injuries. Daily, American soldiers demonstrate their professionalism, technical skill, compassion, and determination to accomplish difficult missions in often dangerous and unforgiving environments. The same determination to succeed and the same technical skill, augmented by situational awareness, have led to success in the peacekeeping mission itself. Our contributions to stabilizing and rebuilding Bosnia are tangible proof that boots on the ground—a visible force of well-trained, professional soldiers—are the best possible means of showing warring parties that America will back its policies with force.

But the U.S. Army was also busy elsewhere in the world throughout 1996. In September the 1st Cavalry Division deployed a brigade to Kuwait to deter Iraqi aggression. In less than 96 hours from the time they were told to go, First Team soldiers closed the first unit in its tactical assembly areas, ready to fight. This example demonstrates how much the Army has changed in six years—in Operation Desert Shield it took 30 days to deploy a similar force.

Our soldiers still stand guard on the DMZ in Korea, deterring war between North and South Korea. American soldiers participated in 16 NATO Partnership for Peace exercises designed to expand and improve interoperability among NATO and other European nations. Operation Able Sentry, a peacekeeping operation, involves a task force that observes and reports from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part

of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force. Soldiers' presence, manning outposts between Macedonia and Serbia, is extremely important to protect the border and bring stability. Similarly, 61 soldiers stand watch on the border between Ecuador and Peru to assist in the peaceful settlement of the border dispute between two important trading partners. A small number of soldiers properly trained and at the right place are truly a strategic asset to the nation. We also provided support to the Summer Olympics and protected American homes and property by fighting fires in the northwestern part of the United States. American soldiers on the ground around the world serve not only as emissaries advancing the security interests of the United States but also as role models promoting U.S. values.

Human Dimension

The high operating tempo (OPTEMPO) by our soldiers is a direct result of the physical and cultural changes of the past eight years. However, the physical and cultural changes do not tell the whole story. There has also been a great deal of human emotion and distress associated with the drawdown and numerous and continuing mission requirements. As OPTEMPO has increased, the stress on soldiers' families has also increased. At the same time, soldiers are deployed more than ever before, and their families have to travel greater distances for child care. It now takes their children longer to travel by bus to school. We don't have as many teachers in Europe to support the education of soldiers' dependents. Medical support for soldiers' families is not nearly as robust as it was before the drawdown. All of these changes, too, take a toll.

Technology and the Human Dimension

In addition to physical and cultural change, another major force for change that the Army must incorporate is technology. Information-age technology offers the Army the opportunity to greatly enhance mobility, lethality and communications. However, while technology is critical, it cannot change the fundamental principles of war. The cornerstone of America's Army will continue to be quality soldiers who possess a strong sense of values. To some the idea of information-age warfare conjures up images of bloodless conflict, images that resemble a computer game more than the bloody wars we have known in the past. Nothing could be further from the truth. The style of warfare will change, but its impact on nations, armies, and soldiers will not. The fates of nations and armies will still be decided by war, but with speed and lethality unmatched in the past. Losers could still spend generations recovering from the consequences of defeat. Whatever technological and operational changes may occur, however, soldiers will always be the key to victory.

As our experiences in the last eight years have demonstrated, the geostrategic environment has changed radically. Our task is to maintain the world's most flexible and capable army while transitioning to meet the requirements of the emerging national security strategy. To meet the new and varied challenges of the future, we have changed from a threat-based force to a full-spectrum capabilities-based force. Our technology is tremendously powerful and will assist us in this effort, but it means that everyone must be doing their job right. That is why the human dimension is so critical to our continuing success, for the challenges of the 21st century will require soldiers and leaders who have the cognitive skills (mental agility, interactive thinking, synthesis) to conceive new operational methods and employ the new technologies with boldness and audacity.

Technology and the ability to handle it will be increasingly important, but the outcome—whether victory or defeat—will be decided by soldiers. The battlefield will always be a dangerous, frightening, and lonely place. Only soldiers of character and courage, well trained, ably led, and properly equipped will survive to win on tomorrow's battlefields.

America will need soldiers who possess the moral character, firm will and professional ability to separate warring factions, to reassure fearful civilians, to restore public order, to protect and deliver humanitarian assistance, and to win the nation's wars. These things will always require boots on the ground. Ultimately, America's soldiers will be the ones to achieve the nation's goals.

America's Army Today—Adapting to a Changing World

Although the Army has undergone a great deal of change in the last eight years, it is only the beginning. Recently, the Army finished the Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) conducted at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. This AWE gave the Army a unique opportunity to see into its future. As Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen said after he visited the AWE, "I have seen the future of warfare. . . . The Army's ability to use information to dominate future battles will give the United States a new key to victory, I believe for years, if not for generations to come." He is absolutely correct. This AWE was about the future of the United States Army. At the National Training Center, Task Force XXI tested 71 separate systems and learned a great deal about the future of warfare. We will take those systems that worked well and proliferate them across the Army as quickly as possible. The Army is combining industrial-age equipment—like M1A1 tanks and AH–64 attack helicopters, which are the best in the world—with information-age technology to vastly improve our warfighting capability.

The AWE was more successful than we hoped, and we learned a number of valuable lessons. First, the industry-soldier lash-up was a huge success. That cooperation permitted us to update technology inside our normal acquisition cycle, literally cutting years off the life-cycle process. One of our goals is to streamline our acquisition process, and this cooperative effort is acquisition reform in action. The AWE was not just about modernization. It is about the essence of our Army, properly balancing our Six Imperatives—quality people, training, force mix, doctrine, modern equipment, and leader development—that are our links to the past and the future.

The lessons learned from this exercise, coupled with the follow-on exercises at division and corps level, will produce Army XXI. Make no mistake about it. Army XXI will give us information dominance. Information dominance allows us to answer three questions that will give us a powerful advantage on the battlefield: Where am I? Where are my buddies? Where is the enemy? The answers to these questions fundamentally allow us to change the way we do business.

Fundamental to all of this improved technical capability is the requirement for quality people. Even with the best technology America can afford to provide, at the point of the spear it will still be a very recognizable fight—system against system, soldier against soldier. That is why our emphasis in Army XXI remains on mental agility and the other aspects of change associated with the human dimension.

Army XXI is critical, but it's only an intermediate step. The focus of the Army's intellectual effort is shifting to the Army After Next—the Army of 2020 and beyond. The Army After Next is our effort to look as deep as possible into the future to understand the environment of the third decade of the 21st century. It is a comprehensive examination that includes consideration of the technology, training, doctrine, leader development and the warfighting concepts that will be necessary at that time.

Soldiers Are Our Credentials

Since 1775, the Army has continually changed to insure the safety and prosperity of the nation. The Army can adapt to physical, cultural and technological change because all change is built upon the bedrock of our quality soldiers. Soldiers protect the ideals and values of America; they insure everyone can live in a free and just society. The prosperity and security of the nation today are a direct tribute to our soldiers, a clear reflection of the spirit of the United States Army and the tangible measure of its might. This legacy is why we say "Soldiers Are Our Credentials."

The strength of our Army is grounded in a values-based organization. The bedrock of the Army as an institution is our commitment to seven values: honor, respect, duty, courage, loyalty, integrity, and selfless service. Values are not something that automatically happen, especially in today's society. Moreover, values are a perishable commodity; they must be nurtured, reinforced, and sustained. You have to spend time discussing values, explaining to new soldiers coming into the Army what values are all about, and reinforcing those values to all soldiers on a daily basis through leadership, action and example.

Honor, respect, duty, courage, loyalty, integrity, and selfless service to the nation are more than words; they constitute the creed by which we live. The actions in Somalia by Master Sergeant Gary I. Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall D. Shughart, who were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, epitomize the highest Army values.

During a firefight in Mogadishu on October 3–4, 1993, Somali gunfire forced a Black Hawk helicopter to crash land in enemy territory. Sergeants Gordon and Shughart fired their rifles from another helicopter to protect their comrades at the crash site below them, even though they endured a heavy barrage of fire. With Somali gunmen closing on four critically wounded soldiers at the crash site, the two NCOs volunteered to help and, after dropping from the safety of their own helicopter, fought their way through to the wounded pilot. They provided cover until their ammunition ran out. When Shughart was fatally wounded, Gordon got a rifle from the crash site and handed the weapon and five rounds to the pilot. Sergeant Gordon said, "Good Luck" and, armed only with a pistol, continued the fight until he was killed. Their instinctive actions symbolize the essence of the Army's values.

Values—Our Bedrock

Values are what made leaders like Shughart, Gordon, and the countless warriors before them do what they did, and those are the things that must be emphasized to all soldiers. Today, however, many enter the Army with a different values base. We must ensure that our standards and values become theirs. We must steep our soldiers in these values from the time they join the Army until they leave. Respect for others is fundamental to what we are trying to do. As General John M. Schofield said in 1879,

> The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than make an Army. It is possible to impart instruction and give commands in such manner and such a tone of voice to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect for others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.

What Schofield knew over a century ago is still absolutely true today. When authority is abused—whether it takes the form of sexual misconduct, racial prejudice, or favoritism—then the Army as an institution is diminished. Therefore, we must ensure that leaders and soldiers at all levels understand that the most important role of the chain of command—from squad leader on up—is to be fair, to be professional, and to take care of soldiers 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

The Army and its soldiers draw strength from our traditions. Subordinates learn and are mentored by senior leaders who nurture and encourage the development of values and professional attributes. Leaders, in turn, are expected to live by and exemplify those values. Internalizing these values—living them—is what builds professional soldiers.

Values and traditions are the soul of the Army. For over two hundred years, from Bunker Hill, to Gettysburg, to the Bulge, and on to Somalia, these values and traditions were forged by the harsh and unforgiving flames of combat. As an institution we must be unwavering in upholding these values and traditions.

In addition to the seven bedrock values upon which we base our development and service as American soldiers, two other characteristics are an intrinsic part of our environment: discipline and teamwork.

In order to create and sustain an effective fighting force, win the nation's wars, and perform other missions in support of the National Military Strategy, the Army must rely on disciplined soldiers. Without discipline, armies are only disorderly, armed mobs.

To develop discipline, the Army inculcates its members with the need to follow legitimate orders. This process begins with basic combat training, where new soldiers are taught Army val-

ues, exposed to positive role models, and prepared for assimilation into the institution. Order and discipline are paramount and fundamental. Without them, our most important missions—combat operations—are doomed to fail.

To achieve these objectives, we focus our efforts on behavioral change through teaching Army values. Although our ultimate goal is to change attitudes, our initial focus is to modify behavior. Our intent is not to convert people—but to ensure their behavior is not prejudicial to the good order and discipline of a unit or of another soldier.

Obedience to proper orders and submission to appropriate authority is central to all that the Army does. To enlist in the Army and become a soldier, one must swear or affirm to this oath:

> I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God!

On taking the oath, soldiers voluntarily forego certain individual liberties, to the point that they must be willing to sacrifice their lives for the good of the nation. It is this voluntary surrender of individual liberties for the common good that makes any abuse of authority by leaders appointed over soldiers so egregious and devastating to discipline. As an institution we must eliminate any and all abuse of authority.

Teamwork, the ability to work together for a common cause, is also critical to everything the Army does. The Army encourages and rewards teamwork at all levels and in all positions. Teamwork is absolutely essential for units to fight and win on the battlefield or to perform other critical, tough missions. Soldiers have to know that they can rely on each other and their leaders; this fact mandates mutual trust and respect. Soldiers who don't treat each other with respect cannot be relied upon to risk their lives for each other on the modern battlefield.

Developing these values—this discipline and teamwork in soldiers—takes both time and resources, but it is a necessary process. The Army perseveres because it must continue to foster the team spirit and sense of community that experience has shown to be so essential to building effective combat forces and winning the nation's wars. The Army must create an environment where all soldiers, regardless of race or gender, feel that they are vital members of the team. Some of the soldiers entering the Army today may bring with them negative attitudes and biases. Therefore, we must work to instill Army values and traits in all soldiers and show them that prejudicial biases have no place in America's Army.

The Army leadership's primary responsibility is to develop our soldiers and to allow them to reach their full potential. All our soldiers are volunteers. They come from diverse backgrounds, but all have expectations they want to accomplish. We must create an environment where they truly can "be all they can be." This environment can be achieved in two ways: First, if we empower people to do what is right—legally and morally—there is no limit to the good we can do. That's all that can be asked of anyone—to do what is right. Leaders need to emphasize the importance of values to their soldiers. Soldiers want to do well; the Army must give them the opportunity. An outstanding soldier, Command Sergeant Major Richard Cayton, summed up a leader's responsibility in this way: "Your soldiers will walk a path and they will come to a crossroads; if you are standing at the crossroads, where you belong, you can guide your soldiers to the right path and make them successful." The Army's leaders must ensure that they are always "standing at the crossroads."

Second, we must treat others as we would have them treat us. This principle is just a simple restatement of the Golden Rule—but it is a critical point. All soldiers must feel that they are being treated fairly. All must feel that the Army cares and will make an honest attempt to insure they reach their full potential. Initiative will be stifled and creativity destroyed unless they feel they are given a fair chance to mature and grow.

Responding to the Challenge

We are proud of what we have done. We have reshaped the Army while keeping it trained

and ready. We know, however, that we have not done it perfectly. We continue to face challenges as we change to meet the needs of the nation in a rapidly changing environment. The Army game plan is clear—continue to deal with the human challenges created by change in an open and forthright manner and continue to do what is best for the Army and for our nation.

Following this game plan, three major themes were emphasized in a recent Army-wide chain teaching program. First, our overarching objective is to create a team spirit and a command climate where soldiers are willing to die for each other, if necessary. Such a climate is not possible if leaders or soldiers harass or abuse each other. Second, the Army will continue to focus on job performance. We must continuously stress the fact that soldiers must meet standards. Shared standards and shared experiences create cohesion that is extremely important to building trust among soldiers. When that experience is done to standard, it builds cohesion and teamwork. The chain of command also must be held to strict standards. Third, education in Army values must be emphasized. We must inculcate every individual with self-respect and confidence. Through this training, every soldier will know how to attack prejudice and discrimination. An observant and proactive chain of command is key to preventing prejudice of any kind. It is also essential that soldiers, as members of the team, look out for the welfare of the team and the well-being of every member of the team. To implement these guiding principles, we have taken six specific steps:

(1) Character Development XXI

Character Development XXI is a deliberate effort to refocus the Army on its core values—honor, duty, courage, loyalty, selfless service, integrity, and respect. The program is scheduled to start in October 1997, with most systems in place not later than January 1998. Character Development XXI is a comprehensive program designed to ensure that every soldier understands all of the Army's values. We will equip our leaders with the knowledge and tools they need to create organizational climates that reinforce our message: Army values are the bedrock of all we do.

(2) Doctrine

We are in the process of rewriting Field Manual 22–100, *Army Leadership*, to reaffirm the importance of values to the Army. The new FM 22–100 will stress the importance of the role of the leader in teaching those values. By focusing on the character development process, the new doctrine will give leaders the tools to create the ethical climate that fosters the development of the Army's bedrock values. As an Army, we want to go beyond just the recognition of the values as a way of life. We want to go beyond simply creating temporary behavioral changes in our soldiers and civilians. We want to encourage them to embrace these values and make them a part of their everyday life. We want to encourage them to do the right thing, even when no one is watching them. We want them to treat others, in every instance, as they would want to be treated.

(3) Training and Doctrine

The Army is coordinating its education and training programs to teach both the concepts of character development and also the tools by which to foster such development. The instruction will be progressive and sequential throughout the Army education system. Army schools will reinforce this instruction throughout a soldier's career in a way appropriate to the soldier's experience level. By coordinating this instruction, we create a common understanding, a common language of leaders' roles. It is a program focused on our Total Army leaders (military, civilian, Active and Reserve forces). Additionally, the successful Consideration of Others program is being offered as a model program on human relations for operational units to emulate as a way of complementing the institutional training and education programs. Consideration for others should really be viewed as situational training that builds teamwork and cohesion and that enhances unit and individual performance.

(4) Evaluation System

Our core values are being made part of all Army evaluation systems. Each system will reflect the common terminology. Values-consistent behavior and the teaching of these values to subordinates will become a part of the evaluation

process. Leaders will be able to use the new evaluation systems as supporting tools for achieving the character development objective of "living" the Army values in our organizations. The noncommissioned officer evaluation report (NCOER) will be modified in the future.

(5) Chaplain Specialized Training

Chaplains hold a unique place in our Army. They remain trusted confidants of soldiers of all ranks, they have access to commanders at all levels, and they are considered visible representations of the moral and personal values we want to uphold. Our Chaplains Corps has an important role to play, not only in assisting soldiers subjected to discrimination but also in helping the Army to inculcate our values in our soldiers. The Chief of Chaplains is working to ensure that the Army has the best possible understanding of values.

Chaplains, by virtue of their identities as clergymen and clergywomen, can coordinate resources designed to complement our systemic understanding by examining why discrimination occurs at the personal level. This understanding will help us apply our knowledge of our military culture to the points where all of our efforts in this area must be effective—the heart and mind of the individual soldier.

(6) Equal Opportunity Reporting

We have determined that the in-house mechanisms we had for reporting discrimination were inadequate. Some of our normal indicators misled us. For example, we thought that we had a better understanding of the sexual harassment issue than, in fact, we did. We have addressed these shortcomings by making three specific changes that will give commanders a clear, continuing perspective on the scope of values in their units.

First, we have revised our regulation governing equal opportunity. We now require that incoming commanders conduct a command climate survey within 90 days of assuming command. This survey should provide new commanders with a wealth of data about their units, including identification of any ongoing problems with values.

Second, our quarterly equal opportunity reporting system has been revised and simplified. This revision will provide greater visibility to values concerns in this major command-level report.

Finally, the Army's most comprehensive equal opportunity report, the annual narrative summary report (ANSR), has also been revised to capture data about values more accurately. This revision, as well as the modification of the other reporting instruments, will allow commanders to identify trends and problems quickly so that they can move swiftly to resolve them. Most importantly, all leaders must set the example and take the time to communicate honestly and often with their subordinates. That is what leadership is all about.

America's Soldiers—They Do the Heavy Lifting for the Nation

The Army is truly people, and that is why it is so important that we address the human dimension of change, just as we do the issues of readiness, modernization, training, and doctrine.

In this era of change the Army must look to its culture, traditions and values for strength. As long as the Army understands the human dimension of change and embodies traditional Army values it will continue to be capable of winning the nation's wars, defending liberty and maintaining peace.

The Army will meet the human dimension challenge head on, just as it has met similar challenges in the past. The strength of the institution gives us confidence that we can do so in a straightforward and comprehensive manner. The Army will be even better in the 21st century for having met this challenge.

The U.S. Army of today and of tomorrow, with its emphasis on developing advanced technology, must give equal, if not greater, emphasis to developing support for the human dimensions of change. Our leaders and soldiers deserve no less. After all, soldiers are today as they have been for the past two hundred and twenty-two years, our nation's credentials.

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Address to the Association of the United States Army Sergeants Major Luncheon

Washington, D.C.

October 13, 1997

Thank you Sergeant Major [Jimmie W.] Spencer [Retired] for that very warm welcome. Today we will honor several outstanding leaders who have labored long and hard to keep the Total Army team focused on our primary mission, to fight and win the nation's wars. In a few moments, you will meet some of the great soldiers that make up our Army and represent us so well. But first, I want to share with you some of my thoughts on teamwork, discipline and values.

Teamwork is a foundation of our Army. I am reminded of a young company commander who received a difficult mission while defending the island of Corregidor during World War II. The commander held a formation with the remains of his company. He explained that he needed two volunteers to accept a very dangerous mission and asked that volunteers take two steps forward of the formation. At this moment, the commander glanced down at his written instructions for further details. When he looked up, he was surprised that the ranks of the formation were unbroken. The commander was outraged, "What, not a single person wants to volunteer for this mission?" the commander asked. The company executive officer standing behind him replied, "Sir, you do not understand. The entire formation stepped forward two paces."

Those soldiers at Corregidor were a team. Over 1,800 of those soldiers left their hometowns in New Mexico and deployed to the Philippines, and 900 of those soldiers paid the ultimate price and lost their lives during the Bataan Death March. They showed us that freedom isn't free. That freedom is a very special privilege that we now enjoy. It is a great legacy that those brave soldiers left us and it remains a great responsibility we have today to live up to their example. We must continue to ensure that their sacrifice was not in vain. They serve as inspiration for us all.

Today's Army is a multidimensional team. It is composed of Active Component, Army National Guard, United States Army Reserve, Department of the Army Civilians, as well as many different races and creeds, men and women. Today's Army is a total force team. Our success has been documented all over the globe these last few years in places such as Bosnia, Haiti, and the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta. Our diversity as an Army and as a nation is our greatest strength. The Army must leverage the strength that comes from men and women of all races and creeds serving together with dignity, mutual respect, and consideration for others as part of one team.

A key concept that distinguishes the military from our civilian counterparts is strict adherence to discipline. Discipline is not the fear of punishment for doing something wrong, but a faith in the value of doing something right. We instill and reinforce personal discipline in two ways. The first is the individual responsibility of every soldier, whether that person is the newest private, or the most senior individual. The individual's responsibility is to do what is right. You cannot teach that, but you can exemplify that. The most effective way to demonstrate individual responsibility is to do what is right and your subordinates will pick that up and do the same.

The second method of instilling discipline is to treat every soldier with dignity and respect. Discipline is one of the cornerstones of our great Army and it has been since the very beginning. In 1778 a Prussian volunteer, Baron Friedrich von Steuben arrived at General George Washington's camp at Valley Forge and published *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States.* This document established the principle that the noncommissioned officer was responsible for the care, discipline, and training of the men in garrison and in the field. The document defended the NCO's battlefield role, gave the enhanced status, and distinguished them from their foreign counterparts. In sum it defined the standards of the American NCO Corps.

The document talked about such things as: "The Sergeant Major . . . must pay the greatest attention to the conduct of the NCO's. He must pay the greatest attention to their conduct and behavior . . . and he must exact the most implicit

obedience. . . ." It also stated: "The First Sergeant . . . should consider that the discipline of the Company, the conduct of the men, their exactness in obeying orders, and the regularity of their manners will depend on his vigilance. . . ."

Very little has changed since 1789 until today and should not change in the future. The duties and responsibilities of the NCO are crucial to unit success. NCOs are the keepers of the crown jewels—our standards. They hold themselves to those standards and they ensure all soldiers, regardless of race or gender meet those standards. Soldiers in Bosnia demonstrate that principle for all to see, not by chance or happenstance but by diligence and strict discipline. Discipline applies to all soldiers, regardless of rank and values tie it all together.

Values are the essence of our Army; like combat skills, they have to be trained, honed, and polished to perfection. They make us different than our civilian counterparts. There are 7 fundamental values that are the foundation of our Army. Those values are Duty—a sense of obligation, Honor—keen sense of right and wrong, Courage—both physical and moral, Loyalty—to fellow soldiers—to one's unit—to our country, Integrity—always telling the truth, Respect—hold others in high regard, Selfless Service—our unit before our self. Leaders of character and competence live these values. If you want an example, look no further than the pages of the 1st Cavalry Division's history.

On Thanksgiving Day in 1966 a young company commander received a mission to assault a nameless village in Vietnam. The commander received a report over the radio that the first platoon had been inserted on the ground. As his aircraft flew towards the landing zone, small arms fire began to strike the helicopter. The pilot declared that the landing zone was a "hot landing zone." Several helicopters flying in formation departed the area. The pilot knew that the commander wanted to be with the platoon that was on the ground and hovered 20 feet over the landing zone. The commander did not hesitate and jumped down to the ground below. As he fell to the rice paddy, he remembered that he had forgotten to order his first sergeant and his radio operator down to the ground with him. He hit the ground, recovered, and noticed that his first sergeant and radio operator had jumped out of the helicopter with him. As the enemy small arms fire became more intense, the commander and his party became separated from the first platoon. The commander turned to his first sergeant and was about to tell him to get things organized when he noticed that he was terribly wounded in the shoulder. Knowing there was nothing he could do or say, he sadly muttered, "Hang in there top." The first sergeant replied, "No damn problem sir, Gary Owen!" The first sergeant remained on the battlefield. The platoon managed to secure the landing zone and the objective. The first sergeant was able to fly in Thanksgiving dinner and saw to it that every man was served. The first sergeant was the last man off the battlefield that day. He demonstrated how to live a creed. "No damn problem sir, Gary Owen!" The values illustrated in the short example have sustained this army for 222 years and will sustain us into the next century. Remember, "No damn problem sir, Gary Owen!" Teamwork—Values—Discipline!

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Remarks at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Luncheon

Washington, D.C.

October 14, 1997

"One Team—One Fight—One Future"

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, fellow soldiers, thank you for such a warm welcome. I know there are too many people here to recognize individually, people that truly deserve to be recognized, but I hope you'll bear with me if I just recognize one group and one individual.

You've already recognized your Army leadership, but I just want to say to them, publicly, how much I appreciate their friendship and support. They are truly the drivers of this engine of change and they, along with the command sergeants

major out there that were introduced earlier, are the people that take care of those great soldiers that we have serving the nation and serving the Army so well around the world and I just want to say thank you to them for their friendship and support and their leadership.

I also want to recognize a very special individual. General Jack N. Merritt, President of the Association of the United States Army. As all of you know, this is his last annual meeting as president and I want to say thank you to him on behalf of all the soldiers that he has touched in a very positive and very personal way. You know, I've been coming to these meetings for a long time and I guess the one thing that's been consistent is they get bigger and better each year. There's probably a lot of reasons for that, but I think the single most important reason is Jack Merritt. It's been his leadership. He is a great soldier. A great mentor. Great friend. Great patriot. And Jack, Mr. President, on behalf of all of our people, thanks for what you've done. We will miss you. We wish you well.

This is a great audience and when you're up here and you look out, you see all the people who have done so much for America's Army—soldiers that have retired, soldiers that are still serving, members of the civilian industry—the leadership of the Army and all the people that come together as the Army team. I can tell you it's a humbling experience to be up here and have the opportunity to address you. But I just want to thank you all for the great support that you've provided our soldiers—the great support you've provided the Total Army. I just appreciate that so very much.

Recently I was in Albuquerque, New Mexico. I had the opportunity while I was there to meet with some of the survivors of the Bataan Death March, soldiers from the 200th Coast Artillery, a National Guard unit from New Mexico. In the autumn of 1942, those great soldiers left their homes and walked the path to history. From the small towns of New Mexico came the hearts of heroes.

They were average Americans, people like Don Dansby, a garage mechanic from Carlsbad; Paulo Maldonado, a construction worker from Albuquerque; Lazaro Chavez, a farmer from Blanco; Fred Evans, a student from Alamogordo. These boys, who became men almost over night, and 19,000 others went when they were called. Less than 900 came home. They faced overwhelming hardship. They faced overwhelming odds. They never lost faith.

Every time I've had the opportunity to meet with the veterans of the 200th Coast Artillery, and I've had the opportunity to meet with them a couple times in the last two or three years, I'm reminded of the story of General Jonathan Wainwright, when he surrendered at Corregidor. As he brought the American flag down for the last time, he folded that flag and he gave it to a young soldier and said, "Young man, carry this flag and when it's all over give it to the Secretary of War." The soldier took that flag and he carried it to his death. Before he died, he gave it to a second soldier who was so weak that he could not carry the whole flag, but he took a scissors and cut a piece of cloth from the flag and sewed it inside his field jacket and true to his charge, he carried it to the end of his ordeal. He presented the patch of cloth to the Secretary of War. Today that tattered piece of the red, white, and blue hangs silently on the walls of the museum at West Point and speaks volumes about the courage, the selfless service and the sacrifice of our soldiers. It speaks volumes about the spirit of an Army that couldn't be beaten, no matter what the odds. What great Americans and what great soldiers and what a debt we owe them. Not just for their service to the nation, but for the example they provide today's soldiers. They have given meaning to selfless service, sacrifice and courage.

Why do we keep going back to memories of the past? Because today's soldiers are linked to the soldiers of the past. There's a brotherhood in history. Not that we can or would or even want to refight the battles of the past. But we must never, never forget their lessons. Yes, the world has changed dramatically since the 200th Coast Artillery left New Mexico and went to the Pacific. Nobody has changed more than America's Army during the past eight years. This change is why we feel a special kinship to those who have served before. History has set a meaningful example for us. Those soldiers during World War II overcame extraordinary challenge. They overcame extraordinary change. And they reached extraordinary

achievements. Perhaps only they, and history, can appreciate the magnitude of the task that we have faced and the scope of our accomplishments in the last eight years.

Our accomplishments have been very praiseworthy and I am truly proud of all that we have done. Basically we've changed an Army—physically and culturally, and as I described last year, we've laid out a vision for the future. And we spent much of the past year, turning that vision into reality. I am truly proud of all that our soldiers have accomplished. It has been an unprecedented year of accomplishment. It's not been perfect, but we must take great pride and we must recognize what we've achieved and we must redouble our commitment to overcome our shortfalls.

We must also recognize another link to the past. We have, as an Army, great traditions in our history. These are the things that have made our Army successful. Values and traditions have sustained us for 222 years—through the good times and the bad. They sustain us today, and God willing, so will it always be. Values are the solid foundation upon which the Army is built. They are the constant that makes a difference.

This is my third opportunity to address this great gathering and no one appreciates more than I, the power of that opportunity to be able to address the distinguished military leaders from our friends and allies around the world; to be able to speak to our partners in government and industry, the giants of their profession, and to have the opportunity to address every facet of the Total Army—Active, National Guard, United States Army Reserve, and Department of the Army civilians. I understand the power of that opportunity and the fact that I have brought you here together, to hear seven words—Honor—Duty—Courage—Loyalty—Integrity—Respect—Selfless Service. These are our values. They are not just mere words. They are the signposts that will guide us from the past to the future. The Army must embrace them. They, more than anything else, produce leaders who lead by example and soldiers who are a valued member of the team. As Secretary West said yesterday in the opening ceremony, "Ours is a very unique profession." General Douglas MacArthur I think described it best when he said the profession of arms is "the will to win. The sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory. That if you fail, the nation will be destroyed." Such a profession is not to be taken lightly. It's a profession filled with glorious traditions and as we move to the future, we shall build on those great traditions.

One of the most important traditions is our "one team concept." An important task in the year ahead is to determine how to best leverage that great strength that we have in the Total Army, because you see, we really are a Total Army—Active, Guard, Reserve, civilians. Fifty-four percent of today's Army is made up of the two Reserve Components. Fifty-five percent of our combat units, 63 percent of our field artillery units, 66 percent of our combat support units, and 98 percent of our psychological operations and civil affair units are located in the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve.

Our Reserve-Component soldiers are our strongest link to the American people and that is our greatest strength. We cannot project America's will without the Reserve Components and that's why over 3,000 have served so successfully in our operation in Bosnia. Fifty-three years ago, in one of the greatest examples of power projection the world has ever seen, we began the liberation of Europe with the invasion of Normandy. This enormous task commanded a total effort. In the first wave to hit Omaha Beach on D-Day, Regular Army soldiers from the Big Red One, the 1st Infantry Division, served along side National Guard soldiers from the 116th Infantry, 29th Infantry Division—one team, one fight. Today elements of the 116th Infantry are at Fort Polk, Louisiana, preparing to return to Europe—this time to Bosnia—preparing once again to serve along side the soldiers of the Big Red One. Fifty-three years have passed since we invaded Normandy, but it's still the same tradition. It's still the same teamwork. One team—one fight.

We have a rich history of integrating Active- and Reserve-Component forces. Our goal remains to preserve this great tradition, preserving the history and lineage of our Reserve Component, while changing to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow and the 21st century. That goal is

an important part of our vision. A vision which recognizes that we are a values-based organization, that the Army is an integral part of the joint team, that the Army is relevant to the needs of the nation, and that the Army has been changing to meet the challenges of the future.

As we discussed last year, Force XXI is the process that we are using to change the Army. It starts with the fielding of Army XXI, which is the covering force for the strategic pause our nation now enjoys—ensuring that the Army and the nation are not surprised as we ready for the emerging challenges and opportunities ahead.

Task Force XXI, the Advanced Warfighting Experiment which was completed in the desert in California in April of 1997, was a great success. It was a proof of principle for the Army XXI concept. It taught us a lot about our future.

The preparation for the follow-on Advanced Warfighting Experiment, the Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment, is taking place as we speak at Fort Hood, Texas. Within thirty days we will know the lessons learned from that experiment.

The key to these efforts in moving into the 21st century is information dominance. If we can perfect and protect this great capability, we believe that we will truly revolutionize warfare. Information dominance will allow us to turn inside of any enemy's decision cycle. I am confident that we can develop that capability. And if we do that, we will maintain the edge.

No doubt the technology that will enable us to overmatch an enemy will be there. In fact, much of it is here. Much of it is here in the exhibits and I hope you'll have the opportunity to see some of those exhibits. See for yourself. The technology will be there, because what you see in those exhibits is the great potential of the partnering that takes place between civilian industry and the United States Army—ensuring that our soldiers have the best equipment and the best weapon systems that the country can provide. I'm extremely pleased with our relationship with industry. We want to make it even stronger in the future.

The task we face is great. The challenges of the future—asymmetrical warfare, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, domestic terrorism, cyber-warfare—these are Total Army challenges, and we must leverage the great strength of the whole team. We must make the whole truly greater than the sum of its parts. Our future is one future. It's a Total Army future and it's a bright future.

We recently completed the Quadrennial Defense Review and in it we laid out a great strategy to meet a new and exciting world. Now, we must create a new model for resourcing the total force that reflects the reality of this new national military strategy. While we will continue and we should continue to leverage efficiencies, we know that that's not going be enough. The real challenge is to break the old Cold War funding paradigm. We must create a new resource model that reflects today's world. This is a task that belongs to the Total Army and the Total Army must accept that task. We must work it out together. It's the right thing to do for our nation and it's the key to our success and our future.

The path is clearly defined. We have rebalanced our priorities to enable us to respond, shape and prepare. The increased modernization resources that we have come up with will allow us to field Army XXI and continue our focused research and development for the Army After Next.

We must work together to build a force that meets the needs of the nation today and tomorrow. In the end, what we really need is best summed up in the phrase "one team—one fight—one future." We need a values-based force. We need a total force that's built up on respect and trust; a joint team forged by a process of experimentation and adaptation; a force funded for the 21st century, not the twentieth; and a force trained and equipped to shape and respond to today's crisis while meeting the challenges of the future. This is our path to the future. It's a path whose signposts have not changed for 222 years. For it is marked by America's soldiers. They have always shown the way, each one a symbol of the Army's seven values.

Let me introduce some of them to you. First is Staff Sergeant Katrina Williams, the Combined Arms Center NCO of the Year. An Audie Murphy Inductee, she's on that path to the future. A senior personnel manager at Fort Leavenworth,

she believes in treating people with "respect," consideration and fairness.

Corporal Mitchell Rosnick is on that path. He was born in Australia and in his short career he has shown his "loyalty" to his adopted nation many times over, most recently when he deployed in support of Operation Sea Signal in Guantanamo Bay.

Staff Sergeant Christopher Seigler is another signpost on our path to the future. A dismounted squad leader in the 1st Infantry Division, he has served as a peacekeeper in both Macedonia and Bosnia. He can tell you what "duty" is all about.

Sergeant First Class Teri Eaton, United States Army Reserve, participated in both Desert Storm and Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. She can tell you something about the "courage" of our soldiers on that path.

Staff Sergeant Richard Boler, the MEDCOM [Army Medical Command] NCO of the Year, is on that path. His "selfless service" has carried him through Desert Storm and now to the Army Medical Research Institute, where he continues to contribute, supporting pioneering work in the important field of combating infectious disease.

And finally, Sergeant First Class Trevis Devall, the 1996 Secretary of the Army National Guard Recruiter of the Year, from Fairfield, Iowa—along with Drill Sergeant Sean Polwort, the Fort Benning Drill Sergeant of the Year. They excel everyday, recruiting America's most precious assets, her sons and daughters, and turning them into soldiers who will extend that path deep into the 21st century. Together these great soldiers build the "integrity" and "honor" of the Total Army team.

Our future is indeed bright. It's so because we build it on the traditions and the history of the past. Today as we look forward to the future, it's important to remember the contributions of those who have gone before, those who have sacrificed, and those who have inspired our nation and earned the praise of all. Again, General Douglas MacArthur, I think, captured it best when he talked about the American soldier—"one of the world's noblest figures, his name and fame are the birth right of every American."

There are many who have gone before. Some of the names are forgotten, but their deeds will live forever. They are not faceless. Let me introduce you to two of them—Captain James McCahon from the 200th Coast Artillery and Sergeant Herman Tafoya also from the 200th Coast Artillery—members of the "Battling Bastards of Bataan." Truly great Americans. Soldiers once—their spirit will live on forever. Their spirit lives in the Army today. It's what will allow us to cross the most difficult obstacles, endure the impossible hardships and accomplish the most incredible tasks. What greater legacy could soldiers leave to their nation? And what nation could be more deserving of such devotion and commitment than the United States of America?

Ladies and gentlemen what you see before you is a proud tradition and a hopeful future. This is what we mean when we say "one team—one fight—one future." Ladies and gentlemen, these truly are our credentials.

God bless our great soldiers, past and present. God bless the great nation they serve. Thank you.

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Women in Military Service for America Address

Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland

October 17, 1997

Thank you very much Lieutenant General [Claudia] Kennedy for that warm welcome. Distinguished guests all, and women Army veterans, I am honored to speak to you today as we celebrate the many contributions that over 1.28 million women Army veterans have made to keep our nation free. I would like to spend just a few moments to share with you some of my thoughts on the history, tradition, values and importance of America's women in military service.

Women have a very proud history of military service to the nation. In fact, that history of service predates the nation itself. That proud service reminds me of the words to an Army song that we use on some of our recruiting commercials:

When you were needed, you were there.
No it wasn't always easy,
No, it wasn't always fair.
But when freedom called, you answered,
When you were needed, you were there.

You were there during the Revolutionary War. Women routinely accompanied the Continental Army in battle. Washington's Army simply could not have been sustained either in the field or in garrison without the support of those valiant women colonialists. Women like Molly Pitcher and Mary Corbin not only served as water bearers but also took over the weapons when the situation demanded. Although they were unauthorized to serve as soldiers, their exploits are the stuff that legends are made of. Due to the heroics of these women, Army artillery units annually present the Molly Pitcher Award to honor the outstanding support of selected spouses.

You were there during the Civil War. Women served as scouts, couriers, and saboteurs. Many of these women made the ultimate sacrifice to preserve the Union.

You were there during World War II. One hundred thirty women served with General Pershing's headquarters in the Army Expeditionary Forces as French-speaking telephone operators. They provided a tremendous service not only for the American forces, but the Allies as well. Over 10,000 Army nurses served in Europe and the United States. These nurses were assigned to mobile and convalescent hospitals, hospital trains and transport ships. Several nurses were wounded in action; there were no nurses killed in action. However, nurses suffered the identical maladies of their male counterparts; over 200 died of complications with the flu and pneumonia. Nurses received awards and decorations for their actions during the war. Three nurses received the Distinguished Service Cross. Three nurses received the Distinguished Service Medal. Over 70 nurses were recognized by various foreign governments for their meritorious service.

You were there during World War II. During this period in our nation's history, we witnessed some fundamental changes in military race and gender policies. In 1942, the idea of women's support services as an official part of the Army became reality. The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps later reorganized and became the Women's Army Corps. One hundred fifty thousand WACs were trained in various noncombatant skills. They served in every theater of operations during World War II. There are some notable examples of their outstanding service to the Army. Eight hundred fifty African American women formed the 6888th Central Postal Battalion. Serving in England and France, they were responsible for censoring mail and relieving the backlog of mail awaiting stateside delivery. In their quest to be counted as equal members of the armed forces, they broke all the previous records established by other postal units getting mail to the front and back home.

Fifty-two thousand nurses also served in World War II. In Europe, Army Flight Nurse Reba Whittle was captured when the air evacuation flight on which she was serving as the flight nurse strayed into enemy territory and was shot down on September 27, 1944. She was imprisoned until her repatriation on January 26, 1945. She was the only woman prisoner of war in Europe during the war. Sixteen nurses lost their lives due to enemy action. Over 1,600 were decorated for their meritorious service and bravery.

You were there during the Korean conflict: 8 WACs and 600 Army nurses proudly served during the war.

You were there in Vietnam. Over 500 WACs and 10,000 Army nurses served; many were recognized for their valor and outstanding contributions to national defense; 7 nurses lost their lives as a result of enemy action.

You were there in Grenada for Operation URGENT FURY. One hundred seventy-nine women deployed as full-fledged military soldiers for the first time. These women soldiers performed their duties magnificently; they served as military police officers, helicopter pilots, intelligence specialists, and medical personnel.

You were there in Panama for Operation JUST CAUSE. Seven hundred seventy women deployed, including Army Captain Linda Bray. Captain Bray successfully led her military police unit in a firefight against Panamanian Defense forces.

You were there in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. Twenty-six thousand women served on the Arabian peninsula. Their numbers represented the largest deployment of American women in combat in our history.

However, you know your history and contributions to our national defense as well as I do. With the dedication of this long overdue memorial, the future generations of this great country will know it as well. I believe it is important for us today to learn from the mistakes of the past as we transition into the next century and values tie it all together.

The Army is more than an organization; it is an institution with a unique and enduring set of values. Values are the essence of our Army. Like combat skills, they have to be trained, honed, and polished to perfection. The Army instills these values in its soldiers who are the men and women in the Army. These values are as follows: Duty, Honor, Courage, Loyalty, Integrity, Respect, and Selfless Service.

Women in the Army have always personified these values. I would like to tell you about several women whose actions exemplified what is best about America's soldiers.

Duty

In 1776, Margaret Corbin helped her husband crew a cannon at the battle of Fort Washington, Maryland. Her spouse died during the battle; however, Margaret continued to perform her duties at the gun, even though she was horribly wounded. She survived the battle and was made a soldier by an act of Congress.

Honor and Selfless Service

During World War II, the Army decorated 4 Army nurses with the Silver Star for protecting the lives of hospitalized wounded soldiers during a bombing raid at the Anzio beachhead in Italy.

Courage and Loyalty

During World War II, 66 Army nurses endured 3 years of unimaginable hardship in captivity as Japanese prisoners of war. Upon release from captivity, each nurse received the Bronze Star Medal for their heroism.

Integrity and Respect

Army nurse First Lieutenant Sharon A. Lane, 312th Evacuation Hospital, Chu Lai, Vietnam, refused to leave her post during an enemy rocket attack until she was killed by shrapnel. For her heroic efforts the Army posthumously awarded her the Bronze Star and the Purple Heart.

Values are the bedrock of our Army. They inspire us to do what is right, day in and day out, in peace and in war. They are what has made us different from our civilian counterparts. They are the keys to our success in the future. Because you have exemplified the Army values throughout the history of this great nation, today your daughters and granddaughters lead military police patrols in Korea, keep the supplies flowing from Germany to Bosnia, and keep the skies free from Scud missiles in Saudi Arabia.

On Saturday, the nation will dedicate the Women in Military Service for America Memorial so that future generations of Americans will know about the sacrifices you paid to keep our nation free. The words of the Army recruiting song serves as a poignant reminder to all that you have been through as distinguished Army veterans:

If they want to find out who you were,
Just tell them where you've been:
From the frozen fields of Valley Forge,
To the trail called Ho Chi Minh.
Through the glory & the sacrifice,
You did your job each day.
You were citizens & soldiers,
You were Army all the way.

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Letter to Army General Officers

November 5, 1997

Building a Values-Based Army—
The Consideration of Others Program

I want to bring your attention to an important commander's tool for building and maintain-

ing a values-based Army—the Consideration of Others program. The objective of this program is to foster and strengthen the command climate, reinforcing the importance of trust, teamwork, dignity and respect for others.

First, let me reemphasize why this program is so important. Today, more than ever, we must focus on the critical task of nurturing and preserving the Army's values and traditions. Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has undergone a great deal of change—both physically and culturally. Despite this change, the Army has remained trained and ready. However, this change has a human dimension reflected in the pressures and stresses faced by our soldiers and civilian employees. The start point for meeting the human dimension challenge is an unreserved commitment to the values and traditions that have sustained us for 222 years—the constants in our history during times of change. As long as the Army understands the human dimension of change and draws on and embodies Army values, it will continue to proudly and faithfully serve the nation.

Modeled on an innovative program developed at the United States Military Academy at West Point, the Consideration of Others program reinforces Army values through the discussion of human relations issues in small interactive groups, which focus on basic leadership and respect principles.

The program begins with a command climate assessment. Based on their assessment, commanders then determine specific requirements for their program. There are no set rules on content, organization, duration or frequency of meetings. The curriculum can be structured to meet a range of human relations and equal opportunity training requirements. The best program is one that is tailored to meet the needs of the command.

Throughout the process of developing the program, leader involvement and commitment are essential. Once commanders develop their program and establish a policy for implementation, they track progress through a series of quarterly reviews. Commanders will find that successful programs not only build trust and teamwork within the command but also provide valuable feedback on organizational concerns and command policies.

Equal opportunity advisors (EOA) provide the commanders key staff support for implementing the Consideration of Others program. In addition to serving as equal opportunity subject matter experts, the EOAs can assist the commanders in organizing and conducting the command climate assessment, as well as in developing and monitoring the conduct of the program.

The heart of the Consideration of Others program is the small group sessions. Well-organized meetings in small groups are the ideal forum for discussing, learning and soliciting feedback within the command. To make these meetings a success, special attention must be given to identifying and training group facilitators.

The Consideration of Others program is important to the Army. It provides a mechanism for sustaining and nurturing the values and traditions taught in our Army schools, while reinforcing and strengthening the chain of command. Above all, the program sends a vital message to our soldiers and civilian employees—every member of the Total Army team is valued and important, and deserves the unimpeded opportunity to reach his or her full potential. Our goal must truly be to help create a "be all you can be" environment that extends dignity and respect to every individual.

The Directorate of Human Resources is the Army Staff proponent for the implementation of The Consideration of Others program. Brigadier General Melton and his staff can provide further details, sample curriculum and suggestions on how to develop and tailor programs to meet the requirements of individual commands. I challenge commanders to take the Consideration of Others program and make it their own. It is an important step in building a values-based Army.

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Letter to Army General Officers

November 17, 1997

Building a World-Class Learning Organization

As I observed the Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment (DAWE) at Fort Hood last week, I couldn't help but be impressed by how far we have come in our journey since the original AWE in May 1994. There could be no mistaking the enormous amount of progress the Army has made in developing and fielding the command and control systems that will be central to Army XXI, and the tremendous energy and pride that has gone into this effort. The goal of fielding a digitized division by 2000 still seems a huge stretch, but I am confident that the Army will make it—not because of rapid technology advances, though they are important, but because we have turned the corner and are becoming a true "learning organization."

Some who visited the DAWE focused their attention around the major technological advancements the Army made, both in developing new systems and integrating the many elements necessary to conduct an experiment of this scope. Certainly there have been a flood of technological advancements, with the resultant increase in speed and capability. To me, however, the most powerful advancements observed are those that relate to the organizational culture of the 4th Infantry Division and III Corps. Soldiers at all levels exude an excitement and confidence that no matter what challenges we face as an Army, we have the innate ability to harness and take advantage of the tremendous capabilities new information systems provided during the experiment.

What I witnessed at Fort Hood was the beginnings of a fundamental cultural change in how the Army conducts business. Without a doubt, 4th Infantry Division, III Corps, and their many partners—civilians and military—are functioning as a world-class "learning organization." They have discovered like Peter Senge in his book, *The Fifth Discipline*, "the organizations that excel in the future will be organizations that discover how to tap people's commitment and capacity to learn at all levels in an organization." An essential element in their rapid cultural transition has been their ability to learn as a team, where there is an extraordinary capacity for collaborative action, where teammates complement each other's strengths, and where they compensate for each other's limitations. The result is a unit whose performance as a whole is greater than the sum of the individual performances of its members. Team learning starts with the ability to "suspend assumptions" and enter into a genuine "thinking together." It follows with a free-flowing of understanding through the group—we call it the "common relevant picture." This process allows organizations to discover things that they might not discover merely as a collection of individuals.

In this regard our new information systems have served as "enablers" for shared understanding, trust, and synergy—between leader and led, between users and contractor, and between peers. Our new information systems allow for the rapid and accurate dissemination of the commander's intent and promote immediate group discussion and interaction to foster high-quality, effective battlefield performance. To understand what I am saying, you need only observe the new G–2 intelligence system—the "virtual ACE"—where multiple levels of command collectively and simultaneously interpret and fuse battlefield information, giving the entire division a coherent, common, and relevant picture of the opposing force. Another great example is the 4ID's prototype G–3 Plans Cell, the "Bat Cave," that allows division battle staff planners to visualize prospective enemy courses of action on a digitized map and wargame potential plans against them using group decisionmaking tools to synchronize the battle—saving literally hours of planning time.

As you can plainly tell, I am excited about the possibilities this DAWE has shown. I am confident that the digitized equipment and new organizational culture we are growing will translate directly into improved battlefield performance. Many years from now, I believe we will look back on this as a time where we began to make quantum leaps in developing the Army as an integrated whole, balancing the six imperatives like we've

never been able to before. The initial insights about learning as an organization developed at Fort Hood will have been the springboard for developing an organizational culture that binds the Army, not only by its seven core individual values but also by important organizational goals like teamwork, discipline, collaboration, trust and empowerment.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

December 1, 1997

National Defense Panel Report

The National Defense Panel [NDP] released its report today. It is a far-reaching report and, although we have not had the time to conduct a detailed analysis, I want to provide you some general observations as well as specific comments made in that report. The observations are mine, based upon a quick read of the report, and are subject to modification, based upon detailed analysis. The specific comments are lifted directly from the report. I think, however, the information is accurate enough to give you a feel for the major thrust lines and allow you to discuss major impacts with your subordinates. Much of what they highlight are things we have discussed and are implementing. Many of the examples they cite are Army examples, such as the Force XXI process and the Army After Next. On the other hand, they rightfully, in my opinion, highlight the need to improve relations amongst the components. My view is that a great deal of attention was paid to Army issues possibly because we have been forward leaning in our change process and possibly because our problems have been very visible. My guess is that it's a little bit of both. I remind everyone that this report is subject to comment by Secretary of Defense William Cohen and then will be sent to Congress for approval/modification. In my opinion, the nation is best served by debating the merits/demerits of this report through the proper forums and then embarking upon the chosen course of action. My general observations are listed below:

The report is clearly future oriented. It deals with primarily the time frame 2010–2020 and does not try to define a strategy for that time frame. The panel makes the point that it would be impossible to choose a strategy this much in advance. The strategy must evolve, and what is important is that we have the capabilities embedded in the force to allow us to successfully execute that strategy. The strategy must focus on capabilities that provide us the flexibility necessary to deal with an uncertain future. The panel tends to project trends such as urbanization and globalization into the second decade of the 21st century. In order to better define the environment in which these capabilities must operate, they tend to look at four possible worlds which range the gamut from a more peaceful version of today's world (Shaped Stability) to a world which is a straight line projection from today (Extrapolation of Today) to a world that is faced with constant turmoil (Chronic Crisis). They highlight the fact that the world will be a bipolar world—have's and have not's—and that many of the threats we face will be transnational and asymmetrical threats. In order to remain a superpower in that world the United States will have to improve the capability to work together amongst Active and Reserve Components, improve jointness, and continue to improve our efforts in coalition operations. They also highlight the need to improve our national security decisionmaking process. They point out the fact that this process is essentially a Cold War process and is 50 years old. It needs to be updated in order to meet the fast changing requirements of today's world.

While not choosing a strategy, the panel does reject the two nearly simultaneous major theaters of war as a strategy. They recognize as we do that this is not a strategy but a sizing mechanism. They rightfully point out that if we are totally tied to this as a sizing mechanism then we run an unacceptable risk of significant changes once one or both of these areas is resolved. They do recognize that in the near term Southwest Asia and Northeast Asia are the most relevant areas for us and they make the point that our force structure

to handle those two areas today is about right. They do, however, emphasize the need to highlight capabilities more and I think that dovetails nicely with the movement we made in 1995 from a threat-based to a capabilities-based force. We are already moving down that road and I think their emphasis on capabilities will only provide increased emphasis to our efforts. The panel discusses a need for a transformation strategy. As they point out, the decisions we make now impact the systems and the force structure 20 years from now. They wholeheartedly endorsed our experimentation process (Force XXI) and want to take it into the joint arena. This is very similar to the position we have been pushing and others, such as Senator Coats, have endorsed. They recommend a joint Forces Command as well as a joint TRADOC which utilizes the Joint Training Center which I assume is composed of the NTC, 29 Palms, Nellis AFB, etc. They point out that there is goodness associated with service competition and endorse it as a way of ensuring the nation has the right joint capabilities. They seem to be advocating a leap-ahead strategy in terms of modernization. They want to minimize the resources going into the legacy systems and increase the resources into systems associated with the Army After Next. They question how far we need to go with our tank modernization strategy and the number of Comanches and Crusaders we will need in the 21st century. They point out both the importance and the difficulty of power projection in the world of tomorrow. Their mark on the wall is the same as ours: being able to move significant combat power in a matter of hours or days as opposed to weeks or months. Of course the implication this has on the type of systems we need and the logistical support required for these systems is well understood by us. On numerous occasions they mentioned the need to move away from the iron mountain and substitute velocity for mass.

In terms of Army specific issues they advocate moving quicker to the Army After Next while confining Army XXI to III Corps and forward-deployed units. In general, I can support that thrust as long as we control the rate of change. The rate of change must be a function of the acceptance of experimentation. This is clearly a critical issue and must be controlled by the Army leadership. To do otherwise runs the unacceptable risk of not being able to deal with near-term requirements and becoming disoriented on the path to the future. They advocate increased roles for the Reserve Components in areas such as homeland defense, national missile defense, U.S. Army South, and coalition operations with emphasis on Partnership for Peace. The report also makes the point that we need restructuring of the Total Army to better integrate and leverage all components. This restructuring should be accomplished through coordination by the Chief with Reserve-Component leaders and approved by the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense. This again I believe is a validation of the process already started. They point out the need to build trust and confidence through greater integration, shared experiences, and more exchange of leaders between components. In my opinion, these are all pertinent observations.

Finally, the report acknowledges that there will be costs associated with this transformation. They estimate an annual budget wedge of $5B–$10B will be needed to support their recommendations. They advocate a revolution in business affairs where the business of defense is run more efficiently. They recommend a close examination of the industrial mobilization programs and greater reliance upon civilian industry to perform commercial-oriented support tasks. They reaffirmed the need for more base closures and recommend that the Department continue to reform the acquisition process as well as rethink the planning, programming, budgeting system. In closing, they point out that if we are to be successful in meeting the challenges of the future, then we need to fundamentally rethink the U.S. national security apparatus and adapt it to be more integrated, coherent, and proactive.

Some of the more pertinent specific comments are listed below:

- The implication of the world in 2020 is to hedge against uncertainty, curtail the outdated/less useful, explore new concepts, and adapt over time.
- They point out that challenges to power projection continue to increase and demands for power projection continue to increase.

◆ They point out that information operations are "a future opportunity, competition, and vulnerability—all at once."

◆ "Given the importance of space-based capabilities to information operations, our ability to operate in space, support military activities from space, and deny adversaries the use of space will be key to our future military success."

◆ "We must also expect to be involved in cities while conducting such contingencies as humanitarian and disaster assistance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations."

◆ "To address the challenges posed by weapons of mass destruction, the United States will need a comprehensive approach that begins with excellent intelligence actions to prevent or slow proliferation, to protect our forces and citizens from attack, and to deal with the consequences of such an event, at home or abroad."

◆ "Protecting the United States from any threat to its survival as a nation remains the primary role of our military forces."

◆ "Beyond its responsibility to secure our borders against attack, the Department of Defense must be able to assist civil authorities against a variety of threats to lives and property in the United States, regardless of their source."

◆ ". . . It is our judgment that our current force structure is sufficient for regional threats that we see today."

◆ "The complexity of the WMD [weapons of massed destruction] challenge lies in the number of potential enemies who have access to, and may choose, this asymmetric means of attacking the United States in an effort to offset our conventional strengths."

◆ "U.S. national security is directly related to the stability of regions far from our shores. . . . Today's forward-based and forward-deployed forces play an important role in enhancing regional stability."

◆ "We must be able to project military power much more rapidly into areas where we may not have stationed forces. . . . First among these new challenges is the need for a much smaller force 'footprint' characterized by fewer but more capable attacking troops and platforms supported by an even smaller logistics element. . . . Projecting military power on short notice into the backyard of a major regional power is an inherently demanding enterprise."

◆ "Such a force would be fully joint and increasingly combined, engaging in multidimensional (i.e., integrated ground, sea, and aerospace) and, where possible, multinational operations at close and extended ranges. It would be fully integrated through a global, distributed reconnaissance and intelligence architecture composed of satellites, unmanned area vehicles, sensors, and infiltration forces."

◆ "We need to develop intelligence systems and military capabilities that enable the effective control (or eviction) of regular enemy forces from urban terrain."

◆ "Space power is an integral part of the revolution in military affairs and a key asset in achieving military advantage in information operations."

◆ "In fact, this military revolution is characterized, in part, by a rapidly growing potential to detect, identify, and track far greater numbers of targets, over a larger area, for longer time than ever before, and to order and move this information much more quickly and effectively than ever before. . . . Information technologies could dramatically enhance the ability to integrate the actions of widely dispersed and dissimilar units."

◆ "Not only do we require lighter, more mobile, forces, but we also require lean logistics. . . . The ability to move our forces rapidly and in the right configuration is key to their effectiveness."

◆ Land Forces:

"Become more expeditionary: fast, shock-exploiting forces, with greater urban operation capability;

"Reduce systems that are difficult to move and support; shift to lighter, more agile, more automated systems;

"Evolve to lighter, greater range, more lethal fire-support systems;

"Develop the twenty-first century tank to be a unique vehicle relying on speed, agility, and hyper-velocity gun technology for operational effectiveness (the panel's view is that 30–35 tons is the appropriate weight range);

"Move beyond Force XXI to incorporate the concepts embodied in Army After Next;

"Restructure above-the-line units, which evolve to smaller operational elements with equivalent (or greater) lethality;

"Move toward advanced vertical lift system versus service-life extensions of current rotary-wing aircraft.

"The panel questions continuing the upgrade of the M1A1 tank and the continuing evolution of the main battle tank beyond its current capabilities, as well as the projected numbers of Crusader and Comanche. . . . These capabilities should be deployed to III Corps and the forward-based forces—as a risk mitigation capability—while transitioning the balance of the Army (force structure and programs) to the Army After Next concept.

"Reserve and Guard units must be prepared and resourced for use in a variety of ongoing operations. Given this, the Department should consider establishing the funding priorities for specific Guard and Reserve programs based on the amount of total force mission capability they provide.

"As the Army undertakes its transformation, reductions in both the active and reserve components can be expected. Such reduction must be the product of deliberations by the reserve components, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of Defense.

"Some portion of the Army National Guard's divisional combat (including combat support) units should become part of the active divisions and brigades. . . . Given the changing character of warfare and the threats we face, Guard divisions should begin now to organize under the concepts proposed in Army After Next. . . . The enhanced brigades should report to an Active Army command. . . . The Guard should develop selected early-deploying units that would join the active component. . . . This implies additional full-time manning requirements and offers an opportunity to exploit the concept of an integrated active component/reserve component unit.

"Both the active and reserve components should decrease the number of armored units. . . . The ratio between support and combat units in the total force should be adjusted to reflect the actual needs of the Army in meeting its mission requirements. . . . The Strategic Reserve units should have clear peacetime missions such as support for combined operations in Southern Command or Partnership for Peace training in Eastern Europe. It is the panel's judgment that the Guard should assume the entire U.S. Army South (USARSO) mission.

"The National Guard should continue to provide general purpose forces to give prompt military support to civil authorities. These forces may need specific additional training—similar to that developed for response to civil disturbance during the 1960s and 1970s—but their primary mission should remain to fight with active forces in combat contingencies. . . . The National Guard should also provide forces organized and equipped for training of civil agencies and the immediate reinforcement of first-response efforts in domestic emergencies. . . . As new homeland defense missions develop (e.g., National Missile Defense and information warfare), the Guard should be used in lieu of active forces wherever possible.

"A total force, fully integrated, requires a common culture to engender unity of thought and action. Shared operational and training experiences, common educational opportunities, and frequent exchange of leaders between the active and reserve components serve to deepen mutual respect and reinforce a common ethic.

"Practical experimentation allows us to experience what may only be theorized at the discussion table. It is only through field exercises that we can adjust and iron out problems before they occur in actual combat.

"The Department of Defense must work with congressional support to eliminate or relax 'color of money' restrictions. . . . To make cost-effective decisions and respond to changing needs, Department of Defense managers need the flexibility to shift funds between accounts.

"The panel urges the Congress to provide legislation and remove statutory barriers to a greater private sector role in defense depot maintenance. . . . The Department of Defense should accelerate public versus private competition for existing systems, ensuring a level playing field for all bidders and move to contractor logistics support for new systems.

"Although aggressively transforming our military may present some risks, the panel believes that risk is both acceptable and manageable. At

any point during this transformation process, we should be able to handle any and all major combat operations—and make it apparent to a potential adversary that we can, and will."

The report while focusing primarily on the organizations and systems for the future does highlight the fact that the armed forces of today have high-quality men and women. They are well trained and well led and the report cautions that we should do nothing to negatively impact upon the training of them. I totally agree. These young men and women are soldiers and they will always be the ultimate weapon system. For over 222 years they have been the difference between victory and defeat. They truly are and will always be our credentials.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

December 5, 1997

Conference of American Armies

I just came back from the Conference of American Armies in Salinas, Ecuador, and want to share with you some of my observations. This is an important conference because it brings together the heads of the armies of North, Central, and South America. We meet every two years and our discussion centers around a predetermined mandatory theme. This year's theme was "The Role of Armies" in the development of their countries. Obviously, in addition to the formal discussions that take place in the conference, there are a lot of other benefits associated with socializing and conducting bilateral discussions. In fact, the personal relationships that come from a meeting like this are probably the most important. In some cases, I was dealing with officers I'd known before and in some cases I was dealing with officers who I'd just met for the first time. But in all cases I found the discussions to be highly professional and very worthwhile.

There was unanimous agreement that armies played a key role in the development of their respective country. First and foremost, everybody discussed the need for the Army to provide external security for the nation state. Without that protection the nation is not going to be able to fully develop its potential. There was general agreement that external threats, at least in the form of other nation states, had diminished in this area. Therefore, more of the effort of most of the armies had been directed toward the contributions each could make in terms of internal development. In some cases, such as narco-trafficking and guerrilla movements, there was definitely a security element to all of this. This varied, of course, from country to country, but I think it fair to say most countries in Central and South America were seized with the linkage between these two threats and with the importance of continuing to combat them or guard against their reappearance. Most of the counterdrug effort in this region is conducted by the police force, but it appears there is increased pressure on the military to do more. This had led to increased cooperation primarily in the area of passing of information amongst nations of the region. This, in my opinion, is very healthy because a regional approach is required to deal with these twin threats. While they were appreciative of our willingness to assist in this effort, the unspoken message was that if the demand went away, the threat would go away and the United States is a heavy demand nation. When this came up, I pointed out what we in the Army are doing to set the example in terms of reduced demand. I talked about how we continue to strive for a drug-free Army and, to the extent we achieve it, we are setting the example for our society. I also pointed out the work that many of you are doing in the schools with your programs to work with the youth of the United States. I think they clearly understood this is a long-term project for us and there is still much that we can do as a nation.

Terrorism and environmental concerns had greater emphasis during this conference than they did during the last one. The terrorism discussion was primarily led by Peru, but I detected a growing recognition of this threat during the discussions. Although environmental concerns did not get a lot of discussion, the fact that they were mentioned so many times by so many different nations

illustrates the growing awareness concerning the criticality of this area. Again, terrorism will require increased sharing of information and regional cooperation. I certainly don't think we can expect in the future that we as a nation will be isolated from this threat. It is time to start the preparation so that if we are required to deal with this threat we can. The efforts of CBDCOM [Chemical-Biological Defense Command] and the training they are providing to the first responders in the major cities throughout the United States is an indication of the type of thing we need to do. As I've said many times, I see the protection of our own homeland against this threat as a Total Army challenge and certainly envision an increased role for the Reserve Components in this area. In the area of environmental concerns I highlighted the increased emphasis we were placing on simulations and the need to preserve the land we live on. I detected a general acceptance of both principles.

I was pleased to see that there was general agreement amongst all that by educating our soldiers and emphasizing values we contribute to the development of our nations. There was a great deal of discussion concerning the need for the armies to reflect society. Again, I was pleased to hear and see that the message has taken hold in many of the countries. For example, in Ecuador, our host, the Army is recognized by the citizens of that country as the most respected institution in Ecuador. We had excellent presentations by Colonel Roy Trumble, Commandant of the School of the Americas, and Major General John Thompson, Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board. I could not help but think about how both of these institutions had contributed to the professionalization of all of these armies and the goodwill I experienced in Salinas. From time to time we tend to forget about and take for granted their contributions. Despite the negative publicity concerning a few of the graduates I believe these two institutions have made a major contribution to peace and stability in the region. As one head of the delegation told me, we used to fight with our neighbors all the time. But now we have a personal relationship and we are committed to peacefully resolving any disputes. I think that short comment best expressed the results of our total effort in this effort.

While we didn't talk much in the official session about border disputes, it was a subject of much of my private discussion with the representatives from Peru and Ecuador. This conference took place at the same time representatives of the two countries were meeting in Brasilia [Brazil]. Our message to both the representatives of Peru and Ecuador was that this is a window of opportunity and both armies must ensure they give the diplomats a chance to work out a solution to this border dispute. They both acknowledged that this dispute was better solved diplomatically but so far we have not found the right solution. The dispute centers around a matter of national pride more than anything else. I think we have to build the trust and confidence between the two countries. The terrain is not militarily significant. Both sides understand that, as well as the fact that an arms race will take away resources that could be much better applied in other areas. While both heads of the armies were cordial to each other and agreed that they had more in common than what separates them, they both expressed strong feelings about this dispute. Their feelings highlighted for me the importance of what our soldiers who serve in this area have done and are doing on a daily basis. This handful of professionals literally holds together an unzip point and brings peace and security in a vital area of the world. They represent the highest form of commitment we can make—boots on the ground. They are truly the point of the spear and we should all be very proud of them.

This was my third Conference of American Armies. I attended the first one as a major in 1973 and, of course, my second one took place in 1995, my first year as Chief. I could not help but be tremendously impressed with the great progress that has been made in less than 15 years. The issues we are dealing with are more pertinent and the level of discussion is much higher. This progress visibly illustrates the previously mentioned professionalization of the military. While there is still much to be done, the SOUTHCOM AOR represents, on the whole, the importance of a consistent strategy and demonstrates what we mean when we talk about shaping the environment. Obviously, SOUTHCOM [Southern Command] and particularly its Army component,

U.S. Army South, deserve a lot of credit. As I've said many times, this is a Total Army effort and the contributions provided by mobile training teams from the Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve have been a significant part of this success. Over time, the road-building and construction projects have truly made a difference. Thousands and thousands of soldiers have sacrificed and served. Most of their contributions have gone unrecognized and certainly unheralded. I couldn't help but think of them as I attended this conference. Although nameless and faceless, it is these men and women who truly deserve the credit for whatever success was achieved in the 22d Conference of American Armies. They truly are our credentials.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

December 15, 1997

Army–Air Force Warfighter Talks

Last week we conducted two important events: the Army–Air Force Warfighter Talks and a Senior Leaders Training Conference. I want to give you an update on some of the major issues that came out of these two important events.

The Army–Air Force Talks are an annual event for the two services, designed to improve trust and confidence between the two services and to promote discussion of issues of mutual interest. I've been a part of these talks for some time and am very impressed with the progress we have made. Last year we focused primarily on the doctrinal issues and I think took some major steps toward a common understanding of joint doctrine. This year the talks focused more on deployment training, space operations, and the future. Each of these areas is extremely important and I think we had a good discussion of the major issues.

In deployment training we agreed that we must continue to improve our ability to do this. This is the first mission essential task for most units and we have to spend a lot of time making sure we have it down right. Many units say we do deployments all the time and therefore we know how to do it, but I think when you look at the totality of this operation it is rather complex and we must spend more time working on it. Clearly, different levels have different roles to play, but all are important if we're going to do deployments right. It's not just loading the ship or the airplane with the right equipment and people and providing the right data—that may be the easiest part—but it's also such things as GCCS [ground command and control station] operator training, streamlined TPFDLs [time-phased deployment list], securing of equipment by the installation, etc. We must make sure that the training for each of the parts is solid and look for opportunities to exercise the entire operation.

We spent a lot of time talking about the importance of space and clearly the Army has a role in space. As we move toward information dominance, we must ensure assured access and protect our systems. I don't feel that all of our systems necessarily have to be military and I think the challenge is how to leverage the commercial investment in space. There's over half a trillion dollars of commercial investment going into space in the near term and the commercial investment is greater than the combined total of all military budgets. There are some things that obviously have to be solely military, but I think we can make much better use of civilian products. One of the key issues is theater missile defense and we agreed to make a major push with the regional CINCs to ensure we're using all the assets available. We will also continue to look at how we can better leverage space assets through our Army After Next wargames and other such opportunities.

We also agreed to conduct a joint warfighting experiment in the near future. I am convinced there is a natural marriage between their Air Expeditionary Force and our Army After Next. We need to start now in order to develop that synergy. The exact date has not been pinned down, but we are looking at about the 2001/2002 time frame to conduct that experiment. We will lay out a road map which leads toward that joint experiment. I am convinced that we must do more joint experimentation with other services

and will continue to push for that wherever we can. As many of you know, we're also working with the Marines to conduct a joint experiment on combat in the cities.

I was extremely pleased with what we were able to do at the Senior Leaders Training Conference. We had leaders from America's Army—Active, Guard, and Reserve—and I think we accomplished an awful lot. Many of you were there and not only formed your own opinions but helped contribute to the success of this conference. As I said, this conference not only focused on the warfighting skills we need today but also dealt with the strategic leadership task of changing the way we develop our leaders. We had a good discussion on how we develop leaders for the future who are willing to take prudent risk and who understand the asymmetrical challenges they will most likely face. We spent the first half day talking about general trends and then divided into panels which fleshed out individual topics in greater detail.

In terms of take-aways for me, I took away the fact that the exercise director is absolutely key to this exercise. In most cases, this is the corps commander and it's his responsibility to train the unit conducting the training. We give him some great assets to help him, the world-class opposing force, and the senior mentors. I want to give them the flexibility to get at the training objectives desired. We're not going to conduct a cookie cutter exercise, but at the same time I want to make sure that this exercise is tough, realistic, and stressful. While we want to embed in all of our leaders a winning attitude and a warrior spirit, I am convinced that this exercise is more about learning than winning or losing. I look at this as our scrimmage sessions and the only thing that counts in the won and lost column is what we do on the battlefield. That's where we must prevail. I don't want people so concerned about winning that we make it too easy. In order to develop leaders who are willing to take prudent risk, we must create situations that require them to do just that. We don't ever want a purely level playing field and will always strive to make sure that we are the side with overwhelming force. On the other hand, we may face situations, particularly during the buildup of forces, where we are on the other side of that ledger. We must deal with these and teach leaders to deal with these. Finally, we must concentrate on realistic asymmetrical threats. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, etc., are things that we talk about, but I think we must weave in enough of these situations in our training program to ensure the first time our soldiers face these threats for real is not the first time they have thought about them.

We also talked about the complementary nature between BCTP [Battle Command Training Program] and our dirt CTCs [Combat Training Centers]. In BCTP we concentrate and I think develop fairly well the tactics and techniques for fire support and aviation but do not do as good a job on maneuver. Just the opposite is true at the dirt CTCs. It's important that these two programs remain complementary and that everyone realizes the contribution of each in our continuum of training programs. This combination gives us the world's best training program, but we also must be realistic in our understanding of both of these programs. They do as good a job of simulating combat as anything I have ever seen. But they are not the same thing.

We discussed some of the trends that have been observed in the Battle Command Training Program. Most units face a real challenge in getting all the available combat power into the fight. Some units seem to stick to the plan too long. We must develop a mentality where we adjust the plan to the circumstances and not vice versa. We must understand the importance of primary intelligence requirements and commanders' critical information requirements. In the information dominance world we will become paralyzed unless we fully develop PIR [priority information requirements] and CCIR [critical combat information requirements] and follow up to make sure that we get what we need. In general, our orders are too detailed and there is a tendency to micromanage a little bit. Finally, we have to put more emphasis on the reconnaissance battle. If we don't do that properly, then we get decisively engaged prematurely. These are general observations but are probably the areas that need the most attention overall.

We also spent a lot of time talking about how we do commander and staff training at all levels.

There is a continuum of training events available, and I believe the key is to be able to take advantage of these events and to build upon each one in order to fully develop the commander and the staff. In the future we'd like to be able to have a system where any commander anywhere in the world can dial a 1-800 number and be hooked up at the National Simulation Center at Fort Leavenworth, where they would be able to provide a scenario-driven training opportunity to work on whatever the commander desires to train on that day. Obviously, we're not there yet but I don't think that's too far off. In the meantime, I think it's important that we continue to maximize the training opportunities that are available. We will continue our program to invest in distance learning and to fully develop the live-virtual-constructive simulation model.

It was a great week and I think we accomplished a lot. Let me close by taking this opportunity to thank all of you for the great work that you have done during the past calendar year. In many ways it's been a tough year, but we have accomplished an awful lot and I couldn't be more proud of the leadership that you have provided. Because of your efforts I think we are moving forward into the 21st century with a lot of positive momentum. Our vision is clear and our priorities are straight. I'm excited about 1998 and I wish each of you a very happy holiday season.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

January 5, 1998

As we start 1998 I want all of you to know how much I appreciate all you did for the Army in 1997. On balance, I believe we had a very good year. I realize that some will be unduly influenced by the negative publicity we received about the actions of a few, but I believe that if we concentrate on the accomplishments of our soldiers we can't help but believe this was a very good year. They did everything we asked them to do—to standard. You provided the leadership and I couldn't be more pleased and proud of what you have accomplished. The greatness of an institution is often determined by adversity. And even in the negative publicity I think there's a silver lining. We were guided by the principle of trying to do what was fair for all concerned and I think we have achieved that. I'm not sure many other institutions would have been strong enough and secure enough in their enduring values to handle the crisis we faced in the manner we did. In that regard, I'm glad 1997 is over but I have no regrets about the manner in which we handled it. As I've said before, it's time to get this behind us and move on to a bright future. We will not forget the lessons learned but we can't wring our hands over the past. We have done our after-action review, developed the action plan, and are in the execution phase. We will continue to monitor and fine-tune as required, with renewed emphasis on discipline, teamwork, and values. The strength and resilience of the institution are based upon a proud history and tradition built by our predecessors. They worked so hard to build the Army we have today. In simple terms our job is to build on that tradition and history and to pass on to our successors an Army better than the one we inherited. In that critical task we must not—and will not—fail.

Our soldiers through their service around the world continue to be magnificent. In Bosnia they endure considerable hardship in order to ensure that the people of that war-torn land have an opportunity for a future. There is no doubt that thousands of people in that area owe their lives to the sacrifices and service of our soldiers. The promise of a brighter future is also within their grasp and really up to the people in that land. As I reflected upon that during Christmas, I cannot imagine a greater gift to give than the one our soldiers are giving. What a great contribution to make to society. As I visited our soldiers in Korea over Christmas I saw the same thing. They stand ready at the fault line between totalitarianism and our way of life. They have no complaints and ask for so very little. They understand better than most the meaning of peace on earth not just at Christmas but throughout the year. Again, they are making it happen and no one can ever take away the contributions they are making. The

same is true wherever our soldiers serve around the world, whether it's in CONUS [Continental United States] with our power projection forces or a handful of soldiers in some far-off land helping a foreign government understand the principles of democracy. In some cases it's a very clear part of their mission, and in other cases they do the job because nobody else will. In all cases they accomplish it in a professional manner. They truly are our credentials.

A couple of vignettes I observed over the holiday season exemplify the professionalism of our soldiers. I was having dinner at the Dragon Hill Lodge in civilian clothes on Christmas night and sitting a couple of tables over were three young soldiers. They didn't pay any attention to me but I eavesdropped on their conversation. I learned that one was a squad leader and the other two were soldiers in a different squad. Over drinks and dinner they talked about leadership and how each could do a better job. For me it was as nice a Christmas present as you could get. It represented the professionalism of our Army. Later at a reception in Washington I was reminded of how unique that is. In talking to one of my retired friends he told me a reporter from Canada had contacted him and wanted to talk about soldiers. He was a little skeptical because he was no longer totally current, but the reporter went on to say that her premise was that the U.S. Army is the most professional military organization in the world. She said that she had noted that when soldiers get together on their free time the majority of the time is spent talking about how to do their job better. She maintains—and she is correct—that this is a true mark of professionalism. Whether it is unique or not I don't know. But I do know we are blessed to have soldiers like the ones I saw and the ones she referred to. We must continue to nourish and develop them.

As we enter 1998 I am filled with optimism about the future. The strategy we developed during the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review], based upon the three pillars of shape, respond, and prepare, is being implemented and institutionalized. The Force XXI change process is in place and we know what we're doing. The National Defense Panel report validated our plans and I am convinced that Congress will also be supportive of how we are going about changing an Army. The momentum to make the Total Army seamless is picking up speed, and I look for 1998 to be a banner year in that area. Resources remain tight and we're going to have to squeeze every ounce of efficiency we can get out of the system, but we have turned the corner in our modernization program. As we continue to gather lessons learned from our change process I expect that we will fine-tune our modernization program to reflect those lessons. We will continue to emphasize spiral development during the Force XXI process, with particular emphasis on leadership, doctrine, training, and force mix. We'll continue to recruit quality soldiers and bring along that technology that offers the greatest promise. I expect to put the final stamp of approval on OPMS [Officer Professional Management System] XXI early this year and we'll all need to start the education associated with that critical program. The new OER [officer evaluation report] went into effect on the first of October and we must ensure proper implementation across the force. Finally, underpinning all of this must be a renewed emphasis on Total Army readiness. I expect to address the undermanning challenges that we face by better using the tremendous capabilities in the Total Army. Near-term readiness, with its critical element of quality of life for our soldiers and their families, remains our most important mission. We must never lose sight of that fact nor take readiness for granted. We must continue to build upon the outstanding programs we have in effect.

In the training base we will deal with the recommendations of the Kassebaum Panel and transition to an extra week of training during BCT [basic training]. We do not intend to add an extra week where we stress just values, but increase BCT to 9 weeks and put greater emphasis on discipline, values, and physical conditioning. I will continue to challenge our drill sergeants to "toughen up" initial entry training, without losing our emphasis on treating all soldiers with dignity and respect. I know that they are equal to the challenge but they will need our support. We must ensure that our soldierization process does not stop with initial entry training but extends into the units. This soldierization process involves sponsorship and

ensuring that each soldier understands the tradition and history of the unit they join. As a minimum, they must understand this and realize that they are now the ones who are making tradition and history. There must be a continuous process of soldierization until our professionalization program with NCOES [Noncommissioned Officer Education System] takes hold. Finally, institutionalizing the Consideration of Others program remains one of my primary objectives in 1998.

As we continue down our path to the future, I am buoyed by what you did in 1997 and I am optimistic about 1998. Our foundation is solid and intact. The key ingredients—such as quality soldiers and concerned leadership—are in place to build upon that foundation. There is no doubt we will face unforeseen circumstances during the next year, but we have demonstrated our agility and resiliency and our soldiers are capable of handling anything that comes their way.

I ask that each of you do everything you can to enable the Army to be all it can be in 1998. If we do that, this will be the greatest year ever.

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"The Year in Review—The Year Ahead"

Remarks at the Institute of Land Warfare Breakfast

Crystal City, Virginia

January 8, 1998

Thank you very much for that warm introduction and the warm welcome. This is a great opportunity for me. I was telling [General] Jack [N. Merritt] earlier that I always look forward to starting off the New Year this way. It gives me an opportunity to speak to the people who support the Army so well. So I just want to start off by saying thanks to all of you for what you did in 1997. Happy New Year, and I am glad that you are with us to face the challenges and the opportunities of 1998.

Let me also say, because I think this will probably be one of the last official functions that Jack Merritt presides over. Let us say thank you to him for the great leadership he has provided the Association of the United States Army [AUSA]. I can just say from my own personal experience if you needed something done, you just picked up the phone, called Jack, and forgot about it, because you knew it was going to get done. The leadership he has brought to this organization has been an important part of the success story of the United States Army. Jack, on behalf of all the soldiers that you've touched in a very positive way, I say thank you very much. I also look forward to working with General [Gordon R.] Sullivan as he takes over [AUSA] on the 1st of February. I know he will continue to provide the leadership that this Association needs.

I'd like to do three things today. First, I'd like to review 1997 from my perspective. Second, take a look at where we're headed in 1998. Third, wrap it up and go into a question and answer period—talk about what you'd like to talk about. I'll try to set the framework here for some of the [ILW-AUSA] breakfasts that you'll have later on when the principals from the Army Staff will come in and give you the details on the things that I talk about here. But, today I thought it would be good to provide you an overview, at least from my perspective, of how 1997 turned out and then also talk a little bit about what I see ahead in 1998. I think it's going to be a very interesting year.

First of all, let me talk about 1997—a very important year in the United States Army. I want to start by talking about our soldiers assigned around the world. You know I've had the opportunity to travel in this job. Last year I went to places like the People's Republic of China, Bosnia and Korea. I have seen our soldiers in different circumstances, under different conditions. Wherever I have gone I have found that they are tremendously professional. They represent not only the United States Army but also the United States of America in such a positive way. I couldn't be more proud of what they're doing. I don't care whether you go and look at the 8,500 soldiers of the Total Army force that we have in Bosnia, or you look at the handful of soldiers rep-

resenting us in the People's Republic of China. They are all respected professionals. And it's not just me that feels that way. That is the opinion of the people that they deal with everyday. When I was talking to the Hungarian Chief of Staff of the Army, he said, "You know, there are a lot of forces in Bosnia, but there's only one Army—the United States Army." I think that comment describes very well the great soldiers that we have representing us. I couldn't be more proud of them and that's why I always talk about soldiers being our credentials—because they truly are.

It has been a busy year for us. We've had over 30,000 of those soldiers deployed away from their home stations in seventy different countries. When you look at the 30,000 deployed figure, you have to factor in the rule of three. For the number deployed, there's usually 30,000 coming back from that deployment and 30,000 going in. So we've had the Army on the move quite a bit in 1997.

Our soldiers in Bosnia have shown that they have handled this high tempo of operations very well. They have demonstrated the importance of tough realistic training, the importance of discipline, and the importance of professionalism. They have made a difference over there. As I talk to them, I always tell them that people can argue the policy, whether we should be there or not, but what people cannot argue with is the fact that they have saved thousands of lives. I absolutely believe that is true. They are doing a great job—and that is not by chance. It is because they went through a tough realistic training program.

Initially, our forces for Bosnia came out of Europe. Now, we have started sharing responsibility for the mission to units in the Continental United States. In the future, you'll see that mission expanded even further across the Army. We've got too many soldiers who have been over there for the second time, and some of them have been over there on their third tour. We have to spread the mission across the Total Army.

I also want to comment here on the tremendous contribution of the Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve. Some of those units are also going back for a second time as well. The Bosnia operation has been a Total Army effort that has been exceptionally well done. We could not do the job without them.

Let me also update you on Korea. I spent Christmas there with our soldiers and it was a very uplifting experience. They're not completely free of challenges over there. But, if you put the mission in perspective, over the last ten years (which is certainly easy for me to do, because I served over there between 1986 and 1988), you find tremendous improvement. We have changed Korea from an economy-of-force theater to a major regional forward presence. We have made that transition (improving readiness, improving quality of life) while downsizing the Army. It is a tremendous accomplishment. The thing that has most impressed me has been the tremendous progress that we have made conducting multinational operations with the Korean Army. The training and the exercise program that has been developed in Korea is exceptional. In my opinion, Ulchi Focus Lens [a joint U.S.-Korean exercise] is the premier training exercise in the world. Our soldiers are just doing a great job over there.

Back in the United States, we've conducted a couple of Advanced Warfighting Experiments [AWEs] as a part of our Force XXI process. As you know, we've been on the Force XXI path for some time. I think we're making great progress. Each one of these events that we conduct in Force XXI help us define the future and educate the Army as an institution. In 1997, we conducted the task force AWE at the National Training Center [California] in March and April. We learned great lessons about what technology does for us and about what our new systems are capable of. We also learned a lot about leader development, about doctrine, and about some of the training changes that we are going to have to make. We built on that experiment with the division AWE at Fort Hood [Texas]. We saw the tremendous growth that occurred between April and May and November of 1997. It's a tremendous feeling to see that kind of progress. It's not just about technology. It is also about what we've learned about leader development. The division had become a learning organization, a real laboratory for the 21st century. In fact, I think the great potential of leaders in the information age is the major lesson coming out of the AWE process. I will simply tell you that I think we're on the right path regarding our

emphasis on information dominance and situational awareness. I am more and more convinced that there is tremendous power in these capabilities, and if we can really leverage that, and I think we can, then I think we can fundamentally change the way we do our job and maintain that edge going into the 21st century.

In the last year, we also spent a lot of time participating in the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR]. It was the third effort since the end of the Cold War aimed at evaluating the requirement for military forces. I think it has been our best effort so far because it built on the previous efforts. Each year I think we get a little bit better at the process. I think all of us are very pleased with what came out of the QDR—I certainly am. The QDR addresses the three pillars of strategy—the need to respond, to shape, and to prepare. The strategy was very, very important to the Army because we believe that strategy determines requirements and requirements determine the force structure. So in the QDR process we fought very hard to make sure that people understood the great contributions of land forces—what boots on the ground really means. And I think we did that very well. I must compliment the Army Staff and all the people that worked on the QDR. I truly believe you helped us make the point. The conventional wisdom going into the QDR is not what came out of it. The reason was we were able to make the case that land power makes a difference. If you look around the world today, you can see that. I think the effort in Bosnia, Korea, and throughout the world demonstrates that the Army is a full-spectrum force.

Following the QDR, the National Defense Panel completed its work and provided us their input and report. I think it's a good report. It has a lot in it. I think it's going to be a subject of congressional debate. My view is that the National Defense Panel really validated what the Army is trying to do. It talked about our change process, Force XXI and the Army After Next [AAN], and I think they gave us a vote of confidence in terms of those particular programs. There are other issues in the report that we need to digest and look at, and we will do that. First, we need to go through the congressional debate and testimony and get their [Congress'] approval. But, I think we're moving down the right path and I don't see anything in the National Defense Panel report that leads me to believe we ought to deviate from the path that we're on.

We also learned a lot about ourselves in 1997, particularly in the area of human relations issues. I think we dealt with them fairly and as honestly and as quickly as we possibly could and I think we've come out of the process much stronger as an institution. We continue to emphasize fairness. We continue to emphasize treating soldiers regardless of race or gender with dignity and respect. And that's what the last year was all about. It was not about weakening basic training. In fact, we're gonna probably toughen up initial entry training. It was about treating people with dignity and respect, regardless of race or gender.

To get things right, we had to go back and revisit our values, our tradition, and our history. We had to go back and refocus on those [issues]. We did that and we'll continue to do that, but we are not going to wring our hands about what happened last year. We're not going to worry about trying to make yesterday perfect; we are going to do a lot of things to make tomorrow better. We're not going to overreact, but we are not going to forget what happened. We know how to improve human relations in the Army. It is a leadership issue—and it is a training issue. We are putting the fixes into the training model. We came up with an execution plan and now we are working on implementing the plan.

The other issue that we dealt with extensively in 1997 really had to do with resources and communications and the relationship between different components in the United States Army. As I mentioned, I think the strategy associated with the QDR was a good one. The challenge that we now face is to make sure we have the right resources to implement the strategy. I think all of us, in all the services, probably would like to have more money. We certainly would in the Army. And there are people that are starting to write about that and starting to focus the debate on resource issues. I think it is an important debate that needs to be done. I think it needs to be accomplished here in the next year. Within the Army I think we have to approach the issue as one team and work for Total Army solutions, and

that means we need good communications and cooperation between the components. I think we can safely say that we've got those back on track. We're making a concerted effort to make sure that the Total Army is really a seamless Army. I am not saying that it is a seamless Army right now, but I will tell you that we're going to work very, very hard to make it a seamless Army. Each of us in the Army share that goal. Basically, we are just going to get together and communicate and work our way through these issues. They're tough, but we've got to face them and do what's right for the nation and certainly what's right for the Total Army. I am very, very encouraged about the progress that we're making and I think that progress will continue into 1998.

Let me switch now a little bit and look ahead to 1998 and talk about some of the things that I see coming up this year. First of all, recruiting. We're off to a good start. Quality remains high. You see it in the soldiers that we bring in and you see it in the field. Recruiting, however, remains a tough challenge and will continue to be a tough one for us. We have a lot of recruiters working very hard out there. We are not going to fall off recruiting quality young men and women, but the competition is very keen. You know that. The economy's doing well. There are other people that are interested in the same quality of people that we're interested in. So we have to compete out there and we're competing hard. In 1998, we project we will meet our recruiting requirements. Success is not preordained in this business and our recruiters, who are doing a great job, will continue to have to work hard.

In 1998 another priority will be implementing the human relations action plan. A major part of the implementation plan is to put additional instruction into basic training. We are going to add one week to basic training—we will commence that program about the 1st of October, the start of fiscal year 1999. The additional training will be designed to emphasize values. During this additional time, we will put more emphasis on physical conditioning and on discipline. We're not going to simply put one week of values training in the front end. We will spread the training across the course. We will build teamwork, values and discipline, so that when we pass new soldiers off to the field, we are passing off a better product. It is a part of a "soldierization process" that starts in basic training and continues at AIT [advanced individual training] and continues until soldiers reach their units in the field. We want to put more emphasis on the tradition and the history of the values of the United States Army—and we will do that in 1998.

In the year ahead we will also work to build the seamless Army I talked about. I've meet with the TAGs [adjutants general] from several states in two sessions. I will finish with another group early this year. I work with them and discuss the tough issues. These sessions have been very productive. I feel more comfortable about the communication links among the components, and that is important. I think you all know that we have agreed to a suggestion by the TAGs to implement two integrated divisions, one we located at Fort Carson and one at Fort Riley, where we will be training three enhanced brigades under an Active Army division headquarters. That's a step forward. It is a step in the right direction.

As the year moves on, you are going see more emphasis on integration of the components. We looked at the Marine Corps model. We looked at the Air Force model. We think there's some goodness in some of these models. But, the fact is that the United States Army is about fifty-four percent Reserve Components, as opposed to some of the other services, which are at least twenty percent below us. So, we must work our way through that and do what is right for the Army. I think you will see tremendous progress being made in that particular area in the next few months.

We also have to fine-tune our training program in the year ahead. We will look at the Combat Training Center [CTC] programs and put more emphasis on asymmetrical warfare. While we do that, we will not lose the focus on [basic] warfighting [skills], but it is important that we also develop leaders to deal with asymmetrical challenges. I don't think, for example, that we can automatically assume that in every operation we are going to have all the force we need, particularly at the early stages of a deployment. We want to have leaders who understand the risks associated

with these threats and are capable of taking prudent measures. The training changes I envision are not a major overhaul, as much as they fine-tune [our institution] to reflect the environment that we find ourselves dealing with more.

We also must work on home station training. We are in a transition phase, relying on simulations and simulators. As these capabilities develop, we must ensure that we get the most training readiness out of them that we possibly can. I personally feel like we have turned the corner and we are moving into a period where we feel a little bit better about training technology. We know how to maximize training and get the best mix out live field exercises and computer simulations and simulators.

OPMS [Officer Personnel Management System] XXI will also be implemented this year. It represents a fundamental change for the way we manage our officers and it is a very important part of the Force XXI process. Basically what we've done is to say that warfighting remains the preeminent skill of the United States Army. We will put our emphasis and most of our leaders into that [career] field. At the same time, we recognize that there are other areas that are very important to the United States Army and so we have established three other fields—we will manage officers against them. Again, I would say that the major emphasis or the preeminent skill of the United States Army will remain warfighting. At the same time, we will develop experts in other critical areas such as information management, force development, and materiel acquisition. Make no mistake about it, OPMS XXI represents a fundamental change to the United States Army. We will move to a requirements-based promotion system. That is something that we have to educate the Army on. You will see us spend a lot of time making sure that people understand what OPMS XXI is all about. We've done our homework on this one—I am convinced we are on the right track.

In the year ahead we will continue with the Force XXI process. I see Force XXI as a continuing process of spiral development, additional experimentation, refining leader development programs, updating our doctrine, and updating our training programs. All these initiatives support and spur on one another. In the future, you are going see us move from the heavy [division] AWEs to focusing on the lighter units. We will put additional emphasis on the rapid force projection initiative [RFPI] and similar kinds of experiments. We have to make sure that we can deploy faster and get an initial force in place, a force that has some capability—much more capability than it has right now. Down the road, you will see us move toward joint AWEs. We are beginning to lay the foundation now to work with our sister services. Overall, the Force XXI process is developing in the direction we want it to go. We will continue to rely on it to take us down the path to the Army's future.

Finally, I would just say that this year we will take a close look at our modernization programs. We will analyze the results from the task force AWE, the division AWE, and the work we are doing with the light forces, and then make some realistic decisions to fine-tune our programs. Army XXI is one of them. Our objective is to field a digitized division by 2000 and a corps by 2004. We think that's doable. We also need to pull forward what we call the Army After Next with focused R&D [research and development] programs. We need to invest in the technology that appears to have the highest payoff for us. There will be significant work going on in that particular area.

Let me just say for now that we are going to continue on the Force XXI path. We are going to do that without taking any emphasis off of readiness or any emphasis off training. Training has really been the glue that has held us together through all of this. So we do not want to lose that focus. I have got to tell you that balancing these requirements is a tough task for installation and division commanders in the field. Their flexibility is being reduced because the resources are tighter. They have to manage what they have very carefully and that's not easy. They are trying to balance the quality of life and readiness and, at the same time, improve training in the field. We have to fight to make sure that we give them as much flexibility as we possibly can because I think that is absolutely essential. It is what we have to do to keep readiness, training and modernization in balance. The point I want to leave you with is that we are not going to take any emphasis off of training and readiness. It has to be there.

I close by asking for your help. I would ask you for your help in terms of continuing to tell the Army story. Continue to talk about the great things that our soldiers are doing. Continue to talk about the fact that the Army is a cost-effective organization. We get twenty-four percent of the Defense TOA [total obligation authority] and we do about sixty percent of the missions—sixty percent of the heavy lifting. Our soldiers are out there "shaping" and, in my mind, are making the world safer for Americans in the 21st century—what a great gift that is to give to our children and grandchildren—if we can pull it off; I really believe we can. I need your help telling that story across America, because in many ways we have been so successful that people have not paid that much attention. It is important that they understand the great job that our soldiers are doing out there and how cost effective they have been. I will also guarantee you that we will continue to put the emphasis on efficiencies because we owe that to the American taxpayers. We also owe it to our soldiers to make sure that we give them the greatest bang for the buck. We need your help in getting out the story of the Army's successes and its commitments.

I also need you to be as supportive as you can of our recruiting effort. If you are traveling around and you go by a recruiting station, stop in. Just say hello to those sergeants and the officers out there and tell them that they are doing a great job. They will love to see you. I do that every once in a while and they love to see me! Seriously, I think you will be as impressed as I am if you go in there and talk to them. Those recruiters work eighteen hours a day, in many cases six or seven days a week. That is what they have to do in order to make the mission. They would appreciate you just stopping by and saying hello—and saying thank you.

The last thing I want to do is to say thank you for your support last year and to ask you to continue your support in 1998. I truly believe 1998 is going to be a great year for the United States Army. It will be a great year because of the partnership that you see here today. Your partnership is going to be a very important part of our program in 1998. We plan to work with you even more closely as we deal with the tough issues ahead. I thank you for your kind attention today and for your support of the United States Army and our soldiers. God Bless you for that.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

January 25, 1998

Assessment of Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Request

I want to pass on some initial impressions of how we are doing as we approach the president's [William J. Clinton] submission of our FY 99 budget to Congress. Many of you expressed concerns when we sent our budget to OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] in September—particularly in the area of O&M [operations and maintenance] funding. We consciously made an effort in that budget to protect readiness, increase modernization funding and minimize the potential for operation and support migration during the execution year. As it turned out, our total FY99 budget settled at $64.3B. This is a $1.7B increase from our September submission. Although most of this increase is against transfers of defense-level programs to the Army (e.g., Chem Demil [chemical demilitarization] and Commissary), we did realize gains in the RDA [research and development account], RPM [real property management], and RC [Reserve Component] areas.

As you can see from the program budget guidance that was provided to the MACOMs [major commands] resource managers last week, the Army fared well in the FY99 budget review cycle. We must remain guarded, however, when it comes to O&M funding. The FY99 O&M budget still shapes up to be the lowest level in years. However, if we execute properly, the buying power should not be decreased. Last summer, we built a bare bones O&M budget, from which we had extracted the maximum dollars possible in order to rebalance the equation between near-term readiness and modernization. We are counting heavily on efficiencies in logistics, utilities mod-

ernization, savings in ground and air OPTEMPO [operations tempo], and other areas in order to increase buying power. We arrayed the budget to improve the percentage of funded BASOPS [base operations] requirements, and thus reduce year-of-execution migration. But that meant we went into the OSD budget review with no flexibility to absorb cuts or rearrange O&M accounts. The strong arguments presented to OSD resulted in a mostly unchanged program—a plus for our Army.

Our ability to maintain readiness will depend heavily on each command achieving the programmed efficiencies. Each command must ensure every effort is made to complete the utilities privatization and most efficient organizational studies (A–76 studies) within or prior to the programmed fiscal year. You need to know these have been built into this budget, both in the field and here in the headquarters. Additionally, we recognize commanders require the maximum flexibility to apply funds as necessary. We will continue to argue for more flexibility and less restrictions on O&M execution. Each of you also needs to make that point to the various visitors you host at your installations.

In addition to limited gains in OMA [operations and maintenance account], our RC received increased O&M funding for FY99. Our ARNG [Army National Guard] received an additional $158M to improve their OPTEMPO and schools and special training areas. Likewise, the USAR [U.S. Army Reserve] got a $49M increase in their FY99 budget to beef up their OPTEMPO, Individual Ready Reserve, and overseas deployment training accounts.

The FY99 budget cycle preserved our efforts to increase modernization. The OSD budget review provided $550M in additional FY99 dollars to augment our procurement programs. This funding will put the digitization effort back on track for both the AC [Active Component] and the RC. We can purchase equipment to support the ARNG division redesign study in the areas of CSS [combat service support] and air defense—which accelerates the conversion of several units. Additionally, there is sufficient funding to begin RC aircraft modernization. Bottom line, the FY99 president's budget will preserve modernization programs requested in the Army's POM, with emphasis on major systems upgrades, critical missile and combat service support systems, adequate training ammunition, digitization, and developing the technologies to achieve the capabilities envisioned for Force XXI and the Army After Next.

I truly appreciate what you do for our soldiers and our Army. Be mindful that FY99 resources must still face the test of Congress.

Emphasize the need to achieve programmed efficiencies with your commanders. They are the front line when it comes to exercising good stewardship over the resources to which they have been entrusted.

We will provide more details at the Winter Senior Commanders Conference next month and look forward to hearing the details of your concerns.

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Address to the Reserve Officers Association

Midwinter Conference—Army Section Meeting

Washington, D.C.

January 27, 1998

Thank you very much for such a warm introduction and warm welcome. It is great to be back and speak to you again. I enjoy talking to this audience because it includes a lot of good friends, and it reminds me of some of the things we have accomplished together. You are true patriots, in the finest sense of the word, who serve this great country so very well. If I had to categorize you, I would describe you as partners in America's Army. That is what I want to speak with you about today—our partnership and our hopes and desires for America's Army.

I just got back Sunday night from a trip overseas, during which I had the opportunity to visit Bosnia. The weather was great and I was able to get around and visit with soldiers and talk to them. What a great experience it was! I came

away with a number of distinct impressions that repeatedly validated my hopes, dreams, and feelings about America's Army.

There is a Total Army out there. We cannot accomplish the mission in Bosnia without a Total Army effort—the contribution of all three components. Our unity as a total force is evident when I travel and talk to soldiers. When I ask them, "Where are you from?" or ask them whether they are Army National Guard, Army Reserve, or Active Component, they really do not care. The soldiers always focus on the fact that they are wearing U.S. Army tags on their BDUs [battlefield dress uniforms]. That is what we leaders should focus on.

While I was in Bosnia, I had the opportunity to visit the 396th Combat Support Hospital out of Washington State. What a great job they are doing! Some of you know that we had an OH–58 helicopter crash a little while ago. The staff showed me the injured pilot's X-rays. I will tell you that they did a lot to stabilize that young man. It was a terrible crash. The young man was hurt very badly, but he will live. He will have a long rehabilitation program, but if it had not been for the 396th Combat Support Hospital, the prognosis might be somewhat different. Col. Kristine Campbell commands the 396th Combat Support Hospital. Colonel Campbell is the first nurse and the first female to command a hospital unit in a combat area. I could not have been more impressed as I walked around and talked to soldiers assigned to that hospital.

I would also tell you that one of the things I am concerned about is the employer support system. One soldier told me how he recommended his employer for the "Employer of the Year" award in the state of Washington. His employer won that award and was preparing to compete in the national competition. I think we have been blessed to have tremendous support of our National Guard and Reserve employers. I think that is something that is very important to the Total Army.

Another thing I took away from my visit to the Balkans is that our operation reflects how much we have changed the Army since the end of the Cold War. We have changed fundamentally from a Cold War threat-based force to a post–Cold War capabilities-based force. The capabilities you see displayed in Bosnia are what the Army is all about today. The operation reflects a change we have seen in our world and a change we have seen in our strategy. During the Cold War we focused a lot on a strategy of containment designed to constrain the Soviet Union. It was a very dangerous world back then, but it was also a very predictable world. We modernized our equipment against that threat. We trained our forces against that threat. We also wrote our doctrine against that threat. We were very comfortable talking about and figuring out how we were going to beat the Soviet Union on the plains of Europe.

When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, we found ourselves in a new, different, and strange world. We conducted operations in places like Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. We did not plan for these operations. Our soldiers were thrust into those areas. We had to reform our strategy and develop a new one that made sense for the world we now live in. We changed from a strategy of containment to a strategy of engagement and enlargement. We just recently went through a Quadrennial Defense Review, which I will address in a few moments where we came up with a strategy based upon three pillars. First, the strategy reflects the fact that we are interested in *responding* to a crisis like Bosnia, Somalia, or Haiti. It also reflects the fact that we are interested in *shaping* the environment for the 21st century. In my words, we are trying to make the world a safer place for our children and our grandchildren. What a tremendous goal that is. If we can pull that off, and I think we can, that will be a tremendous contribution we will leave behind to society—not only to American society but to the world as well. The third pillar is to *prepare* the force now for the 21st century. We have to change the Army fundamentally—from a Cold War Army to a post–Cold War Army. It will look much different than the Army we have now. It will have different systems, objectives and missions as the world evolves during the next century. That is our strategy. This strategy is important because it is the underpinning for every thing we do. We must make sure we get this strategy right.

The trip to Bosnia also brought home to me the change in our PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO.

We often talk about the fact that the OPTEMPO has increased 300 percent since the Cold War ended. We often mention that we are using our forces to shape the environment. The way to reflect that is to compare today's Army to the one I joined in 1962. We used to teach military policemen that their secondary mission is to fight as infantry; now we teach the infantry how to be military policemen. Bosnia also reflects the emphasis we are placing on civil affairs and psychological operations. Civil affairs units come primarily from the U.S. Army Reserve. Their mission is just as critical to the success of the Bosnia operation as that of any maneuver unit we have ever put into combat. It also exemplifies the concept of "One Team, One Fight, One Future." As I travel around and talk to soldiers, they do not talk to me about what component they belong to, but about how much they enjoy being in the United States Army—America's Army. That is our vision. That is our dream for the future.

Nineteen ninety-seven was an important year for the Army. I think it moved us forward in a number of different areas. As I already mentioned, a new strategy—*shape, respond, prepare*—came out of the QDR. I think that it is a good strategy. The Army drove that strategy by looking at the world as it really is. We could not wish away the state of the world to make it the way we would like it to be. We must deal with reality. When we deal with reality, we find that land forces make a great contribution to shaping. When we talk about military-to-military contacts, we are talking about land-based army-to-army contacts. The new National Military Strategy is the right strategy for the nation and it is the right strategy for America's Army.

Strategy is our reason for being. We often say that strategy drives requirements and requirements, in turn, determine force structure. The strategy that we developed was not a cost-constrained strategy. We did not go into the analysis with the mindset that we only have so many dollars and therefore we can only develop this size of a force. At the same time, we were realistic. We knew that resources were not unlimited. We knew that we had to be realistic in our approach, so cost did play a role. We tried to get our head out of the sand and come up with an affordable objective. We really tried to develop a strategy within the resources we thought would be available to us, so we tried to balance readiness, modernization, and the quality of life for our soldiers. I think we have done a pretty good job. We are trying to prepare a force for the 21st century, but we must keep it trained and ready for today's missions. There is some risk associated with that strategy and there is some risk associated with the budget system we have. When we balance those risks, we are required to make tough decisions. Tough decisions are not always popular. With tough decisions there is always a lot of emotion. As we developed our position on the QDR, we encountered some hard feelings amongst the components of the Total Army. Not everyone got what he or she wanted. Not everybody was totally satisfied with what we came up with. If I were king and we had all the resources we desired, I would do things differently. But, we do not. We had to deal with constrained resources and we made the decisions we thought were right for the Army and that were right for America.

These decisions involved some tough tradeoffs. They involved trading end strength for modernization. Basically, as we drove the Army down as the Cold War ended in 1989, we mortgaged our modernization accounts, using the funds to take care of soldiers. It was the right decision at that point in time and it is the right decision now. If we had to do it over again, I would not do anything differently. However, coming to the end of the drawdown, we had to increase the modernization account because we could not continue to afford to mortgage modernization, therefore putting the future at risk. We focused the issues on the application of resources. We are continuing to work those issues with the leaders of America's Total Army. Increasing communications with all forces, we attempt to talk with groups like ROA [Reserve Officers Association] and try and receive your issues and concerns. We need to listen as much as we talk. Ultimately we have to make some tough decisions and get on with life; I am prepared to do just that. I deeply appreciate the leadership of the United States Army Reserve. I know there are some tradeoffs that were tough for you to make. I know you will continue to be driven by what is right for the nation.

Beyond concerns about resources, there is another issue that lingers out there—the revolution in business affairs. As we came out of the QDR, we said we have to do business differently in the Department of Defense. We have to identify those principles that work well in civilian industry and then apply them to the business of running the Pentagon and the Department of Defense. The United States Army Reserve has led the way in this area and will be absolutely critical to our success as we start to work our way through this revolution in business affairs. We will lean upon you because of some of the programs you have implemented. In many ways you pull us along as you validate these programs for the Department of Defense. That is critical for the Army because there are $10.8 billion worth of efficiencies that we have placed into these programs. If we do not produce a revolution in business affairs, we will have a $10.8 billion deficit that we will have to fix in the interim years. I do not like the alternatives for addressing that particular problem, so we have to get these efficiencies and we will lean on you to help us do that right.

What I also said about our strategy is that there will not be a revolution in military affairs without a revolution in military logistics. We have accomplished some outstanding work in this area. It hits home for the U.S. Army Reserve because much of our logistical component is imbedded in the U.S. Army Reserve. Forty-seven percent of the combat service support and over 95 percent of the civil affairs units are located in the U.S. Army Reserve.

Let me talk a little bit about the future. I think the future will be very exciting. The National Defense Panel [NDP] report validated the Army position that came out of the QDR. It validated the importance of land forces and talked about the need to move into the 21st century and to modernize our forces. It pointed out that the key role for land forces was to shape the 21st century and highlighted our forces in Bosnia as an example. The NDP report also challenged us to accelerate the Force XXI process for the Total Army. I have a little trouble with that because I do not think you can set time lines. The Force XXI process is based upon the presumption that you will get it right. When you start changing something as important as military operations, you need to make sure you got it right. Secondly, when you embed change in a conservative organization, you have to demonstrate that the changes you desire to implement are better than what you previously had. The experimentation process gives us the opportunity to do that.

The NDP process challenged us to quickly heal the rift in the Total Army. The NDP report pointed out that this rift serves neither the Army nor the country well, and I certainly agree. In this regard, I throw out four principles that we want to use to heal that rift. First, the Army requires a single training readiness and deployment system for all components. We need to move the Active Component, the U.S. Army Reserve, or the U.S. Army National Guard smoothly and efficiently. Right now, we do not have a system like that. Second, the Total Army requires personnel management systems that allow soldiers to serve in multiple components during a career of service as a matter of course. We need something like your Reserve Augmentation Support Program, which is a model for what we want in that area. Third, we need a fully integrated Total Army command-and-control system that allows thorough and complete integration of all components. This is similar to what we have in Bosnia and what we have seen in other places.

Finally, we need to develop multiple component organizations that maximize the capabilities and unique strengths of each component. A perfect example of this type of organization is the 19th Theater Army Area Command. They have a small group of Active Component soldiers backed up by a large Reserve Component organization. That is important to us as we try and fulfill all our worldwide responsibilities.

In each of these four principles, we want to build them upon two concepts. One concept is that of the citizen-soldier. All of us are soldiers, and all of us are citizens. We are responsible for doing the best we can for the soldiers in the United States Army. We are responsible for doing the best we can for the nation. The second concept that captures all of these principles is the fact that our profession is different. We do not have "8 to 5" jobs. We do not work at our jobs for 8 hours and then go home to our families and have dinner. This is a special profession. This is the profession General MacArthur spoke about when

he stated, "Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory. If you lose, the nation will be destroyed." That is what is at stake here. That is why the profession itself is an important part of those four principles.

We will continue to focus on the readiness of the Total Army as we continue the experimentation process. I am pleased with the experimentation process. We have learned that situational awareness does work and it leads to information dominance—which can ultimately allow us to change the way we do things on the battlefield. This will give us a leg up and will enable us to maintain the edge against our foes. It will allow us to turn inside the enemy decision cycle and capitalize on that information.

The Army Warfighting Experiment is changing the way we change the Army and it is changing the way we think about change. We are trying to transform the field army from an operating organization into a learning and operating organization. Stop and think about what I just said—into a learning and operating organization. When this transformation is complete, people in the field will also have the responsibility to educate, to train, and to develop soldiers of all ranks and skill levels. Once the system is in place, there is no limit to the things you can accomplish. That will require greater cooperation and it will require us to leverage the capabilities of all components of the Total Army. It will require greater integration of all the components.

The U.S. Army Reserve is accomplishing much in that area. One example is the Total Army School System that is currently being developed and put in place. Our modernization program must also reflect the vision we have for the future. We have to invest more in distance learning—that is the way of the future. Civilian industry is adapting to that concept and that is the way the Army must go also. It not only allows you to do just-in-time training for the type missions you conduct like Bosnia and Somalia but also saves you resources and reduces your personnel situation tempo.

This is a great opportunity to construct the Total Army for the 21st century—the Army that the nation needs. While much is changed, much remains the same. The one constant in the world is our soldiers. They continue to perform magnificently whether it is in Bosnia or Camp Casey, Korea, or Camp McCoy, Wisconsin. They truly are our credentials, and I could not be more proud of what they do and how they do it on a daily basis. We must take care of them—that is, the essence of leadership and the responsibility of those of us in this room. We must treat them with dignity and respect regardless of race and gender. It is important that they feel like valued members of the team.

I want to comment on my good friend General Max Baratz and the great leadership he has provided to the U.S. Army Reserve while he has been the Chief of the U.S. Army Reserve. He is not only a close personal friend and somebody that I respect but also a man who has made the tough decisions. I will miss him after he leaves that important job.

These are exciting times for America's Army. It is important that we continue to contribute to the stability of the world. As you look at what has happened to some of the areas of the world, such as the economic crisis in Asia, instability still exists. We have to be prepared to provide stability to that unstable world. I think it is important that we continue to change the Army in order to remain relevant to our changing world.

The 21st century Army must be a full-spectrum force, reflecting the needs of the nation. The way to accomplish that is to focus on the readiness of the Total Army. I think it is now as good as it has ever been. I grant everyone that we are a smaller Army. I grant that we have a lot of different missions; it goes back to strategy. Our job is not simply to fight the "Big One." Our job is to help shape the environment for the 21st century. If we can do that right, then we may not have to fight the "Big One." However, we have to be prepared anyway. Given our current strategy, I am very satisfied with the readiness of the Total Army. Finally, this is all about taking care of soldiers so that they can take care of America. That is what we do in the United States Army and I think we do it damn well.

Thank you all very much for your kind attention. Thank you very much for your selfless service. Thank you all very much for the great leadership that you provide to America's Army.

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Letter to Army General Officers

January 30, 1998

"Just in Time Logistics"—It's Time!

Logistics is the lifeblood of armies, that is, an indisputable constant in military history. Our logistical operations and business practices are also the key to the future of America's Army. You have heard me say on many occasions that we will not have a revolution in military affairs, until we first have a revolution in military logistics and business affairs. This is not an overstatement. I truly believe that the Army will not and cannot be prepared for the future unless we complete an unprecedented transformation in how we supply and sustain the Total Army. Now, more than ever, we need the hands-on involved leadership of all senior commanders to create the logistical system the Army needs—just in time to face the challenges and opportunities of the next century.

We have a clear vision for 21st century global military logistics. It is a system based on efficiently distributing resources, rather than stockpiling supplies, providing the right support at the right time, in the right place—any place on Earth. It is a system designed to be rapidly tailored and to agilely support high-tempo dispersed operations—a system designed to anticipate, rather than react to requirements. It is a system predicated on effectively learning from and partnering with industry. And, most important, it is a system designed to unleash and exploit the potential of the best work force on the planet—not only the soldiers and civilian employees of America's Army but our industry partners as well. Empowering this vision is a great challenge, but I am confident we are equal to the task.

Revolutionizing logistical affairs and business practices is central to preparing for future military operations; it is the fulcrum of our effort to balance readiness and modernization. The Army has programmed approximately $10.5 billion in efficiencies over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). While we have assumed a degree of risk through the aggressive pursuit of efficiencies, we believe the risk is known, balanced, and manageable. But we mitigate our risks only if we aggressively follow through on our transformation of the Army's logistical and business practices.

Positive leadership is the best answer to any difficult challenge and transforming military logistics is no exception. As General "Shy" Meyer used to say, "We must manage change, not be managed by change." While I believe we are moving in the right direction, we need to keep the momentum going.

Senior leaders must set and enforce standards that will move us forward. We must:

- Develop a plan that requires deliverables in short 12- to 18-month increments.
- Prioritize what needs to be accomplished and then aggressively seek the funding. If we do not sufficiently fund the enablers, the revolution will not happen.
- Insist on streamlining financial transactions.
- Ensure we understand the nuances associated with changing from a supply-based logistics system to a transportation-based logistics system.

Senior leaders must seek out new ways of doing business. I expect you to:

- Exploit technology. Don't just automate the current process. Insist on creative solutions that best leverage technological advantages.
- Establish long-term partnerships and partner with companies that are the best in their class.
- Eliminate activities that don't add value. Use the velocity management process. Challenge the old way of doing things and don't be reluctant to test new procedures.

Senior leaders must prepare for logistical and business operations in an information age. It is essential that we:

- Develop decision support systems that can quickly analyze lots of data and expedite sound decisionmaking, both on the battlefield and at home station. Exploit total asset visibility.
- Create open architecture systems with the potential to grow and mature.
- Design operations, doctrine and systems for an army that will thrive on knowledge and speed. Lighten up the system and reduce demands.

We are on a direct path to the 21st century. We can not be afraid of change. In this movement to contact with the future, Army logistics must lead the way. The time for the revolution in military logistics and business affairs is here!

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E-mail to Army General Officers

February 17, 1998

Congressional Testimony

The acting secretary of the Army, Mike Walker, and I just concluded testimony in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee last week. I want to share with you my views on some of the major issues discussed during this session.

The secretary hit hard on the need for a Bosnia Supplemental and I said we needed assurance that we were going to get the money by the first of April. I explained to them that there was both a pre-June 1998 piece of this and also a post-June 1998 as well as an FY 99 piece. The post-June 1998 portion and the 1999 portion have not been included in any of the president's budget submits and the pre-June '98 piece that was in our budget was not sufficient to cover what actually took place. I told them that we would have a major readiness crisis in the fourth quarter if we do not receive the supplemental. If we did nothing in terms of adjusting our guidance, the training funds would run out by mid-July. I believe this is fully understood by Congress, and they are working hard to address these requirements as well as additional resources associated with DESERT THUNDER. We also indicated that there were many efficiencies associated with our program and to the extent we don't achieve these efficiencies, then the buying power will be decreased. I told them that we have a strategic management plan in place to track these efficiencies but that we needed their help in support for outsourcing and privatization as well as allowing us to become more efficient in our business operations.

I also had the opportunity to talk to them about the change that we had undergone and how we are continuing to change the Total Army to be relevant to the needs of the nation and the new world in the 21st century. I explained to them that it was not an easy process to take out over 620,000 people, close over 700 bases, change from a forward-deployed to a power projection Army, and fundamentally change your strategy 180 degrees from containment to engagement and enlargement. At the same time, I felt we had moved far down the path of our Force XXI process, and the two Advanced Warfighting Experiments we had conducted at Fort Hood [Texas] since I last testified in front of them had convinced me that we were on the right track. I went on to say that we expected to shift the focus of our Advanced Warfighting Experiments [AWE] to the light forces as well as conduct a joint AWE with the Marines in 1999, and have scheduled a joint AWE with the Air Force some time after the turn of the century. In sum, we were an extremely busy Army. Our soldiers are working very hard and performing magnificently.

I also told them that just like every budget the Army had ever submitted there was risk associated with our 1999 budget. Although we had kept near-term readiness the number one priority, the last two budgets clearly reflected our attempt to more evenly distribute that risk between current and future readiness. I pointed out that during the drawdown we had taken the primary risk in our modernization account in order to take care of people and keep the force trained and ready. That was the right decision and it had worked well for us. Now that we have reached a relatively stable state we needed to bump up the modernization account. If we do not do that, then we face a period of vulnerability in the 21st century because of block obsolescence and the failure to keep pace with technology changes. If we did not address that window of vulnerability now, then surely we would face once again the challenge that [General] George Marshall talked about during the buildup for World War II when he said: "When we had the time we had no money, and when we had the money we had no time." The lessons of history are very illuminating, but I also know the execution of this is very tough.

We spent a lot of time discussing readiness and why there appears to be such a dichotomy between the anecdotal evidence coming from the field and official reports coming out of the department. I explained that we used the USR [unit status report] system to compile our reports. This is a bottom-up system and I am convinced that the field is reporting accurately. The message for some time has been that we have very real personnel problems in terms of shortage of people and too much turbulence. I told them that fixes are in place and some of the anecdotal evidence we are starting to hear indicates that it is improving. We project continuing improvement as we continue to bring force structure and end strength more in line. There will always be some operating strength deviation, but I think we have taken the steps necessary to reduce the amount of personnel shortages. I believe that the long-term OPMS [Officer Professional Management System] should reduce our officer personnel turbulence and we are running a pilot program to experiment with keeping commanders and staff together for a longer period of time in order to see how much improvement we get from that situation. Although limited in scope, I believe that the analysis will be significant to truly enlighten us. I told them that the last USR had indicated that the major concern is shifting to funds. Many of the commanders hit that and I firmly believe that there is true hurt out in the field. I pointed out to the members of the committee that the budget we submitted in 1998 was extremely tight and that when we received it back from Congress with $273M worth of unspecified cuts we had no recourse but to take those cuts in the OMA [operations and maintenance account] area, and those cuts at least partially contributed to the challenge we are facing this year. As all of you probably know, we have conducted a thorough review of the MACOMs [major commands] and I think have a pretty good feel for the level of funding hurt and will soon come up with a course of action to address that concern for 1998. Finally, I pointed out that the pace of operations for our people was very high. The unit OPTEMPO [operational tempo] reports do not indicate how busy our individual soldiers really are. This varies by MOS and by theater. We will in 1999, as we stabilize the follow-on force in Bosnia, attempt to spread more evenly these missions across the entire Army. I think by doing that we can to some extent address individual PERSTEMPO [personnel tempo] challenges. In sum, I tried to paint the picture that we were adjusting to a new strategy of respond, prepare, and shape and that readiness levels come in bands. There is a band of days associated with each readiness level, and while we still operate in the band of excellence, there may be a movement toward the lower part of that band of excellence. In other words, if it took a unit 10 days to get ready to go in the past, it might take 14 or 15 now. The C rating may not have changed, but units may be a little lower on the sine curve.

We were asked for our views of the recent article on readiness that appeared in a national magazine and referenced NTC [National Training Center] performance. I told them that trying to compare specific unit performance at the NTC against any other benchmark is an apples-to-oranges comparison. While the tasks and standards remain the same, the conditions vary greatly. Our units are pitted against the best military trained force in the world, the OPFOR [opposing forces]. They are not only the best but the most experienced. They conduct ten rotations a year and fight literally hundreds of battles. My guess is that they have won over 90 percent of their battles over the years. CTC training is not as much about winning and losing as it is about learning. Quite frankly, we want this experience to be the toughest experience our soldiers will ever have to endure—"the more we sweat in training the less we bleed in war." I stressed to the members of the committee that we never attempt to compare one unit's performance against another. There are two reasons for that. First, as I mentioned before, the conditions are never the same and, more importantly, we must protect the integrity of the after-action review process. I firmly believe that our AARs [after-action reviews] are both unique and the true strength of our training process. The minute soldiers and leaders feel that they are going to be criticized for their mistakes we will change the learning and assessment process of the CTC [Combat Training Center] program to an evaluation process and we will destroy the goodness of what we are doing there. From some of

the comments I have heard, we obviously have people in the Army who do not understand this or who do not believe this philosophy. I take no credit for helping develop the CTC program, but I am firmly convinced that it is the right way to go and I ask your help in educating those who may not understand how important it really is for the United States Army. We must all understand that we have over time modified our CTC program. For example, in 1995 at the Senior Leaders Training Conference we made a decision to consider CTC rotations as part of the continuum of training and have approached them more as a come-as-you-are training event. It was necessary to do that for a lot of reasons, but primarily it was tied directly to the downsizing we had experienced and the pace of operations. We have also improved the sophistication of the CTC program over time—a much more demanding live fire exercise, a world-class MOUT [military operations in urban terrain] facility, and improved fidelity of feedback are just some of the examples that come to mind. We have also, particularly in the case of CMTC [Combat Maneuver Training Center], used the CTC programs to prepare our units for the new missions they've received. Their performance on these exercises is the only criteria I measure myself against.

Another issue that came up concerning the quality of standards is today's force. There are still some who claim that the Army has let quality slip. They generally base that claim on three indicators: the percentage of high school diploma graduates, the percentage CAT I–IIIA soldiers, and the percentage of CAT IV personnel we bring into the force. They point out that in 1996 we lowered our goal from 95 percent high school diploma graduates to 90 percent. While that in fact is true, the statistics do not support the contention that the quality of the force has slipped. When you compare our statistics today against those three same statistics in 1988 (the force that fought DESERT STORM), we find that we are slightly lower in one area and slightly higher in the other two. As I've said many times, quality is the bedrock of this force and we don't intend to let it slip and I don't think it has. There are an awful lot of people out there working extremely hard to ensure our quality stays high and they need to know how much we appreciate their efforts. I think it is also unfair to our great soldiers to keep reading about how quality has slipped when in fact statistics do not bear that out. I believe our soldiers are high quality and they perform magnificently around the world. Their quality speaks for itself but we have to help turn around that perception.

We also spent some time talking about change. I think it's recognized that our Force XXI change process is working very well and is the model for the Department of Defense. I'm sure at the appropriate time there will be a greater joint effort in this change process and that is good. I'm firmly convinced that the Advanced Warfighting Experiment process is the way to institutionalize change and we need to share our lessons learned with others as we move down that path. I'm sure we'll continue to play a leading role in this effort.

Finally, we mentioned that while much had changed, some things will never change. The United States Army is people. It is these people who do the nation's bidding and we must take care of them properly. America has entrusted us with their most sacred assets—their sons and daughters—and it is our job to ensure they are properly cared for. This means providing them the most realistic training possible and the best caring and concerned leadership we can possibly provide. It is also a shared responsibility with Congress. We must provide them adequate pay, proper medical care, acceptable housing, and stable benefits to include retirement. These are the four areas of quality of life that we think most important. We must ensure that these four areas are properly resourced before we move to anything else. Our soldiers deserve no less.

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Letter to Army General Officers

March 23, 1998

Engaging El Nino—Total Army Effort

Recently, I visited California and spent time with some very important and often unheralded

parts of our Total Army. In many ways what has happened to the Army presence in the western part of the United States is reflective of what is going on across the force. Men and women of the U.S. Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, and Active Army, and Department of the Army civilian employees are pulling together as a team, dealing with the challenge of change, conducting vitally important missions and ensuring the readiness of the total force. The Army's response to the recent natural disasters created by the El Nino weather pattern is a case in point. In engaging El Nino, we have taken up the front line of defense in domestic emergency response, demonstrating the very best of what America's Army has to offer.

My visit to California began with a return to the Presidio in San Francisco. There, three years ago, I participated in closing down the post as part of the Base Realignment and Closure Initiative (BRAC). Although the Army has completed turning over these facilities to the National Park Service, we still occupy some of the housing, continuing more than two centuries of unbroken military presence in the Bay Area. It was gratifying to see the progress made in the turnover, as well as our enduring connection to this place rich with Army heritage. The closing of the Presidio reminds us that the Army has, and must continue, to change to be relevant. At the same time, our longstanding ties to the community recall the importance of the Army's link to civilian society. As the Army goes about its mission, it is critical that our citizenry understand who we are and what we do.

One aspect of Army operations is understood well by Californians. On a scale of 1 to 5, the National Weather Service predicated that the adverse weather conditions generated by the recent El Nino weather pattern would be a "5+." Accordingly, Californians have been very concerned about flooding from the abnormally high seasonal rains. So far the state has avoided disaster, thanks in large part to the Army's effort. Responding to the threat of El Nino, floods required Total Army teamwork, with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers South Pacific Division spearheading our response. The division's area of responsibility covers a ten-state area. In California alone, the division manages 2,000 (of the 6,000) miles of levees and 29 major reservoirs (with flood control authority over 18 more). Responding to the wake of floods last winter, the division oversaw an unprecedented $120 million in repairs and restoration of the water control system. This work ensured that the regional system was in superb shape to deal with the torrential rains generated by El Nino. In addition to the levee repairs, the division established a model for interagency coordination, creating a framework that pools together the efforts of 12 major federal agencies. The division also organized an information-age emergency operations center that optimizes its ability to respond. To date, the engineers' efforts have spared the state an estimated $2.0 billion from flood damage last year and another $1.8 billion in damage already this year.

The California Army National Guard has joined the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the El Nino engagement, making the operation truly a Total Army effort. During peak periods, over 1,300 National Guardsmen have been mobilized to deal with the aftermath of El Nino, from repairing levees to rescuing civilians stranded by floodwaters. During one rescue operation, a Kiowa OH–58 pilot noticed that the levees that were leaking and in danger of giving way appeared different when viewed through the helicopter's forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR). The Guard then organized patrols with FLIR-mounted helicopters and HMMWVs to search out cracks and leaks, providing early warning of levees that were about to break open. This initiative has immeasurably improved the state's ability to anticipate and respond to flood dangers.

I finished my trip to California with a visit to 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Camp Roberts, California. Throughout the last few months the division has been heavily involved in responding to the crisis caused by El Nino. At the same time, the soldiers of the 40th Infantry Division have been assembling at Camp Roberts and at armories across the West to ensure their soldiers are trained and ready, preparing for operations wherever and whenever they are needed. The division has many resource challenges that make their training task a challenging one. Nevertheless,

their dedication and innovation are an outstanding example of the hard work and commitment of all our soldiers who work relentlessly to balance readiness and mission requirements.

The efforts of the 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers South Pacific Division in leading the El Nino engagement are another great illustration of why America needs America's Army. Not only does our nation need her Army to deter potential threats, defeat any enemy that may rise against us, and reassure our friends and allies, but she also needs us, as in the case of battling El Nino, to provide military support to civilian authorities. What our soldiers are doing every day in California—changing for the future, responding to the full spectrum of today's missions and readying for tomorrow's tasks—really says it all. America is well served by her Army. It's a story we should be proud to share.

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Letter to Army General Officers

March 23, 1998

Readiness

I recently returned from visits to the Armor Center [at Fort Knox, Kentucky], the Joint Readiness Training Center [at Fort Polk, Louisiana], and Camp Roberts, California. I witnessed some outstanding training and spoke with some dynamic junior leaders. We held several great discussions; I truly enjoyed the dialogue with those energetic warriors. I am excited about the future of the Army because so many of our junior leaders are concerned about the force they will inherit from today's senior leaders. As I share these concerns with you, I want to emphasize the importance of making sure our subordinates understand how we are tackling these tough issues.

They asked about readiness. There are units in the field that do not have all the soldiers they need to accomplish their missions. That is the result of drawing the Army down by about 630,000 soldiers and civilians in the last seven years. Balancing the requirement for soldiers against the number of soldiers you actually have is tough business during a drawdown. However, we are improving steadily in this area. There are already signs we are better filling our units as we align personnel authorizations and requirements.

Some junior leaders expressed concern about unit performance at our Combat Training Centers (CTCs). While units may not arrive at CTCs at quite the same high levels of training as during the Cold War, that is understandable. Basically, home station training has been a bill payer in terms of trying to balance PERSTEMPO [personnel tempo], quality of life, and tough realistic training. We are continuing to fine-tune that equation, but I assure you we do not want standards to slip and our CTC program is the crown jewel of the Army training program. CTCs are about training hard and learning. What really counts is how much units learn and improve during the course of a cycle. By that measure, units are still learning the vital skills that will make them winners on the battlefield. By that measure, learning is winning. The CTCs provide units with a focused, distraction-free, and realistic training environment unavailable at home station. Additionally, the CTCs provide a high-quality experienced cadre of observers, controllers, and opposing forces that also cannot be replicated at home station. The teaching, coaching, and mentoring they provide is one of the greatest benefits of the process. Even though many individuals are reassigned following Combat Training Center rotations, the high-intensity and stressful training produces experienced junior leaders who are better prepared to accept the challenges they will face in the future and who can carry this experience with them to other units in the force.

Army recruiting standards are another area of concern for some individuals. Today, we have the same quality force that we had in Operation DESERT STORM—which is not a bad standard of measure. We use three criteria to judge our recruiting performance. Those standards include the number of high school diploma graduates, the percentage of recruits who score highest in our aptitude tests (categories I through IIIA) and the percentage of recruits in the lowest category.

Comparing our recruiting performance in 1997 and 1998 against the performance of the Desert Storm force that we recruited in 1987 and 1988, you find that today our performance is slightly lower in one of those categories and slightly higher in the other two. The idea that we are letting quality slip is simply incorrect. We will always emphasize recruiting quality soldiers because high-quality soldiers ensure a high-quality force.

Some young leaders worry that frequent changes to modified table of organization and equipment documents adversely affect unit readiness, especially in Army National Guard and Army Reserve units. Reserve Component units only have a limited number of training opportunities during the year, and many units are now using this time to train individual soldiers on newly acquired military occupational specialties rather than to train collectively. Clearly stabilizing the MTOE [modified table of organization and equipment] process is one of the short-term measures we can institute to decrease turbulence and improve readiness.

I am convinced today's Army is trained and ready. I am equally optimistic about the course we have laid out for the future. However, we do not live in a risk-free environment. Our greatest challenge is balancing near-term and future readiness in an era of diminishing resources. During the drawdown, we mortgaged our modernization account and made some difficult decisions. Our focus now must be to begin preparing now for the 21st century. Tell your junior leaders to keep these factors in mind while reading articles and listening to discussions about the Army's state of readiness. In the end, we must gauge readiness against the strategy—can the Army shape, prepare, and respond? Yes. America's Army can provide the ground forces the nation requires to get the job done.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

April 7, 1998

Visit to Kuwait

I just came back from visiting the troops in Kuwait and want to share some thoughts with you. First, I was extremely impressed with what I saw. This has been a professional operation from the very start. I said goodbye to some of these soldiers when they started the deployment about 30 days ago. To see the progress they have made in the last 30 days was extremely gratifying. Second, this has been a team effort and it has come together very well. Third Army as ARCENT has had the lead, but they have received great support from AMC, OMC Kuwait, ISC, Forces Command, ARCENT-KUWAIT at Doha, and many others. Again, it's most gratifying to see how the Army pieces fit together and the teamwork that takes place when something like this happens.

It is also very evident that we have made tremendous progress in the last few years. We closed that force and were ready to fight in less than 96 hours and that is tangible proof of the progress we've made since Operation Desert Shield when it took us a matter of weeks to close the same force. This is a microcosm of the change that has occurred as we move from a forward-deployed Army to a power projection Army. Obviously, these sorts of time lines are possible today only because of pre-positioned stock. However, as I look to the future—and particularly, the Army After Next—I believe these time lines are going to be the norm. I think that it is realistic to believe that through a combination of pre-positioned stocks and strategic mobility enhancements that we will be able to close adequate forces anywhere in the world in less than 96 hours. I know you fully understand the deterrent effect of such capabilities, as well as the impact that will have upon regional stability throughout the world. Of course, the key is not only to improve strategic mobility but also to make sure that when we close the force we are capable of accomplishing the mission. That's what Army After Next is all about and what I saw in Kuwait strengthened my view that the

mark on the wall of 96-hour closure rates is about right.

Our procedures for handling the pre-positioned equipment continues to be refined with each exercise and we are very close to the point of institutionalizing these procedures. AMC has done a great job of ensuring that the equipment is kept in a combat-ready status, and a small but talented group of people at Doha (ARCENT-KUWAIT) have done a super job of simplifying the draw to the maximum extent possible while greatly improving the quality of life for all who live and deploy there. Everybody I talked to had a positive attitude about what needs to be done, and I am convinced with teamwork like this there is no limit to what we can accomplish.

The troops in the field were magnificent. They were literally living in the middle of the desert, where the population was probably less than 5 per square kilometer—and most of those were camels. Yet they have made the most out of these austere living conditions, and everywhere I went I was pleased to find that force protection was a matter of highest priority. I was also pleased to see that we were maximizing the time available by conducting tough realistic training. Another example of the team effort was the support by the Battle Command Training Program and the National Training Center that provided observers/controllers for both the CPX [command post exercise] and FTX [field training exercise] conducted in Kuwait. Their support also indicated our ability to export their tremendous capabilities wherever they are needed. There is no doubt this is a tremendous capability that is unique to the United States Army. That is another reason why we are the world's best. As I talked to soldiers, it was obvious that they were focused on the mission at hand. They were taking nothing for granted and you could tell from the look in their eyes that they were deadly serious about the job they had to do. I detected no hand wringing, and although I know the issue was much on their mind, no one asked me the question about when they were going home. I think they understood that the answer to that was when the mission is accomplished, and I hope they understand that we will not keep them there any longer than necessary.

This operation helped highlight for me what we were doing in the area of asymmetrical warfare. Clearly some of the most important elements in this operation are our Patriot units. I can assure you they are locked and loaded and on guard 24 hours a day. We have had that capability in Southwest Asia now for many years. Many of the soldiers have had repetitive tours in this area and yet I saw no signs of complacency. One can't help but be impressed with the difficulty of their task of destroying another bullet in mid-flight. However, I was also impressed with the tremendous improvements we've made since Operation DESERT STORM with this capability. The GEM missile gives us a several order of magnitude improvement over the capability we fielded in 1991. It's still a daunting task, but when you talk to the soldiers you can't help but feel that they are more than equal to that challenge. The Army Air Missile Defense Command deployed for the first time to an operational theater and it clearly is the wave of the future. Utilizing the newest in information-age technology, it provides us a command-and-control capability we've never had before—a multicomponent unit made up of active-duty soldiers from the Space and Strategic Missile Defense Command and Army National Guard soldiers from Florida. This truly leverages the great capabilities of our components and does it in a cost-effective manner. We need to do more things like this.

One of the things that makes this such a good operation is the strength of the coalition. The Kuwaiti government and their armed forces have been very supportive of our soldiers for obvious reasons. Quite frankly, I was impressed with all they do for our people who serve there and who deploy there. They understand there is no way you can put a price tag on freedom and, consequently, are very supportive of what we're doing. I was also impressed with the improvement of capabilities that I saw in the Kuwaiti armed forces. Although I did not visit any of their units, it was obvious from talking to others how much improvement they have made. This I think, in large part, is a tribute to the great work of those personnel assigned to OMC Kuwait. We have 45 people out of the 65 people that make up that organization, and they are obviously

doing a superb job. I know it takes a lot of patience in these types of jobs, but it is obvious that their efforts are making a tremendous difference. The Kuwaitis deployed early on during this crisis and have demonstrated their resolve throughout this period. Their improved equipment, to include M1A2 tanks and Bradleys, makes them a potentially formidable force. As we continue to work with them to develop combined command-and-control procedures and to refine tactics, techniques, and procedures, we will vastly improve deterrence and combined warfighting capabilities. This is a great example of what a full-spectrum force does in terms of reassuring and working with allies. Our OMC Kuwait group is a small but vital part of this critical capability. We owe a great debt of gratitude to this group of hard-working professionals.

There are a lot of reasons why this operation was successful. Some I mentioned in previous paragraphs, but one that is absolutely critical and never gets enough credit is leadership. Everywhere I went, from squad to Army level, I found the investment that we have made in leadership as an institution is paying huge dividends. One sometimes tends to take for granted leadership. Built upon the solid foundation of values and framed by the three pillars of institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development, that model works well whether you're recruiting soldiers, training them in basic training, or leading them in operations like DESERT THUNDER. I guess because I was so uniformly impressed with the leaders I met at all levels during this visit I was reminded not to take this for granted. As we continue to move toward the future, it's important we do nothing to weaken our leadership development program. We must continue to make the tough calls in determining those leaders who truly care about soldiers. We must identify them and move them into positions for which they are best suited. Our soldiers ask for no more and we can do no less.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

April 24, 1998

Mentoring

This Random Thoughts While Running will be relatively short but extremely important. My message is one that applies to the Total Army and one which I believe has a lot to do with our future. The subject is mentoring and I would not normally insult your intelligence with giving you some thoughts on "Leadership 101." However, I do so for two reasons. First, this is such a critical issue that it deserves your attention. Second, I continue to get too much feedback that in all cases this is not being implemented according to my intent. This is such a fundamental issue in terms of strategic leadership that I take this opportunity to ensure that nobody misunderstands my desires.

I firmly believe that mentorship is absolutely key to both the change process we are currently involved in and to developing the leaders for the future. When I talk about mentorship I'm not talking about some paper program but a real life leader development program. This is not about picking out someone you like and making them a member of your fan club. This is about one-on-one face-to-face counseling and preparing junior leaders for increased responsibility. This is what the operational assignment pillar of our leader development program is all about. It cannot be done without devoting adequate quality time to this particular task. As I tell every Pre-Command Course, identifying and developing the future leaders of America's Army are their most important functions. I go on to explain that during their tenure they will be faced with a constant tug of war between near-term readiness and leader development. Their best NCO will be scheduled for BNCOC [Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course] during the upcoming NTC [National Training Center] rotation, and if they don't schedule the time, the face-to-face counseling with junior leaders will never take place. I tell them that, faced with this tension, they must err on the side of leader development—let the NCO go to BNCOC and carve out time to talk with your

young leaders. This is a window of opportunity that we must leverage to build for the future.

The new OER [officer evaluation report] was designed to make counseling mandatory at certain levels and highly encouraged at all levels. I did not make it mandatory for all levels because I expected senior leaders to set the example without me telling you how to do that. However, I must admit I am concerned about some of the messages I'm getting from the field, in which people are saying the new OER is the same as the old and the counseling requirement is pro forma. Nothing could be further from the truth. I want you to use the support form as a mentoring tool. I don't expect this to be a one-time requirement nor do I expect you to simply initial off on this requirement. Spend some time discussing performance objectives with your subordinate leaders. Ensure that as part of their objectives they list "providing meaningful counseling for subordinates," and hold them to it. Make that prime time and insist upon no interruptions during those sessions. Do it as often as necessary to provide the leader development necessary for your subordinates. The greatest legacy we have is how well we've trained our subordinates. When it's all said and done and time to leave, that's our report card. You have to believe that with all your heart and then you've got to walk the walk so that everybody understands you're serious.

Besides one-on-one counseling, there are other mentoring sessions. Each of you who conduct quarterly training briefs should view those as a mentoring session for all your subordinate leaders. Like our after-action reviews we must encourage participation and the exchange of good ideas. Your role is to facilitate and eliminate those "good ideas" that are not so good as well as pass on your experience. There's a secret to all of this and it comes with practice. I had the opportunity to learn from a real master and those sessions with him are still ingrained in my mind. He never called it mentoring and I never adequately expressed my appreciation, but I think we both knew what was happening and I certainly have benefited enormously over time from these sessions. Look at all the conferences you have as a mentoring opportunity. Most people may not understand them as such—at least initially—but as I did, over time, they will grow to appreciate the time you invested in them.

Everybody thinks the United States Army broke the mold in terms of leader development. I certainly believe we have the best program going, but I also believe we must do our own AAR [after-action review] to ensure it's all it can be. I charge you to do just that. Really when you get down to the fundamental level, leadership is fairly simple and doesn't change based upon rank. Basically, it requires us to know the details of our profession, to truly care and focus on our soldiers, and to lead by example. That focus must be down, not up. Through mentoring we gain confidence in our ability to power down and give subordinates the ability to learn and develop. Mentoring is what differentiates power down from power off. Through mentoring we can program for success without micromanaging. If we don't do this, then the future will not be as bright as it should be.

The requirement for mentoring is not something new. I trace it all the way back to General John "Black Jack" Pershing when he told the allied leaders that the soldiers of the American Expeditionary Forces would not be committed as individual replacements. In so doing he placed the responsibility for leadership in both peace and war squarely on the backs of American commanders. Every commander and leader since then has shouldered that responsibility. How well they have done can generally be measured by the next generation of leaders and the performance of their soldiers. We should hold ourselves to the same standard. As I visit you in the future please discuss with me how you personally are handling mentoring, and during my discussions with junior leaders I will make it a point to see how well it is taking at that level. We owe this to our soldiers.

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Letter to Army General Officers

May 11, 1998

Army After Next Update—"The Insights Fueling Force XXI"

Recently, we completed a review of the Spring Army After Next (AAN) War Game. The results were impressive. AAN is producing the insights and judgments we need. The ideas are keeping the Force XXI process oriented on developing the right capabilities to meet the next century's national security challenges.

The AAN war games are a series of iterative exercises designed to help senior leaders envision the possibilities of global change, identify future U.S. interests and vulnerabilities, and determine the operational concepts and capabilities that would best serve the nation's needs in these future scenarios. The war games allow us to make a "mark on the wall," broadly defining the long-term Force XXI requirements that will orient our research and development, doctrinal, training, force mix and leadership programs.

The Spring AAN War Game examined how the United States would deal with a potential regional crisis in the year 2020. Significant insights from the exercise included:

There Are Potential Threats That Could Really Threaten

There are several disturbing trend lines that require close attention. Faced with superior U.S. conventional military power, potential foes are far more likely to seek out asymmetrical responses, avoiding our strengths and attacking our vulnerabilities. In particular, we must consider the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—chemical, biological and nuclear arms that can hold both military forces and civilian populations hostage. We must also anticipate that our military forces will face transnational threats whose power, influence and interests transcend borders. The pace of global urbanization is another issue of growing importance for military operations. In addition, we must give serious thought to how we will secure our vital space-based assets. Finally, we must consider that since in the future most of America's military power will come from America's shores, at the start of any conflict the front line may be our front door, as enemies attempt to disrupt the homeland before the U.S. can project its military power.

There Are No Silver Bullets

The war game reaffirmed our conviction that there is no single technology or operational capability that will meet all our future requirements. As the potential of future threats demonstrates, no thinking enemy, even one substantially overmatched in conventional military power, will allow an opponent to execute a plan unchecked. They will develop the countermeasures and asymmetrical responses that make folly of well-crafted campaigns. There is no substitute for a complementary mix of agile, flexible joint forces that can confront a foe with a complex array of formidable capabilities. The answer to future challenges will not be found in simple solutions but in determining how we can make the best use of all the aspects of national power and build effective multinational coalitions, combining them in creative and innovative ways and adapting them to the specific needs of each security challenge.

Strategic Agility Makes All Things Possible

During the war game no capability proved more crucial than the ability to intervene with the right force at the right time and place. For this reason, our emerging AAN operational concepts place a premium on knowledge and speed. The war game's results argue that we must take a holistic approach to enhancing strategic agility, moving Active- and Reserve-Component forces, logistical support and information with equal swiftness and assurance. In particular, we must close the gap between our heavy and light force capabilities. Improving global agility will require a prudent combination of a well thought-out strategic positioning balanced with technological and force mix enhancements.

Technology Will Make a Difference

The future force will require technology "enablers." Conducting military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), for example, necessitates

increased situational awareness, low-level unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), maneuverable precision munitions, vertical and complex terrain vehicles, and large area non-lethal weapons. In addition, all future operations will require a fully integrated full spectrum of space-based capabilities. We will also need technologies that revolutionize military logistics, improving strategic and operational mobility, reducing energy requirements, and lightening the force. Most important, we have to take a systemic approach to developments. Process and procedures are as important as technology.

The Army Is People

While technology is important, the war game reaffirmed the centrality of leadership and the human dimension. Enhanced forces require better leaders, leaders that can take full advantage of the adaptive, versatile capabilities we plan to embed in our future systems. More than ever we will have to focus on distributed, independent leadership and intuitive, creative thinking. In addition, armed with robust, all weather, day-night capabilities, human endurance will clearly become the limiting factor in operational tempo. We must look to innovative force structures that maximize the distinct attributes of all component forces, creating flexible formations rapidly tailorable to each mission. At the same time, we must never forget that we must master the fundamentals of our profession—those basic skills that have served the Army well for almost 223 years—if we are to maximize this tremendous potential.

In the future the AAN war games will continue to help us to refine our requirements. The importance of these games is growing. The joint community, our partners in industry and a spectrum of other government agencies have come to recognize them as a powerful tool for envisioning the possible. AAN is becoming the lynchpin of a broad strategic partnership, helping fuel the ideas that will secure America's place in a free and prosperous world well into the next century.

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Letter to Army General Officers

June 2, 1998

OPMS XXI Update

OPMS [Officer Professional Management System] XXI is a crucial element in transforming Army leadership for the challenges of the 21st century. First and foremost, it is designed to improve our capability to produce the world's preeminent warfighters. It will also give us officers deeply skilled and experienced in the full range of competencies necessary to execute the Army's Title X responsibilities. OPMS XXI goes hand-in-glove with the Force XXI spiral development process by training the leaders who will manage this change process and lead the Army After Next.

This past week marked two key events for OPMS XXI. The first was an initial report on the health of the new OER as it is being implemented. The second was the first officer development update (ODU) and my resultant decision to proceed to Phase II of implementation.

The New OER

Initial indications are that we are off to a strong start with the new OER [officer evaluation report]. We now have had over 10,000 OERs submitted under the new system. Our initial feedback indicates that most officers believe the system is good and will work. Perhaps most heartening is that we have had no misfires to date. Senior raters are largely operating within the guidance regarding maintaining credible profiles. On average—across the ranks—they are rating about 22 percent of their officers as above center of mass and most of the remainder as center of mass. I recognize that transitioning to a system where most officers receive center of mass ratings (less than top block) concerns both raters and the rated greatly. However, the old OER had the majority of officers in the center-of-mass (top block) and left little opportunity for those closest to the rated officer to really influence leader development. The new OER corrects this deficiency. I am confident that over time selection boards will dispel these fears by routinely select-

ing officers who have multiple COM ratings for promotion, resident schooling and command. This will produce a healthy system that works well for us as it matures.

Preliminary observations about the new OER form itself indicate we need to reinforce how some of the sections should be used and what they should address. One important section that we need to ensure we get right is the rater's "unique skills" block (Part Vc), which is intended to identify and encourage unique skills and special expertise, not to recommend future duty positions. PERSCOM [Personnel Command] is providing regular feedback to the field on this and other important OER issues, and you can find the latest insights and tips regarding the OER posted on "PERSCOM on Line."

All of us must keep in mind that we have designed this OER to be an integral part of OPMS XXI, and with this comes additional counseling responsibilities. I cannot emphasize enough to you how important consistent high-quality counseling is to the success of the new OER system. How you describe an officer's performance, potential, unique skills, and future assignments will all play an important role in how the rated officer and selection boards make career field decisions. In this regard, the new OER is designed to drive more and better communication between you and the officers you rate or senior rate, and the requirement starting in October to recommend career fields for rated officers should only serve to encourage more frequent and natural counseling. You know my thoughts on this, but only you, however, will really be able to tell whether that counseling is happening to the extent it should.

The Officer Development Update

Our inaugural officer development update gives me great confidence that we are moving in the right direction. Before we begin the actual transition to the new system, we have to accomplish three major preliminary tasks: (1) recoding officer authorizations to align with OPMS XXI, (2) revising DA Pamphlet 600–3 and doing other necessary preliminary proponent work, and (3) educating the officer corps on OPMS XXI. This ODU was designed to report on our progress on these three tasks as well as lay out a series of ongoing officer development action plans [ODAPs] that the Army will work iteratively over time and assess semiannually in future ODUs. Our progress in these three areas has been considerable, convincing me to go to Phase II and begin transitioning officer year groups into the new system. I am also convinced that ODAPs give us a workable "living" system to monitor and adjust OPMS XXI as it evolves.

Our efforts in recoding officer authorizations have been ongoing since last July and are on track. This process required a review of the entire officer personnel structure by grade and skill, aligning the right skills under OPMS XXI with existing positions. By recording the entire force, we should be able to afford officers more branch qualification time as majors and relieve considerably our shortages in Signal Corps, Military Intelligence, and Logistics skills. In addition, recoding will allow a broader range of officers more opportunities for joint assignments. Because keeping officer authorizations in proper balance will be critical to the success of OPMS XXI, recoding will, by necessity, be a living process requiring regular review and adjustment.

The new DA Pamphlet 600–3 has progressed rapidly and is on schedule for publication this coming October. I commend all the proponents for their full support and hard work in bringing this product so far in such a short time. This manual not only tells officers what they must do, like its predecessor, but also instructs them on who they must be. Providing a framework for officer development and career decisions, it promises to be a great tool for mentoring. Chapter 1, in particular, outlines the leader's responsibilities as a mentor, and I will be providing it to future PCC [Pre-Command Course] classes for their review and comment. Competency is the underpinning of our profession. As I mentioned in a recent Random Thoughts While Running, mentorship is one of the most important ways we can build it. DA Pamphlet 600–3 is designed to help us greatly in that regard. I urge you to use it for that purpose.

The OPMS XXI Task Force has been educating the officer corps steadily over the last 10 months, visiting over 60 installations worldwide

and distributing a wide variety of products. All officers should have received "The Officer's Guide to OPMS XXI," and all units down to brigade level should have access to the OPMS XXI Chain teaching kits. I also commend the OPMS XXI Web Page to all officers. It is packed with information and has points of contact for those who want to know more. We will continue to update it as required. Finally, we will begin distributing the formal OPMS XXI report to PCC in the very near future.

Officer development action plans are the tools that will allow us to continue refining OPMS XXI. All are works in progress and are designed to adjust as requirements dictate. They will be our tools for ensuring that OPMS XXI stays healthy and in balance over time. There are over 80 of these ODAPs grouped under nine general headings, and all are progressing well. Most recently we have incorporated the transition of the Reserve Components into an ODAP, and I have been enormously impressed by how rapidly the Reserve Components have come on board. A truly seamless force begins with a seamless officer corps and a common culture. OPMS XXI is on the mark in this respect and is one more of the many mechanisms we are putting in place to facilitate complete AC/RC integration. As with the many other ODAPs, I will continue to monitor it closely in future ODUs.

OPMS XXI is a critical element of the change process, and its importance continues to grow as it evolves. Learn this new system and keep your officers informed. We are entering the transition phase, so we must ensure the officers who will grow up in this new system can make informed decisions about their future. It would be difficult to find any time in our history when counseling and mentorship are more important than they are now.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

July 6, 1998

Mission Rehearsal Exercise for the 1st Cavalry Division in Preparation for Their Bosnia Operation

Last week I visited Fort Polk to observe the Mission Rehearsal Exercise for the 1st Cavalry Division in preparation for their Bosnia operation. This is an extremely important mission and our soldiers must be properly prepared before we send them. As usual, when the Army gets a mission like this we gravitate toward our real strength—tough realistic training. Everybody knows that's the way it always has been and hopefully always will be. It has never failed us, at least in my lifetime. However, this exercise was extraordinary and I want to share a few thoughts with you concerning it.

First, this represents a major change in mission for JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center] and Fort Polk. I had visited them about 10 days earlier as they were finishing up the 41st Infantry Brigade rotation. To be able to rearrange the whole post—that is, adjust from training for conventional operations to peace support operations in such a short period of time—is a major accomplishment. They had established a number of base camps which replicated those in Bosnia, brought in over 300 role players, and shifted from free-play to a master incident list-driven exercise. They had literally turned the post 180 degrees in a short period of time and best I could tell had done it flawlessly. This is truly remarkable, particularly when you understand they are facing a major A76 competition and are in the process of reorganizing. We are indeed fortunate to have such dedicated professionals supporting our soldiers. I know of no one else that could have done it as well as the Army did, and JRTC demonstrated once again why our Combat Training Center Program is truly a national asset.

While the soldiers of the 1st Cav are truly on point and the focus of our training, this is a Total Army effort and visibly demonstrates the importance of teamwork. The United States Army Reserve PSYOP [psychological operations] sol-

diers were training with the brigade, a large hunk of the III Corps staff was participating along with division staff elements. General Eric K. Shinseki, the NATO commander in Sarajevo, stopped by to observe training and conduct an officer personnel development class. Leaders from the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment who had just returned days before from Bosnia came out to check training and provide fresh lessons learned. Role players adjusted to their new role easily and very realistically. Observer controllers were doing their usual superb job of providing feedback to player units. The sum total of all of this made the exercise an extraordinary training opportunity. It's one we should all be extremely proud of.

There are lots of keys to success, but I believe first of all we must understand that this is small unit operations. As such, our junior leaders and soldiers carry an enormous load. They must understand the rules of engagement and these rules must almost be second nature with them. They will be called upon to make split-second, critical life and death decisions under stress. They must realize that tactical actions can become strategic in importance within minutes. That's why so much emphasis is placed on discipline and professionalism. These have been the trademarks of our operation so far and, even though we rotate soldiers on a regular basis, there must never be any change in these two critical areas. The leaders and soldiers I talked to understood this and were focused on ensuring no degradation in either discipline or professionalism.

Operations like this really put the spotlight on the importance of information operations. Obviously, understanding what the different factions are doing and identifying potential trends are extremely important in this type of operation. We also face the formidable task of trying to shape events for the use of information operations. We are currently developing this whole field because we believe it's important for the future. It's also one of the primary reasons we have made information operations a separate functional area in OPMS [Officer Professional Management System] XXI. I believe it will continue to increase in importance as we move into the 21st century. While I don't think there are any silver bullets in terms of how to use information operations, I also don't think it's something we need necessarily to fear. In my mind, if we look at information operations in terms of a defensive and offensive phase, then I think it breaks down into manageable chunks. The defensive phase simply is protecting critical information from potential adversaries. We need to think of it in terms of force protection. I believe we have the tools to handle that and it's just a matter of focus. At the tactical level, the offensive phase is very similar to psychological operations. Here is where we let potential adversaries know what we want them to know about us. I firmly believe that one of the reasons Bosnia has gone so well so far has been because people understand our capabilities. We are the "biggest dog on the block" and nobody wants to mess with us, and that's the way it must continue to be. Our doctrine on psychological operations is sound and we have over time developed tactics, techniques, and procedures. Our basic tools will stand us, in good stead. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield, primary intelligence requirements, situational templates, commander's intent, etc., transcend the full spectrum of operations. But the fundamentals for each does not change. We're having to think about things a little differently but we're not having to start from scratch.

With our diversity in terms of race and gender, one of the things we bring to Bosnia is a role model on how things could and should be. We have been able to leverage that diversity into the finest military organization of the day. Hopefully that lesson will not be lost on the Bosniacs. They ultimately will have to make their diversity work for them. However, diversity in itself is not the total answer. What unlocks the great strength in diversity is values-based leadership. Without values-based leadership and consideration of others, no organization and entity are able to achieve their full-potential. That's a soft sell task for us because you can't just preach it; you must demonstrate it. That clearly is one of our most important tasks and that's why the actions of soldiers and leaders of all ranks are so important. Through their example they are truly shaping the environment of the future.

Finally, let me return to where I started and talk about teamwork. To get the 1st Cav ready to

go will require us to cross-level over 500 personnel. Part of the reason is because we are tailoring the force to meet specific requirements. The other part of the reason is we had to replace nondeployables. Our critics will say that this is an indication that hollowness is creeping back into the force. They don't understand the situation. We chose not to implement stop loss or to prevent people who were scheduled for schools to go to those schools. Had we done so we would have reduced dramatically the replacement requirements. However, this situation does illustrate two things which I want to again reemphasize. First, we must at all levels continue to reduce nondeployables to the very minimum. With our smaller Army each soldier is critical and we must count on their contributions to the team. Second, as the diversity of our missions continues to increase, it is important that we become even more adaptable. To be more adaptable we must expand the base, and that leads you to the teaming concept which we are in the process of implementing. By pairing AC and National Guard divisions I think we broaden the base, build on the teamwork inherent in the teaming concept, and increase our adaptability to these missions. This is an important concept and one we must grow to be all it can be. If the teaming concept was mature, it would have greatly facilitated this mission. However, there is no doubt that the teamwork I saw at Fort Polk will ensure success. Those soldiers were pumped up and they'll make it happen.

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One Team—One Fight—One Future

United States Army Chief of Staff White Paper

June 18, 1998

For the Common Defense

Providing for America's national security is a formidable task. It always will be. It stands as the nation's greatest continuous challenge—and it demands the nation's finest effort. America's Army has always been built on meeting this challenge—of giving "nothing but our best." *One Team, One Fight, One Future* is about embedding that spirit of excellence into the 21st century Army—it is about developing programs for the continuing integration of the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Active Army. It envisions a process that creates Total Army integration, moving the Army from three components to one seamless 21st century force designed to meet the challenges of supporting America's National Military Strategy.

One Team, One Fight, One Future includes:

- *A clear sense of the challenges ahead* describes how the Army is preparing for the future, building on our values and traditions, the National Military Strategy, and a clear vision which recognizes that *our Reserve Components are our strongest link to the American people.*
- *A unified approach to tough decisions* is a frank and honest discussion of the challenges we face in effectively integrating the Total Army, including "right-sizing" force structure and the burden of excess infrastructure, as well as the importance of Total Army leadership and teamwork in addressing these issues.
- *The four principles—our approach to integration* reaffirms that *the Army must change to prepare for the future* and lays out what we are doing to enhance Total Army integration, including adapting the force to meet the new missions and challenges of the National Military Strategy.
- *The next steps—new ideas* suggests the next step in Total Army integration through the creation of multicomponent units and teaming concepts ideally suited to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
- *A seamless, integrated force* provides our vision for the future of Total Army integration, based on a resolution that readiness is nonnegotiable and that maintaining a quality force that can execute the National Military Strategy in peace and war remains the bedrock of the Total Army idea.

The *One Team, One Fight, One Future* concept recognizes that the relationships among the Army's three components have at times been strained, reflecting differing views on how best to

balance current readiness and future modernization requirements. There are no easy answers. To move forward requires an honest appraisal of requirements and capabilities measured against our National Military Strategy, along with determining what must be done to enhance the integration process. Our approach has been shaped by frank and honest discussions with leaders in government, the military leadership from the other services and throughout the Army, and in open dialogue with private American citizens who share a deep concern for our national defense. These discussions have helped us develop a clearer vision and a realistic appreciation of the opportunities, as well as the obstacles and challenges, facing effective integration.

Integration of the Army components is, at its heart, about achieving the bedrock of the Total Army idea—a quality force. Total Army integration is not about how Reserve Component units can supplement or replace Active units. It is a process of combining the three components to create the force our nation needs; it is all about quality—ensuring we have the best mix of forces available to get the job done. What follows is our assessment of the state of the integration programs that will ensure quality Total Army contributions to our national security today, tomorrow, and into the next century.

One Team, One Fight, One Future represents the Army's concept for developing Total Army integration programs. More than just a slogan, these words reflect three ideas that are the core of our effort to provide the most effective and efficient landpower for the 21st century.

- The Army components must be supported, resourced, and modernized as one fully and completely integrated team.
- This team must function and fight together as a Total Army, with each component sharing in the duties and responsibilities of the nation's defense.
- Most importantly, the team must draw on the knowledge, expertise, and wisdom of senior leaders from across the force to make the right decisions to prepare the Army to meet America's future national security needs.

These are the thoughts that stand behind our commitment to *One Team, One Fight, One Future.*

A Clear Sense of the Challenges Ahead

The Army must change to be prepared for the full spectrum of security tasks in the next century. We have already begun this transformation, studying our history, thoughtfully considering the future to gain a clear sense of the challenges ahead, and then adapting to manage change effectively.

Proud Traditions

History reminds us of two important traditions tying this great nation together, bonds that give us both the strength and the irrepressible confidence to face the future.

The first and oldest Army tradition is our citizen-soldier heritage. The idea of the citizen-soldier is the heart of republican democracy. This tradition recognizes that citizenship carries both rights and responsibilities. Foremost among our responsibilities is each citizen's obligation to serve the common good and, when necessary, to take up arms in the common defense. The opportunity and honor to serve this great country are an essential part of what binds us together as one people. A clear but bitter lesson of the Vietnam War is that when America fights with anything less than a Total Army effort, we diminish ourselves. Committing the Total Army is an unmistakable statement of our nation's purpose, a bold declaration to any foe that they are facing the resolve of all Americans. Learning this lesson well after the Vietnam War, Army Chief of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams restructured the force, ensuring that in future conflicts America's Army would fight the first battle together. This fundamental concept remains at the core of the Army's traditions.

The second tradition that defines us is the nature of our profession. We are a profession of arms, a profession, as General MacArthur once said, predicated on "the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory. That if you lose, the nation will be destroyed." Our profession is unique. As a young leader recently stated, being a soldier is "more than just holding a job and going home for dinner." We are a profession committed to unlimited and unrestrained service to the nation, wherever and whenever America needs America's Army.

Our shared traditions are the heritage of America's Army. Our vision must recognize that preserving the dual traditions throughout the three components is the key to maintaining the essential fabric of the Total Army. The Army's mission is too great to be achieved by any one component. It takes the combined effort and sacrifice of the Army team, individually and collectively, to perform such extraordinary service.

A Promising Future

Achieving Total Army integration requires an appreciation for the challenges of the future as well as a respect for the lessons of the past.

A New Strategy—Shape, Respond, Prepare

Considering a force for the future starts with the National Military Strategy. Our current strategy, based on the three pillars *shape*, *respond*, and *prepare*, is a remarkable statement of American intent. It establishes three equally important tasks for America's total force. Responding is the capability to answer a crisis, wherever and whenever it arises. The capability to respond, however, is not enough. We would rather deal with problems before they become acute, and diminish threats before they become dangers to our national interests. So our strategy also includes being able to shape the international environment, creating the conditions that will make the world safer for our children and grandchildren. Finally, the strategy requires us, while maintaining current readiness, to prepare now for the challenges we will face in the 21st century by modernizing our force, ensuring that we have an overwhelming advantage in the next battle and the Total Army leaders necessary to leverage the unbeatable combination of quality soldiers and modern technology.

Our approach to Total Army integration must be consistent with our National Military Strategy and the strategic requirements for landpower. In this respect, we must thoroughly understand and appreciate the unique contributions of each Army component. Each force has distinct attributes that best suit the specific needs of *shape*, *respond*, and *prepare*. Active forces are ideally suited for forward presence, global rapid response, and frequent or prolonged deployments. The Army Reserve, through its primary emphasis on support units, and the Army National Guard, through its primary emphasis on combat units, provide critical enablers that complete the Army's capability to perform the full spectrum of potential missions. In addition, the Army National Guard will always spearhead the homeland defense mission and military support to civilian authorities. Finally, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard add resilience to the force, providing the Army with the means to rapidly expand and tailor its capabilities to match the strategic demand for land forces. In short, while every component has a role to play in each of the three pillars, specific requirements must be based on the needs of our National Military Strategy and the most efficient and productive use of the unique aspects of all of our forces.

Visionary Ideas—From a Joint Vision to Total Army Integration

National Military Strategy serves as the cornerstone for our thoughts about the future. Based on the strategy, the Joint Staff, the Army, and the Army components have each developed long-term visions. Linked and compatible, these visions reaffirm the importance of Total Army contributions.

Joint Vision 2010 provides a conceptual template for matching future-oriented joint operational concepts with emerging enabling technologies. The objective is full-spectrum dominance, an unprecedented warfighting ability to overmatch any potential threat in any environment. *Joint Vision 2010* focuses each service on taking full advantage of future capabilities. This joint vision does not, however, embrace "silver bullet solutions," the promise that a single technology or innovation can solve all the nation's diverse and complex national security requirements. Capabilities to support all the joint operational concepts must be developed to provide the mutually supporting and complementary forces needed for the future. *Joint Vision 2010* reminds us that we must deal with the world as it is, not as we want it to be. Though technology may allow us to radically restructure our forces and strategy in the long term, the services must control the pace of change and transformation, providing a balance of capabilities, managing risk, and matching the

delivery of enhanced capabilities with the maturing of technology.

Army Vision 2010 describes the Army's contribution to the operational concepts in *Joint Vision 2010*. The Army vision guides the transformation of the Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve. *Army Vision 2010* gives us a single unifying vision, reaffirming that the Army's senior civilian and uniformed leadership and the Army Staff have the authority and responsibility for ensuring that the Total Army is prepared to train, mobilize, deploy, and sustain operations to meet our nation's needs today and tomorrow. *Army Vision 2010* also serves as a pledge by the senior Army leadership to maintain a momentum of modernization that will carry all components effectively through the decades ahead.

Army National Guard Vision 2010 and the United States Army Reserve white paper *America's Army Reserve: Building for the 21st Century* also make important contributions to our vision of the future force. Rightfully, both reject the notion that modern war is too complex for Reserve-Component forces. In the 21st century, more than ever, the Reserve Components will be effective, relevant, and responsive to the needs of national security. The United States Army Reserve and Army National Guard, in fact, comprise 54 percent of America's Army, by far the largest percentage in any of the services. The Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve provide important complementary capabilities for the total force. The Army National Guard supports both federal and state missions and provides vital assistance to local communities. In addition to their warfighting missions, they man the front lines for homeland defense and domestic emergency response. The United States Army Reserve contributes critical support units, power projection and training enablers and individual soldiers to support the Total Army. Together, the Reserve Components provide essential capabilities for every aspect of Army operations. The Army could not function without them nor expand to meet the nation's often changing global responsibilities. These forces are also our strongest link to the American people, and this link is, without question, our greatest strength. The Reserve Components are the visible presence of America's Army in our nation's communities. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve expand the opportunities for every citizen to serve the nation and expand our nation's power, making America equal to any challenge wherever and whenever it might appear.

A Unified Approach to Tough Decisions

Vision alone, however, is not enough to ensure the effective integration of the Total Army—change requires action. We began turning vision into reality with our Force XXI process, creating battle labs, conducting Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), and institutionalizing a change process for the 21st century. The Force XXI process has become a model for the Department of Defense, a recognition that the Army as an organization has developed a powerful, disciplined, and forward-looking method to reshape the force. We know where we need to go, and in our Force XXI process we have a concrete plan to get us there.

All the difficult decisions, however, are not behind us. Even today, more than nine years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, it is hard to grasp how significantly our decisions to change the Army have reshaped the force. We have reduced the Army by over 630,000 people, from the Active Component, the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, and our civilian component. We have closed over 700 bases worldwide. The changes of the last nine years would be enough to overwhelm any organization, but they are only the precursor. Tough choices remain in order to deal with our competing but mutually supportive priorities of ensuring short-term readiness and modernizing the force to prepare for the challenges ahead. We fully acknowledge that there are crucial, difficult core issues that we have yet to resolve fully. The key issues facing the Army today span four critical areas: force structure, the institutional Army, infrastructure, and force modernization.

Force Structure

Force structure, in particular, remains a difficult challenge. The Army is in the process of completing force structure reductions while opera-

tional and personnel tempos increase. This increased tempo has affected all the Army's components and placed great demands on the force as a whole. We considered this issue very carefully during the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). A primary objective of the QDR was to determine the right size of the military force for executing the National Military Strategy. A common misconception of the QDR was that it was based solely on a two-war strategy. Many erroneously believe that the size of our force is predicated solely on the armed forces' ability to simultaneously fight in two major theaters of war. Though a two-war capability does have a deterrent value, more accurately, the two major theaters of operations concept should be seen as a sizing mechanism, a strategic management tool, rather than a strategy in itself. During the QDR, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, combatant commands and the services conducted a series of war games called DYNAMIC COMMITMENT. While the war games employed the two-theater scenario, they also included a comprehensive look at the other requirements for shaping, responding and preparing. The exercise employed all of our Army forces, including our strategic reserve, the Army National Guard divisions, validating their warfighting and operational utility. In other words, DYNAMIC COMMITMENT recognized that the services need robust and versatile forces to hedge against the uncertainties of the future. Recent events have confirmed that the results of DYNAMIC COMMITMENT were on target. We are a force in demand. Today, there are more than sufficient missions to justify the size of the Total Army.

The Institutional Army

We must also be concerned about the institutional Army, the portion of the force responsible for recruiting, training and sustaining our operational units. The institutional Army supports all three components.

A quality Army requires, above all else, a trained and ready force. Meeting this responsibility starts with recruiting high-quality soldiers. The Army continues to enjoy success in attracting and retaining high-quality recruits, but attracting young people to serve, in the numbers we need, with unemployment figures at their lowest point in a decade, is becoming increasingly difficult. To accomplish the essential task of recruiting a high-quality force, we must continue to ensure adequately resourced recruiting programs.

The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) provides a large part of the institutional Army's contribution to training the force. All soldiers, regardless of component, receive initial entry training at TRADOC installations. TRADOC's branch schools, the Sergeants Major Academy, and the Command and General Staff College educate noncommissioned officer and officer leaders from across the Army. In our effort to preserve essential operational capabilities, we have found indications that we have downsized too many of the key elements in this command and must correct this shortfall.

The Army Materiel Command (AMC) provides essential sustainment support for all the Army components, as well the other armed services, while completing a major reorganization that has reduced its military and civilian work force by one-half. Currently, the Army is undergoing a revolution in military logistics, transforming our sustainment process to meet the fast-paced diverse requirements of 21st century operations. Maintaining a responsive and efficient sustainment base is also critical to the Army.

In short, to ensure the trained and ready force we need, the health of the institutional Army is central to the future success of Army integration programs.

Infrastructure

At the same time, despite reductions, we also recognize the continued presence of excess infrastructure that is supporting a smaller, leaner, and more efficient post–Cold War force. The cost of maintaining this excess capacity can only be sustained at the expense of readiness and quality of life for all our soldiers and their families. We must make the best and most efficient use of our resources.

Modernization

As part of its Force XXI process, the Army has conducted a series of Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs) that have demonstrated the

importance of information technologies for future operational capabilities. The Army is working to embed these capabilities throughout the force. The result will be Army XXI, a force designed to leverage the potential of information-age warfare. At the same time, the Army is developing the requirements for the Army After Next (AAN), the next-generation force designed to perform the security tasks we expect beyond the year 2025. Maintaining an effective integrated force will rely on sufficient resources to apply these modernization initiatives to each component at a pace that preserves our capability across the full spectrum of national security needs.

Resolving the issues regarding force structure, the institutional Army, infrastructure, and modernization is a prerequisite for embarking on a visionary approach to Total Army integration. These challenges require tough decisions and thoughtful action. Making and implementing difficult choices require us to take a unified approach to decisionmaking. The Army leadership must impartially present requirements for all Army components to the Department of Defense and Congress. The Army Staff is actively and systematically consulting with leaders from across the force to fully incorporate all views. In addition, we are working to eliminate statutory and bureaucratic processes that tend to inhibit, rather than promote, effective integration.

The Army has one overwhelming advantage in facing the tough decisions ahead. We know that in peace and war we must always depend on each other. The Army is at heart a community, a community of Active, National Guard, and Reserve soldiers, civilian employees, and their families. Communities thrive when people care about one another, work for the common good, and trust one another. Today's Army is seeded with this spirit and is committed to resolving our shortfalls and building on our strengths. We can be optimistic about the future. Our commitment to one another is the key to remaining the best Army in the world.

The Four Principles—Our Approach to Integration

In a recent letter to the services, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen recognized the importance of integrating all component forces. In his letter, Secretary Cohen outlined four principles to guide future integration efforts.

The Four Principles for Total Force Integration

- Clearly understood responsibility for ownership of the total force by the senior leaders throughout the total force.
- Clear and mutual understanding of the mission for each unit—Active, Guard, and Reserve—in service and joint/combined operations during peace and war.
- Leadership by senior commanders—Active, Guard, and Reserve—to ensure the readiness of the total force.
- Commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions.

We believe that the four principles offer an effective framework for developing *One Team, One Fight, One Future* programs. This process begins with making an honest assessment of where we are and what we might do in the future to further enhance our efforts. Assessing the current state and prospects for Total Army integration is an important and instructive step to move the Army further down our path to the future.

Responsibility

We recognize that responsibility for the Total Army can only be taken through energetic leadership and effective communications. The Army has moved aggressively to improve communications. The Army Chief of Staff has had several small-group meetings of state adjutants general, ensuring close coordination between the National Guard and the Army's most senior leadership. In addition, the secretary of the Army has established an Army forum on integration of the Reserve and Active Components to embed Total Army leadership involvement in integration issues. The secretary has also placed renewed emphasis on our Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee, composed of Active, Guard, and Reserve general officers. At the same time, the Vice Chief of Staff has reenergized the Reserve Component Coordination Council to address tough policy and resourcing issues. Together, these efforts have immeasurably

improved communications among the Army's three components.

The Army also has a long history of promoting the integration of component leadership within the Army Staff and major commands, and we will continue these initiatives. These steps are predicated on the belief that for leaders to take ownership of the Total Army, they must routinely work together, know one another, and understand the unique qualities and contributions of each component. For years, the Army has integrated senior Reserve Component leaders into its major commands and the Army Staff. The 3d Medical Command is just one example. Although composed primarily of Army Reserve soldiers, the command's deputy commander, chief of staff and 26 staff officers are from the Active Component. The U.S. Army I Corps is another example of a fully integrated command structure.

In the future, we will continue to expand the integration of Reserve- and Active-Component leaders at all levels. We are considering innovative ways to increase integration opportunities throughout the careers of our officers and noncommissioned officers. Recently, we began a pilot program that places Active-Component officers in key Reserve-Component command and staff billets. In 1996, for example, as a proof of principle, an Active-Component lieutenant colonel assumed command of a National Guard artillery battalion. In the years ahead we plan to conduct more command exchange programs, including having Reserve-Component officers command Active units. In addition, the creation of multicomponent units will significantly enhance the professional development opportunities for all Army officers and noncommissioned officers. We look to these kinds of initiatives to guide our future efforts, and we must pursue them more aggressively. Shared experience, leader and staff exchange programs, the opportunity to serve and work together, and common understanding are key to building senior leaders who share in the responsibility for the Total Army.

Relevant Missions

This principle recognizes the importance of establishing clear, mutually understood missions for each unit. We believe "missioning" all units is essential because it establishes the purpose and relevancy of the force.

There is no question of the Total Army's relevancy to the National Military Strategy. The Army needs all its forces to help meet its worldwide commitments for shaping the conditions that will enhance America's global interests and for responding to the threats that endanger our peace and security. In addition to our forward-deployed forces, the Army has been committed in 28 of the 32 major post–Cold War deployments, providing over 60 percent of the personnel in these operations. In 1997, the Army averaged over 58,000 soldiers deployed daily away from their homes and families, spread across 70 countries around the world. Stability operations in Bosnia are a prime example of Total Army operations. In 1997, on average, one-quarter of the force in Bosnia was provided by the Reserve Components. Not only is the Army busier than ever, but its ability to project power is also greater today than at any time in our nation's history. During DESERT STORM, for example, it took over 30 days to deploy the first heavy combat brigade to the theater. Today, we can deploy a heavy armored brigade in 96 hours. As the nation's strategic deployment and logistics support capabilities mature in the near term, our ability to deploy and sustain Active and Reserve forces will be further enhanced, thus making our forces even more versatile in conducting the global tasks of shaping and responding.

The nation's increased reliance on the Army in recent years is a reflection of the success of our transformation from a Cold War force to an Army relevant to the missions of the modern era. The task remains, however, to complete this transformation throughout the Total Army. We will convert 12 Army National Guard brigades to provide needed combat support and service support requirements identified as essential to the National Military Strategy. We are also creating new and more capable integrated units, such as the 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC); 93d Signal Brigade Headquarters; Army Service Component Command-South; and 304th Materiel Management Center. In addition, we are exploring innovative organizational concepts, such as the associate truck company, where

we design our operations to equip Army Reserve units with stay-back equipment from Active units as they deploy and fall in on pre-positioned equipment overseas.

To enhance the utility of the Reserve Components further, we will also look for opportunities to create "dual-mission capable" units that not only have the potential to perform traditional combat missions but also meet a range of requirements. In this area, we are looking at a number of innovative concepts. These initiatives range from forming composite units that could augment or replace other forces to identifying new missions that the Reserve Components could assume within their existing force structure. One of the most important areas for potential additional missions for the Reserve Components is homeland defense. These missions could include responsibilities for national missile defense, protection of key assets, and response to domestic emergencies that include threats from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

The Army senior leadership is working closely with the Army Reserve and National Guard leadership to explore fully these new requirements and initiatives. We must ensure that every unit has appropriate, relevant assigned missions to guide its training, modernization requirements, and operational preparations. Our objective remains getting the greatest utility out of every component while adding predictability and stability to the force. Rapid and unplanned force structure changes are unnecessarily expensive, place additional stresses on the force, diminish readiness, and complicate not only resourcing decisions but also long-term professional development of officers and soldiers. Where possible, we must make informed decisions that minimize turmoil while providing the most effective and responsive force possible. As units are converted to take on new missions, we must also provide adequate resources to train soldiers efficiently in their new operational specialties. We must also ensure requirements for all units, including the Army's National Guard divisions, are accurately reflected in our war plans and operational requirements. Getting all the tasks associated with the "missioning" process right is crucial. It is key to providing the trained and ready mission-oriented force needed to support the National Military Strategy.

Readiness

This principle recognizes that all our efforts are meaningless if we cannot ensure the readiness of the Total Army. This commitment to readiness must include training, maintaining, and modernizing the Total Force.

In the last few years, the Army, with congressional support, has made significant progress in creating an integrated approach to readiness. The 1993 Defense Authorization Act created the program commonly referred to as Title XI to enhance readiness within the Reserve Components. Under this program, the Army assigns officers and noncommissioned officers to support the Army National Guard enhanced separate brigades and other high-priority units. These Active Army soldiers are assigned to regional training brigades to assist in the planning, preparation, and execution of training and mobilization. Key officers and noncommissioned officers are trained at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and observer-controller (OC) academies and, through their experience and expertise, they bring the best of their training and operational techniques to soldiers throughout the force.

In 1995, the Army began implementation of the Total Army School System (TASS). TASS created an integrated system of Active- and Reserve-Component schools that teach the same tasks to the same standards for all soldiers, adapting instruction to meet the unique training environment of each component. An important part of TASS is the pioneering efforts of the Army National Guard in developing distance learning using state-of-the-art information technologies to deliver training on demand to both Reserve- and Active-Component forces around the world. Other important aspects of TASS are the United States Army Reserve Divisions (Institutional) and Divisions (Exercise), which provide training and training support for all components, including initial entry training, soldier skills qualification, and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC).

In 1997, the Army began Support to Organizational Training (SOT), a phased implementation plan that significantly improves our

capability to provide training support to the Reserve Components and reorganizes the training support structure for the Continental United States armies (CONUSAs). By October 1999, we will have created one single integrated support structure. Once completed, this integrated structure will leverage the training assets resident in all our components and provide unity of effort to our training program.

New training initiatives continue to be developed. One readiness initiative of major importance proposed by the state adjutants general is the development of the integrated division. Over the next year, the Army will create two integrated divisions, each with three Army National Guard enhanced separate brigades under a headquarters commanded by an active-duty major general. This effort will culminate two and a half years of hard work and outstanding cooperation. We are moving to establish these two integrated divisions in October 1999, with the division headquarters having a well-defined training and readiness oversight responsibility for the enhanced separate brigades. As we gain experience and more fully define the potential of the organization, we will look for the future opportunity to field a deployable integrated division.

The Reserve Associate Support Program is another important initiative that provides enhanced training for Army Reserve soldiers. After individual entry training, soldiers serve in an Active Army combat support or combat service support unit for extended periods. These soldiers then return to their Army Reserve unit experienced and fully trained. The Army is now implementing a pilot program to test concept feasibility.

Another promising program is the National Maintenance Training Center at Camp Dodge, Iowa, which trains Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve maintenance companies. Direct or general support maintenance units that complete training at Camp Dodge subsequently participate in training during an Active- or Reserve-Component deployment to the National Training Center (NTC). This program provides an exceptional opportunity for training critical combat service support skills and enhances the readiness of Active and Reserve units.

To enhance Total Army readiness further, we have expanded the use of the Army's world-class combat training centers for the Reserve Components. All unit rotations to the National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) include Active and Reserve units and soldiers. In 1997, NTC and JRTC trained almost 23,000 Reserve-Component soldiers. One training rotation per year is set aside for an Army National Guard enhanced separate brigade at both the JRTC and NTC. The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), which trains both Active Army and Army National Guard divisions, already devotes 60 percent of its effort to the Reserve Components. In addition, we are supplementing Combat Training Center (CTC) experience with exportable CTC training packages that will allow us to project CTC standards and techniques to assess and support live "lane" field training.

All these individual efforts are important, but we still lack an overarching comprehensive approach to Total Army readiness. We must start by improving our understanding of standard measures of readiness across all the components. We must have a level playing field—one clear, consistent standard for the Army. Army readiness must also be continually tested and validated. Finally, we must thoroughly assess our training and mobilization capabilities, ensuring that they realistically meet the needs of the Total Force. As a first step, we are developing an Operational Readiness Unit Status Report that will derive comprehensive, consistent, and verifiable operational readiness ratings for all Army units. As we develop this system, we must continue to ensure that warfighting commanders have accountability for all the component forces assigned to them.

Resources

All Total Army integration programs must culminate with a commitment to resource forces adequately to accomplish their assigned missions.

Although in recent years we have revised and integrated our internal resourcing processes and priorities to reflect the increased reliance that the Army has placed on the National Guard and Army Reserve, the Army does not have sufficient resources to address all the needs of the

Total Army. Since 1989, the Army budget has declined in buying power by 37 percent. This reduction in resources has affected all the components, limiting our ability to leverage all their unique strengths. The Army has, where possible, targeted prudent investments in the Reserve Components. Over the last six years, for example, the Army has invested an unprecedented $21 billion in new or refurbished equipment to modernize Reserve-Component forces. These investments demonstrate the Army's commitment to fund the force so that we get the most out of what we have. Any additional resources we receive in the future will be used to improve the readiness of all components.

In the future, more can and will be done to ensure the efficient and appropriate distribution of resources. Reserve and National Guard participation is critical in the Total Army Analysis (TAA) force structuring process, programming, and budgeting. Increased participation alone, however, is not enough. Even the most efficient use of resources cannot compensate for a lack of resources. There is still much to do—and very limited dollars to do it with. Defense spending accounts for 3.0 percent of GDP and is declining—the lowest level since Pearl Harbor—while the armed forces are as busy as ever. In the face of these fiscal constraints, we must make the best use of our resources and continue to maintain the right balance between current and future readiness.

The Next Steps—New Ideas

In addition to our current and planned *One Team, One Fight, One Future* programs, we also must look to new ideas that will make the next giant step toward realizing the seamless integrated force of the future. We believe that many of these ideas will be found in our Force XXI process as we think through the possibilities for redesigning the Army's force structure to meet the challenges of the next century. Through the Force XXI process, we will look at new multicomponent units and teaming concepts that will provide flexible, agile forces which can be rapidly tailored to meet a wide range of operational requirements and leverage the inherent strengths in all the components.

We have already begun creating these new organizations, integrating over 400 Reserve-Component spaces across two-thirds of the units in the recently completed redesign of the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. This digitized and modernized division represents the spearhead of America's land combat power for Army XXI and a "way point" toward the Army After Next. In addition, by integrating Reserve-Component soldiers into an Active division structure, the design will serve as the basis for developing future integration initiatives.

We plan to further strengthen the Army's ability to respond through divisional-teaming, a pilot program that will pair selected Active and National Guard combat divisions across the entire spectrum of Army operations. Under the divisional-teaming concept, partnered divisions will conduct joint planning, training, and readiness assessments. When called upon to support operational requirements, the divisions will team their resources for rapid response. The Active division will take the lead in global crisis response. The Army National Guard will augment and assist its partnered command, speeding deployment of the Active division and then conducting its own follow-on post-mobilization preparations. In domestic emergencies or homeland defense, the Active division will be prepared to supplement and reinforce the Army National Guard division's lead. Through the divisional-teaming partnership, both units will benefit, and the Army's capability to respond across the full spectrum of military operations will be greatly enhanced.

As we look to additional integration initiatives, we need to explore programs that allow us to round out or supplement Active forces with small platoon and company-size National Guard and Army Reserve units, enhancing our means to rapidly tailor or reconstitute forces to meet specific operational needs. This fast-track deployment process would offer a dual advantage. First, it would facilitate the quick-reaction response our forces need to meet the dynamic requirements of the post–Cold War world. Second, integration at the lowest levels would provide our young leaders more exposure to the capabilities of the entire Army. As these officers and noncommissioned

officers become more senior, they will carry with them the trust and confidence in each other that they have gained through years of common training and operational experience.

With this concept in mind, we are, for example, exploring the feasibility of a pilot program for integrating an Army National Guard company into selected infantry battalions in our Active light infantry divisions. The initial test would include three companies each in two of our light infantry divisions. The Army National Guard company commander and his soldiers would be seamlessly integrated into the Active unit through a structured program that ensures common equipment, training, and readiness standards. These integrated light infantry battalions could set the pattern for future Army organizational designs. By constructing units with building block capabilities, we will not only enhance integration but will also continue to develop adaptive forces that are optimally suited to performing the myriad complex security tasks the Army will undertake in the 21st century.

As the Force XXI process works toward building the Army After Next (AAN), the redesigned Army for 2025 and beyond, we must embed multicomponent units into all our organizations. One of the most important lessons we have learned from our Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs) is that we are building systems that far outstrip the limits of human endurance. Machines can run twenty-four hours a day—people cannot. We must look at building future organizations that allow us to maximize the human potential of the force. To do that, we must consider force structures that incorporate multiple crews and staffs, enhancing our ability to perform continuous operations. Another potential "plug-in" capability is earmarking commands and staffs as "bridging forces" for working with our friends and allies around the world. These soldiers would serve as important links to facilitate combined and multinational operations and integrate high- and low-tech forces. Such concepts would make the future force structure more robust, agile, and efficient, and would enable commanders to build just the right capability to match the requirements of each mission.

These ideas are a recognition that the Army must continue to change. In Force XXI, we have a disciplined process to flesh out these new concepts and synchronize them with the Army's other ongoing efforts. As we move forward, teaming concepts and multicomponent initiatives will become an integral part of our disciplined and deliberate path ahead.

A Seamless Integrated Force

The Army's current and planned programs will serve as our bridge to the future, a future that moves Total Army integration from coordinating three components to building one seamless 21st century force, a common culture based on common training, doctrine, experience, and shared knowledge. This future force might include:

- A single education, training, readiness, and deployment system for the Total Army.
- Personnel management systems that allow leaders and soldiers to serve in multiple components during a career of service as a matter of course.
- Fully integrated command and control and digital systems that allow for thorough and complete integration of all component forces.
- Organizations that maximize the capabilities and unique strengths of each component.

The seamless integrated Army of the future will not only be bound together by its structures and systems but will also be forged with the Army's enduring commitment to teamwork, discipline, values, and absolute trust.

Finally, our vision of the future force reaffirms that readiness is nonnegotiable. Our bottom line is that maintaining a quality force that can execute the National Military Strategy in peace and war remains the bedrock of the Total Army idea. To that end, Total Army integration must be a centerpiece in our Force XXI process and we must approach the challenge with Total Army teamwork, including addressing the core issues identified by the Reserve-Component leaders. We'll start by ensuring the Total Army leadership participates fully in our Army After Next (AAN) war games that are helping to define our future requirements and in the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process that is shaping our force structure for the years ahead. These key activities and the

programs and initiatives discussed in *One Team, One Fight, One Future* are the critical tasks of Total Army integration.

A Commitment to the Future

One Team, One Fight, One Future is a commitment to nothing less than a complete transformation of the Total Army. The One Team concept is a commitment to develop Total Army integration programs that:

- Reaffirm the protection of America's vital interests as our number one priority;
- Respect the heritage and traditions of the Total Army—because they are the links in the chain that anchor America to America's Army;
- Sustain an enduring commitment to mission, train, support, and care for every soldier in America's Army; and
- Ensure maximum input from senior leaders from the Total Army so that we make informed decisions and judiciously use our resources.

We are committed to these initiatives because they chart the right course for building the right force for the 21st century, providing America "nothing but the best"—*America's Army!*

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1998–1999
The Final Year

1998–1999: The Final Year

Wherever we go. Whatever we do. We must never forget it is all about the American soldier. . . . They suffered at Valley Forge. They were the "first wavers" at Omaha Beach. They walked point in Ia Drang. They crushed the Iraqi Army. They separated warring factions in Bosnia. When it is all over for me . . . this is what I will always remember.

Dennis J. Reimer, General, United States Army

Letter to Army General Officers

September 29, 1998

Personnel Readiness

Readiness has been the focus of considerable interest over the past few weeks, and I want to share with you the focus and thrust of the ongoing dialogue in Washington. First, let me say that I know there is great uncertainty in the force. As we finish reshaping the force, more and more often, soldiers are asking, "When will it end?" The concerns they have expressed provide anecdotal evidence of declining readiness within their units.

In our recent meeting with President Clinton, the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs, and the CINCs discussed the readiness of America's forces at length, and the President affirmed that readiness must remain our number one priority. In my remarks, I spoke about three areas—people, time and resources—as the keys to guarding against declining readiness in the Total Army.

I am absolutely convinced that maintaining quality soldiers is the most important factor in achieving current and future readiness. Earlier this week, the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on military readiness. We unanimously told the committee that the need to fix the current retirement system and shrink the civilian-military pay gap are the two most pressing issues for our forces. The message to Congress on closing the pay gap is important to our recruiting effort, and changing the retirement program is critical to improving retention.

Trend lines are going down in both recruiting and retention, and I want to inform you of what I see happening in these programs. To put it in perspective, the overall quality of today's Army remains high—we continue to exceed DoD [Department of Defense] quality standards, more than 90 percent of our enlisted soldiers are high school degree graduates, and roughly 27 percent of recruits have some college education. Having said that, we must realize the challenges we face in maintaining that quality.

We assessed the quality and quantity of Active-Component soldiers for our FY 98 mission, but to do so we had to reach into the Delayed Entry Program we were building for FY 99. We also had some shortfalls in our Reserve-Component recruiting mission. All indications are that FY 99 will continue to be challenging for our recruiters across the Total Army. A numerical decline in the prime recruiting market of 17–21 year olds, competition with both the civilian sector and the other services, a civil-military pay gap, and the high pace of Army operations will continue to make the recruiting mission a very difficult one.

One of our sergeants on recruiting duty in Ohio described the challenge this way: "The attitudes, values, and beliefs of today's youth are changing. A recruiter is constantly trying to bridge the generation gap by selling yesteryear ideas at yesteryear's wages. Today's starting wages and benefits at fast food restaurants are competitive to starting wages in the armed forces. We are asking today's youth to leave home, deploy at a moment's notice and give his life for his country for the same pay as a fry cook."

As part of the FY 99 budget, our soldiers will receive a 3.6 percent pay raise, and we have agreement that the pay raise over the following two years will be at or above 4-percent per year. This will help reverse the pay gap that is currently estimated to be between 8–14 percent. In the current budget, we have taken additional steps to assist the recruiting effort.

We added 600 recruiters, increased enlistment bonuses in critical MOS, and raised the Army College Fund. We've also plussed up the advertising budget. In the next few weeks, you'll see the new advertising campaign targeted at our prime market. The commercials are contemporary, upbeat, and fast-paced. The message is that the Army is a learning organization and that learning is the key to success and personal and professional growth. Potential recruits, and their parents, will see the valuable experience the Army provides. They will see cutting-edge technology; however, the ads clearly convey that the Army is, and always will be, about people. We've kept "be all you can be," but with the recognition that the phrase means something different to our younger generation.

Retention will continue to be another critical program for the Army. Retention rates for both officers and enlisted soldiers were strong up to the very end of this fiscal year. I attribute this in large part to the concerted efforts of our leaders and retention NCOs in the field. Faced with market realities, they have had to emphasize the more intangible benefits of Army service—values, personal growth, job satisfaction, and recognition for doing very demanding jobs very professionally. This took greater involvement by leaders at all levels to understand and influence the decision process our soldiers and families use in choosing to stay in the Army. We must continue to work our retention programs hard and reduce attrition of our first-term soldiers.

Our soldiers are smart, hard working—and tired. They also face some very tough choices between their own desires and their families' needs in the areas of pay, benefits, spouse employment, medical and dental care, housing, quality of life, and retirement. In my talks with soldiers, I am finding more and more concern about retirement benefits—concern that if they commit to a career of service to the nation, when they retire, their pay and medical benefits will be inadequate. The greatest concern is with the current REDUX package that applies to soldiers coming in since 1986. They will approach retirement age soon and are realizing the erosion of benefits their retirement plan represents as compared to soldiers who entered service just a month before them. Soldiers covered by the REDUX program can expect a 25 percent smaller retirement package than previous retirement systems. We have to fix that; that was our message to Congress.

In addition to working our recruiting and retention programs very hard, we are making progress in aligning force structure authorizations (spaces) with our available inventory (faces). The change in NCO structure (CINCOS) and officer restructuring initiative (ORI) processes are very painful for us, but they are absolutely necessary for building our future forces and correcting perceptions of personnel unreadiness that arose from having too much structure and not enough personnel to fill the billets.

We will continue to press for quality of life issues—increased pay, a return to the pre-1986 retirement program, improved housing, and better medical benefits. We must take a holistic view toward Active- and Reserve-Component recruiting, training, and retention and avoid optimizing one component without realizing the impacts on the others. We must also provide commanders consistent, adequate base operations funds to ensure quality-of-life programs for our soldiers and families. Let me reemphasize that my concerns encompass the Total Army. Any additional resources we realize in the years ahead must be applied to all the components so that all commanders can conduct appropriate realistic training and take care of soldiers and families.

As a final thought, sometimes we lose good soldiers simply because we fail to tell them that we appreciate them and value their service. I would ask leaders throughout the chain to emphasize to our soldiers that they are invaluable members of the team and they make a critical difference to their units and the Army. Let them know we share their concerns, we are working very hard, and we are seeing progress in our efforts to improve quality of life for soldiers and families. We need to keep good soldiers in the Army.

★★★★

"The Army Is People"

Army

October 1998

The Army is people. In Bosnia, at the 405th Combat Support Hospital, a U.S. Army Reserve unit from West Hartford, Conn., the chief ward master receives word of five injured Norwegian peacekeepers. The 405th is the closest hospital, and they are bringing the soldiers in. The master sergeant knows every second counts. He has only a few minutes to assemble the right team to respond to the emergency. The effort pays off. Four of the five recover and are released. The fifth requires even more serious medical attention, 38 hours of intensive care and evacuation to a hospital in Oslo, Norway. Months later, his mother comes to Bosnia to visit the 405th and thank the master sergeant and his crew for their extraordinary efforts, for giving her son a chance.

Soldiers make a difference.

In California, a young soldier from the 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), U.S. Army National Guard, drives his car to a weekend drill. Conducting pre-execution checks on a dusty landing pad at the camp, he stands among a cluster of citizen-soldiers. They are some of the most experienced and competent soldiers he has ever seen—proud professionals. He is glad he came. He knows it will be a weekend of tough, realistic training.

No one gives more than an Army soldier.

On the desert floor at the National Training Center, a division operations officer from the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) briefs the Secretary of Defense on the progress of an Advanced Warfighting Experiment. Flanked by a bank of computers, he explains the changes made possible by the brigade's new information systems. In the past, he spent 70 percent of his time collecting information and 30 percent planning what to do with it. Now he spends 30 percent of his time getting information and 70 percent thinking about how to use it and advising his commander. This is the kind of dramatic result that changing the Army can bring.

These three moments from a year in the life of America's Army say a tremendous amount about who we are and what we do. They are moments that demonstrate the incredible commitment and professionalism of the force. They reflect the challenges facing our soldiers, military families and the Army's civilian workforce. They also illustrate the unprecedented opportunities that we have to shape the force for the future. During another period of tumultuous change more than 20 years ago, the courageous and visionary Gen. Creighton W. Abrams Jr. said, "The Army is not made up of people. The Army is people." Today more than ever, the Army relies on people.

Taking care of people is also more important than ever. We serve in demanding and unforgiving times:

- The Army's operational tempo has increased 300 percent since the end of the Cold War. The requirements for U.S. landpower in peacetime are without precedent. America's Army is busier than ever.
- The Army faces tremendous resource challenges. While the pace of operations remains high, spending on defense accounts for less than 3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, the lowest level since Pearl Harbor. We have to make the most efficient use of resources that we can, balancing current and future readiness requirements while taking care of the force and maintaining an adequate quality of life.
- We must continue to change. The Army has experienced monumental changes since the

end of the Cold War, but they are only precursors to the changes ahead. America's national security needs are evolving to match the demands of a rapidly changing world. Despite the taxing demands and challenges of Army life and the lure of a healthy civilian economy during the last quarter-century, the Army has consistently been able to recruit and retain a high-quality force. Our ranks are filled with dedicated, talented, selfless men and women.

Today's realities demand much from the leadership of America's Army. It is our responsibility to see the Army through these historic times. We have to respond to the world as it is, not as we want it to be. It comes down to a simple, fundamental challenge: knowing what to change and what not to change.

Not long ago I took part in a staff ride of the Civil War battlefield at Gettysburg. I have been there many times, but each time I learn something new. On this last visit I learned about Springfields and Henrys. During the Civil War, Union and Confederate soldiers used the muzzle-loading Springfield rifle. A soldier had to be able to fire three rounds a minute, which was about the best you could expect from the rifle. In 1863, the year of the battle at Gettysburg, both sides could have been armed with Henry repeating rifles that had a 15-round magazine. If either side had used these rifles, the volume of fire across the killing zone would have increased dramatically and probably would have changed the outcome of the battle, perhaps that of the war.

The issue then was whether to invest in new technology or to hold on to what was proven and true. The U.S. Army elected to stay with the proven weapon. After the war, the Army continued to wrestle with this decision, but in the end chose to stay with the single-shot rifle. Although they improved the rifle a bit, adopting the metallic cartridge, rapid firing caused ammunition extraction problems. Each soldier was issued a small knife with which to extract the overheated casing, but essentially it was the same old single-shot weapon. A decade later, soldiers in blue fought the Sioux and Northern Cheyenne at Little Big Horn. After the battle, the field was littered with malfunctioning weapons and those little knives. While the Army had stuck with the single-shot Springfield, the Indians chose more advanced, commercial, off-the-shelf technology. They acquired repeating rifles, and the rest is history.

The Springfields and Henrys of the 1860s and 1870s are a cautionary reminder of the importance of knowing when and what to change, and the terrible cost our people must bear when we make poor choices. The decisions we face today are no less meaningful. We must move the Army from the force that won the Cold War to the Army that will secure America's place in a free and prosperous world in the next century.

As we prepare for change, it is important to understand what cannot change, what is most important to Army people—our values. Loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage are our legacy. This is why you have seen a renewed focus on values across the Army. We talk about the seven inherent values of the U.S. Army everywhere—in our officer efficiency reports, our doctrine, our training programs. Values are the bedrock of the institution, the foundation on which we build. We can never compromise on Army values.

We also have to hold on to the traditions that make our Army great. In particular, we have to keep up our commitment to the tradition of being a Total Army, drawing equally on the strengths of our Active, Army Reserve and Army National Guard forces. Most of the Army, 54 percent, is in the reserve components. When we do anything with less than a Total Army effort, we diminish ourselves. The Army leadership addressed the importance of holding on to the fundamentals of the Total Army idea in the white paper "One Team, One Fight, One Future." The paper emphasizes that:

- Readiness is nonnegotiable. The U.S. Army exists to win the nation's wars. This is a simple statement, but it is absolutely true. Whatever we do in the future, we can never forget it.
- Standards are important. As long as we commit ourselves to setting and maintaining the right standards, we are going to continue to ensure the Total Army is a quality force.
- Assigning every unit an appropriate mission is essential because it establishes the purpose and relevancy of the force. Missions give units a

focus for their training and operational planning. All Army units must be clearly aligned with war plans and other operational requirements.

◆ We must build trust and confidence across the force. It is important, as we work our way through the challenges, to be able to communicate with each other and build the trust and confidence that has to be there if we truly want to carry the Total Army concept forward.

These fundamentals have been the touchstone for our efforts during the last year and the azimuth for the path we will take to the future.

Building on values and traditions also depends on having a disciplined, deliberate change process that will prepare the people of America's Army for the challenges of the next century. Our process is called Force XXI. It has served us well and will continue to guide us in the years to come.

Force XXI begins with the Army After Next (AAN) war games. The war games look at the future and determine how the world may look in 2020 by analyzing all the trends that we see around the world today: increasing urbanization, growing environmental concerns, population expansion and others. The war games allow us to project ourselves onto a mountaintop in 2020, look at the world and determine the role and requirements for landpower.

The AAN war games provide a clear and confident vision for what kinds of capabilities we will need, pulling us toward the 21st century. While we cannot yet define all the systems of the AAN or a precise time line for implementation, the war games have focused us on some key conceptual ideas.

One important characteristic of the Army After Next is that it must be more strategically, operationally and tactically mobile. We have to be able to move the future force anywhere in the world, fast. During Operation Desert Shield, it took more than two weeks to move a heavy brigade to Saudi Arabia. This year, using pre-positioned equipment, we moved a brigade from Fort Stewart, Ga., to Kuwait in less than 96 hours. The "mark on the wall" for the AAN is to be able to move a brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours or less, with or without pre-positioned equipment. We can make this happen. We must. As the AAN war games have shown us, one soldier at the right time is worth five soldiers later on. Winning in the future will be about getting there "firstest with the mostest."

The Army After Next must have the right force when it goes in. We still will need heavy forces, light forces and special operation forces, but we will need to fine-tune this mix within the overall context of the future Total Army. In structuring forces, we will have to look beyond the wiring diagrams that show how units are organized and think about rapid force tailoring concepts that will allow us to shape capabilities to match the mission.

In particular, the future Army must also be more expansible. The limiting factor for the AAN will be human endurance. Computers can run 24 hours a day; people cannot. We need to think about how we can expand capabilities to match operational requirements. For example, you might have a certain capability embedded in your active component forces that can run 12 hours a day. If you want to go to 24-hour-a-day operations, you would call up a reserve component group to augment the active force. This is the kind of expansibility that we must develop.

Enhancing logistics will also be an important part of the Army After Next. There will never be a revolution in military affairs until there is a revolution in military logistics. This means putting our faith in concepts like velocity management and total asset visibility, giving up the comfort of stockpiling supplies on an iron mountain. We have to depend on systems that will deliver the right support, at the right place, at the right time. We have to build the systems that will give us the confidence and responsiveness we need. A revolution in military logistics will be a vital step to the Army After Next.

Army After Next forces must also be more agile in terms of responding to the range of unconventional threats we may face. How do we address asymmetrical threats? What do we do about military operations in urban terrain? How do we respond to the possibility of terrorists in the United States or transnational threats? What do we do about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? The ability to counter these types of dangers must be part of the Army After Next as well.

Most important, to man this future force we must continue to focus on the people factor, having high-quality soldiers and leaders, because we are going to ask them to do some tough things. They will have to operate in many different environments, performing diverse and challenging missions. In particular, we need to have leaders who are able to handle successfully the uncertainty of change. All of us are uncomfortable with uncertainty. We like to have things lined up—this is the way we were taught, but it is not the kind of world we will find in the future. Whatever we do, we must ensure we have the programs that recruit, train and educate quality people because people are what makes the U.S. Army work, and they are the key enabler for making the Army After Next a reality.

Using the Army After Next war games, we are defining the characteristics and requirements for the future force. While the war games are pulling us forward, the Advanced Warfighting Experiments are pushing the envelope, showing us what we can do with current technology. These experiments have been worthwhile and have given us the results we wanted. The most visible result has been the heavy division redesign completed this year. The heavy division redesign exploits the potential of information systems; anticipates the revolution in military logistics with new organizational structures and support concepts; provides smaller and yet more lethal and deployable forces, offering more flexibility and more boots on the ground to respond to the range of military operations; and, most important, introduces multi-component units and staffs, better exploiting the full potential of the Total Army.

The design, a prototype for the heavy force we will see in the Army After Next, recognizes the power people bring to the organization. The changes empower our soldiers, providing the command and support systems that will unleash their initiative, skill and tactical judgment. On the whole, the division redesign represents a great, evolutionary first step. It is the right move in building toward the Army After Next.

The "push" of the Advanced Warfighting Experiments and the "pull" of the Army After Next war games feed what we call the spiral development approach of the Force XXI process. Spiral development means keeping the Army's six imperatives synchronized over time as we move from 1998 to 2025 and beyond, making sure doctrinal developments match new equipment, personnel, training, force design and leader development initiatives.

For example, while we continue to pursue new systems and organizational designs, we are already developing the leadership for these future units through major changes in the officer personnel management system. We also have initiated a new officer efficiency report, and we will probably change our other evaluation reports as well, structuring them so they help cultivate the versatile leaders we need for the next century.

To keep leader development and the Army imperatives woven together as we move toward the Army After Next, we use the Army's strategic management plan (SMP), which guides our efforts by ensuring resources are matched to the changes we want to make. The plan looks to the long term, focusing support for the research and development base so that we can bring forward the technologies we want, ensuring that when we need them in the 2010 to 2025 time frame, they will be there. In addition, we use the SMP to track efficiencies, making sure we get the most from every dollar. This is an important part of ensuring current readiness and at the same time funding the force for the future.

Changing the Army is a complex task, akin to trying to solve a Rubik's Cube, balancing six different variables at the same time and making it all come out right. I can assure you that in the Department of Defense and the halls of Congress, they understand the complexity of our challenge and respect the Army for what it has accomplished. They understand the Force XXI process, and they support it. They know we are not trying to figure out how to fight the last war better. What we are doing is remaining trained and ready today while moving quickly to the future, and we are handling this challenge well.

The tasks the people of America's Army face are not easy. This year I had the opportunity to address the graduating cadets from Norwich University and the U.S. Military Academy—the youngest and newest people of America's Army.

What I told them holds true for all of us. We will face our share of adversity in the years ahead. We have to accept this. Life is not just a smooth road; there are bumps along the way. I always found that it helps to think about the West Point Cadet Prayer, the part about choosing the harder right instead of the easy wrong. There will be bumps along the way, but do not let them get you down. America's Army is running a marathon, not a 100-yard dash, and we are running a good race. Every day, around the world, Army people are making a difference, and our efforts to prepare for the future are unmatched by any military force on the planet. We are winning the race because we have the best Army on earth—dedicated selfless soldiers and Department of the Army civilians, all backed by great Army families.

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Remarks to the National Press Club

Washington D.C.

October 2, 1998

"Readiness—for What?"

You know, when you stop and think about the 90 years that you all [the National Press Club] have been in existence, and the people who have stood up here and addressed this National Press Club gathering, it is a humbling experience, I assure you.

It's been a good day for me so far. I had the opportunity to participate in a number of activities; I started out this morning by going out and doing a run with the Old Guard at Fort Myer. Most of you recognize the Old Guard. They're the soldiers that you see around the Military District of Washington that do most of our ceremonies. And they do everything from White House arrival ceremonies to burials at Arlington Cemetery, and they do it so very well. So every time I have an opportunity to do something with them, I am always more than willing to participate.

Many people don't realize they also participate in their normal skills. In other words, they continue to develop those skills that they need as soldiers, and we send them off to training in places like Fort A.P. Hill [Virginia] or Fort Pickett [Virginia].

I was talking to one of the companies that had just come back, and the men told me about their experience out there in the field. And they mentioned the fact that they were out on this field training exercise. And this one company commander and first sergeant at the end of the day were just getting ready to hit the sack, and so they were lying down.

And the first sergeant turned to the company commander and said, "Sir, look up and tell me what you see."

And the company commander looked up, and he said, "Well, I see beautiful stars in the sky, and there are millions of them."

And the first sergeant says, "What does that mean to you?"

And the captain said: "Well, astronomically, it means that there are millions of galaxies up there and probably billions of planets. Theologically, it means that God is great, and God is good, and we are very small and insignificant in his sight. And meteorologically, it means that we are scheduled to have a beautiful day tomorrow."

And the captain said to the first sergeant, "What does it mean to you?"

The first sergeant says, "Sir, it means that somebody stole our tent." (Laughter.)

Troops have a great way with words, and also they have a great way of keeping you honest and humble.

I thought I'd take the time that I have allotted to talk to you a little bit about readiness. It seems to be the topic of the day and the topic that I talked about a little bit earlier this week. But I'd like to approach from the standpoint and ask the question: Readiness for what? I think that's an issue that we need to explore a little bit, and so I'd like to spend my time talking about readiness and readiness for what.

Before I talk about readiness today, let me talk a little bit about where we've been. Ken mentioned it in the introduction—that we've

taken out over 600,000 people in the United States Army. That's Active, Guard and Reserve, and DA civilians. And just to give you a benchmark, that's more than the population of the state of Vermont. That's a tremendously large drawdown. And quite frankly, we have people out there in the field that are asking the question, "When's it going to stop?"

We've closed over 700 bases. Most of those have been in Europe, but there have been a large number here in the Continental United States. I participated in three different base closures, one at Fort Sheridan; one at the Presidio, San Francisco; and one at Fort Ord. I can tell you those were very emotional experiences. People didn't want us to leave, and our soldiers didn't want to leave. But the problem was that we had to keep the Army trained and ready, and we had to close those bases to become a more efficient organization. And so that's what we set about doing.

We have changed from a forward-deployed to a power projection Army. In 1989, for example, we had 216,000 soldiers stationed in Europe, primarily in Germany. Today we have 65,000. Most of the force in the United States Army is located back in the Continental United States. So that's a great change that we have undergone since the end of the Cold War. Most of the time we use as a gauge, as a measurement, as a start point, the end of the Cold War in 1989. That's the change that has taken place. And so it's a very significant change.

I would argue, from the standpoint of historical context, that this has been a very successful drawdown. In my mind, it's been unprecedented. If you look back in our history, you can find a number of times where we've had to downsize the Army and draw it down. And I would go back to the time after World War II. In 1945 we had about 12 million people, men and women, serving in the armed services. Five years later, the war in Korea broke out, and we were unable to deploy a trained and ready battalion into Korea. That's where the famous Task Force SMITH came from. Those were brave young Americans that we sent over there.

And I talked to Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Brad Smith when he came over to Korea while I was serving over there, and I asked him about his experience. Basically, he said, the Army over there was an occupation Army. They didn't spend much time training. The instructions that were given to Brad Smith was to go into Korea: "You'll find somebody over there that will tell you what to do. And you just go up there. And as soon as the North Koreans see you, they'll turn and run."

He led his soldiers up to a place near Osan. They took a stand—but nothing worked properly. They were not trained. The equipment they had was not good. It did not work properly. The North Koreans went through them like a hot knife through butter. That was Task Force SMITH, and that was the result of the drawdown we had after World War II.

We did another drawdown, the drawdown that I was a part of, after Vietnam. When we finished the Vietnam conflict, we found ourselves in 1979 going from Vietnam into the hollow Army. There was about 700,000 people that were taken out of the Army and we did it very quickly.

The hollow Army was not just about the shortage of people, but it had a lot to do with the quality of equipment. It had a lot to do with what we did in order to fight the Vietnam War, to rob from the theaters in Europe and the Continental United States to make sure that we had the forces over there in Vietnam necessary to do what we had to do.

When you compare the drawdown that we've gone through now and 10 years after that drawdown, we are certainly not at a Task Force SMITH level, and we're certainly not a hollow Army.

At the same time, I would tell you that there are some warning signs that we need to heed. It's kind of like having a car. You can go through life and not change the oil, not spend $19.90 for a lube or an oil change, and sooner or later you are going to have a blown engine. I think that's the point that we face right now. We've got to be willing to invest a little bit more in taking care of our Army if we really want the Army that we all need, and I think the nation needs, in the future. And so that's where we are. We must deal with these warning signs that are out there.

That's the change that has occurred since 1989, and it's very quantifiable. But I would also tell you that there's a more significant change at

least in my mind, that has occurred, and that is the fact that we changed our strategy. And that's the framework for the discussion of readiness, as far as I am concerned. The strategy is terribly important. We in the Army believe that the strategy determines your requirements and the requirements then determine the force structure—the people you need to execute those requirements.

If you look at what happened in the Cold War, we had a strategy that was containment—containment of the threat. It was a very successful strategy. We lived in a dangerous, but predictable world. I spent 27 years in that Army, where containment was our primary strategy. For us it was a very predictable world because what the threat did determined what we did. We trained against that threat, we modernized against that threat, we wrote our doctrine against that threat. And so it was very simple in many ways for us to travel back and forth to Europe and to fight those battles in our minds, to train our leaders how to do those type of battles. That was the Cold War that we lived in; dangerous, but somewhat predictable. And we all grew up in that, and we were somewhat comfortable with that strategy.

Today we find ourselves with a strategy of engagement and enlargement, a national military strategy that is based upon three pillars. One is to be able to prepare for the future. Second is to be able to shape the environment. The third is to be able to respond to crises wherever they may occur. If you stop and think about it, that's vastly different than what we faced in the Cold War—containment versus engagement and enlargement. I often argue that that's about 180 degree switch. And consequently, we find ourselves living in a still dangerous, still complex, but a much more unpredictable world. And that's why I say strategy is so very important. And when you ask about readiness, you have to ask about readiness for what? And I argue that it's readiness for the strategy that we are forced to execute.

The readiness issue for the United States Army is very simply: We must keep the force trained and ready while we undergo the most fundamental changes that we've ever had to make in our force since the end of World War II, and at the same time, take care of our quality people in a constrained resource environment.

Now that's fairly easy to talk about and fairly easy to explain, but when you get into the execution part, it's very, very difficult. I try to relate that to the Army in terms of military operations, when I talk about the fact that what we're really forced to do is to put a covering force out there in front of us to buy us time to change. The covering force is the trained and ready forces that respond to crises, whether they be in Bosnia or wherever they may be—Korea, Southwest Asia. The change process is ongoing back here as we change the Army to the Army that's going to be needed in the 21st century. And so we have a covering force which is buying us time—the trained and ready forces—and a change process that is changing us in a very fundamental way.

That's why the Army is much busier than it's ever been. If you go back and look again at the Cold War, you find that since 1945 to 1989 we used our military, the United States of America did, 10 times. Since 1989, we've found that we had to use our military 33 times. And so with all this drawdown that's taken place out there in the field, the soldiers have found themselves deploying more and more to different places and doing the things that soldiers do in Southwest Asia, Bosnia, Kuwait, Korea.

But there is another part of change that is terribly exciting, and that's the part that says we have an exciting opportunity to change the Army into something fundamentally different in the 21st century. As I've said before, these are the most fundamental changes that have taken place since World War II. I think we have a good process in the United States Army for that change. Our change process is very simple. We refer to it as Force XXI. It's Force XXI because it's taking us into the 21st century. But if you look at it, it's simple. We have a vision of what we think the world's going to look like in the 21st century. In order to get that vision, we've taken a look at the demographic trends, urbanization, what's happening throughout the world, and how we project the world to be in the 2020 time frame. And we try to look at what that world looks like at that particular point in time, and then we look back to 1998, where we are today, and we try to figure out the path to get from 1998 to 2020.

We have a series of warfighting experiments which are designed to help us correct our course as we go along. We realize that anything we do today is not going to give us a true azimuth for 2020 because that vision is somewhat blurred. The closer we get to it, the better we're going to be, and I think we'll be able to land right where we need to land. But right now you have to run those Army warfighting experiments in order to make corrections as you go along.

Fundamental to this change process, however, is something that we have done inside the Army, and that is to basically identify the core competencies of the United States Army. And really, when you look at it from our standpoint, there are six core competencies.

One is the quality people, the young men and women who serve in our Army today and the soldiers that are part of that.

Second is the training system, the realistic training system that we have. It's the best I've ever seen in 37 years of service. It gives you the fidelity of feedback that you need in order to train people for combat. It's the best thing short of combat that you'll ever get in terms of training.

The third is the proper force mix. We still believe that you're going to need heavy forces similar to what—similar to the forces that fought the war in Operation DESERT STORM. You're going to need light forces, you're going to need special operating forces.

We also think that you're going to need a doctrine. For us it's a playbook; it's how we do our tactics, techniques and procedures. And so that has to be modified as you go along.

And fifth, I guess, is leader development—how you develop our leaders. During Operation DESERT STORM somebody said it takes us 20 years to grow a division commander. That's absolutely right. So if you want somebody as a leader who can be a division commander in 2020, and you want them with the different skill sets, you've got to start right about now in order to develop them because that's how long it's going to take.

And the last of course, which is terribly important, is the modernization of the force; to be able to have the best equipment, the best weapon systems, the best trucks, the best tanks, the best howitzers in the world. We have that today, but unless we invest properly in the future, then we will not have that in the 21st century.

And so that's what we're trying to do is get all six of those imperatives, or core competencies, I've talked about synchronized and keep them synchronized over time as we move to the vision of 2020, and that's what our change process is all about.

Now, how did we get there and how did we implement this change process? Well, we did it through a series of war games, in which we projected out to the 2020 time frame, said we were on a mountaintop, and looked around and said what is the role of landpower in a joint environment and what's the role of the Army? And then we looked back and tried to pull ourself forward over that time frame. The Advanced Warfighting Experiments which we've been running at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; those are terribly important, because we've made adjustments as we've gone along. And we're really just into this journey a little bit, and we're already starting to make fundamental adjustments as we continue on that path called Force XXI.

This is a Total Army effort. It's a Total Army effort involving the Active Component, the Army National Guard, the United States Army Reserve, and our Department of the Army civilians. It has to be that way because, as we downsize the Army, 54 percent of the Total Army is made up of Reserve Components, and so the issue of having readiness across the Total Army is very, very serious for us.

I think the strategy that we're on, the strategy that talks about being able to respond to crisis, wherever they may occur, to be able to shape the environment, such as we're doing in Bosnia right now, and being able to prepare for the future, is the right strategy. I think it's a strategy of the 21st century, and we have to see our way through on that one to make sure we execute properly.

When you talk about shaping, people kind of misunderstand that sometimes, but in my mind shaping the environment is making the world safer for our children and grandchildren. If we're able to do that, then I think we're able to move war to the right, and that's what we all would like to see happen.

The question on strategy, however, is: Is it affordable? And I would like to just talk about that for a minute and give you a couple of facts and let you draw your own conclusions.

Norm Augustine, in June of 1994, I guess it was, 7 June 1994, speaking at this National Press Club luncheon, said the following: "America should spend no more on defense than it needs. But America can afford what defense it does need."

In that regard, we today spend more on legalized gambling than we do on defense, more on beer and pizza than we do on our Army.

I would also say that many people think that we spend a large percentage of our gross domestic product on defense. We are clearly in the top 50, but just barely. We're 49th when we spend 3.2 percent of the GDP on defense.

I would also say that there has been a peace dividend. If you took the 1989 budget, and if you just straight-lined it, and then you looked at the budgets that we've executed since 1989, the area under the curve is a peace dividend, a saving of over $700 billion during that particular point in time. I argue that that has contributed significantly to the budget surplus that we need, and I go back to what Norm Augustine says: We ought to be able to afford whatever defense we need.

Historians who have been talking about World War II often list the price of World War II as $360 billion at that time frame. And if you translate that into 1998 dollars, it's something like $4.3 trillion. But I would tell you that the real cost of World War II was the sacrifices of the over 16 million Americans who served over there and the over 400,000, who, as Lincoln said, "paid with the last full measure of devotion!"

Steven Spielberg has just produced, and I am sure many of you have seen it, a wonderful movie called "Saving Private Ryan." And my favorite scene in that movie is at the end, when Private James Francis Ryan from Iowa is standing in the cemetery at Normandy, and he has his wife and family there, and he turns to them and he says: "Tell me I am a good man. Tell me I have done a good job."

So I told Steven Spielberg, when we recognized him, I thought that the movie "Saving Private Ryan" was more than just a movie about Captain John Miller and a handful of men who saved James Francis Ryan. It was about a generation who saved the world, a generation that gave us freedom, and a generation that told us, as John Miller told James Francis Ryan at the end, "Earn it." And all of us who serve in the military today take that charge to heart. We work very hard to earn it. And that's what we continue to try to do, and we will always continue to try to do.

The secret of success for us is very simple; it's the young men and women who serve in our Army today. Many of you have visited them, have seen them. And I really deeply appreciate you taking the time to visit them whether it's in Korea, Bosnia, Fort Hood, the National Training Center, wherever.

But I think you come away from that experience as I came away from my run this morning with the Old Guard: These are wonderful, wonderful young men and women. They ask for very little, and they give an awful lot. I would simply say to you that this discussion about readiness is all about them. And it reminds you that America can afford whatever defense it needs.

I thank you very much for your kind attention, I thank you for your interest in our Army, and I look forward to your questions. Thanks a lot.

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Address at the Dwight David Eisenhower Luncheon, Association of the United States Army

Washington, D.C.

October 13, 1998

"The American Soldier"

First of all, let me thank you. Thanks to the Association of the United States Army [AUSA] for what you do. You know the Army is indeed fortunate in a lot of things, but I think it is most fortunate in having an association like AUSA to back us—helping us take care of our soldiers. I'm not only talking about the national chapter, which all

of your represent, but also all those individual chapters that are scattered around America. Thank you for all you do everyday in your own special way to take care of our soldiers. Thank you very much.

Congratulations to General Gordon R. Sullivan, my good friend, for a very successful meeting. He and this great staff have put together another wonderful meeting and we are deeply in their debt. Thank you all very much.

Welcome to distinguished guests—and you're all distinguished guests as far as I'm concerned—friends of America's Army; allies and partners from around the world; congressional leaders; leaders from the Department of Defense; our veterans; our alumni, our partners in industry; and, flanking the room from one end to the other, truly the world's best soldiers. What a great team! Thank you all so very much for all you do for America's Army.

I also want to recognize the Army's senior leaders sitting up here with me. On any given day thousands of our men and women are deployed around the world; our soldiers continue to the heavy lifting for our nation. The fact that we've done it so successfully—that we've accomplished mission after mission, that we've brought our soldiers home and trained them again for the next mission and taken care of them and their families and, at the same time, kept our eye on the future—that is no small feat. It didn't just happen. None of that Herculean effort would be possible without the leadership you see here.

We've recently said good-bye to some great leaders, [General] Bill Hartzog and [Lieutenant General] Dave Bramlett—and we will soon say good-bye to my great friend and a great soldier [General] Bill Crouch will also be leaving soon. I would be terribly remiss if I did not say publicly how much I appreciate all that they have done, their friendship and support and their unwavering commitment to do what's right for the nation. They are truly remarkable.

Whatever we do, wherever we go, we must never forget it is all about the American soldier.

It is an honor to be making my fourth address to you. Every year in the life of the United States Army is precious—year by year we gather here to review one more chapter in our glorious history.

If there has been one theme in my remarks to you over the last four years it has been the challenge of change. Change has been our constant companion, our battle buddy; it is one of the few constants in the world today.

Dealing with change is terribly important—it's also terribly difficult.

Let me discuss how we have addressed that challenge over the last four years. . . .

At the luncheon in 1995 I talked about the Army's foundation for change—our vision. I reminded you that as the old saying goes "any road will do when you don't know where you want to go," but we knew we had to do better than that because we knew what we had to accomplish. We knew how important that was to our nation.

We were determined to build on what has been achieved. Change required us to transform ourselves from a Cold War Army into a force for a world that was long on new and short on order. And we knew we needed a strategic vision to guide the effort. It had to be a vision grounded in meeting the needs of the nation as expressed by the National Military Strategy. A vision that recognized the world as it is, not as we wanted it to be. A vision of the world's best Army—a full-spectrum force, a total force, trained and ready for victory, a values-based institution.

In 1996, I talked about how we planned to achieve that vision, our change process—Force XXI. To turn a vision into reality, you need a disciplined deliberate process—a process that not only tells you when to change and how to change but, equally important, what not to change.

Our process is simple.

First, we identified the Army's core competencies—our Six Imperatives:

- realistic training
- the right doctrine
- the proper force mix
- modern equipment
- dynamic leadership
- and quality soldiers

Then we participated in war games that took place in the second decade of the next century to identify the requirements for something we called Army After Next [AAN]. Using those games to enlighten us, we put a mark on the wall for the

type of force we need in the 2020 time frame. Then we looked back to see what it would take to connect the dots from 1998 to 2020—to give us a general azimuth for evolving the Six Imperatives. We defined the general characteristics of the future force and what technology we want to "pull" forward so that we will have the right capabilities at the right time.

And we linked AAN to our experimentation effort—the Advanced Warfighting Experiments [AWEs].

The AWEs allow us to fine-tune our azimuth and, more importantly, to keep the Six Imperatives synchronized over time.

This process is relatively simple to explain, but terribly difficult to execute. I would also tell you that it is absolutely the right one when you deal with something as important as national defense. It is absolutely the right process when you deal with something as indispensable to the nation as the United States Army.

Last year, I focused on a key piece, maybe "the critical" piece of this process—making sure the foundation was solid, making sure we never lose sight of our values, our heritage and our traditions.

Values, heritage, traditions—these concepts are also simple, but profound. They must be taught and re-taught. They must be nurtured in every generation. They are and will always be our anchor in difficult and turbulent times.

And I emphasized one of our most important traditions—the Total Army. I said that to solve the challenges of tomorrow we must start today building a truly seamless force. I reminded you that fifty-four percent of our force is in the Reserve Components. We must leverage their tremendous capability today, tomorrow—and always.

I think history will show that the debates we've had over the last couple of years, while not fun, were healthy for the Army. They focused the total Army leadership on taking a very long and very hard look at what we really mean when we say, *One Team, One Fight, One Future*. Those words are more than a bumper sticker—they are our commitment to make the Total Army idea a reality.

We've already started that journey to the future by focusing on new initiatives designed to get the most out of the total force. We must figure out how we can best accomplish our expanding, diverse missions with a shrinking base. Obviously this requires leveraging the unique capabilities of each component and that means multicomponent units. You saw this, for example, in the new division design where we mixed Active- and Reserve-Component soldiers inside the division for the first time. You saw that on Monday when the leaders of the Total Army signed the memorandum of agreement that officially initiates another key effort—the integrated division concept, where we will group three enhanced separate brigades [Army National Guard] under an Active-Component headquarters. You saw that when we announced last month that we have programmed the Army National Guard 49th Armored Division to command a rotation of both Active and Reserve forces in Bosnia.

The chapters of the Army over the last few years have moved us from vision, to a tightly focused, disciplined change process, to a renewed emphasis on values, traditions and Total Army solutions.

And now, today, as every year, for the past 223 years, we add another chapter.

Where does the Army stand today? What did this year 1998 represent, and what can we look forward to in 1999?

First, I think you, all of you, all of you, and indeed all Americans should be immensely proud of our Army. What you the Army team have accomplished in the last decade is unprecedented. The Army has undergone its greatest transformation since World War II, and you have done that transformation better than any Army in history—and that's no boast.

History is a great teacher. It teaches us who we are by reminding us of who we were.

Remember that 5 years after the end of World War II, when the first American soldiers were sent into combat during the Korean War, they were insufficiently trained, poorly equipped and totally unprepared for the mission. We must never forget what the system did to the brave Americans of Task Force Smith.

Remember, five years after Vietnam, we had an Army that didn't train to standard . . . that didn't understand the importance of standards.

We had an Army full of broken, obsolete equipment. An Army with empty units. And even more onerous—it was an Army that had lost its spirit and misplaced its soul. We labeled it hollow.

Nine years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, nine years after the end of the Cold War, we have the best equipped, best trained Army on earth. That's not my opinion; the results speak volumes. Just look around the world. We have over 30,000 soldiers deployed to 80 different countries, keeping the peace and providing stability. Just look around this room. We are surrounded by the reason for that unprecedented accomplishment—American soldiers.

In Bosnia, you can, and people do, argue about whether we should be there, but you can not argue about what our soldiers have done. There are children there that are a year older. There are families that have celebrated another year of holidays and anniversaries together. What a wonderful contribution.

American soldiers did that.

At the same time, when we needed a show of force in Southwest Asia, within 72 hours we had the most modernized, best trained brigade combat team in the history of warfare on the ground in the desert.

American soldiers did that.

And everyday the Army is deployed around the world in almost a hundred countries—training, helping, keeping the peace.

At home our Army responded to everything from forest fires to hurricanes—helping our neighbors, saving lives, saving property, serving the nation, protecting our communities.

American soldiers did that.

Five years after World War II we could not do that.

Five years after Vietnam we could not do that.

Today, there is no other Army in the world that could do that.

Only American soldiers.

We know we have a great Army, but we also recognize keeping it great is no easy task; it requires tough, difficult choices—one of the most difficult is how to balance requirements with resources. We have to do the best job with the resources we have. We owe that to the American taxpayer.

America's Army is cost effective. Our Army receives less than 25 percent of the total Department of Defense budget, less than Americans spend on beer and pizza every year. Spending on the entire Army accounts for less than 1 percent of GDP—the lowest level of spending since Pearl Harbor. Our reduced resourcing reflects both the change in the nation's national security needs since the end of the Cold War, and the priority given to balancing the federal budget in order to maintain the health of our economy. And this shift has had a profound affect on our nation. Reduced defense expenditures have amounted in a peace dividend of $700 billion over the last decade. And this year for the first year in almost thirty years we have a balanced budget, a budget surplus and a thriving economy. This should not be surprising, for during the same time, the Army has helped maintain peace and stability around the world, stability that has added almost 2 million jobs to the American economy.

We have kept the force trained and ready while implementing the most fundamental change since World War II and we have done all that despite 14 straight years of declining buying power.

American soldiers did that.

American servicemen and women have unselfishly carried a heavy load for the nation, but it has required us to make tough choices and to balance current and future readiness. But we must ask—ready for what?

The measures of Cold War readiness no longer apply. We now have a new military strategy, a strategy based on three pillars—shape, respond and prepare. We must prepare now for the future; shape the international environment, pushing the possibility of war to the right; and respond to crisis when needed. It's a good strategy, the right strategy, and we must manage readiness to support each of these pillars.

In particular, to ensure our ability to prepare for the future now, we have had to shift some of the risk to near-term readiness and there has been a price associated with that shift. The readiness concerns that you hear from commanders and soldiers in the field are a fair and honest reflection of this shift in risk. The pace of operations is higher. The time and resources to train are less. The entry

level of units at Combat Training Centers is lower. The ability to balance investment in training, our installations and quality of life is becoming more difficult. In short, we have too few resources chasing too many requirements, and we must fix that.

Our number one concern for continuing to balance current and future readiness is, as it has always been, the American soldier. We cannot sacrifice quality. Global reach requires a professional career force. We must recognize that our post–Cold War strategy is leadership intensive, requiring a higher leader-to-led ratio in both the institutional and tactical Army. The heart of our force is experienced highly trained soldier-leaders, both officers and noncommissioned officers.

Today these soldiers are smart and dedicated. They are also overworked. Our principal readiness concerns are continuing to recruit, retain and take care of our soldiers and their families. We must counter the growing concerns of our soldiers over the disparity between military and civilian pay and declining military benefits such as retirement, health care, adequate housing and aging facilities. We will continue to carry that message to our national leadership and to the American people.

Still, I stand in front of you enormously proud, optimistic and hopeful:

- proud of all that the Army has accomplished.
- optimistic that we can approach all our challenges from a Total Army perspective.
- and hopeful that we can continue to get the balance of our investments right and the support we need to serve the nation.

Today we have the best Army on earth. There is no potential enemy anywhere that thinks they can take on the American Army in battle and win. We are going to make sure they understand that until the day they die. That is how I read this chapter in our history.

But our story never ends. Today, at Fort Polk, Louisiana, the soldiers of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment [ACR], who have recently returned from Bosnia, are preparing to embark on an adventure that will be truly exciting and terribly important to the future of our Army—designing the next generation of Army organizations, the Strike Force.

The 2d ACR is the oldest continuously serving regiment on active duty. It was formed in 1836 as a regiment of dragoons and has fought in every war since. The 2d ACR's history has been the history of an adaptive organization, transforming itself. And just as it led General George S. Patton's Third Army across Europe to victory, we are asking it to lead the U.S. Army across an uncertain future to the AAN.

The Strike Force concept incorporates the lessons learned from past advanced warfighting experiments and builds upon our geostrategic view of the world. The Strike Force emphasizes knowledge, speed and power achieved through information dominance. It will be capable of operating in restricted and urban terrain as well as undeveloped theaters. It will provide the core for overmatching combat power, and the right hooks for linking our Army forces with the emerging capabilities of the other services.

The objective for the U.S. Army still remains as Nathan Forrest said, "Get there firstest with the mostest." And, as always, the key to success is knowledgeable leadership, dedicated soldiers, and realistic training.

The Strike Force will provide us adaptive organizations and command and control that will allow us to bridge between our heavy and light units, giving us the means to mix and match our capabilities to create the best force mix for each mission and the best support for our commanders in the field.

As the 2d ACR becomes our AAN experimental force, we'll link it with the great facilities at the joint readiness training center, also at Fort Polk, conducting world-class experimentation and developing world-class adaptive forces—once again pushing the edge of the envelope. What's going on today in the 2d ACR is terribly exciting and terribly important for tomorrow.

While AWEs look ahead, I'd like to close by looking back. And I want to close, as I started, by talking about the American soldier. Douglas MacArthur introduced me to them in May 1962 when he spoke for the last time to the cadets at West Point. General MacArthur called them "one of the world's noblest figures, not only as one of the finest military characters but also as one of the most stainless. His name and fame is the

birthright of every American. In his youth and strength, his love and loyalty he gave—all that mortality can give. He needs no eulogy from me or from any other man. He has written his own history and has written it in red on his enemy's breast. But when I think of his patience under adversity, of his courage under fire, and of his modesty in victory, I am filled with an emotion of admiration I cannot put into words. He belongs to history."

Wherever I have been in the last 36 years I have seen those soldiers of whom MacArthur spoke so eloquently—and passionately. They have done the nation's bidding. They have accomplished every mission. "They have drained deep the chalice of courage." They truly belong to history.

Recently Steven Spielberg captured part of that history for all to see in a film—"Saving Private Ryan." For me the most profound moment was when Private James Francis Ryan from Iowa was standing on the windswept cliffs of Normandy, by the sweeping fields of crosses and stars of David—the youth long gone, the war and the terror of Normandy many years in his past—and he turned to his wife and said, "Tell me I'm a good man. Tell me I did a good job." He had to know if saving him had been worth the sacrifice of Captain John Miller and a handful of brave men. But "Saving Private Ryan" was not about saving one man. It was about a generation who saved the world—who gave us the priceless gift of freedom. For me it brought home what General MacArthur had said 36 years ago to me and my fellow cadets at West Point. "Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose the nation will be destroyed." The soldiers who fought World War II did not lose—thank God.

What a magnificent story Steven Spielberg tells. But, I will tell you what is even more magnificent. For every fictional story of courage there are thousands, hundreds of thousands of real stories of courage in our history, in our Army today. They are called, simply, American soldiers.

Each year I ask a handful of them to join me here on the stage. I do that because I can think of no better way to recognize the contributions of each and every individual soldier who has ever served, past and present. There are thousands of monuments to the American soldier, from the bronze and marble monuments rising on the fields of Gettysburg to the simple crosses in Arlington just a few miles away. Each speaks to a special moment of service and sacrifice. Each reminds us of the men and women of America's Army—working at a refugee center in Bosnia, standing guard at the DMZ in Korea, sitting next to you in the audience today, America's sons and daughters, our most precious asset. It is in their eyes, in their hearts, and through their deeds that we answer James Francis Ryan. Yes, the American soldier has led a good life.

It is now my very, very great honor, for the last time as your Chief of Staff, to introduce to you America's soldiers.

Staff Sergeant Kim Dionne from Auburn, Maine; Staff Sergeant Jason Wolfe from Springfield, Illinois; and Sergeant First Class Greg Seibert from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. They are the Army Reserve, National Guard and Active Recruiters of the Year. They are where the Army begins. Every year these noncommissioned officers and thousands like them work harder, put in longer hours, spend more time away from home, to make sure we have quality soldiers for the Total Army.

Staff Sergeant Bradley Houston from Nashport, Ohio, and Sergeant First Class Timothy Graves from Mount Vernon, Kentucky. They are the Active and Reserve Drill Sergeants of the Year. Every day they accomplish minor miracles by taking young Americans and making them proud soldiers in a remarkably short time. They teach them what the motto "This We'll Defend" really means. They teach them how to be steelie-eyed killers but also how to treat others with dignity and respect. They teach them how to act; they teach them how to be American soldiers.

And because the efforts of recruiters and trainers we have great soldiers like:

Sergeant Lisa Weisbeck from Sturgis, South Dakota, an assistant squad leader from the 411th Base Support Battalion in the U.S. Army Europe. Airborne qualified, she is a veteran of operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Macedonia. She is a recognized leader in her unit and her community.

Specialist Mamie Jenkins from Red Bank, New Jersey, fulfilling a lifelong dream of becoming a soldier, as a member of the elite 101st Airborne Division, she successfully completed air-assault training. Currently deployed on a one-year hardship tour to Korea, she was the runner-up for the command's Soldier of the Year.

And Sergeant Jose Marengo from Lindenwood, New Jersey, and Sergeant First Class Greg Valcin from Port Arthur, Texas. Ranger Marango, a squad leader in Company A, 2d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, is a highly skilled infantrymen who has trained in every theater in the world from Asia to Germany to Saudi Arabia. He also participated in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti.

Platoon Sergeant Valcin is a decorated veteran of JUST CAUSE and Operation DESERT STORM. He holds the combat infantry badge and master rated combat parachutist badge.

American soldiers all. They need no eulogy from me, but they deserve the very best support we can give them.

Ladies and gentlemen standing before you are our credentials.

They suffered at Valley Forge. They were the "first wavers" at OMAHA Beach. They walked point in Ia Drang. They crushed the Iraqi Army. They separated warring factions in Bosnia. When it is all over for me, this is what I will always remember.

It is a great honor to ask you to join me in recognizing one of the noblest figures in history—the American soldier.

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Memorandum for Army Leaders

September 29, 1998

"Army-Media Relations: An Update"

In September we hosted the first Senior Leader Media Conference at Carlisle Barracks, pairing Army senior leaders and prominent reporters for some frank and honest discussions about the importance of ground forces to our National Military Strategy and the relationship between the military and the media. Major General Neal Creighton (USA, Retired), the Chairman and CEO of the Chicago-based McCormick Tribune Foundation, served as our facilitator. As one of its principal charters, the McCormick Tribune Foundation works to foster close working relations between the U.S. military and media, so Neal was an ideal candidate to serve as our facilitator and he did a fine job.

We started the conference with a staff ride of the Gettysburg Battlefield. As always, walking the terrain of Gettysburg proved a powerful reminder of the importance of training and readiness, bold and innovative leadership, leveraging technology, and especially the personal courage displayed by soldiers throughout our nation's history. The staff ride also provided us with an excellent forum to emphasize the enduring importance of ground forces to our National Military Strategy. We concluded the staff ride with an explanation of how we have applied the lessons learned from Gettysburg in today's Army and in our preparations for the Army After Next. Collectively, the staff ride was an excellent way to get all of us in a common frame of mind and helped build relations as we prepared for the day-two roundtable discussions.

The discussions on day-two built on the staff ride, focusing on four key areas:

- the Army's vision for the 21st century;
- how emerging technology will affect future military operations, media coverage of these operations, and future military-media relations;
- an assessment of both near-term and long-term readiness; and,
- the institutional barriers that exist between the military and the press.

The discussions were candid and productive. These were tough issues, and they highlighted again for me the importance of clear, effective strategic communications. It is no easy task, but it's important work for helping both soldiers and citizens understand the complex and demanding challenges facing our Army.

I am convinced now more than ever that strategic communications is an important senior leader responsibility. Our success as an institution

depends in large part on the degree to which all leaders communicate to the American people through the news media. Our return on investment is in direct proportion to the time and effort we invest in media relations.

In that vein, this conference represented just one of many proactive steps we are taking to improve our strategic communications programs. In support of the speaking-with-one-voice philosophy, we recently published *Focus '98*. We are revising our media training programs for senior Army uniformed and civilian leaders as well as for more junior leaders in the school base.

In the near future, we will also publish a *Senior Leader Media Outreach Strategy*, which we'll distribute to every general officer and SES in the Total Army.

The bottom line is the Army has a great story to tell. We must maintain the communications initiative and must all play a role in helping tell our story. I need your support.

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"Developing Great Leaders in Turbulent Times"

Military Review

January/February 1999

The U.S. Army is about winning. The mere thought of anything less is repugnant, because when the Army loses, America loses. I think this determination goes a long way toward explaining our success. The Army's history is a history of change, but no amount of change or adversity has ever dampened our quest for victory. The magnitude and speed of the Army's transformation over the last decade has been particularly challenging. Yet, throughout this difficult transition, we held on to the constants—the unshakable belief that America's Army can and must always be a winner. At the same time, we embraced change because it made us a better Army and because it best served the nation's needs.

Balancing change and continuity is the secret of our success. It is also the key to developing the leaders who will carry that winning tradition into the 21st century. We have the leader and soldier development programs to grow great 21st-century leaders—programs that preserve the constants while accounting for the human dimension of change in a changing world. Embracing and implementing these programs are critical tasks for America's Army, and it all starts with understanding the dynamic relationship between the constants and the changes that drive our Army.

Back to the Future—Leadership's Past and Potential

During a recent one-day trip, I experienced firsthand the feel of the great change and continuity that chart the course of America's Army. This journey took me to Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, and Fort Hood, Texas. At Camp Beauregard, I participated in the change of command of Louisiana Adjutant General Major General Ansel "Buddy" Stroud. As I landed at that small, beautiful post, I was reminded of what took place there over 50 years ago. The camp was a staging area for the Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM)—large-scale war games used to get the first divisions ready for World War II.

The maneuvers' scope was vast. The exercises developed new tactics and techniques for combined arms warfare, integrated Active (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces, validated new weapon systems and organizations, established requirements for future developments and identified leaders with potential for promotion and those who were not suited for combat. While the tasks were great, resources were scarce. Units substituted drainpipes for mortars and beer cans for shells because they did not have the proper equipment. Although the results were not perfect, they were good enough to start the American Army on the road to victory. The enormous obstacles facing the Army in those difficult times made the maneuvers' success even more impressive. LAM succeeded, in large part, because they relied on the soldiering fundamentals—values, teamwork and discipline, the constants that always make the difference.

From Camp Beauregard I flew to Fort Hood for the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) [4th

ID (M)] Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE). The experiment was the latest step in our Force XXI process and was designed to provide insights that will guide the Army's future. Upon arrival, I immediately felt the excitement and enthusiasm for what was taking place. Without seeing a single command post, I knew that something important was happening. You could see it in people's eyes. I could not help but be impressed with the teamwork I saw there—AC, Army Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers working side by side with Department of the Army civilians (DACs) and industry representatives. The 4th ID (M)—reorganized, reequipped and retrained, backed by great organizations from the 138th Field Artillery Brigade (Kentucky National Guard) and 493d Engineer Group (U.S. Army Reserve) from Texas—challenged the world-class opposing forces, outthinking, outmaneuvering and checkmating every attempt to adjust and react to the 4th ID's initiatives.

What I witnessed was more than just a technological change, it was a cultural change as well. Leaders at all levels were confident, because we had created the right leadership environment and given soldiers the opportunity and the tools to harness the potential of a lethal, information-age force. Consequently, I observed commanders willing to take prudent risks to achieve extraordinary gain. I imagine I witnessed the same basics at work that built an army of excellence during the LAM over 50 years ago, but I saw them operating in a new environment, a culture based on information-age warfare. I returned from this trip more confident than ever that the Army can and will be the master of its own future as long as we keep the dynamics of constants and change in balance.

Constants We Must Preserve

First and always, we must remember that we are a profession of arms. Our profession is unique and, as General Douglas MacArthur once said, predicated on "the will to win. The sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory. That if you fail, the nation will be destroyed." As a young observer/controller at Fort Polk's Joint Readiness Training Center put it, being a soldier is "more than just holding a job and going home for dinner." We are a profession committed to unlimited and unrestrained service to the nation, wherever and whenever America calls.

Our profession's purpose says a great deal about our soldiers and what they do every day. Our mission is too great to be achieved by any one individual or any single task. There is a tremendous depth and breadth to our profession. The Army's purpose for being is to "win our nation's wars," but this means far more than just killing or the willingness to be killed. The American warrior has been and will always be more than the soldier fighting at the point of the spear. We deter and respond to aggression, but we also shape the international environment by building regional stability and reducing the possibility of conflict. The Army's responsibilities include everything from destroying targets to caring for and safeguarding civilians and dividing warring factions. Often these very different tasks have to be done by the same force, with precious little time and space dividing one mission from the next.

It takes the combined effort and sacrifice of the Total Army team to perform such extraordinary service. Every team member and mission contribute to the victories that secure America's place in a free and prosperous world. In the American profession of arms, even apparently mundane tasks take on extraordinary meaning. Throughout our proud history, these tasks have always been part of our mission and they always will be.

Another Army constant is the performance of our people. The soldiers who maneuvered across the forests and lowlands of Louisiana over 50 years ago were great Americans, patriotic and dedicated. Despite the difficulties and turbulence of our own time, the men and women of today's Army are no less exemplary. Of the 32 major post–Cold War deployments by U.S. forces, the Army has participated in 28 of those operations, providing more than 60 percent of the personnel. In 1997, the Army averaged over 31,000 soldiers deployed away from their home station and families, in 70 countries around the world. All of this activity took place in tandem with one of the most significant force reductions in our nation's history. We have taken more than 600,000 AC and RC soldiers and

DAC employees out of the force. We have closed over 700 bases. In Europe alone, we reduced the force from 232,000 soldiers to 65,000. The total drawdown in Europe would be equivalent to closing major installations in the United States.

While these reductions took place, Army operations tempo (OPTEMPO) increased approximately 300 percent. Despite the magnitude of our efforts and the everyday pressures and stresses on the force, our soldiers continue to perform magnificently. They have the same willingness to take prudent risk, boldness to seize the initiative and professionalism to do their absolute best—trademarks of successful armies from our past.

I recognize that the service of our soldiers has not come without cost. We are not perfect. Many are concerned whether the Army can maintain the tremendous progress we have made since the Vietnam War's end. Some worry that a "zero defects" mentality might resurrect itself and that opportunities for assignments and promotion will diminish. Others fear a return to a "hollow army," where requirements far outstrip resources. Some are concerned that the high OPTEMPO will detract from training to the point that units will lose their warfighting edge. These concerns are understandable and bear watching because they highlight another important constant we can never compromise—the Army's concern about taking care of people.

As I think back over my 35 years of military service, I have learned that the Army's waxing and waning has had less to do with the resources available than with our commitment to pull together. The Army is, at heart, a community of AC and RC soldiers, DAC employees and their families. Communities thrive when people care about one another, work with one another and trust one another. I believe today's Army carries within it this spirit and sense of community, the commitment to address our shortfalls and build upon our strengths. I am optimistic about the future and convinced that because we hold tight to a strong tradition of commitment to one another, we are and will remain the best army on Earth.

A Values-Based Army

Undergirding these constants is the most important constant of all—Army values. We must never be complacent about the role of values in our Army. That is why we have made a concerted effort to specify and define the Army values. Army values are thoroughly consistent with the values of American society, but it is a bad assumption to presuppose that everyone entering the Army understands and accepts the values that we emphasize.

The Army is a values-based organization that stresses the importance of the team over the individual. Values that emphasize only individual self-interest are cold comfort in times of hardship and danger. Rather, the Army emphasizes "shared" values, the values that make an individual reach beyond self. Army values build strong, cohesive organizations that, in turn, become the source of strength and solidarity for their members in difficult and turbulent times.

Values-based leadership means setting the example and then creating a command climate where soldiers can put values into practice. It is leadership best described by the simple principle "be, know, do." Leaders must not only exemplify Army values in their words and deeds, they must create the opportunity for every soldier in their command to live them as well. To do anything less is to be less than a leader.

General John M. Schofield described the link between a leader's thoughts and actions when he coined his definition of discipline.

> The discipline which makes soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such action is far more likely to destroy than make an army. It is possible to impart instruction and give commands in such manner and tone of voice to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels this respect which is due others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels disrespect for others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.

Schofield framed these words in 1879, but they are as true today as they were then. The real-

ity of leaders' performance must match the rhetoric of their words. Schofield's definition reminds us that values-based leadership is not about weakening standards or detracting from the Army's warrior spirit. There is nothing incompatible between the warrior spirit and treating all soldiers with dignity and respect. In fact, when we deny soldiers the opportunity to "be all they can be," the Army as an institution is immeasurably diminished. There is no better guarantee for maintaining our warrior spirit than preserving the constants of Army values and traditions, the bedrock of America's Army.

Changes We Must Accept

While change is itself another constant in Army history, the level of physical and cultural change in the past decade is almost without precedent. Developing great leaders depends as much on acknowledging what will change in the future as on a commitment to preserving past values and traditions.

We must start by recognizing the importance of balancing moral and physical courage. Physical bravery is without question an important part of being a soldier. There will always be a special place for the extraordinary heroism that is the legacy of American soldiers in battle. This courage was epitomized by Master Sergeant Gary I. Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall D. Shughart, who were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for their actions during a firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia, on 3 and 4 October 1993. Without a moment's hesitation, both rushed to the aid of a downed helicopter crew despite the fact that they knew they were facing certain death. The courage of America's soldiers represents unparalleled commitment. As Stephanie Shughart said so eloquently at the award ceremony for her late husband, "It takes a special person to not only read a creed and memorize a creed, but to live a creed."

Living the creed is what Army courage is all about. However, it should not diminish the importance of unbound physical courage to recognize that bravery in battle is only part of what makes a successful soldier. Soldiering is also about the moral courage reflected in the discipline and mental toughness to handle both lethal and nonlethal engagements. Today's soldiers must be able to implement disciplined rules of engagement under stressful and demanding conditions. Our soldiers' performance in Bosnia is an outstanding example of the other "face" of courage. An effective team of AC and RC forces, they performed a complex range of daily tasks and did every one of them to standard. They are a living testament to the Army's capacity to accommodate a rapidly changing international environment.

Perhaps the greatest change we face today is becoming comfortable with using the technologies of an information force to enhance the execution of leadership. Leading in the information age requires new trust and confidence—trust in technology and the confidence to share information and decision making. What I witnessed at Fort Hood during the 4th ID's AWE was the beginning of a fundamental cultural change in the Army. The 4th ID (M) is without a doubt a world-class "learning team." They discovered, like Peter Senge in his book *The Fifth Discipline*, that "the organizations that excel in the future will be organizations that discover how to tap people's commitment and capacity to learn at all levels in an organization."

Throughout the experiment, the 4th ID (M) demonstrated an extraordinary capacity for collaborative action, where teammates complement one another's strengths and compensate for one another's limitations. The result is a unit whose performance as a whole is greater than the sum of the individual efforts of its members. Learning teams have the ability to "suspend assumptions" and enter into a genuine "thinking together." This process allows organizations to discover solutions they might overlook if approaching problems merely as a collection of individuals.

New information systems have served as "enablers" for shared understanding and trust. They allow for rapid and accurate commander's intent dissemination and promote immediate group discussion and interaction to foster high-quality, effective battlefield performance. The 4th ID's results tell us that the key to winning future wars is learning how to use information systems to best advantage. Getting the most out of our future force will not happen without deliberate,

disciplined effort. Technology can become a straitjacket for the military mind as easily as it can be used to unleash the power of our soldiers. During the Vietnam War, helicopters could whisk commanders to any battlefield at any time. Some used this technology to extend their control over subordinate leaders. We called them "squad leaders in the sky." We must be smarter than that!

Without discipline, accumulating masses of data through information technology can quickly lead to over centralized decision making. We must have the trust and confidence to empower leaders at all levels with information, allowing them to exercise their good judgment and initiative.

Building Predictability

Today's Army must create an environment that teaches, nurtures and builds on the constants while embracing and leading necessary change. This effort begins with creating a positive, predictable and ethical command climate for our young leaders and soldiers.

In many respects we are not masters of our fate, controlling neither the missions nor budget allocated to the Army. We can, however, give our soldiers a powerful tool for the demands of Army life—predictability. *Predictability* in the force and the training schedule is the key to creating a positive environment. There are responsibilities leaders at every level share, as well as specific actions the senior leaders and field commanders must take to ensure predictability for the force.

We all have a role to play here. Creating a predictable environment begins with setting and enforcing standards. A sergeant major once told me that "the Army is an easy place in which to succeed. The Army has standards for everything, and all we have to do to get ahead is to meet those standards." He had it about right. Every time leaders waver from a commitment to standards, trouble follows. We must ensure that all leaders understand standards and enforce them—leaders must set the example. In particular, I have charged our Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Corps with being the keeper of Army standards. Standards are the "crown jewels of the Army." Without them, soldiers will never know what to expect from their leaders.

However, just setting and enforcing standards is not enough to create a predictable environment. Senior Army leaders have an obligation to give commanders and soldiers a reasonable expectation that they will have the time and resources they need. For starters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are committed to reducing joint training and exercise requirements by 25 percent. This reduction is designed to eliminate the least effective training events and should help reduce the burden on commanders who all too frequently meet themselves coming and going, racing from one training exercise to the next.

Within the Army, we are working hard to give leaders the confidence that they will have the people they need to get the job done. This effort focuses on reducing the personnel shortages and staff vacancies many commanders see in their units. As the Army drew down, a significant gap grew between the number of "spaces" in the force structure and the number of soldiers to occupy those spaces. We are in the process of balancing "faces and spaces," as well as vigorously recruiting to fill chronically short, critical military occupational specialties.

Over the next 12 months these efforts will result in a more predictable and consistent level of manpower for our Army. We are also working hard at maintaining the quality of the force. I am satisfied with the adjustments we have made to recruiting efforts. As a result, the quality of the force today is every bit as high as the Army that fought in Operation DESERT STORM. Our initiatives will not solve every unit's shortfalls, but they should give commanders confidence that they can expect to continue to have high-quality soldiers, in greater percentages, to fill their ranks.

Leaders in the field also need to do their part in building predictability. This starts with a commitment to stick to the principles of effective training management regardless of how much turbulence and changes pull on leaders to abandon their effort to take control of the schedule. They also have an important part to play in "slowing down the train." More training is not always better training. I do not believe we can do more with less. However, I do believe we must get the best out of what we get. Fewer but higher-quality training events are more important than ensuring

every moment on the training schedule is chock full of activity. Sometimes less is better. In addition, leaders must set and monitor key indicators, such as borrowed military manpower, signs that will tell them if we are making the most efficient and appropriate use of our soldiers.

Creating Ethical Environments

The environment Total Army leaders create needs to be *ethical* as well as predictable. Ensuring an ethical command climate requires commitment to Army values and leadership, as well as a core of relevant, focused programs that build on those constants.

Creating ethical environments starts on the first day of initial entry training (IET). Leaders must recognize that individuals entering the Army have different values bases, and we must pay increased attention to inculcating and reinforcing our standards and values in these soldiers. To help energize the process, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, in cooperation with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, is developing a structured program that places greater emphasis on Total Army values and traditions during IET. Soldiers will leave for their first assignment enriched with the proud history, winning traditions and deeply held values that stand behind our Army.

But that is not enough. Building soldiers of character only starts in IET. Leaders must immerse their soldiers in Army values and traditions from the day they join up until the day they leave, ensuring that both leaders and led show respect and tolerance of others and unswerving commitment to doing what is morally and legally right. Once soldiers arrive in their units, leaders have a responsibility to reinforce and sustain the ethical foundation built in IET. One aid that has been provided to leaders is the *Ethical Climate Assessment Survey*, which affords commanders a quick self-assessment of their unit and indicators to guide sustaining or improving the ethical climate of command.

Another important tool is the *Consideration of Others* Program that provides commanders a systematic approach for training and sustaining an ethical work force. Modeled on an innovative program developed at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, Consideration of Others reinforces Army values through small groups that emphasize basic leadership and respect principles. We are institutionalizing use of the *Consideration of Others Program* and *Ethical Climate Assessment Survey* throughout the Army. They are important tools for building the positive, ethical command climate needed to grow great leaders.

Building for the Future

Creating the right environment to help leaders develop and mature is only part of the task of growing great leaders for the 21st century. Building future leaders also requires long-term, purposeful leader and soldier development programs. The Army is developing these programs under an umbrella concept called *Character Development XXI*.

The *Character Development XXI* centerpiece effort is the revision of US Army Field Manual (FM) 22–100, *Army Leadership*. The manual's objective is to provide concise and understandable doctrine that demonstrates the important linkages between the intent and actions of soldiers and junior and senior leaders. The FM puts the "mystery" of leadership into clear, plain language, reaffirming the Army's tested and proven approach to leading. The manual admonishes that there are no easy answers, no substitutes for competent, caring and courageous leaders. FM 22–100 also provides special focus on the character-development process, the importance of teaching values, evaluating an organization's ethical climate and creating a positive, productive leadership environment.

The *Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI* and the new Officer Evaluation Report (OER) are also important components of Character Development XXI. Although these are officer programs, they have relevance to the Total Army. They are intended as a start point for institutionalizing Army leader programs for the 21st century. Not only do we expect them to produce officer leaders with the "right stuff" to teach, coach and counsel NCOs, soldiers and DAC employees, we believe these programs will serve as a blueprint for other personnel development initiatives.

OPMS XXI restructures how active duty officers will be managed, developed and promoted over a career of service. The changes it introduces are significant. There were clear signs that the old system was struggling to answer concerns about career security, opportunities to get the right assignment and the stress of high personnel turnover. *OPMS XXI* addresses these concerns by establishing a new career field framework. The career fields are designed to enhance the Army's warfighting capability, shape the structure of the future officer corps and provide every officer with a reasonable opportunity for success. The new system will not only open new opportunities for advancement, command and education, but will better serve the Army's demanding and diverse needs for officer leadership in the 21st century.

We developed *OPMS XXI* hand-in-hand with the revision of the OER system. The new OER will apply to all AC and RC officers. The OER's intent is to create an effective tool for teaching, coaching and counseling, not just rating officers. The new report places special emphasis on ethical attributes and the ability to share and instill those qualities in subordinates. The OER changes, along with *OPMS XXI*, are important steps in building a personnel development system for the future, one that builds better leaders at all ranks and at all times.

Measuring Future Success

For the last 222 years, we have been an Army prepared for turbulent times, an Army that never relinquished its zest for victory or unshakable dedication to serve the nation—an Army postured to win. I believe that we are still that Army today and that we will remain a relevant, powerful force as the Army continues to change. We will keep the winning edge by holding fast to the constants that make a difference while never losing the confidence that we can adapt to the challenges ahead.

If we are successful at developing great leaders, what will soldiering in our Army look like in the next century? We will see a Total Army team—a seamless team—of AC and RC soldiers, backed by a contingent of dedicated DAC employees and proud partners in industry. We will also see a team of dedicated, enthusiastic and adaptable professionals. They will be prudent risk takers who are unafraid to share information and unleash initiative. Their potential will manifest in powerful organizations built on trust, teamwork, cohesion and discipline.

I am confident we are on the right path to the future and that we have the tools to develop great leaders in turbulent times. During the 4th ID (M) AWE, I watched the young men and women who will lead tomorrow's Army. As I watched them, I asked myself whether I could envision them in battle. Do they have the right stuff to secure America's interests around the world? Can they be entrusted with leading our nation's sons and daughters?

The answer is a resounding "Yes! We have the right leaders." What we need now is the courage and commitment to follow through on the programs that will take those leaders and the Army into the 21st century.

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Prepared Statement to the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues

Washington, D.C.

January 28, 1999

Madam Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to talk with you about military training and gender-related issues.

The Challenge of Change

We have changed Army training significantly in the last few years, to better take care of our soldiers and prepare them for the tasks they will face today and tomorrow. Change is never easy, but it is necessary. Organizations that recognize and embrace change are the most successful. You must know when to change, what to change, and, most important, what not to change. I think this dynamic must frame our discussion on military

training and gender-related issues. We have realistically looked at the changes required and have made, or are making, the changes necessary.

Constants We Must Preserve

As we consider how to best structure the Army's training to serve the nation and our soldiers, we have to think about the things that should not change. First and always, we must remember that we are a profession of arms. Our profession is unique. General Douglas MacArthur said it this way, "Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed." As a young observer/controller at Fort Polk, Louisiana's Joint Readiness Training Center put it, being a soldier is "more than just holding a job and going home for dinner." We are a profession committed to unlimited and unrestrained service to the nation, wherever and whenever America calls.

Our profession's purpose says a great deal about our soldiers and what they do every day. Our mission is too great to be achieved by any one individual or any single task. There is a tremendous depth and breadth to our profession. The Army's purpose for being is to "win our nation's wars," but this means far more than just killing or the willingness to be killed. The American soldier has been and will always be more than the warrior holding the spear at the frontline of battle. We deter and respond to aggression, but we also shape the international environment by building regional stability and reducing the possibility of conflict. The Army's responsibilities include everything from assaulting bunkers to caring for and safeguarding civilians and dividing warring factions. Often, these very different tasks have to be done by the same force, with precious little time and space dividing one mission from the next.

You do not have to go much further than a newspaper to gain a sense of what is required of today's Army. Within the last few months, over the span of a few weeks, each day's headlines and evening broadcasts carried an important story about our Army:

- the President standing with U.S. soldiers in South Korea reminding us that a North Korea undeterred, if it chose to, could seriously threaten Asia's peace and security;
- soldiers in Bosnia and Macedonia, working, on the ground, seeking to preserve stability and prevent a regional crisis;
- across Central America, U.S. soldiers joining in an international effort responding to the devastation left in the wake of Hurricane Mitch; and
- in Southwest Asia, soldiers supporting Operation Desert Fox keeping the pressure on Saddam Hussein.

These headlines reflected different dangers on different parts of the globe, but together they illustrate the wide range of tasks our nation expects the Army to perform well.

These tasks demand we have the best teamwork in the world. We have to be able to take soldiers with diverse backgrounds and experience and combine them into effective, cohesive teams, often very quickly under stressful and dangerous conditions. And we must form these teams constantly and unendingly, building teamwork, and then forming new teams to meet every mission. The breadth and depth of Army operations, the many ways we use our force to secure the safety of the American people, demands a high level of teamwork. That is a constant.

Undergirding the aspects we must not change are the most important constants of all—Army values. Values are the foundation of the force. The Army is a values-based organization that stresses the importance of the team over the individual. Values that emphasize only individual self-interest are cold comfort in times of hardship and danger. Rather, the Army emphasizes "shared" values, the values that make individuals reach beyond themselves. Army values build strong, cohesive organizations that, in turn, become the source of strength and solidarity for the team.

In reviewing our requirements for training the force over the last few years, we found we had become too complacent about the role of values in our Army. Army values are thoroughly consistent with the values of American society, but it is a bad assumption to presuppose that everyone entering the Army understands and accepts the values that we emphasize. That is why we have made a concerted effort to specify and define the

Army values and renew our emphasis on educating and instilling these values in our soldiers during initial entry training. Every day, our drill sergeants instill the values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage that must define the essence of every soldier's character. As I'm sure you have seen in your visits to our training bases around the country, values are everywhere, stenciled on the stairs, painted on the walls, framed in posters on every bulletin board—and instilled in the character of our soldiers.

I emphasize the constants in the force—mission, teamwork, values—because they must be the foundation of the Army training system. Whatever we do, however we train, these constants, these essentials, must always be at the core of building great soldiers.

Changes We Must Accept

Army training has been the lynchpin in ensuring that we remain able to meet all of our requirements. Over time, we have faced and resolved many training challenges, from dealing with the implications of racism to the issues of sexual harassment. The approach to dealing with these issues is to clearly face each issue and commit to resolving the root causes. In the case of sexual harassment, which was brought to the forefront after incidents at Aberdeen, the Army has thoroughly and systematically dealt with these issues. We have critically reviewed all aspects of Army training, kept the very best of our system, and strengthened the spots where it was weak. This is an ongoing effort, which will continue as we strive to develop trust and confidence that soldiers and leaders will do what is right.

The Army's training programs are versatile, adaptable, and well suited to taking our Army into the future. Our current training program reflects the vital role of both men and women in our Army today. Women are an integral part of the Army team. They comprise 15 percent of our Active-Component strength and are trained in all of our combat support and combat service support specialties. Their skills, talents, and leadership ability are crucial to the Army, and that is why their training must be integral to everything we do.

I know from your visits to our training and operational units you understand not all Army training is gender-integrated. The Army trains 40 percent of its soldiers, the direct ground combat military skills of infantry, armor, and cannon artillery, in male-only training units because this is the way we employ these units. We train the other 60 percent, our combat supporters and service supporters, in a gender-integrated environment for precisely the same reason. This training strategy is based on the fundamental understanding that the requirement to forge effective teams begins on the day new recruits enter basic combat training.

Basic combat training builds trust, confidence, and teamwork in soldiers. Shared experiences and commitment to common goals forge effective teams. We train as we fight—we train to fight and win our nation's wars. This is more than a bumper sticker. We train as teams because teamwork is essential to how the Army accomplishes its missions.

The issue of segregating combat support and combat service support recruits in basic training implies a basic lack of trust in the ability of all soldiers to understand and absorb Army values. It negates many years of successful integrated training experiences, and it would reverse the great progress we have made on integrating key members of the Army team. Segregation creates a perception of double standards and an atmosphere of distrust and isolation between groups of soldiers in basic combat training at a period in time where we have the greatest supervision of trainees. The basic fostering of Army values must occur from the onset.

I firmly believe gender-integrated training for our combat service and service support soldiers is the most effective training method, but I also understand that the changes this creates within our institution will take time to reach full potential. We have made significant progress not only in the conduct of training but, just as importantly, in the attitudes of soldiers within the Army. As you know, attitudes are far more difficult and take much more time to change than behavior does. I recently reviewed some survey results of Army members that indicate a growing understanding of the capabilities of

women in the Army. Comparing 1997 survey results to responses from 1993, there is a significant increase in the percentage of male soldiers who agree that women perform well in their jobs and that mixed gender units do not have a negative influence on unit cohesion. There is also a notable rise in male soldiers' perception that women are as able as men to meet the physical demands of being a soldier.

I believe it would be counterproductive for us to reverse this progress by segregating our young men and women during the essential training that defines them as soldiers.

Getting Change Right—Mission, Teamwork, Values

The most difficult part of the change process is knowing when you have it right—when you have properly balanced the essential constants and the demands for change. My most important measure is our soldiers, because essentially that is what the Army is all about. As General Creighton Abrams once said, "the Army is not made up of people, the Army is people." Recently, I was reminded of this when I was at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and had an opportunity to speak with Sergeant First Class Mark Barnes, the post's 1998 Drill Sergeant of the Year.

An infantry soldier awarded the Combat Infantryman's Badge, Sergeant Barnes spent most of his career with the 82d Airborne and the 25th Infantry Divisions. He had never worked with women soldiers until his current assignment as a drill sergeant. Two years ago, he was firmly convinced that gender segregation was the best training method. That is what he had been led to believe his whole career. Twenty-five months and 25,000 recruits later, he is now convinced that "gender-integrated training is the best thing the Army's got going in training." Basic combat training is the greatest challenge most young men and women will have faced up to that point in their lives, he told me, and gender-integrated training is the best way to build respect, pride, and confidence among soldiers.

Soldiers training together get the best perspective on the capabilities of their team members. Turning from gender-integrated training takes away the Army's best chance to strip away stereotypes. He would not have thought it possible two years ago, but Sergeant Barnes says he's thankful for the opportunity he was given to train soldiers in an integrated environment. "How you inspire and lead has a lot to do with what obstacles soldiers can overcome," he concluded. Sergeant Barnes reminded me that our soldiers have faith in gender-integrated training. They know it works, and, more importantly, they know it is important to the Army's success.

The U.S. Army is about winning. The mere thought of anything less is repugnant, because when the Army loses, America loses. I think this determination goes a long way toward explaining our success. The Army's history is a history of change, but no amount of change or adversity has ever dampened our quest for victory. The magnitude and speed of the Army's transformation over the last decade has been particularly challenging. Yet, throughout this difficult transition, we held on to the constants—the unshakable belief that America's Army can and must always be a winner. At the same time, we embraced change because it made us a better Army and because it best served the nation's needs. As we consider the balance of constants and change in how we train, we must remember that, above all, teamwork and shared values are essential to America's Army.

The Army recruits and trains more than 180,000 young men and women annually—more than the other military services combined. We train soldiers to perform duties in more than 510 military occupational specialties, and we deploy them to over 70 countries around the world, to perform a myriad of tasks. The common threads that bind our Army are mission, teamwork, and values, and that begins with our rigorous, challenging basic combat training.

I thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you today and welcome your questions.

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The Strike Force Operational Concept Paper

January–February 1999

(Note: This working paper was presented to the Army's Training and Doctrine Command as guidance for developing the Strike Force concept.)

Introduction

The Army's Strike Force represents both a new near-term asset to meet current strategic requirements and a test bed for developing the capabilities that will meet the Army's long-term transformation objectives. In the near-term it will provide a rapidly deployable, flexible and adaptive early entry force. Not only will the Strike Force get there fast, but it will be able to swiftly tailor assets for each mission to quickly stabilize a situation or set the conditions for the employment of follow-on forces. At the same time, the Strike Force will serve as a test bed for tackling the most difficult and important challenges in evolving the capabilities of our force, helping create what we call the Army After Next.

The Strike Force operational concept outlines:

- why the Army needs the Strike Force—the strategic context,
- how the Strike Force will enable the transformation of the Army—the Force XXI context,
- our intent for the Strike Force—purpose, method, end-state,
- how the Army will organize the Strike Force and conduct contingency operations, and
- how we will experiment with the Strike Force and develop future capabilities.

The Strike Force concept is laid out in two parts. The first half of this paper explains the rationale behind the Strike Force initiative. Strategically, we need the Strike Force to provide a "niche" capability, the capacity to respond rapidly to an unpredictable, diverse and challenging international environment with a hard-hitting, flexible, early entry force. In terms of transforming the Army, we need the Strike Force to serve as an experimental vehicle, helping us achieve the right balance of intellectual and physical change. The second half of this paper describes how we will employ the Strike Force as both an operational and experimental command. It describes how we will use the Strike Force to get the most out of our Active, United States Army Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers, operating as part of an effective team with assets from the other armed services and federal agencies.

Why the Army Needs a Strike Force—The Strategic Context

The Army must continue to change to meet current and future strategic requirements and security concerns. After a decade of experience in the post–Cold War world, we have a fair understanding of the challenges we face. We cannot predict with certainty when, where and how we will employ our joint forces. We do, on the other hand, have a good grasp of how to use our forces to best effect and we know what technology can do for us in dealing with existing and emerging threats. Using this knowledge and experience we have crafted a realistic, flexible and achievable approach to enhancing the Army's operational capabilities.

The nation's strategic requirements have changed dramatically in the post–Cold War world. Through the beginning of the century the United States primarily saw security as a question of hemispheric defense—keeping enemies from American shores. After World War II, the foundation of America's strategic approach was containment—blocking the expansion of the Soviet power. Today our fundamental post–Cold War strategic imperative is the recognition that the United States must be a global leader—a recognition that international order, as well as stability in many regions of the world, requires proactive American leadership. Our challenge is to provide global leadership in an age rife with ambiguity. We cannot predict what the world will look like in future decades: the final course of economic turbulence in Asia and Latin America, the political fortunes of Russia, long-term prospects for peace in the Middle East, the union of Europe, or advancement in Africa. We must therefore be prepared to deal with the challenges of uncertainty.

The greatest danger is complacency. Strategic requirements can always change faster than the size, capability and state of training of military forces. Radical disparities between strategy and capability incur grave costs. The United States' entry into the Korean conflict is a dramatic example. U.S. strategy did not envision fighting a ground war on the Korean peninsula. As a result, we had only meager forces in the theater. The invasion by North Korea prompted us to change our strategy overnight, sending the first available units into battle improperly equipped, insufficiently trained and totally inadequate for the mission assigned. The North Koreans quickly overwhelmed the American troops, revealing tragically that at the outbreak of the war our linkage between strategy and forces was insufficiently flexible to accommodate the changing requirements of our national interests.

Today, the need for flexible, agile forces is even greater than it was during the Cold War. The current and projected security environments suggest many potential challenges from either states or individuals who comprise "transnational groups." Recognizing the tremendous power of the United States, potential foes may devise unique weapons or strategies that avoid direct confrontation with our combat forces and strike at our bases, diplomatic posts, economic interests, telecommunications, computer networks or the American homeland. We may face different kinds of threats and we must be prepared for those threats to lead to escalating levels of violence. Ballistic missiles, terrorism, urban combat, and weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological or chemical) might well become the instruments of choice in a future conflict. In addition, we may have to conduct many different types of military operations (working with the other armed services and federal agencies), possibly simultaneously, with little or no reaction time. Finally, we have to recognize that there will be frequent requirements for prompt and sustained operations requiring the control of people and terrain.

From a strategic perspective we need to ensure our forces are agile and flexible enough to meet evolving traditional threats and emerging nontraditional dangers to American security. Since we cannot predict the progress of global events in the next decades with any degree of certainty, we need forces with speed, agility and decisiveness that can deal with a broad range of strategic requirements. We can achieve this by building greater adaptability into our current and future forces. Today we know that our land forces are applicable to a wide range of critical security tasks. Unit for unit, our forces are more lethal, more versatile and can deploy faster than at any time in our nation's history. In recent years the United States Army proved the utility of ground forces in a variety of contexts during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, Operation DESERT STORM in Southwest Asia, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq, Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, Operation ABLE SENTRY in Macedonia, Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY in Haiti and our current operations in Bosnia. We have demonstrated the capabilities of our Active Army, United States Army Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers and our ability to act effectively as part of a joint—Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps—team. In qualitative terms our capabilities are unmatched by any other army on the planet, and we have successfully met every security challenge of the post–Cold War world. In addition, we are well on our way to developing the future-oriented capabilities that incorporate path-breaking technologies and prepare us for the 21st century's security challenges. We have a wide range of capabilities—and they are improving every year. What we must do now is enhance our ability to adapt them to each strategic requirement. The solution is building adaptive forces, commands that can be rapidly tailored to meet diverse changing requirements. We will develop these capabilities further by incorporating the Strike Force into the Army's change process—Force XXI.

How the Strike Force Will Enable the Transformation of the Army—the Force XXI Context

Changing to meet the nation's evolving strategic needs requires a disciplined, deliberate change process.

We cannot wish ourselves into the future. The Army must change, but change, particularly concerning something as serious as the security of the nation, takes time. Revolutions in military affairs do not occur as quickly as they appear in turning the pages of a history book. Even in modern times profound change has taken a decade or sometimes even a generation. A true revolution in military affairs is more than simply "dressing-up" the current force with high-tech weaponry. It requires advancing all the critical aspects of the force. Balanced development is our best hedge against the uncertainties of the future, but it takes time and resources.

In the meantime, we must continually provide strategically adaptive, trained and ready forces. In the real world there are no time-outs in preparing for the future. To prepare for the future without putting the current force at risk, we must develop all the Army's core competencies in a synchronized manner. Trying to evolve the force in a piecemeal fashion, one or two competencies at a time, will surely fail. In the 1950s, the Army tried with its pentomic Army concept to undergo radical organizational and doctrinal change very quickly, without bringing along commensurate advances in modern equipment, training, and leader development to support and complement change. The pentomic Army proved inadequate and was quickly abandoned.

Since the pentomic Army, we have made tremendous strides in learning how to change, ensuring the right balance of people and equipment to meet the nation's strategic needs. By the 1980s, we built the Cold War's best conventional Army—the Army of Excellence. And then, even before the end of the Cold War we began to transform the Army of Excellence to meet the nation's evolving strategic requirements. The United States recognized that not all its vital interests could be satisfied with forces designed exclusively to win conventional campaigns in Europe. There were compelling diverse needs for military forces in many regions of the world. The Army responded by fielding light forces and emphasizing rapid deployment to meet the broadening range of strategic tasks required of landpower. The Army also acknowledged that all operations, from conventional campaigns to contingency operations, required a far greater integration of joint capabilities than had ever been undertaken in the past. This recognition gave rise to AirLand battle doctrine that envisioned a fusion of joint capabilities, integrating the efforts of the armed services to a far greater degree than had been foreseen in the past.

It is ironic that today some still suggest that the Army has not overcome a Cold War view of the world. In truth, our thinking began to change long before the first glimmers of the Cold War's end were even in sight. We changed because the nation's emerging strategic approach to global leadership demanded a broader set of military capabilities.

On February 24, 1991, AirLand battle and America's Army of Excellence entered their greatest test of battle during Operation DESERT STORM. The result was a resounding victory during a hundred-hour ground war. Almost immediately, however, America's shifting national security environment rapidly increased the momentum for further change, while the collapse of the Soviet Union and soaring federal budget deficits generated a demand for rapid force reductions. On March 8, 1994, we formally initiated Force XXI to guide and integrate our wide-ranging efforts to transform the Army and meet the pressing demand to change as rapidly and effectively as possible.

The term, *Force XXI*, was chosen to reflect our commitment to providing the nation the right land forces for the 21st century. The Force XXI process incorporated a number of wide ranging, but integrated activities including research, field trials, war gaming, computer-assisted analysis and simulations, strategic management, professional development, training and force modernization programs, all focused on enhancing our ability to employ landpower to meet future challenges. Since its inception, Force XXI has served us well, and it will continue to guide us in the years to come as our overarching program for guiding the Army's transformation.

The heart of the Force XXI change process has always been understanding how changing aspects of the force will affect one another and which changes are the most critical. It does us no good, for example, to have new weapons without

quality soldiers trained to use them, the doctrine to employ them, or the organizations to support them. To get change right, we focus on the Army's six imperatives:

- realistic training—ensuring our soldiers and leaders are prepared to execute as part of a joint team, ready to perform any of the diverse, demanding warfighting or security tasks they may be assigned.
- the right doctrine—providing the doctrinal guidance on how to employ the capabilities of our forces to their best effect.
- the proper force mix—having the capability to rapidly deploy exactly the right kinds of forces needed for the task at hand.
- modern equipment—fielding the equipment required to perform the mission and protect the lives of our soldiers.
- dynamic leadership—providing professional military leadership that knows how to get the job done right and take care of soldiers.
- quality soldiers—having soldiers grounded in the Army's values and traditions, armed with the right physical and mental skills.

The initial focus of Force XXI was on the near term, ensuring we had a sufficient trained and ready force to meet the nation's current strategic challenges. Implicit in the Force XXI effort was that we had to be able to provide robust strategic capabilities with a much smaller Army. The Army had already announced that by 1996 it planned to reduce to 10 Active divisions and 8 National Guard divisions. To make these fewer forces more effective, the initial experimental efforts emphasized exploiting the potential of information-age technology for enhancing military operations. The Force XXI effort began by developing eleven wide-ranging force design options for an information-age division. Among the options considered was a mix of aviation, light infantry and armored brigades similar to the force tested during the 1970s in the TRICAP experiment. The study also looked at the concept of building the Army out of independent fixed brigades, a concept first explored extensively during the Division 86 studies in the 1980s. The Army eventually settled on a modified version of the current division design and tested the prototype through a series of Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs) that paired real soldiers and real equipment under tough realistic operational conditions.

The Advanced Warfighting Experiments proved extremely useful in telling us how to adapt the force to new capabilities. As a result of the experimentation effort in 1998, we completed a division redesign that fully exploits the potential of existing information-age technology. Currently, we are in the process of completing the fielding of the first division under this design concept, a true information-based force—a "digitized" division built around the best available, proven information-age capabilities.

The Advanced Warfighting Experiments focused on what we could achieve in the near term with current technology, force structure, and leader and soldier development. Meanwhile, another aspect of Force XXI provided our focus for longer-term developments. We call that effort the Army After Next. The Army After Next project began with *Joint Vision 2010*, a document which describes the joint operational concepts for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Army team of the year 2010 and beyond. The goal of the Army After Next is to define the Army's contribution to this future joint force. Through the Army After Next war games, we identify key requirements, resources and technologies. We then look back at the force we have today and determine what must change to give us the capabilities we want. This effort provides us a general azimuth for evolving the six imperatives, together, over time. We have already used the Army After Next war games to define the general characteristics of the future force and what technology we want to "pull" forward so that we will have the right capabilities at the right time.

One key issue which the Army After Next war games have identified is—how to rapidly project sufficient capabilities to minimize risks and ensure success in the early stages of a contingency operation? A daring future adversary could potentially gain an advantage by seizing an objective and then adopting asymmetric and anti-access strategies to frustrate our employment of joint assets. Protecting the force and accomplishing the mission in the uncertain and often rapidly changing conditions of a contingency operation

calls for deploying "overmatching" capability very quickly. Securing an overwhelming advantage early on will require tremendous flexibility. The traditional means of applying decisive force, such as heavy armored forces, firepower, air power or swift operational maneuver, may not be sufficient to meet every contingency. We must be prepared to respond with different combinations of joint capabilities, ensuring we can deal with diverse threats under varying operational conditions. Therefore, the Army's number one long-term transformation objective is to enhance *strategic responsiveness*, the ability to rapidly project the right mix of mission tailored, combat-ready land forces and capabilities, including support and sustainment, from the United States or forward-deployed areas.

In order to provide *strategic responsiveness*, the Army has placed its emphasis of effort on four interrelated transformation priorities. *Information superiority*, critical to achieving "mental agility," is the Army's number one near-term transformation priority. The ability to *rapidly project forces* for the full range of military missions is also a key mid- and long-term priority. The Army must pursue concurrently both of these goals—achieving mental and physical agility. In addition, two enabling priorities, streamlining *sustainment* operations and enhancing *force protection* also require focused effort. In accomplishing our transformation priorities the Army, operating as part of a joint and interagency team, will be able to generate the knowledge, speed and power that can "overmatch" any potential foe.

To achieve greater strategic responsiveness, the results of the Army After Next war games have told us we need a "bridge" between the capabilities we have developed in the Advanced Warfighting Experiments and what will be required for the Army After Next. We have not been completely successful in developing all the Army's six imperatives at an equal pace, and we need a means to get them re-synchronized so we can co-evolve them over time. In particular, our greatest challenge is the human dimension of change—how we prepare and organize our people. The Advanced Warfighting Experiments have already demonstrated the tremendous capability of information-age technology to dramatically transform how we conduct military operations. Now, we must develop the leaders and soldiers who will thrive in this environment and have the capacity to fully exploit the potential of the systems and organizations we put in their hands. By developing the leaders and soldiers of the 21st century now, when new technology becomes available and new organizations are created we will have the people we need to make the most of the opportunity. To accomplish this objective we must add another component to the Force XXI process. Using the Army's Strike Force to conduct the first Advanced Warfighting Experiments for the Army After Next, we will build the bridge we need between our near-term capabilities and the objective force of the future. The Strike Force will serve as our test bed for ensuring the balanced, co-evolution of the Army's six imperatives.

Our Intent for the Strike Force—Purpose, Method, End-State

Since the challenges of uncertainty and the unrelenting pressure to change are with us here and now, the Strike Force must provide both near-term capabilities and serve as a vehicle for developing the future force.

Purpose—Complement existing force structure by:

- provide a needed near-term strategic capability for rapidly deploying a versatile initial entry force that can be readily adapted to diverse requirements and threats, and
- serve as our platform for testing Army After Next organizations and developing the critical leader and soldier development skills to support these organizations.

Method—Use the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and our Advanced Warfighting Experiments to implement the Strike Force concept.

End-State—Speed our transformation from an industrial-era force to an information-age Army, while constantly maintaining readiness to support the U.S. National Military Strategy.

How the Army Will Organize the Strike Force and Conduct Contingency Operations

The immediate goals of the Strike Force will be to dramatically enhance our ability to combine

diverse Army capabilities for a specific mission; compress significantly the amount of time required to prepare and deploy; and reduce the size of the force's forward-deployed "footprint."

We expect the Strike Force to be able to conduct a broad range of strategic tasks, often within the context of the same mission. Our forces must be capable of conducting more than just traditional warfighting. The Strike Force, for example, might be required to project power and deter conflict in an area of operations while, at the same time, providing humanitarian assistance.

Initially, the key to the adaptive capacity of the Strike Force will be the command-and-control capabilities we embed in the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. We will start by making the Strike Force the Army's premier operational headquarters, incorporating lessons learned from past Advanced Warfighting Experiments and emphasizing the knowledge, speed and power achieved through information dominance. We will build on the tremendous expertise, experience and capabilities in power projection already resident throughout the Army. The Strike Force's command and control will provide the core around which we can task organize the full spectrum of Army assets as missions require and provide the linkages to quickly integrate the right set of joint capabilities. Tactical operations, intelligence collection, surveillance, reconnaissance, logistical support, planning, joint coordination, liaison and rehearsals will all be facilitated by the rapid exchange of high volumes of accurate, timely, relevant information made possible by transforming the regiment into a unique knowledge-based organization. We will combine the best information-age technology with the most robust and versatile command-and-control systems available to create an unmatched capacity to collect, understand and distribute information. The regiment will become, in effect, a "receptacle" headquarters into which we can "plug-in" the capabilities we need. We want to be able to task organize as easily, quickly and efficiently as anyone who can plug a light into a wall receptacle and turn it on with the flick of a switch.

After creating the receptacle, we will develop techniques that will allow us to utilize our existing forces to rapidly build the optimum contingency force for each operation. The Strike Force will experiment with the means for creating highly adaptive commands that can draw on the Army's expertise worldwide. Today our forces have a tremendous amount of experience in conducting a wide spectrum of military operations in diverse regions of the world. We also have commands with unique skills and expertise on the most challenging military tasks. The 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York, for example, is the Army's expert on operations in urban terrain. Other divisions have their own areas of expertise, from conducting raids and deep strikes to rapid power projection with heavy forces. Through the Strike Force we will be able to draw on and combine the capabilities of world-class experts from across the Army to meet unique operational missions that are not ideally suited for any of our current forces. More importantly, we will be able to provide our theater commanders in the field exactly the kinds of multimission capabilities they need to support their requirements for contingency forces.

A Strike Force Scenario

Under the Strike Force concept, initially we will not create new organizations but develop a system that allows us to draw just the precise capabilities we need from already existing forces and integrate them into a single, streamlined command for a given mission.

A theater commander could, for example, be faced with the difficult task of preempting the impending "meltdown" of a failing state. In this case, the mission might require separating and deterring well-organized armed factions possessing a combination of conventional forces, terrorist threats and weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the intercession would have to secure the state's capital, protecting and aiding the civil population, while providing an enclave for the continued functioning of government and the implementation of security and confidence building measures as the disputing factions negotiate a settlement. This mission would require a broad spectrum of capabilities. Under the Strike Force concept, the Army could quickly dispatch a precise mix of land forces, firepower and support to hold off a combination of conventional and asym-

metrical threats while providing essential assistance to civil authorities. The Strike Force might incorporate elements from the urban warfare specialists from the 10th Mountain Division to secure the enclave; a slice of heavy fire support and army aviation, teamed with other joint assets to help deter conventional forces; and experts from Special Operations Forces, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard to provide civil support and respond to terrorist, chemical and biological warfare threats.

Today, particularly as we face the prospect of being called on to conduct operations in developing regions of the world, we anticipate the Army will be increasingly required to meet unique contingency requirements that fall in the gap between what can be provided by the rapid response of our light forces and the tremendous combat power of our heavy forces. In addition, we may need to draw on the Army's ever-growing capabilities to respond to emerging threats like urban warfare, weapons of mass destruction and theater ballistic missiles. Mixing and matching units for each mission enormously complicates the challenge of deploying, controlling and sustaining forces.

Not only would the Strike Force headquarters control land force assets, but it would integrate rapidly with the other joint capabilities that would be needed for the mission, as well as interfacing with governmental and nongovernmental agencies. In its initial configuration the Strike Force would be capable of serving as a Land Forces (LANDFOR) headquarters. As the concept matures, the Strike Force may develop the potential to act as a joint task force headquarters. The Strike Force will also have the capability to reach back and get the information/intelligence it needs—wherever it is. It should have hooks into the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and all national systems. With the Strike Force's unique capabilities it need not go through layers of headquarters initially in order to accomplish its mission. As the name implies, the Strike Force will be a fast moving, hard hitting, multimission force.

In addition to allowing us to organize our forces more efficiently, streamlining the operational capabilities and the requirements for deploying units will allow us to project power more quickly and reduce the size of the command's forward-deployed footprint. The Strike Force will provide an early entry force that can be introduced immediately into a theater to stabilize the situation or set the conditions for bringing in follow-on forces. We envision the Strike Force will be capable of conducting 30 days of sustained high-tempo operations. If there is not enough time to conduct decisive operations or stabilize the situation, then the Strike Force will set the conditions for bringing in additional joint capabilities. If operations expand into a land campaign, follow-on divisions and corps will deploy into the theater and assume the LANDFOR mission. The Strike Force might remain in theater to prepare for a subsequent operation or redeploy, while the units under the Strike Force disperse and redeploy or rejoin their parent organizations as they join the campaign.

In the near term, as we develop the concept, we may reconfigure one or two additional headquarters in overseas theaters as Strike Force commands, giving regional commanders the ability to build their own Strike Forces using the capabilities they already have, as well as drawing from units from the United States. In this manner, we could, in the near future, create a fairly robust capability to provide global Strike Force coverage. Over time as the capabilities of the Strike Forces grow, the range of support they can provide our theater commanders for contingency operations will expand considerably. In fact, we may see two or three "generations" of the Strike Force develop over the next decade as we gradually grow and expand its capabilities.

How We Will Experiment With the Strike Force and Develop Future Capabilities

The Strike Force experimentation plan will build on a decade of our experience of serving the nation in the post–Cold War world—a decade of practical experience in using military force to make and keep peace while maintaining trained and ready forces, and a decade of groundbreaking experimentation and thoughtful reflection about how to best support the nation in the future.

We will design the Strike Force to balance its requirements for operational readiness and its

role as the Army After Next test-bed. The XVIII Airborne Corps will remain the core of our rapid response forces. Meanwhile, with its initial operational capability, the Strike Force will focus on limited, specific contingency missions—freeing up the corps to focus on major operations. To ensure its responsiveness, the Strike Force may alternate phases of experimentation and ready-status or remain in the experimental mode and transition to ready status according to a predetermined alert process. As the operational capabilities of the Strike Force expand over time, its responsibility for contingency operations will also grow. As additional Strike Forces are brought online, to enhance readiness, we may alternate the Army After Next test-bed among them in accordance with a coordinated joint experimentation program and the requirements of theater commanders.

The Strike Force will be able to transition readily from the testing to the operational mode because we will employ a coordinated, phased and iterative experimentation plan. In short, we will not be experimenting on all the aspects of the Strike Force all the time. We will focus on individual key enablers in the Strike Force during each experimentation cycle using the facilities already resident at the regiment's home station in the Joint Readiness Training Center and we will maintain contingency plans for terminating experimentation and returning to operational status.

The sequence in which we focus on the key Strike Force enablers will reflect our priorities for developing the Army's six imperatives. Above all, Strike Force experimentation will serve to advance concepts in command and control, adaptability and compressing the leader development time line. In particular, we must dramatically improve our leader development programs. In developing the concepts of information-age warfare, we have stressed situational awareness, information dominance, collaborative planning enablers and reach-back capabilities. What is required now is the "spade work" to determine exactly what we need to do to enhance the performance of our leaders in order to use these information-age tools and, as we develop these capabilities in the Strike Force, distribute them through the rest of the Army. Accordingly, our priority of effort will be in the following order.

- Reengineer the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment's command and control (C^2). This will provide the foundation for the Strike Force's operational capability, an initial ability to build adaptive forces, and create a platform for experimenting with the human dimension of change. Command and control has always been the nexus of Army operations. By focusing in this area we will be going right to the heart of challenging our preconceptions about employing land forces. This is the place we must start to rethink our assumptions and conceptualize what soldiers and leaders must be able to do in the 21st century force.
- Experiment with training, leader and soldier (TLS) development. The objective of this effort will be to determine how to create new mental processes and adaptive teaming skills and then compress the time required to develop these skills and attributes in our future leaders and soldiers. We will explore the potential of TLS development by making the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment a true learning organization that "self-teaches," determining the "standards of performance" it can achieve and then through successive training iterations set increasingly higher standards as it discovers the full potential of the organization. As an integral part of the TLS effort, the Strike Force will become the Army's showcase for distance learning, using information-age telecommunications to distribute knowledge and facilitate collaborative learning.
- Expand the joint and interagency "hooks" into the Strike Force. This initiative will begin to extend the range of contingency operations that the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment will be capable of performing.
- Develop sustainment enhancements. This effort will provide the Strike Force its first level of leap-ahead capability. Developments will focus on streamlining logistical needs, reducing deployment requirements, expanding the adaptive capabilities of the force and shrinking the Strike Force's forward-deployed footprint.
- Enhance rapid deployment. Here we will focus on getting the Strike Force's expanded capabilities into an operational theater faster. As

the Army After Next war games have repeatedly demonstrated, one soldier early on is worth five soldiers later.

◆ Integrate new operational capabilities. With the forces we have today, we can "operationalize" the Strike Force concept without breakthroughs in new technology. We must, however, continue to modernize or face the block obsolescence of our equipment. In addition, we must maintain our technological edge to project overwhelming power with fewer forces. Quality has a quantity all its own. Therefore, while the Army After Next project guides our long-term science and technology (S&T) efforts, we will use feedback from Strike Force operations and experimentation to help continually refine our requirements. Meanwhile, we will utilize advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTD) and the Army's battle labs to lead our efforts in rapidly maturing new capabilities or creatively adapting available commercial "off the shelf" technologies. As these efforts progress, we will develop the new systems that show the most potential and make them available as Strike Force assets to provide the next level of leap-ahead operational capabilities.

◆ Design new organizations. We will leverage the lessons learned from the Strike Force and begin to define the organizations that will make up the Army After Next.

By addressing these key enablers in a focused, phased and iterative manner, over the course of several years we will be able to balance operational and experimental requirements while focusing on the essential efforts required to co-evolve the Army's six imperatives. As we complete each iteration of experimentation, we will fold new capabilities into the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, creating the next generation of Strike Force design and expanding the command's capability to conduct contingency operations.

In addition, while we conduct Strike Force experimentation over the next decade, we will continue on with our other key Force XXI efforts. They, too, will provide essential enhancements for the future force, such as developing new doctrine, improving our ability to protect the force, employ nonlethal technologies, and conduct operations in urban terrain. As these capabilities are developed they will be "cross-fertilized" with the Strike Force so that all our Force XXI efforts benefit from one another.

Throughout our effort in the years ahead, the Advanced Warfighting Experimentation plan for the Strike Force will focus on testing the limits of our ground forces' adaptability and rapid deployment. We might start by conducting the first test in the lowlands of the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana under a stability operations scenario. The Strike Force might then be dispatched to the forested hills of the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Europe with a different set of capabilities and a different mission—a preemptive deployment. Finally, we could deploy the Strike Force to the desert floor at the National Training Center with a third set of capabilities and a third mission—a forced entry operation. This unprecedented experimentation plan would test our ability to project power and conduct a broad spectrum of missions, against both current and emerging threats, in diverse operational environments, as part of a joint force.

In formalizing the experimentation plan for the Strike Force, we must pay particular attention to the potential of our Reserve-Component forces, the United States Army Reserve and Army National Guard. Their expertise, for example, in rapid mobilization, distance learning and rapid team building will be invaluable in developing the unique characteristics and flexibility we will embed in the Strike Force's organizational design. They may also provide key "plugs," such as WMD response assets and logistical, civil affairs or psychological operations units. In short, both the Active and Reserve Components have important roles to play in the Strike Force Advanced Warfighting Experimentation.

For Strike Force experimentation to be truly path-breaking, however, it must also be synchronized with a joint and interagency experimentation plan. The success of the Strike Force will be in its ability to provide just the right support to a theater commander during the initial stage of a contingency operation. The ability to rapidly integrate the capabilities of the Strike Force with the other military and nonmilitary assets available will create a synergistic effect, allowing commanders to deal with a crisis with greater authority, quicker, and with more comprehensive solutions.

The focus of the Strike Force experimentation plan will not only be to advance near-term capabilities. The Strike Force will be our test-bed for the organizational structure, training, leader and soldier development, and manning requirements for the Army After Next. In particular, we will focus on the most difficult aspects of evolving the force—the human dimension, the leader and soldier development issues that will address how to instill the skills and attributes needed by 21st century warriors. In addition, as promising technologies mature they will also be integrated into the Strike Force design. The Strike Force will provide the perfect vehicle for both defining requirements and testing their application to future operations. Using the Strike Force we will make a "mark on the wall" for defining the kinds of units and systems we want for the Army After Next—and we will draw that line based on real operational experience and tough realistic experimentation with real soldiers and real-world capabilities.

Summary

The Strike Force will provide:

- just the right force mix for a contingency operation, making the most efficient use of our existing capabilities;
- the means to tailor our force mix more quickly and effectively;
- an early entry force that can be deployed rapidly, with a reduced forward-deployed footprint;
- improved links to joint forces and supporting governmental and nongovernmental agencies;
- an asset designed to meet the needs of our theater commanders (CINCs) around the world;
- the capability to better deal with emerging threats, such as urban warfare, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles; and
- a test-bed for experimenting with the capabilities we need for the Army After Next, developing both the human dimension, organizations and the technology we will require in the future force.

Through the Strike Force we will envision new ways to conceptualize combining and employing land forces to meet the demanding and complex operational environments of the future. The key will be adaptive command-and-control structures that give us the means to mix and match our capabilities, creating the right force mix for each mission and providing the best support for our commanders in the field. The Strike Force will give us a real-world asset today and serve as a test-bed for co-evolving the six imperatives to meet the needs of the Army After Next.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

February 17, 1999

On Change

Last week I had the opportunity to talk at the Army Public Affairs Conference in Washington, D.C. In attendance at this session were some of the Army's best and brightest public affairs personnel. They came from the Active, Guard, and Reserve, as well as the civilian component of the Army and truly represented the Total Army family. I spoke to them about change and the critical role they play in helping us to shape that change. There is no doubt that the Army has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, and yet as I dialogued with these public affairs personnel I realized that we had changed much more than most people understood. I asked for their help in telling the Army story. As I reflect on that session, I realize that the change is coming very fast and I have to do a better job of keeping you all informed on this change as well as soliciting your ideas concerning the direction we are headed. I know there is a lot of brainpower out there and one of the strengths of the Army has been our ability to tap into great ideas wherever they exist. As you remember, when we faced the decision on the senior rater profile for the new OER [officer evaluation report], I asked for your comments. I believe because of that we came up with a much better solution, and certainly the execution of that change has been better because of your input and

participation. I want to conduct a similar exercise on change.

This RTWR will be about change. Basically, I want to take you through the rationale for change and then explain how all the change packages that we have in place tie together. Each of you has been involved with key pieces of this change package, but when you look at the totality of it, I think you'll see how it ties together and how far we have gone. I hope that an added benefit of this effort will be to help all of us tell the Army story better. One of the key tasks for strategic leadership is to be able to explain what they are doing and why they are doing it. In the Army we must be able to explain that to a large internal audience as well as the American public.

The start point for change is really the end of the Cold War. The last 10 years have not been the only time the Army has experienced change, but the difference associated with this decade is the magnitude and pace of change. The challenge that we have faced and continue to face is how do you keep the force trained and ready and conduct the most fundamental restructuring since the end of World War II in a constrained resource environment. This is a difficult task under any circumstances, but as you know it is made more difficult by the fact that this is also one of the busiest times for ground forces in our history. The battle rhythms that we were used to during the Cold War have been accelerated not only because of the types of operations our soldiers are involved in but also because change is leader intensive business. However, when you compare the change that has taken place against previous changes, such as at the end of World War II and the Vietnam War, I think we must conclude that, while not perfect, this change has been accomplished very well.

I also think it important to recognize that what was done during the Cold War was also done exceptionally well. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled one of the greatest victories ever achieved. All of our predecessors had a lot to do with that as well as laying the foundation for today's Army. The Cold War force they built was one of the most powerful fighting forces in military history. One needs only to look at the results of DESERT STORM for testimony to that fact. That Cold War force had an equal mix of Active and Reserve Components. It was a threat-based force, primarily focused on a strategy of containment. The things that made that force special are the underpinnings of our force today. We call them the Six Imperatives (soldiers, training, doctrine, force mix, modernization, and leader development). These imperatives will never change, but inside each of these imperatives we must change, in order to adjust to the changing environment. However, our change must be well thought out because it is critical that we keep the Six Imperatives synchronized over time.

As we became smaller and picked up new and diverse missions, we sometimes found that we had a force structure/requirements mismatch. In other words, the requirements we faced did not always lend themselves to the force packages we built for the Cold War. Consequently, we often had to borrow capabilities from one another to mix and match so that we were able to properly meet the requirements of METT-T. Two concepts designed to bridge the gap between requirements and force structure are teaming and Strike Force.

Today's Army consists of 54 percent Reserve Components and 46 percent Active. While it is a much more cost-effective force the new challenge is to be able to meet the increased and diverse requirements with a smaller total force structure. Basically, we have to broaden the base from which we draw our force structure. With ten Active-Component divisions and eight National Guard divisions, one way of doing that is to team an Active and National Guard division. Without a draft it is hard to fill shortages and replace nondeployables in the Active-Component division without drawing from other Active-Component forces that are also needed. Some have also questioned the relevancy of our National Guard divisions in the post–Cold War world. By teaming we are able to address both issues and create a win-win situation. The teaming concept is basically similar to a follow and support tactical mission. Whatever the lead division needs, the teamed division will provide, whether it's equipment or people. Ideally both will come in small-unit packages, but they could also come as individuals if required. Today we have four divisions in the teaming concept—1st Cavalry Division and the 49th Armored

Division, and the 4th [Infantry Division] and the 40th [Infantry] Division. These pilot programs have already taught us much about this concept and I have tasked Forces Command to look at expanding it even further. Obviously, this concept will require changes to mobilization laws and policies concerning equipping and training. I believe all of this is doable once we properly explain what we're trying to do. One of the real benefits of the teaming concept is that it picks up some of the goodness associated with the capstone alignment of the Cold War and leverages that goodness to complement the support to organizational training (5,000 officers and NCOs provided to improve Reserve-Component readiness). One of the other key features of this concept is that it better allows us to manage our PERSTEMPO [personnel tempo] amongst the components. Quite frankly, the teaming concept is the best way of broadening our base to meet the diverse requirements associated with our National Military Strategy while still giving due consideration to cost and PERSTEMPO challenges.

Strike Force complements the teaming concept in a very important way. It is designed to provide a more adaptive force structure for the diverse challenges, be a leader development laboratory for the entire Army, and to serve as a prototype organization for the Army After Next. While we will use the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment [ACR] as a base organization upon which to build the Strike Force, this is not about developing and equipping a new armored cavalry regiment. At the heart of the Strike Force is command and control. Through the reorganization of the 2d ACR, we should be able to create the spaces necessary to form the command-and-control elements of Strike Force. I envision this command-and-control element to be different. Strike Force should have the capability of commanding and controlling whatever initial capabilities we need in order to stabilize or control the situation. Further, it should have the ability to plug in to national intelligence systems, if required, and to reach back and draw from the vast arsenal of support available in America's Army. It is neither heavy or light but has the capability to employ both. As such, it complements the development taking place along both our heavy and light axis. By locating it at Fort Polk it takes advantage of the enormous capabilities associated with our Combat Training Center Program. The Strike Force will have very little if any organic permanently organized combat capabilities. It will, however, borrow whatever it needs, based upon the factors of METT-T [an analysis of the mission, enemy, terrain, friendly troops, and the time available] from the vast array of capabilities across America's Army. By temporarily borrowing from other units, we create an adaptable rapidly deployable force, designed to meet diverse requirements with current capabilities.

Obviously, the leader development part of Strike Force is the key to success. There are obviously challenges associated with this kind of adaptability and the only way to overcome them is through leader development. Again, located at JRTC the Strike Force can take advantage of the leader development program already in place and will have the opportunity to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures required. Of course, we will try to push the edge of the envelope in terms of utilizing information-age technology to assist in this mission. However, the most important dimension of this will be the human aspect. We intend to focus considerable attention and resources to develop the leader and soldier skills, as well as the training system necessary for such an organization. As such, the spotlight will be on the TLS [training, leader, soldier] portion of our Six Imperatives. In order to keep the imperatives synchronized we will continue the work on all imperatives on the other axises but particular attention will be given to TLS with the Strike Force. The Training and Doctrine Command continue to have the task of pulling these efforts together.

Equally important in my mind is the need to start investigating different organizational designs for the future. Strike Force can serve as a prototype design for the Army After Next. One way of looking at it is as an ACTD [Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration] organizational design. By not embedding permanent combat capabilities in this structure at this time we leave ourselves enormous flexibility. As we continue to experiment, we will also fine-tune and at some point we will be ready to employ this organization. My

belief is that we are closer to employment than many think, but like fine wine we need not use it until it's ready. Through employment we will again gain valuable insights and continue our fine-tuning process, leading all the way to an organizational design for Army After Next.

If you couple these concepts with the changes that have already taken place in the Force XXI process, I think you must agree that we have done a lot and we are continuing to change at a very rapid pace. I believe this is an exciting part of the Army today. We must challenge ourselves and our young leaders to understand this change process. I challenge you to become actively involved in explaining this process to internal and external audiences. In that regard, if you have comments concerning the clarity of these concepts or comments—either good or bad—about these concepts, I urge you to let us know. All you have to do is respond to this message and we will ensure that your comments are collated and factored into the discussion and decision process. The good news is that nothing is locked in concrete, and you still have an opportunity to make a difference. The important thing is that we must get it right for our soldiers.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

February 24, 1999

Manning the Force

Last weekend we had our board of directors meeting and the subject of the meeting was "Manning the Force." As all of you know, that has been a tough challenge for us over the years. Nineteen ninety-eight represented the eighth straight year of drawdown and provided us a clearer picture of where we were at the Active-Component endstate. This clearer picture and our projections for the future helped shape our discussions. I would like to provide you a few thoughts about those discussions.

Manning the force is a complex equation of recruiting, retention, and attrition. To get the proper manning levels, we must have all three in balance. Today what we find is that while retention remains high and our recruiting quality indicators remain high, so does our attrition. In fact, first-term attrition, despite the high-quality indicators of the different cohort groups, remains right around 38 percent and that is one of the highest rates in the history of the Volunteer Force. We also have a lot of experience with the Volunteer Force and have done a careful analysis over time of what the numbers really mean.

In 1998 our retention was above 100 percent of objective. This year, recognizing that we were at end-state, we raised slightly the retention objectives over 1998 and hope to achieve 65,000 to help make end strength. Our projections are that because of your hard work we will make that number. However, all of those retentions are not necessarily soldiers who would have left the force in 1999. Many have signed up for the career status as soon as eligible and that is good, but it doesn't necessarily mean that we have increased the end strength of the Army in 1999 by 65,000. As I'm sure you recognize, the 65,000 reenlistments don't correlate directly to Army needs. They are quality soldiers and we need every one of them, but they don't solve all the shortages across the force. However, clearly your efforts in this area have made a difference and continued efforts over the next few months to focus on the initial and midterm soldiers with a FY 99 ETS will directly impact on our ES. We need to retain as many good soldiers as we possibly can, and we will continue to attempt to control the distribution of these soldiers through our Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program.

Attrition in my mind is the anomaly. If you look at the quality indicators and compare them to any time in our history, except during the early 1990s when we started the drawdown, you'll find that our quality indicators today remain extremely strong. We are recruiting quality; still it is attriting faster than in the past. There's something wrong in this picture and we don't know what it is. I do know, however, the answer and that is leadership. We don't plan to change any of our policies dealing with quality, but I do ask leaders to become more directly involved with the attrition problem. To some extent, I think the mental-

ity of downsizing has overtaken us and we have not spent as much time counseling, mentoring, coaching, and teaching our soldiers as we should. I ask that you do that. If the quality indicators are correct, then we are truly recruiting quality and now it's up to us to work with that quality and develop it to "be all it can be."

Our recruiting challenge is the toughest I've seen. There are lots of reasons, to include a strong economy, the perceived lack of a threat, increased emphasis on education in all sectors of our society, and many other valid reasons. All of these are good things and we should not wish them to be any other way, but I still think we have a lot to offer. A recent Harris Poll showed the military was the most respected institution by over 12 percentage points. The most recent propensity for service in the military showed the Army still remains the highest rated service in 1998. We have additional recruiters in the field and, having visited them on numerous occasions, I'm convinced they are working hard to meet these objectives. However, despite all of that, we were still about 2,300 below glide path during the first quarter and we are projecting that unless things change dramatically we could miss the AC accession mission by the end of 1999 by approximately 6,000.

The first and most important thing for all of you to understand is that we do not intend to let quality slip. As I said earlier, our quality is high and it will continue to remain high. Let me take you through the mechanics of determining that quality. The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) is used to determine the category of recruits, I-IV. Based upon their scores on this primarily verbal and math test, new recruits are placed in a category. Once categorized, the AFQT data is not used again. In order to determine where we place that recruit, we use the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Test (ASVAB). The line scores from this test are used to determine what MOS the new recruit is qualified for. With 25 years of experience with these numbers (despite the re-norming of the AFQT we did in the early 1980s), we know a number of things. For example, high school graduates generally attrit at a lower rate than non–high school graduates. That has been true in the past and it continues to be true. Category IIIB soldiers attrit slightly higher than Category I-IIIA soldiers, but Cat IIIB soldiers stay with us after the first term of enlistment at a slightly higher rate than other categories. While up to the years just before Desert Storm we were accepting as many as 6.9 percent Category IV personnel, we know that indiscipline rates and other problems went up with this group at a greater proportion than the numbers increased. Consequently in the 1990s we have accessed no more than up to 2 percent and plan to continue that cap. Lifting it, in our opinion, is just not worth the effort.

We also know a little bit about our demographics and how different groups relate to these quality indicators. For example, while female quality indicators are much higher than male, so is their attrition. More Hispanic youths sign up for combat arms than any other minority group and the attrition rate of non–high school graduates is lowest among the Hispanics, followed by Blacks, and then Whites. I throw this data out there not to indicate that we are fixing to change policies, but to point out both the complexity of this issue and the data bank we already have.

It's important for you to understand that we have accumulated all this data and we know a lot about what constitutes a quality force. We owe a great deal of gratitude to our predecessors who built this force and who held the line that quality has a quantity of its own. We will continue to hold the line on quality. Most people recognize the Operation Desert Storm force as a high-quality force. In 1989, the quality indicators for recruits for the force that fought Operation Desert Storm were 89.9 percent high school diploma graduates, 62.5 percent CAT I-IIIA, and 6.9 percent CAT IV. Today, we are much higher than that in Category I-IIIA (65 percent) and much lower in Category IV (2 percent). As I indicated, we do not intend to raise the caps in Category IV and we will put a floor of 62.5 percent for the I-IIIA Category. If you look at the total force and do the comparisons, what you find is that during ODS we had 90/58/10 as quality indicators and today we have a force of 90/65/4. Consequently, I think you can look anyone in the eye and say that we are not lowering quality.

That doesn't mean, however, that we won't continue to refine our analysis so that we become

a closer reflection of society. We are underrepresented in Hispanic soldiers and yet we know this is the fastest growing minority. We also know that their propensity is for the combat arms and that they make good soldiers. Yet the high school dropout rate for Hispanic youths is twice as high as any other group. Maybe through the use of JROTC [Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps] programs we can encourage this population to stay in school and also help inform them of the benefits of the Army. We have seen a trend over time of Blacks shifting from combat arms to combat service support. We still attract a great deal of high-quality Black youth and want to do that because they also make great soldiers. We will continue to refine this data and continue the course in terms of attracting as many as possible. Female soldiers have definitely improved the quality indicators of the Army. However, we must continue to work on attrition problems and figure out what is happening there. The bottom line is that we have some work to do in order to meet our end strength and be an accurate reflection of society. This will result in our taking a look at some pilot programs, but I want to assure you that quality is fundamental to this Army. We have benchmarked the Operation DESERT STORM and we plan on the quality of the future force being at least equal to or greater than the one that fought DESERT STORM.

We also spent considerable time discussing CINCOS and officer restructuring initiative. Basically we are committed to buying back 4,000 NCOs starting in FY00. They will be distributed across the force and should go a long way toward solving our NCO shortage problem. However, it's important to remember that we cannot get all of them out in 2000. I've instructed the DCSPER [Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel] to open the promotion gates for NCOs as fast as we possibly can so that we can deal with this shortage as quickly as possible. Until that time, it is important that you continue to manage your NCOs properly and ensure that you distribute them according to the priority. Additionally, I ask that you look into the scheduling of your SGT to PLDC [Primary Leader Development Course] and the SSGs to BNCOC [Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course] so that those soldiers recommended for promotion can be promoted when they meet the cut-off scores. No matter how many NCOs we have, they will always be a critical asset and with the shortage it is even more important that we ensure they are properly distributed. The officer restructuring initiative is coming along very well. We still have a requirements/inventory mismatch. Branch qualified captains will continue to be a critical shortage. I don't see any quick-term fix here, but we will continue to work it. This is a very critical issue, at least from my perspective, because I believe captains are the center of gravity for our future force. We have extremely high-quality captains but we must retain them in sufficient numbers to provide the leadership for the Army After Next. I am encouraged with what I saw reference OPMS [Officer Professional Management System] XXI and how over time that will better align our inventory and requirements process. The bottom line, however, is that we will continue to use an ODP [officer distribution plan] for the near term, but our objective through the officer restructuring initiative remains to get inventory and requirements aligned so that we no longer require an ODP. That, however, is a few years off.

This was a very good session because we focused on some tough issues that were critical to our Army. They were all about soldiers. While I don't think we solved all of them, I am convinced that we have a better understanding of them and are moving in the right direction.

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E-mail to Army General Officers

March 22, 1999

JRTC and NTC—What I Saw Was an Army Transforming Itself

During the last two weekends I had an opportunity to visit both the JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center] and NTC [National Training Center]. As always, I was thoroughly impressed with all that I saw taking place at both

locations. Basically what I saw was an Army transforming itself from the most powerful force in military history—the Army of Excellence—to a new Army based upon knowledge, speed, and power. This is an Army that is not simply modernizing but through our spiral development process, it is an Army moving from the industrial age to the information age. In the course of one week and with two short visits I was able to see an awful lot. I was extremely pleased with all that I saw.

At JRTC [Fort Polk, Louisiana], I saw a brigade from the 101st conducting military operations in urban terrain. Their mission was to take down the Shughart-Gordon Complex and to rescue the civilian populace being held by the opposing force. I was impressed by the degree of difficulty associated with this task. This is Ph.D.-level work. The realism provided by the role players in Shughart-Gordon made this an extremely realistic training exercise. I was also impressed with the solid planning taking place within the brigade. Even though it was Ph.D.-level work, we have still not forgotten the fundamentals, being led by the brigade commander and conducted by the leaders of the brigade. I couldn't help but think that in the future—and the not-so-distant future—that this type of coordination process could be conducted electronically. The situational awareness could involve the key leaders on a continual basis and ensure that the plan is modified over time to reflect changes in the situation. This truly reflects what I talk about in terms of knowledge, speed, and power. Knowledge of the enemy situation along with our own situational awareness ensures that the plan is well thought out and that the execution is fully coordinated and synchronized. The tactical agility associated with this type of knowledge gives you the speed necessary to turn within the enemy's decision cycle. By ensuring that the right force is at the right place at the right time we have the power necessary to accomplish any mission. This is truly what knowledge, speed, and power is all about.

At the National Training Center [Fort Irwin, California], I saw our first digitized brigade and a live fire exercise with the opposing force. Although they were unable to take their equipment with them from Fort Hood, the soldiers of the brigade clearly demonstrated the importance of the training they had conducted at home station. There was a definite sharpness associated with the battle rhythm of this brigade and you didn't have to look hard to find it. Even though this was the 13th day of the rotation, everybody seemed to be upbeat and pleased with what they had accomplished. I know I certainly was. In talking with the soldiers I was convinced that we are on the right track. One of the comments I received concerned how they wished they could have brought their own equipment so they could have taken advantage of FBCB2 [digital brigade and below command-and-control system] and the situational awareness it provides. To me, that was a powerful endorsement of the fact that we are on the right track. Again, I saw the importance of fundamentals. Little things like being able to conduct the proper PMCS for our vehicles and ensuring that the information that comes from those checks and services are provided to the right people in a timely fashion are truly combat multipliers. Again, my mind flashed to the future, a future with embedded diagnostics and prognostics so that we can reduce the time associated with our preventive maintenance checks and services, and ensure the reliability of our equipment conducting operations. This is really powerful stuff and is within our grasp.

Visiting both of these crown jewels of our training system convinced me that we are indeed on the right track. We're not getting ready to get ready but we have rucked it up, moved out, and are well past the line of departure. Our approach to change is much the same as what we've done throughout our almost 225 years of history. We are doing what needs to be done without a lot of fanfare and accomplishing it in a clearly professional manner. I remain convinced that we are on the right track and that the spiral development process of Force XXI is the right process to ensure we continue to be able to meet the needs of the nation. While we must continue to ensure we get it right because we are talking something as important as the security of our nation, we should have no fear about the track we're on. This is a wonderful opportunity and we must seize the moment.

There is no secret about the key to success. It is and always has been our people. The skilled

soldiers I saw during these visits are truly excited about what they're doing and, more importantly, are capable of doing exactly what we ask them to do. They are led by some of the best and most caring leaders I have seen in my 37 years of service. If there's a problem, it is simply we just don't have enough of them. I believe the talent is there and we must leverage that talent. I would ask all of you to discuss with your sergeants major the recent message SMA Hall put out entitled "Out and About." It had to do with the opportunity for promotion for our NCOs. As you know, we cut back too much on the NCO force and are currently in the process of increasing our end strength by about 5,000. I don't want to promote anybody who is not qualified. On the other hand, this gives us an opportunity to promote NCOs at the maximum rate allowable through the DOPMA process. It is a wonderful opportunity for the Army and we must fully leverage it. This means that we must identify those soldiers and noncommissioned officers who are ready for promotion and get them prepared. It is particularly troubling to me to see the number of soldiers who would otherwise be eligible for promotion to sergeant except they have not been through PLDC or have not been boarded for promotion. I've heard all the reasons why that is the case. Some say they are not qualified and if that truly is the case that is a valid reason. Others say that there's no use boarding them because they're going to get out anyway, or that they do not have enough time in grade to be promoted. Those are simply excuses as far as I'm concerned. We must take care of our soldiers in two ways. First, we must provide them the best leadership possible and, second, we must give them an opportunity to be all they can be. I ask you to discuss this with your sergeants major and all your subordinates so that we make sure that we are doing the right thing. This is about strategic leadership because it is all about developing the leaders capable of leading with knowledge, speed, and power. Our soldiers deserve that.

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"The Army After Next: Revolutionary Transformation"

Strategic Review

Spring 1999

We launched the Army After Next (AAN) project in the spring of 1996 to assist us in the development of a vision of future requirements. AAN was to occupy a "hilltop" 30 years into the future and report what it saw. Looking forward is difficult for any organization. Looking forward 30 years is virtually unprecedented, particularly for an army. To ensure that it maintained a comprehensive perspective, the AAN project focused on four critical areas: the geo-strategic environment; technology; military art; and human and organizational behavior. AAN's two annual reports thus far, *Knowledge & Speed* and *Knowledge & Speed: Battle Force and the U.S. Army of 2025*, have yielded a vision for changing the Army from an industrial-age to an information-age organization. That vision amounts to a revolutionary transformation for the Army—a transformation founded upon three principles: Knowledge, Speed, and Power.

Why Change?

Our investigations into the future thus far have given us two compelling reasons for transforming the Army. First, the geo-strategic environment is becoming more complex and dynamic. Ethnic rivalries, national and religious tensions, international crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, and the rise of one or more major military competitors capable of challenging the U.S. regionally will probably increase the likelihood of conflict over the next several decades. To provide leadership and to promote democratic principles, human rights, and free-market economies in such a world, the United States will need an Army that is more strategically responsive.

Second, advances in precision weaponry and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will make the future battlefield a much more lethal place. Tomorrow's tactical engagement areas will likely extend as far as today's operational and strategic distances. To

survive and accomplish its objectives in such an environment, the Army must become more mentally and physically agile. It must also fight as part of a joint team, contributing its unique capabilities toward the realization of the operational concepts laid out in Joint Vision 2010: Dominant Maneuver; Precision Engagement; Full-dimensional Protection; and Focused Logistics. While advances in precision weapons will make the battlefield more lethal, recent events have shown that if we want to protect a people's cultural and ethnic existence, we have to do it the old fashioned way—by putting troops on the ground.

Our Strategy for Change

Preparing for the future is a challenge. As General Electric's recent annual report reveals, trends predicted 20 years ago—record highs for oil, Japanese dominance in the world economy, and double-digit inflation—"did not play out." Today, oil is at record lows, the Japanese economy is struggling, and inflation remains low. Jack Welsh and GE's other leaders have thus concluded that an organization's ability to meet the future depends a great deal upon its "ability to cope with any trend." Like GE, the Army had to adopt a flexible approach to preparing for the future. Failure to adapt could mean letting the nation down in a moment of crisis.

Time is not necessarily on our side. We can't afford to stand down the Army in order to modernize it. The Army can't take a time out from readiness. We must change while executing the national military strategy, a strategy for which the Army does much of the "heavy lifting." Hence, our change process had to afford us enough flexibility to alter our vision as the need arises.

To guarantee flexibility, we adopted a process of experimentation and development in 1994 called Force XXI, which consists of three overarching efforts: redesign of the tactical Army; redesign of the institutional Army; and the integration of information-age technologies into the force. The key to Force XXI is *Spiral Development*—a partnership of soldiers, scientists, testing agencies, and leading members of industry, academia, and the research and development community working together in an iterative experimentation effort. Spiral Development allows us to anticipate, leverage, and monitor change in the Army's Core Competencies: Quality People, Leader Development, Training, Modern Equipment, Doctrine, and Force Mix. Transforming the Army successfully requires synchronizing our progress across all of these areas, ensuring that the effects of change in one area are addressed in the others over time. We want them to co-evolve, to change with respect to each other in ways that contribute to the effectiveness of each. The FXXI Process focuses on capabilities instead of weapons.

The Army's selection of a standard machine gun in 1904, during a period of unparalleled reorganization, is a good example of Spiral Development. Rather than choosing a machine gun solely on its own merits, we elected to synchronize its selection with that of the new service rifle (M–1903 Springfield) so that the two weapons would have matching ammunition calibers, thus easing the logistical burden on the battlefield. We subsequently chose the water-cooled Maxim and synchronized its adoption with other initiatives on structural reorganization and new doctrine and training methods. Keeping our core competencies synchronized thus allows us to maintain a comprehensive perspective with regard to change and to reduce the potential friction among the Army's many moving parts *before* those parts are tested in battle.

The Army of 2025

The Army of 2025 will consist of a mixture of forces ranging from special operations, light, mechanized, and *strike* and *battle forces*. Every element of the Army of 2025 will both contribute to and benefit from Knowledge, Speed, and Power in some form.

Knowledge means the ability to answer three questions: Where am I?—Where are my buddies?—Where is the enemy? Ideally, we want to be able to answer those questions successfully, all the time. We cannot do that unless we are able to leverage fully the tremendous capabilities associated with information technology. Speed refers to tactical agility as well as rapid strategic responsiveness—getting there "first with the most." Speed also means agility—making decisions quickly, developing leaders who are comfortable

with a degree of uncertainty and capable of harnessing the power of the information age. By 2025, the Army will put decisive combat power in theater in a matter of hours. Power means providing not only an overmatch of the *right* forces to do the job, but also having enough flexibility and adaptability within those forces to respond to unforeseen situations. It also means having the right force at the right place at the right time to accomplish the mission quickly and with minimum casualties.

When combined, Knowledge, Speed, and Power will amount to a revolution in strategic ways because they will give us more freedom to decide *how* and *where* we will engage.

Throughout history the Army's major strategic challenge has been *getting to the fight*. Deployment times and logistics requirements forced us to arrive in stages, which in turn put tremendous constraints on how we fought. Tomorrow, knowing where the enemy is, moving faster than he can, and with more of the right mix of force than he has will enable us to *checkmate* him. In other words, we will remove his options so that he will have only two choices: to fight against overwhelming odds or to concede the conflict on our terms.

Knowledge, Speed, and Power will also help us conduct stability and support operations more effectively by enabling us to put "boots on the ground" in the right locations, quickly, and with the right capabilities to control people and places. Knowledge of the capabilities and locations of friendly and hostile forces, the ability to move quickly anywhere on the globe with the right kinds of forces to do the job, will greatly facilitate peacekeeping, arms control verification, disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation, and counter-terrorist missions. To do so effectively we must reach back and tap into the vast arsenal available in the whole of America's Army.

Knowledge, Speed, and Power will thus make the Army of 2025 the nation's most versatile expression of military power.

Thus Far . . .

We have made a great deal of progress within a few short years. The Army's Battle Command System, which uses emerging information technologies to combine real-time situation awareness with near-instantaneous transmission of the commander's intent, has brought us one step closer to revolutionizing our tactical command and control procedures. Other steps toward that revolution include fielding the first digitized division in the year 2000 and the first digitized corps before the end of 2004. This will allow our heavy force to leverage the significant capabilities associated with situational awareness and ultimately information dominance. Our light forces will complement the heavy force so that the Army maintains a balance of capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict. The battlefield awareness or *knowledge* that our digitized systems will impart to every unit in the Army remains a prerequisite for achieving the proper balance between dominant maneuver and precision strike over all types of terrain from urban and restricted to open.

We are using the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) to create a Strike Force that will provide an adaptive, near-term, early entry force capable of rapid strategic deployment. The Strike Force will possess the characteristics of speed, agility, and decisiveness required to conduct operations in a rapidly changing strategic environment. Once fielded, it will also serve as a prototype for testing organizational structures, operational concepts, and critical leader and soldier skills for the Army of 2025. Initially, the key to the adaptive capacity of the Strike Force will be the command and control capabilities we embed in headquarters elements of the 2d ACR. These capabilities will provide the core around which we can task organize the full spectrum of Army assets (basically Cold War units) and link them to the right set of joint capabilities in response to a crisis today involving any combination of conventional and asymmetrical threats. This is the most cost-effective way of adapting the Cold War structure to post–Cold War requirements while pulling forward the technology needed for the future. Such a force might include land maneuver elements, heavy fire support, and Army aviation and joint or combined assets to address conventional threats, as well as Special Operations Forces, and Army Reserve and Army National Guard units to provide civil support and to respond to terrorist, chemical

and biological threats. As the name implies, the Strike Force will be a fast moving, hard hitting, multi-mission force that we can tailor to meet specific requirements.

Efforts are also under way to achieve a revolution in military logistics to reduce the Army's cumbersome logistical tail, an essential step toward achieving greater strategic speed while sustaining the force's logistical needs. By 2010, the Army will have new technologies and procedures in place to transition to a logistics system capable of pinpoint distribution. Among other things, this system will feature the capability to track an item from the moment it is requested by the user to the instant it arrives and is put to use. In addition, new logistics management systems will enable us to anticipate supply requirements based upon equipment with self-diagnostic capabilities. All of these steps, when complete, will amount to a total transformation of the way we supply, repair, and transport the operational Army.

The institutional Army is also changing. We are currently evaluating ways to reorganize the Department of the Army and major army commands to capitalize on the ongoing Revolution in Business Affairs. We are reengineering to achieve better performance, consolidate to remove redundancy and maximize synergy, compete to improve quality and reduce costs, and eliminate excess support structures to free up resources. Current initiatives include partnering with the private sector to "outsource" selected functions and efforts to build efficient and effective installations through better management practices and doctrine. The days of the "Iron Mountains" associated with the Cold War are long gone. The emphasis on total asset visibility and velocity management will not only decrease cost but increase deployability.

As the noted historian and scholar Sir Michael Howard has observed, it is less important for armies to predict the future than it is for them to adapt quickly when it arrives. We have built flexibility into our change process so that we can adjust our transformation as our vision of the future changes. The most critical ingredient for success, however, is the human element—the open-mindedness of our soldiers and leaders. As the CEO's of GE discovered, the future that unfolds 25 years from now will be different from what we expect it to be. Our success as a pillar of national defense will depend a great deal upon how well the young people entering the Army today adapt to the world of tomorrow. If their current performance in Central and South America, Korea, Bosnia, and in a hundred other locations across the globe is any indication—and it is—the Army's future is in good hands.

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Address to the Graduating Class of the United States Military Academy

West Point, N.Y.

May 29, 1999

Lieutenant General [Daniel W.] Christman [Academy Superintendent], Brigadier General [Fletcher M.] Lamkin [Dean of Academics], Brigadier General [John P.] Abizaid [Commandant of Cadets], members of the staff and faculty of the United States Military Academy, let me thank you for the great leadership you've provided this great institution. Thank you. You do this job very, very well. Senator [Jack] Reed, Congressman [Benjamin A.] Gilman, Congressman [Charlie] Norwood, Secretary [of the Army Louis] Caldera, distinguished guests, all, ladies and gentlemen, and most especially, the Class of 1999, your families and friends. It's a privilege to be here today in this beautiful setting with all this tradition and history—my alma mater.

It's a great honor for me to be able to address the Class of 1999. I thank the Superintendent and the Class for allowing me that honor. One of the great jobs, or one of the great parts of my job, is to be able to travel around and visit soldiers everywhere in the world.

Recently, I returned from a trip to Kuwait, where I visited some of our soldiers who are living about a thousand miles from nowhere in the middle of a desert. You live out there in the open. A first sergeant and a company commander were

completing a hard days work and they were just about to hit the rack and the first sergeant turned to the company commander and he said, "Sir, look up and tell me what you see."

The company commander looked up and he said, "Well, I see a beautiful sky with lots of stars and a full moon."

The first sergeant said, "What does that mean, Sir?"

The company commander thought about it for a little while and he said, "Well, astronomically, it means that there are millions of planets and potentially billions of galaxies. Theologically, it means that God is great and we are very insignificant in his sight. Meteorologically, it means that tomorrow will be another beautiful day."

And he paused and thought for a minute and he said, "What's it mean to you, first sergeant?"

The first sergeant said, "Sir, it means somebody stole our tent." (laughter).

There are many distinguished guests here this morning and I certainly can't name them all individually, but clearly, the most distinguished are the parents and friends, the people who got you here. Let's give them another round of applause. They truly deserve it. (applause)

To the Class of 1999, congratulations. As the Sup[erintendent] said, "You made it." You're a great class with a great record.

You've excelled in academics, sports and leadership and, not to mention that in football, you taught Navy the meaning of landpower three out of the last four years. (applause)

I want to let the audience in on a little secret. This is a very special class, at least in my eyes. As already was alluded to, we started out together in August of 1995 with the plebe hype. I told them, then, that we would start together and hopefully we'll graduate together. I think we're going to do that, although my graduation is still a few weeks off. So, there's a closeness that I feel to them and I know there's a closeness amongst them. I feel good that as I exit the Army they will continue.

Class of 1999, we're expecting great things from you and I'll be watching you.

Classmates are very important. They give you strength, and during some of my toughest hours, a note from a classmate with a simple message, "grip hands"—that's what gave me the strength to continue. There's a special thing about classmates and you get to appreciate that more as you continue along in life. West Point is a special experience and it binds you together in a way that few things in life can. There's a certain magic about the inspiration that comes from a common experience of four tough years, a friendship that is developed from that experience. Don't ever forget that. Don't ever lose that.

Thirty-seven years ago, in Washington Hall, I heard General of the Army Douglas MacArthur speak. He spoke eloquently and with quiet clarity. As I reflect back on his remarks, I find that his words are timeless. They were spoken in 1962, but those were the words for the next millenium. I plan to quote, literally, from that speech, not because I think you don't know it—I know you do—but because as I look back I conclude that MacArthur's words were right for my class and I think they also apply to you.

He spoke first of a profession of honor. "Yours is a profession of honor, the will to win, and the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed. That the very obsession of your public service must be duty, honor, country."

I can't imagine a more important profession. It's a heavy load to carry and it's a tremendous responsibility and just thinking about that burden—the fate of our nation, our way of life, resting on anyone's shoulders, is difficult enough. But the fact is, in this modern era, every class that has graduated from West Point has led American soldiers in harms way. There's no reason to think that your fate will be any different.

You are, indeed, important. America will entrust their most precious assets, her sons and daughters, to your care. We put in your hands, our safety, our security and our future.

It's also tremendously gratifying to know that when it's all over and you have answered your nation's call—that you have accomplished something very special—you have helped carry the load, you've held that trust, you have earned your place.

No one can predict the future. As one of the world's greatest living philosophers, Yogi Berra, once said, "The future ain't what it used to be."

He was correct, however, one thing is certain—you will have to deal with change.

President Kennedy, in his address to our graduating class, spoke of pride, tradition and commitment. He also predicted that "the graduates of West Point, the Naval Academy and the Air Academy, in the next ten years, will have a greater opportunity for the defense of freedom, than the academy graduates have ever had." These words were spoken in 1962 and by 1972, with two tours in Vietnam under my belt, I was convinced he was correct.

He was also correct when he talked about the changing nature of conflict. He said, "When there's a visible enemy you can fight in open combat, the answer is not so difficult. Many serve, all applaud...but when there is a long, slow struggle, with no immediate visible foe, your choice will seem hard, indeed."

Very appropriate words for the situation we face today.

President Kennedy's message was a message of change, and as I reflect back on the thirty-seven years, change has often been the only concept we had to deal with. We've gone from Vietnam to the Balkans, from a draft army to the Volunteer Army, from DESERT ONE to DESERT STORM, from a strategy of massive retaliation to containment, and finally, to engagement and enlargement.

Today's Army is also much different than the one I joined. It's smaller by about a third.

It's busier by an order of magnitude and it's more global. Today, a soldier is walking point in one of 70 different countries, lonely, austere places all the way from Albania to Korea.

It's an Army more dependent on the Reserve Component, 54 percent of our Total Army is in the Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve.

It's also a better Army, better trained, better equipped, with more realistic doctrine. It has a better mix of forces—heavy, lights, special operating forces—with high-quality people and experienced leaders.

No doubt during my career there has been a great deal of change. What I've experienced will pale in comparison to what you will experience. The frontier of space will be the high ground of the 21st century. You will have to occupy and control it.

Countering asymmetrical and transnational threats will occupy your time, and you'll still have to deal with religious and ethnic animosities—rooted in centuries of history.

No doubt there will be great challenges, but their will also be wonderful opportunities.

The role of leadership is to turn challenges into opportunities.

The opportunities for you and the Army are endless. We are in the midst of the most fundamental transformation of the Army since World War II. We are moving from an industrial age to an information age, moving from the Army of today to an Army based upon "knowledge, speed and power."

Knowledge will come from being able to leverage the tremendous capabilities associated with the information-age technology.

Speed has two aspects, to be able to move forces, soldiers anywhere in the world as quickly as possible, to do what Nathan Forrest reminded us so many years ago: "to get there firstest with the mostest." The second aspect is to be able to have the mental agility to think quick and to turn inside an enemy's decision cycle and be able to checkmate him everywhere he turns.

Finally, it's about power— to be able to have the right force, for the right situation, to be able to mix and match forces so that we can meet the mission that we're given.

Turning challenges into opportunities is easier said than done, but I would give you some advice and if you will follow it, I will guarantee you that you will be successful.

You'll be successful in the Army and you'll be successful in life if you abide by three little rules, very simple rules and all you have to do is follow them.

First, do what's right every day, legally and morally. You'll get a lot of legal advice on what's legally correct, but the moral litmus test can only come from one person, you, you have to look yourself in the mirror every day and say, "am I doing what's right."

The second rule is to be all you can be. We've recruited a lot of great soldiers with that catchy slogan. They have expectations and they

expect us to meet those expectations. We need to do that. We also need to challenge ourselves to be all we can be.

Finally, remember the golden rule, treat others as you would have them treat you.

Don't ever forget your values. You came here with a solid foundation base built by your family and friends, your communities. West Point honed those values around duty, honor, country. "Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be. They are your rallying points to build courage when courage seems to fail, to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith, to create hope when hope becomes forlorn."

Over 37 years, from Vietnam to the Pentagon those three hallowed words, duty, honor, country, have never failed me. They won't fail you either. In the Army, we'll expand your value base to loyalty, to duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage. You can remember those because the first letter of each word spells out the abbreviation "ldrship."

We don't want you just to remember those words, we want you to live them; we want you to lead from up front in all that you do.

You will lead remarkable men and women, people like Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart, who died in October 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia. He fast-roped to sudden death because a fellow soldier was on the ground—and Shughart needed to go down there and help him. His widow Stephanie, in accepting his Medal of Honor, said, "It takes a remarkable person to not just read a creed or memorize a creed, but to live a creed." Those remarkable men and women look to you for their example; don't fail them.

People like Sergeant First Class Shughart—we call soldiers. What a noble title. They come in all sizes, all colors and from different races. There is not an adequate way to describe a soldier. MacArthur did it best when he described him,

> as one of the world's noblest figures, not only as one of the finest military characters, but also as one of the most stainless. His name and fame is the birthright of every American and his youth and strength, his love and loyalty he gave, all that mortality can give. He needs no eulogy from me or from any other man. He has written his own history and has written it in red, on his enemy's breast. When I think of his patience under adversity, of his courage under fire and of modesty in victory, I feel with an emotion of admiration, I cannot put into words. He belongs to history.

For 37 years, everywhere I went—the Continental United States, Vietnam, Korea, Germany, Bosnia, Southwest Asia and almost in 100 countries around the world, I saw those magnificent soldiers.

They were named Gonzales, Claybaugh, Makey, Garrett, Peters, Hall. They were different from the ones that MacArthur spoke of, but there was a sameness about them. They did the nation's bidding. They were a band of brothers, they sacrificed and served.

They had drained deep the chalice of courage, some gave the last full measure of devotion.

They made things better, and they made a difference.

More important, I had the high honor to serve alongside them, to be a part of their team, to fight with them and to fight for them.

At the end of day, a simple, "thank you, sir for caring" was priceless.

You, the class of 1999, have been given a great gift, to lead American soldiers. Nothing you ever do will surpass that high honor.

You have been well trained, you should be confident in your abilities because you have the right stuff and that is why I have so much confidence in our future. It is in good hands.

Finally, let me close with a challenge. You are a great class and to those to whom much is given, much is expected.

Steven Spielberg in his film "Saving Private Ryan" told a compelling story of a generation that saved our world, the greatest generation. Many of you probably had relatives who served and sacrificed in World War II, grandfathers or great uncles. Spielberg captured their story on film and brought it alive. It was a story filled with powerful messages. One of the most powerful was when Captain John Miller who led a patrol of soldiers, was dying and called Private James Francis Ryan from Iowa close to his lips, and he whispered to James Francis Ryan, "Earn it." That was a personal message from Miller to Ryan, but it was also it

seems to me a message from that great generation. They gave us the freedoms that we enjoy so much here today in this beautiful setting. They have sent a message to all succeeding generations—"Earn it."

So to the class of the 1999 United States Military Academy, my challenge to you is "earn it."

Thank you, good luck and God Bless you all.

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Farewell Speech

Whipple Field, Fort Myer, Virginia

June 21, 1999

First, I guess I should say that we worked very hard, troops, to make sure the weather was cool. We had all the chaplains praying for it. [The weather was overcast and misty.] I think we overshot. [laughter]

Recognition of Friends, Families, and Colleagues

Secretary [of Defense William S.] and Mrs. Cohen, Secretary [of the Army Louis] and Mrs. Caldera, General [Henry H., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] and Mrs. Shelton, Secretary [of Veterans Affairs Togo] and Mrs. West, and happy birthday Secretary West, Senator [Ted] Stevens, Senator [John W.] Warner, Congressman [Ike] Skelton, ladies and gentlemen, fellow soldiers, distinguished guests, all.

Today is a day to say thanks and good-bye. I have attended a lot of these ceremonies before, in the past four years, but this one is different. This one is tougher. I have left a little of my heart and soul out there with those soldiers when I did the inspection of the troops.

Let me first say thanks to the members of Congress. Thanks for being here today, to honor us with your presence. The Constitution gives you the responsibility to raise and support the Army. You take that seriously. We have had a lot of dialogue on that in the last four years—and I know how seriously you take your responsibility. Even more importantly, you have taken the time to visit our troops, to see what they do, to see how special they are, and to see them in action. I thank you for your support of our soldiers and I urge you to continue to spend time with them.

To the civilian leadership for the Department of Defense, and especially Department of the Army, represented by Secretary Cohen, Secretary Caldera, and Secretary West: There are too many to acknowledge individually, but let me just simply say thanks for your concern for our troops, and thanks for your leadership during the past four years.

To my fellow members of the Joint Chiefs, my battle buddies, [General] Hugh Shelton, [General] John Shalikashvili, [General] Joe Ralston, [Admiral] Bill Owens, [Admiral] Jay Johnson, [Admiral] Mike Boorda, [General] Mike Ryan, [General] Ron Fogelman, [General] Chuck Krulak: They have been my band of brothers. Their advice and counsel have always been on target and they have always focused on what was best for our nation. I'm proud to have been a member of their team and eternally grateful for their friendship.

I was blessed with a great, hard-working Army staff, led by people like [General] Ron Griffith, [General] Bill Crouch, and [General] Eric Shinseki and directed for four years by [Lieutenant General] John Dubia. It is impossible to recognize them individually, except to say they are absolutely superb. They are the greatest group of professionals I have ever known. It has been a team effort—but they have done the heavy lifting.

To my personal staff, words cannot express my gratitude to Lil [Cowell] and CW5 Tony Eclevea, Sergeant Majors Cline and Simmons, and all the others—the ones that "packed my parachute" for the last four years. You will always be special.

My battle buddy, Sergeant Major of the Army Bob Hall and his wife Carol, and all the families and soldiers you represent, your friendship, support, loyalty have made a difference and I truly appreciate that.

To the military leaders of America's Army, Active, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve, past and present, especially those with whom I have served for the past four years, and

those who trained me, thanks for your mentoring, your inspiration, your friendship, and your loyalty. You gave me the strength to carry on.

To my classmates, the Medford [Oklahoma, High School] class of 1957, the [United States Military Academy] West Point class of 1962 and a special group, Mary Jo's Marymount [College] class of 1962—lifetime friends—you have done so much in so many ways. Showing up at events—sending a note—simple powerful messages like "grip hands." It's made a big difference. Yours has always been a meaningful part in our life.

To my family, my brother Charles, who is here, my cousins, aunts, and extended family from Mary Jo's side, all of my family could not physically be here today, for good reasons, but they have always been there for me when I needed them.

Finally, to my immediate family, Mary Jo [wife], Mike [son], Ann [daughter]—I married a saint. She has been there every step of the way, through good times and bad. I certainly would not be here without her. She is the perfect Army wife because she cares deeply for Army families, and more importantly, she does something about it. We are blessed with two wonderful children, Mike and Ann, and two beautiful granddaughters. Army life is a tremendously large commitment for families and I am so proud of them for what they have done and who they are. I love you all very deeply.

Reflection on Years of Service

During my 41-year love affair with the United States Army I have learned much. It's impossible to cover everything, but I would like to share with you some key points.

General [Douglas] MacArthur taught me that this was a special profession. He said, "Yours is a profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you fail, the nation will be destroyed." I can't think of anything more important. I am proud to have been a part of an institution with such a high moral purpose.

The foundation of our profession is values. The cornerstone of that foundation has always been the West Point values of duty, honor, country, and over time that foundation has expanded to loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage. L-D-R-S-H-I-P. It spells leadership. That is the critical component, leadership. As President Kennedy reminded us during the West Point commencement address in 1962, "when there is a visible enemy to fight in open combat the answer is not so difficult. Many serve, all applaud and the tide of patriotism runs high. But when there is a long, slow struggle with no immediate visible foe, your choice will seem hard indeed." He was correct.

I have learned that change is difficult. Protecting the core competencies of the institution, keeping them synchronized over time, you have to do that on the run. With over 30,000 soldiers deployed on a daily basis, there is not much of a margin for error. The good news is, you get a lot of advice. The bad news is, you get a lot of advice—sometimes too much. I have learned that silver bullets don't generally work, and that the "solution of the month club" is well meaning, but may not understand the complexities of our organization. I have always felt that managing and leading change should be left to the professionals who have earned that moral authority—those who have the responsibility for taking care of America's most precious assets, our sons and daughters—those who had the responsibility of putting soldiers in harm's way—and those who have known, firsthand, people who have given the "last full measure of devotion."

The position of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army is a four-year term. You build on a course laid out by people like [Generals] Pershing, Marshall, Eisenhower, Ridgway, Abrams, Rogers, Vuono, Sullivan, and many others. It is an awesome responsibility, knowing that what you do adds another chapter to that proud history—a history of two hundred and twenty-four years of selfless service to our nation, from Valley Forge to Kosovo. I have gained strength from knowing that our Army has never let the nation down and it will never do so. When we were needed, we were there. So may it always be. The work continues.

The Way Ahead

The azimuth for change for our course is set. We have embarked on an exciting journey to transform the Army to one based upon "knowledge, speed and power"—an Army that remains

indispensable to the needs of the nation, which is able to counter new and emerging threats.

At the completion of this ceremony, in a separate ceremony Ric Shinseki will be sworn in as the 34th Army Chief of Staff. This transfer of power is unique. I think it demonstrates the great strength of our Army and our nation.

Ric and Patty are a great leadership team. They have been there and done that, and more importantly, they care. They care about our soldiers and families.

A Tribute to Soldiers

And finally, while the complexities of this institution are great, at the core it is very simple. It is all about people. As General Creighton Abrams said, "The Army is not made up of people. The Army is people." General MacArthur talked about soldiers needing no eulogy. "Their name and fame are the birthright of every American. They truly belong in history." Both of these gentlemen were correct. Everywhere I have gone I have seen these same people—these magnificent soldiers. They were different from the ones that MacArthur and Abrams knew. They were named Gonzales, Mackey, Claybaugh, Peters, Hall. They came from different backgrounds and different races and different religions, but there was a "sameness" about them. They were all Army green. They were bound together by a shared set of values, a common purpose, and a deep belief in our way of life and each other. I have been fortunate to have the opportunity to serve alongside them, to fight for them, and to lead them. There is no higher honor.

Soldiers—what a noble title. They are represented today on the field, as always, by the magnificent ranks of the Old Guard and Pershing's Own. At today's ceremony they once again have demonstrated the importance of standards and discipline. No one does it better. They truly are our credentials. My thoughts and prayers will always be with them. God bless them, God bless my beloved Army, and God bless the United States of America.

Thank you.

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