FM 3-16

THE ARMY IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS



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THE ARMY IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

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Preface

FM 3-16 provides fundamental principles and guidance for Army forces that operate as part of a multinational force. It blends in key points of JP 3-16 to ensure consideration by Army elements of a joint force and addresses Army forces' roles and functions in multinational operations. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCANZ) Armies Program achieved levels of standardization in certain areas, no comprehensive common doctrine exists among the armies. This publication helps the multinational commander to understand the common doctrine for multinational forces and assists in understanding and developing solutions. (Refer to JP 3-16 for more on multinational forces.)

FM 3-16's principal audience is all members of the profession of arms, especially trainers, educators, commanders, and staff members of multinational headquarters. Readers can also refer to joint publications of multinational doctrine in the competition continuum for additional information.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of armed conflict and the rules of engagement. (Refer to FM 6-27 for more information on the law of land warfare.)

FM 3-16 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. When first defining terms in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

FM 3-16 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

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Introduction

Whenever commonality of interests exists, nations enter political, economic, or military partnerships, or combinations thereof. These partnerships occur in regional and worldwide patterns as nations seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real or perceived threats, gain international or binational influence, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, conduct peace operations, and promote their ideals. Cultural, diplomatic, informational, military, economic, religious, psychological, technological, and political factors all influence the formation and conduct of multinational operations.

America's interests are global, but its focus is regional. Existing alliances and past coalitions reflect that focus. Allied participants establish formal standardization agreements for operational objectives. As forces of these nations plan and train together, they develop mutual trust and respect. Allied nations strive to field compatible military systems, structure common procedures, and develop contingency plans to meet potential regional threats. For example, the United States is currently a member of the following multilateral alliances and agreements:

- United Nations (UN).
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
- American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCANZ) Armies Program.
- Defense and cooperation treaties with the Republic of Korea (known as ROK) and Japan.
- Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

Terminology for a coalition or an alliance has evolved. Commonly used terms include allied, bilateral, coalition, multinational, combined, or multilateral. This manual uses the term *multinational*. In almost all usages except NATO, *multinational* replaced the older term *combined*. Nuanced language includes the following:

- An **alliance** forms the basis for responding to broad or long-term objectives between two or more nations with a common interest.
- A **multinational coalition** is formed for a specific purpose and for a limited time. It does not afford military planners the same political resolve and commonality of aim as alliances. Coalitions such as OPERATION DESERT SHIELD and OPERATION NEW DAWN have emerged to meet national strategic requirements.
- Joint and U.S. Army forces conduct **multinational operations** with mission partners. Mission partners typically include partners outside the Department of Defense (DOD) with whom the DOD cooperates to achieve national goals. These partners can include individuals or departments from—
  - Other departments and agencies of the federal, state, local, and host-nation governments.
  - Multinational forces and forces of allies and foreign partners.
  - Nongovernmental organizations.
  - Academia.
  - Businesses in the private sector.
- **Unified action partners** is an Army-specific term for combined U.S. forces and mission partners with whom U.S. Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. Unified action partners include joint forces (activities in which elements of two or more U.S. military departments participate); other departments and agencies of the federal, state, local, and host-nation governments; multinational forces; forces of allies and foreign partners; nongovernmental organizations; members of academia; and businesses in the private sector.

The precise role of land forces in multinational operations will vary according to each political and military situation. The U.S. Army participates in multinational operations for three reasons:

- Only land forces hold terrain and control populations.
- The U.S. Army structure contains capabilities other Services do not have.
- Soldiers on the ground clearly demonstrate political resolve.

Planners study and consider the political goals of each participant and lessons learned from multinational partners when writing multinational operation plans. This field manual aims to prompt commanders and staffs to consider details of agreements and treaties when planning multinational operations.

This publication underwent significant changes since 2015. FM 3-16 reflects the U.S. Army's role within a larger framework of multidomain operations and large-scale combat operations through its focus on maximum flexibility. This publication embraces the U.S. Army's approach to command and control: mission command. This publication also discusses interoperability and ways to view multinational operations in an interoperable environment. This publication aligns directly with concepts and guidance in AR 34-1, ADP 3-0, FM 3-0, and JP 3-16.

U.S. commanders expect to conduct military operations as part of a multinational force. These operations span the range of military operations and require coordination with various U.S. government agencies, military forces and government agencies of other nations, local authorities, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. Each entity that cooperates in conducting operations with U.S. Army forces is called a unified action partner (UAP). A comprehensive approach to problem solving increases the need for coordination and synchronization among UAPs. Multinational operations demand full staff integration. Multinational operations also demand multinational force staffs understand commander's intent, execution capabilities, and limitations of every multinational force unit.

Nations in multinational operations must share lessons learned and best practices. Multinational partners use information systems, liaisons, and analog methods to share information. The U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (known as CALL) serves as the office of primary responsibility and action agent for the implementation of the U.S. Army Lessons Learned Program. Readers can access its lessons learned at the Center for Army Lessons Learned at https://www.army.mil/call. The ABCANZ Armies' Program coalition operations lessons learned database is located at https://wss.apan.org/cda/ABCANZ-armies. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (known as PKSOI) repository of information is in the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (known as JLLIS) at https://www.jllis.mil. This system requires a Common Access Card and account for access. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute website allows access to the U.S. military, U.S. government agencies, multinational military and civilian organizations, and private sector organizations to collaborate for collecting, analyzing, disseminating, and integrating lessons learned for peacekeeping and stability operations.

Chapter 1

Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

This chapter introduces the fundamentals of multinational operations and the structure of multinational forces. Next, it discusses the nature of multinational operations and the importance of mutual confidence in multinational forces. It concludes with information on multinational interoperability and mission partners' capability and considerations.

MULTINATIONAL FUNDAMENTALS

1-1. Army forces conduct a range of military operations across the competition continuum and may constitute the majority or a minority of multinational forces. *Multinational operations* is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). The United States may be a troop contributing nation as part of a multinational command and as part of a joint multinational command headquarters. Alternately, an Army echelon may lead a joint multinational land component command headquarters. (Refer to JP 3-16 and JP 3-33 for joint and multinational operations.)

1-2. Commanders and staffs of multinational forces and subordinate headquarters employ, process, and organize efforts, integrate warfighting functions across multiple domains, and synchronize force actions to accomplish the mission. The operations process consists of planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing an operation. Commanders consider each multinational force's capabilities and the desired level of interoperability during the operations process. Commanders especially consider the key relationships and integration points between commanders and staffs. Throughout the operations process, the commander and staff review considerations for achieving and improving interoperability with their mission partners.

1-3. The Army's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces, and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas. Army forces accomplish their missions by supporting the joint force in four strategic roles: shaping operational environments, countering aggression on land during crisis, prevailing during large-scale ground combat, and consolidating gains. The strategic roles clarify the overall purposes for which U.S. Army forces conduct multidomain operations with partners on behalf of multinational force land component commanders (known as MNFLCCs) across the competition continuum in the pursuit of policy objectives. (Refer to ADP 3-0 for more information on the Army's strategic roles.)

1-4. Military operations in the land domain are foundational to operations in other domains because the operations are ultimately enabled, based, or controlled from land. Forces resolve conflicts on land because that is where the root of military and economic power exists, people live, and political decisions are made. Resolving conflict requires the integration of joint and multinational capabilities to enable operations on land and the employment of land forces to enable operations in the other domains. (Refer to JP 3-31 for a detailed discussion of land power.)

1-5. Multinational military operations are the norm, and American commanders have operated with multinational forces throughout history. General George Washington's partnership with the French forces during the American War of Independence illustrates an early example of U.S. military multinational operations. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, in most significant conflicts, the U.S. Army conducted multinational operations. The Army requires proficiency operating as an ally or partner land force during multinational operations and should practice doing so as often as possible.

THE FORMATION OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES

1-6. The United States acts unilaterally in its national interests. However, the United States prefers to pursue national security interests through international efforts, such as multinational operations. Multinational operations occur within the structure of an alliance or a coalition.

ALLIANCES

1-7. An alliance results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives furthering the common interests of the members. An alliance is a relationship. Alliances have standing headquarters and organizations. Sample alliances for the United States include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Republic of Korea and Combined Forces Command, Korea. An example of a long-term objective of an alliance is standardization. (Refer to JP 3-16 for a discussion on standardization.) The Department of Defense (DOD) achieves cooperation among the joint services and allied members through shared research and development. The joint services and allied members agreed to adopt the use of—

- Common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistics procedures.
- Common or compatible technical procedures and criteria.
- Common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons, or equipment.
- Common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility.

COALITIONS

1-8. A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for a common action. Nations create a coalition to fulfill goals of common interest. This action is a multinational action outside the bounds of an established alliance. It is based on a willing subset of allied members. (Refer to JP 3-16 for a discussion of a coalition as part of multinational operations.)

1-9. A coalition differs from an alliance. Coalitions exist for a limited purpose and time. A coalition does not afford military planners the same political resolve and commonality of goals as an alliance. With defined and limited goals, a coalition requires more diligence and care from military planners than in an alliance since mutual goals arise from temporary situations. Planners study, know, and apply each participant's political goals when planning. Short-term political considerations have greater influence with coalitions than with alliances.

1-10. Commanders of multinational forces are influenced by many things including sovereignty. Military commanders' traditional authorities are reduced because of their responsibility to their national leadership. Multinational commanders accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus of leadership rather than through traditional command relationships. Unity of effort is essential in multinational operations. Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives. This is true even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization. (Refer to JP 1 Volume 2 for more on unity of effort.) Commanders and subordinates operate as diplomats and warriors in a coalition.

THE NATURE OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

1-11. Multinational operations are shaped by—

- Common agreement among the participating partners of alliance or coalition.
- Terms of an alliance.
- A mandate or authorization provided by the United Nations (UN).

1-12. Multinational operations require greater attention than unilateral operations due to their complexity with national interests and organizational influence potentially competing with doctrine and efficiency. Gaining consensus may be difficult and solutions may be national in character, as troop contributing nations must adhere to their own national policies and priorities. An effective multinational force commander and staff accept, know, and work within necessary complexities of multinational operations beginning from the planning stage. Differences in culture, language, procedure, and technology all pose a level of complexity not found in U.S. Army pure operations.

1-13. Training for these multinational operations and pursuing interoperability with allies and likely coalition partners is paramount to the U.S. national security. *Interoperability* is the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives (JP 3-0). There are human, procedural, and technical dimensions to interoperability. Reducing these differences through human interactions, standardized and common procedures, and shared or compatible technology improves the ability of the multinational force to operate cohesively.

1-14. Successful multinational operations have characteristics identified in Table 1-1.

Table 1-1. Characteristics of successful multinational operations

Person or Organization	*Actions*
Commander and staff	Integrate interoperability throughout the operations process to plan, implement, and adjust technical, procedural, and human dimension solutions to enable shared understanding, mutual trust and confidence, and unity of effort among mission partners.
Commander and staff of U.S. units	Continuously collaborate with designated mission partners after receipt of mission for a multinational operation or exercise.
Commander and staff	Appoint a mission partner coordinator upon receipt of mission to plan, coordinate, and assess unit interoperability plans of action and milestones, track staff progress, and report interoperability challenges and accomplishments.
Commander and staff	Establish boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups. Invite multinational participation in existing boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups as required to plan, implement, and execute key interoperable tasks.
U.S. and mission partner staff	Based on commander's intent and guidance, collaborate to develop a common understanding of interoperable processes and the associated information sharing requirements.
Commander and staff	Develop and implement staff and liaison officer exchange plans to support development of effective technical and procedural interoperability solutions.
Commander and staff	In preparation for multinational operations, ensure subordinate units and mission partners have trained, rehearsed, and are prepared to execute operations at the desired level of interoperability by warfighting function.
Partner nations	Collaboratively develop network, cyber defense, data, and common services standards reflected in the joining, membership, and exiting instructions; implement in the mission partner network; develop and implement data standards as documented in the knowledge management plan; and test and validate the network.
Multinational units	Conduct rehearsal of concept drills, tactical exercises without troops, communications exercises, staff exercises, and other collective training with mission partners to gain task proficiency and shared understanding of the scheme of maneuver; conduct rehearsal of associated tactics, techniques, and procedures; and conduct rehearsal of standard operating procedures.
Multinational units	Conduct continuous interoperability assessment, identify and correct gaps and shortfalls, and improve multinational mission performance.

U.S. United States

THE IMPORTANCE OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE

1-15. The commander's ability to build a cohesive team drives the foundation of successful multinational operations. The commander must consider the political objective, mission, patience, sensitivity to the needs of other force members, a willingness to compromise or coming to a consensus when necessary, and mutual confidence. This mutual confidence stems from tangible actions and entities and intangible human factors. The commander builds team relationships in multinational operations while developing mutual rapport and respect. The intangible considerations that guide the actions of all participants, especially the senior commander, are—

- Rapport.
- Respect.
- Knowledge of partners.
- Team building.
- Patience.
- Trust.
- Shared understanding.

If a commander or staff ignores these considerations, mutual confidence weakens and multinational operations risk failure.

RAPPORT

1-16. Commanders and staffs establish mutual confidence through rapport with counterparts from other countries. This is a personal and direct relationship. Good rapport among multinational force members results in successful teamwork and unity of effort.

1-17. Commanders build rapport when the multinational forces share a mutual respect and a common purpose. Commanders and staff establish rapport by first understanding customs, personalities, capabilities, ambitions, sensitivities, history, languages, religions, and cultural habits of multinational partners. Understanding these characteristics helps commanders and staff then understand each nation's legal and policy constraints. Once this understanding exists, partners can clearly demonstrate respect, trust, patience, and compromise. The resulting understanding and demonstration help develop and maintain rapport. The multinational force commander makes personal visits to all units to build rapport and to assess capabilities, readiness, and morale.

1-18. U.S. commanders use preexisting relationships with multinational commanders and staff as a catalyst to reestablish rapport, when possible. Often U.S. and multinational commanders and staff have preexisting, personal, or professional relationships with multinational partners because of training together. Commanders canvas their organizations for people who have existing relationships to rapidly build rapport.

RESPECT

1-19. Without genuine respect among multinational partners, rapport and mutual confidence cannot exist. All forces of all nations need respect, regardless of position or size of force. Respect for other partners' cultures, combined with understanding and considering their perspectives, solidifies a partnership. Lack of respect leads to friction and jeopardizes mission accomplishment. Army forces that consider multinational operations from the perspective of being an ally or partner instead of simply doing things with allies and partners are likely to create higher levels of mutual respect.

1-20. Commanders consider combat capability when assigning missions to multinational forces. Effective commanders include all partners in planning and consider partners' opinions, national honor, and reputation in mission assignment. Understanding, consideration, and acceptance of multinational force partners leads to more critical thinking to adapt and use individual capabilities to their advantage.

KNOWLEDGE OF PARTNERS

1-21. To have mutual confidence, commanders need to know their multinational partners' capabilities and limitations. It is important that partners understand each other's concerns and needs. Each partner in an operation has a distinct cultural identity. Although nations with similar cultures face fewer obstacles to interoperability than nations with divergent cultural outlooks, differences still exist. Effective commanders and staffs learn the capabilities of partner nations or organizations. These capabilities differ based on national and organizational interests and objectives, political guidance, limitations on the national force, doctrine, organization, rules of engagement (ROE), law of armed conflict, equipment, culture, and other factors.

TEAM BUILDING

1-22. Mutual confidence in multinational operations requires team building. Differing national agendas can disrupt priorities and unity of effort unless understood and considered when planning. Problems arise when competitiveness among Soldiers and among nations detract from the mission or from unit cohesion. Multinational force commanders reinforce that all forces are operating as one team instead of forces conducting operations with other forces. Establishing an atmosphere of cooperation and trust is essential. Establishing team-building activities positively influences subordinates.

1-23. Commanders treat all units equally regardless of national background. Multinational partners see unequal treatment as prejudice or lack of respect, and this may result in political repercussions. Partner nation commanders and staff have fair representation on the planning staff to prevent exclusion from decision making and risk sharing. Commanders and planners consider unit capabilities, national honor, reputation, partner opinions, and agreement caveats when assigning missions. National caveats articulate constraints

under which a nation's forces must fight or participate. All plans and operations must include considerations for these caveats.

PATIENCE

1-24. Developing effective partnerships takes time and attention but establishes mutual confidence which enhances mission performance. Diligent pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with multinational force partners requires patience. Commanders must demonstrate understanding and patience when dealing with all mission partners.

TRUST

1-25. Trust is important for mutual confidence. Ethical principles guide Army professionals in their actions to establish trust, maintain teamwork, and communicate respect to all multinational partners. Mutual trust results from honest efforts to learn about and understand capabilities each member brings to the multinational force. Additionally, demonstrated competence, planning, and training together builds a cohesive team.

SHARED UNDERSTANDING

1-26. Commanders build shared understanding through a common operational picture, human understanding, respect for others, and standardized procedures. Sharing information enables effective information flow and shared understanding in multinational operations, not unlike U.S. Army-only operations. Planners for multinational operations develop and implement human, procedural, and technical dimensions. Effective information flow and shared understanding across a multinational force have human, procedural, and technical dimensions that involve—

- Thoroughly understanding human nature.
- Respecting cultural differences.
- Including multinational partners in planning.
- Sharing information and planning.
- Implementing standard operating procedures.
- Ensuring equipment compatibility.

1-27. NATO and ABCANZ have established human, procedural, and technical dimension solutions which enhance the cooperation and multinational operations under these two alliances. New alliances or new coalitions establish their own human, procedural, and technical dimension solutions for challenges when conducting multinational operations. Multinational operations require a resilient mission partner environment (MPE) with robust information management (IM) and knowledge management (KM) processes to support effective information exchange and shared understanding.

MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY

1-28. Technical dimension solutions are easy with enough trust and resources. However, interoperability is far more than compatible networks and equipment. As previously stated, interoperability enables partners to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently so they can achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. The foundation of interoperability is broad, spanning all Army warfighting functions with human, procedural, and technical dimensions that commanders must consider. The human dimension builds the basis of the mutual understanding and respect fundamental to unity of effort and operational success. New coalitions or alliances should create a shared understanding first through the human dimension by exchanging liaisons. Liaisons bridge procedural or technical barriers by using a shared language and by being considerate, competent, and respectful. Mission partners build procedural and technical dimension solutions after human dimension solutions. Not all alliances require the same level of interoperability, but all alliances require the lowest level of human dimension solution such as exchanged liaisons. The procedural dimension ensures that Army forces achieve sufficient harmony in policies and doctrine that enable them to operate effectively with unified action partners (UAPs).

1-29. Joint forces, which also require interoperability, face a rapidly evolving, multidomain environment in which highly adaptive and innovative adversaries create resilient formations, forces, and systems to support their strategies. Adversaries employ systems to achieve their strategic ends to avoid conflict and negate the traditional operating methods of the joint force. It is in this context that Army forces, as the primary land

force of the U.S. military, partner with joint forces. They organize, practice, and employ capabilities in multidomain operations to contest adversaries. This occurs in competition below armed conflict and during armed conflict. The capabilities that joint forces provide are critical to the success of any such campaign and act as a military force multiplier for coalition forces.

1-30. In dynamic operational environments, U.S. Army forces often have only days to integrate key functions and capabilities with UAPs. Therefore, interoperability must be a fundamental condition of how Army commanders plan to fight now and in the future. At its core, interoperability aims to increase the effectiveness of U.S. Army forces with UAPs as they execute their assigned missions. U.S. Army commanders increase the probability of mission success by integrating the imperatives of operations. Imperatives, which are actions Army forces take to defeat enemy forces and succeed in operational environments, are based on characteristics of the competition and conflict. (Refer to FM 3-0 for a discussion on imperatives.) Integrated imperatives enable U.S. Army forces, as part of a coalition, to employ all available Army and UAP capabilities in ways that enhance the accomplishment of U.S. and coalition objectives.

1-31. U.S. Army operations integrate UAPs while applying each of the imperatives. Doing so requires mutual trust and confidence, shared understanding, and unity of effort enabled by interoperability solutions across human, procedural, and technical dimensions. To conduct combined arms operations with UAPs, Army forces require a base technological architecture (such as an MPE) into which Army forces and their partners can easily integrate and operate. Figure 1-1 illustrates the dimensions of interoperability.




Figure 1-1. Dimensions of interoperability

LEVELS OF INTEROPERABILITY

1-32. Interoperability has four levels ranging from no demonstrated interoperability to fully integrated interoperability with U.S. forces. (See Table 1-2 for the levels of interoperability and AR 34-1 for additional information.) Interoperability has five priority focus areas (sometimes called PFAs). (See Figure 1-2 for integration of levels with priority focus areas.) Interoperability is and will remain a key requirement for the

Army. The Army's interoperability priority focus areas comprise the following functional areas: communications and information systems, each member's intelligence community, fires, and sustainment.

Table 1-2. The four levels of interoperability

Level	*Operability*	*Description*
Level 0	Not Interoperable	UAPs have no demonstrated interoperability. Command and control interface with the Army is only at the next higher echelon. UAP formations must operate independently from U.S. Army formations and operations.
Level 1	Deconflicted	U.S. Army and UAPs can co-exist but do not interact. Requires alignment of capabilities and procedures to establish operational norms, enabling UAPs and the U.S. Army to work together.
Level 2	Compatible	U.S. Army and UAPs can interact with each other in the same geographic area in pursuit of a common goal. U.S. Army and UAPs have similar or complementary processes and procedures, and they can operate effectively with each other.
Level 3	Integrated	U.S. Army and UAPs can integrate upon arrival in theater. Interoperability is network-enabled to provide the full range of military operations (ROMO) capability. UAPs can routinely establish networks and operate effectively with or as part of U.S. Army formations.

UAP unified action partner U.S. United States




Figure 1-2. Levels of interoperability and priority focus areas

MISSION PARTNER CAPABILITY

1-33. Allies and partners have considerable capabilities that make them a credible deterrent against adversary aggression, improve combined collective capabilities, and lessen the burden on U.S. forces should deterrence

fail. Forward-stationed U.S. Army forces, by themselves, generally do not enjoy favorable correlation-of-force ratios against adversaries. Allies and partner nations form the initial foundation of the ability to conduct operations during armed conflict. This combined force capability enhances deterrence for both the partner nation and the United States. (Refer to FM 3-0 for more on deterrence in multinational operations.)

Chapter 2

Command and Control During Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by discussing the multinational force commander and mission command purpose. It then discusses the purpose of unity of effort, the MPE, and integrated interoperability. The chapter then discusses structures for multinational operations, the purpose of command relationships, purpose of other command relationships, communications, and the purpose of knowing each nation's capabilities. Considerations for commanders concludes this chapter.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER

2-1. Commanders and staff build consensus of interest among partners in multinational operations through collaboration and coordination. This consensus enables partners to exercise command and control (C2) compatibly at the political, military, and cultural levels. Successful multinational operations establish unity of effort if not unity of command. *Unity of command* is the direction of all forces under a single, responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces (JP 3-0). A successful multinational operation begins with the authority to direct operations of all assigned or attached military forces.

2-2. The multinational force commander directs the military effort to reach a common objective. Nations create a multinational force once those nations reach a common interest. Each multinational operation is specific. Each national commander who is part of a multinational force is responsible to the commander of the multinational force and the national chain of command. Troop contributing nations maintain a direct line of communications to their national headquarters and their own national governments.

MISSION COMMAND DURING MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

2-3. Multinational force commanders implement a C2 system and employ it using a mission command approach. *Mission command* is the Army's approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation (ADP 6-0). The principles of mission command remain unchanged during multinational operations. Army commanders and staff still develop and maintain competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, commander's intent, mission orders, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance as enablers to successful mission command. (Refer to ADP 6-0 and JP 3-16 for more information on mission command.)

2-4. Multinational force commanders use various methods and styles of leadership to impart their commander's intent and to influence subordinates and coalition partners. Command styles vary greatly. On one end of the spectrum, these command styles are authoritarian or operate as centralized power. On the other end of the spectrum, these command styles provide looser control and offer decentralized power. The command style reflects the relationship between the leader and the led. The national and military cultures of both styles shape the relationship. Multinational commanders vary their command style to harmonize with the characteristics of the forces they lead. However, leaders have a reciprocal relationship, and the leaders and the led are responsible for harmonization. Subordinate leaders appreciate the culture of their multinational superiors.

2-5. Commanders and staff understand that although the principles of mission command remain unchanged in multinational operations, these operations require interoperability which has significant implications for how U.S. forces plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations throughout the operations process. The mission variables—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations, commonly known as METT-TC (I)—influence the commander's guidance for interoperability solutions. For instance, the mission variables might influence guidance on the levels of interoperability required to support multinational operations across warfighting functions and specific tactical tasks critical to the commander's plan.

INTEROPERABILITY WITH MULTINATIONAL FORCES

2-6. A major operational consideration for the United States is the ability to operate with multinational forces. Historically, interoperability has been achieved through various technical solutions using trial and error during combined training exercises and operations. To avoid this trial-and-error approach to interoperability, the Army has emphasized the importance of interoperability through bilateral, multilateral, and multinational standardization programs. Participation in NATO, ABCANZ, and multinational exercises offers increased opportunities for understanding partner capabilities and developing interoperability approaches that use human, procedural, and technical dimensions.

2-7. To increase interoperability, the DOD strives for maximum cooperation among the Services and DOD agencies for the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources. The DOD also agrees to adopt the broadest possible resources that use common or compatible procedures, criteria, corresponding organizational compatibility, sustainment, and logistics.

STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS WITH MULTINATIONAL FORCES

2-8. Implementation of NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) or ABCANZ standards are transparent to U.S. units. In the case of doctrine, implementation occurs when doctrine proponents incorporate the content of the STANAG into U.S. doctrine and Army doctrine publications. Additionally, soldiers of each NATO or ABCANZ nation use their own national doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures. To them, the interoperability is also transparent. For example, NATO and ABCANZ nations agree to use the same military symbols. In this way, participating units passing graphic operational information such as overlays share a common understanding of the symbols. When operating within the NATO or ABCANZ construct, partners do not need to develop alternative symbology or terminology. (Refer to STANAG 2019 and FM 1-02.2 for military symbols.) Other international STANAGs prevent the need to develop ad hoc solutions. Some examples of standardized procedures include the five-paragraph operation order, close-air support procedures, and call-for-fire procedures.

2-9. In a coalition, NATO STANAGs and ABCANZ standards provide a baseline for cooperation. They set the minimum guidance for cooperation. Additionally, in many parts of the world, bilateral interoperability agreements among potential coalition members exist before the nations form the coalition. Students who attend professional military development courses in other nations are additional sources for interoperability. However, in most ad hoc coalitions, not all participants are familiar with such agreements. The multinational commander relies on designated standard operating procedures (SOPs), good liaison officers, and clearly written, uncomplicated operation orders.

PURPOSE OF UNITY OF EFFORT

2-10. Unity of effort is critical in multinational operations. UAPs achieve unified action when they synchronize, coordinate, and integrate to achieve unity of effort, even if the partners come from a different command, country, or organization. The principle of unity of command also applies but is more difficult for commanders to attain. In stability tasks and Article 5 of The North Atlantic Treaty (Collective Defense), government agencies have the lead.

For the first time in NATO's history, the allies invoked Article 5—a pact of mutual assistance in case any NATO member is attacked—after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States.

2-11. Unified action demonstrates unity of effort over a lengthy time requiring military and civilian leaders to work together towards a unified goal. Every senior military commander in a multinational coalition reports to a civilian chief. Each commander integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes with civilian agencies and cooperates with intergovernmental organizations. Command arrangements do not involve a typical command authority due to national and host-nation interests. Commanders consider how to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize their actions with other instruments of national power that include diplomacy, information, and economy. The U.S. Army and joint forces conduct civil-military operations at each echelon. Due to the time required for unified action, military commanders consider how to apply their forces to support civilian and other organizations to best achieve unity of effort.

2-12. An effective command relationship is vital for successful multinational operations. Military advice to national authorities is critical in early planning to determine the strategic end state, objectives, and composition of a multinational force. Dialogue, understanding, and agreement provide not only the basis for

unity of effort, but also the foundation for the command guidance needed by staffs when conducting campaigns. During planning, commanders consider national sensitivities, capabilities, and norms. Multinational forces anticipate that some forces from member nations have direct and near immediate communications from the operational area to their respective national political leaders. The ability to have direct communications either eases coordination issues or becomes a source of friction if external leaders issue guidance directly to deployed national forces.

COMMAND JURISDICTION

2-13. Each participating nation in a multinational operation has its own national caveats (such as prohibited munitions and other operational or tactical limitations and constraints). Each nation is responsible to its own national legal authority for the conduct of operations as it views the conflict based on its own national interests. In addition to their national caveats, most nations will specify their level of support in terms of committed units and capabilities, duration of support, degree of interoperability, and acceptable command relationships and authorities.

2-14. Multinational commanders must consider both political and military issues during operations. They work with each nation's force and authorities of each nation to understand and work within the caveats provided by the political leaders. Where these interests overlap or align, commanders have the greatest latitude.

NATIONAL INTEREST

2-15. The political agendas of participating countries affect unity of effort during multinational operations. Many nations will not, or are reluctant to, relinquish command of their forces to other countries even when they work together toward a common objective. On a case-by-case basis, each country's national government places national forces under the multinational commander's operational control. In such cases, parallel chains of command exist through the coalition force and national authority. The multinational force's challenge is to arrange the best command relationships with its subordinate forces to ensure mission success.

2-16. The interests of nations regarding an operation are described in terms of reference between the troop contributing nations and other multinational partners or the UN if it is involved. The multinational force develops a written document that outlines command relationships. Partners can write this document as an annex to an operation plan, an operation order, or a campaign plan.

2-17. The multinational force transfers authority to the multinational commander's control. This may become a command relationship issue. Nations may not agree on when the transfer of control occurs. The earlier the multinational force gains control, the more flexibility it uses to train and conduct operations. Differences in national interests, objectives, and policies at the national level—and the availability of forces based on concurrent commitments—delay planning and agreement to subsequent decisions.

COMMAND AND CONTROL INTEROPERABILITY

2-18. Each multinational partner brings a unique mix of capabilities and limitations, potentially including fundamental differences in C2 doctrine, technologies, processes, and even basic geospatial datum and formats. Partners joining with incomplete (or incompatible) technological or procedural capability may lack the procedures, network, and digital tools or trained personnel to effectively share information. Other multinational partners may have policy or doctrinal constraints that inhibit information sharing across one or more security domains or with only select mission partners. Each U.S. combatant command may have agreements for bilateral information sharing with individual multinational partners that differ from potential partner to partner. The specific mission, roles, and tasks for each multinational partner may impact information sharing requirements. Varying standard groups exist today that define information exchange agreements and processes. For example, the Multilateral Interoperability Programme and artillery systems cooperation activities represent a mix of interoperability agreements and base standards for interoperability between multinational partners.

2-19. Key to multinational interoperability is the capability to share data freely and securely. Such sharing enables a commander to create unity of effort with improved speed of C2 while building trust during mission-partnered operations and a shared information exchange network. Networks for sharing information facilitate communication, trust, and propagation of data between multinational forces and U.S. forces. This network

can support a plug-and-play capability. Integrated and secure information sharing enables multinational partners to fight as one team in an MPE (see Figure 2-1 for a visual depiction of MPE). This team includes members of other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, state and local governments, allies, coalition, host nations, other nations, multinational organizations, nongovernmental organizations, academia, and the private sector.




Figure 2-1. Mission partner environment

MISSION PARTNER ENVIRONMENT

2-20. The MPE is the overarching U.S. DOD capability framework for UAP information sharing. As such, the Army has an interest in informing and influencing how that framework develops. To support future operational mission planning, preparation, execution and assessment, the Army uses an enterprise MPE. The DOD MPE enterprise—

- Ranges from strategic to operational levels.
- Is U.S.-owned and -operated under U.S. policy and regulations.
- Aligns with U.S. approved standards and protocols that enables essential collaboration among U.S. Government; state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; and foreign partners.

This enterprise enables shared understanding and unity of effort as the Army mans, trains, and equips the multinational force and gains strategic operational awareness. Army units conduct a seamless transition when directed to an MPE expeditionary mission partner network (MPN) focused by region and mission to accomplish coalition training and operational missions. An expeditionary MPN is a temporary network established for a specific purpose to allow information and data exchange among multinational treaty organizations, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations. An expeditionary MPE also connects to the enterprise MPE. (Refer to ATP 6-02.61 for additional information on MPN operations.)

2-21. Successful commanders and staffs consider interoperability throughout the operations process, beginning with the planning phase. Army capabilities inherently integrate information sharing and processes

to ensure shared understanding, mutual trust and confidence, and unity of effort between U.S. Army units and joint forces. Units conducting multinational operations explicitly address solutions to enable effective information sharing and task execution. Common best practices for effective interoperability, regardless of mission type or forces involved, include—

- Designation of a mission partner coordinator reporting directly to the commander and chief of staff responsible to—
  - Measure progress towards interoperability.
  - Develop interoperability plans of action and milestones.
  - Collaborate with mission partners regarding the plans of action and milestones.
  - Coordinate and integrate staff section activities to meet plans of action and milestone objectives.
- Identification and requisition of resources related to interoperability.
- Early and routine collaboration with mission partners when developing, implementing, and assessing interoperability solutions. Such solutions can include a MPN, common processes, KM planning, and multinational organizations.
- Documented, updated, and published plans directly related to interoperability—such as joining, membership, and exiting instructions (JMEI), MPN plan and architecture, and KM plan—that ensure shared understanding as dynamic plans change.
- Establishment of key multinational organizations to support planning, implementing, and continually assessing the MPN, coalition common operational picture (COP), appropriate multinational advanced-analytics cells supporting artificial intelligence, advanced analytics, other information sharing, and decision support functions that depend on effective interoperability.

INTEGRATED INTEROPERABILITY PURPOSE

2-22. Interoperability requirements add complexity to the operations process. Integrated interoperability involves the commander and staff adding to and integrating with, but not replacing, the activities associated with planning, preparation, execution, and assessment for a given multinational mission or operation. Commanders and staffs identify and address interoperability considerations to enable shared understanding, mutual trust and confidence, and unity of effort across a synchronized multinational force. Leaders adapt to changing circumstances throughout the operations process. Chapter 3 discusses additional considerations and desired outcomes specifically for planning in multinational operations.

PLAN

2-23. Planning for interoperability begins with receipt of mission directing the unit to conduct an operation with one or more multinational partners. Planning continues within the seven steps of the military decision-making process (known as the MDMP) to orders production, dissemination, and transition. Key planning considerations for effective interoperability, regardless of mission type or forces involved, include—

- Commander and staff of U.S. units collaborate with designated mission partners after receipt of mission for a multinational operation or exercise.
- Based on commander's intent and guidance, U.S. and mission partner staff collaborate to develop a shared understanding of interoperable processes and associated information-sharing requirements.
- Staff and liaison officers develop, implement, and exchange plans to help develop effective technical and procedural interoperability solutions.
- Staff plans for effective preparation, execution, and assessment of interoperability considerations.

PREPARE

2-24. Preparation normally begins during planning and continues into execution by units. Preparation helps the force transition from planning to execution. Like other activities of the operations process, commanders drive preparation activities with a focus on leading and assessing. Team building is essential during multinational operations. Commanders ensure all units are treated and exposed equally regardless of national background. All participants perceive missions as appropriate, achievable, and equitable in burden and risk sharing. Multinational partners should be included in planning. Their opinions about the type of mission assignment for their units are important. Planning staffs ensure they understand all national caveats. Commanders consider national caveats based on legal and policy constraints when assigning missions and tasks to members. All plans and operations consider these caveats.

2-25. As part of preparation, commanders, units, and Soldiers perform activities. While the unit may perform many preparation activities concurrently, it schedules some preparation activities sequentially. For example, a unit conducts required individual training for new system operators prior to rehearsals with these systems. Unit leaders determine specific preparation requirements, activity relationships, and schedules during planning. Preparation activities critical to successful multinational operations include the following:

- Coordinate and establish liaison. Units train and deploy liaison elements (such as embedded staff, exchanged staff, or liaison officers) to provide functional expertise to assist mission partner commanders and staffs during all phases of the operations process.
- Complete task organization. The multinational force completes planned task organization based on mission analysis and limitations. Mission analysis reveals the operation plan, mission partner capabilities, and mission partner limitations. The coalition command structure imposes authorities and relationships.
- Integrate new units and Soldiers. All units include integration activities in the preparation phase of the operations process with emphasis on team building. This integration enables shared understanding of coalition-wide—
  - Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
  - SOPs.
  - KM.
  - ROE.
  - Other relevant common plans and orders that affect unit operations.
- Train. Units conduct individual and collective training to build proficiency in integration. Units train to integrate multinational facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel. Proficiency enables effective C2 systems, applications, and common processes and activities (such as battle rhythm events, reporting, tactical tasks, and maintaining the coalition COP).
- Perform pre-operations checks and inspections. In preparation for multinational operations, commanders and staff ensure subordinate units and mission partners have trained, rehearsed, and are prepared to execute operations at the desired level of interoperability.
- Initiate network preparations. Partner nations collaboratively develop network, cyberspace defense, data, and common services standards reflected in the JMEI and implemented in the MPN. Partner nations develop and implement data standards as documented in the KM plan. Partner nations test and validate the network.
- Conduct rehearsals. Multinational units rehearse concept drills, tactical exercises without troops, communications exercises, staff exercises, and other collective training with mission partners. These rehearsals improve task proficiency and shared understanding of the scheme of maneuver and associated TTP and SOPs.
- Revise and refine the plan. Units integrate, train, and rehearse with mission partners to build understanding of an operational environment, mutual capabilities and limitations, and interoperability gaps and shortcomings. The resulting understanding helps units revise and refine operation plans and interoperability solutions.

EXECUTE

2-26. Effective execution is enabled by units seizing the initiative through action and commanders who accept risk to exploit opportunities. A staff supports the commander by building knowledge and shared understanding and by enabling rapid decision making and synchronization. Effective interoperability supports effective execution which will—

- Enable information flow to support the commander's visualization and decision making.
- Provide collaborative tools and processes to encourage staff synchronization, rapid planning, and implementation with all mission partners.
- Improve subordinate decision making and reduce reaction time through shared understanding of the commander's intent and mission with all mission partners.
- Minimize C2 risks, gaps, and shortcomings during execution of multinational operations.

2-27. Unit leaders ensure mission partners have the same understanding of graphic control measures, especially changes, during execution. Graphic control measures can include fire support coordination lines, unit boundaries, and coordination points. The KM plan provides the process and procedure for changes to

orders, to include graphic control measures. The lead nation headquarters sends alerts for changes to orders, plans, processes, or graphics to all mission partners. Alerts can include chat text messages, email notifications, and alerts in the appropriate running estimates and commander updates.

2-28. Common services enable improved information flow and shared understanding of a situation. Commander updates, while still based on the commander's preference, focus on decision making and shared understanding of the current and future situations. These updates do not focus on sharing routine information available in running estimates or other easily accessed KM products.

2-29. A single COP coordination cell effectively and efficiently builds and maintains a quality coalition COP. The COP coordination cell has representatives from each mission partner. It also has the ability and responsibility to monitor, correct, and report issues between the coalition COP (published over the MPN) and national COPs. The COP coordination cell provides a status of the coalition COP in relation to a national COP. Shared status increases mission partner trust and confidence during execution.

ASSESS

2-30. The interoperability assessment plan guides interoperability assessment. Staffs develop the plan during planning, and they rehearse and revise the plan during the preparation phase. The assessment plan includes key measures selected to inform progress against desired levels of interoperability and mission critical interoperability requirements. For example, if a commander wants to achieve integrated interoperability in C2 with all mission partners, then the commander establishes a COP coordination cell. An identified mission critical interoperability requirement to achieve a level 3 is a coalition COP. Measures selected to assess this requirement include COP accuracy, timeliness, and completeness. To consolidate monitoring and evaluation of these measures, the commander establishes a COP coordination cell staffed with network, data, and KM subject matter experts representing all mission partners. Staffs include COP coordination cell assessments in a running estimate. The assessments are included with the overall assessment of the coalition COP. Interoperability assessment consists of the following activities:

- Monitoring the current situation, with a focus on the mission critical interoperability requirements and achieved levels of interoperability between mission partners and across warfighting functions.
- Evaluating the progress toward achieving desired levels of interoperability and meeting mission critical interoperability requirements. This evaluation uses an interoperability running estimate, commander updates, or other commander-directed information sharing to determine and report root causes.
- Directing changes to address interoperability gaps or challenges and improve established process and coordination.

MONITOR

2-31. The interoperability assessment plan defines responsibilities. This plan identifies a mission partner coordination center, other designated staff element, or leader as the overall lead for interoperability assessment. This lead conducts monitoring and aggregates monitoring results from other staff elements and commands to develop an accurate and complete picture of the current interoperability situation.

2-32. Functional and special staffs identify and report any information flow, procedural, or other interoperability issues. Staffs monitor established processes, such as the military decision-making process or KM, for indicators that can be used to determine the extent to which interoperability has been achieved with mission partners. Indicators, often described as measures of performance and measures of effectiveness, are key to effective assessments. Measures of performance related to interoperability may include the number of mission partner staff officers participating in a planning group or the number and placement of liaison officers between headquarters. Measures of effectiveness related to interoperability may consist of the time required for mission partners to answer a request for information or provide intelligence in a common database.

2-33. Staff or special organizations are assigned assessment responsibilities for specific interoperability capabilities. Examples include common services assessments and a coalition network operations and security center that is responsible for the network.

EVALUATE

2-34. The interoperability assessment lead—supported by staff, mission partners, and special organizations—analyzes the current situation for trends, evaluates root causes for emerging interoperability issues, and aggregates key indicators into an overall assessment for each mission critical interoperability requirement. The interoperability running estimate or other reporting mechanism provides the commander, staff, and mission partners with the current interoperability situation across echelons by mission critical interoperability requirements.

RECOMMEND

2-35. Designated staff elements implement corrective actions within their functional area or area of responsibility. Examples include making minor adjustments to a staff battle drill or SOP; modifying network protocols to improve throughput, connectivity, or security; or augmenting a theater liaison detachment (TLD) during execution to provide additional required capabilities or capacity. Staff elements communicate any changes to all mission partners to ensure shared understanding and adaptation to the corrective action.

2-36. Designated staff elements submit major changes as recommendations to the commander. Major changes affect interoperability or operation plans, or they require actions that may affect operation plans, scheme of maneuver, or commander's intent. Staffs submit major changes to a commander with sufficient information to support the decision-making process.

DIRECT

2-37. Informed by their staffs, commanders use the interoperability assessment to direct changes to resources, priorities, processes, and authorities to address identified interoperability challenges and improve integration with mission partners. Substantial changes may warrant the development of a revised interoperability assessment plan with new indicators to inform subsequent assessment.

STRUCTURES FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

2-38. All multinational operations have two chains of command regardless of structure or authority. The first is the multinational chain of command constructed by the UN, alliance, or coalition. The second chain of command is a national chain of command extending back to the national capitals of the nations involved.

2-39. The UN has three types of operations:

- Operations under the command of the UN reported to the Secretary General. The Security Council sets the mandate for these operations in a resolution. The Secretary General manages and supervises the execution of the mandate.
- Operations conducted by a coalition of willing states authorized by the UN. The coalition remains under the command of a lead state or regional organization and reports to its national or alliance chain of command. The Security Council that allows the coalition to achieve its specified mission authorizes these operations.
- Hybrid operations. The UN force operates with a force from another country without any formal C2.

2-40. Alliances, UN forces, and coalitions create a command structure that meets the needs, diplomatic realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations. Since no single command structure fits the needs of all alliances, UN, and coalitions, several different command structures evolved. Paragraphs 2-41 through 2-51 describe four types of command structures:

- Lead nation.
- Parallel.
- Integrated (discussed with reference to alliances).
- Combination (discussed with reference to coalitions).

2-41. Command structures of alliances and coalitions are organized along these lines. Some situations exist when these structures do not apply. Coalitions normally form as a rapid response to unforeseen crises. The nature of the coalition (for example, whether it is based on a UN mandate or common agreement among countries) determines the type of command structure. Political agendas of each nation participating in the coalition influence the nature of the coalition itself.

Note. Some nations use the term "framework nation" instead of "lead nation."

LEAD NATION COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-42. The lead nation command structure recognizes that one nation has the lead role and its C2 authority has primacy during the conduct of operations. (See Figure 2-2 for a sample command structure.) Normally, the lead nation is the country that provides the largest number of forces and most resources for that operation. An example of a lead nation command structure is the NATO International Security Assistance Force (known as ISAF) operation in Afghanistan. In this example, the United States deployed the largest number of forces, supplied the most resources, and was the lead nation among the 50 troop contributing nations.

2-43. The lead nation determines the appropriate C2 procedures and works closely with the other partner nations. It provides specific equipment and software to a national component headquarters of other nations when feasible. Other nations provide appropriate liaison personnel to the lead nation headquarters. Robust liaison is aligned in function and level of expertise. Such liaison is essential to develop and maintain unity of effort in coalition operations. It often is key to addressing procedural and human gaps in interoperability within functional and staff areas.

2-44. Staff augmentation from other national contingents supplements a lead nation staff depending on the size, complexity, and duration of the operation. This augmentation ensures that a lead nation headquarters represents the entire coalition. Such augmentation includes designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This facilitates planning by providing the coalition commander with a source of expertise on coalition members. Augmentation is required if a coalition partner possesses specific organizations or capabilities not found in lead nation forces.




Figure 2-2. Lead nation command structure

PARALLEL COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-45. The parallel command structure is an alternative to the lead nation command structure. No single coalition commander exists under this structure. The multinational leaders coordinate among the participants to attain unity of effort. This is not the preferred structure because of the absence of a single coalition commander and lack of unity of command. (See Figure 2-3 on page 18 for depiction of parallel command structure.)




Figure 2-3. Parallel command structure

INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-46. In an alliance, a coalition-mandated operation, or a UN-mandated operation, the entire staff comprises an integrated command structure. The deputy commander and each primary staff officer could be a different nationality. Subordinate commands and staffs integrate to the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission. (See Figure 2-4 that illustrates an integrated command structure.)

2-47. Using an integrated command structure in an alliance provides unity of command. The NATO command structure is a good example of an integrated command structure. In Europe, NATO has allied command operations, also known as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe. It has a commander from one of the member nations. NATO nation members are a part of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe staff. This integration also occurs among the subordinate commands and staffs several levels below Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe.

2-48. An integrated alliance command structure has—

- A single designated commander.
- A staff comprised of representatives from all member nations.




Figure 2-4. Integrated command structure

2-49. Another example of a standing integrated command structure is NATO's Europe Command Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (known as ARRC). The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps has characteristics of a lead nation command structure. Figure 2-5 on page 20 illustrates an integrated command structure with lead nation command structure characteristics. The United Kingdom provides most of the framework of the headquarters structure and 60 percent of the overall staff. It is an integrated command structure because the primary staff members are different nationalities. (For example, the assistant chief of staff, operations [G-3] is a U.S. brigadier general.) The entire staff is integrated, and 15 partner nations contribute the remaining personnel. The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps' two subordinate divisions—the multinational division (central) and the multinational division (south)—are also integrated. Other NATO nations provide forces for specific operations as the mission dictates. One U.S. division coordinates with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps in peacetime for planning and training.




Figure 2-5. Integrated with lead nation command structure

2-50. Another example of a standing integrated command structure is the Combined Forces Command, Korea. This integrated command structure has evolved over years of cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea. The Combined Forces Command staff and the staff of its subordinate ground component command are fully integrated.

COMBINATION COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-51. The lead nation concept and a parallel command structure can exist simultaneously in a coalition. This combination command structure occurs when two or more nations are the controlling elements for a mix of international forces. This structure is more desirable than the parallel command structure. An effort to achieve a total lead nation command structure for unity of command is preferred to achieve more efficient C2 during a multinational operation.

PURPOSE OF COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

2-52. The Army has doctrinal definitions for command relationships. Those are the same definitions used by the joint community and listed in the *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. However, as a member of NATO, the United States agrees to NATO definitions for command relationships. The NATO definitions differ from the U.S. definitions. Additionally, Combined Forces Command directives define specific command relationships between the Republic of Korea armed forces and U.S. Forces, Korea. Commanders understand how each nation defines command relationships to operate in multinational operations. Multinational force commanders understand what they can and cannot do with forces from each troop contributing nation. (For a further explanation of the U.S. view of command authority, refer to JP 3-16.)

2-53. To provide an understanding of some of the issues involved in the different aspects of command authority, see Table 2-1. It illustrates command authorities in NATO definitions. Allied doctrine requires the national authority to always retain full command authority.

Table 2-1. Comparison of command authorities

Authority	*Full command*	*NATO operational command*	*NATO operational control*	*NATO tactical command*	*NATO tactical control*
Direct authority to deal with nations, diplomatic missions, and agencies	X				
Granted to a command	X	X			
Delegated to a command			X	X	X
Set chain of command to forces	X				
Assign mission and designate objective	X	X			
Assign tasks	X	X		X	
Direct and employ forces	X	X	X		
Establish maneuver control measures	X	X	X	X	X
Reassign forces	X	X			
Retain operational control	X	X			
Delegate operational control	X	X	X		
Assign tactical command	X				
Delegate tactical command	X	X	X		
Retain tactical control	X	X	X		
Deploy force (information and within theater)	X	X	X		
Local direction and control designated forces	X				X
Assign separate employment of unit components	X	X			
Directive authority for logistics	X				
Direct joint training	X				
Assign and reassign subordinate commanders and officers	X				
Conduct internal discipline and training	X				

The national authority always retains FULL COMMAND by allied doctrine.

Has this authority

Denied authority or not specifically granted

PURPOSE OF OTHER COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

2-54. Different command relationships have different purposes. Paragraphs 2-55 through 2-78 list operations and their purposes for use. Other command relationships include—

- Allied operations.
- UN operations.
- Multinational forces control.
- Agency cooperation and coordination.

ALLIED OPERATIONS

2-55. Allied operations provide integration among subordinate commands and staffs several levels down. Allied operations rely on NATO doctrine to frame operations. (For NATO operations, refer to AJP-01.) Commanders and staffs use this publication at the operational level; however, commanders and staffs at any level can use it as a reference. Although NATO forces primarily use AJP-01, the doctrine is instructive and provides a useful framework for operations conducted by a coalition of NATO, partners, non-NATO nations, and other organizations.

2-56. Although the ABCANZ Armies Program is not a formal alliance nor has an ABCANZ force ever been employed, these armies have invested decades of research and collaboration to develop and update agreed-to standards to enable interoperability. In developing interoperability SOPs, units use available ABCANZ standards as their source material. Sometimes they use another source if the unit is subordinate to a combatant command with specific interoperability guidance and agreed-to standards (such as United States Army, Europe and Africa Command [known as USAREUR-AF] aligned to NATO STANAGs or U.S. Eighth Army in Korea).

UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS

2-57. In UN operations, a single commander employs the force. The Secretary General appoints the force commander with the consent of the UN Security Council. The force commander reports to the UN Secretary General or a special representative and has wide discretionary powers over day-to-day operations. The force commander refers all policy matters to the UN Secretary General or special representative to resolve.

2-58. Most national authorities that provide forces to multinational operations assign national forces under operational control of the multinational force commander. A smaller nation commits its force's operational control to a larger force. The larger force is then under the multinational force commander's operational control. Caveats qualify these forces from the respective nations according to national policies. The multinational force commander's additional assignments to Service component commanders in an operational control status are subject to approval by the respective national governments.

2-59. The parent national commander retains the command less operational control of the national forces. The designated national commander of the respective nations in the multinational force exercises this command less operational control. The multinational commander and national commanders discuss and clarify their mutual understanding of the command authorities they receive. This clarification ensures they share a common understanding of those authorities. It also precludes potential misunderstandings.

2-60. For Army forces, the U.S. commander retains command over all assigned U.S. forces in multinational operations. The U.S. chain of command runs from the President through a combatant commander to a U.S. national commander. The chain of command, from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field, remains inviolate.

MULTINATIONAL FORCES CONTROL

2-61. Liaison networks and coordination centers improve control of multinational forces. Liaison officers come from the major troop contributing nations, close allies who routinely communicate directly with U.S. and other regional commanders, and the multinational operations commander. Meetings, boards, and conferences help integrate operations in the multinational force. Effective liaison networks are vital in any coalition. Differences in doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and national law demand a robust liaison structure to facilitate multinational operations. The use of the liaison networks is an invaluable human and procedural dimension tool and a significant source of information for the coalition staff and commander.

Liaison Network

2-62. Regardless of the command structure, effective liaison is vital in any multinational force. Using a liaison proves invaluable to build confidence between the multinational force and subordinate commands. It also—

- Fosters a better understanding of mission and tactics.
- Facilitates the transfer of vital information.
- Enhances mutual trust.
- Develops an increased level of teamwork.

2-63. A liaison supplies significant information for the multinational force headquarters about subordinate force readiness, training, and other factors. Early liaison establishment reduces the fog and friction caused by incompatible communications systems, doctrine, and operating procedures. Units should provide only the best officers and noncommissioned officers as liaison officers because their quality directly affects operations and perceptions about Army forces.

2-64. The command and its higher headquarters, adjacent units, supporting and attached forces, and other appropriate host-nation and intergovernmental organizations establish their liaisons early. For U.S. forces, liaison with the American Ambassador if there is one, is essential.

2-65. The commander identifies and requests liaison personnel early. The request includes specific qualifications. Differences in doctrine, organization, training, and equipment among the multinational nations demand a hardier liaison structure to facilitate operations than in a national force. Liaison teams cover many functions on a 24-hour basis. Such coverage requires more liaison personnel than a force normally has assigned. Liaison personnel need equipment compatible with the multinational force.

2-66. Liaison personnel understand the capabilities and limitations of parent units and nations, including the structure, capabilities, weapon systems, logistics, and planning methods employed and their national interests. Whether personnel are language qualified or have interpreter support, they understand the language and culture of the multinational headquarters to which they are attached. This ensures successful liaison operations. However, professional knowledge and functional expertise are far more important. Officers who have participated in schools and training with other multinational nations or have experience in multinational operations may provide this expertise. Mission success requires careful selection of liaison officers who are Army professionals in competence, character, and commitment. The sending command provides liaison teams with knowledge of the doctrine, organization, materiel, and language of multinational partners and an understanding of appropriate regional information. Liaison officers assigned to the multinational force headquarters influence decision making. These officers also possess the authority to answer routine multinational force queries on behalf of their commands.

2-67. Once liaison is established, liaison teams directly represent their respective commanders. They advise, help, coordinate, and monitor their commands. The liaison teams attend briefings and maintain close contact with the multinational operations center. However, the command they become a part of does not formally task their sending unit through the liaison officer. Formal tasking occurs through normal C2 channels.

2-68. The commander determines whether to integrate multinational liaison personnel into the staff of the multinational force. When integration creates a more effective organization, the multinational force establishes an orientation program for all liaison personnel. The multinational personnel reception center performs this requirement. The multinational force determines what staff officer or staff section is responsible for liaison personnel reporting to the headquarters. Commanders need to identify personnel liaison requirements early during the planning process and staff accordingly.

2-69. Effective liaison is vital in any coalition. Differences in doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and national law could demand a robust liaison structure to facilitate operations. Liaison training should include areas of doctrine, organization, culture, and language. Not only is the use of liaison an invaluable human and procedural dimension tool, but it is also a significant source of information for the coalition staff and commander.

Coordination Centers

2-70. Commands provide training in coordination centers to all units or individuals that receive liaison equipment support to other nations. Training covers liaison capabilities and limitations, employment considerations, support requirements, onboarding, and planning processes.

2-71. Special operations forces are effective during multinational operations as liaison officers or liaison teams. Their language capabilities, cultural and customs training, and experience working and training with another country’s militaries qualify them to improve coordination and communication. Special operations forces may be useful as liaison during escalation and de-escalation of conflict due to preexisting relationships. However, commanders use special operations forces judiciously in any enduring role. Special operations forces are limited in numbers and usually have operational control retained at the joint force command level. With these attributes, special operations forces are often subject to rapid and frequent retasking and should usually not be the primary means for maintaining liaison.

2-72. TLDs are assigned to select Army Service component commands. These detachments allow an Army commander to conduct liaison with subordinate, parallel, or higher joint and multinational headquarters in an operational area. These detachments have 30 functional staff experts in logistics, intelligence, airspace management, maneuver, and fires. These experts provide advice and assistance to supported units and ensure

rapid and accurate coordination among headquarters. TLDs have organic transportation and Army computer systems. These detachments receive communications support from Army theater signal units. Qualified linguists and interpreters with specific language capabilities augment TLDs. Digital liaison may be able to augment procedural aspects of staff functions even in areas where digital augmentation is not desired or necessary. In the Republic of Korea, two TLDs coordinate the specific U.S. aspects of combat, information, protection, and logistics support for the Combined Forces Command. (Refer to ATP 3-94.1 for additional details on TLDs.)

MULTINATIONAL BOARDS, BUREAUS, CELLS, CENTERS, AND WORKING GROUPS

2-73. The multinational commander and staff determine early in the planning process the multinational boards, bureaus, cells, centers, or working groups and operational planning teams (known as OPTs). The commander and staff assess requirements for effectively integrating task execution and the associated critical information from across warfighting functions to avoid isolating information functions. Based on purpose and responsibilities, these staff cells and centers may integrate UAPs and national C2 information systems within the lead nation's command post. Or these staff cells and centers may send out liaisons to UAPs to develop and maintain relationships and communications supporting shared understanding, trust, confidence, and unity of effort among partners.

Coalition Network Operations Security Center

2-74. Effective network operations (known as NETOPS) provide consistent performance in the MPN. A critical component for network operations in an MPE is standing up a coalition network operations and security center (CNOSC). This includes setting a network staff with national C2 information systems provided by network contributing partners. The C2 information systems aid in establishing, operating, and troubleshooting the MPN. MPN operations include monitoring national networks to identify impacts to the network, assisting the COP coordination cell in producing the multinational (sometimes called coalition) COP, and helping mission partners meet JMEI requirements. Integrating the CNOSC with the joint network operations control center (or similar C2 group) helps avoid unnecessary duplication of effort in a mission partner operation. (Refer to ATP 6-02.61 for more information on the CNOSC.)

Coordination Cell

2-75. The COP coordination cell includes representatives from each multinational partner with the ability and responsibility to monitor, correct, and report issues between the coalition COP (published over the MPN) and national COPs. The COP coordination cell, like the CNOSC, is a requirement for a lead nation headquarters conducting mission partner operations. The COP coordination cell operates as an effective and efficient method for building and maintaining a quality coalition COP. The COP coordination cell provides a status of the coalition COP in relation to each national picture, which increases multinational partner trust and confidence during execution. (Refer to ATP 6-02.61 for more information on the COP coordination cell.)

2-76. Commanders establish various centers that enhance C2 at each echelon. Commanders in multinational operations integrate allies, coalition partners, interagency organizations, and intergovernmental organizations into a variety of centers within a multinational command. Member nations provide liaison officers familiar with their nations' activities, and they integrate, coordinate, and synchronize multinational operations by function. Multinational commanders integrate multinational staff into various centers to enhance control, such as the operations center, fire direction center, and numerous sustainment operations centers. Joint intelligence operations centers may be difficult to integrate due to intelligence sharing permissions and authorities. The joint deployment and distribution center (known as JDDC) is a critical coordination center that liaisons integrate with to obtain coalition sustainment support. Coalition partners provide liaisons to the joint movement center to synchronize priorities of movement among coalition partners.

2-77. A multinational commander, operating under a parallel command structure, must establish a coordination center to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize operations with parallel commands. The coordination center allows for parallel commands executing independent operations to coordinate their activities while exercising independent C2. Parallel command structures are discouraged. (Refer to JP 3-16 for more on parallel command structures.)

AGENCY COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

2-78. Multinational force commanders focus on cooperation and coordination rather than C2 when dealing with most nonmilitary agencies. These agencies have their own purpose with missions and goals. Coalition commanders have a limited ability to influence these agencies' actions. Commanders seek agency cooperation to ensure that they accomplish the mission and achieve the end state while allowing these agencies to do the same. Agency cooperation also requires that each agency and multinational force staff coordinate to prevent interference in one another's missions. A civil-military operations center is one way of achieving cooperation and coordination with nonmilitary agencies. The civil-military operations center provides a single point of contact between agencies and the commander.

PURPOSE OF MULTINATIONAL FORCE STAFFING

2-79. The multinational staff organization is based on the option used to form the headquarters, either the lead-nation concept or a composite headquarters. The commander has a choice if the establishing authority designates an organization. If the establishing authority uses the lead-nation concept, the lead nation's doctrine assigns the commander and staff's duties. The doctrine is modified as necessary for the specific situation. If the establishing authority uses a composite headquarters, the commander and staff specify duties in more detail. A composite headquarters combines national capabilities from participating nations into a deployable multinational headquarters, specifically designed for commanding task-organized formations. This approach provides participating nations with a capability that exceeds the sum of their individual national contributions. The multinational functions' names change based on sensitivities when working with organizations such as the UN.

2-80. Appropriate members in key positions from each country that provide forces are a part of the multinational staff. These positions stem from the mission and type of operations conducted. Multinational commanders look at force composition as it applies to capabilities, limitations, and required support. The importance of knowing, trusting, and quickly reaching a comfort level with staff members makes it desirable for the multinational commander to choose members of the staff such as the G-3 or S-3.

2-81. When mission requirements exceed staff capabilities, the commander requests the necessary personnel, facilities, and equipment from either the national chain of command or the multinational force's establishing authorities. These commands and authorities have experts prepared to augment a multinational force to assist in the early stages of organization and planning. The staff includes experienced operators for C2 information systems who establish a trusted COP, procedures, and overall information fusion. Personnel nominated to fill multinational augmentation billets possess the following attributes:

- Knowledge, confidence, and forcefulness.
- Professionalism, character, and commitment.
- Preparedness to represent their nations and units.
- An understanding that they are the de facto national subject matter experts.
- An ability to work as part of a multinational force without national parochialism.

2-82. The command establishes a staff orientation program to ensure that all individuals joining the staff become familiar with their surroundings. Establishing a multinational personnel reception center under the assistant chief of staff is accomplished by the adjutant general-personnel (G-1) or S-1. The buddy system is another program that the command establishes with the reception center or by itself. This system assigns an experienced staff member to a new staff member to help with familiarization.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER

2-83. The multinational force commander is responsible to the member nations to accomplish the mission. The following responsibilities are a guide. Commanders adapt these responsibilities to the specific mission and forces assigned:

- Exercise control over assigned and attached forces. The commander determines when to transfer forces to the multinational force operational control or tactical control.
- Develop an operation order or campaign plan in the planning guidelines as directed by the establishing authorities.

- Make recommendations to the establishing authorities on the proper use of assigned and attached forces for mission accomplishment. This includes identifying requirements for additional forces.
- Request supplemental ROE needed to accomplish the mission.
- Establish combat identification measures.
- Notify establishing authorities when prepared to assume responsibility for an area of operations (AO).
- Ensure cross-nation support.
- Ensure the force operates as an effective, mutually supporting multinational force.
- Determine the requirement for and provide guidance on establishing the necessary boards, centers, and bureaus (such as multinational visitor's bureau or multinational movement center).
- Define the subordinate AOs for each subordinate force, including special operations forces. The commander—
  - Ensures accurate accountability of forces deployed.
  - Monitors the operational situation and maintains daily contact with the establishing authorities.
  - Coordinates with forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments, multinational nation agencies, or nongovernmental or intergovernmental organizations.
  - Builds a cohesive team, including nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and others.

DEPUTY MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER

2-84. Normally, the deputy commander is from a different country than the commander. The selection is based on the mission or the number and type of forces in the multinational force. The deputy usually is of equal or senior rank to the subordinate force commanders. The deputy possesses a broad understanding of the operation. The deputy performs special duties as directed by the commander. Examples of these duties include—

- Chairing committees.
- Coordinating with liaison personnel.
- Coordinating for incoming and outgoing requirements.
- Coordinating interagency requirements.
- Acting in the commander's behalf when the commander is not available or otherwise engaged.

CHIEF OF STAFF

2-85. In most cases, the chief of staff comes from the same country or command as the commander. Because the staff has officers from different nations, the chief of staff places special emphasis on training, coordinating, and directing the staff's work. The chief of staff establishes routine procedures to ensure necessary coordination and reviews staff actions for completeness and clarity.

Assistant Chief of Staff, Adjutant General-Personnel (G-1)

2-86. The G-1 is the principal staff assistant to the commander on human resources support. The multinational G-1 considers differences in requirements and procedures that impact personnel management. The G-1 is responsible for human resources support to include finance and religious ministry. Some areas that may significantly impact planning and operations include rotation policies, tour lengths, and expected surges or reductions in personnel based on rotation policies of participating nations. The multinational G-1 also advises the multinational commander on critical shortages for the coalition and specified requirements for key multinational force enablers such as liaisons, linguists, special documentation, requirements for travel, and other comprehensive human resource requirements.

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (G-2)

2-87. The G-2 is the principal staff assistant to the commander for intelligence support. The multinational G-2 considers differences in requirements and procedures that impact intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination. The G-2 is responsible for intelligence capabilities, understanding staff and policy limitations, and information sharing procedures for each nation represented in the multinational force.

Understanding the capabilities and limitations of intelligence operations greatly enhances the G-2 staff's ability to produce a timely and accurate intelligence COP. Additional considerations for the G-2 include—

- Managing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) allocation and collection.
- Managing, planning, and maintaining releasable information.
- Developing and answering commander's critical information requirements.

Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations (G-3)

2-88. The G-3 is the principal staff assistant to the commander for operations. The multinational G-3s have knowledge of separate and combined capabilities and limitations of multinational forces. G-3s also understand key differences of multinational forces that inform operational risk. The multinational G-3 considers the following:

- The examination of ROE to ensure collective understanding of and usability by all forces.
- The appropriate method to share information that works with national caveats and authorities.
- The suitability of missions and assignment.
- COP content and timing requirements.
- The implications resulting from differences of national and administrative boundaries relative to historical events and cultural boundaries.
- The required density, location, and available redundancy of liaisons and interpreters.

(See Chapter 3 for details on operations.)

Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics (G-4)

2-89. Planning and preparation considerations in multinational operations are extensive and may prove particularly challenging if overlooked. Early identification of agreements for sharing and the roles between the nations and forces involved is paramount. Like all other staff functional areas, considering differences in logistics capabilities, requirements, and limitations can inform operational and strategic risks and opportunities. All national forces can execute operations to meet the commander's stated interoperability objectives, support the concept of operations, understand supporting information exchange requirements, and understand related management processes. Key areas the G-4 or S-4 considers:

- National caveats related to the contracting, transport, accounting, use, and sharing of logistics requirements.
- Differences in the capability and availability of supply chain mechanisms.
- Differences in mortuary affairs processes.
- Equipment maintenance times and recovery requirements.
- Differences in national environmental policies.
- Fuel quality requirements.

(See Chapter 5 for sustainment challenges.)

Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans (G-5)

2-90. The assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5) is the principal staff officer for planning operations for the mid- to long-range planning horizons at division and higher echelons. The G-5, in conjunction with the G-3, has staff planning and supervisory responsibility for integrating multinational partner capabilities, anticipating and managing transitions, and managing bilateral and multilateral agreements within the multinational force as the mission dictates. Early in the planning process, the G-5 balances the diverse set of capabilities and limitations of the multinational force using the COP to assist with planning considerations across all staff sections. To manage transitions effectively, the G-5 develops plans with inputs from multinational partners and synchronizes plans through future operations and current operations to facilitate improved interoperability throughout the operations process. (See Chapter 3 for planning challenges.)

Assistant Chief of Staff, Signal (G-6)

2-91. Signal staffs in multinational operations determine what communications and information systems are contributed by each partner and their compatibility and interface with other components. The assistant chief

of staff, signal (G-6) has a thorough knowledge of the network architecture. This officer effectively identifies routing and connections to the enterprise-level network where required, planning for flexibility and redundancy for the tactical MPN, and supporting operations through multiple classification channels. Establishment of structures such as the CNOSC can assist in establishing and monitoring a diverse network. Determining the type, level, redundancy, and location of subject matter expertise is often among the most critical considerations. (Refer to JP 3-16 for details for establishing communications.)

Assistant Chief of Staff, Information Operations (G-39)

2-92. Contributing partners have varying information operations capabilities, understanding, doctrine, and policies to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict. The G-39 knows ways contributing partners define and perceive information operations in general. This officer considers how applicable cultural lenses, similarities and differences, and the way operations are conducted aid in developing common and integrated solutions and risk management.

COMMANDER'S PERSONAL AND SPECIAL STAFFS

2-93. The commander's personal and special staff groups includes the following:

- Political advisor.
- Translators and interpreters.

Political Advisor

2-94. Commanders routinely work directly with political authorities in the region. The commander establishes a close, efficient, and effective relationship with the political advisor. The political advisor—

- Works with the commander and helps the national government create policies that meet multinational objectives it can conduct.
- Acts as the principal contact with ambassadors and informs the appropriate diplomatic personnel of multinational force plans in the AO.
- Supplies information about policy of the diplomatic agencies relevant to the operation.

Translators and Interpreters

2-95. Translators and interpreters are critical to multinational operations mission success. Communication with the local populace and multinational forces is hindered without these professionals. Language barriers cause difficulties when working with other armies and the host nation. Language problems make it difficult to sustain a rapid decision cycle. Even common tasks such as sharing intelligence may require translation before a commander shares it. This slows the development of plans and execution. Language capability speeds command, reduces confusion, and contributes to mutual respect. Forces exchange command information and other information to work together successfully. Few translators have the technical expertise and depth of understanding to be fully understood while crossing both language and doctrinal boundaries.

2-96. Planners consider liaison officers, foreign area officers, and language-capable personnel to fill these positions. Planners determine requirements for language-trained personnel early in the planning cycle. Translators and interpreters are scarce and require a long lead time to deploy. These language-qualified personnel require a training period to become familiar with technical terms and procedures of the organization. Language is more than the direct translation of words. Word choice and mannerisms also convey information.

2-97. Translator or interpreter requirements do not exist only in liaison teams or headquarters elements. Stability operations and logistics functions need linguists or interpreters to coordinate with local authorities, civilian transportation coordinators, dislocated civilian and relief centers, medical staffs, legal offices, and local police forces. A military translator translates a foreign language into English within a command post, while an interpreter interactively works to facilitate communication between a foreign party and a command representative. Commanders consider the physical location for interpreters and functional support. Some situations may require digital systems to assist with translating. Employing digital systems, operators can provide face-to-face digital communication between mission partner representatives and speed of translation.

2-98. Translators differ from interpreters. The translator translates into English (one-directional translation), whereas an interpreter fluently converts the communication into English from the foreign language and back again. The interpreter's linguistic capabilities as a two-directional translator depend on the quality of training provided.

2-99. The time it takes to acquire and train enough translators and interpreters is significant and requires support from the next higher national echelon. The staff conducts its initial joint task force mission analysis and planning and identifies all linguist support requirements early in planning. Early planning ensures availability and timeliness for deployment. (Refer to JP 3-33 for planning for linguists.)

2-100. Host-nation translators and interpreters are important for multinational operations. Vetted local translators and interpreters are acceptable for many requirements. However, some sensitive positions require military translators with appropriate security clearances. Host-nation personnel and members of the multinational force need to trust each other. Without a means of establishing trust, multinational forces are vulnerable.

COMMUNICATIONS

2-101. Communications are fundamental to successful multinational operations. It is important to prepare for communications during planning. Mission analysis and assessment provide an opportunity for the communications officer to identify communications requirements and evaluate in-country capabilities.

INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS

2-102. Commanders solve many communications issues with an equipment exchange and liaison teams. Continual liaison among communications planners helps alleviate interoperability issues. Communications requirements vary with the mission, composition, and geography of the AO. Interoperability is constrained by the least technologically advanced nation. The multinational force addresses the need for integrated communications among all forces early in the planning phase.

2-103. In a multinational force, a primary communications link is between the lead nation and the national contingent headquarters. The ability for commanders, staffs, and subordinates to communicate with civilian agencies across all operations is important. The lead nation and contingent headquarters consider transitioning links to subsequent units, commercial communications, or to agencies such as the UN early in an operation.

2-104. A multinational force plans for adequate communications to include using voice (secure and nonsecure), data, and video teleconferencing. The force needs a deployable communications capability and enough trained operators for sustained operations with multiple means of communications to avoid a single point of failure. (For more details for communicating with foreign forces, refer to JP 3-16 and ATP 3-07.10.)

ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT

2-105. In addition to problems of compatibility and security, many units lack communications equipment to meet mission requirements. During initial planning stages, planners identify communications requirements, issues of spectrum management, and controls on access to information. Liaison teams, with adequate communications equipment, reduce the severity of some problems. Effective communications planners anticipate these requirements during initial planning, evaluate host-nation communications resources, and integrate the requirements into JMEI, KM and IM plans, and the communications plan. The means available need to satisfy operational requirements.

PURPOSE OF KNOWING EACH NATION'S CAPABILITIES

2-106. Each nation's force has finite capabilities it can commit to a multinational operation. Each force's national representative knows those limitations for planning and integration.

NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE INVOLVEMENT IN PLANNING

2-107. Representatives of each nation attend the planning. National representatives ensure that taskings fit the abilities of the force. If a unit has a mission it cannot accomplish, the plan will not work. If possible,

national representatives are available in each staff element. Effective representatives thoroughly understand their nations' capabilities and limitations.

INTEGRATION OF EACH NATION

2-108. Each member nation provides its own distinct units and capabilities to a multinational force. These capabilities differ based on national interests, objectives, arms control limitations, doctrine, organization, training, leader development, equipment, history, defense budget, and domestic politics. To integrate these abilities into multinational operations, the member understands the differences in organization, abilities, and doctrine. The more nations involved, the greater these differences will be for the multinational force.

2-109. Understanding these differences affects whether multinational operations succeed or fail. Units of the same type in one nation's army may not perform the same functions as units in another army. An engineer unit in one army may have capabilities to build roads or buildings, while another army engineer unit may be limited to laying out minefields or building defensive positions.

2-110. The commander of the multinational force integrates force capabilities to achieve the desired end state. Selecting the right mix of capabilities is a challenge. The multinational staff understands the capabilities and limitations of each nation in the multinational force when integrating units.

2-111. National forces operate using their own doctrine internally, while externally their actions conform to the overall direction of the multinational force. To make this work, however, multinational commanders consider doctrinal differences among the other nations. Liaison officers or augmentees and supplemental staff officers help commanders understand differences, capabilities, and variations. When U.S. forces operate with NATO or ABCANZ countries as part of a multinational military command, they follow the doctrine and procedures embedded in U.S. doctrine from previously ratified STANAGs and ABCANZ standards. If time permits, commanders study and understand the doctrine of NATO and multinational partners. Nonetheless, nothing replaces knowing Army doctrine. Army doctrine comprises a part of NATO and multinational doctrine in most instances. At a minimum, it is a framework to begin operations.

2-112. Conventional multinational force capabilities include the following assets and operations:

- Air and missile defense.
- Armor.
- Aviation.
- Engineering.
- Field artillery.
- Infantry.
- Intelligence.
- Medical.
- Military police.
- Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN).
- Translators.
- Interpreters.
- Ordnance.
- Personnel.
- Quartermaster.
- Signal.
- Transportation.

Multinational headquarters need to determine the requirements, capabilities, and dependencies of the forces they will lead across all warfighting functions. These include information about aviation assets, logistics, bases that enable operations, medical evacuation systems, and communications.

Security Force Assistance Brigades

2-113. The security force assistance brigades (SFABs) have the capacity and capability to advise, support, liaise, and assess foreign security forces and their supporting institutions in support of theater security

cooperation objectives. The SFABs can conduct liaison activities in support of multinational operations during large-scale combat and crisis operations in support of U.S. strategic objectives.

2-114. In many cases, a SFAB requires additional support. This could include intelligence, fires, and protection. An effective multinational force commander clearly understands the support relationships for all advisor teams within SFABs. The commander also recognizes an advisor team's ability to expand combined combat power, enable interoperability, enhance partner performance, and enhance situational awareness through advise, support, liaise, and assess activities.

2-115. During competition and campaigning, each geographic combatant commander is allocated a persistent SFAB force package. Conducting security cooperation activities under the threshold of armed conflict, a SFAB often falls under operational and administrative control of the theater army. Operations inside an established joint operations area give a multinational force commander significant authority and responsibilities. The joint force commander assigns subordinate organizations to conduct military operations in those AOs. The geographic combatant commander assigns tactical- or operational-level security force assistance tasks to the SFAB. (Refer to ATP 3-96.1 for more information on SFABs.)

2-116. A SFAB works best when its higher headquarters, in coordination with the partnered nation or security force, gives it objectives for developing or integrating forces. Usually, senior SFAB commanders receive objectives through a tactical control relationship between themselves and their next higher headquarters. This allows the SFAB commanders and staffs to use their advisors and resources against those objectives in a manner best suited to accomplish the SFAB mission.

Special Operations Forces

2-117. Special operations forces capabilities complement conventional capabilities. Selected special operations forces are regionally oriented and have personnel experienced and conversant in the languages and cultures of the AO. These forces help with liaison to facilitate interoperability with multinational forces. When a commander considers using special operations forces, the commander must understand their capabilities and properly apply those capabilities.

2-118. The multinational force commander designates a joint special operations task force to carry out a special operation or prosecute special operations to support a theater campaign or other operations in the AO. A joint special operations task force consists of forces from more than one Service. This commander commands with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite C2. The commander exercises day-to-day C2 of assigned or attached special operations forces and allocates forces against tasks to support the command. The command defines a special operations area for use by the special operations forces. Establishing a joint special operations area delineates and facilitates simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.

2-119. The commander determines where certain special operations forces best fit in the organization. The G-3 or S-3 integrates liaisons from the supporting special operations task force. The special operations task force may provide a special operations C2 element to the supported command. Personnel from the special operations C2 element may combine with the G-3 or S-3 current operations or targeting cells as well as the G-5 or S-5 plans directorate of the multinational command. This integration facilitates special operations, conventional, and multinational forces interoperability as well as interdependence. (Refer to AJP-3.5, ADP 3-05, and TC 3-05.5 for special operations forces and task force planning.)

2-120. At the earliest opportunity, the command's higher headquarters identifies the requirement for civil affairs, psychological operations, and public affairs staff augmentation. These units may require Reserve Component augmentation depending on mission requirements. Staffs understand the delay when requesting these assets because of the lead time necessary. Civil affairs operations, psychological operations, and public affairs actions are mutually supportive and have the potential to dramatically affect the perceived legitimacy of peace operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

2-121. Commanders participating in a multinational operation should consider and be able to answer affirmatively the following questions about a force's participation in the operation.

COMMAND

2-122. Commanders answer the following command questions about the force's participation in the operation:

- Has the command structure been identified? Is it a lead nation, parallel command, combined, or integrated command structure?
- Have political motivations responsible for each nation's participation in the operation been identified? Have potential conflicts that can arise been identified?
- Have the implications of national and regional culture on contemplated multinational operations been assessed?
- Have appropriate orientation briefings from civilian agencies been requested?
- Have status-of-forces agreements (known as SOFAs) been agreed to? If not, who should conduct negotiations? Is there an alternative (for example, technical agreements) that provide adequate protection?
- Have interoperability factors (for example, command, control, communications, or logistics) that can affect the mission been identified?
- Are there cultural barriers that prevent a harmonious relationship? Has a force structure that minimizes friction between partners been identified?
- Have supported and supporting relationships been established or referred to higher authority to resolve inadequacies?
- Has the manner that participating nations view the role and execution of intelligence operations been identified?
- Have linguist and interpreter needs been identified and met?
- Have the capabilities to obtain more linguists and interpreters as needed been identified and met?
- Have specific capabilities that a national contingent brings to the multinational force been identified?
- Have constraints imposed on multinational forces by their national authorities been identified?
- Has the composition of an early-entry command post, if required, for senior grade personnel, staffing, and communications been identified and met?
- Have standards for operational or logistic capabilities been established for certifying units to participate in the operation? Have nations with deficiencies indicated a method of resolution?
- Have national caveats on the use of multinational forces been identified and disseminated throughout the command?
- Have deficiencies with multinational commanders been negotiated for resolution?
- Have C2 arrangements been made for individuals in coordinating functions including the multinational ambassadors, military attachés, and nonmilitary government officials?
- Are forces, logistics support, and command, control, and communications capabilities robust enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?
- Have all multinational legal constraints been considered in planning for C2?
- Have the personnel for the multinational staff been chosen to reflect the required functional skills, training level, language skill, and avoidance of historic animosities?
- Have minimum communications capabilities been established for each multinational member to enable successful 24-hour operations?
- Has the command structure been designed to minimize the number of layers?

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

2-123. Commanders answer the following command relationships questions about the force's participation in the operation:

- Have command relationships for the control of forces been defined?
- Is there an initiating directive that clearly articulates the command arrangements?
- Have the command relationships been defined and analyzed for the following:
  - Feasibility of achieving unity of command or unity of effort?
  - Feasibility of accomplishing the mission defined by the command relationships?

- Assistance required from the national government to negotiate unity of command or unity of effort at the strategic level?
- Clarity of relationships and understanding on the part of all multinational elements?

LIAISON

2-124. Commanders answer the following liaison questions about the force's participation in the operation:

- Have the needs of liaison officers sent to multinational force headquarters and to adjacent, supporting, and supported units been identified and met?
- Do liaison elements on the staff possess requisite authorities? Do the liaison elements have a full understanding of both national interests and multinational objectives?
- Do liaison elements have appropriate communications, linguistic, logistics, and office support capabilities in place?
- Have liaison officers been identified? Have key liaison officers been interviewed for suitability?
- Have the requirements for interagency and multinational coordination been identified and met? Does the force have adequate liaison officers or liaison officer teams to meet required coordination?
- Have Army forces mobile liaison teams been requested?

LANGUAGE

2-125. Commanders answer the following language questions about the force's participation in the operation:

- Has the language used for force-wide communications been identified?
- Has the command level been identified that each force will resort to its national language? Are there sufficient interpreters for planning and execution?

COMMUNICATIONS

2-126. Commanders answer the following communications questions about the force's participation in the operation:

- Have the areas been identified that come under multinational control and that remain national issues?
- Has the requirement for portable communications devices such as cell phones been identified and met?
- Have commercial companies that establish telephone service for use by multinational forces been identified?
- If the multinational force establishes a multinational visitor's bureau, has that communications capability been identified and determined if required?
- Do national laws require agreements defining payments for using the information systems networks or military satellite communications (SATCOM) assets?
- Has the responsible party for funding additional communications capability been identified?
- Will nations be expected to provide communications capabilities to other nations' military forces or civilian agencies?
- Have plans for expanding the communications system been identified and met if needed?
- Has the policy on morale calls been identified? Who supports them?
- Have steps to ensure procedural compatibility been identified and implemented?
- Has the common identification of friend or foe procedure been identified and implemented?
- Have the data-link protocols been identified and implemented?
- Have the communications equipment capability between forces been identified and implemented?
- Has coordination been accomplished regarding frequency assignment?
- Have C2 information systems required to support diminishing multinational force presence been identified and implemented?
- Will command channels be used only for execution and national channels be used only for reporting status and requesting support?
- Are there a means and a plan to provide all forces with a COP?
- Do multinational partners with a lesser C2 capability have appropriate liaison officers, interpreters, operators, and maintainers to enable adequate C2 in the multinational force?

- Is there a policy or plan for the control, release, and dissemination of sensitive information and cryptographic materials, especially to civilian agencies that require some access to classified material to accomplish their missions?
- Has the language exchange point been determined?
- Are there sufficient interpreters available for both planning and execution?
- Has the terrain and environment been considered while planning for a communications network?
- Has the rapid dissemination of targeting materials been provided for?
- Have arrangements been made for staff communications?
- Have common databases been provided for?
- Has the nation most capable of providing an integrated, interoperable communications network been selected to serve as network manager for the multinational C2 infrastructure?
- Have arrangements been made to allow contract host-nation employees to work on staffs without exposing them to automated data processing and classified information used in daily operations?
- Has the multinational force established a standard datum? Will all products be on that datum?
- Is there a multinational force geospatial information and services plan that designates all mapping, charting, and geodesy products for use?
- Have the command relationships, locations of headquarters, and the type of services required (such as tactical satellite, telephone, facsimile, amplitude modulation, and frequency modulation or modulated) been determined?
- Have the frequency requirements and planning ranges for equipment been identified and implemented?
- Has the multinational force communications coordinator requested frequencies?
- Has the method the multinational force will use to conduct spectrum management been identified and implemented? This accounts for frequencies already in use by civilian agencies.
- Has the method the multinational force will use to achieve automated data processing software compatibility to facilitate file transfers been identified and implemented?
- Has the method the multinational force will use to achieve communications interoperability been identified and implemented? Will the system satisfy communications requirements from the national authorities to the lowest information exchange requirement?
- If civilian agencies have separate communications networks and the multinational force provides security for these agencies, has the method they will request assistance during emergencies been identified?
- Has the method the multinational force will use to ensure adequate redundancy been identified? Are multiple assets available and used during operations to ensure information flow?
- Has the method the multinational force will use to handle incompatible communications equipment among organizations and multinational forces been identified?
- Has communications support provided to civilian agencies been identified? Will support be provided through the civil-military operations center?
- Has the method and time the multinational force will use to establish its communications architecture been identified?
- Has the method the multinational force will use to account for and use communications networks established by civilian agencies been identified? This includes commercially leased circuits, commercial satellite services, high frequency, and very high frequency radios.
- Has the method the multinational force will use to address the need for secure communications been identified?
- Has the method the command will use to handle spillage incidents when a person accidentally transmits classified data over the unclassified computer network been identified?
- Has the policy on implementing communications blackout periods to support multinational operations security been identified?
- Is there a multinational force standardized email naming convention?

Chapter 3

Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations

This chapter discusses planning challenges beginning with an overview of campaign preparation. It then discusses the importance of force protection. The chapter also addresses the commander's mission focus and guidance to ensure unity of effort. This chapter discusses planning for the MPE and establishing the MPN within multinational forces. The chapter then provides early planning considerations.

CAMPAIGN PREPARATION

3-1. The ability to alert, mobilize, and rapidly deploy forces in any region is critical to mission success. Understanding the limitations and capabilities of multinational forces' contributions helps create a secure and stable environment. Planners review national military contingents and mission partner assets. These contributions allow the necessary forces to deploy efficiently with the available lift assets. Understanding the current infrastructure and transportation limitations in the region helps the force allocate resources. Once resources are committed, national contingent units and liaison offices coordinate with the mission partners for deployment in the AO. Effective planners anticipate and coordinate requirements to maximize capabilities and minimize resources for the multinational force. This prevents duplication of effort from the lead nation.

FORCE PROJECTION FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCES

3-2. Force projection for a multinational force is critical to mission accomplishment. From the beginning, participants must know the multinational considerations to deploy forces and use lift assets. Multinational operations strive to avoid duplicated effort and unit capabilities. For example, before the UN protection force deployed to the former Republic of Yugoslavia, each participating nation performed its own engineer reconnaissance of the infrastructure. This enabled staff to see duplicated efforts and to find omissions in necessary support. Multinational force planners review assets from national military contingents and mission partners and then agree on a division of labor.

3-3. Limited lift means maximizing efficiency during deployment of forces and sustainment capabilities. This lift requires coordination with troop contributing nations, so units do not deploy capabilities already available, such as port operations forces. In some cases, one multinational force transports another nation's forces to the AO. Liaison officers from national contingents coordinate with the nation moving its forces or with the multinational force headquarters responsible for coordinating the movements with the nation providing lift. (See Chapter 5 for additional information on sustainment.)

MISSION FOCUS FOR THE COMMANDER

3-4. Mission focus is a planning challenge for commanders. Political considerations and military capabilities of the multinational force affect the focus that commanders have on multinational operations. The commander remains focused on the mission and understands the reason each national contingent participates. This mission focus determines the structure and resultant taskings of the multinational force. Commanders need to prevent a multinational force from splitting into components operating under differing political directions. The commander recognizes that political considerations can push an acceptable course of action rather than the optimum military solution. The commander remains flexible to adjust to unforeseen political influences, keeps the multinational force focused on the military objective, and avoids mission creep.

3-5. Another challenge to mission focus is national differences in doctrine, training, or equipment. Leaders assign functions to a smaller group of partners to overcome differences in doctrine, training, or equipment. For example, the multinational force assigns the mission of support area security to home defense or police forces. Commanders consider tasking members of the multinational force with specific warfighting functions or operations based on the threat's special capabilities and its nation capabilities. Commanders recognize the strengths and differences of the forces' cultures. Commanders' decisions and military leadership use the capabilities of the forces. Subordinate commanders request control of forces that provide capabilities not

organic to that nation's forces. The guiding principle is to allocate assets, as needed, and maintain concentrated critical capabilities.

3-6. The commander's ability to understand and integrate each nation's capabilities into a cohesive force binds a multinational operation together. Commanders articulate their intent. This enables each nation to form the same picture of an end state and the rules governing engagements. Given the language difficulties found in many multinational forces, commanders clearly and simply state their intent. At a minimum, the planning guidance states—

- The purpose of the operation.
- A mission statement for the multinational force.
- Broad objectives and tasks for the multinational force.
- Desired end states and guidance on termination or transition.
- Participating nations and expected initial contributions.
- Common security interests.
- Specific national limitations, concerns, or sensitivities.

TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY

3-7. The transfer of authority of forces to a multinational commander can impact mission focus. The designated multinational commander will have some form of authority over national units at some point. Planners define limits of authority and accomplish transfer of authority as early as possible. The timing of the transfer is part of the initial negotiations that govern how the multinational force forms. Planners determine when transfer of authority occurs. Early transfer of authority and deployment of liaison teams enable a multinational commander to plan and perform effective integration training through three options.

3-8. The first option is to arrange transfer of authority to the multinational force before deploying from a unit's home station. Commanders control the unit arrival sequence to best suit operational requirements and facilitate reception area base operations. This option assumes clear political consensus, timely decisions on national participation, and a significant lead time for planning and setting up the multinational force headquarters.

3-9. The second option is to have transfer of authority at an intermediate staging base en route to an operational area. Forces resolve problems in a secure area. Forces deploy only when fully ready and as required by the multinational force.

3-10. The third option is to have transfer of authority occur once forces arrive in the AO. This option leaves each nation responsible to deploy and prepare its contingent for operations. It does not allow the multinational force positive control of deployment into the AO.

3-11. Centralized control of force flow provides the best support to the multinational force's requirements and the best support to the participating forces. Whichever option the commander chooses for transfer of authority, central coordination of deploying forces is preferred. Such coordination prevents repetitive crisis management of reception operations.

3-12. Each multinational nation has a different way to plan operations. If a lead nation commands the multinational force, then the lead nation uses its own planning. At national contingent headquarters, nations use their own planning.

PLANNING FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS OVERVIEW

3-13. Multinational planning begins before the actual operation and uses generic plans on which to build the actual plan of execution. Depending on the type and nature of operations conducted, planning includes governmental agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. Initial planning typically addresses pre-deployment, deployment, sustainment, transition, roles, participation, and redeployment operations.

3-14. Based on the identified mission partners and relationships, the commander determines interoperability planning and preparation requirements. Commanders consider whether to establish additional organizational staff coordination centers, such as a mission partner coordination center to support interoperability. They also

consider whether to rely on direct coordination between unit and mission partner staff elements to conduct the required interoperability planning and preparation.

3-15. In accordance with the commander's decision and final planning guidance, the chief of staff or executive officer coordinates with staff principals to assist the G-3 or S-3 in developing the plan or order. Based on the commander's planning guidance, the chief of staff or executive officer dictates the type of order, sets and enforces time limits and development sequence, and determines staff section responsibilities for attachments within the order. Before the commander approves the plan or order, the staff ensures the plan or order is internally consistent and nests with the higher commander's intent. Mission partner coordination centers, staff elements, working groups, and planning teams provide input on final operation plans and operation orders, and they complete and coordinate required attachments. Input from these planning efforts vary but may be specified tasks, coordinating instructions, sustainment instructions, and fire support instructions.

3-16. The unit prepares for multinational operations by implementing planned human, procedural, and technical dimension solutions. Preparation normally begins during planning and continues into execution by forces identified but not yet committed. Like the other activities of the operations process, commanders drive preparation activities with a focus on leading and assessing.

3-17. When the situation permits, commanders seek to improve the contributions of national forces by planning for training assistance and sharing resources such as radios, vehicles, or weapons. Training assistance and dedicated liaison teams are important when working with forces that have digital capability and those with analog means. Effective integration in combat operations requires training beforehand through multinational command post exercises or through full-scale multinational exercises at combined training centers such as the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany. Commanders make every effort to integrate mission partners into the exercise design and planning conferences prior to exercise execution. This practice fosters buy-in and can serve as a substantial training event for the foreign staff officers as they plan alongside their U.S. counterparts. It also functions as a rehearsal, ensuring all parties understand and agree to the exercise design and training objectives prior to execution.

PLANNING GROUPS FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCES

3-18. When a multinational force is formed, the commander determines the organization and functions of the planning group and the methods for the group and the staff sections to interact during planning and execution. The planning group includes the commander and representatives from appropriate multinational staff sections and national formations. Challenges from these planning groups range from diversity and different perspectives to strategic and operational problems and solutions. This planning group should—

- Perform crisis action planning.
- Be the focal point for the operation plan or operation order development.
- Perform future planning.
- Perform other tasks as directed by the commander.
- Analyze and develop the MPE based on the commander's specific guidance.

MISSION PARTNER ENVIRONMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

3-19. Multinational operations present planning challenges for MPE planning. The Army MPE framework enables the Army, with the joint forces and mission partners, access to an information environment (such as an MPE MPN). This environment supports required planning, training, and conduct of operations through all operational phases across the competition continuum. The MPE facilitates shared understanding, fosters mutual trust and confidence, and is critical to achieving unity of effort with all mission partners. The MPE generates strategic, operational, and tactical flexibility for national, regional, and deployed commanders by moving and managing information onto the MPN with appropriate common security enclaves.

3-20. A significant planning challenge for MPE development and implementation involves adjudicating existing policy with desired MPE capabilities and functions. The foreign disclosure officer gets involved early in the planning stages to determine appropriate levels of classification. This officer can assist with the "write to release" process and implementation of the foreign disclosure procedures. The foreign disclosure

officer categorizes and is the approval authority for the release of military information to foreign government representatives. Commanders and staffs must understand what information to share with mission partners to accomplish the mission. Commanders and staffs need to understand which U.S. systems can and cannot communicate with mission partners' systems due to levels of classification. Once the multinational commander establishes MPE requirements, the staff plans for establishing the MPN tailored to information requirements of mission partners.

MISSION PARTNER NETWORK PLANNING

3-21. Planning challenges occur with the MPN in multinational operations. The creation of an expeditionary MPE with an associated MPN supports required planning, training, and the conduct of operations. Commanders expect expeditionary MPEs to exist only during the mission and partners to be the only ones contributing to, supported by, or providing support to the specific mission. Planners tailor each specific expeditionary MPE MPN topology for operations based on an operational environment and specific mission partners information-sharing requirements. This expeditionary MPE allows connectivity and reachback to the enterprise MPE. (Refer to ATP 6-02.61 and ATP 6-02.62 for more information on planning MPNs.)

3-22. Key Army requirements to implementing an expeditionary MPE include the following:

- Rapidly configuring and deploying an MPE MPN to support a new operation with a unique mix of mission partners, mission requirements, and objectives.
- Standardizing information technology services across U.S. MPE contributions to eliminate duplication. Such services might include network operations, data handling and protection, user access and permissions, and network security.
- Standardizing common services—such as voice over internet protocol, email, chat, file sharing, and video teleconferencing—to ensure access and usability for all mission partners.
- Ensuring cybersecurity measures meet security objectives whether implemented by the Army or a mission partner and are balanced against the need for access and flow of information.
- Assigning and managing appropriate privileges and providing user access to mission communities of interest.
- Considering and implementing privacy controls across the multinational force to account for mission partner privacy laws to protect personally identifiable information and personal health information.
- Enabling authorized mission partner access to the enterprise MPE and permitted communities of interest data enclaves, with appropriate access controls and data guards to prevent unauthorized access or data spillage.
- Integrating electromagnetic spectrum operations within MPE planning and implementation.
- Providing a means to coordinate and convert datum, formats, and projections of geospatial data and information to develop a base map to support a COP, common reporting, and geospatial foundation data.
- Implementing structured, tailorable, and intuitive data management, IM construct, and KM construct to facilitate information sharing.
- Developing and implementing technical and procedural dimension solutions to integrate Army-joint mission partner ground, air, and space operations. The solution must address—
  - Air support requests, air space control measures, and terminal attack guidance among mission partners.
  - Integration of surface fires, rotary-wing aviation, and fixed-wing aviation among mission partners.
  - Integration of surface, unmanned aircraft, rotary-wing, fixed-wing, and space-based ISR capabilities across the collection spectrum.
  - Integration of air and missile defense capabilities with all mission partners to engage hostile air assets (such as manned and unmanned aircraft, and missiles) and in accordance with planning guidance.

TRANSITION PLANNING

3-23. Transitions are conditions based, not time based. Transitions are a process rather than a specific event. Commanders and their staff should think through the strategic, operational, and tactical situations; assets and

resources; political factors; and environmental factors when considering transitioning from one imperative to another.

3-24. National decision makers determine the political necessities for transition. Commanders and planners understand that these political factors—whether host-nation, multinational force, alliances, or coalition—are likely to shape any conditions-based approach. The political environment could affect national institutions, public services, control of operational environments, or geographical areas. Multinational force commanders consider how actions taken by the multinational force may impact transition, the overall effect of the mission, or the national political environment. Transition planning is an integral part of operational planning and a hedge against the risk.

TYPES OF TRANSITIONS FROM MULTINATIONAL FORCES

3-25. Planning varies for different types of transitions. One type of transition is a multinational force military relief in place. This transition has normal military operation emphasis on a mission and protecting the force. The relief in place uses doctrine from the lead nation. Commanders and staff plan by reading the lead nation's doctrine.

3-26. A second type of transition is a multinational force military to civilian or UN authorities. This transition occurs with a normal UN civilian support type mission with emphasis on military support to the civilian and UN missions. In this transition, planning occurs as both the military and civilian authorities—

- Identify the conditions suitable for handover.
- Identify and agree on responsibilities for C2 of the operation.
- Identify the necessary phases of the operation.

Also in this transition, planning occurs as both the military and civilian authorities escalate or de-escalate. The command—

- Confirms multinational members.
- Identifies ROE and national differences of ROE.
- Identifies protection issues.

3-27. Another transition is a multinational force military handover to a national government. This transition is a withdrawal. The military places emphasis on fully handing over responsibilities and allowing the government to assume power and authority. The commander identifies host-nation capability gaps and the national decision makers identify those capabilities that remain behind to ensure that an effective handover of authority and support to the government occurs.

CONSIDERATIONS

3-28. Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations use the military decision-making process. Other doctrinal decision-making processes supporting multinational operations, such as the Army design methodology or troop leading procedures, may also be relevant.

Note. Units planning for a multinational exercise routinely begin planning for the exercise, to include the military decision-making process (known as MDMP), in the final months before execution. The commander and staff assisted by the mission partner coordinator begin planning and implementing interoperability solutions for an exercise before the initial planning conference. The commander provides interoperability guidance. The staff develops plans and begins to implement solutions, such as operator training and MPN development, throughout the exercise planning process. They use the initial, mid, and final planning conferences as opportunities to collaboratively plan with mission partners, validate progress against the interoperability plan of action and milestones, and generate feedback from unit leaders and exercise controllers regarding progress to meet the commander's interoperability guidance.

STEP 1—RECEIPT OF MISSION

3-29. Commanders answer the following questions about the force's participation in the operation concerning Step 1—Receipt of Mission:

- Are the unit's mission partners, the task organization, command structure, and command relationships determined between the unit and mission partners?
- Does the commander establish additional ad hoc structure to support interoperability? Or does the commander rely on direct coordination between unit and mission partner staff elements to conduct required interoperability planning and preparation?
- Does the commander appoint a mission partner coordinator to assist the staff and advise the commander in planning, implementation, execution, and assessment of interoperability solutions?
- Did the unit conduct initial coordination and staff or liaison exchanges with mission partners?
- Did the unit identify mission analysis information requirements and share these requirements with subordinates and mission partners?
- Did the unit issue a warning order to subordinates and mission partners?

STEP 2—MISSION ANALYSIS

3-30. Commanders answer the following questions about the force's participation in the operation concerning Step 2—Mission Analysis:

- Are the relevant agreed-to standards determined between U.S. and mission partners?
- If no common standards exist, is a baseline standard determined to tailor to the specific circumstances?
- Are the force capabilities, limitations, and national caveats of each mission partner determined to enable shared understanding and unity of effort?
- Are the laws, policies, regulations, and higher guidance with impact on interoperability solutions determined?
- Is the higher headquarters order examined for interoperability guidance such as force KM plans, theater ROE, network architecture, and COP data standards?
- Are the mission critical interoperability requirements identified?
- Are the tactical tasks the commander identified with interoperability guidance and associated information exchange requirements used in KM and network planning?
- Are external resource requirements such as TLDs, translators, and MPN hardware determined?
- Are changes to mission partner mix, command structure, authorities, and task organization identified to improve interoperability?
- Is a draft plan of action and milestones developed to synchronize and to meet planning and implementation requirements for interoperability solutions?
- Is a warning order published with updated interoperability requirements, identified standards, and other interoperability guidance as input to course of action (COA) development?

STEP 3—COA DEVELOPMENT

3-31. Commanders answer the following questions about the force's participation in the operation concerning Step 3—COA Development:

- Does the COA account for interoperability? Are changes to the ROE, KM, and coalition TTP required?
- Is an interoperability assessment plan developed with key measures and a focus on mission critical interoperability requirements?
- Are initial liaison, training, and rehearsal plans developed?

STEP 4—COA ANALYSIS

3-32. Commanders answer the following questions about the force's participation in the operation concerning Step 4—COA Analysis:

- Is the operational COA analyzed for interoperability implications, strengths, and weaknesses?
- Are unique mission partner support requirements identified for each operational COA based on assigned tasks and scheme of maneuver?

- Is mission partner feedback sought on an operational COA?
- Are common plans, such as ROE, KM, interoperability assessment, and liaison, refined?

STEP 5—COA COMPARISON

3-33. Commanders answer the following questions about the force's participation in the operation concerning Step 5—COA Comparison:

- Is mission partner input sought for COA comparison?
- Is ensured interoperability included in operational COA evaluation criteria?
- Are revised common plans, interoperability assessment plans, liaison plans, training, and rehearsal plans based on COA comparison results?

STEP 6—COA APPROVAL

3-34. Commanders answer the following questions about the force's participation in the operation concerning Step 6—COA Approval:

- Is interoperability input (provided to ensure internally consistent planning) nested in the higher commander's intent?
- Are tasks to mission partners clearly stated and understood?
- Did the unit issue a warning order to subordinates and mission partners with draft common plans and updated commander's guidance for interoperability?

STEP 7—ORDERS PRODUCTION, DISSEMINATION, AND TRANSITION

3-35. Commanders answer the following questions about the force's participation in the operation concerning Step 7—Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition:

- Are requests finalized and submitted for external resources to address interoperability requirements?
- Are requests finalized and submitted for waivers, required accreditations, authority to operate, and others?
- Are common plans completed and integrated—such as ROE, KM, liaison, and JMEI—as attachments to an order?
- Are TTP and SOPs coordinated and finalized across mission partners and warfighting functions as attachments to an order?
- Are all preparation activities coordinated and scheduled with subordinate units and mission partners? Do they include training plans, rehearsal plans, and schedules as attachments to an order?
- Are orders translated and verified for each mission partner? Are completed orders delivered and acknowledged by higher headquarters, mission partners, and subordinate units?

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Chapter 4
Intelligence During Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by discussing multinational intelligence and multinational information sharing. It then discusses planning, communications, and processes for multinational forces operations. multinational forces Next, it discusses intelligence operations, complementary intelligence capabilities, and information sharing. Lastly, this chapter discusses information versus intelligence and includes considerations for commanders and staff.

MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

4-1. The multinational force synchronizes its intelligence efforts with UAPs to achieve unity of effort and to meet the commander's intent. Intelligence unity of effort is critical to accomplish the mission. UAPs contribute to the intelligence effort. Multinational and interagency partners provide cultural awareness and unique perspectives that reinforce and complement Army intelligence capabilities. UAPs may have access to different capabilities, or they may have more of a capability than Army and joint forces have. Some partners may have unique policies, authorities, or access that provide intelligence opportunities that are not otherwise available to Army forces. Using appropriate procedures and established policy, multinational force intelligence leaders provide information and intelligence support to multinational forces. The intelligence staff section leverages the intelligence enterprise to answer the commander's requirements.

4-2. Intelligence leaders ensure that the intelligence warfighting function operates effectively and efficiently. These leaders are the commander's primary advisors on employing ISR and information collection assets. *Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance* is an integrated operations and intelligence activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors; assets; and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (JP 2-0). Multinational forces need to approach joint ISR as a unified effort. To drive joint ISR and information collection properly, intelligence leaders consider and leverage all capabilities provided by the multinational force. Additionally, intelligence analysts support their commanders with analysis and production of timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive assessments and products tailored to the commander's needs. (Refer to ADP 2-0 for more information on intelligence and the intelligence warfighting function. Refer to JP 2-0 for more on integrating intelligence and exploitation in operations.)

4-3. Intelligence leaders ensure that multinational forces use the intelligence capability of UAPs. Failure to employ UAPs or disseminate their products is the same as keeping intelligence capabilities in reserve and may communicate an insult to the partner, which may result in a change in the level of support from the partner. Intelligence leaders may need to employ products, personnel, and capabilities from UAPs innovatively. This may include adding to existing capacity for performing types of collection or analysis, or generating a new, complementary capability. For example, leaders may use an open-source research capability to conduct in-depth studies of aspects of operational variables or civil considerations of an operational environment.

MULTINATIONAL INFORMATION SHARING

4-4. Every multinational operation differs, as do the methods by which the force collects and disseminates intelligence. As classification and dissemination controls may present problems in releasing information, it is important for intelligence leaders to avoid over classifying information and to work with the foreign disclosure officer and foreign disclosure representatives. Together, they ensure leaders can share relevant information appropriately with partners in the multinational force. (See Executive Order 13526 and AR 380-10 for guidance on foreign disclosure.)

4-5. Multinational operations require foreign disclosure coordination and security classification policy guidance to drive write for release at the lowest levels. Staffs at all levels must follow foreign disclosure guidelines and regulations when sharing information and intelligence with allies and multinational partners.

To help intelligence sharing, staffs establish and adhere to procedures, specific guidelines, and policies. These guidelines and policies improve interoperability, trust, and operational effectiveness in a multinational force.

4-6. To avoid intelligence and information sharing becoming a contentious issue, commanders address sharing from the planning phases to ensure everyone understands national policy limitations and the risks versus rewards. Timely sharing of intelligence products and combat information enables prompt responses to situations. For example, a multinational force establishes processes to rapidly modify, validate, and downgrade classification, and to release imagery to one or more partners with a need to know. Commanders educate themselves on the positions of allies and partner nations regarding intelligence sharing and ensure that intelligence is shared to the degree necessary for mission accomplishment and force protection. Early information sharing during planning ensures that forces receive requirements that are clearly stated, guidance supports the commander's intent, and the multinational force uses procedures supportable by other nations. (Refer to ATP 3-39.21 for more on expeditionary forensics, ATP 2-22.82 for more on biometrics-enabled intelligence, and ATP 2-22.85 for more on tactical employment of biometrics.)

4-7. Multilateral and bilateral security sharing agreements fall under the purview of a combatant command but are the results from policy agreements between the United States and one or more partners. These agreements cover security cooperation initiatives and operations planned for allies and partner nations. A combatant command can request that intelligence reports, products, and assessments be made releasable to multinational partners as necessary. The intelligence officer, in coordination with the foreign disclosure officer, understands existing agreements (established at the earliest time of UAP formation) before articulating disclosure guidance to operations planners and facilitates clear communications and interoperability among elements within a coalition. Intelligence officers consider how national laws and policies of individual coalition members affect the sharing of information and intelligence. These officers recognize that each coalition or multinational force will develop unique procedures for intelligence sharing since sharing authorities vary depending on partners involved. These authorities may also change over time. Disclosure guidance for a multinational force should maximize existing authorities and include guidelines for writing for release.

4-8. Writing for release means developing products specifically for disclosure to the partners involved. Often it carefully excludes information that might reveal sources, collection methods, or other protected information to reduce the risk of misclassifying information. Intelligence planners apply writing for release to intelligence production and all aspects of the operation, such as operation orders and update briefings. Writing for release applies to more than just intelligence production, such as a releasable version of the same product or a tear line within the product. In situations with diverse UAPs, complicated sharing guidance and planners often produce multiple versions of the same product with different dissemination controls. These precautions ensure that every coalition member gets some degree of shared understanding while limiting risks. Writing for release works best with a command policy that requires planners to prepare products with releasable versions at their creation instead of requestors asking for releasable versions after the fact.

4-9. A multinational force maximizes potential contributions of each partner through coordination. Although the communications architecture is an essential element in this area, there are specific intelligence areas requiring extensive coordination that include—

- Friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
- Use of space assets, location of intelligence assets, and location of known or templated threat locations to collect against.
- Verification that the intelligence effort serves both the multinational and national needs.

4-10. Priority intelligence requirements focus on intelligence concerning the adversary and environment. Commanders find answers by coordinating at all levels. An established joint center provides TTP available to commanders to enable improved collaboration and information sharing. Joint centers enable collection and promote intelligence and information sharing across multiple intelligence sources or nations. Multinational commanders at various echelons create joint centers to manage the flow of information and intelligence, to focus information collection to satisfy information requirements, and to process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate the resulting collection.

PLANNING FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCES OPERATIONS

4-11. UAPs may have policy restraints and sovereignty concerns. Such restraints and concerns mean that nations will likely limit their available assets to a multinational force. As a result, multinational forces accept that they will often have limited, decentralized control over some of their intelligence assets, and they will have no direct control over assets restricted by individual nations. These undisclosed assets are managed by the nation's national intelligence cell. Multinational forces performing intelligence operations establish an intelligence fusion cell at the headquarters level through which intelligence tasks will flow. This cell helps integrate intelligence representatives and liaison personnel at each organizational level and improve access to intelligence capabilities. A staff bases information collection plans on matching intelligence requirements of a coalition organization with the available and accessible intelligence assets in the AO.

4-12. The multinational force conducts ISR and information collection with an emphasis on leveraging the larger intelligence enterprise. The commander provides the intelligence staff with a clear mission statement and commander's intent. The intelligence section then develops information and intelligence requirements that commanders review, matches assets with requirements, and requests joint ISR support. A multinational force's ability to gather and process intelligence varies widely. The command's collection manager accounts for this variance and tasks various intelligence assets and joint ISR platforms accordingly, matching collection assets with requirements to answer priority intelligence requirements. Sharing information and mutual support are key to integrating all resources into a system to best meet the command's intelligence requirements.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMUNICATIONS AND PROCESSING

4-13. The ability to collect, process, and disseminate information to many users requires effective lateral and vertical communications. UAPs come to an agreement during the planning phase of an operation as to what SOPs and data standards partners will use. The agreement also addresses using existing agreements such as those articulated in NATO STANAGs, ABCANZ standards, and other STANAGs. A lead nation establishes appropriate JMEI for the MPN to facilitate interoperability. Liaison officers at the multinational force headquarters provide subject matter expertise in their national capabilities and supplementary communications to their parent nations.

4-14. Successful multinational intelligence operations use a common intelligence architecture to leverage capabilities of participating allies and partners. This architecture enables effective communications within the multinational force without compromising national security interests. Information and intelligence exchange requirements for multinational forces focus on enabling a common intelligence picture with two-way information flows among U.S. military commands and multinational partners. Establishing, testing, and validating the multinational force's intelligence architecture during the preparation phase of the operation contribute to shared situational awareness and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

4-15. *Intelligence operations* are the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units through the intelligence disciplines to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements (ADP 2-0). Intelligence operations collect information about the intent, activities, and capabilities of threats and relevant aspects of an operational environment to support multinational commanders' decision making. Data and information collected during intelligence operations are essential to developing timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored intelligence products. Intelligence operations use mission orders and standard command and support relationships. Intelligence operations are shaping operations the commander uses for the main effort. Flexibility and adaptability to changing situations are critical to conduct effective intelligence operations. (Refer to ADP 2-0 for more information on intelligence operations and intelligence disciplines.)

4-16. The intelligence disciplines are as follows:

- Counterintelligence.
- Geospatial intelligence.
- Human intelligence.
- Measure and signature intelligence.
- Open-source intelligence.

- Signals intelligence.
- Technical intelligence.

4-17. Counterintelligence is also known as CI. *Counterintelligence* is information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities (JP 2-0). (Refer to JP 2-0 and ATP 2-22.4 for more information on information and counterintelligence.)

4-18. Geospatial intelligence is also known as GEOINT. *Geospatial intelligence* is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on or about the Earth (JP 2-0). Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and other geospatial information. Geospatial intelligence includes full-motion video platforms. (Refer to JP 2-0 for more on geospatial intelligence.)

4-19. Human intelligence is also known as HUMINT. *Human intelligence* is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources (JP 2-0). (Refer to JP 2-0, ADP 2-0, and FM 2-22.3 for more information on human intelligence.)

4-20. Measure and signature intelligence is also known as MASINT. *Measure and signature intelligence* is information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to detect, characterize, locate, and identify targets and events; and derived from specialized, technically derived measurements and signatures of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event (JP 2-0). (Refer to JP 2-0 for more information on measure and signature intelligence.)

4-21. Open-source intelligence is also known as OSINT. *Open-source intelligence* is publicly available information collected, exploited, and disseminated to address a specific requirement (JP 2-0). (Refer to JP 2-0 for more information on open-source intelligence.)

4-22. Signals intelligence is also known as SIGINT. *Signals intelligence* is a category of intelligence comprising all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted, individually or in combination (JP 2-0). (Refer to JP 2-0 for more details on signals intelligence.)

4-23. Technical intelligence is also known as TECHINT. *Technical intelligence* is intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an enemy's technological advantages (JP 2-0). (Refer to JP 2-0, ATP 2-22.4, and AR 381-26 for a thorough discussion of technical intelligence.)

COMPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

4-24. Complementary intelligence capabilities contribute valuable information for all-source intelligence to conduct operations. The complementary intelligence capabilities are specific to the unit and circumstances at each echelon. These capabilities vary across the intelligence enterprise in a multinational formation, depending upon what each of the national contingents can provide. The complementary intelligence capabilities are as follows:

- Biometrics-enabled intelligence.
- Cyber-enabled intelligence.
- Document and media exploitation.
- Forensic-enabled intelligence.

(Refer to ADP 2-0 for more information on complementary intelligence capabilities.)

4-25. Biometrics-enabled intelligence is intelligence resulting from the combination of biometric information with other intelligence, threat information, or information relating to other aspects of an operational environment to answer intelligence requirements. (Refer to ADP 2-0 for more on biometrics-enabled intelligence.)

4-26. Cyber-enabled intelligence is produced by combining intelligence analysis with collaborated information concerning activity in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. (Refer to JP 3-85 for electromagnetic spectrum operations.)

4-27. Document and media exploitation is also known as DOMEX. Document and media exploitation is the processing, translation, analysis, and dissemination of collected hardcopy documents and electronic media that are under the U.S. government's physical control and are not publicly available. Units can derive threat intent, capabilities, and limitations through the exploitation of captured materials. (Refer to DODD 3300.03 for more on document and media exploitation.)

4-28. Forensic-enabled intelligence is also known as FEI. *Forensic-enabled intelligence* is the intelligence resulting from the integration of scientifically examined materials and other information to establish full characterization, attribution, and the linkage of events, locations, items, signatures, nefarious intent, and persons of interest (JP 2-0). (Refer to JP 2-0 for details on forensic-enabled intelligence and ATP 3-39.21 for more on expeditionary forensics.)

MULTINATIONAL INFORMATION SHARING TASKS

4-29. Every multinational operation and all the tasks the force uses to collect and disseminate intelligence differs. Classification may present a challenge in sharing information, but keeping as much information at the lowest appropriate classification level as possible improves interoperability, trust, and operational effectiveness in the multinational force. Commanders know other nation's positions on intelligence sharing and ensure that intelligence is shared as much as possible, especially if required for mission accomplishment and force protection. Early information sharing during planning ensures that multinational force requirements are clearly stated, guidance supports the commander's intent, and the multinational force uses procedures supportable by other nations.

4-30. The following tasks guide multinational intelligence operations:

- Adjust for national differences in intelligence concepts.
- Create an integrated multinational staff and intelligence fusion center with representatives from all participating nations within national limits on intelligence sharing.
- View the mission from a multinational and national perspective; treat a threat to one member as a threat to all members.
- Agree to and plan for multinational intelligence requirements in advance of the operation.
- Plan complementary intelligence operations using all available multinational intelligence resources focusing on national strengths.
- Exchange liaison officers to limit problems derived from culture, language, doctrine, and intelligence requirements.

CONSIDERATIONS

4-31. Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations consider and answer the following questions with respect to the intelligence portion of the operation:

- Does the multinational force have an initial collection management working group? What are the positions in the deployment timetable?
- Does the collection plan incorporate all collection assets available for tasking and account for differences in capabilities, limitations, and release authorities of the collecting nation?
- Are there any specific cultural, historical, language, customs, or religious relationships between the multinational force partners and the adversary or the local population?
- What is the intelligence architecture?
- Does the intelligence architecture meet mission requirements? Are there any gaps in coverage?
- Has the C2 system been established to disseminate time sensitive information for targeting or rapid reaction to all participants?
- What are the procedures for sharing intelligence and information or releasing information policies? Are all multinational partners treated equally, considering compartmented and national sensitivities?
- What are the levels of interoperability between different intelligence information systems including database compatibility?

- What are the staffing requirements for the intelligence staff—including specialists, linguists, and liaison officers—and a subordinate joint force intelligence directorate counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element staff?
- What are the differences in availability and capability of national collection sources?
- How can the differing intelligence authorities be exploited to maximize multinational force operations?
- Are intelligence liaison officers planned?
- Is the intelligence support package planned for, with capabilities and limitations, explained to supporting units?
- Are training programs in place with a focus on creating a common view of the enemy, enemy dispositions, threat characteristics, doctrine, capabilities, and intelligence systems?
- Has an intelligence daily cycle been established? Does it include reporting timelines and routine briefings and conferences? Have collection management timelines been defined?
- Have all intelligence systems, including communications and information systems, been rehearsed?
- How will national intelligence cells exchange intelligence among multinational partners?
- Have staff and liaison officers at all levels established and tested the intelligence architecture, including communications and information systems? Are links with the host nation, civilian agencies, and the media functioning?
- Was the process effective for the national intelligence cells to exchange intelligence among nations?
- Have national intelligence summaries, imagery, and threat assessments approved for dissemination been shared?
- What are the laws, policies, procedures, and sensitivities regarding the questioning of detainees captured by or in the custody of each multinational partner?
- What are the levels of interoperability among different intelligence automated information systems including database compatibility?
- What is the level of interoperability with national collection resources?
- Is there a process to evaluate effectiveness and efficiency and a feedback system?
- Are all positions which require access to classified information tracked for appropriately cleared acceptable use policy personnel?

Chapter 5
Sustainment During Multinational Operations

This chapter offers a multinational sustainment overview. It then discusses the unity of effort among nations and agencies, responsibility for logistics, and planning for logistics. This chapter then discusses acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, host-nation support, and operational contract support. Lastly, it discusses the UN logistics system, movement support in multinational operations, and considerations for the commander.

MULTINATIONAL SUSTAINMENT OVERVIEW

5-1. A coordinated sustainment effort is needed for the multinational force to accomplish its mission. Multinational commanders must consider how to coordinate the sustainment effort. They must also consider the coordination for interagency funding and control processes and reimbursement procedures. Commanders should also reflect on the environmental and legal considerations, which are essential to multinational operations. Nations competing for host-nation resources to provide logistics support to troop contributing units hampers the multinational force's efforts to accomplish its mission. This competition for resources also causes harmful inflation to the host-nation economy. The multinational commander strives to achieve unity of effort in the sustainment effort.

UNITY OF EFFORT AMONG NATIONS AND AGENCIES

5-2. Unity of effort is essential to multinational logistics operations. Unity of effort requires troop contributing nations and civilian agencies in the AO to coordinate assets and operations. The multinational force commander is responsible for achieving unity of effort while executing multinational logistics. When possible, the logistics staff officer (G-4 or S-4 at the battalion or brigade levels) develops the multinational logistics concepts of support using unity of effort. Effective multinational logistics are flexible, responsive, and predictive, and they provide timely sustainment support throughout the entire operation for a multinational force. The plan for multinational logistics incorporates logistics requirements of all contributing forces.

5-3. To increase unity of effort, effective commanders consider multinational logistics requirements and support issues early during planning. Commanders should comprehend multinational forces' doctrine and have good relations with subordinate commanders and civilian leaders. All partners providing logistics support and operational elements should understand the concept of support based on national caveats. This understanding begins during the initial planning phase and continues through all phases of the operation.

5-4. Commanders coordinate logistics based on standardization, multilateral, and bilateral agreements among troop contributing nations, achievable standardization, and levels of interoperability. Under certain conditions, creating a single multinational logistics command provides economy of assets and system efficiency. Even if multinational participants (for national command reasons) maintain a national logistics structure, assigning a lead for logistics responsibility precludes duplication of effort. The G-4 or S-4 establishes a planning group with members from all participating nations to define the extent of interoperability that exists among multinational forces. Commanders identify the funding authority early to support multinational force logistics and develop procedures to prevent an adverse impact on operations.

5-5. Multinational operations complicate logistics support and reduce the degree of flexibility inherent in a national logistics system. Although responsible for logistics support of its national forces, not all nations have deployable logistic capabilities. Such nations depend on other nations for all or part of their support. In these cases, the multinational force provides deployment and sustainment to military and civilian organizations. For deployment, close liaison with theater airlift C2 helps coordinate approval and facilitate airlift once approved. When support is required, close liaison ensures clear funding lines.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOGISTICS

5-6. Logistics is a national responsibility during multinational operations. Some nations do not want to relinquish authority of logistics assets. However, relations between NATO and the United States have evolved enough that logistics is a collective responsibility with NATO support agency oversight. The multinational commander needs the authority and control mechanisms for logistics to accomplish the mission. Each nation performing logistics functions separately would be inefficient and expensive. The multinational logistics staff handles mutual logistics support among multinational partners. The planning staff designs the plans to complement partner nations' capabilities and minimize weaknesses. After which, participating nations discuss which nations provide support functions for the multinational force and the procedures and methods those nations will use to provide that support. (For additional information on multinational logistics, refer to JP 4-0, AJP-4, FM 4-0, and applicable NATO STANAGs.)

5-7. The multinational force may exercise some control over national logistics units or act as the coordinating authority. The degree of control depends on existing agreements and arrangements negotiated with troop contributing nations. The multinational force commander is responsible for delivery of logistics to the multinational force. This can be accomplished by establishing a logistics coordination center headed by the G-4 or J-4 to coordinate common logistics support in the AO.

5-8. The logistics coordination center identifies and determines responsibility for common logistics support capabilities from national authorities. Common logistics support capabilities provided to a multinational force do not negate national logistics support requirements. Early coordination between national authorities and multinational force commanders is essential in identifying common logistics support capabilities and responsibility for their provision.

5-9. Three methods of executing cooperative logistics exist in a multinational force. Each method is executed as a standalone method or combined with the other methods. Regardless of the method used, national decisions and commitments are made early in the planning cycle. The three methods:

- The lead nation concept. For this method, one nation provides the framework for one or more logistics functions to support the multinational force.
- A role-specialization nation. Under this method, one nation provides a particular class of supply or service for all or most of the multinational force.
- Multinational integrated logistics unit. For this method, two or more nations form an integrated logistics support structure to provide supply or support functions to the multinational force.

PLANNING FOR LOGISTICS

5-10. It is essential to conduct logistics planning in parallel and collaboration with operational planning to ensure success in multinational operations. The multinational staff must have required logistics personnel in place early to facilitate planning and coordination with nations. The multinational logistics staff will develop the logistics plans to support the commander's operation and disseminate logistics requirements to individual nations. Logistics planners share partial planning data with partner nations to facilitate parallel planning. Staffs—

- Evaluate the level of standardization and interoperability among participating nations.
- Determine and account for differences in logistics doctrine, capabilities, methods for computing requirements, stockage levels, organizations, and communications and information systems.
- Account for differences in language, values, religious and moral beliefs, economic infrastructure, nutritional standards, and social outlooks that affect logistics support to multinational forces.

5-11. Nongovernmental organizations may provide logistics support to the local population. However, in some circumstances when military support is required, logistics planners may be required to address the requirements of the local population as a part of the logistics plan of the operation order.

5-12. Logistics personnel prepare logistics in the theater of operations for a flexible operational support plan. Logistics personnel perform actions at all echelons to optimize the means (force structure, multinational and host-nation resources, and strategic lift) to support the multinational force commander's plan. Personnel identify resources available in the theater of operations for use by multinational forces and ensure access to those resources. (Refer to FM 4-0 for more information on sustainment preparation.) These actions include—

- Identifying and preparing intermediate staging base and forward logistics bases or forward logistics elements.
- Selecting and improving lines of communications.
- Coordinating multinational logistics support.
- Forecasting and building operational stock assets forward and afloat.
- Identifying resources in Army prepositioned stocks that may support mission partners.

5-13. Sustainment planners collaborate with mission partners to develop appropriate solutions for key interoperable sustainment procedures, to include—

- Reporting sustainment status information and developing a recognized sustainment picture for the multinational force.
- Requesting and tracking sustainment support requests for specific classes of supply or other sustainment capabilities such as transportation and mass vehicle recovery.
- Executing other key sustainment interoperable tasks as required by the specific mission and commander's interoperability guidance.

ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS

5-14. An acquisition and cross-servicing agreement is an international agreement with countries or international organizations that allows U.S. forces to exchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. This agreement sets the terms and conditions under which the reimbursable acquisition or transfer of logistics support, supplies, and services can occur. Often the agreement exists between U.S. forces and foreign governments or international organizations with which the United States has an agreement. An acquisition and cross-servicing agreement does not bind either partner financially or politically to provide support. Partners to an agreement support requests consistent with national laws and policies. An implementing arrangement is a supplementary arrangement for logistics support, supplies, and services. This supplement prescribes details, terms, and conditions to implement acquisition and cross-servicing agreements effectively. (Refer to JP 3-16 for more on acquisition and cross-servicing agreements.)

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

5-15. The multinational command analyzes the physical infrastructure in the host nation to determine what facilities and services are available to support the command and to determine how the command minimizes the sustainment footprint. The command understands the culture, business practices, laws, religious implications, and political and social structures of the host nation. Analysis includes location and the command's needs. AOs without a functioning government provide limited support. Multinational commanders integrate host-nation support into the logistics structure of the command to ensure effective use. Commanders allocate this support based on command priorities. Nations coordinate and agree on methods of concluding host-nation support at the end of an operation.

5-16. The host nation has legal, financial, acquisition, medical, and administrative experts. These experts provide liaison support to sustainment staff to identify and procure host-nation support. This support ensures that the command's requirements are met and prevents competition between partners.

5-17. While local procurement efforts are beneficial to the host nation, these efforts sometimes undermine important command goals. An otherwise innocent procurement decision may have a significant political meaning in the host nation. Procurement actions may inflate local prices with negative impacts on local groups or civilian agencies. These effects can influence the attainment of the end state and the timing of withdrawal.

5-18. The command obtains authorization from national authorities to negotiate for host-nation support. Agreements with the host nation include the authority for the command to deal directly with the host nation for support. The command develops a list of current host-nation agreements. The command legal advisor and Department of State or Ministry of Foreign Affairs political advisor negotiate host-nation support agreements. Negotiable agreements are for local contracting, currency exchange rates, local hire wage scales, and customs regulations.

5-19. The sustainment staff evaluates the effectiveness of current host-nation contracts between the host nation and civilian agencies in the AO. Then, the staff determines the best lead agency (military or civilian) to negotiate and contract for host-nation support. (Table 5-1 provides host-nation considerations for support.)

Table 5-1. Host-nation considerations

Items and Considerations	
Accommodations • Billeting • Offices • Stores and warehouses • Workshops and vehicle parks • Medical • Hardstands • Fuel • Weapons and ammunition storage • Transportation, including aircraft • Firing ranges • Training areas and facilities • Recreation areas and facilities • Laundry and dry-cleaning facilities • Postal facility • Mortuary facilities	**Communication** • Local • International • Security
	Finance Payment for • Accommodations, supplies, communications, equipment, local labor maintenance, medical, and movement facilities • Emergency facilities • Personal facilities
Weapons and Ammunition • Security • Storage • Collection or delivery	**Fuel** • Aircraft • Vehicles • Ships • Methods of delivery • Storage • Interoperability of refueling equipment • Common use of refueling installations
Local Labor • Method of hiring • Method of payment • Administration	**Rations** • Fresh • Pack • Potable water
Medical • Normal facilities • Emergency facilities • Reciprocal national health agreements • Evacuation of casualties • Medical and blood supply system	**Translation** • Interpreters and language specialists • Translation of documents
	Supplies and Equipment (other than ammunition, fuel, or rations) • Common use items

Table 5-1. Host-nation considerations (continued)

Items and Considerations	
Maintenance • Accommodations • Vehicles • Ships • Equipment • Roads (including snow clearance) • Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft • Provision of assembly areas • Damage control • Emergency facilities for visitors' vehicles and equipment • Recovery and transportation of disabled vehicles and equipment • Waste and disposal	**Water** • Production and purification capability • Municipal • Other water treatment systems • Distribution capability • Trucks • Pipeline • Hoseline • Storage capability • Receipt and issue capability • Available water sources • Wells • Surface • Subsurface • Host-nation water quality standards
Movement • Airheads • Alternates • Facilities • Ships • Equipment • Refueling • Ports • Alternates • Draft • Bunkering and fueling • Repair • Road and rail movement • Personnel • Security • Traffic control • Pipeline movement	**Transportation Equipment** • Host-nation military vehicles, equipment, ships, aircraft • Locally hired vehicles and equipment, ships, aircraft • Policy on drivers and handlers for above • Electricity (locally procured or generator) • Trash pick-up • Other services

5-20. The national government handles agreements for transferring defense goods and services between nations. This is cumbersome and time consuming. Support provided and received in multinational operations should comply with existing legal authorities. Under an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, national authorities enter into agreements for acquiring or cross-servicing logistics support, supplies, and services on a reimbursable, replacement-in-kind, or exchange for equal value basis. The acquisition and cross-servicing agreement is a broad overall agreement, generally supplemented by an implementing arrangement. The J-4 and the Department of State with the country involved write the agreement in the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. The DOD and the country involved provide the approval and sign the agreement. Major commands in country negotiate the details with their counterparts and document the services (whether used or not) on a statement of requirements for exchange of support and services. The implementing arrangement contains details on orders for logistics support. The G-4 or S-4 documents receipt of agreed-upon services to prevent fraudulent payment for services not provided.

OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

5-21. Operational contract support (OCS) is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and minor construction from commercial sources in support of combatant commander-directed operations. Commercial support can provide cost-effective surge capability and skills not organic to the unit (such as

translators). Army theater sustainment commands and expeditionary sustainment commands play a key role in planning and executing OCS operational actions. As the senior command requiring activity for sustainment-related OCS, these units provide expertise to OCS planning activities. Theater sustainment commands and expeditionary sustainment commands provide guidance on developing acquisition-ready requirement packages for theater-wide support requirements. There are second-order effects considerations when using commercial support such as local population employment and economic stimulation. Integrating contractors and their equipment into military operations can prove challenging. Contractor challenges involve additional mission risk when compared to using organic support capabilities, such as potential loss of flexibility, additional force protection, and security-related requirements. Additionally, the commander has limited authority to keep contractors on the job, when compared to military members, a fact often not understood by operational commanders and their staffs. (Refer to JP 4-10, ATP 4-10, and ATP 4-10.1 for additional information on OCS.)

5-22. Multinational forces rely on contracted support to perform many support functions and tasks. Factors that have led to this increased reliance include—

- Reductions in the size of military forces (especially in the combat support and sustainment areas).
- Increases in tempo and missions undertaken by the military during large-scale combat operations.
- Increased complexity and sophistication of weapon systems.
- A continued push to gain efficiencies and reduce costs through outsourcing or privatizing commercially adaptable functions.

5-23. The logistics directorate of a multinational staff oversees OCS and contractors providing support to the multinational force in a designated operational area. Centralized coordination of contracting efforts is essential to manage limited resources. This coordination ensures the multinational force OCS priorities. Through centralized coordination of contracting efforts, a multinational force derives maximum benefits from volume procurements, optimize competition, avoid price escalation, and minimize opportunities for local black-market operations.

5-24. Early planning is critical for effective and efficient OCS in multinational operations. From an operational planning point of view, many considerations influence when commands use contract support in multinational operations. Common contract support considerations include the—

- Type of operation. Operations with a higher risk of combat, such as initial entry operations and large-scale combat operations, are less suitable for outsourcing than lower risk operations such as peacekeeping and stabilization operations.
- Phase of the operation. In the early stages of an operation, military units support military functions because of high risk, efficiency, operational effectiveness, and security. As an environment stabilizes and risk reduces, selected support functions transfer to a lead nation or role specialist nations to provide their contract support.
- Protection of contractors. Although contractors are mostly self-sufficient, they are not combatants. The force is generally responsible for the security of contractor employees accompanying the force.

5-25. Multinational partners have a collective responsibility for planning and implementing contracted support. This responsibility encourages partner nations to identify support requirements that host-nation contracted services, supplies, minor construction, and created contractual arrangements can meet. Through prior arrangements, these nations share providing as well as using contractor capabilities and resources to support the force.

5-26. Planning and preparation for providing contracted support in multinational operations begins with a concept of support. Multinational partners use existing common logistics role specialist agreements, lead nation agreements, and other available Service, joint, and allied contracting support agencies that provide contracting services on a reimbursable basis. Properly prepared and funded, contracted support enhances support to operations, releases military resources for higher priority tasks elsewhere, overcomes identified sustainment shortfalls, and provides endurance where needed with less impact on military assets than would be the case without it. (Refer to ATP 4-10 and ATP 4-10.1 for additional information on contract support.)

5-27. As a matter of policy, U.S. contract support to multinational partners is limited to supplies, services, and minor construction planned and procured for support of U.S. forces. Additionally, standards of support for contracted services are the same standard established by the national support element providing the

support. Finally, proper funding approval must adhere to national laws and policies of all parties before receiving or providing contract support. More specifically, U.S. policy and law require an approved acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, and when appropriate, an implementation agreement before U.S. forces provide contracted supplies, services, and minor construction to any multinational partner.

5-28. Determining the appropriate contract support arrangements is a critical step in multinational contract support planning. Three generally acceptable contract support sharing arrangements exist:

- Lead nation. This is the most common form of multinational contract support arrangement in which one nation is designated the lead common contract support provider.
- Role specialist nation. Similar to lead nation arrangement, this form of multinational contract support has one or several nations arrange for contracted support for a single service such as fuel, medical evacuation, security, force protection, food, and maintenance.
- Multinational support capability. Nations normally use multinational contract support only for large-scale and long-term operations and base it on a formal alliance capability. This type of direct contract support arrangement is complex and takes significant time to plan and implement.

5-29. During multinational operations, it is possible to stand up a theater allied contracting office to contract for selected goods and services in limited supply in the operational area or are commonly needed by the entire force. To coordinate theater allied contracting office activities, the multinational force contractors may publish a restricted-items list that identifies critical, limited supplies and services in the operational area. Staffs coordinate this procurement with the contracting coordination center. The theater allied contracting office negotiates base ordering agreements for use by all participating nations.

5-30. The multinational force's authority over the control, support, and integration of contractors is limited. Accordingly, the multinational force contract personnel coordinate contractor management policies and procedures between the major multinational partners including movement control, minimum government furnished support arrangements, legal jurisdiction, and visa requirements. (Refer to JP 4-0 for more information on logistics support of multinational operations.) The multinational logistics procurement support board helps with multinational force contracts to ensure these policies and procedures are incorporated into contributing nation's contracts and included in their national contract oversight.

UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS SYSTEM

5-31. The UN logistics system requires member states to be self-sufficient at the unit level for 60 to 120 days. This allows the UN to organize a logistics structure, acquire real estate and facilities, and establish contracts and local memorandums of understanding and letters of assistance to provide support for the multinational force.

5-32. A UN survey and assessment team evaluates operational requirements and develops planning data for sustainment. When participating in UN missions, the command sends a logistics representative with the UN survey team if possible. The multinational force coordinates with UN forces to improve the unity of effort and reduce potential conflicts.

FORCE LOGISTICS SUPPORT CENTER

5-33. In most cases, the UN will ask a member state, or states, to form a force logistics support group. The group incorporates logistics units from participating nations. A state accepting the group role and the chief logistics officer at the force headquarters establish local contracts to support the force. Even with a force logistics support group, member states are responsible for specific national elements of resupply—such as repair parts, clothing, food, and major end item replacements—unless nations establish an agreement to provide this support. This support is on a reimbursable basis under an arrangement that the UN and contributing nation's government agree to before deployment.

CONTRACTOR CONCEPT

5-34. The UN economizes logistics support by using contractors. The goal is to achieve the most economical logistics organization that meets the demands of the force and releases military manpower for redeployment. Force headquarters coordinate the process. UN contracting does not fall under the logistics division. It falls under the purchasing and transportation services division. UN procurement is bureaucratic and slow. It is

decentralized and each agency uses its own procedures. The Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office of the UN Development Programme creates a standard procurement system.

5-35. The UN chief administrative officer does not work for the multinational force commander but reports to the Special Representative of the Secretary General. The civilian logistics infrastructure officers, including the budget officer, report to the chief administrative officer. Mission partners require the chief administrative officer to solve logistics problems. Continuous liaison required between military and civilian counterparts allows synchronized effort.

5-36. The UN normally coordinates logistics standards for some bulk supplies and services. Logistics support that extends beyond what the UN agreement outlines is not reimbursable. National standards such as consumption rates, space requirements, and safety levels typically exceed UN standards. Sophisticated multinational military equipment requires different standards of support from what the UN has agreed to provide or fund. The G-4 or S-4 understands UN standards concerning level and quality of support provided and funded. The multinational force stands prepared to bring its own support in the areas where the UN-provided support is deficient.

MULTINATIONAL RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

5-37. Movement is critical to multinational force operations. A multinational force headquarters, or its supporting combatant command, plans and executes all intertheater movement. However, it remains a national responsibility to move forces into an operational area. The multinational force headquarters coordinates these deployments to support the commander's plans and controls intratheater movement through reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI).

INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE

5-38. Nations participating in multinational operations consult with the multinational force commander to determine if the force needs an intermediate staging base. If established, the intermediate staging base will be outside the operational area. The commander balances numerous requirements, including greater lift requirements, against better efficiency. Multinational forces assemble and stage in an intermediate staging base, especially if combat is imminent. Units can better solve problems and correct deficiencies in a nonhostile environment. The intermediate staging base provides a secure area to assemble, train, equip, and build the multinational force into a cohesive team. The multinational force headquarters staff assembles first and works together, followed by the rest of the multinational force. The intermediate staging base provides sufficient billeting and training capacity to support the entire multinational force at once. Access to airports and seaports for smooth reception of the force and its subsequent deployment is critical. If the multinational operation is a lesser regional contingency or a second major regional contingency, an intermediate staging base is not possible.

MULTINATIONAL RECEPTION

5-39. Reception is the first movement for sustainment in RSOI. At ports of debarkation, units work with host-nation, contracted host-nation support, and multi-Service personnel to secure the port, discharge equipment, process equipment and personnel, and move units to marshaling areas. Host-nation forces perform and help with many of these functions. The multinational force headquarters assigns a troop contributing nation to oversee and help the host nation perform these functions. If host-nation support forces are not available, then national units perform those functions. The multinational task force commander plans for all units in the strategic flow. Some national forces have limited capability, so the commander specifies functions for these units based on planning staff recommendations.

5-40. Commanders integrate the strategic and theater of operations movement requirements to prevent congestion at seaports and airports. Establishing intratheater hubs maximizes cargo throughput and improves theater distribution. Nations provide movement data to the multinational force theater movement control system. This data provides information for the direct delivery or transloading of passengers and cargo. It deconflicts strategic movements with other theater of operations movements.

5-41. Civilian agencies help by shipping relief supplies. These agencies often cause transportation choke points en route to and in the theater of operations. A G-4 or S-4 link with the civil-military operations center can solve transportation choke points. The civil-military operations center can work with civilian agencies to gain access to civilian ports of entry and infrastructure.

5-42. The multinational force designates a director of mobility forces. The director is normally a senior officer familiar with the AO and has an extensive background in airlift operations. The director is the designated agent for all airlift issues in the AO and for other duties as directed.

MULTINATIONAL STAGING

5-43. Staging is that part of the RSOI operation that reassembles and reunites unit personnel with their equipment and schedules unit movement to the tactical assembly area, secures or uploads unit basic loads, and provides life support to personnel. During this phase, the following occurs:

- Units reassemble and unite with their equipment and are scheduled for movement toward the tactical assembly area.
- Materiel is segregated, prioritized, and prepared for transport.
- Units upload Class V supplies.
- Units provide deploying Soldiers life support until units are self-sustaining.

MULTINATIONAL ONWARD MOVEMENT

5-44. The onward movement phase of RSOI begins when units move to their destination. Multinational units accomplish such movement to ensure the forward and concurrent movement of troops and supplies. Units follow a carefully devised movement program that employs convoy, rail, and host-nation contract assets (such as heavy equipment transporters and other trucks). Centralized control of transportation assets is required. Real estate management is a problem unless a multinational counterpart to the U.S. joint force utilization board (usually controlled by engineers) has authority to allocate terrain to all forces and agencies.

5-45. When planning the movement of multinational forces, planners know the details of the organization, equipment, capabilities, and limitations of the forces. Planners know how to request intratheater movement of multinational forces consistent with the multinational commander's operation plan. The movement complements sequencing of operations and time-phased force deployment. Movement planners consider all assets (joint, multinational, nongovernmental, governmental, host nation, and third country) and modes (air, land, or sea) of transport. Planner also consider infrastructure limitations to maximize efficiency. For example, planners consider tunnel heights and rail gauge when conducting movement in Europe. During execution of these movements, movement control personnel physically validate actual movements.

MULTINATIONAL INTEGRATION

5-46. Integration is the last phase for sustainment in RSOI. During integration, combat-ready multinational units transfer to the operational commander and merge into the tactical plan. The transfer may require interaction and familiarization among multinational units. The transfer may also require that arriving multinational units meet certain standards before being completely integrated into the combat plan. Consequently, requirements for integration planning and coordination occur early in the force projection process. Units modify requirements according to mission variables until units achieve force closure.

CONSIDERATIONS

5-47. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations consider and answer the questions in paragraphs 5-48 through 5-55 with respect to the logistics portion of the operation.

SUPPORT AND CAPABILITIES

5-48. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following support and capabilities questions with respect to the logistics portion of the operation:

- What areas come under multinational control? What areas remain national issues?
- What logistics service and support are available?
- What impact will current sanctions have on the ability to receive host-nation support (such as banking, payments, insurance, and worker's compensation)?

- Does the unit have sufficient assets (such as maintenance, communications, and transportation) to conduct its movement and mission? Will it require support?
- What are the specific logistics capabilities of each nation of the multinational force?
- What mortuary affairs capabilities does the command have?
- What legal restrictions do national laws impose on logistics support?
- Do national legal authorities permit providing logistics support among multinational nations?
- Are mutual logistics support agreements in accordance with existing legal authorities?
- What is the system for property accountability?
- What special clothing and equipment requirements have a long lead time to obtain, such as nonmilitary supplies or riot control gear?
- What are the procedures to provide support such as transportation, housing, and meals to diplomats and distinguished visitors? What coordination is there with a joint visitors bureau on this?
- What is the system for preventing fraud, waste, and abuse?
- How does the command assess logistics requests, requirements, and actions to ensure that they are valid with respect to the operation and authority given to the command?
- How does the command adequately secure logistics assets?
- Will the command establish a common retail store at some point during operations?
- How will the intelligence staff incorporate logistics and engineer assets into the information collection plan?
- What are the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement procedures to account for and reimburse nations for services and supplies exchanged between nations?
- What are the common supplies and services that one nation or a multinational organization might provide?
- Is there an agreement that authorizes forces to exchange mutual logistics support of goods and services and that accounts for the amounts received?
- Will there be, and if so when and how, a transfer of authority of national logistics assets to the multinational force?
- What is the multinational force's authority to redistribute logistics assets and services under routine and emergency conditions?
- How will the command maintain national asset accountability from the national sustaining base to the front-line units?
- How will the command ensure compatibility and interoperability of communications and information systems, including automated data processing interfaces between the multinational and national support systems?
- How will the command prioritize, allocate, and use common infrastructure capabilities (ports, airfields, and fire and rescue roads) to support military intervention, occupation, and civil administration?
- Which entity is responsible to ensure ports have the necessary birthing capacity, depth, and materials handling equipment to accommodate certain sized and capacity ships?
- Which entity is responsible to identify rail widths and gauging to accept International Organization for Standardization or NATO standards? What is the plan to establish necessary transfer points to overcome when differences occur?
- Which entity monitors road networks to understand route capabilities or limitations and general (surface composition, width, height, weight, and hazardous material or impacts of weather and time or distance factors?
- What are the existing STANAGs that facilitate multinational logistics support?
- What is the logistics support structure? How will it identify capabilities and responsibilities of troop contributing nations?
- Does the multinational force have an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement among multinational nations?
- Does the logistics structure have one officer in charge or a main point of contact for management of contract personnel?
- Have contractor procedures been established to allow total multinational participation in contracts led by national personnel and used by multinational personnel?

- Is there a need to establish a multinational logistics command or element? If so, has its staffing been determined?
- Has the relationship between the multinational and national logistics elements been clearly defined?
- Have lead nations been designated where appropriate?
- Have logistics reporting procedures been established throughout the force?
- Do all forces know and comply with the infrastructure repair plan?
- Is there duplication of effort in the support plan for the operation?
- If there is a need, what is the composition of the multinational logistics command or element?
- Have coordination centers been established for movements, medical support, contracting, infrastructure engineering, and logistics operations?
- What is the transitional plan for operational assumption of in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agency or alliance?
- Are multinational legal representatives available to provide council on national law, international law, and legal agreements?
- Have customs clearance procedures been established at ports of embarkation?
- Have standards been identified for logistics support? Is there a plan to perform, inspect, and ascertain compliance with these standards before deployment?
- What is the division of responsibilities among multinational, national, and host-nation logistics support?
- How will each class of supply be handled?
- What are the multinational force's capabilities to receive, store, and issue dry cargo, fuel, and water (including water production and purification capability)?
- Does the multinational force have the means to communicate requirements to the multinational logistics management center?
- What materials handling equipment is available in the multinational force and host nation?
- Does the multinational force have a load of ammunition? What are ammunition procedures?
- What are the multinational force's special requirements including tents, cots, reverse-osmosis water purification units, laundry, latrines, and batteries?
- What are the military assistance program requirements for multinational forces?
- What is the best method for providing potable water?
- Have the engineers, preventive medicine personnel, and other staff officers been consulted about potable water? Using bottled water has an added advantage of enhancing troop morale.
- What is available in lessons learned databases for specific requirements, planning factors, and potential problem areas?
- Has liaison been established with other multinational nations and civilian agencies to obtain the most up-to-date logistics information on the AO?
- What are the personnel augmentation requirements and equipment needed for mission support?
- Have basing rights and diplomatic clearances critical to mobility been secured?
- What are intratheater capabilities and resources of civilian agencies in the AO?
- What current agreements exist with other participating nations that provide for logistics support?
- Does this include agreements governing logistics support with representatives of other nations?
- What quality controls have been established for all services and supplies such as petroleum, oils, and lubricants, water, and food? How will those controls be monitored?
- What are the procedures to ensure in-transit visibility at all transportation nodes? Lack of in-transit visibility causes loss of confidence in the supply system and leads to unnecessary reordering, further clogging the supply lines.
- For UN operations, what standards are followed concerning support?
- What is the support plan for redeployment of forces and materiel?
- What logistics infrastructure, materiel, and capabilities remain in country for use by subsequent forces or organizations?
- What are the possible environmental impacts on the host nation providing support?

(For additional information on environmental considerations, refer to ATP 3-34.5.)

FUNDING

5-49. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following funding questions with respect to the logistics portion of the operation:

- Has it been determined if, or to what extent, operational-related expenses are reimbursed from common funding or sources external to national funding by the participating nations?
- Has funding been identified to defense support of civil authorities or reimbursement expenditures? What are the limits on funding authority?
- What is the availability of common funding of contracting, multinational headquarters establishment, and general or common support?
- What are the accounting and reimbursement procedures for services and supplies exchanged between nations? Are replacement-in-kind procedures included?
- Has the probable cost of multinational operations been determined? Is the probable cost acceptable?
- What are the funding requirements for renting facilities for defense support of civil authorities?
- Does the command have funding codes from all multinational nations? What methods and documentation are required to record all expenditures?
- How will the command capture costs associated with supporting the multinational force?

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

5-50. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following host-nation support questions with respect to the logistics portion of the operation:

- Has host-nation support been evaluated to determine the logistics support available? Are law enforcement, sanitation, medical services, facilities, storage, and materiel included?
- What are the capabilities of existing infrastructure? Do they include water treatment plants, power stations, reservoirs, and bulk and retail fuel storage? Engineers or facility managers provide critical information on the availability of existing facilities.
- Have negotiations to secure support either been established or completed?
- What is the impact of obtaining host-nation support on the host nation's economy?
- What are the possible environmental impacts on the host nation providing this support?
- What technical agreements—such as environmental cleanup; customs duties and taxes; and hazardous material and waste storage, transit, and disposal—need be developed to augment host-nation support agreements?

(For additional information, refer to sections 2341 through 2350 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.)

MAINTENANCE

5-51. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following maintenance questions with respect to the logistics portion of the operation:

- Do the multinational forces have maintenance support?
- Do the multinational forces have the means to order and receive repair parts?
- Do multinational forces have wreckers, stake and platform trailers, or heavy equipment transporters?
- Do the multinational forces have communications repair facilities?

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE

5-52. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following CBRN defense questions with respect to the logistics portion of the operation:

- What logistics resources exist to assist multinational forces to counter CBRN hazards to include toxic industrial materials such as at medical treatment facilities or industrial facilities? (Are U.S. policies and guidelines acceptable to other nations if none exists?)
- Is the necessary CBRN protection, detection, and reconnaissance equipment available to troops to counter the threat and continue their mission in a CBRN environment?
- Are adequate unit and theater stocks of individual protective equipment available?
- What plans exist to protect and train military dependents, contractors, and locally hired civilians against threats of weapons of mass destruction?

TRANSPORTATION

5-53. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following transportation questions with respect to the logistics portion of the operation:

- What is the multinational transportation command structure?
- What are the available multinational air and sea lines of communications?
- What are assigned airlift and sealift capabilities and allocations? Are the requirements to support both military and civilian agencies included?
- What are the requirements for and capabilities, limitations, and availability of airfields, seaports, and inland transportation systems in the departure, intermediate staging, and objective areas?
- What resources are required for new construction or necessary improvements to existing facilities?
- What is the multinational RSOI process?
- What is the ability of the host nation to receive personnel and equipment at ports and airfields?
- What are the access rights in the AO? The command coordinates diplomatic efforts to arrange for—
  - Support, country, and diplomatic clearances.
  - Over-flight rights.
  - Basing for forces in transit from one locality to another.
- What is the capability of transportation systems to move forces once they arrive in the theater of operations?
- Do multinational forces have tactical rotary- and fixed-wing assets for intratheater supply?
- Who supplies transportation supply throughput from the multinational logistics center for multinational forces?
- Do multinational forces have transportation assets for moving troops?
- How will the command control movement into and out of airfields and seaports?
- How will transportation facilities be shared with civilian agencies and contractors?
- Is rail a feasible transportation method? If so, can rail cars transport tactical equipment (tanks)?
- Are the railhead facilities usable?
- Are there sufficient on and off load capabilities?
- What are the security requirements for rail transport by the multinational force or host nation?
- Will nontactical vehicles be needed for the operations? If so, how many and what types (such as vans, sedans, and buses)?
- Will the host-nation or multinational force provide or contract nontactical vehicles?
- Will there be other transportation requirements based on mission location, weather, or lack of transportation infrastructure?

MANNING AND EQUIPPING

5-54. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following manning and equipping questions with respect to the logistics portion of the operation:

- Have deploying units provided planning numbers of deploying forces?
- Have deploying units provided planning numbers of deploying equipment, types of containers, and number of containers?

HUMAN RESOURCES SUPPORT

5-55. The G-1 or J-1 is the principal staff assistant to the commander on human resources support. This individual provides guidance, oversight, and coordination of manpower and personnel issues. The G-1 or J-1 coordinates finance support and manages the religious ministry and legal personnel support. The G-1 is responsible for human resources support for national contingents. Commanders and staff consider and answer the following questions with respect to the human resources portion of the operation:

- How are multinational forces accounting for losses and conducting replacement operations?
- What are the processes for ensuring postal operations continue during operations?
- How is personnel accountability being conducted at theater ports of debarkation?
- How are government civilians and contractors being tracked and accounted for?

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Chapter 6
Medical Support During Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by discussing multinational considerations for medical support. It continues by discussing Army Health System support and functions, medical planning, and health threat assessment. This chapter then discusses medical support policies and issues, medical countermeasures, and standards of care. Lastly, this chapter provides considerations for commanders and staffs.

MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR MEDICAL SUPPORT

6-1. The multinational force commander ensures that forces deliver medical care rapidly, effectively, and efficiently without interfering with the multinational force mission. Medical care is a national responsibility. The command assesses medical support requirements and capabilities both quantitatively and qualitatively and provides guidance to enhance the effectiveness of medical support through shared use of assets. Any medical services that a nation cannot provide requires coverage by agreements between national governments of the nations in the multinational force. This agreement requires coordinating all medical assets, providing a detailed support plan, and performing effective liaison among senior medical officers of each nation. The multinational command surgeon plans, coordinates, and synchronizes the medical support plan based on actual capabilities of troop contributing nations with standing medical agreements among the troop contributing nations. The concept of one nation's forces being treated by another nation's medical personnel or in another nation's medical treatment facilities should be achievable.

ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM SUPPORT TO MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

6-2. Military medical operations are typically joint in nature and often conducted with the armed forces of two or more partner nations. Army medical units may be tasked to conduct multinational operations in pursuit of common objectives. Each multinational operation is unique. Key considerations involved in planning and executing these types of operations vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization's members. Partner nations are primarily responsible for providing medical support to their forces. Nations can also transfer responsibility for this support through agreements with other nations or the appropriate multinational planning staffs and multinational force commanders. Due to differences in medical standards, national sensitivities, customs, and training, the United States relies on national resources to provide joint health services to the maximum extent. (Refer to FM 4-02 for more information on the Army Health System. Refer to JP 4-02 and JP 3-16 for information on health services.)

ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM FUNCTIONS

6-3. Army Health System support includes both the health service support and force health protection missions as well as the capabilities in each of the 10 medical functions. The 10 medical functions are medical treatment (organic and area support), hospitalization, dental services, medical logistics (including blood management), medical evacuation (including medical regulating), combat and operational stress control, veterinary services, force health protection, laboratory services, and medical C2. The medical C2 function integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes the other nine functions into operation plans and operation orders. Army medical units from each of the 10 medical functions may support multinational operations to ensure the highest standard of care to wounded or ill Service members.

6-4. The Army medical command (deployment support)—known as MEDCOM (DS)—is the theater medical command responsible for C2, integration, synchronization, and execution of Army Health System support throughout the area of responsibility. The Army medical command is assigned to the Army Service component command and works with the theater army surgeon, multinational force surgeon, and surgeon cells at each echelon. Together they provide the continual planning, coordination, and synchronization necessary to reduce health risks, evacuate casualties, provide medical care, and return personnel, as appropriate, to the fight. The Army medical command integrates and synchronizes all Army Health System

operations and provides C2 through its subordinate medical brigades, medical battalions (multifunctional), and Army medical units providing health service support and force health protection to the deployed force. (Refer to FM 4-02 for a detailed description of the Army Health System and the deployable Army medical units that may be tasked to provide this support.)

6-5. During multinational operations, the command clearly defines applicable directives command and support relationships for providing medical support. The authority creating the multinational force issues these directives to each national component commander. The national component commander delegates operational (technical) control of national medical support resources to the senior medical officer to help coordinate resources in the theater of operations. It may not be possible to establish C2 over all participants. Some nations have constraints that limit how much command authority a multinational or national commander can exercise over their forces. Command in its formal sense does not exist and a system of cooperation exists in its place.

6-6. During operations, the responsibilities of the commander or surgeon at each level include—

- Advising the commander on the health of the command.
- Informing the commander and staff on matters affecting the delivery of healthcare.
- Developing, preparing, coordinating, and monitoring medical support policy and procedures with commanders of National Health Service units.
- Exploiting medical intelligence data and information derived from national and other Service sources.
- Monitoring the activities of medical support assets assigned to their command.
- Providing recommendations to minimize health risk to personnel.
- Providing medical education and training.

6-7. The commander and the senior medical officer of each nation understand the legal limits of using non-national medical treatment facilities and supplies, especially blood, by their nations' forces. Exchanging blood between nations is a sensitive issue and requires early coordination. Mutual medical support complies with existing legal directives. During multinational planning, medical staffs address coordination for any lead nation, role specialization, or the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement authority. Casualty evacuation, especially outside the AO, and using non-national medical treatment facilities requires careful planning and an agreement. Even using locally sourced medical materiel, such as regionally unique antivenins, are subject to individual national statutory and regulatory standards.

MEDICAL PLANNING

6-8. Medical planning occurs at all levels. Medical planning develops a system that provides the best possible use of medical support resources in each situation. Considerations include the operational situation (commander's overall mission) and medical threat information including endemic diseases and climate appropriate to the theater of operations. Planners and commanders identify issues specific to the operation and consider these issues in planning. (Refer to ATP 4-02.55 for detailed information on Army Health System support planning.)

6-9. The following factors are critical aspects of medical planning:

- Mission and type of operation.
- Operation concept or plan.
- Anticipated duration of the operation.
- Theater evacuation policy.
- Selection and consideration of the medical support plan.
- Health threat assessment, including medical countermeasures.
- Health surveillance.
- Casualty estimates (provided by the G-1 or S-1).
- Provision of patient estimates by the staff and effects on health care delivery.
- Availability of and limitations on resources.
- Availability of and access to host-nation facilities.
- C2 requirements and limitations.
- Medical management of CBRN casualties.

HEALTH THREAT ASSESSMENT

6-10. The health threat assessment is a composite of several conditions:

- Ongoing or potential enemy actions.
- Adverse environmental, occupational, and geographic and meteorological conditions.
- Endemic diseases.
- The use of CBRN weapons or accidental release of CBRN substances.
- Specific training and equipment requirements for environment (such as altitude or extreme cold weather).

Each of these conditions has the potential to affect the short- or long-term health (including psychological impact) of personnel. The health threat assessment can preserve the effectiveness of the multinational force by mitigating wounds, injuries, diseases, and psychological stressors.

MEDICAL SUPPORT POLICIES AND ISSUES

6-11. The multinational force surgeon establishes medical support policies to cover medical support in multinational operations. The multinational force surgeon establishes policies with medical officers of troop contributing nations.

6-12. The multinational force policy and coordination should include—

- Medical care eligibility for noncombatants, contractors, dislocated persons, dislocated civilians, and indigenous civilians plus appropriate reimbursement for nations.
- Medical support coordination provided to or received from a multinational force or other friendly nations including using host-nation facilities.
- A mass casualty response plan including options for limited resource challenges.
- Liaison establishment with each nation's surgeon.
- Medical regulations, to include evacuating patients to non-national medical treatment facilities.
- Policies on medical countermeasures and vaccinations.
- Policies on exchanging medical equipment accompanying patients.
- Policies on transferring a patient from one nation's medical evacuation system to another.
- A mechanism for returning patients to their parent nations after medical treatment in another nation's medical treatment facility.
- Medical support to detainee operations and facilities.
- Medical support for CBRN patients.
- An established policy for handling contaminated remains for both temporary storage and transport.
- Policies for mortuary affairs.
- An established evacuation system for the theater of operations, including a theater's holding and evacuation policy, mission responsibility, and evacuation control system.
- A requirement for medical reports, including format, content, and frequency.
- Clinical documentation, policy format, and the exchange of clinical records that include the following:
  - Medical records of the clinical condition with treatment of each patient so that continuing treatment in relation to past events and post-deployment actions.
  - Information to notify the patient's next of kin.
  - Information to units for preparing personnel strength returns.
  - Statistical data for planning purposes and historical records.
  - Materials for medical research.
  - Translation of foreign care records.
  - Information to track patients whose whereabouts are unknown.
- Policies on blood supply source, screening standards, storage, and use.
- Policies on pharmaceutical source, acceptance standards, storage, and use.
- Policies on collecting, sharing, exchanging, and archiving occupational and environmental health surveillance data and reports. Data and reports include—

- Air, soil, and water sampling results.
- Individual or group exposure results.
- Any other environmental sampling.

MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

6-13. Historically, disease and nonbattle injuries have rendered more Soldiers combat ineffective than actual operations casualties. The 2019 Coronavirus (known as COVID-19) pandemic highlighted the impact an infectious disease can have on operations. Medical countermeasures can reduce disease and nonbattle injuries. The capability to assess the Soldier's health continuously and improve Soldier sustainability is required to protect the force.

6-14. The following medical countermeasures ensure effective force medical protection:

- Continuous health surveillance.
- Medical countermeasures, disease prevention, and immunization policies approved by the multinational force commander and implemented by all troop contributing nations.

STANDARDS OF CARE

6-15. The multinational medical support ensures continuity of patient management at a standard acceptable to all nations. Achieving the desired degree of patient management depends on the successful interoperability of treatment principles and clinical policies. As a national responsibility executed under national standards of care and practice, each nation sets medical policy for its soldiers. As such, multinational commanders cannot direct a sovereign nation's armed forces to adopt a different standard for the sake of uniformity across their command. Patient management is a continuous part of medical care that attends to the clinical needs of a patient during competition or conflict. While optimal patient management is never compromised unless dictated by the operational situation, it is also a balance of many conflicting factors. These factors include the following:

- Treatment.
- Evacuation.
- Resources.
- Environmental and operational conditions.

6-16. Dental support is arranged in levels, reflecting an increase in capability at each succeeding level. The functions of each lower level of dental support are contained within the capabilities of each higher level. A preventive dentistry program is provided in the theater of operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

6-17. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations consider and answer the questions in paragraphs 6-18 and 6-19 with respect to medical support.

MEDICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

6-18. Commanders and staffs answer the following medical C2 questions with respect to medical support:

- How experienced are the commander, surgeon, and staff?
- Are the medical command relationships clearly defined?
- Are there adequate arrangements for coordination and liaison among medical elements, including translation of foreign care records?
- Has a command surgeon been appointed?
- Are there health services representatives on the assessment team?
- Have troop contributing nations provided staff or a liaison to the multinational force surgeon?

MEDICAL SUPPORT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

6-19. Commanders and staffs answer the following medical support planning considerations questions with respect to medical support planning:

- Does the health service support plan conform to the operation and administrative plans?
- Is the allocation of medical evacuation capabilities synchronized with the placement of medical treatment facilities to sustain proximity throughout the continuum of care?
- Does the support plan include flexibility for unseen contingencies (such as weapons of mass destruction)?
- Are medical support assets sufficiently mobile to provide support to the force?
- Have the following medical protection issues been addressed:
  - Health threat assessment.
  - Medical countermeasures and vaccination.
  - Health surveillance system.
- Who is eligible for treatment?
- Are mass casualty plans established and synchronized?
- When will limited resource triage be initiated?
- How will casualty evacuation be coordinated (dedicated, designated, and platform of opportunity)?
- How will casualty numbers be reported and from whom?
- How will patients be accounted for during unregulated movement?
- Are there sufficient medical evacuation assets?
- Does the theater evacuation policy support available hospitalization, intratheater, and intertheater medical evacuation capabilities?
- What medical support reports will be available to the multinational force commander?
- What are the arrangements for force health protection measures?
- Are there adequate dental services available?
- What provisions exist for preventing, identifying, and managing combat and operational stress reactions?
- How will multinational forces obtain Class VIII supplies?
- How will medical equipment be repaired?
- What is the blood supply system?
- How are patient movement items managed?
- Does the support plan include provision of, or access to, limited critical medical equipment such as magnetic resonance imagery?
- Does the support plan identify any unusual soldier physical screening standards necessary for this operation?
- What are the medical support requirements for detainee operations and facilities?

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Chapter 7
Special Operations During Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by discussing the considerations for special operations in multinational operations. It then discusses applicable special operations principles. The chapter then provides general considerations and coordination. It moves then to a discussion of C2 for special operations forces. The chapter concludes with considerations for commanders and staffs including special operations.

MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

7-1. *Special operations* is activities or actions requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments (JP 3-05). Special operations forces consist of Active and Reserve Components forces of the Services specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. For the Army, special operations include civil affairs, psychological operations, rangers, special forces, special mission units, and Army special operations aviation forces assigned to the United States Army Special Operations Command.

7-2. As planning for multinational force operations begins, special operations planners add an evaluation of foreign capabilities. This evaluation helps determine the overall capabilities available to the multinational force special operations component commander (known as MNFSOCC). Army special operations forces (known as ARSOF) routinely conduct this evaluation as they accomplish missions in support of the combatant commander's campaign plan. These evaluations help the multinational force special operations component commander make informed decisions. These decisions cover task organizing a nation's special operations force contributions, assigning roles and missions, accounting for interoperability requirements, integrating national capabilities with each other, and creating interdependence among multinational force special operations echelons or subordinate task forces.

7-3. Army special operations forces contribute to multinational operations by conducting special operations core activities:

- Direct action.
- Special reconnaissance.
- Countering weapons of mass destruction.
- Counterterrorism.
- Unconventional warfare.
- Foreign internal defense.
- Security force assistance.
- Hostage rescue and recovery (select Army special operations units only).
- Counterinsurgency.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance.
- Military information support operations.
- Civil affairs operations.

PRINCIPLES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

7-4. No single activity is ever conducted in isolation. An operation applies any combination of the activities that make up a special operation. The core principles of discreet, precise, and scalable special operations enable the achievement of objectives unilaterally, or with or through indigenous forces and populations. Discreet, precise, and scalable operations provide joint and multinational force commanders a flexible application of military capabilities in politically sensitive and culturally complex environments. These operations enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the indigenous population, host nation, or partner nation with which special operations forces work. (Refer to ADP 3-05 for a discussion on the principles of special operations.)

COORDINATION CRITERIA

7-5. Multinational and bilateral relationships with other nations' special operations forces often play a critical part for Army special operations forces executing their role during multinational operations. Shared doctrine, such as AJP-3.5, facilitates interoperability, integration, and interdependence among these forces. Commanders carefully coordinate existing relationships between countries' forces when creating a multinational force.

7-6. To prepare for large-scale combat operations, the multinational force focuses its training and priorities on armed conflict against peer and near-peer adversaries. Within the multinational force, special operations forces fulfill unique requirements to support government agencies, combatant commanders, allies, and partners across the range of military operations. Special operations forces provide support by preparing environments for successful large-scale combat operations. Special operations conducted during military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence are critical for success when an operational environment demands crisis response, limited contingency operations, or armed conflict.

7-7. Commanders consider five basic operational mission criteria when determining whether special operations forces are the appropriate force for their operational requirement:

- The mission is an appropriate special operations force mission or task.
- The mission or task should support the combatant commander's campaign or operation plan.
- The mission or task is operationally feasible.
- Required resources are available to execute and support the mission.
- The expected outcome of the mission justifies the risk.

(Refer to ADP 3-05 for a full discussion on operational mission criteria.)

COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES DURING MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

7-8. The command structure for Army special operations forces strongly resembles the structure for U.S. joint operations. The multinational force commander may establish a special operations component command as a component of the multinational force. Those Army units capable of establishing a special operations joint task force (known as SOJTF) or joint special operations task force (known as JSOTF) can lead a multinational force special operations component command. It is likely that the 1st Special Forces Command is tasked to establish the core of a special operations' joint tasks force. The 1st Special Forces Command is a scalable element organized to establish a special operations joint task force. This capability allows the command to execute joint, multinational, or combined force special operations component responsibilities for the operation or theater. The combatant commander must establish appropriate command relationships among special operations units, such as the theater special operations command, the joint force special operations component, the special operations joint task force, the joint special operations task force, and the special operations task force.

7-9. An established special operations joint task force improves interoperability and interdependence among special operations forces, other joint forces, multinational forces, allies, and partners. The special operations joint task force can plan and coordinate all special operations in the joint operations area, to include employing and sustaining U.S. and multinational special operations forces. The special operations joint task force increases synergies in intelligence, communications, and information sharing; improves manpower efficiency; improves integration of conventional forces and special operations forces; and enhances coordination between all special operations forces in theater.

7-10. The most versatile special operations task force is the joint special operations task force. It is a scalable element organized around a single special operations group or regiment-sized unit, and it is commanded by a colonel, brigadier general, or Service equivalent. It is a joint task force comprised of special operations units from more than one Service and may serve as the joint, multinational, or combined force task force special operations component in deterrence, crisis response, and limited contingency operations. This task force may serve as a subordinate, tactical headquarters during security cooperation, deterrence, crisis response, limited contingency operations, or large-scale combat operations. (For more information on Army special operations forces, refer to ADP 3-05.)

7-11. As a supporting commander, the multinational force special operations component commander employs a special operations C2 element. This element helps with special operations duties while supporting the multinational force commander and the multinational force's subordinate ground force commanders. The element remains under the operational control of the special operations commander. The special operations C2 element assists the joint special operations task force commander in fulfilling the supporting commander's responsibilities.

7-12. The establishment of liaisons with other component commanders as well as partner organizations is a best practice. Special operations forces liaison and integration capabilities are especially suited to the multinational environment. JP 3-05 contains information on various special operations forces liaison solutions to support cooperation, integration, interoperability, and interdependence among special operations forces task forces or units and other echelons in a joint task force or multinational force, an American Ambassador's country team, a host nation, or a partner nation. To gain the most utility from these liaison capabilities, commanders grant the appropriate level of direct liaison authorized to special operations forces personnel. This enables special operations forces liaisons to act in timely manner.

7-13. Special operations forces' capabilities, enabled by technological and ISR advances, allow for timely action against time-sensitive targets. However, these capabilities also present C2 challenges to commanders and staff, particularly regarding weapons release criteria and authorities. In addition, the complexity of the multinational environment generally compounds C2 challenges. JP 3-05 discusses unique C2 structures that allow special operations forces to capitalize on timely information while meeting higher headquarters reporting and information requirements.

CONSIDERATIONS

7-14. Commanders exercising command over special operations forces consider the following actions:

- Provide a clear chain of command to create unity of command with the authority to accomplish assigned tasks.
- Establish clear organizational relationships to achieve unity of effort.
- Provide supported commands special operations forces staff with sufficient experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support operations.
- Integrate special operations forces with coalition, multinational, and host-nation forces early in the planning process.
- Match special operations forces unit capabilities with mission requirements.
- Understand synchronization of special operations within joint operations as part of unified action.
- Maintain a clear chain of command for special operations forces units and continuity of C2 within operational areas, especially during distributed operations.

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Chapter 8

Civil Military Integration During Multinational Operations

This chapter discusses civil military integration. It addresses civil-military operations (CMO) and interorganizational cooperation. This chapter discusses civil affairs core competencies as they affect unified action within the multinational headquarters and for the mission. The chapter also covers civil-military liaison and civil-military teaming. It then discusses key civilian organizations and civilian-based relationships. The chapter concludes with considerations for commanders and staffs.

CIVIL MILITARY INTEGRATION

8-1. Multinational commanders must understand the capabilities required to achieve civil military integration (CMI). CMI is imperative to achieving unified action. *Civil military integration* is the actions taken to establish, maintain, influence, or leverage relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions to synchronize, coordinate, and enable interorganizational cooperation and to achieve unified action (FM 3-57). This Army action supports the joint activity of CMI as it applies to joint doctrine. CMI is the common activity performed in support of mission command and the operations process. (Refer to JP 3-08 for additional information about interorganizational cooperation.)

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS AND INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION

8-2. CMO are activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations among military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. CMO are integrated into the commander's intent. Commanders may rely on components and Service capabilities to support the CMO effort. (For more information regarding CMO, refer to JP 3-57.) *Interorganizational cooperation* is the interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08). Commanders involved with CMO and interorganizational cooperation recognize the need to establish stability mechanisms and CMI mechanisms into planning and force composition. These mechanisms may include establishing a joint interagency task force, joint interagency coordination group, or civil-military operations center (CMOC). (Refer to JP 3-08 for more information regarding interorganizational cooperation.)

8-3. Successful multinational CMO require established and maintained civil networks with people and organizations operating in the civil component. General liaison, civil-military teaming, meetings, and collaborative engagements with both civilian and military representatives achieve CMI. These integration mechanisms and activities facilitate various levels of cooperation ranging from information sharing to integrated and synchronized planning.

8-4. CMO can be executed by all capabilities at the commander's disposal including infantry, armor, and artillery units. Typical CMO capabilities could include medical, engineer and military police units. Army units have civil affairs staff and units that enable and coordinate the commanders CMO. (Refer to JP 3-57 for more information regarding CMO.)

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

8-5. Civil affairs operations (CAO) are expeditionary capabilities organized to achieve unified action. These operations allow the commander to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate governmental and nongovernmental entities in the civil component with Army operations. Civil affairs forces collect, analyze, and evaluate civil information to produce civil knowledge that is integrated into the operations process. Civil

affairs forces develop and engage civil networks and ensure the appropriate control and continuity of government functions in occupied or liberated territory.

8-6. CMI is a key tenet of CMO and interorganizational cooperation. CAO promote CMI into any headquarters and at echelons above brigade. Commanders consider CAO early in the planning and preparation of the operations process.

8-7. The Army rules of allocation apply to all echelons. A civil affairs company is assigned to brigade combat teams, civil affairs battalion headquarters to divisions, civil affairs brigades to corps or joint task force. Lastly, civil affairs commands (known as CACOMs) are assigned to a theater army, land component command, or geographic combatant command.

CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPETENCIES

8-8. Civil affairs forces focus on the interests, functions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of populations, institutions, government apparatus, and UAPs that reside or operate in and around an AO. The civil affairs branch has the following core competencies:

- Transitional governance.
- Civil network development and engagement (known as CNDE).
- Civil knowledge integration (known as CKI).
- CMI.

TRANSITIONAL GOVERNANCE

8-9. CAO focuses on winning the battle for moral authority and legitimacy. Legitimacy is promoted in the eyes of the world's community of nations by inclusion of as many nations as possible into the mission. Some nations will not provide military forces, but they may provide civilian entities. Many UAPs must be integrated through CMI. The populace only perceives legitimacy as achieved within an AO. Civil security and civil control are performed as stability tasks. These tasks require the continuity of government functions and appropriate control throughout conflict to establish or maintain stability. Only through stability will the indigenous populace confer legitimacy. CMO plays a crucial role in achieving stability and legitimacy.

CIVIL KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION

8-10. *Civil knowledge integration* is the actions taken to analyze, evaluate, and organize collected civil information for operational relevance and informing the warfighting function (FM 3-57). The resulting civil knowledge is integrated with other knowledge about an operational environment to create shared understanding among commanders, UAPs, international organizations, and civilian partners. Civil affairs forces use civil knowledge integration primarily to inform, focus, and direct CAO and CMO at all echelons.

8-11. In addition, civil knowledge integration enables the commander's understanding of an operational environment and development of the COP. Commanders incorporate civil knowledge integration using the Army's integrating processes: intelligence preparation of the battlefield, information collection, targeting, risk management, and KM. Civil affairs units also use this information as inputs to the civil network development and engagement process to refine information requirements and to shape branches, sequels, and other future missions.

CIVIL NETWORK DEVELOPMENT AND ENGAGEMENT

8-12. *Civil network development and engagement* is the activity by which the civil network capabilities and resources are engaged, evaluated, developed, and integrated into operations (FM 3-57). Developing and engaging civil networks provides commanders with a more complete understanding of an operational environment while providing access to use those networks to shape operational outcomes. A *civil network* is a collection of formal and informal groups, associations, military engagements, and organizations within an operational environment that interact with each other with varying degrees of frequency, trust, and collaboration (FM 3-57). Civil networks can be mobilized or self-motivated to bring collective action, social pressure, and political pressure around an area of common interest. Civil network development and engagement enables commanders to understand the civil component of an operational environment.

8-13. European and other allied partners leading a multinational command may employ a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) concept of operations. Within the CIMIC concept of operations, CIMIC capabilities coordinate and develop communications networks between military and nonmilitary organizations. This activity is referred to as civil-military interaction (not to be confused with CMI). Commanders and staffs of a unit with Army CAO capabilities supporting multinational commands ensure they understand the differences and similarities of civil-military interaction and CMI.

CIVIL MILITARY INTEGRATION

8-14. Civil affairs forces conduct CMI as a core competency. Commanders and UAPs conduct CMI to achieve unity of effort and to integrate planning, preparation, and execution. To achieve unity of effort, CMI is essential to effective integration of operations with commanders and UAPs.

8-15. Multinational or combined commands consist of two or more national forces or agencies of two or more allies or UAPs operating together. Civilian agencies, as well as some military partners, within the combined or multinational force may not possess the same information sharing access as some or most members. This presents a C2 dilemma for the commander. Civilian agencies may follow a different C2 system from the multinational force. Some host nations or other military partners may also not possess the access to sensitive or classified information which is often shared within the command post or joint operations center. The commander can opt to mitigate these obstacles through several civil-military integrating mechanisms to include civil-military liaison, civil-military teaming, CMOCs, or a joint CMO task force. These mechanisms integrate, coordinate, and synchronize with intergovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and UAPs operating in the AO. Some of these mechanisms may not be under the C2 system of the combined or multinational commander.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

8-16. The *civil-military operations center* is an organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the commander (JP 3-57). The primary CMI mechanism is the CMOC. In allied or multinational commands, the CMOC may be referred to as a CIMIC center. Civil affairs forces are trained, manned, and equipped to establish a CMOC at every echelon. The CMOC provides with an alternate operations center to the commander. This center includes partners who may not possess the commensurate information access authorities to permit entry to the command post or joint operations center. An Army civil affairs unit (from a civil affairs command to company levels) possesses the organization, manning, and equipment necessary to establish a CMOC to support units from a geographic combatant command to brigade levels. The CMOC provides the structure, equipment, and manning to establish the appropriate information sharing architecture to share information with UAPs who lack the required information access.

8-17. The CMOC enables the commander to integrate, synchronize, coordinate, and collaborate with multinational forces, indigenous populations and institutions, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, the private sector, and interagency forces when conducting multinational operations. Commanders create and sustain shared understanding and purpose through collaboration and dialogue within their organizations and with UAPs to facilitate unity of effort. Through this collaboration of the civil component and multinational forces, the CMOC becomes the location to collect, process, and share information, synchronize actions, and enable unified action in an operational environment. The CMOC supports mission command by providing commanders an integrating venue and capability. Civil affairs forces conducting CMI enable commanders to interface, collaborate, and inform the various elements of the civil component as well as synchronize these efforts with the military forces in the AO.

8-18. CMOCs are tailored for each mission. When a unit establishes a CMOC, the supported command should invite representatives of other entities. These entities might include the following:

- U.S. Agency for International Development.
- Department of State, country team, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies.
- Military (including foreign military) and civilian liaison personnel from participating countries.

- Host-nation or local government agencies.
- Intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, regional organizations, and the private sector (as appropriate).

CIVIL MILITARY LIAISON

8-19. Civil affairs units have designated civil-liaison teams organized in their unit structures at the battalion, brigade, and civil affairs command levels. These civil-liaison teams are established to conduct liaison functions for the division through joint force command level with interagency, intergovernmental, and host-nation entities.

CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMING

8-20. Civil-military teams are temporary organizations of civilian and military personnel which are task-oriented to provide an optimal mix of capabilities and expertise to accomplish specific planning or assessment tasks or to conduct synchronized or integrated activities at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. A civil-military team helps stabilize an AO in a province, district, state, or locality through its combined diplomatic, informational, military, and economic development and enforcement of the rule of law. The team provides the joint force commander with a means to understand the benefits of competencies that are normally external to the military. The team helps integrate the knowledge, expertise, and unique capabilities of U.S. Government departments and agencies with multinational military forces and civilian elements of multinational partners. Civil-military teams help the joint force commander understand the unique roles, responsibilities, parallel relationships, and objectives of other international and nongovernmental actors and organizations that may be present in an operational environment, but over whom neither the joint force commander nor the chief of mission exercises authority.

8-21. Civil-military teaming provides the multinational command with a means to achieve horizontal integration while preparing, planning, executing, and assessing operations. A civil-military team combines diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities to enhance the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the host-nation government. A civil-military team can focus on combined military and civil efforts to diminish the means and motivations of conflict while developing local institutions so they can take the lead role in national governance of providing basic services. (Refer to JP 3-57 for more information on CMO.)

TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY

8-22. *Transitional military authority* is a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority (FM 3-07). When asserting transitional military authority, the military is the lead agency and conducts stability operations to ensure the continuity of governance functions, specifically civil security and civil control. The multinational force commander is the de facto military governor. The military government may draw assistance from experienced civilian agencies and organizations. These agencies and organizations have the expertise to establish a system of government that fosters the gradual transition to an interim or indigenous authority. Transitional military authority is an interim solution. It continues only until the indigenous institutions and infrastructures can resume their functions and responsibilities. Sometimes, however, sufficient civilian expertise is not present, or conditions of an operational environment do not support introducing such civilian expertise. Military forces may then be required to lead until they stabilize the security situation and can safely transition responsibility for the stability sectors to civil authority.

8-23. The occupying force maintains an orderly administration and transfers authority to an interim authority, indigenous authority, or other civilian authority. Transfer of authority does not necessitate military withdrawal. Transferring authority to an interim authority may require support to civil administration. Transition occurs within its capabilities and is subject to the principle of military necessity arising from any ongoing combat or security operations. The multinational force commander analyzes military activities likely to increase tensions and those likely to facilitate and accelerate a return to civil administration or government subject to the requirements of the military situation. The commander's analysis is important in multi-ethnic or multicultural environments where one or more of the parties to a conflict view the COA as partisan.

SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

8-24. Multinational commanders must ensure the continuity of governance functions by performing civil administration activities in an occupied territory. *Civil administration* is an administration established by a foreign government in friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government or in hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established (JP 3-05). Multinational commanders act on the authority of a nation, alliance, coalition of nations, or the UN. The military controls the territory under administration.

8-25. Civil affairs forces assist an established government of an interim civilian authority through support to civil administration. *Support to civil administration* is assistance given by United States armed forces to stabilize or enhance the operations of the governing body of a foreign country by assisting an established or interim government (FM 3-57). U.S. forces provide support to civil administration with security cooperation, or transitional governance as authority transitions from military authority to an interim authority, indigenous authority, or other civil authority.

KEY CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS

8-26. Civilian organizations perform many activities encompassing humanitarian aid. This aid includes human rights; protection of minorities, refugees, and displaced persons; legal assistance; medical care; reconstruction; agriculture; education; arts and sciences; and general project funding. CAO staff and personnel understand the mandate, role, structure, methods, and principles of civilian organizations. Collectively, with local populations and their representatives, these staff and personnel represent the other half of the CAO equation. It is impossible to establish an effective relationship with civilian organizations without this understanding.

PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION

8-27. Commanders review the four humanitarian principles to understand the civil-military relationship. This differs from the commanders' requirement to understand the different roles and mandates of the various civilian organizations. The international community adopted these four humanitarian principles. Most civil aid organizations base operations and humanitarian action on these principles:

- **Humanity**. Human suffering must be relieved, and the dignity and other human rights of individuals and groups must be respected.
- **Impartiality**. Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discrimination. Relief is given without regard to nationality, political or ideological beliefs, race, religion, sex, or ethnicity, but only if needs are urgent.
- **Neutrality**. Humanitarian participants do not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious, cultural, or ideological nature at any time.
- **Independence**. Humanitarian participants maintain the right to independence of their own actions and resist any attempts to place conditions on their actions or movements in return for cooperation with military authorities.

LEAD AGENCIES

8-28. The international community mandates a lead agency to coordinate civilian organization activities. A *lead agency* is the United States Government agency designated to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation (JP 3-08). These civilian organizations volunteer for an operation. It is normally a major UN agency such as UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Children's Fund, or the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which is part of the UN secretariat.

8-29. Specific responsibilities of a lead agency include—

- Acting as a point of contact for other agencies, particularly in the areas of planning and information sharing.
- Coordinating field activities to avoid duplicating effort and wasting resources.
- Acting as an interface with the military at the theater level.

Often the lead agencies coordinate field activities through field offices of another agency or organization. Although the latter is from UN High Commissioner for Refugees or the World Food Programme, nongovernmental organizations such as Save the Children have filled this role in the past. Lead agencies have also contracted other intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations to implement health, food, or transportation programs or to operate refugee camps. The International Organization for Migration has assisted in these areas. The International Committee of the Red Cross performed its activities with the other agencies in this field. In such situations, nongovernmental organizations operate under legal agreements involving them as partners with the host-nation government and a UN agency. The relationship between the coalition and the lead agency is critical. A memorandum of understanding between the multinational force and the lead agency helps to make the relationship work.

TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS

8-30. Three principal types of civilian organizations operate outside formal national government structures:

- Intergovernmental organizations.
- Nongovernmental organizations.
- International and national donors.

Intergovernmental Organizations

8-31. Intergovernmental agreements establish intergovernmental organizations and operate at the international level such as the various UN organizations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Five major UN organizations are involved in humanitarian relief:

- UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
- UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
- World Food Programme.
- UN Children's Fund.

8-32. Intergovernmental agreements did not establish the International Committee of the Red Cross. This organization is impartial, neutral, and independent. Its humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities performed by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in situations of conflict and the aftermath. The International Committee of the Red Cross has a distinct status. It fulfills a role conferred upon it by international treaties such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (and the additional protocols of 1977) to which nearly all countries belong. The states party to the Geneva Conventions in 1986 adopted the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Nongovernmental Organizations

8-33. Governments do not always fund nongovernmental organizations because those organizations are voluntary. Nongovernmental organizations are primarily nonprofit organizations independent of government, intergovernmental organizations, or commercial interests. While many nongovernmental organizations come to the AO from foreign nations, local nongovernmental organizations may also operate. A nongovernmental organization legally differs from UN agencies and other intergovernmental organizations because each writes its own charter and mission.

8-34. Nongovernmental organizations fall into one of two categories:

- **Mandated**.
- **Nonmandated**.

A mandated nongovernmental organization has a lead intergovernmental organization that has officially recognized the nongovernmental organization in a crisis and authorized it to work in the affected area. A nonmandated nongovernmental organization has no official recognition or authorization and works as a private concern. An intergovernmental organization or a mandated nongovernmental organization can contract or subcontract these nongovernmental organizations. In other cases, these nonmandated nongovernmental organizations obtain funds from private enterprises and donors.

8-35. An implementing partner denotes a nongovernmental organization, local or international, mandated and contracted by a UN lead organization or other donor or intergovernmental organization to carry out work on its behalf. Implementing partners carry out specific functions for the nongovernmental organizations through funding by both government and private entities.

8-36. The number of nongovernmental organizations and levels of sophistication are increasing. In any potential AO, hundreds of these organizations exist. A nongovernmental organization generally remains strongly independent from political control to preserve its independence and effectiveness. In many cases, the nongovernmental organization's impartiality is a great benefit; its impartiality permits the only available means to rebuild relations when political dialogue has broken down. A nongovernmental organization is often highly professional in its field, extremely well motivated, and prepared to take physical risks in appalling conditions. Host nations usually accredit a nongovernmental organization before it is authorized to operate in the country. When a nongovernmental organization is not accredited by its host nation, it can create local tensions.

8-37. A perception of increased competition among nongovernmental organizations exists due to the need for funding. This perception accentuates the idea of a lack of structure in the nongovernmental organization community. Nongovernmental organizations cooperate at the local level assisted by civil affairs teams. Civil affairs teams persuade nongovernmental organizations by reason and not by authority with an emphasis on networking and building multinational relationships.

International and National Donor Organizations

8-38. The following international and national donor organizations are responsible for funding, monitoring, and evaluating development programs:

- U.S. Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.
- U.S. Agency for International Development.
- Department for International Development (United Kingdom).
- Canadian International Development Agency.
- Australian Agency for International Development.
- European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office.
- The World Bank.

These donors are present during humanitarian emergencies and work with the lead agency or with the civil administration or government.

Additional Agencies

8-39. In addition to the lead agencies and types of organizations, other agencies of humanitarian actions exist. These involve civilian development and human rights agencies that are also important.

Civilian Development Agencies

8-40. Several civilian development agencies are concerned mainly with reconstruction. Many of these agencies provide technical assistance to developing countries. For example, the UN Development Programme administers and coordinates technical assistance provided through the UN system. Civilian development agencies often spend a longer time in the affected area than the military does. In these cases, the CAO staff identifies any need for military involvement in reconstruction with the local government and lead agencies to enable the organizations to begin work and continue under the most favorable conditions. The reconstruction agencies allocate resources based on need to plan and develop projects throughout the affected area.

Human Rights and Democratization Agencies

8-41. Human rights and democratization agencies focus on protecting human rights and promoting democracy. The primary agencies in this area are the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, although the latter only operates in Europe. These agencies protect human rights in states where

abuses are rampant. These agencies seek to instill democratic values and the rule of law at all levels of government. Additionally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe can arrange for and monitor elections and coordinate programs instilling democratic institutional values.

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS, GOVERNMENTS, AND THE MILITARY

8-42. Governments handle humanitarian needs in their own countries. Civil organizations establish contacts with government and local authorities to develop their activities. The military works closely with the civil organizations, national governments, local authorities, or a combination of these organizations in CAO. In some cases, the military only plays a supporting role. In other situations, CAO occur to establish and develop the necessary initial contacts. This latter situation occurs when no civil authority is in place, which is a common occurrence.

8-43. Military forces, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, government donors, and the UN contain their own organizational cultures characterized by national, professional, and institutional differences. The degree of involvement, liaison, and influence of each organization varies greatly depending on the situation. The various organizations have difficulty achieving cooperation and consensus due to the requirement for each one to maintain relationships on three levels:

- In the field, relationships are maintained at the tactical level.
- Between national parties (host government or authorized government body), relationships are maintained at the operational level.
- For the international community and supporting donors, relationships are maintained at the strategic level.

8-44. The military commander has a legal responsibility for matters relating to relief activities in the joint operations area in which the law of occupation applies. With this responsibility comes the legal authority to regulate the activities of relief and civil agencies. A commander has this authority in operations performed under Chapter VII of the UN charter where "all necessary measures" are authorized and humanitarian assistance is part of the mandate. Civil affairs teams conduct CAO professionally and cooperatively.

CONSIDERATIONS

8-45. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations consider and answer the following questions with respect to CMO:

- Is there a comprehensive campaign plan? Does it address CAO issues?
- Have CAO planners been included in the assessment team for the operation?
- What areas of CAO come under multinational force control? What areas remain national issues?
- What are the political and civil implications of the desired strategic and operational end states?
- What are the civil end states implied by the military end states?
- What are the civil centers of gravity that need to be addressed? What are the associated decisive points?
- What are the CAO culminating points?
- Have measures been established to synchronize the CIMIC activities with the campaign plan's lines of operation?
- What are the required civil and military resources to achieve the operational objectives?
- What key civil organizations will be operating in the AO? Has an analysis been conducted on their respective end states, cultures, languages, customs, religions, objectives, and methods? How will they affect military operations?
- What structures, reinforcements, policies, committees, and liaison are needed at the strategic level to support the operational commander?
- Where the operational commander is to rely on host-nation support, does the force have sufficient sustainment resources available? Are memorandums of understanding and technical agreements for this support in place? What will be the impact on the local economy as human and personnel resources are drawn to military host-nation support?
- Is the national civil-military plan coordinated with the other governmental departments?

- Have national civil-military plans been coordinated with multinational force headquarters?
- Has the multinational force headquarters established a relationship with coalition ambassadors and, if a UN operation, the special representative of the Secretary-General?
- Is the civil administration sound, or will one be established? If the latter, what resources will be required?
- What are the requirements for restoring or rebuilding the local infrastructure?
- What are the requirements for restoring or providing essential services in the short-, medium-, and long-terms? The short-term tasks (such as urgent provision of shelter, water, sanitation, and power) may become military tasks. The military will need to plan accordingly.
- What support is required to assist or establish the host-nation civilian law and order system?
- Has an operational estimate for CAO been conducted?
- Are there adequate CAO personnel available to assist planners?
- Has a CMOC been established at an appropriate level to coordinate CAO?
- Is there a lead agency or lead agencies for humanitarian assistance such as UN or International Committee of the Red Cross?
- What international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and international and national donor agencies will be operating in the joint operations area?
- Is there a process in place for the commander to deal with rogue nongovernmental organizations? Is it linked to a lead agency?
- What is the policy for dealing with international organizations or nongovernmental organizations that are political or economic fronts to corporations, political action groups, rogue nations, allies of the combatants, criminal organizations, or terrorist groups?
- What legal authority does the commander have to take a more prescriptive approach to CAO if this should be necessary?
- Is there a synchronization plan that articulates a common operational effect across boundaries (such as military, social, political, cultural, religious, media, or economic boundaries)?
- What areas of CAO support can nations provide and what areas can nations not provide?
- Do all participating nations understand CAO or CIMIC?
- Do all nongovernmental organizations subscribe to the code of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and nongovernmental organizations in disaster relief?
- Do civilians in the AO need mine awareness and unexploded ordnance training?
- What other CAO engineering requirements exist in the theater?
- Is there separate funding to support these requirements?

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Chapter 9
Maritime Considerations During Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by discussing the characteristics of a maritime environment. It then discusses the characteristics of maritime forces, planning considerations, and an operational approach in a maritime environment. Lastly, the chapter provides considerations for commanders and staffs.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

9-1. In a maritime environment, key terrain is any land that friendly or enemy forces can occupy to attain a physical position of relative advantage. The maritime environment includes littoral and Arctic regions as well as land masses surrounded by large bodies of water. The littoral region has two segments: seaward and landward. Seaward segments include the area from open ocean to the shore. Landward segments are those areas inland from shore that forces can support and defend directly from the sea. The arctic region encompasses part of the areas of responsibility of three different geographic combatant commands, eight countries, and all time zones.

9-2. The maritime environment challenges planners to account for operational reach. Planners must consider the impact of space and time on reinforcement of the existing forward-stationed forces and allies. The distance between bases throughout maritime regions hinders mutually supporting operations, sustainment, and reinforcement from supporting echelons in the theater. Isolation and distance increases vulnerability to amphibious raids by special purpose enemy forces, attacks from adversary long-range aircraft or missiles, and potential physical isolation by blockade from naval forces.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MULTINATIONAL MARITIME FORCES

9-3. Multinational maritime operations cover a range of military activities undertaken by multinational forces, across the competition continuum, to exercise sea control or project power ashore. Maritime forces are primarily navies. However, air forces, land forces, Army watercraft and port terminal detachments, and other government agencies all contribute to multinational operations in a maritime-dominated environment.

9-4. The qualities that characterize maritime forces as political and military instruments that support coalition policies are readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility. Maritime forces reassure or support allies and partners, deter aggression, influence unstable situations, and respond to aggression. Multinational maritime operations are built on multinational partnerships. Multinational partnerships enhance and expand the flexibility and mobility to respond promptly to developing crises. Multinational maritime operations require Army and multinational partners capable of being readily deployed globally to display the flexibility and mobility necessary to conduct operations in maritime environments.

MARITIME FORCE FLEXIBILITY

9-5. Maritime forces provide a wide range of weapons systems, military options, and logistics in support of multinational operations by land forces. Since the end of World War II, maritime forces resolved many international crises. These forces control the seas and provide diplomatic leverage in peace or times of crisis. They perform tasks ranging from forcible entry and strike operations to noncombatant evacuation operations, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance. Strategic and tactical command, control, and communications capabilities of maritime forces provide for a distinctly controlled force that complements diplomatic efforts. Maritime forces offer a presence without occupation and a deterrence without commitment. These enable and protect the strategic lines of communication upon which multinational land forces depend.

MARITIME FORCE MOBILITY

9-6. Maritime forces are less constrained by political boundaries than air or ground forces. Maritime forces deploy virtually anywhere in the world and transit the seas according to international law. With their strategic, operational, and tactical mobility, maritime forces—

- Monitor a situation passively.
- Remain on station for a sustained period.
- Respond to a crisis rapidly.
- Deploy in combat with authority.

9-7. Mobility enables maritime forces to respond from over the horizon, becoming selectively visible and threatening to adversaries as needed. If diplomatic, political, or economic measures succeed, maritime forces withdraw without further action ashore. Maritime forces respond to indications of pending crises by relocating rapidly through the theater of operations or from one theater of operations to another, usually independent of fixed logistics. In combat, the ability to position maritime forces quickly provides commanders with significant tactical and operational advantages.

MARITIME FORCES SELF SUSTAINABILITY

9-8. Maritime forces maintain self-sufficiency as the norm. Often the nature of the operation and the types of committed units determine the degree of self-sustainment achievable. Maritime forces operate in forward areas at the end of long supply lines without significant land-based supply structure. With replenishment-at-sea, on-station replacement of personnel and ships, and the resilience of ships (an ability to sustain damage and continue the mission), maritime operations may continue indefinitely.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

9-9. A maritime environment requires some unique planning considerations. Complex details are required to coordinate the movement and landing of troops, equipment, and supplies using air and maritime means. The most critical planning in a maritime-dominated theater involves collaboration among the components of the multinational force and between supporting organizations and agencies.

9-10. Basic planning considerations are universal at all echelons. The success of multinational operations in the maritime environment has three critical requirements:

- Commanders' involvement and guidance.
- Unity of effort.
- Integrated and collaborative planning with other assigned headquarters and subordinate echelons.

9-11. The multinational force commander stays involved and provides guidance to maritime operations. Most commanders for maritime operations will likely be a senior naval officer. Because of physical distances and the relative isolation typically associated with land operations in a largely maritime environment, commanders maintain situational understanding through collaboration. They ensure their operations or activities do not have a negative unintended effect on other operations or units. This may include integration with multinational amphibious or like maritime units.

9-12. The commander ensures unity of effort across the multinational force. Unity of effort includes ensuring the task and purpose of operations nest with the overall multinational operational concept. In the maritime environment, the unity of effort should include the commanders and staffs identified for the maritime, air, and land elements.

9-13. Integrated and collaborative planning has two critical attributes in maritime operations: integration across functional areas at every echelon and collaborative planning by multinational commanders and staffs. Ideally, commanders and their staffs conduct planning for maritime operations in the same location. When this is not practical, the exchange of liaison officers facilitates planning functions. This is crucial for any operation conducted across extended maritime distances.

CHALLENGES

9-14. A maritime environment presents specific challenges. The obvious differences in uniforms and equipment can cause misidentification. The lack of standardized markings and unit identifiers can present the potential for fratricide. The problem can be exacerbated because allies and partners can have similar equipment to potential enemies.

9-15. Situational awareness is paramount in a maritime environment. All participating units at all echelons ensure they share the same level of situational awareness regarding the disposition of adjacent unit locations.

Partners share and use trusted COPs to help mitigate the potential for fratricide. Current operations and plans personnel also consider differences in the way various naval forces use symbology and graphics in a maritime environment. Units should consider a liaison officer exchange, when possible, to deconflict operational differences. Embedded liaison officers can provide mission analysis and identify critical coordination points and times to mitigate potential risks.

9-16. An Army formation that has interoperable multinational partners in a maritime environment is substantially more capable than one that lacks partners. Effective interoperability includes understanding technical challenges across joint components, developing methods to bridge gaps, and understanding the maritime capabilities of each member in the multinational force.

Area of Operations

9-17. An AO is the operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces. This area needs to be large enough to both accomplish the mission and provide flexibility regarding COAs. The designation of subordinate AOs in a maritime environment enables freedom of action, maintains tempo, and maximizes available combat power. Larger island landmasses may allow multinational forces to operate with a contiguous AO, with the unit boundaries directly adjacent to each other. Smaller archipelagic island chains may require a noncontiguous AO and may even leave some islands in a designated AO completely unoccupied by friendly forces depending on the operational requirements and threat.

9-18. Ideally, the AO is equal to or less than the area of influence. Commanders balance the available multinational forces against the capabilities of the total multinational force. The commander and staff estimate the area of influence. The estimate accounts for using capabilities—and their resulting effects—in air and maritime domains. The size difference between an AO and area of influence requires balancing available forces with the size of the AO. If an AO is too large, the assigned multinational force may not accomplish its mission due to a lack of resources. If an AO is too large for a unit to effectively control, then the situation increases risk, allows sanctuaries for enemy forces, and limits joint force flexibility. If the AO is too small, the assigned multinational force may fail to use subordinate forces to their full capabilities.

OPERATIONAL APPROACH FOR A MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

9-19. When developing the operational approach for a maritime environment, naval and air components often become the key enablers for the multinational commander. The multinational force develops a nested operation plan that accounts for the overall multinational commander's strategic priorities. This nested approach accounts for all domains of the operation across a competition continuum.

9-20. C2 in a maritime environment may have significant challenges. Given the size of an AO for most maritime dominant environments and the distance between land masses, there may be multiple active assigned AOs, each with separate headquarters. Synchronization and communication between units is critical when conducting operations in a maritime environment. Commanders and staff access each mission partner's capability to obtain and maintain C2 to facilitate mission success.

9-21. Operations planners consider the multinational force's capability to defeat enemy antiaccess and area denial to enable offensive operations. Operations in a maritime environment are likely to be contested throughout armed conflict. The multinational force may be required to seize key terrain for emplacing air and missile defense systems to defeat the enemy antiaccess and area denial. This enables offensive operations, which are likely to be conducted in two complex forms of forcible entry operations: vertical envelopment and amphibious landing. Forcible entry operations seize and hold lodgments against armed opposition into a denied area to allow movement and maneuver to accomplish the mission. (Refer to FM 5-0 for more on planning.)

9-22. Commanders and staffs should also consider the possible challenges of sustaining a multinational force in a maritime environment. Sustainment in a maritime dominant environment requires collaboration. The multinational force provides theater and port opening functions to maintain strategic and operational capabilities. The extended distances in most maritime dominant AOs may require bringing pre-positioned stocks of all classes of supply ashore. This may require detailed planning as part of the movement plan. Floating stocks may be discharged in support of armed conflict and require detailed early planning. The life support demands and maintenance footprint may quickly exceed the capabilities of a small island port.

Coordination with host nations that have access to suitable, deep draft port facilities, infrastructure, and support equipment should be considered in the early planning of the operation.

CONSIDERATIONS

9-23. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations consider and answer the following questions with respect to maritime operations:

- What are the land and air components' relationship with the maritime component?
- Are maritime forces operating in the littoral environment to project forces ashore as part of a multinational operation?
- What is the scope of support from the maritime component in terms of time and space?
- Are maritime forces contributing to operations ashore by conducting operations in direct or indirect support of land and air operations?
- What is the multinational structure of the maritime component and what capabilities does it possess?
- What is the potential for sea basing?
- What control procedures will be used to de-conflict air (to include unmanned aircraft systems), indirect fire, and afloat assets including small boats?
- Who has control and requires access to the recognized maritime picture and intelligence products?
- How does the maritime component link to the COP?
- If there is a maritime interdiction operations concept of operations, does it support achieving specified objectives?
- Are there any commercial or national constraints on using contracted vessels?
- Can all multinational partners be supported by the maritime component?
- What medical treatment facilities exist in the maritime component?
- Are casualty and medical evacuation assets available?

Chapter 10
Air Considerations During Multinational Operations

This chapter begins by discussing the characteristics of the air environment. It then discusses air operations in multinational operations, air and missile defense, and airfield operations. Lastly, the chapter provides considerations for commanders and staffs.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AIR ENVIRONMENT

10-1. The *air domain* is the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth's surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible (JP 3-30). As with other domains, unique characteristics of the air domain directly impact operations in other domains, including on land. Conversely, characteristics of the land domain (such as airfield locations, obstacles to approach, and landing zones) create effects in the air domain. The multinational ground force commander contributes to operations in and receives support from the air domain. Multinational forces frequently cannot achieve mission success in one domain without controlling key terrain in the other.

MULTINATIONAL AIR OPERATIONS

10-2. Multinational air operations gain and maintain sufficient control of the air to conduct operations against objectives in the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. To simultaneously meet the various objectives against which air operations can be planned, multinational commanders achieve unity of effort between air and ground operations. The most important principles for achieving unity of effort include the following:

- Unified air action.
- Centralized control.
- Decentralized execution.

(Refer to AJP-3.3 and JP 3-30 for more information on unity of effort.)

COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING AIR OPERATIONS

10-3. The multinational commander designates a multinational air component commander, an area air defense commander, and an airspace control authority to control the capabilities of air operations. The multinational commander establishes the authority and command relationships of the multinational air component commander and assigns responsibilities. Responsibilities include planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking joint air operations based on the multinational commander's concept of operations and air apportionment decision. These activities rely on the full representation and expertise of all elements of the multinational force contributing to the air operations plan. At the tactical level of operations, the multinational air component commander's authority includes exercising tactical command over assigned and attached forces and tactical control over other military capabilities or forces available for tasking.

10-4. The multinational commander establishes supporting and supported relationships between components to facilitate operations. The commander retains the option of controlling air operations directly using the multinational headquarters staff. The multinational commander vests authority to a component commander to carry out the duties of the airspace control authority and area air defense commander. The multinational air component commander is the most likely choice for appointment as the airspace control authority and area air defense commander. The multinational air component commander is responsible for air operations and airspace control measures. Any division of these responsibilities requires detailed coordination for safe and effective air operations.

AIR OPERATIONS PLANNING AND TASKING

10-5. Air operations planning develops the concept of operations that describes the best COA and produces the air operations plan. This plan articulates and communicates multinational air component commander's

strategy for achieving the multinational commander's operation plan. This is a continuous process developed as units use air tasking orders and airspace control orders. The multinational force uses this process to ensure it has adequate air assets to achieve the commander's objectives. Air operations planning involves—

- Identifying air objectives that contribute to the multinational campaign objectives.
- Determining the air strategy to exploit multinational air assets to support the multinational objectives.
- Identifying centers of gravity to satisfy the multinational force's strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.

10-6. The air tasking cycle that uses orders—such as the air tasking order and airspace control order—promotes efficient and effective use of the available multinational air capabilities and assets. It begins with the multinational commander's air apportionment and culminates with the combat assessment of previous missions and sorties. The cycle provides repetition for planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking air missions and sorties while following the multinational commander's guidance. The cycle accommodates changes in an operational situation or to the commander's guidance. It also accommodates late notice requests for support from other commanders. The air tasking cycle is an analytical, systematic approach that focuses targeting efforts on supporting operational requirements to produce an air tasking order. A timely multinational air tasking order is critical. Other commanders conduct planning and operations based on the content and scheduling in the air tasking order, and they depend on its accuracy. (Refer to FM 3-52 for more information on air tasking cycle.)

10-7. During the initial planning of operations, commanders and staff consider methods to sustain and maintain air assets for the entire operation. Planners consider the host nation's support and use of established airfields, airports, and maintenance infrastructure. Sustaining aerial platforms during large-scale combat operations could pose significant issues if the force is using air assets further away from their sustainers during offensive operations. Maintaining the fleet of air assets might hinder planners if units overuse certain assets. Commanders and staffs must know the capabilities and limitations of all air assets as well as methods to sustain and maintain each platform in the multinational force.

AIRSPACE CONTROL

10-8. Airspace control complements and supports a multinational commander's campaign plan without adding undue restrictions and with minimal adverse impacts on the capabilities of any multinational forces. Each commander uses the airspace with maximum freedom consistent with the degree of operational risk directed by the multinational commander. Airspace control procedures—

- Prevent mutual interference.
- Facilitate the classification and identification of aerial platforms.
- Accommodate and expedite the safe flow of all air traffic.
- Enhance combat effectiveness to support the multinational objectives.
- Prevent fratricide.

10-9. When designated by the multinational commander, the airspace control authority can—

- Establish an airspace control system.
- Prepare the airspace control plan.
- Promulgate the relevant airspace control orders.
- Implement airspace control means.
- Harmonize regional airspace control plans.
- Synchronize subordinate unit airspace plans.

10-10. The airspace control authority should establish an airspace control system that responds to the needs of the multinational force commander. The airspace control system rapidly distributes airspace control orders and updates to all multinational force commanders in an area of responsibility. All component commanders comply with the airspace control plan. However, the multinational commander provides procedures to adjudicate differences that the airspace control authority and the component commanders cannot resolve. Centralized direction by the airspace control authority does not imply that it assumes operational control or tactical control over any air assets.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

10-11. Air and missile defense is a multinational force responsibility. Multinational air and missile defense integrates the capabilities of all component air and missile defense assets to protect and influence an operational environment associated with the multinational campaign plan. If area air defense commanders are not airspace control authorities, they coordinate with those authorities to synchronize the area air defense plans and airspace control orders to support air and missile defense operations. Area air defense commanders plan and direct the multinational air and missile defense operations that the component commanders execute. Area air defense commanders—

- Protect the force from hostile air activity.
- Integrate and coordinate the force's air and missile defense assets into a multinational air and missile defense plan (including host-nation air and missile defense systems).
- Promulgate and employ common procedures for managing air operations and reducing mutual interference.
- Control and coordinate all air and missile defense operations by component commanders.
- Coordinate with the air component authority to ensure that the airspace control plan supports air and missile defense operations.

10-12. An Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC) is the Army's operational lead for Army theater air and missile defense. In wartime, the AAMDC deploys to the theater of operations to support the Army commander or, if designated, the joint force land component commander. The joint force air component commander ensures that Army theater air and missile defense operations are properly coordinated and integrated with those of joint and multinational forces.

10-13. Based on mission variables and augmentation with Army, joint, interagency, and multinational personnel, the AAMDC serves as an operational protection integrator for Army forces or the joint force. In peacetime, the AAMDC ensures Army air defense artillery forces for echelons above corps are properly trained and ready to support theater air and missile defense operations. The AAMDC plans and executes various training activities such as exercises and simulations to ensure force readiness. It also coordinates with joint and multinational partners to develop procedures for combined theater air and missile defense operations, interoperability, and training. The AAMDC also supports homeland defense operations.

AIRFIELD OPERATIONS

10-14. Aviation combines speed, mobility, and lethality to gain advantages as the aerial maneuver element of the multinational force. Unlike ground combat systems, aviation requires secure airfields to conduct sustained operations. Multinational forces manage airfields to enhance the safety, sustainability, and survivability of aircraft and aircrews to ensure successful mission accomplishment. Efficient management and thoughtful airfield design contributes to the timely response of aviation in large-scale combat operations and contingency operations. Locations for aviation airfield operations include but are not limited to—

- Highway landing strips.
- Improved and unimproved austere airfields.
- Captured enemy airfields.
- Host-nation and adjacent nation airfields.

10-15. Expansion of the AO at each echelon may depend on forward operating airfields that enable the commander to seize the initiative and influence operations at critical points. Aviation, including armed and unarmed unmanned aircraft systems, expands the ground commander's AO in both time and space. A forward airfield enhances—

- Aviation maneuver across all core competencies.
- More depth and breadth for information collection and joint or coalition fires against either a conventional or an asymmetric threat.
- Economy of force and resources ensuring that aviation can fly anywhere in the AO.
- Aviation's ability to conduct attacks, shape operations, and support sustainment as well as to provide aerial C2 platforms for supported tactical and operational commanders.

- The mobility, long-range fires, and sophisticated sensors of attack reconnaissance aircraft blocking enemy detection and engagement beyond the range of ground direct fire systems.
- Conventional and asymmetric operations.

10-16. Well-established and properly maintained airfields contribute to aviation tactical sustainment operations. Such operations include air movement and aerial sustainment to support special operations, infantry, airborne, air assault, and heavy forces. These airfields also support high priority resupply and air movement throughout the theater of operations. (Refer to ATP 3-04.16 for more information on airfield operations.)

CONSIDERATIONS

10-17. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations consider and answer the following questions with respect to the integration of air capabilities into operations:

- Has the multinational commander designated a multinational air component commander?
- Has the multinational commander designated an airspace control authority?
- Has the multinational air operations center and the other appropriate headquarters established liaisons?
- What are the capabilities and limitations of multinational airpower? Have commanders and staffs been briefed?
- Have planners considered all elements of airpower when employing multinational fires?
- Has the multinational air component commander published special instructions? Are they consistent with ROE?
- Has an airfield operations manual been published?
- Have administrative and tactical movements been performed?
- Have precision direct-fire engagements been performed?
- What are the recognized aural signatures?
- Can the host nation provide support such as airports, airfields, and infrastructure?
- What is the maintenance plan for aircraft?
- How will weather affect the air operation portion of the plan?
- What are the U.S. air and missile defense capabilities?
- What capabilities are multinational forces providing?
- What is the desired air and missile defense organization for early entry forces?
- What is the control structure for U.S. and multinational air and missile defense forces? Have air defense regions and sectors been established?
- Has the multinational commander designated an area air defense commander?
- Has the area air defense commander designated a deputy for air and missile defense?
- What are the ROE for air and missile threats?
- What are the U.S. air and missile defense capabilities? What capabilities are the multinational forces providing?
- What is the desired air and missile defense organization for early entry forces?
- What is the control structure for U.S. and multinational air and missile defense forces?
- Have air defense regions and sectors been established?

Chapter 11
Space Considerations During Multinational Operations

This chapter begins with a discussion on the characteristics of the space domain. Next, the chapter discusses space operations in multinational operations and building capacity and partnership through multinational operations. It then discusses space planning considerations and command structure for space operations in multinational operations. The chapter concludes with considerations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SPACE DOMAIN

11-1. The *space domain* is the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible (JP 3-14). It is where military, civilian, and commercial space activities are conducted, and the upper limit extends infinitely outward. (Refer to FM 3-14 and JP 3-14 for more information on space domains.)

11-2. Ground forces leverage space capabilities to support multinational operations from large-scale combat operations to individual Soldiers at the tactical level of warfare. Space capabilities enhance ground forces' ability to effectively communicate, navigate, accurately target the enemy, protect and sustain our forces, and enable intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Like other domain relationships, multinational forces cannot achieve mission success in the space domain without controlling key terrain on the ground.

11-3. Effective integration requires all personnel engaged in supervising multinational operations to have a common and clear understanding of how space capabilities (military, civilian, commercial, national, and multinational) contribute to multinational operations. Personnel understand methods to integrate military space capabilities and effects into operations to achieve alliance security objectives. They also recognize that adversaries will increasingly seek to exploit an access to space products with military utility; many products are now available from commercial sources.

SPACE OPERATIONS IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

11-4. Ground forces use space capabilities that operate across all domains. The physical space domain is the location where space-based satellites transmit and receive signals. Land-based space forces conduct the planning, coordination, integration, and synchronization of space capabilities and effects across all functions within multinational operations from the land domain. While joint and multinational forces can complete their assigned mission in a denied, degraded, and disputed space operational environment, these forces are more agile and efficient when using space capabilities to their fullest ability.

11-5. Information acquired through space capabilities supports ground forces and helps foster an information advantage. Many space-enabled and space-enhanced devices on the battlefield are used to conduct C2, targeting and precision fires, movement, maneuver, communications, protection, sustainment, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and other information-related requirements.

11-6. Army space operations, duties, and responsibilities support multinational ground forces through the use and exploitation of joint space capabilities. A space capability is the ability of space forces to accomplish a mission or operation in, to, and from any space segment. (Refer to JP 3-14 for various discussions about space capability.) The joint space capabilities that multinational ground forces rely on are as follows:

- Space situational awareness.
- Space control.
- Positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) to include Global Positioning System (GPS).
- SATCOM.
- Missile warning based on detection of high-energy infrared (heat) events.
- Environmental monitoring.
- Space-based ISR.

11-7. Many space-enabled or space-enhanced tasks and activities are not codified in joint doctrine specifically as space capabilities. Instead, they are combined, derived, or listed as second-order tasks and actions enabled by space capabilities. These include, but are not limited to—

- Information advantage—supported by the information acquired through space capabilities.
- Joint friendly force tracking—supported by PNT and SATCOM (when mission dictates).
- Network transport of data.
- Commercial imagery.
- National reconnaissance office overhead systems.
- Tactical exploitation of national capabilities (known as TENCAP) program that uses all joint space capabilities.
- National-to-theater program interfaces.
- Geospatial intelligence.
- Integrated broadcast service.
- Common interactive broadcast.

11-8. Space-based capabilities provide a significant advantage for multinational operations through the ability of global maneuver. Satellites use their ability to loiter over a designated area or have frequent revisit times over a target location to collect and transmit data to ground receiving stations. Effects provided by space capabilities can be temporary, permanent, reversible, or nonreversible on certain adversary systems. The collection means and effects provided by satellites are not easily influenced by adversary antiaccess and area denial (known as A2/AD) strategies used on ground, maritime, and airborne forces thus making them an invaluable tool.

11-9. Many integrated space operations exist among the many multinational forces. Each space operation is based on its own national priorities, funding, laws, and technology implementation. Sharing capabilities provides increased effectiveness, resilience, and flexibility to space operations and complicates an adversary's decision making. The most frequently used space capabilities pertain to weather, PNT, SATCOM, missile warning, and space situational awareness.

11-10. The multinational force commander understands the ground forces rely on space-based capabilities for success in multinational operations. Those capabilities include PNT, communications, space and terrestrial weather, ballistic missile warning notification, and information collection products. These systems are critical enablers for joint and multinational forces to plan, communicate, move and maneuver, maintain AO space situational awareness, engage the enemy, and protect and sustain forces. Space operations experts enable and enhance operations when involved in planning and mission execution. Space planning and coordination with multinational forces occurs with Army space professionals attached at the corps and division levels. These professionals provide expertise, advice, and planning to the commander on space-related issues that directly affect multinational operations. Space-based capabilities enhance awareness of deliberate interference activities such as attempts to jam or spoof friendly communications.

11-11. When U.S. space assets are involved, space professionals ensure that space activities and operations comply with the law of armed conflict, any treaties or international agreements, domestic law and policy, and any applicable host-nation laws. During planning and execution, legal counsel assesses compliance with applicable laws, policy, or agreements and provides guidance for operations.

11-12. Space-enabled capabilities are ubiquitous and widely used to maintain space situational awareness within an operational environment. Space-based systems enable multinational operations during combat and the subsequent stages of force projection operations by—

- Providing unclassified, commercial imagery products releasable to multinational forces to support targeting, fires, and geospatial engineering efforts.
- Providing rapid communications that enable a commander to gain and maintain the initiative by developing the situation faster than the enemy can. The commander can—
  - Visualize the AO and share a COP, retain the ability to recognize and protect multinational friendly forces, synchronize force actions with adjacent and supporting units, and maintain contact and coordination critical to multinational operations.
  - Receive updates on the solar environment and the impact to both terrestrial and space-based segments of friendly communications systems.

- Monitor terrestrial areas of interest through information collection assets to help reveal the enemy's location and disposition; reveal route, area, zone, and force reconnaissance; and attempt to identify the enemy's intent.
- Receive GPS status and accuracy of PNT for planning and conducting mission and maneuver operations to support fires and targeting effects.
- Receive meteorological, oceanographic, and space environmental information which the staff has processed, analyzed, and leveraged to produce timely and accurate weather effects and impacts on operations.

BUILDING CAPACITY AND PARTNERSHIP THROUGH MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

11-13. Space operations continuously support multinational operations throughout a combined space operational environment. This persistent space support is technology driven and often transparent. Not all allies or international partners own the same or equal amounts of organic space capabilities, but all understand the synergy and unity of effort created when capabilities are synchronized to support the commander's intent and concept of operations. Conducting multinational space operations demonstrates the importance of building capacity within responsible and capable partner nations for current and future operations.

11-14. Interoperability is constrained by our mission partners' capabilities and limitations. Some multinational forces lack the ability or sufficient experience to dedicate personnel to a space position and assign space operations as an additional duty. However, those forces still have requirements for space operations in a multinational environment. In these cases, elements such as the theater space support element can assist in generating requests and providing useful information.

11-15. Forces can use space operations systems in multinational operations to build partnership capacity and improve resilience and interoperability in the following ways:

- Terrestrial and space weather monitoring for operational planning.
- GPS accuracy reports.
- Geolocation and neutralization of mobile signal jammers.
- Satellite imagery from military and commercial collection systems.
- Notification of ballistic missile launch events or attacks.
- Resolution of SATCOM electromagnetic interference.

11-16. Some space operations systems, capabilities, or effects may not be authorized for disclosure to multinational forces due to their classification. This does not prevent the capability or effect from being included in planning and used in operations. To avoid compromise or spillage of information to noncleared forces, these capabilities and effects are segmented and require special considerations during their planning, integration, and execution.

SPACE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

11-17. The space planner ensures all COAs meet the requirements for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability regarding the integration of space capabilities and effects. The space planner ensures shared knowledge is suitable. This suitability includes understanding the level of knowledge that partner nations' armies have regarding the use of space products and services. Feasibility involves early planning. The early involvement of space planners in the development of the commander's intent and planning enables collaboration and integration with missions, functions, and tasks. A consideration of space operations is the lead-time required for capabilities and effects.

11-18. Space planners anticipate requirements during initial planning, evaluate host-nation resources, and integrate the requirements into the operation plan. Space planners participate in all aspects of COAs development, analysis, and comparisons. During COA development, the principal focus of space planners should be to—

- Determine how space operations can best support commander's intent.
- Determine how to integrate space capabilities and effects into mission operations.
- Provide input on which COAs are most supportable with effective space operations.

11-19. The space planner determines if space operations are acceptable. During the planning process of multinational space operations, planners consider how the integration of space operations will affect other operations. It is rare for units to conduct space operations independently of other operations. Planners are aware of how space operations will affect or impact operations in all domains. Acceptable COAs have fewer risks.

COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR SPACE OPERATIONS IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

11-20. When determining the placement of space operations personnel within the command structure, the multinational force commander considers the complexities of an operational environment and the relationships used by space operations to integrate and coordinate with other elements of the staff. In a theater of operations, the individual designated as space coordinating authority has the responsibility to plan, integrate, and coordinate space operations. The space coordinating authority is responsible for coordinating joint and multinational space operations and integrating all space capabilities and effects within a theater of multinational operations. The space coordinating authority helps coordinate joint and multinational space operations and integrates space capabilities and effects to support the multinational force commander. The space coordinating authority is the ultimate decision maker regarding space operations in a theater. The multinational force commander does not direct tasking authority of space assets. However, the commander can request allocation of space assets.

11-21. Coordination of space operations within multinational operations typically occurs at a combined headquarters such as a joint forces command, Service component command, the Combined Space Operations Center, or the U.S. Space Command. Within these headquarters, liaison officers from participating allies and partner nations come together to directly interact, collaborate, and coordinate on plans and space support requests sent to them. Liaison officers review plans and requests, identify capabilities based on the desired effect, determine unintentional effects of the capabilities used, and identify capability gaps required to support specific operations. Once a space support request has been assessed and verified, it is sent to the director of space forces to be prioritized. The space support request is submitted to the Combined Space Operations Center for asset assignment and inclusion into the air tasking order.

11-22. The U.S. Army typically takes the lead in the coordination process since it possesses the most robust and holistic complement of space resources. Though robust, U.S. assets do not represent every capability. Through liaison officers' coordination, allies and partner nations provide their unique capabilities, often discrete or specialized, and incorporate these capabilities through data layering into the concept of operations to improve mission results.

11-23. Each combatant commander normally has a chief of space force on staff. The chief of space force is a U.S. Space Force officer who oversees all space operations activities and forces conducted by all Services in a theater of operations. The chief of space forces is responsible for—

- Accomplishing the duties of the space coordinating authority.
- Conducting day-to-day functions of the space staff.
- Integrating space capabilities, space control operations, and planning into joint and multinational operations.
- Providing advice on space capabilities and employment.

11-24. In a multinational headquarters, space liaison officers are granted significant authority and reachback capabilities, and they are considered invaluable assets for coordination. Army space operations personnel are typically assigned under an Army echelon G-3 or an established command and support relationship. In the absence of an established or codified command structure, space operations personnel create a support relationship with lead nation forces and other supporting liaisons formally or informally if sufficiently important to transient requirements. In these instances, normalizing space capabilities into terms more commonly used for planning such as fires, maneuver, and intelligence alleviates confusion and simplifies requests for support. In doing so, space operations personnel can integrate space capabilities and effects into joint targeting, the air tasking order, and the COP.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMANDERS AND STAFF

11-25. Space operations bring essential capabilities with unique tools to influence, enable, and enhance all mission areas during ground operations. Unit commanders have a clear understanding of the space capabilities available that contribute to mission operations and ways to use those capabilities.

11-26. The commander of the multinational force integrates space capabilities and effects from different nations to achieve the desired end state. The multinational staff understands the capabilities and limitations of space resources used by other nations in the multinational force and incorporates them into the overall plan. Many allies and partners desire space capabilities to defend and protect their national interests. Shared education, experience, and capabilities increase commitment to defend and protect combined space assets and leverage capability gaps in a fiscally constrained environment.

11-27. The capacity of resources significantly limits space operations. Once a COA is approved, space force personnel synchronize all planned effects to deconflict redundancy and prioritize the use of resources to create convergence through unity of effort.

11-28. Staffs communicate space-related information at the appropriate security classification level and with the broadest releasability allowed by policy and foreign disclosure processes to prevent disclosure of export-restricted information. To effectively integrate space capabilities and effects into multinational operations, commanders and staff need to know the classification, releasability, and disclosure level of space capabilities. Classification guides designed to protect information are often obsolete or not thorough enough to properly identify information that partners and allies need without placing capabilities at risk.

11-29. Host-nation organic space capabilities greatly benefit multinational operations and overall mission success. However, host-nation organic space capabilities are not the only means of supporting space operations interoperability. Some nations without an abundance of space capabilities may provide other operational benefits such as various means of access and basing availability. These options increase the flexibility of the multinational force commander.

CONSIDERATIONS

11-30. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations consider and answer the questions in paragraphs 11-31 through 11-44 with respect to space operations portion of the operations.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

11-31. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following C2 questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:

- Can space operations enhance effectiveness?
- Has the multinational commander designated a multinational space component commander?
- Has the multinational commander designated a space control authority?
- What is the multinational space operations mission?
- What are the multinational space operations specified tasks?
- Are there any multinational space operations implied tasks?
- What multinational space control assets are available?
- Are multinational space operations assets for communications and information systems protected against possible attacks?
- What is the multinational CBRN threat assessment? Can space operations forces help identify and monitor threats and hazards?
- What is the multinational plan for recovery of critical space operations equipment and resources?

PLANNING

11-32. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following planning questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:

- What space control electromagnetic warfare capabilities are available? Is the use consistent with the ROE? Do the ROE authorize their employment? How are the space capabilities and effects integrated into the targeting cell or board?

- What is the established space control electromagnetic warfare policy by the space force J-6?
- What are the capabilities and limitations of multinational space operations? Have commanders and staffs been briefed?
- Has the adversary's use of space assets been analyzed? Have requests for denying militarily useful space capabilities to the adversary been considered?
- Are the correct authorities in place to conduct space operations?

TARGETING

11-33. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following targeting questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:

- Is there a multinational space control and targeting process or surveillance and target acquisition plan and battle damage assessment process? What countersurveillance control measures are in force?
- Are there multinational targets that can be affected by space capabilities?
- What multinational targets should be affected by space capabilities?
- When and where are the targets likely to be identified, accessed, or otherwise engaged to create desired effects?
- How long will the targets remain accessible?
- What are the related information collection requirements essential to the targeting effort, and how and when is the information to be collected, processed, and disseminated?
- When, where, how, why, and in what priority should the targets be affected?
- What are the measures of performance and measures of effectiveness of a strike on the target?
- What or who will obtain assessment or other information required for determining the success or failure of each engagement of target nodes?
- Who receives and processes necessary information, how rapidly, and in what format?
- What space capabilities are available and sharable at the multinational level? Which space capabilities can provide national support only?
- Do the weapons depend on GPS signals for accuracy?
- What is the status and accuracy of the GPS signal predicted to be during operations?
- Has there been positive identification of a military target recently?

HOST-NATION ISSUES

11-34. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following host-nation issues questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:

- Has the multinational headquarters coordinated to provide the host-nation with space operations support?
- Has the multinational headquarters anticipated and considered host-nation cultural issues that will likely impact multinational space operations?
- Has the multinational headquarters coordinated to provide the host nation restricted frequency use?
- Are there any agreements that could affect space operations?

DOCTRINE

11-35. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following doctrine questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:

- Is there common multinational space operations doctrine, including definitions and procedures?
- If no common multinational doctrine exists, can space operations doctrine be developed?
- What are the applicable doctrinal publications?
- What are the applicable NATO STANAGs or ABCANZ standards?

TRAINING

11-36. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following training questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:

- When will training occur—at home, en route to operation, or in a secured area?
- Will commanders and staffs get generalized training for them to better understand the capabilities and effects space capabilities can provide?
- Will intratheater ranges be available?
- What will be the policy on test firing weapon systems intratheater?

SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

11-37. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following SATCOM questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:

- What military SATCOM assets are available and will they fulfill mission requirements?
- How much bandwidth or capacity is needed?
- Are there validated requirements to support the mission?
- What kinds of ground terminals are available?
- Does an international agreement prohibit the use of specific communications or frequencies?
- What is the organization's priority for restoration and has it been communicated to the combatant command communications system directorate of a joint staff?
- Are leased commercial SATCOM links required and or available?
- What kind of terrain, weather (terrestrial or space), vegetation, and or buildings may interfere with terrestrial or SATCOM equipment?
- What are the jamming or interception capabilities of threat forces?
- Does the unit have a spectrum analyzer to detect and locate SATCOM interference?
- How can the unit deny the enemy access to SATCOM?

POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING

11-38. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following PNT questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:

- Does the command require a capability to jam or deceive (also known as spoofing) commercial PNT receivers?
- Does the threat force have the capability to jam or deceive PNT receivers?
- What systems (such as GPS) is the threat using for PNT?
- Do the supported commands have sufficient military issue GPS receivers?
- Will the supported commands require a GPS differential capability?
- What unit equipment requires the timing signal from GPS?
- Can friendly communications or radar equipment interfere with the PNT signal?
- What friendly force tracking devices do the supported commands have? How are they tracked?
- What personal locator beacon devices do the supported commands have and how are they tracked?
- How do the supported commands handle PNT electromagnetic interference issues?
- How does the unit track allied and partner nation forces?
- Are all unit friendly force tracking and personal locator beacon devices registered with the friendly force tracking mission management center?
- How many and what type of commercial PNT devices are used by the unit?

SPACE-BASED SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

11-39. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following space-based surveillance and reconnaissance questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:

- What areas may imagery need to be requested?
- What type of information is needed and at what resolution?
- Can another system such as unmanned aircraft systems provide the information?
- How is the collections manager contacted?

- Does the collection manager address sensors for change detection?
- What is the collection priority of the request?
- What website does the unit use for archived imagery?
- Is archived imagery available and sufficient to meet the need?
- Are there electromagnetic interference issues that might impact collection operations and how might the issues be mitigated?

MISSILE WARNING

11-40. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following missile warning questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:

- What is the threat missile capability?
- What missile warning sensors or communications networks are available to the command?
- How quickly does the operations center need the information?
- How quickly does the information need to be disseminated?
- What communications networks are available to handle voice or data warning reports?
- Does the command need a separate voice or data system for missile warning?
- Do the missile defense forces have their tactical receiver equipment filters set correctly to receive the integrated broadcast service or other missile warning?
- Are there areas that could benefit from having terrestrial radar capable of providing missile warning?
- Are resources available to correlate terrestrial radar and space-based warning data?

ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

11-41. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following environmental monitoring questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:

- What effects will space weather have on operations?
- What effects will terrestrial weather have on data gathered and transmitted by space assets?
- Does the G-2 or staff weather officer know how to get system-specific weather matrix?
- Has the collections manager requested synthetic aperture radar for times of low visibility?

SPACE CONTROL

11-42. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following space control questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:

- How may space control capabilities can be used to defeat adversary antiaccess, area denial strategies?
- What space control capabilities are necessary to enable forcible entry into an antiaccess, area denial environment?
- How may the unit integrate space control capabilities in the tactical fight?
- What are the appropriate echelons to employ space capabilities to ensure freedom of actions?
- Are space control effects and counter operations incorporated into the multinational force commander's operation plan during the planning phases?
- How does each unit integrate space control operations, cyberspace operations, and electromagnetic warfare operations to achieve the desired effects?
- Do the supported commands know how to detect PNT interference and navigation warfare indications?
- Do the supported commands have specific TTPs to counter navigation warfare impacts?
- To what degree does the adversary rely on GPS and dual-use technologies to ensure access to PNT?
- To what extent will each unit operate in a denied, degraded, and disrupted space operational environment and still effectively accomplish the mission?
- How does each unit ensure access to PNT capabilities in a denied, degraded, and disrupted space operational environment?
- What asymmetric effects cross domains and operational boundaries (such as targeting of economic or civil infrastructure) that may cause each unit problems?

- Are navigation warfare effects and counter operations incorporated into the multinational force commander's operation plan during the planning phases?
- How do supported command's space operations, cyberspace operations, and electromagnetic warfare operations achieve the desired navigation warfare effects?
- What indigenous ability exists in each unit to characterize the PNT environment to provide PNT situational awareness in support of mission command and joint combined arms operations?
- What options, if any, are available to counter adversary attempts to deny, degrade, or disrupt PNT support capabilities to warfighters?

ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE

11-43. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following electromagnetic interference questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:

- Is the equipment physically damaged?
- Does the device have the current encryption and was it initiated in an electromagnetic interference-free area?
- Has the frequency been verified against the joint restricted frequency list?
- Is an alternate frequency available?
- Is there something obstructing the receiver's view of the satellites?
- Has the device been verified against another device in the same location?
- Have the known data for forecasted PNT interference, such as space weather, multiple satellite outages, and the GPS Interference and Navigation Tool, been referenced?
- Has the equipment been tried at a different location after completing the above troubleshooting?
- Has the spectrum manager verified appropriate use of frequencies by nearby forces?
- Has a joint spectrum interference resolution online report been submitted?

FRIENDLY FORCE TRACKING

11-44. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following friendly force tracking questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:

- Does the multinational force have friendly force tracking capability?
- Have the known data for forecasted PNT interference, such as space weather, multiple satellite outages, and the GPS Interference and Navigation Tool, been referenced?
- Has the mission management center verified system status and device registration with the joint friendly force tracking global network?

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Chapter 12

Cyberspace Considerations During Multinational Operations

The chapter begins with a discussion of influences of cyberspace operations on multinational operations. Next, the chapter describes cyberspace operations support to multinational partners. Then the chapter discusses the cyberspace operations command structure, followed by a discussion of synchronization with other operations and then communications systems principles. The chapter concludes with a checklist for considerations for commanders and staffs.

INFLUENCES OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS ON MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

12-1. Cyberspace operations impact multinational operations on land and in the other domains. These operations rely heavily on the electromagnetic spectrum and integration of cyberspace with other capabilities.

IMPACT OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS ON MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

12-2. Cyberspace can vastly impact a multinational operation. C2, fires, intelligence, sustainment data, and even the local news can pass through cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. To understand the impact cyberspace has in multinational operations, commanders must understand U.S. and multinational partner's reliance on cyberspace-enabled capabilities. They also must recognize how units move and store data and information. Lastly, commanders understand how sharing information provides Army, joint, and multinational forces an ability to gather knowledge and project power.

12-3. Knowing when and how to leverage cyberspace capabilities can help multinational commanders achieve positions of information advantage. Having the ability to act faster, commanders can affect threat decision cycles and guide the perceived available threat COAs by leveraging cyberspace-enabled capabilities.

DEPENDENCY ON THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM

12-4. The multinational force largely depends on the electromagnetic spectrum. The electromagnetic spectrum is a major transport medium for cyberspace. Commanders can use the electromagnetic spectrum to send and receive friendly communications and to generate effects. Friendly, neutral, and threat users develop and implement wireless cyberspace capabilities using spectrum-dependent devices, all of which are vulnerable to detection and electromagnetic effects.

INTEGRATING CYBERSPACE WITH OTHER CAPABILITIES

12-5. Cyberspace operations, integrated with lethal and other nonlethal capabilities, may provide separate or complementary effects. Some of these capabilities include—

- Cyberspace as it addresses—
  - Cybersecurity.
  - Cyberspace defense.
  - Cyberspace attack.
  - Cyberspace situational awareness.
- Weapon platforms as they address—
  - Long-range precision fires.
  - Rocket and cannon artillery.
  - Maneuver platforms.
- Information advantage as it addresses—
  - Military information support operations.
  - Public affairs.
  - Social media.

- Intelligence.
- Media polarization.

12-6. A multinational force prevents threats from gaining an advantage in cyberspace while seeking to create and exploit weaknesses for the threat. Delivering strategic-level effects across the globe is almost instantaneous. Staffs observe carefully when planning, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace effects with capabilities from other domains to prevent unintended effects in friendly and neutral systems that depend on cyberspace.

12-7. Members from multiple countries in a multinational force may contribute capabilities or manning to the cyberspace element of a combined joint task force. When transitioning to become a part of a combined joint task force, joint and multinational military units have the option of maintaining the cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare section separately from the joint electromagnetic spectrum operations cell.

COORDINATING WITH MULTINATIONAL PARTNERS

12-8. Organizing and executing cyberspace operations within multinational operations require a robust liaison effort. Effective liaison mitigates complications caused by differences in policy and facilitates system integration and information sharing. Differences in national standards and laws pertaining to sovereignty in cyberspace may affect the willingness or the legality of a partner's participation in cyberspace operations.

INFORMATION SHARING

12-9. Multinational forces coordinate with information sharing. Information sharing with multinational partners is essential when multinational forces operate together. Connectivity issues can compound interoperability challenges among multinational partners. Hardware and software incompatibilities, differing technical standards, and information security or cybersecurity policy may cause gaps in security or capabilities that require additional effort to overcome. These issues often hinder all coordination in the collection, dissemination, and sharing of information among multinational partners.

12-10. It is necessary to communicate cyberspace-related information at the appropriate security classification level with the broadest releasability allowed by policy. To effectively integrate cyberspace capabilities and effects into multinational operations, commanders and staff need to understand foreign disclosure processes and the classification and releasability considerations for cyberspace capabilities.

MISSION PARTNER NETWORK

12-11. Multinational forces coordinate using the MPN. The MPN relies on common technical standards, configurations, and security policies among partner nations to maintain a secure network. U.S. forces mitigate information sharing challenges by planning and executing operations using a secret releasable MPN.

SYNCHRONIZING CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS

12-12. Multinational forces coordinate by synchronizing cyberspace operations. Most planning and synchronization in a multinational operation occurs on a secret releasable MPN, whereas most cyberspace operations planning takes place at a higher security classification. Security restrictions may prevent full disclosure of some cyberspace capabilities or planning, which may severely limit synchronization efforts.

12-13. Effective synchronization requires the use of systems and information at the lowest appropriate security classification level. It is easier to coordinate cyberspace mission operations with allies and NATO partners than it is with nonallied multinational partners. This is based on the foreign disclosure processes, releasability of information, national capabilities, political leadership, common mission analysis and execution methodologies, and a common language.

CYBERSECURITY

12-14. Multinational forces implement cybersecurity when coordinating with mission partners. Commanders ensure adherence to cybersecurity procedures when conducting cyberspace operations with nongovernmental organizations and multinational partners. Planning with nongovernmental organizations may be necessary for foreign humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping operations, and CMO. Incorporation of these organizations into an operation requires the commander to balance the need of the nongovernmental organization for

information with operations security considerations. Strategic-level planning to include nongovernmental organizations into multinational operations often requires coordination with cyberspace defense.

SOVEREIGNTY

12-15. Each nation has sovereignty over cyberspace components within its geographic area. The use of a nation's cyberspace requires coordination and negotiation through formal approvals and certifications. Additionally, coordination seeks to develop an interoperable cyberspace defense capability. Considerations for coordination are given to adjacent countries, particularly if forces stage, train, or operate within these countries. Likewise, compatibility of protective measures, such as countermeasures, is essential to avoid system fratricide that degrades protection for all.

MULTINATIONAL INTEGRATION

12-16. Multinational forces coordinate and integrate cyberspace operations to achieve unity of effort. The commander of the multinational force integrates cyberspace capabilities and effects from different nations to achieve the desired end state. The multinational staff understands the capabilities and limits of cyberspace resources used by other nations in the multinational force and incorporate them into the plan. Shared education, training, experience, and capabilities increase the multinational force's ability to protect combined cyberspace assets and mitigate capability gaps in any single nation's cyberspace capacity.

PROTECTING HOST-NATION INFRASTRUCTURE

12-17. Multinational forces coordinate to protect the host-nation infrastructure. Host-nation organic cyberspace infrastructure presents a significant attack surface for threat cyberspace attacks aimed at disrupting key civil activities, such as transportation, power generation, banking, and media. For example, a cyberspace attack may attempt to disrupt rail transportation necessary to evacuate noncombatants from a potential conflict zone. Some nations' cyberspace defense capabilities may not be adequate to defeat these attacks. Multinational forces coordinate to set the conditions to protect the host-nation infrastructure through surveys prior to conflict, identifying vulnerabilities and potential targets. Interagency and industry partnerships coordinate the expedited acquisition and implementation of cyberspace defense capabilities and measures. When multinational forces augment host-nation cyberspace defense, cyberspace professionals ensure their activities and operations comply with the law of armed conflict, treaties or international agreements, domestic laws and policies, and applicable host-nation laws. Coordinating multinational forces and partner efforts protects the host nation's ability to continue necessary civil functions if the situation crosses the threshold into crisis or armed conflict.

UNDERSTANDING CYBERSPACE CAPABILITIES

12-18. Multinational forces coordination relies on commanders understanding cyberspace capabilities. Multinational force commanders at all echelons understand the defensive and offensive capabilities that cyberspace operations contribute to multinational operations, the risks associated with not understanding cyberspace capabilities, and the impact to operations when friendly forces are denied the use of cyberspace capabilities. Cyberspace operations bring essential capabilities with unique tools to influence, enable, and enhance all mission areas. Unit commanders clearly understand available cyberspace capabilities that contribute to operations and how best to use those capabilities. (Refer to FM 3-12 for more information about defensive and offensive cyberspace capabilities.)

CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERSPACE DEFENSE

12-19. Multinational forces coordinate when preparing cybersecurity and cyberspace defense. It is critical that commanders and staffs identify and plan for the security and defense of mission-critical capabilities and key cyberspace terrain. Key terrain corresponds to nodes, links, processes, or assets in cyberspace, whether part of the physical, logical, or cyber-persona layer. (Refer to FM 3-12 for more information about key terrain in cyberspace.) Key terrain in cyberspace may include—

- Locations in cyberspace where information and intelligence can be collected.
- Locations in cyberspace that support network connectivity.
- Entry points to friendly networks that require priorities for defense.
- Locations in cyberspace that friendly forces require access for essential functions or capabilities.

12-20. The defense of cyberspace assets supports mission assurance. *Mission assurance* is a process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets, including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains, critical to the execution of Department of Defense mission-essential functions (JP 3-26). Units protect friendly cyberspace to enable the conduct of their missions and provide indirect support to other operations.

Cybersecurity

12-21. Cybersecurity establishes baseline network protection, network monitoring and threat detection, incident analysis and response, and cyber incident mitigation and remediation. Cybersecurity personnel apply measures to secure the network against all known vulnerabilities and exploits. A network attack identified during network monitoring and threat detection will trigger cyberspace defense actions.

Cyberspace Defense

12-22. Cyberspace defense preserves the ability to use friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, cyberspace, enabled devices, and other designated systems by defeating on-going or imminent malicious cyberspace activities. Intelligence estimates inform cyberspace defense efforts to recommend defensive measures to deny threat actors the ability to access and affect friendly networks. Cyberspace defense forces integrate and synchronize their activities at all echelons to share network situational awareness, assess network security, maintain readiness, and recommend changes to the network cybersecurity baseline.

Cyberspace Offense

12-23. Offensive cyberspace capabilities provide commanders a way to deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, and manipulate an enemy's ability to maneuver in cyberspace. Preserving friendly freedom of action in cyberspace while denying the same to the enemy allows commanders to achieve an information advantage.

12-24. Commanders understand that cyberspace effects can support maneuver efforts all the way from the strategic level (influence and deterrence) to the tactical level (disruption or destruction of threat capability) to destroy or otherwise limit an enemy's ability to tactically maneuver. Targeting for cyberspace follows the existing targeting process. However, due to the restrictive authorities for cyberspace offense, commanders and staffs identify potential targets early through the joint targeting process and add them to the geographic combatant commander's target list with sufficient time for approval before the effects are needed. (Refer to FM 3-12 for more information about requests for cyberspace effects.)

CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS STAFF

12-25. Multinational forces coordinate for information sharing. When attached to a multinational force headquarters, dedicated cyberspace personnel understand the available range of cyberspace capabilities and provide input during mission analysis, planning, and targeting. Cyberspace operations staffs understand the commander's intent, mission, and schemes of fire and maneuver to integrate cyberspace capabilities and effects thoroughly into planning.

12-26. The cyberspace operations staff informs commanders of available cyberspace assets and recommends how to best use cyberspace capabilities in all phases of an operation to support the overall scheme of maneuver. Commanders and staffs must understand that effects in the land, maritime, air, and space domains can also create effects in cyberspace. The cyberspace operations staff can identify and nominate cyberspace targets for lethal and nonlethal targeting. Once a commander approves a COA, the staff synchronizes desired cyberspace effects through the targeting process to deconflict with lethal and other nonlethal fires capabilities and to prioritize the use of resources.

CYBER SUPPORT TO THE MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE

12-27. Currently, no cyberspace multinational operations doctrine exists. Each alliance or coalition develops its own protocols and plans. U.S. planning for joint operations accommodates and complements such protocols and plans for the potential use of U.S. cyberspace forces to protect multinational force networks. (Refer to JP 3-12 for more information on cyber support.)

12-28. Combatant commanders direct joint cyberspace operations within their respective areas of responsibility with support from USCYBERCOM and assigned cyberspace forces. USCYBERCOM assigns operational cyberspace forces to the joint operations commander based on the needs of the operational environment and availability.

12-29. The joint cyberspace center and theater network operations control center collaborate with USCYBERCOM cyberspace support element, the Defense Information Systems Agency (known as DISA) enterprise operations center, and Service component Department of Defense information network (known as DODIN) operations centers to ensure effective operation and defense of the theater network.

CENTRALIZED VERSUS DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS

12-30. Clearly established command relationships, unity of command, and unity of effort ensure timely and effective employment of cyberspace capabilities. However, the complex nature of cyberspace operations—where cyberspace forces can simultaneously operate at the global, theater, or joint operations area, and tactical levels—requires adaptations to traditional C2 structures. Multinational forces generally employ centralized planning and decentralized execution of operations. Due to their ability to create effects far outside the AO, cyberspace operations require constant and detailed coordination at the theater and global levels to deconflict with other operations in theater.

12-31. Certain cyberspace operations functions, including cyberspace defense and pursuit of global cyberspace threats, lend themselves to centralized planning and execution to meet multiple, near-real time requirements for response. Multinational force commanders should integrate and synchronize centrally controlled cyberspace operations with regional or local cyberspace operations conducted by forces in the AO. For these reasons, there may be times when commanders exercise C2 of forces executing simultaneous global cyberspace operations and theater cyberspace operations using supported and supporting command relationships under separate, but synchronized, chains of command. The supported commander integrates and synchronizes cyberspace operations into the concept of operations and detailed plans and orders.

DECONFLICTION WITH NATIONAL-LEVEL CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS

12-32. In partnership with USCYBERCOM, the combatant command in the geographic location coordinates regionally with interorganizational and multinational partners to deconflict combatant commander-directed cyberspace operations with DOD or other U.S. Government cyberspace activities within the area of responsibility. As early as possible in the planning process, combatant commands gather cyberspace requirements from U.S. forces and UAPs in theater. The combatant command uses that information to provide USCYBERCOM with enough details about combatant commander-planned cyberspace operations to deconflict them with other U.S. Government cyberspace activities.

12-33. Each combatant command with a geographic mission has a theater-aligned combat mission team to provide cyberspace operations expertise and enable the combatant command staff to integrate operational- and tactical-level cyberspace activities into operation plans. Joint force headquarters-cyberspace exercises operational control of combat mission teams and aligns teams to specific target sets within the area of responsibility. The combatant command staff and joint force headquarters-cyberspace establish unity of command and unity of effort for the combatant commander's (or combined joint force commander's) cyberspace operations through direction of the combat mission teams.

SYNCHRONIZATION WITH OTHER OPERATIONS

12-34. Cyberspace operations may create effects in the land, maritime, air, and space domains. Commanders can use cyberspace operations to affect threat capabilities. Commanders use their resources and knowledge of systemic operational behaviors to identify and mitigate unintended consequences. These unintended consequences can affect the following:

- Cyberspace security governance addressing—
  - Policy and doctrine.
  - Key risk indicator identification.
  - Third-party cyberspace risk assessment.

- Information technology and systems assessments such as—
  - Digital.
  - Cloud.
  - Network.
  - Critical operations.
- Security assessments:
  - Network.
  - Data center.
  - Cloud.
  - Configuration.
  - Threat vulnerability.
  - Cyber.
- Cyberspace operations centers:
  - Log monitoring.
  - Threat intelligence.
- Cyberspace training and awareness for multinational operations:
  - Security awareness.
  - Phishing simulation.

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM PRINCIPLES

12-35. The complex nature of communications in cyberspace operations requires systems guided by principles in order to ensure mission success. The multinational force capitalizes on information and near-simultaneous dissemination to turn information into actions. An effective system helps the commander conduct distributed operations. Force employment decisions are influenced by the system's ability to network the force in an often-contested operational environment. The network must be interoperable, agile, trusted, and shared to provide the flexibility to meet mission objectives. (See Figure 12-1 for the principles of an effective network.) The network increases the operational effectiveness of multinational forces by enabling dispersed forces to operate, communicate, and maneuver more efficiently. That same network also enables forces to populate, access, and share a COP to attain the desired end state at all echelons. The communications system directorate of the multinational force's staff integrates each partner nation's network into the multinational communications system.

Interoperable
When information can be exchanged directly between communications systems or equipment, and between them and or their users. Facilitated by—

- Common equipment.
- Compatibility of equipment.
- Standardization.
- Liaison.

Agile
System agility attributes to—

- Responsiveness.
- Flexibility.
- Innovation.
- Adaptation.

Trusted
Trusted communications attribute to—

- Survivability.
- Security.
- Sustainability.

Shared

- Mutual use of information, services, or capabilities.

Figure 12-1. Communications system principles

CONSIDERATIONS

12-36. Effective C2 of multinational forces depends on the ability to share the right information with the right people at the right time. This synchronization improves unity of effort, reduces decision time, increases adaptability of forces, improves situational understanding, and provides greater precision in mission planning and execution. Information sharing requires sustained and responsible collaboration among all federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, private-sector, and multinational partners. While innovation has enhanced the ability to share information, increased sharing creates potential vulnerabilities, requiring comprehensive cybersecurity practices. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational cyberspace operations should understand and consider—

- Partner nations' capabilities and limitations in creating cyberspace effects, including limitations due to national laws and policies.
- Applicable provisions of the law of armed conflict, treaties, national and international agreements, domestic laws and policies, and host-nation laws.
- Challenges in connectivity and compatibility between U.S. and partner nations' cyberspace capabilities.
- Challenges in information sharing, releasability, and foreign disclosure to synchronize cyberspace operations among partner nations.
- Anticipation of and accounting for cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare effects, capabilities, constraints, and limitations.
- Shared situational understanding and common objectives for the operation.

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Chapter 13
Additional Factors During Multinational Operations

This chapter provides additional factors to commanders to help them assign key roles and responsibilities, and to improve the operational effectiveness of the force. It addresses support for fires, engineer, geospatial, security force assistance, and countering weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, this chapter provides planning considerations for commanders and staffs.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

13-1. Military capabilities differ based on national interests and objectives, national character, doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, and materiel. Multinational commanders consider the unique abilities and limitations of each nation when deciding how to allocate resources and employ assets. U.S. forces provide robust capabilities for many of the additional considerations this chapter discusses. However, countries cannot always share and employ their organic assets evenly across the force.

FIRE SUPPORT

13-2. The multinational force commander ensures that the force develops good fire support coordination. This optimizes the effects of fires and minimizes the possibility of fratricide, collateral damage, and disruption to the civilian populace. Fire support coordination in multinational operations demands special arrangements with multinational force members and local authorities. These special arrangements include communication and language requirements, liaison personnel, and interoperability procedures. A multinational force fire support staff establishes SOPs for fire support to achieve the most effective results for use by the multinational force.

13-3. Effective joint fire support contributes to multinational success. Effective control of multinational force firepower is the key to its use. The staff analyzes whether resources and requirements are balanced correctly to support the multinational campaign or operation. Staff analysis of firepower also ensures an appropriate balance of forces and capabilities exist. Joint detailed integration of joint fire support with maneuver of the multinational force is critical. (Refer to JP 3-09 and ADP 3-19 for more information on fires.)

ENGINEER SUPPORT

13-4. Multinational forces require multiple engineer support functions. Engineers are responsible for supporting several operational environment functions including—

- Combat engineering (mobility, countermobility, and survivability).
- General engineering.
- Geospatial engineering. (This is referred to as geomatic by some multinational forces.)
- Defense support of civil authorities and stability operations.
- Environmental considerations.

(Refer to FM 3-34 and JP 3-34 for more discussions of the engineer operational environment functions and engineer operations.)

13-5. The tasks associated with the three engineer operational environment functions include—

- Providing a full range of operational- and tactical-level combat engineering (mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability) support.
- Providing a full range of general engineering support. This includes protection construction, diving, firefighting, facilities engineering, environmental considerations, infrastructure, sustainment support, and power generation and distribution. In some Services and multinational forces, engineer support includes CBRN functions.
- Providing a full range of operational- and tactical-level geospatial engineering support.

13-6. To ensure efficient and effective engineer effort, the multinational headquarters requires both a senior engineer and a supporting engineer staff to plan and coordinate engineer efforts to support the multinational commander's plan. The senior engineer and associated staff controls force-level designated engineer units on behalf of the multinational commander. This control includes—

- Planning.
- Setting engineer standards.
- Supervising and coordinating.
- Controlling engineer support to the force and, when necessary, to the local population.
- Potentially exercising C2 for other nonengineer capabilities and assets.

13-7. Engineers are also responsible for managing civilian engineer contractors who complete tasks in the AO. Control of engineer support aligns with the multinational commander's priorities and intent. Multinational commanders and staffs remain aware of the significant difference in the doctrinal traditions between NATO allies and former Warsaw Pact militaries, particularly when it comes to the role of engineer assets in traditional combat engineering functions. While NATO battalion and brigade combat team commanders are accustomed to the decentralized integration of engineer operations at the tactical level, former Warsaw Pact nations have traditionally employed these assets in a much more centralized manner at division and corps levels. As a result, tactical commanders perform engineering tasks associated with building integrated obstacles and mutually supporting engagement areas at the battalion and brigade levels. An understanding of these tasks and many other differing doctrinal traditions manage expectations and result in better integration of multinational forces.

GEOSPATIAL SUPPORT

13-8. The successful conduct of land operations relies on commanders at all levels understanding the terrain where operations are conducted. The better the understanding of this terrain, the greater the degree of certainty of successful prosecution of operations. Up-to-date and accurate geospatial information enhances geospatial knowledge and situational understanding. It also helps commanders understand more clearly how terrain influences operations.

13-9. Multinational force commanders and staffs receive geospatial information. This information comes from the host nation, one or more multinational partners, or a combination of sources. This information increases friendly advantages and minimizes the adversary's advantage gained by local knowledge. The information provided helps the force commander to understand, visualize, and describe an operational environment and further direct, lead, and assess military operations. Timely and relevant topographic support has the potential to be a significant combat multiplier in multinational operations.

13-10. A geospatial specialist can quickly acquire and provide appropriate and relevant geospatial information. This is generally a resource-intensive undertaking. Topographic support relies on availability of a fundamental layer of geospatial information. Each nation provides topographic support to its national component forces, but efficiencies and synergies come from this support. This is particularly true with acquiring and providing the geospatial data set. As a guiding principle, one nation has lead responsibility to acquire and provide geospatial information with other nations assigned supporting roles. This division of responsibilities is a high-priority requirement addressed early in the planning.

13-11. The highest command level echelon coordinates geospatial information because of the complexities involved with acquiring and providing it. The multinational force engineer commander coordinates geospatial information. Longer-term information densification and maintenance responsibilities also need to be addressed early in planning. This is in case, the multinational force remains in that AO for a long duration or units have been compromised. The multinational force engineer commander has access to an appropriate level of topographic advice from the engineer staff assigned.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE SUPPORT

13-12. The Army conducts security force assistance (SFA) missions when it has the objective to—

- Increase the capability and capacity of allied and partner nation foreign security forces (FSFs) and their supporting institutions enabling their interoperability and provide the U.S. Government access, presence, and influence.
- Develop situational understanding.
- Enhance FSF and joint force interoperability.

Ultimately, SFA aims to create FSFs that are competent, capable, committed, and confident. Such FSFs build a security apparatus that supports U.S. policy related to achieving regional stability.

13-13. UAPs conduct SFA to address deficiencies in FSF capabilities or capacity, improve multinational interoperability, or demonstrate resolve and support. Each multinational SFA effort is unique, dynamic, analyzed, and framed to accommodate both U.S. objectives and foreign partner concerns and constraints. To increase the effectiveness of SFA activities, planners thoroughly assess and analyze the following throughout planning, preparation, and execution of the operation:

- An operational environment (including civil and sociocultural considerations).
- Legal and fiscal authorities.
- The core grievances and potential threats (possibly including the prerequisites of insurgency).
- FSF institutional functions (governance, executive, generating, and operating).
- Methods, successes, and failures of FSF security efforts.
- The state of training at all levels, and the specialties and education of leaders.
- FSF equipment and the priority and capability placed on maintaining that equipment.
- Sustainment and infrastructure structure and the ability to meet the force's requirements.
- Laws, regulations, and doctrine governing the FSF, and their relationships to national leaders.
- Theater security cooperation plans.
- Integrated country strategies—operation plan or concept plan requirements.
- Other provisional or specialized SFA teams as needed.

13-14. The United States tailors its contribution to multinational forces to support a multinational SFA effort. Support may include one or more of these sources:

- Special operations forces.
- Conventional forces.
- SFABs.
- Ministry of Defense advisors.
- Civilian expeditionary workforce.
- Contract support to SFA.

13-15. When operating inside an established joint operations area, the DOD is usually the lead agency with the U.S. Department of State as the supporting agency. In this scenario, SFAB commanders operate in the DOD-nested concept of operations for SFA. Under most circumstances when operating in an established joint operations area, a SFAB is assigned to the joint or combined force land component commander for employment.

13-16. If given responsibilities outside of its primary SFA mission, the SFAB requires augmentation to conduct terrain management, information collection, CMO, air and ground movement control, clearance of fires, security, personnel recovery, medical support, and other functions based on the environment. That augmentation can come in the form of other military forces or, in some cases, FSFs.

13-17. The SFAB works best when its higher headquarters, in coordination with the partnered nation or security force, gives it objectives for developing or integrating FSFs. Usually, this is done through a tactical control relationship between senior SFAB commanders and their next higher headquarters. This allows SFAB commanders and staffs to use their advisors and resources against those objectives in a manner best suited to accomplish the SFA mission and expand the amount of available interoperable combined combat power.

13-18. Properly established command and support relationships are critical to the success of the SFAB and its SFA mission. The SFAB's Army Service component command headquarters consider the following SFAB traits prior to establishing their command relationships:

- SFABs are optimized to operate at the advisor team level. Breaking teams apart degrades their ability to conduct advisor team activities.
- SFABs can task-organize advisor teams from across a brigade against unique FSF requirements by location.
- SFABs are designed to manage, coordinate, and adjust SFA tasks at the tactical and operational levels to support strategic goals.
- SFABs have no capability to conduct independent combat operations against an enemy force.
- SFABs have a very limited ability to sustain themselves.
- SFABs expand combined combat power up to two echelons above a unit type. For instance, a captain-led team could integrate a battalion and a lieutenant colonel-led battalion advising team could integrate a division.
- SFABs enable partner forces access to joint fires and effects.

COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SUPPORT

13-19. Despite the existence of a broadly accepted regime of international agreements, adversaries continue to develop and field weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to gain an advantage against the United States and its allies. To prevent, dissuade, or deny adversaries or potential adversaries from possessing or proliferating WMD, U.S. forces work with UAPs to support countering WMD, prevention, protection, and response efforts.

13-20. The United States, its partners, and allies face an increasing WMD threat from actors who operate transregionally and require U.S. forces and allies to counter with a coordinated approach. The DOD contributes to the U.S. Government efforts by providing joint forces to deter the use of WMD.

13-21. Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) operations have a greater likelihood of success if planned in cooperation with allies and partner nations. *Countering weapons of mass destruction* are efforts against actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery (JP 3-40). Unity of command and unified action are essential to CWMD. CWMD shaping activities planned and executed in cooperation with partners can alleviate concerns regarding acquiring, developing or using WMD and alleviate the need for more aggressive and costly action later. (Refer to JP 3-40 for details on CWMD operations.)

13-22. CWMD programs are a part of a network. When operating with a partner or host nation, it can be expected, and generally encouraged, for the partner or host nation to take the lead in dealing with the local populace. A host nation understands the adversary language and culture making the host nation better at communicating transportation, financing, production, and storage capabilities to other partners. An in-country source understands the WMD threat an adversary might use. Language similarities between partners or host nations and adversaries may aid in information collection.

13-23. Multinational doctrine helps guide employing the forces of two or more nations in coordinated action. In some cases, multinational doctrine is required for CWMD. For example, NATO has developed doctrine for CBRN defense and CWMD. The increased potential of forces to encounter CBRN hazards during CWMD activities necessitates planning interoperability of warning and reporting systems. Standardization of reports among partner nations improves communication. Partners prepare standardized reports to clearly communicate WMD hazards to enable understanding and response. Many partner nations use NATO Allied Technical Publication-45 to standardize exchanging CBRN information.

13-24. Integrated multinational sustainment may improve efficiency and effectiveness, but unique national equipment requirements for CBRN environments pose challenges. Operations in CBRN environments can increase demand on the logistics system for consumables that may be unique to each nation. For example, filter systems and protection equipment may not be interoperable with all nations. The United States and many NATO countries may follow NATO standardization recommendations and STANAGs to unify

standards. During planning, CBRN staffs of the United States and partner nations perform capability gap analysis to understand where interoperability exists and where separate logistics are required.

13-25. Planning the dismantling of WMD facilities, stockpiles, or programs is required to prevent reconstitution of any WMD programs. If directed, operational commanders and staffs facilitate the transfer of CWMD operations to other U.S. Government agencies, international agencies, or host nations to continue destruction, monitoring, and redirection activities. If transfer is not directed, commanders stand prepared to complete the remaining activities and request coordination with, and technical assistance from, applicable agencies as necessary.

CONSIDERATIONS

13-26. To help commanders and staff in planning operations, the following considerations are provided for other support.

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

13-27. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following fire support planning questions with respect to multinational operations:

- What is the nature of the multinational operation? For example, is it littoral or land and air phases?
- Where is the operation in the range of military operations?
- What are the development and dissemination of surface-to-surface and air-to-surface ROE?
- Are the ROE agreed upon and understood by multinational forces according to national caveats?
- Are request procedures streamlined and tested?
- What is the likely duration of the operation? What are the issues of rotation and sustainability?
- Are there contingency measures to meet the requirement for increased force levels? Will it be from national backfilling or fall under a call-up of reserve forces policy?
- What is the intended end state and exit strategy?
- What is the commander's intent?
- Is the national asset authority understood and agreed upon by multinational forces?
- Where is the AO? How does the AO affect the climatic, terrain, cultural, political, language, and socioeconomic issues?
- What is the overall multinational force structure?
- What capabilities are at the multinational level? Which will provide national support only?
- What fire support assets is the multinational force providing? What are their capabilities and command status?
- What is the desired fire support organization for early-entry forces?
- What is the deployment timeframe?
- How will the deployment be carried out (land, sea, or air)?

Delivery Systems

13-28. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following delivery systems questions with respect to multinational operations:

- What is the desired order of arrival of fire support assets?
- What are the characteristics, capabilities, and quantity of fire support assets, including range, tactical, and operational mobility and authorized munitions?
- What is the multinational policy for survey, meteorology, and calibration?

Weapons

13-29. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following weapons questions with respect to multinational operations:

- What is the capability and interoperability of multinational munitions to include proofing compatibility and ballistic data contained in fire control computers?
- What are the planned ammunition stocks and expenditure rates?
- What are the key interoperability constraints?

- Are there any special ammunition handling, storage, and environmental considerations or national limitations on the employment of weapons or weapon systems?
- Do the weapons depend on GPS signals for accuracy?
- What is the status or accuracy of the GPS signal predicted to be during operations?
- Are there any occupational health and safety constraints?
- Are volumetric (blast) munitions available? If so, what are the constraints on their employment?
- What nonlethal weapons are available, and are there any national restrictions on their use?

Command

13-30. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following command questions with respect to multinational operations:

- What are the multinational levels of command?
- What will be the command relationships for fire support assets?
- What is the command arrangement for conducting multinational long-range fires?
- What are the liaison arrangements?

Control

13-31. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following control questions with respect to multinational operations:

- Will terrain requirements to support offensive operations be considered in the overall deconfliction of real estate by the G-3 or S-3?
- What operational environment control procedures deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and unmanned aircraft system assets?
- What operational management requirements exist in relation to electromagnetic warfare?
- What is the policy for using indirect fire systems using nonprecision munitions in the ROE?
- What is the policy for using obscurants and illumination in the ROE?

ENGINEER PLANNING

13-32. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following engineer planning questions with respect to multinational operations:

- What is the engineer command structure for the mission?
- What are the engineer coordination interfaces?
- When will these coordination measures take effect?
- What are the capabilities of the allies' engineer forces? Have these capabilities been passed on to other multinational forces?
- Who is the lead nation and what force engineer capabilities is the lead nation providing?
- What capabilities is the host nation providing?
- What multinational documents and agreements apply to the mission, such as ABCANZ standards?
- What are the technical standards for the mission and who is the technical authority?
- What are the specific AO characteristics that affect interoperability, such as severe climatic conditions?
- Who is the lead nation for mapping? Who is maintaining the common map database?
- Are engineers involved in targeting to assess or estimate the work required to repair infrastructure and utilities? Are engineers involved in clearing the area and route of mines and unexploded ordnance at the end of the hostilities?
- What are the phases and flow of engineer units, capabilities, and materiel to the mission area to support the plan?
- Is this flow reflected in the multinational time-phased force and deployment list?
- Are there any specific multinational engineer capabilities that could facilitate deployment?
- Is there a clear multinational engineer control structure to facilitate force deployment and reception?
- Has a common multinational facilities survey been conducted and coordinated at the force engineer level?

- Is an engineer materiel management system in place?
- What is the agreed command critical engineer resources list?
- What are the multinational funding arrangements for multinational engineer tasks?
- Are there engineer contracts with the host nation or other contractors outside the host nation?
- What is the host nation actually providing in terms of engineer services?
- How is engineer effort coordinated in the theater of operations?
- What is the multinational engineer priority of work?
- What are the control mechanisms to affect common engineer tasks in the multinational force?
- Who is conducting the environmental health site assessment?
- Who is conducting the environmental baseline survey?

EXECUTION

13-33. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following execution questions with respect to multinational operations:

- Have there been any modifications to the engineer command structure?
- What are the ongoing new engineer support agreements?
- What multinational documents and agreements apply to the mission, such as STANAGs and ABCANZ standards?
- What, if anything, is the impact of nongovernmental organizations and CAO activity in the theater of operations on the engineer plan?
- What are the interoperability disconnects between multinational engineer partners? Are they being addressed?
- What are the intratheater engineer coordination mechanisms? Are these mechanisms capturing lessons learned and informing all nations to allow intratheater adaptations to doctrine and new problems?
- Are there any host-nation cultural constraints and restrictions that could impact multinational engineer operations?

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. The proponent publication for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAMDC	Army air and missile defense command
ABCANZ	American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand
ADP	Army doctrine publication
AJP	allied joint publication
AO	area of operations
AR	Army regulation
ATP	Army techniques publication
C2	command and control
CAO	civil affairs operations
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CIMIC	civil-military cooperation
CMI	civil military integration
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
CNOSC	coalition network operations and security center
COA	course of action
COP	common operational picture
CWMD	countering weapons of mass destruction
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
FM	field manual
FSF	foreign security force
G-1	chief of staff, adjutant general-personnel
G-2	chief of staff, intelligence
G-3	chief of staff, operations
G-4	chief of staff, logistics
G-5	chief of staff, plans
G-6	chief of staff, signal
G-39	chief of staff, information operations
GPS	Global Positioning System
IM	information management
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-6	communications system directorate of a joint staff
JMEI	joining, membership, and exiting instructions
JP	joint publication
KM	knowledge management
MPE	mission partner environment
MPN	mission partner network
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OCS	operational contract support
PNT	positioning, navigation, and timing
ROE	rules of engagement
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
S-1	battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
S-3	battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4	battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-5	battalion or brigade plans staff officer
SATCOM	satellite communications
SFA	security force assistance
SFAB	security force assistance brigade
SOP	standard operating procedure
STANAG	standardization agreement
TLD	theater liaison detachment
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
U.S.	United States
UAP	unified action partner
UN	United Nations
USCYBERCOM	United States Cyber Command
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

SECTION II – TERMS

air domain

The atmosphere, beginning at the Earth's surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible. (JP 3-30)

civil administration

An administration established by a foreign government in friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government or in hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 3-05)

civil knowledge integration

The actions taken to analyze, evaluate, and organize collected civil information for operational relevance and informing the warfighting function. (FM 3-57)

civil military integration

The actions taken to establish, maintain, influence, or leverage relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions to synchronize, coordinate, and enable interorganizational cooperation and to achieve unified action. (FM 3-57)

civil-military operations center

An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the commander. (JP 3-57)

civil network

A collection of formal and informal groups, associations, military engagements, and organizations within an operational environment that interact with each other with varying degrees of frequency, trust, and collaboration. (FM 3-57)

civil network development and engagement

The activity by which the civil network capabilities and resources are engaged, evaluated, developed, and integrated into operations. (FM 3-57)

countering weapons of mass destruction

Efforts against actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery. (JP 3-40)

counterintelligence

Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. (JP 2-0)

forensic-enabled intelligence

The intelligence resulting from the integration of scientifically examined materials and other information to establish full characterization, attribution, and the linkage of events, locations, items, signatures, nefarious intent, and persons of interest. (JP 2-0)

geospatial intelligence

The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on or about the Earth. (JP 2-0)

human intelligence

A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (JP 2-0)

intelligence operations

(Army) The tasks undertaken by military intelligence units through the intelligence disciplines to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements. (ADP 2-0)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

An integrated operations and intelligence activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors; assets; and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. (JP 2-0)

interoperability

The ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)

interorganizational cooperation

The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (JP 3-08)

lead agency

The United States Government agency designated to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. (JP 3-08)

measure and signature intelligence

Information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to detect, characterize, locate, and identify targets and events; and derived from specialized, technically derived measurements and signatures of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event. (JP 2-0)

mission assurance

A process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets, including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains, critical to the execution of Department of Defense mission-essential functions. (JP 3-26)

mission command

(Army) The Army's approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. (ADP 6-0)

multinational operations

A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16)

open-source intelligence

Publicly available information collected, exploited, and disseminated to address a specific requirement. (JP 2-0)

signals intelligence

A category of intelligence comprising all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted, individually or in combination. (JP 2-0)

space domain

The area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible . (JP 3-14)

special operations

Activities or actions requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments. (JP 3-05)

support to civil administration

Assistance given by United States armed forces to stabilize or enhance the operations of the governing body of a foreign country by assisting an established or interim government. (FM 3-57)

technical intelligence

Intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an enemy's technological advantages. (JP 2-0)

transitional military authority

A temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. (FM 3-07)

unity of command

The direction of all forces under a single, responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces. (JP 3-0)

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