
HISTORICAL STUDY

HISTORY OF MILITARY MOBILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY 1775-1945



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET NO. 20–212

HISTORY OF MILITARY MOBILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

1775-1945

By
MARVIN A. KREIDBERG
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, United States Army
and
MERTON G. HENRY
First Lieutenant, AGC, United States Army



Cy 4

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY NOVEMBER 1955

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C., *30 November 1955*

DA Pamphlet 20–212 is published for the information and use of all concerned.

[AG 370.01 (14 Sep 54)]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

M. B. RIDGWAY,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
JOHN A. KLEIN,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army:

Gen Staff, DA (5)	Armies (5)
SS, DA (5)	Corps (3)
Tec Svc, DA (5)	Div (1)
Admin & Tec Svc Bd (1)	Gen & Br Svc Sch (5)
AFF (25)	PMST ROTC units (1)
OS Maj Comd (10)	Mil Dist (1)
MDW (1)	

NG: Div (1); State AG (1)

USAR: Div (1)

Unless otherwise noted, distribution applies to ConUS and overseas.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see SR 320-50-1.

FOREWORD

The Office of the Chief of Military History of the Department of the Army is currently preparing a series of special studies which was undertaken to implement the Army's policy of exploiting historical data that may be of practical value. The studies already completed include "The History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army" and "The Personnel Replacement System in the U. S. Army."

This monograph is essentially a treatment of the manpower aspects of military mobilization. Its primary object is to provide a more comprehensive record of military mobilizations in the United States for the use of General Staff officers and students in the Army school system than has been available before in a single work. Since it is undoubtedly true that mobilization errors have been repeated because the lessons of previous mobilizations have not been readily available, it is hoped that this study will assist the mobilization planners of the future in eliminating such errors. The material will also assist the thoughtful civilian in understanding some of the basic problems of national security.

The study ends with the mobilization for World War II. Because of the swift flow of events since 1945, it is merely background for the rearmament of the United States culminating in the Korean operations, and an additional monograph will be necessary to record the mobilization developments and lessons up to the present time.

PREFACE

Mobilization is the assembling and organizing of troops, materiel, and equipment for active military service in time of war or other national emergency; it is the basic factor on which depends the successful prosecution of any war. There has never been readily available a record of mobilization planning nor of the procedures which were eventually used during mobilizations by the United States Army. The purpose of this study is to provide staff officers, students at Army schools, and other interested persons with usable and detailed information on the procedures of past mobilizations and the lessons learned. The accounts of the early mobilizations are necessarily brief: for the most part they are limited to the basic lessons both of interest and value to the military staff planner. The material on developments since 1900 is more detailed. The footnotes will guide anyone who wishes to make a more complete study of individual phases of the subject matter. It is hoped that some of the errors of previous wars may be avoided by this account of the history of military mobilization in the United States Army.

The manuscript is divided into four parts, roughly equal in length. Part I, "Mobilization in an Emerging World Power," contains five chapters covering the period from the Revolutionary War through the Spanish-American War. Part II, "World War I: Preparations and Mobilization," contains six chapters covering the period from 1900 through World War I. Part III, "Mobilization Activities Between World Wars I and II," contains four chapters covering the planning agencies and plans developed between 1920 and 1940. Part IV, "World War II," contains six chapters on the actual mobilization for World War II.

In writing this study there has been no desire to place blame for errors on individuals. Where errors have been made, they have been shown—but only for the object lesson. The authors have attempted to analyze events in the light of the period during which they took place. To judge an action which occurred in 1778 in accordance with 20th century standards and vision is neither sound historically nor is it just.

A sincere attempt has been made to present an objective account devoid of bias. The authors have been allowed complete freedom in research and the developing of ideas. Consequently, it must be em-

phasized that the opinions expressed and the conclusions reached in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Department of the Army nor of the Office of the Chief of Military History.

Lt. Col. Marvin A. Kreidberg initiated the project and wrote the first draft of chapters I–III and XII–XXI before being transferred to another assignment. 1st Lt. Merton G. Henry researched and wrote chapters IV–XI. Since Colonel Kriedberg's reassignment, Lieutenant Henry has made extensive revisions in the manuscript.

CONTENTS

Page

PART ONE. MOBILIZATION IN AN EMERGING WORLD POWER.

CHAPTER I. THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 1
The Roots of Military Preparedness in the United States 1
The Colonies Revolt 9
The Continental Congress Assumes the Responsibility 10
Procurement of Military Manpower 12
The Special Problems of Mobilization 14
Mobilization of Materiel for War 17
The Lessons of the War 22

II. THE WAR OF 1812 23
The Period Between the Wars 23
Defense Under the Articles of Confederation 23
The Constitution: "to raise and support armies" 25
Indian Uprisings Give Rise to Mobilization Measures 27
The Militia Law of 1792 30
War with France or England: Preparedness Legislation 31
A New President Prepares the Army for Perpetual Peace 36
Mobilization Measures, 1803–1808 37
Act of April 12, 1808 and its Aftermath 39
The Indians Go on the Warpath 41
The War Hawks 42
War with England: 1812 43
Mobilization Legislation Enacted on Advent of War 44
Manpower Mobilization: Problems and Procedures 47
The Monroe Proposals for a National Military Policy 53
Procurement for the War 56
The Lessons of the War 59

III. THE WAR WITH MEXICO 61
The Period Before Hostilities 62
"The Army of Observation" 64
War Begins 68
The Act of May 13, 1846 70
The Mobilization is Planned 72
The Manpower Mobilization in Operation 74
Logistics Problems 77
Training 80
The Lessons of the War 81

Page

CHAPTER IV. THE CIVIL WAR 83
The United States Forces in Being, Spring 1861 84
The Leaders 84
The Regular Army 88
The Militia 90
The War and Mobilization Begin Together 90
Mobilization Procedures 97
Cameron's Replacement Plan 101
The Draft Plan of 1862 103
The 1863 Draft Act 104
The Bounties 109
Substitution and Commutation 111
Utilization of Negro Manpower 113
Limited Service Men 115
Officer Procurement 115
Training 119
Logistics Problems 123
Subsistence 125
Clothing and Equipment 124
Troop Housing 125
Transportation and Communications 126
Ordnance Problems 127
Reform and Reorganization in the War Department 128
Mobilization in the Confederacy 129
Confederate Manpower Mobilization 134
Confederate Economic Mobilization 137
The Lessons of the War 139

V. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 141
The Post-Civil War Period 141
Proposals for Reorganization of the War Department 141
Military Training in Civil Educational Institutions 145
The Army School System Established 147
War Declared Against Spain 148
The Military Establishment, 1 April 1898 148
Mobilization "Planning" 150
Regular Army Concentration 153
Wartime Legislation 153
Manpower Mobilization and Procedures 156
Volunteer Army 156
Regular Army 159
Special Federal Volunteer Units 162
Summary of Manpower Program 163
Army Corps Organization 164
The Selection of Camp Sites 165
Supply Problems Harass Mobilization 167
Training 169
Troop Movements Overseas 171
The Lessons of the War 172

Page

PART TWO. WORLD WAR I: PREPARATIONS AND MOBILIZATION.

CHAPTER VI. THE FORMATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF AND EARLY PLANNING IN THE ARMY 175
The Army War College Board 176
The Establishment of the General Staff 178
The Mobilization Concept Prior to World War I 179
The First General Staff Reorganization 181
The Military Policy in 1912 183
The Reserve Program 185
The Militia 186
The Volunteer Act of 1914 188
Effect of the War in Europe on National Preparedness 189
The National Defense Act of 1916 192
Economic Mobilization Comes Under Study 195
Operations on the Mexican Border 196
The National Guard Mobilization: A Study of Errors 199
Compulsive Service: An Old Doctrine Becomes New Again 201
Military Education and Training Prior to World War I 202
Army Schools, 1901–17 202
Military Training in Civil Educational Institutions 205
Reserve Officers' Training Corps 208
Military Training in Secondary Schools 209
The Wyoming Plan 211
Plattsburg Camps 213

VII. THE STATE OF READINESS, 6 APRIL 1917 214
The Organization of the War Department 215
Military Manpower 221
The Forces in Being 221
The Forces on Paper 224
Voluntary Enlistments 227
Planning for Economic Mobilization 229
The Early Emergency Agencies 229
The Organization for Supply 229
The Degree of Logistic Readiness 230
Quartermaster Corps 230
Ordnance Department 231
Signal Corps 233
Engineer Corps 233
The Immediate Shipping Crisis 234
The Plans and Planners, 6 April 1917 235

VIII. DEVELOPMENT OF MOBILIZATION PROCEDURES AND MACHINERY 241
The Legislative Bases for Manpower Procurement 241
Manpower Increments 246
Voluntary Enlistments 248
The Draft 253

Page

CHAPTER VIII. DEVELOPMENT OF MOBILIZATION PROCEDURES AND MACHINERY—Continued
The Selective Service System 253
Organization 253
Personnel 260
Selective Service Processes 261
Registration 261
Selection 263
Mobilization 277
Military Training and Education, World War I 281
Officers' Training Camps 281
Students' Army Training Corps 283
Military Training in Secondary Schools 286
Volunteer Base Hospitals 287
Training Manuals and Aids 289
Troop Bases and Allocations 290
The Tentative Program 294
Thirty-Division Program 298
Eighty-Division Program 302

IX. LOGISTIC EFFECTS ON WORLD WAR I MOBILIZATION 310
Troop Housing 311
Materiel Shortages 318
Shipping 324
Addition of Ships to the Fleets 328
Improved Utilization of Existing Shipping 332
Coordination Between the Army and the Nation's Economy 336
Conclusions 343

X. INFLUENCE OF PROPAGANDA AND CENSORSHIP ON MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR I 345
Information Agencies 347
Committee on Public Information 347
Censorship Board 349
Chief Cable Censor 351
Miscellaneous Agencies 352
Legislation 355
Propaganda 357
Publication Activities 358
Speaking Activities 362
Films 364
Work with the Foreign-Born 365
Miscellaneous Domestic Activities 366
CPI Overseas Program 367
Censorship 368
Press Censorship 368
Communications Censorship 371
Mail Censorship 371
Film Censorship 371
Other Types of Censorship 372
Conclusion 372

XI. SUMMARY OF THE WORLD WAR I PERIOD 373

Page

PART THREE. MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES BETWEEN WORLD WARS I AND II

CHAPTER XII. EARLY MOBILIZATION PLANNING, 1919–1931 377
Determination of Military Policy and Mobilization Responsibilities 377
National Defense Act of 1920 378
The Planning Responsibility Fixed 380
Immediate Postwar Mobilization Planning 382
Mobilization Framework Outlined in 1920 384
Pre-Plan Planning, 1920–22 385
Palmer's Proposals 394
Special Plan Blue 396
Mobilization Role of Corps Area Commanders 398
War Department Mobilization Plan, 1923 401
Changing Mobilization Concepts 405
War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1924 406
Mobilization Committee Dissolved 409
1924 Plan Procurement Decentralization Nullified 410
The 1924 Plan Under Attack 412
War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1928 316
The 1928 Plan Appraised 419
The 1931 Revision: A Staff Exercise Only 421

XIII. MOBILIZATION PLANS AND DEVELOPMENTS, 1931–36 424
New Mobilization Concepts 424
Establishment of the Four Field Armies 426
Proposal for an Immediate Readiness Force 433
Studies of Needs for the Initial Mobilization 435
Progress Toward a New Mobilization Plan and a Dispute 439
War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933 441
The Six-Year Programs 448
Army Budgetary Problems 449
No Money for Research 453
The Logistical Feasibility of the 1933 Mobilization Plan 457
The Personnel Feasibility of the 1933 Mobilization Plan 459
Mobilization of the Civilian Conservation Corps 461
Selective Service Planning Becomes Functional 463
A High Pressure Recruiting Plan 465
Staff Doubts About the 1933 Mobilization Plan Become Fixed 466
The Early Mobilization Tests Prove Little 471
The Field Joins the Staff in Criticizing the 1933 Plan 472
The Last Days of the 1933 Plan 474

XIV. THE PROTECTIVE MOBILIZATION PLANS 476
The First Installments of the PMP 477
The Procurement Planners Request More Information 478
The 1938 PMP: All Installments 479
The 1939 PMP 480
The 1939 PMP Analyzed 485
The Flaws in the PMP 491

Page

CHAPTER XV. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PLANNING, 1920–1939 493
Industrial Mobilization Planning—A War Department Responsibility 493
The Planning Branch 496
The Army Industrial College 497
The Army and Navy Munitions Board 499
Early Implementation of Industrial Planning 502
The Basic Procurement Plans 504
Industrial Mobilization Planning 507
Creation of the War Policies Commission 508
Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930 511
Baruch Proposals 512
The War Policies, Commission Report 515
The Flaws in the Early Plans 516
The Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933 518
Reaction of the Nye Committee 523
Changes in Plans and Policies 524
Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1936 527
Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1939 532

PART FOUR. WORLD WAR II.

CHAPTER XVI. THE BEGINNINGS OF MOBILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 541
Rearmament Begins 541
Adherence to the Balanced Army Concept 543
The Forces in Being, 30 June 1939 548
G-4 Estimates of Cost of Implementing the PMP 552
A New Chief of Staff and Immediate Action Plans 553
War in Europe: The United States Takes a Small Step Toward Mobilization 554
The Planning Vision Expands 556
The Plans Outstrip the Implementation 563
The National Guard's Uncertain Status in Premobilization Plans 568
The Regular Army Continues to Expand 570
Mobilization Begins: National Guard and Selective Service Proposals 575
Peacetime Selective Service: A Civilian Proposal 577

XVII. MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES AND PROBLEMS 581
The Establishment of GHQ 581
The Mobilization Progresses 587
The Problem of Regular Army Distribution in the Mobilizing Forces 589
The Fight for Draft Extension 592
7 December 1941 596
War Department Reorganization, 9 March 1942 599
Mobilization Training Problems 604
Training Weaknesses 606
The Pedagogical Training Tools 607
The Army Schools During Mobilization 611
Censorship and Public Information 614

Page

CHAPTER XVIII. TROOP PROCUREMENT BASES 618
The Fluctuating Troop Bases, 1940–44 618
The Victory Program 621
1942, 1943 Troop Bases 625
1944 Troop Bases 628
The Question of Armor in the Troop Bases 630
The Leaks in the Troop Bases 631
Reallocation of Manpower 631
Army Specialized Training Program 635
Special Units 636
The Efforts to Repair the Troop Bases Leaks 637
The Apportioning of Quality: Classification and Assignment 639
Negro Military Manpower 643
Replacement Planning 644
Operational Changes in Replacement Plans 645
The Division Slice as a Measuring Device 648

XIX. LOGISTIC INFLUENCES ON MOBILIZATION 654
Military Appropriations are Increased 654
Early Materiel Plans and Programs 657
The Munitions Program of 20 June 1940 660
The Munitions Program of 30 June 1940 663
Planning Deficiencies 665
The Initial Camp Construction Program 666
The Later Camp Construction Program 669
The First Materiel Time Estimates Proved Too Optimistic 670
Foreign Purchases Impede U. S. Mobilization 671
Lend-Lease 673
Equipment Shortages, 1941–43 677

XX. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION ORGANIZATION 682
The Industrial Mobilization Plan Discarded 682
The War Resources Board 682
The Office of Emergency Management 683
The Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense 683
The Office of Production Management 684
The Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supplies 685
The War Production Board 686
The Office of War Mobilization 687
Other Emergency Economic Mobilization Agencies 687
The Purposes Served by the Industrial Mobilization Plan 689

XXI. THE LESSONS OF MANY WARS 695

CHARTS

No		Page
1	War Department, Staff Departments, Civil War	86
2	Organization of the War Department, April 1861–11 March 1862	130
3	Organization of the War Department, 11 March 1862–23 July 1862	131
4	Organization of the War Department, 23 July 1862–12 March 1864	132
5	Organization of the War Department, 12 March 1864–April 1865	133
6	Geographical Military Departments, 1898	151
7	Organization of the War Department, 6 April 1917	218
8	Territorial Departments After 1 May 1917	220
9	Final Organization of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, World War I	255
10	Selective Service Organization, World War I	260
11	Organization Chart, War Department General Staff, August 1918	facing 292
12	Manpower Mobilization, World War I	293
13	Organization of the War Department, 1 September 1918	344
14	Corps Areas as Organized 20 August 1920	386
15	Scheme Governing the Flow of Recruits from Sources to Units	400
16	War Department Responsibilities in Preparing for an Emergency, March 1930	495
17	War Organization of the Executive Department, Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930	513
18	Organization for the Mobilization of the Industries of the United States for War, 1930 IMP	514
19	Organization of the Administration of War Industries, 1933 IMP	520
20	Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government of the United States, 1933 IMP	521
21	Suggested Organization for Coordination of National Resources and Mobilization of Industry in Time of Major War, 1939 IMP	534
22	War Resources Administration, 1939 IMP	535
23	Defense Commands Established, 17 March 1941	585
24	Organization of GHQ after 3 July 1941	facing 586
25	Organization of the Army, 9 March 1942	601
26	Organization of the Army Ground Forces, 9 March 1942	602
27	Organization of the Army Air Forces, 9 March 1942	facing 602
28	Organization of the Services of Supply, 9 March 1942	603
29	Consolidation of Information Agencies	616
30	Development of the War Organization	688

TABLES

No.		Page
1	Troops Furnished in the Revolutionary War, by Year	17
2	Number of Troops Employed in the War of 1812	50
3	Number of Troops Mobilized During the War with Mexico: 1846–48	78
4	Militia Force of the United States	91
5	Quotas and Men Furnished Under Militia Call of 15 April 1861	92
6	Number of Men Called for, Periods of Service, Quotas, and Number furnished under Each Call During the Civil War	94
7	Strength of the Army at Various Dates: 1860–1865	95
8	Men Mobilized for the Union Army by States During the Civil War	96
9	Bounties Paid by the Federal Government—Civil War	109
10	Estimate of the Minimum Amount of Bounties Paid by the State Governments—Civil War	110
11	Draft Substitution and Commutation in the Civil War	113
12	Negroes Recruited or Drafted in the Civil War, by States	114
13	Strength of the Regular Army: 1 April 1898	149
14	Strength of the Volunteer Army: May–August 1898	160
15	Strength of the Regular Army: May–August 1898	161
16	Special Federal Volunteer Units Mobilized During the Spanish-American War	163
17	Strength of the Army: May–August 1898	164
18	Comparison of Corps Enlisted Strength: May–August 1898	165
19	Students in Military Drill in Public and Private High Schools, 1895–1906 and in 1914	210
20	Enlisted Strength of the National Guard, by States, 1 April 1917	223
21	Enlistments and Reenlistments: Fiscal Year 1917	221
22	Strength of the Armed Forces, 1 April 1917, and Manpower Increments to 11 November 1918	247
23	Recruiting Personnel: 1916–1918	248
24	Recruiting Stations: 1916–1918	248
25	Inductions and Voluntary Enlistments, by Month: 2 April 1917–11 November 1918	250
26	Personnel of the Selective Service System: 31 October 1918	261
27	Selective Service Registration in World War I	263
28	Local Board Exemptions Under 1917 Selective System	266
29	Classification of Registrants in World War I	267
30	Deferments and Exemptions in World War I	268
31	Physical Classifications: 15 December 1917–11 September 1918	273
32	Mobilization of Inductees by Camp: to 11 November 1918	278
33	Selective Service Results in World War I, by States	279
34	Military Training in Public High Schools: 1916–1927	286
35	Proposed Organization of an Army of Five Army Corps and Army Troops: 10 July 1917	300
36	Schedule of Priority Shipments for American Expeditionary Forces: 7 October 1917	301
37	Planned and Accomplished Results of the Thirty-Division Program	303
38	Details of Eighty-Division Program of 18 July 1918	305
39	Planned and Accomplished Results of the Eighty-Division Program	307
40	Assignment of Inductees by Branch of Service	309

No.		Page
41	World War I National Guard Camps and National Army Cantonments	314
42	Status of National Army Cantonments: 4 September 1917	316
43	Special Camps Constructed During World War I	318
44	Ordnance and Ammunition Needed to Equip an Army of 1,000,000 Men	320
45	Artillery Battery Requirements for a Forty-Division Army and Estimated Deficiencies on 30 June 1918	321
46	World War I Shipbuilding Program and Results	329
47	American and Foreign Vessels Owned or Under Some Form of Control by the United States Government on 1 September 1918, by Source of Acquisition	333
48	Embarkation of Army Personnel from the United States for Europe: 1 May 1917–11 November 1918	335
49	Cargo Shipped Overseas by Month: 1 June 1917–31 December 1918	335
50	Army Personnel Embarked for American Expeditionary Forces by Ships of Various Nations: 1 May 1917–11 November 1918	336
51	Strength of the United States Army: 1919–1946	379
52	Manpower Procurement, 1928 and 1933 Plans Compared	443
53	Military Estimates of the War Department and the President and Appropriations by the Congress	452
54	The Protective Mobilization Plan 1939, Outline of Mobilization	484
55	Geographical Distribution of Increase Recommended for the Regular Army and National Guard, 30 November 1938	544
56	Size and Distribution of the Regular Army, 30 June 1939	549
57	Strength of Infantry Divisions, 2 February 1939	550
58	Personnel Enlisted, Called to Active Duty, or Inducted in Fiscal Year 1941, by Month and Component	590
59	Recommended Priorities for Reduction of the Army, 22 September 1941	595
60	Strength of the Army by Duty Branch: 31 December 1941	597
61	Reception Centers, 30 June 1941	598
62	Replacement Training Centers, 30 June 1941	598
63	Troop Basis for Fiscal Year 1941 as of December 1940	619
64	Summary of Troop Bases Prepared by G–3 During 1941	620
65	Comparison of Victory Program Troop Basis, 25 September 1941 and Size of the Army, 31 May 1945	623
66	Revision of the 1943 Troop Basis, 1 June 1943	627
67	Army Manpower Allocation Program, 15 November 1943	629
68	Comparison of Percentage of Total Strength in Combat and Service Branches, 1942	638
69	Percentage Distribution by AGCT Classes of Men Assigned by Reception Centers to Ground Combat Branch Replacement Training Centers Before and After 1 March 1942	640
70	The Army in Two World Wars	651
71	Comparison of Munitions Programs of June 1940 for 2,000,000-Man Army	664
72	Representative Quantities of War Department Lend-Lease Shipments: 1941–1945	674
73	Shortages in Representative Items of Training Equipment, 28 February 1943	680
74	Comparison of Agencies Planned in the 1939 Industrial Mobilization Plan With Agencies as They Existed in 1945	694

APPENDIXES

	Page
A—United States Troops Participating in Major Wars	706
B—Military Service of Presidents of the United States	708
C—Military Service of the Secretaries of War	711
D—Senior Officers and Commanding Generals of the Army	716
E—Chiefs of Staff of the United States Army	717
F—Steps Taken by the War Department in Preparation for Possible Hostilities with Germany	718
G—What the Government Asks of the Press, 1 January 1918	720

ILLUSTRATIONS

Caricature of 1812	48
Civil War Recruiting	111
The Army War College	178
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and Chief of Staff, Gen. Peyton C. March	217
World War I Draft	264
Lack of Equipment in World War I	323
Civilian Conservation Corps	462
The General Staff, September 1938	477
World War II Draft	572
Training Obstacles, World War II	605
World War II Construction	668

Credit—

Photographs are from the files of the Department of Defense.

PART ONE

MOBILIZATION IN AN EMERGING WORLD POWER

CHAPTER I

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The Roots of Military Preparedness in the United States

The disagreements and grievances which led to the Revolutionary War came to the fore after the removal of the threat of an immediate French invasion at the end of the French and Indian War (Seven Years War: 1756–1763). The resentment caused by the Stamp Act of 1765 and subsequent legislation did not, at first, envisage a break with England nor any lessening of allegiance to the Crown. Indeed, the Colonies were still concerned with the possibilities of another war with France and as late as 12 September 1768, a Boston town meeting used the French as a pretext for stockpiling arms by advising all persons without arms to procure them "in consequence of prevailing apprehensions of a war with France." [1]

The entire matter of concerted defense of colonial North America had always been under the guidance and administration of England. The royal governors and to a greater extent the captain-generals on duty in America planned the war operations and supervised the war administration. Each colonial assembly insisted on being consulted concerning the funds, materiel, and men which the colony was expected to furnish for military operations, but this interest was colored more by economics than by military concern. Defense on a united colonies concept had not yet become part of colonial thinking, but was still a problem for Great Britain. After the Albany Congress in 1754, Benjamin Franklin had despaired of ever uniting the Colonies, which seemed to have more grievances against each other than against England. Ironically, it was England's insistence that a unified common defense establishment be created for all the Colonies after the Seven Years War that contributed to the growing resentment in the Colonies, for included in this defense establishment was a projected standing army of 10,000 men to be supported and quartered by the Colonies.[2]

---

[1] Richard Hildreth, *The History of the United States of America* (Rev. ed.; New York, 1860), II, p. 546.

[2] Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry S. Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic* (4th ed.; New York, 1950), I, pp. 142–43.

Franklin in 1770 voiced the widespread colonial antipathy to being compelled to help pay for the united common defense when he suggested that the keeping of standing armies in the Colonies without the consent of the assemblies ". . . is not agreeable to the Constitution."[3] The First Continental Congress, in a 1774 memorial to the King, asserted: "A standing army has been kept in these colonies, ever since the conclusion of the late [French and Indian] war, without the consent of our assemblies; and this army with a considerable naval armament has been employed to enforce the collection of taxes."[4] The Colonies, far from planning for common united defense or mobilization measures from 1763–1775, were disturbed that Great Britain was doing it for them.

Concerning its own defense, however, every colony had from its inception a deep concern and interest. To the militant Puritan, defense by arms of his property was not only a temporal necessity but a religious duty. The Massachusetts Colonial General Court voiced the feeling of all the Colonies in the preamble to its militia law of 1643: ". . . as piety cannot bee maintained without church ordinances & officers, nor justice without lawes & magistracy, no more can our safety & peace be preserved without millitary orders & officers."[5]

The charter of Massachusetts, which was characteristic of all the royal charters on the matter of defense, expressly empowered the governor and the company ". . . for their speciall defence and safety, to incounter, expulse, repell, and resist by force of armes, as well by sea as by lande, . . . all such person or persons as shall at any tyme hereafter attempt or enterprise the destruction, invasion, detriment, or annoyance to the said plantation or inhabitants."[6] This explicit authority to formulate a military system within the colony was implicitly assumed by all the Colonies.

In keeping with a traditional English veneration for precedent, the Colonies, and later the United States, based their theories and enactments for military mobilization on what have been believed to be English laws and customs. Since the primary commodity of any military mobilization is manpower, consideration of the military manpower doctrines of the Colonies is necessary not only for a proper evaluation of mobilization during the Revolution but also for a determination of their effect on later history.

---

[3] Albert H. Smyth (ed.), *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin* (New York, 1906), V, p. 259.

[4] Worthington C. Ford and Others (eds.), *Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789* (Washington, 1904–37), I, p. 116.

[5] Herbert L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (New York, 1904), I, p. 497. A discussion of military affairs in the colonies is found in vol. I, ch. XIII, "The System of Defence in the New England Colonies," and vol. II, ch. XV, "The System of Defence in the Later Proprietary Provinces." Professor Osgood's *The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1924), I–IV, contains frequent references to military activities.

[6] *Ibid.*, I, p. 496.

There can be no controversy concerning the fear and aversion in the Colonies to what was termed a "standing army." The congressional sentiments cited in the memorial to the King were reiterated even more strongly by the Continental Congress in 1784: ". . . standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism." [7] Erroneous conclusions drawn from this and similar statements, declarations, and memorials made by the colonial leaders and legislative bodies have resulted in the fallacious belief that the American tradition has been against a military component and against military preparedness in peacetime.

The opposition in the Colonies to a "standing army" could be traced to the unfortunate experiences of the English Civil War. Both Puritans and Cavaliers remembered with loathing Cromwell and his New Model Army which emerged from the Civil War as the prototype of a "standing army." Parliament did not secure control of the "standing army" until the passage of the Mutiny Act of 1697, a development which was too recent to establish a precedent in English views. The military system which had been established in each of the Colonies at the time of their establishment, which had been legally authorized by the charters, and which had the traditions of centuries behind it, was an all-embracing, compulsory *Militia.*[8] Following the destruction of the feudal armies, during the Wars of the Roses, the Militia had been the only military force remaining in England. The insulation of the seas surrounding England and the efficiency of a professional navy-in-being tended to diminish the reliance placed on the Militia, which inevitably deteriorated in efficiency but not in popularity. It was this Militia system which came to the Americas with the colonists.

Initially the Militia system in the Colonies was strong and efficient. It was not a *voluntary* force composed of a few citizens who liked to play soldier; rather the Militia meant every able-bodied man, within prescribed age limits, who was required by *compulsion* to possess arms, to be carried on muster rolls, to train periodically, and to be mustered into service for military operations whenever necessary.

The earliest enactments in all of the Colonies definitely made compulsory military training the law of the day. The wording of the laws in the different Colonies varied to an extent consistent with human differences, but the intent and, in general, the provisions of the

[7] *Journals of the Continental Congress,* XXVII, p. 433.

[8] Earlier names for militia were the *"fyrd,"* the *"levee en masse,"* and the *"posse comitatus":* in effect, the entire body of inhabitants who might be summoned to preserve the peace. Under English Common Law, all able-bodied males over 15 years of age could be called.

laws followed the same pattern. The age limits for military service, in most instances, included all males from 16 to 60, with certain understandable exceptions such as justices, sheriffs, ministers, constables, physicians, schoolmasters, ship masters, notaries, and similar public servants. The laws, at first, required small unit training once monthly. Each man was required to possess his own firearm, of a musket type, and a definitely stipulated minimum amount of powder, flint, and bullets. In some of the Colonies, the legislators, with a keen awareness that some men are militarily inept, authorized extra training for the awkward. To ensure that no man escape his military obligations, muster rolls were required wherein every male was listed.[9]

Well over six hundred colonial laws were enacted and reenacted concerning the compulsory militia. Exemptions were changed and changed again; the number of training days was periodically varied; compulsory bearing of arms was directed for Indians, then was forbidden when fears of possible uprisings suddenly occurred to the colonists.[10]

The employment of Negroes in the armed forces was a matter for considerable thought and concern in most of the Colonies. Many of the Colonies, at first, were disposed to include Negroes among those compelled by law to bear arms for defense. But very quickly there developed disquietude concerning possible dangers from slaves bearing arms. The laws were accordingly changed to exclude Negroes from military service; to justify this action it was remembered and pointed out that service in the traditional English Militia had been the compulsory prerogative of freemen only. Thus the exclusion of slaves from bearing arms was in the accepted legal tradition.[11]

There were two kinds of unit mobilization. First, there was the mobilization or assembly of the unit for routine, specified training which took place on muster days set aside for regular training. This training was entirely local, each band or company meeting in its local village directed by the local captain. More sudden and expeditious was the unit's mobilization in the event of an emergency. To signal a general alarm requiring full mobilization, discharge of a musket three times and at night beating a drum continuously, firing a beacon, or discharging a piece of ordnance were the usual methods, supplemented, where necessary, by mounted messengers between towns. The warning usually spread rapidly. The local alarm was given by fir-

[9] Osgood, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 505–09.

[10] For a comprehensive compilation of colonial military enactments see: *Military Obligation: The American Tradition* ("Backgrounds of Selective Service," Monograph No. I, vol. II, pts. I–XIV [Washington, 1947]).

[11] Stanley M. Pargellis, *Military Affairs in North America, 1748–1765* (New York, 1936), pp. 174–75; Osgood, *op. cit.*, II, p. 385.

ing a musket once.[12] At the general alarm, every Militiaman had to assemble at his unit's assembly area without delay on penalty of being fined £5—a salutary fine for that time.

As the Colonies grew in population, regimental organizations of the Militia came into being: in Massachusetts regiments were established by law as early as 1636. The regimental sergeant majors (the chief military officer of a county in New England but more conventionally called "colonels" elsewhere) played an important role in mobilization planning and implementation. In Massachusetts the sergeant major was required to mobilize his regiment for training once a year, but in Connecticut regimental training was conducted only once every four years. The chief Militia officer in Massachusetts was the sergeant-major general who regulated the Militia, formed rural and small town Militiamen into 64-man companies, and mobilized the Militia or parts of it as directed by the governor or general court (colonial legislature). He moved Militia units to threatened areas and kept the governor, the council, and the general court informed of the military situation. Sometimes, as during King Philip's War, he raised, equipped, and conducted expeditions.[13]

The British provided the Colonies with the staff planners, the administration, the skilled artillerymen, and the engineers for combined operations against a foreign foe. Periodically it was required in most of the colonies that the military officers meet in so-called councils of war wherein common military problems were discussed and decisions theoretically made to promote Militia efficiency and skill. Colonial staff planners, as such, were nonexistent.

In none of the Colonies was there a commissary or quartermaster staff, nor was there any need for one: the expeditions against the Indians never required many men or much time. The Militiamen reported in with their own arms, their own clothes, and their own provisions. If the expedition were to last longer than a very few days, then the general court would appoint one or more commissaries, *pro tempore*, with the specific mission of purchasing set amounts of specific food items. Rations were easily secured locally and involved no prior logistic planning. Regimental quartermasters existed in colonial regiments, but their mission never went beyond distribution of supplies within their units.

The colonial legislative bodies from the earliest times were careful to assert and maintain civilian control over the military, particularly in the expenditures of funds. Whenever any military action or expedition was undertaken, there was a military committee, a committee of war, a committee of safety, or a committee of Militia, selected by

[12] Alarm procedures varied somewhat in the different colonies, but followed a similar pattern.

[13] Osgood, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 511–13.

the colonial general court from its membership, to supervise the conduct of the expedition. The general court, with the traditional concern of English legislative bodies for military affairs, checked closely not only on the conduct of military affairs, intervening directly on the decisions of military commanders, but even on the operations and decisions of its own committee. The commander on the battlefield, it may be readily assumed, was sometimes forced to temper tactical wisdom with political expediency.

The custom of popular election of Militia officers was early established in the Colonies. The Militiamen of the bands selected the company grade officers whose commissions were then issued by the governor and general court. The company officers similarly elected the field grade officers below the grade of general. This system, inherited from the English Militia, introduced politics into the military system and thereby proved a powerful deterrent to the development of an efficient officer corps. Indeed, an efficient officer who insisted on rigorous training and proper discipline would quickly be voted back into the ranks. The officers, therefore, were in many instances more concerned with political fence-building than with learning mobilization procedures. This system of officer selection was, however, a logical method for the period. The difficulties of land transportation made it extremely difficult for any governor, legislature, or board to examine and become familiar with officer material throughout a colony. The judgment of the community had to be relied upon and the custom was to exercise such judgment by popular vote. It was an age of localism: men did not trust strangers. A thoroughly competent officer sent to command a local company to which he was unknown would have been ridden out of town on a rail borne by indignant privates.[14]

The general officers were appointed by the royal governors, generally on the advice of the colonial assemblies. Key field officers, such as adjutants, were similarly appointed. An example was the appointment by Gov. Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia in 1752 of George Washington as major and district adjutant. Washington had no military experience at the time of the appointment, but he had lobbied for a commission to serve as colonial adjutant.[15]

As immediate Indian dangers moved westward with the advancing frontier, colonial interest in military affairs waned and the colonists

[14] Osgood, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 524–26. Even Washington, whose judgment and breadth of outlook were considerably in advance of his day, was not free from predisposed prejudice against Massachusetts; their officers, he complained, "are the most indifferent kind of People I ever saw." With evident repugnance, he grudgingly conceded that Massachusetts privates would fight well, if properly officered, ". . . although they are an exceedingly dirty and nasty people." John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), *The Writings of George Washington* (Washington, 1931–40), III, pp. 433, 450. Later, as he came to know his Massachusetts men better, his attitude changed.

[15] Douglas S. Freeman, *George Washington* (New York, 1948), I, pp. 266–68.

became increasingly civilian. They were still members of the compulsory Militia, but the growing sense of security brought with it a diminishing interest in martial skill and prowess. There were many evidences of the trend: the training days and muster days were cut down more and more with the passing years; in too many instances, they no longer involved military training or maneuvers but degenerated into lodge frolics. An amazed spectator who saw a Virginia Militia company drilling in what was fondly termed "the Prussian exercise" described the performance as a "mere burlesque." [16]

Timothy Pickering, later a quartermaster general of the Revolutionary Army, described a Massachusetts muster of mid-18th century: ". . . some strangers, one of them a woman, were passing through town on a training-day morning just as the soldiers were assembling. They were fired at, and thereby, and by various motions and flourishes of the guns, their horses were excessively frightened, insomuch that the woman was in imminent danger of her life." [17] The training was made up of a few short drills, a day's musketry practice, and two sham battles—colorful, noisy, but useless as a standard of military effectivesness.[18]

The declining efficiency of the Militia and the fact that it could not be used outside the colony without legislative permission made it necessary for England to devise other means of recruiting colonials to fight against the French in Canada after the middle of the 17th century. The contingency was partially solved by the creation in the Colonies of provisional infantry regiments for field service made up of volunteers whose officers and cadre were appointed by the royal governor and then sent out to gather recruits.[19] The enlisting orders, "beating orders" as they were literally called, were colorfully executed. Massachusetts' Governor Shirley in 1755 had issued such an order to a Lt. John Thomas: "I do hereby authorize and impower John Thomas Junr. of Marshfield, Gent., to beat his drums anywhere within this Province for enlisting Volunteers for His Majesty's Service in a Regiment of Foot to be forthwith raised for the Service and Defense of His Majesty's Colonies in North America." [20] The order further enjoined colonels and officers of Militia regiments from molesting or obstructing John Thomas wherever he might go to accomplish his mission.

At first the Volunteer reverted to the Militia when he returned from the campaign because the Volunteer regiments were temporary, emer-

[16] Sir George Otto Trevelyan, *The American Revolution* (New York, 1921), II, p. 187.
[17] Allen French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington* (Boston, 1925), p. 43.
[18] Contemporary accounts of the gala "training days" are numerous. See: H. Telfer Mook, "Training Days in New England," *The New England Quarterly*, XI (1938), pp. 675–97; Abby M. Hemenway (ed.), *Vermont Historical Gazetteer* (Burlington, 1871), II.
[19] Allen French, *The First Year of the American Revolution* (Cambridge), 1934, p. 34.
[20] Thomas Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, as cited in *ibid.*

gency units disbanded when the emergency was over. In several of the Colonies the greater efficiency of the Volunteer units made sufficient impression to ensure their continuation as a permanent part of the defense establishment.[21] It is from these organizations that the National Guard developed.[22] The Volunteer regiments from the middle Colonies in general appear to have been distinctly more efficient than common Militia units. Their regimental cadres were made up of selected individuals who were interested in the military profession; they were distinctively uniformed, better armed and equipped, generally better officered and trained, and of considerable *esprit*. The New Jersey Blues, the Volunteer regiment from that colony, was, on the occasion of its passing through New York City in 1758, well lauded by the local newspapers as of "handsome appearance . . . the likeliest well-set Men as has perhaps turned out on any Campaign." New Jersey's colonial Governor Bernard proudly reported to the royal government that the Blues was "universally allowed to be the best Provincial Regiment in America." [23]

In no instance was there a full-scale mobilization of a colony's Militia for a foreign war outside that colony. But there were innumerable instances of set numbers of Militia ordered to be compulsively impressed or drafted for specific campaigns.[24]

It can be assumed that ingenious methods were used to get farm boys, apprentices, and village loafers to "volunteer" for foreign service. Poorly trained, sometimes ineptly officered, ill-clothed and equipped, they deserted or died of disease or battle. The initial 20 miles a day to the rendezvous area might well have seen many an embryonic soldier collapse by the wayside. They were not efficient troops on the whole.[25] One literate deserter from such a Militia at Fort Ontario in 1756 courteously left a note of farewell tied to a stone: "Gentlemen, you seem surprized at our Desertion, but youl not be surprized if youl Consider that we have been starved with Hunger & Cold in the Winter, and that we have received no pay for seven or eight Months; Now we have no Cloaths and you cheat us out of our allowance of Rum and half our Working Money." [26]

There was still a third class of military unit employed in colonial expeditions: the Rangers. These were the frontier scouts and hunters who customarily fought their battles as individuals, but who had the good sense to realize that they could be helped by organized military

[21] Frederick P. Todd, "Our National Guard: An Introduction to Its History," *Military Affairs*, V, No. 2 (1941) p. 75.

[22] *Ibid.*, The distinction between the Common Militia and the Volunteer units is brought out clearly in this article.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[24] Connecticut General Court, Act of June 19, 1711, as cited in "Backgrounds of Selective Service," Monograph No. I, vol. II, pt. II, pp. 103–04.

[25] Todd, "Our National Guard: An Introduction to Its History," *op. cit.*, p. 75.

[26] Pargellis, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

expeditions. The Rangers served as scouts and patrols for the expeditions and then melted back into the forests on the frontier and beyond once the battle was over.

With the increasing disinterest for military training in the Militia, there was a growing uneasiness in some of the general courts concerning security. The lawmakers tried to revive the effectiveness of the military by instituting alert organizations from the Militia, the forerunner of the later "Minutemen." [27] On 13 October 1675, at the outbreak of King Philip's War, the jittery Massachusetts General Court ordered the mobilization of the Militia of Suffolk and Middlesex counties "in their complete armes, and be ready to march on a moments warning." [28] These latter troops, however, inasmuch as they were already mobilized, differed from the Revolutionary Minutemen who were to seize arms and move from their plows, smithies, and other civilian pursuits to war on a minute's notice. In 1743, Governor Shirley of Massachusetts enlisted Snoeshoemen "whose duty it is to hold themselves ready at the Shortest Warning to go in pursuit of any Party of Indians." [29] In 1756, Capt. Obadiah Cooley's company on the Crown Point expedition called themselves "Minnit Men." The value of prompt mobilization was thoroughly known in the Colonies.

The Colonies Revolt

The actions of King and Parliament brought about a trend toward unity in the Colonies after 1765 and caused the institution of some preparedness measures. Committees of observation and safety sprang up in all the Colonies following a suggestion of the Virginia House of Burgesses in March 1773. The Militia was somewhat belatedly overhauled and refurbished in several colonies in an effort to improve its efficiency. Military stores of all kinds—munitions, engineer tools, linen, military accoutrements, provisions—were collected; and as "The calls for arms became constant, . . . manufactories sprang up . . . to answer them." [30] Massachusetts, which initially bore the brunt of English displeasure, took the lead in preparing for armed resistance. A Massachusetts Provincial Congress was organized on 7 October 1774 and a Committee of Safety appointed. The Massachusetts Militia was reorganized to remove any royal taint; Minutemen units were provisionally constituted; funds were voted; military stores were purchased and collected in the neighborhood of Concord; provisional resolves toward the establishment of a New England army were drawn up.

---

[27] As early as 12 August 1645, Massachusetts Bay authorized the chief commander of every company to choose 30 soldiers out of their companies to be ready "at halfe an howers warning" for any service. See: French, *The First Year of the American Revolution*, p. 33.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] George W. Greene, *The Life of Nathanael Greene* (Cambridge, 1871), I, p. 75.

The British in Boston were well aware of these potentially unfriendly preparations. Lt. Col. Francis Smith, in command of several companies of British Regulars, was ordered to move from Boston to Concord to seize and destroy military stores concentrated there to interrupt the progress of these preparations. Colonel Smith accomplished his mission on 19 April 1775, but he also precipitated a war.

The Massachusetts Minutemen and Militia seized their muskets and rushed off to resist—a mobilization so spontaneous as to make detailed plans unnecessary. A coordinated series of express riders carried the news from Massachusetts to the other colonies. These colonies, less in danger but enraged by the use of British Regulars against a sister colony, mobilized Militia units and gathered supplies more slowly but no less surely.[31]

The Continental Congress Assumes the Responsibility

The Second Continental Congress took over the combined war effort in June 1775, although the general order so stating was not published until 4 July 1775. On 15 June 1775, this Congress appointed one of its own members, George Washington of Virginia, Commander in Chief.

The efforts of the Continental Congress to mobilize troops and materiel for the war have generally been damned as inept. John Adams' plaintive summation of the difficulties, however, is pertinent: "When fifty or sixty men have a constitution to form for a great empire, at the same time that they have a country of fifteen hundred miles extent to fortify, millions to arm and train, a naval power to begin, an extensive commerce to regulate, numerous tribes of Indians to negotiate with, a standing army of twenty-seven thousand men to raise, pay, victual, and officer, I really shall pity those fifty or sixty men." [32]

The members of the Continental Congress made many mistakes in the prosecution of the war, but it must be remembered that the Congress had little centralized authority or power; this had been retained by the individual Colonies. The Congress could recommend, it could even enact, but it could not enforce. Furthermore, a demand by Congress for more power might not have been well-received by colonists who were fighting against a principle of centralized governmental power. The fact, too, that a considerable percentage of the population—more than a third of the influential men by John

[31] For a detailed review of activities before 19 April 1775 see: French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington.* See also: Spencer P. Mead, "The First American Soldiers," *The Journal of American History,* I (1907), pp. 123–28; French, *The First Year of the American Revolution,* pp. 22–46. For the organization and administration of the Revolutionary Army see: Louis C. Hatch, *The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army* (New York, 1904).

[32] Charles F. Adams (ed.), *The Works of John Adams* (Boston, 1850–56), II, p. 412.

Adams' estimate—were opposed to armed resistance constituted a baleful weakness. These were formidable handicaps even for a group of men experienced in public affairs although for the most part untrained in the conduct of military operations.

Such planning and preparations as had been done prior to active hostilities had been done by the individual colonies. The Second Continental Congress, acting for the concerted Colonies, had to start almost from scratch. The mobilization materials which then existed in the Colonies consisted, in manpower, of some 2,500,000 males, one-fifth of whom were Negroes. Further deductible from this pool were the Tories, who fought against the revolutionists; the indifferent, who were sure only that they wanted no war against Britain; and the conscientious objectors who did not want a war against anyone. (Some Quakers, like Nathanael Greene, gave up a sect for a cause.)

When the Continental Congress took over the war in June 1775, there were some 14,500 colonists in arms besieging the British in Boston. The initial flush of enthusiasm continued at least until the end of 1775, by which time Washington had nearly 19,000 effectives around Boston.[33] But these men had rushed to the fray without any immediate thought of a protracted war. Indeed, the term of the initial enlistments specifically ended with the last day of December 1775.

In the planning for the Army to be recruited for service beginning in 1776, there was no question but what the value of long enlistments (preferably for the duration of the war) was clearly understood, not only by Washington, and the other military men but also by many members of the Congress. This latter group saw the desirability of a Continental Army recruited and administered under Congressional auspices, rather than a conglomeration of forces recruited and administered under the control of the independent Colonies. The recommendation of the Congress to Massachusetts and Connecticut late in 1775 that enlistments be for one or two years is, therefore, difficult to understand until it is remembered that the Congress had to consider not only what should be done, but what *could* be done. There were few colonists who would have enlisted for the duration of the war. John Adams estimated that in Massachusetts not over a regiment ". . . of the meanest, idlest, most intemperate and worthless . . ." would have enlisted for the duration.[34] Joseph Hawley, a member of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, was even more pessimistic: in his opinion, no bounty would induce New England men to enlist for more than two years.[35]

---

[33] Jared Sparks (ed.), *The Writings of George Washington* (Boston, 1834) III, p. 493.
[34] Adams, *op. cit.*, III, p. 48.
[35] Peter Force (ed.), *American Archives* (Washington, 1837–53), 5th Series, I, p. 404.

Although in the abstract it is unquestionable that an army composed of well-trained soldiers enlisted for the duration would have been of inestimable value, it seems doubtful if such a force could have been logistically maintained. The small forces which were available to Washington were so frequently hungry, barefoot, shirtless, and otherwise ill-supplied that it is difficult to believe that a large permanent force could have been sustained (i. e. fed, clothed, and equipped). The men in the Continental Congress were certainly practical and hardheaded. How could they hope to supply, for example, 20,000 men daily for several years when they could not provide for 2,000 men for a few months each year? Nor did it make sense to them to feed, clothe, and equip hordes of men during the severe winter months when armies, in those days, did not fight much. Assuming, too, that it would have been possible to sustain a large colonial army for the duration, how could that army have been transported from New England to New Jersey and farther south, to engage the British whose control of the waterways made them vastly more mobile? An army of trained soldiers enlisted for the duration was an impossibility in the revolutionary Colonies.

Many of the desertions which so plagued Washington and his generals were due to the Colonies' inability to supply men when they had them.[36] Some of the desertions were due also to the fact that there was usually nothing for the soldier to do between battles. Few of the officers knew how to carry on any kind of a training program. To the discomforts from the lack of food, clothing, pay, and housing, there was added the even more unendurable ill of boredom. The records are replete with instances of Militiamen acquitting themselves well when they were hurriedly mobilized to strike at the enemy invading their area. Once the battle was over, they melted back to their homes ready to be called to fight another day, but unwilling to stay assembled for the battle which *might* come next month, or the month after. The battles of Bennington, Oriskany, Saratoga, King's Mountain, and the Cowpens, as well as innumerable minor engagements, illustrated the Militia's will to fight today's battle, but its disinclination to remain in an organized army after the battle was over.

Procurement of Military Manpower

The Second Continental Congress, in October 1775, on the advice of a council of general officers and a committee of Congress, authorized for 1776 a Continental Army of 20,372 men organized into 26 regiments of 728 officers and men each. Washington's tribulations in the recruiting of this force were many and bitter. On 19 November 1775, when only 966 men had enlisted for 1776, Washington somberly in-

[36] Sparks, *op. cit.*, VII, pp. 287, 300.

formed the President of the Congress: "There must be some other stimulus, besides love for their country, to make men fond of the service." [37] By the 28th of November, Washington could report some progress, but his discouragement was plain: "The number enlisted since my last is two thousand five hundred and forty men. I am sorry to be necessitated to mention to you the egregious want of public spirit, which reigns here." [38] With recruiting progressing at a snail's pace, Washington, using the authority granted him by the Congress, had to request short-term Militiamen from several colonies before 1775 was over.

The Continentals were recruited, in most instances, by a judicious combination of emotionalism, martial psychology, and rum.[39] The recruiting officer, when he was abetted by a pleasantly warm day, would make his stirring speech before the village tavern, whereafter the unwary listeners would be regaled with a few glasses of ale or, perhaps, something stronger. The enlistment papers were then passed about. It was a simple formula, basically still used (less the grog) whenever voluntary enlistment is employed. But it didn't work in appreciable numbers. The farmer's sons had work to do on the farm which might not get done without them. The young apprentices in the towns had good jobs and good prospects, for these were boom times.[40] Patriotism played its part to a degree, but, looking closely, General Greene perceived of New Englanders, "The common people are exceedingly avaricious; the genius of the people is commercial . . ." [41]

The fierce desire of the recruiting officers to meet quotas, then as now, sometimes overcame their judgment. Many a rascal was enlisted who should more properly have been jailed. And many a jailbird was enlisted who should more properly have been hanged. The prison as a recruiting source was put off limits by the Congress in January 1776.[42]

---

[37] *Ibid.*, III, p. 165

[38] *Ibid.*, III, p. 176.

[39] Allen Bowman, *The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army* (Washington, 1943), p. 14.

[40] "Efforts at [currency] stabilization, fairly successful for several year, were defeated by the Revolution, when values were again completely upset. . . . Then wage rates appear in pounds per day instead of shillings, and all wages and prices mount to fanciful heights. . . . " *History of Wages in the U. S. from Colonial Times to 1928* (Bulletin of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 604 [Washington, 1934], p. 18). Wages during the Revolution soared to a dollar a day and more depending on the occupation. The soldier's pay was $6.66 per month, when he could get it.

[41] Greene, *op. cit.*, I, p. 126.

[42] The shoddiness of some of the recruits enlisted by tricky recruiting officers was a matter of incessant complaint and reproach by American commanders. Henry Knox stated: ". . . the army . . . is only a receptacle for ragamuffins." (See Noah Brooks, *Henry Knox, A Soldier of the Revolution* [New York, 1900], p. 71). Anthony Wayne called them: *"Food for Worms*—miserable sharp looking Caitiffs, hungry lean fac'd Villians." (See Charles J. Stillé, *Major-General Anthony Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line in the Continental Army* [Philadelphia, 1893], p. 44). Nathanael Greene said:

The officers recruiting for Continental soldiers had much less to offer than the Militia recruiters, with their short-term enlistments and high bounties, and the privateersmen, with their glamorized booty inducements. Bounties to encourage enlistments were used from the outset by several colonies, to the scandalized indignation of the Congress, which disapproved of the practice and principle by a resolve on 6 December 1775. The Congress felt that the pay of the private, six and two-thirds dollars monthly, was a munificence adequate to inspire men to flock to the service in so worthy a cause. The pay, indeed, was higher than in European armies, but to the American, weighing the factors involved, it was too little.[43] The Congress seeing recruiting at a standstill and the Army dribbling away sacrificed principle to expediency by authorizing a Continental bounty of $10 scrip in June 1776. At a time when the Colonies were offering as much as $150 in specie for short-term enlistments in the Militia, this gesture had an effect considerably less than enthusiastic. The Congress by subsequent enactments increased the bounty successively through the war to $20, $80, $100, and $200 for the private soldier. Accompanying these money grants for "duration" enlistment and service were land grants, proportioned to rank and grade, suits of clothes, amelioration from small claims legal difficulties, and some pension provisions.[44]

The Special Problems of Mobilization

Mobilization in the Revolutionary War was accomplished on a trial and error basis. The problems encountered by the Continental Con-

"the worst in the world . . . of no more use than if they were in the moon." (See Greene Papers as cited in Bowman, *op. cit.*, p. 13). Washington and Greene, among others, bitterly protested the enlistment of convicts which, in several of the southern colonies, was considered an excellent solution. See: Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.*, VIII, pp. 56, 78; Greene, *op. cit.*, I, p. 559.

[43] The pay of a private soldier in the British Army during the Revolutionary War was 8 pence a day—about $1.20 per month. But from this was deducted so many charges, for subsistence, uniforms, clothing, arms repair, medical care, etc., as to leave the foot soldier no coin and very little food and drink. See: Edward E. Curtis, *The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution* (New Haven, 1926), p. 158.

[44] The Second Continental Congress first offered a land bounty to Hessians and others in the service of the British Crown if they would desert to Americans. This offer, made in August 1776, made little impression on the British soldiery, since the Continental Congress had no land to grant, and might have encountered spirited resistance from the land-owning states who conceivably would have objected to giving their land away. There is record of only one Hessian who yielded to this lure and who finally got his 50 acres in 1792. In September 1776, the same Second Continental Congress made its first offer of land bounties to officers and men who would enlist for the duration in the Continental Army. This offer was, by later resolution, expanded to include all officers and men who had previously enlisted in the Continental Army for the duration. These promises, too, were empty since the Congress still had no lands to give. However, the successful conclusion of the war made the promises obligations which, after years of haggling and bickering between the Federal Government and the states, were finally honored beginning in 1796 and ultimately liquidated in 1907, by which time nearly 3,000,000 acres had been so disposed. The principal beneficiaries were speculators who bought up the bounty warrants from soldiers and their heirs who grew weary waiting for the land and who, for the most part, had no desire to move to the frontier areas where the lands were located. See: Payson J. Treat, *The National Land System, 1785–1820* (New York, 1910), ch. X.

gress were new and surpassed the previous experience of any of its members. Of greater importance, however, was the fact that the Continental Congress had no real power and had to rely on the voluntary cooperation of the states for the implementation of its plans.

The mobilization of the short-term Militia throughout the Revolution was accomplished by the respective Colonies on quotas recommended by the Continental Congress. The Continental Army was recruited in the same manner, except that Continental officers and soldiers were at first detailed as recruiters in their respective colonies. By July 1777, Congress came to realize that experienced Continental officers could no longer be spared for recruiting. The Colonies were then divided into districts, each with its local officer who would receive $8 for every enlistee secured and $15 for every deserter apprehended.

To meet their quotas the states had to resort to a spiraling series of bonuses which, varying from state to state, enabled the pleased soldier to sell himself to the highest bidder, and sometimes by well-contrived desertions enabled him to sell himself two, three, or more times.[45] The quotas still could not be filled until the states, on advice of Washington and on the recommendation of the Continental Congress, resorted to coercion—a draft.[46] [See table 1.] This draft was a state Militia draft and varied from state to state as to details. Most of the states reluctantly resorted to a draft after exhausting all other possible methods of raising the men requested by the Continental Congress. The draft was never all-embracing because of the means of evading it, such as the payment of a fee in lieu of service or the furnishing of a substitute. The draft's operations, in most instances, involved a drawing by lot of all eligibles on the muster rolls. The drawing was from a hat, which the statutes admonished had to be held by an important person who would periodically shake the hat to insure fairness. In general, draft rolls included only single men. Three of the principles of selective service—impartiality, selection by lot, and married exemption—were here stablished.[47]

---

[45] Desertion was a peculiarly pressing problem of increasing severity as the war continued. It was most persistent in the Militia but was also serious in the Continental Army. The causes were the usual ones, plus inadequate food and clothing, arrears in pay, etc. The references to this plague of armies during the Revolution are so many as to make unnecessary their listing here. The cures attempted included reprimands and fines and later flogging and the death penalty, but even these extreme penalties failed to have the desired effect. Of some 225 men whose court-martial sentences for desertion were death, only 40 are definitely known to have been executed, but many more may have been, since the records are fragmentary. See: Bowman, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–92; Worthington C. Ford (ed.), *General Order Issued by Major-General William Heath* (Brooklyn, 1890), p. 78; Edward W. Hocker, *The Fighting Parson of the American Revolution: A Biography of General Peter Muhlenberg* (Privately published, Philadelphia, 1936), p. 116.

[46] Sparks, *op. cit.*, V, pp. 96-97.

[47] For a discussion of the Maryland Militia draft see: Arthur J. Alexander, "How Maryland Tried to Raise Her Continental Quotas," *Maryland Historical Magazine,* XIII (1947), pp. 193–95; for Pennsylvania see: Arthur J. Alexander, "Pennsylvania's Revolutionary Militia," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography,* LXIX (1945), pp. 15–25.

The issue of Negro service caused many a vexatious conference.[48] In the northern colonies, resistance to Negro recruitment dissipated quite early. In the southernmost colonies there were divergent opinions, but sentiment was predominantly against the enlistment of Negroes. It was not then so much a social or moral issue as an economic one. The enlistment or drafting of large numbers of Negroes off the southern farms, it was argued in a letter to Madison, would: ". . . ruin individuals, distress the State, and perhaps the Continent, when all that can be raised by their assistance is but barely sufficient to keep us jogging along with the great expense of the war." [49] Madison, a southerner, had suggested the employment of Negroes in regiments with white officers and a leavening proportion of white soldiers.

Of much greater concern to the Americans' struggle was the lack of artillery, skilled artillerymen, and, to a lesser degree, competent military engineers. The British, it will be recalled, had furnished the artillery and the military specialists during the colonial wars in America. The Common Militia was comprised of the relatively inexpensive and more readily procurable infantry foot soldiers and cavalry. There were few artillery pieces available in the Colonies in 1775, and many of these few were unserviceable. The supply of artillery was but slowly increased during the war, principally by capture from the British, and there remained a dearth of artillerymen skilled enough to fire the cumbersome cannon and to train others. In August 1776, well over a year after the war had begun, shortages of artillery and artillerymen were still so chronic that the *one* regiment of artillery in the Continental Army had but 585 men. Even that was an achievement attributed to the great energy of Col. Henry Knox, the first chief of Artillery in the American Army.[50]

The development of a corps of Light Infantry in the Continental Army was initially a tactical innovation based on European precepts and combat experience. It became, however, an elite corps of men picked from all other units and maintained at full strength. A precedent was hereby established in the American Army for such elite, specially selected organizations as the Rangers and Paratroopers of World War II. Similarly, the selection of men from other units to provide a nucleus for the Continental Artillery, when it was being organized, was a forerunner of the cadre system which later became an integral part of mobilization planning and practice.

---

[48] *American Archives,* 4th Series, II, p. 762; Worthington C. Ford (ed.) *The Writings of Washington* (New York, 1889), III, p. 162n.

[49] Ltr, Joseph Jones to James Madison in: Gaillard Hunt, *The Writings of James Madison* (New York, 1900), I, p. 106.

[50] French, *First Year of the American Revolution,* pp. 43, 73, 180; Trevelyan, *op. cit.,* II, pp. 205–08.

*Table 1. Troops Furnished in the Revolutionary War, by Year**

Year	Total troops furnished [a]	From returns of the Army			Additional short-term militia [b]
		Total	In Continental pay	Militia [b]	
1775	37, 623	27, 443	[c] 27, 443	0	10, 180
1776	89, 651	72, 951	46, 891	26, 060	16, 700
1777	68, 720	44, 920	34, 820	10, 100	23, 800
1778	51, 052	37, 252	32, 899	4, 353	13, 800
1779	45, 184	32, 834	27, 699	5, 135	12, 350
1780	42, 826	26, 826	21, 015	5, 811	16, 000
1781	29, 340	20, 590	13, 292	7, 298	8, 750
1782	18, 006	14, 256	0	0	[d] 3, 750
1783 [e]	13, 477	13, 477	13, 477	0	0

[a] Because of short terms of service and reenlistments, these figures are considerably higher than the average size of the Army for any one year.

[b] Militia service, due to fragmentary records, short terms of service, and repeated terms of service, is difficult to estimate accurately. Those figures are based on records available to the Secretary of War in 1790 and constitute a conjectural estimate. The data in the last column are estimates of additional Militia employed for short periods which were not shown in the returns of the Army.

[c] Enlisted to serve to 31 December 1775.

[d] Not separately shown.

[e] The Army in the Northern Department was discharged on 5 November 1783, and that in the Southern Department on 15 November 1783.

**Source*: *American State Papers, Military Affairs* (Washington, 1832), I, pp. 14-19.

Mobilization of Materiel for War

As in the mobilization of manpower, mobilization of materiel for the greater part of the war was a state prerogative and function. Just before actual hostilities all of the colonies had made some effort to collect military stores and to a limited extent some increase in manufacturing facilities had occurred even before Lexington and Concord; but there had been no concerted plan for industrial mobilization or for long-range procurement. The concept of industrial mobilization was not to be conceived anywhere in the world for 85 years when it was to be stillborn in the Confederacy. As for long-range procurement, there was no preconceived idea that fighting would be protracted if it should occur. The First Continental Congress was not a planning agency; it was a grievance forum. Even the Second Continental Congress, in 1775, was not initially prepared to plan, legislate, or to operate. When the emergency in Massachusetts occurred, the Second Continental Congress simultaneously began planning and legislating—but hobbled all the time by its inability to execute *forcibly*.

The Colonies in no instance had accumulated sufficient military stores to supply the forces which they were mobilizing. The first men mobilized had their own arms and accoutrements, their uniform being whatever clothes they had been wearing when the alarm sounded.

But later levies had neither arms, accoutrements, nor clothes to speak of. There was an understandable reluctance on the part of a Militiaman to yield his musket or his personal property at the conclusion of a short tour for reissue to a recruit. There was a less understandable design of many Militiamen, on the conclusion of a short tour or on deserting, to depart with the musket which had been issued to them. Shortages of all kinds of military stores, accoutrements, and supplies were quick to occur.[51]

At first, the Colonies were expected not only to mobilize their troop quotas but also to equip them. Even the few colonies which zealously tried to fulfill these obligations soon found it difficult to procure all the necessary materiel for their men and even more arduous to get procured equipment to them during the fluid periods of the war. The competition between colonies to purchase materiel and munitions understandably had an unhealthy effect on overall supply and costs.

There was no War Department on the Continental level when Washington took command at Cambridge, nor was there any agency approximating it. Washington was expected to coordinate and to supervise the overall war effort, but Washington first found his time fully occupied recruiting and organizing an army without which there would have been little need for supplies. To fill the void for an overall supervising agency, the Second Continental Congress established many committees, and assigned one war problem to each. The shortage of salt was assigned to a Committee for Salt, the shortage of meat to a Committee for Meat, clothing to a Committee for Clothing. The committees were ineffective to an even greater extent than the Congress because they had no power to compel and because they were restricted in their actions by the zealous Congress as a whole.

Congress, in spite of weaknesses of which it was well aware, had to assume not only legislative functions but executive ones, too. This assumption of executive power was unquestionably a source of weakness and one which has been well exposed and analytically criticized. But who was to exercise executive authority? It is very well to speak of proper systems of government, but the mechanics for such a system had not yet been worked out in America and were not worked out until the adoption of the Constitution a few years after the war. Furthermore, in the British tradition Parliament contained within itself the executive authority which had been wrested from the King over a span of centuries. In assuming executive functions, the Second Continental Congress was filling a vacuum according to English governmental tradition. The United States Constitution in its separation of the executive and legislative branches broke with English tradition.

[51] See : Bowman, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–20 ; Trevelyan, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 30–36.

The Congress quickly realized the necessity for some kind of centralized supervisory civil agency for the Army and the war effort. As early as 24 January 1776 a committee was appointed to draw up a plan for a war office. By June 1776 the committee had made its recommendations and Congress enacted into existence a Board of War consisting of five members of Congress plus one paid secretary.[52] This Board was charged with the mobilizing of land forces, their equipment and supplies, the supervision of all military stores, the keeping of officer registers, etc. In 1777 Congress removed some of the political discord of the Board by eliminating members of Congress from its composition. In the five years of its existence, the Board of War—the direct ancestor of the Department of the Army—did a somewhat better job than the committee it had superseded. In October 1781, Congress, moving slowly towards centralization and away from divided authority, abolished the Board and appointed Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln Secretary of War.[53] Mobilization machinery evolved about the time when demobilization was to occur.

The principal supply problems of the war were procurement and transportation which were initially mobilization problems. Adversely affecting a solution to the problem of procurement was a domestic economy which produced few surpluses for war. Even where surpluses existed, however, as in agricultural products of various kinds, the want of an acceptable monetary medium to pay for them was a serious handicap. The Continental Congress had no power to levy taxes. It could request money from the Colonies, which did exercise taxing powers to a limited extent, but there was no way to compel a colony to furnish the money requested. Specie (hard metallic money) was limited. The Congress, perforce, resorted to paper scrip, a type of exchange which deteriorated in value as rapidly as the printing presses turned it out. Prices soared as supplies dwindled and paper money became more and more worthless. Even farmers loyal to the revolutionary cause were unwilling to yield up their produce without getting paid for it—and paid at a profit.

The Congress recommended to the states that prices be fixed by law to discourage profiteering, and although generally unsuccessful, there were some price controls. Maj. Gen. Israel Putnam, as early as 8 August 1777, by a military edict at Peekskill established prices for farm produce for his army and made his edict reasonably effective, for a time, by confiscating produce purchased at prices above the maximums he had established.[54] The Congress recommended to Washington that he confiscate farm produce where and when neces-

[52] *Journals of Continental Congress*, IV, p. 85 ; V, pp. 434–35.

[53] *Ibid.*, XXI, pp. 1030, 1087.

[54] Worthington C. Ford (ed.), *General Orders Issued by Major-General Israel Putnam When in Command of the Highlands in the Summer and Fall of 1777* (Brooklyn, 1893), p. 51.

sary. Washington, however, rarely did so, for he wisely realized that the use of force in such a manner would have an adverse effect on civilian good will and would therefore be harmful in the long run.[55]

Transportation throughout the war was for the Americans an unsolvable problem. The poor road net at certain times of the year was impossible. [See *chart 1.*] The sea lanes, the best means of transport, were held to a considerable extent by a British fleet and were therefore inaccessible. The shortage of wagons and teams and the difficulty, due to lack of funds, of procuring more had an adverse influence on mobilization of food and materiel for the war.

The army supply systems which evolved during the war were closely integrated with procurement and mobilization of materiel which, like mobilization of manpower, was never ceasing throughout the war. Mobilization normally can be said to cease, in a sense, when systems of recruiting manpower and utilizing resources have been established, and are functioning. In the Revolution, however, one system succeeded another, with each lasting long enough for its disadvantages to become so glaring as to make another, any other, seem preferable. These trials and errors in what is considered the first war of the United States taught many mobilization lessons which were not too well learned and were remembered even less.

The Continental Congress had quickly set up an army supply system, based on European models, with a quartermaster general to superintend transportation and a commissary general to purchase and issue provisions. These staffs functioned reasonably well during the first phase of the war when the Army was in Massachusetts, which was an excellent larder, and before Continental money tobogganed in value. Within two years Congress, tinkering with the supply system, split the commissary general's department into two parts: a commissary of purchases and a commissary of issues, each with a commissary general and several deputies, the latter appointed by the Congress and not by the commissary general. This separation of procurement from issue and the division of authority within the two new sections led to the resignation of hard working Commissary General Joseph Trumbull; it also led to a rapid decline in supply efficiency. The deputy commissaries within each department bid not only against the other departments but against each other; they were little inclined to heed or show allegiance to their chief since they, like he, were appointed directly by Congress. Congress took proper administrative action to prevent such practices, but integrity and character are qualities difficult to create by legislation.[56]

---

[55] *Journals of Continental Congress,* VII, pp. 283–84; VIII, pp. 751–52; IX, pp. 905, 1013–15.

[56] Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington, 1907), pp. 50–53.

The expanding demands for the Army did provide impetus to manufacturing, particularly for the fabrication of cloths of all kinds—duck, russian sheeting, tow-cloth osnaburgs, ticklenburgs—and to the production of shoes, gunpowder, and small arms. Home industries carded and spun wool, flax, and cotton at a vastly accelerated rate. Home windows and clocks provided their lead weights for rifle and cannon balls.[57] But the increased production, hampered by inefficient supply systems, a depreciated currency, and a woefully inadequate transportation system, frequently was unable to provide the troops even with those surpluses which it did create.

Where the colonies were unable to produce enough materiel or the required kinds of materiel, recourse was had necessarily to friends and allies in Europe. Particularly the influx of French supplies and munitions was a material salvation of the war effort. Gunpowder, an understandably basic and vital munition, for the first two years of the war had to be secured principally abroad. Of some 2,347,455 pounds of gunpowder obtained during those first two years of the war, about 90 percent was imported.[58] After 1778, when France openly entered the war on the side of the States, supplies and credit from Europe became even more appreciable.

The supply and procurement systems evolved during the war were sufficiently varied to provide texts for future mobilization planning. There was the almost completely decentralized system wherein the states and several Continental agencies competed against each other for materiel. The weaknesses of this method were so clearly proved that it might reasonably have been expected that never again would such a mistaken procurement system be employed. Nevertheless, the same system would be tried again at the outset of every war of the United States for the next 139 years. Secondly, there was the requisition system whereby each state was expected to furnish supplies in kind on a fixed quota. This system failed signally and was never tried again. The third system was the civilian contractor system, inherently dangerous and weak for it made supply of the Army a whim and prerogative of individuals who were not part of the Army and not subject to Army control. Such a system did not work at all if the contractor was dishonest and seldom worked more than indifferently well. This system was tried again in later wars. And, finally, there was a centralized system, under unified, coordinated control and supervision. This system, evolved late in the war, worked best of all and has been the system eventually arrived at in all major wars, but only after other systems previously proved failures have been tried again and failed.[59]

[57] *American Archives*, 4th Series, V, p. 1401.

[58] Orlando W. Stephenson, "The Supply of Gunpowder in 1776," *American Historical Review*, XXX (1925), p. 278.

[59] See: Hatch, *op. cit.*, ch. VI, "Supplying the Army," pp. 86–123. This chapter contains a comprehensive coverage of supply problems and machinery in the Revolutionary Army.

The Lessons of the War

Most of the mobilization lessons of the Revolutionary War are as immediate as the lessons of the last war. Many of them are the same lessons. The danger of short-term enlistments was incontrovertibly demonstrated. The weakness of the volunteer method of mobilizing manpower and the vices connected with a bounty system were plainly proved. The necessity for conscription in a protracted war was clearly established. The imperative necessity for proper training of recruits before their employment was demonstrated. Short-term enlistments afforded insufficient time for adequate training. Had every man who served in the American forces enlisted for the duration at the outset of the war, the bulk of the force would have continued untrained for there were neither the facilities nor the officers to train them. The few partially trained officers at Washington's disposal were the veterans of the French and Indian Wars. The Militia drills had imparted little military training of value. There were no official training publications or drill manuals and there were few who had the initiative of Nathanael Greene and Henry Knox to pore through bookshops for foreign military texts to study diligently. These texts were few, too, even had there been the initiative. The *British Manual*, the *Norfolk Discipline*, Pickering's *Easy Plan* were some of the current military texts, but in such short supply as to be almost unobtainable. The systems of training were so various, so inept, and so confusing, for the most part, as to have military value principally for the enemy who faced the troops so trained. It was not until Von Steuben's presence and his *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States* were felt that improvement in training techniques was discernible. What these early colonial soldiers lacked in military skill they made up in spirit and determination; without these, their early military ineptitude would have lost the war long before they became militarily proficient.

The inescapable value of centralized, coordinated control and supervision of the war effort was proved. The need for control of the national economy and of public opinion was foreshadowed. The fact was established that a nation which can produce only few surpluses for war use must have some other assured source of war material. The lesson was brought home with considerable impact that to wage war, a nation must have a reasonably dependable means of transporting material to the fighting troops. The inferred overall lesson was inescapable: that a mobilization accomplished during a war, without adequate prior planning, is wasteful, clumsy, inefficient, and potentially disastrous.

CHAPTER II

THE WAR OF 1812

The Period Between the Wars

Defense Under the Articles of Confederation

Following the successful conclusion of the Revolutionary War, the new nation almost completely disbanded its military forces. This first demobilization in accordance with disintegration concepts established a precedent and example for all of our later demobilizations. (See *DA Pam 20–210*, History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army (*Washington, 1952*).) The Continental Congress on 2 June 1784 limited the Regular force to 80 enlisted men and a handful of officers under the command of Capt. John Doughty. Twenty-five enlisted men were to be stationed at Fort Pitt and 55 at West Point to guard military stores (principally gunpowder).[1]

The Indians in the Northwest were hostile to the Americans and were making raids into Pennsylvania and Kentucky. It therefore became necessary for Congress to provide a force to occupy these posts which the British were expected to evacuate under the terms of the Treaty of Paris. On 3 June 1784, Congress passed a resolution calling for 700 Militia to serve for 1 year: Connecticut to furnish 165; New York, 165; New Jersey, 110; and Pennsylvania, 260. Congress was completely dependent on the states for the implementation of this embryonic mobilization, the results of which emphasized the weaknesses of the Confederation. Pennsylvania supplied its quota promptly; New Jersey furnished a company; Connecticut did not begin recruiting until 1785; and New York ignored the request.[2] Because Pennsylvania was requested to furnish the largest number of men she was permitted to select the commanding officer. For this purpose Josiah Harmar, 31-year-old Revolutionary War veteran, was appointed a lieutenant colonel. Harmar's force numbering approximately 200 men moved to Fort Pitt, and during January 1785 a treaty was concluded at nearby Fort McIntosh with the Indians in adjacent areas.[3]

---

[1] *Journals of the Continental Congress*, XXVII, p. 524.

[2] James Ripley Jacobs, *The Beginning of the U. S. Army 1783–1812* (Princeton, 1947), p. 18.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23. Harmar was made a brevet brigadier general 31 Jul 1787.

Although the Indians around Pittsburgh had been pacified, the rest of the Ohio valley was still subject to frequent depredations. Since Harmar's Militia force was to serve for only one year and most of his command would vanish by the end of the summer, Congress on 12 April 1785 requested the recruiting of a force of 700 men for three years with the same quotas assigned to the states as under the call of 3 June 1784.[4] In the fall of 1785, Harmar moved westward and built three forts near the Ohio River which he garrisoned with his small force.[5]

Indian activities and unrest in western Massachusetts in the fall of 1786 spurred the Continental Congress into passing a resolution on 20 October 1786 for an expanded Army. They requested 1,340 men from the states with quotas assigned as follows:[6]

Infantry and Artillery		*Cavalry*	
New Hampshire	260	Maryland	60
Massachusetts	660	Virginia	60
Rhode Island	120		
Connecticut	180		

THE WAR OF 1812

Only two companies of Artillery were ever raised under this call. On 3 October 1787 Congress passed a resolution continuing the Army as then constituted for three more years. The authorized forces consited of one regiment of Infantry, eight companies of 70 men, and one battalion of Artillery, four companies of 70 men, or a total of 840 men.[7] This was the authorized strength, but the actual strength was always lower.

This regimental Army was too small for even the limited police mission assigned to it. Fortunately the British did not evacuate their forts as provided by the Treaty of Paris until 1796.[8] Knox,[9] Harmer, and their tiny Army would have been unable to take over the forts. Life in the frontier stockades and log forts was strenuous and monotonous; supplies were scarce and poor in quality; pay was almost always in arrears. All of the difficulties of manpower procurement, supply, transportation, and communications which were to be encountered by the Army along the western frontier until after the Civil War were present in the period from 1784–90. The Continental Congress passed a land ordinance in 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance 13 July 1787 which encouraged settlement and promised a civil

[4] *Journals of the Continental Congress,* XXVIII, p. 247.

[5] Jacobs, *op. cit.,* pp. 24–26. Fort Finney at the mouth of the Great Miami River, Fort Steuben above Wheeling, and Fort Harmar at the mouth of the Muskingum River.

[6] *Journals of the Continental Congress,* XXXI, pp. 892–96.

[7] *Ibid.,* XXXIII, pp. 602–03.

[8] The last fort to be turned over by the British was Fort Mackinac evacuated 11 Sep 1796. Jacobs, *op. cit.,* p. 185.

[9] Henry Knox was elected Secretary of War by the Continental Congress 8 Mar 1785 at an annual salary of $2,450. His staff consisted of three clerks and a messenger. *Journals of the Continental Congress,* XXVIII, p. 129.

administration for the area north of the Ohio River. No provision was made, however, for an Army large enough to police the area and control the hostile Indians. The government under the Articles of Confederation was unable to provide for the military, commercial, or financial needs of the new nation. The meeting of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia on 14 May 1787 was to be the beginning of a new order.

The Constitution: "to raise and support armies"

The framers of the Constitution were exceptionally able men who had seen the weaknesses of military mobilizations during the Revolution and under the Articles of Confederation. Six consecutive clauses in section VIII, article I of the Constitution empowered the Congress of the United States:

> To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;
>
> To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use, shall be for a longer term than two years;
>
> To provide and maintain a navy;
>
> To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;
>
> To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;
>
> To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

The fact that the raising and support of armies was given precedence over powers to employ State Militia has always led to the conclusion that the new Federal Government had authority to raise armies by more direct and powerful methods than by calling for Volunteers and State Militia. The discussions of these military clauses at the Constitutional Convention, the refusal of the Convention to approve a motion proposed by Eldridge Gerry of Massachusetts and Luther Martin of Maryland that would amend the military clauses and set a Constitutional limit to the size of the peacetime Army,[10] are further indications of the intent of the authors of the Constitution to make absolute the plenary powers of the Federal Government to mobilize armies.

By 21 June 1788, the Constitution had been ratified by the necessary nine states. The First Congress met in New York 4 March 1789,

---

[10] *Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution* (Washington, 1836–45), V, p. 443, as cited in Joseph C. Duggan, *The Legislative and Statutory Development of the Federal Concept of Conscription for Military Service* (Washington, 1946), p. 7. This is an excellent and succinct dissertation on legal connotations of early Federal military mobilization enactments.

but the new government was not completed until the inauguration of George Washington as first President on 30 April 1789. The first law relative to military affairs was passed by Congress on 7 August 1789, entitled "An Act to establish an Executive Department to be denominated the Department of War." [11] This act continued the Department of War established during the Revolutionary War but transformed it from a legislative to an executive agency. Henry Knox, Secretary of War under the Articles of Confederation since 1785, was continued in that office by President Washington. The creation of a supervisory and controlling agency for the Army was necessarily the first step towards establishing a sound military system. In addition to supervision of the Army, the Secretary of War was also charged with such extraneous duties as land grants, Indian affairs, and naval affairs.[12]

On 29 September 1789, Congress passed an act continuing the Army created by the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation. It also authorized the President to call Militia into service in the event of Indian attacks along the frontier. The authorized strength of the Army was 840 men.[13] On 8 August 1789 Secretary Knox had reported that there were 672 men in the Army: 76 at the West Point and Springfield arsenals and 596 in the Ohio Valley.[14] The act of 29 September was only a temporary measure. The first comprehensive military enactment was passed by Congress 30 April 1790, providing in great detail for an army of 1,273 officers and enlisted men to serve for three years. This force was to be organized into one regiment of Infantry, with three battalions, and one battalion of Artillery. Pay for officers was slightly increased but that for privates was cut to $3 per month. No provision was made for a War Department staff.[15] The legislation of 1789 and 1790 affected the size and organization of the Army; it did not provide machinery to plan or facilitate a mobilization.

President Washington, Secretary of War Knox, and Von Steuben did some independent thinking and made recommendations for a sound military establishment which had within it some farseeing mobilization provisions. With minor variations, each of the three recommended a small, permanent standing army and a well-regulater, well-trained Militia under Federal supervision and required to meet Federal standards. To provide such a Militia, there was recommended a kind of compulsory, universal military training system from which very few of the Nation's youth would have been exempted.

---

[11] Act of Aug 7, 1789, 1 *Stat.* 49. Cited in John F. Callan, *The Military Laws of the United States* (Philadelphia, 1863), pp. 85–86.

[12] A separate Navy Department was established by Congress in Apr 1798.

[13] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

[14] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, p. 6.

[15] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 87–90.

Such a Militia could have been mobilized swiftly when necessary, and would have made the Nation's manpower into an effective military reserve.[16] But at the end of the Revolutionary War as at the end of later wars in the first half of the 20th century, neither the Congress nor the country was disposed to adopt such a policy. Congress did not adopt this plan but merely extended the President's authority to call out the existing Militia in emergencies in the act of 30 April 1790.

Indian Uprisings Give Rise to Mobilization Measures

While Congress debated the national military system, the unsettled frontier was erupting with sporadic Indian troubles. In the summer of 1790 the Government decided to send a punitive expedition against the Miami Indians north of the Ohio River. General Harmar, still the senior officer in the Army, was assigned to command the expedition. The Federal Government had to fall back on the Militia since the Regular Army was too small and scattered to make it available for an offensive military operation. In July 1790 the states of Pennsylvania and the district of Kentucky were called on to furnish quotas of 500 and 1,000 men respectively. This Militia was called out by state general orders issued to various Militia companies. The Militia units were quick to avail themselves of the substitution system so that instead of "the smart active woodsmen, well accustomed to arms, eager and alert to revenge injuries . . . [there] . . . were a great many hardly able to bear arms, such as old, infirm men, and young boys . . . [many of whom] . . . probably had never fired a gun. . . ." [17]

Only 1133 Militia reported to General Harmar out of the 1,500 men called for. With this Militia Force and 320 Regulars, Harmar in late September 1790 moved against the Miami Indians. After two engagements Harmar withdrew back to Fort Washington (later Cincinnati, Ohio).[18]

Harmar's lack of success forced the third session of the First Congress into strengthening the Army, not only in numbers but in recruiting powers. The Act of March 3, 1791, authorized the President, at his discretion, "to employ troops enlisted under the denomination of levies, in addition to, or in place of the militia, . . . to raise . . . a corps" of 2,000 men, and concluded, by empowering him to make up for any deficiencies, ". . . by raising such farther number of levies, or by calling into the service of the United States, such a body of militia as shall be equal thereto." [19] This legislation by the repeated

[16] For discussions of Washington's and Von Steuben's concepts see: John McAuley Palmer, *Americans in Arms* (New Haven, 1941). For Knox's plan see: *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 6–13.

[17] "Testimony of Major Ferguson before a Court of Inquiry on General Harmar," *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, p. 21.

[18] See: *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 20–36; Jacobs *op. cit.*, pp. 52–65.

[19] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–91.

use of the Constitutional phrasing "to raise" presumedly inferred that the President, under this act, could legally have resorted to a compulsory draft if had so desired.[20]

The force raised under the Act of 1791 consisted principally of volunteer, short-term levies; the Regular Army was also expanded somewhat. Recruits for both the Volunteer short-termers and for the Regular forces were secured in the customary manner. But it was a time of labor shortage in the United States when jobs were plentiful [21] and, in comparison, the military service had little to offer: $2 monthly for the privates (the pay was $3 monthly, but $1 of this was withheld for uniforms and hospital stores), poor uniforms, worse equipment, scanty rations, ill-treatment which conceivably the Indians would terminate by torture and death. The bounty of $6 for enlistment in the Regulars or $3 for enlistment in the short-term Volunteer levies served to continue the pernicious bounty system but was not enough to improve the quality of the recruits. The $2 per recruit bounty which the recruiting officers received sometimes made them overlook noticeable physical defects which should have kept the unfit from the service.

Even from such inferior material, soldiers might conceivably have been made by adequate training, with good equipment, and under competent leadership. But this force raised by the Act of 1791 was intended to punish quickly and drastically the Indians who had forced Harmar to withdraw in 1790. The short enlistment period of the Volunteer levies, the insistence on quick action, the slow rate of recruiting left no time at all for training. Equipment, even including rations (still provided by a civilian contractor), either was wanting entirely or was of poor, wornout substance. And the leadership was as shoddy as the equipment.

The staff created by the Act of 1791 included a general in command, a general as deputy commander, an adjutant general, and, for the first time since the end of the Revolution, a quartermaster. The commanding general selected was Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair, Governor of the Northwest Territory, who had served in the Revolution, but who was now somewhat old for arduous field campaigns.

The strength of the force intended by the Congress for the expedition was three thousand enlisted men. But so slow was the recruiting of the short-term levies and the Regular forces that Knox recommended to St. Clair that he make up shortages by Militia requests on the Governors of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the District of Ken-

[20] Duggan, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[21] Carpenters in 1790–91 were getting about $0.60 daily wage, masons about $1 daily, and common laborers about $0.50 daily. See: Carroll D. Wright, "Historical Review of Wages and Prices, 1752–1860," *Sixteenth Annual Report of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor* (Boston, 1885), pp. 319, 324, 326.

tucky.[22] When the Army moved against the Indians in mid-September the force was composed of two infantry regiments of some 600 Regulars (the whole of the Infantry in the Regular Army, less some garrison detachments), about 800 short-term levies, and 600 Militia, a combined force of 2,000 men. Except for the Regulars, the troops were untrained; the whole of the force was ill-equipped, poorly supplied, and without adequate transportation. Disease and desertion reduced the Army's strength to 1,700 by 24 October.

The mobilization of this force, the plans for the expedition, and the execution of it were on the same level of ineptitude. The morning of 4 November 1791, after an advance of some 97 miles from Fort Washington northward into Indian country made at the rate of 5 miles per day, the "Army" was ambushed and badly defeated by an Indian force no larger than itself.

A seven-man committee of Congress was promtly appointed to investigate the causes and responsibility for the defeat. On 8 May 1792 the committee's report, submitted to the House of Representatives, found that the disaster was due to the delay in passing the act which provided for the mobilization of St. Clair's expeditionary force, "the gross and various mismanagements and neglects in the Quartermaster's and contractor's departments" and the lack of "discipline and experience in the troops." St. Clair was cleared of all blame, the committee reporting that ". . . the failure of the late expedition can, in no respect, be imputed to his conduct."[23] The committee report, boiled down to its essence, simply states that the massacre was due to faulty mobilization planning, for which the Congress itself and the Secretary of War were held primarily responsible.

The Second Congress, convening on 24 October 1791, was alarmed by St. Clair's defeat, which had led the victorious Indians to more sustained depredations, and upset by the blame imputed to Congress by its own committee. After prolonged discussions, it passed an act on 5 March 1792 providing for the better "protection of the frontiers of the United States." This was not a real mobilization measure, but it authorized the President to more than double the size of the Regular Army temporarily at his discretion.[24]

There were mobilization lessons, however, which could have been learned from the ensuing mobilization of the "Legion of the United States" as the new force was designated.[25] Its strength was recruited by the same methods as St. Clair's army and, in general, secured the same kind of riff-raff. However, the commander, Maj. Gen. Anthony

[22] Ltrs, Knox to St. Clair, *American State Papers, Indian Affairs,* I, pp. 175–82.

[23] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, pp. 38–39.

[24] Callan, *op. cit.,* pp. 92–94.

[25] The name "Legion of the United States" originated with Von Steuben. The Legion organization was abolished by an act of Congress effective 31 Oct 1796.

Wayne, used proper mobilization training procedures. He selected and constructed a training camp some twenty miles down the Ohio from Pittsburgh. Here excellent training methods were employed, camp sanitation was insisted upon, proper discipline was enforced, and good leadership was developed and practiced. The end result was the production of fine soldiers who so soundly trounced the Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, 20 August 1794, that peace was thereafter ensured for the Northwest Territory. The methods employed by Wayne to receive and train green manpower were so singularly successful that it might have been expected that they would be codified for subsequent use in any kind of mobilization or increase of the Army. Unfortunately this was not done.[26]

The Militia Law of 1792

The Second Congress, bestirred by several messages from President Washington, applied itself to the enactment of a basic defense measure implementing the Constitution's provision for a Militia: "An Act more effectually to provide for the national defense by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States." [27] This long-enduring, but hardly far-sighted measure, reaffirmed the principle so well established in the Colonies, by tradition and custom, of a compulsory, universal military obligation for *all* free, white male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45. (Exemptions from this service in the act reasonably included such personages as the vice president, members of the Congress, certain other governmental employees, and some essential occupations.) Subsequent acts expanded this Militia law in minor essentials, as in provisions for arming the Militia and for establishing a court-martial system for the Militia. A revision of the Militia Law, on 28 February 1795, contained a provision that the Militia, when mobilized, could not be compelled to serve more than three months in any one year.[28] This amazingly destructive limitation was not repealed until 29 July 1861.

The organic Militia law of 1792 required all citizens, within six months after being enrolled in the Militia, to provide themselves, at their own expense, with arms and accoutrements. It was a delusion to suppose that the male population would comply with this requirement when there was no penalty either explicit or implied for failure to do so.

A system of enrollment was also prescribed, the work to be done by the Militia company commander whose duty it would be ". . . to

[26] The authorized strength of the Legion was 5,120 but Wayne only had a force of 2,643 at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. See: William A. Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army* (New York, 1924), p. 101. Although training had been improved, manpower procurement still was the major problem of mobilization.

[27] Approved May 8, 1792, 2d Cong., 1st sess. Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 95–100.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

enroll every such citizen [between 18–45 years of age] . . . , and also those who shall, from time to time, arrive at the age of eighteen years, or, being the age of eighteen years, and under . . . forty-five . . . , shall come to reside within his bounds". The third section of the act provided for the organization of the Militia into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies by the states and provided that the ". . . said militia shall be officered by the respective states." This casual delegation to the states of all power and authority to implement the measure meant that no matter what the zeal and concern of the states for the law, at best there would be as many different standards and procedures as there were states. At worst, it meant that not only would the State Militias be variegated but that they would be inefficient and inept militarily. The lack of teeth in the act and failure to provide Federal standardization and supervision for it doomed it to impotence; but it was to remain a law of the land, the organic mobilization measure in the United States, for 111 years.

The inadequacies and weaknesses of the Militia law were regularly brought to the attention of Congress by many of the Presidents beginning with Washington. As early as 29 December 1794, Rep. (later Sen.) William B. Giles, chairman of a congressional committee appointed to investigate these manifest deficiencies, reported to the House of Representatives that: ". . . further provision ought to be made, by law, . . . for enforcing the execution of the existing militia laws, by adequate and uniform penalties." [29] It was over a hundred years, however, before action was taken.

During the uneasily peaceful years which lasted until 1812, there was concern and limited planning in the War Department for what might have to be done in the event of war. In February 1796, Secretary of War Timothy Pickering reported to the Senate that the Army should not be reduced in strength because of its multiple missions.[30]

War With France or England: Preparedness Legislation

The increasing tension with both France and England following John Adam's inauguration as President occasioned some mobilization planning. Secretary of War James McHenry, on the advice of Hamilton, recommended to the Congress on 27 February 1798 and again on 9 April 1798 an increase in the Regular Army, authorization for a Provisional army of 20,000 and for military supplies in the amount of $1,108,900.[31] Congress was reasonably quick to act, not to the letter of McHenry's recommendation, but well within the spirit of it. On 27 April 1798, the Regular Army was increased by a regiment of artillerists and engineers. One week later, the Congress also increased

[29] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, p. 107.
[30] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 112–13.
[31] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 119–23.

military appropriations by nearly $1,200,000 for fortifications, arms, and other military munitions. On 28 May, the Congress provided the President with discretionary authority for the desired Provisional army which it limited to 10,000 men to be enlisted for three years. The act granting this authority to the President also gave him power to commission all officers for this force, to organize it in accord with his judgment into infantry, artillery, and cavalry units, and with good foresight appropriated some $600,000 to arm and equip the force. The same act also authorized the President, at his discretion, to accept for Federal service any company or companies of infantry, cavalry, or artillery who should arm, clothe, and equip themselves and offer themselves for service. By implication, the President was authorized to commission the officers of the Volunteer companies also and, expressly, to commission the field officers necessary for the Volunteers. On 16 July 1798, the Congress expanded the Regular Army again by increasing the size of existing regiments and authorizing the recruitment of twelve additional infantry regiments and six troops of light dragoons.

The preparedness legislation of 1798 is notable in several particulars: first, the Congress soundly legislated to rely on Regular Army and Federal Volunteers exclusively, without resort to Militia; second, officers for Provisional and Volunteer units were to be commissioned by the President, not by the states nor by popular election; third, short-term enlistments were eliminated. Less commendatory were the undeniable facts that the legislation was enacted piecemeal, over a period of several months, and contained no provision for compulsory service. The continuance of a bounty for enlistment also was not desirable.[32]

To head the force authorized, Washington, then retired at Mount Vernon, was appealed to by President Adams. His appointment as lieutenant general in command was enthusiastically approved by the Senate on 7 July 1798. Washington accepted only on the proviso that he assume no duties and receive no pay until he took the field to repel invasion. To assist him and to do the spade work of organization and supply, Alexander Hamilton and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney were appointed major generals.[33] James Wilkinson re-

[32] The legislation of 1798 included: "An Act to provide an additional regiment of artillerists and engineers," Apr. 27, 1798; "An Act supplementary to the Act providing for the further defence of the ports and harbors of the United States," May 3, 1798 [$250,000]; "An Act to enable the President of the United States to procure cannon, arms, and ammunition; and for other purposes," May 4, 1798 [$800,000]; "An Act authorizing the President of the United States to raise a provisional army," May 28, 1798; "An Act providing arms for the militia throughout the United States," July 6, 1798; "An Act to augment the army of the United States, and for other purposes," July 16, 1798. See: Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 119–29.

[33] Henry Knox was also recalled to duty as the third ranking major general, but, incensed at being made junior to Hamilton and Pinckney, he declared he never would serve and never did.

mained a brigadier general and by the 1798 legislation was demoted from commanding general of the Army into a subordinate position ranked by three seniors.

Hamilton and Pinckney labored at the job of preparedness. As a major general, Hamilton's perspective was different from what it had been when he was Secretary of the Treasury. He was decidedly for military control of military expenditures and on his prompting the Congress on 16 July 1798 by law transferred the purchase of army supplies back to the War Department from the Treasury Department.[34] Actual purchasing was still done by the Purveyor of Public Supplies, a Treasury official, but at the direction of the Secretary of War. The Treasury Department retained only the right to inspect and to revise the expenditures and accounts of the War Department.[35]

The military legislation of 1798, in spite of defects already touched upon, was sound: certainly the best mobilization measures the United States had had up to that time or was to have for many years afterwards. However, very little of the legislation was implemented by President Adams. The threat of war subsided enough so that the Provisional army of Volunteers was never mobilized. Recruiting for the 12 additional Regular Army regiments had just become appreciable (3,399 had enlisted by January 1800) when it was discontinued; the 6 cavalry troops were not activated at all.[36]

On 2 March 1799, a law was enacted which created a medical department for the Army. The framework of the department was properly made flexible enough to permit its expansion in the event of war. Heading the new department were to be a physician general, a purveyor, and an apothecary general; hospitals, properly staffed, were provided. This law envisaged a medical department not only geared for a small peacetime army, but for an army vastly expanded in wartime.[37]

The same day the Congress renewed the President's authority to augment the Army but with some changes. The Congress now gave the President authority in the event of war or imminent danger of invasion, ". . . to organize and cause to be raised . . . twenty-four regiments of infantry, a regiment and a battalion of riflemen, a battalion of artillerists and engineers, and three regiments of cavalry . . . for a term not exceeding three years," and ". . . to appoint and commission all officers for the said troops." Sections 6–8 of the same act further authorized the President to accept and organize a Provisional army of 75,000 Volunteers, apportioned specifically to the states and

[34] By the Act of May 8, 1792, purchasing for the Army was made a function of the Treasury Department.

[35] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

[36] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 132, 137.

[37] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 129–31.

territories, and ". . . to appoint all officers thereof." But there was a fatal restriction placed on the employment of these Volunteers: ". . . the said volunteers shall not be compelled to serve out of the state in which they reside, a longer time than three months after their arrival at the place of rendezvous." [38] By this clause, effective use of the Provisional army was destroyed before the army was created.

On the following day, 3 March 1799, the Congress enacted most of the additional recommendations made by McHenry 10 weeks before. The strength of regiments in the combat arms was raised as requested; some military pay increases were granted; the army ranks of ensign and cornet were abolished in favor of second lieutenant; the ration was changed so as to reduce the whiskey allowance to a half gill daily, issue of which was no longer mandatory but discretionary with commanding officers; the staff of the Army was augmented so that it consisted of a quartermaster general, adjutant general, paymaster general (directed to be close enough to the troops to pay them on time), all of whom were provided with a reasonable number of assistants.[39]

Recruiting would be conducted in the customary manner, i. e., by recruiting officers who had the usual bounty bait to lure the prospects. To recruit the Provisional Army, the recruiting officers would be company grade officers commissioned for that Provisional army—an excellent idea since these officers would presumably use judgment enlisting men for their own companies. These measures, had they been implemented, would have provided a Regular Army of 40,000 men and a Provisional army of 75,000 Federal Volunteers. Again, in the 1799 legislation, the employment of Militia was not provided for. The legislation, except for the unfortunate restriction on the use of the Volunteers and for its failure to include provisions for compulsory service, was sound policy. But the war danger had again receded. None of the troops authorized by the Congress were ever mobilized, neither Regulars nor Volunteers. The Congress, be it noted, had acted with unusual speed in 1799; preparedness legislation requested by the President was enacted 10 weeks after his request was received. It had taken four months for similar legislation in 1798. The acceleration in 1799 may conceivably have been sparked by the desire of the members of Congress to go home, for 3 March 1799 marked the last session of the Fifth Congress.

Hamilton continued his planning. With commendable good sense, he summoned Wilkinson to return from the West to assist in the Army reorganization enacted by the flurry of legislation and to give advice on the military situation on the frontiers. On 1 August 1799 Wilkinson arrived in New York to confer with Hamilton, his sub-

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 131–33.
[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 133- 39.

ordinate officer during the Revolution but now his senior. The tact of Hamilton mollified Wilkinson to such a degree that he appears to have given excellent information and advice not only concerning the political and tactical situation on the frontiers, but also concerning morale and combat efficiency of the troops stationed there.[40] Acting on this advice and on his own observations, Hamilton informed the Secretary of War that the management of the supply agents was ". . . rediculously bad. Besides the extreme delay, which attends every operation, articles go forward in the most incomplete manner. . . ." McHenry, beyond giving the Purveyor, Tench Francis, an additional assistant, took no remedial action, so that Hamilton was again moved to write angrily to the Secretary of War that supply proceeded ". . . heavily and without order or punctuality . . . ill adapted to economy . . . and the contentment of the army . . . disjointed and piece-meal."[41] In addition to incompetence, lack of materials added to the supply difficulties which would have been acute had war required the mobilization of the full force authorized. The changes in uniform which Hamilton had adopted, while they bedizened the troops in a remarkable manner, tended further to complicate the supply situation without making any notable improvement in combat efficiency.

But the military system set up by the legislation and planning of 1798 and 1799 was never put into effect. The fall of the Directory in France in November 1799 and the emergence of the firmer, abler, conciliatory Napoleon soothed President Adams and the Congress into a pacific mood. Preparations for war ceased forthwith. Recruiting for the expanded force not only ceased, but the 3,399 already enlisted were ordered mustered out by 15 June 1800. To assuage the presumable grief of the officers and enlisted men at their abrupt dismissal from the Army, the Congress granted to each of them three months' pay, in addition to the allowance to get them home.[42] The Army, from its paper dream of 40,000 Regulars and 75,000 Provisionals, awakened to the dismal reality of 3,429 Regulars in mid-1800, and this handful of Regulars was scattered all over the frontier and Atlantic seaboard. The plans for mobilization in 1798–99 were abandoned as the emergency which had made them necessary ended. The War Department, suddenly stripped of its expansive legislation and its generals,[43] ceased to plan for mobilization, for preparedness, or for anything else, except current routine operations.

[40] Jacobs, *op. cit.*, pp. 227–28.

[41] Ltrs, Hamilton to McHenry, 14 Jun 1799; McHenry to Hamilton, 15 Jun 1799; Hamilton to McHenry 13 Aug 1799. Cited in Bernard C. Steiner, *The Life and Correspondence of James McHenry* (Cleveland, 1907), pp. 390–91, 409.

[42] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

[43] Washington had died at Mount Vernon on 14 Dec 1799. The commissions of the other generals expired with the legislation which had created them.

A New President Prepares the Army for Perpetual Peace

The inauguration of Jefferson on 4 March 1801 was not an auspicious event for the Army. The New President had an abiding conviction that professional armies were wrong; he had, too, a sublime faith that a citizen soldiery was the hope and bulwark of any honorably efficient military system. Acting on his convictions and his faith, Jefferson propounded his "chaste reformation" of the Army which included a reduction in the size of the already tiny Regular Army, whose continuance as a permanent institution he seriously questioned, and the improvement of the Militia by whatever aid was required to accomplish that purpose.

The Congress acceded to the first thesis: the Army was reduced. The Act of March 16, 1802, eliminated the Cavalry entirely, cut the Infantry strength from four regiments to two, Artillery from two to one, and cut down the General Staff.[44] Authorized strength of the Army, by this act, went from 5,438 officers and men (of whom 4,051 only were in ranks on 19 December 1801, recruiting to fill vacancies having been halted) to 3,312 officers and men (of whom only 2,732 were in ranks by 4 February 1805).[45] And the horse-drawn Artillery's horses were sold, an economy which immobilized the Artillery for 10 years. But the act which whittled the Army almost into nothingness did contain one section of lasting significance: the creation of a military academy at West Point. This act specified that ". . . the said corps, when so organized, shall be stationed at West Point, in the state of New York, and shall constitute a military academy; and the engineers, assistant engineers, and cadets of the said corps, shall be subject, at all times, to do duty in such places and on such service, as the President of the United States shall direct."

The most important event in Jefferson's first administration was the purchase of the Louisiana Territory on 30 April 1803. Only a little more than a year after the reduction of the Army, the territory of the United States was doubled and vast new military responsibilities acquired. The boundaries of the territory were uncertain particularly in the region around the mouth of the Mississippi; the population in the New Orleans area was principally French; the rest of the territory was populated only by Indians about whom little was known. The military implications of the Louisiana Purchase were ignored.

During the early years of Jefferson's administration, war with France, Spain, or England was possible. The Regular Army, however, was scattered over an ever increasing number of small posts, most of them on the expanding frontier. For some years, the public believed that strong fortifications could protect the country from invasion. The Congress appropriated considerable sums of money for

[44] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 141–49.
[45] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 155, 175–77.

these seaboard fortifications and took a keen interest in their state of readiness. To supplement the land batteries in their fortresses, Jefferson became convinced that a fleet of shallow draft gun boats was the economical and practical solution. The Congress concurred with the President[46] and some 69 of these tubby little gunboats were constructed by the end of 1807, each schooner rigged and armed with a battery of two guns, which, in any kind of sea, had to be stowed below decks to keep the little craft from capsizing. Secretary of War Henry Dearborn estimated that 257 gunboats were needed to protect the country, but production was stopped well short of that number.

Fortresses require cannons, and Dearborn, after some study, was concerned about the ability of American manufacturers to meet demands. He accordingly suggested to a master armorer, Henry Foxhall, that he build at his own expense on public land in Washington a foundry for the manufacture of heavy ordnance. Foxhall, with considerable reason, objected to such a proposal since, were Government orders to cease for any reason, he would be unable to keep the foundry in operation, thereby suffering great financial loss. Foxhall recommended instead that the Government build its own armory which, he urged, was "absolutely necessary" in any event as a yardstick to determine fair cost of ordnance and to enable standardization of artillery.[47] Dearborn's planning and concern, however, did not go so far as to spend public money for an ordnance foundry and the project was dropped. The United States, all through the War of 1812, was to suffer from want of artillery which the five hundred private foundries in the country were not able to manufacture fast enough or in sufficient quantity.[48]

Mobilization Measures, 1803–1808

The need for mobilization of ground forces in the event of war was apparently not deemed a matter of moment by the President from 1803 to 1808. There were several laws passed by the Congress which authorized some mobilization measures, but they created only paper soldiers for Jefferson failed to implement them.

On 3 March 1803 the Congress granted to the President authority to requisition from the states ". . . a detachment of militia not exceeding eighty thousand, officers included" to be held ". . . in readiness to march at a moment's warning." The act also provided that the detachments be officered out of the "present militia officers, or others, at the option and discretion of the constitutional authority in each state . . .; the President of the United States apportioning the general officers among the respective states." An appropriation of

[46] *Ibid,* I, p. 217.
[47] *Ibid.,* I, pp. 215–17.
[48] Jacobs, *op. cit.,* p. 277.

$1,500,000 to pay these troops, if mobilized, to purchase ordnance and military stores, and for other defense purposes, to be used at the discretion of the President, was included. The Militia detachments, if the President judged it expedient, could be composed of Volunteers, who would serve not more than 12 months.[49] This act was never implemented. It was significant only because it appropriated money and reverted to that Revolutionary War-proved weakness: selection of officers by the states. This lesson of the Revolution, remembered in the 1790's, was forgotten by 1803 and was not to be recalled until the next century. The increasing confidence of the Congress in the Volunteer Militia, rather than in the Common Militia, was also evident in legislation.

On 18 April 1806, in words almost exactly the same as the Act of March 3, 1803, the Congress renewed the President's authority to requisition up to 80,000 Militia from the states and appropriated $2,000,000 to cover expenses of mobilization. Period of service, however, was reduced to six months from the already weak one-year term.[50] Again, the President did not exercise the authority granted him: not a man was mobilized. Indeed, it was well over a year before the Secretary of War wrote to the governors informing them of their respective state quotas.

By the end of 1806, the Congress was becoming increasingly worried about defense but the War Department seemed less concerned. Dearborn continued vague and planless about troop mobilization and defense preparations.[51] In the meantime the Congress continued to legislate preparedness measures. The strength of the Regular Army, on 2 December 1807, as nearly as can be determined from War Department files, was about 3,338 officers, cadets, and enlisted men.[52] At the same time, Dearborn at the request of Congress estimated annual costs for a balanced army of 32,800 men which came to $8,087,943.[53]

While the United States considered its military establishment, France and Great Britain were fighting for supremacy in Europe. Great Britain had begun blockading the continent in May 1806 with its Orders in Council. Napoleon retaliated by setting up his Continental System, which decreed a paper blockade of Great Britain and closed the continent to British trade. American shipping fell prey to the competing forces, and to avoid war the Congress at the Administration's suggestion passed the Embargo Act of December 22, 1807, forbidding the departure of ships for foreign ports.

---

[49] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 169.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 198.
[51] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 206–07.
[52] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 222–23.
[53] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 224–27.

The issue of *physically* increasing the army, rather than just increasing it on paper, was debated in Congress through 1806, 1807, and the first two months of 1808. Finally on 26 February 1808 an aroused Jefferson, for the first time in his administration, formally requested the Congress to increase the Regular Army by 6,000 men.[54] He also recommended some augmentation of Volunteer Militia but on 3 March 1808 Congress reenacted the old standby legislation of March 3, 1803 (renewed in 1806) which provided a paper army of 80,000 Militia.[55] The Regular Army bill was passed by comfortable majorities and became law on 12 April 1808.

Act of April 12, 1808 and its Aftermath

The Regular Army increase voted was substantially as recommended by Dearborn and approved by the President. There were provided 6,000 troops which when added to the 3,300 Regulars already in the service would provide a Regular Army of 9,900 men.[56]

The Act of April 12, 1808, authorized a light artillery regiment, but since artillery units were expensive Secretary of War Dearborn, treading cautiously, authorized only one battery, whose horses were purchased in May 1808. The enthusiastic battery commander, Capt. George Peter, labored arduously to recruit and train his men, to assemble his equipment, and to train his animals. This promising beginning towards mobile artillery fire support came to an untimely and abrupt end in the spring of 1809 when a new Secretary of War, William Eustis, in the interest of economy ordered the artillery horses sold. This economy completely immobilized the artillery for three more years at a time when mobilization measures should have been emerging.[57]

President Jefferson, unpleasantly aware of the danger of war, was again urging some constructive legislation to strengthen the Militia. In his Eighth Annual Message to Congress he asked if the Militia could "repel a powerful enemy at every point of our territories exposed to invasion." [58] The Congress pondered this query and came to its customary decision in the matter on 3 January 1809. The members of a House Committee, ". . . have carefully examined the subject referred to them, are of the opinion that it would not be proper, at this time, to make any alteration in the militia system of the United States." [59]

---

[54] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, pp. 227–28.

[55] Callan, *op. cit.,* p. 200.

[56] *Ibid.,* pp. 200–05.

[57] William E. Birkhimer, *Historical Sketch of the Organization, Administration, Materiel and Tactics of the Artillery, United States Army* (Washington, 1884), pp. 34–36.

[58] Thomas Jefferson, *Eighth Annual Message to Congress,* 8 Nov 1808, in James D. Richardson, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1902* (Washington 1897), I, p. 443.

[59] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 236.

One additional provision of the Act of April 12, 1808, can be construed as a mobilization measure: it provided for the creation of two additional brigadier generals. With a fine weighing of political factors, the stars were given to Wade Hampton, from South Carolina, and to Peter Gansvoort, from New York. Political expediency was satisfied, but military ability was hardly considered.[60]

The administration of Jefferson terminated on 3 March 1809. During the last four years of that administration, the United States had teetered on the brink of war. Preparedness legislation had been enacted, but, in a practical sense, there had been no mobilization plans. Jefferson, during most of his years as President, had refused to plan for war; nor had he exercised the leadership which was his to secure from the Congress implementing mobilization legislation, except for recommending a more efficient Militia system, and on that subject the Congress was not disposed to heed him. At the same time Jefferson had multiplied the military responsibilities of the country by the vast Louisiana Purchase in 1803. Dearborn, Jefferson's Secretary of War for eight years, was completely loyal to his policies. He turned the Army into a kind of constabulary to police the Indians but left it unprepared and ill-equipped for war.

President Madison began his administration by reversing the already motionless preparedness measures. Under the pleasing misapprehension that relations with England and France had improved, the President ordered the gunboats still afloat to be tied up and released the Militia from alert status. Inasmuch as the gunboats were useless and the Militia something less than alert, the actions of the President were more indicative of a kindly, pacific nature than of any firm grasp of realities. In his first message to the Congress, which met on 22 May 1809, Madison went so far as to wonder whether it might not be feasible to reduce the Army and the Navy.

The Congress was not reluctant to consider the matter of reducing the Army. John Randolph promptly and enthusiastically demanded two days later that all Regular Army units raised under the Act of April 12, 1808, be discharged forthwith, and that the funds thereby saved be used to buy more arms for the Militia. The Secretary of War felt ". . . it expedient to reduce the military establishment at this time," but suggested that recruiting for the Army might be suspended provided the President was given discretionary power to renew it.

The Congress defeated Randolph's bill to abrogate the Act of April 12, 1808, but more for political reasons than for any considered concern for defense. (The bill would have diverted most of the money saved to the Militia of the southern states, a maneuver ex-

[60] Jacobs, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

tremely repugnant to northern Congressman.)[61] A few days later a measure was enacted suspending any more enlistments for the force, the suspension to continue until at least 20 days after the next meeting of Congress.[62] The President was *not* given discretionary power to resume enlistments; this Congress, like some that were to come later, was of the firm but fallacious impression that no emergency could occur so rapidly that the Congress could not move fast enough to cope with it.

The 11th Congress, in its several sessions, sat for 285 days without passing a single practical military preparedness measure. The President had vainly tried to lead the Congress to an awareness of possible war and to prepare for it to some extent, but Madison as a leader was ineffectual. Eustis had made some sensible recommendations to Congress which were not followed, but in the main Eustis was so lost in a morass of inconsequential detail that he was incapable of leading or advising the Congress on military matters. The War Department was without an adequate staff, headed by a confused Secretary, and undermanned in even clerical help; it stumbled along, inadequate to create a dynamic peacetime army and totally unprepared to fashion an army for war purposes. The 11th Congress conducted many a bitter investigation, engaged in many acid debates, but accomplished nothing practical as far as mobilization measures were concerned. On 30 January 1810 Eustis reported to the House that the "Peace Establishment" Regular Army now had an aggregate strength of 2,765 and that the "Additional Military Force" authorized by the Act of April 12, 1808, but for which recruiting had been suspended by Congress in 1809, had an aggregate strength of 4,189 or about two-thirds of the authorized strength. Out of the combined Regular Army strength, some 2,772 had been concentrated in the Orleans area by the early summer of 1809.[63]

The Indians Go On the Warpath

While Congress talked and Madison bickered with the British, war erupted on the frontier. William Henry Harrison, Governor of Indiana Territory, had been pushing westward with an acceleration which stripped the Indians of 48,000,000 acres of land in 14 years (1795–1809). The discontent of the Indians was unified and sharpened by the able chief Tecumseh and his brother the Prophet, a combination of sword and mysticism that kindled a crusading fervor in the Indians and alarmed the frontier. The War Department was to-

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 343.

[62] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

[63] The returns for 31 Oct 1809 reported that out of 1,667 men assigned to the Orleans area, 745 were sick, 9 confined, 499 absent, and 414 present for duty. A total of 686 died between May 1809 and March 1810. See: *Ibid.*, I, pp. 249–53, 270.

tally unprepared to solve the crisis except by leaving it to the man on the spot to improvise his own plans and to implement his own actions. The man on the spot this time was Harrison. Eustis gave tacit approval to some kind of military action by directing one company of the 4th Infantry to report to Harrison at Vincennes, but the rest of the regiment was to halt near Cincinnati; the Secretary also directed Harrison to mobilize four companies of the Indiana Militia. Disturbed by the War Department's inadequate measures, Harrison, on his own initiative, mobilized the *entire* Indiana Militia and ordered the *entire* 4th Infantry to report to him at Vincennes. With a 1,000-man force, rather than the 300 men authorized initially by Eustis, Harrison took off to reason with the Indians. His force had been strengthened by Kentucky volunteers when the Indians attacked at Tippecanoe and were soundly defeated on 7 November 1811.[64] Peace was restored on the frontier; the Indians sadly resumed their withdrawal to the west; and Harrison had established himself as a national hero at Tippecanoe. Mobilization of the force and conduct of this brief military campaign had been accomplished by Harrison without any plans or appreciable assistance from the War Department. Decentralization of authority to the man on the spot was complete.

The War Hawks

Conditions in Europe were still chaotic; the struggle for supremacy between Great Britain and France continued. The Embargo Act of 1807 had proved ineffective as far as forcing France and England to respect neutral shipping, but it had seriously hurt American shipping and was repealed 15 March 1809. It was followed by the Non-Intercourse Act of May 20, 1809, which permitted commerce with all countries except France and England; this act was in turn repealed in May 1810. Old disputes over the rights of neutral shipping remained unsettled, and the resumption of trade brought new ones.

The Congressional elections of 1810–11 changed not only the complexion but the spirit of the Congress. Almost 50 per cent of the members of the 11th Congress were defeated for reelection. There can be but little question that Madison's confused foreign and military policies, which were reflected in the leaderless 11th Congress, had aroused public opinion and brought into the 12th Congress the "War Hawks." These newly elected members included Henry Clay from Kentucky, John Sevier from Tennessee, John C. Calhoun from western South Carolina, and Peter P. Porter from western New York. Although the "War Hawks" did not have a majority in the House, they were politically clever enough to have Clay made Speaker, a vantage

[64] At Tippecanoe, Harrison had about 250 Regulars of the 4th Infantry, 600 Indiana Militia, 60 Kentucky Volunteers, and 270 assorted Mounted Dragoons from Indiana and Kentucky.

point that then controlled appointment to all important committees. The leadership of the 12th Congress steered for the war, beyond which they saw Canada ripe for annexation. This Congress first assembled on 4 November 1811 and it began to pass preparedness legislation before the year was over.

On 24 December 1811 the suspension of enlistments directed by the 11th Congress in 1809 was lifted.[65] On 2 January 1812 the President was given authority to raise six companies of Rangers for frontier duty.[66] On 11 January 1812 the Regular Army was authorized ten more regiments of Infantry, two of Artillery, and one of Light Dragoons, all to be enlisted for five years.[67] On 6 February 1812 the President was authorized to call for Volunteer companies up to 30,000 men, officers to come with the companies as appointed in the respective states; $1,000,000 was appropriated to provide for these Volunteers.[68] On 24 February 1812 the Congress authorized the President to buy horses and equipage for the Light Artillery which had been afoot and immobile since their horses had been sold in 1809.[69] And on 28 March 1812 the Army got a quartermaster general again, with a reasonable number of deputies and clerical help. The same act created a commissary general of purchases, under the direct supervision of the Secretary of War, thereby removing entirely the Treasury Department's hand from the War Department purse strings.[70]

The evident intent of the Congress—that the emergency be met by an expanded Regular Army—could not be complied with. The inadequate recruiting system and the antipathy throughout the country to Regular Army service made it impossible to increase the Regulars as fast or as much as the Congress had hoped. In this unforeseen emergency Congress continued to legislate. On 10 April 1812 the President was authorized to call out up to 100,000 Militia men for a period of six months.[71] Militia service was, as usual, more popular than the Regular Army. Still trying to make the service more desirable, this enactment also suspended flogging as an authorized punishment.

War With England: 1812

A flood of legislation [72] which was in keeping with public opinion perhaps weakened Madison's desire for peace. Castlereagh's reluc-

[65] Callan, *op cit.*, p. 211.
[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 211–12.
[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 212–15.
[68] *Ibid.*, pp. 215–16.
[69] *Ibid.*, pp. 216.
[70] *Ibid.*, pp. 217–20.
[71] *Ibid.*, pp. 222.
[72] On 23 Apr 1812 an act authorized a corps of artificers to be attached to the quartermaster general's department. Six days later, the Military Academy at West Point, which had come close to extinction during Eustis' waning months at the War Department, was revitalized by additional funds and other remedial legislation. The improvements legis-

tance to repeal the Orders in Council washed away with what was left of Madison's aversion to war. On 1 June 1812 the President sent the Congress a message recommending war against Great Britain for four reasons: impressment, violations of the three-mile limit, paper blockades, Orders in Council. On 18 June 1812 war was declared.[73] The vote in the House was 79 to 49 for war; 19 to 13 in the Senate. It was an amazing vote, for a majority of the Congressmen from New England, New York, and New Jersey, the maritime states which owned three-fourths of the Nation's ship tonnage and in whose supposed interest the war was declared, voted *against* the war. The inland and western states of Vermont, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, few of whose inhabitants had ever seen the sea and whose communities were both immune from Orders in Council and safe from the British fleet, came within one vote of unanimity for war.[74]

Mobilization Legislation Enacted on Advent of War

The 12th Congress, in its first session, had enacted 15 mobilization measures culminating in the war declaration. Following that declaration, the Congress passed six more military measures, one of which gave the President authority to commission officers for the Federal Volunteers. This authority had formerly been a prerogative of the governors. On 6 July 1812, with sublime assurance that the necessary legislation had been provided to ensure a quick and easy victory in a short war, the first session of the 12th Congress adjourned. It did not vote any new taxes nor any increase in the Navy. Public and legislative opinion was of the belief that the march to Canada would be an easy one.

On 18 June 1812, the day war was declared, the legislation which immediately preceded it had increased the *authorized* Regular Army strength to 35,603 officers and enlisted men. In addition, the President had been authorized to mobilize 30,000 Federal Volunteers, 100,000 State Militia, and a handful of Federal Rangers, making a total authorized strength for the land forces of about 166,000 men. The staff of the Army had been expanded so that there were now authorized two major generals, nine brigadier generals, a quartermaster general, a commissary general of purchases, a commissary of ordnance, an inspector general, an adjutant, a judge advocate general, a paymaster general and a surgeon general. The military academy at West Point had been strengthened and improved. Funds had been allotted

---

lated for West Point came too late to influence the war but would be felt later. By Jun 1812, only 89 cadets had finished a course at the Military Academy and of these only 65 were still in the Army. On 14 May 1812, the Congress further increased the Army's staff by creating an Ordnance Department to be headed by a commissary of ordnance. See Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 222, 223, 226.

[73] Two days earlier, on 16 Jun Castlereagh had announced in the House of Commons that the Orders in Council were suspended.

[74] Samuel E. Morison, *Oxford History of the United States* (London, 1927), I, p. 283.

to purchase arms, equipment, and clothing for the expanded force. These were mobilization measures which on the surface were sound, but in their execution something was lacking.

The immediate and clearest weakness of this legislation was that it came too late. The war and the legislation to prepare for war came almost simultaneously. There did not exist in the War Department a planning group of any kind which could match mobilization legislation with implementing mobilization plans. When the 12th Congress first assembled, the War Department consisted of Secretary Eustis and a staff of seven clerks. The senior general in the Army, Brig. Gen. James Wilkinson, had been away from Washington for most of his service and had had little influence on war policy or planning; questionable activities had incurred for him so much enmity that during the 1810–11 period he was kept busy defending himself before a court-martial and a Congressional investigating committee. The staff, before 1812, had been reduced to an adjutant-inspector general, a paymaster, and an adjutant. The expanded staff provided by the 12th Congress was, in the short time it existed before it was confronted with a war, hardly able to organize, let alone function.[75]

Furthermore, there had been no opportunity for staff training on any level, since regiments and battalions had no staff at all up to 1812. The heads of the staff departments on 18 June 1812 were not particularly capable men; the staff posts had been filled by men who lacked both training and experience, but it is doubtful if any better men were available. The tiny Regular Army, scattered in small detachments all over the frontier, had not provided the kind of service which trained officers to be leaders in large scale operations. The men commissioned for the expanded Army in many instances lacked military training and in most instances were political appointees. As Lt. Col. Winfield Scott described them, the older officers had ". . . very generally sunk into either sloth, ignorance, or habits of intemperate drinking"; the new officers were ". . . coarse and ignorant men . . . swaggerers . . . decayed gentlemen, and others—'fit for nothing else', which always turned out *utterly unfit for any military purpose whatever.*" [76]

---

[75] Eustis wrote to General Pinckney on 13 Jun 1812: "The late periods at which the laws respecting the several staff departments have passed, and the supplementary acts which became necessary, have delayed their organization and produced great embarrassments to the service. . . . In the present state of the several Staff Departments, extra official duties will devolve on commanding officers, requiring the exercise of great discretion, and involving no small degree of Responsibility. To organize them [the staff departments] as soon as possible, and in the best manner which the Law will admit, is the constant object of this Department." *Military Book No. 5, Letters Sent, Office of the Secretary of War,* pp. 441–42. Records of the Secretary of War. National Archives. Eustis' hopes were impossible to achieve, for there were so few commanding officers with enough experience to be able to exercise discretion or who were capable of assuming great responsibility.

[76] Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL. D.* (New York, 1864), pp. 31–35.

The dearth of leaders for the Army was as acute on the highest stratum of command as in the staff and small unit echelons. The expanded Army authorized by Congress in 1812 provided two major generals, where there had been none, and nine additional brigadier generals, where there had been three.[77] Eustis was able to fill these senior vacancies faster than the recruiting service could fill the ranks, but the selections were politically influenced. The appointees were old men, most of whom had not had military service for many years.[78] The ranking major general was Henry Dearborn, who had been Secretary of War himself for eight years and who was, in 1812, Collector of the Port of Boston, an assignment befitting his 62 years. The second major general, Thomas Pinckney, had served ably in the Revolution but had had no military service since then; he was now 61 years old.

Laws had been passed creating a Regular Army of over 35,000 men, but Eustis reported to the Congress on 5 June 1812 that the Army numbered 6,744 men and his breakdown, showing where they were stationed, accounted for only 5,087; the discrepancy of 1,657 consisted presumably of recruits not yet present with their units.[79] This was hardly indicative of an enthusiastic flocking to the Colors. It was easy to understand this reluctance to enlist for eighteen months or for five years when glory, martial ardour, and financial enrichment could be satisfied by a two- or three-month tour in the Militia. But difficulties were quick to occur in the mobilization of the Militia too. Eustis had allocated the quotas to the states to raise the 100,000 Militia authorized by the Congress on 10 April 1812 and had written to the governors directing them to mobilize and equip their allotted number.[80] The governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island promptly refused to obey the order, which, they maintained, was not constitutional and therefore illegal. This depletion of 13,500 men cut down the 100,000 Militia by nearly 15 per cent. There were im-

[77] Two of the three had been created by the Act of April 12, 1808; until 1808, Wilkinson had been the only active general officer in the Army.

[78] The Navy, on the other hand, during the Barbary campaigns had developed young, vigorous leaders: John Rodgers, David Porter, James Lawrence, Oliver H. Perry, Isaac Hull, Stephen Decatur, but these capable naval commanders were handicapped by the absence of a Navy. The strategists in Congress and the elder statesmen, from Jefferson down, had decreed that this was to be a land war.

[79] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 319–20.

[80] The state quotas were as follows:

New Hampshire	3,500	Maryland	6,000
Massachusetts	10,000	Virginia	12,000
Connecticut	3,000	No. Carolina	7,000
Rhode Island	500	So. Carolina	5,000
Vermont	3,000	Georgia	3,500
New York	13,500	Kentucky	5,500
Pennsylvania	14,000	Ohio	5,000
Delaware	1,000	Tennessee	2,500
New Jersey	5,000		

See: *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, p. 319.

mediate questions raised, too, concerning the legality of the Federal Government's employing Militia outside the United States or even outside its home state.[81]

Manpower Mobilization: Problems and Procedures

Recruiting for the Regular Army was as slow and discouraging as it had been during the Revolutionary War and for the same reasons. The greater attractiveness of short-term Militia tours with their high bonuses and the absence of any kind of compulsion to bring men into the service were handicaps which the Regular Army recruiting teams with small immediate $16 bonuses and nebulous future land grants could not overcome. Disturbed by the emptiness of the Regular regiments, the Congress, again in session, tried to remedy the situation by such expedients as increasing the pay for all enlisted grades; exempting enlisted men from arrest for debt; making the term of enlistment the duration of the war instead of five years; advancing the enlistees $24 of their pay; and increasing the premium for enlistees from $2 to $4.[82]

To ease the situation further, the Act of January 20, 1813, authorized recruiting officers to enlist for the Regular Army any man then performing Militia service. Having taken these measures which, in a more diluted form had already proved ineffective, the Congress optimistically voted on 29 January to increase the Regular Army by six major generals, six brigadier generals, and by twenty additional regiments (the latter for one year).[83] This brought the total authorized strength of the Regular Army to 58,354; but in February 1813 only 19,036 men were in regular service.

The President had also been authorized to raise up to 30,000 Federal Volunteers and 17 companies of Rangers.[84] Recruits were as reluctant to join these Federal Volunteer forces as they were to join the Regular Army. The *Army Register*, an innovation of 29 December 1813, listed enough officers of Volunteer units for perhaps 12 companies of Rangers, 46 companies of United States Volunteers, and 5 companies of Sea Fencibles (a specially qualified volunteer organization for seacoast defense).[85] Even assuming that these companies were full strength, their total in 1813 could not have been much more than five thousand men, hardly enough to make them an appreciable factor. These Federal Volunteer units took over some of the seacoast fortifications and a few frontier posts, thereby relieving Regular troops to fight.

---

[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 321–26.
[82] Acts of Dec. 12, 1812 and Jan. 20, 1813. See: Callan, *op cit.*, pp. 236–38.
[83] Act of Jan. 29, 1813. *Ibid.*, pp. 238–40.
[84] Federal Volunteers should not be confused with State Volunteers or Volunteer Militia.
[85] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 421–23.



This amusing caricature of the men recruited for the War of 1812 is the work of D. C. Johnston and was first published in 1832. This form of art was popular during the early nineteenth century.

Figure 1. Caricature of 1812.

Eustis was succeeded in the War Department by Maj. Gen. John Armstrong on 13 January 1813 and the negative weaknesses of Eustis gave way to the positive weaknesses of Armstrong. Armstrong did have some understanding of military administration which may have been responsible for the publication of the *Army Register* and of the vastly more important *Rules and Regulations of the Army of the United States*, dated 1 May 1813.[86] This forerunner of *Army Regulations*, published eleven months after the war began, contained such valuable information as the duties of the different staff officers, rules for promotion, uniform regulations (in great detail), pay scales, clothing allowances and costs, recruiting instructions, rules for Militia drafts, etc. The exigencies of administering an expanded wartime Army through a newly created and not yet actively competent staff had become so manifold and disturbing that decentralization was the only solution. The *Rules and Regulations* divided the country into nine military administrative districts with a brigadier general in command of each district.[87]

Recruiting for the Regular Army and for the Federal Volunteers, being an administrative function, was made a responsibility of the military district commander who was directed to set up a principal

[86] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 425–38.

[87] Division of the country into supply districts for the letting of ration contracts had been found so practical during the Revolution that the system had been continued and was still in effect; there was no apparent planned effort made in 1813, however, to make the military districts and ration supply districts correspond. Where they were the same that sensible uniformity was the result of blending of coincidence with geography.

rendezvous and such minor depots for recruits as he deemed necessary. The Commissary General of Purchases was directed to deposit at each principal recruit rendezvous, a "sufficient quantity of clothing, arms, accoutrements, ammunition, camp equipage, and medicine" [88] for the quota of regulars to be recruited in the district. Replenishment of these recruit supplies was to be on requisitions made by the district commander, who also was given bounty and premium funds to allot to the recruiting teams. These teams were composed of officers and enlisted men from Regular Army regiments who were charged with recruiting men for their own units.[89] The recruiters were enjoined not to accept any ". . . person . . . who has sore legs, scurvy, scald head, ruptures, or other infirmities . . . No objection is to be made to a recruit for want of size, provided he be strong, active, well made, and healthy." [90] The oath of service was subscribed to before a civil magistrate within six days of enlistment. Recruiting parties were to report the following week to the district commander: the strength of the recruiting party; the number, names, and description of recruits enlisted the past week; and an accounting for funds, property, and recruit clothing. The recruits, with their up-to-date service records, were forwarded from local depots to the principal recruit rendezvous, within seven days of enlistment, where they would be formed into squads or companies for basic training and disciplining. District commanders were held responsible for the good conduct, order, and discipline of recruiting parties and for the efficiency of the recruiting system. It was a reasonably efficient and simple mobilization system, but general unfamiliarity with it due to its late promulgation and even more general failure to comply with all of its provisions sometimes made it extremely difficult for the War Department to keep informed of the status of enlistments. On 22 October 1814 The Adjutant-Inspector General was aggrievedly informing a committee of the Senate that two regiments (the 40th Infantry and the 46th Infantry) had not submitted any recruit returns at all and that several other regiments were late submitting their returns.[91] The concern of the War Department and of Congress over possible misuse of bounty funds by recruiting officers appears to have been unfounded; the number of recruits closely approximated the bounty and premium funds expended for such purposes.[92]

The dearth of Regulars and Federal Volunteers was to continue during the entire war. [See *table 2.*] There was again proved the immu-

[88] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 432.

[89] The methods used by the recruiting teams included the familiar fife and drum psychology, appeals to patriotism and self-interest, plus the usual judicious application of rum.

[90] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, pp. 432–33.

[91] *Ibid.,* I, p. 518.

[92] *Ibid.,* I, pp. 518–19.

table fact that a man, when given a choice, would choose a short-term enlistment with a high bounty in a Militia unit rather than a long-term enlistment with a relatively small bounty in a Regular Army unit. James Monroe relieved Armstrong as Secretary of War 27 September 1814 after the Bladensburg debacle which Armstrong and President Madison had witnessed first hand. Monroe soon became convinced that the failures in the recruiting service were due in most states ". . . principally to the high bounty given for substitutes by the detached Militia. Many of the Militia detached for six months have given a greater sum for substitutes than the bounty allowed by the United States for a recruit to serve for the war." [93] The Congress made some attempts to correct this defect by increasing the bounty (in 1814) to $124 payable in three installments; by increasing the land grant, on honorable discharge, to 320 acres; and by raising the premium for recruits to $8.[94] These measures increased the cost of Volunteer enlistments but did not materially increase their numbers.

Table 2. Number of Troops Employed in the War of 1812.[a]*

Type of troops	Number	Term of service	Number
Total	527, 654	Total	527, 654
Regulars [b]	56, 032	12 months or more [b]	63, 179
Special Federal Volunteers [c]	13, 159	6–12 months	66, 325
Federal Volunteers	10, 110	3–6 months	125, 643
Rangers	3, 049	1–3 months	125, 307
Militia [c]	458, 463	Less than 1 month	147, 200

[a] Audited statistics for the War of 1812 are not available, but figures quoted are the ones most generally accepted.

[b] Includes 5,000 sailors and marines.

[c] Since the majority of this force was employed for short intervals at various times and some served or enlisted many times, the number of individuals who actually served cannot be estimated.

*Source: Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington, 1907), p. 137.

The lack of Regulars and Federal Volunteers during the war made it necessary for the President to have recourse to Militia calls which had been authorized by the Congress under the Act of April 10, 1812. In general, the state governors, after receiving notice of the quota of the state's Militia which *might* be required and which they were directed to have in readiness for immediate mobilization, took no action other than the publication of a state general order, until a specific request to furnish the whole or part of the quota was made. These state general orders subdivided the state's quota to various divisions and brigades and directed the commanders thereof to furnish the

[93] *Ibid.*, I, p. 519.

[94] Callan, *op cit.*, p. 250.

required number whenever called on by the authorized Regular Army officer. When that call came, Militiamen were directed to come furnished with arms and equipment, but the orders provided that those who were short would be supplied on their arrival at designated rendezvous points where depositories of arms and equipment were kept. The Militiamen were required to march to the rendezvous area where they would be inspected and mustered into the Federal service.

The specific call or request for Militia from a state would be made by an Army officer, usually of general's rank, to whom the President especially delegated the authority to call on certain governors for a stipulated number of Militia. The United States officer would issue his requisition to the governor, expressing the number of privates, non-commissioned officers, and officers required.[95] The Militia unit commanders, on receipt of a call for a detachment, would assemble their commands and call for volunteers to meet the quota. When oratory and exhortation failed to produce the required number of Militia volunteers, a judicious threat of a draft and, if need be, the carrying out of the threat supplied the men, who were then "in the Army" for the customary short tour. Usually the drafted Militiaman had the option of furnishing a substitute. As soon as 100 privates, 11 non-commissioned officers, and 5 officers were mobilized and formed into a company, they were inspected by an inspector general or other designated Regular Army officer, and mustered into the Federal service.[96]

There had been little advance preparation for the selection of sites for recruit rendezvous depots or for necessary construction there of barracks and other facilities. In March of 1812, the Secretary of War, suddenly realizing that some kind of camps would be necessary and that some kind of troop housing thereat would be desirable, wrote

[95] The former practice of requisitioning so many companies, battalions, regiments, or brigades had been found so loose and inefficient that it had been discontinued.

[96] *The Rules and Regulations of the Army of the United States for 1813* contained a section entitled "Rules with Regard to Militia Draughts":

1st. All militia detachments for the service of the United States must be made under the requisition of some officer of the United States, (to be hereafter authorized to make such requisition) on the Executive authority of the State, or of the territory from which the detachments shall be drawn.

2d. In these requisitions shall be expressed the number of privates, non-commissioned and commissioned officers required; which shall be in the same proportions to each other as obtain in the regular army. The looser method of requiring regiments or brigades will be discontinued.

3d. So soon as one hundred privates, eleven non-commissioned, and five commissioned officers, shall have been organized as a company, under any requisition as aforesaid, they will be mustered and inspected by an Inspector General, or his assistant, or some other officer of the army of the United States, thereto specially appointed; upon whose rolls and reports they will be entitled to pay, &c.

4th. It shall be the duty of the officer so mustering and inspecting militia detachments, to make immediate report thereof to the War Department; and

5th. Payment will be made through the regimental paymaster, in all cases in which the corps shall be organized as a regiment; and in all cases in which it shall fall short of the number necessary to that organization, by the Paymaster accompanying the army or division to which it may belong.

See: *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, p. 443.

to the military agents and to the senior Army and Militia officers directing them to select camp sites and to begin construction or to rent suitable buildings; but the instructions were both broad and vague.

Training at first was omitted almost entirely. There were few officers or noncommissioned officers qualified to instruct recruits. The Military Academy at West Point which had been established in 1802 had graduated only 89 officers by the beginning of the War of 1812; 73 of these graduates served in the Army during the war years, but most of them held low rank. So few men, trained only for a year or two at West Point, could have had little effect on the wartime Army.[97] There was also a dearth of training literature. So apparent was the unfortunate effect of the lack of training on recruits that there were repercussions on the floors of Congress.[98]

In the field, there were a few efforts to rectify the poor or absent training procedures. Brig. Gen. George McClure in December 1813, at Batavia, N. Y., set up a kind of recruit training camp under the command of 1st Lt. David Riddle, a Regular officer of some ability.[99] This effort, however significant it may have been as the first replacement training camp in the United States, was on too limited a scale to influence appreciably the Army's efficiency. Far more important was the training camp set up by Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott near Buffalo, in 1914. Here officers were put through a practical training program at the conclusion of which they gave the same training to their men. The beneficial aspects of this training were notable in those units which were subject to it, but the program was late and certainly not Army-wide.[100] Its importance lay in the fact that the concept of proper training methods was taking root in American military consciousness. During the War of 1812, there were still not enough officers imbued with that concept, but the foundation was laid.

Training literature, although more extensive than it had been during the Revolutionary War, was not readily available, nor was it of much tactical value. Besides the *Rules and Regulations of the Army of the United States* and the *Army Register*, there were some stilted manuals on formal infantry and field artillery parade-ground drill formations.[101]

So short were the enlistment periods of many Militia units that the Militiamen were ready for discharge before an attempt could be

---

[97] George W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy* (Cambridge 1891), I. In addition to the 73 graduates from the 1802–12 classes, 1 man was graduated in 1813 and 30 in 1814, all of whom served in the closing months of the war.

[98] Speech, Thomas R. Gold, 29 Dec. 1812, in *Abridgement of the Debates of Congress* (Washington, 1861), IV, p. 615.

[99] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 487.

[100] Charles Winslow Elliott, *Winfield Scott, the Soldier and the Man,* (New York, 1937), p. 146.

[101] Amasa Smith, *A Short Compendium of the Duty of Artillerists* (2d ed.; Boston, 1813), was typical of the training literature available.

made to accomplish the mission for which they had been mobilized. Time was always so short that there was almost no opportunity for training. It is no wonder that the untrained, often shoddily equipped Militia frequently deserted on contact with uncomfortable field service or broke on contact with danger. Commanders were constantly harassed by the uneasy choice of using untrained, undisciplined, untrustworthy, poorly equipped Militia, or of seeing them go home, unused, after a few weeks. Neither solution was beneficial to military reputations.

The Monroe Proposals for a National Military Policy

The difficulty securing Regulars and unfortunate reverses suffered by the Militia at Bladensburg so concerned the Congress that Sen. William B. Giles, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, in September 1814 appealed to Secretary of War Monroe for information on two points: what was wrong with the military establishment and what legislation was needed to correct defects.[102]

Monroe, after three weeks' deliberation, responded in some detail. After recommending some staff augmentations and increases for the Engineer Corps and the Ordnance Department, he made his strongest recommendation for necessary measures to fill the Regular Army and to expand it by a force of 40,000 men specially trained for ". . . defence of our cities and frontiers." To bring the Regular Army to authorized strength, Monroe submitted four alternate plans for the consideration of the congressional committee. The first and preferred plan outlined a sort of Federal draft, applying to all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45. For the implementation of this draft, the entire free male population between 18 and 45 would be divided into classes of 100 men each, the classification to be based on equal distribution of property among the several classes. Each class would furnish four men for the war, and would ". . . replace them in the event of casualty." If any class failed to provide the men required of it within the time specified, then four men from the class would be drafted (anyone so drafted could furnish a substitute). Bounties of money and land for each recruit would be furnished by a tax levied on ". . . all the inhabitants within the precinct of the class within which the draught may be made, equally, according to the value of the property which they may respectively possess." To execute such a law, Monroe suggested three alternative bodies: (1) the county courts through the United States; (2) the Militia officers in each county; (3) *particular* persons appointed for that purpose in each county.[103]

These recommendations, which called for Federal legislation embodying national obligation to serve. selective service, local administra-

[102] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 514.

[103] The entire plan submitted by Monroe to Senator Giles is in *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, pp. 514–21.

tion, and imposition of military duty directly on the citizen without the states as intermediaries, form the first Federal selective service plan in United States history. Except for the unfortunate substitute provision, the recommendations of Monroe contain most of the principles of the selective service system which finally evolved in the United States in the 20th century world wars.[104] Tremendously significant is the legal reasoning with which Monroe buttressed his plan for a compulsive draft:

> Nor does there appear to be any well founded objection to the right in Congress to adopt this plan, or to its equality in its application to our fellow-citizens individually. Congress have [*sic*] a right, by the constitution, to raise regular armies, and no restraint is imposed on the exercise of it, except in the provisions which are intended to guard generally against the abuse of power, with none of which does this plan interfere. It is proposed that it shall operate on all alike; that none shall be exempted from it except the Chief Magistrate of the United States and the Governors of the several States.
>
> It would be absurd to suppose that Congress could not carry this power into effect, otherwise than by accepting the voluntary service of individuals. It might happen that an army could not be raised in that mode, whence the power would have been granted in vain. The safety of the State might depend on such an army. Long continued invasions, conducted by regular, well disciplined troops, can best be repelled by troops kept constantly in the field, and equally well disciplined. . . . The grant to Congress to raise armies, [*sic*] was made with a knowledge of all these circumstances, and with an intention that it should take effect. The framers of the constitution, and the States who ratified it, knew the advantage which an enemy might have over us, by regular forces, and intended to place their country on an equal footing.
>
> The idea that the United States cannot raise a regular army in any other mode than by accepting the voluntary service of individuals, is believed to be repugnant to the uniform construction of all grants of power, and equally so to the first principles and leading objects of the federal compact. An unqualified grant of power gives the means necessary to carry it into effect. This is a universal maxim, which admits of no exception. Equally true is it, that the conservation of the State is a duty paramount to all others. The commonwealth has a right to the service of all its citizens; or rather, the citizens composing the commonwealth have a right, collectively and individually, to the service of each other, to repel any danger which may be menaced. The manner in which the service is to be apportioned among the citizens, and rendered by them, are objects of legislation. . . .
>
> The plan proposed is not more compulsive than the militia service, while it is free from most of the objections to it. The militia service calls from home, for long terms, whole districts of county. None can elude the call. Few can avoid the service; and those who do are compelled to pay great sums for substitutes. This plan fixes on no one personally . . . It is a principal object of this plan to engage in the defense of the State the unmarried and youthful, who can best defend it, and best be spared, and to secure to those who render this important service an adequate compensation from the voluntary contributions of the more wealthy, in every class. . . .
>
> The limited powers which the United States have in organizing the militia may be urged as an argument against their right to raise regular troops in

[104] Duggan, *op cit.*, pp. 13–14.

the mode proposed. If any argument could be drawn from that circumstance, I should suppose that it would be in favor of an opposite conclusion. The power of the United States over the militia has been limited, and that for raising regular armies granted without limitation. There was doubtless some object in this arrangement. The fair inference seems to be, that it was made on great consideration; that the limitation, in the first instance, was intentional, the consequence of the unqualified grant in the second. But it is said, that, by drawing the men from the militia service into the regular army, and putting them under regular officers, you violate a principle of the constitution, which provides that the militia shall be commanded by their own officers. If this was the fact, the conclusion would follow. But it is not the fact. The men are now drawn from the militia but from the population of the country. When they enlist voluntarily, it is not as militia men that they act, but as citizens. If they are draughted [*sic*] it must be in the same sense. In both instances, they are enrolled in the militia corps; but that, as is presumed, cannot prevent the voluntary act in the one instance or the compulsive in the other. The whole population of the United States, within certain ages, belong to these corps. If the United States could not form regular armies from them, they could raise none.[105]

In assessing the proper weight of these constitutional arguments by Monroe for a compulsive mobilization of manpower, it must be remembered that he was Secretary of War in Madison's cabinet. The inference is that Madison approved his Secretary's reasoning; and since Madison was one of the framers of the Constitution, Monroe's interpretations in all probability were in accord with those of the Constitution makers.[106]

In the second of his four plans, Monroe recommended the classification of the Militia into three age groups: 18 to 25; 25 to 32; and 32 to 45. The President would have authority to call into service any portion of one or more of these classes, as he deemed necessary, for two years of service, with no provision for substitution.[107] This second plan thus also contained Federal compulsion applied directly on citizens.

The third plan provided for the exemption from Militia service of every five men who could find one man to enlist for the war. Plan four, a last alternative in the event the Congress was unable to concur with any of the first three plans, would continue the system already unsuccessfully in effect, but with an increase in the land bounties for en-

[105] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 515–16.

[106] In further support of this intent of the framers of the Constitution is one of Hamilton's arguments in the pre-United States *Federalist Papers:* ". . . if we are in earnest about giving the union energy and duration, we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the states in their collective capacities; we must extend the laws of the federal government to the individual citizens of America." *The Federalist, op. cit.*, No. XXIII, p. 197. So shaken had Jefferson been by some of the catastrophies of the war that on 1 Jan 1815 he wrote approvingly to Monroe: "But you have two more causes of uneasiness; the want of men and money. For the former, nothing more wise or efficient could have been imagined than what you proposed. It would have filled our ranks with regulars, and . . . it would have rendered our militia, like those of the Greeks and Romans, a nation of warriors." Paul L. Ford, (ed.) *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (New York, 1892–99), IX, p. 497.

[107] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, p. 516.

listment. Plans three and four were not recommended by Monroe with any enthusiasm or apparent hope that they would ameliorate the situation.

After considerable debate, in which the opposition to the plans was ably led by Daniel Webster, the Congress finally enacted plan four of Monroe's proposals just before the war was terminated on 24 December 1814 by the Treaty of Ghent. By this treaty, both sides agreed to disagree on all important matters except the termination of hostilities and the restoration of the prewar boundaries. The victory of Jackson at New Orleans, two weeks after the war was over, was indicative of the slowness of communications.

Procurement for the War

There was no adequate planning for procurement and supply either before or during the war. There had been some concern in the War Department, prior to the beginning of the war, concerning the adequacies of small arms and cannon manufacture. Government armories for the manufacture of small arms had been established and were believed adequate, as indeed they were, for this war. However, the statement that the Nation's civilian foundries could produce sufficient artillery ordnance was too optimistic. The War Department's appraisal of the ordnance situation was based on an inadequate survey of the situation.[108] There was no ordnance staff officer or department until the passage of an act on 14 May 1812 on the eve of the war.[109] The recommendation of Henry Foxhall, made to Secretary of War Dearborn in 1807, that a national cannon foundry be constructed had been filed but not acted upon.[110] The value of educational orders had been sensed in the War Department quite early, and before 1812 some contracts had been let with this principle in mind. But these contracts had been so few and small as to have no effect on procurement during the war.

All stores, other than rations, for the peacetime Regular Army were sent to the depot at Philadelphia and were issued from there. The Superintendent of Military Stores at Philadelphia, therefore, was a key man in the supply system.[111] Callender Irvine, who became the first Commissary General of Purchases when that staff department was created in 1812, had been Superintendent of Military Stores from 24 October 1804 to 8 August 1812. During that period he had made some surveys on the capacity of American manufacturers to produce adequate amounts of military supplies, particularly uniform materials, and had come to the conclusion that American industry could *not* produce enough pants, coats, and shirts even for the peacetime

[108] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 303–07.
[109] Callan, *op cit.*, pp. 226–27.
[110] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 215–17.
[111] Jacobs, *op cit.*, pp. 259–60.

Army, let alone an expanded Army. Unwilling to accept so gloomy an estimate, Eustis, in 1811, had directed Tench Coxe, Purveyor of Public Supplies (the Treasury official then responsible for Army procurement and purchasing), to make an effort to clothe the Army, employing only United States manufacturers.[112] Coxe, after a hurried survey confidentially assured Eustis that the country's manufacturers could produce enough woolen, cotton, and linen textiles to meet the needs of the Army, but that prices might be exorbitant. But Coxe was basing his estimates on the peacetime Army of 5,000 men, so that his planning, fallacious for 5,000, became ludicrous for several hundred thousand.[113]

Unheeding the warnings from Irvine, textile manufacturers agreed with Coxe and boasted of their patriotic determination to furnish all the cloth the Army required. The Nation's press, overcome with an overdose of pride, was quoting statements in the spring of 1812 that abundant provision had been made to supply the Army with clothing of "American manufacture." [114] Not to be outdone, the legislature of Massachusetts (the state whose governor refused to provide any Militia to fight in the war) proudly asserted that Massachusetts alone could supply the central Government with all necessary clothing for any emergency.[115]

In contrast with these claims, Commissary General of Purchases Irvine in 1814 informed the Congress that in 1813 he had been forced to purchase over 26 per cent of the cloth for the Army abroad.[116] There is strong evidence, too, that a measurable proportion of the 74 per cent purchased in the United States had been manufactured abroad and smuggled in. This disturbing failure to achieve the claims made becomes all the more reprehensible when it is realized that the country could have done better: many United States textile manufacturers, able to sell their cloth in a rising civilian market, refused to sell to the Army.[117]

As the war fronts expanded, the Commissary General of Purchases had to decentralize his purchasing to the nine military districts. Depots were established in all of those districts, and supplies were eventually delivered to the nearest depot rather than to the main

---

[112] *Military Book No. 5, Letters Sent, Office of the Secretary of War,* Eustis to Coxe, 24 May 1811 and 14 Jun 1811, pp. 138–39, 157. Records of the Secretary of War. National Archives.

[113] In a comprehensive report, "Digest of Manufacturers," prepared for the Secretary of the Treasury 21 Jun 1813, Coxe reaffirmed his previous estimate by stating: "It may be safely affirmed, that there is no irremovable obstacle to the manufacture of every species of arms, and almost every supply of war, of good qualities, and in sufficient quantities." *American State Papers, Finance.* II, pp. 675–76.

[114] Hezekiah Niles, *The Weekly Register* (Baltimore, 1811–49), III, p. 6.

[115] *Ibid.,* II, p. 17.

[116] *American State Papers, Finance,* II, p. 818.

[117] Ltr, Commissary General of Purchases Callender Irvine to SW John C. Calhoun, 3 Jun 1819, in *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* II, p. 43.

depot at Philadelphia, thereby expediting supply handling by cutting down transportation distances. But with no kind of stock accounting system in effect at the subdepots. military commanders simply drew what they desired at the nearest depot without hampering formality of written requisitions, and supply became not only unaccountable but chaotic.

The supply of rations by civilian contract, a dubious holdover from the Revolutionary War, had been a matter of complaint and dissatisfaction before the second war with England. The War Department, however, had made no plans to change the system. Ration contracts during the War of 1812 were let in the ration supply districts to civilians who would then supply rations to all troops stationed in or moving through the district. With an amazing lack of planning vision, there was no provision made for rationing troops who might, during the course of invading enemy territory, get outside of the United States. The patent weaknesses of this method of supplying food to troops in wartime were summed up in 1818 by the Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, in a letter to the House of Representatives:

> The defects of the mere contract system is so universally acknowledged by those who have experienced its operation in the late war, that it cannot be necessary to make many observations in relation to it. Nothing can appear more absurd than that the success of the most important military operations, on which the very fate of the country may depend, should ultimately rest on men who are subject to no military responsibility, and on whom there is no other hold than the penalty of a bond. When we add to this observation, that it is often the interest of a contractor to fail at the most critical juncture, when the means of supply become the most expensive, it seems strange that the system should have continued for a single campaign.[118]

The supply of rations to the Army by civilian contractors continued until 14 April 1818 when a staff Subsistence Department, headed by a Commissary General of Subsistence, was created by the Congress.[119]

Further complicating the procurement of supplies was the authority granted to myriads of individuals—commanding officers, deputy quartermasters, etc.—to make emergency purchases of any supplies not furnished through the regular channels. Officers unfamiliar with Army accounting procedures frequently had difficulty keeping their records accurately. The purchase and issue of these emergency supplies would have completely confused any supply accounting had not the condition of that accounting already been chaotic. The Congress, dimly aware of this unhealthy condition, attempted to rectify it in mid-war by the creation of the Office of Superintendent General of Military Supplies, whose mission was to keep accounts of all military supplies and stores purchased or distributed for the use of the Army

[118] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 781–82.
[119] Callan, *op cit.*, p. 286.

of the United States, for the Militia and Volunteers, by the various officers of the Quartermaster's Department, by the regimental quartermaster, by hospital surgeons, officers of the Hospital Department and Medical Department, and by all other persons, officers, or agents who should have received, distributed, or been entrusted with such stores and supplies.[120]

This war, for the first time in United States history, saw women and children utilized in the manufacture of munitions. Their employment, however, was not due to a shortage of manpower, but rather to the fact that women and children were far less expensive as labor than were men. Nevertheless, the lesson was indicated that in the event of war, the manpower availability pool could be expanded by the inclusion of women and, if need be, children.

Transportation, which had been so serious a problem during the Revolutionary War, was again troublesome and difficult in the War of 1812. Not only were the roads to the fighting fronts almost as poor as they had been 35 years before, but there had been no plans made for procuring horses and wagons. Transportation had to be secured in emergencies at exorbitant cost and with great difficulty.

Both the United States and Canada considered control of the Great Lakes a vital adjunct to the fighting of a successful war. But until March 1813, there had been no plans made or action taken in the United States towards building the ships which would be needed for this purpose. The ships with which Capt. Oliver H. Perry and Comdr. Thomas Macdonough won their notable success on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain were not built until 1813. Here again, lack of mobilization planning to provide the necessary tools of war impeded the war effort and contributed to several months of military disasters for the United States along the Lakes front.

The overall summation of mobilization planning and execution in the United States during the War of 1812 not only showed inefficiency and errors but indicated that nothing had been learned from the lessons of the Revolutionary War and the campaigns in the Northwest Territory.

The Lessons of the War

The lessons of the Revolutionary War, which were repeated and intensified in the War of 1812, are reasonably obvious:

1. Mobilization of manpower and resources for war must be planned in advance to avoid inefficiency, waste, and defeats.

2. Mobilization planning and implementation can never be accomplished in advance without an integrated, well-coordinated staff to which that mission has been assigned.

---

[120] Act of March 3, 1813; See: Callan, *op cit.*, pp. 242–44.

3. Unity of command and coordinated staff planning, rather than independent staff bureaus, are vitally necessary for efficient military operations.

4. Volunteering will not provide sufficient manpower for the armed services in a protracted war: some kind of compulsion must be resorted to.

5. Untrained troops of any classification, be it Militia, Volunteers, or Regulars, are unsatisfactory and expensive. The inescapable corollary of this is that proper training of troops requires a certain minimum time and that if Militia are to be employed as soon as they are mobilized, their peacetime training must be efficient.

6. Short-term enlistments are harmful because they allow time neither for efficient training of the men nor for long-range tactical planning for their employment.

7. Procurement for the armed forces in war must be based on sound assessment of the nation's economic and industrial capacity and must include some arbitrary allocation of resources to ensure a flow of supplies to sustain the war effort. Where critical shortages exist in national resources, some assured means of supply must be secured, whether it be by stockpiling or other means.

8. Women and, if need be, children, can be advantageously employed in the manpower availability pool, particularly in farming and industry.

9. The supply of rations to the armed forces by the civilian contract system is unserviceable at any time and perniciously dangerous in wartime.

10. Transportation and routes of supply must indispensably be provided for in war planning.

11. Military leaders cannot be trained overnight. Aptitude in business or in politics is not necessarily a sound indicator of military leadership qualifications.

12. Military training, to be truly efficient, must have adequate training literature and competent instructors.

These were the lessons, twice taught in the first two major wars of the United States. Only lesson 9 was well learned, for the contract ration supply system was abandoned in 1818. The other lessons were to be taught again many times in succeeding wars, but they were never to be learned until the world wars of the 20th century.

CHAPTER III

THE WAR WITH MEXICO

The end of the War of 1812 was also the end of the military establishment that had been created to fight that war. On 3 March 1815, Congress passed "An Act fixing the Military Peace Establishment of the United States" which limited the Army to a maximum of 10,000 men. Reductions were also made in the size of the staff when it was reorganized by the Act of April 24, 1816.[1] When the Army resumed its principal function as an Indian-fighting constabulary, the staff readjusted its vision to the operation of the small peacetime Army. Each bureau was completely independent, responsible only and directly to the Secretary of War.

During the period between the War of 1812 and the War with Mexico, few people in the War Department were concerned with the possibility of a future mobilization. John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War from 1817 to 1825, was a notable exception. The mobilization plan advocated by Calhoun in 1820 contemplated an efficient staff and a peacetime Regular Army so organized that it would provide the skeleton framework for a wartime expanded Army, the padding to be provided by the mass of recruits who would be brought into service during war. The Calhoun "Expansible Plan" (which many years later became a military cult with Emory Upton as its major proponent) did not have any provision for the improvement or utilization of the Militia. Perhaps its greatest weakness was its failure to foresee that a small Regular Army would not be able to provide sufficient cadres for a huge mass Army and that the organization would crack under the weight of too many recruits. An additional weakness of Calhoun's plan was the fact that a peacetime Regular Army company consisting of some thirty cadre specialists would be difficult to employ tactically in the sporadic skirmishes with the Indians. Calhoun's mobilization proposals for an "expansible army" were adopted in part by Congress when it approved on 2 March 1821 that portion of his plan which reduced the size of the Army from 12,664 men to 6,183.[2]

Of considerable practical significance in this period was the establishment in July 1822 of general recruiting rendezvous for the Reg-

[1] Act of March 3, 1815, cited in Callan, *op cit.*, pp. 266–67; Act of April 24, 1816, pp. 272–76.

[2] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* II, pp. 189–94, 452; Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 306–09.

ular Army in New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The first three were so successful that in 1823 three more rendezvous were set up in Boston, Providence, and Albany.[3] The General Recruiting Service, thus created, fulfilled the replacement needs of the peacetime Army until the Mexican War when it was somewhat shaken by the manpower demands of the Regular Army. Although the General Recruiting Service weathered the Mexican War, the Civil War was to prove too much for it.[4]

The Period Before Hostilities

The Mexican War began 24 April 1846, after prolonged grievances and bitterness on both sides. The agitation for Texan independence and possible annexation by the United States had caused rising tension between the United States and Mexico throughout the 1830's and early 1840's. Texas won its independence in 1836, and after lengthy negotiations it was offered annexation by the United States in a joint resolution of Congress, 1 March 1845. Texas accepted the offer on 4 July 1845 and was admitted to the Union 29 December 1845. Mexico, however, had never recognized Texan independence and broke diplomatic relations with the United States 31 March 1845. War fervor, fanned by newspaper comment, burned throughout the United States and Mexico.[5]

Although the Government in Washington was outwardly serene in its protestations of peace, steps were taken to put both the Army and the Navy in a better defensive position. From the distant frontier posts, the scattered, skeleton Regular Army companies were gradually assembled near Fort Jesup, in western Louisiana. By the end of June 1845, the entire 3d Infantry Regiment (10 companies), 8 companies of the 4th Infantry Regiment, and 7 companies of the 2d Dragoons were assembled there under the command of Brevet Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor and dubbed the "Army of Observation." The total number of troops in this concentration of 25 companies was well under fifteen hundred men. The lack of manpower in the Army, in view of the considerable number of companies, was due to the Act of August 23, 1842, which had reduced the maximum number of privates in an infantry or artillery company to 42 and in a dragoon company to 50.[6] This enactment was an economy measure taken by

[3] WD GO 34, 1822; *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* II, p. 457.

[4] For discussion of the General Recruiting Service in this period see: Lt Col Leonard L. Lerwill, "History of Personnel Replacement System, U. S. Army" (Special Studies Series, OCMH), ch. I.

[5] For newspaper comments and public opinion in general see: Justin H. Smith, *The War With Mexico* (New York, 1919), I, ch. VI, "The American Attitude on the Eve of War", pp. 117–37.

[6] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 358–61. The Act of March 2, 1821, had reduced companies to 42 privates, but during the Seminole War and the dispute with Great Britain over the Maine boundary 16 privates were added to artillery companies and 38 to infantry companies by the Act of July 5, 1838. *Ibid.*, pp. 341–49.

Congress when there was little danger of war and was passed over the protests of the War Department.[7]

In November 1845 Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, Commanding General of the Army, suggested a prompt increase of the Regular Army, or, as a less desirable alternative, the creation and filling of new regiments.[8] No action was taken on General Scott's recommendations, and the War Department budget estimates in 1845 were not appreciably greater than they had been the year before.[9]

The concentration of the Regular Army in Louisiana left many posts along the Gulf, the Atlantic, and the frontiers almost completely stripped of their garrisons. Had the danger been only Mexico, this weakening of the defense structure might have been costly only in a monetary sense since the Army posts would deteriorate rapidly when abandoned. But in the waning days of 1845 the Administration became increasingly convinced of the grave contingency of war with either Great Britain (about Oregon) or Mexico or both. The Cabinet, on 23 December 1845, not only agreed that the situation was grave but that vigorous preparations for defense should be made. President Polk was in full accord with his Cabinet on these issues.[10]

The Secretary of War, William Learned Marcy, and the Secretary of the Navy, George Bancroft, implemented this cabinet decision by messages to the Military and Naval Committees of both Houses of Congress. The messages from Marcy to the Military Committees reiterated the recommendations made a month earlier for expanding the Regular Army by increasing the authorized strength of companies and batteries and expanded his previous arguments by specific requests for more ordnance and engineer funds. Also included was a plan for granting the President discretionary authority to call up fifty thousand Volunteers for a year's service. The Volunteers, Marcy advised, would probably be more efficient than state drafts of Militia.[11] The pattern of the coming mobilization was herein foretold: the war, when it came, would be fought by Regulars and Volunteers, the latter to be enlisted for one year.

Both General Scott and Secretary of War Marcy could recall the Militia difficulties during the War of 1812. That experience had convinced Scott that the Militia was irredeemable; Marcy, somewhat more clear-thinking in this matter, believed that the Militia could be reformed into an efficient force, but that such reforms were then politically unachievable. The end result of the different reasonings of

[7] For the staff feeling see: "Report of The Adjutant General to the Secretary of War," 30 Nov 1848, in H Ex Doc 1, 30th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 165–68.

[8] "Annual Report of the Commanding General of the Army to the Secretary of War," 20 Nov 1845, in Sen Doc 1, 29th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 208–10.

[9] "Report of the Secretary of War to the President," 29 Nov 1845, in Sen Doc 1, 29th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 193–206.

[10] Allan Nevins (ed.), *Polk, The Diary of a President, 1845–1849* (New York, 1952), p. 36.

[11] Ltr, SW to Chm, SMAC, 29 Dec 1845, in Sen Doc 255, 29th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1–3.

Marcy and Scott was that they both were opposed to using Militia as such if and when mobilization became necessary.

The messages of Marcy and Bancroft to the congressional committees were clear enough but they lacked immediacy. If the emergency were severe, the Congress reasoned, surely the President would have pointed out the dangers with greater emphasis than he had used in his State of the Union Message the preceding December. The Congress consequently took no action to vote more funds or men for defense. On the advice of his Cabinet, however, President Polk reluctantly sent a special message to the Senate on 24 March 1846, which concluded: ". . . it is my 'judgment' that 'an increase of our naval and military force is at this time required,' to place the country in a suitable state of defence." [12] The message did not panic the country; neither did it arouse the Congress to action.

"The Army of Observation"

While these activities were taking place in Washington, the concentration of the available Regular Army units in the south was completed and a forward movement toward the border undertaken. Secretary Marcy had instructed General Taylor in May and June 1845 to dispose his Army closer to Mexico in order to be ready for any hostile Mexican activity if and when Texas were annexed to the United States.[13] Taylor promptly displaced forward from Fort Jesup to Corpus Christi, a small seacoast town on the Texas mainland near the south side of the Nueces River. By the end of August all of Taylor's Regulars had closed at Corpus Christi. In addition, two Volunteer companies of artillery arrived unexpectedly from New Orleans where they had been illegally mustered into service by Brevet Maj. Gen. Edmund P. Gaines, then commanding the Department of the West. Gaines was an elderly officer whose enthusiasm for mobilizing Militia without authorization was well known.[14] Additional Regular Army units continued to stream into Corpus Christi until on 15 October 1845 Taylor had there 3,860 troops, more than 50 per cent of the total Regular Army strength.[15] The Government's policy was truly anomalous, for even as it publicly foresaw no danger of war, over 50 per cent of the Regular Army was concentrated for war.

On 6 August 1845, The Adjutant General had instructed Taylor:

> . . . to learn from the authorities of Texas what auxiliary forces, volunteers, &c., could be placed at your disposal in case any additional troops may be needed; and how soon they would be able to take the field upon any emer-

[12] Sen Doc 248, 29th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2.
[13] H Ex Doc 60, 30th Cong., 1st sess., "Mexican War Correspondence," pp. 79–82.
[14] Upton, *op. cit.*, p. 201.
[15] H Ex Doc 60, p. 111.

gency . . . for such procedure on your part the requisite authority is now conferred. . . .

In view of further precautionary measures, I am instructed by the Secretary of War to learn from you, at the earliest date, what other force and munitions . . . you deem it necessary to be sent to Texas; that is to say, what additional troops, designating the arms of the service; what supply and description of ordnance and advance stores, small arms, &c.

It is deemed expedient to establish in Texas one or more depots of ordnance and other supplies, for which purpose you will please report the proper points to be occupied. Orders have already been issued to send 10,000 muskets and 1,000 rifles into Texas. . . .

Officers of the corps of engineers, topographical engineers, and ordnance, have been ordered to Texas, with instructions to report to you without delay.[16]

On 23 August Marcy informed Taylor that in addition to the auxiliary force which he could raise in Texas, he was also authorized in an emergency:

. . . to accept volunters from the States of Louisiana and Alabama, and even from Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky. Should Mexico declare war, or commence hostilities . . . you are instructed to lose no time in giving information to the authorities of each or any of the above mentioned States as to the number of volunteers you may want from them respectively. . . . Arms, ammunition, and camp equipage for the auxiliary troops that you may require, will be sent forward subject to your orders. . . . Orders have been issued to the naval force on the Gulf of Mexico to co-operate with you. You will, as far as practicable, hold communication with the commanders of our national vessels in your vicinity, and avail yourself of any assistance that can be derived from their co-operation.[17]

Secretary Marcy's directives to General Taylor during the last months of 1845 had some elements of mobilization planning. In many respects, this delegation of implementing mobilization powers to Taylor was necessary and proper. The distance from Washington to the Texas-Mexican boundary, the slowness of transportation and communication, the complete lack of any intelligence agencies, the absence of any creditable information concerning the topography, climatology, people, and resources of these newly acquired areas made it impossible for the War Department in Washington to make sound logistical and tactical decisions. The characteristic attitude of the United States that Mexico strike a first blow before calling out Volunteers from the states made it imperative that the call, when made, be made quickly. Only Taylor could do that. The directed coordination of the land and naval forces of the United States was also good, common sense forethought. But there were clearly discernible flaws in the planning. The strict enjoinders to Taylor not to call for state Volunteers until

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 83–84.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

some definite aggression was committed by Mexico meant that Taylor, after calling for Volunteers, could not possibly receive those Volunteer reinforcements from any state, except perhaps Texas, in time to meet any impending attack by whatever forces the Mexicans might mobilize. The vagueness in these early directives concerning a definition of aggression probably put too great a responsibility on Taylor.

On 30 August Marcy was more specific: ". . . the assembling [of] a large Mexican army on the borders of Texas, and crossing the Rio Grande with a considerable force, will be regarded by the Executive here as an invasion of the United States, and the commencement of hostilities. . . . Should depredations be committed on our commerce by her public armed vessels, or privateers, . . . this will constitute a state of war." Marcy, in the same communication, further charged Taylor: "In case of war, either declared or made manifest by hostile acts, your main object will be the protection of Texas; but the pursuit of this object will not necessarily confine your action within the territory of Texas. Mexico having thus commenced hostilities, you may . . . cross the Rio Grande, disperse or capture the forces assembling to invade Texas, defeat the junction of troops, uniting for that purpose . . . take, and hold possession of, Matamoras and other places in the country." [18] These instructions not only made clearer to Taylor what constituted aggression but also gave him assurance that in defending himself, he could attack the enemy on his own grounds. The somewhat dubious legality of employing Militia to invade a foreign nation—a legal distinction which had so severely impeded American operations in Canada during the war of 1812—did not disturb Marcy in 1845, nor was it likely even to occur to Taylor. Taylor's response was confident and reassuring: he considered his forces adequate. Almost as an afterthought, he suggested that some heavy artillery might be necessary for siege operations and that a supply of pontons and ponton wagons might be helpful.[19]

During this period, when the Secretary of War and General Taylor were engaged with the probabilities of mobilization and war, there does not appear to have been a single directive to any of the War Department staff bureaus calling for procurement or logistics planning of any kind, nor is there any indication that any of the bureaus prepared mobilization plans on their own initiative.[20] Even the concentration of the "Army of Observation" (which, after Texas' annexation, was redesignated the "Army of Occupation") was not provided for in the budget. Consequently, the quartermaster transportation funds

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 88–89.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 103–106.

[20] Smith, *op. cit.*, I, p. 478, n. 30, asserts that Scott *was* planning during this period, but there is no record available to support this surmise.

for the fiscal year 1845 were almost completely exhausted during the first quarter.[21]

As he had assured Taylor he would, the Secretary of War on 25 August 1845 advised the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana that General Taylor was authorized to call on them for Militia Volunteers in the event of war with Mexico. Marcy enclosed with the letters organizational charts to assist the governors in mobilizing the Militia. But the War Department did not include any instructions concerning how the forces were to be mobilized, equipped, initially supplied, and basically trained. These matters, it was apparent from the lack of Federal instructions, were to be left to the discretion of state authorities. The customary state procedures in mobilizing Militiamen were to be employed, including state selection of the officers. Marcy's statement that the Congress had not foreseen the emergency and had not appropriated money to pay these Militiamen should they be mustered into Federal service was hardly fair to the Congress. With the Administration's talk of peace and with no record of any request to either House of Congress for mobilization measures of any kind, prior to President Polk's State of the Union Message in December 1845, the Congress can not reasonably be charged with neglect for its failure to enact legislation. On 28 August 1845, Marcy dispatched similar letters to the governors of Tennessee and Kentucky concerning Taylor's authority to call for Militia in the event of war with Mexico.[22]

The Regulars at Corpus Christi, meanwhile, idled in their tent encampments; training was sketchy and discipline poor.[23] The lack of practical logistics planning by the War Department had already resulted in some unnecessary discomforts. The Quartermaster, suddenly faced with the problem of providing tents, could not find proper linen cloth to manufacture them from and was compelled to substitute inferior cotton materials, which were hardly shelter against the morning dews. Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup later tried to shift blame for this particular deficiency on the Congress which, in the 1845 budget, had stricken out a quartermaster request for camp equipage. But this routine economy in peacetime hardly excused The Quartermaster General from not determining in advance at least a source of supply.

---

[21] "Report of the Secretary of War to the President," 29 Nov 1845, in Sen Doc 1, 29th Cong., 1st sess., p. 197.

[22] Ltrs, SW to Govs of Ala., La., Miss., Tenn., Ky., 25 and 28 Aug 1845, in *Military Book No. 26, Letters Sent, Office of the Secretary of War,* pp. 64–67. Records of the Secretary of War. National Archives.

[23] "Despite orders from the President, military exercises were given up after a time; a sullen torpor and silence reigned in the camp and many deserted. Meanwhile a horde of gamblers and liquor-sellers opened booths near by; and the soldiers, driven to desperation, paid what little money they had to be drugged into insensibility or crazed into brawls and orgies." Smith, *op. cit.,* I, pp. 143–44.

Taylor, in spite of some command and morale difficulties at Corpus Christi, continued to show confidence. On 4 October 1845, he suggested by letter that it might be advisable to move his force to the Rio Grande River to impress the Mexicans with the desirability of peace by visibly showing them the instruments of war. He added: ". . . should any auxiliary force be required, I propose to draw it wholly from Texas. I do not conceive that it will become necessary, under any circumstances, to call for volunteers from the United States." [24] By 15 October 1845, Taylor's force, present and absent, numbered 3,860 men, but was already short 300 replacements to bring units to full, authorized strength, and would, Taylor estimated, be short 500 replacements by the end of the year.[25]

By the end of January 1846, it seemed certain that Mexico was not disposed to peaceful settlement of the Texas issue. Marcy, on President Polk's instructions, ordered Taylor to move his force to the Rio Grande where he arrived on 25 March 1846.[26] For the first time Taylor showed some uneasiness, as he came face to face with "decidedly hostile" Mexican military forces. "Under this state of things," he tardily warned, "I must again and urgently call your attention to the necessity of speedily sending recruits to this army. The militia of Texas are so remote from the border . . . that we cannot depend upon their aid." [27]

The number of reinforcements which could be sent to Taylor was negligible. Although the Regular Army had an authorized maximum strength in April 1846 of 734 officers and 7,885 enlisted men or a total of 8,619, the actual total strength both present (6,562) and absent (803) was only 7,365 which was 1,254 short of the maximum authorized strength for the *skeletonized* Army. In May 1846, 3,554 officers and men were assigned to Taylor's "Army of Occupation" on the Rio Grande. The staff of the Army in this period consisted of 3 general officers, 9 staff departments (Adjutant General's, Inspector General's, Quartermaster, Subsistence, Medical, Pay, Engineer Corps, Corps of Topographical Engineers, and Ordnance) with 259 officers, and 17 military storekeepers.[28]

War Begins

On 24 April 1846, a 63-man dragoon patrol commanded by Capt. Seth B. Thornton on a reconnaissance mission from General Taylor's

[24] H Ex Doc 60, pp. 107–09.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 111.
[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 90, 129.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 132.
[28] TAG to SW, "Report of The Adjutant General in reply to Resolution of the House of Representatives dated July 31, 1848," 3 Dec 1849, General Reports No. 69, Records of AGO. National Archives; *Army Register for 1846* (Washington, Jan 1846). The three general officers were Maj Gen Winfield Scott, Brig Gen (Brevet Maj Gen) Edmund P. Gaines and Brig Gen John E. Wool; Zachary Taylor was only a brevet brigadier general with the permanent rank of colonel.

"Army of Occupation" was surrounded by a sizable Mexican force on the north side of the Rio Grande. When the dust cleared, 16 United States dragoons were dead or wounded, and the rest captured. Taylor reported to Washington:

> Hostilities may now be considered as commenced, and I have this day [26 April 1846] deemed it necessary to call upon the governor of Texas for four regiments of volunteers—two to be mounted and two to serve as foot. As some delay must occur in collecting these troops, I have also desired the governor of Louisiana to send out four regiments of infantry as soon as practicable . . . I trust the department . . . will give the necessary orders to the staff departments for the supply of this large additional force.
>
> If a law could be passed authorizing the President to raise volunteers for twelve months, it would be of the greatest importance for a service so remote from support as this.[29]

Taylor's advocacy of a one-year enlistment has been part of the basis of later critical comments about his judgment and military competence. However, in 1846 the concepts of war and mobilization had not materially changed from what they had been in the colonial days and during the Revolution. When danger threatened at any point, the citizens nearest that point would seize arms, fight until the danger was removed, and then return to their homes. Taylor's experience in warfare had been limited to small engagements during the War of 1812 and his Indian fighting. He could not readily conceive the necessity for maintaining large armies in the field for protracted periods, nor did he have any idea of the complex problems of a war on foreign soil. A year's service for Volunteers was not a short enlistment to Taylor, Polk, and the country at large; it was a long enlistment.

Taylor's early April dispatches, which arrived in Washington about one month after they were written, were so alarming that the President seriously considered asking Congress in advance for a declaration of war on Mexico, to be promulgated by him the moment Mexico committed a definitely overt act. Polk finally decided, however, to wait for the overt act to come before he asked for the declaration of war.[30]

When news of the dragoon patrol incident arrived in Washington the President hesitated no longer. Acting decisively and with keen political insight he consulted with his Cabinet and with Congressional leaders as he prepared the war message which was read to both Houses of Congress on 11 May 1846: ". . . Mexico . . . has invaded our territory, and shed American blood upon the American soil. . . . war exists . . . notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself."[31] A declaration of war was quickly passed by Congress, and signed by the President on 13 May 1846.

---

[29] H Ex Doc 60, p. 288.
[30] Nevins, *op. cit.*, pp. 81–82.
[31] H Ex Doc 60, pp. 8–9.

The Act of May 13, 1846

The President, in his message, had recommended to the Congress the mobilizing of ". . . a large body of volunteers, to serve for not less than six or twelve months. . . . A volunteer force is, beyond question, more efficient than any other description of citizen soldiers; . . . I further recommend . . . liberal provision be made for sustaining our entire military force and furnishing it with supplies and munitions of war." [32]

These recommendations were broad enough, but vague and nebulous. For detailed recommendations, the Congress turned to the reports which Secretary of War Marcy and General Scott had made during 1845 and included them in "An Act providing for the prosecution of the existing war between the United States and the Republic of Mexico" passed on 13 May 1846. The act contained the following provisions:

1. It authorized the President to call for and accept the services of any number of Volunteers, not exceeding 50,000 ". . . to serve twelve months . . . or to the end of the war, unless sooner discharged, . . . and that the sum of $10,000,000 . . . is hereby, appropriated for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this act into effect."

2. It extended the Militia's term of service from three to six months, at the discretion of the President.

3. It required the Volunteers to furnish their own uniforms and clothes and, if cavalry, their own mounts and horse equipage, but arms to be furnished by the United States. Volunteers would receive a money commutation to reimburse them for their purchase of uniform and clothes.

4. Company, battalion, squadron, and regimental officers were to be appointed as provided for in the [Militia] laws of the respective states.

5. The President, at his discretion, was to apportion staff, field and general officers among the respective states furnishing Volunteers.

6. The Volunteers in service were to be subject to the articles of war, have disability pension benefits, and receive the same pay as Regulars, except mounted Volunteers furnishing their own horses who were to receive 40 cents per day additional for the animal.[33]

This measure repeated many of the errors of the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Indian Wars, but the Congress was acting on the advice of the President, the Secretary of War, and the Commanding General of the Army. The maximum number of Volunteers recommended by Marcy and Scott was 50,000 which was granted. The $10,000,000 was not niggardly. Polk had suggested an enlistment term of six months to a year. The Congress made the

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[33] Callan, *op. cit.*, I, p. 367–68.

term a year *or for the duration*, at the option of the President. The provision delegating to the states authority to select officers for the Volunteers was not a good one, but it was in accordance with the concepts of the period. Daniel Webster felt that it was better for Americans to die under ignorant officers of their own choosing than be degraded by being compelled to serve under strange officers.[34] There had been no official recommendation by Polk, Marcy, or Scott for Federal selection of officers, nor is there anything to indicate that such selection would have produced officers materially better than those furnished by the states. The United States then had no Reserve Officers Training Corps nor was there any plan for selecting or training officers. Even the Regular Army, which was so small that it could not have been spread very far, was kept an integral force. Regular officers were kept with Regular units, which were expanded so slowly during the war that many well-trained, capable junior Regular Army officers never got higher than company grade.

Some of the Volunteer officers elected by their men and given commissions by their governors were young, capable, enthusiastic military men who had graduated from West Point and then later resigned from the Army. Such men as Albert Sydney Johnston, Jefferson Davis, Jubal Early, and Alexander Mitchell were among the Academy graduates who were given field grade commissions in the Volunteers. Where competent, trained men were available, they generally received officer commissions in the Volunteer forces and were properly utilized in field grades.[35] It was in junior officers that the Volunteers were woefully deficient. It was a curious anomaly that the Volunteer units had many excellent field officers, a good proportion of whom had been graduated from West Point, but had few capable junior officers; the Regular Army, on the other hand, had many excellent junior officers, most of whom had been trained at West Point, but few capable field officers, hardly any of whom had been trained at the Military Academy and many of whom were decrepit.[36] Junior Regular Army

[34] Smith, *op. cit.*, I, p. 192.

[35] The number of such men available, however, was small. West Point graduated 1330 men up to 1847; of those still alive, 523 were in the Army and some 500 more returned to the service from civil life. Private military schools had not yet become an important source of officer material. The two most prominent schools of this type then in operation were Norwich University in Vermont, founded in 1819, which had some 50 alumni in the Mexican War, and the Virginia Military Institute, founded in 1835, which had only 14 alumni in the war. The Citadel at Charleston, S. C., and the Kentucky Military Institute were among the schools established just before the war began. West Point figures from George W. Callum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy* (Cambridge, 1891), I–II, and from Richard Ernest Dupuy, *Men of West Point* (New York, 1951), p. 455; Norwich University material is from William A. Ellis, *History of Norwich University 1819–1911* (Montpelier, Vt., 1911); Virginia Military Institute information is from Ira L. Reeves, *Military Education in the United States* (Burlington, Vt., 1914).

[36] On 30 July 1846, the AG reported that of 36 Regular Army field grade officers, one-third were unfit for field duty. "Report of The Adjutant General to the Secretary of War," 5 Dec 1846. H Ex Doc 4, 29th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 72–75.

officers were unwilling to accept service with Volunteer units, in spite of the almost certain rapid promotion there, because they would be demobilized along with their units at the end of the war.

The provision that Volunteers furnish their own clothes and uniforms was to work out poorly, but there did not appear to be any other solution. The Quartermaster General's Department was already swamped by the necessity of providing uniforms for the modest Regular Army increases and by the other logistics problems of the war. No other solution to the problem of clothing and uniforming the Volunteers was suggested to the Congress other than the one adopted.

The Act of May 13, 1846, in the light of later day judgment, was not a good mobilization measure. But in the confusion of that day, when plans were absent and when most of the recommendations suggested were not good, it was as good as could be reasonably expected from Congress. The Congress, as is its custom during war emergencies, continued to legislate with speed. On that same day, 13 May 1846, another act authorized the President to increase by voluntary enlistment the number of privates in each or any of the companies of infantry, dragoons, and artillery up to 100, thereby doubling the authorized enlisted strength of the Regular Army without requiring any additional officers.[37] Other mobilization legislation in 1846 authorized an additional Regular regiment of mounted riflemen for service in Oregon; increased the staff of the Pay and Quartermaster Departments; authorized additional general officers; and reimbursed states and individuals for expenses incurred in fitting out Volunteers.[38] The legislative branch of the Government had quickly given the executive branch the legal authority and the money to prosecute the war. Whether the Congress had given enough could only be determined by results; certainly the Congress had given all that was asked at the time.

The Mobilization Is Planned

President Polk, Secretary of War Marcy, and General Scott had two conferences during which ". . . the whole field of operations was examined."[39] Scott was ready at the first conference with a recommendation for calling out 20,000 men apportioned among the states; at the second conference, he had ready additional recommendations for receiving the men, housing them in the United States for several months of training, after which there would be campaigns to Santa Fe, Chihuahua, and along the lower Rio Grande.[40]

---

[37] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 369.
[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 371–78.
[39] Nevins, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
[40] Smith, *op. cit.*, I, p. 478, n. 30, believes that Scott must have been working on these plans for some time, but there is no evidence that he had.

The President distrusted Scott politically and was not inclined to delay operations in order to train and equip men, nor did he think favorably of Scott for having made such recommendations. The personality clash between Polk and Scott, fanned into a white-hot feud by Scott's injudicious pen,[41] resulted in Taylor's continuance in command of the field forces for over a year while Scott remained in Washington to oversee the now accelerating mobilization.

The mobilization of manpower got under way with reasonable promptness. The first calls for Volunteers were issued to the governors by the Secretary of War on 15 May 1846; four days later, the rest of the calls were dispatched. The states closest to Mexico were requested to make their 20,000 Volunteers immediately available; the more distant states were given alert warnings to have their quotas for 25,000 additional men ready for later call.[42] The proportion of Cavalry to Infantry was set by Scott at roughly one to three. In spite of his differences with the President and the Secretary of War, Scott was now issuing plans and directives with enthusiasm, energy, and skill, although he was considerably hampered by lack of information of the situation in the war zone.

On 3 June 1846, the Secretary of War directed Col. Stephen W. Kearny to move his regiment, First Dragoons, from Fort Leavenworth to Santa Fe, and to arrange with the Governor of Missouri to augment the dragoons with 1,000 mounted Volunteers already called for. Details concerning supplies and transportation for this force was left to Kearny, but he was assured that necessary arms, ordnance, war munitions, and provisions, in addition to what he could procure locally, would be sent by sea transport for delivery to him in California. Kearny was also authorized to increase his force by one-third of its strength by adding Mormon Volunteers. Some well-considered instructions concerning military government and treatment of Mexicans in areas conquered were also given Kearny.[43]

At the same time, the Secretary of the Navy directed Commodore David Connor to blockade Mexican ports and assist Army operations. Commodore John D. Sloat, commanding United States naval forces in the Pacific, was ordered to seize the San Francisco Bay area and to establish friendly relations with the inhabitants there.[44]

---

[41] Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 190–200, has a brief but adequate account of Scott's "suicide with a goose-quill."

[42] Ltrs, SW to Govs, 15, 16, and 19 May 1846, in *Military Book No. 26, Letters Sent, Office of the Secretary of War,* pp. 220–40. Records of the Secretary of War. National Archives.

[43] Ltr, SW to Kearny, 3 Jun 46, in H Ex Doc 60, pp. 153–55.

[44] H Ex Doc 60, pp. 232–39. After seizing San Francisco in Jul 1846, Sloat, in poor health, turned over his command to Commodore Robert F. Stockton. See: Smith, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 334–36.

On 15 May 1846, Scott issued a warning memorandum to the chiefs of the supply bureaus in Washington which was, in effect, a directive for them to bestir themselves to provide for the Army:

> An army of some twenty odd thousand men, regulars and volunteers, including the troops already in Texas, is almost to be directed against Mexico, in several columns.
>
> For the numbers of troops yet to be sent into Texas, the rendezvous or points of departure, and the routes of march thither, each chief of the general staff will obtain the information needful . . . from the . . . calls upon the governors of several states, and from the adjutant general.
>
> Arms, accoutrements, ammunition, and camp equipage [and] . . . Subsistence will . . . be thrown in advance upon the several rendezvous given, and as far as practicable on the several routes thence to be given to both regulars and volunteers. Hard bread and bacon (side pieces or middlings) are suggested . . . for marches, both on account of health and comparative lightness of transportation. On many of the routes it is supposed beef cattle may be obtained in tolerable abundance.
>
> With the means of transportation by water and land, according to the several routes to be given to the troops—and, on land, whether wagons or pack mules, or both wheels and packs—the quartermaster general will charge himself at once, and as fast as the necessary data can be settled or known. It may, however, be now assumed by him, and the two other chiefs of staff in question, that Cincinnati, and Newport (Kentucky); Madison or Jefferson, Indiana; Louisville and Smithland, Kentucky; Quincy or Alton, Illinois; Memphis and Nashville, Tennessee; Washington or Fulton, on the Red River, and Natchez, Mississippi, will be appointed as places of rendezvous for . . . volunteers . . . For marches by land, a *projet* for the means of transportation, by company, battalion, or regiment, according to route, is requested, as a general plan. The means of transportation on and beyond the Rio Grande, . . . will require a particular study; but boats for transporting supplies on that river should be early provided.[45]

This memorandum, comprehensive as it was, cannot be considered an implementing plan. It was rather a directive to the staff bureaus to begin planning and operating along indicated lines.

The Manpower Mobilization in Operation

The initial mobilization of manpower was accomplished with amazing celerity. The Militia whom Taylor had called from Louisiana and Texas began to report to him by 22 May 1845, less than a month after his call. Unexpectedly, there began to report to Taylor considerable numbers of six months' Volunteer Militia whom General Gaines, without informing either the War Department or Taylor, had illegally but enthusiastically mobilized by calls on various governors. The first two battles of the war, however, were fought and won by Taylor's 3,000 Regulars at Palo Alto (8 May 1846) and Resaca

[45] H Ex Doc 60, pp. 546–47. The memorandum was addressed to Gen T. S. Jesup, Quartermaster General; Gen George Gibson, Commissary General of Subsistence; Gen N. Towson, Paymaster General; Col George Talcott, Ordnance Department; Dr. Thomas Lawson, Surgeon General.

de la Palma (9 May 1846) before any of the Militia or Volunteers had arrived on the scene.

On 3 June 1846, Taylor reported to the War Department that he had nearly 8,000 men in his force, and he did not know how many more were coming. Since all the new troops were coming without transportation, Taylor complained that they would ". . . embarrass rather than facilitate our operations." [46] The total number of Militia who responded to the calls of Generals Taylor and Gaines was as follows: [47]

Total	12,601
Three months' Militia called by General Taylor	1,390
Six months' Militia (released after 3 months) called by General Gaines	11,211

Immobilized by their lack of transport and other equipment, all 12,601 Militiamen were demobilized without having been tactically employed and General Gaines was relieved from command.

The response of the governors to the call for 12 months' Volunteers was quick and energetic. The quotas were easily and speedily filled in spite of many minor problems. There was some confusion concerning the expenses of mobilizing men prior to their muster into Federal service. The Secretary of War had no funds available to cover transportation from local rendezvous to muster points. While the state and Federal governments bickered, necessary funds were provided by state and local appropriations, by bank loans to states, and by public subscription.[48] There were some minor difficulties, too, because in many of the states the Militia system had deteriorated so badly that procedures for Militia mobilization had been forgotten. Research for precedents was required in several states to determine how company officers should be elected, whether field officers should be elected or appointed by the governor, whom to accept, whom *not* to accept, etc.[49]

---

[46] Ltr, Taylor to TAG, 3 Jun 1845, in H Ex Doc 60, pp. 305–06.

[47] TAG to SW, "Report of The Adjutant General in reply to Resolution of the House of Representatives dated July 31, 1848," 3 Dec 1849. General Reports No. 69, Records of AGO. National Archives.

[48] Gov Thomas Ford's GO No. 2 to the Illinois Militia, 5 June 1846, printed in the *Illinois State Register* (Springfield, 1846); also editorial in *Illinois State Register,* 29 May 1846. Kentucky, Federal Writers' Project, *Military History of Kentucky* (Frankfort, 1939), p. 123; ltr, SW to Gov of Kentucky 25 May 1846, *Military Book No. 26, Letters Sent, Office of the Secretary of War* p. 246, Records of the Secretary of War. National Archives; ltr, SW to Gov. of Mississippi, 12 June 1846, p. 311, *Ibid.; The Southern Recorder* [Milledgeville, Ga.], 16 June 1846. Library of Congress.

[49] Message from Gov Graham to the Legislature of North Carolina, 1846–47 Session (Raleigh, 1847); Message from Gov Whitcomb to the General Assembly of Indiana, 6 Dec 1846, in *Documents of General Assembly of Indiana, 30th Session Commencing December 7, 1846,* Part First (Indianapolis, 1847). [Both of these references are on microfilm at the Library of Congress.] Message of the Governor to the Legislature of Georgia, 2 Nov 1847, reprinted in The Columbus [Ga.] *Enquirer,* 9 Nov 1847. Library of Congress.

In general, the initial procedure in most states for mobilizing Volunteers was for the governor to issue a proclamation directing Militia officers to assemble their units at local rendezvous points. If the Militia system was in such a state of disuse that there were no officers available, then the county sheriffs convened the Militia units of their county.[50] At this assembly, Volunteers from the Militia were called for. The men volunteering were forwarded to a state rendezvous point where, under state control, they were formed into companies, battalions, and regiments, and were enrolled. In some instances, whole units volunteered, thereby simplifying the organizational problems. It was during this formative period when the states were struggling to assemble and organize their forces that financial difficulties were pressing. The Federal paymasters and mustering officers generally refused to provide rations or money for any Volunteers until they were mustered into the Federal service; nor would they muster Volunteers into Federal service until they were properly organized into regiments, with the stipulated number of companies and with officers duly elected or appointed. Where too many units volunteered, thereby oversubscribing the state's quota, units were accepted by the state either on the basis of first ready, first accepted or, in a few instances, by lot, which caused some bitterness.[51]

The men were required to furnish their uniforms for which they were later reimbursed by the Federal government. These uniforms were of amazing variation. Some of these resplendent trappings were provided by public subscription and made up by the patriotic ladies of the town.[52] After a state had properly organized and enrolled its quota, it was mustered into Federal service by a Regular Army officer. Weapons and other individual equipment were then issued to the men who were now United States Volunteers.[53] The responsibility of the state authorities for the men ended once they were mustered into Federal service, but most states also assisted the Federal government in getting the men to ports where they were loaded aboard steamboats or sailing ships for the trip to New Orleans and the mouth of the Rio Grande. The steamboat and the sailing ships were the chief means of transportation; ". . . the War with Mexico was the first steamboat war." [54]

As was to be expected, Volunteer units were far easier to fill, at first, than the Regular Army regiments. The one-year enlistment and easy service in the Volunteer units were far more attractive than the

[50] Gov. Thomas Ford's GO No. 1 to the Illinois Militia, in *Illinois State Register,* 29 May 1846.

[51] Smith, *op. cit.,* I, p. 195.

[52] Kentucky, *Federal Writers Project, op. cit.,* p. 125.

[53] Callan, *op. cit.,* p. 367 ; Albert G. Brackett, *General Lane's Brigade in Central Mexico* (Cincinnati, 1854), p. 19. Rare Book Collection, Library of Congress.

[54] Robert S. Henry, *The Story of the Mexican War* (New York, 1950), p. 85.

five-year enlistment and reputedly strict discipline of the Regulars. Recruiting for the Regular service, however, picked up when Congress authorized a $12 enlistment bounty and changed the enlistment period to five years or the duration of the war, at the option of the soldier.[55] General Scott in several general orders exhorted the recruiting superintendents to use diligence but economy in meeting their recruit quotas. The Regular Army recruiters were authorized to use newspaper advertisements to extol the merits and advantages, especially financial advantages, of Regular Army service.[56] Subsequently, the Congress authorized a land bounty of 160 acres for all men, Regulars and Volunteers, who served for 12 months or more; 40 acres for those who served less than 12 months; but in both instances, the service had to be in the war zone.[57] These measures helped to secure adequate numbers of men for the war for both the Regular and Volunteer units. During the war, however, it was again found difficult to secure replacements for Volunteer units already organized and in combat; it was easier to fill new Volunteer units than to refill old ones.[58]

The severest manpower crisis of the war occurred in May 1847 when General Scott (then somewhat precariously restored to the President's good graces) had to send home some 3,700 men whose year's enlistment was about to expire. At the time, Scott, then halfway between Vera Cruz and Mexico City, had just routed the Mexican Army opposing him and was ready to march on the Mexican capital. The demobilization of over one-third of his army made it necessary for Scott to wait for reinforcements.[59] The Act of February 11, 1847, had authorized ten new Regular Army regiments (one dragoons, nine infantry), and the Act of March 3, 1847, had authorized the President to accept Volunteers both individually and in units to replace men and units in Mexico. The Congress, in its provisions for the new regiments to be mobilized in 1847, made the term of service for the duration of the war. Thus at least one lesson had been learned.[60] [See *table 3* for over-all manpower statistics.]

Logistics Problems

The staff bureaus were not prepared for the war with either supplies or plans for the procurement of supplies. When the war came, the bureaus were faced with the uncomfortable necessity of procuring supplies without being able to delay long enough to make any plans for that procurement. But in this war, as in others, although The

[55] Act of January 12, 1847, in China, *op. cit.*, pp. 378–79.
[56] WD GO 26, 23 Jul 1847; WD GO 17, 15 Apr 1847.
[57] Act of February 11, 1847, in Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 379–82.
[58] Lerwill, *op. cit.*, ch. I.
[59] Smith, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 63–64.
[60] Callan *op. cit.*, pp. 379–87.

*Table 3. Number of Troops Mobilized During the War with Mexico: 1846–48**

Type of troops	Number
Total number of troops mobilized	115, 906
Regular Army	42, 374
Strength as of May 1846	[a] 7, 365
Recruits for Old Establishment, May 1846–July 1848	[b] 21, 018
Recruits for New Establishment, March 1847–July 1848	[b] 13, 991
Militia (Militia Volunteers)	12, 601
Called by Taylor for 3 months	1, 390
Called by Gaines for 6 months (held 3 months)	11, 211
Volunteers (under Act of 13 May 1846)	60, 931
On General Staff duty	272
Volunteered for 12 months	27, 063
Volunteered for duration	33, 596

[a] Includes 3,554 men with Taylor's "Army of Occupation' in May 1846.

[b] These data are believed to exclude officer accessions, the number of which is not furnished in the basic source. All other figures include officers.

**Source:* "Report of The Adjutant General in reply to Resolution of the House of Representatives dated July 31, 1848," General Reports No. 69, TAG to SW, 3 Dec 1849. National Archives.

Quartermaster General was willing "to pay for *time*," that commodity could not be readily purchased.[61]

The immediate and overwhelming shortage was transportation: wagon transport, shallow draft steamboats, and animal transport. Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup, during 1845, had apparently been completely unaware that extraordinary demands for wagons and steamboats were going to be made. During the period from July to December 1845, contracts for only 110 wagons had been let by The Quartermaster General, and so little was the sense of impending urgency that a quartermaster officer in Philadelphia was advised that: "The making of the wagons should not be hurried: see that they, as well as the harness, be of the best materials and workmanship."[62] With some justice, General Jesup later complained that there was no information in Washington to enable the War Department to determine whether wagons could be used in Mexico.[63] Indeed, even after the war had begun, Jesup was unable to furnish a map of Texas to one of his inquisitive officers, "there being none on hand for distribution." [64]

Col. Thomas Cross, the quartermaster officer with General Taylor's Army, appears to have been a most energetic and competent supply

[61] H Ex Doc 60, p. 605.
[62] *Ibid.*, pp. 576, 577, 579.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 560.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 592.

officer. From September 1845 on, he continually requested that additional wagons be sent to Texas. His other recommendations to Washington concerning supply preparations were sound, particularly the one advocating a wagon train with enlisted drivers as an organic part of the Army. The civilian teamsters who had been so unsatisfactory during the Revolutionary War and War of 1812 were still as unruly, undependable, and unsatisfactory in 1845–46. This recommendation, reiterated by later quartermaster officers with Taylor, was subsequently heeded by Congress when enlisted teamsters were added to dragoon, artillery, and mounted regiments and companies.[65] Colonel Cross' recommendation for a service train of three to four hundred wagons made in an established pattern so their parts would be interchangeable was too far in advance of his day for approval.[66]

Once war had been declared, Taylor was frantically calling for wagons; The Quartermaster-General had officers at every possible procurement point in the United States ordering and purchasing wagons. Philadelphia, New York, Pittsburgh, Troy, Columbus (Ga.), Savannah, Buffalo, Cincinnati, all were thoroughly canvassed by quartermaster officers willing to buy wagons at any price. A large number of mules was purchased also. By the end of August 1846, the wagon supply situation was under control.[67] Camp equipage was procured in the same manner by decentralized purchasing at centers of supply, but for most of these items, supply was adequate. The problem was principally procurement. When the need for steamboats became crucial, again quartermaster agents scoured every available market; the boats were procured but at exorbitant cost.[68] General Jesup had recommended to Col. J. J. Abert of the Topographical Engineers that a railroad be built to haul supplies from Brazos San Iago to the mouth of the Rio Grande, but this farsighted recommendation, like General Taylor's casual request for a ponton train, became so tangled in interbureau red tape that it was not implemented.[69]

The difficulties of The Quartermaster General in the war were intensified by the failure of the Army commanders to realize the need for mobility. There is no question but what the number of wagons utilized in the service trains was far greater than was necessary for maintaining the force at combat efficiency. In this war, there developed the practice of bringing the civilian standards of living along with the field forces. The troops in the field were provided with dancing girls, bars, theaters, newspapers, ice, liquor, vaudeville, gam-

[65] Act of March 3, 1847, in Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

[66] H Ex Doc 60, p. 646.

[67] Smith, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 490–91, n. 5; see: H Ex Doc 60, pp. 638–745, for letters on transportation problems.

[68] Smith, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 482–83, n. 13; H Ex Doc 60, pp. 690–91.

[69] H Ex Doc 60, pp. 571–72, 103; Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 76. The ponton train made of India rubber was finally delivered in Oct 1846 when it was no longer needed.

bling houses, fancy tobaccos, fancy groceries, camp followers, Bibles, souvenir items, etc. These conveniences required transport far in excess of that needed by an Army in the field.[70]

The provision that the Volunteers furnish their own uniforms, which had resulted at first in such a gaudy profusion of colorful garb, was impossible to continue when the uniforms needed replacement. There were no private sources of supply available in the field. Unit commanders, understandably unwilling to let the men face the rigors of a campaign without clothes or shoes, drew uniforms for the Volunteers from the Regular Army supply depots, although legally there was no basis for such issue. Some of the Volunteers were at first averse to the Regular's uniform, but most of them wound up wearing it.[71] The Quartermaster General thus had to provide uniforms far in excess of anticipated needs. The Congress legalized this *fait accompli* when, on 26 January 1848, Volunteers were provided uniforms instead of the commutation in lieu thereof.[72]

The supply bureaus eventually procured all of the supplies that were needed; but the lack of data on what was needed, the lack of procurement plans, the lack of cooperation between bureaus added tremendously to the cost of the war and could have been disastrous had it not been for the even greater confusion of the enemy.[73]

Training

There was a relative improvement in training in the Mexican War. The Regular Army units which composed General Taylor's "Army of Occupation" at the beginning of the war were reasonably well-drilled and disciplined. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant who had served as a second lieutenant in Taylor's Army wrote in his memoirs:

> . . . At the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca-de-la-Palma, General Taylor had a small army, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best of drill and discipline. Every officer, from the highest to the lowest, was educated in his profession, not at West Point necessarily, but in the camp, in garrison, and many of them in Indian wars. . . . A better army, man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the one commanded by General Taylor in the earliest two engagements of the Mexican war. The volunteers who followed were of better material, but without drill or discipline at the start. They were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educated officers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence they would not have felt otherwise. They became soldiers themselves almost at once.[74]

---

[70] Henry, *op. cit.*, ch. V, pp. 80–95, has a good brief account of the Army's "morale" appendages.

[71] Brackett, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[72] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 389.

[73] For the difficulties and procedures of The Quartermaster General during the mobilization see correspondence in H Ex Doc 60, pp. 549–769.

[74] Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant* (New York, 1885), I, pp. 167–68.

The first Volunteer units raised during the Mexican War were rushed to the Rio Grande without any preliminary training; during May and June 1846 the only thought was to forward men to General Taylor. General Taylor prescribed six hours of daily drilling for the Volunteers once they reached Mexico.[75] Later in the war Volunteer regiments were sent to schools of instruction in Mexico where they were drilled with Regular regiments, and the officers received instruction in tactics.[76] Drill was, of course, the chief element of the training program.

Regular Army recruits received basic training at camps of instruction, which were part of the General Recruiting Service, before being sent to Mexico. On their arrival at their assigned units, training was facilitated by the considerable number of trained junior officers in the Regular Army during the weeks between active campaigns. The Volunteers were not as well trained as the Regulars because of the inexperience of the Junior officers and noncommissioned officers (the backbone of training programs) in the Volunteer units.[77]

There was a slight improvement in training literature during this period, notably General Scott's regulations entitled *Instructions for Field Artillery, Horse and Foot* which was made standard for the Army and the Militia in 1845.[78] This manual undoubtedly contributed to the fine performance of the Regular Army artillery during the Mexican War. Although the quality of training literature was somewhat better, the supply was still extremely limited. The most common training text was General Scott's three volume *Infantry Tactics.* Another forward step was made with the publication of *The General Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1847* by the War Department, which contained detailed military information on organization and administration.

The Lessons of the War

The lessons of the Mexican War were never studied a great deal, probably because the war had been so brief and successful. The victory expanded the United States to the Pacific Ocean, thus fulfilling Manifest Destiny, and put Zachary Taylor and Franklin Pierce in the White House. Those results were remembered, but most of the mobilization lessons were forgotten.

The old lessons which were repeated again were:

1. Military policy and foreign policy must be coordinated at all times.

---

[75] Upton, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

[76] Brackett, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 25. See also: Francis Baylies, *Narrative of Major General Wool's Campaign in Mexico* (Albany, 1851).

[77] See also: Lerwill, *op. cit.*, ch. I

[78] Ganoe, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

2. Staff planning for war in advance of the war itself is most necessary, but will never be accomplished until a specific agency is charged with that planning.

3. The departments which control and accomplish mobilization must be coordinated in their operations to prevent confusion and inefficiency.

4. Unplanned for, piecemeal activities in wartime are costly, slow, wasteful, and confusing.

5. The ability, experience, and leadership of the peactime Regular Army must be more effectively diffused through the entire wartime army.

6. Training can be effectively accomplished only when there is time, a program, and sufficient capable instructors and instructional material.

7. Adequate means of transportation must be provided for military purposes. The importance of transportation was becoming even greater as the transportation media became faster. The need for organic transportation in a military force was reemphasized.

8. War plans must be based on adequate and accurate intelligence information.

9. The inability of the Militia as organized to provide a reservoir of military manpower was not only reaffirmed but was emphasized, for by 1846 the Militia was not only inefficient, it was verging closely on extinction.

10. The accepted system of election of officers by their men was inefficient and needed replacement by a system of Federal selection of officers, selection to be based on impartial standards. Federal rather than state control of officer selection was better because only under Federal control could officer standards be made uniform.

11. The complexity of this war made it even more necessary than in previous wars that the term of service be for the duration of the war.

Lessons which were perhaps new or which first acquired major significance in this war were:

1. The extent to which civilian luxury services accompany troops in the field must be strictly limited, or the weight of those luxury services will immobilize the Army.

2. Supply planning for a mobilizing Army must be based on the total force. The assumption that elements of the force could provide for their own equipment and uniforms or else obtain them from their states was not only fallacious but led to procurement competition which impeded the overall procurement effort.

3. Joint operations of the Army and Navy can be successfully accomplished when there is cooperative planning, and a sincere cooperative effort made by the commanders of the units of the respective services.

CHAPTER IV

THE CIVIL WAR

The American Civil War, 1861–65, was the last of the old wars as well as the first of the modern wars by 20th century standards. Its modernity extended from the comprehensiveness of its mobilization to the grim tragedy of its final casualty lists. The problems of Civil War mobilization in both the United States and the Confederate States were problems of mobilization for modern warfare. The solutions to those problems, finally reached after devious confused improvisations, were essentially solutions still applicable to the problems of World Wars I and II.[1]

No two wars have ever been alike; indeed, a common military error has been to expect the next war to be the exact counterpart of the last war. The major difference between the Civil War and the World Wars is inherent in the very name—*Civil* War. This was a war between component parts of one nation in which the overriding basic issue, once the contest was joined, was whether that nation was to exist as one. In that elemental factor can be found extenuating reasons for the failure of both sides to prepare with reasonable adequacy for the conflict which they knew was surely coming. Extensive preparation for war by either side would have precipitated the conflict. The bitter critics of the Buchanan administration are justified when they point out its weakness and lack of decisive leadership; but they should temper their criticisms with the political, social, and military crosscurrents of 1860–61.

The important role which state governments played in the Civil War mobilization was another factor which distinguished the Civil War from the World Wars. Both the North and the South used the state governments as the medium for recruiting and equipping manpower in the early part of the war. In the South this reliance on the states was due primarily to the states' rights theory, while in the North

[1] "Although mistakes were made by both sides in the Civil War, invaluable lessons were learned and recorded. In 1861 Brig. Gen. James Oakes, who, as Assistant Provost Marshal General for Illinois, administered the draft in that State, wrote an exhaustive report enumerating the mistakes and making definite recommendations for any future mobilization. . . . Many of the ideas and principles embodied in the Oakes report were incorporated in the Selective Service Act of 1917 and later in the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended." See *The Army Almanac* (Washington, 1950), p. 836; for Oakes Report see: *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* hereafter referred to as *Official Records* (Washington, 1880–1901), ser. III, vol. V, pp. 825–35.

it was due more to inability to devise a better system for raising armies at the outset of the war.[2] It was a curious anomaly that centralized control over mobilization processes was asserted first by the Confederacy whose existence was predicated on state sovereignty rather than by the North which was fighting to maintain the Federal Union.

Centralization increased steadily throughout the war until the Federal Government became the dominant agency for raising and maintaining armies in war as well as in peace. The arguments of Washington, Hamilton, and Monroe that the Federal Government could under the Constitution raise armies by direct call on the citizens rather than through the states became the established national policy.

The United States Forces in Being, Spring 1861

The Leaders

The military forces in being in the United States in 1861 which were to serve as the nucleus for the Civil War mobilization had changed very little organizationally or numerically since the close of the Mexican War in 1848. The four Secretaries of War from 1849 to the end of 1860 all came from the South,[3] and all subsequently held office in the Confederacy. None of them during their respective terms as Secretary of War had been disposed to resolve the mounting intransigency of the Southern states by military coercion. Even planning for civil war was impossible with such men at the head of the War Department. When a pro-Union Secretary, Joseph Holt, was finally appointed by Buchanan two months before the end of his administration, it was too late to act even if Buchanan had been so disposed.[4]

On 4 March 1861, Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated President of the United States and became Commander in Chief. Lincoln was a relatively obscure Illinois lawyer whose qualities for meeting the great problems facing the Union were unknown. He had served one

[2] "To an alert secretary the call for a vounteer army might have offered an opportunity to set up a national system of recruiting, but Cameron made no effort to take responsibilities from the governors. Inertia, rather than any respect for state's rights led the Secretary to use militia system and to rely on the governors in raising the new army." See: William B. Hasseltine, *Lincoln and the War Governors* (New York, 1948), p. 176.

[3]

Sec. of War	*State*	*From*	*To*
George W. Crawford	Georgia	8 Mar 1849	23 Jul 1850
Charles M. Conrad	Louisiana	15 Aug 1850	7 Mar 1853
Jefferson Davis	Mississippi	7 Mar 1853	6 Mar 1857
John B. Floyd	Virginia	6 Mar 1857	29 Dec 1860

The often repeated charge that Floyd treasonably diverted United States arms and equipment to the Southern States during his term as Secretary of War is disproven by the records. See: Alexander Howard Meneely, *The War Department, 1861* (New York, 1928), pp. 40–42.

[4] Joseph Holt of Kentucky was Secretary of War from 18 Jan 1861 to 5 Mar 1861. Holt was an able man and a strong Unionist. After serving the Lincoln Administration as a trouble-shooter, he was appointed Judge Advocate General of the Army 3 Sep 1862 and served until 1 Dec 1875.

term in the House of Representatives, but had had little administrative experience; his military experience had consisted of a brief tour of duty as a Militia captain in the Black Hawk War. Lincoln's election was due to the division of the country into sectional minorities. As a direct result of his election, seven states had seceded from the Union by 4 March 1861.[5]

The Secretary of War in President Lincoln's cabinet was Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania. Cameron was a political chameleon whose versatility had kept him in a succession of political posts since Jackson's administration. His appointment as Secretary of War was in payment of a campaign promise made by Lincoln's presidential campaign manager.[6] The record was clear in 1861 that Cameron was not a qualified appointee; subsequent events were to prove him a most incompetent Secretary.[7]

The General in Chief of the Army was Brevet Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott who had held that position since 5 July 1841. He was a Virginian by birth, but he remained consistently loyal to the Union and to the Army of which he had been an officer since 1808. Scott was an able officer, and he had gained important field experience in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. He was, however, 74 years old and a semi-invalid in the spring of 1861. His long self-imposed exile in New York because of his differences with a succession of Secretaries of War had kept him out of close touch with military affairs until he returned to the Capital on 12 December 1860.[8]

Next in the War Department hierarchy were the semi-independent bureaus and departments which comprised the staff. [For a roster of the bureaus and their chiefs *see chart 1.*] Although there were several internal reorganizations in the various bureaus during the Civil War, the only major organizational change was the merger of the Corps of Engineers and the Corps of Topographical Engineers on 3 March 1863.

The high age of the bureau chiefs [See *chart 1.*] was due to the fact that there was no provision for retirement from the Army either

[5] South Carolina seceded 20 Dec 1860; Mississippi 9 Jan 1861; Florida 10 Jan; Alabama 11 Jan; Georgia 19 Jan; Louisiana 26 Jan; Texas 1 Feb. On 4 Feb 1861, the Provisional Congress met at Montgomery, Ala., to begin organizing the Confederate government. On 18 Feb 1861, Jefferson Davis was inaugurated Provisional President. Contrasted with Lincoln, Davis was a graduate of the Military Academy at West Point, had served as a colonel of a Volunteer regiment in the Mexican War, had had a long career in Congress, had served as Secretary of War 1853–57, and had been chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee 1857–61. Probably no other civilian was more familiar with the United States Army in 1861 than Davis. The four other states that later seceded were Virginia 17 Apr; Arkansas 6 May; North Carolina 21 May; and Tennessee 8 Jun 1861.

[6] Burton J. Hendrick, *Lincoln's War Cabinet* (Boston, 1946), p. 58.

[7] For Cameron's background see: Meneely, *op. cit.*, pp. 74–82. There is almost universal agreement about the character and abilities of Simon Cameron and the fact that they were a major reason for the confusion in 1861.

[8] Charles W. Elliott, *Winfield Scott, the Soldier and the Man* (New York, 1937), p. 679.

*Chart 1. War Department, Staff Departments, Civil War.**

Department	Chiefs	Term of service	Home States	Age on 12 Apr 61	Misc
Adjutant General	Col. Samuel Cooper	15 Jul 52– 7 Mar 61	N. Y.	62	A. G., CSA.
	Brig. Gen. Lorenzo Thomas	7 Mar 61–22 Feb 67	Del.	56	
Quartermaster General	Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston	20 Jun 60–22 Apr 61	Va.	54	Gen., CSA.
	Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs	15 May 61– 6 Feb 82	Pa.	45	
Inspector General	Col. Sylvester Churchill	25 Jun 41–25 Sep 61	Vt.	77	Retired.
	Brig. Gen. Randolph B. Marcy	9 Aug 61– 2 Jan 81	Mass.	49	
Medical (Surgeon General)	Col. Thomas Lawson	30 Nov 36–15 May 61	Va.	79	Died.
	Col. Clement A. Finley	15 May 61–14 Apr 62	Ohio	64	Retired.
	Brig. Gen. William A. Hammond	25 Apr 62–18 Aug 64	Md.	32	Dismissed.
	Brig. Gen. Joseph K. Barnes	22 Aug 64–30 Jun 82	Pa.	43	
Judge Advocate General	Brevet Maj. John F. Lee	2 Mar 49– 4 Sep 62	Va.	48	Resigned.
	Brig. Gen. Joseph Holt	3 Sep 62– 1 Dec 75	Ky.	53	
Ordnance	Col. Henry K. Craig	10 Jul 51–23 Apr 61	Pa.	70	Transferred.
	Brig. Gen. James W. Ripley	23 Apr 61–15 Sep 63	Conn.	66	Retired.
	Brig. Gen. George D. Ramsay	15 Sep 63–12 Sep 64	Va.	59	Retired.
	Brig. Gen. Alexander B. Dyer	12 Sep 64–20 May 74	Mo.	46	
Subsistence (Commissary General)	Col. George Gibson	18 Apr 18–29 Sep 61	Pa.	78	Died.
	Col. Joseph P. Taylor	29 Sep 61–29 Jun 64	Ky.	65	Died.
	Brig. Gen. Amos B. Eaton	29 Jun 64– 1 May 74	N. Y.	55	
Paymaster General	Col. Benjamin F. Larned	20 Jul 54– 6 Sep 62	Mass.	67	Died.
	Col. Timothy P. Andrews	6 Sep 62–29 Nov 64	D. C.	67	Retired.
	Brig. Gen. Benjamin W. Brice	29 Nov 64– 1 Jan 72	Ohio	52	
Corps of Engineers**	Brig. Gen. Joseph G. Totten	7 Dec 38–22 Apr 64	Conn.	72	Died.
	Brig. Gen. Richard Delafield	23 Apr 64– 8 Aug 66	N. Y.	62	

Corps of Topographical Engineers**	Col. John J. Abert	14 Sep	34– 9 Sep	61	Va	72	Retired.
	Col. Stephen H. Long	9 Sep	61– 3 Mar	63	N. H	76	
Chief Signal Officer	Col. Albert J. Myer	27 Jun	60–21 Jul	64	N. Y	31	Transferred.
	Col. Benjamin F. Fisher	3 Dec	64–28 Jul	66	Pa	26	

Source: Compiled from Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army* (Washington 1903); George W. Cullum *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy* (Cambridge, 1891); and James G. Wilson and John Fiske, *Appleton's Cyclopedia of American Biography* (New York, 1898).

**The two Engineer Corps were merged 3 March 1863. Highest rank attained in bureau is given for each officer.

for age or for disability, until passage of the Act of August 3, 1861. This lack of retirement procedures had made senility and high rank almost synonomous throughout the Army and especially in the staff departments. The average age of the 11 bureau chiefs 12 April 1861 was 64, but 6 were over 70.

With but few exceptions, the War Department staff at the onset of the Civil War was an antiquated machine made up of independent parts headed by career soldiers both over age and physically and mentally incapable of meeting the mobilization demands.[9] The combination of elderly staff officers (unfamiliar with troops or with staff operations beyond those for a small peacetime army) and uncoordinated staff bureaus proved to be a serious handicap when the mobilization began.

The general officers of the line of the Army on 4 March 1861 were old men who had grown rusty and decrepit in the service. In addition to the General in Chief, General Scott (74), there were Brevet Maj. Gen. John E. Wool (77), Brevet Maj. Gen. David E. Twiggs (71), and Brig. Gen. William S. Harney (60). Wool and Twiggs were veterans of the War of 1812; Harney had entered the Army in 1818. None of the four general officers had attended the Military Academy at West Point.[10]

The Regular Army

The forces in being on 4 March 1861 consisted solely of the Regular Army. Although the Militia was still in existence, it was only a paper force. The strength of the Regular Army 1 January 1861 was 1,108 officers and 15,259 enlisted men organized into 19 regiments (10 Infantry, 4 Artillery, 2 Dragoons, 2 Cavalry, and 1 Mounted Riflemen).[11] Of the 198 companies (or similar-sized units) in these regiments, 183 were widely scattered at 79 posts along the frontiers from Texas to Minnesota and from Puget Sound to southern California. The other 15 companies manned posts along the Atlantic coast, the Canadian border, and the 23 arsenals. It was unusual for as much as a battalion of Regulars to be assembled in the period 1849–61. It was, indeed, more usual for the small companies to be split into smaller detachments to permit their being dispersed even more extensively.[12] Even after the firing on Fort Sumter it was impossible to concentrate all the Regular Army without stripping the frontier of its defenses against the Indians.

For administrative and tactical purposes the United States was divided geographically [13] into the following six departments:

---

[9] Meneely, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–26.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 22.
[12] Ganoe, *op. cit.*, pp. 244–45.
[13] *Official Army Register* (Washington, Jan 1861), p. 54.

Department	*Extent*	*Headquarters*
(1) Department of the East.	Country east of the Mississippi River.	Troy, N. Y.
(2) Department of the West.	Country west of the Mississippi River and east of the Rocky Mountains except Texas and New Mexico.	St. Louis, Mo.
(3) Department of Texas.	Texas	San Antonio, Tex.
(4) Department of New Mexico.	Territory of New Mexico less Fort Mojave.	Santa Fe, N. Mex.
(5) Department of Utah.	Territory of Utah less portion west of 117° west longitude.	Camp Floyd, Utah.
(6) Department of the Pacific.	Country west of the Rocky Mountains less the departments of Utah and New Mexico.	San Francisco, Calif.

The Regular Army was demoralized by the decision of 313 of its officers (29 per cent of the total 1,098) to either resign or accept dismissal to join the Confederacy. Even more serious than the number of officers who went over to the South was their high caliber. Such men as Robert E. Lee, Albert Sidney Johnston, Joseph E. Johnston, and Samuel Cooper resigned. Four of the five regimental commanders of mounted regiments left the Army. "But few, if any, enlisted men turned against the government." [14]

The small detachments of the Regular Army stationed in Southern states were in a precarious position because they could be easily swamped by any Southern forces which might be assembled. A crippling blow was dealt the Regular Army when General Twiggs surrendered the Department of Texas on 18 February 1861. All public property in the department except the personal arms of the troops was turned over to Texas. The 102 officers and 2,328 enlisted men (about 16 per cent of the entire Army) were to be allowed to withdraw from the state via the coast. Although Twiggs was a Southerner with Southern sympathies, he had tried vainly to get instructions from the War Department as to what disposition he should make of property and troops in Texas if it seceded. The vacillation of the War Department exasperated Twiggs into requesting relief from his command, but the relief order did not arrive until he was completing the surrender negotiations. Only about 1,200 of the Regulars had been withdrawn from the state before the firing on Fort Sumter, after which the rest became prisoners.[15] A sizable portion of the Regular Army was thus lost just as the mobilization was beginning.

---

[14] "Final Report made to the Secretary of War by the Provost Marshal General of the Operations of the Bureau of the Provost Marshal General of the United States from the Commencement of the Business of the Bureau, March 17, 1863 to March 17, 1866; the Bureau terminating by Law August 28, 1866," hereafter cited as "PMG Report," *Messages and Documents, War Department, 1865–1866, III* (Washington, 1866), I, pp. 6–7.

[15] *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. I, pp. 521–79. Twiggs was dismissed from the Army 1 Mar 1861 for the surrender of Texas.

The *actual* force in being on 12 April 1861, the Regular Army, was not capable of suppressing a rebellion of great magnitude or even of waging sustained warfare. It was small; dispersed over the wide area of the West (where roads were primitive and communication slow and difficult); untrained for large scale operations; and commanded by old men.

The Militia

The *theoretical* force in being in the spring of 1861 was still the Militia; and the Militia Act of 1792 was still the law of the land. Its failure during the War of 1812 and its disuse during the Mexican War had not destroyed paper existence of the Militia. [See *table 4* for summary of the *latest* available militia returns at The Adjutant General's Office in January 1861.]

Of the 3,163,711 Militia reported, 2,471,377 were from Union states and 692,334 from Confederate states. The totals were impressive but some of the returns dated back to 1827. The figures did not indicate how much the Militia, as a military force, had deteriorated. The Militia organization prescribed in the Act of 1792 had never been precisely complied with in all the states although they all had some kind of Militia-implementing laws on their statutes. Most of these state laws directed that all men in certain age groups were to be enrolled in the Militia. But long before the Civil War, the muster and drill day for the Militia had disappeared almost entirely. Where it still survived, it was an occasion for carnival merriment and not a military exercise.

When the Civil War began, the United States and the Confederate States, for all practical purposes, had no forces in being on which to base a mobilization. Both sides had to start from the bottom.

The War and Mobilization Begin Together

The war began on 12 April 1861 when Southern forces bombarded Fort Sumter, a United States installation off Charleston, S. C., commanded by Maj. Robert Anderson. The long-standing sectional differences were to be resolved by Civil War.

There were no plans immediately available in the North for the mobilization of military manpower or for the waging of war. However, General Scott, in spite of his infirmities, applied himself strenuously and almost singlehandedly in the preparation of such plans. He alone in Washington appeared to understand that the task was one of tremendous magnitude and one which required sound planning. The President consulted with his Cabinet, with Scott, other military men, and available political advisers; and although all had ideas, none had any considered plans except Scott. Scott's preliminary plan for the conduct of the war estimated that a Regular Army of 25,000 men and 60,000 Volunteers (for three years) would be neces-

*Table 4. Militia Force of the United States.**

State or Territory [a]	Year [b]	Total Militia	Officers	Enlisted men
Total [c]		3, 163, 711	50, 053	2, 144, 445
Maine	1856	73, 552	304	73, 248
New Hampshire	1854	33, 538	1, 227	32, 311
Massachusetts	1860	161, 192	580	160, 612
Vermont	1843	23, 915	1, 088	22, 827
Rhode Island	1859	17, 826	163	17, 663
Connecticut	1860	51, 630	200	51, 430
New York	1859	418, 846	1, 993	416, 853
New Jersey	1852	81; 984		
Pennsylvania	1858	350, 000		
Delaware	1827	9, 229	447	8, 782
Maryland	1838	46, 864	2, 397	44, 467
Virginia	1860	143, 155	5, 670	137, 485
North Carolina	1845	79, 448	4, 267	75, 181
South Carolina	1856	36, 072	2, 599	33, 473
Georgia	1850	78, 699	5, 050	73, 649
Florida	1845	12, 122	620	11, 502
Alabama	1851	76, 662	2, 832	73, 830
Louisiana	1859	91, 324	2, 792	88, 532
Mississippi	1838	36, 084	825	35, 259
Tennessee	1840	71, 252	3, 607	67, 645
Kentucky	1852	88, 979	4, 870	84, 109
Ohio	1858	279, 809		
Michigan	1858	109, 570	1, 018	108, 552
Indiana	1832	53, 913	2, 861	51, 052
Illinois	1855	257, 420		
Wisconsin	1855	51, 321	1, 142	50, 179
Missouri	1854	118, 047	88	117, 959
Arkansas	1859	47, 750	1, 139	46, 611
Texas	1847	19, 766	1, 248	18, 518
California	1857	207, 730	330	207, 400
Minnesota	1860	24, 990	185	24, 805
Territory of Utah	1853	2, 821	285	2, 536
District of Columbia	1852	8, 201	226	7, 975

[a] There is no record of any Militia in Iowa, Oregon, Washington Territory, Nebraska Territory, Kansas Territory, nor the Territory of New Mexico.

[b] Represents year of latest return received by The Adjutant General.

[c] All State totals are not broken down as to the number of officers and enlisted men.

**Source: Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 67–68.

sary to open the Mississippi River and conduct an enveloping land campaign in conjunction with a tight naval blockade to strangle the South into submission.[16] Although at the time Lincoln and his advisers were unwilling to accept Scott's "Anaconda plan" for a long and difficult struggle, it was the general strategy eventually employed. The major weakness in Scott's plan was the size of its manpower estimates.[17]

[16] Ltr, Scott to McClellan, 3 May 1861, in *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. II, pt. I, pp. 369–70.
[17] Elliott, *op. cit.*, pp. 721–23.

The only statutory basis for increasing the military forces was the Militia Act of 1792 which empowered the President to call out the Militia to suppress insurrection. After consultation with his advisers, President Lincoln issued a proclamation on 15 April 1861 calling out 75,000 Militia for three months and convening a special session of Congress 4 July 1861.[18] Both of these decisions have been questioned: first, why the call was only for 75,000 Militia; and, second, why the meeting of Congress was delayed for over 11 weeks. But Scott's "Anaconda plan" had called for only 85,000 men; and it may have been hoped by many in the Capital that one of the attempts at compromise and reconciliation might still succeed.

The apportioning to the states of their quotas under the call for 75,000 Militia was quickly accomplished. Messages dispatched to the governors over Secretary Cameron's name gave the places of rendezvous, set 20 May as muster day, and allotted quotas. [See *table 5*].

*Table 5. Quotas and Men Furnished Under Militia Call of 15 April 1861.**

States and Territories	Quota	Men furnished	States and Territories	Quota	Men furnished
Total	73, 391	93, 526	Ohio	10, 153	12, 357
			Indiana	4, 683	4, 686
Maine	780	771	Illinois	4, 683	4, 820
New Hampshire	780	779	Michigan	780	981
Vermont	780	782	Wisconsin	780	817
Massachusetts	1, 560	3, 736	Minnesota	780	930
Rhode Island	780	3, 147	Iowa	780	968
Connecticut	780	2, 402	Missouri	3, 123	10, 591
New York	13, 280	13, 906	Kentucky	3, 123	0
New Jersey	3, 123	3, 123	Kansas	0	650
Pennsylvania	12, 500	20, 175	Tennessee	1, 560	0
Delaware	780	775	Arkansas	780	0
Maryland	3, 123	0	North Carolina	1, 560	0
West Virginia	2, 340	900	Territory of New Mexico	0	1, 510
District of Columbia	0	4, 720			

**Source*: *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 66–77; "PMG Report," I, p. 161.

The replies of the governors followed sectional lines. The Governor of Kentucky telegraphed: "Your dispatch is received. In answer I say emphatically Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States."[19] But John A. Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts, replied cryptically to Cameron: "Dispatch received. By what route shall we send?"[20] The Governor of Delaware replied his state had no law under which he could call

[18] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 67–68.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 70.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

out the Militia. The regiment raised in that state was the result of work of private citizens.[21]

Preceding the President's proclamation of 15 April, there had been a call for 10 Militia companies from the District of Columbia on 9 April for the immediate defense of the Capital. After some haggling, about whether these companies could be employed outside the District, companies of District Militia were mobilized—35 under the restrictive condition and 3 without restrictions. Most of the companies served outside the District without protest once the war began.[22]

The war situation darkened during the two weeks following the call for 75,000 Militia. Virginia seceded from the Union on 17 April. A Massachusetts regiment passing through Baltimore on 19 April was attacked by a mob which later destroyed the bridges and telegraph lines to the North. The Capital was isolated and surrounded by hostile territory. Although Federal troops forcibly restored order in Baltimore some days later, the panic in Washington resulting from the severance of communications was so great that the Administration decided drastic action was necessary to prevent complete deterioration of the military situation.[23]

The Militia call of 15 April had been based on the Militia Act of 1792. The President now decided not to wait until Congress met before calling for Volunteers but to act and hope Congress would ratify his action after it convened 4 July. Therefore, on 3 May 1861 the President in a second proclamation increased the Regular Army by 22,714 men (an increase of eight regiments of Infantry, one of Artillery, and one of Cavalry), called for 42,034 Volunteers for three years, and 18,000 seamen for the Navy for one to three years.[24]

When Congress met it not only approved the President's action but in the Act of July 22, 1861, authorized him to call up to 500,000 Volunteers for from six months, to three years, service as the Prsident deemed necessary. Quotas were to be apportioned among the states according to population taking into consideration the number of men already in the service. The same act prescribed the organization for the Volunteer units (old Regular Army regiments and Volunteer regiments were to have ten companies whereas the new Regular Army regiments had three battalions of eight companies each); pay, pension, and other benefits were essentially the same for Volunteers as for the Regular Army; the President was given the right to appoint general officers, but the governors were to commission company and field officers. The President was given power through the medium of military boards to examine into the qualifications of all officers appointed by the governors and to remove those deemed not qualified.

[21] *Ibid.*, ser. IV, vol. IV, p. 1264.
[22] "PMG Report," I, p. 7.
[23] Meneely, *op. cit.*, pp. 116–19.
[24] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 145–46.

This excellent provision was vitiated to a degree by a provision that officer vacancies in Volunteer units in the company grade would be filled by vote of the enlisted men of the unit and in the field grade by vote of the officers in the regiment. Additional provisions gave all soldiers the privilege of free postage, provided some death benefits to next of kin, and directed establishment of a system of family allotments.[25]

Subsequent acts of Congress provided authority for calling additional Volunteers, and finally the Enrollment Act of 1863 removed statutory limits on the size of the Army. In addition to Regulars and Volunteers, the President was authorized to call out Militia units whose period of service was limited to 60 days after Congress convened unless specifically extended.[26] [See *Tables 6, 7,* and *8* for statistics of the manpower mobilization of the Civil War.]

*Table 6. Number of Men Called For, Periods of Service, Quotas, and Number Furnished Under Each Call During the Civil War.**

Date of call or proclamation	Number called for	Periods of service	Quotas assigned	Number obtained
Total [a]	2, 942, 748		2, 759, 049	[b] 2, 690, 401
15 April 1861	75, 000	3 months	73, 391	93, 326
3 May 1861, Volunteers	42, 034	3 years	611, 827	714, 231
3 May 1861, Regulars	22, 714	3 years		
3 May 1861, Seamen	18, 000	3 years		
22 and 25 July 1861	500, 000	3 years		
May and June 1862		3 months		15, 007
2 July 1862	300, 000	3 years	334, 835	431, 958
4 August 1862	300, 000	9 months	334, 835	87, 588
15 June 1863	100, 000	6 months		16, 361
17 October 1863	300, 000	3 years	467, 434	[c] 374, 807
1 February 1864	200, 000	3 years		
14 March 1864	200, 000	3 years	186, 981	284, 021
23 April 1864	85, 000	100 days	113, 000	83, 652
18 July 1864	500, 000	1, 2, and 3 years	346, 746	384, 882
18 December 1864	300, 000	1, 2, and 3 years	290, 000	204, 568

[a] The totals in the various tables do not always agree; Civil War statistics derived from different official records vary appreciably even when assembled in such a compilation as the *Report of the Provost Marshal General.* The fact that many short-term Militiamen frequently reenlisted for varying terms made accurate personnel accounting impossible. If all enlistments were reduced to a 3-year standard, the estimated total enrollment in the Union Army is approximately 2,325,000.

[b] Includes 86,724 paid commutations, excluding 63,322 men furnished at various times for various periods of service.

[c] Includes 35,883 men raised and 52,288 paid commutations resulting from the draft of July 1863.

* *Source:* "PMG Report," I, p. 160.

[25] "An act to authorize the employment of volunteers to aid in enforcing the laws and protecting public property," 22 Jul 1861, in Callan, *op. cit.,* pp. 466–71; "An Act to increase the present military establishment of the United States," 29 Jul 1861, in *ibid,* pp. 473–76.

[26] *Ibid.,* pp. 476–78.

*Table 7. Strength of the Army at Various Dates: 1860–1865.**

Date	Total			Present			Absent		
	Total	Regulars	Volunteers	Total	Regulars	Volunteers	Total	Regulars	Volunteers
1 January 1860	16, 435	16, 435	----------	14, 636	14, 636	----------	1, 799	1, 799	----------
1 January 1861	16, 367	16, 367	----------	14, 663	14, 663	----------	1, 704	1, 704	----------
1 July 1861	186, 751	16, 422	170, 329	183, 588	14, 108	169, 480	3, 163	2, 314	849
1 January 1862	575, 917	22, 425	553, 492	527, 204	19, 871	507, 333	48, 713	2, 554	46, 159
31 March 1862	637, 126	23, 308	613, 818	533, 984	19, 585	514, 399	103, 142	3, 723	99, 419
1 January 1863	918, 191	25, 463	892, 728	698, 802	19, 169	679, 633	219, 389	6, 294	213, 095
1 January 1864	860, 737	24, 636	836, 101	611, 250	17, 237	594, 013	249, 487	7, 399	242, 088
1 January 1865	959, 460	22, 019	937, 441	620, 924	14, 661	606, 263	338, 536	7, 358	331, 178
31 March 1865	980, 086	21, 669	958, 417	657, 747	13, 880	643, 867	322, 339	7, 789	314, 550
1 May 1865	1, 000, 516	----------	----------	797, 807	----------	----------	202, 709	----------	----------

*Source: "PMG Report," I, p. 102.

*Table 8. Men Mobliized for the Union Army by States During the Civil War.**

State or Territory	Quota	Men furnished	Paid commutation
Total	2, 759, 049	[a] 2, 666, 999	86, 724
Maine	73, 587	69, 738	2, 007
New Hampshire	35, 897	33, 913	692
Vermont	32, 074	33, 272	1, 974
Massachusetts	139, 095	146, 467	5, 318
Rhode Island	18, 898	23, 248	463
Connecticut	44, 797	55, 755	1, 515
New York	507, 148	445, 959	18, 197
New Jersey	92, 820	75, 315	4, 196
Pennsylvania	388, 515	338, 155	28, 171
Delaware	13, 935	12, 265	1, 386
Maryland	70, 965	46, 053	3, 678
West Virginia	34, 463	32, 003	----
District of Columbia	13, 973	16, 534	338
Ohio	306, 322	310, 654	6, 479
Indiana	199, 788	194, 363	784
Illinois	239, 379	258, 162	55
Michigan	95, 007	88, 111	2, 008
Wisconsin	109, 080	91, 021	5, 097
Minnesota	26, 326	24, 002	1, 032
Iowa	77, 459	75, 793	67
Missouri	122, 496	108, 773	----
Kentucky	100, 194	75, 275	3, 265
Kansas	12, 931	20, 095	2
Tennessee	1, 560	31, 092	----
Arkansas	780	8, 289	----
North Carolina	1, 560	3, 156	----
California	----	15, 725	----
Nevada	----	1, 080	----
Oregon	----	1, 810	----
Washington Territory	----	964	----
Nebraska Territory	----	3, 157	----
Colorado Territory	----	4, 903	----
Dakota Territory	----	206	----
New Mexico Territory	----	6, 661	----
Alabama	----	2, 576	----
Florida	----	1, 290	----
Louisiana	----	5, 224	----
Mississippi	----	545	----
Texas	----	1, 965	----
Indian Nations	----	3, 530	----

[a] Includes 63,322 men not included in table 6.

**Source:* "PMG Report," I, p. 163.

Although there were well over 2,000,000 men enrolled in the Union Army during the war, the total present and absent strength at any one time never reached half that number. This is attributable to four factors:

1. Short terms of enlistment and service.
2. Over 200,000 discharges during the war for disabilities arising either from wounds or disease.
3. Heavy casualties; there were 359,528 battle and nonbattle deaths in the Union Army.
4. Heavy desertion rate; some 16,365 men deserted from the Regular Army and 182,680 deserted from Volunteer units.[27]

As in 1846 a decision was made to keep the Regular Army intact rather than to utilize its officers and men as cadres for the huge Volunteer armies being mobilized. This departure from the "expansible army" concept which had been used by the Army since Calhoun originated the plan in 1820 was due to General Scott's insistent advice. Remembering the Mexican War, Scott was anxious to keep in tactical being the only force which he believed was completely dependable—the Regular Army. Although Scott showed farseeing wisdom in his strategic plan for the war, he sadly underestimated the ground forces which would be necessary for such a war of attrition. In an Army whose aggregate strength would be 85,000 men, as Scott initially estimated, a Regular Army of 25,000 would indeed have had a marked leavening effect. But in an Army which grew to over 1,000,000 men, the intact Regular force was too small to influence the mass, or to be employed independently on any large scale tactical mission. This decision to keep the Regular Army intact was to deprive the mobilizing armies of maximum use of the small reservoir of military leadership contained in the Regular Army.[28]

The ultimate number of troops mobilized by the United States during the Civil War was a fine achievement in military manpower procurement, but the methods by which those men were procured clearly demonstrated how *not* to raise armies.

Mobilization Procedures

There were no coordinated plans for implementing the early mobilization; the methods used followed the patterns of custom as they were remembered from the previous wars. The procedure, in general, was for the President to issue a proclamation calling for a specified number of troops for a given period of service. The Secretary of War

[27] Fox, *op. cit.*, pp. 531–32; "PMG Report," I, pp. 78–79.

[28] For the official policy on keeping the Regular Army intact see: Ltr, AG to Maj Gen Patterson, 30 Apr 1861, in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 138. For further discussion of the results of keeping the Regular Army intact see section this chapter on officer procurement and n. 84. For Scott's plan see: *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. II, pt. I, pp. 369–70.

would then assign to the respective governors their quotas according to population. These messages usually also specified the branch of service for which men were wanted and named the rendezvous point for muster. The governors then issued state proclamations subdividing the quota within the state, specifying the local and state rendezvous points, and furnishing other pertinent information. Procedures varied somewhat between states in accordance with different state laws and customs. Mobilization within the states was usually by regiments.[29]

From the point of view of the individual soldier, enlistment followed a personal decision to volunteer. Usually there were several units from which he might make a selection recruiting simultaneously in any area. In a large city such as New York the choice was even greater. Once a man volunteered, he might help recruit the unit (company or regiment) up to strength. When the minimum prescribed strength was reached the unit proceeded to a mustering point where it was inspected before muster into Federal service by a Regular Army officer. Instructions to mustering officers were simply: ". . . to receive no men under the rank of commissioned officer who is in years apparently over forty-five or under eighteen, or who is not in physical strength and vigor." [30] By 3 August 1861 a thorough medical examination was required: ". . . volunteers . . . to be mustered into the service of the United States . . . will . . . be minutely examined by the surgeon . . . to ascertain whether they have the physical qualifications necessary for the military service." [31] There was, however, considerable disregard of the medical regulations in the rush to fill regiments to strength.[32]

Once the oath of allegiance had been taken the muster was completed and the unit (usually a regiment) was under Federal jurisdiction. If complete uniforms and equipment had not been furnished by the state, shortages were made up by the Federal government as quickly as possible.[33] Usually drill began even before muster; on 24 May 1861 the Secretary of War asked the governors to turn the rendezvous into camps of instruction for units not ordered to a concentration point.[34] If a unit were ordered to a concentration area such as Wash-

[29] For Secretary of War's letters to the governors for call of 15 Apr 1861 see: *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 68; for call of 3 May 1861 see: *ibid*, pp. 203–04.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 384.

[32] The physical examinations were not effective according to a letter from the Executive Committee of the United States Sanitary Commission to the President, 21 Jul 1862: "The careless and superficial medical inspection of recruits made at least 25 per cent of the volunteer army raised last year not only utterly useless, but a positive incumbrance and embarrassment, filling our hospitals with invalids and the whole country with exaggerated notions of the dangers of war that now so seriously retard the recruiting of the new levies we so urgently need." *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 237.

[33] *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 107.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 229.

ington or Cairo, drilling and instructions were continued there. Units were moved by rail and boat with occasional marches when easier means of transportation were not available.

Potential officers frequently undertook recruiting for a unit which they hoped to command. Usually these men were given their commissions by the governors once the unit was filled. This was the beginning of the recruiting competition which led to practical anarchy in the early mobilization. Sometimes also at the beginning of the war volunteers would be called for at a patriotic meeting and then allowed to select their own officers. General Grant's first action in the war was to preside over such a meeting at Galena, Ill., in April 1861.[35]

In addition to the recruiting activities of the governors and of the Regular Army, certain private individuals were authorized by the War Department to raise regiments or brigades independently. This was not an attempt at Federal recruiting since the officers conducting the recruiting were practically independent until the unit was completed; it was rather an acceptance by the War Department of spontaneous efforts by private individuals. The governors resented the resulting competition for the available manpower in their states and complained bitterly to the War Department.

In the first enthusiasm in the North which followed the President's first two calls for Militia and Volunteers, states frequently organized more units than their quota. There was an amazing correspondence between the governors and Secretary of War Cameron in the late spring of 1861; the governors pleaded and urged the War Department to accept additional units; Cameron adamantly refused them; and on occasion the President would intervene to direct acceptance of an extra-quota unit.[36] The War Department's reluctance in the early part of the war to accept more men than called was due to the fact that the War Department was fully occupied trying to organize, equip, sustain, and utilize the men it already had. It was believed also that the first two calls would provide enough men to implement General Scott's plan. The War Department was probably also worried about justifying additional unauthorized expenditures to Congress.

The confusion, lethargy, and lack of a long-range mobilization plan by the War Department in 1861 failed to take advantage of the tremendous war enthusiasm which swept the North after Fort Sum-

[35] Grant, *op. cit.*, I, p. 231. For descriptions of early recruiting see: Josiah M. Favill, *The Diary of a Young Officer* (Chicago, 1909), p. 42 ff.; John G. B. Adams, "Sunshine and Shadows of Army Life," *Civil War Papers . . . Massachusetts Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the U. S.* (Boston, 1900), II, pp. 448–49, 451; Michael H. Fitch, *Echoes of the Civil War as I Hear Them* (New York, 1905), pp. 17–20; all quoted in Henry Steele Commager, *The Blue and the Gray* (New York, 1950), I, pp. 72–76.

[36] For examples of this correspondence see: *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 131, 203, 219, 229, 233, 274.

ter, but which slackened off by the late summer.[37] This abatement of fervor was accentuated by press accounts of poor clothing and food in the Army. The expanding war economy was utilizing more and more of the available manpower in the factory and on the farm at ever rising wages.[38] The disaster at the first Battle of Bull Run (21 July 1861) shocked the North and revived Volunteer enlistments, but the enthusiasm of April and May 1861 was never again equaled during the war.

The confusion which began with the mobilization of the 75,000 Militia called by the President 15 April was increased by his subsequent calls for 500,000 Volunteers in 1861. Militia quotas and three-year Volunteer quotas became inextricably confused. Many regiments mobilized under the Militia call later volunteered for three years thereby upsetting administrative accounting. The authority granted to private citizens to recruit their own regiments outside of state control added to the confusion and harassed the governors who had become the chief cogs in the mobilization machinery of 1861. The quota accounting had become so chaotic after the President's call of 3 May 1861 that the War Department for the rest of the year discontinued formal assignment of quotas to the states. With no long-range mobilization plan in 1861 requisitions were made on the governors for units as circumstances dictated. Sometimes the governors mobilized units without any Federal call for them, and private individuals also mobilized units without even state connections. The Army, like Topsy, just grew in 1861. When the quota system was reinstituted in 1862, exhaustive checks were made of the Adjutant General's records to determine the men from each state that were already in the service so that the state could receive proper credits in subsequent quota allocations.[39]

In September 1861 the War Department took the first step to bring some sort of order and system into the mobilization. By a series of orders all units being recruited independent of the governors were placed under state control.[40] This was a step toward eliminating recruiting competition, but control of competition within a state depended on the respective governors. As late as August 1862 there were 11 colonels in Philadelphia alone recruiting for their regiments.[41] Delegation of authority to the governors for raising troops was almost complete. Having established a general policy, the War Department proceeded to make an exception by authorizing Maj. Gen. Benjamin F.

---

[37] Ltr, Sen W. P. Fessenden to Sec of War, 8 May 1861, in *ibid.*, p. 191.

[38] Fred A. Shannon, *The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861–1865* (Cleveland, 1928), I, pp. 259–60. Shannon's two volume work based mainly on the *Official Records* is one of the better secondary sources although frequently his conclusions are open to question.

[39] "PMG Report," I, p. 160.

[40] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 518.

[41] *Ibid.*, ser. III, v. II, p. 422.

Butler to raise troops in New England. Butler was a political general, a war Democrat who had been defeated for the governorship of Massachusetts. Conflict between the two political rivals was inevitable; from September to February a stalemate in recruiting existed in Massachusetts with Butler and Andrew bickering and arguing. In theory Butler expressed the correct view when he stated: "I . . . was informed by Governor Andrew, in substance, that the President of the United States had no right to recruit in Massachusetts men for the volunteer service of the United States without his leave. This doctrine of secession did not seem to me any more sound uttered by a Governor north of Mason and Dixon's line than if proclaimed . . . south." [42] However, if the War Department expected the governors to recruit Volunteer units effectively it should have refrained from authorizing independent recruiting parties such as General Butler's. The Butler-Andrew controversy was a major political blunder which demonstrated the ineptitude of the War Department under Cameron in 1861.[43] A general order of 21 February 1862 ended the confusion: "The Governors of States are legally the authorities for raising volunteer regiments and commissioning their officers. Accordingly, no independent organizations, as such, will be hereafter recognized in the U. S. service." [44]

Cameron's Replacement Plan

The second step in systematizing the mobilization was the plan to establish a replacement program. War Department General Orders No. 105, 3 December 1861, provided that:

1. After the units in the process of organization were completed, troops would be recruited only on requisition from the War Department.

2. War Department general superintendents of recruiting would take charge of the central recruit depots in each state on 1 January 1862. Each superintendent would have supervisory control over all regimental recruiting parties within his state.

3. Recruits would be assembled, equipped, and instructed at central depots before being forwarded to their assigned regiments.[45] This system placed recruiting activities directly under War Department control and supervision. The state governors whose job had been to raise new units were gracefully eased out of the mobilization picture by halting the creation of new units. The primary responsibility for manpower procurement thus passed to the Federal Government.

---

[42] *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 652–55.

[43] Material on the Butler-Andrew controversy is found in *ibid.*, pp. 810–66. A good summary is found in Hesseltine, *op. cit.*, pp. 186–91.

[44] WD GO 18, 21 Feb. 1862. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 898.

[45] WD GO 105, 3 Dec 1861. *Ibid*, pp. 722–23.

It was felt that the forces already mobilized were adequate to suppress the rebellion if this replacement system were effective. The total strength of the Army 1 December 1861 was 660,971 men apportioned by arm of service as follows: [46]

Arm of Service	*Number*
Total	660,971
Infantry	568,383
Cavalry	59,398
Artillery	24,688
Riflemen-Sharpshooters	8,395
Engineers	107

The replacement plan, however, was never put to an adequate test. Cameron was replaced as Secretary of War on 15 January 1862 by Edwin M. Stanton. The new Secretary who was to prove so able, energetic, and honest an administrator committed a major blunder on 3 April 1862 by abolishing the new recruiting-replacement system set up under his predecessor.[47] The reasons for this action were simple enough. It appeared to Stanton in April 1862 that the Army was large enough to accomplish its mission for he grossly underestimated future casualty losses of the Army. Congress and the people were looking more and more aghast at the huge expenditures for the war. The discontinuance of the recruiting system was part of Stanton's campaign to economize and to eliminate waste in the War Department's operations.[48]

The heavy losses suffered by the Union Armies during the Peninsula Campaign (April-June 1862), at Shiloh (6 April 1862), and from disease and desertion greatly reduced the Army. Replacements in large numbers were going to be necessary very quickly. On 1 May 1862 the War Department directed Army commanders to requisition recruits from the governors to keep the regiments in the field up to strength.[49] This was only a temporary expedient. The Federal recruiting service was restored 6 June 1862.[50] Not only were individual replacements needed in far greater numbers than had been estimated but the lengthening lines of communications required new units to protect them.[51]

---

[46] "Report of the Secretary of War to the President," 1 Dec 1861. *Ibid.*, p. 699.

[47] WD GO 33, 3 Apr 1862. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 2–3. The order was all-inclusive: "The recruiting service for volunteers will be discontinued in every State from this date. The officers detached on volunteer recruit service will join their regiments without delay, taking with them the parties and recruits at their respective stations. The superintendents of volunteer recruiting service will disband their parties and close their offices, after having taken the necessary steps to carry out these orders." Shannon called the order "one of the colossal blunders of the war." Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 266.

[48] "PMG Report," I, p. 9.

[49] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 28–29.

[50] WD GO 60, 6 June 1862.

[51] For a complete discussion of replacements in the Civil War see: Lerwill, *op. cit.*, ch. II. The spring of 1862 was the low point in the replacement picture. There was a gradual

The governors were appealed to once again for manpower although for morale and propaganda purposes the impression was given that the governors spontaneously urged the President to accept 300,000 more Volunteers and that he graciously acceded to their request.[52] The President's call was issued 2 July 1862; quotas were assigned calling for 334,835 Volunteers for three years. At the beginning the War Department authorized prepayment of $25 of the $100 bounty which had heretofore been paid on discharge.[53] The immediate response to the call was slow, and the need for manpower was increasing daily.

The Draft Plan of 1862

The War Department had two alternatives available by which it could increase the response to the call of 2 July 1862: increase bounties or draft men. Two states, Iowa and Missouri, had used the threat of a draft in 1861 to speed up volunteering.[54] The Confederate Congress had passed a comprehensive draft act on 16 April 1862. There was no direct Federal statutory authority for a draft, but an obscure provision in the Militia Act of July 17, 1862, provided that for those states which did not have adequate laws governing the Militia "the President is authorized . . . to make all necessary rules and regulations."[55] Interpreting this provision broadly, the President on 4 August 1862 issued a call for a draft of 300,000 Militia for nine months. A proviso was added to that call that any state which by 15 August 1862 had not furnished its full quota of three-year Volunteers under the call of 2 July 1862 would make up the deficiency by a special draft from the Militia. The Secretary of War was instructed to establish the necessary rules for the draft.[56] This is the first instance of the Federal Government assuming military draft prerogatives in the United States. This Militia draft may well have been intended to spur the governors to greater recruiting speed.[57]

The draft machinery[58] was prescribed in General Orders No. 99, 9 August 1862:

1. State governors were responsible for the conduct of the draft within their respective states.

---

improvement after the establishment of the Provost Marshal General's Bureau in 1863 and the passage of the draft. Although the War Department never retained complete control of the Volunteer recruiting service, its possession of the power to conscript proved to be a weapon of coercion in forcing the governors to divert Volunteers from new organizations into the ranks of the old. By late 1864 a federally controlled replacement system was in operation which supplied a steady although insufficient and poorly distributed stream of replacements for the old regiments.

[52] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 180, 187–88.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 187. Eventually 431,958 men were furnished under the call of 2 Jul 1862. See also "PMG Report," I, p. 160.

[54] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 273–74.

[55] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 531.

[56] WD GO 94, 4 Aug 1862, in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 291.

[57] Hesseltine, *op cit.*, p. 201.

[58] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 334.

2. All men between 18 and 45 were subject to the draft and were to be enrolled except the following exempted classes:

(a) those in military service; (b) telegraph employees; (c) railroad locomotive engineers; (d) employees of public arsenals and armories; (e) the Vice President, members of Congress, and judicial and executive officers of the Federal Government; (f) customs officials and clerks; (g) postal officials and clerks; (h) pilots and the merchant marine; (i) those exempted by state law; (k) those certified physically incapable of service by a state surgeon.

3. Substitution was authorized.

4. The county was to be the local unit of draft jurisdiction.

5. County or state appointed officials would conduct the draft.

These regulations were issued 9 August 1862. "Troubles quickly followed. The governors did not question the President's authority to order a draft—which was of dubious legality . . . Instead the governors protested at the time allowed, and . . . the proper quotas. The people protested, too. There were draft riots in Wisconsin, and threats of riots in Pennsylvania. Yielding to pressure, Stanton permitted the governors to postpone the draft—first for a month, and then indefinitely." [59] Although the draft of 1862 never went into effect, the threat of a draft and increased bounties helped to fill the calls of 2 July and 4 August 1862. Under Stanton's accounting system of allowing four nine-month Militia to equal one three-year Volunteer, the calls yielded 431,958 Volunteers and 87,558 Militia and were, therefore, considered successful.[60] The chief contribution of the executive draft of 1862 was that it affirmed without serious constitutional opposition the principle of a compulsive Federal draft of manpower for military purposes.

The 1863 Draft Act

The principle of a compulsory Federal draft of manpower was reaffirmed by the Congress when after two weeks of debate it passed by comfortable majorities "An Act for enrolling and calling out the National Forces, and for other purposes," 3 March 1863.[61] The functional provisions [62] of the Enrollment Act of 1863 were as follows:

1. Draft liability was imposed on all male citizens and declarant aliens between 20 and 45 years of age except the following exempted categories:

---

[59] Hesseltine, *op cit.*, pp. 201–02. At least three governors (Washburn of Maine, Morton of Indiana, and Yates of Illinois) had expressed approval of a draft in principle before the President's call. See *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 201, 212–13, 289. Gov. Andrew of Massachusetts opposed this draft on the very sound principle that it would produce ". . . a mere paper army, unorganized, ineffectual, discontented, valueless—flocks of green men, green officers, conscripts." *Ibid.*, p. 401.

[60] Hesseltine, *op cit.*, p. 202.

[61] Act of March 3, 1863. *Stat. L.*, XII, pp. 731–37.

[62] Duggan, *op. cit.*, p. 48. Duggan contains a succinct summary of the Enrollment Act of 1863. Most of the outline summary of that act is based on Duggan's analysis.

a. Physically or mentally unfit.
b. Vice President, Federal judges, heads of Federal executive departments, and governors.
c. Men with certain specified types of dependents.
d. Persons convicted of a felony.

2. Enrollees were divided into two classes: Class I, all persons between 20 and 35 and all unmarried persons between 35 and 45; Class II, all enrollees not in Class I.

3. No Class II enrollees could be drafted until the Class I pool was exhausted.

4. Enrollees were subject to draft for two years after enrollment; once drafted, they would remain in service for three years or the war, whichever ended first.

5. Administratively the country was divided into enrollment districts with at least one per congressional district. Enrollment boards could subdivide enrollment districts into conveniently small subdistricts.

6. Draft quotas from each district would be set by the President based on population and the number of men already in the service from each district.

7. The executive machinery to administer and enforce the Enrollment Act consisted of:

a. The Provost Marshal General as the operating executive under the President and Secretary of War.
b. A provost marshal with the rank of captain for each district appointed by the President to serve as president of the Enrollment Board and to act as principal administrative and enforcement official in the district.
c. Enrollment Board of three members including the district provost marshal and one practicing physician.
d. Each district or subdistrict was to have an enrolling officer to conduct the actual enrollment and transmit the list of enrollees to the Enrollment Board.

8. Procedure for drafting men was essentially as follows:

a. The President would assign a draft quota to an enrollment district.
b. The Enrollment Board would call from its roster of enrollees the requisite quota plus a 50 percent overstrength to report at a designated rendezvous.
c. The physician on the Board would examine all enrollees called and report the results to the full Board. Decision of the Board as to exemption for physical reasons was final.
d. As soon as the quota of able-bodied men was filled the remainder were released and those selected were mustered into the Army.

9. Substitution, whereby a drafted man could hire another to perform military service for him, and commutation, whereby a drafted man could purchase relief from obligation for that call by paying $300, were authorized.

The Enrollment Act of 1863 also had formidable defects:

1. The administration and enforcement of the draft were charged solely to military officers.

2. Under the enrollment procedure officers went from house to house enrolling men rather than making it a civic responsibility to register.

3. The substitution and commutation privileges were unsound and unjust.

4. Exemptions and commutations almost emptied the manpower pool before the draft began.

The Enrollment Act was, however, a Federal law providing for the raising of armies by Federal administrative machinery, and it ignored the state governments in the task of mobilizing manpower. A fundamental change in the theory of military mobilization had thus taken place.

The implementation of the Enrollment Act began with the first enrollment which started 25 May 1863. Drafting began the first week in July and continued into August. Sporadic resistance to the draft throughout the country culminated in riots in New York City. Police, Militia, and the Regular Army finally restored order after four days of rioting and an estimated 1,000 casualties and $1,500,000 damages.[63]

The statistics of the draft of July 1863 are a good indication of its relative effectiveness:[64]

Status	*Number*
Whole number drawn	292,441
Number not examined	39,875
Failed to report	39,415
Discharged, quota filled	447
Discharged per order	13
Number examined	252,566
Exempted	164,395
Held to service	88,171
Men raised	35,883
Held to personal service	9,881
Furnished substitutes	26,002
Paid commutation	52,288

[63] Rhodes, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 328.
[64] "PMG Report" I, p. 175.

The net results of 35,883 men and $15,686,400 were so meager as to justify the assertion that the Enrollment Act of 1863 was a failure as a direct medium for the procurement of manpower. Certainly the number of men secured by the draft in 1863 fell far short of meeting military manpower requirements for 1864. In addition to the heavy losses at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the desertion and disease rates were continuing high, and the three-year enlistment term of the 1861 Volunteers was drawing to an end. In frustration Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, General in Chief of the Army, wrote to General Sherman 1 October 1863 "Your ranks cannot be filled by the present draft. It is almost a failure, as nearly everybody is exempt. It takes more soldiers to enforce it than we get by it. A more complicated, defective, and impracticable law could scarcely have been framed." [65]

To fill the seemingly inexhaustible manpower demands of the war, the President resorted to additional calls for Volunteers. On 17 October 1863 he called for 300,000 three-year Volunteers with a warning that if Volunteers were not forthcoming deficiencies would be made up by draft to be held 5 January 1864. The draft was postponed, and on 1 February 1864 the President increased the call to 500,000 Volunteers with a draft to begin 10 March 1864 if volunteering did not produce the required number. This draft was also postponed to allow men to volunteer and take advantage of the increased bounties included in an act passed 24 February 1864 amending the Enrollment Act of 1863. The major changes in that act included: (1) a redefining of quota credits; (2) increasing the penalty for resisting the draft; (3) recognizing the validity of conscientious objectors; (4) subjecting Negroes to enrollment and service.[66]

On 14 March 1864 the President increased the pending calls for 500,000 Volunteers by another 200,000 and again directed a draft to fill vacancies to begin on 15 April 1864. Quotas assigned under these calls for 700,000 men came to 654,415, and 658,828 men were raised, a substantial achievement after three years of war. Although many communities produced enough Volunteers to fill their quotas, many other communities had to resort to the draft which this time had the following results: [67]

Status	*Number*
Held to service	45,005
Men raised	12,327
Held to personal service	3,416
Furnished substitutes	8,911
Paid commutation	32,678

[65] *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. III, pt. I, p. 718.
[66] Duggan, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
[67] "PMG Report", I, p. 185.

Again the major effect of the draft was not its direct procurement of manpower (which can be measured exactly), but its indirect effect by encouraging volunteering.

Two more major calls for men were made by the President. The call on 18 July 1864 was for 500,000 men to serve 1, 2, or 3 years, but the quotas assigned to the states came to only 346,746 men. Although 384,882 men were raised under this call, a draft was again necessary in many localities. Its results were as follows: [68]

Status	*Number*
Held to service	85,589
Men raised	84,291
Held to personal service	26,205
Substitutes furnished by enrollees before draft	29,584
Substitutes furnished by draftees	28,502
Paid commutation	1,298

The last call was made on 18 December 1864 for 300,000 men. Quotas were allocated for 290,000 and 204,568 had responded when the war ended. Draft results this time were: [69]

Status	*Number*
Held to service	30,494
Men raised	30,034
Held to personal service	6,845
Substitutes furnished by enrollees before draft	12,997
Substitutes furnished by draftees	10,192
Paid commutation	460

The net results of the four applications of the Enrollment Act of 1863 were as follows: [70]

Status	*Number*
Held to service	249,259
Men raised	162,535
Held to personal service	46,347
Substitutes furnished	116,188
Paid commutation	86,724

Of the 2,666,999 men raised by the North during the Civil War, only 6 percent can be attributed to the direct effect of the draft. The indirect effects of the draft in encouraging enlistments cannot be accurately assessed, but that those effects were important seems certain. The principal importance of the Enrollment Act of 1863, however, lies not in the direct or indirect effects it had on manpower procurement for the Civil War. It lies in the fact that this measure established firmly the principle that every citizen owes the Nation the obligation to defend it and that the Federal Government can impose

[68] "PMG Report," I, pp. 44, 199.

[69] "PMG Report, I, pp. 56, 212.

[70] The 86,724 commutations yielded $26,366,316.78, part of which was used for bounties and substitutes. "PMG Report," I, p. 95.

that obligation directly on the citizen without mediation of the states. Of almost equal importance were the lessons learned from the Civil War draft which served as the basis for the well-planned selective service laws of World Wars I and II.

The Bounties

As in previous wars, bounties were an integral part of the Volunteer system during the Civil War. Because the Civil War was on a larger scale the bounty payments came to staggering totals for that day. It is not possible to assign relative weights to the influence of bounties and the draft in spurring volunteering since both measures were used simultaneously. It is reasonably safe to assert that both the bounties and the draft had an appreciable effect on encouraging men to volunteer for service. [For complete estimates of the amounts expended by the Federal and state governments on bounties during the Civil War see *tables 9* and *10*.]

*Table 9. Bounties Paid by the Federal Government—Civil War.**

Periods	Class	Period of service	Number of men	Amount per man	Total amount paid
Total			1, 722, 690		$300, 223, 500
3 May 1861 to 17 Oct 1863.	Volunteers	3 years	905, 869	$100	90, 586, 900
17 Oct 1863 to 18 Jul 1864.					146, 417, 500
	Veteran Volunteers.	3 years	158, 507	400	63, 402, 800
	Recruits	3 years	257, 028	300	77, 108, 400
	Recruits	3 years	11, 025	100	1, 102, 500
	Drafted men and substitutes.	3 years	48, 038	100	4, 803, 800
18 Jul 1864 to end of war.					63, 219, 100
	Volunteers	1 year	191, 936	100	19, 193, 600
	Volunteers	2 years	10, 606	200	2, 121, 200
	Volunteers	3 years	139, 681	300	41, 904, 300

**Source:* "PMG Report," I, 213.

The cost of bounties was extraordinarily high. The $585,000,000 reported in *tables 9* and *10* is far from a complete total. Although Federal records are reasonably accurate, the total includes only a minimum estimate of the amount paid out by the state governments and entirely omits local bounties paid by towns, cities, and counties. It has been estimated that the total amount paid out in bounties exceeded $750,000,000. Bounties cost about as much as the pay for the

Army during the entire war; exceeded the quartermaster expenditures for the war; and were twice as great as the cost of subsistence and five times the ordnance costs.[71]

*Table 10. Estimate of the Minimum Amount of Bounties Paid by the State Governments—Civil War.**

State	Amount paid	State	Amount paid
Total	$285, 941, 036	District of Columbia	$134, 010
		West Virginia	864, 737
Maine	7, 837, 644	Kentucky	692, 577
New Hampshire	9, 636, 313	Ohio	23, 557, 373
Vermont	4, 528, 775	Indiana	9, 182, 354
Massachusetts	22, 965, 550	Illinois	17, 296, 205
Rhode Island	820, 769	Michigan	9, 664, 855
Connecticut	6, 887, 554	Wisconsin	5, 855, 356
New York	86, 629, 228	Iowa	1, 615, 171
New Jersey	23, 868, 967	Minnesota	2, 000, 464
Pennsylvania	43, 154, 987	Missouri	1, 282, 149
Delaware	1, 136, 599	Kansas	57, 407
Maryland	6, 271, 992		

**Source:* "PMG Report," I, pp. 214–23.

The basic evil of the bounty system was the local competition which developed in bounty payments; as communities vied with each other to get recruits, local bounties became progressively higher. The bounty became not a reward for volunteering but a price for mercenaries. The evils of bounty jumping and substitute brokers were the result. When bounties soared as high as $1,500, the substitute-bounty broker "racket" became big business. The high desertion rate was closely related to the bounty system, for men deserted time and time again in order to enlist elsewhere for additional bounties.[72]

Bounties were frequently considered, in part, as another form of pay. Pay increases for soldiers were necessary to bring their pay into a more equitable relationship with steadily increasing civilian wages. Bounties, however, were an inefficient method for bringing about such a readjustment. Pay in the Army for privates increased from $11 per month in April 1861 to $13 in August 1861 to $16 in June 1864. A clothing allowance of $3.50 was also authorized.[73] There were proportionate increases in pay for other ranks of the Army. Although the increases seemed appreciable on paper, "Actually the pay of the soldiers diminished throughout the war through the depre-

[71] Shannon, *op. cit.*, II, p. 80.
[72] "PMG Report," I, p. 86; Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 69–71.
[73] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 468, 489; *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 448.



Although there was no large scale organized Army draft until World War I, many measures were taken to recruit men for the service. Frank Leslie, the famous illustrator, has left this memento of the Civil War.

Figure 2. Civil War Recruiting.

ciation in the value of greenbacks with which after February, 1862, they were paid." [74]

However well the bounty program was conceived, in practice it was costly, inefficient, and sordid. Its manifest evils during the Civil War taught another lesson which was to be remembered in 1917 and 1940.

Substitution and Commutation

Substitution and commutation were closely related to bounties. The practice of furnishing substitutes had developed as an adjunct of Militia drafts in the colonial period. As long as there was only one call or draft of manpower the practice of furnishing substitutes did little damage. But when the need for manpower made necessary frequent uses of the draft in the Civil War, the immunity from service derived from furnishing a substitute reduced the available manpower

[74] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 246. General Sherman stated: "I believe it would have been more economical to have raised the pay of the soldier to thirty or even fifty dollars a month than to have held out the promise of three hundred and even six hundred dollars in the form of bounty." See William T. Sherman, *Personal Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman* (3d ed.; New York, 1890), II, p. 387; "Conclusion—Military Lessons of the War," ch. XXV of General Sherman's memoirs, is a most valuable and interesting commentary.

pool. This contingency had never occurred before the Civil War, and therefore was not foreseen in 1862 when a substitution privilege was included in the executive draft.[75] Although there is a considerable difference of opinion over the caliber of substitutes, the mercenary factor motivated most of them in seeking that entrance into the service.[76]

The Enrollment Act of March 3, 1863, contained the following substitution-commutation provision: "That any person drafted and notified to appear as aforesaid may, on or before the day fixed for his appearance, furnish an acceptable substitute to take his place in the draft; or he may pay to such person as the Secretary of War may authorize to receive it, such sum, not exceeding three hundred dollars, as the Secretary of War may determine, for the procuration of such substitute." [77]

A question of interpretation arose as to the length of exemption to be obtained by hiring a substitute or paying commutation. The amendments to the Enrollment Act passed 24 February 1864 clarified the substitute-commutation system by providing in general: (1) substitutes had to be men not liable to the draft themselves; (2) a principal's exemption lasted only as long as his substitute remained in service; (3) payment of commutation exempted the payee from service only for that specific draft call. These changes not only raised the hiring fee of substitutes but also confirmed the belief that the substitute-commutation system was a class privilege. To hire a substitute or pay $300 for exemption from each draft call was beyond the financial capacity of the average farmer and laborer in the 1860's. Public antipathy centered on the commutation fee and became so strong that Congress abolished commutation outright for all but conscientious objectors 4 July 1864. The substitution privilege remained, and the Act of July 4, 1864, specifically provided: "That nothing contained in this act shall be construed to alter or change the provisions of existing laws relative to permitting persons liable to military service to furnish substitutes."

In spite of the substitution privilege the Enrollment Act was in its best form during the period 4 July 1864 to 3 March 1865. The percentage of men brought into service out of the number examined was greatest during this period. An act passed 3 March 1865 contained several new amendments to the Enrollment Act including a repeal of the provision that substitutes must come from men not themselves subject to the draft.

A review of Civil War draft statistics indicates the extent to which the substitution and commutation privileges were utilized:

---

[75] *Ibid.*, II, p. 11; *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 334–35.

[76] For praise of substitutes in after-action reports see: *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXIX, pt. I, pp. 286, 288.

[77] Act of March 3, 1863. *Stat. L.*, XII, p. 733.

*Table 11. Draft Substitution and Commutation in the Civil War.**

Date of call	Held to personal service	Substitutes furnished by draftees	Substitutes furnished by enrollees	Paid commutation
Total	46, 347	73, 607	42, 581	86, 724
July 1863	9, 881	26, 002	0	52, 288
14 Mar 1864	3, 416	8, 911	0	32, 678
18 Jul 1864	26, 205	28, 502	29, 584	1, 298
19 Dec 1864	6, 845	10, 192	12, 997	460

**Source:* Summary of draft statistics in "PMG Report," I, compiled by the author.

The substitution-commutation concept was predicated on the faulty assumption that no draft for personal service was necessary if military manpower could be procured by other methods. Yet the very passage of the Enrollment Act of 1863 indicated the failure of the volunteer system. A curious effort was made to retain the fiction of volunteering by stimulating it with bounties and the threat of draft. Substitution and commutation were part of the camouflage used to make the draft more palatable.

Utilization of Negro Manpower

The question of whether Negroes should serve in the armed forces of the United States was settled affirmatively during the Civil War after more than a year of hot political arguments. At the beginning of the war the Regular Army limited enlistments to free white males. The first authorization for using Negroes in the Army was contained in an act passed 17 July 1862 authorizing the President to accept Negroes for labor and other military service. The Congress did not include Negroes in the draft until 24 February 1864.

The first recruiting of Negroes took place in captured areas of the South beginning in Louisiana in September 1862. With the exception of a few units organized by states, Negro units were formed and filled by the Federal Government. The Bureau for Colored Troops (created by General Orders No. 143, 22 May 1863) was charged with the organization and supervision of Negro units. The Adjutant General of the Army took personal charge of Negro recruiting in the Mississippi Valley in the spring of 1863; after that, recruiting was accelerated all over the country and continued until 29 April 1865.[78]

[78] "PMG Report," I, pp. 67–68. Even after issuance of WD GO 143, 22 May 1863, the Northern governors were allowed to recruit in the South and receive credit for Negroes enlisted on their state quotas. This composed a very small part of the Negro recruiting program, however. See *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. III, pp. 372, 383, 572, 576.

By the end of the war the following Negro units had been organized and mustered into Federal service:

120 Regiments of Infantry,
12 Regiments of Heavy Artillery,
1 Regiment of Light Artillery,
7 Regiments of Cavalry.[79]

Of the 186,017 Negroes in the Union Army, some 134,111 were from slave states and most of those were slaves or former slaves.[80] [See *table 12* for summary of Negro enlistments by states.]

*Table 12. Negroes Recruited or Drafted in the Civil War, by States**

State	Number	State	Number
Total	186,017	Border States	44,034
		District of Columbia	3,269
Northern States	35,699	Maryland	8,718
Colorado Territory	95	Kentucky	23,703
Connecticut	1,764	Missouri	8,344
Delaware	954		
Illinois	1,811	Seceded States	93,346
Indiana	1,537	Alabama	4,969
Iowa	440	Arkansas	5,526
Kansas	2,080	Florida	1,044
Maine	104	Georgia	3,486
Massachusetts	3,966	Louisiana	24,052
Michigan	1,387	Mississippi	17,869
Minnesota	104	North Carolina	5,035
New Hampshire	125	South Carolina	5,462
New Jersey	1,185	Tennessee	20,133
New York	4,125	Texas	47
Ohio	5,092	Virginia	5,723
Pennsylvania	8,612		
Rhode Island	1,837	At large	733
Vermont	120	Not assigned to States	5,083
West Virginia	196	Officers	7,122
Wisconsin	165		

**Source:* "PMG Report," I, p. 69. See also *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 1269–70.

Militarily the Negroes appear to have been amenable to discipline and army life in the Civil War. No effort was made to integrate Negroes into white units although an occasional Negro undoubtedly

[79] "PMG Report," I, pp. 68–69.

[80] The figure 134,111 includes Negroes from the seceded states plus Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. Another 5,052 credited to Northern states came from seceded areas and were presumably for the most part former slaves as were the 3,269 from the District of Columbia. See: Bell I. Wiley, *Southern Negroes 1861–1865* (New Haven, 1938), p. 311; *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 1270.

served in a white unit. Negro units were used principally as labor-service organizations and for garrisoning forts along the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, along lines of communication, and in coastal regions. The instances where Negro troops were employed in combat were so few as to preclude any appraisal of their overall value in combat.[81]

Limited Service Men

The pressing need for additional manpower in 1863 led to the establishment of a special corps to utilize the services of partially disabled veterans. General Orders No. 105, 28 April 1863, established the Invalid Corps which was to be composed entirely of officers and enlisted men no longer fit for frontline service but who volunteered for further duty. The Corps was organized into companies, battalions, and regiments of Infantry divided into two classes according to the physical capacity of the men: units available for any work except combat and units available for only very light work. The Corps performed valuable rear area services as prisoner guards, building guards, clerks, hospital orderlies, administrators, etc., thereby releasing physically fit men for combat. In 1864 the unpopular term "Invalid" was dropped and the Corps redesignated the "Veteran Reserve Corps." Although the Corps did not furnish an appreciable amount of manpower, the establishment of the principle of the utilization of limited service men was truly significant. Altogether over 60,000 men passed through the ranks of the Veteran Reserve Corps. The strength of the Corps at various times was as follows: [82]

Date	Total	Officers	Enlisted men
31 Oct 1863	18, 255	491	17, 764
1 Oct 1864	29, 502	764	28, 738
31 May 1865	30, 614	762	29, 852

Officer Procurement

The sources of trained officer material in the United States at the outset of the Civil War were meager indeed. The Military Academy which had been established at West Point in 1802 had graduated 1,966 men by June 1861 of which 684 were in the Regular Army at the outbreak of the war. Of the total of 1,098 officers in the Regular Army, 313 elected to serve with the Confederacy. The 785 Regular officers

[81] Wiley, *Southern Negroes 1861–1865*, pp. 340–41. In the reorganization of the Army under the Act of July 28, 1866, Negro Regular Army Regiments of both Infantry and Cavalry were authorized for the first time.

[82] "PMG Report," I, pp. 91–93, WD GO 105, 28 Apr 1863 in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. III, pp. 170–72; WD GO 111, 18 Mar 1864, in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 188.

who remained loyal were for the most part kept in their Regular Army units during the early months of the war thus depriving the mobilizing armies of the men best qualified to lead, command, and instruct them. The same insistence on keeping the Regular Army units intact made it impossible to utilize qualified Regular Army enlisted men as officers. The war brought back into the service many graduates of the Military Academy who had resigned from the Army. Included in this group were such men as Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, Henry W. Halleck, and George B. McClellan. These officers proved to be invaluable, but there were far too few of them to meet the need for officers in an Army which would eventually number a million men. Altogether some 800 officers who had attended West Point served in the Union Army and another 296 in the Confederate forces. There had been an increase in private and state military schools since the Mexican War, but a great majority of these schools were in the south.[83] The most important private military school in the North was Norwich University in Vermont which furnished 523 men for Union service and 34 for Confederate.[84]

The call for 75,000 Militia 15 April 1861 included within the total 3,549 officers, all of whom were to be appointed by the state governors even including the 5 major generals and 17 brigadier generals. The call for Volunteers 3 May 1861 directed the governors to appoint com-

[83] Gen Sherman was head of a state-sponsored military school in Louisiana when the war began.

[84] West Point figures are from Callum, *op. cit.*, vol. I–II, and from Dupuy, *op. cit.* Norwich University figures are from Ellis, *op. cit.* See also: Reeves, *op. cit.* For the official policy on keeping the Regular Army intact see: Ltr, AG to Maj Gen Patterson, 20 Apr 1861, in *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. I, p. 138. An excellent example of the failure to make prompt use of Regular Army officers was Gen Philip H. Sheridan, who was serving as a captain as late as 25 May 1862. See Philip H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan* (New York, 1888), I, p. 141. In his memoirs General Grant stated: "The North had a greater number of educated and trained soldiers, but the bulk of them were still in the army and were retained, generally with their old commands and rank, until the war had lasted many months. In the Army of the Potomac there was what was known as the 'regular brigade,' in which, from the commanding officer down to the youngest second lieutenant, every one was educated to his profession. . . . This state of affairs gave me an idea . . . that the government ought to disband the regular army, with the exception of the staff corps." See Grant, *op. cit.*, I, p. 283. General McClellan stated: ". . . it would have been wise to adopt a definite policy with regard to the regular army—viz., either virtually break it up, as a temporary measure, and distribute its members among the staff and regiments of the volunteer organization, thus giving the volunteers all possible benefits from the discipline and instruction of the regulars, or to fill the regular regiments to their full capacity and employ them as a reserve at critical junctures. I could not secure the adoption of either plan." See George B. McClellan, *McClellan's Own Story* (New York, 1887), p. 97. The Executive Committee of the United States Sanitary Commission in a letter to President Lincoln, 21 Jul 1862, stated: "If we have learned anything, it has been that it was a mistake to keep the Regular Army and the Voluntary Army separate. Had the regulars been from the first intermingled with the volunteers they would have leavened the whole lump with their experience of camp police, discipline, subordination, and the sanitary conditions of military life. We should have had no Bull Run panic to blush for. Our little Regular Army, diffused among the volunteers of last year, would within three months have brought them up to its own standard of discipline and efficiency." *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. II, p. 237. The Regular Army officers who went South were utilized to the fullest extent much earlier in the war.

pany and regimental officers but reserved to the President the appointment of general officers for the Volunteers.[85] On 22 May 1861 Secretary of War Cameron at the instigation of General Scott wrote the governors to urge them to use great care in officer selection and suggested maximum age limits for the various ranks as follows:

Lieutenant, 1st and 2d	22
Captain	30
Major	35
Lieutenant Colonel	40
Colonel	45

The governors were admonished "To commission no one of doubtful morals or patriotism and not of sound health" and ". . . that the higher the moral character and general intelligence of the officers . . . the greater the efficiency of the troops and the resulting glory of their respective States.[86]

The governors for the most part were able and loyal. When militarily experienced men were available, the governors gave them commissions. The scanty supply of trained soldiers which the governors might commission was accentuated by the decision to keep the Regular Army intact. An officer holding a Regular commission in the early days of the war had to resign to accept a higher commission in the Volunteers unless the War Department released him. Most Regulars were loathe to resign since there was considerable doubt that they could regain Regular status after the war. Once the supply of experienced officer material was exhausted the governors had to commission untrained civilians. The governors had a difficult time selecting men from the swarms of candidates for commissions. Inevitably political considerations and expediency influenced the governors in their choices.[87] Governor David Tod of Ohio, in a telegram to Secretary of War Stanton, frankly admitted commissioning unqualified men: "In my efforts to popularize volunteering I have been compelled to appoint many officers who I fear unfit for their positions. This difficulty can be cured only by an examining board. Please organize one . . . at as early day as possible." [88]

In many states company grade officers and even higher were elected by the men and then commissioned by the governors. The custom of electing officers was an inheritance from the Militia system and dated back to colonial times. A provision in the Act of July 22, 1861, specifically provided that officer vacancies occurring in Volunteer regiments should be filled by election. Company officers were to be elected

[85] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 69.

[86] *Ibid.*, pp. 227–28.

[87] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I pp. 158–59: Thomas W. Higginson, "Regular and Volunteer Officers," *Atlantic Monthly*, XIV (1864), p. 354.

[88] Telg, Tod to Stanton, 11 Sep 1862. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 538. Stanton replied: "I am pretty much of your opinion about some of your officers, and will try to do them justice by a board." *Ibid.*

by members of the company and field grade officers elected by the officers of the regiment. This provision of the act was never implemented, but was repealed by the Act of August 6, 1861, which provided: "That vacancies hereafter occurring among the commissioned officers of the volunteer regiments shall be filled by the governors of the states respectively, in the same manner as original appointments." [89] Any attempt at systematization of officer selection was abandoned by this restoration of gubernatorial control over Volunteer commissions.

A section of the Act of July 22, 1861 provided for the appointment of military boards (of three to five officers) to examine "the capacity qualifications, propriety of conduct, and efficiency of any commissioned officer of volunteers." [90] If the board made an adverse report against any officer and if the report was approved by the President, the officer's commission was vacated. This authorization for the first real efficiency boards in the United States Army was a soundly progressive measure aimed at raising the standards of the officer corps. There was, however, a curious inconsistency in coupling the authorization for the boards with the short-lived provision for filling vacancies by popular election.

The boards removed some of the Volunteer officers by direct action, others resigned rather than face a board, and indiscriminate appointments were discouraged.[91] General McClellan felt that many inefficient Volunteer officers ". . . were weeded out by courts-martial and boards of examination." [92] There were limitations of the effectiveness of the boards, however. The supply of good officer material was limited because of the absence of an officer training program, and the caliber of replacements was frequently little better than that of the original officers.[93] The various state systems used to select officer replacements in the first years of the war usually combined election and gubernatorial confirmation. In the early days popularity was frequently more important than ability in securing a commission through election. Finally the boards were more successful in weeding out incompetent junior grade officers than they were in removing senior grade officers.[94]

---

[89] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 470, 488–89.

[90] The military boards authorized by the Act of July 22, 1861, to determine officer fitness were established by WD GO 47, 25 July 1861.

[91] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 187.

[92] McCellan, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

[93] To assure a reserve pool of partially trained officers in future wars the Congress passed the Morrill Act of July 2, 1862. This act provided for a grant to each state of public lands which were to be sold and the money derived therefrom used to endow a state college where agriculture, the "mechanic arts," and "military tactics" would be taught. This, however, was a long-range program for training potential officers and was not implemented until after the Civil War. See: ch. V, "The Spanish-American War," this study, for an account of the implementation of the Morrill Act after the Civil War.

[94] Higginson, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

Probably the greatest waste of experienced officers during the Civil War resulted from raising new regiments rather than filling up the depleted veteran units. In his memoirs General Sherman stated:

> The greatest mistake in our civil war was in the mode of recruitment and promotion. When a regiment became reduced by the necessary wear and tear of service, instead of being filled up at the bottom, and the vacancies among the officers filled from the best noncommissioned officers and men, the habit was to raise new regiments, with new colonels, captains, and men, leaving the old and experienced battalions to dwindle away into mere skeleton organizations.[95]

Eventually the election of officers was supplanted by a system of appointment within the Army which materially improved the caliber of the company grade officers. By the end of the war the appointment of veterans directly from the ranks had become the chief method of obtaining officer replacements. The standards of the officer corps rose gradually if slowly throughout the war.[96]

The Act of August 3, 1861, established a retirement system for Army officers, authorizing retirement for physical disability or after 40 years of service with adequate pay and allowances. Although the retirement program was not intended as a direct mobilization measure, it materially assisted the mobilization effort by making possible the elimination of high ranking line and staff officers no longer physically able to do their work adequately.[97]

Training

Training and discipline in the forces mobilized in the spring of 1861 were rudimentary. Comparison of the straggling regiments on the road to Bull Run in July 1861 with the veteran troops who paraded in the Grand Review in Washington in May 1865 indicates, in part, the degree of improvement in the training and discipline of the Union Army. The War Department never developed a comprehensive training program. Whatever training was given in the Union Army was due to the foresight and initiative of individual officers.

General Scott, with discerning forethought, emphasized the importance of training in his plan for squeezing the South into submission, but his advice on training was no more heeded in 1861 than it had been by President Polk in 1846. In a letter to General McClellan, 3 May 1861, Scott advised: "Lose no time . . . in organizing, drilling, and disciplining your three-month's men, many of whom, it is

---

[95] Sherman, *op. cit.*, II, p. 387.

[96] See the list of appointments in *Annual Report of The Adjutant General to the Governor of the State of Ohio for the Year ending November 15, 1865* (Columbus, 1866) for an indication of the high number of appointments directly from the ranks. See also: Rpt, Hq, 25th Reg. Mass Vols., 16 Dec 1864. *Official Records*, ser. 1, vol. XLII, pt. 1, pp. 809–10.

[97] Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 484–86.

hoped, will be ultimately found enrolled under the call for three-years' volunteers. Should an urgent and immediate occasion arise meantime for their services, they will be more effective." [98]

The call of 15 April 1861 for 75,000 three-month Militia designated rendezvous points rather than training camps as the place for the assembly of the Militia.[99] The length of service of the Militia was so short that any thorough training was precluded. After the call for three-year Volunteers, 3 May 1861, Secretary Cameron at the instigation of General Scott suggested the desirability of training to the governors in a circular dated 24 May 1861:

> As soon as the regiments of three-years' volunteers comprising the quotas called for from your respective States are organized and equipped I will ask that those not otherwise ordered be assembled at rendezvous to become camps of instruction. These Your Excellencies best can choose.
>
> A rolling surface or porous soil should be chosen. Other conditions are proximity to wood, water, abundant subsistence for men and horses, and railroad or water transportation. Each camp should be the rendezvous of four or eight regiments.
>
> As some of these regiments may not be called into activity much before frost, they will have ample time to acquire discipline, habits of obedience, and tactical instruction, without which they would be unequal to the campaign for which they are intended.[100]

But the pressing necessity for assembling an army at Washington resulted in dropping this proposal. Troops were rushed to Washington, underwent perfunctory training and drill,[101] and marched to disaster at Bull Run on 21 July 1861. First Bull Run became a classic example of a battle fought by troops without adequate training or discipline.[102] The three-month Militia units which had not volunteered for three years were demobilized after Bull Run as their term of service expired.

The shock of Bull Run awakened the North to the seriousness of the war ahead. Trained and disciplined men were needed in large numbers. In July 1861 the President issued calls for 500,000 Volunteers for three years; the 714,231 men obtained under these calls formed the backbone of the mobilizing Army. Men recruited by the Federal Government for Regular service and Volunteers not entering the service in units were sent to "camps of rendezvous and instruction

---

[98] Ltr. Scott to McClellan, 3 May 1861. *Official Records,* ser. I, vol. II, pt. 1, pp. 369–70.

[99] *Ibid.,* ser. III, vol. I, p. 69.

[100] *Ibid.,* pp. 229–30.

[101] An account by a member of a New York regiment described the training of this period as follows: ". . . after breakfast, come company drills, bayonet practice, battalion drills, and the heavy work of the day . . . In the afternoon comes target practice, skirmishing-drill, more company-or-recruit-drill, and at half past five our evening parade. Let me not forget tent-inspection, at four, by the officer of the day, when our band plays deliciously." Theodore Winthrop, *Life in the Open Air, and Other Papers* (Boston, 1863), pp. 271–76, as quoted in Commager, *The Blue and the Gray,* I, pp. 268–69.

[102] For a colorful account of the lack of training and discipline at Bull Run see: Shannon, *op. cit.,* I, p. 177.

. . . at or in the vicinity of New York; Elmira, N. Y.; Harrisburg, Pa.; Cincinnati, Ohio; and other convenient places." [103] Complete Volunteer regiments mobilized by the states (which constituted the major part of the troops raised in this period) were forwarded as soon as filled to the front or to army concentration areas such as Washington; Cairo, Ill.; or St. Louis, Mo.[104]

Four days after Bull Run, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan was placed in command of the forces around Washington which were to become the Army of the Potomac. General McClellan stated: ". . . the mass of troops placed under me were utterly demoralized and destitute of organization, instruction, discipline, artillery, cavalry, transportation." [105] During the winter of 1861–62, the Army of the Potomac was built and, after a fashion, trained under the able administration of General McClellan. Whatever his other foibles, General McClellan was a very competent military organizer and administrator whose creation of the Army of the Potomac was a masterful military accomplishment. But training consisted primarily of drill with little emphasis placed on such essentials as rifle and musket practice.[106]

Training and instructional materials were scarce throughout the war. The two most popular military texts were still General Scott's *Infantry Tactics* (in three volumes) and William J. Hardee's *Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics* (in two volumes). Congress twice appropriated $50,000 "For purchase of books of tactics and instructions for volunteers." [107] General Orders 45, 16 February 1863, provided that in the Artillery: "Each company should be supplied with three copies of the Tactics for Heavy Artillery and rigidly adhere to its directions." [108] The materials available were keyed not for the use of the individual soldier but for the trained officer, and their distribution does not appear to have been very effective or widespread.

Occasionally an especially competent commander set up a practical training program in his jurisdiction. General Sherman, in command of the XV Army Corps, on 30 August 1863 ordered:

> Besides the daily guard-mounting and parade, the rollcalls prescribed by Regulations, and drills, heretofore ordered, division commanders will give special attention to the arms, ammunition, and equipments of their commands, and see that all things material to the service are now procured. A system of book instruction should be instituted in all the brigades, that the officers and men now on duty may become qualified to impart proper instructions to all recruits and conscripts to which we are entitled to fill our ranks.[109]

---

[103] WD GO 58, 15 Aug in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 412.
[104] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 153.
[105] McClellan, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
[106] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 173.
[107] Act of July 5, 1862, in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 214–17; Act of June 16, 1864, in *ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 455.
[108] WD GO 45, 16 Feb 1863, in *ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 48.
[109] Hq, XV Army Corps GO 69, 30 Aug 1863, in *ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXX, pt. III, p. 226.

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, in command of the Army of the Potomac, issued a circular 19 April 1864 (after three years of war) ordering that steps be taken to train the men in the use of their rifles:

> To familiarize the men in the use of their arms an additional expenditure of 10 rounds of small-arm ammunition per man is hereby authorized. Corps commanders will see that immediate measures are taken by subordinate officers to carry out the order. Each man should be made to load and fire his musket under the personal supervision of a company officer. It is believed that there are men in this army who have been in numerous actions without ever firing their guns, and it is known that muskets taken on the battle-fields have been found filled nearly to the muzzle with cartridges. The commanding general cannot impress too earnestly on all officers and men the necessity of preparing themselves for the contingencies of battle.[110]

The most thorough training program used during the Civil War was that of the Signal Corps. The training methods and procedures employed for officers and enlisted men at the Signal Corps camp at Georgetown, D. C., were thorough, intensive, and successful. Unfortunately the Signal Corps was such a small organization that its comprehensive training system had little overall effect.[111] Through the efforts of such officers as McClellan, Sherman, and Meade and through the Signal Corps program there was a gradual improvement in training throughout the Army. However, the most effective means of providing the men with functional training was combat itself.

When only a few new regiments were being formed an effort was made to provide some training for replacements before forwarding them to their units. But the training that recruits received before they joined their regiments was still primarily drill. Once a recruit reached his unit he received training from the combat veterans in the unit.[112]

The lack of comprehensive training was due to several simple factors:

1. The failure of the War Department to formulate a specific training program.
2. The scarcity of officers and noncommissioned officers capable of conducting training.
3. The absence of an adequate supply of usable training literature and materials.

Poor discipline was one of the results of inadequate training. The extremely high desertion and AWOL rates were an indication of the poor discipline. There were some 199,045 deserters from the Union Army. Statistics for AWOL's are highly inaccurate because of the

---

[110] Cir, Hq Army of Potomac, 19 Apr 1864, in *ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXIII, pp. 907–08.

[111] For detailed information on the Signal Corps training program see: *Ibid.*, ser. I vol. V. pp. 69–73; ser. III, vol. I, pp. 694–95; ser. III, vol. II, p. 945; ser. III. vol. IV, pp. 819, 837–38.

[112] See Lerwill. *op. cit.*, ch. II.

failure to report short but unauthorized absences which indicate that men seem to have come and gone with considerable fluidity. The Provost Marshal General attributed the high desertion rate to the bounty system, the failure to deal harshly with offenders early in the war, and to poor officers.[113] A comprehensive and effective Army-wide training program would undoubtedly have done a great deal to correct the poor discipline in the Union Army.

Logistics Problems

No plans had been made before the firing on Fort Sumter to meet either the manpower or logistics problems of the impending war. Even then it was only after the calls for manpower had been made that some thought and attention were given to equipping, feeding, sheltering, and transporting the men called. As units mobilized and assembled at camps, according to War Department directions, food and clothing procurement became problems of great immediacy. The War Department had no reserves of clothing and equipment other than some obsolete rifles. The War Department had neither the staff nor the organization to undertake the vast task of initial supply and procurement. In the first press of the emergency the War Department delegated to the states the task of feeding and providing initial equipment for their own units with the assurance that the United States would eventually reimburse the states.[114]

The early period of procurement activities was so thoroughly disorganized as to constitute one of the sorriest examples of mobilization ever to occur in this country. Federal agents from different bureaus, state agents, and private individuals bid against each other in the domestic markets and competed with the Southerners in foreign markets. Haste, carelessness, collusion, and profiteering were so great that fantastically high prices were paid for the shoddiest commodities. When Simon Cameron was replaced as Secretary of War 15 January 1862 by Edwin M. Stanton a reformation of the procurement system gradually took place.[115]

Subsistence

Logistically the food supply presented few major problems in the Civil War. The rations were plain and simple, obtained from local areas for the most part, and easily moved to the camps. When the armies were in the field the problems of transporting rations in-

[113] "PMG Report," I, 89–90, 203–31.

[114] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 132.

[115] Shannon, *op cit.*, I, chs. II and III, contains a good documented account of the procurement system with details on the graft and speculation; Commager, *The Blue and the Gray*, II, pp. 725–28, contains two interesting accounts on this subject by Regis de Trobriand and Charles A. Dana.

creased proportionately with their distance from their bases. Railroads, wagon trains, and water transportation were all used to move rations to the front. Cattle for fresh beef usually traveled on the hoof.

Congress increased the food ration for the Army for the duration of the war by the Act of August 3, 1861. This act increased the bread or flour allowance outright; authorized the substitution of fresh meat for salt meat; added potatoes to the bean, rice, and hominy ration; and authorized the substitution of tea for coffee.[116] Standard Army rations, in spite of these increases, did not provide a proper diet. The possibility of scurvy alarmed the Sanitary Commission, but that disease was not widespread because the men supplemented their rations with packages from home, purchases from the sutlers' wagons, and foraging.

The latter, although usually discouraged, was a common part of Army life. Once food was consumed it was difficult to ascertain its source. During the later part of the war foraging was used on occasions as part of military policy. The best example of such foraging was Sherman's march from Atlanta to the sea. Potable drinking water was often more of a supply problem than food; the principal source was shallow wells and reasonable clean streams.[117]

Clothing and Equipment

Clothing, equipment, and other military accoutrements were a severe problem in the early months of the mobilization. ". . . while effective arms were not an absolute necessity until the battlefield was reached, blankets and clothing were indispensable in rendezvous camps . . . And while it may be true . . . that an army travels on its stomach, nevertheless, stout shoes keep the feet from dragging." [118] Equipment had to be furnished the men immediately after enlistment. As has already been noted the War Department had no reserve supplies on hand in 1861. The initial supply of the Militia and Volunteers was left to the states with a promise of ultimate reimbursement.[119] This resulted in clothing and equipping the Army with whatever materials could be obtained on the local markets regardless of price. Consequently the Army was supplied with inferior and frequently impossible clothing and personal equipment. No pattern or prescribed color was designated for uniforms. Because the Southerners

---

[116] Callan, *op. cit.*, p. 484.

[117] For further details and discussion of Army food during the Civil War see: Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 76–80, 208–13; Cyril B. Upham, "Arms and Equipment for the Iowa Troops in the Civil War," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics,* XVI (1918), pp. 46–48; John D. Billings, *Hardtack and Coffee, or, The Unwritten Story of Army Life* (Boston, 1887), pp. 110 ff., as quoted in Commager, *The Blue and the Gray,* I, pp. 290–95; Reports of the Commissary General of Subsistence for 1862 and 1863 in *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. II, pp. 738–39 and vol. III, p. 944.

[118] Upham, *Iowa Journal of History and Politics,* XVI (1918), p. 27.

[119] *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. I, p. 132.

were also attired in all types and colors of uniforms, mistakes in battle occurred in attempting to distinguish friend from foe. Early in 1862 steps were taken to standardize Union uniforms.[120]

The shortages of clothing and consequent troop hardship during the war may be attributed to four factors:

1. Shortage of supply.
2. Poor methods of distribution.
3. Inferior materials and workmanship.
4. Lack of supply discipline among the troops.[121]

Once the 1861 units were raised by the states, procurement of supplies became primarily a Federal function and most of the early abuses were eliminated. The Quartermaster General was the chief procurement officer of the Union Army. He decentralized his purchasing activities by establishing depots at the principal market sources. In addition to the main quartermaster depot at Philadelphia, new depots were established at Boston, New York, Cincinnati, Louisville, Indianapolis, St. Louis, Detroit, and Springfield, Ill.[122] Quartermaster officers drew their supplies from these depots and only rarely were authorized to make individual purchases after 1861.[123] Once the organization of new units tapered off, replacements were equipped with quartermaster supplies under the supervision of the provost marshal at recruit depots. As the Quartermaster General's Department gained experience in purchasing and distributing large quantities of clothing and equipment, the supply situation throughout the Union Army improved.[124]

Troop Housing

Troop housing throughout the war was primitive and improvised. At the beginning public buildings, halls, churches, warehouses, etc., were utilized whenever available. In Washington in April and May 1861 the Capitol building itself was used to house troops. Tentage at first was scarce, but later in the war, as production expanded, it became abundantly available. The shelter half, popularly known as the "pup tent," originated early in the Civil War and was the principal shelter for men in the field.

Barracks, constructed at concentration camps and for winter quarters, were of rough wood or log construction. There was no prescribed shape or capacity for these barracks, but most of them were of two general patterns.

---

[120] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 93–94.

[121] *Ibid.*, pp. 82–83.

[122] Rpt, QMG to Sec of War, 18 Nov 1862, in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 803.

[123] Instructions to Army quartermasters from QMG, 8 Oct 1863, in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 867.

[124] For more complete coverage of clothing and equipment in the Civil War see: Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 80–103, 213–16; Upham, *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, XVI (1918), pp. 27–41, 48–51.

The more primitive type was wedge shaped, built of rough boards standing on end and leaning against a ridge pole, to which they were nailed. The ends were closed by gables containing doors, which, in addition to unintentional interstices, were the sole source of ventilation and light. The whole bore a striking resemblance to an elongated hog-house or a detached clapboarded roof of a "shot-gun" dwelling house. Elevate such a shed as this upon four walls and you have the other type.[125]

Transportation and Communications

The Civil War was the first war in which railroads played an important part. As early as 2 August 1861 General McClellan wrote President Lincoln: ". . . the construction of railroads has introduced a new and very important element into war, by the great facilities thus given for concentrating at particular positions large masses of troops from remote sections, and by creating new strategic points and lines of operations." [126]

On 11 February 1862 the supervision and management of railroads in the war areas was centralized and a director and general manager for military railroads appointed with complete power. Secretary Stanton selected Col. Daniel C. McCallum, a Volunteer officer with extensive railroad experience, for the position which he held throughout the war.[127] The director and general manager had control of maintenance, repair, building, and management of all railroads in the theaters of operations. Railroads proved of inestimable value in concentrating and supplying the armies from the very beginning. In the winter of 1864 Colonel McCallum was sent west to reorganize the railroads there in preparation for General Sherman's advance into Georgia. General Sherman subsequently wrote in his memoirs: "The value of railways is also fully recognized in war as much as, if not more so than, in peace. The Atlanta campaign would simply have been impossible without the use of railroads." [128]

The railroads revolutionized warfare, but water transportation was also an important factor in the Civil War. Steamboats, which had played an important part in the Mexican War, were used extensively. Wagon and pack transport were also used in areas without railroads or waterways and were still an integral part of Army transportation.

The invention of the telegraph began the revolution in military communications. The newly established Signal Corps was responsible

---

[125] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I p. 203. Troop housing is discussed in more detail in Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 198–208, and Upham, *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, XVI (1918), pp. 44–46.

[126] McClellan, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

[127] "Report of the Director and General Manager of the Military Railroads of the United States" hereafter cited as "McCallum Report" in *Messages and Documents, War Department, 1865–1866* (Washington, 1866), I, p. 5. This final report of the director to the Secretary of War, 26 May 1866, gives a brief but complete coverage of the use of railroads during the Civil War.

[128] Sherman, *op. cit.*, II, p. 398, and Grant, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–48, discuss the use of railroads in the campaigns in the West. For a complete account on Northern railroads see: Thomas Weber, *The Northern Railroads in the Civil War: 1861–1865* (New York, 1952).

for the operation of military telegraph lines which were used with ever increasing frequency throughout the war. General Sherman was one of the officers who appreciated the importance of the telegraph: "For the rapid transmission of orders in an army covering a large space of ground, the magnetic telegraph is by far the best." [129]

Ordnance Problems

Munitions constituted a separate logistical problem of considerable magnitude during the Civil War. The Chief of Ordnance on 21 January 1861 had reported that there were on hand 617,881 small arms (477,087 in the North and 140,794 in the South) and 163 field guns (122 North and 41 South).[130] The condition of this supply of arms varied from serviceable to useless. There were three methods employed to augment the ordnance supplies:

1. Importation from abroad.
2. Contracts with domestic manufacturers.
3. Increasing the manufacturing capacity of Government arsenals.[131]

Importation was the first method used to augment ordnance supplies. Europe was deluged with Federal and State purchasing agents from both the North and the South and also with private speculators purchasing arms for resale in the United States. There was a surplus of arms on the European market because many of the countries were changing from muzzle to breech-loading guns.[132] But because of the demand created by all the competing purchasers, prices skyrocketed and quality decreased. In October 1861 the Federal Government withdrew its agents from Europe, and in late November Secretary Cameron asked the States to recall their agents. Thereafter the North entrusted its foreign ordnance purchasing to resident diplomatic officials.[133] An investigation and review of contracts to purchase foreign arms early in 1862 led to a cancellation or modification of many of the contracts.[134] Foreign purchases were but an expedient to bridge the initial crisis. Every effort was made to increase the production of rifles at the Government arsenal at Springfield, and private manufacturing of both arms and ammunition was encouraged.[135]

---

[129] Sherman, *op. cit.*, II, p. 398.

[130] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol, I, p. 43.

[131] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 113–14. Shannon's chapter entitled "The Problem of Munitions," I, pp. 107–48, based in great part on the *Official Records*, gives an excellent coverage of ordnance problems.

[132] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 118.

[133] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 575, 675–76.

[134] For the report of the commission which handled the investigation of ordnance procurement, 1 Jul 1863, see: *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 188–95.

[135] "Report of the Secretary of War to the President", 1 Dec 1861. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 702. The arsenal at Harper's Ferry had been destroyed early in the war. See also "Report of the Chief of Ordnance to the Secretary of War," 21 Nov 1862. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 852.

Since artillery was not employed in mass, its procurement was not a serious mobilization problem. Government and private arsenals were able to produce enough to meet most of the requirements. Only 7,892 field pieces were issued to the Union armies from 1861 to 1866 while over 4,000,000 small arms were issued during the same period.[136]

The reluctance of the Ordnance Department to accept improved weapons during the war has led to severe criticism. The breech-loading seven shot repeater rifle was rejected by the Chief of Ordnance 9 December 1861.[137] The Ordnance Department also rejected the Gatling type guns, a precursor of the machine gun. After a new and younger Chief of Ordnance took over the department in September 1863 there was a gradual change in attitude. By the end of the war steps had been taken to use both the breech-loading repeater rifle and the Gatling guns. The chief criticism of the Ordnance Department during the Civil War was its failure to set up effective procedures for examining and testing new armaments.[138]

This brief coverage of logistical problems in the Civil War indicates that the economic mobilization was uncoordinated and piecemeal. Industry in the North was able to expand its production enough to produce both guns and consumer products. The halting, uneven progress of the North's logistical achievements, due to the failure to coordinate manpower and materiel procurement, should have served as a warning that better coordination and more cohesive planning would be necessary in future wars. In the Civil War no one had the time, the vision, or the experience to be the architect of an orderly mobilization.

Reform and Reorganization in the War Department

In 1861 the War Department bogged down in handling the vast mobilization program and soon became the subject of severe criticism.[139] Cameron's resignation 13 January 1862 was ". . . hailed as equivalent to a great Union victory."[140] His successor, Edwin M. Stanton, was a man of fearless honesty and an effective administrator. Using the same machinery which had faltered under Cameron, Stanton soon had the War Department on a more efficient basis.

There were few major organizational changes in the War Department during the Civil War, but there was continuous experimentation to create a workable relationship between the War Department and the armies in the field. The system which finally evolved in 1864,[141]

---

[136] *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. V, p. 1042.
[137] *Ibid.*, ser III, vol. I, pp. 733–34.
[138] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 147.
[139] Hendrick, *op. cit.*, p. 221, and Meneely, *op. cit.*, contain a more complete coverage of the War Department under Cameron.
[140] Meneely, *op. cit.*, p. 371.
[141] WD GO 98, 12 March 1864.

was the most satisfactory arrangement up to that time. Secretary Stanton ran the War Department bureau activities which meant manpower and supply procurement. General Grant commanded the actual operations of all the field armies from a headquarters with the Army of the Potomac. General Halleck served as Chief of Staff of the Army in Washington and was the main channel of communication and coordination between the Secretary of War and General Grant. [The evolution of this system can be traced in *charts 2, 3, 4* and *5.*]

The Judge Advocate's Office was given bureau status by an act passed 17 July 1862, and its chief became The Judge Advocate General. A similar act passed on 3 March 1863 gave the Signal Corps definite bureau status also. The Corps of Topographical Engineers was merged with the Corps of Engineers by the same law. The only new bureau created was The Provost Marshal General's Department which managed the draft. Substantial increases were authorized in both military and civilian personnel in the bureaus.[142] The increases in the Engineer and Medical Departments were particularly large reflecting the increased importance of those fields. The Act of August 3, 1861, authorized the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of War; later the number of Assistant Secretaries was increased to three by administrative action.[143]

The cumbersome, slow internal staff procedures did not change a great deal during the war. The bureaus competed bitterly with each other at times, but nevertheless presented a united front against any attempt to streamline their procedures. The staff functioned as a collection of independent bureaus without real coordination throughout the war. Any convulsive changes in organization were avoided, but the gradual replacement of the bureau chiefs by younger men improved the functioning of the respective bureaus. [See *chart 1.*] Although this process of reform was slow, in the end a reasonably efficient machine was developed.

Mobilization in the Confederacy

The problems of mobilization were essentially the same in the South as in the North except that they were appreciably more difficult. The South, with a considerably smaller manpower pool and without an extensive industrial economy, was compelled to resort to measures to conserve that manpower and to utilize its economic resources fully much earlier and more stringently than the North. Although mobilization in the Confederacy would not nominally be included in this

[142] Act of August 3, 1861, in Callan, *op. cit.*, pp. 480–86.

[143] The men who served as Assistant Secretaries of War were: Thomas A. Scott—3 Aug 1861 to 1 Jun 1862 (Scott fulfilled duties from Mar 1861), Peter H. Watson—24 Jan 1862 to 31 Jul 1864, John Tucker—29 Jan 1862 to 21 Jan 1863, Christopher P. Wolcott—12 Jun 1862 to 23 Jan 1863, Charles A. Dana—28 Jan 1864 to 31 Jul 1865.

Chart 2. Organization of the War Department, April 1861–11 March 1862.




Chart 3. Organization of the War Department, 11 March 1862–23 July 1862.




Chart 4. Organization of the War Department, 23, July 1862–12 March 1864.





Chart 5. Organization of the War Department, 12 March 1864–April 1865.



study, the solutions which the South improvised for these two major mobilization problems had particular significance and influenced mobilization in the North during the Civil War and in later periods.

Confederate Manpower Mobilization

No complete compilation of the size of the Confederate Army has ever been made. According to the 1860 census the South's military manpower pool totaled 1,064,193 men as contrasted with 4,559,872 men in the North's pool.[144] Estimates of the aggregate total of the Confederate armies throughout the war range from 600,000 to 1,650,000 men but probably about 1,000,000 is the most accurate and generally accepted estimate.[145]

As soon as they seceded most of the Southern states took steps to place themselves in a position of partial military preparedness. Alabama seceded 11 January 1861, and the governor recommended to the legislature three days later ". . . that the State of Alabama be placed, at as early a period as practicable, upon the most efficient war footing. The first requisites of this condition are money, men, and arms." [146] Several of the Southern states mobilized portions of their Militia or special Volunteer organizations.[147]

The provisional Confederate Government was organized 4 February 1861; Jefferson Davis was elected provisional president 9 February; and on 28 February the Provisional Congress passed an act authorizing Davis to take charge of military operations, to receive property confiscated from the United States, and to receive into service any or all units tendered by the states for a period of 12 months' service.[148] On 6 March 1861 the Provisional Congress passed two major military laws. The first authorized the President to call out the Militia for 6 months and to accept 100,000 Volunteers for one year. Volunteers were to furnish their own clothing and, if mounted, their horses and horse equipment; arms were to be provided by the states from which the men came or by the Confederacy itself. The second act authorized establishment of a Regular Army of some 10,600 men for the Confederacy.[149] Thus the Provisional Congress provided for the extensive use of manpower even before the war began. After the firing on

---

[144] Fox, *op. cit.*, p. 552. The pool included white males between 18 and 45. A somewhat larger proportion of Southerners were available for service because the slaves could tend the crops.

[145] Shannon, *op. cit.*, I, p. 107; Fox, *op. cit.*, p. 552.

[146] *Official Records*, ser. IV, vol. I, p. 50.

[147] "PMG Report," I, pp. 115–16.

[148] *Official Records*, ser. IV, vol. I, p. 117.

[149] *Ibid.*, pp. 126–31. The Confederate Regular Army was never much more than a paper organization because the war began so soon. The Provisional Army fought the war. See E. Merton Coulter, *The Confederate States of America 1861–1865* (Louisiana State University Press, 1950), p. 308.

Fort Sumter, 12 April 1861, the size of the forces authorized was increased and the term of service lengthened.[150]

The implementation of the military legislation passed by the Provisional Congress did not keep pace with its passage. The first call for manpower was made 9 March 1861 for 7,700 men to garrison Southern forts. A second call for 19,500 Volunteers was made 8 April 1861 which brought the total forces requested before Sumter up to 27,200. The Southern states probably had larger forces under arms than did the Confederate government. On 16 April 1861 Davis called for 32,000 more Volunteers.[151] The calls were met enthusiastically; feeling in the South was optimistic that it would be a short, victorious war. The South's victory at First Bull Run (Manassas) sustained morale and enthusiasm at high levels. Men continued to respond to the President's calls in numbers beyond what he requested.[152]

Although the manpower situation in the Confederacy was favorable at the outset of the war, uneasy doubts about logistical sufficiency arose in the minds of Southern leaders. Gen. Robert E. Lee on 15 June 1861 reported to the Governor of Virginia that ". . . assembling the men . . . was not the most difficult operation. Provision for their instruction, subsistence, equipment, clothing, shelter, and transportation in the field, required more time and labor." [153]

Enthusiasm in the South began to wane as it did in the North when it became apparent that the war was likely to be long and difficult. On 8 August 1861 the Provisional Congress authorized the President to call up to 400,000 Volunteers for up to three years of service.[154] In the winter of 1861–62 the Confederate Congress became concerned with the approaching expiration of the enlistments of the 12-month men which comprised the major part of the Confederate armies. Ef-

[150] Coulter, *op. cit.*, pp. 308–09. For Acts of May 8, May 11, and May 16, 1861, see: *Official Records*, ser. IV, vol. I, pp. 302, 310, 326-27.

[151] "PMG Report," I, pp. 118–19. Quotas were as follows:

State	9 Mar 1861	8 Apr 1861	16 Apr 1861
Total	7,700	19,500	32,000
South Carolina	0	3,000	5,000
Florida	500	1,500	2,000
Georgia	2,000	3,000	5,000
Louisiana	1,700	3,000	5,000
Texas	0	3,000	5,000
Alabama	2,000	3,000	5,000
Mississippi	1,500	3,000	5,000

[152] Albert B. Moore, *Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy* (New York, 1924), pp. 4–6.

[153] Ltr, Lee to Gov of Virginia, 15 Jun 1861 in "PMG Report," I, p. 116. "The training and equipping of men, particularly the latter, constituted the really difficult military problem." See Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[154] *Official Records*, ser. IV, vol. I, p. 537.

forts were made by an act passed 11 December 1861 to induce these men to reenlist by authorizing reenlistment bounties and reenlistment furloughs and by guaranteeing them the right to reorganize themselves into companies, battalions, and regiments and to elect their officers.[155] Several others acts were passed to stimulate reenlistment and volunteering before the expiration of the Provisional Congress 18 February 1862. "Every conceivable means of securing men was adopted, save that of compulsion.[156]

By the spring of 1862 things were going badly for the Confederacy. Forts Henry and Donelson had fallen; New Orleans was on the verge of capture; at the terrible drawn battle of Shiloh, 6 April 1862, the Southern forces had suffered heavy casualties; McClellan in preparation for his Peninsula Campaign against Richmond was besieging Yorktown. The one-year Volunteers were not reenlisting in appreciable numbers.

The Confederate Congress abandoned its adherence to states rights in this crisis, and on 16 April 1862 passed a Conscription Act which provided that:

1. The President was authorized to draft into service for three years all white males between 18 and 35.
2. The terms of service of all men in the army were extended to three years (thus retaining the 12-month Volunteers).
3. Enrollment and draft would be administered by state officials under Confederate supervision.
4. Drafted men would be assigned to units from their own states.
5. Election of company, battalion, and regimental officers was guaranteed.
6. Persons not liable for service could substitute for those who were.[157]

Thus the first major military draft law in the United States was passed by the Confederate government to retain its 12-month men and to force other men into service. It was passed over ten months before the Enrollment Act in the North. There was no provision for exemption in the Act of April 16, 1862, but this omission was corrected by the Act of April 21, which provided exemption for Confederate and state legislative, executive, and judicial officials and their clerks and employees; ferrymen, pilots, and all actually engaged in river and railroad transportation work; employees in iron mines, foundries, and furnaces; telegraph operators; ministers; printers; educators, hospital employees, and druggists (with qualifications); and certain employees in wool and cotton mills.[158] This series of ex-

[155] *Ibid.*, pp. 825–26.
[156] Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
[157] *Official Records*, ser. IV, vol. I, pp. 1095–97.
[158] *Ibid.*, p. 1081.

emptions made the Confederate conscription system in actuality a selective service system. Other groups were exempted by subsequent legislation which seriously reduced the manpower pool. Finally the entire system of exemptions was overhauled and the final decision on exemptions made a matter of executive discretion by the Act of February 17, 1864.

Amendments to the Conscription Act of April 16, 1862, increased the draft age from 35 to 45 on 27 September 1862 [159] and on 17 February 1864 included 17-year-olds and men 45 to 50 for state defense.[160]

Another Act of February 17, 1864, authorized the use of both free Negroes and slaves in labor units.[161] Finally an Act of March 30, 1865, just at the end of the war, authorized the use of slaves as soldiers.[162] The unpopular substitution provision was repealed outright by an Act of December 28, 1863.[163] These and other amendments improved the Conscription Act. The absence of records makes it difficult to assess the proper direct and indirect value of the law. Many difficulties developed because of the use of state officials to administer the act, besides which there was a great deal of popular opposition to the conscription.

Confederate Economic Mobilization [164]

The South had within its borders practically all of the materials necessary for waging war. The problem was to transform those materials into munitions and supplies for the Army. The South's greatest weakness was its lack of an industrial economy to accomplish this transformation of raw materials into finished products.[165]

Economic controls were necessary if the Confederacy were to equip and supply its Army. Controls of varying types and effectiveness were instituted during the war. On 17 April 1862 the Confederate Congress passed an act to assist businesses with war contracts in building new factories and enlarging existing facilities by loaning without interest one-half the cost of such undertakings.[166] Profits were limited first to 75 per cent and then to 33⅓ per cent, and factories which received government assistance were required to sell two-thirds of their production to the government. These regulations were enforced by denying labor and transportation facilities to recalcitrant

---

[159] Act of September 27, 1862. *Ibid.*, ser., IV, vol. II, p. 160.

[160] Act of February 17, 1864. *Ibid.*, ser. IV, vol. III, p. 178.

[161] Act of February 17, 1864. *Ibid.*, pp. 208–09.

[162] "PMG Report," I, p. 120.

[163] Act of December 28, 1863. *Official Records*, ser. IV, vol. III, p. 11.

[164] The material in this section is based almost entirely on comprehensive accounts in Coulter, *op. cit.*, ch. X, "War Supplies and Manufactories," pp. 199–218; ch. XI, "Prices, Profits, and Labor," pp. 219–38; ch. XII, "Agriculture, Subsistence, and Negroes," pp. 239–68; ch. XIII, "Transportation and Communication," pp. 269–84.

[165] Coulter, *op. cit.*, p. 202. Coal, iron, lead, and most other war materials were available except mercury and niter.

[166] *Official Records*, ser. IV., vol. I, pp. 1070–71.

manufacturers under powers derived from the Conscription Act of April 16, 1862, and the wartime railroad laws. Cost plus contracts were experimented with by the Confederacy as well as fixed fee contracts, but neither was very satisfactory. Eventually a fixed fee contract with a provision for subsequent arbitration of prices was developed.

An oversupply of paper money and speculation began an inflationary spiral which undermined the Confederate economy. Even the government could not afford to pay market prices. Impressment of supplies because of military needs began in 1861. On 26 March 1863 the Confederate Congress passed "An Act to regulate impressments." [167] This was a complicated law regulating in great detail the methods of impressment and the fixing of prices for impressed articles. The President of the Confederacy and the governor of each state each appointed a commissioner to fix prices. These two men were supposed to publish price schedules at two-month intervals to guide impressing officers.

Railway transportation was one of the most difficult problems which the Confederacy faced. Its railroad system was not highly developed at the beginning of the war. An extensive construction program was beyond the South's economic capacity in wartime. Even small construction projects of highest priority bogged down. Early attempts at voluntary coordination of railways were abandoned in May 1863 when control of almost all railroad equipment was turned over to The Quartermaster General.[168] Government control of the deteriorating system came too late and was no more successful than private control had been. Control of telegraph lines was given to the President in May 1861, and he delegated supervision to the Postmaster General.[169]

The industrial expansion of the South was remarkable considering its lack of manufactories at the beginning of the war. This was the first attempted economic mobilization of a nation for war. The controls which the South imposed over its economic life were improvised and not always too effective. The South had no precedents to guide it and was forced to use the trial and error method of experimentation while fighting for its life. The South failed because it was unable to produce manpower and munitions in quantities and at speeds necessary to match the North. That the Confederacy was able to survive for four years was due in great part to her superior mobilization effort.

---

[167] *Ibid.*, ser. IV., vol. II, 469–71. For examples of price schedules see: *Ibid.*, pp. 836–38, 842–45.

[168] Coulter, *op. cit.*, p. 280. For a complete account of the Confederate railroad system see: Robert C. Black, III, *The Railroads of the Confederacy* (Chapel Hill, 1952).

[169] Coulter, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

The Lessons of the War

There was no precedent for a war of the magnitude of the American Civil War. It was necessary to improvise solutions as problems arose. Many contemporaries were aware of the errors and inadequacies of the mobilization, but in the press of events little more than improvisation was possible. The mistakes of past wars were repeated to a great extent. The outstanding mobilization lessons of the Civil War were as follows:

1. Planning in advance of a mobilization is necessary to avoid waste and inefficiency. Such planning should be the responsibility of a special staff group.

2. Centralized, coordinated, supervisory control of the war effort at the War Department level is a prerequisite of an orderly mobilization. The activities of staff bureaus and agencies must be integrated into the overall program.

3. Manpower for a major mobilization can not be procured by a Volunteer system whether under state or Federal control.

4. The Militia as organized could not provide a reservoir of military manpower.

5. Conscription based on principles of selective service is the most efficient and fair method of obtaining military manpower. Such a system should include utilization of manpower regardless of color and should include limited service men. It should preclude use of bounties, substitution, or commutation. The term of service should be for the duration of the war.

6. After the initial organization of the Army, units should be kept at full strength by a replacement system; additional units should be raised only if actually needed as organizations.

7. The officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army with their experience and training must be used as the cadre for the wartime Army. Keeping the Regular Army intact deprived the Volunteer Army of leaders and instructors during the crucial months of the initial mobilization.

8. Some sort of an officer training program for company grade officers is necessary in any large-scale mobilization. Officer candidates should be selected on the basis of prospective ability. A retirement system is necessary to allow older officers to step aside. Promotion should be based on efficiency and not strict seniority.

9. Training programs should be carefully planned and organized at the War Department level in peacetime so that an adequate uniform training program can be instituted at the beginning of a mobilization.

10. Coordination of manpower mobilization and logistics is essential. Economic factors influence manpower mobilization both directly and indirectly.

a. Reserves of supplies should be kept on hand for at least the first increment of manpower in a mobilization.

b. Procurement must be based on a sound assessment of the nation's economic and industrial capacity.

c. Necessary controls over the nation's economic life must be instituted including an arbitrary allocation of manpower and resources to ensure a flow of supplies for the war effort.

d. Critical shortages in national resources must be met by careful stockpiling.

e. Adequate testing procedures must be developed to take full advantage of technological developments.

CHAPTER V

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

The Post-Civil War Period

When the Civil War ended in the spring of 1865 the Union Army was the most powerful military force in the world, but its strength was soon dissipated in a rapid demobilization.[1] The Congress passed an act on 28 July 1866 which fixed the military peace establishment at 45 infantry, 10 cavalry, and 5 artillery regiments with a total strength of 54,302 men.[2] This strength was subsequently reduced to 37,313 in 1869 and to 27,472 in 1876.[3] During this period, characterized as the Army's "dark ages," the Army engaged in Indian campaigns and routine garrison life.[4] Replacements were the major manpower problem. Mobilization planning was unknown except for the rare efforts of individual farsighted officers.[5] Among the more important events of the period were the proposals for the reorganization of the War Department and the developments in military education.

Proposals for Reorganization of the War Department

When the Army had been reorganized and reduced in size in 1821, the senior officer of the Army was given the title of Commanding

[1] DA Pam No 20-210, *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army* (July 52) pp. 5-8. This study covers personnel demobilization through World War I briefly and the World War II period in detail.

[2] Act of July 28, 1866, 39th Cong., 1st sess., "An Act to increase and fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States"; *Stat. L.*, XIV, pp. 332-38.

[3] Otto Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff* (Washington, 1946), p. 11. The following table compiled from the War Department annual reports for the indicated years summarized the actual strength of the Army in the period between the Civil War and the Spanish-Amercian War:

Date	Total	Officers	Enlisted
1871 [a]	28,953	2,105	26,848
1875 [a]	24,864	2,068	22,796
1880 (30 June)	26,411	2,152	24,259
1885 [a]	26,859	2,154	24,705
1890 (30 June)	27,089	2,168	24,921
1896 (30 June)	27,038	2,169	24,869

[a] For these years the strengths are from the latest returns received, but the dates of the returns are not indicated.

[4] Ganoe, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

[5] Lerwill, *op. cit.*, ch. III, deals with the replacement problems of this period in detail. For an example of individual mobilization planning see: Ltr, Col John Gibbon to General in Chief, 15 March 1877, in H Misc Doc 56, 45th Cong., 2d sess., "Reorganization of the Army," pp. 124-28.

General of the Army.[6] Before 1821 the Secretary of War under the supervision of the President had exercised nominal command of the Army through various geographical departments.[7] The position of Commanding General of the Army was never specifically recognized by statute; its powers and duties developed from Army regulations and customs and were never clearly prescribed. Theoretically, the Secretary of War was responsible for the administrative and technical services; he controlled the financial affairs of the Army; and the bureau heads reported directly to him. The Commanding General was responsible for the efficiency, discipline, and conduct of the troops. The staff of the Commanding General was usually limited to his personal aides and secretaries.[8] The control of expenditures by the Secretary of War meant that no Commanding General in time of peace could exercise any substantial power unless he conformed to the policies and views of the Secretary of War. Conflict and disagreement were almost inevitable with such organizational confusion.

Another complicating factor was the relative position of the Secretary of War and the Commanding General in relation to the President who under the Constitution of the United States is the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. The Secretary of War was appointed by the President and served at his pleasure; he was the President's *alter ego* in the control of the War Department. The Commanding General was assigned to the command of the Army by the President, but once assigned he could not be removed except by court-martial until he was eligible for retirement.[9] Usually a Commanding General served under a series of Presidents and Secretaries of War with varying relationships. The extent of his ability to command the Army and perform his duties was dependent on the support and confidence he received from the President and Secretary of War. Throughout this entire period the Commanding General was always faced with three alternatives: he could move his headquarters to some location away from Washington; he could stay in Washington and subordinate his views to those of the Secretary of War; or he could stay in Wash-

[6] Jerome Thomases, "Preliminary Checklist of the Records of the Headquarters of the Army 1825–1903," Aug 1946. PC49 (47–5). National Archives. The title of the office varied from time to time with Commanding General and General in Chief most commonly used.

[7] The Congress provided for the appointment of a commanding general 28 May 1798. George Washington was commissioned first as a lieutenant general and then under the Act of March 3, 1799, as General of the Armies of the United States. General Washington never actually assumed command of the Army. The office of Commanding General was discontinued with Washington's death, 14 Dec 1799.

[8] When General Grant was Commanding General during the last year of the Civil War he had a personal staff in the field with him including a chief of staff with the rank of brigadier general.

[9] Harold D. Cater, "Evolution of the American General Staff," p. 17ff. MS in Gen Ref Office, OCMH.

ington and bicker with the Secretary, thereby causing a virtual stalemate in Army business.

The danger of the absence of clearly defined lines of command in the War Department had become apparent with Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott's disagreements with the Secretaries of War during and after the Mexican War. Under the pressure of the Civil War and after a great deal of experimentation, a workable organizational arrangement was evolved when General Grant became Commanding General 12 March 1864. From his headquarters in the field General Grant exercised command of all military operations, but he maintained close liaison with the Secretary of War and the President through Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck who served as Chief of Staff of the Army in Washington and who had previously been Commanding General. This was only a temporary wartime solution and was recognized as such by General Grant. [See charts for departmental organizational during Civil War.]

After the Civil War, General Grant outlined his proposals for the organization of the War Department command in a letter to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton dated 29 January 1866:

> The entire adjutant-general's office should be under the entire control of the general-in-chief of the army. No orders should go to the army, or the adjutant-general, except through the general-in-chief. Such as require the action of the President would be laid before the Secretary of War, whose actions would be regarded as those of the President. In short, in my opinion, the general-in-chief stands between the President and the army in all official matters, and the Secretary of War is between the army (through the general-in-chief) and the President.[10]

No immediate action was taken, but General Grant kept the proposal in mind and discussed the subject with General Sherman in the winter 1868–69. General Grant became President 4 March 1869, and the following day Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, Secretary of War, issued the following order:

> By direction of the President, General William T. Sherman will assume command of the Army of the United States.
>
> The chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus will report to and act under the immediate orders of the general commanding the army.
>
> Any official business which by law or regulation requires the action of the President or Secretary of War will be submitted by the General of the Army to the Secretary of War, and in general all orders from the President or Secretary of War to any portion of the army line or staff, will be transmitted through the General of the Army.[11]

Thus, by the too simple device of issuing a general order, General Grant clearly delineated the lines of authority within the War Depart-

---

[10] William T. Sherman, *Personal Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman* (3d ed., New York, 1890), II, pp. 449–50.

[11] WD GO 11, 8 Mar 1869.

ment and the Army. The similarity between this system and the system which developed out of the General Staff Act of 1903 is striking. The order, however, conflicted with the statutes creating the individual staff bureaus and stirred up so much opposition that it was revoked 26 March 1869 and the Commanding General reverted to his previously undefined status. Although in "command" of the Army his staff was limited to his personal aides and he was deprived of any effective means of command. This situation resulted in a series of disagreements between General Sherman and the Secretary of War, William W. Belknap, and in October 1874 General Sherman moved his headquarters to St. Louis. In his memoirs General Sherman stated: "The only staff I brought with me were the aides allowed by law, and, though we went through the forms of 'command,' I realized it was a farce, and it did not need a prophet to foretell it would end in a tragedy." [12]

Secretary of War Belknap resigned in March 1876 following charges of corruption. The new Secretary of War, Alphonso Taft of Ohio, asked General Sherman to return to Washington. General orders issued 6 April 1876 were designed to avoid some of the previous conflicts between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army:

> The headquarters of the army are hereby reestablished at Washington City, and all orders and instructions relative to military operations or affecting the military control and discipline of the army issued by the President through the Secretary of War, shall be promulgated through the General of the Army, and the departments of the Adjutant-General and Inspector-General shall report to him, and be under his control in all matters relating thereto.[13]

In 1876 the bureau chiefs still were directly responsible to the Secretary of War in all matters except those reserved to the Commanding General. As long as the Commanding General's staff was limited to his personal aides, he had no effective means of either actually commanding the Army or of planning for possible military campaigns.

In the period 1865–98 the Congress investigated and studied the problems of War Department organization over and over again. In a questionnaire sent to a select list of officers in 1872 the question was asked as to whether the staff departments should be under the Secretary of War or the Commanding General. Maj. Gen. George G. Meade replied: "The staff corps, being constituent parts of the Army, should in all purely military matters, be under the orders of the general commanding the Army, this officer being himself under the orders of the Secretary of War, as representing the President." [14] Special studies of staff organizations in other armies were made for the War

[12] Sherman, *op. cit.*, II, p. 454.
[13] WD GO 28, 6 Apr 1876.
[14] H Rpt 74, 42d Cong., 3d sess., "Army-Staff Organization," 2 Feb 1873.

Department by officers on special detail; among the studies which were published were Emory Upton's *The Armies of Asia and Europe* and Theodore Schwan's *Report on the Organization of the German Army.*[15] No action was taken on the various proposals to reorganize the War Department before the Spanish-American War began.

Military Training in Civil Educational Institutes

The Civil War found the United States, and the North in particular, without adequate sources from which to draw sufficiently trained officers. To remedy this situation in future emergencies, the Congress passed a bill introduced by Rep. (later Sen.) Justin S. Morrill of Vermont which was signed on 2 July 1862 by President Lincoln. The Morrill Act provided for a grant to each state of public lands which were to be sold, and the money thus derived—

> . . . to constitute a perpetual fund, the capital of which shall remain forever undiminished, . . . and the interest of which shall be inviolably appropriated, by each State which may take and claim the benefit of this act, to the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college where the leading subject shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, *and including military* tactics [italics author's] to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislatures of the States may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life.[16]

The phrase "and including military tactics" became the foundation for military education in the new land-grant colleges. The land-grant colleges had a dual function: they were to provide higher education along practical lines as well as military training.

At the time the Morrill Act was passed the country was in the midst of the Civil War; military education in the new schools had to wait until the Rebellion was over. The Act of July 28, 1866, which prescribed the peacetime establishment of the Army, contained a provision empowering the President to detail up to 20 officers to schools having more than 150 male students "for the purpose of promoting knowledge of military science among the young men of the United States," but the land-grant colleges had no priority on the detail of these officers. A joint resolution of Congress on 4 May 1870 authorized the Secretary of War to issue small arms and artillery not needed by the Army to schools with instructors detailed under the Act of July 28, 1866. A further act of Congress, 5 July 1876, authorized an increase from 20 to 30 in the number of officers the President might detail as military instructors. Subsequent increases followed until

---

[15] Emory Upton, *The Armies of Asia and Europe* (New York, 1878); Theodore Schwan, *Report on the Organization of the German Army* (Washington, 1894).

[16] Act of July 2, 1862, 37th Cong., 2d sess., "An Act Donating Public Lands to the several States and Territories which may provide colleges for the benefit of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts" [Popularly referred to as the Morrill Act]. *Stat. L.*, XII, p. 504.

100 officers were authorized for assignment to school details under the Act of November 3, 1893. This latter act also provided that retired Army officers detailed for duty within the quota would receive the full pay of their rank.[17]

In the period 1866–98 the War Department failed to utilize the program of military instruction in civil educational institutions to create a reserve of trained officers. Not even a record of those who had received instruction was maintained. Officers were generally assigned only to the land-grant colleges and to essentially military schools of which there was an increase after the Civil War. There was very little standardization in the training. Its usefulness depended on the initiative and program of the individual officers assigned as instructors and on the attitude of the school authorities. Among the officers who later distinguished themselves after serving as professors of military science and tactics in the 1880's and 1890's were 1st Lt. John J. Pershing (Commander in Chief, American Expeditionary Forces in World War I and General of the Armies) and 1st Lt. Enoch H. Crowder (Judge Advocate General, 1911–23, and simultaneously Provost Marshal General in World War I).[18] The President of the University of Tennessee summarized the status of the program in 1898: "The land-grant colleges have by no means failed in the past of their duty in respect to military education. Had they been helped more and been encouraged more . . . they would doubtless have done much more." [19]

Although the program of military training in civil educational institutions had not been fully developed by 1898, the fact that thousands of college graduates had received basic military instruction meant that a potential supply of partially trained prospective officers had been created. These men would be available for Volunteer service in an emergency.[20] The Regular officers detailed as professors of military science and tactics were ordered to their regiments in April 1898, and military instruction in the schools just about ceased for the duration of the war.

---

[17] Act of July 28, 1866, 39th Cong., 1st sess., "An Act to increase and fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States." *Stat. L.*, XIV, p. 336; Act of May 4, 1870, 41st Cong., 2d sess., "Joint Resolution authorizing the supply of arms, for instruction and practice, to certain colleges and universities." *Stat. L.*, XVI, p. 373; Act of July 5, 1876, 44th Cong., 1st sess., "An Act to amend section twelve hundred and twenty-five of the Revised Statutes of the United States." *Stat. L.*, XIX, p. 74; Act of November 3, 1893, 53d Cong., 1st sess., "An Act to increase the number of officers of the Army to be detailed to colleges." *Stat. L.*, XXVIII, p. 7.

[18] General Pershing was PMST at the University of Nebraska, 1891–95 and General Crowder was PMST at the University of Missouri 1885–89. Both men also earned law degrees while at the respective schools.

[19] Charles W. Dabney, *The Colleges and National Defense* (U. S. Dept of Agriculture, Office of Experiment Stations, Circular No. 40 [Washington, 1898]).

[20] For further information and list of schools, number enrolled, etc., in 1897 see "Report of The Inspector General," pp. 256–65, and "Report of The Adjutant General," pp. 226–33, in *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1897.*

The Army School System Established

In the post-Civil War period steps were taken to establish a system of Army schools to give small Regular units concentrated training, to train officers appointed to the Army from civil life, and to give advanced training to graduates of the Military Academy. The Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Va., which had been founded in 1824, served as a model. The first post-Civil War school was the School of Instruction for Light Artillery at Fort Riley, Kans., authorized 18 February 1869 and discontinued 4 March 1871. This school of instruction was designed to train light artillery batteries and not just officers.[21] "The instruction at this first school at Riley was purely of a practical nature. There were no regular classes as we now know them and theoretical instruction probably was in the form of critiques delivered during, or following, the exercise." [22]

A School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry was ordered established 7 May 1881 at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., by General Sherman on the recommendations of Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan and Maj. Gen. John Pope. One lieutenant from each regiment of Infantry and Cavalry was assigned to the school; the course of instruction was for two years. The "practical instruction" prescribed included ". . . everything which pertains to Army organization, tactics, discipline, equipment, drill, care of men, care of horses, public property, accountability, &c., and generally of everything which is provided for in Army Regulations." "Theoretical instruction" included "reading, writing, grammar, arithmetic, geography, algebra, geometry, and trigonometry sufficient for the measurement and delineation of ground, and such history as every young gentleman should be presumed to know." The final field of study was to be "the 'science and practice of war,' so far as they can be acquired from books." [23] A list of prescribed books was included in the order. The School was designated "The United States Infantry and Cavalry School" in 1886; it was gradually expanded and perfected in the period before 1898.[24]

Following recommendations made by General Sheridan, the Congress passed an act 29 January 1887 authorizing the establishment of ". . . a permanent school of instruction for *drill and practice* [italics author's] for the Cavalry and Light Artillery service of the Army of the United States" at Fort Riley, Kans. The actual organization and opening of the school was delayed until 9 January 1893 while facilities were constructed. The instruction was given to units as a

[21] WD GO 6, 18 Feb 1869; WD GO 17, 4 Mar 1871.
[22] Woodbury, F. Pride, *The History of Fort Riley,* (Fort Riley, 1926), p. 165.
[23] WD GO 42, 7 May 1861; WD GO 8, 26 Jan 1882.
[24] WD GO 39, 22 Jun 1886. See: Reeves, *op. cit.,* pp. 204–08 for background; and "Regulations of the United States Infantry and Cavalry School" in WD GO 49, 7 Aug 1897.

whole and was chiefly practical concentrated training; the average course was a year in length.[25]

Two other service schools were established before the Spanish-American War. The first was the United States Engineer School at Willets Point, N. Y., established in 1890 as an outgrowth of a series of schools for application conducted by the Engineers.[26] The United States Army Medical School was established at Washington, D. C., 24 June 1893 to instruct candidates for admission to the Medical Corps in army procedures and medical practice.[27] All the service schools were discontinued when the Spanish-American War began and the personnel ordered to their units. But in the period before 1898 the foundations for an Army service school system had been laid.

War Declared Against Spain

The sinking of the USS *Maine* in Havana Harbor the night of 15 February 1898 brought already declining Spanish-American relations to a new low. For two years, the situation in Cuba had led to a widening gulf between the United States and Spain. War fervor, kept alive by journalistic activities,[28] boiled over in the United States when the *Maine* was so mysteriously blown up. The Congress unanimously voted $50,000,000 for national defense on 9 March 1898. When a Naval court of inquiry concluded 28 March that the *Maine* had been sunk by a submarine mine, inflamed popular opinion in the United States was convinced that the mine had been touched off by the Spanish. Although the Spanish government agreed to adjust the Cuban problem, President McKinley finally yielded to popular opinion and asked Congress for authority to intervene in Cuba on 11 April. The Congress, swept by the same emotions as the people, passed a joint resolution 19 April which was tantamount to a declaration of war. The President signed the resolution the next day, and on 25 April the Congress declared that a state of war had existed between the United States and Spain since 21 April 1898.[29]

The Military Establishment, 1 April 1898

On 1 April 1898 Russell A. Alger was Secretary of War. A lawyer by profession, he had served as a Volunteer colonel and brevet major general during the Civil War. He had been elected governor of Michigan in 1884 and became Secretary of War under President McKinley 5 March 1897; he was 62 years old when the Spanish-American

---

[25] Act of January 29, 1887, in WD GO 9, 9 Feb 1887; WD GO 17, 14 Mar 1892 authorized the establishment of the school; "Regulations for the Cavalry and Light Artillery school, 1896" in WD GO 6, 28 Feb 1896; Pride, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

[26] Reeves, *op. cit.*, pp. 256–61.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] For a discussion of journalistic activities see: Marcus M. Wilkerson, *Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War* (Baton Rouge, 1932).

[29] Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (4th ed.; New York, 1950), pp. 501–10.

War began. The office of Assistant Secretary of War, which had been discontinued after the Civil War and then reestablished by the Congress 5 March 1890, was held by George D. Meiklejohn.

The Commanding General of the Army was Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles. General Miles, who was 58 years old, had entered the Army as a Volunteer officer from Massachusetts in 1861; he rose from first lieutenant to major general in the Volunteers and commanded a corps at 25; he remained in the Regular Army after the Civil War as a colonel of Infantry; and he became a major general in the Regular Army in 1890 after successful Indian campaigns. Upon Lt. Gen. John Schofield's retirement General Miles became Commanding General of the Army 2 October 1895. General Schofield had served both as Secretary of War (1 Jun 1868–13 Mar 1869) and as Commanding General (14 Aug 1888–29 Sep 1895). As Secretary of War on 5 March 1869 he had issued the general orders (rescinded by his successor) giving General Sherman control over the staff bureaus. Realizing that the actual power of the Commanding General depended on a close relationship with the Secretary of War, General Schofield served more as a military adviser to the Secretary than as a Commanding General. General Miles did not appreciate the delicate balance struck by General Schofield between the office of the Secretary of War and the Commanding General, and the old struggle for power was resumed, straining personal relations between Alger and Miles.

The staff of the Army consisted of 10 War Department bureaus: Adjutant General's Department, Inspector General's Department, Quartermaster General's Department, Subsistence Department, Medical Department, Pay Department, Engineer Department, Ordnance Department, Signal Department, and Judge Advocate General's Department. There had been few changes in staff work or precedures since pre-Civil War days.

*Table 13. Strength of the Regular Army: 1 April 1898.**

Organization	Strength			Number of regiments
	Total	Officers	Enlisted men	
Total	28, 183	2, 143	26, 040	42
General Officers and Staff Corps	2, 558	532	2, 026	0
Cavalry	6, 484	437	6, 047	10
Artillery	4, 774	288	4, 486	7
Infantry	13, 714	886	12, 828	25
Miscellaneous	653	0	653	0

*Source: "Report of The Adjutant General," *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1898*, vol. I, pt. I, p. 253.

The strength of the Regular Army on 1 April 1898 was 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men, a total of 28,183. [For distribution by services see *table 13.*] The regular Army was scattered at some 80 posts across the country with the largest portion of the troops at small posts in the West.[30] The 1890's were the end of a military era. From the close of the Civil War until the Battle of Wounded Knee Creek, 29 December 1890, the Army had been almost continuously absorbed with the pacification of the Western Indians. At the beginning of the Spanish-American crisis the Army was still distributed in the West pretty much as it had been during the Indian campaigns. For Army administrative purposes the country in 1898 was divided into eight geographical military departments.[31] [See *chart 6.*]

The only means of augmenting the Regular Army was by voluntary enlistment. Recruiting was carried on under the supervision of The Adjutant General at general recruiting stations in the larger population centers and at all military posts. In 1897 there were 15 general recruiting stations and 3 special stations in operation. The number of general recruiting stations was increased in April 1898 to 22, which operated during the war. The recruiting activities at the military posts and recruiting stations were designed to maintain the strength of the peacetime Regular Army at about 25,000 and were not meant to obtain the manpower for a major mobilization.[32]

In addition to the Regular Army the only organized military force was the organized Militia or National Guard. On paper the Militia contained 9,376 officers and 106,251 enlisted men, or a total of 115,627. Equipment for the Militia was scarce and outmoded; units were below strength and had only meager training; and it appeared that it would take almost as long to place the Militia on a war footing as to organize new units.[33]

Mobilization "Planning"

During the two years of steadily mounting tensions between the United States and Spain, no practical plans were prepared for a possible mobilization. As a matter of fact there was no organization within the War Department specifically responsible for mobilization


[30] S Doc 221, 56th Cong., 1st sess., "Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War With Spain," hereafter cited as "Report on Conduct of the War," (Washington, 1900), I, p. 113. The commission, sometimes referred to as the Dodge Commission after its president, Maj Gen Grenville M. Dodge, met from 24 Sep 1898 to 9 Feb 1899. The report consists of eight volumes of reports and testimony. See vol. I, pp. 107–233, for an account of the mobilization for the Spanish-American War.

[31] WD GO 7, 11 Mar 1898.

[32] "Report of the Adjutant General," *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1897,* pp. 216–18.

[33] *Official Army Register for 1898,* p. 354; Ruby W. Waldeck, "Missouri in the Spanish American War," *The Missouri Historical Review,* XXX (1935–36) p. 377.

*Chart 6. Geographical Military Departments, 1898.**



O Department Headquarters.

**Source:* WD GO 7, 11 Mar 1898.

planning. There was also considerable antipathy to planning for offensive operations on the part of the McKinley administration. As late as 9 March 1898 the President had given positive instructions that the $50,000,000 appropriated by Congress for defense would be expended within the strictest, most literal interpretation of defense.

The first official planning conjecture that there was going to be a war which would require offensive action came in a letter from General Miles to Secretary of War Alger, 9 April 1898. The general in this letter recommended the immediate mobilization of all available Regular Army troops: specifically, the assembling of 22 regiments of Infantry, 5 of Cavalry, and the Light Field Artillery in one large camp where they could be ". . . carefully and thoroughly inspected, fully equipped, drilled, disciplined, and instructed in brigades and divisions, and prepared for war service." To back up this Regular Army force of some 30,000 men, General Miles further recommended that the President call 50,000 Volunteers. These measures, Miles summed up, would provide an army capable of launching an offensive against the Spaniards in Cuba, estimated to number 80,000 effectives. In addition, state troops in the coastal areas would be available for emergencies or threatened attacks on exposed cities and towns "or for construction of the large force that may be required in the future." [34]

This was the first concrete step toward estimating the manpower which might be needed for a possible war with Spain. In all, General Miles estimated that a combined Regular and Volunteer force of at least 80,000, not including state troops for coastal defense, would be needed. These broad suggestions of General Miles were still under consideration by Secretary of War Alger on 15 April 1898 when the general again wrote to the Secretary reiterating and elaborating his recommendations of 9 April. Miles advised that the site for the mobilization of the Regular Army should be ". . . in the best and most available healthful position in the Department of the Gulf." He suggested Chickamauga Park, near Chattanooga, Tenn., because ". . . of its altitude and advantages for preparing a command for the serious requirements of actual warfare." Miles believed that the number of state troops needed to man coastal defenses would be 40,000.[35] This time the Secretary of War, presumably after approval by the President, immediately directed the Regular Army concentration recommended by General Miles. Secretary Alger wrote three years later that "Fortunately there was no law forbidding immediate mobilization." [36]

---

[34] *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army to the Secretary of War, 1898*, p. 5.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.

[36] Russell A. Alger, *The Spanish-American War* (New York, 1901), p. 15.

Regular Army Concentration

Orders were dispatched by The Adjutant General on 15 April to the commanding generals of seven departments ordering all the light batteries of five artillery regiments, six cavalry regiments, and twenty-two infantry regiments to one of four stations in the South. Contrary to General Miles' recommendation for concentrating the Regular Army at a single camp but following the recommendations of a Joint Military and Naval Board, the Cavalry and Light Artillery were ordered to Chickamauga and the Infantry scattered, with eight regiments ordered to New Orleans and seven each to Mobile and Tampa.[37] Ostensibly, these units would be ready for an immediate descent upon Cuba, but they were placed beyond any possibility of the combined training with the other arms which they so badly needed.[38] This original order was later amended to permit some of the Infantry to proceed with the Artillery and Cavalry to Chickamauga.[39]

Another order from The Adjutant General 15 April assigned commanding generals to each of the four chosen camp sites and directed those men to send their chief quartermasters to those places to select ground for the camps. The same order directed that all officers on duty at the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth and the Cavalry and Light Artillery School at Fort Riley who belonged to any of those units under orders rejoin their commands.[40]

The Regular Army troops who began their trek toward these four camps from over 80 garrisons scattered all over the Nation were, individually, at a fair standard of efficiency as the result of years of Indian campaigning. Tactically they were almost totally devoid of any but minor maneuver experience. Field maneuvers by regiments were almost unknown. Only the Civil War veterans had ever seen a force much larger than a regiment.

The joint resolution passed by the Congress 19 April 1898 had demanded that Spain relinquish its authority over Cuba and withdraw its military and naval forces. The President was given authority to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry this resolution into effect. It was evident that more than a concentration of the Regular Army and Naval forces were going to be necessary to implement this resolution.

Wartime Legislation

In his original recommendations of 9 April General Miles had proposed the raising of a "volunteer force" of 50,000 men. The only

---

[37] AGO, *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain . . .*, I, p. 7; Arthur L. Wagner, *Report of the Santiago Campaign 1898* (Kansas City, 1908), p. 25.

[38] Walter Millis, *The Martial Spirit* (Cambridge, 1931), p. 154.

[39] *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898*, p. 9.

[40] *Correspondence Relating to the War With Spain. . . .* I, pp. 7–8.

reserve forces from which even partially trained military personnel could be drawn were the state Militia or National Guard units. The term "National Guard" had come into general use in most of the states in the post-Civil War period. It was synonomous with the older term "Organized Militia" and should not be confused with the National Guard organized by the National Defense Act of 1916. These state units were too influential politically to be ignored by recruiting a completely new Federal Volunteer force. The War Department struggled to find some formula whereby the National Guard of the states could be federalized without reintroducing the Militia problems of Civil War days.[41]

A hurriedly drafted bill creating an independent Federal force with all officers to be commissioned directly by the President was drawn up by the War Department. In order to get around the desire of the governors to appoint the officers for regiments raised within their states, the argument was advanced that since this force was to be used outside state boundaries and probably outside the United States the President should retain the authority to appoint the officers. There was even thought of omitting the term "Volunteer" to assuage National Guard pride; the National Guard felt that it should have a priority on serving and resented the formation of Volunteer units unless they were composed of Guardsmen. But the War Department's efforts were in vain. Before the bill even reached the Congress, the Army was forced to yield to political pressure and agree that any National Guard unit up to full strength would be integrally taken into the mobilizing Army, if the state governor so desired, and that none of these units would be staffed with Regular Army officers. The bill was then turned over to the House Military Affairs Committee with a companion measure for increasing the Regular Army just as war was declared.[42]

The Congress passed "An Act to provide for temporarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in time of war" on 22 April 1898. This act provided:

1. In time of war the Army would be composed of the Regular Army and the Volunteer Army which would include the Militia of the states when in Federal service.

2. The President with Congressional permission could call for Volunteers between the ages of 18 and 45 for two years of service with quotas to be apportioned among the states according to population.

3. If any Militia organization volunteered in a body it, with its officers, would be integrally accepted as a unit into the Voluntary army.

---

[41] Millis, *op. cit.*, pp. 155–56.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 156–57.

4. Other organizations would be raised by the states and the officers appointed by the governors.

5. The Secretary of War was authorized to organize units "possessing special qualifications, from the Nation at large not to exceed three thousand men" with officers Federally appointed.

6. All units accepted were to be recruited to maximum strength and provision was made for the organization of both Regular and Volunteer units into brigades, divisions, and army corps.

7. Not more than one Regular officer could be appointed to any Volunteer regiment.

8. Efficiency boards composed of Volunteers were authorized to review "the capacity, qualifications, conduct, and efficiency" of Volunteer officers.[43]

This was not an ideal Volunteer law; it repeated many of the mistakes of the Civil War. Units were to be raised by the states and the officers appointed by the governors. The period of service was to be for two years. But the Act of April 22, 1898, had made possible the reinforcement of the Army and that reinforcement, when it came, was to be under Federal control.[44]

The Congress passed an act on 26 April 1898 providing for "the better organization of the line of the Army of the United States." This act authorized the President to expand the Regular Army by adding a battalion to each of the infantry regiments (making a total of three) and by bringing the companies up to maximum strength. The actual increases were wisely left to the discretion of the President enabling him to adjust the mobilization to meet changing conditions. The maximum authorized strength of the Regular Army was thus increased to 64,719 men. At the same time enlisted pay was increased 20 per cent in time of war.[45]

Under an act passed 11 May 1898 the Congress authorized the Secretary of War to raise two additional Federal Volunteer forces: (1) a brigade of Volunteer Engineers of 3,500 men; (2) a force of 10,000 enlisted men "possessing immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates.[46] Other legislation authorized minor increases in the staff departments, the raising of a Volunteer Signal Corps of 65 officers and men, and provided for the filling of Volunteer officer vacancies by the governors.[47] Thus the Congress had authorized a Regular Army of some 64,700, federally raised and officered Volunteer forces of 16,500 (3,000 "Special qualifications," 3,500 Volunteer Engineers,

[43] Act of April 22, 1898, in WD GO 30, 30 Apr 1898.

[44] Millis, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

[45] Act of April 26, 1898, in WD GO 29, 29 Apr 1898; Ganoe, *op. cit.*, p. 373; WD GO 27, 27 Apr 1898.

[46] Act of May 11, 1898, in WD GO 44, 13 May 1898.

[47] Act of May 12, 1898, and May 18, 1898, in WD GO 52, 24 May 1898; Act of May 28, 1898, in WD GO 62, 3 Jun 1898.

10,000 "Immunes"), and such state-raised Volunteer forces as the President deemed necessary.

Manpower Mobilization and Procedures

Volunteer Army

President McKinley issued a proclamation on 23 April 1898 calling for 125,000 Volunteers under the authority given him by the joint resolution of 19 April and the Act of April 22, 1898.[48] The number of men was to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among the states, territories, and the District of Columbia, according to population. The length of service was to be two years unless sooner discharged. The men gained through this call were to be organized into the following types of units:

Cavalry	5 Regiments, 17 Troops.
Light Artillery	16 Batteries.
Heavy Artillery	1 Regiment, 7 Batteries.
Infantry	119 Regiments, 10 Battalions.[49]

On 26 April General Miles communicated to the Secretary of War his views on processing the Volunteers called under the President's proclamation. He recommended that these troops remain in state camps selected by the governors for a period of approximately two months while they were equipped, organized, and disciplined for field service.[50] General Miles acknowledged that "many of the States have made no provision for their State militia, and not one is fully equipped for field service." [51] Because the states themselves were not prepared to process their men in state camps and because the Army did not have an adequate number of qualified quartermaster, commissary, ordnance, and medical officers to staff the state camps, it was decided to concentrate the mobilizing Army in a few large camps. General Miles later claimed that this decision was a serious error. However, supplies and equipment for any camps were almost nonexistent, and the use of large Federal concentration camps undoubtedly simplified the mobilization process. The Quartermaster Corps later reported that it had had only enough clothing and camp and garrison equipment on hand to provide for the existing Regular Army and perhaps 10,000 more men.[52]

The Adjutant General's Office had issued its "carefully prepared regulations" for the guidance of mustering officers on 22 April 1898. These regulations specified that only officers of the Regular Army,

[48] Proclamation is published in WD GO 30, 30 Apr 1898.
[49] *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898*, p. 489.
[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[52] "Report on Conduct of the War," I, pp. 127, 436–37.

except in case of necessity, would be detailed to muster duty. A few of the more pertinent provisions of these regulations were as follows:

1. The organization of the units to be mustered was to follow statutes and War Department regulations.

2. During the organization of a Volunteer regiment, the adjutant, quartermaster, and, when necessary, medical officers could be mustered in to aid in recruiting the regiment. The noncommissioned staff was not to be mustered in until the regiment was complete.

3. After a regiment had been mustered into service no commissioned officer was to be mustered in before he produced a commission from the governor of his state, and then only if a vacancy existed.

4. All Volunteers had to be between 18 and 45 years of age and were to be "minutely examined" by a medical officer of the Army or a contract physician.

5. Mustering officers were to be careful that one company or detachment did not borrow men from another to swell its ranks for muster.

6. As in the days of the Civil War every officer and man in a mounted organization should be the owner of the horse in his use.

7. No officer of the general staff of the Militia force was to be mustered in without special authority from the War Department.[53] The Federal Government assumed responsibility for financing the mobilization of Volunteers in General Orders No. 26 issued 27 April 1898:

> All absolutely necessary expenses for the subsistence, transportation, sheltering and generally the maintenance of volunteers during the interval between their enrollment (enlistment) and their muster (or being sworn) into the service of the United States; also all incidental expenses connected therewith, such as the hire of offices, clerks, messengers, etc., for mustering officers, will be met by the Government of the United States from the proper appropriation at the disposal of the several staff departments of the Army.[54]

The men to comprise the 125,000 called under the 23 April proclamation came primarily from men already in the Militia units of the states. However, these men had to volunteer as individuals since under the Federal Constitution, National Guard or Militia units could be ordered into Federal service only to repel invasion, to execute the laws of the Union, and to suppress insurrection. To circumvent the constitutional limitation and still give the National Guard priority, the Act of April 22, 1898, provided that National Guard units would be taken first if the governors so desired, if the men volunteered as a unit, and if the unit was up to strength. The telegrams to the governors assigning state quotas included a sentence which stated: "It is the wish of the President that the regiments of the National Guard or State militia shall be used as far as their numbers will permit, for

[53] *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898, pp. 507–10.*
[54] WD GO 26, 27 Apr 1898.

the reason that they are armed, equipped and drilled." The governors were asked what additional supplies and equipment would be required and when the troops would be ready for muster into Federal service.[55]

Response to this call was immediate and varied.[56] In some states the governors refused to permit their National Guard units to go, and formed new units for the call. The units which volunteered and were chosen by the governors were then ordered to camps within their state where organization was completed. Units discharged personnel who failed to volunteer to go with the unit and conducted recruiting campaigns to bring their strength up to that required for muster into Federal service. Units then accepted had their organizational designation changed from that of National Guard or Militia to Volunteer, i. e., 1st Regiment, New York National Guard became the 1st Regiment, Infantry, New York Volunteers. The mobilization of the Volunteer Army units began with their muster into Federal service at state camps. In most cases, the mobilization was conducted with great rapidity.[57]

Before the Volunteers requested under the call of 23 April had been mobilized, strategic manpower requirements had been greatly increased by Rear Adm. George Dewey's victory in Manila Bay, 1 May 1898. Up to that time all plans had contemplated campaigns in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The question of sending a force to the Philippines was first raised by General Miles in a letter to Secretary Alger 3 May.[58] Admiral Dewey estimated 13 May that it would take 5,000 men to hold Manila;[59] the same day Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, who had been selected by the War Department to lead the Philippine expedition, estimated a force of at least 14,400 (6,350 Regulars and 8,050 Volunteers) would be needed.[60] With considerable foresight General Merritt in a letter to the President 15 May pointed out: "It seems more than probable that we will have the so-called insurgents to fight as well as the Spaniards, and upon the work to be accomplished will depend the ultimate strength and composition of the force."[61]

To meet the increased manpower needs President McKinley issued a second proclamation on 25 May calling for 75,000 Volunteers, thereby increasing the total number of Volunteers called to 200,000.[62] The act of April 22 contained a provision that no new organization would be

[55] Telg, SW to Gov of N Y, 25 Apr 1898, sub: Mobilization of Volunteers. Incl 2, AG 247144 filed with AG 253334 (Correspondence Relating to the Muster of Troops in the War with Spain). National Archives.

[56] For account of N Y National Guard units, see: Millis, *op. cit.*, p. 158–59.

[57] See: copies of telegrams and messages Apr-May 1898, sub: Mobilization of Volunteers. AG 253334. National Archives.

[58] *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain.* . . . II, p. 635.

[59] Richard H. Titherington, *A History of the Spanish-American War of 1898* (New York 1900) p. 352.

[60] *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain,* . . . II, p. 644.

[61] *Ibid.,* II, p. 646.

[62] Proclamation of 25 May 1898 in WD GO 83, 28 Jun 1898.

accepted into the service from any state unless the organizations already in service from that state were as near their maximum strength as the President thought necessary. Therefore, a part of the men obtained under this second call were used to fill up below-strength units. This was done by sending recruiting parties from the various Volunteer organizations to the localities where the troops had originally been raised. When a state had a surplus remaining, it was applied toward organizing new units. Some 40,000 men had been obtained under the second call when instructions were given to suspend Volunteer recruiting following the signing of the protocol for an armistice and peace negotiations 12 August 1898.[63] [The growth of the Volunteer Army is shown in *table 14*.]

Regular Army

The strength of the Regular Army on 1 April 1898 had been 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men. The monthly rate of enlistment prior to March 1898 was from 700 to 1,000, but under the stimulus of the war the number jumped to over 9,000 for May and June, over 6,500 for July, and over 3,000 for August. Although the Regular Army expanded appreciably [See *table 15*] its strength never quite reached the maximum authorization of approximately 64,700 men.[64] The strength of the Regular Army was maintained and augmented solely by means of recruitment. In the period prior to the outbreak of war recruits enlisted at the various stations were dispatched as quickly as possible to regiments and posts. The Army continued this practice during the war insofar as it was possible.[65]

When it became necessary to collect recruits for those regiments on foreign service, Fort McPherson, Ga., was selected as the rendezvous point for Cuba and Puerto Rico, and the Presidio of San Francisco for the Philippines. The base at Fort McPherson was soon turned over to the Medical Corps and the recruits there distributed elsewhere. The end of active operations came before this Regular Army replacement depot system really got under way.

Immediately after the declaration of war orders were sent to regimental commanders to recruit their regiments to their authorized war strength. To assist in this intensified recruiting program, commanders were authorized to send out regimental recruiting parties. However, because of the scarcity of officers, the transfer of the Regular Army regiments to concentration camps and the early departure of these regiments overseas, it was not always possible to send out or

---

[63] Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 515.

[64] *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898*, p. 485; "Report on Conduct of the War," I, p. 118.

[65] This section on Army recruiting is based on material in the "Report of The Adjutant General to the Commanding General," *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898*, pp. 485–506.

*Table 14. Strength of the Volunteer Army: May-August 1898.**

Organization	May		June		July		August	
	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted
Total	6, 224	118, 580	7, 169	153, 355	8, 633	203, 461	8, 785	207, 244
Major Generals	11		12		18		21	
Brigadier Generals	25		70		70		71	
Adjutant Gen's Dept	54		98		100		99	
Inspector's Gen Dept	19		30		27		25	
Judge Advocate Gen's Dept	6		7		8		8	
Quartermaster Gen's Dept	34		82		114		121	
Subsistence Dept	25		87		106		108	
Medical Dept	19		84		99		113	
Pay Dept	12		65		80		86	
Corps of Engineers	10		24		28		28	
Ordnance Dept					20		24	
Signal Corps	10		101	897	112	1, 089	111	1, 173
Engineers			81	704	108	2, 458	150	3, 286
Cavalry	285	5, 972	292	6, 920	292	7, 221	289	7, 003
Heavy Artillery	83	1, 836	83	2, 010	93	2, 540	92	2, 570
Light Artillery	69	1, 706	84	2, 979	120	4, 405	120	4, 265
Infantry	5, 562	109, 066	5, 969	139, 845	7, 238	185, 748	7, 319	188, 947

* *Source:* "Report on Conduct of the War," I, p. 254.

*Table 15. Strength of the Regular Army: May–August 1898.**

Month	Total	General officers and staff corps	Cavalry	Artillery	Infantry	Miscellaneous
May	44, 125	3, 209	8, 270	7, 865	16, 212	8, 569
Officers	2, 191	535	435	305	916	0
Enlisted [a]	41, 934	2, 674	7, 835	7, 560	15, 296	8, 569
June	51, 711	5, 547	10, 342	9, 382	18, 249	8, 191
Officers	2, 198	535	430	317	916	0
Enlisted [a]	49, 513	5, 012	9, 912	9, 065	17, 333	8, 191
July	56, 258	7, 103	11, 010	11, 677	19, 872	6, 496
Officers	2, 327	550	419	369	989	0
Enlisted [a]	[b]53, 931	6, 553	10, 591	11, 308	18, 883	6, 496
August	58, 688	8, 528	12, 013	12, 823	23, 445	1, 879
Officers	2, 323	548	419	369	987	0
Enlisted [a]	56, 365	7, 980	11, 594	12, 454	22, 458	1, 879

[a] Monthly data include the men of the Hospital Corps which are exclusive of authorized strength. Regular Army enlistments were as follows: May—9,569, June—9,311, July—6,586, August—3,400.

[b] Includes 100 persons not shown in succeeding columns.

*Source: *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898*, p. 486.

maintain regimental recruiting parties. The number of enlistments made by the regimental parties was therefore greatly reduced. General service recruiting officers at posts and city stations were instructed to assign general service recruits to regiments when requested to do so by their regimental commander. There was but one special regimental recruiting station in operation in April; in May the number was 126; in June 120; in July 85; and in August the number dropped off to 58. Lack of officer personnel prevented any considerable increase in the number of general service recruiting stations in cities. In October 1897 there were 15; the maximum during the war months was only 22.

During the period May–July 1898, 25,500 recruits were enlisted, notwithstanding the fact that Regular Army recruiting parties had to compete with recruiting for the Volunteer army and for the various special Federal Volunteer units. By the end of August the enlisted strength of the Regular Army, exclusive of the Hospital Corps, was approximately 52,000 men. Although the Regular Army doubled in size during the war, over 75 per cent of the applicants for enlistments

were rejected "as lacking in legal, mental, moral, or physical qualifications." [66]

The Regular Army officer corps, small to begin with, was placed under a severe strain. Some 387 officers of the Regular Army were nominated and appointed to commissions in the Volunteer Army; many others were placed on staff or mustering duty with the Volunteers.[67] The absence of these officers interfered with the regimental recruiting programs. This was even more evident when the units departed for foreign service. Generally speaking, those units which were able to detail a number of recruiting officers soon had their commands filled to maximum strength. Unfortunately, artillery officers were so scarce that few officers of that branch were released for recruiting; the strength of the artillery units suffered as a result.

Special Federal Volunteer Units

In addition to the Regular Army units and those obtained from the states for the Volunteer Army, Congress provided for the organization of some 16 special units to be recruited by the Federal Government from the nation at large. [See *table 16.*] The Act of April 22 authorized the Secretary of War to form units of men with special qualifications and appoint their officers for a total number not exceeding 3,000. Under this authorization three regiments of United States Volunteer Cavalry were raised. The 1st Regiment, United States Volunteer Cavalry, popularly known as the Rough Riders, was organized by Col. Leonard Wood (later Chief of Staff of the United States Army) and Lt. Col. Theodore Roosevelt (at that time Assistant Secretary of the Navy).

The Secretary of War was authorized under the Act of May 11 to organize a Volunteer brigade of Engineers. This brigade was to be composed of not more than three regiments or more than 3,500 men. The regiments were to be armed and equipped as infantry, the officers to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. This same act also authorized the Secretary of War to organize an additional Volunteer force of not more than 10,000 men or 10 infantry regiments to be recruited from men possessing immunity to tropical diseases. The officers for these units were likewise to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. Each regiment organized under these provisions was to be known as the ———— Regiment of United States Volunteer Infantry, and was to have a maximum strength of 46 officers and 992 men. At least five of these units were to be composed of white troops; as it worked out, four were colored units and six were white. These units soon became known throughout the Army as Immunes.[68]

---

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 505.

[67] "Report on Conduct of the War," I, p. 255.

[68] Act of May 11, 1898, in WD GO 44, 13 May 1898. For regulations governing the organization of these forces see WD GO 55, 26 May 1898.

*Table 16. Special Federal Volunteer Units Mobilized During the Spanish-American War.**

Unit	Date muster in completed	Strength at completion of muster in		
		Total	Officers	Enlisted
Total		16, 452	729	15, 723
U. S. Volunteer Cavalry		3, 056	133	2, 923
1st (Rough Riders)	21 May 1898	1, 041	47	994
2d	30 May 1898	1, 009	41	968
3d	23 May 1898	1, 006	45	961
U. S. Volunteer Engineers		3, 431	152	3, 279
1st	16 Jul 1898	1, 148	50	1, 098
2d	12 Jul 1898	1, 136	49	1, 087
3d	20 Aug 1898	1, 147	53	1, 094
U. S. Volunteer Infantry		9, 965	444	9, 521
1st	4 Jun 1898	1, 017	46	971
2d	26 Jun 1898	995	45	950
3d	9 Jul 1898	1, 027	43	984
4th	25 Jun 1898	1, 008	46	962
5th	13 Jul 1898	1, 027	46	981
6th	15 Jul 1898	950	46	904
7th	23 Jul 1898	995	42	953
8th	24 Jul 1898	908	40	868
9th	16 Jul 1898	1, 030	46	984
10th	22 Jul 1898	1, 008	44	964

**Source:* AGO, *Statistical Exhibit of Strength of Volunteer Forces Called Into Service During the War With Spain . . .*, pp. 18–21.

Summary of Manpower Program

The paper mobilization program called for raising approximately 281,200 men as follows:

Item	*Total*
Total	281, 200
Regular Army	64, 700
23 April call for Volunteers	125, 000
25 May call for Volunteers	75, 000
3 Regiment U. S. Vol Cavalry	3, 000
1 Brigade U. S. Vol Engineers	3, 500
10 Regiments of Immunes	10, 000

Manpower procurement was never a problem during the mobilization for the Spanish-American War, which lasted less than four months. There were 102,000 applicants for the Regular Army during the months of May, June, and July, of whom only 25,000 were found acceptable. In response to the President's call for Volunteers on 23 April nearly 125,000 men had been mustered into service by the end of May. The muster of the three regiments of Cavalry ("men with

special qualifications") was completed by 30 May, the ten Immune Infantry regiments by 30 July, and a special Engineer brigade by 24 August. The grand total of the Army reached its high point in August 1898, when 11,108 officers and 263,609 enlisted men appeared on its rolls.[69] [See *table 17.*]

*Table 17. Strength of the Army: May-August 1898**

Month	Total	Volunteer Army	Regular Army
May	168, 929	124, 804	44, 125
Officers	8, 415	6, 224	2, 191
Enlisted	160, 514	118, 580	41, 934
June	212, 235	160, 524	51, 711
Officers	9, 367	7, 169	2, 198
Enlisted	202, 868	153, 355	49, 513
July	268, 352	212, 094	56, 258
Officers	10, 960	8, 633	2, 327
Enlisted	257, 392	203, 461	53, 931
August	274, 717	216, 029	58, 688
Officers	11, 108	8, 785	2, 323
Enlisted	263, 609	207, 244	56, 365

**Source:* "Report on Conduct of the War," I, p. 254.

Army Corps Organization

The Act of April 22, 1898, provided that units should be organized into brigades of not more than three regiments per brigade, and that the brigades should be formed into divisions, each division to have no more than three brigades. Furthermore, the President was authorized to organize three divisions into an army corps. On the following day the Regular Army troops at Chickamauga were formed into a provisional army corps under Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke.[70]

Some two weeks later General Order No. 36, 7 May 1898, was published providing the ultimate framework under which the Army was to be organized and employed. It provided for the creation of seven army corps to be composed of Regulars and Volunteers, these corps to be numbered consecutively from one to seven. Actually the Sixth Army Corps was not activated; and an Eighth Army Corps was

[69] *Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898,* pp. 491–92.
[70] WD GO 25, 23 Apr 1898.

formed to provide for those forces comprising the Philippine expedition. Seven corps in all were activated.

Some attempt at uniformity is evidenced by this order. Coupled with the mustering instructions of 22 April regarding the necessity of units being organized according to prevailing regulations, a fairly equal distribution of strength among the several corps might have been effected, but such was not the case. The combined enlisted strengths of the First and Third Corps at Chickamauga ranged from 6,000 in April to 56,644 in June, and 12,725 in August. [See *table 18* for a comparison of corps enlisted strengths.]

*Table 18. Comparison of Corps Enlisted Strength: May–August 1898**

Corps	31 May	30 June	31 July	31 August
First and Third Corps [a]	42, 036	56, 544	42, 260	12, 725
Second Corps	17, 406	22, 624	21, 373	20, 686
Fourth Corps	7, 456	20, 053	13, 485	9, 933
Fifth Corps	15, 657	14, 945	18, 619	14, 347
Seventh Corps	8, 847	18, 375	23, 193	27, 817
Eighth Corps	10, 793	11, 660	7, 478	5, 988

[a] Enlisted strength on 30 April 1898 was 6,328.

**Source: Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1898,* pp. 497–500.

The Selection of Camp Sites

Some 15 camp sites in the United States were utilized by the War Department for the mobilization, training, and demobilization of the troops. The first camp to be chosen was that of Camp Thomas at Chickamauga Park, Georgia. This was the site selected by General Miles for the concentration of all the available regular Army units. The order of 15 April designated three other areas in addition to Chickamauga for the concentration of the Regular Army—Mobile, Alabama; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Tampa, Florida. The camps established at Mobile and New Orleans were temporary ones and used only during the first few weeks of the war. Regular Army units were dispatched to port areas to be readily available for quick loading in the event a hurried invasion of Cuba became necessary, but the troops assembled at these points were shortly transferred to other more permanent installations for incorporation into brigades and corps. Like Mobile and New Orleans, Tampa was never intended as a permanent camp; troops were sent there only to stage, but gradually it became a permanent installation.[71]

The reason for the selection of Tampa as a base of operations was questioned during the investigation by the Dodge Commission of the

[71] "Report on Conduct of the War", I, p. 266.

conduct of the War Department during the war. The Secretary of War informed the commission that Tampa was selected "On account of the shipping facilities at that point and its comparative short distance from Cuba, rendering any movement of the troops possible on short notice." [72] Tampa was, however, completely inadequate in port or railroad facilities. Its selection was a major error and contrary to previous recommendations.[73]

The majority of sites chosen for camps were in the South. The reason for this seems to have been their proximity to the prospective scene of action and for acclimatization of the troops to a semitropical region. A number of camps over and above those originally planned were set up primarily as a result of outbreaks of yellow fever, malaria, and smallpox. Efforts were then made to scatter the troops to more healthful locations. The Dodge Commission investigated all of the camps occupied by the Army in view of charges of unhealthy locations, poor water supply, poor camp discipline, and of political influence in their selection. The commission found these charges to be exaggerated and largely baseless, but felt that the camp commanders at Camp Thomas had not been as attentive to sanitary conditions as they might have been.[74]

Most of the charges relating to conditions in the camps were aimed at the Secretary of War. In his history of the war, Secretary Alger listed five reasons why the War Department assembled troops in large camps:

1. The supply bureaus could not set up depots in each of the 45 states to supply Volunteers in small state camps because the shortage of personnel and supplies had already overtaxed the bureaus. There were not enough Regular Army officers in the supply and medical branches to detail one of each branch to so many scattered state camps, and only Regular Army officers were qualified for such assignments.
2. It was desirable to place the Volunteers in camps with the Regulars in order that they might benefit from the example and instruction of seasoned troops.
3. The War Department wanted to get the Volunteer units away from home as soon as possible "in that home influences tended to retard military discipline."
4. Immediate training in brigades, division, and corps maneuvers was of great importance, and only large camps would permit this.
5. "Considerations of national moment, which subsequent events prove wise, suggested the brigading of regiments, not from the same state, but from the four great geographical divisions—North, South, East, and West. In this way clannishness and provincialism were obliterated, and the result was a homogeneous army." [75]

---

[72] *Ibid.*, I, p. 245.
[73] See: Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
[74] "Report on the Conduct of the War", I, pp. 202–22.
[75] Alger, *op. cit.*, pp. 26–27.

Supply Problems Harass Mobilization

Stockpiles of equipment were virtually nonexistent at the outbreak of the war. "The situation found the country unprepared with any large stock of arms, ammunition, clothing, supplies, and equipments." [76] The Quartermaster Department, with only 57 officers assigned to it, had sufficient clothing and garrison and camp equipage on hand for three months' supply for the Regular Army as then constituted (25,000) and perhaps 10,000 additional troops.[77] In less than one month that Department was called upon to equip over 250,000 men. What surplus clothing the Quartermaster Department had on hand was unsuitable for issue to troops expected to train and serve in tropical climates.

State units ran the gamut from those with virtually no uniforms or equipment to a few fairly well-outfitted organizations.[78] Sometimes the earlier units from a state were better equipped than those which followed, "but the worst from some States are better equipped than the best from others." [79] In late May, Maj. Gen. Joseph Breckenridge, The Inspector General of the Army, reported that at Camp Thomas the lack of uniforms, especially underclothing, was everywhere noted. In some companies there was a mixed uniform, in others wholly civilian attire prevailed. The fit of the clothes that were issued was often poor.[80] Some Volunteer units arrived in uniforms which had been furnished by their state and were in very poor condition. On 4 June 1898 General Miles wrote the Secretary of War from Tampa where he had been ordered to expedite the departure of the Santiago expedition: "Several of the volunteer regiments came here without uniforms; several came without arms, and some without blankets, tents, or camp equipage." [81]

In early March, The Quartermaster General had instructed government manufacturing depots to speed up production of certain items and authorized the purchase of additional tentage material—the shortage of this last item was later to plague the Army. In mid-April some sketchy inquiries were sent to manufacturers for estimates of prices, quantities, and delivery dates for certain essential items, but no implementing plans were prepared based on those tentative procurement studies.[82]

Following the declaration of war, Congress made adequate funds available for the purchase of supplies and equipment. But again

---

[76] "Report on Conduct of the War," I, p. 113.
[77] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 126–27.
[78] For examples, see: *Ibid.*, I, pp. 293, 307–09.
[79] *Ibid.*, I, p. 277.
[80] *Ibid.*
[81] *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, . . .* I, p. 24.
[82] "Report on Conduct of the War," I, pp. 128–29.

money was not enough: it could not buy time. For example, cotton twill or duck for summer uniforms could not be obtained; these materials did not become available until after the Santiago Campaign had been completed. The War Department pressed manufacturers and let contracts at a furious rate. Efforts were made to relieve the conditions at state camps by authorizing local purchases of items, but these were not always obtainable.[83]

The supply of ordnance materiel—the tools of the soldier—was about as bad as quartermaster. The Infantry and Cavalry of the Regular Army were equipped with the .30 caliber Krag-Jorgensen type, bolt-action rifles or carbines. This weapon had a box magazine with a five-round capacity, and fired a smokeless cartridge. Unfortunately the Ordnance Department had on hand at the outbreak of the war only 53,508 of these rifles and 14,875 of the carbines.

The standard weapon of the National Guard was still the .45 caliber Springfield breech-loading rifle usually Model 1873 or Model 1884. This was a long, unwieldy, single-shot weapon modified over its original .50 caliber version of late Civil War vintage but certainly not suitable for modern warfare. Inspections often revealed these weapons to be in a poor state of repair, rusty, and hardly capable of lasting a campaign. The ammunition on hand for these weapons was all black powder; efforts made to obtain cartridges with smokeless powder were not successful until after the end of the fighting. The use of this weapon with its revealing black powder ammunition caused the withdrawal from action in the Santiago Campaign of the two Volunteer units equipped with Springfields.[84]

There were numerous incidents of units arriving in camps without even outmoded weapons. General Breckenridge discovered, in his May inspection of Camp Thomas, that two complete regiments of one division were without arms and that some others had none for 30 to 40 per cent of their men. Sentinels were often observed walking posts with clubs or sticks.[85] The situation began to show improvement by 1 September after 53,571 Krag rifles and 11,715 Krag carbines had been issued to the troops; but had the war progressed and hard fighting ensued the Army would still have been hard-pressed for enough modern small arms for the additional men mobilized.[86]

The Medical Department was unprepared in either men or materials to meet the needs of the mobilizing Army. Economy in the prewar Medical Department had prevented the accumulation of any reserve supplies. If such contracts had been made, some of the later

[83] *Ibid.*

[84] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 196–98; Philip B. Sharpe, *The Rifle in America* (New York, 1938), pp. 96–98.

[85] Report on Conduct of the War", I, p. 277.

[86] *Ibid.*, I, p. 197.

shortages might have been avoided. The Dodge Commission found that there was too much red tape in issuing medical supplies and that the table of supply was too restricted. It condemned the serious mismanagement of medical supplies.[87]

The supply situation, critical enough in itself, became further complicated. In the early stages of mobilization, as articles of supply and equipment became available, they were shipped forward in bulk without bills of lading. The result was that railroad cars arrived in Tampa and Chickamauga with their contents unknown to anyone. A great deal of delay resulted while officers broke open boxes to discover their contents while searching for badly needed articles. Materials of different classes belonging to different departments were frequently loaded in the same car making it necessary to remove large crates of quartermaster or commissary supplies in order to obtain a small package of medical supplies. Inadequate loading and unloading facilities at camps, particularly at Tampa, coupled with the inexperience of those in authority caused terrific backlogging, sidetracking, and jamming of rail traffic. At one time supplies for 70,000 men for 90 days were ordered into Tampa, and the confusion became so great that 1,000 railroad cars were sidetracked, some as far back as Columbia, S. C.[88]

In the face of these supply difficulties it seems miraculous that the United States was able to field any sort of an army while a well-equipped army was out of the question. The salvation of the war effort was the nature of the enemy and the effectiveness of the native Cuban Rebellion. Eventually, the procurement efforts of the supply bureaus caught up with the demand, and later the log jam of distribution was also broken. Manpower, supplies, and equipment were nearly in balance by the end of the war, an achievement considering the magnitude of the task, the inadequacy of the staff tools, and the shortness of the war.

Training

The Regular Army was small, but the individual standard of training of its personnel was comparatively high. The great deficiency was in large unit tactical maneuvers. The Indian Wars had been largely fought by small units or detachments, and as a result small unit tactics were excellent. There had been no brigade or division formations since the end of the Civil War. The Regular Army units that assembled in the camps at Mobile, Tampa, New Orleans, and Chickamauga were individually well-trained, fairly well equipped, their discipline was good, and their morale high.

In the case of the Volunteers the situation was quite different. Ostensibly, the units were to be made up from National Guard personnel

[87] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 172–74.

[88] For an account of the railroad chaos at Tampa see: *Ibid.*, I, pp. 132–33; *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain . . .* I, pp. 24–25.

insofar as it was possible since the Guard had some equipment and drill. There was no other source of manpower with any semblance of a military organization. The degree of training of Volunteer army units, like their equipment, varied considerably. Even those units at the top of the training scale had seldom progressed beyond proficiency in close order drill. The training level, high or low, of many National Guard units mustered into Federal service was decreased by the absorption of raw recruits needed to meet the minimum strength requirements for muster into the Volunteer Army. Many of the officers in the Volunteer units raised by the states had had some training in the Militia, in military programs in schools or colleges, or had had Civil War experience, but as a body they were not comparable to the Regular Army officers. Some of the states still permitted the election of officers in Militia or National Guard units.[89] The Inspector General of the Army summarized his observations on the caliber of Volunteer officers: "They are, as a rule, zealous and fairly competent—some noticeably promising—as far as the limited instruction and experience of the National Guard can carry them; but when all is said, they are as much in need of instruction and experience as the men under them." [90]

He also noted that the First Corps appeared to be a fine body of men but were "not yet well in hand nor instructed in the first practical requirements of campaign and battle, such as marksmanship or extended order." In some units the manual of arms was not being taught in conformity with drill regulations. In the 1st Division over 30 per cent of the men were raw recruits, and over 20 per cent had had less than one year's service in the Militia; over 50 per cent had received no target practice of any description. Furthermore, differences in regimental strength ran as high as 300, and all were 200 or more below their authorized complement.[91]

General Breckinridge's inspection of Camp Thomas resulted in remedial action. Division and brigade maneuvers and mass reviews were held for the first time. As a result of this visit The Inspector General concluded that prior to an offensive campaign Volunteer units needed constant drill for at least two months, during which time they should be fully clothed and equipped. He also concluded that there was a great need for extended order drill, a training subject which the National Guard seemed to have neglected, and also for target practice.[92]

On 5 June 1898 General Miles reported to the Secretary of War from Tampa concerning the training status of the Santiago expedition: "This expedition has been delayed through no fault of anyone

[89] Waldeck, *The Missouri Historical Review*, XXX (1936), pp. 388–89.
[90] "Report on Conduct of the War," I, p. 282.
[91] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 276; 278.
[92] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 280–84.

connected with it. It contains the principal part of the [Regular] Army, which for intelligence and efficiency is not exceeded by any body of troops on earth. It contains 14 of the best-conditioned regiments of volunteers, the last of which arrived this morning. Yet these have never been under fire. Between 30 and 40 per cent are undrilled, and in one regiment over 300 men had never fired a gun." [93]

Records of inspection of units in mid-July indicate that some progress had been made, but at least one Volunteer unit with a Regular Army officer as its lieutenant colonel was still in a deplorable state of discipline and training after two months of Federal service.[94] Others had made fine progress in small unit training. Adequate training in large-scale maneuvers suffered from the traditional American insistence on an immediate campaign.[95]

Troop Movements Overseas

The Spanish-American War was the first major war that the United States fought against an overseas power without territory contiguous to the United States itself. Troops had been moved comparatively short distances in coastal waters in both the Mexican and Civil Wars, but the Spanish-American War set the stage for the great overseas wars of the 20th century. The Spanish-American War was principally a naval war. The Army's campaigns around Santiago and Manila on opposite sides of the world were undertaken to supplement and aid naval campaigns.

In the prewar period no long-range plans or preparations had been made to move a sizable body of troops by water. The United States did not possess a single troopship. In the latter part of March 1898, The Quartermaster General had a canvass made of vessels that could be chartered in New York and learned that the Navy had options on most of the serviceable ships.[96] As soon as the war began the Quartermaster's Department was called upon to furnish ships to transport 5,000 men to Cuba; this number was subsequently increased to 25,000. A fleet of 38 ships was collected at Tampa, but ". . . upon loading these vessels it was found that their capacity had been largely overrated, and it was impossible to carry upon them . . . more than 16,000 men." [97] As soon as the ships reached Tampa, it was necessary to fit them with bunks and other accommodations for service as transports. "Thus, owing to our lack of military preparation, it became necessary to go through the labor and delay of altering all manner of steamers into troop ships, at a time when celerity of movement was of impera-

[93] *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain.* . . . I, p. 26.
[94] "Report on Conduct of the War," I, pp. 343–44.
[95] For reports of inspections see: *Ibid.*, I, pp. 343–46.
[96] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 133–134.
[97] *Ibid.*, I, p. 134.

tive importance and delay was both dangerous and costly." [98] The Dodge Commission reported: "In spite of the efforts of the Quartermaster's Department many of these vessels were poorly equipped with sleeping accommodations; the sinks in many instances were inconvenient and insufficient, and some of the vessels were badly ventilated and filled with disagreeable odors. . . . The Quartermaster's Department ought to have been able to more thoroughly equip these vessels, and surely it should have been more certain of their carrying capacity." [99]

The embarkation and debarkation of the Santiago expedition was one of the poorest managed phases of the war.[100] There was no system in loading the ships; units were split up and placed on different ships and their equipment and supplies on other ships. After superhuman efforts the expedition was finally loaded and ready to sail on 8 June, when a report of Spanish naval vessels outside of Santiago delayed the departure of the loaded transports until the 13th and 14th of June.[101] The expedition began an unopposed landing at Daiquiri near Santiago on 22 June. "The landing was made in small boats belonging to the transports, supplemented with a number borrowed from the Navy. . . . The landing . . . could have been greatly expedited had there been lighters provided beforehand for this purpose." [102] "The disembarkation was attended with serious difficulties. The high surf dashed several of the strong naval boats to pieces. The mules, artillery, and private horses of the officers were pushed overboard, several being drowned in attempting to swim to the shore." [103] Fortunately, transportation for the expeditions to Puerto Rico and the Philippines was better managed than for the Santiago campaign.[104]

The Lessons of the War

The brief Spanish-American War (21 April–12 August 1898) publicized the inadequacies of our prewar military establishment and concepts. Although combat casualties were comparatively low—22 officers and 244 enlisted men were killed, 7 officers and 96 enlisted men died of wounds, and 115 officers and 1,479 enlisted men were wounded but not mortally—public opinion was aroused. Most of the old mobilization errors were repeated again, and several were particularly pointed up.

---

[98] Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
[99] "Report on Conduct of the War," I, pp. 134–35.
[100] Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
[101] Titherington, *op. cit.*, pp. 209–11.
[102] Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
[103] Joseph Wheeler, *The Santiago Campaign 1898* (Boston, 1898), p. 14.
[104] For a running account of embarkation of Santiago expedition see: Millis, *op. cit.*, pp. 246–49; and for debarkation see: *Ibid.*, pp. 263–68.

The principal error as in the War with Mexico was in the failure to coordinate foreign policy with military policy. Although following an aggressive foreign policy, ". . . there was no plan of mobilization, no higher organization, no training in combined operations, no provision for the assembling or transporting of an overseas expedition, or for the handling of any large body of troops whatever." [105]

Supply shortages again had an adverse effect on the mobilization. The Dodge Commission pointed out the future necessity for stockpiling critical supplies: "One of the lessons taught by the war is that the country should hereafter be in a better state of preparation for war. . . . Especially should this be the case with such supplies, equipment, and ordnance stores as are not in general use in the United States and which can not be rapidly obtained in the open market." [106]

The inefficiency in the embarkation of the Santiago expedition taught the need for careful logistical preparations for overseas expeditions, the need for a careful selection of ports of embarkation, and the need for either a more adequate merchant marine or a fleet of transports.

The division of authority in the War Department between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army which resulted in friction, squabbling, and indecision during this war as in earlier periods was clearly pointed up. The Dodge Commission felt ". . . a remedy, if possible, should be applied." [107]

The lack of preparedness and the hasty mobilization might have resulted in disastrous consequences if it had not been for the even greater weakness of the enemy, the effectiveness of the Cuban Rebellion, and the naval victories at Manila and Santiago. The Dodge Commission concluded that ". . . there was lacking in the general administration of the War Department during the continuance of the war with Spain that complete grasp of the situation which was essential to the highest efficiency and discipline of the Army." [108] The hue and cry raised by what was felt in the public mind to be the mismanagement of the war gave impetus to the movement to reorganize the military establishment and particularly the War Department.[109]

[105] *Ibid.*, p. 152.
[106] "Report on Conduct of the War," p. 114.
[107] *Ibid.*, I, p. 115.
[108] *Ibid.*, I, p. 116.
[109] For a discussion of manpower procurement for the Philippine Insurrection see: Lerwill, *op. cit.*, ch. III. This was primarily a replacement problem and not a military mobilization of any sizable proportions.

PART TWO

WORLD WAR I: PREPARATIONS AND MOBILIZATION

CHAPTER VI

THE FORMATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF AND EARLY PLANNING IN THE ARMY

A major obstacle to efficient administration and planning for future emergencies on the part of the Army in 1898 was the division of authority between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army. The difficulties of this situation had been apparent even before the Civil War when General Scott left Washington in frustration to establish his headquarters in New York; they were again apparent in 1874 when General Sherman moved his headquarters to St. Louis. Theoretically, the Secretary of War was responsible for the administrative and technical services: he controlled the financial affairs of the Army and the bureau heads reported directly to him. The Commanding General was responsible for the efficiency and discipline of the troops and other purely line matters. Because the lines of authority and responsibility were not clearly delineated, long-range planning for eventual contingencies was almost unknown in Army circles before 1903. No one was specifically charged with responsibility for mobilization planning: the Secretary of War was too busy and usually not trained for such work; the Commanding General lacked the necessary personnel and authority; each of the great staff departments went its own way coordinated only by the Secretary of War himself.[1]

The Spanish-American War brought out the inefficiencies of the organization of the War Department so glaringly that some sort of an

[1] For a more complete account of the difficulties between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General see: ch. V, this study. See also: "Report of the Secretary of War," *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902*, pp. 48–49; and Harold D. Cater, "Evolution of the American General Staff," pp. 17ff. MS in Gen Ref Office, OCMH.

overall reform seemed mandatory.[2] When Elihu Root succeeded Russell A. Alger as Secretary of War 1 August 1899, one of his first recommendations was for the creation of an army war college:

> . . . an army war college should be established which shall be composed of . . . officers to be detailed for service in the college for limited periods, so that while the college shall be continuous in records, character, and performance, it shall continually and gradually change in its personal elements. It should be the duty of this body of officers to direct the instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army, to acquire the information, devise the plans, and study the subjects above indicated, and to advise the Commander in Chief upon all questions of plans, armament, transportation, mobilization, and military preparation and movement.[3]

The original idea seems to have been that the proposed army war college would assume all mobilization planning and perform many of the functions usually belonging to a general staff.

The Army War College Board

The first step toward the creation of a war college was taken 19 February 1900 when a board of officers under the presidency of Brig. Gen. William Ludlow was appointed to consider the proposal. The Ludlow Board report recommended that an army war college be established by Executive order with the following functions: ". . . to collect, record, digest, and disseminate authentic military data and information; to regulate and develop existing means of military education and training; to provide for and further the higher instruction of the Army; and to serve as an authoritative and responsible agency, at the disposal of the War Department, for the consideration and disposition of professional matters and the coordination and regulations of the military administration."[4] No further action was taken for nearly a year until, on 27 November 1901, the War

---

[2] "For many years the divided authority and responsibility in the War Department has produced friction, for which, in the interest of the service, a remedy, if possible, should be applied. The Constitution makes the President the Commander in Chief of the Army, and he can not transfer that authority to any other person. The President selects his Secretary of War, who has his confidence, and who is his confidential adviser. . . . The President must have the same power of selection of his general in chief as he has of his Secretary of War; without this there can be no guaranty that he will give, or that the Secretary of War will place in the general in chief, that confidence which is necessary to perfect harmony. Neither the President nor the Secretary of War should have in the command of the Army an officer who is not working in harmony with him." See: S Doc 221, 56th Cong., 1st sess., "Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain," I, pp. 115–16. See also: Maj Gen William H. Carter, "Creation of the American General Staff" (S Doc 119, 68th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 15–21; Memo, Carter for TAG and SW, undated, sub: Creation of a General Staff Corps. AG 474507. National Archives.

[3] "Report of the Secretary of War," *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1899*, p. 49.

[4] Memo, Board of Officers to SW, 24 Oct 1900, with inclosed report favoring establishment of an army war college and minutes of the board. AG 311224. National Archives.

College Board was established by general orders which outlined its organization and duties.[5] The question of whether the War College Board was to fulfill the functions of a general staff had not been favorably considered by the Ludlow Board, and the idea was not incorporated in the general orders. The War College Board was limited to overall policies and to educational matters.

The War College Board held its first meeting 10 July 1902 and met irregularly until 13 August 1903. It was composed of five officers detailed from the Army at large with the chief of Engineers, the chief of Artillery, the superintendent of the Military Academy, and the commanding general of the General Service and Staff College as *ex officio* members. Maj. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young was president of the War College Board and Brig. Gen. William H. Carter, who had also served on the Ludlow Board, was a member. The minutes of the board indicate that it dealt primarily with the organization of the General Staff Corps, the establishment of the Army War College, and directives implementing the Dick Militia Law. A great deal of time was spent handling routine requests for information.[6]

The board made but one excursion into military planning on a major scale. At the express direction of the Secretary of War on 18 October 1902, the board evolved a scheme for organizing and equipping forces of 25,000; 50,000; 150,000; and 250,000 men.[7] But since the board was of an essentially advisory and educational character, it could not provide the planning and coordinating functions so vitally needed by the Army. Recognizing this fact and following the recommendations of his military advisers (particularly General Carter), Secretary Root in his annual report for 1901 urged the establishment of a general staff of which the War College Board would form a part.[8] The Congress passed such an act on 14 February 1903. The importance, however, of the Army War College and military education as a supplement to the General Staff in formulating a cohesive, continuing military policy was emphasized by Mr. Root three days after passage of the General Staff bill.[9] With the establishment of the General Staff on 15 August 1903 the War College Board ceased to exist as a separate agency and became part of the overall planning and coordinating structure charged with supervision of the Army War College.

---

[5] WD GO 155, 27 Nov 1901.

[6] Minutes of the War College Board, 10 Jul 02 to 13 Aug 03. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[7] Memo. War College Board to SW, 17 Mar 03, sub: Equipment and Organization of Military Forces. Records of WDGS, 3d Div. National Archives.

[8] "Report of the Secretary of War," *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901*, p. 25.

[9] *Ceremonies at the Laying of the Corner Stone of the Army War College Building February 21, 1903* (Washington, 1903), pp. 10–15.




Figure 3. The Army War College.

The Establishment of the General Staff

Under the Act of February 14, 1903, the General Staff Corps consisted of a Chief of Staff, 2 other general officers, and 42 junior officers. Under subsequent regulations, the General Staff was divided into the War Department General Staff and the General Staff serving with the troops. The War Department General Staff was divided into the three following divisions: First Division, administrative matters; Second, military information; and Third, military education and technical matters.[10] Lt. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young became the first Chief of Staff 15 August 1903.

Although at first fully occupied with organizational problems and the struggle for survival, the General Staff soon turned to the field of planning. The Chief of Staff at this time was primarily an administrative officer, who left all but general policy to the staff divisions. The Third Division handled most of the planning, which was accomplished by assigning officers studying at the Army War College monographs on particular subjects in which the Division was interested at the moment. One, containing a draft of a "Bill for the Organization

[10] War Records Office, National Archives, "Preliminary Checklist of the Records of the WDGS," 1945.

of a Volunteer Army" clearly and firmly summarized the value of present planning for future mobilizations.[11] Other studies dealt with the history of previous mobilizations.[12]

The mobilization planning of this period was concerned mainly with manpower. Planning for economic mobilization as it was understood in World War II was nonexistent and was approached only by the staff work done by The Quartermaster General in planning reserve supplies for the initial issue of equipment to forces which might be raised. The Office of the Quartermaster General and the Army War College also considered the problems of transportation and railways in the event of an emergency.

The Mobilization Concept Prior to World War I

The prevalent theory of mobilization which constituted the only military policy of the time was that the Regular Army formed the first line of defense, the Militia (National Guard) the second line, and Volunteers the third line. The size and organization of the Regular Army was governed by the Act of February 2, 1901, which set maximum strength at 100,000 men. Actual strength was controlled by annual appropriations and set by Executive order. The actual strength of the Regular Army on 15 October 1902 was 69,589; on 15 October 1911 it was 74,638, exclusive of the Hospital Corps and the Philippine Scouts. These two figures represent high points. The lowest point was reached in 1907 when the Regular Army totaled only 53,940. The average for the ten-year period, 1902–1911, was 65,616.[13] Usually nearly a third of this force was on duty outside the United States while troops and officers remaining in the United States were scattered throughout the country at small posts. The Regular Army forces which could be assembled had no training in any unit larger than a regiment. The first line of defense was paper-thin.

The efficiency of the Militia was dubious indeed. These state forces totaled somewhere around 100,000 men with varying degrees of training. The relations of the Federal Government to the Militia were controlled by the Militia Act of January 21, 1903, popularly known as the Dick Bill, which was amended by the Militia Act of May 27, 1908. The effect of these laws was disappointing; the Militia forces were still basically state organizations.

The Dick Bill was intended to strengthen the Militia by eliminating some of the still present weaknesses of the old Militia Act of 1792, but it failed. However, two of these weaknesses were eliminated by the

---

[11] AWC Study No. 6, "Draft of a Bill for the Organization of a Volunteer Army with Report thereon Submitted by the Army War College for Consideration of the Chief of Staff," pp. 6–7. AWC Library.

[12] See AWC Studies Nos. 13 and 20.

[13] See the annual reports of the War Department for the period, 1902–1911.

Militia Act of May 27, 1908. First, the restriction limiting Federal service to nine months was changed to cover the period of enlistment. Second, the restriction limiting service of the Militia to the continental United States was removed. (This second provision was subsequently abrogated by an opinion of the Attorney General of the United States in 1912 which declared that service of State Militia outside the United States would be unconstitutional.) The Act of 1908 further required that "in order to be classified as 'organized militia,' and thereby enjoy the benefits of the funds appropriated by Congress and of the issues made pursuant to law, all state forces must have the same organization, armament, and discipline as the Regular Army." [14] The mobilization of the Militia for duty on the Mexican Border in 1916 showed that most of these paper efforts to raise the Militia to a first-class fighting force had failed.

The third line of defense was envisaged as a great Volunteer Army to be raised and trained after the commencement of hostilities. Its effectiveness was predicated on the idea that the first and second lines could control any situation until the Volunteer Army was ready. The only legislative basis for Volunteer forces, the Volunteer Act of 1898 which was passed in haste at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, was considered entirely inadequate to meet the needs of raising future Volunteers. In spite of never-ceasing efforts by the War Department, it was not until 1914 that Congress finally passed a new volunteer bill.

But until 1910–1911 no comprehensive plans were prepared by the General Staff to implement these mobilization concepts. Prior to that, all planning had dealt with isolated problems, such as the creation of a reserve for the Regular Army, drafts of new volunteer laws, and the creation of supply depots. A major weakness of the Regular Army was its dispersal in regimental and battalion posts in the West. In 1906, the Third Division of the General Staff recommended the gradual concentration of a part of the mobile forces in eight carefully selected brigade and divisional posts. Simultaneously recommended was the abandonment of some 31 smaller or poorly located posts. These proposals ran into serious Congressional opposition, and there is no evidence that at that time either ever received serious consideration beyond the Chief of Staff's desk.[15]

A series of magazine articles [16] on the military unpreparedness of the country stirred Congress to inquire about the state of our defenses. On 23 June 1910 Congress requested the Secretary of War to submit a

[14] "Report of the Secretary of War," *War Department Annual Reports, 1909*, p. 60.

[15] Memo, Ch, 3d Div to CofS, 7 Jul 06, sub: Concentration of the Army. Records of WDGS, 3d Div, vol. XXII of reports. National Archives.

[16] Lt Hugh Johnson, "The Lamb Rampant," *Everybody's Magazine*, XVIII (1908), p. 301. This was the same Hugh Johnson who played a prominent staff role during World War I and who later was the colorful NRA Administrator.

report on the state of preparedness of the military forces. The Army War College prepared a frank analysis of the complete lack of defenses which was backed up by a barrage of statistics and other supporting data. It pointed out the weaknesses of the Regular Army: (1) inadequate strength, (2) lack of reserves of field guns, ammunition, and other ordnance, (3) the clumsy and inept organization of the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments, and (4) the lack of combat balance of the Army's organization. And it graphically stated the deplorable condition of the Militia: (1) deficiency in training, (2) lack of physical stamina, (3) woeful understrength, (4) lack of arms of all kinds, and (5) poor organization. The report summed the situation up in a brief conclusion—"It is apparent that we are almost wholly unprepared for war . . . that the things we need most will take the longest to supply."[17] But no action was taken. The country was divided on the preparedness issue in 1910, but the Army itself was beginning to overcome its internal difficulties and gear its machinery to real planning.

The First General Staff Reorganization

Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, who became Chief of Staff 22 April 1910, was appalled by the mass of inconsequential matter which was cluttering up General Staff operations. Out of a hundred random staff studies he found not one that bore any relation to war and only three that were of any consequence at all. As a result, General Wood, in 1911, reorganized the General Staff into four divisions, Mobile Army, Coast Artillery, Militia, and War College, and directed the Staff to expedite decisions by avoiding long drawn out staff memoranda.[18]

The results of this reorganization were considerable. The War College Division, now the central planning agency of the Army, gradually developed Army planning from uncoordinated, piecemeal studies to the cohesive *Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States* in 1915. The War College Division combined the General Staff planners and the Army War College into one integrated unit. The effect was most apparent in the immediate attention given to problems of the Militia. Under the direction of longtime Assistant Secretary of War Robert Shaw Oliver, data was collected on Militia mobilization camps in each state and an up-to-date appraisal of the Militia forces was made.[19]

A memorandum outlining a general mobilization program was drawn up by the War College Division in March 1911 which said in part:

---

[17] Memo, Pres, AWC to CofS, 24 Aug 10, with accompanying draft of reply to McLachlan Resolution. WCD 6193. Records of WDGS, 2d Div. National Archives.

[18] Hermann Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood* (New York, 1931), II, pp. 99–100.

[19] WCD 6084. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

> Any practicable scheme for mobilization, while being general in its character, must at the same time, be especially applicable to that war which would be most embarrassing and dangerous to our country. This condition will be met if an invasion of our continental territory by a first-class power be considered, for such a war would involve the employment of our entire military strength, including the regular army, organized militia, and a volunteer army of great numbers, and it would also present the greatest difficulties in concentration.
>
> The popular demand made on the outbreak of war for the movement of our available forces will make it impossible to hold organizations at their mobilization camps until they are put on a war footing, and this consideration must be kept in mind.[20]

The memorandum then outlined the procedure for the mobilization of the Regular Army, the Militia, and the Volunteers and the method of concentration to be followed. Once such a general policy of mobilization was clearly established, the General Staff could turn its attention to developing the details.

Thus, by 1911, two of the reasons for the early weakness of the General Staff were alleviated to a major degree. Trial and error had brought experience and an increasing awareness of the full purpose and powers of the Staff. Faulty organization and clumsy operating procedures were corrected to a considerable extent by the reorganization of 1911. The third reason for the weakness of the early Staff still existed in 1911—the opposition of the older, conservative elements in the Army itself. The leader of this opposition was The Adjutant General, Maj. Gen. F. C. Ainsworth, who had a reputation as an able administrator and was backed by powerful friends in Congress. The struggle reached a climax early in 1912 when Ainsworth, who had been previously warned by the Secretary of War that he was bordering dangerously close to insubordination, wrote a memorandum, which was clearly an attack not only on General Wood but also on Secretary Stimson. Mr. Stimson was decisive; after consulting President Taft, he suspended Ainsworth and began to prepare a court-martial. Ainsworth was allowed to retire at his own request before action against him passed the preliminary stages, and the Chief of Staff was now the recognized head of the Army. An attempt by Ainsworth's friends in Congress to weaken the General Staff, expel Wood from office, and make The Adjutant General once more the dominant power was made in the form of a rider to the annual Army appropriation bill, but a Presidential veto squelched the move.[21]

Thus, within nine years after its establishment, the General Staff emerged as the mainspring of the Army. Its early weaknesses were for the most part overcome. That part of the Army whose duty it was to plan and prepare for future emergencies was on a solid footing

[20] Memo, WCD to Sec, GS, 10 Mar 11, sum: Mobilization. WCD 6358, Doc 4. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[21] Hagedorn, *op. cit.*, II, p. 125.

for the first time in our history. But, although the General Staff had acquired strength and substance by 1911, the military forces of the Nation had not. The Regular Army was pitifully small, the Militia untrained, the Volunteers not in existence.

The Military Policy in 1912

Early in 1912, the Chief of Staff had finally won out over The Adjutant General in the battle for power and for a progressive military policy. The ideas of the progressive elements of the Army were expressed in a series of articles which appeared in the magazine, the *Independent*, in the spring of 1912. These articles were subsequently collected and printed as an official document entitled *What is the Matter with our Army?* This question was answered in part by Secretary of War Stimson in the final article of the series: "The trouble with the Army comes down, therefore, to our lack of an intelligent military policy in dealing with it." [22] As a start toward the development of an intelligent military policy, Mr. Stimson had the General Staff prepare a report on "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States." [23]

This report (known as the Stimson Plan) constituted the first overall comprehensive statement of a military policy prepared by the General Staff. It covered nearly every phase of a military mobilization program in some detail with the complete exception of the field of economic mobilization. The military planners were still concerned exclusively with manpower and organization. The broad subjects considered in the report were: (1) general relations between the land and naval forces; (2) relations between the land forces at home and abroad; (3) the land forces within the territorial limits of the United States; (4) the peace administration of the regular land forces; (5) the necessity of a reserve system; (6) the tactical organization of mobile troops; (7) relation of promotion to organization; (8) raising and organizing the national volunteer forces; (9) considerations determining the strength, composition, and organization of the land forces of the United States; (10) a council of national defense. The report reviewed the traditional military policy of the United States and the major problem raised by that policy:

> . . . the military establishment in time of peace is to be a small Regular Army and that the ultimate war force of the Nation is to be a great army of citizen soldiers. . . . But reliance upon citizen soldiers is subject to the limitation that they cannot be expected to meet a trained enemy until they too, have been trained. . . .

[22] S Doc No. 621, 62d Cong., 2d sess., "What is the Matter with our Army?" Articles by SW Henry L. Stimson and six Army officers.

[23] "Report of the Secretary of War," *War Department Annual Reports 1912*, pp. 69–128.

> It is therefore our most important problem to devise means for preparing great armies of citizen soldiers to meet the emergency of modern war. . . . the Regular Army is simply the peace nucleus of the great war army, and its strength and organization should always be considered with reference to its relation to the greater war force, which cannot be placed in the field until war is imminent. The problem is one of expansion from a small peace force to a great war force. Its solution therefore involves the provision of a sufficient peace nucleus, the partial organization and training of citizen soldiers in peace, and provisions for prompt and orderly expansion on the outbreak of war.[24]

The solution suggested by the report was simple but complete. For the Regular Army it proposed a six-year enlistment period., three years on active duty and three years in the reserve. These Reserves were to be used to bring Regular Army companies to war strength during emergencies to avoid diluting their strength with raw recruits. The remainder of the Reserves were to be used to create a replacement pool. A Reserve officers' program would be instituted to utilize the men who had received military training in college; West Point would be greatly expanded, but only some of its graduates would go into the permanent military establishment. For citizen soldiers, the report proposed an eventual National Militia program under the "power to raise and support armies." Although this idea was not fully developed, the suggestion was made that the Militia organization be based on Congressional districts. Until such a program could be developed, enacted into law, and become a functioning reality, the proposal was made to increase Federal control over the State Militia indirectly through a pay bill. Because of the constitutional difficulties, these states forces would be utilized as Volunteer organizations but not as Militia organizations. Behind all this would be a host of Volunteers to be mobilized when the Regular Army and National Guard could not meet the situation. The proposals were summarized as follows:

> The complete organization of the mobile land forces of United States will, therefore, include three distinct forces.
>
> 1. A regular army organized in divisions and cavalry brigades and ready for immediate use as an expeditionary force or for other purposes for which the citizen soldiery is not available, or for employment in the first stages of war while the citizen soldiery is mobilizing and concentrating.
>
> 2. An Army of national citizen soldiers organized in peace in complete divisions and prepared to reenforce the Regular Army in time of war.
>
> 3. An army of volunteers to be organized under prearranged plans when greater forces are required than can be furnished by the Regular Army and the organized citizen soldiery.
>
> The peace establishment of the Regular Army with the organized division districts of the National Guard should include the machinery for the recruiting, organization, and mobilization of this great third line of the national defense.[25]

---

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 76.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

This was an all-inclusive program for the mobilization of American manpower. It represented a compilation of the ideas and planning of the General Staff since 1903. Had it been adopted the whole preparedness controversy might have been avoided.

The Reserve Program

Woodrow Wilson's victory in 1912 meant that the Stimson plan was pigeonholed and the General Staff, unable to secure a comprehensive military policy, had to continue piecemeal planning. The War College Division prepared a plan for a reserve for the Regular Army pursuant to instructions from the Chief of Staff. "I am particularly anxious to have a section of the War College devote its efforts to perfecting a scheme for reserves, and, in connection therewith, to prepare a new enlistment act on a basis of three years with the colors and three years with the reserves, and a general provision to the effect that men who are proficient, etc. would be transferred to the reserves at the end of the year." [26] The answer to this request outlined a complete reserve program which was submitted to Congress in 1913 but was never enacted into law. Similar plans were submitted by the War Department to Congress in 1914–15. The War College Division suggestion in 1916, that legislation discontinuing the practice of discharge by purchase and the substitution of furlough to a reserve be urged, was disapproved by the Chief of Staff.[27] Furlough to a reserve of sorts under an act of August 24, 1912, continued until the Mexican crisis in May 1916 when it was suspended by the Secretary of War. The provisions of that reserve system were described as follows:

> The object of the law is to establish a force of trained soldiers who would in case of emergency return to active service in the Regular Army. The enlistment period is changed by this law from three to seven years, the first four to be with the colors and the last three on furlough attached to the Army reserve, without pay to reservists except in case of war, when they receive $5 a month for the time they have been in the reserve. The reserve is to consist of soldiers furloughed to the reserve for the unexpired portions of seven-year terms of enlistment, on their own application after three years' service, or compulsorily after four years' service, unless they shall elect to be discharged with a view to immediate reenlistment for another period of seven years, or to remain with their present organization until the completion of their whole enlistment, without passing into the reserve; and soldiers who enlist or reenlist in the reserve after having been honorably discharged from the Regular Army.[28]

---

[26] Memo. CofS to Pres, AWC, 15 Oct 13, sub: Reserve for Regular Army. WCD 8106, Doc 1. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[27] Memo, WCD to CofS, 13 Mar 16 and Memo, Sec, GS to Ch, WCD, 15 Mar 16, sub: Furlough to reserve instead of discharge by purchase. WCD 8106, Doc 19. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[28] "Report of the Secretary of War," *War Department Annual Reports, 1913*, p. 21.

After two years of operation, the Secretary of War reported that the Reserve Act of 1912 had "proven utterly useless" since only 16 men had been transferred to the reserve.[29] This criticism was neither considered nor considerate. Only those men who had been honorably discharged from the Regular Army after three years of service were eligible for furlough to the reserve. In the four years since the passage of the act, the men eligible for the reserve were certainly very few. The weakness of this reserve system was that the source for Reservists was very limited.

The Militia

The War College Division, the planning agency of the War Department, continued engrossed with studies and plans for the Militia during the period 1912–14. The State Militia was still considered the second line of defense, in spite of the opinion of the Attorney General in 1912 that the use of the State Militia was definitely limited by the Constitution to the three enumerated purposes—"to suppress insurrection, repel invasions, and to execute the laws of the Union." [30] But the continued reliance on the State Militia for the second line of defense was sheer necessity: it was the *only* force in being which could be utilized in an emergency. Since the enactment of the Dick Bill in 1903, Militia standards had been somewhat improved by appropriations from Congress which provided equipment and training for that force. Joint maneuvers of the Regular Army and Militia were held whenever possible. The maneuvers of 1914, held in the vicinity of Washington, D. C., and San Francisco, were something of a success although the weaknesses of the semitrained Militia were readily apparent to observers.[31]

The Militia was improved structurally by its organization into 12 tactical divisions in 1912.[32] These divisions were established on a regional basis with concentration points at which the divisions would assemble from the state mobilization points. Planning thereafter was based on this divisional organization; students at the Army War College prepared comprehensive monographs on the mobilization, organization, concentration, training, and supply of selected divisions. These monographs all followed the same pattern: (1) the President would issue a proclamation; (2) state authorities would recruit their units up to strength and begin training at the local rendezvous where the initial issue of supplies would be kept; (3) at the state mobilization camps, training would continue, physical examinations would be

[29] "Report of the Secretary of War," *War Department Annual Reports, 1914*, p. 11.

[30] Ltr, Atty Gen to SW, 17 Feb 12. Copy in "Report of the Secretary of War," *War Department Annual Reports, 1912*, pp. 147–50.

[31] WCD 8269, records of WDGS, contains information on the combined Army-Militia maneuvers for 1914. National Archives.

[32] WCD 7409 "Organization of the Organized Militia of the United States into Tactical Divisions," 13 Nov 12. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

given along with innoculations, partial ordnance equipment would be issued, and the muster into Federal service would occur; (4) units would then be forwarded to the concentration camps where training would again continue, and supplies and equipment issued in full.[33] Thus the second line of defense acquired substance on paper. There was a continuous juggling of units in the attempt to give these paper divisions some semblance of the proper proportion of the various arms, a task made difficult by the states' preference for infantry regiments, which were less expensive and easier to raise than artillery, cavalry, or engineer units. The War Department's acceptance of the tactical divisions was reaffirmed in a memorandum in January 1915 when the chief of the Division of Military Affairs rebuked the War College Division for referring to them as "tentative organizations."[34] It was perhaps fortunate that these Militia divisions were never required to stand the test of a national emergency, for their paper organization overrated their combat efficiency to a considerable degree.

In conjunction with the planning of the organization of the Militia divisions, the War College Division set up a rather complete file of data on the individual state mobilization camps. The advisability of purchasing permanent maneuver camps was considered, but it was decided that it would be less expensive and more advantageous to use leased land, changing the sites each year. Plans for establishing camps at the location of the state mobilization points were developed. Blueprints for buildings to be erected and estimates of construction costs were prepared which later proved of invaluable assistance in building the camps for World War I, although these plans were never utilized by the Militia forces for which they were originally prepared. Officers of the National Guard were frequently consulted in the preparation of plans for the Militia divisions. The New York Division under the command of Maj. Gen. John F. O'Ryan was particularly active and was probably the best trained of the Militia forces. General O'Ryan was in almost continuous consultation with the War Department and attended the Army War College for a year. National Guard officers of General O'Ryan's caliber, however, were the exception and not the rule. The energetic War College Division considered the possibility of creating reserves for the Militia, but The Judge Advocate General ruled that there was no authority under existing legislation for such action.[35]

---

[33] Monographs on mobilization of National Guard divisions, 1913–14 session AWC. WCD 8319. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[34] Memo, Ch, Div Militia Affairs to Ch, WCD, 12 Jan 15, sub: Organized Militia Divisional Organization. (Approved by SW). WCD 7409, Doc 25. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[35] Memo, Ch, Div of Militia Affairs to CofS, Jan 13, sub: Method of War Recruiting and forming a reserve adopted in Virginia. WCD 6084, Doc 37 Records of WDGS. National Archives.

The Volunteer Act of 1914

After years of effort by the War Department, a new volunteer act was finally passed on 25 April 1914. The Hay bill, named after the powerful chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, first of all scrapped the almost useless Volunteer Act of 1898, which had been so hastily passed after war had been declared against Spain. The new act provided that: (1) "the land forces of the United States of America shall consist of the Regular Army, the organized land militia while in the service of the United States, and such volunteer forces as Congress may authorize"; (2) the President could call for Volunteers only after Congress authorized him to do so; (3) before calling Volunteers, the President must first accept any organized Militia units which volunteer with three-fourths of their minimum enlisted strength; (4) only after the Militia had had a chance to volunteer could other units be raised; (5) the President would appoint all officers in the Volunteers from a list of recommended sources, including the Regular Army, those registered under the Act of January 21, 1903, the Militia, graduates of schools where military instructors were on duty, and those who had had prior Regular, Volunteer, or Militia service.[36] This act obviously gave the Militia a preferred position by allowing them to have the first chance at service. This was in keeping with the policy of the War Department to build up and utilize the force already in existence as our second line of defense. It is interesting to note that the President retained his power to call out the Militia and to use it within the continental United States under the constitutional limitations, but he could not use it or any Volunteer forces outside the United States without congressional authorization. The Hay bill clarified matters as far as the General Staff planners were concerned. Before its passage, they did not know if the organized Militia could be used outside the United States; now all that was necessary was to prognosticate how many Militia units would volunteer in a given emergency. On 22 May 1914, the Secretary of War dispatched a confidential letter to the respective governors containing a detailed outline of mobilization procedure "in the event occasion should arise to put into execution the provisions" of the Hay bill.[37]

The Hay bill envisaged a system of Federal Volunteers to meet any emergencies which might arise, but it gave precedence to the Militia in volunteering. The letter of the Secretary of War to the governors delegated to the states most of the authority that Congress had given the Federal Government. The Hay bill not only had

[36] Act of April 25, 1914, 63d Cong., 2d sess., "An Act to provide for raising the volunteer forces of the United States in time of actual or threatened war."

[37] Ltr, SW to al governors, 22 May 14, sub: Mobilization procedure under Hay Bill. WCD 8160, Doc. 15. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

merged planning for the Militia and the Volunteers by making the raising of the latter dependent on the utilization of the former, but it also represented achievement of a goal toward which the War Department had worked since Elihu Root's time: it gave legislative authorization for Federal Volunteer forces. In spite of the limitations and weaknesses of the act, it was predicated on basically sound principles, if Volunteers were to be used at all. The Secretary of War and the General Staff planners vitiated it, but once again the country was to be spared an actual testing of the paper plans.

Effect of the War in Europe on National Preparedness

From the beginning of World War I in Europe until our own entrance into that war the United States went through the greatest debate on national policy since the Civil War. The immediate debate centered on the state of our national defense: its broader aspects included our whole foreign policy. For over two and a half years the controversy raged back and forth across the land, but few preparations, and those pitifully inadequate, were made for the conflict which kept coming ever closer. Among the leaders of the forces favoring national preparedness were Theodore Roosevelt and Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood. The undisputed leader of the antipreparedness forces was William Jennings Bryan. Congress and the Nation were not only divided on the question of preparedness, but those who were aligned on one side of the issue could not agree among themselves on a program or military policy.

The entire period was overcast with uncertainties. Few realized that there was an actual possibility of our involvement in the European catastrophe. The country drifted forward, as Theodore Roosevelt said "stern foremost,"[38] toward war. Nothing in the period was better indicative of the uncertainties than the vacillation of President Wilson on national policies which included national defense and the advisability of planning for war in time of peace. Even when President Wilson advocated measures for preparedness they were frequently ambiguous or contradictory as his advocacy of "universal military training 'on a voluntary basis.' "[39] In 1917, on the eve of our entrance into the war Wilson still believed in nonpreparedness. With such indecision and hesitancy on the part of the Commander in Chief, it is no wonder that there were uncertainties during the period. Mr. Bryan resigned as Secretary of State in June 1915 because he thought the administration was following a too aggressive course;[40] 10 months later, Mr. Garrison resigned as Secretary of War for almost

[38] Hagedorn, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 204–05.

[39] "Growing Momentum of the Movement for Universal Military Training," *Current Opinion*, LXI (1916), p. 77.

[40] Frederick Palmer, *Newton D. Baker, America at War* (New York, 1931), I, p. 5.

exactly the opposite reason. The uncertainties of the prewar period must be kept in mind to understand the work of the War Department General Staff in the development of preliminary plans and to comprehend why those plans failed when the successive crises culminated in the declaration of war.

World War I began in Europe 28 July 1914 when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. On 4 August 1914 President Wilson issued his neutrality proclamation. In spite of the neutrality admonitions, the United States could not fail to take cognizance of the rapid mobilization of forces in all the European countries except Great Britain whose military system was somewhat analogous to our own. In this country a great tide of preparedness propaganda was beginning to rise, but we were militarily weak because, except for the tiny Regular Army, there was an almost complete lack of trained forces. To correct that weakness, the General Staff spent most of the year 1915 in drawing up the *Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States* with its 30 supplementary documents.

The *Statement* was to bring up to date the "Report on the Organization of the Land Forces in the United States," prepared in 1912. When completed and published in September 1915, the *Statement* constituted an elaborate survey of our military needs.[41] It recommended more than doubling the size of the Regular Army, from 100,000 to 230,000; continued support of the Organized Militia; a Regular Army reserve; a reserve of trained citizen soldiers; a reserve of officers; and a reserve of essential supplies. After the publication of the *Statement*, 30 supplementary brochures were prepared and issued amplifying specific topics. These brochures ranged from military aviation to coast artillery, from training men to economic subjects, from military organization to reports on the European War. Most of the planning at this stage was based on the use of Volunteers for all the forces and reserves to be organized. The *Statement* was the most comprehensive analysis of our military problems and their solutions prepared up to that time.

In an attempt to implement part of the *Statement* into reality, Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison devised his Continental Army scheme and urged it on the President and Congress. He felt that a force of 500,000 men ready for instant call was necessary for national defense. Neither the Regular Army nor the National Guard could provide the necessary manpower, since it would be impossible to maintain a Regular Army of sufficient size, and the National Guard was basically a state force limited by the Constitution as to its employment. It was therefore necessary to have a Federal force available to supplement the Regular Army which should be ". . . definitely iden-

[41] WDGS, *Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States* (Washington, 1915).

tified in personnel, provided with equipment and organization, possessed of some training, and subject to instant call." [42] Having reached definite conclusions as to the size and type of national force necessary, Mr. Garrison proposed an increase of the Regular Army to 141,843, and the creation of a more workable reserve plan for the Regular Army whereby trained men would be furloughed to a reserve to finish out their enlistment but subject to recall at a moment's notice in an emergency. He outlined an elaborate plan for training Reserve officers and also advocated an increase in the facilities at West Point. He proposed an increase in assistance to the National Guard. Then he outlined his scheme for the Continental Army:

> It is proposed to supplement the Army that is constantly under arms by a force of 400,000 men raised in increments of 133,000 a year, obligated to devote a specified time to training for a period of three years without obligation excepting to return to the colors in the event of war or the imminence thereof. For the purpose of convenience this force has been designated the Continental Army. It is proposed to recruit it territorially according to population; to have it subjected to short periods of intensive training; and in addition to what officers may be developed from its own operations, to obtain officers for it from those who have served in the National Guard, those who have served in the United States Army and are no longer upon its active list, and those who, by training acquired in colleges and schools or in other ways, have become equipped with sufficient military information and experience to make them available, and in the ways above more particularly described. It is the purpose to have membership of this force assembled at convenient places and have there such portions of the Regular Army to assist in their training as are desirable, and to obtain all the benefit which can be obtained from intensive training over such a period of time as is possible. For the purposes of the necessary figuring upon costs, etc., as well as for military reasons, the period proposed is two months. . . . With respect to pay, it is proposed that the officers and men shall receive pay on the same basis as the Regular Army for the time actually occupied." [43]

In general, Mr. Garrison's plan could be reduced to three main points:

1. A Regular Army sizable enough both to meet immediate military needs and to train the other military forces.

2. A volunteer Federal Reserve force (the Continental Army) sufficiently trained to supplement the Regular Army immediately in emergencies.

3. A National Guard under state control but with increased Federal assistance.[44]

The proposal for the Continental Army, however, was the core of Mr. Garrison's plan for national defense. Sides were quickly taken. One commentator, the editor of the *Unpopular Review*, favored the

---

[42] "Report of the Secretary of War," *War Department Annual Reports, 1915*, pp. 22–23.
[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 25–26.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 27.

Continental Army plan as a last attempt to test our traditional system of using volunteers: "It represents an honest endeavor to read the lessons of the past and to rectify the proved evils of the volunteer method. It is in fact the only way in which our traditional system can be rehabilitated and made useful. Or, if the volunteer notion be indeed bankrupt, then this will be the convincing demonstration of that fact. It will smooth the road towards some really effective military policy." [45] The Continental Army plan was also supported by the National Security League, the most important of the preparedness groups, and by former Secretaries Root and Stimson. It was opposed by those who felt it didn't go far enough, led by Colonel Roosevelt, and by the pacifists who opposed anything military. In Congress, it was opposed by some of the most important Democrats including James Hay, the chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee and an old friend of the Militia. The President withdrew his support of the plan in face of the congressional opposition within his own party, and on 10 February 1916 Secretary Garrison and Assistant Secretary Breckinridge resigned in protest.[46] In retrospect, it is doubtful whether enough men would ever have volunteered to make the Continental Army an effective force but the Continental Plan appears to have been the best one then offered for a national military policy. The doubt concerning the number who would volunteer was one of the reasons that military leaders such as Generals Scott, Bliss, and Wood were not overly enthusiastic about the proposal.

The resignation of Secretary Garrison threw military planning into complete confusion and increased the already dominant uncertainties of the period. Maj. Gen. Hugh Scott, the Chief of Staff, became Secretary of War ad interim while President Wilson searched for a successor to Mr. Garrison. The ultimate selection of Newton D. Baker hardly soothed the advocates of preparedness since Mr. Baker was widely known as a pacifist. Congress was in the meantime studying proposed military legislation on its own initiative. One writer described the situation as follows: "We face a crisis, and the solution has been entrusted to ignorance and self-interest. The President has abdicated the function of firm leadership which he exercised so successfully in the Tariff and Currency bills. The hour is dark for those who have the military interests of the country at hears." [47]

The National Defense Act of 1916

In this confused uncertainty, Congress seized the leadership relinquished by the President. After extensive hearings, a major piece of

[45] Frank J. Mather, Jr., "The Continental Army," *Unpopular Review,* V (1916), p. 227.
[46] John Dickinson, *The Building of an Army* (New York, 1922), pp. 43–44.
[47] Mather, *op. cit.,* p. 234.

military legislation gradually emerged and finally became law on 3 June 1916: The National Defense Act of 1916. It was the most comprehensive piece of military legislation which Congress had ever passed. Based in part on the General Staff's *Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States* and its supplements, it began with the statement "That the Army of the United States shall consist of the Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, and such other land forces as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law." [48] More specifically, the act provided that the Regular Army should be increased to 175,000 over a period of five years; it outlined fixed organization tables for all units; it increased the number of general officers; it created a Regular Army enlisted reserve with an elaborate system of bounties for staying in the reserve or reenlisting in time of war; it limited the General Staff to 3 general officers and 52 junior officers with the added proviso that no more than half the junior officers could be on duty in or near the District of Columbia; the Mobile Army and Coast Artillery Divisions of the General Staff were abolished; the duties of the Staff were to be limited to nonadministrative matters (which raised the question whether the General Staff still had supervisory control over the bureaus. This was settled affirmatively by a decision of Secretary of War Baker on 13 September 1916.) The act placed the Officers' Reserve Corps and the Reserve Officers Training Corps on a firm basis. The student and business men's summer training camps were to be continued. An Enlisted Reserve Corps, in which specialists for the engineer, signal, quartermaster, ordnance, and medical departments might be enrolled in time of peace, was also authorized.

Perhaps the most important and by far the most controversial parts of the act of 1916 dealt with the "nationalization" of the Militia and provided that: "The Militia of the United States shall consist of all able-bodied male citizens of the United States and all other able-bodied males who have or shall have declared their intentions to become citizens of the United States, who shall be more than 18 years of age, except as hereinafter provided, not more than 45 years of age, and said Militia shall be divided into three classes, the National Guard, the Naval Militia, and the unorganized Militia." [49] No program at all was planned for the "Unorganized Militia" beyond a continuation of the principle that all able-bodied men were subject to military service. The National Guard, however, was dealt with in detail. Its size was to be raised gradually from about 100,000 to over 400,000, apportioned

[48] Act of June 3, 1916, 64th Cong., 1st sess., "An Act for making further and more official provision for the national defense and for other purposes." (Popularly referred to as the National Defense Act of 1916.)

[49] *Ibid.*

among the states on the basis of the number of senators and representatives from the states. The National Guardsmen would all have to agree to obey the President and defend the Constitution in their enlistment contracts. The enlistment period was to be for six years—three active and three in the reserve; the appointment of officers was limited to certain specified categories of qualified individuals. Supplies and discipline were to be the same as for the Regular Army. The Militia Bureau, established in place of the old Division of Militia Affairs of the General Staff, was to have control over National Guard affairs. The units of the Guard were to have 48 drill periods a year plus 15 days of field training unless excused by the Secretary of War. Instructors were to be provided and inspections conducted by Regular Army personnel. Guardsmen were to be paid for their services with Federal funds, to be apportioned by the Secretary of War among the states "in direct ratio to the number of enlisted men in active service of the National Guard." [50] The lever to force compliance with all provisions of the act was the power of the Secretary of War to stop funds to those states which did not comply. Final sections of the Defense Act of 1916 pertained to economic mobilization.

The reception which the National Defense Act of 1916 received was mixed. An analysis of the new law in the *Century Magazine* presented the most critical viewpoint:

> The Army Reorganization Bill was signed by the President on June 3, and the administration devoutly hoped and prayed that the nation would sit back and consider itself adequately prepared. Mr. Hay of Virginia is admittedly the fairy godmother of the bill. . . .
>
> It is manifest to all that the protest of these men [Root, Wright, Garrison, Stimson, Breckenridge, and Baker] means that the bill is worse than nothing, and that it has been passed for petty political reasons, against the united opposition of our military experts.[51]

The article then proceeded to condemn the act for what was considered its futile attempt to nationalize the Militia.

In a pamphlet entitled *Preparedness*, former Assistant Secretary of War Henry Breckinridge bitterly denounced the Act of 1916: "It is either a comedy or a tragedy. A comedy if only a passing ridiculous phase of the progress toward real national defence. A tragedy, if it is an accurate presage of what is to be the final result of the labors of this Congress on the great problem of the national security. Surely the mountain has labored and brought forth a mouse!" [52]

A more accurate and more objective appraisal was made by General Palmer: "The National Defense Act of 1916 provided for increasing the Regular Army and employing the National Guard. But it did not provide the machinery or the organization for a great national

---

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] Eric Fisher Wood, "The New Army Act and the Militia," *Century*, XCII (1916), p. 801.

[52] Henry Breckinridge, *Preparedness* (New York, 1916), p. 3.

mobilization."[53] Actually the new law, although weak in many respects, was at least a step forward. To condemn the act because of its political aspects alone would be a mistake. The increase authorized in the Regular Army, however commendable, was largely a paper provision because it was impossible to recruit enough men to fill up the Army even without the increase. When National Guard provisions of the act were tested, suspected weaknesses of the Guard were proven true. The Reserve officer and the economic provisions of the act, however, were sound measures which withstood the tests of time.

Economic Mobilization Comes Under Study

The importance of economic resources was given urgency by World War I in Europe, and the *Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States*, prepared in 1915, devoted an important section to reserve supplies.[54] It recommended stock-piling of essential supplies for the initial issue to all contemplated troops. To supplement the *Statement* a study prepared at the Army War College and entitled *Mobilization of Industries and Utilization of the Commercial and Industrial Resources of the Country for War Purposes in Emergency* made four recommendations:

> 1. That the President be empowered . . . to place an order with any individual, firm, corporation, company, or organized manufacturing industry for such product or material as may be required, and which is of the nature and kind usually produced or capable of being produced by such firm or company.
>
> 2. That compliance with all such orders or demands for service shall be obligatory on the part of the industries concerned, and shall take precedence over all other orders and contracts. . . .
>
> 3. That the compensation shall be fair and just and shall result in a reasonable profit to the industry concerned. . . .
>
> 4. That there shall be authorized and established a board or commission on mobilization of industries essential for military preparedness, nonpolitical in nature. . . .[55]

These recommendations were incorporated almost word for word in the National Defense Act of 1916 with authorization to seize recalcitrant industries. In addition, the Secretary of War was ordered to make a survey of all plants connected with the manufacture of arms or ammunition. Finally, the act authorized the President to have plants for the manufacture of nitrate built and operated by the government. These broadly drawn provisions of the National Defense Act of 1916 contained ample authority for the mobilization of industry. The railroads, voluntarily falling in line with the new

---

[53] John McAuley Palmer, *Washington-Lincoln-Wilson, Three War Statesmen* (New York, 1930), p. 319.

[54] "Report of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1916*, pp. 227–28.

[55] WCD, GS, *Mobilization of Industries and Utilization of the Commercial and Industrial Resources of the Country for War Purposes in Emergency* (Washington, 1916). Copy in WCD 8121–45. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

emphasis on economic mobilization, offered the War Department complete cooperation.[56] The failure and delay of the railroads in several instances during the microscopic mobilization of 1916, however, was a prelude to their subsequent collapse when faced with complete mobilization. But awareness of the importance of economic as well as manpower mobilization became clearer in the months preceding our entrance into World War I.

One result of this increasing awareness of the importance of economic mobilization was the start toward the development of the machinery to accomplish such a mobilization. For many years the War Department had advocated the establishment of a Council of National Defense; in a rider attached to the Army appropriation bill passed on 29 August 1916, such a body was created. The Council was composed of six cabinet officers: the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. The chairman was the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker. The legislation also authorized the creation of an advisory commission to aid the Council.[57] On 7 December 1916, Walter S. Gifford, chief statistician of the American Telephone and Telegraph Co., was appointed director of the Council of National Defense.

Operations on the Mexican Border

Concurrently with the uncertainties of this period and the early planning and legislation, the War Department was compelled to conduct a practical application school on the Mexican border, first for the Regular Army and eventually for the National Guard. The policy of the Government was never clearly defined concerning the Mexican problems beyond attempting to safeguard our nationals in Mexico and keep the border pacified. The aged dictator Diaz was overthrown by a revolution led by Madero in 1911. Because of the fighting just across the border in Mexico, the United States found it necessary to increase its own border patrols. This increase was followed by the mobilization of the so-called Maneuver Division, a tactical organization composed of Regular Army units concentrated at San Antonio from March 1911 to 7 August 1911. According to the Chief of Staff, the mobilization of the Maneuver Division demonstrated the need for (1) concentrating the scattered Regular Army units in larger garrisons to avoid the delay experienced in assembling

[56] See: WCD 9201, "Mobilization of Railroads for War." Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[57] The Advisory Commission was comprised of Chairman Daniel Willard, president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; Bernard M. Baruch, financier; Howard E. Coffin, vice president of the Hudson Motor Company; Julius Rosenwald, president of Sears, Roebuck & Company; Dr. Hollis Godfrey, president of Drexel Institute; Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor; and Dr. Franklin Martin, secretary general of the American College of Surgeons.

the division; (2) better coordination between the War Department and the railroads; (3) the danger of diluting the efficiency of Regular Army units by adding recruits and the need for a trained reserve to bring organizations from peace to war strength; (4) the need for accumulating reserves of supplies; or ". . . in short, the necessity for proper military organization and preparedness for war." [58]

The Maneuver Division, under the command of Maj. Gen. William H. Carter, reached a maximum strength of 12,269 enlisted men and 540 officers in May 1911. In addition to the Maneuver Division, many other units were strung out along the border. The total forces in the border area reached 23,059 in April 1911 but were reduced to 9,530 by 31 July 1911, when the situation became less tense.[59] This was the largest concentration of troops in the United States since the Spanish-American War. Many of the lessons learned during this mobilization were included in the report on the "Organization of the Land Forces in the United States" prepared by the General Staff in 1912.

Although the situation in Mexico was serious enough for the United States to effect a partial mobilization-concentration of the Regular Army, there was no planning effort made to prepare the Nation industrially for war. The supply bureaus continued to make their purchases in the usual peacetime manner, without haste and without any attempt to build up reserve supplies. The General Staff, prior to 1915, had made only a few haphazard studies of economic or industrial factors in mobilization and war. Such a study was the 1904 staff recommendation of stock-piling sodium nitrate.[60] Troop transport by rail was studied at the War College, and occasionally elaborate railway routings would be prepared for some military map problem.[61] These were academic studies, however, not functional plans. Even "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States" failed to mention economic mobilization, although it dealt more fully with manpower mobilization than had ever before been done in the United States.

Counter-revolutions in Mexico again led to an increase in border patrols in 1912.[62] In early 1913, President Madero was deposed by General Huerta and subsequently shot under peculiar circumstances. A full scale civil war broke out in Mexico between Huerta and the Constitutionalists led by General Carranza; considerable fighting occurred close to the border for possession of the strategic border

[58] "Report of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1911,* p. 157.

[59] "Report of The Adjutant General," *Ibid.*, p. 242.

[60] Rpt, Ch, 3d Div, GS, to SW, 8 Jan 04, sub: A Reserve Supply of Sodium Nitrate. Rpt No. 3, vol II, Memorandum Reports. Records of WDGS, 3d Div. National Archives.

[61] See: WCD 4183 and 5585, records of WDGS, for information on railways, 1909-1917. National Archives.

[62] "Report of the Secretary of War," *War Department Annual Reports, 1912*, p. 13.

towns. In the latter part of February 1913, the U. S. 2d Division was mobilized at Galveston and Texas City. This division was a separate organization additional to the forces already patrolling the border areas (which grew to over 12,000 in 1914). The 2d Division remained at Galveston and Texas City until April 1914 when its 5th Brigade was dispatched to Vera Cruz. Earlier in April, American sailors had been arrested at Tampico and Vera Cruz was seized in retaliation for the failure of the Mexican government under Huerta to make proper amends. Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, in command of the troops at Vera Cruz, had "3,832 enlisted men of the Army and 3,333 enlisted men of the United States Marine Corps . . . making a total enlisted force of 7,165 men" in that command.[63] General Funston arrived at Vera Cruz 30 April 1914 and remained there until November 1914 when he returned to Galveston and rejoined the 2d Division, still in a state of readiness in Texas. The 6th Brigade, 2d Division, was detached and sent to Arizona in December 1914. In October 1915, the 2d Division was demobilized and its units assigned to border patrol in the Southern Department, which totaled 924 officers and 17,696 enlisted men on 30 June 1915.[64] The Regular Army forces continued to patrol the border, although things were somewhat quieter in Mexico after the flight of Huerta and the victory of the forces under Carranza. The latter, however, was not able to achieve complete stability; a considerable degree of anarchy still existed, particularly in the northern part of the country near the international boundary. Matters again came to a head on the night of 8 March 1916 when Mexican forces under Francisco Villa raided Columbus, New Mexico. On 15 March 1916, a column under Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing crossed the border into Mexico in pursuit of Villa. While General Pershing was in Mexico, several other raids were made on border towns in Texas by Mexican outlaws. The National Guard of Texas, N. Mex., and Arizona was called into Federal service 9 May 1916 and assigned to duty on the border. The recruiting for these Militia forces was handled by the Federal authorities in the Southern Department.[65]

General Pershing's column succeeded in dispersing Villa's forces, but a series of minor incidents with Mexican forces aggravated the already tense situation. War seemed imminent. Almost all Regular Army forces were mobilized on the border or were with Pershing in Mexico itself; the National Guard of the border states was in Federal service. Finally, on 18 June 1916, the President called nearly all the remainder of the National Guard into Federal service and ordered it to the border. This call was probably necessary, but it came at a most inopportune time as far the states were concerned. The National

[63] "Report of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1914*, p. 135.
[64] "Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1915*, p. 211.
[65] "Report of the Secretary of War," *War Department Annual Reports, 1916*, p. 11.

Defense Act of 1916 with its scheme for "nationalizing" the Militia had become law only 15 days before. Sufficient time had not elapsed to accomplish the transition, thereby adding to the muddled confusion which occurred during the mobilization of the Guard. Guard organizations were dispatched to the border as soon as they were in any degree of readiness. "On August 31, 1916, . . . the troops in the Southern Department consisted of 2,160 officers and 45,873 enlisted men of the Regular Army, and 5,446 officers and 105,080 enlisted men of the National Guard, a total of 7,606 officers and 150,953 enlisted men in that department".[66]

This show of force deterred the Mexicans from attacking General Pershing's column, and a sufficient degree of stability was achieved on the border to permit the demobilization of the Guard during the fall of 1916. General Pershing's forces were withdrawn from Mexico during the period 28 January—5 February 1917. As Secretary Baker pointed out:

> The Mexican incident was valuable to the United States in two important ways. In the first place, it demonstrated very definitely the determination of the Government not to allow a menace to continue on our frontier; and, in the second place, by the mobilization of the Regular Army and the National Guard, it gave an excellent opportunity for training both to the men in the Guard and to several supply departments of the Government, and thus afforded a most serviceable foundation upon which to proceed with the larger expansion of the Military Establishment which we were soon called upon to undertake.[67]

The mobilization of troops in the Southern Department constituted an excellent school of application. There officers received valuable training in handling large numbers of men, transportation and supply systems were tested, and the weaknesses of the National Guard clearly demonstrated.

The National Guard Mobilization: A Study of Errors

Although the mobilization of the National Guard occurred during an inopportune period of transition, the failure of the Guard at the moment of crisis would not have been so great had not the old style Militia been so completely without substance. The old weaknesses—lack of training, lack of equipment, and lack of manpower—still existed.[68]

The official records of the rejections for physical reasons in the Central Division showed how lax the states had been in their physical requirements as compared with Federal standards. The percentage of

---

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[67] "Report of the Secretary of War," *War Department Annual Reports, 1917*, p. 10.

[68] For comments on the mobilization of the Guard, see: Sigmund Henschen, "The Collapse of Our Militia." *Forum*, LVI (1916), pp. 290–96; Charles Merz, "The Truth of It," *Everybody's Magazine*, XXX (1916), pp. 434–35; "Mobilizing the National Guard—A Lesson on Preparedness," *Current Opinion*, LXI (1916), p. 76.

rejections at the final muster into Federal service after state physical examinations ranged from a low of 10.3 per cent for Colorado to a high of 25.2 per cent for Ohio. The average for the 14 states in the division was 15.5 per cent, or 9,230 rejected out of 59,021 reporting.[69] Closely related to the rejection rate of the National Guard was its expense. In his report for 1916, the Chief of Staff stated that when the National Guard was increased to minimum strength 43 per cent of its men were without prior service and the remainder had had only rudimentary training. Discharge requests flooded the War Department, and the discharge rate was so great that it was necessary to send recruiting parties out for each National Guard regiment. The recruiting parties were unsuccessful for the most part; in a state the size of New York, whose National Guard was above average, only 351 recruits were obtained in August 1916 at an average cost of $40 per recruit; in Massachusetts, in August and September, only 189 recruits volunteered although 20 National Guard recruiting stations were maintained at Federal expense. Because of the poor results, recruiting for the National Guard was discontinued. The Chief of Staff concluded: "The system speaks for itself in dollars and cents, which is readily understood by the average man." [70]

The morale of the National Guard was low throughout the period of the mobilization, in some part because of poor indoctrination of the men themselves, but principally because of preventable hardships and inexcusable shortages of supplies.[71] When comparisons were drawn between our mobilization in 1916 and the European mobilization in 1914,[72] our errors were highlighted. The blame for the inept Guard mobilization was laid to its timing, the mistakes and blunders of the War Department,[73] the system itself, and, above all else, to the people of the United States.[74]

Three clear conclusions could be drawn from the mobilization on the Mexican border in 1916: first, the mobilization involved economic as well as military factors and both had to be coordinated; second, the National Guard as constituted would never furnish an adequate second line of defense; third, the volunteer system failed to produce sufficient manpower even when national feelings were at a peak. These conclusions were certainly apparent at least six months before our declaration of war on Germany on 6 April 1947. They resulted in two important changes in planning for the ultimate mobilization: the

[69] "Report of the Mustering in of the National Guard in the Central Division." NG File 370.01 Reports [Box 433]. National Archives.

[70] "Report of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1916,* p. 191.

[71] Ltr, CG, So Dept to CofS, 20 Oct 16, sub: Report on the Guard Along the Border. WCD 9836, Doc 2. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[72] "Mobilizing the National Guard—A Lesson on Preparedness," *op. cit.*

[73] "Report of the Mustering in of the National Guard in the Central Division," *op. cit.*

[74] George Marvin, "Marking Time with Mexico," *World's Work,* XXXII (1916), pp. 531–33.

economic factors of mobilization were more fully studied, and the principle of compulsory service was substituted for the old volunteer system.

Compulsive Service: An Old Doctrine Becomes New Again

The failure of the volunteer system to provide adequate manpower for the mobilization on the Mexican border turned the General Staff to intensive study of some form of compulsory service. The question of universal military service had been discussed in periodicals and at preparedness meetings since the outbreak of the European War. In a speech on 15 April 1915 General Wood argued: "The voluntary system failed us in the past, and will fail us in the future. It is uncertain in operation, prevents organized preparation, tends to destroy that individual sense of obligation for military service which should be found in every citizen, costs excessively in life and treasure, and does not permit that condition of preparedness which must exist if we are to wage war successfully with any great power prepared for war." [75] The general advocated adoption of a system of compulsory universal service based on the Swiss plan.

After publication of the *Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States* in September 1915, national attention was focused on Secretary Garrison's proposal for a Continental Army, whose dependence on volunteers had led many military leaders to doubt its value. Among the supplements of the *Statement* was a short *Statistical Comparison of Universal and Voluntary Military Service*, which was most direct in its advocacy of universal service.[76]

On 10 January 1916, in hearings before the House Military Affairs Committee, Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott, then Chief of Staff, advocated compulsory military service, but carefully added: "I can speak only for myself." [77] This was a bold public stand for the ranking military man at that time, but the events of the summer of 1916 supported General Scott. He concluded his 1916 report with the statement: "Universal military training has been the cornerstone upon which has been built every great republic in the history of the world, and its abandonment the signal for decline and obliteration. This fact was fully recognized by the makers of our Constitution and evidenced in our early laws." [78]

In November 1915 when Capt. George Moseley had attempted to circulate a memorandum advocating compulsory military service

[75] Maj Gen Leonard Wood, *The Military Obligation of Citizenship* (Princeton, 1915), pp. 33–34.

[76] WCD, GS, *Statistical Comparison of Universal and Voluntary Military Service* (Washington, 1916), pp. 8–9. Copy in Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[77] "Report of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1916*, p. 160.

[78] *Ibid.*, pp. 159–60.

among his fellow General Staff officers, he was informed that instructions from Secretary Garrison forbade consideration of the topic. His memorandum was filed but was later used in June 1916 as the basis of a proposed bill to provide for universal military service. This so-called Moseley bill was widely circulated and was adopted by the National Association for Universal Military Training, whose advisory board included Elihu Root, Henry Stimson, Maj. R. R. McCormick, and Lt. Gen. S. B. M. Young (Ret.), the first Chief of Staff. Here was powerful support for the idea of compulsory service.[79] In the period before the war the pressure for compulsory service in some form or other increased and a favorable public opinion was slowly created.

Military Education and Training Prior to World War I

Army Schools, 1901–17

In a major military mobilization the presence or absence of a well-trained officer corps able to conduct the mobilization, train the Army, and lead it when trained may well be the determining factor in the success or failure of the mobilization. Army service schools including the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth and the Cavalry and Light Artillery School at Fort Riley had for all practical purposes ceased to operate with the beginning of the Spanish-American War. The demands of the Army involved in the Cuban occupation, Philippine Insurrection, and China Relief Expedition prevented the reopening of the service schools for almost four years. In the meantime the Army had been doubled in size necessitating the addition of almost 1,500 officers between 1898 and 1902. The Secretary of War stated in his report for 1901 that one-third of the officers in the Regular Army had received no formal military education.[80] The problem of raising the caliber of the officer corps in the period 1901–17 was thus a very urgent one.

The Army schools which existed before 1898 had been created piecemeal, and no general system of military education had been evolved. After a careful consideration of the development of a system of military education under the guidance of Secretary Root, the War Department on 27 November 1901 announced a reorganization of the Army schools, which were then in the process of being reopened, as follows:

> With a view to maintaining the high standard of instruction and general training of the officers of the Army and for the establishment of a coherent plan by which the work may be made progressive, the Secretary of War directs that the following general scheme be announced for the information and guidance of all concerned:

[79] All information on compulsory service is from WCD 9317. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[80] "Report of the Secretary of War," *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1901*, p. 20.

The System of Instruction

There shall be besides the Military Academy at West Point the following schools for the instruction of officers of the Army:

1. At each military post an officers school for elementary instruction in theory and practice.
2. Special service schools—
   (a) The Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia.
   (b) The Engineer School of Application, Washington Barracks, District of Columbia.
   (c) The School of Submarine Defense, Fort Totten, New York.
   (d) The School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery at Fort Riley, Kansas.
   (e) The Army Medical School, District of Columbia.
3. A General Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
4. A War College for the most advanced instruction at Washington Barracks, District of Columbia.[81]

The service schools below the Army War College level were to be open to limited numbers of officers of the National Guard, former officers of Volunteers, and graduates of military schools and colleges which had Army officers as instructors. The new officers' schools at military posts were designed to give a thorough grounding in basic military subjects to all junior officers and especially those without formal military education. This instruction was to be combined with practical on-the-job-training. Officers who showed particular promise were to be recommended for the Leavenworth schools, and those who failed a course not only had to repeat it but had that fact entered in their efficiency records.

The new Army education system had also provided for five special service schools. The oldest of the service schools was the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Va., which had been established in 1824. After the school was reopened in 1901, it was enlarged and improved. When the Field and Coast Artillery were separated under the Act of January 25, 1907, the school at Fort Monroe became the Coast Artillery School.[82] The School of Submarine Defense established in 1901 at Fort Totten, N. Y., was merged with the Coast Artillery School on 1 August 1908 at Fort Monroe.[83] The Engineer School of Application was moved from Willets Point, N. Y., to Washington Barracks, D. C., in 1901. It inaugurated a two-year course for engineer officers and a ten-month course for other officers; in 1904 it was renamed simply the Engineer School.[84] The Army Medical School in Washington was reopened in 1900 after a new faculty had been designated and new regulations for the admission of students prescribed.[85]

[81] WD GO 155, 27 Nov 01.
[82] WD GO 178, 28 Aug 07.
[83] WD GO 145, 8 Nov 01; WD GO 27, 3 Mar 08.
[84] WD GO 117, 3 Sep 01; WD GO 146, 9 Nov 01.
[85] WD GO 119, 6 Sep 1900.

The first step toward reopening the Cavalry and Field Artillery School at Fort Riley, Kans., was taken in April 1901 when regulations for the school were issued.[86] The school was reopened 11 September 1901, but it was not until 1904 that ". . . a systematic and adequate course of instruction was followed." [87] Gradually the school developed and improved its program; in 1907 it was renamed the Mounted Service School.[88] By 1908 the four main service schools had developed into reasonably efficient specialized training institutions giving both practical and theoretical instruction.[89]

The Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, became the General Service and Staff College under the reorganization of the Army schools in 1901. It was reopened on 1 September 1902 with Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell as commandant.[90] The one-year course was set up at a graduate level of instruction with 94 student officers in the first class. In 1904 the General Service and Staff College was reorganized and became simply the Staff College whose object was ". . . to instruct specially selected officers of engineers, cavalry, artillery, and infantry in the duties of general staff officers in time of war." [91] It was to be strictly a graduate school.

At the same time two new schools were organized at Fort Leavenworth: the Infantry and Cavalry School and the Signal School. The Infantry and Cavalry School was to train officers for higher commands in those arms in time of war; the Signal School was a specialist school to train selected signal corps, artillery, and infantry officers in signal work. Both of these schools gave courses in Spanish. Students for the Staff College came from selected graduates of the Infantry and Cavalry School, the Artillery School, and the Engineer School.[92] In 1907 new regulations for the Leavenworth schools were published. The Infantry and Cavalry School became the Army School of the Line which was to be open to carefully selected officers from the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Signal Corps, and Engineer Corps. Only the highest graduates of the Army Schoool of the Line could attend the Staff College.[93] By 1909 the schools at Leavenworth had come to be known collectively as the Army Service Schools. In 1910 two new schools were added at Leavenworth: the Army Field Engineer School and the Army Field Service and Correspondence School

[86] WD GO 60, 30 Apr 01.
[87] Pride, *op. cit.*, p. 236.
[88] WD GO 191, 13 Sep 07.
[89] There were three other specialized schools established in the period before World War I: the School of Musketry established at Presidio Monterey, Calif., by WD GO 35, 19 Feb 07, and transferred to Fort Sill, Okla., by WD Bul 19, 9 Jun 13; the School of Fire for Field Artillery established at Fort Sill, Okla., by WD GO 72, 3 Jun 11; and the Signal Corps Aviation School established at San Diego, Calif., by WD GO 79, 13 Dec 13.
[90] WD GO 64, 1 Jul 02.
[91] WD GO 115, 27 Jun 04.
[92] *Ibid.*
[93] WD GO 211, 15 Oct 07.

for Medical Officers. The Army Field Engineer School corresponded roughly to the Signal School in scope and purposes. The Army Field Service and Correspondence School for Medical Officers was designed to train medical officers for administrative, staff, and field work.[94] The Army School of the Line and the Staff College were designed to turn out well-rounded officers capable of assuming major assignments; the other three schools supplemented that program by giving specialist and staff training.

The Leavenworth schools and the four main service schools (Coast Artillery, Engineer, Medical, and Mounted) constituted the backbone of the integrated Army school system and were designed to meet the overall needs of the service. The Army War College was at the top of the Army progressive school system. ". . . not to impart academic instructions, but to make a practical application of military knowledge already acquired." [95] The Army War College was closely connected with the War College Division of the War Department General Staff. Officers assigned to study at the Army War College worked with officers in the War College Division on special studies and projects frequently involving mobilization planning. The regular course of study at the Army War College included study of plans of operations, study of operations themselves, technical problems, a war game, and informal lectures and discussions. An officer who graduated from the Army School of the Line, the Staff College, and the Army War College in succession received a broad and thorough theoretical and practical preparation for command or staff duty in time of war.[96]

Military Training in Civil Educational Institutions

Under the Morrill Act of 1862 and subsequent legislation, provision had been made for a military training program in civil educational institutions. War Department General Orders No. 70, 18 November 1913, outlined all the statutory provisions then in force and summarized the number of officers, both active and retired, who could be detailed for school work. An outline of that summary follows:

1. Of the 100 officers authorized by Section 1225, Revised Statutes, one was to be detailed to each land-grant college and the remaining 52 were to be apportioned according to population.

2. Active officers were to be detailed to essentially military schools with a minimum of 100 students who were 21 at graduation, or to land-grant and other nonmilitary schools with 150 students under military training who would be 21 at graduation.

---

[94] WD GO 69, 20 Apr 10; WD GO 86, 9 May 10; WD GO 132, 11 Jul 10; WD GO 147, 29 Jul 10.

[95] WD GO 115, 27 June 04.

[96] For more detailed information on the Army schools 1901–17 see the regulations issued almost annually by the War Department for each school in War Department general orders; the annual reports of the school commandants to the Secretary of War in the War Department annual reports; and Reeves, *op. cit.*, for the period up to 1914.

3. Retired officers were to be detailed under Section 1225, Revised Statutes, to schools with 75 males over 15 years of age under military instruction, or to schools without specifications under the Act of April 21, 1904. The pay and allowances varied for the two categories.

4. Retired noncommissioned officers were detailed only at schools where an officer was on duty.[97]

The number of active officers detailed as professors of military science and tactics could not exceed 100 but the only limitation placed on the number of retired officers was the number available. On 30 June 1916, there were only 489 retired officers below the rank of lieutenant colonel, and few of these were available for further service.[98] In 1914 only six schools had retired officers on duty under the provisions of the Act of April 21, 1904.[99] The number of officers detailed at all civil educational institutions for sample years after the Act of April 21, 1904, was certainly not great:[100]

Date	*Total*	*Active*	*Retired*
30 June 1905	75	39	36
30 June 1906	84	52	32
30 June 1910	89	64	25
30 June 1915	94	61	33
30 June 1916	95	63	32

The results of the detail of military instructors from the Army at civil educational institutions prior to the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916 were not satisfactory. Although the War Department's disinterest was in great part responsible for the inadequacy of the military training at the land-grant colleges, the colleges themselves were also at fault. The standards of the essentially military colleges such as Virginia Military Institute and Norwich University were particularly high, possibly equal to West Point, but the quality of instruction varied from school to school. At some of the land-grant colleges, military training seemed to be carried on primarily in order to obtain continued Federal financial support. In an address given 14 November 1913, Dean Edward Orton of the College of Engineering at Ohio State University stated that: ". . . while an equal obligation rests upon all institutions founded under the Morrill Act to maintain military instruction, there are really great differences in the extent to which this obligation is felt or recognized in the different schools."[101]

The greatest weakness of the entire program, however, was because of the failure of the War Department or the Government to take ad-

---

[97] WD GO 70, 18 Nov 13.

[98] "Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1916,* p. 249.

[99] Reeves, *op. cit.,* p. 410.

[101] Address, Edward Orton, *The Status of the Military Department in the Land-Grant Colleges* (Washington, 1914).

[100] "Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports* for respective years.

vantage of the training, imparted at considerable expense, by enrolling the graduates of the military training program in a reserve. Except for infrequent commissions in the Regular Army, the military connections of the alumni of these schools were severed upon graduation. Not even a list of the men who had received such training was maintained. They constituted only a nebulous potential supply of partially trained officer.[102] In a supplement to its *Statement of Proper Military Policy for the United States* the War College Division of the General Staff summarized the military training program in civil educational institutions as follows:

Year	Students under military instruction	Military students graduated	Year	Students under military instruction	Military students graduated
1905	17, 835	2, 441	1911	28, 843	4, 700
1906	18, 138	2, 890	1912	29, 979	4, 757
1907	21, 616	3, 073	1913	30, 872	5, 153
1908	24, 101	3, 441	1914	31, 911	4, 970
1909	25, 222	3, 789	1915	32, 313	5, 200
1910	27, 122	4, 215			

Only a small percentage of the total number graduated, 44,629, will be "trained officers," as the words are understood today, but all will have pursued a course, both practical and theoretical, insuring a working knowledge of rudiments. Since 1912 the training has become more intensive, and 1,100 out of 15,323 have been recommended for commissions in the Regular Army and Volunteer forces. Previous to 1912 nearly all have, no doubt, lost all touch with things military, and have consequently forgotten what little they learned before their graduation. . . .

The main points of dispute between the War Department and the authorities of the institutions are:

(a) The indifference of the constituted authorities to the military department and a misunderstanding of the benefits which may be obtained by carrying out this training, as indicated by the law. This is ordinarily shown by the wholesale excusing of students from this work because of athletics, etc.

(b) By not providing sufficient funds for the upkeep of the military department to insure its efficiency.

(c) By failing to allot proper time and opportunity for the work of the department when getting up the college schedule.

(d) By minimizing the importance of the military and by placing agriculture and mechanic arts in competition with the military department.[103]

An attempt to set up minimum standards in the military departments was made in 1912 at a conference of college officials with Brig. Gen. W. W. Wotherspoon, President of the Army War College.

[102] WDGS, "Study on Educational Institutions Giving Military Training as a Source for a Supply of Officers for a National Army," Nov 1915, prepared as a supplement to the *Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States*. WCD 9053–121. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[103] *Ibid.*

Although there was some improvement in training, the results fell far short of desired standards. The National Defense Act of 1916, in some of its most farsighted provisions, corrected the weaknesses and deficiencies of the college military training program.

Reserve Officers' Training Corps

Beginning in 1912, the War Department had strongly urged the establishment of an adequate reserve program which would include some method of enrolling men with military training in an officers' reserve corps. Special emphasis was placed on the graduates of colleges at which Army officers were detailed as instructors. In November 1915, the War College Division of the General Staff issued a *Study on Educational Institutions Giving Military Training as a Source for a Supply of Officers for a National Army* as a supplement to the *Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States.* From the several plans for training Reserve officers which were considered in this study, the War College Division made recommendations, most of which were written into the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916 which created the Officers' Reserve Corps and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps. Pertinent provisions of the Act were:

> SEC. 40. *The Reserve Officers' Training Corps.*—The President is hereby authorized to establish and maintain in civil educational institutions a Reserve Officers' Training Corps, which shall consist of a senior division organized at universities and colleges requiring four years of collegiate study for a degree, including State universities and those State institutions that are required to provide instruction in military tactics under the provisions of the act of Congress of July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, donating lands for the establishment of colleges where the leading object shall be practical instruction in agriculture and the mechanic arts, including military tactics, and a junior division organized at all other public or private educational institutions, except that units of the senior division may be organized at those essentially military schools which do not confer an academic degree but which, as a result of the annual inspection of such institutions by the War Department, are specially designated by the Secretary of War as qualified for units of the senior division, and each division shall consist of units of the several arms or corps in such number and of such strength as the President may prescribe.
>
> SEC. 56. *Military equipment and instructors at other schools and colleges.*—sary for proper military training shall be supplied by the Government to schools and colleges, other than those provided for in section forty-seven of this act, having a course of military training prescribed by the Secretary of War and having not less than one hundred physically fit male students above the age of fourteen years, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe; and the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to detail such commissioned and noncommissioned officers of the Army to said schools and colleges, other than those provided for in sections forty-five and forty-six of this act, detailing not less than one such officer or noncommissioned officers to each five hundred students under military instruction.[104]

[104] National Defense Act of 1916, *op. cit.*

Although the law contained a broad grant of power to increase and improve military education in schools and colleges, the appropriations necessary for its effective implementation were not immediately forthcoming.

The rules and regulations for the establishment of ROTC units were prescribed in General Orders No. 49, 1916; and General Orders No. 48, 1916, prescribed the regulations for the detail of officers and issuance of equipment to the schools and colleges designated in Section 56. But the transition of the schools from the old system of military training to the ROTC program had hardly begun when we entered the war, and all active officers on detail at educational institutions were relieved at the end of the 1916–17 academic year. In the period 1916–19, Senior ROTC units were established at 144 schools and Junior ROTC units at 18 additional schools. Twelve of the 144 schools with Senior units had Junior units also;[105] there were therefore 30 schools with Junior units.[106]

Military Training in Secondary Schools

Military training of some kind in public high schools is almost as old as the schools themselves. High school or academy cadet companies were a source of local pride particularly in the years following the Civil War.[107]

The agitation for military training in the public schools, grammar as well as high schools, received a decided impetus in 1893 when the Grand Army of the Republic endorsed the proposal and took over the cause.[108] At the time, the Grand Army was still the most influential pressure organization in the country. The movement spread in New England, New York, and the East, but results elsewhere were negligible. Actually few of the units entitled the "American Guard," went much beyond the closeorder drill stage in their training; the principal benefit from such a training program was the development of an interest in military affairs on the part of secondary school students.

Agitation for and against military training in the public schools continued from 1895 to World War I. The chief opposition came from pacifist and women's organizations and from physical culturists, most of whom strongly opposed military drill as a means of physical development. It was unfortunate that the conflict between military

---

[105] *Order of Battle of the U. S. Land Forces in the World War* (1917–1919): *Zone of the Interior* (Washington, 1949), pp. 559-629, contains scattered tables of ROTC units by territorial departments.

[106] The only public high school with a Junior ROTC unit was Leavenworth High School in Kansas. This unit was established on 19 Jan 17, with a retired officer, on duty at Fort Leavenworth, as the instructor, but authority was withdrawn on 10 Oct 17 in accordance with WD policy. On 9 Apr 17, the SW limited the establishment of Junior ROTC units to essentially military schools which automatically excluded high schools.

[107] Garret B. Drummond, "Military Training in the Secondary Schools of America," *Infantry Journal*, XXXI, pt. II (1927), p. 611.

[108] Whidden Graham, "Our Schoolboy Soldiers," *Munsey's Magazine*, XV (1896), p. 459.

drill and physical education developed in the schools because the two were more complementary than incompatible. Letters continued to flow into Washington from private citizens advocating military training in high schools,[109] and periodicals occasionally contained articles favorable to military training in secondary schools as well as colleges.

The number of students who received military training in public and private high schools, however, did not vary materially from 1898 to 1914 as the following table shows:

*Table 19. Students in Military Drill in Public and Private High Schools 1895–1906 and in 1914.**

Year	Total	Public high schools	Private high schools
1895	12, 049	5, 812	6, 237
1896	15, 545	8, 274	7, 271
1897	15, 309	8, 661	6, 648
1898	16, 886	9, 032	7, 854
1899	18, 855	10, 396	8, 459
1900	19, 355	10, 455	8, 900
1901	18, 670	9, 632	9, 038
1902	18, 036	8, 850	9, 186
1903	18, 820	9, 771	9, 049
1904	18, 961	9, 208	9, 753
1905	18, 438	9, 519	8, 919
1906	17, 926	9, 427	8, 499
1914	17, 243	9, 532	7, 711

**Source:* Ltr, George H. Stevenson, Dep. of Agri., to Capt. S. J. B. Schindel, undated, sub: "Students in Military Drill in Public High Schools." WCD File 9064-23. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

Although the number of boys receiving military drill remained fairly constant from 1900 to 1914, the number of boys in high school more than doubled during that period. The enrollment in both public and private high schools in 1900 was 271,941 with .0712 per cent, or 71 in a 1,000, taking military drill; the enrollment in 1914 was 614,357 with only .081 per cent or 28 in a 1,000 taking military drill.[110] The number of public high schools giving military drill in 1906 was 103, but although that number had declined to 82 in 1914, the number of boys actually receiving drill remained above the same. Apparently, after the enthusiasm of the Spanish-American War had subsided, interest in military training in public schools declined.

[109] Ltr, Thomas F. Hull to Pres Theodore Roosevelt, 11 Mar 07, and similar correspondence. AGO File 1222021. National Archives.

[110] Ltr, George H. Stevenson Dep. of Agri., to Capt S. J. B. Schindel, undated, sub: Students in Military Drill in Public High Schools. WCD 9064–23. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

The beginning of World War I in Europe revived the waning military interest in the United States. The public consciousness of our military unpreparedness was frustrated by the failure of the Administration and Congress to exert leadership and to provide a program or funds for national defense. Privately sponsored preparedness measures sprang up, and military training in public secondary schools was revived. At first, the attitude of the War Department toward this latter measure was cool. The Secretary of War on 6 January 1915 rejected the draft of a letter which would have endorsed military training in public schools.[111] Within a month, however, the attitude of the War Department had changed. In reply to a request from the Superintendent of Schools of New Orleans on 8 February 1915, asking if the War Department would provide equipment and instructors for the high schools of that city, General Scott replied:

> . . . the law does not permit the issue of uniforms to high schools, nor does it permit the issue of arms and equipments except in case an officer of the Army is detailed for duty thereat. At high schools only retired Army officers are eligible for detail, and they can be detailed only with their consent. At present the demand is so great that the War Department has difficulty in locating retired officers suitable and willing to accept such details, but if you know of one who desires such detail, the War Department will be only too glad to detail him and to furnish any other assistance in its power. . . . The subject of military instruction in high schools has hitherto not received the consideration it deserves, with the result that the law does not make adequate provision for it. I feel this is much to be regretted, but I can assure you that it is the wish of the War Department to encourage this instruction wherever possible.[112]

The Wyoming Plan

An insight into the military training in the public schools can be obtained from an examination of its most prominent and successful application—the Wyoming Plan. This program was originated in 1911 by Lt. E. Z. Steever in the high school at Cheyenne, Wyo. At the time, Lieutenant Steever was on duty as inspector-instructor with the Organized Militia of Wyoming. Opposition to his proposal for military training in public schools was instantaneous, coming from the parents, women's clubs, labor unions, teachers, and even the boys themselves. Lieutenant Steever succeeded in overcoming the opposition by organizing his program along the lines of competitive athletics. In early 1915, Lieutenant Steever introduced the plan in many of the other high schools of Wyoming outside of Cheyenne. The Wyoming legislature endorsed the program in 1915 by appropriating money for

[111] Ltr, Dir Ed, NYC, to SW, 6 Jan 15, sub: View on Military Training in Public Schools. AG 1222021. National Archives.

[112] Ltr, CofS to Supt of Schools, New Orleans, 8 Feb 15, sub: Military Training in High Schools. AG 1222021. National Archives.

cadet uniforms. Close-order drill, physical exercises, wall-scaling, interschool competition, and summer field trips constituted the basic instruction. Although the program was voluntary, 90 per cent of the high school population of the state were enrolled in it at the peak of its popularity.[113]

The General Staff had outlined the military needs of the country in the *Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States.* Acutely aware of the necessity for training manpower by any available, *inexpensive* method, the General Staff endorsed and publicized the Wyoming Plan in a supplement to the *Statement.* It recommended:

> 1. That school boards throughout the United States be encouraged by the War Department to institute, in their school systems, a citizenship training similar to that outlined (in the Wyoming Plan).
>
> 2. That the proper authority request Congress to authorize the detail of United States Army officers as instructors in public school systems.
>
> 3. That tentage and other field equipment of obsolete or modern pattern be issued to school boards under bond in the same manner that Krag rifles and ammunition are now furnished.[114]

Steever spent the early fall of 1916 in Washington, D. C., remodeling the cadet system there along competitive lines similar to what he had developed in Wyoming. His reputation as an authority on military education in public schools had grown rapidly. He was in great demand as a speaker, and his correspondence was filled with requests for information about the Wyoming Plan. A significant result of the Wyoming Plan was its strength in the Middle West, which was generally considered averse to military preparedness. After repeated requests from many sources, the War Department in December 1916 assigned Captain Steever to duty in connection with military instruction in the public schools of the Central Department, which embraced the Middle West area. Steever made his headquarters at Culver, Ind., where he was assisted by four carefully selected officers and 16 noncommissioned officers, who served as actual instructors in the schools under the supervision of the officers. He established military training programs in the public high schools of Chicago, Kansas City, Denver, and several smaller communities. The greatest interest in the program was in Chicago and northern Illinois areas.[115] The entrance of the United States into World War I halted the expansion of the program under War Department auspices.

---

[113] Capt E. Z. Steever, "The Wyoming Plan of Military Training for the Schools," *The School Review,* XXV (1917), p. 148.

[114] WDGS, "Military Training in Public Schools," Nov 1915, prepared as a supplement to the *Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States.* WCD 9064–16. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[115] WCD 9064. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives. For further information on the Wyoming Plan see George Creel, "Wyoming's Answer to Militarism," *Everybody's Magazine* XXXIV (1916) pp. 150–59; *The School Review,* XXV (1917), pp. 145–86.

The Wyoming Plan was supposed to provide and combine military, moral, civic, business, and educational preparation for citizenship. Part of its early success was due to its competitive basis. Its great weakness was that it did not provide sufficient functional military training. In Wyoming, the enthusiasm for the plan waned almost as soon as Steever left the state.[116]

The postwar decline of military training in secondary schools can undoubtedly be explained in part by an unheeded warning made in 1917: "The work once well started and efficiently managed will rapidly gain supporters. But it must be intelligently directed and the training must be thorough and business-like, for haphazard or half-hearted military instruction is worse than none; it is, in fact, a demoralizing influence from which many of our colleges and semi-military schools have already suffered." [117]

Plattsburg Camps

The Plattsburg Camps [118] had their inception in two summer camps for college and high school students held at Gettysburg, Pa., and Monterey, Calif., in the summer of 1913 at the suggestion of General Wood, then Chief of Staff. Two hundred and twenty-two students paid their own expenses including transportation, clothing, and subsistence, and received basic military training in drill, tactics, sanitation, care of troops, and rifle practice. These first student camps were so successful that four more were held in 1914; the program was again expanded in 1915, this time to include a camp for young businessmen at Plattsburg, N. Y. No funds were available from the War Department, but contributions from private citizens, including $10,000 from Mr. Bernard Baruch, made the camps possible. In the winter of 1915–16, the Military Training Camps Association was established by "alumni" to further the program. Congress appropriated money for transportation and subsistence for the 1916 camps, and then gave the entire program a statutory basis in the National Defense Act of 1916. Over 12,000 men attended the 1916 Plattsburg Camps held throughout the country. Although they furnished a basic model for the officer training camps and although those attending received some rudimentary military training, the greatest contribution of the "Plattsburg Idea" was in helping to arouse public support for the preparedness program.

Thus the United States drifted toward World War I, which was to see the first truly great mobilization of American resources for a war fought on foreign shores.

---

[116] D. C. Bliss, "Military Training in the High School," *The School Review*, XXV (1917), pp. 165–66.

[117] H. Durborow, "Preparing While We Wait," *The School Review*, XXV (1917), p. 156.

[118] The material on Plattsburg Camps is compiled from the following: "Reports of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916*; Walter Millis, *Road to War, America 1914–1917* (Boston, 1935); J. Palmer, *Washington-Lincoln-Wilson*, p. 318; Ralph Barton Perry, *The Plattsburg Movement* (New York, 1921).

CHAPTER VII

THE STATE OF READINESS, 6 APRIL 1917

Diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Empire were severed on 3 February 1917. From that day, the eventual entrance of the United States into the European War seemed inevitable to most observers although two months elapsed before the actual declaration of war. As a result of unrestricted German submarine warfare and after prolonged cabinet discussions, the President on 26 February asked congressional permission for the arming of American merchant ships. Although the Zimmerman note to Mexico had created a wave of war fervor, the bill to arm merchantmen was filibustered to death in the closing days of the 64th Congress, which ended 4 March 1917. After the inauguration, the Attorney General decided that the President himself had the power to arm merchant ships anyway. On 9 March 1917 President Wilson called a special session of Congress to convene on 16 April; the date was subsequently advanced to 2 April after German submarines sank three American vessels—the *Vigilancia*, the *City of Memphis*, and the *Illinois*.[1]

On the evening of 2 April, President Wilson, in a dramatic address to a joint session of Congress, asked for a declaration of war against Germany.[2] The waiting was over. The last steps toward war were taken when Congress passed and the President signed the formal declaration of war on 6 April 1917.

War Department preparations for the war had not gone beyond the planning stage even after the severance of diplomatic relations. As General Pershing quite accurately said: "Little more than a gesture was made to get ready for eventualities; in fact, practically nothing was done in the way of increasing our military strength or of providing equipment."[3] This indictment of the War Department must be analyzed as the condition of readiness of the United States for war on 6 April 1917 is examined.

The military establishment of the United States had as its legislative basis the National Defense Act of 1916. This law had been passed as a compromise measure by Congress which had accepted neither the Continental Army plan of former Secretary of War Garrison nor the

[1] Mark Sullivan, *Over Here, 1914–1918* ("Our Times," V [New York, 1933]), p. 272.
[2] Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), *Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace* (New York, 1927), I, pp. 9, 14, and 16.
[3] John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War* (New York, 1931), I, p. 7.

universal military training proposals of certain Army officers, including Generals Wood and Scott. Instead, the law authorized an increase in the Regular Army, in five increments, and provided for the so-called "federalization" of the Organized Militia, henceforth to be known as the National Guard. Analysis of the state of preparedness at the outset of the war must be made within the framework of the National Defense Act of 1916 and with due cognizance of that law's destructive and constructive provisions:

> The National Defense Act of 1916 was in some respects rather a national offense. Purporting to be a preparedness measure, it included the narrow provision that not more than half the officers of the General Staff should be in Washington at one time. The fear that officers might be located in Washington for personal and social reasons rather than the needs of the service moved Congress to provide that, with war menacingly booming on the horizon, the military planning body could not even mobilize itself. This limitation of the Staff in numbers only to officers and in funds next to nothing undoubtedly resulted in the almost incredible circumstance that even six weeks before war was declared the army had not even hypothetical plans for the organization and equipment of a force of any size. Not only that, but it did not even have a formula for undertaking such a task. It actually remained for the Council of National Defense's Advisory Commission, a purely civilian body, to take the initiative (February 15, 1917) in calculating what the raising of an army of one million men would involve in the way of material.[4]

The Organization of the War Department

On 6 April 1917, the War Department was headed by Newton D. Baker, who had succeeded Lindley Garrison as Secretary of War in March 1916. The Assistant Secretary of War, William M. Ingraham, had been appointed 8 May 1916 and remained in that office until 11 November 1917 when he was succeeded by Benedict Crowell. During Mr. Crowell's tenure, the Office of Assistant Secretary of War acquired much greater significance.

The Act of February 14, 1903, which had abolished the office of Commanding General of the Army had created in its place the office of Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff was to be the chief military adviser to the President and the Secretary of War and to have charge of the General Staff Corps, the planning agency of the Army. The Chief of Staff in 1916 was primarily an administrative official with theoretical supervisory control over all the Army. The office was held on 6 April 1917 by Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott, a distinguished soldier but one who was ill-fitted by training, experience, or by temperament to head the General Staff of the War Department during a great war.[5] The Assistant Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, had been one of the leaders in the establishment of the Army War College and had had considerable administrative experience in

[4] Grosvenor B. Clarkson, *Industrial America in the World War* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 30.
[5] Johnson Hagood, *The Services of Supply* (Cambridge, 1927), p. 25.

the Cuban occupation, but no experience in the handling of large numbers of troops. Both Scott and Bliss were 63 years old—less than a year away from compulsory retirement. Their limitations were the limitations of the Army itself, which was used to the old routines of a small establishment. In May, General Scott was sent to Russia as a member of the Root Mission, and General Bliss became Acting Chief of Staff. In less than a year the Chief of Staff's office was juggled between four men no less than seven times:

Chiefs of Staff

1917	
6 April	Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott.
16 May	Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss (acting).
17 August	Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott.
23 September	Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss.
8 October	Gen. Tasker H. Bliss.
30 October	Maj. Gen. John Biddle (acting).
17 December	Gen. Tasker H. Bliss.
1918	
10 January	Maj. Gen. John Biddle (acting).
4 March	Maj. Gen. Peyton C. March (acting).
25 May	Gen. Peyton C. March.[6]

The General Staff had, by statute, 41 officers, and of these only 19 could be stationed in Washington. This War Department General Staff of 19 officers was better coordinated than the old bureau system had been, but it was woefully undermanned for the tremendous planning job made necessary by the impending war.

The War College Division, the major subdivision of the General Staff, was located at Washington Barracks (renamed Fort Lesley J. McNair, 13 January 1948) as was the Army War College, but there it was out of close contact with the Chief of Staff and the War Department. The president of the Army War College and the chief of the War College Division of the General Staff was Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn, under whose supervision most of the early War Department planning was done. The students at the Army War College prepared many of the planning studies and were an inseparable part of the War College Division.

Almost simultaneous with the commencement of hostilities, the War Department, and particularly the General Staff, started a series of reorganizations which lasted throughout the duration of the war. When General March became Acting Chief of Staff 11 months after the war began, he said: "I found the General Staff personnel entirely unable to cope with the tremendous volume of business coming into it and did not hesitate to add to the General Staff all the officers that

[6] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 27.




Figure 4. Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, and Chief of Staff, Gen. Peyton C. March.

were necessary to carry on the work, finally reaching a personnel on the General Staff in Washington alone of 1,072." [7] Thus the number of General Staff officers in Washington increased from 19 to 1,072. Gradually the planning and coordinating machinery were perfected while the great mobilization itself went forward with increasing momentum. [See *chart 7* for the organization of the War Department 6 April 1917.]

[7] Peyton C. March, *The Nation at War* (Garden City, 1932), p. 46.

Chart 7. Organization of the War Department, 6 April 1917.*



*Source: Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War (1917–19): Zone of the Interior (Washington, 1949), pp. 16–17.

The great weakness of the War Department organization in 1917 was its inability to coordinate the activities of the 11 separate bureaus.[8] The Chief of Staff theoretically was the coordinator of War Department activities, but in practice throughout 1917 he was merely the chief military adviser to the Secretary of War, who himself still dealt directly with the bureau heads on frequent occasions. This weakness was corrected, in one of the later organizations, by giving greatly increased power to the Chief of Staff after General March assumed that office on 4 March 1918.[9]

On 6 April 1917 War Department field administration was decentralized to four territorial departments in the United States, one in Hawaii, and one in the Philippines. "Territorial departments were organized to assist the War Department in its functions. They were modeled after the central organization in Washington and thus represented miniature war departments within their respective territorial spheres."[10] On 1 May 1917 the territorial organization of the continental United States, which at that time had consisted of the Eastern, Central, Southern, and Western Departments, was changed to comprise six departments, "Northeastern, Eastern, Southeastern, Central, Southern, and Western."[11] [See *chart 8*] Thus the beginning of hostilities found the territorial departments in a state of transition which was unfortunate because these departments were integral parts of the War Department machinery for mobilization. Such vital functions as selecting the sites for the future cantonments and mobilizing the National Guard pertained to the department commanders.[12] The reasons for the regrouping appear to have been more political than military.[13]

---

[8] The chiefs of the 11 major WD bureaus and their ages on 6 Apr 17 were as follows:

Chief of Coast Artillery	Maj. Gen. Erasmus Weaver (62).
Chief of Militia Bureau	Brig. Gen. William A. Mann (63).
Adjutant General	Brig. Gen. Henry P. McCain (56).
Inspector General	Brig. Gen. John L. Chamberlain (59).
Judge Advocate General	Brig. Gen. Enoch H. Crowder (57).
Chief of Bureau of Insular Affairs	Brig. Gen. Frank McIntyre (52).
Quartermaster General	Maj. Gen. Henry G. Sharpe (58).
Chief of Ordnance	Brig. Gen. William Crozier (62).
Surgeon General	Maj. Gen. William C. Gorgas (62).
Chief of Engineers	Brig. Gen. William H. Black (61).
Chief Signal Officer	Brig. Gen. George C. Squier (52).

[9] Benedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson, *The Armies of Industry* (New Haven, 1921), I, pp. 1–19.

[10] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 551.


[11] *Ibid.* See also: WD GO 38, 2 Apr 17.

[12] Department Commanders on 6 Apr 17 were:

Eastern Department	Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood.
Central Department	Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Barry.
Southern Department	Maj. Gen. John J. Pershing.
Western Department	Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell.
Hawaiian Department	Brig. Gen. Frederick S. Strong.
Philippine Department	Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett.

[13] Hagedorn, *op. cit.*, II, p. 206.

Chart 8. Territorial Departments After 1 May 1917.*



O Department Headquarters.

*Source: *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War (1917–19): Zone of the Interior* (Washington, 1949), p. 552.

Military Manpower

The Forces in Being

The basic commodity of any military mobilization effort is manpower. Without trained soldiers, any war department superstructure is like the proverbial house built on sand. American military manpower on 6 April 1917 was composed of two general categories—the troops on hand and the troops on paper.

The military forces on hand, those immediately available for service, consisted of the Regular Army and the National Guard in Federal service. The strength of the Regular Army on 1 April 1917 was 5,791 officers and 121,797 enlisted men: a total of 127,588.[14] In addition, there were 169 officers and 5,354 enlisted men in the Philippine Scouts,[15] making the total of Regular forces 5,960 officers and 127,151 enlisted men, or an aggregate total of 133,111. These Regular Army troops were divided into branches of services as follows:[16]

Branch	*Total*	*Officers*	*Enlisted*
Total	133, 111	5, 960	127, 151
Regular Army	127, 588	5, 791	121, 797
General Officers, Staff, Etc	18, 911	1, 590	17, 321
Engineers	2, 416	254	2, 162
Cavalry	18, 203	917	17, 286
Field Artillery	8, 621	368	8, 253
Coast Artillery Corps	20, 923	771	20, 152
Infantry	46, 575	1, 891	44, 684
Miscellaneous	11, 939	0	11, 939
Philippine Scouts	5, 523	169	5, 354

The small size of this force is readily apparent. The authorized strength of the Regular Army was 7,252 officers and 138,897 enlisted men,[17] but in spite of vigorous recruiting activity the Regular Army, including the Philippine Scouts, was 1,292 officers and 11,746 enlisted men *below* its authorized strength. These forces might have made up some four divisions under the tables of organization ultimately used by our units in France [18] but only the Southern Department had enough troops within its jurisdiction to form a tactical division of 27,000 with supporting troops.[19]

---

[14] "Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1917*, p. 170.
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] Tables, "Strength of the Army for the Month of March 1917." Copy in records of TAG, Officers Division, 1916. National Archives.
[17] "Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1916*, p. 238.
[18] John Dickinson, *The Building of An Army* (New York, 1922), p. 107.
[19] "Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1917*, p. 170, table B.

Department	*Total*	*Officers*	*Enlisted*
Total	133, 111	5, 960	127, 151
Eastern	26, 538	781	25, 757
Central	698	81	617
Southern	49, 717	2, 055	47, 662
Western	7, 297	247	7, 050
Hawaiian	9, 900	338	9, 562
Philippine			
Regular Army	12, 428	448	11, 980
Philippine Scouts	5, 523	169	5, 354
In China	1, 383	40	1, 343
Miscellaneous	19, 627	1, 801	17, 826

The line forces of the Regular Army were organized into 3 engineer, 9 field artillery, 17 cavalry, and 38 infantry regiments.[20] The enlisted strength of the line units was approximately 72,000 men on 1 April 1917, but more than 22,000 of these were in units outside the continental United States. Altogether 1 engineer, 3 field artillery, 3⅓ cavalry, and 13 infantry regiments were scattered in 5 widely separated areas outside the United States.[21] This was almost one-third of our total Regular line organizations.

Of the line organizations in the United States, all engineer units (less 3 companies), all 6 regiments of field artillery, all cavalry regiments (less 1), and 22 of the 24 infantry regiments were concentrated in the border states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. The rest of the Army was scattered in a number of small posts throughout the United States.

In addition to the Regular Army forces on hand for immediate use there were the National Guard troops which had been called into Federal service, many of them between 25 March 1917 and the declaration of war on 6 April 1917. These National Guard forces in Federal service consisted of 3,733 officers and 76,713 enlisted men.[22] They came from every state in the Union except Kansas and Utah, none of whose men had been called, and Nevada, which had no National Guard at all. Thus on 6 April 1917 there were actually at the disposal of the War Department 127,588 Regular Army, 5,523 Philippine Scouts, and 80,446 National Guard troops, an aggregate total of 213,557 (9,693 officers and 203,864 enlisted men). These meager forces could be augmented by calling out the reserve forces and by voluntary enlistment.

---

[20] "Strength of the Army for the Month of March 1917," *op. cit.*

[21] WD, AGO, *Army List and Directory, March 20, 1917* (Washington, 1917).

[22] *Hearing,* HMAC, 65th Cong., 2d sess., "Army Appropriation Bill, 1919," I, p. 1321; "Report of the Chief of the Militia Bureau," *War Department Annual Reports, 1917,* p. 911.

*Table 20. Enlisted Strength of the National Guard, by States, 1 April 1917**

State	Total	In Federal Service	In State Service
Total	[a] 174, 008	76, 713	97, 295
Alabama	4, 181	3, 866	315
Arizona	672	672	0
Arkansas	1, 192	527	665
California	4, 853	3, 040	1, 813
Colorado	1, 290	448	842
Connecticut	3, 945	2, 631	1, 314
Delaware	544	299	245
District of Columbia	1, 943	1, 368	575
Florida	1, 446	273	1, 173
Georgia	4, 131	3, 443	688
Hawaii	4, 237	0	4, 237
Idaho	966	966	0
Illinois	6, 962	3, 411	3, 551
Indiana	3, 975	795	3, 180
Iowa	2, 244	932	1, 312
Kansas	1, 798	0	1, 798
Kentucky	3, 582	1, 980	1, 602
Louisiana	2, 093	1, 661	432
Maine	1, 976	932	1, 044
Maryland	3, 607	2, 100	1, 507
Massachusetts	9, 972	4, 104	5, 868
Michigan	3, 723	877	2, 846
Minnesota	3, 967	1, 231	2, 736
Mississippi	1, 285	1, 192	93
Missouri	4, 776	2, 456	2, 320
Montana	559	559	0
Nebraska	1, 300	663	637
Nevada	0	0	0
New Hampshire	1, 589	54	1, 535
New Jersey	6, 110	4, 387	1, 723
New Mexico	719	719	0
New York	25, 267	7, 422	17, 845
North Carolina	3, 287	849	2, 438
North Dakota	371	118	253
Ohio	8, 437	2, 398	6, 039
Oklahoma	632	559	73
Oregon	2, 294	1, 197	1, 097
Pennsylvania	14, 128	3, 940	10, 188
Rhode Island	2, 178	410	1, 768
South Carolina	2, 457	991	1, 466
South Dakota	899	282	617
Tennessee	3, 375	1, 031	2, 344
Texas	4, 347	3, 706	641
Utah	613	0	613
Vermont	1, 771	923	848
Virginia	3, 866	2, 341	1, 525
Washington	2, 407	1, 273	1, 134
West Virginia	2, 999	2, 116	883
Wisconsin	4, 659	1, 373	3, 286
Wyoming	384	198	186

[a] Excludes the enlisted National Guard Reserve which numbered 4,443 on 30 June 1917.

*Source: *Hearings*, HMAC, 65th Cong., 2d sess., "Army Appropriation Bill," I, p. 1321.

The Forces on Paper

The reserve forces which comprised the second major category of troops were divided into six distinct groups, each with a separate statutory basis in the National Defense Act of 1916. These troops on paper were the National Guard in state service, the Regular Army Reserve, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the ROTC, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the National Guard Reserve.

The National Guard forces still in state service on 1 April 1917 totaled 3,879 officers and 97,295 enlisted men, an aggregate total of 101,174.[23] They were scattered in all the states, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia with the exception of Arizona, Idaho, and Montana, whose units were all in Federal service, and Nevada, which had no National Guard. [*Table 20* shows the distribution of the enlisted strength of the National Guard as of 1 April 1917.] These National Guard forces constituted the only major reserve of manpower with any semblance of military organization. They were still under state jurisdiction, however, and were not all called into Federal service until 5 August 1917.

The Regular Army Reserve was established by an act of August 24, 1912, which provided for an enlistment period of seven years—four with the colors and three in the reserves.[24] The National Defense Act of 1916 provided:

> SEC. 30. Composition of the Regular Army Reserve.—The Regular Army Reserve shall consist of, first, all enlisted men now in the Army Reserve or who shall hereafter become members of the Army Reserve under the provisions of existing law; second, all enlisted men furloughed to or enlisted in the Regular Army Reserve under the provisions of this Act; and, third, any person holding an honorable discharge from the Regular Army with character reported at least good who is physically qualified for the duties of a soldier and not over forty-five years of age who enlists in the Regular Army Reserve for a period of four years.[25]

Prior honorable Regular service, voluntary enlistment, and physical and age standards were the prerequisite which made this a narrowly limited force in size. It was composed of former Regular enlisted men who were willing to serve on call. About three thousand members of the Regular Army Reserve were called to active duty 28 June 1916 and were thereafter carried on the Regular Army rolls.[26] The strength of the Regular Army Reserve in the various departments on 10 April 1917 was:[27]

---

[23] *Hearings*, HMAC, 65 Cong., 2d sess., "Army Appropriation Bill, 1919," I, p. 1321.
[24] "Report of the Secretary of War." *War Department Annual Reports, 1913*, p. 21.
[25] National Defense Act of 1916, *op. cit.*
[26] "Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1917*, p. 193.
[27] Memo, Ch, WCD to CofS, 18 Apr 17, sub: Regular Army Reservists. WCD 9587–29. Records of WDGS; AG 1906091. Both in National Archives.

Department	*Number*
Total	4,767
Eastern	2,172
Central	1,014
Southern	296
Western	690
Philippine	[a]595
Hawaiian	[b]

[a] Report as of 31 March 1917.
[b] No report.

The Regular Army Reserve not an active duty was mobilized 1 May 1917 and on 30 June 1917 The Adjutant General reported that there were 8,355 members of the Regular Army Reserve on active duty.

The Officers' Reserve Corps was also established by the National Defense Act of 1916. One of the most farsighted provisions of that piece of legislation stated:

> SEC. 37. The Officers' Reserve Corps.—For the purpose of securing a reserve of officers available for service as temporary officers in the Regular Army, as provided for in this Act and in section eight of the Act approved April twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and fourteen, as officers of the Quartermaster Corps and other staff corps and departments, as officers for recruit rendezvous and depots, and as officers of volunteers, there shall be organized, under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, an Officers' Reserve Corps of the Regular Army. Said corps shall consist of sections corresponding to the various arms, staff corps, and departments of the Regular Army.[28]

On 7 February 1917, The Adjutant General reported to the Chief of Staff that less than 500 Reserve officers of the line had been commissioned.[29] The Adjutant General's recommendation that immediate steps be taken to increase the number of Reserve officers was not approved by the War College Division until 27 February 1917. The following day, the Secretary of War approved a stepped-up recruiting program. By 1 March 1917, 939 Reserve officers had been commissioned and 565 others had been offered commissions but had not yet accepted them.[30] The initial failure to implement promptly Section 37 of the National Defense Act of 1916, plus the three weeks' lag in the approval of The Adjutant General's recommendations, served to delay the institution of a program, which would have provided some semblance of an officers' corps for the inevitable mobilization. The increased recruiting program resulted in the commissioning of a total of 7,957 Reserve officers by 15 May 1917, when all were sent to the first series of Officers' Training Camps.[31]

[28] National Defense Act of 1916.
[29] Memo, TAG to CofS, 7 Feb 17, sub. Officers' Reserve Corps. WCD 9153-75. Records of WDGS. National Archives.
[30] Memo, AGO, 1 Mar 17, sub: Officers' Reserve Corps. WCD 9153-85. *Ibid.*
[31] "Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1917*, p. 166.

The Reserve Officers' Training Corps had its beginnings in the Morrill Act of July 2, 1862, but was given real substance by Section 40, National Defense Act of 1916, which provided: "The President is hereby authorized to establish and maintain in civil educational institutions a Reserve Officers' Training Corps, which shall consist of a senior division organized at universities and colleges requiring four years of collegiate study for a degree, . . ." [32] After graduation, those who had completed the full ROTC program might be commissioned by the President in the Officers' Reserve Corps. Over 60 ROTC units had been authorized by 6 April 1917, although many of them had been authorized so recently that they could not have been functioning by that date.[33] Although this force was a reserve in training for another reserve force, its members can properly be included in the troops on paper.

The Enlisted Reserve Corps was also authorized by the National Defense Act of 1916:

> SEC. 55. The Enlisted Reserve Corps.—For the purpose of securing an additional reserve of enlisted men for military service with the Engineer, Signal, and Quartermaster Corps and the Ordnance and Medical Departments of the Regular Army, an Enlisted Reserve Corps, to consist of such number of enlisted men of such grade or grades as may be designated by the President from time to time, is hereby authorized, such authorization to be effective on and after the first day of July, nineteen hundred and sixteen.[34]

The slowness of the War Department in implementing this section of the National Defense Act resulted in a shortage of technical troops when they were most needed. The War College Division reported on 26 April 1917 that the total authorized strength of the Enlisted Reserve Corps was 24,000,[35] but there was probably less than 10,000 men enrolled in the Enlisted Reserve Corps on that date, and on 30 June 1917 the Corps totaled only 35,000.

The most nebulous of all the troops on paper was the National Guard Reserve, whose statutory basis was in Section 79, National Defense Act of 1916: "Subject to such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe, a National Guard Reserve shall be organized in each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia, and shall consist of such organizations, officers, and enlisted men as the President may prescribe, or members thereof may be assigned as reserves to an active organization of the National Guard." [36] On 30 June 1917 the Guard was composed of 4,443 men distributed in 26 states and ranging in number from 1,702 in New York to 21 in Delaware.[37] Probably some 4,000 of these men were enrolled before the declaration of war.

---

[32] National Defense Act of 1916.

[33] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior,* pp. 559, 567, 579, 590–91, 611, and 617.

[34] National Defense Act of 1916.

[35] Memo, Ch, WCD to CofS, 26 April 17, sub: Enlisted Reserve Corps. WCD 9972–2. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[36] National Defense Act of 1916.

[37] "Report of the Chief of the Militia Bureau," *War Department Annual Reports, 1917,* p. 911.

By way of summary or review, the total troops on paper can be estimated at approximately 122,000 on 6 April 1917, distributed as follows:

Reserve Force Group	*Number*
Total	122,000
National Guard in State Service	101,000
Regular Army Reserve	5,000
Officers Reserve Corps	2,000
Enlisted Reserve Corps	10,000
Enlisted National Guard Reserve	4,000

The obvious conclusion is that the troops on paper, except for the National Guard, comprised an insignificant force. The failure of the War Department to speedily implement the provisions of the National Defense Act of 1916 for the Officers' Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps was one of the more serious errors in the prewar period. Officers and technical specialists were necessary before the process of raising and training sizable forces could begin; their lack undoubtedly delayed and hampered mobilization when it came.

Voluntary Enlistments

With the troops on paper practically negligible, the only immediate means of augmenting the troops on hand on 6 April 1917 was by voluntary enlistment. In his war message, however, President Wilson had flatly stated that war with Germany "will involve the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States already provided for by law in case of war at least five hundred thousand men, who should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service." [38] This was, however, a thought for future legislation; it could not be accomplished immediately. For the moment, the Army still had to rely on voluntary enlistments, utilizing the recruiting machinery in existence.

Recruiting for the Regular Army was under the jurisdiction of The Adjutant General who had a special section in his office to handle the program. Actual recruiting was, of course decentralized. As of 20 March 1917 there were 62 general recruiting stations and 173 central recruiting stations, which were really substations, making a total of 235 recruiting points in the United States. Large cities, such as New York and Chicago, had several recruiting stations,[39] There were 188 officers [40] and 1,617 enlistem men [41] assigned to the recruiting service. Of the officers, 108 were Regular Army and 80 were retired Regular Army on active duty. From the recruiting stations, the Volunteers who passed preliminary tests and physicals

[38] Baker and Dodd, *op. cit.*, I, p. 10.
[39] *Army List and Directory, March 20, 1917*, pp. 73-74.
[40] "Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1917*, p. 184.
[41] "Strength of the Army for the Month of March 1917," *op. cit.*

were sent to any one of 5 recruit depots, or to one of 11 recruit depot posts.[42] At these depots, the recruits were given further physical examinations before being sworn into the service. That the physical standards were high was indicated by the fact that only 44 percent of the applicants were finally accepted by the Regular Army.[43] The effectiveness of the recruiting program in obtaining Volunteers is demonstrated by the enlistment statistics. [See *table 21.*]

The rapid increase in the number of recruits from March to April was in response to the declaration of war. The recruiting service also was "called upon to assist the department commanders in securing recruits for the Enlisted Reserve Corps and the National Guard in Federal Service." [44] The recruiting service apparently was able to handle the tremendous increase in voluntary enlistments without serious difficulty. Its decentralization and trained personnel helped it adjust to the rush of Volunteers which more than quadrupled its load in a month. Although recruiting machinery itself was adequate, the principle of voluntary enlistment was not.

Table 21. Enlistments and Reenlistments: Fiscal Year 1917 *

Type and period	Total	Enlistments	Reenlistments
Total	[a]159, 180	155, 455	3, 725
Staff Departments [b]	25, 248	24, 488	760
Line of the Army	133, 932	130, 967	2, 965
1916 July	4, 145	4, 108	37
August	2, 858	2, 840	18
September	2, 271	2, 256	15
October	2, 431	2, 412	19
November	3, 116	2, 747	369
December	3, 938	3, 624	314
1917 January	4, 059	3, 744	315
February	4, 688	4, 185	503
March	6, 374	5, 980	394
April	29, 027	28, 674	353
May	39, 589	39, 153	436
June	31, 436	31, 244	192

[a] Excludes 795 enlistments and 109 reenlistments in the Philippine Scouts.
[b] Separate monthly data not available.

* *Source:* Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1917,* p. 187.

[42] Recruit depots at the time of our entrance into the war were located at Columbus Barracks, Ohio; Jefferson Barracks, Mo.; Fort Logan, Colo.; Fort McDowell, Calif.; and Fort Slocum, N. Y. Recruits depot posts were located at Fort Bliss, Tex.; Fort Douglas, Utah; Fort George Wright, Wash.; Fort Huachuca, Ariz.; Jackson Barracks, La.; Fort Lawton, Wash.; Fort Sam Houston, Tex.; Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.; Fort Screven Ga.; U. S. Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.; and Vancouver Barracks, Wash.
[43] "Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1917,* p. 187.
[44] *Ibid.,* p. 193.

Planning for Economic Mobilization

The Early Emergency Agencies

To accomplish economic mobilization which was to be such an important phase of the war program there were special planning groups in existence on 6 April 1917 in addition to the military structure. The main group concerned with economic policy was the Council of National Defense. The Council dealt only with top policy questions: actual planning was done by the Advisory Commission. While the General Staff was hampered by lack of personnel and actual prohibitions against planning, this group of competent citizens was able to initiate effective plans for economic mobilization from the start:

> . . . [It] devised the entire system of purchasing war supplies, planned a press censorship, designed a system of food control and selected Herbert Hoover, as its director, determined on a daylight-saving scheme, and in a word designed practically every war measure which the Congress subsequently enacted, and did all this behind closed doors, weeks and even months before the Congress of the United States declared war against Germany. . . . [This commission] formed an organization . . . for selling supplies to the Government, which organization was well perfected before the war was declared.[45]

Another organizational step was taken 17 March 1947 when the Munitions Standards Board was established as a branch of the Council of National Defense. In spite of these economic mobilization organizations and their successors, the United States was in the war for a year before there was a comprehensive approach to economic mobilization.[46] [See *ch. IX*, this study, for a more complete discussion of the industrial mobilization agencies.]

The Organization for Supply

The supplies to equip and maintain manpower in a military mobilization are of equal importance with that basic commodity. But, in spite of its importance, there seems to have been no coordinating contact between the General Staff manpower procurement policies and the supply bureaus of the Army (Quartermaster, Ordnance, Signal, Engineers, and Medical Corps). At the outset of war the functions of these supply bureaus were:

1. The Quartermaster Corps: Subsistence, transportation, animals and vehicles, forage, camp and garrison equipage, clothing, construction of buildings, roads, bridges, ships, etc., retail stores at posts, pay of the Army.
2. Medical Department: Medical and hospital supplies.
3. Corps of Engineers: Certain construction, electrical supplies, engineering problems of supply routes.
4. Ordnance Department: Procured ordnance and ordnance stores, cannon and artillery vehicles, equipment and ammunition, personal and horse equip-

[45] Clarkson, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–25.

[46] Harold J. Tobin and Percy W. Bidwell, *Mobilizing Civilian America* (New York, 1940), pp. 10–11.

ment and harness, ordnance tools, machinery, and materials, maintained arsenals and depots.

5. Signal Corps: All supplies connected with signaling, telephones, telegraph, balloons, and airplanes.

. . . [These] bureaus [were] five separate purchasing agencies with separate systems of finance, storage, and distribution, each feeling itself largely independent within its own sphere of action, accustomed by long habit and tradition to perform its various functions without reference to the activities of the others or of other departments of the Government. . . . [They competed] with each other as well as with the other great agencies of the Government and of the Allies, for manufactured articles, raw materials, industrial facilities, labor, fuel, power, and transportation.[47]

The Degree of Logistic Readiness

In order to assess the degree of logistic readiness for our entrance into the war, each of the five supply departments must be considered individually as to the supplies on hand, the needs, and the outlook for fulfilling those needs. On 27 February 1917, the War College Division directed the supply bureaus to prepare estimates of the supplies needed to equip a force of about 1,000,000 men, including the Regular Army, National Guard, and 500,000 Volunteers. All supplies on hand and in the possession of the Regular Army and National Guard were to be included in the estimates. The supply bureaus were also to estimate how much time would be required to obtain supplies not on hand.[48] Since all estimates were made for a total ultimate force of only 1,000,000 men, the fact that the ultimate strength attained by the Army on 11 November 1918 was 3,685,458,[49] should be kept in mind.

Quartermaster Corps

The Quartermaster General reported that as of 2 March 1917 the supply situation in his department was as follows:

Clothing and Camp and Garrison Equipage: Only the enlisted men of the Regular Army can be considered as fully equipped with Equipment "C" (field service equipment). The National Guard cannot be considered fully equipped, therefore supplies will be necessary for—

Regular Army (war strength; all increments added)	141,763
National Guard (war strength)	318,000
Volunteers	500,000
	959,763

It is estimated that there is in stock at the general supply depots sufficient Equipment "C" for approximately 75,000 additional new men, but this is a

[47] "Report of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1919,* pp. 340–41.

[48] Memo, Ch, WCD to SG, QMG, Ch of Engrs, Ch of Ord, and CSO, 27 Feb 17, sub: Supply estimates requested. WCD 9433–11/A in OCE 104860. Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers. National Archives.

[49] This figure excludes about 21,500 Army nurses and 3,600 Army field clerks and field clerks, Quartermaster Corps. Officer strength of 200,004 was obtained from the records of the Precedent and History Branch, Comptroller Division, The Adjutant General's Office, and enlisted strength of 3,485,454 from "Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1919,* p. 496.

working stock and if used to equip new troops, there will be nothing left from which to meet current requirements. . . . it should be stated that no supplies are available for the equipment of Volunteers.

The necessary clothing and equipage supplies for 500,000 Volunteers could be purchased in from seven to eight months under war conditions. Adding to the 500,000 Volunteers, the National Guard and remainder of the Regular Army to be equipped, a total of approximately 960,000 men, it will require from nine to twelve months to procure the necessary clothing equipment for these men.[50]

The Quartermaster General further predicted that transportation equipment, including horses, mules, and motor transportation, could be obtained in from 60 to 90 days; basic necessities could be purchased in the open market within 30 days; other miscellaneous supplies could be obtained about as rapidly as the Army was increased. These estimates subsequently proved to be too optimistic, and in a memorandum of 18 July 1917 The Quartermaster General was forced to recommend that the assembling of the National Army be postponed from 1 September 1917 until October.[51]

Ordnance Department

Although the Ordnance Department was one of the most vital supply bureaus, it entered the war completely unprepared for the task ahead of it. Of the 97 officers on duty, only 10 were experienced in the design of artillery weapons, and the projected Army of 5,000,000 men required 11,000 trained officers to handle every phase of ordnance service.[52]

In reply to the War College Division query of 27 February about supplies on hand, the Ordnance Department reported that there was on hand personal equipment for 400,000 men; horse equipment for a force of 270,000 men; rifles for 890,000 men; pistols for a force of 298,000 men; ball cartridges, caliber .30, for 95,000 men; and pistol ball cartridges, caliber .45, for 63,000 men. Rifles were the only item on hand in sufficient quantity to equip even half the contemplated force. Existing orders for equipment to be delivered by 1 September would have provided additional personal equipment for 200,000 men; horse equipment for a force of 63,000 men; rifles for 127,000 men; pistols for 165,000 men; ball cartridges, caliber .30, for 146,000 men; and pistol ball cartridges, caliber .45, for 254,000 men. There would be only enough rifles on hand and on order for a force of 1,000,000 men by 1 September 1917. The shortage of reserves of small arms ammunition was particularly critical. It was estimated that to produce enough supplies for 1,000,000 men would take at least one year after the funds had been made available by Congress and provided no limitations were

[50] Memo, QMG to Ch, WCD, 2 Mar 17, sub: Supply Statement. WCD 9433–11/C. Records of WDGS. National Archives.
[51] Memo, QMG to CofS, 18 July 17, sub: Clothing Shortage. WCD 9876–53. *Ibid.*
[52] Benedict Crowell, *America's Munitions, 1917–1918* (Washington, 1919), p. 25.

placed on the amount which might be expended in the purchase thereof.[53]

In regard to artillery, the report stated:

> The artillery material in the hands of troops and in store this date is sufficient to equip about *3½ Army Corps*, or approximately, 220,000 men, except 9.5" howitzers, complete as to the number of guns required, but not in proper proportion as to the calibers and kind. Of this, 8½ batteries are in Panama, Hawaii and the Philippine Islands.
>
> To provide the remainder of the equipment required . . . to equip the entire Regular Army and National Guard at their full strength (about 1,000,000 men), if called out this date by the President, would require about 2½ years time. . . .
>
> The artillery ammunition on hand or under manufacture is the full . . . allowance for the artillery in the hands of troops and in store this date. This artillery is sufficient to equip about *3½ Army Corps*, or approximately 222,000 men, except 9.5" howitzers, complete as to the number of guns required, but not in proper proportion as to calibers and kind. Of this, 8½ batteries are in Panama, Hawaii and the Philippine Islands.
>
> To provide the remainder of the ammunition required to equip the entire Regular Army and National Guard (about 1,000,000 men), would require about one year and a half. . . .[54]

Another weapon which came into its own in World War I was the machine gun. In March 1917:

> The present 38 regiments of infantry and 17 regiments of cavalry (Regulars) are equipped with five machine guns each, one of these being a spare gun.
>
> Fifty-four (54) machine gun organizations of the National Guard are equipped with 4 Lewis guns each. Of the latter, the guns of 50 companies, a total of 200, are being turned in by order of the Secretary of War for re-issue to the Signal Corps for equipment of aero-planes. No further machine guns are available for issue at this time.
>
> To procure the entire equipment of machine guns required for the Army of 1,000,000 (as provided by the report of the Machine Gun Board, approved by the Secretary of War), 17,283, assuming the conditions as to appropriations, etc., to be the same as for field artillery materiel would require about 18 months.[55]

The Government itself owned and operated the Springfield and Rock Island Arsenals which produced the Model 1903 (Springfield) rifle; in addition, three private plants which had been producing Enfields for Great Britain had almost filled their contracts and could begin manufacturing modified Enfields for the United States. The

---

[53] Memo, Ch of Ord to Ch, WCD, 17 Mar 17, sub: Supply Statement. WCD 9433–11/F. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] *Ibid.* Benedict Crowell (*America's Munitions, 1917–1918*, p. 161), stated:

> On the 6th day of April 1917, our equipment included 670 Benét Mercié machine rifles, 282 Maxim machine guns of the 1904 model, 353 Lewis machine guns, and 148 Colt machine guns. The Lewis guns, however, were chambered for the .303 British ammunition and would not take our service cartridges. Moreover, the manufacturing facilities for machine guns in this country were much more limited in extent than the public had any notion of then or today. . . . We had at the outbreak of the war only two factories in the United States which were actually producing machine guns in in any quantity at all.

productive capacity for rifles alone was adequate,[56] but they were the big exception in the ordnance supply picture, for the supply of all other items, especially artillery, ammunition, and machine guns, was practically neglible.

Signal Corps

The Signal Corps in 1917 included the fast developing air forces of the Army. Before World War I, the communications system of armies had been rudimentary, but in that war extensive use of telegraph, telephone, radio, and airplanes was made for the first time. In a report on the Signal Corps supply situation, 3 March 1917, the Chief Signal Officer stated:

> 1. . . . this office is in a position to furnish Signal Corps supplies to the present regular establishment, plus the second increment, and to the National Guard as now organized with the exception of wheel radio sets and of field glasses for the National Guard. . . .
>
> 2. Signal equipment for the three remaining increments of the Regular Army, for any increases in the National Guard, and for 500,000 volunteers, is not available. It is estimated that to obtain complete equipment for such a force will require six months from the date authority is given to obligate funds for the purpose.
>
> 3. There is no extra equipment consisting of airplanes, motorcycles, autotrucks and other airplane supplies on hand or under orders in the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps that could be applied in the organization and training of the proportionate number of aerial units comprised in a volunteer force of 500,000 that might be called to active service. . . .
>
> 6. Assuming the organization of 20 aerial units from 500,000 volunteers, equipment with airplanes alone would require at least nine months. Trucks and other supplies could be turned out in three months.
>
> 7. . . . the flying personnel required by these 20 squadrons . . . could not be turned out inside of one year.[57]

Although most of the signal equipment and personnel could be readily procured from industry because of the similarity between Army and civilian equipment and operations, such was not the case in the field of aviation. There were few aircraft and practically no aircraft industries. Yet it was in the field of aircraft production that America's fabled industrial might was expected to turn out miracles on an assembly line.[58]

Engineer Corps

The Engineer Corps was the smallest of the five supply bureaus as far as quantity was concerned and probably entered the war better prepared than the others. A force of 18 infantry divisions and 6 cavalry divisions, or 500,000 men, could be fully equipped except for deficiencies in searchlight and ponton equipment. Of the latter, enough were

---

[56] Crowell, *America's Munitions, 1917–1918*, p. 179.

[57] Memo, CSO to Ch, WCD, 3 Mar 17, sub: Supply Statement. WCD 9433–11/E. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[58] Crowell, *America's Munitions, 1917–1918*, p. 235.

on order to furnish searchlight equipment for 3 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, or 85,000 men. Engineer supplies for an additional force of 500,000 men could be procured, provided funds were available, in about three months except for the special equipment, such as searchlights, ponton equipage, surveying and optical instruments, armored cars, etc., the supply of which would require probably a year.[59]

The heavy medical supplies purchased by the Allied nations had already put a heavy strain on medical supply productive capacity before the United States entered the war.[60] As early as 7 February 1917 The Surgeon General pointed out the lack of reserve medical supplies and warned that it would take from eight months to a year to procure all necessary equipment and supplies. The reply to the War College Division inquiry on supplies indicates that stockpiling recommendations by The Surgeon General had not been implemented: ". . . the Medical Department has on hand, in reserve, sufficient equipment for the regular Army when it shall be raised to its full strength as authorized by the National Defense Act. It has no additional material to equip volunteers. It would take from eight to twelve months to secure the sanitary equipment for five hundred volunteers." [61] With its disastrous lack of preparation in the Spanish-American War still in mind, the Medical Department was acutely aware of its inadequacies in 1917.

In review, the supply situation seems to have been even more vulnerably inadequate than military manpower. With few exceptions, there was no reserve of supplies available or on order on 6 April 1917. The needs after the declaration of war were almost beyond comprehension. The outlook for procuring these supplies was exceedingly discouraging. By December 1917, the supply system had almost faltered to a halt; it resumed momentum only after complete reorganization and overhauling.

The Immediate Shipping Crisis

Germany had resumed unrestricted submarine warfare 1 February 1917 and by April 1917 was making serious inroads in Allied shipping. When we entered the war, we were faced with the necessity of transporting troops and supplies across three thousand miles of submarine-infested oceans. Our merchant marine was comparatively small; and we had almost no troopships capable of making the voyage to France and back. The army transport fleet included the troopships *Kilpatrick*, *Logan*, *Sheridan*, and *Thomas*, the cargo ships *Buford*, *Summer*, and *Dix*, and some others of both sorts. In addition to the Army

[59] Memo, Ch of Engrs to Ch, WCD, 2 Mar 17, sub: Supply Statement. WCD 9433–11/D, Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[60] Crowell, *America's Munitions, 1917–1918*, p. 512.

[61] Memo, SG to Ch, WCD, 2 Mar 17, sub: Supply Statement. WCD 9433–11/B. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

transports, the Navy had two of its own: the *Henderson*, still under construction in April 1917 but nearing completion, and the *Hancock*, an old vessel of slow speed, later withdrawn from overseas transport duty because of her unseaworthy condition.[62]

The sources of shipping which could be utilized in the emergency to get men and supplies to France were strictly limited. By construction, seizure, purchase, leasing, and borrowing, the United States increased the shipping available for transatlantic service and eventually moved the Army and its supplies to France. Every ship available was utilized to the fullest extent. When we entered the war, however, the overall shipping outlook was bad; sinkings were exceeding launchings and until the submarine menace could be reduced it might be impossible to send anything to Europe. [See *ch. IX*, this study, for a detailed analysis of the shipping situation in World War I and its effect on mobilization.]

The Plans and Planners, 6 April 1917

It is apparent that the manpower and supplies available for offensive action against the German Empire immediately after 6 April 1917 were entirely inadequate—indeed, practically nonexistent. The situation could have been eased had there been available adequate, functional plans for the gigantic mobilization effort. The General Staff on duty in Washington was exceedingly small and many of the few officers in Washington were tied up with routine administrative duties. Five months after our entrance into the war, only eight of the General Staff officers who were in the War Department on 6 April 1917 were still in Washington.[63] General Scott, during that period, had been away three months on a mission to Russia. The 21 other General Staff Corps officers outside of Washington at the beginning of the war were scattered from Texas to Romania and the Philippines. Only 2 out of the 21 were recalled to Washington before 1 September 1917. The unusually large turnover in General Staff officers at the War Department undoubtedly had a detrimental effect on current planning for the entire war effort.

The plan on hand fell into two categories: (1) the strategic war plans; (2) the plans for raising and equipping the forces needed to carry out the war plans. The War College had plans in its files in 1917 to be used in the event of hostilities with any one of four powers.[64] At least one of these plans was prepared in considerable detail and was constantly revised to keep it current. The other three plans were in

---

[62] Albert Gleaves, *A History of the Transport Service* (New York, 1921), p. 28.

[63] *Army Directory, September 1, 1917.*

[64] "Study and Report of the G–3 Features of the War Department War Plans and Preparations for War from the Time of the Revolutionary War to Include the World War." File 352–4A, pp. 25–50. AWC. This study contains the only authoritative summary of prewar planning known to exist.

lesser conditions of completeness. None of these plans was ever used in whole or in part.

The statement has repeatedly been made that when we went to war on 6 April 1917 we had no plan for war against Germany, strategic or tactical. That statement is true only in the sense of complete war plans as they are understood in 1952. Incomplete plans had been prepared by the General Staff before 6 April 1917 which envisaged war with Germany. These plans, however, were so fragmentary that they could not have been considered in violation of the President's known opposition to such planning.

The first plan for use in the event of a war with Germany was prepared in 1915. It assumed a defensive war on our part with Germany attacking the Atlantic coast. The plan included the calling of 1,000,000 Volunteers. The second plan was submitted on 29 February 1916. This plan, however, was incomplete. It looked only into the initial action of the War Department in the event of a complete rupture and had in mind principally such matters as the guarding of munitions plants, establishment of a national censorship, etc. It did not change the previous plan with reference to the call for 1,000,000 Volunteers, but limited the first call to 400,000 men.[65]

In the interval between these two plans, the War College Division had prepared *The Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States* and the Continental Army Plan, which had been rejected. The second German War Plan had been prepared while General Scott was serving as Secretary of War ad interim between the Garrison and Baker regimes. The Mexican crises and the work entailed along with the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916 kept the small General Staff more than occupied. The basic steps to be taken by the War Department in case of war with Germany were determined simultaneously with the severance of diplomatic relations, 3 February 1917, and were summarized in a memorandum by the War College Division entitled "Preparation for possible hostilities with Germany."[66] [See *App. A.*]

On 30 October 1916 the Chief of Staff directed the War College Division, with the assistance of the Army War College, to make a new survey of the military policy of the United States in light of the effects of the war in Europe. Then on 12 December 1916 he specifically directed the War College Division to prepare a study of a system of training and universal service to form the basis for legislation. The study was submitted to the Chief of Staff in its final form on 14

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[66] Memo, Ch. WCD to CofS, 3 Feb 17, sub: Preparations for possible hostilities with Germany. WCD 9433/4. Copy filed as incl. to memo, Lt G. E. Adamson (aide to Pershing) to TAG, 20 Feb 23, sub: Request for information on prewar plans. AG 381. National Archives.

February 1917 and to Congress on 23 February.[67] Briefly, this so-called National Army Plan advocated a system of universal military training under which each year some 520,000 19-year-olds would receive one year of training and then pass to the reserves. The country was to be divided into 16 divisional training areas. Each training area was to contain eventually three reserve divisions in the first reserve and three in the second. The organizational system was built on the idea of a pyramid. Men from each training division would be divided among the three reserve divisions at the end of each training period. After four years in the first reserve, which would be subject to immediate call, men would move on for seven years to the second reserve, whose divisions would be subject to call and 90 days' refresher training before action. Men in the first reserve would have been required to serve for two weeks each summer to give the organizations of trained men some experience in functioning as a unit. While taking training, the Reservists would be paid $5 a month to cover personal items. In time of war they would receive full pay and allowances while on active duty. A system of registration was outlined, utilizing the Post Office Department as the registration organization. The only exemptions from training would be given to the physically unfit. To set up such a military program would have then required an increase in the Regular Army to 24,400 officers and 285,886 enlisted men, an aggregate total of 310,286. The estimated cost of this National Army program is analyzed below:[68]

Comparison of Cost of Maintenance and Effective Strength Under the National Defense Act and the Proposed National Army Plan

	National Defense Act	*Proposed National Army plan*
Trained and partially trained soldiers available for war after either system is in full operation	[a] 1,137,200	[b] 3,296,023
Annual cost	$339,548,000.00	[c] 572,258,746.00
Per capita cost	298.58	143.28

[a] Includes 826,572 National Guard and other partially trained troops. The number given is the total number. This number may or may not be forthcoming under the Volunteer system.

[b] This number does not include 475,000 recruits undergoing training nor does it include the trained Reservists who have completed their service in the organized Reserves. The number given is the number of troops in organized units, all of whom have had a minimum of 11 months' intensive training. In addition to this initial training 2,229,500 of these Reservists will have had two repeating seasons of two weeks each. Under this plan the total number of trained soldiers will ultimately include all able-bodied male citizens over 18 years of age.

[c] Includes cost of repeating seasons and also the annual cost of maintenance of 475,000 recruits undergoing training. This number of recruits is not included in the strength shown in this column of the table because they are only partially trained.

---

[67] Memo, to all WCD officers, 12 Dec 16, sub: Plans; Ltr, SW to Sen George E. Chamberlain, SMAC, 23 Feb 17, sub: National Army Plan. WCD File 9876/1 and 23. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[68] *Congressional Record*, 64th Cong., 2d sess., 8 Mar 17, p. 5751.

The National Army Plan was an elaborate, long-range program. The comments of the General Staff officers on the National Army Plan are indicative of the thinking at the War Department two months before we entered the war. Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn's comments were: "The Committee's plan, if put into effect, would undoubtedly accomplish the purposes in view. Its cost is, however, prohibitive, and it is a practical certainty that it will not be adopted by Congress. To meet this objection it is suggested that . . . the annual contingent of recruits be . . . cut in two." Col. William H. Johnston's: "The sincerest friends of universal liability to military training would hesitate to indorse this plan, as (1) It increases the Regular Army too much. (2) It attempts to train too many. (3) It will prove unduly expensive." Col. George B. Duncan's: "The plan appeals to me very strongly in its simplicity of means to bring about the desired end, and in its decentralization of authority for training forces. It presents excellent groundwork for further detailed study, especially as to the matter of cost. But the broad principles outlined are believed to be sound." Lt. Col. William S. Graves: "It seems to me that in view of the cost we must expect modification before Congress seriously considers the report." Maj. Douglas MacArthur's: "I concur in this report as a whole, reserving to myself liberty of future discussion of the details thereof." Maj. Frank S. Cocheu's: "In my opinion the report of the Committee of the General Staff calls for too large a force." Maj. Dennis E. Nolan's: ". . . I concur in the report and draft of law on a plan for a National Army." [69] General Bliss perhaps best summarized the chief thought in the mind of each General Staff officer:

> In the preparation of any plan, it is unfortunate that we cannot get any clew to the one factor which ultimately, in this country, is likely to decide for or against any system proposed. That factor is the maximum cost which will be regarded by Congress and the people and the voters as prohibitive. If we know that factor, however insufficient it might be from our point of view, we could make the best plans for the utilization of the sum allowed.[70]

The National Army Plan was designed as a long-range defensive measure. The General Staff was working in a vacuum, ignoring the events of those early February days of 1917, and uncertain as to what role the United States Army would play. The only indication that the War College Division considered adapting this plan to an immediate emergency is in the memorandum from General Kuhn transmitting the report to the Chief of Staff.

> The system of training as outlined in the statement and covered by the proposed draft of legislation is one adapted to normal peace conditions when ample time is available for deliberate preparation. If such a system should

[69] Comments made in early Feb 17 at request of CofS are contained in WCD 9876–15. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[70] Memo ACofS to CofS, 31 Jan 17, sub: National Army Plan. WCD 9876–13. *Ibid.*

be inaugurated in time of emergency with the view of providing an army in a minimum of time, the plan should be modified in certain essential particulars. The War College Division has in preparation a modified plan adapted to emergency conditions.[71]

Eventually, an adaptation of the National Army Plan served as a basis for the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917. The fact that the War College Division had prepared such a plan and presented it to Congress before the declaration of war was an achievement. The National Army Plan was the keystone of prewar planning; its flexibility was one of its strongest features.[72]

Certain general policies advocated by the War College Division in its 15 March plan for a force of 500,000 Volunteers in addition to the Regular Army and National Guard must also be mentioned. First of all, the War College Division strongly advised against any attempt to raise an army by voluntary enlistments. The division was certain that the President, Congress, and the people were willing to accept conscription; that any force would need at least one year of training before it would be ready for offensive action; that the Regular Army should not be overexpanded but that only the second increment should be added. It stated: "It may be remarked that the employment of any portion of the Regular Army in an expeditionary force to the European theatre of war will be inadvisable, in view of the necessity of maintaining garrisons in our overseas possessions and the possibility of disturbances on the Mexican border and in Cuba." [73]

It can be concluded that such strategic war plans existed for war with Germany, were designed for a defensive war, were general in nature, and were totally inapplicable to the situation on 6 April 1917. Mobilization planning was, however, slightly more advanced. The General Staff had considered the possibility of war after 3 February 1917 and had made specific recommendations to meet such a contingency. It had also prepared plans for raising forces varying from 500,000 to 1,500,000. The National Army Plan for universal military training was the most functional piece of planning which the War College Division prepared and was eventually adopted as the basis for the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917. It is remarkable that so much was accomplished, considering the inadequate number of General Staff officers, the resistance of the Wilson administration to war planning, the confusion concerning the foreign policy of the United States, and the complete lack of coordination between foreign and military policy.

---

[71] Memo, Ch, WCD to CofS, 14 Feb 17, sub: System of National Defense based on universal liability to military training and service. WCD 9876–20. *Ibid.*

[72] AWC 352–4A, pp. 44–46. AWC.

[73] Memo, Ch, WCD to CofS, 15 Mar 17, sub: 500,000 Volunteer Plan. WCD 9433–11 in OCE 104860. Records of Office of Chief of Engineers, National Archives.

From the perspective afforded by time, and with no attempt to blame any individual or group, it may be concluded that in organization, personnel, troops, supplies, and plans the War Department on 6 April 1917 was only very slightly prepared to face the gigantic military mobilization before it. The only major improvement since the Spanish-American War had been the institution of the General Staff. Although imperfect in organization, inadequate in numbers, the General Staff during the war was to develop into an efficient planning operating machine which brought order out of confusion and enabled the United States to make a major contribution to the winning of the war.

CHAPTER VIII

DEVELOPMENT OF MOBILIZATION PROCEDURES AND MACHINERY

The Legislative Bases for Manpower Procurement

"When war was declared against Germany on April 6, 1917, we were totally unprepared to give any immediate military aid to our allies in Europe. At least a year must elapse before any considerable American Army could be formed even in America." [1] The history of that year is the history of the developing military mobilization with its crises and sacrifices, and the ultimate creation of a large, semi-trained American Army. It had taken three years to create an effective offensive Northern Army in the Civil War, but the United States was in better shape in 1917 than it had been in 1861. President Wilson was supported by a united country; the War Department was organized on a better basis with its civilian head assisted by a Chief of Staff and a General Staff Corps; and the service schools and Army War College had developed a small reservoir of officers with a thorough scientific training for the conduct of war.[2]

The legislative basis for the mobilization effort at the time of our entrance into the war was the National Defense Act of 1916. Briefly, it provided for an increase in the Regular Army in five annual increments; it provided for the "federalization" of the Organized Militia into the National Guard; it created the Officers Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps; and it gave the President broad powers in the field of economic mobilization. It also reduced the number of General Staff officers in Washington and attempted to limit General Staff activities to a purely advisory status; this attempt, however, was thwarted by the ambiguous wording of the law. As Secretary of War Newton D. Baker interpreted the law, the General Staff should continue to function as it had before the National Defense Act was passed.[3]

The National Defense Act of 1916 was revised and supplemented by the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917. These two military mobilization laws were the basis for the entire war effort. Other

[1] John McA. Palmer, *Washington-Lincoln-Wilson, Three War Statesmen* (New York, 1930), p. 325.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 328.

[3] "Report of the Secretary of War," *War Department Annual Reports, 1916*, pp. 70–80.

items of military legislation were passed by Congress almost daily. These included an item in an appropriations bill of May 12, 1917, increasing the General Staff Corps to 91 officers for the emergency (all restrictions subsequently removed by Section 11, Act of May 18, 1917); an act of April 6, 1918, creating the offices of the Second and Third Assistant Secretaries of War; and a major amendment of the Selective Service Act on August 31, 1918. Appropriations bills in particular contained minor changes in military organization, procedures, or authorizations. The Overman Act of May 20, 1918, permitted the major reorganizations in mobilization agencies in 1918.

The passage of the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, was due in part to the educational campaign conducted by the influential National Association for Universal Military Training under the presidency of Lt. Gen. S. B. M. Young (Ret.) who had been the first Chief of Staff in 1903. Elihu Root and Henry L. Stimson were active members of the association. Most of the early discussion of legislation centered around the bill for universal military and naval training drawn up by Capt. George VanHorn Mosely while he was on duty with the General Staff in 1916.[4] Although universal and selective service were interwoven in many discussions, an early distinction was made by Brig. Gen. M. M. Macomb, chief of the War College Division, in a letter dated 15 June 1916 advocating not universal training, but liability for universal service with those needed to be obtained by a selective process.[5]

Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff, was in a position to exert the greatest possible influence on the Secretary of War and the President on all military matters. In his annual report dated 30 September 1916 General Scott urged that the ". . . volunteer system in this country . . . be relegated to the past."[6] In testimony before a Senate Committee 19 December 1916 General Scott said "The time has come when this country must resort to universal liability to military training and service."[7] It was in December, too, that General Scott requested that the War College Division prepare a specific plan for universal military training. After considerable study, the National Army Plan was prepared, approved by General Scott, and submitted to Congress by Secretary Baker in February 1917. This, however, was a long-range plan and not precisely suited to the exigencies of April 1917. It served a useful educational purpose, however, and many of its salient features found their way into the Selective Service

[4] The Moseley material is found in WCD 9317. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[5] Ltr, Ch, WCD to W. D. Cowles, Spokane, Wash., 15 Jun 16, sub: Universal Service WCD 9317–7. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[6] "Report of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1916*, p. 159.

[7] A copy of General Scott's testimony 19 Dec 16 is filed under WCD 9317–14. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

Act of May 18, 1917.[8] In addition to General Scott, Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood was a consistent and vociferous advocate of compulsory service although the two frequently differed over details of specific proposals.

Shortly after the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany on 3 February 1917 Secretary Baker himself became convinced of the necessity for compulsory service. Writing after the war was over he stated:

> After the suspension of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany, General Scott, discussing with me the possibility of our entrance into the war, raised the question of the method by which men should be called to the service. He told me that, in his own view, there should be a draft law at the very outset and that we should avoid the British experience of starting out with the volunteer system and being later obliged to come to the draft. In this discussion I became convinced of the soundness of the suggestion and at once laid it before the President, who discussed it with me earnestly and at length and in the end, approved the suggestion saying, "Have the law drawn at once so that, if I should be obliged to go to the Congress, I can refer to it in my message as a law ready to be presented for their consideration."[9]

Secretary Baker then proceeded to draft a bill embodying the idea of selective service. A series of conferences were held in his office with Generals Scott, Bliss, Kuhn, Crowder, and others participating. General Scott was one of the few officers who believed that such a measure could be pushed through Congress. Strangely enough General Crowder who subsequently became Provost Marshal General ". . . was steadily opposed to the introduction of such a bill in Congress because he did not believe either Congress or the people would accept the system."[10] Finally a bill was prepared, approved by the President, and sent to Congress after the President's war message in which he gave the unprecedented proposal his endorsement: ". . . men, who should, in my opinion be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service."[11] Secretary Baker limited his selective service proposals to the duration of the emergency leaving the long-range question of universal military training for future determination. He opposed all attempts to incorporate either the General Staff or Chamberlain universal training proposals in the law. In his testimony before the House Committee on Military Affairs Baker stated:

> . . . the President was of the belief that the volunteer spirit and principle ought to be preserved to the extent of authorizing the filling of the Regular Army and the National Guard to full strength by that process, if the process

[8] For further information see: WCD 9876. *Ibid.*

[9] Thomas G. Frothingham, *The American Reinforcement in the World War* (New York, 1927), p. 17. See also: Frederick Palmer, *Newton D. Baker* (New York, 1931), I, p. 184.

[10] Peyton C. March, *The Nation at War* (New York, 1932), p. 232.

[11] Ray Stannard Baker and William F. Dodd (eds), *Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace* (New York, 1927), I, p. 10.

proved sufficient to accomplish that end; but that as to the additional forces to be raised a policy ought to be adopted which, without becoming the beginning of the practice of universal training or service and without committing the Government to a present decision of that problem, was yet so far assimilated to it as to call into the service of the United States for the additional forces a class of young men who would be relatively free from the business and domestic entanglements which have hitherto embarrassed the country in the sudden calling of large forces from the body of the people, and who would be selected by a process which was sufficiently democratic to spread the strain over the entire country, and at the same time have men of varying ages within the maximum limit of those who could be spared from the industrial uses of the country.[12]

The bill met with strong opposition in the House of Representatives but was finally passed under the guidance of Julius Kahn, the ranking Republican on the House Military Affairs Committee.[13] The measure had easier going in the Senate although an attempt was made there to include a provision for a permanent universal training program. This section was removed by the conference committee, and the bill which finally passed was pretty much the measure Baker had requested. The Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, provided that "in view of the existing emergency, which demands the raising of troops in addition to those now available, the President be, and he is hereby, authorized":

1. To raise the Regular Army to maximum strength and add as many of the increments provided in the National Defense Act of 1917 as deemed necessary.
2. To call all National Guard and National Guard Reserves into Federal service retaining insofar as practicable the state designations.
3. "To raise by draft as herein provided, organize and equip an additional force of five hundred thousand enlisted men, or such part or parts thereof as he may at any time deem necessary."
4. "The President is further authorized, in his discretion and at such time as he may determine, to raise and begin the training of an additional force of five hundred thousand men. These were also to be raised by draft."
5. To accept four Volunteer divisions composed of men over 25 years of age. These divisions could be accepted only if they were a complete division.

Other sections of the act provided:

1. The term of service for everyone whether Regular, National Guard, or drafted was to be for the duration of the emergency.[14]
2. Neither bounties nor substitutes were to be permitted.

---

[12] *Hearings*, HMAC, 65th Cong., 1st sess., "Selective Service Act, 1917," p. 5.

[13] Opposition to the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, in the House of Representatives was led by the Democratic Speaker and Democratic Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committeee although sponsored by a Democratic President and Secretary of War. March, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

[14] Any differentiation between the Regular Army, National Guard, or draftees became academic. The nomenclature distinction was abolished by General Orders 73, 7 Aug 18, when all three became simply the "United States Army."

3. All executive, legislative, and judicial officers of the United States, the states, territories, and District of Columbia, all ministers and theological students, and all members of the armed forces were exempted from the selective draft. All members of recognized religious sects or organizations whose creeds prohibit war were to be exempted *from combat*. The President could exclude government employees at all levels from service at his discretion; he could also exempt persons in vital industries including agriculture and all who were physically or morally deficient.

4. To handle the selective process and decide exemptions the President was authorized to appoint local and appeal boards none of whose members "shall be connected with the Military Establishment." The President could make all rules and regulations necessary to put the program into effect.

5. All persons between the ages of 21 and 30 inclusive were required to register. The President could use all Federal and state officials to help in the process. Failure to register or to do one's duty as instructed would result in a year's imprisonment.

6. ". . . all persons enlisted or drafted under any of the provisions of this Act shall as far as practicable be grouped into units by States and the political subdivisions of the same."

7. The President could appoint all general officers with the advice and consent of the Senate; all appointments to be for the emergency only and removal for cause permitted. Officers below the rank of general were to be appointed by the President alone.

8. All components were to receive the same pay, allowances, and pensions while pay was simultaneously increased by the act.

9. "That all existing restrictions upon the detail, detachment, and employment of officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army are hereby suspended for the period of the present emergency."

10. Alcohol or brothels in or near camps were prohibited, and it was made a crime to sell liquor to anyone in uniform.

Section 2 of the Act of May 18, 1917, contained the heart of the law:

SEC. 2. That the enlisted men required to raise and maintain the organizations of the Regular Army and to complete and maintain the organizations embodying the members of the National Guard drafted into the service of the United States, at the maximum legal strength as by this Act provided, shall be raised by voluntary enlistment, or if and whenever the President decides that they can not effectually be so raised, or maintained, then by selective draft; and all other forces hereby authorized, except as provided in the seventh paragraph of section one, shall be raised and maintained by selective draft exclusively; but this provision shall not prevent the transfer to any force of training cadres from other forces. Such draft as herein provided shall be based upon liability to military service of all male citizens, or male persons not alien enemies who have declared their intention to become citizens, between the ages of twenty-one and thirty years, both inclusive, and shall take place and be maintained under such regulations as the President may prescribe not inconsistent with the terms of this Act. Quotas for the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, or subdivisions thereof, shall be determined in proportion to the population thereof, and credit shall be given to any State, Territory, District, or subdivision thereof, for the number of men who were in the military service of the United States

as members of the National Guard on April first, nineteen hundred and seventeen, or who have since said date entered the military service of the United States from any such State, Territory, District, or subdivision, either as members of the Regular Army or the National Guard. All persons drafted into the service of the United States and all officers accepting commissions in the forces herein provided for shall, from the date of said draft or acceptance, be subject to the laws and regulations governing the Regular Army, except as to promotions, so far as such laws and regulations are applicable to persons whose permanent retention in the military service on the active or retired list is not contemplated by existing law, and those drafted shall be required to serve for the period of the existing emergency unless sooner discharged.[15]

An outlet for volunteer enthusiasm by enlistment in the Regular Army or National Guard was provided, but drafted men could be assigned to those units if not enough Volunteers were forthcoming.

Thus for the first time in its history the United States at the beginning of a war created an adequate legislative basis on which to raise an army by scientific and fair methods. The Selective Service Act of 1917 was broadly worded, granting unheard of discretion and powers to the executive branch, and commendably free from unnecessary limitations and restrictions. But while admitting this soundness, the Selective Service Act was not a perfect law. Initially its most serious weakness was the provision which continued voluntary enlistments; this resulted in confusion and uncertainty in the management of selective service. It is doubtful, however, if a law precluding voluntary enlistments completely would have passed Congress or been accepted by the people themselves.

Manpower Increments

The Army forces were increased from 213,557 on 1 April 1917 to 3,685,458 on 11 November 1918. There were more than 17 times as many men in the Army at the Armistice than at the beginning of the war—an increase of 3,471,901. This unbelievable multiplication was effected by 203,786 commissions, 2,810,373 inductions, and 877,458 enlistments.[16] The two methods utilized by the United States to effect these increases were enlistments and inductions. [*Table 22* contains a detailed breakdown of the increase in both the naval and military forces in World War I.]

---

[15] Act of May 18, 1917, 65th Cong., 1st sess., "An Act to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States." [Selective Service Act of 1917]

[16] The statistical data in the charts and text of this chapter are not always in complete agreement. World War I statistics differ according to the source used. This data has been reviewed and adjusted by the Program Review and Analysis Division, Office of the Comptroller of the Army; and although some discrepancies still exist, it is believed that the reader will obtain a reasonably accurate picture of the size of the mobilization effort from the statistical data given.

*Table 22. Strength of the Armed Forces, 1 April 1917, and Manpower Increments to 11 November 1918**

Item	Number	Percent of total Armed Forces	Percent of Army Forces	Percent of Army increment
Total United States Armed Forces raised to 11 November 1918	4, 791, 172	100. 0		
Armed Forces	4, 176, 297	87. 2	100. 0	
Naval Forces	614, 875	12. 8		
Strength 1 April 1917	378, 619	7. 9		
Army Forces	291, 880		7. 0	
Regular Army	127, 588			
National Guard	164, 292			
Naval Forces	86, 739			
Navy	69, 029			
Marine Corps	13, 599			
Coast Guard	4, 111			
Increments to 11 November 1918	4, 412, 553	92. 1		
Army Forces	3, 884, 417		93. 0	100. 0
Commissioned	203, 786			5. 2
Inducted	2, 801, 373		67. 1	72. 1
Enlisted	877, 458			22. 6
Regular Army	390, 874			10. 1
National Guard	296, 978			7. 6
Reserve Corps and National Army	189, 606			4. 9
United States Guards (Commissioned and Enlisted) [a]	1, 800			0. 1
Naval Forces	528, 136			
Navy	464, 623			
Commissioned	24, 702			
Inducted	2, 394			
Enlisted	437, 527			
Marine Corps	61, 219			
Commissioned	1, 799			
Inducted	6, 529			
Enlisted	52, 891			
Coast Guard	2, 294			

[a] While the strength of the United States Guards on 15 November 1918 was 25,906, yet only 1,800 of those who were assigned to it prior to January 1918 can be considered as an increment to the Army forces, the later strength being supplied from inducted men assigned from the National Army.

*Source: *Second Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War*, 20 Dec 18, Table 80, p. 227 (as adjusted).

Voluntary Enlistments

The recruiting program to secure voluntary enlistments in the Army was under the control of the Enlisted Division of The Adjutant General's Office. The country was divided into 64 recruiting districts with an officer in charge of each district. Officers for the recruiting service were detailed for four years from the active list or placed on active duty from the retired list. The officers and enlisted men were assigned to duty at either the recruiting stations or the recruit depots to which applicants accepted at the recruiting station were sent for final examination and processing. [*Table 23* and *24* show the growth of the recruiting service in personnel and station during the war period.]

*Table 23. Recruiting Personnel: 1916–1918**

Type of personnel	30 June 1916	30 June 1917	30 June 1918
Total	1,203	2,275	2,107
Officers	126	188	171
At Recruiting Stations	60	113	72
Active	30	43	9
Retired	30	70	63
At Recruit Depots	66	75	99
Active	66	65	82
Retired	0	10	17
Enlisted Men	1,077	2,087	1,936

**Source:* "Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1916*, p. 265; *1917*, pp. 184–85; *1918*, p. 209.

*Table 24. Recruiting Stations: 1916–1918**

Date	Total	Main recruiting stations	Central recruiting stations
30 June 1916	189	54	135
30 June 1917	401	64	337
30 June 1918	398	62	336

**Source:* "Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1916*, p. 265; *1917*, pp. 184–85; *1918*, p. 209.

To supplement the regular recruiting stations in 1917–18, temporary recruiting stations were opened from time to time, frequently manned by a single enlisted man, and moved from town to town. The maximum number of temporary stations operated at any one time in the

fiscal year ending 30 June 1917 was 323 and in the year ending 30 June 1918 was 150.[17] In addition to recruiting for the Regular Army, the general recruiting service also secured enlistments for the Enlisted Reserve Corps and the National Guard in Federal service.

The results of the recruiting program were good. Appraising the program in 1917 The Adjutant General wrote: "Due to the intensive system of recruiting thus authorized and to the activity of the officers and enlisted men on recruiting duty, as well as to the unusual conditions existing, a larger number of recruits were secured within the fiscal year covered by this report than have been secured in any other year in the history of the recruiting for the Regular Army under the system of voluntary enlistments." [18] The end result of the recruiting program by the time it was discontinued in August 1918 was 877,458 enlistments—390,874 in the Regular Army, 296,978 in the National Guard, and 189,606 in the Reserve Corps and National Army.[19] The total enlistments by months were as follows: [20]

Month	*Number*	*Month*	*Number*
Total	877, 458	1918	199, 109
1917	678, 349	January	41, 225
		February	26, 197
April	86, 405	March	25, 268
May	119, 470	April	23, 155
June	95, 818	May	25, 794
July	73, 887	June	27, 583
August	59, 556	July	19, 028
September	24, 367	August	10, 859
October	31, 216		
November	45, 699		
December	141, 931		

The fluctuations in enlistments were directly related to War Department policies and directives. At the outset of the war in April 1917 enlistments would undoubtedly have been larger, but immediately after the declaration of war the recruiting stations actually turned men away because they had no authority to make enlistments beyond those necessary to bring the Regular Army up to strength. Many individuals would not enlist in the Regular Army until the term of enlistment was limited to the duration of emergency. The number of enlistments in May and June was high but declined in July and August hitting a low of 24,367 in September. Registration for the draft was held 5 June 1917; the first drawing was held 20 July and

[17] "Report of The Adjutant General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1918*, p. 265; *1917, pp.* 184–85; *1918*, p. 209.

[18] *Ibid., 1917*, p. 185.

[19] *Second Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War*, hereafter cited as *Second Report, PMG*, 20 Dec 18. Table 80, p. 227.

[20] *Ibid.*, Table 19, p. 223.

*Table 25. Inductions and Voluntary Enlistments, by Month: 2 April 1917–11 November 1918**

Month	Total	Inductions		Enlistments					
		Number	Percent of total	Army		Navy and Reserves		Marine Corps and Reserves	
				Number	Percent of total	Number	Percent of total	Number	Percent of total
Total	4, 178, 172	2, 810, 296	67. 2	877, 458	21. 0	437, 527	10. 5	52, 891	1. 3
1917	1, 382, 495	516, 212	37. 3	678, 349	49. 1	167, 459	12. 1	20, 475	1. 5
Apr	113, 633	0	0. 0	86, 405	76. 0	24, 593	21. 7	2, 635	2. 3
May	146, 868	0	0. 0	119, 470	81. 3	22, 174	15. 1	5, 224	3. 6
Jun	150, 249	0	0. 0	95, 818	63. 8	50, 502	33. 6	3, 929	2. 6
Jul	85, 838	0	0. 0	73, 887	86. 1	8, 698	10. 1	3, 253	3. 8
Aug	66, 172	0	0. 0	59, 556	90. 0	4, 641	7. 0	1, 975	3. 0
Sep	324, 248	296, 678	91. 5	24, 367	7. 5	2, 025	0. 6	1, 178	0. 4
Oct	210, 392	163, 493	77. 7	31, 216	14. 8	15, 292	7. 3	391	0. 2
Nov	90, 395	35, 721	39. 5	45, 699	50. 5	8, 458	9. 4	517	0. 6
Dec	194, 700	20, 320	10. 4	141, 931	72. 9	31, 076	16. 0	1, 373	0. 7
1918	2, 795, 677	2, 294, 084	82. 0	199, 109	7. 1	270, 068	9. 7	32, 416	1. 2
Jan	93, 522	23, 288	24. 9	41, 225	44. 1	26, 860	28. 7	2, 149	2. 3
Feb	121, 693	83, 779	68. 9	26, 197	21. 5	10, 258	8. 4	1, 459	1. 2
Mar	169, 791	132, 484	78. 0	25, 268	14. 9	11, 362	6. 7	677	0. 4
Apr	220, 079	174, 377	79. 2	23, 155	10. 5	19, 921	9. 1	2, 626	1. 2
May	428, 466	373, 063	87. 1	25, 794	6. 0	24, 537	5. 7	5, 072	1. 2
Jun	431, 582	301, 941	70. 0	27, 583	6. 4	97, 158	22. 5	4, 900	1. 1
Jul	452, 417	401, 147	88. 7	19, 028	4. 2	23, 732	5. 2	8, 510	1. 9
Aug	346, 924	282, 898	81. 5	10, 859	3. 1	48, 137	13. 9	5, 030	1. 5
Sep	273, 080	262, 984	96. 3	0	0. 0	8, 103	3. 0	1, 993	0. 7
Oct	249, 185	249, 185	100. 0	0	0. 0	0	0. 0	0	0. 0
Nov	8, 938	8, 938	100. 0	0	0. 0	0	0. 0	0	0. 0

**Source: Second Report, PMG,* Table 79, p. 223.

those chosen were examined with the first large group of 180,000 selectees reporting to the cantonments in early September. The draft system undoubtedly cut down the number of voluntary enlistments at certain periods and stimulated them at others. In October and November enlistments again gradually increased. When it was announced 8 November 1917 that enlistments in the Army by registrants for Selective Service were to be discontinued on 15 December 1917, the recruiting stations were flooded by men in the 21–30 age bracket who were registered at that time. Voluntary enlistments in December catapulted to 141,931. With enlistments limited to men 18–21 or

30–40 years of age the number of voluntary enlistments naturally declined. On 8 August 1918 all enlistments in the Army were ordered discontinued. In September 1918 voluntary enlistments in the Navy and Marine Corps were also halted so that on the eve of the Armistice Selective Service finally became the sole means of raising military forces. [*Table 25* shows the relationship between voluntary enlistments and inductions.]

In his second report The Provost Marshal General discussed the influence of the draft on enlistments as follows:

> . . . the selective draft, in the varying stages of its indirect compulsory influence, was an effective stimulant of enlistment. In spite of the general popularity of the selective service system as such, there persisted always—for many, at least—the desire to enter military service (if needs must) by enlistment rather than by draft—that is, to enter voluntarily in appearance at least. Thus, whenever the prospect of the draft call seemed near, enlistments received the benefit of the dilemma thus created. This indirect effort of a selective draft in stimulating enlistment must be reckoned as one of its powerful advantages.[21]

From the table it would seem that the selective draft had a somewhat greater influence on naval enlistments than on Army, with the exception of the deluge of Army volunteers in December 1917. The close correlation of naval enlistments with draft fluctuations is more evident because the restriction against Army enlistments by draft registrants subsequent to 15 December 1917 destroyed any means of proper comparison.

The peacetime methods of handling new recruits were continued insofar as possible. Men accepted by the recruiting stations were sent on to recruit depots or recruit depot posts where they were given final physical examinations and the enlistment was completed. The following recruit depots and posts were in operation during the war:

Recruit Depots	*Recruit Depot Posts*
Columbus Barracks, Ohio	Fort Bliss, Tex.
Jefferson Barracks, Mo.	Fort Douglas, Utah.
Fort Logan, Colo.	Fort Ethan Allen, Vt.
Fort McDowell, Calif.	Fort George Wright, Wash.
Fort Slocum, N. Y.	Fort Huachuca, Ariz.
Fort Thomas, Ky.	Jackson Barracks, La.
	Fort Lawton, Wash.
	Fort McPherson, Ga.
	Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.
	Fort Sam Houston, Tex.
	Fort Screven, Ga.
	U. S. Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.
	Vancouver Barracks, Wash.[22]

[21] *Second Report, PMG*, p. 224–25.
[22] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 71.

The usual procedure of sending recruits to the depots was dispensed with whenever units needed filling quickly. Of the 3,678,831 men added to the Army Forces in World War I 877,458 or 24 percent of the total were added by voluntary enlistment.

Besides allowing for the authorized increases in the Regular Army and National Guard by voluntary enlistments, the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, contained a provision for another type of voluntary unit similar to volunteer organizations raised in past wars:

> Seventh. The President is further authorized to raise and maintain by voluntary enlistment, to organize, and equip, not to exceed four infantry divisions, the officers of which shall be selected in the manner provided by paragraph three of section one of this Act: *Provided*, That the organization of said force shall be the same as that of the corresponding organization of the Regular Army: *And provided further*, That there shall be no enlistment in said force of men under twenty-five years of age at time of enlisting: *And provided further*, That no such volunteer force shall be accepted in any unit smaller than a division.[23]

This subsection was inserted in the act at the instigation of and as a favor to former President Theodore Roosevelt by congressional friends. It was a definite hold-over from our previous wars when prominent individuals raised and led Volunteer units. It is apparent without a detailed discussion of the political and military issues involved that this volunteer concept was contrary to the scientific basis on which the War Department General Staff was attempting to build the Army. Roosevelt was one of the most colorful and aggressive leaders in American history, but at the time he was 59 years old, in declining health, and had had only very limited military experience: nothing which would qualify him to command a division in combat. On the advice of the Chief of Staff,[24] Secretary Baker refused to authorize Mr. Roosevelt to raise a Volunteer division in spite of the shower of political abuse which the decision precipitated. The correctness of that decision was subsequently affirmed by both Generals March and Pershing.[25] Thus, Volunteer units passed from the military scene, and even voluntary enlistments took a back seat in the military mobilization for World War I. General Crowder summed up the passing of the volunteer system as follows:

> To waste lives and money in frittering away the national man-power would mean not only a long war, but a lost one. The full fighting strength must be marshaled forthwith. The volunteer system was unequal to the task. Only another and more effective way could save the world.
>
> But the raising of an army was not the only task. True, it was the pressing and the immediate problem. But industry, likewise had to be preserved and

[23] Selective Service Act of 1917.

[24] Hugh L. Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier* (New York, 1928), pp. 561–62. For further information on the Roosevelt division see: F. Palmer, *Newton D. Baker*, I, pp. 194–206.

[25] March, *op. cit.*, p. 345; Pershing, *op. cit.*, I, p. 22.

industrial manpower redistributed. Armies could not fight effectively if industry did not function efficiently.

The volunteer system destroyed all calculation. It took its toll from all classes and from all walks of life. It had no eye for the industrial life to be maintained behind the armies, without which those armies could not live. It envisioned war as a struggle of arms, not as a struggle of whole nations. It was not fitted for a modern war. It could not organize the nation; it could not even organize its armies.[26]

The Draft

Before World War I our only Federal attempt at raising military forces by conscription or draft had been during the Civil War. [See ch. IV of text.] The Civil War draft was not entirely successful, but the experience gained in that war served as a basis for the Selective Service System of World War I. One stroke of genius on Baker's part did more than anything else to insure the success of the draft in World War I. "It was by entrusting this draft machinery to the people themselves that Secretary Baker assured its mighty success. Here again Abraham Lincoln's faith was vindicated: 'The people will save their government if the government itself will do its part only indifferently well.' "[27] This act overcame the objections to the military-dominated and—operated Civil War draft. Only slightly more than 2 percent of the people engaged in the administration of the Selective Service Act of 1917 were military personnel.[28] Although Baker was anxious to have the draft administered by civilians he opposed any attempt to sugar-coat it with fancy terminology.[29] When asked to define a selective draft Baker responded:

A draft is the exercise of the peremptory power of the State to summon into the service of the State such part of the population as is determined by the political authority to be proper for the task involved. As applied to military matters the draft is the summoning by this superior power of the State of men of suitable military age into the military service. A selective draft is a draft in which, in addition to summoning available military material, the Government exercises the principle of selection so as to exclude some who would otherwise be chosen for reasons of the convenience of the Government or such other reason as the selective power determines.[30]

The Selective Service System

Organization

The administration of the Selective Service Act of 1917 was placed in the hands of The Provost Marshal General. After the passage of the act, Maj. Gen. Enoch H. Crowder, The Judge Advocate General, was appointed Provost Marshal General 22 May 1917 and served as

---

[26] Enoch H. Crowder, *The Spirit of Selective Service* (New York, 1920), pp. 91–92.
[27] J. Palmer, *Washington-Lincoln-Wilson*, p. 320.
[28] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 374.
[29] *Hearings*, HMAC, 65th Cong., 1st sess., "Selective Service Act, 1917," p. 228.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 296.

both throughout the course of the war.[31] Although doubtful as to whether a draft law would pass Congress, General Crowder was instrumental in preparing the law itself once Secretary Baker determined the overall War Department policy. The preliminary plan of draft organization was worked out in the Judge Advocate General's Department and approved 10 April 1917.[32] Thus General Crowder became the logical candidate to head the draft organization; the choice proved to be a wise one.

In his second report, General Crowder described selective service organization as follows:

> The administration of the selective service system under the Provost Marshal General was organized on the principle of "supervised decentralization." The terms of the Act of May 18, 1917, lent themselves readily to this effective mode of linking the district and local boards (explicitly created by the act), through the State executives, with a small Federal directive agency, designated by the President through the Secretary of War and serving as a central source of instruction and guidance, to give uniformity, accuracy, and speed to the operations of the boards. Appurtenant to this main vertebral organization there developed in course of time, at various points, a few additional agencies made necessary by the growth of the work and the dictates of experience.
>
> The entire administrative system thus consisted of the following coordinated parts, operating regularly and almost constantly: (1) The Provost Marshal General; (2) the State governors and draft executives; (3) the district boards; (4) the industrial advisors; (5) the local boards; (6) the Government appeal agents; (7) the medical advisory boards; (8) the legal advisory boards; (9) the boards of instruction. To these should be added (10) civic associations casually contributing volunteer assistance.[33]

Because the organization and methods developed by the Selective Service System in 1917–18 became a model, they should be examined carefully. The ten component parts referred to by the Provost Marshal General above, functioned as follows:

1. *Office of the Provost Marshal General.* This office served as national headquarters for the decentralized administration of the draft. Briefly its duties were as follows: "To direct the process of selecting men for induction into the military service, from the initial registration to the actual arrival of the men in camp. This duty included the examination of registrants; their classification in groups; the rendering of decisions in cases involving claims for exemption; the handling of appeals from the rulings of local boards; and the entraining of men for camp." [34] [See *chart 9* for the final organizational setup of the Office of the Provost Marshal General.] Although


[31] Crowder was a graduate of West Point and the University of Missouri Law School; he had served on the General Staff from 1903–07; he had been a member of the Judge Advocate General's Department since 1895, and Judge Advocate General since 1911. *Official Army Register for 1916* (Washington, 1916), p. 18.

[32] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior,* p. 368.

[33] *Second Report, PMG,* p. 251.

[34] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior,* p. 368.

Chart 9. Final Organization of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, World War I.*



*Source: *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War (1917–19); Zone of the Interior* (Washington, 1949), pp. 369–70.

the Office of Provost Marshal General served as a national headquarters, its work was on the policy-making and supervisory level. It actually had little to do with the induction of the men themselves once the number to be called was determined. The process of selection and induction took place at the local level.

2. *The State Governors and Draft Executives.* The governors of the states and the commissioners of the District of Columbia were responsible for the execution of the Selective Service Act in their respective jurisdictions. The governors were permitted to delegate to their adjutant generals the details of draft supervision. Usually the adjutant general was in charge of the state headquarters assisted by an executive officer and a medical adviser plus necessary clerical help. Each state headquarters also had a number of inspectors who advised and aided the local boards. The primary work of the state headquarters was the nomination of the members of the district and local boards and their auxiliaries who were then appointed by the President. Other work was primarily of an administrative and public relations character. The system was ". . . essentially one of *National* supervision but of *State* control." [35] The real work was done at the district and local board level.

3. *The District Boards.* There were 155 district boards with a total original membership of 780, later increased to 1,039. Each board was composed of a minimum of five members consisting of one member representing agriculture; one, industry; one, labor; a lawyer; and a physician. "The boards reviewed decisions of local boards, upon appeal, and heard and determined, as courts of first instance, all questions of accepting for or excluding from the draft persons engaged in industry, agriculture, or other necessary occupations. In practice, these agencies provided a check on irregularities by local boards and guarded the industrial and agricultural interests of the Nation." [36]

Each district board had on the average about 30 local boards within its jurisdiction. The work of the district boards was quasi-judicial and they adapted legal methods to suit their peculiar needs so that they assumed the atmosphere of a law court particularly when hearing appeals from the decisions of local boards.

4. *The Industrial Advisers.* The industrial advisers were an adjunct of the district boards authorized by an amendment to the Selective Service Act on 31 August 1918. Each board was to have three industrial advisers—one nominated by the Department of Agriculture, one by the Department of Labor, and one by the respective district board. By 11 November 1918, 126 out of the 155 district boards had appointed their industrial advisers. The Armistice halted

[35] *Second Report, PMG,* p. 267.
[36] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior,* p. 371.

Selective Service, and the system of industrial advisers never really had an adequate trial.

5. *The Local Boards.* In his second report, 20 December 1918, The Provost Marshal General stated:

> The term "local board" occupies a unique place in the thought of the Nation and in the hearts of the people. It has acquired a distinct individuality. Long after the selective service machinery will have been dismantled, and the processes of the draft will have faded from memory, the term "local board" will hold its place in our speech as the typical mark of the system that lifted America from the most peaceful of Nations to a place of first magnitude among military powers. That mobilization of manpower was chiefly accomplished, not by military officers, nor even by civilians peculiarly trained for such service, but by laymen from each community, chosen only for their unquestioned patriotism, fair-mindedness, and integrity, and impelled solely by the motive of patriotic self-sacrifice.[37]

Although the number of local boards fluctuated slightly there were finally 4,648 organized with a total of 14,416 members. The variation of training and background of the membership of the local board is evident from the compilation by occupation as follows:

Occupation	*Number*
Total personnel 1 Oct 1918	13,564
Medicine	4,246
Public Office	2,841
Law	1,517
Agriculture	982
Commerce	975
Banking	379
Manufacturing	313
Education	142
Labor	121
Transportation	102
Clergy	74
Other Occupations	[38] 1,872

Under the decentralized administrative setup, it was the local board which did almost all of the actual day-to-day work. The fury of dissatisfied registrants was vented on the local boards. They were to the average citizen the very epitome of Selective Service. They became the symbol of the entire draft system.

> The duty of the local board was to mobilize the selectives as directed. But in this concise statement is comprised the entire gamut of a hundred complex processes. Except for the initial registration of June 5, 1917, the local boards had charge of every one of the steps in the transit from home to camp.
>
> The registration was the first main stage of the process. Then came the determination of serial and order numbers. The classification was the next and largest stage. And finally came the call and the entrainment. But each

[37] *Second Report, PMG,* p. 276.
[38] *Ibid., p.* 277.

of these parts became itself a center for many minor processes, and each of these in turn for others. Moreover, each individual case had its own variety of peculiarity, and led to special inquiries and deliberations. Add to this, that records must accurately be kept of each act done in every part of each registrant's case. And, besides the attention necessary merely for reaching an official decision, there was added the time and labor demanded in almost every case for a cluster of tentative and informal inquiries appurtenant to matters coming before the board. The regulations composed a thick volume, numbering 250 sections and 433 pages, with more than 100 important forms; and these must be mastered for daily and instant use.[39]

The work load and responsibilties of the local boards were staggering. Their job could never been done without the almost unanimous moral and actual support of the general public. The fairness of the law and its administration did much to get public opinion solidly behind the project and contributed to its ultimate success. ". . . Whatever of credit is accorded to other agencies of the selective service law, the local boards must be deemed the corner-stone of the system." [40]

6. *Government Appeal Agents.* These officials occupied a most unique position in the Selective Service System. The governors appointed at least one government appeal agent for each local board—4,679 were appointed in all. Their duty was to safeguard the rights and interest of both the government and the registrants to insure ultimate justice for all concerned. They appealed all rulings they believed erroneous and watched over the rights and problems of registrants who did not fully comprehend the Selective Service System. They became the legal counselors of both the local boards and the registrants, and as such it was virtually essential that they be members of the bar.[41]

7. *Medical Advisory Boards.* The medical advisory boards were created to examine registrants whose cases were appealed to them by the registrant, a government appeal agent, or referred by the local board. Each medical advisory board had three or more members. The ideal board included the following specialists: internist; eye, ear, nose, and throat specialist; orthopedist; surgeon; psychiatrist; radiographer; and dentist. The medical advisory boards detected obscure or rare physical defects as well as malingerers. Through their efforts the number of rejections at mobilization camps was reduced, and future pension claims against the government lessened. The suggestion for the medical advisory boards originally came from the American Medical Association, which further aided the government by publicizing draft medical information in its *Journal.* Members of the medical advisory boards were nominated by the governors and

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 279–80.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 290.
[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 292–93.

appointed by the President. Ultimately, 1,319 boards with 9,577 members were organized. The members of the medical advisory boards served without pay, even though their work load had been increased by the influenza epidemic and the shortage of civilian doctors caused by the flow of medical men into the services.[42]

8. *Legal Advisory Boards.* In order to provide registrants with competent legal advice without cost, the Provost Marshal General's Office appealed to the American Bar Association in November 1917 to assist the governors in the appointment of legal advisory boards. Eventually 3,646 boards were appointed with 10,915 members and 108,367 associate members. The boards advised registrants on the meaning and intent of the Selective Service law and subsequent regulations; they assisted registrants in making out their questionnaires; they aided appreciably in a just administration of the law. Their chief work was in connection with the classification questionnaires filled out during December 1917 and January 1918.[43]

9. *Boards of Instruction.* The boards of instruction originated in a suggestion made by the Secretary of War which was incorporated in a letter from the Provost Marshal General's Office 4 July 1918 to the local draft boards. The letter suggested that the local draft boards appoint so-called boards of instruction which would meet with the selectees before they left for camp and in a series of two or three informal meetings give them advice on government insurance and allotments, discuss America's purposes and goals in the war, and occasionally give them preliminary military drill. A total of 2,952 boards of instruction were appointed with more than 16,000 members. The methods of approach varied from community to community, but their purpose of raising selectee morale remained the same. These boards achieved no small degree of success in the closing months of the war and succeeded in sending a better indoctrinated group of selectees to the camps.[44]

10. *Civic Cooperating Agencies.* The following agencies were cited for their assistance to the Selective Service program by The Provost Marshal General in his second report;

The American Red Cross.—Furnished canteen service for selectees at the various railroad stations along the route to camp.

The American Protective League.—Placed its entire membership at the disposal of the Department of Justice and of the local boards, to locate delinquents and furnish useful information.


Representatives of the Press.—Kept registrants informed, through their printed space, of the duties required under the Selective Service Act.

The American Bar Association.—Assisted the Governor in the organization of legal advisory boards.

---

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 293–94.
[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 297–98.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 298–303.

Chart 10. Selective Service Organization World War I.*



*Source: Edward A. Fitzpatrick, *Conscription and America* (Milwaukee, 1940), p. 36.

The American Medical Association.—Made the suggestion for the medical advisory boards and assisted in their selection.

The National Dental Association.—Was instrumental in the expansion of the preparedness league of American Dentists, which furnished free service to the selectees and other military personnel.

The Body of School Teachers in the United States.—Volunteered under the guidance of the Bureau of Education, to assist in transcribing 9,000,000 occupational cards for the Industrial Index.[45]

[*Chart 10* shows the organizational relationship of the different functioning and advisory boards just described from the local to the national level.]

Personnel

Personnel manning the selective service machinery totaled 193,117. If the members of the legal advisory boards are excluded, the total is only 73,835, many of whose services also were intermittent. Military

[45] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 373.

personnel constituted only slightly over 2 percent of the total. The personnel involved in the administration of the Selective Service law 31 October 1918 is shown in *table 26*.

*Table 26. Personnel of the Selective Service System: 31 October 1918**

Type of personnel	Number
Total	193, 117
State and Territory Governors and D. C. Commissioners	54
Military Personnel	4, 004
Commissioned Officers	192
Enlisted Men	3, 812
Civilian Personnel	189, 059
District and Local Board Members	15, 455
Other Civilians	173, 604

**Source: Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 374.

Selective Service Processes

The chief phases of the Selective Service program were: (1) registration; (2) selection, with the related problems of classification, deferments, and special categories; and (3) mobilization.

Registration

The preliminary step in organizing the selective service process was, of course, the registration of all men within the age limits of those eligible for selective service. The registration for the Civil War draft, the only existing precedent, indicated more what ought not to be done than what should be done. In the Civil War it had required six months to appoint the enrollment boards and conduct the registration. The enrollment officers went from house to house at the risk of life and limb to take the military census; some were killed, many were injured, and the registration was both incomplete and inaccurate.[46] Unless the entire war effort was to be stymied before it started, a repetition of the Civil War errors had to be avoided.

While Congress debated the Selective Service Act, the War Department worked on the assumption that the act would ultimately pass. The details of the Selective Service System were worked out;

[46] *First Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War*, hereafter cited as *First Report, PMG*, 20 Dec 17, pp. 6–7.

the governors and local officials were informally informed of the task ahead; the registration machinery was planned and even the future registration officials selected; the registration forms and regulations were printed and shipped to local officials. All this was done in secrecy while the Congress still deliberated.[47] When the act was passed 18 May 1917 everything was prepared for the first registration and the previously prepared proclamation fixing 5 June 1917 as registration day for all men 21 to 31 years of age was issued.

Rather than to go to the individuals and register them as a census taker would, it was made a patriotic duty for the individual to come forward and register at a designated place. Once this policy was determined it seemed only logical to have the men report to their customary voting precincts to register. The electoral machinery constituted a ready-made registration organization. Although considerable anxiety existed as to what the response to the call for registration would be, practically the entire male population within the age group of 21 to 31 registered 5 June 1917. The day was singularly devoid of incidents or opposition to this preliminary step in the organization of the draft machinery. The final total of registrants attributed to the first registration was 9,925,751 men including late registrants and reports from the territories.[48]

> In the spring of 1918, it was apparent that the yield of effectives in the first registration would not suffice for the increasing demands of the military program; and a further registration for military service became necessary. On May 20, 1918, Congress passed a joint resolution (Pub. Res. No. 30, 65th Cong., S. J. Res. 124) requiring the registration of all males who had attained the age of 21 since June 5, 1917, on or before the day set by the President for their registration; and further authorizing the President to require the registration, at such intervals as he might prescribe, of all males attaining the age of 21 since the day of this second registration and on or before the next day set by him for such registration. This resolution made all such persons liable to military service under the act of May 18, 1917; but provided that they should be "Placed at the bottom of the list of those liable to military service in the several classes to which they are assigned." [49]

The President fixed 5 June 1918 as the date for the second registration, and on this anniversary of the first registration approximately 735,834 persons registered. The demands of the Army were such that a supplemental registration was held 24 August 1918 to register all who had become 21 since 5 June 1918 and those missed in the previous registration. This supplemental registration yielded 159,161 more men, and after late and territorial registrations were added a total of 912,564 had been enrolled during the second registration.[50]

Knowing that the additional manpower made available from the second registration would fail to fill the increasing needs of the Army,

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 9.
[48] *Second Report, PMG*, p. 22.
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

the War Department had to decide whether to call men of draft age in the deferred classes or to ask the Congress to enlarge the age groups available for service. The latter course was adopted, and a bill was introduced 5 August 1918 in the Congress to enlarge the registration ages to include the age groups 18–20 and 32–45. The act was passed on 31 August 1918; and 12 September was immediately set as the day for the third registration. In anticipation of the passage of the act, the arrangements for the registration were practically completed before its approval. An intensive publicity campaign was instituted in an attempt to secure a 100 percent registration.[51] The campaign was successful: the final total of registrations 12 September 1918 was 13,395,706. The total of persons in all three registrations was 24,234,021.[52] [*See table 27.*]

*Table 27. Selective Service Registration in World War I**

Registration	Number	Percent
Total	24, 234, 021	100. 0
U. S. less Territories	23, 908, 576	98. 7
Territories [a]	325, 445	1. 3
First Registration	9, 925, 751	41. 0
U. S. less Territories	9, 780, 535	40. 4
Territories [a]	145, 216	0. 6
Second Registration	912, 564	3. 8
U. S. less Territories	899, 279	3. 7
Territories [a]	13, 285	0. 1
Third Registration	13, 395, 706	55. 2
U. S. less Territories	13, 228, 762	54. 6
Territories [a]	166, 944	0. 6

[a] Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.

*Source: *Second Report, PMG*, p. 31.

Selection

Registration was only the preliminary step in the selective service process. The real work centered around the process of selection which determined "that one man should bear arms, that another should remain in industrial employment, and that a third should be transferred from one occupation to a different one regarded as more essential." [53]

[51] *Ibid*, pp. 28–29.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[53] John Dickinson, *The Building of an Army* (New York, 1922), p. 130.



Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, draws a number in the nation's first large scale conscription of troops. This setup is the counterpart of the Selective Service System of World War II.

Figure 5. World War I draft.

The major part of the selection work was handled by the local boards within the framework of executive regulations stipulating the details of the process. The 4,648 local boards nominated by the governors and appointed by the President were composed of the "neighbors" of the future selectees. The only specification made concerning local board membership was that one member must be a physician. Once the local boards were set up the selective service machinery began to function.

"One of the most difficult tasks that always attends a selection from a mass of men whose obligation before the law are all equal was the determination of the order of liability to examination and selection." [54] This problem was settled by conducting a central lottery in Washington. First a number was assigned to each registration card in each local board jurisdiction. The cards were not arranged in any particular order, and the numbers were assigned consecutively to the shuffled cards. Then in Washington the numbers were stamped on slips of paper; the slips were enclosed in capsules placed in a large

[54] *First Report, PMG,* p. 14.

glass bowl and thoroughly mixed. "The drawing took place on Friday, July 20, in the public hearings room of the Senate Office Building. The first number, 258, was drawn by the Secretary of War. . . . As soon as the order of liability had been determined each of the 4,557 local boards began, most assiduously, the task of evolving their quotas of selected men under the hurriedly prepared seelction rules and regulations." [55] Once the great lottery was completed each registered man knew the order of his liability for service. Two subsequent lotteries were held to determine the liability for service of the men registered in 1918. These lotteries took place 27 June 1918 and 30 September 1918 with high government officials, including President Wilson and Secretary of War Baker participating.

With the registration and determination of the order of liability for service completed, the next step was to determine the number of men to be selected and to apportion that number into quotas among the states. After The Provost Marshal General had been supplied with an overall figure, the Selective Service Act itself contained the rules for the breakdown into state quotas:

> Quotas for the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia or subdivisions thereof, shall be determined in proportion to the population thereof, and credit shall be given to any State, Territory, District, or subdivision thereof, for the number of men who were in the military service of the United States as members of the National Guard on April first, nineteen hundred and seventeen, or who have since said date entered the military service of the United States from any such State, Territory, District, or subdivision, either as members of the Regular Army or the National Guard.[56]

This rule was clear and concise. Since the initial manpower needs were set at 1,152,985 with credits totaling 465,985 only 687,000 men had to be raised by the selective draft. The total figure was apportioned among the states in proportion to their population. The credits for each state were then subtracted and the net quota determined. Hawaii's credits exceeded its quota so no draft was necessary in that Territory for the first call. Under the terms of the statute and subsequent regulations the state quotas were apportioned among the local communities again in proportion to population. Many local communities had their quotas filled by voluntary enlistments for the first draft call. Several problems arose in connection with the apportionment of quotas. For example, a community with a high proportion of aliens who were excused from the draft found its quota falling on a smaller segment of its population than the spirit of the law intended. Resentment against this discrimination was so strong that several proposals to correct it were made. The solution was the passage of a joint resolution by the Congress 16 May 1918 which changed the basis

[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15.
[56] Selective Service Act of 1917.

for apportioning quotas from the total population to the number of men in a given classification. With available men in Class I and aliens in Class V the inequities of the quota apportioning system were corrected.[57]

Once the local board received a quota, its real work began. Two greatly differing systems were used by the local boards in the selection process. The selection system used in 1917 consisted primarily of each local board calling, in the sequence of their order numbers, about twice as many men as would be needed to fill their quota. Each man was first given a physical examination; if he failed in that he was immediately discharged from further obligation. Of the 3,082,949 men called under the 1917 system, 2,510,706 were given physical examinations of which 730,756 or 29.11 percent were rejected. The remainder were then given an opportunity to claim exemption. Of the 3,082,949 called, 1,560,570 or 50.62 percent made claims for exemption. Of the 1,419,678 claims made to local boards, 1,161,206 or 81.79 percent were granted. Of the 140,892 made to the district boards, 53,843 or 38.21 percent were granted. [See *table 28* for claims granted by the local boards under the 1917 selection system.]

*Table 28. Local Board Exemptions Under 1917 Selective System**

Reason for exemption	Number	Percent
Total	1, 161, 206	100. 0
Dependency	859, 150	74. 0
Aliens	228, 452	19. 7
Vocational	67, 716	5. 8
Religious Belief	3, 887	0. 3
Moral Unfitness	2, 001	0. 2

**Source: First Report, PMG*, p. 24.

This system, however, was both wasteful and slow. Once the local boards had filled the first call a new method was devised which went into effect 15 December. The major change in the selection process used in 1918 was the classification system, which provided that no man be given a physical examination until it was certain that there were no other grounds for deferment and that if physically fit he would be immediately eligible for service.

The key of this new classification system was a questionnaire. Each registrant was required to file answers to a series of questions designed to show a simple inventory of his qualifications and circumstances. If on the

[57] For details on state quotas and the apportioning system see: *Second Report, PMG*, pp. 213–19, 463–67; and material in WCD 9876. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

basis of these he desired to make a claim for exemption or deferred service, he indicated this intention in his answer. If he made no such claim, he was at once classified as available for immediate service. All claims made were examined by the board, and either granted or refused. Failure of a registrant to make a claim, or final adjudication of his claim, resulted in fixing his ultimate position in one of five classes into which the entire body of registrants was graded in the inverse order of their liability for call into service. Class I included those registrants whose situation offered no obstacle to their immediate induction into the army. Classes II, III, and IV included persons whose occupation or domestic status rendered inexpedient their immediate employment in military service, graded in the order in which they could most readily be spared for such service. Thus Class II included registrants who, while having some claim to exemption which made it desirable to defer calling them until after the exhaustion of all registrants in Class I, were yet less indispensable to the economic life of the nation than were persons in Class III, and who were thus subject to be called ahead of registrants in the latter class. Class III registrants stood in the same relative position with regard to registrants in Classes II and IV as was held by Class II registratnts in comparison with men in Classes I and III. In Class V were placed registrants who, because of physical unfitness or other disqualifications, (such as the fact that they were non-declarant aliens), were totally unavailable for military service.[58]

[The results of the classification system with its questionnaires (which were eventually filled out by all registrants including those who had been previously released under the 1917 system) are shown in table *29;* a breakdown of reasons for deferments is given in table *30.*] The small number of occupational deferments was undoubtedly due to the fact that large numbers of persons eligible for such deferments were actually deferred because of dependency. Although the reasons differed, the results were the same; and the disruption of the economic life of the country was minimized.

*Table 29. Classification of Registrants in World War I**

Category	Number	Percent
Total Registration	[a] 23, 908, 576	100. 0
Number Classified	[b] 17, 593, 868	73. 6
Class I	[b] 6, 373, 416	26. 7
Classes II, III, and IV	[b] 7, 923, 386	33. 1
Class V	[b] 3, 297, 066	13. 8
Number not Classified	6, 314, 708	26. 4

[a] Excludes Territories.

[b] The source for this data contains small unreconciled differences with related data from the same source appearing in table 30 and in other statistics used in this chapter.

**Source: Final Reports of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War,* 15 Jul 19, pp. 30–31; 38–39; 46–47.

[58] Dickinson, *op. cit.,* p. 147.

*Table 30. Deferments and Exemptions in World War I**

Category	Number
Total Classified	[a] 17, 593, 778
Number Held for Service	6, 373, 414
Number Deferred or Exempted	11, 220, 364
Agricultural Deferments	506, 815
Dependency Deferments	6, 964, 229
Industrial Deferments	317, 570
Aliens	1, 467, 319
In Armed Forces	722, 335
Physically Disqualified	925, 873
Other Deferments	316, 223

[a] Excludes Territories.

**Source: Final Report, PMG,* pp. 20–21.

Each class to which registrants were assigned was broken down into further subdivisions or groups by attaching a letter to their classification number. Thus the classification I–A indicated that a man was eligible for immediate general military service while classification V–H indicated that a man was morally unfit for military service because he had been convicted of a felony. Without analyzing the complicated regulations and subclassifications used by the Selective Service System, there follows a brief general discussion of each of the five main reasons for granting deferments and exemptions—alienage, dependency, occupation, physical fitness, and moral fitness.

1. *Alienage*

Under international law a neutral or friendly alien who is a permanent resident of a country is liable to military service at the call of that country, as otherwise he would be receiving the benefits of national life without sharing in its burdens. The Selective Service Act, however, imposed draft liability only on such aliens of friendly or neutral nationality as had declared their intention to become citizens of the United States. Aliens who had not declared such an intention were exempted from liability.[59]

It was decided, however, that the responsibility for proving one was a nondeclarant alien would rest with the registrant, or otherwise he would be eligible for service. In a small number of cases, diplomatic considerations resulted in administrative action by the War Department to correct errors or to avoid embarrassment to the government. Many nondeclarant aliens entered the American armed forces voluntarily and became eligible for immediate citizenship along with declarants.[60] The size of the problem of alienage in relation to the draft can be seen, in part, from the number of aliens registered: [61]

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 130.
[60] *Second Report, PMG,* p. 96.
[61] *Ibid.*

Citizenship	Number	Percent of total	Percent of aliens
Total Registration	[a] 23, 908, 576	100. 0	
Citizens	20, 031, 493	83. 8	
Aliens	3, 877, 083	16. 9	100. 0
Declarants	1, 270, 182		32. 8
Nondeclarants	2, 606, 901		67. 2

[a] Excludes Territories.

Enemy aliens constituted a special problem. All enemy aliens were excluded from military service by the Selective Service Act regardless of whether they were declarant or nondeclarant or whether they would sign a waiver or not. The following is a breakdown of enemy aliens registered for the draft: [62]

Citizenship	Number	Percent
Total Aliens Registered	3, 877, 083	100. 0
Enemy Aliens	1, 011, 502	26. 1
Austria-Hungary	751, 212	19. 4
Bulgaria	19, 873	0. 5
Germany	618, 809	4. 1
Turkey	81, 608	[a] 2. 1

Some confusion resulted from the fact that Austria-Hungary did not declare war and become an enemy country until 11 November 1917 by which time some of the aliens from that country had already been drafted. Although we never declared war against Turkey and Bulgaria, nationals of those countries were finally classified as enemy aliens 24 October 1918 after a long investigation of the problem by the State Department.

> The chief problem which arose in connection with alien enemy registrants was how to deal with persons, who while citizens of an enemy country like Austria-Hungary, belonged to an oppressed nationality like the Poles, the Jugo-Slavs, and the Czechoslavaks, and who were in fact only eager to aid the cause of the United States and their allies. The Poles were early provided for by the permission which was granted them to recruit a Polish legion. The Army Appropriation Act, approved July 9, 1918, authorized the organization of a Slavic legion into which Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, and Ruthenians could be enlisted who were otherwise exempted under the draft. Arrangements were completed for local boards to act as recruiting agencies for this legion, when the cessation of hostilities caused the abandonment of the plan.[63]

2. *Dependency.* Of 17,593,778 men classified by the Selective Service System in World War I, 6,373,414 or 36.22 per cent were held for service and 6,964,229 or 39.57 percent were granted dependency deferments.[64] Dependency was the reason for 62 per cent of all defer-

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 399.

[63] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 135. For more detailed information on alienage see: *Ibid.*, pp. 130–36; *Second Report, PMG*, pp. 87–108.

[64] *Final Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War*, hereafter cited as *Final Report, PMG*, 15 Jul 19, p. 20.

ments granted. These figures alone give an insight into the size and importance of the dependency problem.

> Two classes of married registrants could be disposed of without difficulty. Those married men not usefully employed and whose families were not dependent on them for support, or who habitually failed to support their families, had no proper claim for deferment, and belonged clearly in Class I. Likewise those registrants with wives or children wholly or mainly dependent on them were with equal clearness entitled to the limit of deferment and were accordingly placed in Class IV. It was the intermediate cases which caused difficulty. There was first of all the case of the married man with children who was usefully employed, but whose wife or children were not dependent on him for support. Here there was no economic reason for deferment, but it was felt that there was a social reason. . . . A man of this description was accordingly placed in Class II–A. A similar case was that of the married registrant without children, whose induction into the service would not deprive the wife of reasonably adequate support. This case raised the question of what amounted to depriving the wife of reasonably adequate support. It was recognized that the wives of many of registrants were qualified by special skill to support themselves, and that in such a situation a wife without children could spare her husband with far less hardship than when she was dependent on his support. Accordingly husbands in this situation were classified in Class II–B. . . .
>
> A large number of married men were deferred on other grounds than that of dependency. The figures are as follows:

Total married registrants, June 5, 1917–September 11, 1918	4,883,213
Total married registrants deferred on all grounds	4,394,676
Total married registrants deferred on grounds of dependency of wife or children	3,619,466
Placed in Class II–A	183,770
Placed in Class II–B	503,221
Placed in Class IV	2,932,475

> One of the points of greatest difficulty in the whole administration of the draft was the question of dependency claims arising out of recent marriages. . . . Provision for deferred classification was made for single men having dependent parents, brothers or sisters, or adopted children.[65]

Of the 5,796,601 single men registered before the third registration 12 September 1918 only 284,267 were deferred for dependency. These were placed in Class III. The number of single men deferred because of dependency was very small in comparison with the overall Selective Service picture. The 6,964,229 dependency deferments granted in World War I constituted almost 40 percent of the classified registrants and accounted for 62 percent of all deferments. The Nation thus placed the maintenance of our family life on a high priority basis. The grant of so many dependency deferments also was an indirect economy measure because it reduced the cost of gov-

[65] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 151–53, is a summary of material in *Second Report, PMG,* pp. 108–23.

ernment support for dependents and subsequently higher pension costs.

3. *Occupational deferments and exemptions.* One of the basic reasons for the passage of the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, was a realization that the industrial, agricultural, and governmental structure of the country must not be disrupted but must operate on an ever-expanding basis. Thus adequate provision was made in the law and subsequent regulations for the deferment of individuals on an occupational basis. Industrial and agricultural deferments were handled by the district boards which had original jurisdiction in such cases although toward the end of the war the local boards were required to make recommendations on all cases referred to the district boards. In his second report General Crowder indicated that he felt a more effective classification would have resulted if original jurisdiction over occupational deferments had been granted to the local boards.[66]

Out of the 17,593,778 classifications made by Selective Service in World War I, only 506,815 agricultural and 317,570 industrial deferments were granted, or a total of 824,385 industrial and agricultural deferments.[67] Many others who were doubtlessly eligible for occupational deferments were deferred because of dependency or some other reason and their cases never referred to the district boards; therefore the number of such deferments granted does not give any indication of the number eligible.

Three vital industrial groups had serious personnel problems which they blamed in great part on the inroads of Selective Service. The shipping and shipbuilding industry received special treatment with the institution of the Emergency Fleet Classification List. The other two industries which complained about the drafting of their men were the railroads and the coal mine operators. Both requested special blanket deferments of their personnel, but the Provost Marshal General's Office opposed that move on the ground that such industries could then become havens for people who should rightfully be in military service. Regulations were issued to the District Boards, however, directing more careful consideration of the deferment claims of miners and railroad employees which mollified the Railroad Administration and Fuel Administration.[68]

"A further safeguard against utilization in the army of men whose services were more valuable in an industrial capacity was provided by the Furlough Act passed by Congress and approved on March 16, 1918. This act permitted the granting of furloughs to enlisted men

[66] *Second Report, PMG,* p. 80.
[67] *Final Report, PMG,* pp. 20–21.
[68] Dickinson, *op. cit.,* pp. 155–56.

in the army for the purpose of engaging in civil occupations whenever the interests of the national security and defense rendered it necessary or desirable." [69] In the summer of 1918 men were granted agricultural furloughs from the camps when their services were necessary and if they volunteered. In the late summer of 1918 the program was expanded to include furloughs to industries. Between 16,000 and 17,000 men were furloughed back to their former occupations under the provisions of this act.[70]

The district boards which controlled occupational deferments clung to a literal interpretation of the term *industries*. "Thus banking was held not to be an industry; claims of teachers, physicians, and individuals engaged in hospital work or care of the public health, and of those engaged in Red Cross or other welfare work, even though directly related to the Army, were barred because these registrants were held not to be engaged in industry; and commercial enterprises were distinguished from productive undertakings." [71] In an act of August 31, 1918, Congress deleted the phrase "industries, including agriculture" from the original act of May 18, 1917, and substituted for it "industries, occupations, or employments, including agriculture." Industrial deferment policies were thereby made more flexible for the closing months of the war.

In addition to the broad class of agricultural and industrial deferments there were other groups which were either exempted or enjoyed deferment under the selective service program. These groups for the most part fell under the broad heading of occupational deferments with certain noticeable exceptions. This so-called exempt class—Class V in selective service terminology—statistically emerged as follows: [72]

Category	*Number*
Total Classification	17,593,778
Class V	3,297,059
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Officials	31,700
Ministers of Religion	46,203
Theological and Medical Students	37,004
Persons in the Armed Forces	722,335
Alien Enemies	540,020
Resident Aliens (not Enemy) Claiming Exemption	927,252
Totally and Permanently Physically Unfit	925,903
Morally Unfit	42,190
Licensed Marine Pilots	3,012
Discharged for Alienage Upon Diplomatic Request	1,842
Aliens Exempted by Treaty	3,534
Declarant Aliens Who Renounced Declaration	2,035
British and Canadians Exempted by Convention	14,029

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 85.
[70] *Second Report, PMG*, p. 146.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 146.
[72] *Final Report*, PMG, pp. 26–27.

*Table 31. Physical Classifications: 15 December 1917—11 September 1918**

Physical groups	Number	Percent of registrants	Percent of examined
Total Registrants Due to be Classified	9, 952, 735	100. 0	
Not Physically Examined	6, 744, 289	67. 8	
Physically Examined	3, 208, 446	32. 2	100. 0
Fully Qualified (Group A)	2, 259, 027		70. 4
Disqualified Partly or Totally	949, 419		29. 6
Group B	88, 436		2. 8
Group C	339, 377		10. 6
Group D (Class V–G)	521, 606		16. 2

**Source: Second Report, PMG,* p. 153.

The actual occupational deferments included in the catch-all Class V classification were government officials, ministers, theological and medical students, and marine pilots totaling 117,919. When this figure is added to the industrial and agricultural deferments, the total of clear-cut occupational deferments or exemptions is 942,304. The only other group which might be included in the occupational class would be the 722,335 registrants who became exempt because they entered the service through other than selective service channels after a previous selective service registration.

4. *Physical fitness.* Out of the 17,593,778 classifications made by the Selective Service System, 925,903 individuals were exempted because they were physically unfit. These men, too, were placed in Class V. Under the 1917 system of selection, registrants were given a physical examination in the order of their liability before they could make other claims for deferment. After 15 December 1917, only Class I men were given physical examinations. They were classified in four categories: Group A, fully qualified; Group B, those having remediable defects; Group C, men qualified for limited service only; Group D, men totally disqualified.[73] [See *table 31* for breakdown of the physical classifications after 15 December 1917.] The percentage of rejections for physical defects before 15 December 1917 was 29.11 percent; after that date 29.59 percent. Of the 2,124,293 men inducted 10 February—1 November 1918, 172,000 or 8.10 percent were rejected at the camps for physical defects.[74] This percentage seems high, but the physical examinations at camps were more thorough. Although there were a few instances of men being sent to camps without a limb or with some other obvious defect, the boards frequently sent men

[73] Dickinson. *op. cit.*, p. 168.
[74] *Second Report, PMG,* p. 420.

bordering on physical incapacity so that by a clear-cut Army rejection they would avoid the slacker stigma.[75] The following military manpower statistical information was secured by The Provost Marshal General from the physical examinations: (1) a larger proportion of colored registrants were physically qualified than white registrants; (2) a higher percentage of aliens were rejected than native born; (3) there was a higher percentage of rejections in urban than in rural areas; (4) a larger proportion of the younger men—those just turned 21—was physically qualified than those in the age group between 21 and 30.[76]

5. *Moral Fitness.* The President was authorized "to exclude or discharge from the selective draft those found to be physically or morally deficient." No attempt was made by the regulations to define moral deficiency beyond excluding persons convicted of a serious crime. The local boards were given a free hand in interpreting the phrase because the definition of a felony varied from one judicial jurisdiction to another. Since persons who had been convicted of a felony were excluded from enlistment in the Regular Army, it was felt that the standards should not be lowered, nor was it logical to take men into the Army whose service very probably would end in court-martial, imprisonment, and dishonorable discharge. Of the 17,593,778 selective service classifications, 42,190 were found morally unfit for service.[77] This represented about 0.2 percent of the total classified. Although a few men undoubtedly entered the service who were morally unfit under a literal interpretation of the regulations, the problem was a relatively insignificant one.[78]

Four other problems had a bearing on the operations of the selection process in the World War I Selective Service System: (1) permits for departure abroad; (2) conscientious objectors; (3) the Emergency Fleet Classification List; (4) the Work or Fight Order.

1. *Permits for departure abroad.* On 8 August 1918 the President prescribed that no person of draft age should depart from the country without the consent of the Secretary of War.[79] The Secretary of War designated the local boards as the agency to issue permits for such departure. "The board considered the application, and if the applicant was not likely to be called for service during the period of his proposed absence, or if the board was otherwise assured that the issuance of the permit would not result in evasion or interference with the execution of the Selective Service Law, the board took from the applicant a statement of his address while absent and an engagement to keep himself informed of any call that might be made on him and

[75] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 167–68.
[76] *Second Report, PMG*, pp. 159–61.
[77] *Final Report, PMG*, pp. 26–27.
[78] *Second Report, PMG*, pp. 147–50.
[79] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

to return immediately on such call. Thereupon the board issued a permit." [80] Previous to this the Treasury Department had refused to permit draft age citizens to sail without permission from the Provost Marshal General's Office, and the State Department had refused to issue passports without similar permission. The plan adopted 8 August 1918 was more practical and within the decentralized spirit of the Selective Service System. The local board had the necessary information on a registrant's status to enable it to determine whether or not he should be allowed to go abroad. No figures on the number of permits issued are available.

2. *Conscientious objectors.* The Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, stated:

> ... and nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to require or compel any person to serve in any of the forces herein provided for who is found to be a member of any well recognized religious sect or organization at present organized and existing and whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form and whose religious convictions are against war participation therein in accordance with the creed or principles of said religious organizations; but no person so exempted shall be exempted from service in any capacity that the President shall declare to be noncombatant.[81]

This provision of the act was amplified by the Selective Service Regulations. These men were classified in the usual way and if there were no grounds for deferment—dependency, occupation, etc.—they were placed in Class I, but a cipher "0" was placed on their records to call attention to the fact that they must be assigned to noncombatant service. Noncombatant service as defined by the regulations included certain types of service in the Medical Corps, Quartermaster Corps, and Engineer Corps. The real problem of dealing with members of religious sects opposed to war was thus transferred from Selective Service to the Army itself although determination of eligibility for noncombatant service was up to the local boards. No specific list of religious groups was compiled to guide the local boards; they were allowed to use their own discretion. Some 64,693 claims for noncombatant classification were made, and 56,830 of these claims were granted by the local boards.[82]

"The Selective Service Act limited exemptions on the ground of conscientious objection to persons whose scruples against war were outwardly attested by previous membership in a body publicly professing such scruples." [83] No provision was made by the Selective Service Act or subsequent regulations for the so-called conscientious objectors. Once Class I men were inducted and reached camp, however, no at-

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[81] Selective Service Act of 1917.
[82] *Second Report, PMG*, p. 57.
[83] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 136–37.

tempt was made to differentiate between religious creed claimants and conscientious objectors. After induction, the subject was entirely within the jurisdiction of camp commanders acting under the direction of the President and Secretary of War. The Army policy concerning those cases was lenient.[84] The greater part of the objectors agreed to at least serve in a noncombatant capacity. By 20 March 1918 only about 4,000 objectors remained in the whole country who refused to serve at all. A special board of inquiry was appointed to inquire into the sincerity of these objectors; of the 2,294 cases investigated, only 316 were found to be insincere.[85] From the military manpower point of view the problem of objectors to military service because of religious scruples was insignificant, but the careful policy of the War Department avoided unfavorable public reaction.[86]

3. *Emergency Fleet Classification List.* "When the United States entered the World War, the most important problem with which our Government was confronted was that of raising and equipping a large army. The next most important problem was that of transporting to France this army and all necessary food, ammunition, and material for maintaining it in the field. This problem reduced itself to a question of ships.[87] Because of the size and importance of the shipping problem it was necessary for the Selective Service System to make a special exception in regard to the men employed in the shipyards, in navy yards, and in training for work in the merchant marine. Thus, in November 1917, the Emergency Fleet Classification List was created. Any man employed in the shipping field could be deferred by the local boards and placed on a special list as long as he remained so employed. Requests for such special status had to be made by the designated representatives of the Navy Department, United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, and the recruiting service of the United States Shipping Board. The purpose of the Emergency Fleet Classification List was really two-fold: first, it preserved intact the shipping industry as far as the draft was concerned; second, it stimulated a flow of manpower toward the shipping industry. "The total number of registrants placed at various times on the Emergency Fleet Classification List at the request of the various agencies was 202,849; the number of such registrants removed from the list at various times was 56,414; leaving a net total of registrants on the list on October 15, 1918, as 146,435." [88] These 146,435 men represented 18.57 per cent of the 788,755 shipping employees 15 October 1917. The placing of Class I men on the Emergency Fleet Classi-

[84] Edward A. Fitzpatrick, *Conscription and America* (Milwaukee, 1940), p. 74; Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 138–40.

[85] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 143–44.

[86] For further information see: *Second Report, PMG,* pp. 56–62; Dickinson, *op. cit.,* pp. 136–45; Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.,* pp. 74–75.

[87] *Second Report, PMG,* p. 62.

[88] *Ibid.,* p. 68.

fication List was discontinued 23 July 1918 so far the Navy Department and Emergency Fleet Corporation were concerned. Although the granting of blanket deferments to a specific industrial group was contrary to the spirit of Selective Service, it was a necessary evil as far as the shipping industry was concerned in World War I.[89]

4. "*Work or Fight*" *Order.* In an effort to channel manpower in deferred classes from nonessential to essential enterprises the "Work or Fight" Order was issued early in 1918 as part of the Selective Service Regulations.[90] It provided that if a local board found a deferred man idle or engaged in a nonproductive occupation, his deferment should be canceled and he should become liable to immediate induction. Although potentially applicable to all nonessential occupations, at the outset the order was limited to waiters, domestic servants, ushers, sales clerks, and other type of personal service employees.[91]

Under the "Work or Fight" Order, the local boards considered 118,541 cases. Of these registrants, 54,313 changed their occupations without further action while 13,777 cases were referred to the district boards.[92] The chief effects of the "Work or Fight" Order were undoubtedly psychological. It took the place of an industrial draft and could have been greatly expanded, but only the five minor categories of occupations enumerated above were declared nonessential. Over 10 states enacted compulsory work laws during World War I which were usually applicable to all men between the ages of 18 and 50. A nationwide drive began after the promulgation of the "Work or Fight" Order to stamp out loafing and aid the war effort by empelling manpower into more productive channels.

Mobilization

The net result of the foregoing selective service operations was the addition of 2,810,296 men to the armed forces between 18 May 1917 and 11 November 1918. The final function of the Selective Service System was the mobilization of these men—in other words delivering them to the Army camps. Although usually the three phases of the draft are referred to as registration, selection, and mobilization, the actual mobilization was the simplest of the three because it dealt with the smallest number of men and was of short duration.

"The Provost Marshal General levied men under authority of the Secretary of War, upon requisition prepared by the General Staff and issued through the Adjutant General; or, after Oct. 1, 1918, upon requisition from the Secretary of the Navy, issued through the Bureau of Navigation, Director of Mobilization." [93] These requisitions speci-

[89] *Ibid.*, p. 74.
[90] Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–68.
[91] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 162–63.
[92] *Second Report, PMG*, p. 79.
[93] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 398.

*Table 32. Mobilization of Inductees by Camp: to 11 November 1918**

Camp	Number	Camp	Number
Total	2,810,296		
		Camp Lee	138,349
Fort Armstrong (Hawaii)	5,420	Camp Lewis	112,474
Camp Beauregard	14,887	Camp Logan	4,000
Camp Bowie	14,524	Camp MacArthur	11,124
Camp Cody	20,852	Camp McClellan	7,805
Camp Custer	89,146	Camp Meade	103,305
Camp Devens	93,819	Camp Pike	116,236
Camp Dix	105,528	Camp Sevier	14,414
Camp Dodge	111,462	Camp Shelby	26,673
Camp Forrest	16,532	Camp Sheridan	5,224
Camp Fremont	8,000	Camp Sherman	103,800
Camp Funston	122,364	Camp Taylor	120,522
Camp Gordon	102,603	Camp Travis	112,357
Camp Grant	114,140	Camp Upton	111,737
Camp Greene	19,423	Camp Wadsworth	55,834
Camp Greenleaf	39,664	Camp Wheeler	31,209
Camp Hancock	15,980	Fort Wm. Seward (Alaska)	1,852
Camp Humphreys	17,941	Coast Artillery Posts	47,386
Camp Jackson	96,704	Recruit Depots	191,084
Camp Johnston	4,429	Schools	269,657
Camp Kearney	11,000	Miscellaneous	185,103
Camp Las Cases (Puerto Rico)	15,733		

**Source: Second Report, PMG*, p. 240.

fied whether "run of the draft" or specialists were desired. Between 25 August 1917 and 7 November 1918, The Provost Marshal General received 130 requisitions from the Army, and between 3 October and 7 November 1918 he received 7 from the Navy. The largest single requisition was on 17 October 1918 for 290,773 "run of the draft" for 56 Army mobilization camps; the smallest requisition was on 15 August 1918 for 3 photographers for the Army.[94] After receiving the requisition, The Provost Marshal General sent his instructions to the local boards through state headquarters and made the necessary arrangements with the United States Railway Administration for transportation of the men to the camps. The local boards usually made an occasion of the mobilization at their level. The men gathered at a central place, speeches were made by local dignitaries, and preliminary instructions were issued. The men were then marched or hauled to the railroad stations for entrainment.

The number of men called, to October 31, 1918, was 2,801,358. Of this number 45,882 did not travel over railroads under the control of the United

[94] *Ibid.*, pp. 398–402.

States Railway Administration, due to the fact that they reported at mobilization camps within the immediate vicinity of their local boards. The remaining number, 2,755,476 men, were handled by the United States Railway Administration. The average number of miles per man traveled to a mobilization camp was 388, the entire mobilization, therefore, involved the equivalent of 1,069,124,688 miles of travel by one passenger.[95]

In 1917, men who had been inducted were sent only to the 16 National Army camps, but in 1918 the expanded military program required that they be sent to *every* camp, post, and station. [*Table 32* shows the number of mobilized men sent to each of the major camps.]

The total cost in dollars and cents of the Selective Service System was surprisingly low. Out of the $54,896,903 appropriated, only $30,847,914.24 was spent.

. . . the per capita cost per registrant was $1.26; per registrant classified, $1.74; per man inducted $10.38; and per man accepted at camp $11.34. Comparison of the cost per man accepted ($11.34) with the cost per man secured by voluntary enlistment in the Army ($28.95) and in the Navy ($30.23) proves that also in respect to national economy the selective service system is to be preferred. Comparing the cost per accepted man under the selective-service law with the corresponding cost per man under the Civil War Enrollment Act, it would appear that the cost of the latter legislation was, per capita, $217.87 for bounty and $9.84 for operating expenses, a total of $227.71, against a per capita cost of $11.34 under the Selective Service Law.[96]

In a period of little less than 18 months the Selective Service System accomplished the gigantic task of selecting and delivering 2,810,296 men to the armed forces with a minimum of disruption to the economic and social fabric of the nation. The 2,801,373 men who entered the Army represented 67 percent of the military forces of the United States who participated in World War I. [See *table 33* for summary of the main phases of the selective service process by states.]

*Table 33. Selective Service Results in World War I, by States**

State	Registered	Classified	Held for service	Inducted
Total [a]	23, 908, 576	[b] 17, 593, 778	6, 373, 414	2, 780, 576
Alabama	444, 842	256, 370	120, 478	59, 033
Arizona	94, 310	71, 352	18, 143	9, 347
Arkansas	365, 904	271, 597	111, 020	56, 233
California	839, 614	690, 970	318, 589	77, 572
Colorado	216, 820	152, 805	49, 203	25, 280

[a] Data excludes figures for Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.
[b] Includes 28 classifications not distributed by state.

[95] *Second Report*, PMG, pp. 240–41.
[96] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, pp. 398–402.

Table 33. Selective Service Results in World War I, by States—Continued

State	Registered	Classified	Held for service	Inducted
Connecticut	374, 400	269, 803	82, 739	35, 083
Delaware	55, 277	39, 599	13, 512	5, 229
Dist. of Columbia	90, 361	61, 926	24, 719	10, 778
Florida	209, 248	147, 925	64, 812	25, 903
Georgia	549, 235	413, 690	161, 397	64, 554
Idaho	105, 337	74, 786	28, 193	13, 044
Illinois	1, 574, 877	1, 183, 669	397, 171	185, 530
Indiana	639, 834	475, 500	156, 908	74, 561
Iowa	524, 456	433, 814	144, 765	72, 367
Kansas	382, 065	277, 882	91, 528	47, 515
Kentucky	486, 739	347, 860	136, 867	57, 569
Louisiana	392, 316	290, 557	126, 130	56, 335
Maine	159, 631	107, 675	38, 353	16, 582
Maryland	313, 489	214, 785	85, 295	35, 141
Massachusetts	886, 728	618, 874	208, 351	90, 852
Michigan	873, 383	630, 836	194, 706	101, 035
Minnesota	541, 607	400, 464	147, 979	75, 801
Mississippi	344, 724	268, 115	109, 555	43, 437
Missouri	765, 045	533, 763	197, 509	98, 237
Montana	201, 256	146, 255	57, 546	27, 938
Nebraska	287, 414	250, 053	85, 918	34, 226
Nevada	30, 808	20, 775	7, 248	3, 249
New Hampshire	95, 158	65, 240	21, 699	9, 362
New Jersey	762, 485	528, 045	164, 775	74, 371
New Mexico	81, 013	61, 517	19, 457	9, 050
New York	2, 511, 046	1, 929, 894	714, 894	265, 693
North Carolina	482, 463	365, 239	136, 088	58, 063
North Dakota	160, 292	116, 685	42, 158	19, 729
Ohio	1, 389, 474	1, 003, 664	403, 600	149, 027
Oklahoma	435, 668	310, 838	123, 500	68, 476
Oregon	179, 436	122, 296	43, 986	18, 524
Pennsylvania	2, 069, 407	1, 470, 508	475, 587	209, 836
Rhode Island	134, 515	94, 822	28, 817	12, 048
South Carolina	307, 350	218, 597	94, 512	43, 401
South Dakota	145, 706	103, 275	38, 784	21, 283
Tennessee	474, 347	368, 242	130, 915	60, 865
Texas	990, 522	712, 629	251, 242	124, 074
Utah	103, 052	96, 820	24, 375	12, 018
Vermont	71, 484	48, 837	16, 530	7, 095
Virginia	465, 439	338, 823	132, 451	56, 340
Washington	328, 466	214, 763	74, 051	32, 142
West Virginia	325, 266	234, 515	87, 706	43, 132
Wisconsin	586, 290	493, 532	151, 347	75, 289
Wyoming	59, 977	43, 269	18, 306	8, 327

*Source: *Final Report, PMG*, pp. 19–25.

Military Training and Education, World War I

Officers' Training Camps

"The quality of troops and their value as an effective force depends to a very large extent upon the character and and sufficiency of their training, which in turn is dependent upon the officers who are designated to instruct them in camp and lead them in battle. Consequently the first step in the upbuilding of the force of nearly 4,000,000 men which the armistice date found bearing arms for the country was the poviding of officers to train their men how to fight." [97] Immediately after our entrance into the war, the General Staff made plans for the institution of an officers' training program to provide an adequate officer corps. Fortunately, there was no need to wait for congressional action because the National Defense Act of 1916 provided: "The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to maintain, upon military reservations or elsewhere, camps for the military instruction and training, upon their application and under such terms of enlistment and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War." [98]

This authorization was intended to give a permanent legislative basis to the Plattsburg idea, fathered by Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, for summer camps at which students and businessmen could receive military training. Using this provision of the National Defense Act, the War Department on 17 April 1917 announced the first series of officers' training camps to begin 15 May 1917. These training camps were under the supervision of the department commanders. The 7,957 officers who had been commissioned in the Officers Reserve Corps prior to 15 May 1917 "were required to attend these camps, either as instructors or students, . . . and were subject to regrading or to discharge in line with the policy adopted by the War Department to commission officers on the basis of demonstrated ability after three months' observation and training in officers' training camps." [99]

The first series of officers' training camps were held from 15 May to 11 August 1917:

> These camps, sixteen in number, were located at 13 posts, readily accessible to the 16 divisional areas into which the country was divided, for the purpose of insuring, as far as practicable, the assignment of officers to troops within the same area from which both came. The following camps were established:
>
> | | | | |
> |---|---|---|---|
> | Plattsburg Barracks, N. Y. | 2 | Fort Sheridan, Ill. | 2 |
> | Madison Barracks, N. Y. | 1 | Fort Logan H. Roots, Ark. | 1 |
> | Fort Niagara, N. Y. | 1 | Fort Snelling, Minn. | 1 |
> | Fort Meyer, Va. | 1 | Fort Riley, Kans. | 1 |
> | Fort Oglethorpe, Ga. | 1 | Leon Springs, Tex. | 1 |
> | Fort McPherson, Ga. | 1 | Presidio of San Francisco, Calif. | 1 |
> | Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind. | 2 | | |

[97] "Report of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, p. 299.
[98] National Defense Act of 1916. *Stat. L.*, XXXIX, pt. I, p. 194.
[99] "Report of The Adjutant General." *War Department Annual Reports, 1917*, p. 166.

[Each camp was organized as a provisional training regiment, consisting of 9 infantry companies, 2 cavalry troops, 3 field artillery batteries, and 1 engineer company. There were admitted 7,957 officers, previously commissioned in the Reserve Corps, and approximately 30,000 selected civilians. Of the number admitted, 27,341 were commissioned upon conclusion of the camps Aug. 11, 1917.] [100]

A second series of officers' training camps was held from 27 August to 27 November 1917 along the general lines of the first series. A total of 17,237 were commissioned.[101] After the termination of this second series of camps, the staff departments and Coast Artillery received permission to conduct separate schools for commissioned personnel.

A third series of officers' training schools were held from 5 January to 19 April 1918. These 27 schools trained officers for the line. Out of a total of 18,348 students attending, 11,659 were ultimately commissioned. The third series differed from the previous two in that 22 of the third series schools were conducted under division control at divisional camps. A fourth series of schools was begun 15 May 1918 in 24 divisions with an additional school in Hawaii and one in the Philippines. Nine of the divisional schools ran their full cycle and 2,418 officers were commissioned. Because the other 13 divisions were scheduled for overseas, their officers' training schools were detached and consolidated into the Central Officers' Training Schools. Eventually 8 of these Central Officers' Training Schools were established.[102] The program at the Central Officers' Training Schools was arranged so as to admit and graduate a class each month. The original course was to be four months, but it was shortened to three months as the demands for officers continued unabated. These schools were in operation from June 1918 until February 1919. In all, 56,011 students were admitted by the Central Officers' Training Schools and 20,563 were commissioned.

Several officers' training camps were held for special categories of students. An officers' training camp for Negro candidates was held from 18 June to 18 October 1917 at Fort Des Moines, Iowa. Of the 1,250 candidates admitted, 639 were commissioned—all in the Infantry. Three series of officers' training camps were held in Puerto Rico for qualified residents of the island. All commissions were in the Infantry for the graduated of the three Puerto Rican comps.[103] Finally.

---

[100] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, pp. 79–80. Of the 27,341 men commissioned 2 were colonels, 1 lieutenant colonel, 235 majors, 3,722 captains, 4,452 first lieutenants, and 18,929 second lieutenants.

[101] Of the 23,000 students entered, 59 were commissioned majors, 1,557 captains, 7,496 first lieutenants, and 8,125 second lieutenants.

[102] COTS were established as follows: Five for infantry at Camp Gordon, Ga.; Camp Lee, Va.; Camp Pike, Ark.; Camp MacArthur, Tex.; and Camp Grant, Ill.; an artillery school at Camp Zachary Taylor, Ky.; a machinegun school at Camp Hancock, Ga.; and a cavalry school at Camp Stanley, Tex.

[103] Approximately 700 were commissioned in the three camps out of entering classes of 1050.

a special training camp series for members of the Senior Division of the Reserve Officers Training Corps was held 3 June to 18 September 1918 at three Army posts with 6,500 students in attendance, of whom 3,732 received commissions as second lieutenants.

Altogether 80,568 men from the Officers' Training Schools were commissioned as follows: [104]

Infantry	48,968
Field Artillery	20,291
Cavalry	2,032
Corps of Engineers	1,966
Coast Artillery Corps	2,063
Quartermaster Corps	3,067
Ordnance Department	767
Signal Corps	1,262
Statistical Service	152

The Central Officers' Training Schools offered a better program than the previous schools as a result of accumulated experience. They "were established for the purpose of abolishing certain unsatisfactory conditions growing out of the old system. Having had the benefit of the experience of all the officers' training schools previously conducted, and being governed by War Department special regulations, the central schools were enabled to operate under one policy with maximum uniformity, coordination, and efficiency.[105]

Student's Army Training Corps

In the rush to mobilize the economic and manpower resources of the country after 6 April 1917 it was important that any and all existing facilities and establishments be utilized to expedite the mobilization. It was only logical, therefore, that the War Department consider in detail methods for making use of the education facilities of the country. The chief of the War College Division instructed such a study in August but soon reported to the Chief of Staff that there was not time enough to utilize colleges for the training of officers. The Division recommended that the Staff bureaus work out a program for training the needed specialists in trade schools, a recommendation which was approved but never acted on until 10 February 1918 when the Committee on Education and Special Training was created within the General Staff. The War Department, meanwhile, was being urged to make greater use of college facilities. The colleges themselves encouraged this proposal not only for patriotic motives, but also because the loss of male students to the services financially pinched many of these institutions of higher learning. All proposals

[104] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 88.

[105] *Ibid.* For further material see: The reports of The Adjutant General and of the Chief of Staff in *War Department Annual Reports, 1917, 1918,* and *1919.*

that students (even in technical fields and medicine) be deferred had been properly rejected by the Selective Service System.

The Committee on Education and Special Training in the spring of 1918 set up a program combining vocational and military training at 135 educational institutions, varying from universities to trade high schools, to provide the Army with soldier-specialists. These schools, known as National Army Training Detachments, were authorized an enrollment of 100,000 from the selective service stream, but only half of that number were enrolled the first year.[106] Both the Reserve Officers Training Corps and the National Army Training Detachments omitted the vast majority of schools from the mobilization program. During the summer of 1918, three summer camps were held for students and instructors. These camps, located at the Presidio of San Francisco, Fort Sheridan, Ill., and Plattsburg Barracks, N. Y., had a combined enrollment of some 7,000.[107] Instead of enlarging the ROTC program under the provisions of the 1916 National Defense Act, the Committee on Education and Special Training proposed an entirely new program under the 1917 Selective Service Act,[108] which recommended a dual system of military training in colleges, as follows:

* * * * * * *

2. All able-bodied students over 18 years of age in the colleges in which training units are organized will be urged to volunteer for enlistment. Students under 18 are not eligible for enlistment, but may enroll and receive the same training. All enlistments will be in the grade of private. Immediately upon enlistment the students will be granted furloughs under which they can continue their courses at the college.

The Committee on Education and Special Training estimates that approximately 100,000 students will be enlisted in this way. The plan of training outlined requires, in addition to the academic work, 10 hours per week of military instruction and drill, supplemented by 6 weeks of intensive training in a summer camp.

Men on the furlough status while attending colleges will receive no pay and allowances, but when called to service in training camps they will receive transportation and rations.[109]

* * * * * * *

This plan setting up the Student's Army Training Corps was approved to begin on 1 October 1918.

The original purposes of the SATC appear to have been to keep students in college and to help the colleges stay open. The tremendously accelerated need for officers (90,000 by 1 July 1918 for new

---

[106] Memo, Comm on Ed and Sp Tr to Dir WPD, 2 Jul 18, sub: Allotment of Funds for Comm on Ed and Sp Training. WPD 9089-44. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[107] Memo, Dir, WPD to CofS, 27 Jul 18, sub: SATC Camps. WPD 9089-46. *Ibid.*

[108] Memo, Comm on Ed and Sp Tr to CofS, 28 Mar 18, sub: A policy with regard to Military Instruction in Colleges. WPD 9089-40. *Ibid.*

[109] Memo, Ch, WPD to CofS, 25 Jun 18, sub: Plans for Military Training in Colleges. WPD 9089-41. *Ibid.*

units and replacements) and the change in draft age from 21 to 18 made imperative a reexamination of the benevolent and philanthropic goals of the SATC. The program, in August 1918, was completely reversed to make the SATC a practical device for training officers and technicians.[110]

The progress of the new SATC program was summarized for the Chief of Staff by the Committee on Education and Special Training as follows:

1. The Student's Army Training Corps is a distinct branch of the Army, created by G. O. 79, War Department, 1918. It is organized into two sections, called "Section A" (collegiate section) and "Section B" (vocational section). Section A is composed of men matriculated at the colleges of the country, all having high school educations, and is organized in five hundred and sixteen collegiate institutions. Its authorized strength is 200,000, of which 12,600 is allotted to the Navy and Marine Corps. Its actual strength is reported November 1, 1918 to be as follows:

Army	127,766
Navy	12,650
Marine Corps	413
Total	141,805

2. Section B, or the vocational section, is an expansion of the combined military and vocational training, conducted since April 1918, under the name of "National Army Training Detachments." The authorized program from November 1, 1918 to July 1, 1919 called for the training of 220,000 in two months' courses, or 55,000 every two months. In the period from April to November 1918, 91,072 men received this training, the men being secured through the machinery of the draft and alloted to organizations at the completion of the courses. In addition, there are now in Section B about 38,000 men, awaiting order for disposition. Section B units are organized in 121 institutions, 85 of which have Section A units and 36 have Section B units alone.

3. Contracts for the training of men in both Sections A and B have been made with a total of 552 institutions, by authority of the Secretary of War, derived from legislation contained in the Man Power Bill, approved August 31, 1918. These contracts call for the housing, subsistence and instruction of the men, at an average price per man per day of about $1.45, until July 1, 1919.[111]

The demobilization of the SATC, begun 1 December 1918, was completed within a few days in most institutions; a few schools delayed until January 1919 to facilitate the reestablishment of the ROTC program. The SATC at the collegiate level lasted only a little over two months, hardly enough for proper appraisal. However, while some justification can be made for the vocational training of specialists, sound military reasons for the SATC's college phase are not avail-

[110] Memo, Dir, WPD to CofS, 13 Aug 18, sub: Selection of Officer Material and Training Officers. WPD 9089-49. *Ibid.*

[111] Memo, Chm, Comm on Ed and Sp Tr to CofS, 25 Nov. 18, sub: Demobilization of SATC. WPD 9089-65. *Ibid.*

able. The hoarding of potential officer candidates by the War Department at public expense is not proper utilization of manpower, nor is this method the best way to subsidize higher education.

Military Training in Secondary Schools

Military training in public high schools increased rapidly during the war. [See *table 34.*] The period of the greatest activity in high school military training was also the period of the least Federal assistance to the program. Short both officers and equipment in 1917–18, the Federal Government could not give much more than moral encouragement. But the absence of Federal support was atoned for by state and local support. Eight states—Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, and New York—enacted laws providing for military training in their public schools. Some of these laws outlined specific training while others only authorized the local communities to conduct military training in their schools if they so desired. The New York Law—the Welsh-Slater Act—was the most comprehensive. It provided for compulsory physical training of all pupils above the age of 8 and compulsory military training for all boys 16 to 19 in or out of school. In operation the law affected only a small number of boys in that age group because of its extensive exemption system.[112] Many communities outside the states with specific statutory provisions for military training had local programs. Included in these were the Chicago area, Salt Lake City, Boston, and Washington, D. C.; all had military training in their public schools.

*Table 34. Military Training in Public High Schools: 1916–1927.**

Year	Public high Schools with military training	Students enrolled in military training in public high schools
1916	224	25, 000
1918	1, 276	112, 000
1920	688	98, 000
1922	319	57, 000
1927	83	38, 000

**Source:* Garrett B. Drummond, "Military Training in the Secondary Schools of America," *Infantry Journal,* XXXI (1927), pt. II, p. 612.

The controversy as to whether military training of the drill type or a broad physical education program contributed more to the national defense continued during the war period. Several states, notably New

[112] "The Failure of Compulsory Military Training in the Schools of New York," *Advocate of Peace,* LXXXI–XXXII (1919–20), pp. 167–70.

Jersey, California, Maryland, Delaware, and Rhode Island, enacted laws providing for physical training rather than military training in their public schools.[113] Undoubtedly a combination of the two programs, physical training to develop bodies and military drill to instill an appreciation of the military obligations of citizenship, comprised the best solution to the controversy. Military training in secondary schools declined rapidly after World War I.

Volunteer Base Hospitals

The problem of obtaining specialized personnel to man the medical facilities of the vastly expanded Army was met in part by the organization of volunteer base hospitals. The idea of forming volunteer hospitals was first proposed in a magazine article by Dr. George W. Crile. The statutory basis for such hospitals was contained in an act passed 24 April 1912:

> That whenever in time of war, or when war is imminent, the President may deem the cooperation and use of the American National Red Cross with the sanitary services of the land and naval forces to be necessary, he is authorized to accept the assistance tendered by the said Red Cross and to employ the same under the sanitary services of the Army and Navy in conformity with such rules and regulations as he may prescribe.
>
> SEC. 2. That when the Red Cross cooperation and assistance with the land and naval forces in time of war or threatened hostilities shall have been accepted by the President, the personnel entering upon the duty specified in section one of this Act shall, while proceeding to their place of duty, while serving thereat, and while returning therefrom, be transported and subsisted at the cost and charge of the United States as civilian employees employed with the said forces, and the Red Cross supplies that may be tendered as a gift and accepted for use in the sanitary service shall be transported at the cost and charges of the United States.[114]

On 20 April 1916 The Surgeon General of the Army, Maj. Gen. William C. Gorgas, proposed that the Red Cross organize base hospitals which could be turned over to the Army when war came. The proposal suggested that personnel be enrolled, supplies and equipment assembled, and enrolled doctors be commissioned in the Army Medical Reserve Corps.[115] The proposal was approved, and the program was placed under the direction of Col. Jefferson R. Kean, MC, USA, who was also Director-General of the Department of Military Relief of the American Red Cross. The Army Surgeon General cooperated fully with the program and with leaders of the medical profession

---

[113] Ping Ling "Military Training in the Public Schools," *The Pedagogical Seminary*, XXV (1918), pp. 251–75.

[114] Act of April 24, 1912, 62d Cong., 2d sess., "An Act to provide for the use of the American National Red Cross in aid of the land and naval forces in time of actual or threatened war."

[115] Memo, 20 Apr 16. File 155420–9. Records of the Office of the Surgeon General (Army). National Archives. [File 155420 is the basic file on volunteer base hospitals in World War I.]

who were anxious to avoid the sanitary ineptitude of the Spanish-American War.

By 25 June 1916, 13 of these base hospitals had been fully organized, staffed and equipped.[116] By 4 April 1917 Colonel Kean proudly reported to The Surgeon General that the following 33 base hosiptals were ready to serve with the Army Medical Department:

1. Bellevue Hospital, N. Y. C.
2. Presbyterian Hospital, N. Y. C.
3. Mount Sinai Hospital, N. Y. C.
4. Lakeside Hospital, Cleveland.
5. Harvard University, Boston.
6. Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston.
7. Boston City Hospital, Boston.
8. New York Post Graduate Hospital, N. Y. C.
9. New York Hospital, N. Y. C.
10. Pennsylvania Hospital, Philadelphia.
11. St. Joseph, St. Mary and Augustana Hospitals, Chicago.
12. Northwestern University Medical School, Chicago.
13. Presbyterian and County Hospitals, Chicago.
14. St. Luke and Michael Reese Hospitals, Chicago.
15. Roosevelt Hospital, N. Y. C.
16. German Hospital, N. Y. C.
17. Harper Hospital, Detroit.
18. Johns Hopkins Hospital, Baltimore.
19. Rochester General Hospital, Rochester (N. Y.).
20. University of Pennsylvania Hospital, Philadelphia.
21. Washington University Medical School, St. Louis (Mo.).
22. Milwaukee County Hospital, Milwaukee.
23. Buffalo General Hospital, Buffalo.
24. Touro Infirmary, New Orleans.
25. Cincinnati General Hospital, Cincinnati.
26. Minnesota State University, Minneapolis.
27. University of Pittsburgh Medical School, Pittsburgh.
28. Christian Church Hospital, Kansas City (Mo.).
29. City and County Hospital, Denver.
30. University of California, San Francisco.
31. City Hospital, Youngstown (Ohio).
32. Albany Hospital and Albany Medical College, Albany (N. Y.).
33. City Hospital, Indanapolis, Indianapolis.[117]

After the declaration of war, the Red Cross organized 17 additional Army base hospitals:

34. Episcopal Hospital, Philadelphia.
35. Good Samaritan Hospital, Los Angeles.
36. College of Medicine, Detroit.
37. Kings County Hospital, Brooklyn.
38. Jefferson Medical School, Philadelphia.
39. Yale Mobile Unit, Yale University, New Haven.
40. Good Samaritan Hospital, Lexington (Ky.).

---

[116] Press Release, 25 Jun 16. File 155420–28. *Ibid.*
[117] Memo, 4 Apr 17. File 155420–117B. *Ibid.*

41. University of Virginia, University (Va.).
42. University of Maryland Medical School, Baltimore.
43. Emery University, Atlanta.
44. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, Boston.
45. Medical College of Virginia, Richmond.
46. University of Oregon, Portland.
47. San Francisco Hospital, San Francisco.
48. Metropolitan Hospital, N. Y. C.
49. University of Nebraska, Omaha.
50. University of Washington, Seattle.[118]

The Red Cross also organized hospitals for the Navy; several related types of organizations, such as ambulance units, were also set up for the Army. Each of the 50 base hospitals organized by the Red Cross was intended to have a 500-bed capacity, but this was subsequently increased to 1,000 beds. Base Hospitals Nos. 2, 4, 5, 10, 12, and 21 were attached to the British Army.[119]

The Volunteer Base Hospital program was a valuable contribution to the mobilization effort in World War I. It provided trained personnel enrolled and ready to move when the emergency came. The fact that Colonel Kean and General Gorgas were able to initiate and carry out such a program is an excellent example of what can be accomplished by adequate mobilization planning.

Training Manuals and Aids

One factor which expedited the mobilization process in World War I was the improvement in training techniques and the development of training aids. World War II instructional materials, which played such an important role in transforming millions of civilians into soldiers, had their origins in the training manuals and movies evolved during World War I. The Army was completely unprepared in this field when the war began and considerable reliance on French and British training and technical publications was necessary. But rapid strides were made and on 19 February 1918 the War Plans Division, General Staff, listed 55 texts of various kinds which ". . . set forth the principles desired to be taught and practiced in the army." [120] The circular admitted, however, that many pamphlets had been translated and published which had little value. The 55 recommended items ranged from *Infantry Drill Regulations* to *Gas Warfare* to *Notes on the Prismatic Field Monocular Telsecope, Type X, Model 1917*.[121] Some of these manuals—*Gas Warfare*, for example—were well-prepared. Most of the texts were eventually issued in a printed form similar to that used in World War II, but some were only mimeographed. All were frequently revised. Their distribution,

---

[118] "Report of the Surgeon General," *War Department Annual Reports, 1918*, p. 629.

[119] *Ibid.*, p. 629 : *Order of Battle——Zone of the Interior*, p. 253.

[120] Training Cir. 7, 19 Feb. 18. WPD 9383–231. Records of the War Department of General Staff. National Archives.

[121] For a list of these 55 manuals see *ibid.*

which was handled by The Adjutant General, was made on a somewhat confused and limited basis and made it difficult for the average officer to possess what he needed and almost impossible for the noncommissioned officer and soldier even to see the manuals.

Although the scope and use of training manuals in World War I was novel, an equally important innovation was the use of motion pictures for instruction. The War Department was at first reluctant to experiment with training movies and slides. Finally on 25 August 1917 the War College Division secured approval of a plan to produce training movies. By 11 October movies of the school of the soldier and of the squad were completed, and a very favorable response to the first experimental showing to troops was reported. The Chief of Staff informed all troop commanders of the availability of the films on 5 November 1917 and urged that they be used to the fullest extent to supplement the training program.

The films were prepared under the supervision of the Training Section of the War College Division (War Plans Division) of the General Staff. They were made at West Point and at various camps and specialist schools throughout the country by a private producer on a contract basis. Gradually a whole series of films was prepared under the general heading, *The Training of a Soldier.* By 9 August 1918 there were 57 reels of this film available for use by troop commanders. The subject matter of these films ranged from *Discipline and Courtesy to 4.7" Field Gun Battery.*[122]

Troop Bases and Allocations

The functions of the General Staff included the preparation of plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war. It has already been noted that such planning done by the General Staff prior to 6 April 1917 was negligible and looked only toward defensive military operations. This was due partly to the lack of funds and personnel and partly to a lack of provision whereby the General Staff would have known that the expressed isolationist foreign policy of the United States would change in 1917. The failure of the Chief Executive to correlate military policy with foreign policy left both the Congress and the General Staff confused. Planning would have been difficult in such an atmosphere even if personnel had been available.

The major subdivision of the General Staff 6 April 1917 was the War College Division, which had a total of 11 officers assigned to it including its chief, Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn. The removal of all restrictions on the detail of officers to the General Staff by the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, enabled the War College Division

[122] All information on training movies is from WCD 9843. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

to reorganize. A Military Intelligence Section had been created 3 May 1917 to replace the former Military Intelligence Committee. On 16 June 1917 the following five standing committees were created in the War College Division:

1. *Organization and Recruitment Committee.* "To have cognizance of raising all classes of troops, Regular Army, National Guard, National Army (drafted force), special troops and replacement troops; and of forming and amending organization for existing units and others that may be necessary, including special troops, corps and armies."

2. *Military Operations Committee.* "To have cognizance of all matters relating to war plans for the defense of the United States and oversea possessions from foreign invasion and plans for oversea expeditions to the European theater of war; to consult the Organization and Recruitment Committee if plans involve changes in organization."

3. *Equipment Committee.* "To have cognizance of all matters relating to shelter, clothing, subsistence, armament, and other supplies."

4. *Training Committee.* "To have cognizance of all matters pertaining to instruction, both theoretical and practical."

5. *Legislation and Regulations Committee.* "To handle all questions concerning legislation, changes and interpretation of regulations and orders that do not pertain to the duties of other committees." [123]

The internal structure of the General Staff went through an almost continuous evolutionary reorganization from May 1917 to August 1918, made necessary by the inability of the original General Staff organization to cope with the emergency, particularly in the supply field. By August 1918 four main divisions of the General Staff had emerged. They were the Military Intelligence Division, War Plans Division, Operations Division, and the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division. [See *chart 11.*] The Office of the Chief of Staff "served to coordinate the coordinators." [124] The functions of the old War College Division were divided between the War Plans Division and the Operations Division. The functions of recruitment, mobilization, personnel, and overseas priorities fell to the Operations Division which also maintained direct liaison with The Adjutant General, Provost Marshal General, and the bureau chiefs. On 12 December 1917, Brig. Gen. Henry Jervey became chief of the staff section which became the Operations Division in February 1918.

The Operations Division of the War Department General Staff, in summary, had the following principal duties:

[123] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior,* p. 30.
[124] Nelson, *op. cit.,* p. 261.

(a) The recruitment and mobilization of the Army, including the assignment and distribution of the draft; matters of troop personnel; troop movements and distribution; and the determination of all overseas priorities.

(b) The appointment, assignment, promotion, and transfer of officers of all branches of the Army.

(c) Supervision of selection of camp sites, cantonments, hospitals, and other construction projects except for harbor terminal facilities.

(d) The preparation of Tables of Equipment for all branches of the army. This included the determination of types and the general basis of distribution of all types and quantities of equipment and supplies.

(e) The standardization of the design and the reception, storage, maintenance, and replacement of all motor vehicles.[125]

In accordance with approved policy, the Operations Division determined when and how many draft registrants would be called; the camps, cantonments, and posts to which men would be sent; the organizations to which they would be assigned; the priority in which organizations would be sent overseas, and the time they would be removed from their camps.

The Division thus coordinated the work of the various corps and arms concerned, of the supply bureaus, Inland Traffic Service and Embarkation Service, in execution of the Army program.[126]

[See *chart 12* for the mobilization of the Army as effected under the Operations Division.]

The Operations Division and its predecessor organizations decided how many men were to be raised, equipped, trained, and shipped within a given period. The predetermined overall policies were prepared by the War Plans Division and its predecessor committees in the War College Division, or, in a few instances, by the American Expeditionary Forces General Staff in France.


Not only were there no plans in existence for offensive action on our part against Germany 6 April 1917, but no one had a clear conception of what our role in the war would be. The day after the declaration of war, the Secretary of War told the House Military Affairs Committee: ". . . the plans of our military cooperation are in the making rather than having been made. . . . But if, before it is over, it is necessary to send our troops to Europe to take the places of those whose lives are lost in the struggle to which we are a part, then undoubtedly that would be done." [127]

Although no one had a clear conception of what America's role in the war was to be and many felt that only economic assistance would be needed,[128] the General Staff had outlined a definite policy, in its 3 February 1917 plan, for sending troops overseas in the event of war with Germany.

7. If a state of war should arise between the United States and the Central powers a large body of troops would be required before the restriction of peace.

[125] "Report of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1919,* pp. 255–56.
[126] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior,* p. 56.
[127] *Hearings,* HMAC, 65th Cong., 1st sess., "Selective Service Act, 1917," p. 21.
[128] See: Benedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson, *The Armies of Industry* (New Haven, 1921), I, p. XVI; F. Palmer, *Newton D. Baker,* I, p. 120.

Chart 11. Organization Chart, War Department General Staff, August 1918.*




a Direct Liaison with The Adjutant General.

b Direct Liaison with all Supply Bureaus and the War Industries Board.

*Source: *Hearings*, HMAG, 69th Cong., 2d sess., "Historical Documents Relating to the Reorganization Plans of the War Department and to the Present National Defense Act" (Washington, 1927), 1, facing p. 241.

767-876 O-65 (Face page 292)

*Chart 12. Manpower Mobilization, World War I**



**Source: Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War (1917–19); Zone of the Interior* (Washington, 1949), p. 55.

But the War College Division earnestly recommends that no American troops be employed in active service in any European theatre until after an adequate period of training, and that during this period all available trained officers and men in the Regular Army or the National Guard be employed in training the new levies called into service. It should, therefore, be the policy at first to devote all our energies to raising troops in sufficient numbers to exert a substantial influence in the later stage of the war. Partially trained troops will be entirely unfit for such duty, and even if our regular forces and National Guard could be spared from training duty, their number is too small to exert any influence. It is the opinion of the War College Division that we should organize, train, and equip an army of one million five hundred thousand men as soon as possible. The War College Division recommends that legislation be enacted authorizing the drafting of the men necessary for military training and service and that volunteers be not called.

8. As soon as a rupture occurs and war appears certain, steps should be taken immediately to establish a basis of cooperation between our government and the governments of other nations engaged in war with the Central powers. Our action, to be effective, must be based upon some definite understanding between ourselves and other belligerents engaged in seeking a common end. In the beginning our cooperation should be solely naval and economic, but ultimately it may include joint military operations in some theatre of war to be determined by agreement with other nations. Intelligent cooperation for such a contingency must rest upon understanding and foreknowledge. Without such understanding and foreknowledge, it will be impossible to prepare plans of any value for offensive operations.[129]

Both of these recommendations had been approved in principle by the Secretary of War. They provided the general policy framework within which the United States operated after 6 April 1917. These recommendations, however, were not plans, but only general policies. It was only gradually that a definite Army manpower program emerged. The period 6 April 1917–11 November 1918 can be divided into three planning phases for troop bases and allocations: (1) the tentative program; (2) the 30-division program; (3) the 80-division program.

The Tentative Program

No plans existed 6 April 1917 for the immediate dispatch of troops to Europe. In truth, there were no troops in the United States ready to sail nor was there enough shipping available to transport even a small force. In line with the policy approved by the Secretary of War 3 February 1917 "to devote all our energies to raising troops in sufficient numbers to exert a substantial influence in the later stage of the war" and while Congress was still debating the Selective Service Act, War Department General Orders 62, 14 May 1917, authorized the addition to the Regular Army of all increments provided by the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916. The cadres for all new Regular Army regiments were obtained by drawing men from old regiments. All the Regular Army regiments were then filled up to maximum strength by voluntary enlistments. When the time came to find men for cadres for the National Army divisions it was found that the trained military manpower resources were already scattered. The War College Division recommended that 961 Regular Army enlisted men be allotted as an enlisted cadre for each National Army division. The Adjutant General, who was already scouring the Regular Army for enlisted cadremen, had to reduce the figure. The inherent fallacy of the "expansible army" theory was apparent; there were not enough enlisted men, or officers, in the Regular Army to provide the cadre

[129] Memo, Ch, WCD to CofS, 3 Feb 17, sub: Preparations for possible hostilities with Germany. WCD 9433–4. Copy filed as incl to memo, Lt G. E. Adamson (aide to Pershing) to TAG, 20 Feb 23, sub: Request for information on prewar plans. AG 381. National Archives.

skeletons for the rapidly and hugely expanding Army of the United States.[130]

Simultaneous with the increase in the Regular Army and the creation of the draft machinery, orders were issued calling all National Guard units not already in service to duty as of 5 August 1917. The National Guard also attempted to fill up its ranks with recruits. Plans were made at the same time to put over 600,000 selectees in National Army camps in September 1917.

> In the absence of a concrete program the general policy was, in the beginning, to put a large number of men in training. This was the first essential step; the development of a plan for shipping troops overseas could progress during the time necessarily consumed in organizing and training these first increments of the Emergency Army. Accordingly it was early decided to construct sixteen camps for the National Guard and sixteen cantonments for the National Army, or selective service men. More specifically, the policy was to bring the Regular Army to full strength; to call out the National Guard and send it to its sixteen camps; and to call a sufficient number of the draft to fill the sixteen cantonments allotted to it, in order that the maximum amount of training could go on.[131]

This tentative program of placing as many men in training as rapidly as possible was slowed down by the failure of the National Guard to secure sufficient voluntary enlistments to reach full strength, a failure which had to be taken care of by the transfer of drafted men to complete the Guard organizations; the slow completion of the cantonments; the lack of supplies which made it necessary to slow down the flow of manpower into the Army; and the changes in the tables of organization which momentarily confused matters even further. While this mobilization of men was taking place in the great training centers, an overall military program was gradually emerging which set forth certain goals on which troop allocations and bases could be made.

As early as 13 April 1917, the American military attaché in Paris forwarded to Washington a memorandum entitled "Military Studies on possible participation of American troops in operations in France." Several lines of action were proposed in the exhibits attached to this memorandum including using Americans as labor battalions, incorporating small American units in French divisions, and direct enlistment of Americans in the French army. A study, prepared jointly by the French General Staff and the American Military Mission 11 April 1917, proposed that an American infantry division be sent over to France at once to establish training centers. It was also suggested that all available engineer, signal, railway, and other specialized

[130] Memo, Ch, WCD to CofS, 24 Aug 17, sub: Training cadres. WCD 9876–63. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[131] Lecture, Maj Gen Henry Jervey before the General Staff College, 3 Jan 20, "Mobilization of the Emergency Army," p. 2. Copy in Army War College Library.

units be sent to France as soon as possible. Finally the establishment of American aviation training centers in France and the exchange of military missions were proposed.[132] The first concrete proposals for the American Expeditionary Forces came from the French General Staff. The ideas of the French General Staff were further developed in a telegram sent 14 April 1917 by the French Minister of War, Painleve, to the French military attaché in Washington. British approval of the proposal to send an American division to France came from the commander in chief of British forces in France and was forwarded to Washington through the American military attaché in London. The prime reason motivating the desire for the immediate dispatch of American men to Europe was the boost it would give to French morale which had sunk to an all-time low in the spring of 1917.[133]

In May 1917 British and French missions arrived in the United States, and pleas for American manpower grew more insistent. The British Mission was headed by former Prime Minister Arthur Balfour and Maj. Gen. G. T. M. Bridges; the French mission by former Premier René Viviani and Marshal J. J. C. Joffre. In a conference at the War Department 14 May 1917 Marshal Joffre handed Secretary Baker a "Note relative à la Coopération de l'Armée Américaine sur le Front des Armées Alliées," in which he discussed the training that the American Army should be given, offered to send over French instructors, outlined some of the problems of the services of supply, and concluded by urging the early dispatch of an American division to France.[134]

The War College Division prepared a memorandum 10 May 1917 on "Plans for a possible expeditionary force to France." The memorandum stated:

> After a careful consideration of the information given by the French officers and of other sources of information, the War College Division believes that if it should be decided to send a small advance expedition to France, this force should be organized as a complete tactical division with a proper proportion of auxiliaries as determined by actual battle conditions in Europe. This is considered essential not only on account of the requirements of combat, but in order that this advance division should serve as a practical model for determining the proper organization, equipment and training of the larger forces to be sent later. . . .

---

[132] Confidential rpt 103, Ch, Mil Mission (Paris) to Ch, WCD, 13 Apr 17, sub: Military studies on possible participation of American troops in operations in France. WCD 10050–2. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[133] Confidential memo, Mil Attaché (London) to Ch, WCD, 27 Apr 17, sub: U. S. Expeditionary Force in France. WCD 10050–9. *Ibid.*

[134] Joffre to SW, 14 May 17, sub: "En vue de représenter le plus tot possible le drapeau américaine sure le front francais les Etats—Unis enverront un corps expéditionnaire à l'effectif d'une division de toutes armes de 16 à 20,000 combattants, comprenant en principe 4 régiments d'infanterie, 12 batteries de campagne, 6 batteries lourdes et les services correspondants." WCD 10050–66. *Ibid.*

> It should be understood that any division formed now will require extensive training and considerable reorganization before it will be fit for combat. Its Infantry and Field Artillery units will contain a large number of recruits and its new machine-gun units particularly will require organization from the ground up, as well as training of commissioned and enlisted personnel.[135]

The memorandum outlined the personnel, organization, and equipment of the proposed division; recommended the appointment of a commander with broad powers for all American forces in France; suggested the selection of a general officer to take charge of base operations and a general officer to command the first division; recommended also that ports of embarkation be selected and that troops to compose the first division be designated. It concluded: ". . . the War College Division is of the opinion from a purely military point of view, that the early dispatch of any expeditionary force to France is inadvisable because of lack of organization and training, and because the trained personnel contained therein will be needed for the expansion and training of the national forces." [136]

The War College Division "from a purely military view" thus advised against sending a division to France immediately which was consistent with its memorandum of 3 February 1917 containing the basic mobilization policy. Considerations other than military prevailed, however, and the United States agreed to send one division over to help French morale. General Bliss, Acting Chief of Staff, emphasized the morale point of view when he approved a War College Division memorandum dated 28 May 1917:

> In approving the above, it is to be noted that Gen. Pershing's Expedition is being sent abroad on the urgent insistence of Marshal Joffre and the French Mission that a force, however small, be sent to produce a *moral effect.* We have yielded to this view and a force is being sent *solely to produce a moral effect.* If all necessary preparations are not made on the other side it is the fault of the French General Staff and not ourselves, since their officers were and are fully cognizant of our unprepared state for sending a *serious* expedition for *serious* business. Our General Staff has made no plan (so far as known to the Secretary of War) for the prompt despatch of reinforcements to Gen. Preshing nor for the *prompt* despatch of considerable forces to France. . . .
>
> But it seems evident that what the French General Staff is now concerned about is the establishment of the important base and line of communications necessary for a much larger force than Gen. Pershing will have. They evidently think that, having yielded to the demand for a *small* force for *moral* effect it is to be quite soon followed by a large force for physical effect.
>
> Thus far we have made no plan for this. It is conceivable that months will elapse before additional forces go to France, except scattered detachments of railway troops, sanitary units and the like.[137]

---

[135] Memo, Ch. WCD to CofS, 10 May 17, sub: Plans for possible expeditionary force to France. WCD 10050–8. *Ibid.*

[136] *Ibid.*

[137] Memo, Ch, WCD, to CofS, 28 May 17, sub: Plans for possible expeditionary force to France. WCD 10050–34. *Ibid.*

In addition to the initial division and supporting troops the French requested that the United States play a major role in the rapidly developing field of aerial warfare by sending 4,500 aviators and a corresponding quantity of air materiel overseas. "In response to this request and encouraged by popular enthusiasm, the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps undertook a huge program which, for a year, it pursued practically independently. Its failure afforded an early and striking object lesson of the necessity for a General Staff to formulate the military program and to coordinate the activities of the various agencies concerned." [138]

By 1 July 1917 the tentative military program and mobilization began to take definite shape. That program can be summarized as follows:

1. To place in training as large a number of men as was practicable.
2. To send one tactical division to France to serve as a nucleus for the organization and training of future contingents and to create a morale effect on both friend and foe.
3. To increase the expeditionary force to a size that would make American participation an effective factor if and when shipping were available.
4. To enter the field of military aviation on a large scale.

Thirty-Division Program

The tentative military program evolved into the so-called 30-division program during the summer and early autumn of 1917. No one document entitled the 30-division program ever existed; it was rather a composite of General Staff planning at the War Department and in the American Expeditionary Force Headquarters. It was perhaps natural that the latter group should take the chief initiative since it first estimated the needs of the A. E. F. in France and then forwarded requests to Washington. These requests were usually approved by the War Department.

On 7 July 1917 the War College Division submitted to the Chief of Staff a tentative program of shipments to France which proposed sending over 25 divisions totaling 473,050 combatants and 239,000 auxiliary and replacement troops: a total of 712,050 men by 15 June 1918. Each division would have had approximately 18,922 men under the tables of organization which the War College Division used.[139] Almost every study prepared during this period referred to the uncertainty of the shipping situation. It was truly difficult for the military staffs on both sides of the Atlantic to make plans as long as the

[138] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior,* pp. 52–53; see also: Jervey, lecture, *op. cit.,* p. 4.

[139] Memo, Ch, WCD to CofS, 7 Jul 17, sub: Tentative program of shipments. WCD 10050–54. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

outcome of the intensive submarine campaign hung in the balance. A downward revision of the War College Division proposals was sent to General Pershing 24 July 1917:

> The following tentative plan is communicated to you: By using all shipping which is now in sight for the purpose and which will not all be available until the month of November, the plan proposes to transport to France by June 15th 1918, 21 divisions, comprising about 420,000 men, together with auxiliary and replacement troops, line of communication troops, and other amounting to 214,975 men, making a total of 634,975 men.[140]

Work meanwhile was progressing in Paris on what was to become the General Organization Project of 10 July 1917, also referred to as the "Graves Project." Assisting in its preparation was a special board of officers, headed by Col. Chauncey B. Baker, sent to France in June 1917 to ". . . make such observations as may seem of value for the organization, training, transportation, operations, supply, and administration of our forces in view of their participation in the war." [141] Working jointly with the Operations Section of General Pershing's headquarters, the Baker Board helped in the formation of the General Organization Project.[142]

In the letter forwarding the General Organization Project to Washington General Pershing stated: "This project was originally drawn up after extended conferences at French and British General Headquarters and embodies the results of French and British experience." [143] In proposing that a force of over a million men be sent to France by 31 December 1918, the report stated:

> A force consisting of about one million men has been taken as a basis for the following reasons:
>
> (a) A thorough study of the subject of organization could not be made without considering a balanced force, complete in all weapons and services essential to modern war.
>
> (b) An army is the smallest unit fulfilling the conditions included in (a).
>
> (c) The operations of the American forces in France must, for many reasons, not discussed herein, include offensive action on a larger scale. To carry this action out on a front sufficient to produce results commensurate with the endeavor, there must be available 20 combat divisions for the operations.
>
> (d) With 20 combat divisions as a basis, the corps and army troops and necessary line of communications troops were determined.
>
> It is evident that a force of about one million is the smallest unit which in modern war will be complete, well-balanced, and independent fighting organization. However, it must be equally clear that the adoption of this size force as a basis of study should not be construed as representing the maximum force which should be sent to or which will be needed in France. It is taken as the force which may be expected to reach France in time for an offensive in

---

[140] Jervey, lecture, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5.

[141] *Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces* in UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–1919 (Washington, 1948), I, p. 55.

[142] Pershing, *op. cit.*, I, p. 101.

[143] *Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces*, I, p. 91.

1918 and as a unit and basis of organization. Plans for the future should be based, especially in reference to the manufacture, etc., of artillery, aviation, and other material, on three times this force, i. e., at least three million men. Such a program of construction should be completed within two years.[144]

*Table 35 Proposed Organization of An Army of Five Army Corps and Army Troops: 10 July 1917**

Organization	Approximate strength
Total	[a] 943, 205
Divisions	727, 140
Combat Divisions [b]	504, 500
Replacement Divisions	222, 640
Corps Replacement and School Divisions [c]	104, 880
Corps Base and Training Divisions [c]	117, 760
Corps Troops	94, 600
Army Troops	121, 465

[a] An additional 188,641 troops, or 20 per cent of this total, were allowed for the Line of Communications and Services of the Rear which would have brought the total planned strength of the AEF Army to 1,131,846. The General Organization Project provided for a further study of the requirements for the supporting forces.

[b] Consists of 20 divisions (4 to each corps).

[c] Consists of 5 divisions (1 to each corps).

* *Source: Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces* in UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917-1919 (Washington, 1948), I, p. 96.

[See *table 35* for overall organization of the proposed army.]

The differences between the War College Plan and the General Organization Project, as far as overall manpower goals were concerned, were not great. The first contemplated 634,975 men in France by 30 June 1918; the second 1,131,846 men by 31 December 1918. The major difference in the two plans was in the size of the divisions. The War College Plan contemplated a division of approximately 18,922; the General Organization Project recommended a combat division of 25,484. For a time this conflict created confusion in planning, cantonment construction, etc., until the War Department finally adopted a modified General Organization Project type division with 27,123 men in its tables of organization.[145] By 11 November 1918, the size of the infantry division had increased to 28,105. The size and organization of replacement and base divisions varied slightly from the combat infantry division.

The major energies of the War Department were now directed toward the mobilization and training of the manpower needed to fulfill the requirements of the General Organization Project.

[144] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

[145] TO, Series A, 8 Aug 17.

In the meantime, however, the Military Program had still further developed. Under date of September 18, 1917, General Pershing submitted his "service of the Rear Project" which was approved. This was followed by his "Schedule of Priority shipments" or "Priority Schedule" of October 7th, which likewise received approval. This Priority Schedule, together with cabled requests received from time to time for special and additional troops, merely fixed the order in which troops should be shipped to Europe; yet, as it included in general the units called for in General Pershing's Organization Project of July 10, 1917, and his Service of the Rear Project of September 21, 1917, it was, together with the estimate of troops needed elsewhere than in Europe, the approved official Military Program. It formed the basis of all American military undertakings, with the exception of the Air Service, up until the time of the German offensive in the Spring of 1918. It was divided into six phases, and called for placing in France by December 1918, 1,372,399 troops consisting of 30 divisions organized into 5 corps, with the necessary Corps Troops, Army Troops, Service or Supply Troops, and replacements.[146]

*Table 36. Schedule of Priority Shipments for American Expeditionary Forces: 7 October 1917.**

Phase	Total		Corps [a]	Services of the Rear	Army Corps
	Total each phase	Total cumulated			
Total [b]	1, 247, 399	1, 247, 399	883, 442	293, 463	70, 494
First Phase	275, 200	275, 200	174, 118	83, 482	17, 600
Second Phase	267, 490	542, 690	178, 114	73, 114	16, 262
Third Phase	246, 248	788, 938	177, 070	52, 124	17, 054
Fourth Phase	231, 743	1, 020, 681	177, 070	40, 951	13, 722
Fifth Phase	210, 100	1, 230. 781	177, 070	27, 174	5, 856
Sixth Phase	16, 618	1, 247, 399	0	16, 618	0

[a] One Army corps scheduled for shipment in each of the first five phases.
[b] Excludes aviation and replacements.

Source: Memo, C-in-C (France) to TAG 7 Oct 17, sub: Priority of Shipments (personnel). Copy in WCD File 10050-123. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[See *table 36* for a summary of the 7 October 1917 Schedule of Priority Shipments.]

On 19 October 1917 the War College Division prepared a memorandum entitled "Plan for the Organization and Despatch of Troops to Europe" wherein were reviewed previously determined policies and plans.[147] The report made the following statement in regard to overall manpower requirements and the number of men actually available:

Draft: From the draft it is estimated that there will be available 687,000 men, but it is further estimated that 108,172 of these will be required to bring the National Guard Divisions to full strength.

[146] Jervey, lecture, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
[147] Memo, Ch, WCD to CofS, 19 Oct 17, sub: Plan for the Organization and Dispatch of Troops to Europe. WCD 10050-119. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

Estimate of men required: The following is an estimate of the number of men required to carry out the first step in General Pershing's project for an army of 30 divisions in France:

In France:	
1 Army	140,735
5 Corps	74,125
30 Divisions	802,260
Independent Aviation Troops	53,797
Total Zone of Advance	1,070,917
Line of Communications 30%	321,275
Engr. Troops with British	3,243
Signal Corps with French	12,000
Med. Dept.	
6 Base Hospitals with British	1,200
40 Ambulance Sections with French	1,800
Total in France	1,410,435
Additional Requirements:	
Aviation project (US and foreign possessions)	18,999
Regular Army for duty in US	97,852
Regular Army for duty in foreign possessions	31,429
National Army for administrative duty and service of the interior	25,000
Troops in training for replacements, etc	133,710
Total in US and foreign possessions	306,990
Total enlisted required	1,717,425
Available: The number of enlisted men available is estimated as follows:	
Regular Army	322,505
National Guard	454,614
Draft	579,828
	1,356,947

The memorandum recommended that the 360,478 man shortage be made up by a supplemental draft.

[See *table 37* for a comparison of the planned results of the 30-division program with the results achieved from February 1918 (when shipments overseas began to increase) through June 1918 (when the program was superseded by a larger one).]

Eighty-Division Program

Early in 1918, it became evident that enemy submarines could not prevent shipments from reaching Europe. At the same time, the military situation was critical. The elimination of Russia as a military factor enabled Germany to move more troops to the western front where it already enjoyed numerical superiority. Furthermore, the enemy possessed the advantage of unity of command, of operating beyond his own borders, and of having at his disposal

trained senior and general staff officers developed by 40 years of preparation. However, the failure of submarine warfare and the enormous losses sustained by the Army were beginning to affect the morale of the German people. It was therefore logical to assume that the German High Command would endeavor to achieve an early and decisive victory on the western front, before the military power of the United States could become effective. Since France had been drained of manpower, and Britain had thrown in her last reserves, it became mandatory for the United States to supply as great a force as possible, at the earliest moment, if victory was to be assured.[148]

*Table 37. Planned and Accomplished Results of the Thirty Division Program.**

Planned

Month	Men to be drafted	Movement overseas (all classes of troops)	Strength of the Army *		
			Total	In American Expeditionary Forces	In U. S. and possessions
1918:					
February	100, 000	45, 000	1, 565, 000	280, 000	1, 285, 000
March	115, 000	85, 000	1, 660, 000	365, 000	1, 295, 000
April	225, 000	115, 000	1, 875, 000	470, 000	1, 405, 000
May	300, 000	120, 000	2, 155, 000	570, 000	1, 585, 000
June	100, 000	120, 000	2, 230, 000	665, 000	1, 565, 000

Accomplished

Month	Men drafted and enlisted	Movement overseas (all classes of troops)	Strength of the Army *		
			Total	In American Expeditionary Forces	In U. S. and possessions
1918:					
February	110, 000	49, 096	1, 639, 000	253, 000	1, 386, 000
March	157, 000	84, 866	1, 796, 000	320, 000	1, 476, 000
April	197, 000	118, 635	1, 953, 000	424, 000	1, 529, 000
May	399, 000	245, 817	2, 112, 000	722, 000	1, 390, 000
June	330, 000	278, 675	2, 380, 000	996, 000	1, 384, 000

* As of last day of each month.

**Source.* Lecture, Maj. Gen. Henry Jervey before the General Staff College, 3 Jan 20, "Mobilization of the Emergency Army," p. 2. Copy in AWC Library.

This was the situation which faced Maj. Gen. Peyton C. March when he arrived in the United States from France 4 March 1918 to become Chief of Staff. As the seriousness of the situation on the Western Front increased, General Pershing cabled Washington 24 April 1918 requesting: "That only the infantry, machine gun, engineer and Signal Troops of American Divisions, and the headquarters of

[148] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 53

divisions and brigades be sent over in British and American shipping during May." [149] This request that combat troops be given the highest priority in shipment was approved by the Secretary of War 30 April 1918. Extensions of the 30-division program prepared by the General Staff in March 1918 to guide the supply bureaus in their planning for 1919 contemplated a total of 54 divisions in France and 12 at home with a total personnel of 3,560,000 by 31 December 1919.

More than a revision of the shipping program and an extension of the 30-division program were needed to meet the situation which was rapidly developing in the late spring and early summer of 1918. On 18 June 1918 at a conference General Pershing outlined a plan to expand the A. E. F. to 3,000,000 men. In a cablegram to the War Department 21 June 1918 General Pershing advised: ". . . our minimum effort should be based on sending to France prior to May, 1919, a total force, including that already here, of 66 divisions (or better, if possible) together with the necessary corps and army troops, service of supply troops, and replacements. This plan would give an available force of about 3,000,000 soldiers for the summer campaign of 1919, and if this force were maintained, would in conjuction with our Allies give up every hope of concluding the war in 1919." [150] After a conference with French Premier Georges Clemenceau and Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies in France, General Pershing sent a message to the War Department 23 June 1918 also signed by Foch: "To win the victory in 1919, it is necessary to have a numerical superiority which can only be obtained by our having in France in April 80 American divisions and in July 100 divisions." [151] This was a substantial increase over previous estimates.

In line with General Pershing's first recommendations made on 21 June and on its own studies, the General Staff prepared the 80-division program (contemplating 80 divisions in France by 1 July 1919) which the Chief of Staff forwarded to the Secretary of War and the President 18 July 1918. Approved 25 July, it became our formal military program. [*Table 38* outlines the 80-division program in tabular form.]

In recommending the 80-division program, General March also expressed the hope that the war might be ended in 1919 if we were able to carry it out. Because of the time required to produce the supplies and equipment for such a large military program, an extension of the 80-division program was prepared and approved 3 September 1918 which contemplated an American army of 100 divisions in France and 12 in the United States totaling 5,550,000 men 30 June 1920.[152] This program never fully went into effect because of the

---

[149] Jervey, lecture, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19.
[150] Pershing, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 107–08.
[151] *Ibid.*, II, p. 123.
[152] "Report of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, p. 241.

*Table 38. Details of Eighty Division Program of 18 July 1918.**

Planned Manpower

Month	Men to be drafted	Movement of troops overseas			Strength of the Army *	
		Total	Reinforcement troops	Replacement troops	In American Expeditionary Forces	In U. S. and possessions
Total	2, 750, 000	2, 760, 000	2, 155, 000	605, 000	----------	----------
1918	1, 250, 000	1, 425, 000	1, 160, 000	265, 000	----------	----------
Jun	----------	----------	----------	----------	1, 000, 000	1, 500, 000
Jul	345, 000	250, 000	200, 000	50, 000	1, 235, 000	1, 595, 000
Aug	250, 000	250, 000	200, 000	50, 000	1, 470, 000	1, 595, 000
Sep	200, 000	250, 000	200, 000	50, 000	1, 705, 000	1, 545, 000
Oct	155, 000	250, 000	200, 000	50, 000	1, 945, 000	1, 450, 000
Nov	150, 000	225, 000	185, 000	40, 000	2, 160, 000	1, 375, 000
Dec	150, 000	200, 000	175, 000	25, 000	2, 350, 000	1, 325, 000
1919	1, 500, 000	1, 335, 000	995, 000	340, 000	----------	----------
Jan	100, 000	175, 000	160, 000	15, 000	2, 515, 000	1, 250, 000
Feb	200, 000	175, 000	160, 000	15, 000	2, 675, 000	1, 275, 000
Mar	300, 000	235, 000	200, 000	35, 000	2, 885, 000	1, 340, 000
Apr	300, 000	250, 000	175, 000	75, 000	3, 060, 000	1, 390, 000
May	300, 000	250, 000	150, 000	100, 000	3, 210, 000	1, 440, 000
Jun	300, 000	250, 000	150, 000	100, 000	3, 360, 000	1, 490, 000

*As of last day of each month.

Planned Number of Divisions

Date	Total	American Expeditionary Forces	United States
30 June 1918	42	24	18
31 December 1918	70	52	18
30 June 1919	98	80	18

* *Source:* "Report of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, p. 241.

Armistice 11 November 1918, but it represented long-range planning of a kind never before known in the American Army. It served well as a guide to help the supply departments make their plans for the future if the war should continue.

The 80-division program substantially increased the goals for 31 December 1918 over the 30-division program. It contemplated having 2,350,000 men and 52 divisions in France by that date rather than the 1,372,399 men and 30 divisions originally planned. To accomplish this expanded program required a marked increase in the efforts of all agencies involved in the mobilization program. The extension of draft ages to include all men between 18 and 45 years of age 31 August 1918; the final reorganization of the General Staff 26 August

1918 [153] which gave the Chief of Staff complete authority in all Army matters; the reorganization of the supply system; the procurement of additional shipping from Great Britain were but a few of the many steps taken to expedite the 80-division program. While General Pershing and Marshal Foch were urging the adoption of an even larger program, the War Department had its hands full trying to meet its planned goals in the 80-division program. Although the AEF as late as 23 September was still basing its plans on having 100 divisions in France by 30 June 1919, Marshal Foch assured Secretary Baker on 4 October that the war could be won with only 40 American divisions.[154] (Forty American divisions were approximately the equivalent of 80 French, British, or German divisions in numerical strength.) This estimate by Marshal Foch was based on the rapidly improving military situation in October 1918 with the Germans withdrawing and beginning to show signs of collapse. Estimates of the enemy's capabilities were, of course, revised from time to time, but they do not seem to have been a primary factor in the development of the military program.

In spite of disagreement over final manpower goals and needs between Pershing and the War Department, the miracle of the 80-division program was well on the road to realization when the Armistice came. [*Table 39* contrasts the plans and results of the 80-division program from July to November 1918.] Of the 62 infantry divisions organized in World War I (1 cavalry division was organized in December 1917 and demobilized in May 1918), 43 were sent to France and 19 were in various stages of training and organization in the United States by the end of the war; of the 43 divisions which reached France, 30 saw at least some action on the Western Front before 11 November 1918.[155]

An excellent summation of the process of troop allocations was made by General Jervey after the war:

> In determining the number of men required at any one time, the Operations Division was guided by the Military Program in general, and more specifically by General Pershing's Priority Schedule, and by the requirements of organizations formed for domestic service.
>
> It may be said that at all times from April 6, 1917, to November 11, 1918, the demand for men exceeded our ability to induct them. Among the restrictions which limited at different stages of the war, the numbers which could be brought in at one time were the lack of camp accommodations, clothing, and equipment; the lack of adequate facilities for receiving and distributing the men themselves; and in the summer of 1918 the exhaustion of that block of our manpower which had been made available for compulsory service under the Selective Service Law.

[153] WD GO 80, 26 Aug 18.
[154] F. Palmer, *Newton D. Baker*, II, p. 346–48.
[155] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, pp. 1310–16.

*Table 39. Planned and Accomplished Results of the Eighty Division Program.**

Planned

Month	Men to be drafted	Movement overseas (all classes of troops)	Strength of the Army [a]		
			Total	In American Expeditionary Forces	In U. S. and possessions
1918:					
July	345, 000	250, 000	2, 830, 000	1, 235, 000	1, 595, 000
August	250, 000	250, 000	3, 065, 000	1, 470, 000	1, 595, 000
September	200, 000	250, 000	3, 250, 000	1, 705, 000	1, 545, 000
October	155, 000	250, 000	3, 395, 000	1, 945, 000	1, 450, 000
November	150, 000	225, 000	3, 535, 000	2, 160, 000	1, 375, 000

Accomplished

Month	Men drafted and enlisted	Movement overseas (all classes of troops)	Strength of the Army [a]		
			Total	In American Expeditionary Forces	In U. S. and possessions
1918:					
July	420, 000	306, 295	2, 658, 000	1, 293, 000	1, 365, 000
August	294, 000	285, 853	3, 001, 000	1, 579, 000	1, 422, 000
September	263, 000	257, 550	3, 433, 000	1, 843, 000	1, 590, 000
October	[b] 249, 000	185, 730	3, 634, 000	1, 971, 000	1, 663, 000
November	[c] 7, 000	[d] 10, 532	3, 623, 000	1, 944, 000	1, 679, 000

[a] As of last day of each month.
[b] Includes approximately 142,000 members of the Students Army Training Corps voluntarily inducted.
[c] Draft discontinued due to Armistice.
[d] Shipments discontinued due to Armistice.

* *Source:* Jervey, lecture, *op. cit.*, slide 2; Leonard P. Ayers, *The War With Germany* (Washington, 1919), p. 15.

In general, it required about one month to call, receive, and distribute a single large increment of the draft; and so the total number called was limited to the maximum number which could be received and assigned in one month. The allocations of a draft increment to camps was made with a view to facilitating the completion of units that stood at the top of the priority list.

Before the call for each increment of the draft was made, it was necessary to determine whether the Provost Marshal General could furnish the desired men on the dates specified; whether the Supply Departments could clothe and equip them; whether the camps could receive and accommodate them; and whether the railways could transport them.

Based on a study of the factors above indicated, the Operations Branch of the Operations Division decided upon the number and allocations to camps of each draft increment; and notified the Adjutant General to direct the Provost Marshal General to call, on a fixed day, a certain number of men to be sent to report to certain indicated camps. . . .

Now, right here, it might be well to state that if the problem in the mobilization of the draft had been merely to allot so many men to this organization

and that organization, it would have been comparatively simple. But two other factors entered the problem. A man could not be considered as merely a man. He was something more. He was part of machine made up of many different parts, each a man it is true, but having to play a highly specialized part. Consequently it became necessary to economize the specialized abilities of these various spare parts and assign them where their specialized abilities would do the most good. In other words, round pegs had to be selected to fill round holes. This required a careful classification of the men before assignment, though this was not recognized at first as so highly important as it proved to be. Also, in order to keep from drawing on organized combat divisions for replacements, there had to be some method devised for organizing and training replacement units.

The Depot Brigade was the answer; and so the sixteen Depot Brigades were originally intended to fill two complete and separate functions, viz.:

1st, To keep in training that portion of the draft to be used as replacements. At first this was considered as their main function.

2d, To act as receiving units for men sent from the Draft Boards throughout the country. This task included giving them their first elementary military training; classifying them; and distributing them as the calls arose, to fill organizations of all kinds and all forces, to full strength in this country, and to provide men, of special and technical training in civil life, for the organization of various special and technical units.[156]

Thus, the chief factor in determining troop bases was the military program currently in effect. These overall programs constituted the broad manpower goals. The actual allocation of manpower at any particular moment was governed by several factors, including: (1) the Priority Shipment Schedule; (2) the availability of specialized military manpower; (3) camp capacity; (4) the supply situation; (5) the shipping situation. Troop bases and allocations was a responsibility of the Operations Division and its predecessor committees within the General Staff. [See *table 40* for the general allocations of manpower within the framework of the military program.]

The development of overall mobilization procedures and machinery has been traced from the passage of the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, to the Armistice of 11 November 1918 which concluded the mobilization aspects of the war effort. The story of the 877,458 enlistments in the military forces has been unfolded; the entire selective service machinery, processes, and problems have been examined in some detail; the reorganization of the General Staff with the resulting emergence of the Operations Division as the chief directing agency of the mobilization has been considered briefly; and the three major military programs which served as a basis for the planning and allocation of troops have been reviewed. The net result of the mobilization was the addition of 3,884,417 men to the Army forces of the United States between 1 April 1917 and 11 November 1918. This one fact is sufficient to demonstrate the military manpower *was* successfully mobilized in the United States for World War I.

---

[156] Jervey, lecture, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

*Table 40. Assignment of Inductees by Branch of Service.**

Branch	Number of inductions	Percent of total inductions	Percent of Staff Corps inductions
Total to 11 November 1918	2, 810, 296	100. 0	
Naval Forces	8, 923	0. 3	
Navy	2, 394	0. 1	
Marine Corps	6, 529	0. 2	
Army Forces	2, 801, 373	99. 7	
Depot Brigades, Recruit Depots and Line Organizations	2, 292, 022	81. 6	
Schools	269, 693	9. 6	
Staff Corps	239, 658	8. 5	100. 0
Aircraft Production	3, 453		1. 4
Chemical Warfare	550		0. 2
Coast Artillery	54, 984		22. 9
Engineers	37, 195		15. 5
Field Artillery	3, 274		1. 4
Medical	24, 927		10. 4
Military Aeronautics	22, 214		9. 3
Military Intelligence	78		(a)
Motor Transport	4, 304		1. 8
Ordnance	7, 112		3. 0
Provost Marshal General	5, 913		2. 5
Quartermaster	12, 074		5. 0
Signal	41, 247		17. 2
Tank	9, 296		3. 9
Veterinary	1, 600		0. 7
Sundries	11, 437		4. 8

[a] Less than 0.05 percent.

*Source: *Second Report, PMG*, p. 235.

CHAPTER IX

LOGISTIC EFFECTS ON WORLD WAR I MOBILIZATION

The "Dictionary of United States Army Terms" defines logistics as the "art of planning and carrying out military movement, evacuation, and supply."[1] When the United States entered World War I, the War Department was completely unprepared and unequipped to handle the vast economic mobilization necessary to place an American Expeditionary Force in France. But even more important it was also unaware to a large degree of the magnitude and complications of the task it was undertaking. By the end of 1917 the War Department was dangerously close to complete collapse in the field of logistics. The reasons for this were many, but chief among them were faulty organization and the failure to realize the relationship between industrial mobilization and military mobilization.

The organizational defects of the Army supply departments were well summarized by the Chief of Staff in his report for 1919:

> The supply system of the Army of the United States was, prior to the present war, organized along lines of decentralization and consisted of a number of semi-independent bureaus but loosely coordinated either with the organization of the line or with the staff of the Army and having practically no relations in common. The absence of correlation was further accentuated by decentralization of activities within the bureaus. Thus, within the Quartermaster Corps, by far the largest agency of this kind, operations were conducted by means of a considerable field force centering around the depot quartermaster, over whom the Office of the Quartermaster General in Washington had general supervision.
>
> At the outbreak of the war the supply bureaus of the Army were as follows: Quartermaster Corps, Ordnance Department, Medical Department, Corps of Engineers, Signal Corps.
>
> The expansion of the War Department during the war to meet the need for new services led to the creation of several new bureaus, among which the following served as important supply bureaus: Construction Division, Chemical Warfare Service, Bureau of Aircraft Production. (Most of the purchasing for the Division of Military Aeronautics was done by the Bureau of Aircraft Production.) . . .
>
> The supplies needed for the support of the Army during the war were very much larger in amount than for the Navy, the Fleet Corporation, and all the other agencies concerned, and the system of Army supply by bureaus was responsible in large degree for the difficult problems of coordination which faced the Government in its task of mobilizing the national resources. . . .

[1] TM 20–205, 18 Jan 44, p. 159. Webster defines logistics as "That branch of the military art which embraces the details of the transport, quartering, and supply of troops in military operations."

> The war, therefore, began with the supply system of the Army organized on the bureau plan, the bureaus being five separate purchasing agencies with separate systems of finance, storage, and distribution, each feeling itself largely independent within its own sphere of action, accustomed by long habit and tradition to perform its various functions without reference to the activities of the others or of other departments of the Government. Accordingly, when the Army went into the Nation's markets to buy the vast body of supplies needed for the war, it went not as a single agency, seeing the problem of supply as a whole, but as five separate bureaus competing with each other as well as with the other great agencies of the Government and of the Allies, for manufactured articles, raw materials, industrial facilities, labor, fuel, power, and transportation.[2]

Against this background of lack of preparation, faulty organization, and failure of military leaders to appreciate the importance of economic mobilization in the early part of the war, three separate phases of the logistical mobilization must be examined as they affected manpower mobilization: (1) troop housing, (2) materiel shortages, and (3) shipping.

Troop Housing

On 6 April 1917 the Army had housing facilities available for about 124,000 officers and men at the existing camps, posts, and stations which was hardly enough to meet the needs of the Regular Army alone.[3] Before any extensive expansion of the military forces could be undertaken, housing facilities had to be constructed. By the end of 1917 shelter had been prepared for about 1,500,000 men. The construction of the National Army cantonments and the National Guard camps in less than six months constituted one of the great achievements of the mobilization effort.

Before 19 May 1917, all Army construction was controlled by the Office of the Quartermaster General through its Construction and Repair Division. On that date the Cantonment Division, Quartermaster Corps, was created to undertake the construction of the new camps and cantonments and on 5 October 1917 all emergency construction was placed under that division. This construction included the building of new munitions plants, air fields, proving grounds, port terminals, supply depots, hospitals, and the expansion of existing facilities. Also in October the Construction and Repair Division of the Quartermaster Corps was merged with the Cantonment Division. In March 1918 the Construction Division was set up to succeed the Cantonment Division; since the functions of both agencies were very similar, they can be treated as a continuing organization.

On 9 February 1918 the Cantonment Division was placed under the Chief of Staff to function as part of the Operations Division of the General Staff. By that time the organization of the Cantonment

---

[2] "Report of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1919,* pp. 340-41.
[3] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior,* p. 159.

Division had developed into the seven branches which remained the core of its organization for the remainder of the war. These were (1) the Administrative Branch; (2) the Engineering Branch; (3) the Contracts Branch; (4) the Materials Branch (later known as the Procurement Division); (5) the Construction Branch (later known as the Building Division); (6) the Accounting Branch; (7) and the Maintenance and Repair Branch. The first chief of the Cantonment Division was Brig. Gen. Isaac W. Littell who was succeeded by Brig. Gen. Richard C. Marshall, Jr., 18 February 1918.[4]

The Construction Branch (Building Division) exercised general control and supervision over actual construction in the field through a complex field organizational system necessitated by the scattered and decentralized nature of the tasks undertaken. Six sections with each under a supervising constructing quartermaster were organized to handle regional and specialized construction.[5] Each project had its own constructing quartermaster in charge of the engineers, contractors, and work on the location. The constructing quartermasters were responsible to the supervising constructing quartermaster of their section who made frequent inspections and facilitated an exchange of experience accumulated on similar projects.

The personnel of the Cantonment Division in the beginning numbered only 100 officers and clerical personnel. The Division grew by leaps and bounds until on 1 July 1918 there were 4,521 officers, enlisted men, and civilian clerks working for the Construction Division in both Washington and the field. The total had increased to 29,244 by 11 November 1918. In addition, the forces employed by the contractors at the time of the Armistice numbered about 427,000.[6]

The organizations which supervised the great building program were not in existence at the beginning of the war but developed gradually as the construction of troop housing went ahead. There were never any overall plans or directives to govern the building program; it was improvised as the needs of the mobilizing army dictated. The chief advisory body which assisted the Construction Division and coordinated its activities with the overall economic mobilization was the Emergency Construction Committee, a subdivision of the General Munitions Board and its successor, the War Industries Board. The Emergency Construction Committee was headed by W. A. Starrett, a prominent New York architect, and included Frederick Law Olmstead, an expert on city planning as well as an architect.

The first step in the building program was necessarily the selection of the locations where the camps and cantonments were to be con-

[4] All material from *ibid.*, pp. 154–57.

[5] Section A, southern camps and quartermaster shops; Section B, northern camps and general hospitals; Section C, storage and terminals; Section D, ordnance depots and proving plants; Section E, signal corps, aeronautics, housing, and unclassified; Section F, remount service and coast artillery posts. *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 158–59.

structed. This problem was disposed of even before the establishment of the Cantonment Division. A committee of the War College Division of the General Staff recommended on 4 May 1917 to the Chief of Staff that the department commanders be authorized to select camp sites within their departments. The committee also recommended that the camps be distributed by departments as follows:

Department	*National Army cantonments*	*National Guard camps*
Total	16	16
Northeastern	1	0
Eastern	4	0
Southeastern	3	9
Central	6	0
Southern	1	5
Western	1	2

These recommendations were approved by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War.[7] May 1917 orders were issued directing the department commanders to appoint boards of officers to select camp sites in their respective departments. The reports of these boards were forwarded to the War Department along with the recommendations of the department commanders. Tremendous pressure was brought to bear on both the War Department and the department commanders by states and communities wishing to have military camps located in their areas. The government took advantage of the special inducements offered by the communities whenever feasible. The policies adopted contemplated placing the National Guard divisions in tent camps in southern states where canvas shelter would be adequate and winter training feasible; the National Army divisions would be placed in wooden cantonments located in the area from which the draftees were drawn. The shortage of canvas precluded placing the National Army in tent camps too. After the reports and recommendations of the department commanders were received, the War Department made the final decisions on the sites for the National Guard tent camps and the National Army cantonments. [See *table 41.*]

Once the sites of the camps were announced, a howl of protest went up from every community which had not received one. Another furor was created by the location of so many of the camps in the South. Opponents of the Wilson administration claimed that the Solid South was being rewarded politically. Actually the chief considerations in determining the location of camp sites were military; the advantages of the southern climate for year-round training were obvious. In-

[7] Memo, Ch. WCD to CofS, 4 May 17, sub: Camp sites. WCD File 6374–29. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

*Table 41. World War I National Guard Camps and National Army Cantonments**

Camp and location	Cost	Maximum troop capacity
National Guard Camps		
Beauregard, Alexandria, La	$5, 408, 200	29, 121
Bowie, Fort Worth, Tex	3, 777, 400	41, 879
Cody, Deming, N. Mex	4, 210, 000	44, 959
Doniphan, Fort Sill, Okla	2, 913, 300	46, 183
Fremont, Palo Alto, Calif	2, 546, 600	30, 000
Greene, Charlotte, N. C	4, 797, 800	48, 305
Hancock, Augusta, Ga	4, 636, 900	45, 099
Kearney, Linda Vista, Calif	4, 253, 700	32, 066
Logan, Houston, Tex	3, 969, 200	44, 899
MacArthur, Waco, Tex	4, 604, 100	45, 074
McClellan, Anniston, Ala	6, 788, 600	57, 746
Sevier, Greenville, S. C	6, 250, 500	41, 693
Shelby, Hattiesburg, Miss	5, 563, 200	36, 010
Sheridan, Montgomery, Ala	3, 578, 400	41, 593
Wadsworth, Spartanburg, S. C	5, 257, 700	56, 249
Wheeler, Macon, Ga	4, 087, 800	43, 011
National Army Cantonments		
Custer, Battle Creek, Mich	12, 964, 300	49, 014
Devens, Ayer, Mass	11, 889, 800	36, 832
Dodge, Des Moines, Iowa	9, 943, 500	49, 229
Dix, Wrightstown, N. J	12, 687, 600	42, 806
Funston, Fort Riley, Kans	11, 293, 100	42, 806
Gordon, Atlanta, Ga	11, 217, 800	46, 612
Grant, Rockford, Ill	14, 268, 000	62, 675
Jackson, Columbia, S. C	12, 298, 100	44, 009
Lee, Petersburg, Va	18, 639, 300	60, 335
Lewis, American Lake, Wash	8, 809, 800	46, 232
Meade, Admiral, Md	18, 192, 400	52, 575
Pike, Little Rock, Ark	13, 083, 700	55, 010
Sherman, Chillicothe, Ohio	12, 826, 000	49, 112
Taylor, Louisville, Ky	8, 439, 500	45, 424
Travis, San Antonio, Tex	8, 384, 100	42, 809
Upton, Yaphank, N. Y	14, 949, 200	43, 567

**Source: Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 172; Crowell, *America's Munitions, 1917–1918*, pp 546–47.

deed, a more effective criticism would have been that all the camps were *not* located in the South.[8]

The construction of the National Guard tent camps was a minor undertaking in comparison with the effort required to build the wooden

[8] March, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

National Army cantonments.[9] The work on the National Guard camps was rushed so that the Guard divisions could assemble in August to begin training. The average cost of the National Guard camps was approximately $4,500,000; the cost of the National Army cantonments averaged about $12,500,000. This difference indicates the variance in the construction of the two types of camps.

The speed with which the National Army cantonments were constructed was truly remarkable. On 29 May 1917 the Secretary of War directed that the National Army cantonments be completed by 1 September 1917: only 90 days later.[10] The last camp site was not approved until 6 July 1917.

Several early decisions made by the Cantonment Division and the General Munitions Board helped to expedite the construction. First of all, everything was standardized as much as possible. The Quartermaster Corps had some blueprints ready at the beginning of the war; these were revised into detailed plans for each type of building and were given to the contractors. Construction was kept as simple and plain as possible. Finally the financial arrangements made with the contractors were designed to permit a flexibility in expenditure practically unheard of in government circles. The Council of National Defense "through its committees . . . prepared a form of contract upon what came to be known as the 'cost-plus with sliding scale and fixed maximum fee plan, which limited the cantonment contractor in each case to a maximum fee of not more than $250,000, the Army itself retaining control of the cost of materials and the wages paid to labor." [11] The best measure of the speed of accomplishment in the cantonment program is a comparison of the number of troops it was planned each camp should accommodate with the number that could be accommodated by Secretary Baker's early September deadline. [See *table 42.*]

". . . the cantonments . . . were at all times prepared to receive the conscripted soldiers faster than the Army could assimilate them." [12] "All construction work, including numerous additions not contemplated in the original plans, was virtually complete by November 30. These additional structures included cantonment base hospitals, on which the Government spent $10,000,000 for the National Army and $7,500,000 at the National Guard Camps." [13]

---

[9] For a description of a National Guard camp, see: Memo, Ch, Cantonment Div to CofS, 14 Jul 17, sub: NG Camps. WCD 6374–71. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives. For a description of a National Army cantonment, see: *Building American Military Camps,* folio prepared in 1918 by Stone and Webster (contractors) on the building of Camp Travis, Camp MacArthur, and Kelley Field, pp. 4–5. Copy in Library of Congress.

[10] Memo, Actng CofS to TAG, 29 May 17, sub: Construction priorities. WCD 6374–41. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[11] Crowell, *America's Munitions,* 1917–1918, p. 539.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 542.

*Table 42. Status of National Army Cantonments: 4 September 1917**

Camp	Planned troop capacity	Available troop accomodations
Custer	35, 819	11, 000
Devens	37, 416	36, 458
Dodge	44, 356	34, 000
Dix	37, 191	10, 000
Funston	45, 787	22, 800
Gordon	39, 975	23, 300
Grant	37, 191	35, 000
Jackson	40, 200	26, 000
Lee	44, 131	34, 000
Lewis	45, 747	46, 000
Meade	37, 191	20, 000
Pike	38, 603	35, 000
Sherman	37, 416	30, 000
Taylor	41, 387	41, 084
Travis	42, 759	41, 713
Upton	35, 563	7, 000

**Source:* Memo, Ch, Cantonment Div to CofS, 4 Sep 17, sub: Adapting National Army Cantonments to new TO. WCD File 6374–90. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives; Chart for CofS, 4 Sep 17, sub: Status of the National Army Cantonments. WCD File 6374–101. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

The factor which most nearly upset the troop housing program was the change in the size of the divisions to conform with the General Organization Project of 10 July 1917. The barracks in the cantonments were designed to accommodate 150 men each, the size of the infantry company at the beginning of the war. General Pershing asked for infantry companies of 250 men each in the General Organization Project. The tables of organization implementing the change were not issued until mid-August 1917 when the cantonment construction was well underway. On 4 September 1917, the Cantonment Division recommended that several changes in housing plans be made: "To place two Infantry regiments in place of three Infantry regiments, giving two Infantry Companies of 250 men each the barracks intended for three Infantry Companies, and construct some additional quarters for the enlarged Headquarters Company and for the additional number of officers." [14] This makeshift solution was adopted for the most part; subsequent construction was adapted to the increased size of the infantry company by building four smaller barracks, each accommodating 66 men, for each company. One other error in the original construction was the failure to plan barracks large enough to

[14] Memo, Ch, Cantonment Div to CofS, 4 Sept 17, sub: Adapting National Army Cantonments to new TO. WCD 6374–90. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

provide the cubic space per man required by the Surgeon General's Department, a blunder caused by poor staff coordination. In the main, however, the original cantonment construction was sufficiently adaptable to meet the needs of the rapidly growing forces by the addition of more barracks space at the camps.

General Pershing's impatient comment that because of the slowness in starting the construction program ". . . was, with some exceptions, practically six months before the training of our new army was under way" [15] was somewhat unfair. The training of the Army was *not* delayed because of the lack of troop housing facilities. Shortages of equipment and supplies and the length of time necessary to create the draft machinery and secure voluntary enlistments had made impossible any extensive training before September 1917.

The construction of the 32 original camps was only the beginning of the work of the Construction Division. The maximum capacity of some of the original camps was greatly increased.[16] All sorts of special projects were undertaken by the Construction Division from the construction of ordnance plants to housing developments for civilian labor; many of the Regular Army posts were enlarged and their troop capacity greatly increased; coast defenses were improved; air fields were built; supply depots and storage areas constructed. [*Table 43* lists the larger troop housing projects undertaken in addition to the 32 main training camps.] Closely associated with the main troop housing construction program was the construction of hospitals to meet the needs of the Army in caring for the sick and the casualties returned from France. Prewar Army hospital facilities were negligible when compared with the requirements of 1917–18. Assistant Secretary of War Crowell summarized the hospital construction program as follows:

> For the Surgeon General's Department the Construction Division constructed hospitals in this country providing accommodations for a total of 121,000 patients, 12,000 nurses, 4,000 doctors, and 34,000 hospital operation and maintenance troops. There were 294 of these hospitals in all, built at a total cost of $127,725,000 and divided into three types: base hospitals located at the various training camps, departmental hospitals located at various other Army posts, and general hospitals for the reception of sick and wounded men returning from France.[17]

Once the major camp construction program was completed, the Construction Division and the General Staff were confronted by all kinds of requests for supplemental construction. Every division commander wanted to expand his camp, but such requests were considered

---

[15] Pershing, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 29–30.

[16] Memo, Ch, Cantonment Div to CofS, 4 Sep 17, sub: Adapting National Army Cantonments to new TO. WCD 6374–90. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives; Crowell, *American Munitions 1917–1918*, pp. 546–47.

[17] Crowell, *America's Munitions, 1917–1918*, pp. 557–58.

*Table 43. Special Camps Constructed During World War I**

Camp and location	Cost	Maximum troop capacity	Purpose
Benning, Columbus, Ga	$5, 315, 000	5, 040	Infantry School
Bragg, Fayetteville, N. C	11, 000, 000	11, 831	Field Artillery
Colt, Gettysburg, Pa	414, 300	4, 000	Tank Corps
Eustis, Lee Hall, Va	12, 160, 000	17, 000	Coast Artillery
Forrest, Ft. Oglethorpe, Ga.[a]	5, 600, 000	24, 457	Engineers
Franklin, Camp Mead, Md	(b)	11, 000	Signal Corps
Holabird, Baltimore, Md	5, 330, 000	7, 500	Motor Transport
Humphreys, Belvoir, Va	12, 745, 000	32, 434	Engineers
Johnston, Jacksonville, Fla	6, 100, 000	18, 265	Quartermaster
Knox, Stithton, Ky	18, 733, 184	27, 805	Field Artillery
Las Casas, San Juan, P. R	2, 500, 000	13, 265	Training
Meigs, Washington, D. C	655, 000	3, 774	Quartermaster
Merritt, Dumont, N. J	14, 500, 000	39, 079	Embarkation
Mills, Garden City, N. Y	13, 000, 000	25, 000	Embarkation
Polk, Raleigh, N. C	905, 000	4, 820	Tank Corps
Raritan, Metuchen, N. J	13, 300, 000	6, 250	Ordnance
Stuart, Newport News, Va.[c]	16, 125, 000	30, 086	Embarkation

[a] Including Camp Greenleaf.
[b] Included in Camp Meade cantonment.
[c] Including Camp Hill.

**Source:* Crowell, *America's Munitions, 1917–1918*, pp. 546–47; *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, pp. 160–73.

only when additional construction was absolutely necessary for winter occupation. Preparations for winter occupancy of the temporary camps in northern areas were a major problem.[18] A suggestion on 30 May 1918 that the cantonment exteriors be painted was rejected by the Secretary of War because of the expense. The camps and cantonments were strictly functional and temporary; unnecessary construction and expense was reduced to a minimum. The standardization of the camps was as complete as was possible within the limitations of terrain and size.[19] Perhaps the best description of troop housing in World War I would be to say that it was adequate but not sumptuous; it fulfilled the needs.

Materiel Shortages

The reserves of supplies on hand 6 April 1917 were insignificant; provision had been made only for the existing Regular Army. The Army had to supply nearly four million men in the period between 6 April 1917 and 11 November 1918 with clothing, shelter, subsistence,

[18] Telg, CofS to CG, ED, 14 Oct 17, sub: Status of Camp Mills. WCD 6374–141. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[19] Construction Division, U. S. War Dept., *National Army Cantonments, Plans and Photographs, June 1918* and *National Guard and Special Camps, Plans and Photographs, June 1918* (Washington, 1918).

and equipment. Inevitably, in view of the absence of preparations, serious materiel shortages plagued the entire mobilization. The lack of reserve supplies was due partly to the failure of Congress to appropriate funds for such supplies, partly to the defects of the old bureau supply system, and partly to a general lack of foresight.

The War College Division on 27 February 1917 asked the five supply departments to estimate how long a period it would take for them to obtain supplies for 1,000,000 men.[20] [See ch. VIII this study.] The replies should have served as a warning of coming difficulties. The Quartermaster General estimated it would require 9 to 12 months to procure clothing for a 1,000,000-man Army; the Chief of Ordnance thought small weapons and equipment could be obtained in 12 months for such a force, but it would take 30 months to manufacture sufficient artillery and 18 months to procure the necessary machine guns. The other departments also estimated delays ranging from 6 to 12 months before enough equipment could be obtained. These estimates were for an army of only 1,000,000 men. No orders for equipment were placed in excess of appropriations for existing forces before 1 May 1917.

The Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense made a survey of the ordnance material needed for an army of 1,000,000 men contrasted with existing supplies in March 1917. This survey, reviewed and corrected by the War College Division, was then forwarded to the Chief of Staff on 15 March 1917. [See *table 44.*] In submitting this report General Kuhn wrote:

> It should always be remembered that, although the cost of the original equipment for one million men may seem excessive, in fact, nearly prohibitive, it will only represent a small percentage of the maintenance cost in the field. The important problem before this country will be how to organize its industrial resources so that supplies required can be produced as rapidly as needed and in the proper proportions.[21]

General Kuhn succinctly stated the problem in the last sentence, but he did not include any solutions.

After we entered the war, the supply situation became increasingly critical.[22] But in spite of the shortages, the mobilization progressed. Nine months after the declaration of war the American Army totaled over 1,500,000 men:

> On the 1st day of April, 1917, the Regular Army comprised 5,791 officers and 121,797 enlisted men; the National Guard in Federal service, approximately 3,733 officers and 76,713 enlisted men; and the Reserve, 4,000 enlisted men. There were also at that time approximately 2,573 officers in the Reserve, but as these were on inactive duty they can not properly be considered in estimat-

[20] Memo, Ch, WCD to QMG, Ch of Eng, CSO, Ch of Ord, SG, 27 Feb. 17, sub: Supply estimates requested. WCD 9433–11/A, filed under OCE, 104860. Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers. National Archives.

[21] "Minutes of the Council of National Defense," p. 47.

[22] S. Comm. Print No. 6, 74th Cong., 2d sess., "Minutes of the General Munitions Board," p. 67.

ing the strength of the Army of the United States at that time. On the 31st day of December, 1917, the Regular Army consisted of 10,250 officers and 475,000 enlisted men; the National Guard of 16,031 officers and 400,900 enlisted men; the National Army of 480,000 men; and the Reserve of 84,575 officers and 72,750 enlisted men. In other words, in nine months the increase has been from 9,524 officers to 110,856 officers; from 202,510 to 1,428,650 men.[23]

*Table 44. Ordnance and Ammunition Needed to Equip an Army of 1,000,000 Men**

Item, name or description	Required on mobilization	In hands of troops, in storage, and under manufacture and appropriation for 7 March 1917	To be supplied	Additional to be supplied for four months' warfare
Ordnance				
Batteries				
3-inch Field Gun	432	213	219	652
3.8-inch Howitzer	201	42	159	306
4.7-inch Gun	105	24	81	215
6-inch Howitzer	105	24	81	215
9.5-inch Howitzer	105	23	82	152
Anti-Aircraft	64	0	64	64
Glasses, Field, Type EE	50,000	850	49,150	25,000
Grenades, Hand	1,136,000	126,000	1,010,000	1,136,000
Grenades, Rifle	1,136,000	126,000	1,010,000	1,136,000
Machine Guns	[a] 17,283	[b] 6,031	11,252	5,761
Pistols, .45-cal	600,000	165,000	435,000	100,000
Pistols, Magazines Extra	1,200,000	330,000	870,000	200,000
Range Finders, Inf. and Cav	2,082	575	1,507	694
Rifles, 30-cal., with Bayonets and Scabbards	1,500,000	[c] 690,000	810,000	250,000
Ammunition (Thousands of Rounds)				
3-inch Field Gun	4,038	1,541	2,497	21,552
3.8-inch Howitzer	1,696	318	1,378	10,128
4.7-inch Gun	712	112	600	3,780
6-inch Howitzer	531	63	468	3,780
9.5-inch Howitzer	159	0	159	1,260
Pistol Cartridges, .45-cal	95,760	[d] 33,000	62,760	90,000
Rifle Cartridges, .30-cal	3,270,000	[d] 321,000	2,949,000	2,250,000

[a] Recommendation of machine-gun board, approved by Secretary of War.

[b] Includes 356 Lewis guns, 665 Benet, 288 Maxims, old model, and 4,721 new model Maxims contracted and appropriated for.

[c] Does not include 33,000 rifles in Philippine Islands.

[d] Does not include ammunition in Philippine Islands.

* *Source:* S. Comm. Print No. 7, 74th Cong., 2d sess., "Minutes of the Council of National Defense," p. 50.

By the middle of July 1917 a shortage of clothing had developed which led The Quartermaster General to recommend that the calling

[23] *Hearings,* SMAC, 65th Cong., 1st sess., "Investigation of the War Department," pt. III, p. 1605.

of the National Army be postponed from 1 September to 1 October.[24] The only items expected to be available in sufficient quantity to supply the National Army on 1 September were hats and cotton undershirts: a somewhat inadequate uniform. Since it was planned to call selectees at intervals as the cantonments were completed, it was not necessary to definitely postpone calling the entire first draft quota but only to slow down the staggered absorption process. General Bliss acting for the Secretary of War, approved on 3 August 1917 the following recommendation from Frank Scott, first chairman of the War Industries Board:

> For fear deficiencies might occur in standard supplies, the War Industries Board recommends that authority be given its Committee on Supplies to arrange for and expedite purchase of such articles of proper commercial grades, but not necessarily conforming to the Army specification, in such amounts as may be necessary to carry to completion the Government's plan for the equipment of drafted men who are to be called to the colors between this date and January 1, 1918.[25]

Unforeseen shortages discovered from time to time added to the embarrassment of the already harassed Ordnance Department. When the 1st Division units began sailing for France in June 1917, it was belatedly realized that no steel helmets were available. On 6 June 1917 the Chief of Ordnance reported to the Chief of Staff that arrangements had been made to obtain the necessary helmets in Great Britain.[26] Ordnance, especially machine guns and artillery, was one of the main sources of trouble in the supply field. On 15 September 1917, the War College Division calculated the field artillery requirements for a 40-division army and estimated the deficiencies in *batteries* which would exist 30 June 1918. [See *table 45.*]

*Table 45. Artillery Battery Requirements for a Forty Division Army and Estimated Deficiencies on 30 June 1918**

Caliber and type	Required batteries	Estimated deficiencies in batteries
75 mm Guns	519	52
3.5-inch Howitzers	81	74
4.7-inch Howitzers	42	(a)
6-inch Howitzers	198	84
6-inch Guns	114	72
8-inch (or 9.5-inch) Howitzers	72	51

[a] Surplus.

**Source:* Memo, Ch, WCD to CofS, 15 Sep 17, sub: Status of Field Artillery Materiel. WCD File 9432-50. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[24] Memo, CofS to Ch, WCD, 21 Jul 17, sub: Clothing shortage. WCD 9876-53. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[25] Memo, Chm, WID to CofS, 3 Aug 17, sub: Supply specifications. WCD 8121-88. *Ibid.*

[26] Memo, Ch of Ord to CofS, 6 Jun 17, sub: Steel helmets. WCD 10050-52. *Ibid.*

Several proposals were made to solve the ordnance crisis. The indefatigable Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood continually urged the War Department to adopt British and/or French caliber weapons to ease the supplying of our forces in France. This suggestion was strongly opposed by the Chief of Ordnance; and the War College Division in a memorandum proudly asserted: "Dependence upon another nation for our arms and ammunition is contrary to the independent spirit of our people. It is thought that the abandonment of our arms for inferior arms of another nation would be resented by the public at large, and satisfactory explanation by the War Department would be difficult." [27] These were fine words for a War Department almost devoid of artillery and which eventually had to rely chiefly on those "inferior arms of another nation" for its artillery in France.

Complaints about shortages and criticism of War Department errors led to an extensive investigation of the war effort by the Senate Military Affairs Committee in January 1918. The testimony given in those hearings reviewed past, present, and future mobilization activities. The statement of Secretary Baker before that committee on 28 January 1918 refuted many of the charges and answered some of the criticism. In his defense of the Ordnance Department, he pointed out that enough rifles had been available for training although the model to be used in France was not always available. He also stated that we were able to obtain surplus machine guns from France and artillery from Great Britain and France in sufficient quantity to equip all the men we could transport to Europe.[28]

However, the shortages of quartermaster supplies could not similarly be filled by our Allies. A detailed statement of quartermaster shortages by divisions was placed before the Senate Committee 12 January 1918. There were serious shortages of woolen O. D. breeches, woolen O. D. coats, gloves, legging laces, ornaments, field shoes, stockings, slickers, and shelter halves. In his testimony 28 January 1918 Secretary Baker stated:

> The reports I have now are, and the reports for some time have been, that the quantity of woolen underwear in the camps is adequate; that the quantity of heavy cotton khaki is adequate. For some weeks now we have had an adequate supply of overcoats. The supply of coats is approaching adequacy, and almost without exception—I say "almost," because I have not had time to read them all—but from every camp with which I have communicated in the last few days the report comes to me that where there are any shortages of coats, and that seems to be the principal item, that there is no such shortage as interferes either with the safety or comfort of the men; that adequate stocks of heavy woolen underwear and overcoats have protected the men

[27] Memo, Ch, WCD to CofS, 12 May 17, sub: Wood proposals on arms shortage. WCD 9432–37. *Ibid.*

[28] *Hearings*, SMAC, 65th Cong., 1st sess., "Investigation of the War Department," pt. IV, pp. 1945–54.

against actual suffering by reason of the temporary deficiency in goods, but even the temporary deficiency in goods is for the most part supplied.[29]

The Secretary admitted, however, that supply shortages had delayed the mobilization when he stated:

> What we tried to do, and the responsibility for it, I think, I must personally accept, because I was conscious of the grounds on which it lay—what we tried to do was to summon the men out as rapidly as they could be taken care of, with the best knowledge we could get of the capacity of the industry of this country, and it is not unknown to any member of this committee that when the draft Army came to be assembled, we delayed the calling out of the units of it sometimes a couple of weeks, sometimes more than that, in order that at each camp no men would be received who could not be taken care of, and the last element of the first 500,000 or 687,000 men selected by draft, the last element of these men intended, originally, to have come out in November or December, will not in fact report to the camps until the 15th of February, in order that this production may catch up and be adequate for their entertainment and protection when they come.[30]




Figure 6. Lack of equipment in World War I.

There is no doubt that the shortages of quartermaster and ordnance supplies had an adverse effect on the military mobilization. The lack of reserve supplies, the early hesitation in placing orders, the competition between the supply bureaus, and the shortages of certain basic raw materials all lead to a critcal material situation. Gradually as industry converted to war production and control of scarce supplies was instituted the materiel picture improved. Because of the elastic productivity of American industry and the ability of our Allies to supply us with ordnance, the United States achieved the economic mobilization made necessary for the waging of modern wars.

A simple and obvious conclusion, however is that it would have been possible for the United States to place a better equipped and trained Army in France sooner than it did had there not been initial materiel shortages.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 1958.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 1959.

Shipping

Shipping represented the most serious problem facing the United States 6 April 1917. Even if the shortage of military manpower and supplies were corrected within a reasonable period of time, without transatlantic shipping men and supplies would remain immobile in the United States, three thousand miles from the trenches of France. The Allied shipping situation in 1917 was extremely grave. The German U-boats were sinking 800,000 tons of merchant shipping monthly.[31] Germany took the calculated risk that even if the United States should enter the war once unrestricted submarine warfare was resumed the submarines would prevent us from playing an effective role in France. A serious shortage of shipping already existed even before submarines began destroying shipping at a far greater rate than the Allies could replace it. Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, elder statesman of the British Navy and member of the House of Lords, gloomily surveyed the situation 19 July 1917:

> At the present rate of losses—British, Allied, and Neutral, average from 1st February to 14th July (say about six months)—I make out that British, Allies and Neutrals are losing ships at the rate of about seven million tons a year. I also make out that if the allied shipbuilding firms of the world put forward their full strength as at present, they could not produce more than four million tons of new shipping, in other words about one-half. I am also distressed at the fact that it appears to me to be impossible to provide enough ships to bring the American Army over in hundreds of thousands to France, and, after they are brought over, to supply the enormous amount of shipping which will be required to keep them full up with munitions, food and equipment.[32]

Although the Germans and the admiral both proved to be wrong, only superhuman efforts and near miracles made it possible to win the shipping battle. Ultimate success was achieved by lessening submarine effectiveness, which is part of the naval history of the war, and by improved shipbuilding and employment which is part of the mobilization effort. Most of the major decisions made by the War Department were necessarily influenced by the shipping situation which permeated every aspect of the mobilization.

By 1917, the great era of the clipper ships and other American sailing vessels had become a legend; indeed our whole merchant marine in 1917 was more legend than reality. Only 10 percent of the foreign commerce of the United States was carried in American ships in 1914; even Norway was more capable of transporting an army overseas.[33] In 1860 the American merchant marine totaled 8,030,807 deadweight tons; by 1914 it had increased only to 11,893,437, while in the same period Great Britain's merchant marine had nearly trebled from

[31] Gleaves, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–21.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[33] F. Palmer, *Newton D. Baker*, I, p. 398.

12,849,678 to 32,516,955 deadweight tons.[34] To comprehend the solution of the shipping problem there must be considered the overall governmental shipping program, the work of the Army Embarkation Service, and the legislation and agencies which controlled shipping.

The Congress for over 50 years had been aware that legislation was necessary to revitalize our maritime industry but had not been able to agree on what form that legislation should take until the World War forced the issue.[35] Even after the war began, the Congress delayed comprehensive action until it passed the Shipping Act of September 7, 1916.[36] This measure, passed when the United States was still at peace, was not intended as war legislation. The title of the act stated its purpose: "An Act to establish a United States Shipping Board for the purpose of encouraging, developing, and creating a naval auxiliary and naval reserve and a merchant marine to meet the requirements of the commerce of the United States with its Territories and possessions and with foreign countries; to regulate carriers by water engaged in the foreign and interstate commerce of the United States, and for other purposes." [37]

The Shipping Board of five commissioners ". . . was granted broad powers to construct, equip or acquire vessels suitable for commerce and military and naval purposes. Most important of all, it was given the power to form one or more corporations for the purchase, construction, equipment, lease, charter, maintenance, and operation of merchant vessels in the commerce of the United States." [38] Subsequent wartime legislation further increased the powers of the Shipping Board. Although the Shipping Act was passed 7 September 1916, the Board members were not nominated by the President until 22 December 1916 and it was almost a month before the Senate confirmed the nominations.[39] The Shipping Act of 1916 laid the groundwork for increasing American shipping; the Board established by the act became the chief regulative agency in the shipping field and as such controlled

[34] Deadweight tonnage is the actual weight of a ship and its cargo at full load draft. It is the most common measure used in describing American shipping. See: John N. Teal, "Operations of the United States Shipping Board," Feb. 1921, p. 26. Copy in Library of Congress.

[35] Edward N. Hurley, *The Bridge to France* (Philadelphia, 1927), p. 19.

[36] Minor legislative items included: (1) Shipping Act of August 18, 1914, which removed restrictions prohibiting transfer of non-American built ships to American registry inside of five years; (2) Act of February 24, 1915, which admitted to American registry foreign vessels wrecked in coastal waters and salvaged by Americans; (3) Act of March 4, 1915, which repealed penalties on foreign-built vessels owned by Americans. See: Hurley, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–21.

[37] Act of September 7, 1916, 64th Cong., 1st sess.

[38] Hurley, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–23.

[39] The first chairman of the Shipping Board was William Denman, an admiralty lawyer from California. Mr. Denman became embroiled in a more or less public controversy over policy and resigned to restore confidence in the Board. Board membership changed rapidly. By 31 Jul 17 the Board was composed of Edward N. Hurley as chairman, Raymond B. Stevens, Bainbridge Colby, Charles R. Page, and John A. Donald. Only Mr. Donald was a member of the original board.

the overall wartime shipping mobilization. The actual operations of the program, however, were left to subordinate and allied agencies, the most important of which were the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, the Shipping Control Committee, and the Embarkation Service of the Army.

The chief agency of the Shipping Board was the Emergency Fleet Corporation to which the shipping construction program was entrusted.[40] In effect, the Emergency Fleet Corporation was the operating agency of the Shipping Board.[41] There were many advantages in setting up a government corporation to handle the vast shipbuilding program necessitated by our entrance into the war. Such an organization could function along the lines of a gigantic private corporation with the resulting flexibility and leeway while still being backed by the full financial credit of the Federal Government. A clumsy and unfortunate allotment of authority to officials of the Corporation, which was subsequently corrected, caused friction and confusion in its initial operations.[42]

The Shipping Control Committee set up by the Shipping Board on 11 February 1918 established liaison with the War Department. Until that time, there had been no unified control of the fleets operated by the Shipping Board, the Navy Department, and the War Department. The Committee, composed of two American and one British representatives, helped coordinate the overall allocation of Allied shipping.[43] The task of the Shipping Control Committee, to expedite the effective utilization of existing tonnage, was accomplished with a ruthlessness previously unknown in the mobilization program.[44] The Shipping Control Committee assumed a major role in the economic mobilization. It had to determine which raw material imports were vital to the war industries and in what quantities; it allocated coastal shipping to keep the industrial production program running smoothly; it decided how much shipping to allot for the transatlantic movement of men and supplies and how much to keep in reserve to meet unforeseen emergencies. The surprising thing is that such an organization was not created before 11 February 1918; for the last nine months of the war, at least, some semblance of order in shipping allocation was achieved.

The many committees and divisions created by the Shipping Board and the Emergency Fleet Corporation included some which made significant contributions to the shipping effort. Among those organizations were the Chartering Committee of the Shipping Board which centralized all American chartering activities and regulated charter

[40] *First Annual Report of the United States Shipping Board,* 1 Dec 17, pp. 6–7.
[41] Hurley, *op. cit.,* p. 25.
[42] *Ibid.,* pp. 27–29.
[43] *Second Annual Report of the United States Shipping Board,* 1 Dec. 18, pp. 65–66.
[44] Hurley, *op. cit.,* p. 104.

rates; the recruiting services of both agencies which recruited and trained men to operate ships and to work in the construction yards: the Steel Ship Construction Division and the Wood Ship Construction Division of the Emergency Fleet Corporation which controlled construction of the respective types of ship building.

The principal Army agency concerned with shipping was the Embarkation Service. Before the war, the Transportation Division of the Quartermaster General's Office had handled all transportation activities of the Army.[45] From the outset it was obvious that this organization was inadequate to meet the exigencies of a full-scale war. The first step taken was to organize ports of embarkation at New York and Newport News according to the instructions of the Acting Chief of Staff 6 June 1917 and the recommendations of The Quartermaster General 20 June 1917. "On July 2, 1917, the assistant to the Chief of Staff submitted a memorandum emphasizing the lack of coordination then existing between the agencies performing embarkation functions, urging the need of the immediate organization of the ports of embarkation and recommending the appointment of a 'Supervisor of Military Supplies'." [46]

On 4 August 1917 the Embarkation Service was organized as an independent War Department bureau. Its functions were:

> To exercise direct supervision over all movements of munitions and supplies destined for Europe from points of origin to ports; to coordinate all overseas troop movements; to supervise operations at ports of embarkation; to exercise control over Army transports and commercial shipping carrying troops and supplies in the trans-Atlantic service; to arrange with the Navy for convoy service; to expedite shipments and troop movements in accordance with demands of the A. E. F.; and to advise the Chief of Staff with reference thereto.[47]

The Water Transportation Branch continued nominally as part of the Quartermaster Department until 22 April 1918 but actually functioned as an operating branch of the Embarkation Service. The Embarkation Service continued to carry out its original functions, with the exception of inland movements to ports, throughout the war although it ceased to be an independent bureau in December 1917.

Under War Department General Orders No. 167, 28 December 1917, the Storage and Traffic Division of the General Staff and the Embarkation Service was transferred to this new agency. On 16 April 1918, the Storage and Traffic Division merged with the Purchase and Supply Division to create the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division of the General Staff with the Embarkation Service as one of the four main subdivisions. "The Embarkation Service maintained a singular

---

[45] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 499.
[46] "Report of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, p. 379.
[47] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 499.

continuity of organization and existence in a period when constant adjustment and readjustment was the rule.[48]

The Embarkation Service supervised the movement of troops and supplies from their point of origin in this country to their port of debarkation in France. It carried out the priorities laid down by the General Staff Operations Division. By means of direct communication and continual liaison with the Navy Department, the United States Shipping Board, and the Shipping Control Committee, as well as all the War Department bureaus, the Embarkation Service became a major coordinating agency. Its activities were limited only by the shortages of men, supplies, and shipping which harassed the entire mobilization effort. In general, it can be said that providing the tonnage was the responsibility of the Shipping Board and the Shipping Control Committee while the Embarkation Service functioned as a sort of combined passenger and shipping agent for the Army.[49]

The shipping shortage was a major factor in determining military policy and plans as the mobilization developed. There were two methods, both of which were used to the fullest extent, of narrowing the gap between needed and available tonnage. First of all, more ships could be added to the fleets; and second, better utilization of existing ships could be made. Both methods helped alleviate the shipping problem, but it had not been solved by the time of the Armistice.

Addition of Ships to the Fleets

To say that the addition of more ships to the fleets was one means of reducing the shipping shortage is an oversimplification because the number of ships which could be added was strictly limited. Sinkings were exceeding launchings almost two to one when the United States entered the war. The Shipping Board increased the ships at its disposal by six methods.

1. *New Ship Construction.* The number of new ships which could be built was limited in 1917 by the existing shipyard facilities. "When the United States entered the war, American shipbuilders were principally engaged in the construction of ships for foreign account, principally British and Norwegian. The yards were working substantially at capacity. The problem . . . was not merely to build ships, but also to build new yards in which more ships might be constructed."[50] "A capacity of from 6,000,000 to 10,000,000 deadweight tons a year was needed in order to allow a safe margin, whereas our best shipbuilding year, 1916, had produced less than 300,000 deadweight tons of new ships."[51] A revolution in the shipbuilding industry

[48] "Report of the Chief of Staff," *War Department Annual Reports, 1919,* p. 384.
[49] *Ibid.,* pp. 384–86.
[50] *First Annual Report of the United States Shipping Board,* p. 7.
[51] *Second Annual Report of the United States Shipping Board,* p. 129.

was needed, and just such a revolution was created by the introduction of fabricated ships built under assembly line conditions with interchangeable parts. An entirely new shipbuilding industry had to be created on a hitherto undreamed-of scale, but because of the magnitude and radical nature of the program it got off to an extremely slow start.[52]

The Shipping Board, through the Emergency Fleet Corporation, built new shipyards and helped refurbish and enlarge old ones. The EFC contracted with private corporations to construct and operate on a contract basis three large shipyards to turn out fabricated steel ships and had contracts with over 100 other shipyards. The construction of the shipyards was itself a tremendous undertaking even before the yards began producing ships. The largest shipyard built for the EFC was the Hog Island Yard at Philadelphia, but it came late. The Hog Island construction contract was signed 13 September 1917; the first keel was laid 12 February 1918; and the first ship, the *Quistconck*, was launched 5 August 1918.

The ship construction program of the Shipping Board contemplated the completion of the steel ships under construction in American yards (all 431 of which it "seized" 3 August 1917 which meant the government merely took over existing contracts) and the construction of some 2800 other steel, wood, composite, and concrete ships. [The planned construction program and actual deliveries of ships up to 31 October 1918 are shown in *table 46*.]

*Table 46. World War I Shipbuilding Program and Results**

Class of ships	Planned		Delivered by 31 Oct 1918	
	Number	Dead-weight tons	Number	Dead-weight tons
Total	3, 282	18, 499, 878	470	2, 672, 031
Requisitioned Steel	431	3, 056, 008	272	1, 731, 631
Contract Steel	1, 741	11, 914, 670	106	612, 200
Contract Wood	1, 017	3, 052, 200	84	298, 200
Contract Composite	50	175, 000	8	30, 000
Contract Concrete	43	302, 000	0	0

* *Source:* Hurley, *The Bridge to France*, p. 47; *Second Annual Report of the United States Shipping Board*, pp. 138–43.

It is readily apparent that the process of increasing tonnage by building new ships was slow in getting under way.[53] The shipbuilding program was just beginning to roll when the Armistice came.

[52] Hurley, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

[53] Complete discussions of the shipbuilding program and its many problems are found in Hurley, *op. cit.*; *Second Annual Report of the United States Shipping Board*; and Benedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson, *The Road to France* (New Haven, 1921), vol. II.

2. *Commandeering American Ships.*

> . . . a general requisition order was issued on October 12, 1917, to be effective October 15, 1917, by which all American steel power-driven cargo vessels of 2,500 dead-weight tons or over and all American passenger vessels of 2,500 gross register, suitable for foreign service, were requisitioned.
>
> In most cases the Shipping Board did not wish to requisition the title, but merely the use of the vessel. A requisition agreement was therefore sent to the owners, under which the latter assumed the obligation to operate the vessel for the United States. and also a requisition charter, setting forth in detail the duties and responsibilities assumed by the United States and the ship owners respecting their joint physical operation of the vessels, and fixing the requisition rate to be paid to the owners by the United States.[54]

There were two reasons for the requisitioning: first, it would help achieve unity of control over the distribution of shipping; and second, it would facilitate the regulation of shipping rates and thus decrease war profiteering. "The number of United States merchant vessels under requisition charter on November 12, 1918, was 444 (of 2,938,758 dead-weight tons), exclusive of vessels formerly requisitioned but released to owners upon compliance with certain conditions." [55]

3. *Seizure of Interned German Ships.* "When the United States entered the war there were interned in American ports 91 ships of German registry, of an aggregate gross tonnage of 594,696." [56] But these vessels, which were scattered in many of the ports of the United States, had all been damaged by their crews in an effort to scuttle them.[57] The German ships were seized by customhouse officials as soon as we declared war. Under an Executive order of 30 June 1917 they were turned over to the Shipping Board which took immediate steps to repair them and put them back into service. The seized German ships constituted the first major addition to our merchant marine in the war. Among them was the *Vaterland*, the largest passenger ship in the world at the time, which was renamed the *Leviathan* and carried almost 100,000 Americans to France during the war. Austrian ships were seized after we declared war on that country on 11 November 1917. The considerable German and Austrian tonnage interned or seized by other countries was purchased or chartered whenever possible. Ships were obtained by these methods from Siam, China, and several South American countries. Approximately 700,000 deadweight tons of former enemy shipping were being used by the United States at the time of the Armistice.

4. *Acquiring Neutral Shipping.* A considerable amount of tonnage was secured from the Scandinavian countries under chartering agreements which were the outcome of a long series of negotiations. Some ships thus secured were chartered for use in war zone trading and

---

[54] *Second Annual Report of the United States Shipping Board,* p. 34.
[55] *Ibid.,* pp. 35–36.
[56] *First Annual Report of the United States Shipping Board,* p. 19.
[57] Hurley, *op. cit.,* pp. 40–41.

some for use outside the war zone. In either case, the ships were useful because those for use outside the war zone could transport essential raw material to the United States thereby releasing American ships from such runs. The United States obtained 614,000 deadweight tons of steamers and 275,000 tons of sailing vessels from Norway; 200,000 deadweight tons of steamers from Sweden; and 265,000 deadweight tons of steamers from Denmark.[58]

A somewhat similar agreement was arranged with the Dutch government for the use of its ships in American ports in January 1918, but because of pressure exerted on the Dutch by the Germans they were forced to renege. On 20 March 1918 President Wilson ordered the Dutch vessels within the United States territorial jurisdiction seized under what is known in international law as "the right of angary," which allows a belligerent to requisition for military purposes ships of foreign policy within its territorial jurisdiction. The United States by this action acquired the use of 87 Dutch vessels totaling 533,746 deadweight tons in American ports including those in the Philippines.[59] This seizure presented several problems. The ships were out of repair and had to be reconditioned; the owners of both the ships and their cargoes had to be reimbursed; the crews had to be paid, cared for and eventually repatriated; and the ships had to be manned by new American crews. To forestall resentment in the Netherlands, no expense was spared settling the accounts of all concerned. Only the severity of the shipping crisis in early 1918 justified so expensive an action.

5. *Purchase of Ships.*

> On March 19, 1918, negotiations were begun by the War Trade Board and the Shipping Board for the purchase of Japanese vessels and for the construction in Japanese yards of additional vessels. An agreement was concluded under which contracts were made in April and May, 1918, providing for the purchase of 15 Japanese vessels, either completed or nearing completion, totaling approximately 128,000 dead-weight tons, to be delivered between June and December, 1918. . . . The first vessel built in Japan for the Shipping Board was delivered June 13, 1918, and to date (Oct. 1) nine vessels of 72,990 dead-weight tons built in Japanese yards have been delivered and paid for.[60]

Other contracts for ships to be built in Japan were signed in May, 1918, so that the United States would obtain about half of the Japanese ships built in 1919. A contract was also concluded 10 July 1918 between the Shipping Board and a company in Shanghai, China, owned and operated by the Chinese Government, to build four steel vessels of 10,000 dead-weight tons each. Although none of these vessels were delivered before the Armistice, the contract for them indicates how far afield the Shipping Board went to secure merchant ship tonnage.

---

[58] *Second Annual Report of the United States Shipping Board*, pp. 52–53.
[59] *Ibid.*, p. 47.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

6. *Loans from our Allies.*

The chief maritime nation in the world was Great Britain whose merchant marine in 1914 totaled 32,516,955 deadweight tons. By 1918, in spite of its shipbuilding program, its tonnage had been reduced to 25,200,585 deadweight tons by submarine sinking.[61] Already overtaxed by its own needs, Great Britain nevertheless remained the chief source from which we could borrow tonnage to carry out our military program. Under various arrangements Great Britain eventually scraped together enough troop transports to carry more than half the AEF to France. The Allied Martime Transport Council was set up in London on 11 March 1918 to act as an advisory coordinator of all shipping. Once the troop shipments to France in the summer of 1918 really got under way, the cargo vessels at the disposal of the United States could not possibly keep up with the supply needs of the AEF. Secretary Baker, in London, negotiated for the loan of 1,200,000 deadweight tons of Allied shipping from the Allied Maritime Transport Council for six months, with 200,000 tons to be returned each month as it could be replaced by new American ships. This was the only way the 80-division program could be fulfilled. Mr. Baker's request was granted, but the Armistice subsequently made it unnecessary. In addition to British ships, small amounts of tonnage were obtained from Italy and France either on a loan basis or under charter.[62] Most of the ships received on a loan basis never came under direct American control. [See *table 47* for summary of the ship acquisition program.]

Improved Utilization of Existing Shipping

The second method used to alleviate the shipping shortage was the better utilization of available tonnage. Of primary importance in this field was the introduction of the convoy system which reduced the number of sinkings although it slowed down the actual speed of all ships to that of the slowest one in the convoy.[63]

The Government went to great lengths to get all tonnage of suitable size and condition into transatlantic ferry service. A considerable portion of American tonnage in 1917 was concentrated on the Great Lakes. Although most of this was not suitable for ocean service, some of it was of the type needed. Problems grew out of the fact that these ships had been built on the Great Lakes and were too large to go through the Welland Canal at Niagara Falls. This difficulty was resolved by the extraordinary expedient of cutting the ships in half, towing them through the canal, then joining them back together again.

---

[61] Teal, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[62] Hurley, *op. cit.*, pp. 204–08.
[63] For the history of the convoy system see : Gleaves, *op. cit.*

*Table 47. American and Foreign Vessels Owned or Under Some Form of Control by the United States Government on 1 September 1918, by Source of Acquisition**

(Vessels of 500 gross tons or over)

Source of acquisition	Number	Gross tons	Dead-weight tons
Total [a]	2, 614	7, 499, 133	9, 349, 828
Steamers (Including Tankers)	1, 842	6, 405, 388	8, 693, 579
Built for Emergency Fleet Corporation:			
Under Contract	88	323, 870	465, 455
Requisitioned	219	918, 987	1, 344, 242
Built by Japan	8	43, 533	66, 349
Ex-Austrian Ships Taken Over by the U. S. Gov't	1	8, 312	6, 500
Ex-German Ships Taken Over by the U. S. Gov't. (Including 4 from Cuba)	87	579, 975	598, 816
Dutch Vessels Requisitioned	81	329, 122	501, 772
U. S. Vessels Purchased by Shipping Board [b]	20	47, 632	61, 900
Purchased Austrian Vessels Owned by Shipping Board	9	40, 684	59, 506
U. S. Merchant Vessels Requisitioned for Use [c]	408	1, 909, 064	2, 622, 550
Other Requisitioned U. S. Merchant Vessels Released for Operation by Owners or Others and U. S. Merchant Vessels too Small to be Included in Requisition Order of 15 Oct. 1917	475	882, 115	968, 551
Foreign Vessels:			
Chartered to U. S. Shipping Board	220	606, 460	944, 238
Chartered to U. S. Citizens	113	318, 490	462, 631
Chartered to Foreigners Under U. S. Approval	52	189, 913	286, 149
Agreeing to Return to U. S.	61	207, 231	304, 921
Sailing Vessels	772	1, 093, 745	[d] 656, 249
Ex-German Ships Taken Over by U. S. Government	7	15, 739	9, 444
U. S. Vessels Operated by U. S. Citizens	402	465, 015	279, 009
U. S. Vessels Chartered to Foreigners	38	42, 201	25, 321
Foreign Vessels:			
Chartered to U. S. Shipping Board	111	234, 580	140, 748
Chartered to U. S. Citizens	143	213, 388	128, 033
Chartered to Foreigners Under U. S. Approval	71	122, 822	73, 694

[a] Excludes vessels owned by the Army or Navy.
[b] Excludes vessels owned by U. S. Shipping Board moving in the Great Lakes.
[c] Excludes 34 vessels requisitioned and included under "Built for Emergency Fleet Corporation"
[d] Represents the estimated steamship equivalent.
*Source: *Second Annual Report of the United States Shipping Board*, p. 23.

When the first substantial shipments of troops to France were made, it was estimated "that it took fifty pounds of supplies of all sorts, per man per day, to keep the A. E. F. going." [64] In the fall of 1917,

[64] March, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

General Pershing brusquely directed elimination of nonessential supplies.[65] Supplies were first cut to 40 pounds per man, then to 30. Still there was not enough shipping available.[66]

Another problem, which General March solved with the help of Adm. Albert Gleaves, was increasing the capacity of troop transports. This was accomplished by making transports troop ferries rather than passenger ships.[67] Once the ferry idea was put into effect, the carrying capacity of the transports increased over 40 percent. Tiers of bunks were increased from three to whatever the height of the compartment would allow. Hammocks and slung bunks were installed in mess halls and passage ways. Finally the overload system of assigning bunks in shifts was put into effect on the faster transports. Troop capacity was greatly increased in the early summer of 1918 by these expedients, but the influenza epidemic in the fall necessitated a return to less crowded conditions.[68]

Another major saving was made by the reduction of the turn-around: the time required to load, go to France, unload, and return. Port congestion and lack of facilities contributed to protracted turn-arounds in the early part of the war. Gradually this situation was alleviated for both troop transports and cargo vessels. A 10 percent reduction in the turn-around was the same as increasing tonnage 10 percent. Average turn-around for troop ships early in the war varied from 52 to 67 days. This was reduced to an average of 35 days with the *Leviathan* averaging less than 27 days in 1918.[69] The average turn-around for cargo ships which had been 109 days in November 1917 was gradually reduced even though increased shipping near the end of the war sorely overtaxed all port facilities both in the United States and in Europe.[70]

The convoy system, reduction of supplies to bare essentials, use of the ferry idea on troop transports, the reduction of turn-around time, the establishment of the Shipping Control Committee, and other improvements all helped to stretch scarce tonnage further toward meeting the actual needs of the mobilization. [See *tables 48*, *49*, and *50* for the number of men and the amount of supplies ferried across the Atlantic, and the nationality of the ships which transported the AEF.]

The men and material transported across the Atlantic constituted a magnificent contribution to the Allied cause, but only 44 percent of the AEF sailed on American ships. The United States relied heavily on Great Britain for cargo vessels. The Shipping Board with its Emergency Fleet Corporation not only had to build ships

[65] Pershing, *o. cit.*, I, p. 185.
[66] March, *op. cit.*, pp. 101–02.
[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 68–70.
[68] Crowell and Wilson, *The Road to France*, II, pp. 418–20.
[69] March, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
[70] Crowell and Wilson, *The Road to France*, II, p. 382.

*Table 48. Embarkation of Army Personnel from the United States for Europe: 1 May 1917–11 November 1918**

Month	Total [a]		Officers	Enlisted men	Field clerks	Nurses	Civilians [b]
	Monthly	Cumulative					
1917							
May	1, 718	1, 718	229	986	36	438	29
June	112, 257	13, 975	400	11, 663	19	158	17
July	12, 986	26, 961	625	12, 082	0	248	31
August	18, 371	45, 332	1, 197	16, 619	28	202	325
September	32, 522	77, 854	3, 580	28, 758	38	97	49
October	38, 407	116, 261	2, 205	35, 606	176	173	247
November	23, 016	139, 277	1, 391	21, 409	26	84	106
December	48, 824	188, 101	3, 418	44, 549	116	215	526
1918							
January	46, 709	234, 810	3, 927	42, 359	104	105	214
February	48, 011	282, 821	2, 235	44, 904	139	441	292
March	83, 782	366, 603	3, 366	79, 826	126	141	323
April	117, 202	483, 805	4, 557	112, 255	67	253	70
May	244, 207	728, 012	8, 372	235, 062	74	646	53
June	277, 894	1, 005, 906	10, 212	266, 195	140	1, 154	193
July	306, 302	1, 312, 208	11, 004	293, 852	132	1, 182	132
August	281, 454	1, 593, 662	9, 763	270, 254	140	1, 145	152
September	252, 100	1, 845, 762	8, 697	241, 002	163	1, 907	331
October	179, 951	2, 025, 713	7, 028	172, 544	73	144	162
November [c]	10, 561	2, 036, 274	755	9, 749	4	24	29

[a] Data excludes Marine Corps.
[b] Includes War Department and miscellaneous civilians and welfare workers.
[c] First 11 days only.
*Source: *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 505.

*Table 49. Cargo Shipped Overseas by Month: 1 June 1917–31 December 1918**

Month	Short tons	Month	Short tons
Total	[a] 6, 315, 000	1918—Continued	
		February	228, 000
1917:		March	289, 000
June	16, 000	April	373, 000
July	12, 000	May	450, 000
August	19, 000	June	425, 000
September	53, 000	July	536, 000
October	115, 000	August	572, 000
November	78, 000	September	681, 000
December	180, 000	October	750, 000
1918:		November	829, 000
January	122, 000	December	587, 000

[a] Figures rounded to nearest thousand.
*Source: "Report of Chief of Transportation Service," *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, p. 4959

*Table 50. Army Personnel Embarked for American Expeditionary Forces by Ships of Various Nations: 1 May 1917–11 November 1918**

Nation and type of ships	Number of Army personnel [a]	Percent of total
Total	[b] 2, 036, 103	100. 0
United States Ships	890, 982	43. 7
Army and Navy Transports	870, 250	42. 7
Cargo and Animal Transports	12, 102	0. 6
Other United States Ships	8, 630	0. 4
British Ships	1, 016, 161	49. 9
Commercial Liners	881, 108	43. 3
Ships Assigned to United States	135, 053	6. 6
French Ships	44, 427	2. 2
Commercial Liners	15, 381	0. 8
Ships Assigned to United States	29, 046	1. 4
Italian Ships	64, 648	3. 2
Ships Under British Lease	59, 976	3. 0
Other Italian Ships	4, 672	0. 2
Russians Ships Under British Control	19, 885	1. 0

[a] Includes field clerks, nurses, and civilians; excludes Marine Corps.
[b] Nation and type of ship not furnished for 171 persons.
**Source:* "Report of Chief of Transportation Service," *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, p. 4880.

but had to construct shipyards in which to build those ships. The fact that the United States had no adequate merchant marine when the war began was because of the failure of the Executive and the Congress to develop a maritime policy. The Shipping Act finally passed on 7 September 1916 was an admirable example of peacetime legislation, but it was several years late. The Wilson administration then waited nearly five months before setting up the Shipping Board. By the time the Board was ready to act war was declared. Then the Emergency Fleet Corporation was hamstrung by internal disputes until the Shipping Board was reorganized late in July 1917. The shipping crisis is a vivid case history of the shortsighted and dangerous course followed by the United States from mid-1914 to 6 April 1917.[71]

Coordination Between the Army and the Nation's Economy

On 10 December 1915 the Chief of Staff informed the Secretary of War that a board of the highest Army officers "is unanimously and emphatically of the opinion that the Government ought not to establish a monopoly in the production of any of its war material, and ought not to manufacture its own war material to the exclusion of patronage of private manufacturers capable of aiding it." The basic

[71] Rpt No. 1399, H Select Comm. on the U. S. Shipping Board Operations, 66th Cong., 3d sess., 2 Mar 21, pp. 24–25.

policy was thus established that the Army would obtain its supplies from private manufacturers and would operate its own factories "for the purpose of establishing standards, of understanding costs of production, of insuring that attention shall be given to improvement, and of qualifying its officers in all respects as experts with respect to the material needed." [72] Such government factories would be limited to the manufacture of such exclusively military material as small arms, artillery, and ammunition. Adherence to this policy made necessary considerable cooperation between the Army and industry. The policy memorandum of 10 December 1915 neither raised this question of cooperation nor suggested any means of accomplishing it.

The first steps toward coordinating government and industry were taken by the Navy Department which established a Naval Consulting Board in October 1915, composed of eminent scientists and inventors under the chairmanship of Charles Edison. In 1916, the Naval Consulting Board established an Industrial Preparedness Committee which made a broad inventory of facilities for munitions manufacture; data was gathered for some 18,000 industrial plants. "This so-called industrial inventory was an ambitious attempt to list, describe, and classify all of the industrial establishments of importance in the country. It was made, however, at a time when the nature of the problem and the character of the data needed was not clearly determined, and does not appear to have been as useful in practice as might have been expected." [73]

For several years various proposals for the creation of an agency to determine overall defense policies had been made. In the Army Appropriations bill of August 29, 1916, the Congress authorized the formation of a Council of National Defense to be composed of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, and Labor. The Council in its task of coordinating industries and resources for national security was to be aided by an Advisory Commission of seven persons nominated by the Council and appointed by the President. The duties of the Council as prescribed by the act were:

> That it shall be the duty of the Council of National Defense to supervise and direct investigations and make recommendations to the President and the heads of executive departments as to the location of railroads with reference to the frontier of the United States so as to render possible expeditious concentration of troops and supplies to points of defense; the coordination of military, industrial, and commercial purposes in the location of extensive highways and branch lines of railroads; the utilization of waterways; the mobilization of military and naval resources for defense; the increase of

[72] Memo, CofS to SW, 10 Dec 15, sub: Manufacture of war material. WCD 9432–7. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives. The Board was composed of the CofS; Ch, Mobile Army Div; Ch, Coast Artillery Div; Ch, WCD; QMG; Ch of Ord; Ch of Eng; CSO; and SG.

[73] Bernard M. Baruch, *American Industry in the War* (New York, 1941), p. 17.

> domestic production of articles and materials essential to the support of armies and of the people during the interruption of foreign commerce; the development of seagoing transportation; data as to amounts, location, method, and means of production, and availability of military supplies; the giving of information to producers and manufacturers as to the class of supplies needed by the military and other services of the Government, the requirements relating thereto and the creation of relations which will render possible in time of need the immediate concentration and utilization of the resources of the Nation.[74]

The Secretary of War, ex officio chairman of the Council of National Defense, was in the most influential position at the top of the developing economic mobilization machinery. The Council, however, dealt only with general policy decisions, the real work being done by the Advisory Commission.[75]

Although the Council of National Defense and its Advisory Commission had been authorized on 29 August 1916, it was 11 October 1916 before the two groups were officially appointed and their first meeting was not held until 6 December 1916. The early meetings were conferences of a general nature but after diplomatic relations with Germany were severed 3 February 1917 the two groups began to plan in earnest. "How much the forethought of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, and the thinking, planning, and acting of its individual members and their reactions on the Government through the Cabinet members who made up the Council, on army officers, on the Congress, and on uncrystallized public opinion, contributed to definition of purposes, clarification of ways, and energetic efforts to resolve the tangle into straight lines will doubtless never be appreciated."[76] The Council and Advisory Commission had little power except persuasion, but they originated many of the ideas and agencies to handle economic mobilization. In 1918 they retrogressed again into rather inactive advisory bodies. Even the advisory coordination activities which were the original purpose of the Council were assumed for the most part by the War Cabinet in 1918. The Council, however, continued to serve as the clearing house for a multitude of civic enterprises throughout the war.

---

[74] Act of August 29, 1916, 64th Cong., 1st sess., "An Act Making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and for other purposes."

[75] The members of the commission were:

Daniel Willard, transportation and communication.
Bernard M. Baruch, raw materials, minerals, and metals.
Howard E. Coffin, munitions and manufacturing (including standardized) and industrial relations.
Julius Rosenwald, supplies (including clothing), etc.
Dr. Hollis Godfrey, engineering and education.
Samuel Gompers, labor (including conservation of health and welfare of workers).
Dr. Franklin Martin, medicine and surgery (including general sanitation).
Clarkson, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

On 3 March 1917 the Council of National Defense on the recommendation of the Advisory Commission established the Munitions Standards Board composed of six industrialists under the chairmanship of Frank A. Scott who were "to cooperate with the War and Navy Departments in establishing standards for the manufacture of munitions of war." [77] This agency was superseded by the General Munitions Board established on 8 April 1917, also under the chairmanship of Frank A. Scott. The latter Board had some 20 members, including Army officers representing the Army supply bureaus and the General Staff. The chief task of the General Munitions Board was to coordinate Army and Navy purchasing and to end, if possible, competitive buying by different branches of the Government. One of its greatest achievements was the mobilization of contractors and of the vast quantities of building materials used in the construction of the National Army cantonments. Beyond this, it attempted to be the auxiliary of the executive departments in the procurement of materials in which there were shortages.[78] The General Munitions Board was large and unwieldy: instead of centralizing control of economic mobilization work, it dispersed that work to a multitude of committees created for every conceivable activity.

In an attempt to reestablish order, the Council of National Defense created the War Industries Board on 28 July 1917 to supersede the General Munitions Board and the Munitions Standards Board. The War Industries Board was composed of seven members: Frank A. Scott, Chairman; Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Palmer E. Pierce, representing the Army; Rear Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, representing the Navy; Hugh Frayne; Bernard M. Baruch; Robert S. Brookings; and Robert S. Lovett. The Council of National Defense announced:

> The Board will act as a clearing house for the war industry needs of the Government, determine the most effective ways of meeting them, and the best means and methods of increasing production, including the creation or extension of industries demanded by the emergency, the sequence and relative urgency of the needs of the different government services, and consider price factors, and in the first instance the industrial and labor aspects of problems involved, and the general questions affecting the purchase of commodities.[79]

The Army was represented on the War Industries Board itself and on many of the subcommittees it created. Unfortunately, the Board initially was also limited in its activities to powers of persuasion. In spite of this formidable handicap, the War Industries Board accomplished more than might have been expected. Unfortunately, for nearly two months, 11 January–4 March 1918, the War Industries

[77] Baruch, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
[78] Benedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson, *The Giant Hand* (New Haven, 1921), p. 21.
[79] "Minutes of the Council of National Defense," p. 151.

Board remained without a formal chairman.[80] During that period the uncoordinated Army and Navy commandeered industries extensively, let contracts indiscriminately, and disregarded the impotent War Industries Board. The economy of the Nation on which the needed military supplies depended came dangerously close to confused collapse.[81]

The decisive action needed was taken on 4 March 1918 when the President reorganized the War Industries Board and made Bernard M. Baruch its chairman; on that day, too, Maj. Gen. Peyton C. March became Acting Chief of Staff. Baruch had been intimately associated with the economic mobilization as a member of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense and as Chairman of the Raw Materials Committees of the General Munitions Board and the War Industries Board.

In his letter appointing Baruch President Wilson enumerated the six functions of the War Industries Board:

> 1. The creation of new facilities and the disclosing, if necessary, the opening up of new or additional sources of supply;
> 2. The conversion of existing facilities, where necessary, to new uses;
> 3. The studious conservation of resources and facilities by scientific, commercial, and industrial economies;
> 4. Advice to the several purchasing agencies of the Government with regard to the prices to be paid;
> 5. The determination, wherever necessary, of priorities of production and of delivery and of the proportions of any given article to be made immediately accessible to the several purchasing agencies when the supply of that article is insufficient, either temporarily or permanently;
> 6. The making of purchases for the Allies.[82]

The Board now became an operating agency with real power. Its previous organizational structure was continued with only slight changes. Nominally the senior Army representative on the War Industries Board was Maj. Gen. William Goethals, chief of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division of the General Staff, but the functioning military representative was his assistant, Brig. Gen. Hugh S. Johnson. Army officers who served on the important committees of the War Industries Board gave the War Department direct contact with the operating activities of the Board. Until 28 May 1918, the War Industries Board was under paper control of the Council of National Defense even though it completely overshadowed the parent organization. On 28 May 1918 the President, by Executive order, established the War Industries Board as an independent agency.

Although there were many contacts between the Army and the War Industries Board from the beginning, the actual degree of cooperation and coordination at first had frequently been less than desirable.

---

[80] Clarkson, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 41–42.
[82] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

Generals Pierce and Johnson, however, were both active in securing real coordination. The interim between the service of these two men on the Board was the same period in the winter of 1917–18 when the Board and the whole economic mobilization were drifting aimlessly. If an effective War Industries Board had been created in the early days of the war, many of the supply difficulties might have been avoided.

The War Industries Board was the chief agency in the economic mobilization, but other agencies also played an important role. The United States Shipping Board, the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, and the Shipping Control Committee have all been considered in the discussion of the shipping situation. Other important agencies whose activities dealt with the Nation's economy included the War Trade Board, the Fuel Administration, the Food Administration, and the Railroad Administration, all outgrowths of the Council of National Defense and its Advisory Commission.[83] In general, the main relationships between the Army and the Food Administration, Fuel Administration, and the War Trade Board were through the War Industries Board which served as the overall coordinator especially after 4 March 1918. Direct contacts were maintained at the top level in cabinet meeting and at informal or formal conferences, but numerous functional contacts existed on lower levels, particularly with the General Staff.

The relations between the Army and the Railroad Administration were closer than with the other three agencies because of the nature of the work of the Railroad Administration. The Railroad Administration was not established until 9 February 1918. Prior to this, the Council of National Defense had organized a Railway War Board 21 April 1917 which was merely an advisory coordinating body of the 33 members. The railway situation so deteriorated into congestion and confusion that on 28 December 1917 the President, in one of the most controversial and drastic acts of the war, seized the railways and placed them under the control of a Director General—William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury. The Railroad Administration which emerged from this move took over the personnel of the previous Railway War Board.

To coordinate the Army activities in the transportation field, the Embarkation Service was created on 4 August 1917. This service developed a system which required the Army bureaus to secure permits before shipping supplies into ports of embarkation, but there was

[83] The respective dates of establishment of the agencies and their heads were as follows:
Food Administration—10 Aug 17—Herbert Hoover.
Fuel Administration—23 Aug 17—Harry A. Garfield.
War Trade Board—12 Oct 17—Vance C. McCormick.
Railroad Administration—9 Feb 18—William G. McAdoo.

no authority to enforce the system effectively. To remedy this, the Division of Inland Transportation (which became the Inland Traffic Service 22 April 1918) was created as part of the Storage and Traffic Division of the General Staff on 10 January 1918. All Army railroad business was channeled through this General Staff subdivision which maintained close contact with the newly created Railroad Administration. The functions of the Inland Traffic Service were: "To have jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to routing and transportation, inland, of all troops and property of the War Department, by whatever means of transport; to conduct all negotiations with inland carriers in order to promote efficiency of movements; to exercise control over movement of all War Department property for the purpose of regulating flow to prevent congestion of Government facilities and railroad terminals." [84]

Several attempts were made to coordinate the activities of the various special agencies which dealt with various phases of the Nation's economic life in wartime. In the period of near chaos during the winter of 1917–18 a War Council was created by the Council of National Defense. "It was a weekly conference of the Council, the director thereof, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Chairman of the Shipping Board, the Food Administrator, the Fuel Administrator, and the Chairman of the War Industries Board." [85] These conferences were replaced by two weekly conferences: one at the War Department and one at the White House. General March described the War Department meetings as follows:

> We evolved a scheme in the War Department by which, in place of the War Council, we had a meeting once a week in the old War Council room, of the heads of the principal war boards with Secretary Baker and myself, and invited Secretary of the Navy Daniels and Admiral Benson, Chief of Operations of the Navy, to attend these meetings. The President was also invited after it was found to be an extremely valuable contact of minds, but he never appeared. The Navy group was always there.
>
> At these meetings each person responsible for a part of the great war program rose to his feet and told us precisely what he was doing and proposing to do in carrying out his part of the general scheme.[86]

Beginning 20 March 1918 a group met at the White House with the President each Wednesday which came to be known as the War Cabinet. This group did not replace the regular Cabinet but rather supplemented it and served to keep the President and the agency heads familiar with the problems of the various groups and aided in their coordination. The War Cabinet consisted of the Secretaries of War and Navy; the chairmen of the War Industries Board, the War Trade

---

[84] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior,* pp. 525–27, 10, 500.
[85] Clarkson, *op. cit.,* p. 43.
[86] March, *op. cit.,* pp. 71–72.

Board, and the Shipping Board; the Fuel Administrator; the Food Administrator; and the Director General of Railroads.[87]

The Council of National Defense and its Advisory Commission originated most of the economic mobilization policies and agencies. These latter agencies soon surpassed the parent organization in size and importance, and in the final months of the war the Council of National Defense had so declined in influence that it dealt only with the coordination and stimulation of voluntary, civic assistance to the war program through its state and local councils. The War Cabinet and the War Department weekly conferences replaced the Council of National Defense at the top coordinating levels. The principal coordination between the Army and the Nation's economy was achieved through the General Staff and the War Industries Board. Because both the War Department organization and the economic mobilization agencies went through almost continuous evolution and change from 6 April 1917 to 11 November 1918, it would be impossible to pinpoint the state of coordination except at specific moments. [*Chart 13* indicates the channels of coordination control and communication emanating from the War Department on 1 September 1918.]

Conclusions

1. No one realized the magnitude of the economic mobilization necessary to equip, house, train, maintain, and transport America's manpower contribution in World War I until after 6 April 1917.

2. The construction of troop housing was accomplished with a remarkable dispatch and never seriously delayed the mobilization of the Army.

3. Material shortages in the quartermaster and ordnance fields were a considerable handicap in the winter of 1917–18 and were overcome only by superhuman efforts and the assistance of our Allies.


4. The shipping problem remained unsolved throughout the war; the transportation of the American Expeditionary Forces to France was possible only with the assistance of Great Britain.

5. If the General Staff had been reorganized and the War Industries Board reconstituted much earlier, the turmoil and confusion in affecting coordination between the Services and the Nation's economy might have been greatly reduced.

---

[87] *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 1.

*Chart 13. Organization of the War Department, 1 September 1918.**



———— Control.

- - - - - - - - - - Communications Without Control.

**Source: Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War (1917–19); Zone of the Interior* (Washington, 1949), p. 21.

CHAPTER X

INFLUENCE OF PROPAGANDA AND CENSORSHIP ON MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR I

No Pearl Harbor solidified public opinion behind America's entrance into World War I. Although the majority of the people supported our entrance into the war, there was still disquieting opposition from segments of the population. The vote in the Congress on the declaration of war was not unanimous by any means; the Senate had voted 82 for war and 6 against, and the House vote was 373 for and 50 against. The reversal of the Wilson administration from the professed all-out drive for peace to a grudging and then an eloquent espousal of war was too sudden to carry the entire Nation with it. The campaign slogan used by the Democratic Party in the presidential election of November 1916—"He kept us out of war"—was still fresh in people's minds. Frequent prohibitions against foreign entanglements had echoed across the Nation for a century and a quarter since the First President. The great immigrations were just drawing to a close; many wondered just how well the melting pot had melted. The greatest danger to the mobilization, however, would come not from opposition but from indifference on the part of people who were more interested in their homes and families than in the war in Europe. The intensive stream of propaganda aimed at the United States by the Allies had aroused many people and the preparedness campaigns had gained support for a more aggressive policy, but more than majority support was necessary for a sustained military effort. It was necessary to remove indifference and apathy wherever they existed. Thus the first and perhaps greatest challenge of the war effort was in the mobilization of ideas. Without success here all else would fail.[1]

In a constitutional democracy with long-established safeguards guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press the mustering and control of public opinion in time of war is difficult. "Democracy faces a dilemma in wartime. Founded upon the belief of citizen participation in government and of freedom of speech, press, and assembly for all citizens, when war comes those freedoms must be subordinated to the winning of the struggle, if the very government that guarantees civil rights is to continue to function, and thus assure to

[1] James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, *Words That Won the War* (Princeton, 1939), p. 3. Three books which deal with the propaganda effort to influence American public opinion before our entrance into the war are: Walter Millis, *Road to War* (Cambridge, 1935); Horace C. Peterson, *Propaganda for War* (Norman, Okla., 1939); and Charles C. Tansill, *America Goes to War* (Boston, 1938).

the citizens their constitutional privileges."[2] Normal democratic freedoms are incompatible with control of public opinion and information. But since success may be dependent upon such controls, war results inevitably in a necessary curtailment of free expression. One Federal court in this period held: "The constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech does not extend to the protection of utterances in time of war which involve the integrity of the nation or injure or tend to injure it."[3] The development of media of rapid communication across continents and oceans increased the need for exercising control over information.

In the Civil War the presence of an extraordinarily vocal opposition in the North had been extremely embarrassing, and the unfettered publicity which spotlighted almost all military operations on both sides had demonstrated the danger of no control over the press in wartime.[4] In the Spanish-American War strategic and tactical information of the most vital importance was fully reported in American newspapers which were available to the Spanish Government within two or three hours after they were published.[5] The control of press and information in the modern sense was begun by Japan during the Russo-Japanese War; American observers with the Japanese Army could not help but be impressed by its effectiveness. World War I in Europe forced the development of elaborate propaganda and censorship programs by all the belligerents.

These two fields of activity—propaganda and censorship—are closely linked; and although one is an entirely positive program and the other negative, they are completely complementary. Walter Lippmann, the American commentator and columnist had well summarized the relationship between propaganda and censorship:

> Propaganda depends finally on censorship, and I believe it is fair and accurate to say that the very essence of propaganda—as distinguished from education and free public speech—is that the propagandist has the power to withhold and conceal that part of the story which does not support his thesis. The indispensable piece of operating equipment in the kit of the propagandist is a curtain. Without a curtain the beauty, the charm, the terror, the cleverness of what he says will be undone or neutralized by the knowledge of what he does not say. It is possible to educate people, to inform them, to argue with them in the open. But the minds of men cannot, as the saying now goes, be engineered except by a blackout which conceals everything but that on which the spotlight is to be centered.[6]

---

[2] James R. Mock, *Censorship 1917* (Princeton, 1941), p. 3.

[3] *Dodge* v. *United States* (1919), 258 F 300; 7 ALR 1510.

[4] *The Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States, op. cit.*, p. 5.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[6] *Washington Post* 27 Dec 51. For a similar analysis see: Tobin and Bidwell, *op. cit.*, p. 75: ". . . propaganda and censorship are complementary. The former acts positively; by directing a stream of selected information and suggestion into the public consciousness, it aims to create attitudes favorable to loyalty and sacrifice. Censorship acts negatively; its aim is twofold: (1) to keep out of the public press, the motion pictures, the radio and even oral communications, information and opinions which might weaken popular enthusiasm for war; and (2) to keep from the enemy information of value to him."

In the field of information, as in every other, 6 April 1917 found the United States unprepared although civilian and military leaders seem to have been more aware of what this field entailed than they were of economic mobilization for example. The influence of public opinion on the mobilization must be measured by a consideration of the information agencies created and the propaganda and censorship programs evolved.

Information Agencies

The most important agency dealing with the field of public opinion in World War I was the Committee on Public Information, alphabetically known as the CPI. As the chief propaganda agency it supervised the voluntary censorship of the newspapers. In the field of censorship, the two principal agencies were the Censorship Board and the Chief Cable Censor's Office. These were supplemented by miscellaneous branches of several other governmental agencies, including the War Trade Board, the Post Office Department, the Military and Naval Intelligence Branches, and the censorship staff sections in the headquarters of General Pershing and Admiral Sims in Europe. It is readily apparent that overlapping activities were inevitable with such a hodgepodge of agencies functioning in the public opinion area.

Committee on Public Information

When the United States entered the war there was before Congress a bill prepared by the General Staff proposing the establishment of a strict military censorship program. There also existed a decided disagreement between the armed forces and the newspaper profession as to whether control of the press and through it of public opinion should be vested in a military or civilian agency. Almost simultaneously several newspapermen proposed that voluntary censorship be used instead of a compulsory military censorship. One of these proposals, prepared by Frederick Palmer (later biographer of Baker, Bliss, and Pershing) in March 1917 for the Council of National Defense, argued:

> The establishment of a Press Bureau which should centralize censorship and publicity, with its head a civilian of broad experience having the confidence both of the Departments and the press, would prevent much unnecessary friction by promoting a maximum of publicity of all forms with a minimum of risk in imparting information to the enemy.
>
> An officer of the army, an officer of the navy, and an official of the State Department assigned for the purpose, would keep the Chief of the Press Bureau in touch with policy, their decision being final in any debatable question of censorship.
>
> The Press Bureau would be open at all hours. It would spare regular officers whose time is invaluable many details, at the same time that it promoted and protected the individual enterprise of the news man, the feature

writer, the photographer, or any other exponent of publicity, and its suggestions as the result of constant touch with the public would be useful to the Department.[7]

At about the same time another newspaperman, George Creel, in a letter to President Wilson opposed the pending censorship bill and recommended in its stead "voluntary" censorship and the use of propaganda to unite the country and to encourage our Allies.[8] Both Creel and Palmer emphasized publicity or propaganda as a positive program in addition to whatever censorship might be necessary.

These proposals differed sharply from those of the General Staff which dealt only with the negative approach of censorship. On the basis of these suggestions from Palmer, Creel, and other newspapermen, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy recommended in a joint letter to the President, 13 April 1917, that he create a committee to control both censorship and publicity. To implement these recommendations, President Wilson on 14 April 1917 created the Committee on Public Information, composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy with George Creel as its member-chairman.[9] The term "committee" proved to be something of a misnomer because for all intents and purposes the three Secretaries acted only in an advisory capacity. Mr. Creel, however, conferred frequently with the Secretaries of War and Navy and worked with their designated representatives on the committee.[10]

Creel was a crusading liberal journalist who had been a longtime supporter of President Wilson. His reputation as a radical and muckraker, together with his difficult assignment, made Creel the whipping boy of Congress, the press, and the public at large as the symbol of censorship and propaganda. That he performed his difficult job in the face of mounting criticism was a tribute to his resiliency and patriotism; his judgment, however, on some points was certainly open to criticism. Creel and the CPI became practically indistinguishable. The purposes and work of the CPI as stated by Creel were as follows:

> . . . the committee had to start with a purpose only, rather than any predetermined program, and grew under pressure instead of the orderly sequence provided by deliberated plan. This primary purpose was to drive home the absolute justice of America's aims.
>
> Realizing public opinion as a vital part of the national defense, a mighty force in the national attack, our task was to devise machinery with which to make the fight for loyalty and unity at home, and for the friendship and understanding of the neutral nations of the world. At no point were our functions negative. We dealt in the positive, and our emphasis was ever on expression,

[7] Memo, Frederick Palmer to the CND, Mar 17, sub: Censorship. WCD 8976–19. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[8] George Creel, *Rebel at Large* (New York, 1947, pp. 156–158.

[9] EO 2594, 14 Apr 17.

[10] Creel, *op. cit.*, pp. 158–59.

not suppression. We fought indifference and disaffection in the United States and we fought falsehood abroad. We strove for the maintenance of our own morale by every process of stimulation; we sought the verdict of mankind by truth telling. We did not call it "propaganda", for that word, in German hands, had come to be associated with lies and corruptions. Our work was educational and informative only, for we had such confidence in our case as to feel that only fair presentation of its facts was needed.

Under the insistence of this necessity, the committee grew to be a world organization. Not only did it reach deep into every community in the United States, but it carried the aims and objects of America to every land.

There was no part of the great war machinery that we did not touch, no medium of appeal that we did not employ. The printed word, the spoken word, the motion picture, the poster, the signboard—all these were used in our campaign to make our own people and all other peoples understand the causes that compelled America to take arms in defense of its liberties and free institutions.[11]

The censorship activities of the CPI were limited to supervision of domestic publications. This was accomplished mainly on a voluntary basis; publications refrained from printing anything which might be of assistance to the enemy or serious embarrassment to the United States. The CPI specified certain types of information, such as that relating to troop movements, which should not be published. The propaganda activities of the CPI were worldwide and were broadly separated by the CPI into a domestic section and a foreign section. During the course of its existence some 35 divisions were created by the CPI to handle specific activities and projects.[12] The CPI received its funds from the special appropriations at the disposal of the President, from the sale of literature, and from one specific appropriation of $1,250,000 for 1918–19 which was smaller than requested and resulted in a curtailment of activities in the final months of the war. The total cost of the CPI to the Government after its receipts were deducted from its appropriations was slightly more than $4,000,000.[13]

Censorship Board

The Censorship Board was created by the President 12 October 1917 in Executive Order 2727A under provisions of the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act of October 6, 1917. The various censorships already existing were brought together to a degree under the

[11] *Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information*, hereafter cited as Complete Report, CPI (Washington, 1920), pp. 1–2.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 9. Among the more important of these were the Division of Speaking, Division of Four-Minute Men, Division of News, Division of Syndicate Features, Division of Films, Bureau of Expositions, Bureau of War Photographs, Division of Foreign Language Newspapers, Division of Business Management, Division of Distribution and Production, Division of Labor Publications, Division of Women's War Work, Divison of Pictorial Publicity, Division of Advertising, Division of Industrial Relations, and Division of Americanization Survey, all in the Domestic Section. The Foreign Press-Mail, Foreign Press-Cable, Foreign Picture Service, Hungarian Bureau, Scandinavian Bureau, Polish Bureau, German Bureau, Italian Bureau, Lithuanian Bureau, Czechoslovak Bureau, Jugoslav Bureau, and the Russian Bureau were all in the Foreign Section.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

Censorship Board, which was composed of representatives of the Secretaries of War and Navy, the Postmaster General, the War Trade Board, and the Committee on Public Information. These representatives were usually the chief censoring officials of the respective agencies.[14]

Funds for the Censorship Board came through the Post Office Department which gave that agency such disproportionate influence that some of the Board's service members considered it only as an advisory body. The Board was concerned primarily with censorship of mail communications from the United States to areas outside the country and control of ". . . the printing, publication, and distribution of matter in a foreign language. No provision was made for the censoring of internal communications, and the control over the press in the English language remained on the voluntary basis as administered by the Committee on Public Information, subject, however, to the right of the Postmaster General to refuse the right to use of the mails to publications not complying with the provisions of the law." [15]

To accomplish its censorship mission the Board established stations in principal ports and border towns. The stations were actually miniature censorship boards with representatives from the Post Office Department, Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, War Trade Board, and the Chief Cable Censor composing the "Postal Censorship Committee" at each station.[16] The aims of postal censorship were expressed in instructions from the Censorship Board to the postal censorship committees at the censorship stations:

1. To stop all postal communications containing information of Naval or Military importance of any kind whatever which was calculated to be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy.

2. To stop all postal communications containing any photograph, sketch, plan, model, or other representation of any Naval or Military work, dock, or harbor work of such nature that such representations thereof were directly or indirectly useful to the enemy.

3. To stop all postal communications containing any false report or false statements concerning the causes or operations of the war.

4. To stop all postal communications constituting a violation of any law or regulation made in connection with the war, or containing information of any kind likely to endanger the successful prosecution of the war.

5. To supply the proper authority with information of special interest or utility, i. e., information in regard to enemy secret service and propagandist organizations or sources and channels of supply.

6. To supply the proper authority with information likely to assist in detecting the channels of enemy trade or the devices resorted to by the enemy for the evasion of the commercial blockade.

---

[14] Robert L. Maddox of the Post Office Department was chairman of the Censorship Board; Capt F. B. Hyde (Army) was a secretary; Maj Gen Frank McIntyre (succeeded by Brig Gen Marlborough Churchill) represented the Army; Capt David W. Todd, the Navy; Paul Fuller, Jr., the War Trade Board; George Creel, the CPI.

[15] William F. Willoughby, *Government Organization in War Time and After* (New York, 1919), pp. 47–48.

[16] Mock, *Censorship, 1917*, pp. 62–63.

7. To intercept all valuable goods or documents of enemy origin or destination, where the transmission of such goods or documents would increase the material and financial resources of the enemy during the war.[17]

The Censorship Board's chief contribution was as a coordinating and advisory committee to aid the Post Office Department in administering the postal censorship committees at the censorship stations.[18]

Chief Cable Censor

The first American censorship in World War I went into effect on 5 August 1914 with the issuance of Executive Order No. 2011 regulating radio communication:

> This order served notice that all radio stations within the jurisdiction of the United States were prohibited from transmitting or receiving for delivery messages of an unneutral nature, and from rendering to any one of the belligerent nations any unneutral service. Enforcement of the order was delegated to the Secretary of the Navy, who at once directed the dispatch of naval officers and, in some instances, wireless operators "with a knowledge of German if possible," to the six leading wireless stations on the Atlantic coast. To these officers, and to the commandants of all navy yards and stations, went instructions that radio messages containing information relating to operations or to materiel or personnel of the armed forces of any belligerent nation would be considered unneutral in character, and would not be handled by limiradio stations under the jurisdiction of the United States, except in the case of cipher messages to or from United States officials.[19]

When the United States entered the war, the Navy took over all radio stations. This radio censorship, or rather operation, was under the direction of the Naval Communications Service. Prewar censorship was limited to radio communication; all cable lines leading to Allied countries were left uncensored.

One of the first wartime actions was the establishment of cable censorship. On 28 April 1917 President Wilson "ordered that all companies or other persons, owning, controlling, or operating telegraph and telephone lines or submarine cables, are hereby prohibited from transmitting messages to points without the United States, and from delivering messages received from such points, except those permitted under rules and regulations to be established by the Secretary of War for telegraph and telephone lines, and by the Secretary of the Navy for submarine cables."[20] Since censorship along the Canadian border was deemed unnecessary, the War Department was limited to censoring the telephone and telegraph lines along the Mexican border, a relatively minor project. The censorship of submarine cables, however, constituted a major wartime activity. The Secretary of the Navy appointed Capt. David W. Todd, Director of the Naval Com-

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[18] *Ibid.*, ch. IV., pp. 55–72, deals in detail with the Censorship Board.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 73–74.
[20] EO 2604, 28 Apr 17.

munications Service, as Chief Cable Censor 30 April 1917. He maintained his headquarters in Washington and established offices to handle the actual censoring at New York, N. Y.; Key West, Fla.; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Galveston, Tex.; San Francisco, Calif.; Honolulu, T. H.; Guam; Panama; San Juan, P. R.; Ponce, P. R.; St. Thomas, Virgin Islands; St. Croix, V. I.; Cap Haitien, Haiti; San Domingo, Dominican Republic.[21] New York was the main cable censorship point since an estimated 90 percent of all cable business passed through that city.[22] Cable Censorship Circular No. 2, 31 May 1917, stated the objectives to be accomplished by cable censorship:

> (a) To deny the enemy information of military value, or any information prejudicial to the interests of the United States or their allies.
>
> (b) To obtain information of value to the several departments of the United States Government.
>
> (c) To prevent trade with the enemy or such trade as might be of benefit to the enemy directly or indirectly.
>
> (d) To prevent the spreading of false reports or of reports likely to cause disaffection, or to interfere directly or indirectly with the success of the naval or military operations of the United States or their allies, or likely to prejudice relations with foreign powers, or the security, training discipline, or administration of the naval and military forces of the United States.
>
> (e) To interfere as little as possible with American trade, with that of Great Britain, France, and their allies, and with neutral trade.[23]

The importance of cable censorship in relation to the whole field of public opinion stemmed from the fact that 75 per cent of the incoming cables were to newspapers and press associations.[24]

Miscellaneous Agencies

Public relations offices were almost nonexistent in the Federal Government before World War I. The CPI found it necessary to assign one or two men to each of the departments and agencies to gather and distribute news. Gradually agencies established their own information or publicity branches. One of the first news branches in the Government had been created by Secretary Baker on 29 June 1916 at the height of the Mexican trouble. Established on a temporary basis, the Bureau of Information was made the sole source of all War Department information for the press except for routine matters. In charge of the bureau when it was first set up was Mr. Baker's military aide, Maj. Douglas MacArthur.[25]

Military intelligence work was taken away from the War College Division of the General Staff when a new Military Intelligence Section

---

[21] Cable Censorship Cir 2, 31 May 17. Copy in WCD 8976–33. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[22] Mock, *Censorship 1917*, p. 78.

[23] Cable Censorship Cir, 2, 31 May 17. Copy in WCD 8976–33. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[24] Mock, *Censorship, 1917*, p. 80.

[25] Memo, SW, 29 Jun 16, sub: Bureau of Information. AG 2422807. National Archives.

was created on 3 May 1917. It was not until 26 August 1918, in General Orders No. 80, that military intelligence achieved the status of a coordinate General Staff Division. Prior to that, the Director of Military Intelligence had been designated also to act as the Chief Military Censor. To handle this work a Censorship Section (later renamed News Section) was created 16 August 1917 as a subdivision of the Negative Branch of Military Intelligence. All War Department information activities were centralized in the News Section which maintained close liaison with the CPI, Censorship Board, and other agencies engaged in censorship activities. The Chief Military Censor served as a member of the Censorship Board; a representative of the Secretary of War served as a member of the CPI itself. The News Section at its peak operated through 14 subsections [26] and also operated a clipping bureau.

The information activities of the Navy Department were divided between the Communications Division (which had charge of radio and cable censorship) and the Naval Intelligence (which corresponded somewhat to the Military Intelligence Section of the War Department General Staff). Naval Intelligence furnished members for each of the postal censorship committees at the censorship stations run by the Censorship Board, but the Chief Cable Censor (Director of Naval Communications Division) was the Navy Department Representative on the Censorship Board. Both the Communications Division and the Naval Intelligence Division were sections of the Naval Operations Office.

The War Trade Board Intelligence Bureau established the Censorship and Correspondence Division which passed upon the correspondence of that Board and censored material referred to it by the military, cable, and postal censors. It furnished members for the postal censorship committees and acted as a clearinghouse for censorship and information activities in the foreign trade field.[27]

The Post Office Department's work in the field of information was conducted primarily through the machinery created by the Censorship Board. The life or death power of the Postmaster General over mailing privileges was an important weapon of effective censorship.

The programs put into effect overseas by General Pershing and Admiral Sims were in many respects the most vital of all censorship activities. The elimination of information which might be of use to the enemy at its fountainhead in zones of operations reduced the task of censorship in the Zone of the Interior. Rigid censorship regulations governing mail, press dispatches, etc., were put into effect

[26] *Handbook of Federal World War Agencies and Their Records 1917–1921* (Washington, 1943), pp. 353, 384. The subsections were: Executive, Legal, Postal, Prisoner of War, Radio, Telegraph and Telephone, Commercial Motion Picture, Official Photograph, Photographic Permit, Press, Foreign Language Press, Book Propaganda, and Digest.

[27] *Report of the War Trade Board* (Washington, 1920), pp. 276–77.

by the AEF. Information which might be useful to the enemy was carefully enumerated:

2. *Dangerous Information.*

The following information is considered useful to the enemy and must not be included in correspondence. This prohibition applies not only to letters and postcards, but also to wrappings of parcels, private diaries, and all other written matter.

(a) The place in which letters, postcards, etc., are written or from which they are sent. Any picture postcard of any locality in the Army Zone, even when there is no writing on it, may give information of value to the enemy.

(b) *Reference to future operations.*

Whether such operations are rumored, surmised, or known. This includes details of mining and bridge-building operations, railway and road construction, and references to new inventions or use of new material.

(c) *Organization, numbers, and movements of troops.*

This includes hours, dates, and systems of relief: positions of batteries, machine guns, and observation stations; position and description of billets; reinforcements; situation of headquarters of brigades, divisions, etc.

(d) *The armament of troops or forts.*

(e) *Description of references to defensive works.*

(f) *The moral or physical condition of our own or allied troops.*

(g) *All information concerning casualties except those previously given in official lists.*

(h) *Details as to supply service, including the position of railheads and supply columns, condition of roads and railroads reserves or shortages of supplies and ammunition.*

(i) *The effect of hostile fire.*

(j) *All information concerning aircraft and the air service.*

(k) *Criticism of operations, superior officers, noncommissioned officers, conditions of life, subsistence, etc.*

(l) *Criticism of the appearance, equipment, or conduct of allied troops or individual officers and men of allied armies.*[28]

Detailed instructions followed, setting up a censorship organization extending from the company level, where initial censoring took place, through base depots, where final censoring was completed before the mail was forwarded. All special types of mail were covered by detailed instructions.

The American Expeditionary Forces Headquarters also exercised rigid control over newsmen with the Army in France. There were two classes of correspondents—"accredited" who were assigned to the Army permanently and "visiting" who were on tours in France. Both types of correspondents had to sign a statement agreeing to accept all instructions from Military Intelligence as to what they could or could not write. No reporter was forced to send out dispatches contrary to his own opinion; censorship was by deletion only. At first correspondents had to guess as to what news would be passed and what stopped,

[28] Hq AEF GO 13, 13 Jul 17, sub: Field Censorship Regulations. Copy in WCD 8976–84. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives. For complete coverage of AEF activities see: *Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., Staff Sections and Services* in UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–1919 (Washington 1948), XIII, pp. 81–142.

but on 2 April 1918 specific regulations on information were issued based on the idea that anything not of value to the enemy might be published. AEF Military Intelligence handled the censorship over newspapermen in France.[29]

> In its sphere, the Navy Department exercised the same restraints over its men that the War Department did over the soldier. Because of its smaller size, and because its personnel was largely limited to the fifteen naval districts in this country and to ships, the problems of censorship in the Navy was not so difficult, nor did it affect so many Americans as that of the Army. That such restrictions in both services were necessary because of the exigencies of war, made them no less real.[30]

The information agencies described—the Committee on Public Information, the Censorship Board, and the miscellaneous branches of other government departments—certainly covered the field of censorship and propaganda, but they covered it with overlapping functions, without effective coordination, and with relative confusion.

Legislation

The legislative basis for the control of information began with an act passed 3 March 1911 for the purpose of preventing the disclosure of national defense secrets by making such disclosure punishable by a fine of $1,000 or a year imprisonment. Commenting on this act, the Chief of the War College Division stated: "It fixes punishment for acts deliberately and intentionally prejudicial to our national defense. In addition to such betrayal of national secrets, the law should authorize restriction of communication by benevolent and patriotic persons and periodicals. The Act of 1911 might protect us from our enemies. We need laws also to protect us from our friends." [31] To strengthen this act, the War College Division proposed a new law which was before Congress when we entered the war and would have authorized a total military censorship program.[32] The comprehensive scope of this proposed military censorship brought forth protests from Frederick Palmer, George Creel, and others which resulted in the establishment of the aforementioned Committee on Public Information and the voluntary press censorship program.

Three acts of Congress and three Executive orders formed the basis for the censorship and control of information in World War I. In chronological order they were:

1. Executive Order No. 2594, 13 April 1917, which established the Committee on Public Information in accordance with recommenda-

---

[29] Mock, *Censorship, 1917*, pp. 103–04.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

[31] Memo, Ch, WCD to CofS, 25 Feb 15, sub: Control of the Press in War. WCD 8976–1. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[32] Ltr, SW to Chm, H and Sen Judiciary Committees, 11 Aug 16. WCD 8976–11. *Ibid.*

tions made the previous day by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. The Committee was created as a special executive agency by the President under his general powers and not based on any specific legislative enactment.

2. Executive Order No. 2604, 28 April 1916, which authorized the establishment of cable and telegraph censorship by the Navy and War Departments respectively over messages going outside the United States. This stop was taken by the President under his general powers after the declaration of war.

3. The Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, which defined in general terms the acts constituting espionage and illegal activities, including inciting disloyalty and obstructing enlistments. It reenacted and strengthened the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1911, concerning the disclosure of national defense secrets. It provided specifically that:

> Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.[33]

It also provided that "Every letter, writing, circular, pamphlet, book or other publication, matter, or thing of any kind in violation of any of the provisions of this Act is hereby declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier." Although the Espionage Act did not provide for specific newspaper or information censorship, it was worded broadly enough to include whatever censorship the Government might wish to institute.[34]

4. Trading-with-the-Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, which dealt primarily with control over foreign trade, but which, as an adjunct, included a prohibition against any form of communication outside the United States except through regular channels that were to be covered by censorship whenever the President deemed it necessary.[35]

5. Executive Order No. 2727–A, sec. 14–16, 12 October 1917, which provided for the organization of the Censorship Board and established a censorship over all foreign mail.

---

[33] Act of June 15, 1917, 65th Cong., 1st sess., "An Act to punish acts of interference with the foreign relations, the neutrality, and the foreign commerce of the United States, to punish espionage, and better to enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and for other purposes." Stat. L., XL, pp. 217–31.

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] Act of October 6, 1917, 65th Cong., 1st sess., "An Act to define, regulate, and punish trading with the enemy, and for other purposes." *Ibid.*, pp. 411–26.

6. Sedition Act of May 16, 1918, which was in the form of amendments to the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917. Its language was so broad that any form of criticism, no matter how legitimate, could have been suppressed had the Government so desired. The heart of the Sedition Act stated:

> . . . and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States or any language intended to bring the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute, or shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish any language intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the United States, or to promote the cause of its enemies, or shall willfully display the flag of any foreign enemy, or shall willfully by utterance, writing, printing, publication, or language spoken, urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of production in this country of any thing or things, product or products, necessary or essential to the prosecution of the war in which the United States may be engaged, with intent by such curtailment to cripple, or hinder the United States in the prosecution of the war, and whoever shall willfully advocate, teach, defend, or suggest the doing of any of the acts or things in this subsection enumerated, and whoever shall by word or act support or favor the cause of any country with which the United States is at war, or by word or act oppose the cause of the United States therein, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.[36]

Against this background of information agencies and legislation, public opinion was mobilized for the war, and the indifference of early 1917 disappeared. The implementing tools in the mobilization of public opinion were propaganda and censorship.

Propaganda

American propaganda in World War I was based primarily on President Wilson's speech before the Congress 2 April 1917 asking for a declaration of war against Germany and another speech before the Congress 8 January 1918 in which the President outlined a peace program consisting of "Fourteen Points." The "Fourteen Points" were chiefly a restatement of previously announced basic objectives. They proposed: (1) open covenants openly arrived at; (2) absolute freedom of navigation of the seas in peace and war; (3) removal of economic barriers between countries so far as possible; (4) adequate guaranties that armaments would be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety; (5) a general doctrine of self-de-

[36] Act of May 16, 1918, 65th Cong., 2d sess., "An Act to amend . . . the Act . . . approved June fifteenth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and for other purposes." *Ibid.*, pp. 553–54.

termination of their national status by all peoples ("points" 5 through 13 dealt with specific peoples and areas); and (14) a general association of nations to be formed to afford mutual guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity to all nations.[37]

The Committee on Public Information was the chief propaganda agency. In its scope, activities, and techniques it was the precursor of the propaganda ministries developed by warring countries during World War II. The CPI was George Creel's improvisation.[38] "The structure of the Committee on Public Information defies blueprinting. It was developed according to no careful plan. It was improvised on the job, and the job was never completed. From the moment of its birth in April 1917 until it passed into history half a year after the Armistice, the Committee's organization, activities, and personnel changed incessantly. The staff was always coming and going in important haste, and the work itself underwent continual change of scope and direction."[39] The multiple activities of the CPI must be broken down arbitrarily because the CPI itself separated its many subdivisions into only two broad divisions of functions—domestic and foreign. The domestic work can itself be divided again arbitrarily into five categories: publication activities, speaking activities, films, work with foreign born, and miscellaneous activities.

Publication Activities

In his report Mr. Creel stated: "A first duty of the committee, as we saw it, was the coordination and control of the daily news of military operations given out by the war-making branches of the Government."[40] In the period before radio and television, the chief vehicles for the dissemination of propaganda were newspapers and other publications. One of the first sections established by the CPI was its Division of News. "All of the official news of government, with direct relation to the war, went to the people through the Division of News. The Pershing communiques, the weekly press interviews with General March, Chief of Staff, and daily interviews with Secretary of War Baker were regular news features issued in mimeographed form."[41] The Division of News ". . . became the sole medium for the issuance of official war information, and acted not only for the Army and Navy, but for the White House, the Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, the National War Labor Board, the Council of National Defense, the War Industries Board, the War Trade Board, and the Alien Property Custodian."[42] Al-

[37] William L. Langer, *An Encyclopedia of World History* (Cambridge, 1948), p. 944.
[38] Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War*, p. 74.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[40] *Complete Report, CPI*, p. 12.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

though several agencies eventually set up their own publicity offices, the Division of News had a monopoly on war news. It developed the technique of the press "handout" of mimeographed releases, leaving their disposition to the press itself, which could either publish the releases or relegate them to the waste basket. Over 6,000 news releases were issued by the Division. It also prepared a weekly digest of war news for weekly papers called the *War News Digest*, copies of which were sent to more than 12,000 weekly and country papers. A nightly summary of the news was prepared for transmission to all Navy ships during the latter part of the war. Sitting squarely astride the news flow from the principal war agencies, the Division of News was a valuable means of controlling, slanting, withholding, and distributing news in the interest of the war effort: but one must take with a grain of salt George Creel's statement that the Division of News always presented the news objectively ". . . without the slightest trace of color or bias, either in the selection of the facts to be made public or in the manner in which they were presented." [43]

Three other subdivisions of the CPI dealt with newspaper propaganda: the Division of Syndicate Features, the Bureau of Cartoons, and the Division of Advertising. The Division of Syndicate Features, organized in August 1917, appealed to the people via the Sunday supplements and special features. Prominent authors and newspaper writers furnished material which the CPI distributed widely. Because they were intensely interesting and covered subjects with great popular appeal, these releases were in considerable demand.[44]

The Bureau of Cartoons was organized 28 May 1918; ". . . its purpose being to mobilize and direct the scattered cartoon power of the country for constructive war work." [45] It published a weekly *Bulletin for Cartoonists* which was sent to over 750 cartoonists throughout the country. The bulletin contained suggestions and tips on current war drives and campaigns, such as the Liberty Loan Drives and food conservation programs. The Bureau of Cartoons also obtained and disseminated cartoons which were particularly good or were applicable to current activities.

The Division of Advertising, established in December 1918, was affiliated with the CPI and under its jurisdiction, but its headquarters were in New York and its members drawn from advertising organizations. The Division planned and handled advertising campaigns for government agencies from the Food Commission to Selective Service. Special advertising copy was prepared and slanted to appeal to farmers, laborers, students, and many other groups. Space for CPI advertisements in regular publications was donated by publishers

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 774–75.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

and private individuals which Creel conservatively estimated as worth over $1,500,000. This did not include the thousands of billboards used, the 60,000 window displays prepared by the International Association of Display Men, or the extensive advertising campaign carried on in streetcars and subways.[46]

Closely related to the program of the Division of Advertising was the work of the Division of Pictorial Publicity, organized 17 April 1917, under the chairmanship of Charles Dana Gibson, the most famous illustrator of the period and the originator of the "Gibson Girl." This Division prepared poster designs, advertising drawings, seals, banners, etc. Its posters were used by almost every department of the Government. The leading artists of the country contributed their services free to the Division. Canvas murals were prepared and eight artists were sent to France to record the AEF on canvas. Altogether the Division of Pictorial Publicity prepared 700 poster designs, 122 window cards for use in buses, etc., 310 advertising illustrations, 287 special cartoons, and 19 seal and button designs. Its inspiring posters constituted a major propaganda tool.[47]

As a service to governmental agencies and the public, the President issued an order instructing the CPI to publish the *Official Bulletin*, issued daily from 10 May 1917 until 1 April 1919. It was the precursor of the present *Federal Register* and contained all kinds of government news, orders, proclamations, reports, etc. The *Official Bulletin* was published daily from 10 May 1917 to 1 April 1919 to provide a ready source of official information thereby reducing the necessity for considerable interagency correspondence and providing an official record of governmental operations. "Distribution of the *Bulletin* was free to 'public officials, newspapers, and agencies of a public or semipublic character equipped to disseminate the official information it will contain.' It was posted in every military camp and in each of the 54,000 post offices." [48] The *Official Bulletin* was used only indirectly as a propaganda outlet and remained primarily a compilation of official documents and actions.

Besides providing news, cartoons, feature articles, advertisements, etc., for dissemination through established publications, the Committee on Public Information undertook the publication of three series of informative pamphlets prepared under the supervision of its Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation. This Division was organized and headed by Dr. Guy Stanton Ford.[49] The following

[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 43–47, Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War*, pp. 96–101.
[47] *Complete Report, CPI*, pp. 40–43.
[48] Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War*, pp. 93–94.
[49] At the time of his appointment Dr. Ford was dean of the University of Minnesota Graduate School. After the war he served as president of the University of Minnesota and of the American Historical Association.

pamphlets were published by the Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation: [50]

War Information Series

Title	Author	Number Published
1. The War Message and the Facts Behind It.	Prof. William Davis	2, 499, 903
2. The Nation in Arms	Secs. Baker and Lane	1, 666, 231
3. The Government of Germany	Prof. Charles D. Hazen	1, 798, 155
German edition	Prof. Charles D. Hazen	20, 500
4. The Great War, from Spectator to Participant.	Prof. A. C. McLaughlin	1, 581, 903
5. A War of Self-Defense	Sec. of State Lansing	721, 944
6. American Loyalty by Citizens of German Descent	Compilation	702, 598
7. Amerikanische Bürgertreue von Bürgern deutscher Abkunft	Compilation	564, 787
8. American Interest in Popular Government Abroad	Prof. E. B. Greene	596, 533
9. Home Reading Course for Citizen-Soldiers	War Dept	361, 000
10. First Session of the War Congress	Charles Merz	608, 950
11. The German War Code	Prof. G. W. Scott and Prof. J. W. Garner	514, 452
12. American and Allied Ideals: An Appeal to Those Who are Neither Hot nor Cold	Prof. S. P. Sherman	228, 986
13. German Militarism and Its German Critics.	Charles Altschul	303, 600
German edition	Charles Altschul	103, 300
14. The War for Peace	Arthur D. Call	302, 370
15. Why America Fights Germany	Prof. S. P. Tatlock	725, 345
16. The Study of the Great War	Prof. S. B. Harding	678, 927
17. Activities of the Committee on Public Information	Compilation	23, 800
18. Regimental History of the United States Regular Army 1866–1918	AGO	---
19. Lieber and Schurz: Two Loyal Americans of German Birth	Prof. E. B. Greene	26, 360
20. The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy	Compilation	137, 000
21. America's War Aims and Peace Proposals	Prof. C. L. Becker	719, 315

Loyalty Leaflet Series

1. Friendly Words to the Foreign Born	Judge Joseph Buffington	570, 543
2. The Prussian System	F. C. Walcott	571, 036
3. Labor and the War	President Wilson	509, 550
4. A War Message to the Farmer	President Wilson	546, 911
5. Plain Issues of the War	Elihu Root	112, 492
6. Ways to Serve the Nation	President Wilson	568, 907
7. What Really Matters	Anonymous	574, 505

[50] Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War*, pp. 162-75; *Complete Report, CPI*, pp. 15–16.

Red, White and Blue Series

1. How the War Came to America	5,428,048
Foreign language editions	799,864
2. National Service Handbook	454,699
3. The Battle Line of Democracy	94,848
4. The President's Flag Day Address Annotated	6,813,340
5. Conquest and Kultur: Aims of the Germans in their own Words, compilation	1,203,607
6. German War Practices (compilation of atrocity stories)	1,592,801
7. The War Cyclopedia (321 pages)	195,231
8. German Treatment of Conquered Territory	720,848
9. War, Labor, and Peace (Presidential speeches and papers)	584,027
10. German Plots and Intrigues in the United States	127,153

In addition to the three regular series of publications the Division published other leaflets and pamphlets, and occasionally private commercial publications were distributed by the Division. In all, some 75 million items were issued. A special organization had to be established to handle distribution. Frequently entire pamphlets were reprinted by newspapers and private organizations which greatly increased distribution. The pamphlets ran the gamut from scholarly studies to simple patriotic appeals to atrocity stories. The Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation also published a bimonthly 16-page paper which was sent to over 500,000 school teachers and which exerted considerable influence over the teachers and schools.[51]

"So the fighting with printer's ink was carried on vigorously on many fronts during the war, with George Creel as editor-in-chief of the whole great publication venture. Unless a person chanced upon one of the rare 'disloyal' publications, any news story, feature, picture, cartoon, poster, book, short story dealing with the war either carried the official seal of the CPI, or carried no less clearly, to our latter-day eyes, the stamp of CPI influence." [52]

Speaking Activities

Before the advent of the radio in 1920 public speaking was still one of the principal methods of reaching the public. Lyceums, chautauquas, etc., were an accepted part of the American scene in 1917. Naturally, CPI used this medium too in its propaganda activities. There were two distinct speaking campaigns going on during the war under CPI auspices—the Four-Minute Men Program and the regular lecture program.

The idea for the unique Four-Minute Men, originated by a group of young businessmen in Chicago interested in preparedness in March 1917, was to have volunteer speakers give four-minute talks in the movie theatres between performances. Under guidance from CPI

[51] *Complete Report, CPI,* pp. 15–19; Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War,* pp. 158–86.

[52] Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War,* pp. 111–12.

headquarters in Washington the program mushroomed. Speakers were carefully chosen volunteers. *Four-Minute Men Bulletins* were specially published by the CPI giving instructions, speech topics, and speech material; 47 bulletins were issued between 12 May 1917 and 24 December 1918. At any given time all the Four-Minute Men spoke on a selected topic ranging from Liberty Loans to food conservation to tributes for our Allies. Similar bulletins were prepared by the CPI to assist Army small unit commanders in preparing talks for their men on the causes and issues of the war. Eventually the program was expanded further: four-minute talks were made in churches, before men's luncheon clubs, in schools, before women's clubs, labor unions, granges, etc. In September 1918, four-minute singing was added to the program. College Four-Minute Men and Junior Four-Minute Men were organized. Creel estimated on the basis of incomplete reports that a total of 755,190 speeches were given before a total audience of over 314,450,000 at a total cost to the Government of $101,555. Although a person might have escaped CPI propaganda by not reading the newspapers and periodicals, he could not escape the CPI Four-Minute Men talks if he ever left the seclusion of his home. In a letter to all the Four-Minute Men 29 November 1918 President Wilson praised the work they had done during the war months.[53] The Four-Minute Men were truly one of the most unique and effective propaganda tools of the CPI.[54]

In addition to the Four-Minute Men program, the CPI through its Speaking Division (established 25 September 1917) instituted a group which might have been referred to with some justice as the Four-Hour Men. The director of the Speaking Division was Arthur E. Bestor, president of the Chautauqua Institution, which was the leading lecture organization in the country. He set up the Speaking Division as a giant lecture bureau. Leading government figures were booked by the Speaking Division for speeches, and a catalog of more than 10,000 speakers and lecturers was maintained. Conferences were held under various auspices at the instigation of the CPI to instruct and arouse speakers and lecturers. Various CPI pamphlets including the *Four-Minute Men Bulletin* were sent to speakers to give them background and material. Liaison was maintained with all government agencies interested in speaking programs as well as with a host of civic and fraternal organizations. Military speakers from the AEF and from Allied armies were the most popular. The Speaking Division was able to provide speakers for any meeting and to assist in the various special campaigns during the war. In September 1918 the Speaking Division was merged with and became a subdivision of the Four-Minute Men Division of the CPI, thereby co-

[53] *Complete Report, CPI,* p. 21.
[54] *Ibid.,* pp. 21–31; Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War,* pp. 113–26.

ordinating speaking activities. "The Four-Minute Men and the Speaking Division together cost the Government $210,994.14. There is no doubt that speakers formed the very spearhead of the CPI assault on indifference and civic apathy. In this respect the Four-Minute Men program was one of the most amazing experiments in public-opinion management that the world has ever seen." [55]

Films

The use of motion pictures as a propaganda tool had proved effective in Europe before our entrance into the war. By 1917 the motion picture had become one of the Nation's chief recreational pastimes. The CPI production and distribution of films through noncommercial outlets in the early months of the war, however, proved to be ineffective. The Division of Films, established 25 September 1917, developed several simultaneous programs to utilize the movies for propaganda purposes: it aided in the production of Signal Corps and Navy films of a documentary nature; it produced several documentary films of its own; it wrote scenarios and issued permits for commercial pictures of government activities; it controlled the distribution and promotion of official, private, and Allied war films; and it worked closely with the Foreign Film Division in the export of movies abroad.[56]

Three full-length movies were produced by the Film Division: *Pershing's Crusaders*, *America's Answer*, and *Under Four Flags*. The financial arrangements with the distributors for all films were designed to secure the widest possible circulation on a nonprofit basis. The documentaries and full-length propaganda films were released to Army camps and patriotic organizations free of any charges except shipping.

The Film Division engaged in several other activities in addition to its motion picture program. Its Bureau of War Expositions, organized in May 1918, had charge of exhibiting war equipment trophies and war pictures in 20 large cities. "The War Exposition had the attraction of a circus and the effect of a sermon. It brought home to the people the seriousness of war and the effect was immediately noticed in the sales of Liberty bonds, war saving stamps, Red Cross benefits, and other agencies." [57]

The Bureau of War Photographs controlled still picture distribution. It received pictures taken by the services and distributed them after censorship at 10 cents a print. The Bureau also controlled the issuance of permits to private photographers to make photographs of a military nature. The distribution of official photographs by

[55] Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War*, p. 129. For further information on the Speaking Division see: *Ibid.*, pp. 126–30; *Complete Report, CPI*, pp. 32–40.

[56] Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War*, p. 137.

[57] *Complete Report, CPI*, p. 60.

the CPI Foreign Section exceeded their domestic distribution. The Department of Slides, a subdivision of the Bureau of War Photographs, distributed at nominal charges slides and projectors to schools, churches, organizations, etc. Slides were produced in series of sets ranging from *The Ruined Churches of France* to *Transporting the Army to France*. Over 200,000 slides were produced and distributed after September 1917.

Propaganda, through the medium of movies and still pictures, was certainly not limited to official productions. The great majority of war movies produced privately on a commercial basis were subject only to indirect CPI inspiration and to direct censorship and suppression if they were considered detrimental. The propaganda effect of such movies as *Mutt and Jeff at the Front*, *To Hell with the Kaiser*, *Wolves of Kultur*, and *The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin* was incalculable but without a doubt far exceeded any of the "official" productions. Because of their mass circulation and appeal, the movies were undoubtedly one of the most effective propaganda mediums used during the war.[58]

Work With the Foreign-Born

The 14,500,000 foreign-born and their 14,000,000 American-born children constituted a major segment of the population of the United States in 1917.[59] Wisely realizing that attempts at forcible "Americanization" would not succeed, the CPI approached the problem somewhat more rationally. The Division of Work among the Foreign-Born was not created until May 1918, but work in this field had been going on since the inception of the CPI. The 10 bureaus working with 14 foreign language groups were:

1. Scandinavian Bureau (Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, Finnish, and Dutch.)
2. Polish Bureau.
3. Ukrainian Bureau.
4. Lithuanian Bureau.
5. Czechoslovak Bureau.
6. German Bureau.
7. Hungarian Bureau.
8. Italian Bureau.
9. Russian Bureau.
10. Jugoslav Bureau.

The campaign for the loyalty and support of the foreign-born was carried on through the foreign language press, foreign language organizations, field work, and pamplets. "While the bureaus all had the same aim for their work, and all employed certain similar methods, each group presented problems entirely its own and demanded specialized attention. The press and the organizations, national and local, were the nucleus of the work of all the bureaus." [60]

---

[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 47–63; Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War*, pp. 131–57.
[59] Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War*, p. 213.
[60] *Complete Report, CPI*, p. 95.

There were approximately 865 foreign language newspapers published by the 14 foreign language groups. All foreign language newspapers had to have government licenses in order to be published after the passage of the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act 6 October 1917. This gave a life and death power over the foreign language papers and enabled the CPI to receive their "cooperation" in the dissemination of propaganda.

The CPI utilized existing fraternal, educational, religious, and social organizations (whose influence in the American pattern of living was so great, especially among the foreign born) and created or helped sponsor new organizations such as the Friends of German Democracy.[61] By enlisting the support of the leaders of these groups and furnishing them with guidance, the rank and file members were won over to the American side. The head of each of the CPI bureaus engaged in work among the foreign born came from the national group covered by that bureau. Each bureau carried on extensive field work, including frequent trips by the bureau chief or his assistants to confer with the leaders and to speak before groups in the larger centers. Pamphlets were not used very extensively except among the German groups because the foreign language newspapers could put the material across more effectively.

The final major project of the foreign-work groups was more public relations than propaganda; it consisted of publicity work for governmental agencies among the foreign born particularly for the Provost Marshal General (Selective Service) and for Internal Revenue (taxes). Careful, clear publicity for these two agencies did much to reduce misunderstanding, uncertainty, and friction on the part of the foreign born. The Fourth of July 1918 was especially devoted to rallies and meetings of foreign language groups to demonstrate their loyalty. That day included a pilgrimage to Mount Vernon by President Wilson and representatives of 33 of the groups. By its work among the foreign-born groups, the CPI did much to assist their assimilation into American society.[62]

Miscellaneous Domestic Activities

Three activities of the CPI defy assignment to the arbitrary categories discussed above. First of these activities was the program of the Division of Women's War Work, organized on 1 November 1917. This division was set up ". . . for the purpose of informing and energizing the women of the country, keeping in touch with the various women's groups, sending out material, and giving impetus to all movements connected with the work of American women in the war." [63]

---

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 96.
[62] *Ibid.*, pp. 78–103; Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War*, pp. 213–32.
[63] *Complete Report, CPI*, pp. 75–76.

On 11 March 1918 the Division of Exhibits at State Fairs was created to arrange for exhibits of war equipment, the showing of movies, etc., at the various state fairs in the late summer and early fall of 1918. The War, Navy, Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior Departments and the Food Administration contributed exhibits and material for the project. Although a minor activity when compared with other work of the CPI, it nevertheless afforded an excellent opportunity to bring certain aspects of the war to the attention of the public, particularly in rural areas.

One of the most touchy wartime subjects was that of employer-employee relations. The necessity for keeping strikes and labor unrest at a minimum forced the CPI to consider carefully the problem of labor propaganda. For the most part the CPI left this work up to an independent labor organization, the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy of which Samuel Gompers was president, and to the Department of Labor. The CPI Division of Labor Publications maintained joint offices in New York with the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy. In February 1918 the CPI established a Division of Industrial Relations with Roger Babson as director, but it was transferred to the Department of Labor in March 1918. Special labor posters and pamphlets were prepared and printed by the CPI although frequently issued over someone else's name. Hampered by budget cuts after 30 June 1918, the CPI still tried to deal indirectly with labor morale until after the Armistice.[64]

CPI Overseas Program

The domestic work of the Committee on Public Information was its first and primary job, but its activities overseas were also extensive and extraordinarily effective.[65] The order creating the CPI contained no reference to foreign propaganda activities, and it was not until the fall of 1917 that work in this field really got under way. Working closely with the State Department, Military Intelligence, and Naval Intelligence, the CPI organized offices in almost every country. The work was generally carried on in the form of informational activities such as the distribution of news releases and pamphlets, by control of cable messages, and through the control of distribution of American films abroad including such approaches as requiring the showing of CPI documentaries with every American film released. Other activities were engaged in, however, and the program varied according to the needs in particular countries.[66] In 1918 the CPI handled propaganda in Allied and neutral areas while Military Intelligence handled it in enemy countries. Although the CPI methods used to accom-

[64] Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War*, pp. 187–212.
[65] *Ibid.*, pp. 235–36.
[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 236–37.

plish its mission abroad seemed sometimes crude and amateurish, they were generally effective in winning support and friends for the United States. The program was discontinued when the war ended.[67]

Censorship

Press Censorship

The censorship of the press in the United States in World War I is usually referred to as a "voluntary censorship." The term "*voluntary* censorship" is self-contradictory; possibly "*self-imposed* censorship" would have been more accurate. But "voluntary censorship" is the accepted term used to describe the relationship between the CPI and the press in World War I.

> As George Creel and many other people have repeatedly emphasized, press cooperation with the CPI and its support of the war rested on a "voluntary" basis, but . . . impressive legal authority lay behind it. This authority was gradually extended by Congressional and Presidential action, as the war progressed, and by the time of the Armistice the government's potential control of the press was nearly complete. A self-denying ordinance by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Creel was all that stood in the way of an attempt to impose a harsh, rigorous, and thoroughgoing censorship.[68]

The voluntary censorship for the most part proved effective. The CPI furnished publications with a list of types of material which should not be published. Violations or more frequently indiscretions were brought to the attention of the CPI by private citizens and Military and Naval Intelligence. An investigation and censure usually followed. The CPI issued in pamphlet form on 28 May 1917 a "Preliminary Statement to the Press of the United States" which described CPI activities in relation to the press, listed types of material which should not be published, and contained other pertinent information. In his foreword to the pamphlet, Creel stated: "Belligerent countries are usually at pains to veil in secrecy all operations of censorship. Rules and regulations are issued as 'private and confidential,' each pamphlet is numbered, and the recipient held to strict accountability for its safe and secret keeping. The Committee on Public Information has decided against this policy, and the press is at liberty to give full publicity to this communication." [69] The preliminary statement was supplemented by a placard issued 30 July 1917 listing types of information which should not be published and another pamphlet 10 August 1917 entitled "Information Concerning the Making and Distribution of Pictures that Show the Activities of the Army and Navy." These three documents formed the basis for and prescribed the details of the voluntary censorship. A new and

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 247.
[68] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
[69] *CPI, Preliminary Statement to the Press of the United States, May 28, 1917* (Washington, 1917).

slightly changed placard, issued on 1 January 1918, contained categories of news which should not be published. [See appendix B.]

These placards were sometimes supplemented by special confidential requests to editors, such as the letters sent out by the CPI on 24 January 1917 urging editors to use extreme caution in publishing letters from soldiers.[70] Backing up the voluntary censorship was the power to exclude publications from the mails, the most common method of distribution. Although the barring of publications from the mails was rare, it occurred frequently enough to serve as a warning. Foreign language newspapers, since permission was required in order to publish, were subject to much stricter control than English publications. Censorship of foreign languge papers was controlled by the Post Office Department.[71] Although voluntary censorship is usually considered as applying to newspapers, it also applied to periodicals and other publications. Even the staid *Yale Alumni Weekly* incurred a rebuke when it unwittingly broke a CPI rule.[72]

Press censorship was also exercised by the Office of the Chief Cable Censor in New York which controlled dispatches coming into the United States via cable. Since 75 percent of the incoming cables were to newspapers and press associations this gave the Government an effective control over foreign news. The War and Navy Departments, through their respective intelligence branches, controlled their own news at the source. They made frequent requests to the press not to publish certain specific information. For example, all news about the airplane program was strictly controlled. Finally, of course, news from the AEF and the fleet in European waters was controlled by compulsory on-the-spot censorship.

The fact that so many agencies were involved in censorship activities led to a great deal of confusion, some inefficiency and considerable friction. By the fall of 1918 this confusion had prompted the United Press Association to lodge a formal documented complaint with the War Department representative on the CPI. The whole problem was analyzed by the Director of Military Intelligence and Chief Military Censor as follows:

> 1. The attached letter, dated October 28, 1918, from the United Press Association to Mr. Marlen Pew, War Department representative of the Committee on Public Information, is a statement of specific cases of miscarriage of censorship.
>
> 2. The existing unsatisfactory conditions with respect to press censorship are believed to be due to the fact that there are at least six authorized censorship agencies which operate with no coordination or control other than the desire of the various officers concerned to work together for the common good. These agencies are as follows:

[70] Confidential ltr, CPI to Editors, 24 Aug 17, sub: Letters from soldiers. WCD 8976–S6. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

[71] Mock, *Censorship 1917*, pp. 131–52.

[72] Ltr, Asst to CofS to Chm, CPI, 16 Apr 18, sub: *Yale Alumni Weekly*. WCD 8976–131. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

(a) The Chief Military Censor for the War Department, whose duties with respect to press censorship are chiefly those concerned with requests to the press to refrain from disclosing certain facts, and an examination of the press to see whether or not it has been guilty of violations of the Espionage Act.

(b) The A. E. F. censorship exercised under the direction of the Chief of Intelligence Section, A. E. F. This agency exercises a compulsory censorship over correspondents attached to the A. E. F.

(c) The Chief Cable Censor, New York, who has direct control over all cable press dispatches entering or leaving the United States.

(d) The Naval censorship in European waters exercised by Admiral Sims.

(f) [sic] The Naval censorship exercised by the Navy Department, Washington, which is similar to that exercised by the Chief Military Censor, War Department.

(g) The Committee on Public Information. The functions of this Committee are primarily those of publicity, but rules for voluntary press censorship were originally drawn up and promulgated by this Committee, which has always continued to exercise a certain amount of press censorship. In addition to the censorship exercised by the Committee as a whole, Mr. Marlen Pew is a War Department representative for publicity and exercises the censorship function which is involved in seeing that the only War Department statements given to the press are those authorized by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, or other designated authority.

3. Referring to the specific case mentioned in the third paragraph of the letter from the United Press Associations which concerns the publication of the story of big naval guns operating in France, at least five of the six censorship agencies were involved. The Chief Military Censor, the Naval Censorship, and the Committee on Public Information all issued requests to the press not to make any mention of these guns. The AEF censorship, which had not been informed of this request, passed the dispatch concerning them, and the Chief Cable Censor passed the dispatch into the United States because it had been passed by the A. E. F.

4. Under existing conditions confusion and uncertainty are inevitable; and there is always great danger of the disclosure of important military or naval secrets or the inopportune mention of military or naval policies.[73]

The Director of Military Intelligence requested authority to coordinate and centralize censorship in a committee to be composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, and CPI and to be located in the Office of the Chief Cable Censor in New York. The Chief of Staff approved the suggestion, but the Armistice was reached before any action was taken.

Press censorship during World War I, therefore, was basically a voluntary self-imposed censorship in accordance with general rules and directions prescribed by the CPI. This voluntary censorship was supplemented by the power of the Postmaster General to exclude publications from the mails, by Army and Navy censorship of domestic military news at its source, by censorship of incoming cables with news from overseas, and by compulsory military censorship in the

[73] Memo, Dir, MI of CofS, 31 Oct 18, sub: Press Censorship. WCD 8976–151. Records of the War Department General Staff. National Archives.

war areas. All this activity added up to a reasonably effective censorship within a framework of confusion and uncertainty.

Communications Censorship

Activities in this field have already been covered in the discussion of cable censorship of press material. All other cable communications were also censored by the Chief Cable Censor's offices wherever cables reached the United States. Censorship was applied to wireless communications by the Navy Department, and to Mexican telegraph and telephone lines by the War Department. This censorship applied to messages both coming in and going out of the United States and was a necessary supplement to CPI propaganda activities both home and abroad. Although these censorship activities incurred some criticism, they were effective and valuable.[74]

Mail Censorship

Censorship over mail leaving and entering the United States was exercised by the postal censorship committees of the Censorship Board after passage of the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act on 6 October 1917. Such mail was checked by postal, Army, Navy, and War Trade Board agents according to the subject matter of the communication. In addition to suppressing detrimental communications, the mail censorship also occasionally yielded valuable intelligence information.

Film Censorship

Censorship of motion pictures was conducted both on the national and local level. The CPI, through its Division of Films, organized what amounted to a voluntary censorship program among the producers. When movies were considered detrimental, requests that they be withdrawn were usually complied with willingly. Thus such films as *Patria*, *The Spirit of '76*, *The Curse of Iku*, and *The Caillaux Case* were all censored or suppressed because they "aroused ill will against one of the Allies by causing loss of prestige on the part of one of our comrades-in-arms."[75] At the local level, zealous authorities sometimes censored films which the CPI had previously passed. As for censorship of exported films:

> The Committee on Public Information, through a special arrangement with the War Trade Board, held the whip hand over the export of motion pictures, and thereby was able to exercise a controlling influence on the attitude toward America, so far as the theater was concerned, in all the neutral nations of the world. These films, over which the Committee exercised control, in every case had to be consigned to the United States ambassador, minister, consul, or consular agent at the port of destination, and he was instructed to censor the films, equipment or accessories before delivering them or permitting their delivery to the ultimate consignee.

[74] Mock, *Censorship 1917*, p. 93.
[75] *Ibid.*, p. 187.

Under the guidance of George Creel the CPI made full use of this prerogative, and soon had a steady stream of American propaganda films going abroad. The heads of American exporting companies met with the Committee's officers and agreed that no American films were to be exported unless a certain amount of American propaganda film was included in the order.[76]

Other Types of Censorship

Indirect censorship of speech was possible under the Espionage and Sedition Acts to prevent agitation against the war effort. The enforcement of these acts was a responsibility of the Attorney General. The most famous prosecution of the war was the trial and conviction of Eugene V. Debs in 1918 for a speech made in Canton, Ohio, criticizing the war.

The publication of new books was handled under a voluntary censorship similar to that exercised in regard to the press. Publishers cooperated in suppressing books whose publication was considered harmful at the time. Controversies over textbooks raged back and forth. "Many a textbook fight arose during the war days. Book companies circulated rumors that their rivals' publications were tainted with pro-Germanism, and brought political pressure to have them excluded from the schools. When a book was thus under fire, and sometimes even if it was not, the publishers sought protective endorsement from the CPI" [77] The War Department itself maintained an "Index Expurgatorius," listing some 75 books banned from Army camps. The censorship exercised by the armed forces overseas and various local and state activities completed the censorship picture in World War I. It was not a well coordinated or efficiently administered program, but it worked because it had an aroused American public opinion on its side.

Conclusion

The propaganda and censorship programs of World War I, in spite of their weaknesses, succeeded in swinging public opinion completely behind the war effort. The indifference and apathy that had existed in April 1917 vanished as the crusade to "make the world safe for democracy" got under way. Without that complete support of public opinion, the economic and manpower mobilization would not have been possible on so vast a scale. Propaganda and censorship are necessary in wartime and must be included in any overall mobilization plan.

---

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

[77] Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War*, p. 177

CHAPTER XI

SUMMARY OF THE WORLD WAR I PERIOD

In the Spanish-American War the United States for the first time in its history engaged a major power in an offensive war outside its continental limits. This was a complete reversal of traditional American policy. Although the Spanish-American War was short and successful, the inadequacies of the prewar Army and of the War Department were clearly demonstrated. The report of the Dodge Commission on the conduct of the War Department in the Spanish-American War set the stage for reform. Secretary of War Elihu Root, assisted by able and progressive military advisers, pushed through a series of major reforms beginning with the establishment of the Army War College on 27 November 1901. The entire officer training and advanced education program was also overhauled and expanded. The General Staff Act of February 14, 1903, was then guided through the Congress, and the General Staff headed by a Chief of Staff began operating 15 August 1903. At the same time the office of Commanding General of the Army was abolished. The General Staff, however, did not become a firmly established organization before 1912. By that time its organization had been improved and the opposition to the General Staff concept led by The Adjutant General overcome.

The mobilization concept before World War I was based on the use of three lines of defense. The Regular Army constituted the first line of defense. Its size was limited by the Act of February 2, 1901, to 100,000 men. The Militia or National Guard constituted the second line of defense. These state forces usually numbered around 100,000 men. The Dick Militia Act of January 21, 1903, and the Militia Act of May 27, 1908, had increased Federal assistance to the Militia and attempted to place it on a sounder footing. The third line of defense was to be composed of a vast Volunteer army to be raised after war began.

The War Department General Staff prepared the first overall comprehensive statement of a military policy in 1912 when it published *The Organization of the Land Forces in the United States.* The document was revised and expanded in 1915 into the *Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States*, which was supplemented by 30 additional General Staff monographs. These documents were used by the Congress as a basis for portions of the National

Defense Act of June 3, 1916, which was the most comprehensive piece of military legislation passed by the Congress up to that time. It provided that the Regular Army be increased to 175,000 over a five-year period; the National Guard be improved and expanded from 100,000 to 4000,000; the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Reserve Officers Training Corps, and the Enlisted Reserve Corps be established; and the President be given new and broad economic mobilization powers.

The period immediately preceding our entrance into World War I was fraught with uncertainties; there was no coordination between foreign and military policy. A series of crises on the Mexican border lasting intermittently from 1911 to 1917 gave the Army an opportunity to learn some of the difficulties of even a small mobilization effort. The confusion in the National Guard mobilization of 1916 demonstrated the inadequacies of that branch of the defense establishment. The failure to obtain a sufficient number of voluntary enlistments for either the Regular Army or the National Guard during the Mexican crisis of 1916 gave impetus to the consideration of proposals for some form of compulsory service by the General Staff.

When war was declared against Germany 6 April 1917, the United States was completely unprepared to give immediate military assistance to the Allies. On 1 April 1917 there were 133,111 officers and men (including Philippine Scouts) in the Regular Army; 80,446 National Guardsmen in Federal service; or a grand total of 213,557 (9,693 officers and 203,864 enlisted men). There were another 101,174 National Guardsmen still in state service and a comparatively negligible number of men in the recently created Reserve components. The only available means of increasing these forces was by voluntary enlistment. But there were no complete plans available on which to base the impending mobilization effort, and there were only 19 officers on the War Department General Staff to prepare plans and handle the routine staff work.

However, once the basic policy was adopted to raise the war Army by Selective Service and the necessary legislation passed authorizing the drafting of men between the ages of 21 and 30, it was possible to proceed with the development of mobilization machinery and procedures. A nationwide selective service organization composed primarily of volunteer workers was established and elaborate procedures developed for the registration, selection, and induction of men into the Army. The size of the Army 11 November 1918 had reached 3,685,458 men, of which 2,801,373 had been inducted by Selective Service, 203,786 had been commissioned, and 877,458 had enlisted voluntarily. During World War I several series of Officers' Training Camps were conducted and a Student's Army Training Corps organized. There were also important developments in training methods including increased use of training manuals and the use of films, all

of which reduced the length of time required to train the mobilizing Army. Unfortunately, the lack of equipment and facilities for training purposes reduced the rate of mobilization.

There were three programs which served as the basis for troop allocations and the rate of mobilization. First, a tentative program developed spontaneously from the early wartime decisions to train as large an Army as possible, to send one division to France in June 1917 to aid morale, to increase that force in France to a size making American participation effective if and when shipping were available, and to start a large military aviation program. The tentative program was superseded by the 30-division program in July 1917. The 30-division program was based on three main documents: the War Department mobilization plan of 7 July 1917, the General Organization Project of 10 July 1917 prepared by AEF and War Department officers in France, and the AEF Schedule of Priority Shipments of 7 October 1917. The 30-division program proposed to have 30 divisions (there were about 28,000 men in a World War I division), or 1,372,399 men in France by 31 December 1918.

Because of the seriousness of the military situation in the spring of 1918, the 30-division program was replaced by the 80-division program prepared by the War Department General Staff following recommendations from General Pershing. There is no evidence that the expanded military intelligence facilities were utilized to make estimates of the world situation before determining new American requirements for prosecution of the war. The 80-division program was approved 25 July 1918; it proposed to have 80 divisions or 3,360,000 men in France by 1 July 1919. The goals for 31 December 1918 were thus increased from 30 divisions or 1,372,399 men in France to 52 divisions or 2,350,000 men. The Armistice on 11 November 1918 ended active operations and stopped the military program. By that date, 62 divisions had been organized by the United States, 43 divisions and supporting troops had been shipped to France, and 30 divisions had seen action. There was a total of about 2,000,000 men in the AEF 11 November 1918. The fact that 3,884,417 men were added to the Army between 1 April 1917 and 11 November 1918 indicates the size and scope of the American manpower mobilization for World War I.

The necessity for close correlation between the Army program and the Nation's economy in wartime was demonstrated by the difficulties encountered in troop housing, supply shortages, and shipping. The economic mobilization agencies maintained more or less close contact with the War Department; Army representatives served on the Munitions Standards Board and its successor agencies—the General Munitions Board and the War Industries Board. The Army learned that it could not withdraw manpower from defense industries without jeopardizing the flow of vital materials and supplies to the men

already in the Army. The selective service machinery served as the chief agency for coordinating national manpower apportionment. The importance of properly adjusting the industrial mobilization plan to the personnel mobilization plan was clearly demonstrated.

The use of propaganda and censorship in World War I developed a new phase of mobilization activity in the United States. Although the programs were administered for the most part by nonmilitary agencies, their effect on the mobilization program was important. It would be necessary to include propaganda and censorship plans in any comprehensive mobilization planning after World War I.

PART THREE

MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES BETWEEN WORLD WARS I AND II

CHAPTER XII

EARLY MOBILIZATION PLANNING, 1919–1931

Determination of Military Policy and Mobilization Responsibilities

World War I ended 11 November 1918 with mobilization still in full progress. The sudden reversal from mobilization to demobilization precipitated a deluge of problems which the War Department was unprepared to meet. With the Army disintegrating under the impact of popular pressure to "bring the boys home," the War Department was most immediately concerned with some kind of legislation which would keep the Regular Army in existence. Under the wartime legislation almost everyone in the Army was eligible for discharge at the end of the emergency.[1] In January 1919 the War Department General Staff drafted a proposed bill which was intended to reconstitute the Regular Army and to reorganize it in accordance with some of the lessons learned during the war. In this bill, which the House Military Affairs Committee took under consideration 16 January 1919, the War Department recommended a permanent Regular Establishment of some 500,000 officers and enlisted men.[2]

Both Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and Gen. Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff, appeared before the House Military Affairs Committee to discuss the War Department bill. Neither of them was able to justify the somewhat arbitrary 500,000 figure to the satisfaction of the committee. Furthermore, the proposed Regular Army legislation was only a stopgap measure not integrated with any provisions for a National Guard or for universal military training. Mr. Baker acknowledged that the General Staff had made studies and had submitted recommendations on these subjects, but he was un-

[1] DA Pamph No. 20–210, *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army*, Jul 52. This study covers personnel demobilization through World War I briefly and covers the World War II period in detail. See also: Robert S. Thomas, "The United States Army 1914–1923," ch. XX. MS in Gen Ref Off, OCMH.

[2] H. R. 14560, 65th Cong., 3d sess.

willing to make these studies available to the Congress at that time.[3] Because that session of Congress was drawing to a close and party control was to be handed over to the Republicans in the new Congress, the only Army legislation passed was the act of February 28, 1919, which merely authorized the resumption of enlistments in the Regular Army.[4]

Both the Senate and House Military Affairs Committees held extensive hearings on national defense proposals in 1919–20. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) John McA. Palmer (who had returned from General Pershing's AEF staff to become Chief, War Plans Branch, War Plans Division, War Department General Staff) in testifying before a Senate subcommittee on military affairs on 9 and 10 October 1919 attacked not only the War Department bill but the principles he saw as underlying it. Colonel Palmer was convinced that the legislation proposed by the War Department was based on Brevet Maj. Gen. Emory Upton's "expansible" theory with its concomitants of a large standing army backed up by a draft or universal military service. Colonel Palmer argued for a small standing army and a large militia of citizen soldiers.[5]

When General Pershing appeared before a joint meeting of the Senate and House Military Affairs Committees he made a strong plea for some kind of universal military training [6] emphasizing not only the military value of such service but the vast physical and educational advantages which would accrue from it. He was cautioned by at least one Congressman that ". . . we are in danger of having many beautiful schemes for popular education thrust upon us which, if adopted, would make the Army a college rather than a fighting unit." [7]

National Defense Act of 1920

The National Defense Act of 1920 [8] which emerged from the debates of 1919–20 was in the form of a series of amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916. The amendments were so comprehensive that an almost entirely new act was written over the framework of the old. Among the provisions pertinent to this study were the following:

1. "That the Army of the United States shall consist of the Regular Army, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, and the organized Reserves, including the Officers' Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps."

---

[3] The testimony of Secretary Baker and Gen March appears in *Hearings*, HMAC, 69th Cong., 2d sess., "Historical Documents Relating to the Reorganization Plans of the War Department and to the Present National Defense Act" (Washington, 1927), I, pp. 241ff.

[4] Act of February 28, 1919. 40 *Stat.* 1211.

[5] Col. Palmer's testimony is in "Historical Documents . . .," *op. cit.*, pp. 303ff.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 363ff.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 386.

[8] Act of June 4, 1920. 41 *Stat.* 759–812.

2. The Regular Army including the Philippine Scouts was not to exceed 280,000 enlisted men in peacetime. [For actual strength of the Army 1919–46 see *table 51.*]

Table 51. Strength of the United States Army: 1919–1946. [a] *

30 June	Total	Officers			Enlisted personnel
		Commissioned officers	Warrant and flight officers [b]	Army Nurse Corps [c]	
1919	846, 498	77, 966	37	[d] 9, 616	758, 879
1920	201, 918	15, 451	68	[d] 1, 551	184, 848
1921	228, 650	13, 299	1, 159	851	213, 341
1922	147, 335	13, 248	1, 153	828	132, 106
1923	131, 959	11, 820	1, 086	705	118, 348
1924	141, 618	11, 655	1, 065	675	128, 223
1925	135, 979	12, 462	1, 030	725	121, 762
1926	134, 116	12, 143	1, 327	673	119, 973
1927	133, 949	12, 076	1, 263	681	119, 929
1928	135, 204	12, 112	1, 208	699	121, 185
1929	138, 263	12, 175	1, 138	734	124, 216
1930	138, 452	12, 255	1, 089	807	124, 301
1931	139, 626	12, 322	1, 028	809	125, 467
1932	134, 024	12, 314	973	824	119, 913
1933	135, 684	12, 301	926	669	121, 788
1934	137, 584	12, 283	869	609	123, 823
1935	138, 569	12, 043	825	603	125, 098
1936	166, 724	12, 125	784	603	153, 212
1937	178, 733	12, 321	794	625	164, 993
1938	184, 126	12, 522	782	671	170, 151
1939	188, 565	13, 039	775	672	174, 079
1940	267, 767	16, 624	763	939	249, 441
1941	1, 460, 998	93, 172	931	5, 433	1, 361, 462
1942	3, 074, 184	190, 662	3, 285	12, 475	2, 867, 762
1943	6, 993, 102	526, 352	21, 919	[e] 31, 305	6, 413, 526
1944	7, 992, 868	698, 206	36, 903	[e] 41, 871	7, 215, 888
1945	8, 266, 373	778, 316	56, 260	[e] 57, 087	7, 374, 710
1946	1, 889, 690	242, 451	9, 844	[e] 14, 849	1, 622, 546

[a] Represents actual strength of the active Army, including Philippine Scouts. Does not include cadets at the U. S. Military Academy, field clerks, or contract surgeons.

[b] Effective 29 Apr 26, 367 Army and QM field clerks were brought into the Army as warrant officers.

[c] Included as officer personnel in this table for comparability with later years. On 4 June 20 Army nurses were given simulated or relative commissions applicable only to the Army Nurse Corps. On 22 Jun 44 they were given temporary commissions, and on 16 April 47 were commissioned in the Regular Army.

[d] Data is from WDGS, Statistics Branch, "Strength of Military Establishment, June 30, 1914, to June 30, 1926," Spec Rpt 196, rev 22 Jan 27.

[e] Includes Women's Medical Specialist Corps.

* *Source: Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, 1922–1941; Annual Reports of The Adjutant General, 1919–1921;* also Department of the Army, *Strength of the Army* (STM–30), 1 Jul 48, as cited in Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950), p. 16. Statistics for period 1942–46 are from STM–30, 1 Oct 50, p. 39.

3. The organization of the Army into brigades, divisions, corps, and armies was left to the discretion of the President.

4. The number of officers in each grade and the pay for the entire Army was fixed by statute.

5. The War Department General Staff, consisting of the Chief of Staff, 4 assistants, and 88 other officers not below the rank of captain, was:

> . . . to prepare plans for national defense and the use of the military forces for that purpose, both separately and in conjunction with the naval forces, and for the mobilization of the manhood of the Nation and its material resources in an emergency, to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the Army of the United States, and its state of preparation for military operations; and to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. . . . Hereafter, members of the General Staff Corps shall be confined strictly to the discharge of duties of the general nature of those specified for them in this section and in the Act of Congress approved February 14, 1903, and they shall not be permitted to answer or engage in work of an administrative nature.

6. "Hereafter, in addition to such other duties as may be assigned him by the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, under the direction of the Secretary of War, shall be charged with the supervision of the procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War Department pertaining thereto and the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations essential to war-time needs."

7. Comprehensive provisions were enacted providing for the Officers' Reserve Corps, Reserve Officers' Training Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the National Guard.

8. In addition to outlining the organization and size of the staff departments and other miscellaneous provisions, the act also contained a revised set of the Articles of War.

The Planning Responsibility Fixed

The National Defense Act of 1920 assigned mobilization responsibilities to both the Assistant Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. By the summer of 1921 doubts and confusion concerning specific responsibilities had arisen. To resolve these questions, the Harbord Board,[9] which had been appointed to study and report on the organization of the War Department General Staff, was directed to report also on "The relations that should exist between the General Staff and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War in its duty of procurement." [10]

---

[9] The Harbord Board was composed of the following: Maj Gen James G. Harbord, Maj Gen William G. Haan, Brig Gen Henry Jervey, Brig Gen Fox Conner, Col John McA. Palmer, Col Robert C. Davis, and Col John F. DeWitt.

[10] WD SO 155–0, 7 Jul 21.

The Harbord Board appointed a subcommittee to study the relations between the General Staff and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. In its report [11] the subcommittee first affirmed clearly that no principle of unity of responsibility was violated since the General Staff and the Assistant Secretary of War were in reality subordinate to a higher single authority—the Secretary of War—who in turn was responsible to the President. The responsibility for mobilization planning, therefore, rested on the Secretary of War who would coordinate the planning activities of the General Staff and the Assistant Secretary of War. The Secretary of War would present one unified mobilization plan to the President and would be responsible for that plan.

As a *modus operandi* the Harbord Board recommended that the General Staff (the planning side of the system) should present to the Assistant Secretary of War (the business side) an estimate of the requirements which in its opinion were necessary for the national defense. The Assistant Secretary of War then was ". . . charged with the supervision of all the business of the War Department pertaining to purchase or acquisition of all military supplies in accordance with the requirements both as to time and quantity and in conformity with the types and priorities prescribed by the General Staff and approved by the Secretary of War." [12] In brief the General Staff was to determine what materiel was needed and when; the Assistant Secretary of War was to ensure that the materiel was delivered in the types, quantities, and priorities desired. All military aspects of mobilization pertained to the General Staff; all business and industrial aspects of mobilization pertained to the Assistant Secretary of War. The chiefs of the supply branches of the Army were made responsible to the Assistant Secretary of War on all matters regarding procurement, detailed supply plans, and industrial mobilization.

The recommendations of the Harbord Board were incorporated in War Department General Orders No. 41, 16 August 1921, which codified the relationship between the Assistant Secretary of War and the General Staff. The same order also reorganized the General Staff establishing five main divisions under the Chief of Staff:

(a) Personnel Division (first division): G–1.
(b) Military Intelligence Division (second division): G–2.
(c) Operations and Training Division (third division): G–3.
(d) Supply Division (fourth division): G–4.
(e) War Plans Division: WPD.

The primary General Staff responsibility for overall mobilization planning was assigned to the third division—G–3, but WPD also had major mobilization planning responsibilities.

[11] For a copy of the subcommittee report 25 Jul 21 see: "Historical Documents . . .," *op. cit.*, pp. 580–83.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 582.

Immediate Postwar Mobilization Planning

The earliest mobilization concepts after World War I were on a grand scale. The successful functioning of selective service, the bulging military warehouses, the factories which had just acquired know-how and machine tools and had not yet converted to civilian production were such favorable factors that the initial mobilization studies after World War I were lavishly optimistic.[13] But even in this optimism it was realized that some of the war surpluses had to be disposed of if for no other reasons than lack of space to keep them and inability to prevent their rapid deterioration under unfavorable storage conditions. Before any estimate could be made concerning what stocks should be disposed of as surplus and what should be retained as war reserves, there had to be some statistical information on the size and organization of the postwar Army and the rate of its expansion in the event another emergency made mobilization necessary.

As early as 14 November 1919, the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff (WDGS), came up with various data on manpower curves illustrating mobilization possibilities for the year 1920.[14] This data served as the basis for a study requested by Maj. Gen. W. G. Haan, then director of WPD. This study was predicated on the possibility of either an offensive or a defensive war. It considered the following factors of paramount influence "on the strength of the Army if war were declared during the present fiscal year" and came to the indicated conclusions:[15]

Factors influencing strength of the Army	*WPD Conclusions*
a. Number of officers ready for immediate service.	51,637 Reserve officers carried on the lists of TAG with likelihood of 15,000 more joining during the first month of the war. On the basis of 26 officers per 1,000 men, there would be sufficient officers for an Army of 2,500,000.
b. Number of camps available.	10 camps government-owned, 15 more being purchased; plus 13 airfields owned, 1 more being purchased.
c. Capacity of camps	Each of the 25 camps could handle 30,000 men, a total of 750,000. Regular Army posts could hold 130,000, making a total of 880,000 not counting aviation. From these figures it was assumed 1,000,000 men could be ". . . properly sheltered within 60 days."

[13] See: Memo, Dir, WPD to CofS, 2 Apr 19, sub: Outline of a national military policy based on universal military service. WPD 1225 and 9317–132. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[14] Memo, Acting Dir, WPD to CofS, 14 Nov 19, sub: Manpower Curves. WPD 2045. (Copies in WPD 3186 and 9210–156.) Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[15] *Ibid.*

Factors influencing strength of the Army	*WPD Conclusions*
d. Future extension of camps.	World War I temporary construction required five months. With greater experience and efficiency, it was believed shelter for 500,000 more men could be built within three to four months. Adoption of a billeting system for a defensive war would provide space for 500,000 more men.
e. Number of men that could be handled by railroads.	600,000 men in the first month with a maximum of 1,000,000 monthly thereafter, using passenger equipment only. Add 500,000 more per month if freight cars were utilized for troop transport.
f. Number of trained or partially trained men from World War I.	Of 3,300,000 men just demobilized, 2,500,000 would be available; 1,000,000 of them trained, 1,500,000 partially trained.

Manpower procurement was graphically delineated in the study by a series of curves computed for both defensive and offensive war, both based on the assumption that a selective service law would become effective 60 days after the declaration of war.

In an offensive war the planners began with a certain base of 169,000 Regular troops and computed that 220,000 National Guardsmen and Volunteers would be mobilized by M+1, augmented by an additional 100,000 men M+2.[16] With the draft functioning at the beginning of the third month, mobilization would have procured 5,000,000 men by M+11. In a defensive war, manpower procurement would progress even faster than 800,000 men at the end of M+2 to 5,100,000 at M+7. In this latter mobilization, it would be necessary to resort to billeting to provide additional shelter. Other graphs in the study showed availability of divisions, corps, and armies for combat and allotted men for service of supply organizations. The combat goal was 56 infantry divisions, 4 cavalry divisions, 14 corps, and 4 armies (plus). It was estimated that the rejection rate of manpower inducted, for physical and other reasons, would be 20 per cent. These studies were approved for the planning purposes of determining the strength of the Army that would be required and the probable strength of forces in the field at any given time should the United States become involved in a war during fiscal year 1920.

However impressive these manpower curves were, they failed to provide the information desired by the supply agencies of the War

[16] In order to avoid confusion, all Mobilization Days have been standardized according to current Army usage. Thus M+1 means Mobilization Day plus one month; any other time element is shown in parenthesis as M+10 (days). The same system has been used for periods of time before Mobilization Days as M−1 which means one month before Mobilization Day.

Department which were still troubled by such basic problems as how much to keep, how much to sell, and how much and what to buy. Accordingly, the General Staff revised the manpower curves in May 1920 as a "Basis of computation of supply requirements and production data for a war involving maximum effort." [17] These studies were intended only to guide the supply departments in their computation of maximum war requirements, but they were far too uncertain and vague to serve as a basis for actual procurement or as a basis for organization and mobilization.

These early efforts of the supply planners to keep the mobilization planners realistic enough to furnish concrete requirements data could not possibly have achieved any practical results; the War Department staff planners were too fully engrossed in the preparation of adequate legislation for the new national defense establishment. It was difficult for the mobilization planners to be realistic when such factors as the organization and size of the Army and the general defense structure were unknown.

Mobilization Framework Outlined in 1920

The passage of the National Defense Act of 1920 furnished the basis for concrete plans. Immediately the War Department enjoined its staff planners to provide the additional data necessary to set up a new defense structure. A special committee of the General Staff was appointed 21 June 1920 to ". . . define the general plan of organization to be adopted for the Army provided by the Act of June 4, 1920." Five other General Staff committees were also appointed to study and make recommendations concerning various phases of the reorganization of the Army in conformance with the Act of June 4, 1920.[18]

The Special Committee on Organization gave considerable weight in its deliberations to the recommendations of members of the AEF staff, experienced troop commanders, War Department staff officers, and the reports of several military boards convened in Europe after

[17] See: Memos, Dec 19—Jun 20 in WPD 4322-2. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[18] "Report of Special Committee Appointed by the Director, War Plans Division, to Define the General Plan of Organization to be Adopted for the Army of the United States Provided by the Act of June 4, 1920," 8 Jul 20 (approved by CofS 31 Aug 20 and SW 1 Sep 20). WPD 6935 in AG 320. (6-21-20) (1). Records of the Adjutant General's Office. National Archives. The members of the Special Committee were: Col William Lassiter, Col C. S. Farnsworth, Col Fox Conner, Lt Col B. H. Wells, Maj Campbell King, Maj John W. Gulick, Maj Hugh A. Drum, Maj Stuart Heintzelman, Capt George C. Marshall, and Capt A. W. Lane. See also: Memo, WPD, 7 Jun 20, sub: Committees for Working Out Army Reorganization. WPD 6542. Records of WDGS. National Archives; Rpt, Comm No. 2 on Army Reorganization to Dir, WPD, 10 Jul 20, sub: Army Reorganization. WPD 7123. Records of WDGS. National Archives; Memo, TAG to CG, each Corps Area, 20 Sept 20, sub: Organization and Administration of Corps Areas. AG 323. National Archives. WD GO 50, 20 Aug. 20.

the armistice was signed.[19] The report of the Special Committee which provided the framework for the reorganization of the Army included the nucleus of a mobilization concept: a plan for the organization of six field armies plus a GHQ reserve totaling approximately 2,000,000 men to be mobilized and trained within 60 days after the declaration of an emergency. To man the communications zone the committee recommended a force 15 per cent of all troops assigned to the six armies. The overall mobilized strength for M+60 (days), *exclusive of men required for the Zone of the Interior*, was visualized by the committee as follows:

Total	2,375,000
Field Armies and GHQ Reserve	2,065,217
Six Field Armies	1,839,840
GHQ Reserve for Six Field Armies	225,377
Communications Zone (15 per cent of above)	309,783

This was to be only the first echelon in an all-out mobilization.

The approved plan of reorganization, like most decisions on a very high level, provided a broad outline but none of the details. It immediately became necessary to prepare revised war strength tables of organization and tables of allowances in conformance with the outlined plan; without such tables there could be no calculation of requirements nor could there be any assignment, allocation, or organization of the units in all components of the Army. The National Defense Act of 1920 had merged all components into one Army and had provided that the peace establishment be organized into tactical divisions distributed over the country in accordance with military population and administered through corps area headquarters in order to insure effective decentralized operation and a "complete and immediate mobilization" in the event of a serious emergency. The internal reorganization of the Army was accomplished rapidly after promulgation in War Department General Orders No. 50, 20 August 1920.[20] [See *chart 14* for geographic crops areas.]


Pre-Plan Planning, 1920–1922

The reports of the Special Committee on Organization and of the five War Plans Division committees established certain mobilization bases and set up some organizational framework including six

[19] "Report of Special Committee Appointed by the Director, War Plans Division, to Define the General Plan of Organization to be Adopted for the Army of the United States Provided by the Act of June 4, 1920," 8 Jul 20, sec. II, par. III. See also: "Report of Superior Board on Organization and Tactics," 1 Jul 19 and covering ltr, Pershing to SW, 16 Jun 20. AG 320 (Bulky) (4–19–19) (2). National Archives. This report was prepared by a special AEF board appointed by Pershing.

[20] Rpt, Comm No. 2 on Army Reorganization to Dir, WPD, 10 Jul 20, sub: Army Reorganization. WPD 7123. Records of WDGS. National Archives; memo, TAG to CG, each Corps Area, 20 Sep 20, sub: Organization and Administration of Corps Areas. AG 323. National Archives.

*Chart 14. Corps Areas As Organized 20 August 1920.**



O Corps Area Headquarters.

**Source: Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War (1917–19): Zone of the Interior* (Washington, 1949), p. 553.

field armies. The reports did not prescribe what troops and installations would be required in the Zone of the Interior in the event of an all-out mobilization; nor did they prescribe just what units would be included in the bulk allotment of personnel to the Communications Zone; nor what would be the build-up speed. Without this data it was still impossible to determine war reserve requirements which had to be known in order to intelligently dispose of surplus war supplies.

The director of the Supply Division in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff [21] indicated in detail just what data was necessary to determine war reserve requirements. In brief, the Supply Division still wanted to know what was needed for how many men, how many and what kind of units, and how fast they would be needed. Only a carefully worked out mobilization plan could provide such answers, and this was not available. After this memorandum, the General Staff mobilization planners went to work with very little to guide them but with a proper sense of urgency. Studies, surveys, and memoranda were prepared in great numbers, and gradually a coherent picture became discernible.

The first mobilization plans (color plans) prepared by the General Staff in the period immediately preceding World War I had consisted primarily of tables of troops designed to meet a specific strategic situation. A typical table of troops showed the number and types of organizations needed for various expeditions, their approximate strength, the tables of organization which would apply to each unit, and the priority dates for all units. The great number of varying circumstances which were provided for in each color plan made the tables of troops so confused and superficial as to be nonfunctional.

The wholesale reorganization of the Army in 1920 scrapped all the old plans. The staff planners, under great pressure from the supply planners to produce a new mobilization plan, had a new and radical thought: to create one standard mobilization plan which basically would fit any and all strategic war plans. The commonsense logic of this concept was so unmistakable that it was favorably received through the War Department after only a moderately intensive publicity campaign by the Operations and Training Division (G–3).[22]

After this basic concept was accepted, the mobilization planners drew up tentative outlines for a mobilization solution. One of the first of these, drawn up on 12 October 1920, broke down the problem into four requirements summarized as follows:

---

[21] Memo, Dir, Supply Div to CofS, 28 Sep 20, sub: "The policy to be used in declaring supplies as surplus." PS&T 400.7. Records of WDGS. National Archives.

[22] Lecture, Lt Col W. S. Grant, before the Army War College, 27 Jan 21, "Preparation of a Military Program for a Defensive War." AWC 184–21. Army War College.

1st Requirement: Determination of the strength of the covering force behind which mobilization is effected.
2d Requirement: Plants, personnel, and activities connected with peacetime installations expanded to war strength; new wartime installations; and operations of mobilization machinery.
3d Requirement: Basic information needed previous to study of development of manpower.
4th Requirement: Development of manpower and its distribution.[23]

This sketchy outline was rapidly refined. By January 1921, some of the various subproblems had been solved, and a tentative plan was ready for full General Staff study and comment. This tentative plan of mobilization, sometimes referred to as the "Mobilization Project of 1920" but more properly entitled the "Survey of Possibilities under Existing Conditions and Reasonable Assumptions as to a Mobilization Involving a Maximum Effort," [24] was approved for planning purposes on 25 February 1921. This project contemplated the mobilization of 12 field armies, GHQ reserve, and 3 additional army corps totaling 4,500,000 men, all of whom would be in the theater of operation by M+19. In addition, by the end of those 19 months there would be 2,058,000 men in the Zone of the Interior, making a grand total of 6,558,000 men.

After several months of study the War Department G–4 reported on 6 September 1921 that the cost of war reserves to implement this plan came to a staggering $5,039,000,000. Furthermore, the G–4 memorandum asserted that this "approved mobilization plan" could not be sustained by the rate of ordnance supply procurement and recommended that the mobilization planners restudy the problem with a view towards evolving a plan which could be sustained from a supply standpoint.[25]

The effect of the realization that mobilization was not going to be as easily achieved as the drawing of the manpower curve on a chart brought the mobilization planners to a disturbing dilemma. It was now apparent that mobilization could not be achieved rapidly enough to provide sufficient trained and equipped manpower to meet all combinations of major emergencies. It was therefore necessary to know what the foreign policy of the United States was going to be so that a determination could be made as to probable emergencies. If these probabilities could be determined it would be possible to plan a minimum mobilization to cope with them. But information on the

[23] "General Outline of Method of Solution of Problem of Mobilization," 12 Oct 20. AWC 160–37. Army War College.

[24] Lecture, Lt Col W. H. Johnson, before the Army War College, 3 Oct 25, "The War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1924." AWC 318A–4 (Mobilization Course No. 4, 1925–1926). Army War College. This lecture contains the best available summary of mobilization planning 1919–25.

[25] Memo, ACofS, G4 to ACofS, WPD, 6 Sep 21, sub: Test of mobilization curve approved 25 Feb 21 from a supply standpoint. Copy in WPD 29–1. DRB, TAG.

foreign policy of the United States does not appear to have been available to the War Department.[26]

The sense of urgency within the General Staff had become acute because the new Chief of Staff, General of the Armies John J. Pershing, who assumed that post 1 July 1921, expressed a desire for a workable mobilization plan by 1 October 1921. The mobilization planners complained privately that ". . . such a hurried determination of the question cannot be conclusive or logical. It can be nothing more than a guess based on no sound reasoning." [27] But on 21 September 1921 WPD produced the "guess" in a memorandum.[28] This memorandum was approved for the Secretary of War by Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, Deputy Chief of Staff. It pointed out that there was still no knowledge of any probable United States enemy or combination of enemies; it also conceded that the mobilization plan of 25 February 1921 was too expensive for the national economy and possibly too expensive for national defense needs. Further provisions of the memorandum rescinded the mobilization plan of 25 February 1921, reduced the mobilization goal from 12 to 6 field armies, and established as the basis for retention of reserve supplies a mobilization base of three field armies with auxiliary GHQ and communication zone forces, plus zone of the interior troops equal to 20 percent of the forces in the theater of operations. Supply estimates were to be based on sustaining three fully equipped war strenth field armies with appropriate GHQ and communication zone troops in the theater of operations within seven months from D-day.[29]

The new mobilization basis which reduced the contemplated mobilized Army strength by 50 per cent and reduced reserve requirements by 75 per cent did not mollify the G–4 to a degree to keep him from asking for more information concerning what units would be included in the communication zone forces. A WPD memorandum on 28 September 1921 provided this information, breaking the allotment of these troops down by services.[30] These bulk allocations of manpower to the services were supplemented by tables showing specific T/O units which would be included, thereby facilitating the G–4 planning. But G–4 wanted still more information. In a memorandum to WPD on 9 February 1922, G–4 suggested the advisability of projecting the mobilization program beyond seven months after

[26] Memo, Col J. L. DeWitt (WPD) to Col B. H. Wells (WPD), 7 Sep 21, sub: Plan for operation involving the maximum effort. *Ibid.*

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] Memo, ACofS, WPD, to CofS, 21 Sep 21, sub: Determination of a basis for the further declaration of surplus supplies. *Ibid.*

[29] D-day, the day troops arrived in the theater of operations, was then assumed would come so soon after M-day that some of the planners hardly differentiated between the two.

[30] Memo, ACofS, WPD, to ACofS, G4, 28 Sep 21, sub: Determination of a basis for the further declaration of surplus. WPD 29–1. DRB, TAG.

M-day to include a timetable for mobilizing Field Armies 4, 5, and 6.[31]

WPD responded that the urgent need was for G–4 to make his computations as directed for the first three field armies for which war reserves had to be procured immediately. This would involve the voting of funds by the Congress and the expenditure of those funds. The planning for Field Armies 4, 5, and 6, for which procurement would not begin until after a war began, could be left for later study and should be based not on any strategic plan for their employment but on the simpler factors of how fast they could be procured, equipped, and trained.[32] But the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War noted that the National Defense Act of June 4, 1920, contemplated plans for a *complete and immediate* mobilization and three field armies out of six hardly made for completeness. By 8 March 1922 the G–4 timetable for the mobilization of Field Armies 4, 5, and 6 was approved with minor modifications and forwarded to the supply services.[33]

During the intensive staff work on the pyramiding problems of mobilization planning, the General Staff found the Army War College and the General Staff College a frequent source of information. The spade work research and analysis done by student committees at these service schools frequently was reflected in General Staff memoranda, decisions, and policies. The General Staff not only was materially assisted by the work done by these students, but the students, too, many of whom went from the War College to the General Staff, were made familiar with War Department problems and planning. The Army War College mobilization studies provided the War Department Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, with excellent data and guide posts. These early studies determined many of the problems of mobilization and proposed solutions for some of them. Priority tables of mobilization of units; allocation of vocational units to the various corps areas, based on local industrial skills; the flow of personnel from procurement agencies to units; utilization of limited-service men; determination of replacement needs by arm and service; shelter; rate of accession of personnel from volunteering and from a draft (which in these early studies was assumed to become operative on M+1); training of inductees and of officer candidates; classification and assignment of recruits; utilization of Negro personnel; manpower mobilization curves; increased hospitalization needs: all these were studied and reported on.

[31] Memo, ACofS, G4, to ACofS, WPD, 9 Feb 22, sub: Basis of Calculation of Required War Production in Articles of Supply. WPD 29–4. DRB, TAG.

[32] Memo, ACofS, WPD, to ACofS, G4, 15 Feb 22, sub: Basis of calculation of required war production in articles of supply. *Ibid.*

[33] Memo, ACofS, G4, to TAG, 8 Mar 22, sub: Basis of calculation for war production of articles of supply. Copy in WPD 29–6. DRB, TAG.

These studies foresaw that the untended World War I cantonment areas would rapidly deteriorate and that the World War I reservoir of militarily trained manpower would soon dissipate; it was estimated that both World War I cantonments and World War I veterans would cease to be potential factors by about 1925. Some of the computations in these early studies were amazingly accurate. Potential manpower availability was estimated at 12,614,035 in a 1921 study. Initial replacement because of casualties and other losses for units in the theater of operations was computed at 18 percent of unit war strength; thereafter, bulk theater replacements would be 3 per cent of strength, with the greatest percentage going to the Infantry and lesser percentages to the other arms and services, based on World War I experience.[34] Reception center processes were outlined along lines which remained substantially unchanged in mobilization plans for the following 15 years; the recommended processing included issuance of uniform and individual equipment; inoculations; intelligence, psychological, and vocational classification; and then dispatch to training centers. Draft machinery was sketchily but soundly outlined.[35]

By 1921, the Army mobilization thinkers at the War College, at the General Staff College, and on the General Staff were in agreement that the mobilization rate must be governed by three factors, the supply rate, the recruitment rate, and the organization and training rate, and that the first of these, the supply rate, was the dominant factor. But the complexities of the supply rate were not yet understood; the recruitment rate was miscalculated; and the organization and training rate was weighted far too lightly. As the mobilization planning progressed in 1921 and 1922, the magnitude of these problems became increasingly apparent. There were, too, unanticipated problems which required rephasing of plans and recomputation of data. The Regular Army component, for example, which had been calculated at a strength of 280,000, was cut to 125,000 by Congressional appropriations in 1921.

The arithmetic which this change occasioned required so much time that other phases of mobilization planning were retarded. Concurrent with the mobilization planning and closely related to it was the reorganization of the National Guard, the designation of its units, and their allotment to the respective states (under the provisions of the National Defense Act of June 4, 1920, this designation and allo-

[34] World War II experience established a replacement factor of about 17 per cent for initial forces in a theater after 30 days; thereafter, the approximate overall net loss in a theater was 3.8 per cent per month. See: FM 101–10, Aug 48.

[35] Studies at the Army War College and the Army General Staff College. 1920, 1921, in the manuscript collection, Army War College. For a summary of these studies see notes in Mobilization File, Gen Ref Off, OCMH.

cation of National Guard units to the states was accomplished expeditiously and with a minimum of friction by a General Staff committee composed of Regular, National Guard, and Reserve officers); the initial allocation of Organized Reserve units to the corps area and their subsequent reallocation to the states; the enrollment of Reserve officers in an organized Officers Reserve Corps; the preparation of regulations for the National Guard, the Officers Reserve Corps, and the Enlisted Reserve Corps.

There was continuing study, too, of logistic problems and here the progress was something less than satisfactory. The early mobilization plans contemplated the launching of an offensive in some "theater of operations." For this offensive, maximum mobilization rates of manpower and supplies were considered so essential that no other solutions were considered. The initial 12-field army concept had been reduced to the 6-field army concept, but as the supply branches delved further into their studies for this plan, they encountered so many unexpected difficulties that they were unable to produce the desired logistic assurances. The mobilization planners immediately demanded of the supply branches the assurance that they could initially supply and equip armies in accordance with the mobilization timetable, and to sustain them in active combat thereafter. The supply branches were uncertain what precisely the requirements were to sustain the mobilized fighting men, nor were they sure where these men would be employed and under what conditions. The supply studies were not far enough advanced to give an estimate of what they could do, and the mobilization plans were not specific enough to enable the supply branches to advance their studies to a point where they could give the answers. Both the G–3 mobilization planners and the supply branches continued their studies in 1922, each convinced that the lack of information from the other was the principal impediment to more rapid, coherent progress.

By the middle of 1922, the mobilization planners in G–3, assisted by WPD, were able to produce an *Outline of Mobilization*, which was approved by General Pershing on 23 June 1922, as the basis for the preparation of plans for a ". . . complete and immediate mobilization." [36] The *Outline* was exactly that. On the basis of what had already been learned of the complex ramifications of mobilization planning, the *Outline* gave mobilization definitions; briefly described some methods; assigned planning functions and responsibilities to the General Staff; allotted a few planning functions to corps area commanders; and prescribed phases for the initial period of mobilization. In the phases outlined, speed was still the guiding principle, in accordance with the following sequence:

[36] Memo, CofS, 23 Jun 22, sub: Outline of Mobilization. WPD 1028. DRB, TAG.

I. 1st Phase—M-day to M+4 (taken down into three subphases).
(A). *M-day to M+1:*
1. All units of the following categories called to service and begin mobilizing.
(a) All active Regular Army units.
(b) All National Guard units.
(c) All corps units of the Organized Reserves pertaining to the first three field armies.
(d) All Organized Reserve harbor defense units.
(e) All anti-aircraft units pertaining to the first three field armies.
(f) All remaining observation, pursuit, attack, and Airship elements pertaining to the first three Field Armies.
2. Expansion of General and local recruiting begun.
3. Preparation of Reception and Replacement centers begun.
4. Work on additional shelter begun.
5. Foreign garrisons increased to war strength in accordance with approved projects.
(B). *M+1 to M+2:*
1. All units continue mobilizing in accordance with priorities established for the particular emergency.
2. Reception and replacement camps completed.
3. Work on additional shelter continued.
4. Replacement training begun in accordance with rates and priorities established for the particular emergency.
5. Organization begun of such Zone of Interior units and installations as may be designated by the War Department.
6. Draft becomes available.
7. Divisional units (cadres), organized reserves, warned for service.
(C). *M+2 to M+4:*
1. All units continue mobilizing in accordance with established priorities.
2. Divisional units (cadres), Organized Reserves, called to service and begin training.
3. Replacement training continued in accordance with established rates and priorities.
4. Zone of Interior organization continued.
5. All remaining Organized Reserve units (cadres) warned for service.
II. 2d Phase—M+4 to _____.
1. All remaining Organized Reserve units (cadres) called to service and begin mobilizing in accordance with established priorities and as shelter becomes available.
2. Inactive Regular Army units reconstituted.[37]

The guide *Outline* in a brief glance at the supply rate, observed that ". . . Availability of supplies and the requirements must . . . be reconciled to the extent possible either by increasing production or reducing requirements."

The mobilization planning concepts up to this point had been for an all-out, complete mobilization such as would be required in a major war involving operations in a foreign theater of operations. The

[37] *Ibid.* Active Regular Army units upon mobilization were to furnish cadres for inactive Regular Army units. The process was termed "rehabilitation," and the active units, with the inactive units for which it would provide cadres, were "associates."

reduction of requirements, both of manpower and materiel, was merely a deceleration in the rate of mobilization, but the overall requirements remained the same. It might take longer than originally anticipated to mobilize six field armies and to get them to the theater of operations, but the goal remained the same. In addition, WPD began to consider whether it might be desirable to have a mobilization plan for the lesser emergencies which were more likely to occur than an all-out major war. It was suddenly realized, too, that the emergency might conceivably begin with an invasion of the United States; the planners in WPD began to calculate and compute what were the minimum forces which the United States would have to mobilize to defend herself adequately while building up strength to a degree sufficient to make possible a counterattack invasion against an aggressor foe. These minimum requirements to put the United States in an adequate operational defense posture were designated Special Plan Blue.[38]

Palmer's Proposals

Before WPD could complete sufficient staff work on Special Plan Blue to submit a report to the Chief of Staff, Col. John McA. Palmer, then an aide to General Pershing, "jumped the gun" by a series of memoranda to Pershing. Colonel Palmer was vastly displeased by War Department policies and mobilization plans which, it seemed to him, were still predicated far too much on a large standing Regular Army, and far too little on the training and utilization of the citizen army of Reserves. The Regular, Palmer pointed out, was the most expensive per capita soldier; the National Guardsman was next in expense; the Reservist was the least expensive. Palmer argued that ". . . In forming the peace establishment . . . no organization should be maintained in a higher-priced category if it can be safely maintained in a lower-priced category and mobilized therefrom in time to meet the requirements of an emergency."[39] Using this yardstick Colonel Palmer recommended that the Regular Army be divided into two parts, one part for training the citizen army, organized in special training units; the other part of not more than 30,000 to be trained for use as an expeditionary force. Palmer further averred that certain types of organizations, as GHQ reserve tank units or corps, army, and GHQ aviation units, were worthless since they served no purpose in peacetime and could not be expanded in wartime; they should, therefore, be dispensed with.

General Pershing's interest in Palmer's proposals was evident in the approving memorandum with which he forwarded the Palmer

[38] Johnson, lecture, *op. cit.*, 3 Oct 25.

[39] Memo, Palmer to Pershing, 1 Feb 22, sub: Economic and political principles affecting the . . . organization of the Regular Army. WPD 598. DRB, TAG.

paper to the General Staff for study. Thus encouraged, Colonel Palmer, on 20 February 1922, followed up with another memorandum to General Pershing in which he advocated the preparation of a mobilization plan to secure the continental limits of the United States against invasion, a plan termed a "National Position in Readiness" and based on the Swiss military system. Palmer felt that mobilization planning should concentrate on defensive measures, especially "a positive system of coast defense." [40]

After a month's consideration of Palmer's new proposals, General Pershing transmitted them to WPD with a terse request that he desired to discuss with them any staff studies made by WPD in connection with the War Department pamphlet "Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense." [41] In reply, the chief of WPD, Col. B. H. Wells, informed the Chief of Staff that Special Plan Blue which would include the defense of the continental United States, was then in the process of being formulated.[42] Until the plan was completed, WPD believed that the defense plans of the corps areas adequately provided for the security of the coasts of the United States. The chief of WPD also stated that he felt most of Colonel Palmer's proposals were sound.

Inasmuch as Special Plan Blue was still far from complete, WPD recommended to the Chief of Staff that, pending the completion of that plan, a memorandum be issued to all War Department General Staff divisions, corps area commanders, chiefs of branches, commandants of general and special service schools, and to all general officers defining and describing this new concept of a "National Position in Readiness." The memorandum, issued 20 May 1922, generally embodied the proposals of Colonel Palmer except for his recommendations on further reduction of the Regular Army. In addition, it contained reminders to the corps area commanders that they were responsible for preparing plans for the defense of their areas, and that their primary mission was the organization, administration, training, and mobilization of troops.[43]

At an informal conference of representatives of all the divisions of the General Staff, conducted by the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, later in 1922, it was agreed that mobilization planning work was not progressing properly. To correct this lack of expedition, it was agreed to concentrate the planning in a committee composed of one officer

[40] Memo, CofS to DCofS, 16 Feb 22, no sub. WPD 598. DRB, TAG; memo, Palmer to Pershing, 20 Feb 22, sub: Considerations determining the state of training and preparedness required by a Citizen Army upon mobilization. *Ibid.*

[41] Memo, Gen Pershing to ACofS, WPD, 16 Mar 22, no sub. *Ibid.*

[42] Memo, ACofS, WPD, to CofS, 25 Mar 22, sub: Considerations . . . of . . . citizen components of the Army and plans for their employment upon mobilization. *Ibid.*

[43] Memo, TAG to WDGS Divs, CG's, Corp Areas, Chs of Branches, Commandants of Schools, all General Officers, 20 May 22, sub: Considerations . . . of . . . citizen components of the Army. AG 381 (3–25–22) (Miscl. Div.) M–WPD. Copy in WPD 598–1 DRB, TAG.

from each of the General Staff divisions. Some months later the work became so oppressive for the five-man committee that its membership was doubled—two officers from each of the General Staff divisions. No formal orders or written memoranda authorizing the committee were issued until nearly a year later.[44]

Special Plan Blue

The advisability of expediting completion of Special Plan Blue was clear to WPD. The corps area commanders, who had been directed to submit certain basic data required for the plan, were advised to expedite the submission of their reports. By the end of June 1922, Special Plan Blue in tentative draft form, was being circulated in the War Department General Staff for concurrence and/or comment. The plan was not a war plan, since it stopped short of war; but neither was it a real mobilization plan; it simply endeavored to tie into an integrated pattern the planning currently being done within the War Department on the following high priority defense matters: (1) corps area defense projects; (2) basic plan for the organization of the Army; (3) mobilization plans; (4) various war (color) plans. The objectives of Plan Blue were limited to: 1. Minimum standards of preparedness; 2. Basis for initial mobilization; 3. Basis for concentration; 4. Initial deployment, to include provision for the tactical organization and command of land and sea frontiers.[45] To a considerable extent Plan Blue, sometimes called National Position in Readiness, implemented the proposals which Colonel Palmer had recommended. In the sense that it provided for limited initiation of mobilization to the extent necessary for defense of the continental limits, the plan bore some resemblance to pre-World War I German plans for limited mobilization—*Kriegsgefahr.*

The format of Plan Blue included a basic plan to be supplemented by various appendixes and annexes, which were to be prepared by the General Staff divisions, corps area commanders, and by the chiefs of branches. Only the War Department Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, was able to bring his appendix (No. II) to a state advanced enough

---

[44] On 14 Jun 23, the ACofS, G–3, in a memo for the CofS recommended that the mobilization committee be formally legalized and stabilized. The recommendation was approved, and on 22 June 23, the Sec of the GS published a Staff memo "appointing" the already existent committee, and detailing to it the 10 officers (2 from each Staff division) who already comprised it. This committee produced the mobilization plans of 1923 and 1924, formulated Army Regulations 120–10, 130–10, 135–10, pertaining to mobilization, and also reviewed and coordinated all appendixes and annexes to the mobilization plans of 1923 and 1924. In 1925, all Staff divisions except G–3 initiated action to terminate the committee which had, in effect, served to increase the officer strength of the G–3 Division by reducing the strength of the other Staff divisions.

[45] All information on the basic plan and the appendixes of Special Plan Blue is contained in WPD 870. DRB, TAG.

to permit its full publication before Special Plan Blue lost its planning priority.[46]

The basic Plan Blue had made the point clear that it was not a mobilization plan and that overall mobilization would be accomplished as prescribed in the mobilization plan then being prepared. Certain of the basic premises of that mobilization plan were inserted in Plan Blue only for purposes of clarity. In the Position in Readiness, for which Plan Blue was primarily intended, the defense of the United States was intrusted to a GHQ and seven frontier commands: Eastern, Northeastern, Great Lakes, Northwestern, Western, Southwestern, and Southern. To each of these frontier commands was assigned a broad defensive mission. To accomplish the mission, each command was allotted specific Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserve units, all of which were assigned mobilization points or areas (taken from the mobilization plan) and concentration areas for Special Plan Blue.

One provision of Plan Blue relieved the Navy from all responsibility for defense of the coast of the United States in order to leave the fleet free to operate against the enemy fleets. This divorcement of Army and Navy planning for the defense of the United States may have been partly based on agreement with Mahan's theory of the flexibility of sea power, but it was also influenced by the desire to publish Plan Blue quickly, without the delays which joint planning would entail.[47]

With minor changes Plan Blue was concurred in by the General Staff except for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3 (Brig. Gen. William Lassiter), who felt that it went too far in certain particulars, not far enough in others, and that on the whole it tended to confuse the issue of mobilization. In spite of the G–3 objections, the Deputy Chief of Staff recommended Plan Blue for approval, and on 16 October 1922 it was approved by General Pershing.

Almost from the moment of its publication, recommendations for revision of Plan Blue were received from all corps area commanders, mostly on minor matters pertaining to its table of troops. The chief of the Air Service, Maj. Gen. Mason W. Patrick, was vehement in his opposition to what he felt were the inadequate provisions in the plan

---

[46] The greater priority of the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1923, then nearing completion, led to the suspension of further planning for Special Plan Blue. See: Memo, WPD to WD Staff sections, 13 Feb 23, sub: Appendices, Special Plan Blue. WPD 870–7. DRB, TAG.

[47] At the initiation of mobilization planning, at the conclusion of World War I, there had been some tentative feeling in the War Department General Staff that the Navy ought to assist in that planning; there had been considerable interest in the Staff, too, for joint Army-Navy maneuvers, which Gen Pershing and Brig Gen Smedley Butler (USMC) favored. See: Memo, Col J. L. DeWitt, for Col Wells, 7 Sep 21, sub: Plan for Operation Involving the Maximum Effort. WPD 29–1. DRB, TAG. See also: Memos, Oct 21 to Jun 23, sub: Field Exercises. WPD 1028. DRB, TAG.

for air employment. The Assistant Secretary of War, startled by references in the plan to the new mobilization timetable of the pending but yet unpublished mobilization plan, promptly asked WPD whether the accelerated timetable in Plan Blue was the new basis for procurement planning.[48]

Recommendations for revisions in Plan Blue became widespread, however, when, on 4 November 1922, WPD published a table of organization, GHQ, for Special Plan Blue, together with a memorandum elaborating on that table of organization.[49] The memorandum summed up functions of GHQ in wartime as: (1) the coordination of the strategy of the several theaters of operations with the strategy of the theater of war; and (2) the coordination of supply between the several theaters of operations by the establishment of supply priorities. To accomplish these functions, WPD recommended that the commander in chief, GHQ, Special Plan Blue, have a small general staff and a small supply-technical-administrative staff. The officer allotment recommended in the initial organization of GHQ was modest: G–1, 7 officers; G–2, 12 officers; G–3, 7 officers; G–4, 7 officer; adjutant's section, 9 officers; Quartermaster's section, 9 officers; Air Service section, 5 officers; the other staff sections on the same economical scale. General Pershing was quick to approve the memorandum and the recommended initial GHQ organization table. But the staff sections were indignantly opposed to this overwhelming excess of personnel economy. General Patrick suggested that the WPD solution either overlooked the Air Service as a combatant arm or forgot that the Air Service had supply, technical, and administrative duties in addition to its combatant functions. General Patrick recommended a modest increase to 26 officers for the Air Service Section of GHQ.[50] Many of the recommendations for minor revisions were incorporated by WPD in the revision of Special Plan Blue which was approved by General Pershing on 5 May 1923.

Special Plan Blue, in spite of its lack of detail, was another step forward in mobilization planning. It provided an attainable goal to which mobilization planning could point. Furthermore, its publication provided still another incentive to the G–3 mobilization planners to produce an overall mobilization plan.

Mobilization Role of Corps Area Commanders

Special Plan Blue had reiterated the previous decisions that corps area commanders would be responsible for mobilization accomplish-

[48] Memo, Dir of Proc, OASW, to WPD, 8 Feb 23, sub: Special Plan Blue. WPD 870–6. DRB, TAG.

[49] Memo, ACofS, WPD, to all Chs of Branches, etc., 4 Nov 22, sub: TO, GHQ. WPD 870–9. DRB, TAG.

[50] Memo, Ch of Air Service for WPD, 7 Dec 22. *Ibid.*

ment within their respective areas. The corps area commanders became impatient over the delay in issuing instructions on what their specific functions were to be in mobilization and what functions were to be reserved for the War Department itself. On 22 December 1922 some of these questions raised by the corps area commanders were resolved by the publication of "Instructions for Corps Area Commanders and Chiefs of Branches in regard to Mobilization." These instructions expanded the *Outline of Mobilization* and tied in, to a degree, with the first edition of Special Plan Blue.[51] Corps area commanders and branch chiefs were informed in broad and general terms what data they were to prepare for a mobilization plan. To ensure uniform planning progress in all corps areas, the War Department established the following planning phases:

Phase 1. Designation of mobilization points or areas for each unit stationed in or allocated to the corps area.

Phase 2. Number and location of reception centers.

Phase 3. Number and location of replacement training camps and other zone of the interior installations (coordinated by corps area commanders and branch chiefs).

Phase 4. Additional shelter required during Phases 1, 2, and 3 and for meeting the requirements of Plan Blue.

Phase 5. Time required to provide additional shelter.

Phase 6. Requirements in equipment and supplies essential for the mobilization and training of all units allotted the corps area to be tabulated as to show unit for which required, supply point where they should be stored, and the amount required per month.

Phase 7. Additional supply arrangements required, showing time when required and place.


As the planning for each of these phases was completed, results were to be promptly forwarded to the War Department for study and coordination. The instructions repeated some of the unit concentration data from Plan Blue provided some brief and tentative estimates on mobilization points with approximate shelter required thereat for units within the six-army plan, and included a chart diagram illustrating the flow of recruits during mobilization.[52] [See *chart 15.*]

The publication of "Instructions for Corps Area Commanders . . ." did not entirely satisfy General Pershing. The month of its publication, December 1922, he issued instructions to the General Staff to

[51] The "Instructions" contained the following: "Since the requirements of the National Position in Readiness (Plan Blue) are basic to all major emergencies, they should be considered in this study." Memo, WD to all CG's, Corps Areas, and Chs of Branches, 22 Dec 22, sub: Instructions for Corps Area Commanders and Chief of Branches in regard to Mobilization. WPD 1028. DRB, TAG.

[52] *Ibid.*

*Chart 15. Scheme governing the flow of recruits from sources to units.**



*Personnel Division, G-1, War Department, 20 Dec 22. Copy in WPD 1028. DRB, TAG.

make a survey of the extent and efficiency of the fragmentary mobilization plans already prepared and to follow up with another survey by 30 June 1923, by which time he desired and expected that the Mobilization Plan with its appendixes and annexes, would be completed. The Mobilization Committee, as well as other mobilization planners on the General Staff, studied such pertinent problems as the supply factor, National Guard and [53] Organized Reserve priorities, and the number and types of special units needed. The work on the comprehensive mobilization plan requested by General Pershing gradually became a matter of arithmetical computation and proceeded with some speed.

War Department Mobilization Plan, 1923

By 1 April 1923 the Mobilization Committee was able to circulate to all General Staff divisions a draft of the Basic Mobilization Plan together with a tentative draft of the proposed Regulations for the Mobilization of Manpower for Military Purposes. With General Pershing's deadline of 30 June 1923 in mind, the General Staff reviewed the plan; and a revised and concurred-in draft was forwarded to the Chief of Staff on 13 April 1923. Three days later, on 16 April 1923, General Pershing approved the plan, clearing the way for the preparation of the appendixes and annexes.

In approved Basic Plan 1923, the initial echelon of the mobilized force still consisted of the six field armies, GHQ reserve, harbor defense troops, and communications zone troops pertaining to six field armies; reinforcements for overseas garrisons; zone of interior troops; and replacements for all of the above. It was still contemplated that the war establishment would be composed of the following units at war strength:

1. Regular Army: 9 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions plus certain corps, army, GHQ reserve, harbor defense troops; and a proportion of the Com Z and ZI troops.
2. National Guard: 18 infantry, 4 cavalry divisions, plus corps, army, GHQ reserve, harbor defense, and special troops.

[53] The National Guard was then in the throes of reorganization; the Act of June 4, 1920, had fixed the strength of the Guard at 435,000 men, to be reached by 30 Jun 24. It very soon had become apparent that it would be impossible to recruit to that strength in the time stipulated. On the basis of a study made by a special committee of the General Staff, appointed 4 Nov 22, it was decided that a Guard strength reasonably attainable by 30 Jun 26 would be 250,000 men. The National Guard was therefore reorganized to conform to this practical strength and the organization of Guard units in excess of 250,000 strength was held in abeyance. Guard units thus eliminated were given numerical designations in the Organized Reserves and allocated to the several corps areas, with the provision that no Organized Reserve units would be allocated to states or their organization attempted until M-day. There was an added provision that any unit which, at a later date, the Militia Bureau could organize beyond the 250,000 National Guard Strength would displace the corresponding Organized Reserve unit in the Mobilization Plan.

3. Organized Reserves: 27 infantry and 6 cavalry divisions, plus required corps, army, GHQ reserve, harbor defense, Com Z and ZI troops.[54]

Communications zone troop strength was still estimated at 15 percent of the combat strength of units in the theaters of operation, and zone of the interior troop strength at 20 percent of all troops in the theaters of operation.

The mobilization rate in the initial computations was accelerated somewhat in the final version. Although it was still written into the 1923 Plan that the "*supply rate is the dominant factor*" in determining the mobilization rate (the other two factors being the recruitment rate and the organization-training rate), nevertheless, the planners seemed to feel that the important thing about supplies was to have them in the desired quantities and they were not to be deterred by any estimates that the supplies would not be available in those quantities. The mobilization rate in the 1923 Plan emerged as:

	Cumulative totals
M-day	400,000
M+1	550,000
M+2	700,000
M+3	1,000,000
M+4	1,300,000

Thereafter at the rate of 350,000 per month.

With some concern for logistical uncertainties, the 1923 Plan cautioned that the greatest care and economy should be exercised at all times in the distribution of supplies and equipment to meet this mobilization rate.

Continuing its concern with the supply problem, the 1923 Plan divided mobilization into two phases. In the first phase, from M-day to M+4, units to be mobilized were limited to those which it was hopefully expected could be equipped, trained, and effectively employed in the probable theater of operations and in the Zone of the Interior. The organization of tactical units higher than army corps was not contemplated during this first phase. The second phase began with M+4 and ended with complete mobilization of the remaining elements of six field armies with communications zone, zone of the interior, and other elements. This desirable goal could not be accomplished, it was felt, sooner than M+18 and might even be delayed to M+24. These phases, when broken down, corresponded exactly with the phases set up in the *Outline of Mobilization* of 23 June 1922.

Later studies showed the timetables in the 1923 Plan were inexact and contained errors, but the 1923 Plan was the first mobilization

[54] A copy of War Department Mobilization Plan, 1923 with its annexes and appendixes and pertinent correspondence is in AG 381 (7–2–23) (1). National Archives.

plan worked out in the United States by the General Staff in time of peace. It was a detailed, coherent, complete plan. It was not a workable plan, in all its parts, because it contained fundamental misconceptions concerning logistics, procurement of manpower, and training rates. It erred in the optimism with which it assumed that men in vast numbers could be procured, equipped, trained, transported, and sustained in combat anywhere in the World. But in the absence of detailed studies, which could not be made in the time allotted, and which the few mobilization planners were ill-equipped and ill-staffed to make in the first place, the plan is amazing in what it did include and what it did accomplish.

The entire War Department Mobilization Plan, 1923 (WDGMP) included:
- The Basic Plan
- Four Appendixes (G–1, G–2, G–3, G–4)
- Branch Annexes (one for each of the Special Staff branches, as QM, Engineers, Chemical Corps, Medical, etc.)
- Corps Area Annexes (one for each corps area)
- The Legislative Annex (containing recommended legislation).

The War Department Mobilization Plan, 1923, was supplemented by branch plans, corps area plans, and unit plans. If it did nothing more, the 1923 Plan provided a framework for later plans and furnished the basic format which simplified to a tremendous degree the work of later planners. It is easier to amend, revise, and rewrite an existing plan than it is to create such a plan where none existed before. The 1923 Plan judiciously compromised between centralization and decentralization to a degree that was not equaled in succeeding plans for the next 10 years. It foresaw the soundness of getting into the service and training division cadres, both officers and enlisted men, *before* the divisions were activated and filled with drafted recruits.

The planning on the troop basis in itself involved a tremendous amount of detailed computation; it provided for all units, which at that time, were foreseeably necessary to achieve proper Army balance in an all-out mobilization. In these computations, the mobilization planners looked backwards to World War I. It was impossible in 1923 to foresee and provide for the mechanized special units of all kinds which were to be necessary 20 years later. Even with World War I still reasonably fresh in mind, the planners were unable to foresee the tremendous materiel expenditures and consequent production requirements which the next major war would entail. The absence of adequate logistic data was the great and fundamental weakness of the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1923, and to this one major error most of the other deficiencies in the plan can be traced. Even on the basis of incomplete, inaccurate logistic estimates and plans, the planners' conception of a division slice was surprisingly

close to what it was to be in World War II although the terminology in 1924 was "division in depth." [55]

Supplementing the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1923 were three pamphlets:

1. War Department Pamphlet No. 1116 ("Regulations Governing the Mobilization of Manpower for Military Purposes");
2. Army Regulations 130–10 ("Instructions for Mobilizing National Guard Units");
3. Special Regulations No. 46 ("Instructions for Mobilizing Organized Reserve Units").

These documents expanded and amplified to a considerable degree the "Instructions to Corps Area Commanders . . ." which had been published on 22 December 1922.

There were no provisions in the 1923 Plan for joint Army-Navy procedures in mobilization. This omission was perhaps based on the assumption that joint Army-Navy action would be provided for in the procurement plans of the Assistant Secretary of War, in the plans of the Joint Army-Navy Board, or in the potential activities of the dormant Army-Navy Munitions Board. The 1923 Plan was strictly a War Department product and not a national mobilization plan.

The Army planners were not entirely satisfied with their product, and stipulated, therefore, in the Basic Plan that it, together with its appendixes and annexes, ". . . will be kept up to date by serially numbered changes and will be completely revised on December 31st of each year." The War Plans Division of the General Staff was initially charged with the custody of the Mobilization Plan and with staff supervision of proposed changes and annual revisions, but on 20 December 1923 these responsibilities were reassigned to the Oper-

[55] A division slice is a combat division plus proportionate shares of the total corps, army, Com Z and ZI units operating to the rear of the division. The division slice for any given force is equal to the total strength of the force divided by the number of combat divisions in the force. The following table compares the 1924 estimate with the division slice in World War II:

Type troops	1924 Estimate [a]		World War II practice [b]	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total	66,000	100.0	60,000	100.0
Average Basic Division	20,000	30.3	17,000	28.3
Corps and Army Troops	17,000	25.8	13,000	21.7
Communications Zone	9,000	13.6	10,000	16.7
Zone of Interior	20,000	30.3	20,000	33.3

[a] Figures for 1924 are from lecture, Lt Col C. E. Kilbourne, before the Army War College, 6 Mar 24 "Mobilization for War." AWC 160.20. Army War College.

[b] World War II figures are from Field Manual 101–10, Aug 49, p. 102.

ations and Training Division (G–3) of the General Staff where they more properly belonged.[56]

Changing Mobilization Concepts

The publication and issuance of the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1923 led to extensive work by all lower command and staff echelons to prepare the annexes and the unit plans which were called for. The corps area commanders, the department commanders, the branch chiefs, and down the chain of command to the company and battery commanders prepared plans of considerable detail and great complexity. All commanders, too, submitted recommendations for changes and amplifications in the War Department Plan. Most of these recommendations were for routine, mechanical changes affecting troop units, and were of only minor importance.

During the relative brief interim period which preceded the staff work on the 1924 Mobilization Plan, there were some changes in basic concepts. The 1923 Plan, it will be remembered, had been closely integrated with Special Plan Blue which, while not precisely a war plan, at least was a plan for putting the Nation in a defensive posture. The 1923 Plan, too, had counted on utilizing many of the World War I cantonment areas as troop concentration points. During the brief existence of the 1923 Mobilization Plan, some articulate members of the General Staff (particularly in WPD) felt that a proper mobilization plan ought to be an integral part of a specific war plan, and that, therefore, there should be several mobilization plans each tailored to fit the various strategic color plans which were being drawn up. This concept was rejected by the mobilization planners who continued firm in their belief that the War Department Mobilization Plan should be general, all inclusive, and broad enough to meet the maximum emergency; the plan, they averred, should provide a kind of complete warehouse of men, materiel, reserves, etc., from which, in the event of minor emergencies, only the requisite amount of men and materiel would be withdrawn. The mobilization planners agreed that each war plan had to base its mobilization plans on this concept of a modification of an overall complete plan and not on several separate and distinct mobilization plans. The mobilization planners, after their 1923 experience, combined the major problems they had encountered and were encountering under eight broad classifications:

1. Procurement, storage, and distribution of supplies with the development of a system in connection therewith covering operation and required installations;
2. War reserves;

[56] Change No. 3, War Department Mobilization Plan, 1923. AG (12–20–23) (Misc.) M C. National Archives.

3. Shelter and construction;
4. Transportation facilities and operation;
5. Selective service laws, system, and operation;
6. Mobilization localities, training areas, and systems;
7. Corps area and branch establishments;
8. Personnel problems.[57]

Any attempt to solve these formidable problems for each color plan would, the mobilibation planners argued, so confuse mobilization planning as to make it completely ineffective. Therefore, even Special Plan Blue and the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1923 were separated in 1924.

Provisions in the 1923 Plan to utilize World War I cantonment facilities for the training of mobilizing forces were abruptly eliminated as a result of an inspection trip made by the Chief of Staff. On his return from this trip, General Pershing directed the mobilization planners to abandon all hope of utilizing the deteriorated cantonment facilities and to include in the forthcoming revision of the Mobilization Plan the principle of complete, local mobilization, down to the company where necessary and feasible. The accent in the new plan, as the Chief of Staff directed it, would be on decentralization. The planners reluctantly accepted this principle; they had come to feel that greater centralization and not less was necessary. Under the impact of General Pershing's instructions, the desire of the planners to increase centralization was to be worked into the 1924 Plan by ingenious indirectness.

War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1924

The format and component parts of the War Department General Mobilization Plan, approved 26 April 1924, corresponded to the 1923 Plan.[58] The two mobilization phases of the 1923 Plan were continued in the 1924 revision, but they were considerably elaborated on so as to establish definite priorities for all units to be mobilized during both phases. The mobilization rate in the 1924 Plan corresponded exactly to that of the 1923 Plan through M+4 (First Phase), but was only 300,000 men monthly during the second phase, a reduction of 50,000 men per month. The component elements of the forces to be mobilized were exactly the same in the two plans.[59]

The number of Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserve divisions in the 1924 Plan were also exactly the same as in the

---

[57] Johnson, lecture, *op. cit.*, 3 Oct 25.

[58] For a copy of War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1924, its appendixes and annexes, see: AG 381 (5-1-24) and AG 381 (6-7-24). National Archives.

[59] For the theater of operations: GHQ, six field armies, GHQ reserve, harbor and defense troops, and Com Z troops. Other forces included overseas garrisons, ZI troops and overhead, certain additional troops capable of being used either in the theater of operations or in the ZI, and replacements for all forces.

1923 Plan, but their priorities were changed and more rigidly fixed in the later plan in an effort to achieve a better balanced force during all stages of mobilization. To accomplish this desirable end, the timetable for the first phase of the 1924 Plan was detailed and rigid.[60] This preoccupation with phases and concern for balanced forces was based on the primary concept that the war, when it came, would not be fought in the United States but in some theater of operations an appreciable distance away, a concept which was to remain constant in all mobilization planning from 1924 to World War II. Special Plan Blue, a momentary departure from this concept, was soon forgotten. In conformity with this thinking and with the lessons of previous mobilizations in the United States, the planners were unable to visualize a situation in which mobilization would precede war. Hence, they were engrossed with getting men mobilized in large numbers and at considerable speed, giving them accelerated training for probably not over 12 weeks before shipping them off to the war theater: all to be accomplished *after* a declaration of war. Provision for housing these large numbers of men was not given much thought, for it was assumed that men would remain at a training camp only long enough to be trained, and that a few training camps would be adequate for millions of men who would move through them.

The 1924 Plan visualized a selective service act or draft of some kind, not only in full operation by M+1, but producing a steady flow of drafted recruits to the reception stations by that time. In keeping with this optimism, it was contemplated that voluntary enlistments would be discontinued at M+25 (days), six days before the emergence of an operating selective service system. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, in his appendix to the 1924 Plan, with perhaps the barest trace of doubt suggested that plans should be so drawn as to be functional even if it were necessary to defer the anticipated date of draft operation beyond M+1.

As in the 1923 Plan, the 1924 version contemplated the activation and training of division cadres well in advance of the activation and filling up of the divisions themselves. Again, as in the 1923 Plan, the replacement factor was computed at 3 per cent per month for combat troops in the theater of operations, and three-fourths of 1 per cent per month for communications zone and zone of the interior units.

The instructions of General Pershing had been clear and unequivocal concerning the adoption of the principle of local mobilization. But the planners felt that: "The extent to which local mobilization may be carried will vary, depending on local facilities for supply and training and the necessity for organization." [61] The local mobilization principle was affirmed in the provisions that corps area commanders would

[60] Johnson, lecture, *op. cit.*, 3 Oct 25.
[61] *Ibid.*

establish for their areas necessary reception centers, replacement centers, mobilization points, camps, etc., but it was modified by precise and detailed instructions as to where these locations would be, how they would operate, and what construction would be authorized. The completeness of these instructions, in effect, tended to centralize operational mobilization powers in the War Department to a far greater degree than in the 1923 Plan.

There was included in the 1924 Plan, too, the new term "mobilization concentration," which had not been part of the nomenclature in the 1923 Plan. This term was coined to apply to those organizations which, because of lack of certain facilities, would be unable to train locally and must therefore be concentrated at other points more favorable for training, equipment, and supply. Characteristic of such organizations were air service units, heavy artillery units, and technical units.

In the matter of training, the principle of local mobilization was again affirmed and then invalidated by the instructions which followed. In addition to the "mobilization concentration" loophole, through which practically all training could be funneled away from local training, there were other exceptions specifically made. Officer candidate training, for example, was reserved in considerable part to branch chiefs. To the same branch chiefs was delegated authority to train the organizations allocated to them, additional units for duty in camps to be operated by the branch chiefs, certain special categories of replacements and all instructors for replacement centers and schools. Service schools, as the Army War College, the Command and General Staff College, and the Military Academy at West Point, were wisely planned to continue in operation under direct War Department supervision. [See *ch. XVII*, this study, for a discussion of the effects of the closing of the Army War College and the Command and General Staff College during World War II.]

Some of the experience of previous mobilizations was incorporated into the Legislative Annex, which included in proper legislative form bills which it was desired that the Congress enact on M-day. These bills, falling into the respective staff interests, were to provide the following:

1. *For G–1:*
   a. Authority to increase temporarily the Regular Army.
   b. Selective Service.
   c. Authority to discharge or retire inefficient or unsuitable officers.
2. *For G–2:*
   Authority to control and censor communications.
3. *For G–4:*
   Authority to create a Transportation Corps.

4. *For the Assistant Secretary of War:*
   a. Authority for control of resources, industry, etc.
   b. Authority to suspend any laws which restrict or impede procurement.
5. *For The Adjutant General:*
   Authority to establish a branch printing office.
6. *For the Chief of Finance:*
   Authority to use appropriated funds without regard to the purpose for which appropriated.

Mobilization Committee Dissolved

The 1924 Plan was an impressive piece of staff work. Unfortunately, like its predecessor plan of 1923, it was so unrealistic in its logistic phases, concerning both personnel procurement and materiel procurement, that it would not have worked if a mobilization had been necessary. Further, the rigidly inflexible centralization of operational control in the War Department would have bogged down mobilization in a welter of petty details. However, like the 1923 Plan, there was much which was functional in the 1924 Plan and which could be incorporated into later plans. The year which intervened between the 1923 and 1924 Plans had allowed the staff planners time to polish their original plan and to give it additional substance, but this was not enough. There had not been time for the necessary personnel procurement studies nor for the materiel procurement studies, and these two mobilization problems were the basic ones.

The War Department Mobilization Plans, 1923 and 1924, were produced by a committee of only 10 General Staff officers, who were charged with drawing up the General Mobilization Plan and with reviewing and coordinating all of their annexes and appendixes, in addition to their other duties.[62] It is not surprising that these Plans had flaws; but it is surprising that they were so well done. After the issuance of the 1924 Plan, the War Department General Staff, with the exception of the G3 Division, recommended to the Chief of Staff that the Mobilization Committee be dissolved, that the officers on it be returned to full-time duty with their staff divisions, and that the G–3 Division, to which was assigned primary staff responsibility for the preparation of mobilization plans, assume that responsibility without the additional aid of the Mobilization Committeee. The G–3 Division, pointing with pride to the accomplishments of the Mobilization Committee, urged its continuance. This staff difference be-

[62] The 10 officers on the Mobilization Committee in 1923–24 were: from G–1, Col (later Brig Gen) Lawrence Halstead and Col (later Brig Gen) J. E. Woodward; from G–2, Lt Col (later Col) Bruce Palmer and Maj P. H. Bagby; from G–3, Col (later Brig Gen) William E. Welsh and Col Frank C. Jewell; from G–4, Lt Col (later Col) F. W. Clark and Lt Col (later Brig Gen) E. M. Shinkle; from WPD, Lt Col (later Maj Gen) J. W. Gulick and Lt Col (later Gen) Walter Krueger.

came somewhat heated, but there could be but one decision. The Mobilization Committee, in effect, increased the strength of the G–3 Division at the expense of the other General Staff divisions. On 4 April 1925, the Deputy Chief of Staff dissolved the Mobilization Committee and again gave the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, chief responsibility for the development of the War Department General Mobilization Plan. Thus the G–3 Mobilization Branch became the chief mobilization planning section in the General Staff. This Branch consisted of only four or five officers during the late 1920's and early 1930's.[63]

1924 Plan Procurement Decentralization Nullified

It has already been stated that basically the greatest weakness of all of the early mobilization plans was the disregard of logistic factors. Most of this disregard was due to failure to comprehend the enormous complexities and intricate ramifications of supply in modern war, and this lack of comprehension was, in turn, due in considerable part to the absence of adequate study and research. On cursory examination, the 1924 Plan apparently fixed the responsibility for initial supply of those being mobilized on the corps area commanders, who were directed to determine their requirements and to set up such supply depots and related supply establishments in their areas as would enable them to execute these responsibilities. Here again the tacit appearance of decentralization, but closer examination discloses somewhat different facts. The corps area commanders were required to submit their requirements to the respective chiefs of branches who would then furnish the supplies on those requisitions. Thus corps area supply depots were effectively limited to being merely distribution points. The establishment of branch depots in some of the corps areas was decentralization only in a limited sense, for control of these depots remained under the strict and tightly centralized control of the branch chiefs in Washington.

A provision in the G–4 Appendix to the 1924 Plan provided for a limited decentralization of procurement:

> III. *Procurement.*
>
> (1) Corps Area Commanders will apply to the War Department for authority for local procurement, and upon receipt of such authority for any item will provide for its procurement, storage and issue in their supply point plans.
>
> (2) Chiefs of Supply Branches will be authorized to delegate local procurement to corps areas under such restrictions as the Assistant Secretary of War may prescribe. The principle of procurement at points where needed will generally govern where local procurement is authorized.[64]

---

[63] See: Statement, G–3 for AWC, Nov 27, sub: The Organization, Functions, and Methods of the Operations and Training Division, G–3, War Department General Staff. G–3 Course No. 12 (1927–1928). Army War College.

[64] War Department Basic Mobilization Plan [1924], G–4 Appendix. AG 381 (6–7–24), National Archives.

This provision escaped the attention of the Assistant Secretary of War, supply branches, and of the corps area commanders for several months. On 22 January 1925 the commander of the Fourth Corps Area submitted a letter applying, as he had been directed to do, for authority to procure locally certain quartermaster and signal supplies desired for the first phase of mobilization. It was not until six months later that The Quartermaster General suggested that the other eight corps areas be reminded to submit their requests for local procurement authority so all could be consolidated and coordinated instructions issued.[65]

One week later the War Department G–4 directed The Adjutant General to inform each corps area commander, except the Fourth Corps Area, that separate lists of items for air corps, engineer, ordnance, quartermaster, and signal supplies were to be submitted in compliance with WDGMP 1924, G–4 Appendix, paragraph III. The corps area commanders were understandably confused by this vague authority, for conceivably the lists of items which they were to submit for local procurement could include everything in the respective supply branch catalogs. The chiefs of the supply branches reacted quickly and positively to the less restrained procurement requests. The Chief of the Signal Corps and the Chief of the Air Service set the pattern in letters which tactfully but unequivocally informed the corps area commanders that local procurement would have to be limited to simple items of great local abundance, that *no* articles of special design or of manufacturing complexity would be included, that no sources of supply which were allocated to the supply branches could be tapped, and which added an additional admonition that local procurement should not be recommended to the extent that it would interfere with essential civilian needs in the locality concerned.[66]

Only the commander of the Eighth Corps Area, Maj. Gen. Ernest Hinds, appears to have given practical thought to the impossibility of any local procurement policy established by corps area commanders which was not first coordinated with the procurement plans and policies of the supply branches. General Hinds did not submit the directed lists of procurement authority requests, but instead, in a letter of 13 August 1926, pointed out the fallacy of requesting such local procurement authority without tieing in that program with the overall procurement plan. General Hinds' letter was promptly circulated to the supply branch chiefs who agreed that the principle of local procurement at outlined in G–4 Appendix to 1924 Plan was fallacious

[65] Ltr, QMG to TAG, 20 Jul 26, sub: Local Procurement by Corps Areas During Mobilization. AG 381 (7–20–26). National Archives.

[66] See: 2d Ind by CSO, 25 Sep 26, to ltr, CG, 1st Corps Area to TAG, 1 Sep 26, sub: Local procurement of Signal Equipment, WDGMP, 1924. AG 381 (9–1–26). National Archives.

and should be eliminated.[67] Maj. Gen. M. M. Patrick, Chief of the Air Corps, indorsed his correspondence on the issue through the Assistant Secretary of War, who, in spite of his overall responsibility for procurement, had been kept in ignorance of this procurement planning confusion. On 11 October 1926 the Assistant Secretary of War ordered that all corps area commanders be instructed that local procurement under War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1924, would pertain only to quartermaster supplies, and that no industrial surveys would be made by corps area commanders.[68] Thus another decentralizing provision of the 1924 Plan had, in operation, given way to centralized control by the War Department.

The 1924 Plan Under Attack

After the publication of the 1924 Plan with its appendixes, the corps areas, branches, and lesser units in the chain of command, began the arduous labor of compounding their respective annexes and unit plans. They flooded the War Department General Staff with recommendations for changes—most of them of a trivial nature—until the General Staff on 10 September 1925 directed senior commanders to study the War Department Plan thoroughly, to complete their own plans required by it, and to stop making recommendations for changes during the period 31 October 1925—31 October 1926, except for matters of great import requiring immediate action.[69]

Within the General Staff itself there was growing dissatisfaction with basic concepts of the 1924 General Mobilization Plan. The almost rigid centralization in the War Department which the 1924 Plan established under a cloak of decentralization was viewed with increasing misgivings as new officers came to the General Staff. These were officers who in the field had chafed under the strict control exercised by the War Department in even minor details and had concluded that the greatest weakness of the plan was caused by the inflexible centralization of command and administrative functions in uncoordinated agencies of the War Department.[70] These officers were convinced that overall, *coordinated control* of supply and administration should be centralized in the War Department, but that the *operations* of supply and administration should be decentralized,

---

[67] Ltr, CG, 8th Corps Area, to TAG, 13 Aug 26, sub: Local Procurement under WDGMP, 1924; ltr, TAG to Ch, Air Corps, 26 Aug 26, sub: Local Procurement under WDGMP, 1924; see also all indorsements to ltr, TAG to Ch, Air Corps, 26 Aug 26. All in AG 381 (8–13–16) and AG 381 (8–26–26). National Archives.

[68] Ltr, TAG to CG's all corps areas, 11 Oct 26, sub: Local Procurement, WDGMP, 1924. AG 381 (8–26–26) (Misc G). National Archives.

[69] Memo, TAG to Chs, all WD branches, and CG's, all corps areas, 10 Sep 25, sub: Changes to War Department General Mobilization Plan. AG 381 (9–9–25) (Misc) M–C. National Archives.

[70] Memo, G–4, to CofS, 24 Oct 27, sub: Decentralization. G–4/23022. Copy in AG 381 (10–24–27). National Archives.

to a maximum degree, down to branch chiefs, corps area commanders, and port commanders. Under this concept, it would be up to the War Department General Staff to establish coordinated policies and to supervise lower echelons to ensure their compliance with those policies, but it would be for those lower echelons to execute the policies. The new officers who were now being assigned to the General Staff were graduates of the Command and General Staff School and of the Army War College where they had given considerable thought and study to the proper functioning of higher staffs.

By the end of 1925 Assistant Secretary of War Hanford MacNider had available enough surveys and studies of the war industrial capacity of the United States to demonstrate clearly that the industrial plants in the United States could not meet, in many essential items, the requirements of the War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1924. Mr. MacNider reminded the Chief of Staff of this deficiency in a memorandum of 14 December 1925. Since industry could not, in the early months of a war, meet the 1924 Plan requirements, an adequate war reserve of critically essential war material was needed for those months. But on this vital issue of war reserves, the Assistant Secretary pointed out, the War Department had not yet established a policy nor made recommendations, and the Congress in Appropriations Act of 1924, 1925, and 1926 had established only a negative policy.[71] Mr. MacNider concluded his memorandum by asking the Chief of Staff for his recommendations for "a balanced, enduring, and effective policy on war reserves," if practical, by 1 February 1926.[72]

The General Staff promptly considered this communication of the Assistant Secretary, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, prepared a staff study on war reserve policy. This study, submitted to the Chief of Staff on 20 January 1926, reviewed the background of war reserve policies from the conclusion of World War I; it concurred in the necessity for a definite war reserve policy; it suggested that such a policy should be based on the essential materiel required for 27 infantry divisions, 6 cavalry divisions, at war strength, plus that required for the corps of army troops of 3 field armies, plus war strength garrisons to man the fixed defenses of the continental United States and those of foreign possessions; and it concluded by insisting that the War Department should not accept any supply rate which would compel a reduction in the mobilization rate in the 1924 General Mobilization Plan, but should, rather, demand an increased production

[71] These Appropriations Acts all contained the following provision: ". . . Under the authorizations contained in this Act, no issues of reserve supplies or equipment shall be made where such issues would impair the reserves held by the War Department for two field armies or one million men." The problem by 1925, however, was no longer to keep war reserves from being depleted below that necessary for 1,000,000 men, but to build up those reserves to be sufficient for that many men.

[72] Memo, ASofW to CofS, 19 Dec 25, sub: War Reserve Policy. WPD 29–15. DRB, TAG.

rate which would not only satisfy the mobilization rate but also justify the gradual reduction of war reserves. The difficulty in increasing existing war reserves, which were continually being reduced by normal attrition, was clearly recognized as being almost insoluble during peacetime when the Congress was showing persistent reluctance in allocating even sufficient funds to sustain current operations of the small forces in being.[73] The G–3 study was given only grudging concurrence by WPD, who revived again the latent concept that a general mobilization plan was the wrong approach to practical mobilization solutions, which rather should be tailored to *specific* war plans.[74]

A year later on 1 February 1927, Assistant Secretary of War MacNider in another memorandum to the Chief of Staff, again criticized the 1924 Plan, which he bluntly suggested was adequate only as a basis for academic study on the development of a maximum effort in procurement. Mr. MacNider buttressed his memorandum with a chart showing the estimated cost of making up the deficits in materiel needed for the minimum requirements of the 1924 Plan. This estimate totaled $669,644,595.55 (exclusive of unestimated Air Corps needs), which was a staggering figure in 1927. The Assistant Secretary made two recommendations: (1) that a mobilization plan be prepared which could be supported by resources available and that the War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1924 cease to have any official status other than as a basis for academic study and research; (2) that the "Essential Lists" of critical materiel be revised and expanded sufficiently to enable procurement plans to become complete rather than fragmentary.[75]

As criticism of the 1924 Plan increased during 1925 and 1926, G–3 [76] conducted an active rear guard action in defense of that Plan. The most spirited and most convincing elements of this defense were against the WPD attacks on the whole concept of a general mobilization plan. Such a plan, G–3 insisted in studies to the Chief of Staff, was not only mandatory under the provisions of the National Defense Act of 1920, but was the only means by which coherent mobilization plans could be made. There were brought again to the Chief of Staff's attention the old but still valid arguments that the problems of mobilization were so many and so complex that they could be solved only by a definite delineation of requirements which could be done only in a general mobilization plan. To attempt to solve these problems with a different mobilization plan for each specific war plan would so confuse mobilization planning as to make it entirely futile. These were

[73] Memo, ACofS, G3, to CofS, 20 Jan 26, sub: Policy on War Reserves. *Ibid.*

[74] See comments on G3 study, 20 Jan 26, in *ibid.*

[75] Memo, ASW to CofS, 1 Feb 27, sub: War Reserve Policy. Copy in *ibid.*

[76] Brig Gen (later Lt Gen) Hugh A. Drum was ACofS, G–3, 4 Dec 23 to 8 Apr 26 and Maj Gen (later Gen) Malin Craig was ACofS, G–3, 9 Apr 26 to 1 Apr 27.

old arguments, but they were still convincing. The Chief of Staff agreed with the G–3 contention that there should continue to be a general mobilization plan as a framework for all mobilization planning.[77]

Initially, G–3 attempted to correct the weaknesses in the 1924 Plan by numbered changes and mobilization bulletins. An agenda for revision of the General Mobilization Plan was prepared by G–3 on 13 August 1926 and was circulated through the General Staff for comment. In this study, G–3 conceded that the mobilization rate in the 1924 Plan was inaccurate because of errors in computing both the recruitment rate and the supply rate. The studies made by G–1, by G–4, and by the Assistant Secretary of War had made this concession inevitable. G–3, on the basis of the G–1 studies, was willing to cut down the recruitment rate but, even after the depressing effect of the logistic studies, was still unwilling to let the supply rate reduce the mobilization rate. If it were impossible to produce all the supplies required, then G–3 proposed to reduce the initial supplies necessary by eliminating from the planning basis all except the barest minimum of essential items. Coast artillery units, G–3 suggested, initially had to have ammunition, but could get along without clothing and individual equipment; these latter items could therefore be eliminated from the initial plans for coast artillery units. Similarly truck companies and other units which could use commercial articles of equipment did not need therefore to be considered at all for initial supplies. In keeping with this line of reasoning, G–3 dismissed the organization and training rates as theoretical factors which did not need to be considered at all in the revision of the 1924 Plan. The deflationary effects of the supply studies were beginning to have an unfortunately irritating effect on the G–3 planners. And, as the memory of World War I began to fade, the importance of supply began to fade also. If supplies could not be produced fast enough initially to equip the huge mass armies which had come to be considered necessary for mobilization, then the Army would have to get along without some supplies. The planners in G–3, beginning in 1926, became obsessed with the preeminent importance of manpower, and, as the obsession grew, the other factors of mobilization ebbed in importance.[78]

WPD planners retained a somewhat more even balance. They were willing to concur in the G–3 proposal to cut down the list of essential items of materiel for planning purposes, but they took a dimmer view of the summary dismissal of the organization and training rate as a "theoretical factor." The initial landing of an expeditionary

[77] A good summary of the G–3 views on this subject is contained in lecture, Brig Gen E. L. King, G–3, before the Army War College, 16 Sep 29, "The G–3 Division, War Department General Staff, and its Present Outstanding Problems." G–3 Course No. 5 (1929–30). Army War College.

[78] For an example see: King, lecture, *op. cit.*, 16 Sep 29.

force on a hostile shore, which was a basic assumption of the probable employment of mobilized forces, could, WPD suggested, conceivably require amphibious operations demanding a high degree of specialized training. Further, such an amphibious operation might require "composite group" rather than regular type organizations which would then make organization not theoretical but of prime importance. On this matter, in a comment made on a G–3 staff study, WPD seems to have had a good conception of task force organization, but this conception did not mature until 1941 after it had been proven sound doctrine in the European war.[79]

While the discussion of the 1924 Plan was taking place there was a complete turnover in top War Department personnel responsible for mobilization planning. Gen. Charles P. Summerall succeeded Maj. Gen. John L. Hines as Chief of Staff 21 November 1926; Maj. Gen. (later Gen.) Malin Craig became Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, 9 April 1926 serving for only one year when he was succeeded by Maj. Gen. Frank Parker; and Col. (later Maj. Gen.) James K. Parsons became Chief of the G–3 Mobilization Branch. Proposed changes in the 1924 Plan had reached such a volume by 1927 that the decision was made to scrap the 1924 Plan entirely and to prepare a complete revision. On 16 July 1927 all commanders and personnel concerned were directed to stop work on the 1924 Plan "in view of the pending revision of the War Department General Mobilization Plan." [80]

War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1928

A draft of the completely new revision of War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1924 was ready by 19 November 1927 and was widely circulated for comment. On the basis of the comments received, G3 revised the new plan and submitted it to the Chief of Staff on 10 February 1928. The Chief of Staff approved the War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1928 and the accompanying revised AR 120–10 (Mobilization) on 20 July 1928.[81]

The 1928 Plan was a radical departure from the 1924 Plan. The 1924 Plan on the surface had favored decentralization, but by voluminously detailed instructions had provided for tight, centralized control by the War Department; the brief, detailed revision was hinged on the almost complete decentralization of implementing pro-

[79] Memo, WPD (Col S. D. Embick) to G–3, 19 Jul 26. AG 1199–83 to 158, DRB, TAG.

[80] TAG ltr, 16 July 27, sub: War Department Mobilization Plan. AG 381 (7–15–27) (Misc) M–C. National Archives.

[81] For a copy of the first draft (19 Nov. 27) of the revised plan and pertinent correspondence see: AG 381 (11–19–27). National Archives; and for the final War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1928 and pertinent correspondence see: AG 381 (8–1–28). National Archives; for an analysis and summary of the 1928 Plan see: lecture Col James K. Parsons (Ch. G–3 Mob Br), before the Army War College, 13 Sep. 28, War Department General Mobilization Plan." G–3 Course No. 7. 1928–29. Army War College.

visions to corps areas. In the 1924 Plan supply had been considered the dominant mobilization factor; in the revision manpower became the dominant factor with supply relegated to a secondary position. This change in emphasis was summarized by the chief of the Mobilization Branch (Col. [later Maj. Gen.] James K. Parsons) in a lecture at the Army War College:

> It has been stated that supply is the dominant factor in mobilization. Some even hold that mobilization is limited by the quantity of supply that can be procured. Lack of supply may prevent the mobilization of a particular unit, but it will never prevent a nation's mobilizing for defense, if weapons of any kind are obtainable. Deficiency in supply may seriously impair the fighting efficiency of a nation, but most defeats are caused by shortage of men. In the last analysis, manpower is the primary factor, and its importance is supreme. Supply is secondary, and is of value only in direct proportion to the extent to which it may be used. . . .
>
> The General Mobilization Plan [1928] just issued to the Service ignores the factors of supply and training, and is based entirely upon the rate at which men, under the most favorable conditions, can be procured and organized. Deployment under this plan will depend upon conditions as they arise during mobilization. Obviously, every effort will be made to send troops to the front that are trained and equipped. How well trained and how well equipped they may be when circumstances call upon them for immediate service, will depend upon the actions of the enemy.[82]

In format the revised plan also differed radically from the 1924 Plan. It was a brief and concise document complete within itself consisting in final form of only 12 pages and 5 tables. No annexes or appendixes were issued as they had been in 1923 and 1924. Finally, the security classification was removed from the new plan so that it might have wider circulation.[83]

The manpower goals of the revised plan did not materially vary from those in the 1924 Plan; the main difference was that in the 1924 Plan it was expected that the men brought into the Army by the mobilization timetable would be equipped, supplied, and trained at the same accelerated rate as they were procured. In the revision, it was frankly conceded that there would be supply and equipment shortages and that training, if need be, would be of an undesirable skimpiness. By 1927–28, it appeared that a preponderance of the planners on the War Department General Staff could still remember vividly the large armies of World War I, but that they were tending to forget how dependent on the complex elements of supply those armies had been. The planners could refer to the G–1 studies which in 1927 showed a class I manpower strength of about 7,700,000 men, 89.3 per cent of which was white and 10.7 per cent colored. In the

[82] Parsons, lecture, *op. cit.*, 13 Sep 28.

[83] Memo, G–3, to TAG, 21 Sep 28, sub: WDGMP, 1928. G–3/6541–Gen–192. Copy in AG 381 (9–15–28). National Archives; memo, TAG to all persons with copies of WDGMP, 13 Oct 27, sub: WDGMP. AG 381 (10–8–27) (Misc) M–C. National Archives.

unilateral planning of the War Department at the time, this manpower pool appeared more than adequate.[84]

The 1928 Plan substituted "periods" for the "phases" of the 1924 Plan. Each of the succeeding periods was to begin only when the War Department announced the preceding period had ended, but for planning purposes the time length of the four periods was set as follows:

First Period: M day to M + 2
Second Period: M + 2 to M + 3
Third Period: M + 3 to M + 4
Fourth Period: M + 4 to M + 5

These periods, which corresponded closely enough in their goals and time length to the first phase of the 1924 Plan, were very carefully labeled "for planning purposes"; by 1928, the planners had acquired sufficient flexibility to abandon the precise timetables of the 1924 Plan. Each succeeding period would not begin until the manpower goals of the preceding period had been met. By 1928, G–1 had convinced G–3 that it was not only conceivable but extremely probable that a selective service law would not be in operation on M-day.[85]

As at the end of the first phase of the 1924 Plan, at the end of the fourth period of the new plan, it was expected that some 3,500,000 men would be obtained for six field armies and for the Zone of the Interior, but it was to take five months in the new plan, one month longer than the 1924 Plan, to procure the 3,500,000 men. The mobilization of the full six field armies, supporting and zone of the interior troops, was to be completed by M + 10, at which time 2,808,975 men would be in the theater of operations.

The revised plan was very brief. It established the order in which the various components would be mobilized; it designated the agencies charged with accomplishing the mobilization; and it set forth the broad principles which would guide these agencies in accomplishing the mobilization. The corps area commanders were to be the principal implements of mobilization; the branch chiefs were, for the most part, to be limited to major procurement functions under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary of War. The chiefs of the combat arms would play little part except as inspectors-general of training in

[84] "There is ample manpower in the United States to satisfy the demands of any conceivable emergency." Parsons, lecture, *op. cit.*, 13 Sep 28.

[85] A draft of a selective service law and a plan for organization of a selective service system was prepared by the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee which had been created in 1926 and placed under the general supervision of G–1. This Committee submitted its first report on the organization needed for selective service 6 March 1928. Copy in AG 381 (3–6–28). National Archives. The work of the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee was an outstanding part of mobilization planning in the late 1920's and 1930's. Although that work is not analyzed in detail in this study, it is referred to frequently. For a summary of the work see: *Selective Service in Peacetime* [First Report of the Director of Selective Service 1940–41 (Washington, 1942)], pp. 9–[illegible].

all corps areas. The War Department would, during the mobilization, act as a coordinator for intercorps operations and for movements to theaters of operation. War Department depots and War Department schools, with the exception of the Military Academy, would cease operations on M-day and their physical plants would be turned over to the corps area commanders concerned. (This was a reversal of school provisions in the 1924 Plan.) Ports of embarkation would come under the jurisdiction of respective corps area commanders on M-day. Reception, housing, supply, and training of enlisted men and officers would be delegated to the corps area commanders, each of whom was expected to solve his problems in his own way. In addition to his other responsibilities, the commander of the Eighth Corps Area was charged with the mobilization and the training of practically all heavier-than-air Air Corps units.

One unique feature in the final draft of the 1928 Plan grew out of objections to the proposal in the first draft of the plan to select most officer candidates from enlisted ranks and to train them in corps area officer candidate schools. The objections to this provision for training new and replacement officers from the chiefs of arms and branches was solved by delegating the training of all officer replacements of each arm and service to only one corps area: e. g., tank officer candidates would all be trained by the III Corps Area, infantry officer replacements by IV Corps Area, cavalrymen by VII Corps Area, Signal Corps officers by the II Corps Area, engineers by the III Corps Area, field artillerymen by the VIII Corps Area, etc. The training of enlisted replacements was also delegated to the corps area commanders.

An important innovation in the new plan was the authorization of "service commands" for each corps area—in effect housekeeping and administrative headquarters to adequately staff the corps areas in the Zone of the Interior on M-day and to thereafter enable the corps area commanders to carry out their considerable mobilization functions. Similar administrative headquarters were authorized for branch chiefs and other zone of the interior commands and installations. In all instances, the size and general composition of these administrative headquarters was to be left to the judgment of the commander concerned but were to be included in his mobilization plan. The lack of any guiding explanation as to what the General Staff had in mind in regard to the service commands subsequently created considerable confusion.

The 1928 Plan Appraised

The 1928 Plan achieved perhaps the maximum approachable attainment of the decentralization concept. This factor and the brevity of the Plan made a strong appeal to commanders, who had been irked by the limitations on their initiative and functional powers in the 1924

Plan. The 1928 Plan, together with an accompanying and conforming revision of AR 120–10 (Mobilization), was well received by the staff and command agencies when it was circulated in draft form for comment in November 1927. The laudatory comments were profuse; the criticisms were few, but, in some instances, they were pertinent and well-considered. Several of the corps area commanders were critical of the decision to close the Army War College and the other War Department schools at a period when the products of their instruction would be most vitally needed. The wisdom of delegating authority to operate ports of embarkation to corps area commanders was questioned. The failure of the 1928 Plan to provide uniform training programs for use by corps area commanders was criticized. But only two corps area commanders seemed appreciably concerned by the disregard of supply in the new Plan.[86]

The chiefs of the arms and services, in a broad sense, approved the brevity, the decentralization, and what was termed the "flexibility" of the new Plan ("flexibility" and "elasticity" seem to have been the terms used to describe the absence of detailed instruction) but were extremely critical where the new plan sheared away their functions and responsibilities. All chiefs of branches were disturbed at the contemplated closing on M-day of their branch schools. Some of the chiefs suggested that it was desirable that all special schools be kept functioning under War Department control. Most of the branch chiefs felt that they and they alone were qualified to procure and train both officers and enlisted men for their respective branches. Here and there a branch chief protested vigorously at the loss of his depots on M-day to the corps areas. With these major exceptions, the chiefs of the arms and services concurred in the new plan.

The chief of the Air Corps, Maj. Gen. James E. Fechet, declared the 1928 Plan excellent and highly commendable. He further suggested certain changes which, had they been approved, would have on M-day given to the Air Corps the autonomy and control of its existence which it so desired (and which it was not to fully attain until World War II).

The reaction of the General Staff divisions varied: G–2, the General Staff division least concerned with mobilization planning, concurred in the new plan without comment. G–1 concurred after making some pertinent recommendations which G–3 incorporated into the final plan. WPD continued unshaken in its belief that the whole idea of a general mobilization plan was fallacious, but on the premise that there was going to be one agreed that the new plan would serve the purpose as

[86] Maj Gen Douglas MacArthur, commanding the Third Corps Area, and Maj Gen Ernest Hinds, commanding the Eighth Corps Area. The written comments of all corps area commanders and Chief of Staff sections are in AG File 381 (11–19–27). National Archives.

well as any other. G–4, however, did not concur. The disregard for supply in the new plan, its lack of sufficient information on which to base necessary studies, its failure to enumerate by type and number the units to be mobilized in each corps area by 15- or 30-day periods, and the absence of a timetable showing when it was intended that these specific units be sent to theaters of operations—all these G–4 objected to. The Assistant Secretary of War, after being assured that the old 1924 Plan Troop Basis would continue in effect for procurement planning, raised no obejction to the new plan. G–4, somewhat mollified by this last information and also by G–3 assurances that revisions of the troop basis would be accomplished by coordinated staff planning of G–3 and G–4 outside of the mobilization plan proper, withdrew his nonconcurrence.[87]

The War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1928, by its all pervading decentralization, made a definite contribution to effective mobilization planning, but its divorcement of manpower goals from materiel production rates was unrealistic. The retention of the massed manpower concept tended to obscure reasonable analysis of manpower procurement. Like its predecessor plans of 1923 and 1924, the 1928 Mobilization Plan ignored, from lack of knowledge, the intricately meshed integration of manpower, industry, raw materials, and the national economy. Without considered application of that knowledge much of the mobilization planning lacked reality. The plan continued on the assumption that mobilization planning must be predicated on implementation of the mobilization plan only on M-day. The M-day concept was a heritage from the past, and the mobilization planners in the United States were unable to visualize any situation that would require the implementation of a mobilization plan prior to the M-day outbreak of war.

The usual numbered changes were made in the 1928 Plan; but as new staff studies of manpower procurement and materiel procurement were completed, the weaknesses of the 1928 General Mobilization Plan became increasingly apparent. Mobilization tests conducted in 1929 and 1930 helped to verify the findings of the General Staff studies. The 1928 Plan had reversed the trend toward centralization of control of all mobilization details in the War Department, but the pendulum had swung too far.

The 1931 Revision: A Staff Exercise Only

A new revision of the War Department General Mobilization Plan was prepared by G–3 and was first ready in draft form for study in October 1930. A new draft in almost final form was distributed for

[87] The "A to J" Tables, subsequently published, were the result of this coordinated staff planning. They were troop tables for use in computing supply requirements.

comment 21 April 1931. This G3 revision of the 1928 Plan was carefully reviewed and revised, finally being approved on 5 January 1932.[88]

The 1931 revision of the War Department General Mobilization Plan followed the 1928 Plan closely in format and subject matter. It was primarily a polished and perfected version of the 1928 Plan based on 3 years of studies and tests. There were certain basic changes, however. Where, in 1928, mobilization on M-day would have started with 700,000 enlisted men (total authorized strength of the Regular Army and National Guard under National Defense Act of 1920), in 1931 M-day would have had a base of only 280,000 enlisted men (the estimated actual strength of the Regular Army and National Guard). Where, in the 1928 Plan, it was expected that three field armies, with supporting troops, would have been fully mobilized in the first period, in the 1931 Plan the first period effort was reduced to two field armies, with supporting troops. Further tightening of personnel policies in the 1931 Plan was effected by the setting of a daily enlisted procurement objective of 25,000 men; the establishment of definite priorities (during the first period) for personnel procurement; the establishment of personnel priorities for units ordered to the theater of operations by the War Department; the establishment of definite procurement objectives for each corps area (either by voluntary enlistment or selective service); the stating of more definite information concerning officer replacements; and the extension (for planning purposes) of the time element for the completion of mobilization of six field armies from 10 months to 12 months.

The 1931 Plan was somewhat more concerned with the problems of supply. This was illustrated by the addition of another procurement period (making a total of six), the continuance of large War Department depots under War Department control (the 1928 Plan had transferred them to corps area commanders on M-day), and the establishment of priorities in equipment to units ordered to the theater of operations in the order prescribed by the War Department. The 1931 revision included specific instructions concerning troop shelter and construction in the Zone of the Interior. Although not published as part of the 1931 Plan, supplementary tables to be used as a basis for computation of requirements (revisions of the "A to J" Tables of the 1928 Plan) were issued. The disregard for training in the 1928 Plan was, to some degree, corrected in the 1931 revision by a requirement that in general all training would be conducted by the corps area commanders in accordance with War Department training publications. Another requirement was that subordinate com-

[88] For a copy of the 1931 revision of the War Department General Mobilization Plan see: Memo and inclosures, G–3 to CofS, 21 Apr 31, sub: Revision of the WDGMP, 1928. G–3/6541—Gen 353. Copy in AG 381 (4–21–31) (1). National Archives.

mands include in their mobilization plans specific data on the training facilities they contemplated using, and the inclusion in unit plans of all training plans. Additional requirements for replacement training centers were set up, and corps area commanders were required to include in their mobilization plans specific plans for officer candidate schools. Provision was also made for redistributing the responsibility for training heavier-than-air Air Corps units to several corps areas (instead of just the Eighth Corps Area, as in the 1928 Plan).

The rather sketchy data which had been contained in AR 120–10 (Mobilization) was amplified for the first time in 1931 by the publication of Mobilization Regulations. The following Mobilization Regulations had been published or were being prepared, and were referred to in the 1931 General Mobilization Plan:

MR No. 1–1 Recruitment.
MR No. 1–2 Military Welfare and Recreation.
MR No. 1–3 Officer Candidates.
MR No. 1–4 Classification of the Soldier.
MR No. 2–1 Military Intelligence.
MR No. 4–1 Transportation.
MR No. 4–2 Shelter.

The amplifying details in the Mobilization Regulations, the results of considerable staff study, were inevitably of assistance to commanders required to prepare unit mobilization plans.

The changes in the 1931 revision of the War Department General Mobilization Plan were, for the most part, improvements. The unbridled decentralization of the 1928 Plan was curbed somewhat without weakening the decentralization concept. The personnel, training, and supply changes were in the general direction of realism. The Mobilization Regulations gave considerable assistance to commanders charged with preparing implementing mobilization plans. But all of these improvements strengthened the superstruction of the General Mobilization Plan without adding any substance to the dangerously weak foundation on which the Plan was based—the lack of actual manpower and materiel reserves. However, the 1931 revision was to prove merely an exercise in staff planning, for the advent of a new Chief of Staff, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who succeeded Gen. Charles P. Summerall on 20 November 1930, was to lead almost immediately to a reexamination of some of the basic concepts of mobilization planning.

CHAPTER XIII

MOBILIZATION PLANS AND DEVELOPMENTS, 1931–36

New Mobilization Concepts

The weaknesses of the War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1928 had been brought out by the mobilization tests and by the comments and criticisms of the corps area commanders and the chiefs of arms and services. On the basis of this information G–3 prepared a revision of the 1928 Plan during 1931. Before this revision was approved on 5 January 1932, further exhaustive revision was made necessary by the decision of the Chief of Staff, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, to create a four-field army organization. The Chief of Staff had first indicated his interest in the four-field army concept in July 1931 in a memorandum to G–1, G–2, G–3, G–4, and WPD stating his view that the establishment of field army headquarters was necessary and desirable and calling for staff studies to implement such action.[1]

It was General MacArthur's view that the 1928 Plan and the 1931 revision were based on fundamentally unsound concepts. First, those plans created a vast army of many millions of men organized into "simply a collection of skeletonized divisions, each reporting directly to the War Department" [2] and with no organizational framework provided through which they could be assembled, maneuvered, and operated as a unit against an aggressor. The six army headquarters, contemplated in all mobilization plans from 1922 to 1931, were not to be activated until after M-day; thus they would be in the process of organizing themselves at the same time as the troop units which comprised them were being mobilized. General MacArthur asserted that when that happened the War Department would be so bogged down ". . . with matters relating to organization, administration, supply and other features of mobilization" that it would have to relinquish to one or more virtually independent field commanders control of operations. ". . . This fundamental error," the Chief of Staff declared, "has always required improvisation and extemporization in filling the organizational void lying between the War Department and fighting units. It has compelled needless delay in the development of sizable military formations. It has resulted in an essentially dual control of

[1] Memo, CofS for G–1, G–2, G–3, G–4, WPD, 17 Jul 31, sub: Establishment of Field Army Areas. WPD 3561. DRB, TAG.

[2] *Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, 1931,* pp. 9–13.

the Army, from which have sprung inefficiency and lack of coordinations, to say nothing of an unpleasant aftermath of recrimination and abuse." [3]

The second fundamentally fallacious concept in mobilization planning, General MacArthur felt, was the insistence on mobilizing a huge, mass army which could only be produced slowly. General MacArthur's assumption was that the immediate need, at the outbreak of war, would be for a moderate-sized mobile force, mobilized with expedition and trained and equipped to strike with speed and power.[4] Allied with this concept was General MacArthur's continuing belief that: ". . . The most probable conflicts in which the United States might become involved would not require the mobilization of a preponderant portion of our resources." [5] A proper mobilization plan, therefore, should initially provide for the mobilization and utilization of forces actually in being—the Regular Army and National Guard—and should then provide rapidly the additional units needed to make those forces in being a cohesive striking power. Subsequent mobilizations, more slowly accomplished, would build up the initial striking force to whatever strength was necessary. Here was the germ of what several years later was to develop into the Protective Mobilization Plan.

Less basic perhaps, but still of considerable influence in mobilization planning, was General MacArthur's insistence that more emphasis be placed on volunteer enlistment sparked by an aggressive recruiting campaign during the period before the enactment and implementation of selective service. The unused manpower which was stagnating in the country, due to the severe economic depression then current, could, in the event of a national emergency, be readily and voluntarily recruited in sufficient numbers to fill up the troop units in being and also the new units immediately necessary to supplement those forces in the initial striking force.[6]

Fallacious, too, in General MacArthur's opinion, was the concept of the mobilization planners that the general mobilization plan should be geared to no particular war plan, but should in effect be only a warehouse filled with troop units of all sizes, shapes, and kinds from which needed parts could be extracted and then assembled for any

[3] Ltr, CofS to CG's of four field armies, 22 Oct 32, sub: Development of the four Field Armies. WPD 3561–3. DRB, TAG.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] General MacArthur, at first, appeared to feel strongly that voluntary enlistment could make unnecessary any form of conscription, such as selective service. As late as 27 Aug 32, Brig Gen C. E. Kilbourne, WPD Chief, in "Notes of Instructions Issued by the Chief of Staff," a summary of principles to govern WPD staff planners in preparing an agenda for a forthcoming conference of field army commanders, reported that: "The plan for mobilization is to follow, in so far as possible, the present General Mobilization Plan except in so far as conscription is concerned. Enlistment is to be voluntary." WPD 3561. DRB, TAG.

specific war. General MacArthur believed the general mobilization plan should contain not just basic parts, but subassemblies and assemblies which were packaged in sufficient completeness to fit any war plan. It had been necessary under the old concept to have a special mobilization plan (based on the general mobilization plan) for each of the color war plans. In keeping with General MacArthur's concept, however, the special mobilization plans would be eliminated, and the general mobilization plan made so flexible that it would apply to all color plans, with minor variations and adaptations which would be shown in the logistic annex of each color plan. Lastly, General MacArthur desired that the mobilization plan be so constructed that its initial operations could be implemented by Presidential action without resource to congressional legislation, which might be delayed.

Establishment of the Four Field Armies

The views of the Chief of Staff brought about a reorientation of mobilization planning. The keystone of General MacArthur's thesis was the activation of the field armies. Legally, the National Defense Act of 1920 provided ample authority for the regrouping of corps areas into field army areas and for the establishment of headquarters for such field armies.[7] War Department General Orders No. 50, 20 August 1920, included a provision of three army areas: "For the purposes of inspection, or maneuvers, of plans for mobilization, war, demobilization, etc., the nine corps areas will, under their establishment, be grouped into three army areas." These designated army areas, in the familiar Army trilogy pattern, had not been utilized for any purpose at all prior to the appointment of General MacArthur as Chief of Staff.[8]

General MacArthur assigned primary responsibility for formulating a functioning field army organization to WPD. The first of the WPD studies planned for three armies, but strategic and tactical considerations eventually increased the number to four. During the last six months of 1931, WPD staff work to implement the field army organization was so secret that none of the other General Staff sections appear to have been informed of progress.[9] It was 13 months after planning was initiated that the first directive formally organizing the field armies was published in a letter to the commanding generals of

[7] "The Army shall at all times be organized so far as practical into brigades, divisions, and army corps, and whenever the President may deem it expedient, into armies. . . . The President is authorized to group any or all corps areas into army areas or departments." Sec. III, Act of June 4, 1920. 41 *Stat.* 759–812.

[8] Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Jul 31, sub: Organization of Field Army Areas. WPD 3561. DRB, TAG.

[9] "IV. *Concurrences.* None. The plan was prepared as strictly secret between a limited number of the personnel of the War Plans division." Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Jul 31, sub: Organization of Field Army Areas. *Ibid.*

corps areas and departments signed by the Chief of Staff.[10] The directive abolished the three army areas set up on paper in 1920, and substituted for them a general headquarters and four field armies, organized as follows:

1. (a) *General Headquarters:*
   Commanding General, General Headquarters:
   The Chief of Staff
   Staff: War Plans Division, General Staff, and such other personnel from the War Department General Staff as may be designated.
   (b) *Field Army Headquarters:*
   Army Commander: The senior corps area commander assigned to each field army
   Staff: The Army Commander's Corps Area Chief of Staff and such other members of his corps area as may be designated.

2. The field armies would comprise those divisions of the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves, organized into corps, allocated to the corresponding corps areas for mobilization by the War Department General Mobilization Plan as follows:

(a) *First Field Army:* First, Second, and Third Corps Area. (Its mission would deal with the North Atlantic andnortheastern frontier.)
(b) *Second Field Army:* Fifth and Sixth Corps Areas. (Its mission would deal with the strategical area of the Great Lakes and the central northern frontier.)
(c) *Third Field Army:* Fourth and Eighth Corps Areas. (Its mission would deal with the region of the Gulf of Mexico and southern frontier.)
(d) *Fourth Field Army:* Seventh and Ninth Corps Areas. (Its mission would deal with the Pacific Coast.

The functions of the field army commanders were to include development of such defense and operational plans as the War Department might request, the selection and organization of their staffs, and a general supervision of training. It was specifically stated that field army commanders ". . . will have no administrative functions outside of their own corps area in time of peace, except as may be necessary to enable them to perform the above designated duties." The directive was signed by General MacArthur himself.[11]

This broad directive of 9 August 1932 obviously left many questions unanswered. WPD was directed to consider the problems as they arose so that by the end of the year an army commander's conference could be held. In an intraoffice memorandum 29 August 1932 Brig. Gen. C. E. Kilbourne, Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, set forth the objectives of the four-field army organization as envisioned by General MacArthur as follows: (1) to create a rapidly mobilized striking force which could be employed without delay; (2) to rely on volun-

[10] Ltr, CofS to CG's, corps areas and departments, 9 Aug 32, sub: Establishment of Field Armies. *Ibid.* The delay, in part, was probably due to permit certain senior corps area commanders to retire, thereby clearing the way for appointment of the desired corps area commanders as army commanders.

[11] Ltr, CofS to CG's, corps areas and departments, 9 Aug 32, sub: Establishment of Field Armies. *Ibid.*

teering as the source for manpower; (3) to prepare a mobilization plan which could be implemented by Executive proclamation without congressional action.[12]

The opinions expressed by at least one WPD staff planner in a memorandum on the field army plan were probably indicative of the dubious views held by many of the planners as they attempted to produce a plan which would incorporate the Chief of Staff's ideas. It was recommended in this memorandum that the objectives of the four-field army organization be limited to specific war planning, training of officers for duties as army and corps commanders and staff officers, and maintaining blotters for specific war plans and for a proper organization for training purposes. It was felt that the interposition of the Army headquarters between the War Department and the corps area commanders on all matters pertaining to administration, training, and mobilization would result in confusion. It was predicted that:

> . . . The field armies can have no practical value as tactical units, for they would never be utilized as such under any situation that can be conceived. . . . With respect to plans for emergency forces, for both minor and major wars, the units must be drawn from all parts of the country according to their state of readiness. . . . The balancing of forces to be used in theaters and the allocation of units under each plan is a function of the War Department which cannot be delegated for the obvious reasons that each plan requires a different kind of force, to be concentrated in different areas, and drawn from all sections of the country.

These views were at variance with the expressed ideas of the Chief of Staff and were not approved.[13]

The first major problem to arise after the organization on paper of the four field armies was the question as to how much command authority an army commander, in peacetime, would have over the other corps area commanders in his army area. Until the situation could be clarified the army commanders were advised not to begin making inspections outside their own corps areas.[14]

The staff planning for the four-field army organization, after the Chief of Staff's preliminary directive of 9 August 1932, was expanded to include all of the General Staff sections with the overall responsibility and coordinating authority remaining with WPD. The major problems considered by the staff included:

1. The specific delineation of the command and planning authority of the army commanders.

---

[12] Memo, ACofS, WPD, to WPD, 29 Aug. 32, no sub. *Ibid.*

[13] Memo, Maj Paul J. Mueller for Exec, WPD, Sep 32, sub: Comment on Plan for Field Armies. *Ibid.*

[14] Memo, WPD to TAG, 31 Aug 32, sub: ltr, CG, Fourth Army, concerning inspections by army commanders. AG 333.3 (8–22–32). Copy in *ibid.* See also: personal ltr, Gen MacArthur to Maj Gen Johnson Hagood, 29 Dec. 32. Copy *ibid.*

2. The peacetime relationship between the army commander, the other corps area commanders in his army, and the War Department; particularly obscure was the authority of the army commander for mobilization.

3. The selection of tactical corps commanders and staffs, for peace and war.

4. The organization by corps area commanders of the corps area staff which would take over the functions and responsibilities of the corps area at the outbreak of war. These staffs, which were charged with so much of the actual implementation of mobilization, had been termed "corps area service commands" in the 1928 General Mobilization Plan and were still so designated.

5. The mobilization assignment of Regular Army officers.

6. The extent to which army commanders could control training during peacetime and during mobilization.

7. The relationship to be fixed between volunteering and selective service in mobilization.

8. The combat efficiency of the initial force contemplated for mobilization.

General MacArthur, on 22 October 1932, issued another directive to the army commanders which brought them up to date on the General Staff's progress towards a solution.[15] In the main, this directive merely reiterated the previously stated objectives of the field armies and suggested that the army commanders proceed with their own planning. The War Department apparently hoped that some of the difficulties might be resolved by the planning of the army commanders.

The conference of army commanders was held in Washington, D. C., on 8 December 1932. The problems which it had been hoped would be resolved before or during this conference were only brought into the open again, and there were very nearly as many solutions offered as there were conferees present. As was to be expected, the greatest divergence of opinion was concerning the powers proposed for army commanders. At least one army commander argued for complete control over all activities within the army area; other solutions tapered off from this to varying degrees of limitation on the administrative authority and responsibility of the army commander. The peacetime assignment of officers to war duties also was a matter of considerable difference of opinion. The conference, for the most part, did not solve the most pressing problems but spotlighted them for ultimate decision by General MacArthur. Included in the decisions he tentatively made at a conference with General Kilbourne on 13 December 1932 were:

[15] Memo, MacArthur to army commanders, 22 Oct 32, sub: Development of the four Field Armies. WPD 3561–3. DRB, TAG.

1. Approval of decentralizing to army commanders all planning and implementing authority practicable, without sacrificing centralized control by the War Department where such control was essential for efficiency.

2. Continued emphasis on volunteer enlistments during the initial mobilization, but more positive concessions by the Chief of Staff on the ultimate necessity for selective service.

3. Insistence on a mobilization plan which would ". . . permit the prompt and effective use of those organizations maintained on an active or partially active status in time of peace."[16] Decisions concerning the delineation of authority between army commanders and corp area commanders were held in abeyance, for the time being, pending further General Staff study, as was the decision concerning supervisory authority of army commanders over mobilization planning.

There was a sharp difference of opinion in the General Staff concerning what the army commander's authority in mobilization planning and in mobilization should be. General Kilbourne, Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, was at first inclined to feel that the army commander should have complete control of mobilization planning within the corps areas assigned to his army until his departure for a theater of operations. The other four General Staff divisions (G–1, G–2, G–3, G–4) objected to this proposal. Their arguments changed General Kilbourne's mind, and he gave the Chief of Staff the following reasons for reversing his previous position:

> (1) The mobilization would concern many activities affecting the [field] army only indirectly. . . .
>
> (2) Mobilization is essentially a Zone of the Interior activity and a tactical commander should be divorced from its functions . . . since he would immediately have to relinquish all control of mobilization when he took the field. . . .
>
> (3) Absolute control of mobilization planning would call for a considerable increment of the staff of each army headquarters, would embarrass the War Department, G–1, G–3 and G–4 Divisions in their efforts to secure uniformity, . . . and would impose upon Army Commanders administrative functions not contemplated in . . . the directive of August 9th.[17]

Tending to support these arguments of the Staff was the remark which General MacArthur had made to General Kilbourne that he wished to avoid anything lessening the prestige of corps area commanders. The rest of the staff had convinced General Kilbourne, too, that decentralization of supply authority to army commanders should not be as extensive as he had first planned:

---

[16] Memo, WPD to G–1, G–2, G–3, G–4, 15 Dec 32, sub: Report on conference with the CofS 13 Dec 32. WPD 3561–6. DRB, TAG.

[17] Memo, WPD for Gen MacArthur, 7 Mar 33, sub: Comments on Letter of General Winans reference Four Army Plan. WPD 3561–12. DRB, TAG.

> . . . As to supply plans, the distribution of supplies and the necessity for the higher command to establish priorities between GHQ units, armies, frontier defenses, overseas reinforcement and Z. of I., indicates that priorities within his army are all that can safely be given an army commander. Otherwise, they may base plans on assumptions that will not be found possible to meet.[18]

The General Staff, except for WPD, was continuing its pendulum swing back towards the principle of centralized control by the War Department, even though the Chief of Staff had indorsed the principle of decentralization. In order to provide some semblance of efficient combat balance to the initial force desired by the Chief of Staff, the planners felt several Organized Reserve units had to be included for immediate mobilization. Here a legal snag was encountered, for under the law members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps could not be ordered to active duty for more than 15 days a year without their consent, nor could they be ordered to active duty, in any case, in excess of the number permissible under appropriations made for that specific purpose, except in time of emergency expressly declared by Congress.[19] Since it was also the Chief of Staff's desire that the initial mobilization should be capable of implementation by Presidential proclamation and without congressional action, this difficulty was solved by ingenious staff planning. The Organized Reserve units desired for the initial mobilization would be inactivated and replaced by the creation of inactive Regular Army units whose mobilization *could* be ordered by the President. Officers for these inactive Regular Army units would be Reserves who in accordance with law would consent to serve for more than 15 days at the pleasure of the President. It was anticipated that there would be no difficulty in getting sufficient Reserve officers to consent to serve for more than 15 days. Although G–1 was somewhat dubious about the legality of this proposal, The Judge Advocate General of the Army was of the opinion that it was legal and that it was also lawful for the President, without the express authority of Congress, to call out and mobilize units of the National Guard for employment anywhere within the continental limits of the United States.[20]

Another ingenious plan was developed for the mobilization assignment of Regular Army officers. The difficulties of filling each mobilization slot with a specially named officer appeared insuperable because of the frequent station changes of individual officers. The plan finally agreed upon was to give each peacetime officer slot a mobilization assignment. For example, the peacetime commander of Com-

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] Sec. 55b, Act of June 4, 1920. 41 Stat. 780.

[20] Memo, JAG to ACofS, WPD, 18 Jan 33, sub: Decisions as to legality of certain plans pertaining to mobilization in an emergency. WPD 3561–11. DRB, TAG.

pany B, 29th Infantry Regiment, might be given a mobilization assignment as the commander of the 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry. It was felt that mobilization assignment by peacetime office or duty, rather than by name, would not only be easier administratively, but would provide better continuity. There was not much consideration given to the possibility that the person occupying a peacetime position conceivably might not be capable of performing the mobilization assignment of that position.

Encouraged by these basic decisions on key controversial questions, the planners in January 1933 had ready for General Staff circulation a tentative directive for the four-army organization which also provided guideposts for the necessary new general mobilization plan. Although G–1, G–3, and G–4 were only lukewarm in their concurrences, this tentative directive, amended slightly to meet specific nonconcurrences, was approved by the Chief of Staff and on 6 February 1933 was circulated to the army and corps commanders for their comments.

This directive provided that the Army of the United States would be organized to include four field armies, GHQ and GHQ reserve and communications zone troops, GHQ aviation, zone of the interior troops, and overseas garrisons. The Chief of Staff was to serve as commanding general of the Field Forces, and the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff was to provide the nucleus of the General Staff, GHQ. Elaborate provisions were made for the mobilization assignments of all officers, but with assignments made by office held rather than by individual name. The directive stated: "Army commanders are tactical commanders immediately available to command their armies in field operations and are so distinguished from corps area commanders whose functions are primarily administrative." The peacetime functions of the army commanders were limited to the preparation of war plans as specified by the War Department, training matters, and review of corps area mobilization plans. The directive listed eight types of war plans to be prepared for missions which the Regular Army itself could not fulfill.[21] Mobilization was to occur in two phases—initial and subsequent. The initial phase of two months would include the mobilization of active and most inactive Regular Army, National Guard, and Reserve units to be augmented by voluntary enlistments. The subsequent mobilization would be determined by the needs of the situation and would include selective service if necessary. Overall troops and logistic priorities were to be determined by the War Department. The directive concluded by stating: "Until promulgation of the new mobilization

[21] A joint Army and Navy basic war plan; an Army strategical plan; a theater of operations plan for each theater; plans to insure adequate defense of overseas possessions; a joint coastal frontier defense plan for each coastal frontier; plans for defense of land frontiers not part of a theater of operations; modification of the general mobilization plan; and a Navy war plan.

plan, the General Mobilization Plan and the special mobilization plans for each special war plan continue in force." [22]

The field commanders were requested to make their comments on the directive by 10 March 1933 which did not give them time to make detailed studies. The comments, therefore, were in the main favorable except for the objections of the army commanders to the curtailing of their authority over mobilization and supply. All through the 1930's the War Department was to resist the never ceasing efforts made by the army commanders to expand their authority.

Proposal for an Immediate Readiness Force

General Staff mobilization studies were intensified after the publication of the four-army organization directive of 6 February 1933, but they became increasingly discouraging as the data was collated and analyzed. On 27 March 1933 General Kilbourne pessimistically informed the Chief of Staff that: (1) it would be impossible during the initial mobilization to put a force in the field capable of maneuvering with the existing enlisted strength; (2) peace strength tables of organization would not produce units capable of sustained operations; (3) shortages existed in essential items of equipment needed for minimum requirements; (4) three to five months would be neeeded to complete the mobilization (including training) of units proposed for the initial mobilization. After proposing several alternative solutions for these problems for the Chief of Staff to consider, General Kilbourne recommended the creation of an immediate readiness force. He concluded his memorandum as follows:

> This general study convinces me of the importance of letting the President, the Secretary, and Congress know exactly how the reduced strength has affected our readiness for effective action and the importance of increasing the enlisted strength to the minimum of 165,000 so often spoken of. With this goes also representation as to two items of equipment—anti-aircraft and motor equipment for the Field Artillery. Of the former we have fourteen partly equipped regiments; to equip them would call for an expenditure of $3,236,000. We figure the minimum for our first effort to be 19 regiments. The Field Artillery is now practically immobilized, especially the National Guard. We believe the motor equipment, at least for the immediate effort, should be actually on hand. If it appears hopeless to press for an increment in strength we could help the situation by asking for the restoration in legislation of the Regular Army Reserve. It is believed a large number of former soldiers would enroll therein for a small monthly pay—say $2.00. With inadequate strength and no reserve it is difficult to proceed with any logical plan for organization and mobilization.[23]

At this time G–3 again pressed for the mobilization concept of the 1928 General Mobilization Plan which was ". . . intended to serve

[22] Ltr, CofS to CG's, army and corps areas, 6 Feb 33, sub: Development of Four Army Organization. AG 320.2 (1–27–33). Copy in WPD 3561–4. DRB, TAG.

[23] Memo, WPD to CofS, 27 Mar 33, sub: Four Army Organization. WPD 3561–15. DRB, TAG.

as the basis of plans for developing to the maximum the manpower and material resources of the United States." [24] In the opinion of the chief of the Mobilization Branch, G–3 (Col. Edgar A. Myer), the creation of an immediate readiness force would only serve to confuse procurement planning and disrupt the overall mobilization.[25] The War Plans Division continued to follow what it believed to be General MacArthur's views which would include an immediate readiness force within the General Mobilization Plan. General Kilbourne summarized these views as follows:

> The Chief of Staff has stated that he desires to do away with the Special Mobilization Plans, substituting therefor a statement with each War Plan of changes necessary, if any, in the Mobilization Plan.
>
> The War Plans Division believes the immediate readiness force and the reinforcement of overseas possessions will be normal and the possibility of an orderly mobilization of Regular and National Guard units . . . exceptional.[26]

The immediate reinforcement of overseas possessions in an emergency was one factor complicating the plans for mobilizing an immediate readiness force. General MacArthur had first directed that on M-day two divisions be sent promptly to reinforce each of the major overseas possessions: the Philippine Islands, Hawaii, and Panama. Subsequently, the cold logic of simple arithmetic had induced the Chief of Staff to agree that two separate infantry regiments and other detachments not assigned to divisions would be enough to earmark for Panama; but that still left four divisions for the other two places. General Kilbourne agreed that in any war calling for the initial mobilization, it would be *necessary* to reinforce Hawaii and *important* to reinforce Panama, but he was distinctly dubious about reinforcing the Philippines. He felt that in a war with Japan:

> . . . we could not reinforce the Philippines strongly enough to hold *unless* our fleet moved promptly to the Western Pacific—a movement now considered doubtful. . . . In my belief we should strain ourselves in peace to the extent of giving some 800 additional American troops and the necessary material to provide a good antiaircraft defense for the fortifications and let the Department Commander utilize his mobile troops as the nucleus of a large number of volunteer bands to conduct guerilla warfare. The conquest of those islands could, in that way, be made very expensive and the forts could put up a defense that would be lastingly creditable to our flag.[27]

This would reduce divisional allocations for overseas possessions to the two divisions for Hawaii and would make slightly more feasible the formation of an immediate readiness force in the United States.

---

[24] Memo, Ch, Mob Br, G–3, to ACofS, WPD, 15 May 33, sub: Four Army Organization. G–3/6617–29. Copy in WPD 3561–16. DRB, TAG.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] Memo, WPD for DCofS (Gen Drum), 11 May 33, sub: Four Army Organization. WPD 3561–16. DRB, TAG.

[27] *Ibid.*

Studies of Needs for the Initial Mobilization

The paper mobilization plan was developing rapidly, but when the staff tried to apply this paper plan to specific military problems doubts emerged. Some of the more comprehensive of these applied studies, prepared by WPD, considered what part of the initial mobilization of the four-army organization could be carried out under three premises: (1) with the existing Regular Army (12,000 officers and 118,000 enlisted men); (2) with a Regular Army of the size recommended by Major Army Project No. 1 (14,000 officers and 165,000 enlisted men);[28] and (3) with a Regular Army of 17,500 officers and 280,000 enlisted men which was the maximum authorized strength under the National Defense Act of 1920.

The first premise—i. e., existing strength of approximately 12,000 officers and 118,000 enlisted men—WPD flatly declared could not possibly produce adequate forces for initial operations in a major emergency if cadres for reconstituting inactive units, increased overhead, and adequate peacetime overseas garrisons were also to be provided. To complete the initial mobilization from the M-day base of then current Regular Army strength would require from four to six months and even then could be accomplished only by emasculating existing Regular Army units to provide cadres to reconstitute inactive Regular Army units.

The second premise of 14,000 officers and 165,000 enlisted men (Major Army Project No. 1) would appreciably facilitate the initial mobilization. The additional strength provided in this second premise would fill out tactical units (to peace strength) intended for immediate movement to frontiers or to theaters of operations, would afford some emphasis on mechanized forces and air forces, would more than double AA regiments, and would provide some increments

[28] President Hoover in 1929 had directed that a detailed survey be made of the military needs of the Nation; this study, initiated by a General Staff committee on 29 Jul 29, emerged as a 165-page report on 1 Nov 29 ("Report of the Survey of the Military Establishment by War Department General Staff." G–1/11229–39. DRB, TAG.) The report recommended as Major Army Project No. 1 the following:

(1) A Regular Army of 14,000 officers and 165,000 enlisted men.
(2) A National Guard strength of 250,000.
(3) An Officers' Reserve Corps of 116,000 with an annual increment of 6,000 from college ROTC units.
(4) Annual training for 37,500 in CMTC camps.
(5) Build up of war reserves to correct critical shortages in light, medium, and heavy artillery, in ammunition for all arms, in aircraft, in AA artillery and equipment, and in some items of quartermaster supply.

The report criticized the Director of the Budget for his cuts in Army budget requests, made without consulting the War Department as to a recommended priority of funds for retention. The report also contained a Plan II, in the event Project No. 1 was not approved. Plan II called for smaller expenditures for equipment and for no personnel increases at all. The severe economic depression which gripped the Nation at the time the report was published led to its immediate discard by the President. The War Department, however, kept plugging for Major Army Project No. 1 for several years.

for garrisons in Hawaii and Panama. But it was estimated that the initial mobilization could not be accomplished in less than four months after M-day, even starting from this distinctly more favorable second premise.

The third premise—i. e., a strength of 17,500 officers and 280,000 enlisted men—would provide a balanced force of six corps (at peace strength) which could be made available for immediate use in a theater of operations; or, as an alternative, four corps could be mobilized with one of the four at full war strength to constitute an actual immediate readiness force.

For academic purposes the study set forth the strength considered ideal for accomplishing the initial mobilization under the four-army organization at a speed commensurate with optimum expectations: 31,339 officers and 459,508 enlisted men. WPD realized that such a force would never be authorized under any foreseeable conditions in peacetime. WPD briefly mentioned the supply situation which G–4 felt was as critical as personnel. The personnel factor, however, was dominant in the WPD study. To meet the strength requirements for the initial mobilization, WPD suggested reducing even further the number of Regular Army personnel required for initial mobilization assignments and the creation of a trained Regular Army Reserve force. The study planned to take full advantage of the Officers Reserve Corps to supplement the shortage of Regular officers, but there was a disregard of the National Guard as a means of amplifying the supply of trained Reservists.[29]

The WPD study was reviewed by the other General Staff divisions. G–4, naturally more concerned about logistical problems than inadequate personnel, commented: ". . . the plan for mobilizing the Four Armies presents supply problems which are more serious than personnel problems." [30] G–1 advocated caution: ". . . I agree with the figures arrived at for the necessary strength of the Regular Army in order to obtain the rate of mobilization desired. However, from a practical standpoint I believe it would be entirely useless to propose any increase in the existing strength of the Regular Army at this time. Furthermore, the adoption of such a course under present conditions would, in my opinion, be likely to lead to an unfavorable public reaction." [31]

The study was read by the Chief of Staff and returned by him to WPD on 2 May 1933 with instructions that it be held until the " . . . present budgetary situation is cleared up." [32] The method that was employed by the Chief of Staff to bring the study to the attention

[29] See drafts of WPD studies in Mar and Apr 33 in WPD File 3561. DRB, TAG.
[30] Maj Gen R. E. Callan, 10 Apr 33. G–4/29647. DRB, TAG.
[31] Brig Gen Andrew Moses, 12 Apr 33. G–1/12894–12. DRB, TAG.
[32] Memo, DCofS (Gen Drum) to WPD, 2 May 33. OCS 20696–15. DRB, TAG.

of the President and of the Congress was to include much of its data in his annual report for 1933. Apparently in agreement with WPD that it was hopeless to expect a strength of 280,000, General MacArthur put the full weight of his endorsement on a Regular Army of 14,000 officers and 165,000 enlisted men, from which could be fashioned a mobilization based on the second premise of the WPD study. In his 1933 report, the Chief of Staff also urged the replenishing of war reserves with equipment which G–4, WPD, and G–3 agreed was critically short. From 1933 to 1938, General MacArthur and his successor, Gen. Malin Craig, kept their sights on a 165,000 man army. But their pleas received scant attention from the Congress or from the public; the annual reports of the Chief of Staff in peacetime are not documents of widespread public interest or concern.

Another serious mobilization problem was brought out in a G–1 study which reported that the supply of Regular Army officers was insufficient to meet the minimum demands of mobilization and would require the use of Regulars in successive assignments during the mobilization. There were approximately 12,000 officers in the Regular Army and all would be required for initial mobilization assignments. The subsequent mobilization, G–1 estimated, would require an absolute minimum of 6,000 Regular officers, the supply of which, however, had been totally expended in initial mobilization assignments. To rectify this G–1 recommended:

1. That the initial assignment of Regular officers must not be considered as a permanent or even semipermanent assignment.

2. That Regular officers in the Zone of the Interior must, when feasible, train understudies for themselves.

3. That emphasis must be laid on securing and training Reserve officers in mobilization duties in time of peace so that they may rapidly take over all, except for about 5 percent, of the corps areas, service command, and Zone of the Interior duties.[33]

While the General Staff pondered these disquieting figures, the Army commanders, still oblivious to them, were including in their staff rosters at least three times as many Regular officers as would be available to them under the most favorable conditions.[34] The recommendations of the G–1 on Regular officer assignments for mobilization were approved, with an added proviso that the promotion of Regulars, at least initially during mobilization, would continue to be made on the basis of seniority (with certain exceptions).[35]

---

[33] Memo, ACofS, G–1, to ACofS, WPD, 19 May 33, sub: Four Army Organization. G–1/12894–15. Copy in WPD 3561–17. DRB, TAG.

[34] Memo for record, Gen Kilbourne, no date, sub: Four Army Organization. WPD 3561–30. DRB, TAG.

[35] Memo, WPD to CofS, 30 Jun 33, sub: Four Army Organization. WPD 3561–21. DRB, TAG.

Also of assistance to the mobilization planners were the decisions of the Chief of Staff that the adjutant general of the corps area service command would assume command of the corps area on M-day. General MacArthur further decided that the organization of corps area service commands would be determined by the respective corps area commanders in their mobilization plans; that personnel allocated to service commands would be by bulk allotment not by units; that enlisted personnel mobilized for corps area service commands during the initial mobilization would be Regular Army, but thereafter, during the subsequent mobilization, they would be from the Organized Reserves; and that the War Department would retain direct responsibility for the organization of ports of embarkation and embarkation center commands.[36]

In spite of the mostly discouraging conclusions drawn by these realistic staff studies, work on the paper revision of the General Mobilization Plan continued. General Kilbourne reminded his staff associates on 22 June 1933: "The Chief of Staff is now urgently pressing completion of this work." [37] Perhaps the planners hoped that their paper mobilization plans would prove valuable in the event of an emergency. The mobilization plans from 1923 to 1936 were not based on realistic conditions—i. e., guns, ammunition, tanks, airplanes, soldiers, etc.—but on phantoms which it was hoped could acquire substance in time to give reality to the entire superstructure based on them. The weakness and fallibility of this reasoning was its failure to evaluate properly the one overriding factor of time, which would be required to transform paper phantoms into the realistic tools of war. Gen. Malin Craig, who perhaps better than anyone in the War Department understood the importance of "time" and who was to do more than anyone between the two world wars to substitute substance for fantasy in order to lessen the strain of "time," summed it up in the last report he made as Chief of Staff:

> . . . The problems encountered on my entry into office was the lack of realism in military war plans. . . . [They] comprehended many paper units, conjectural supply, and a disregard of the time element which forms the main pillar of any planning structure. . . . What transpires on prospective battlefields is influenced vitally years before in the councils of the staff and in the legislative halls of Congress. Time is the only thing that may be irrevocably lost, and it is the first thing lost sight of in the seductive false security of peaceful times. . . . The sums appropriated this year will not be fully transformed into military power for two years. Persons who state that they see no threat of the peace of the United States would hesitate to make that forecast through a two year period.[38]

---

[36] Memo, WPD to TAG, 22 May 33, sub: Development of the Four Army Organization. WPD 3561–17. DRB, TAG.

[37] Memo, ACofS, WPD to G–1, G–3, and G–4, 22 Jun 33, sub: Four Army Organization. WPD 3561–19. DRB, TAG.

[38] *Annual Report of Chief of Staff, 1939.*

But in 1933 staff planning continued, on the one hand, discouragingly realistic; on the other, unhampered by practical facts. At the same time that the Chief of Staff, in his 1933 annual report, was bluntly stating that the Army in personnel and equipment was unable to meet the goals contemplated in pending mobilization plans, those plans were nearing publication.

Progress Toward a New Mobilization Plan and a Dispute

There were several plans, directives, and regulations being worked on concurrently to complete the four-army organization plan for mobilization. The components of this planning specifically included the following:

1. Revision of pertinent Army Regulations to make the four-army organization effective (AR 10–15, "General Staff Organization and Duties"; AR 90–30, "Coast Artillery Corps Districts"; AR 160–10 [a new one], "Functions of Army Commanders"; AR 120–10, "Mobilization"; AR 170–10, "Duties of Corps Area and Department Commanders.")
2. Revision of the directives on the four-army organization.
3. Revision of the War Department General Mobilization Plan.
4. Preparation, revision, and amplification of Mobilization Regulations which had been begun in fragmentary form in 1928.
5. Revision of Colored War Plans to conform to the new Mobilization Plan.

By 1 July 1933 General Kilbourne was able to inform the Chief of Staff that progress on all of this planning was rapidly advancing toward completion.[39] The one new and four revised Army Regulations were the first planning objectives to be completed. They were approved by the Chief of Staff on 24 July 1933 and were published and dispatched to the field by The Adjutant General on 18 August 1933.

It had also been intended to have ready a revision of AR 95–5, "Air Corps, General Provisions," and AR 95–10, "Air Corps Troops," but this project had been materially delayed by controversy which, developing from a relatively minor disagreement, quickly grew into an eruption of staff and interservice friction. The atmosphere became so heated that it was deemed advisable to permit a cooling-off period before reaching a decision on the Air Corps AR's.

The controversy had its inception in the contention of Maj. Gen. B. D. Foulois, chief of the Air Corps, that the chief of the Air Corps, in peacetime, should be ex-officio, chief air officer, GHQ, and that the GHQ Air Force and commanding general, GHQ Air Force, should

[39] Memo, WPD to CofS, 1 Jul 33, sub: Progress Report on Four Army Organization. WPD 3561–22. DRB, TAG.

be established and made functional in peacetime. The General Staff was of the firm opinion that there should be no GHQ Air Force in peacetime, except on paper, and that the chief air officer, GHQ, when the latter was established, should be an officer other than the chief of the Air Corps. The reasoning of the General Staff was clear enough: the Staff was unwilling for the Air Corps to achieve autonomy which would have been the intended effect of making the chief of the Air Corps also the commanding general of a functioning GHQ Air Force; in the second place, the Staff felt that the chief of the Air Corps, in wartime, had a full time job and should not serve as chief air officer, GHQ. General Foulois retreated on the issue of the commanding general of a peacetime GHQ to avoid inevitable defeat, but he swiftly took the offensive again in a flurry of additional contentions which had the same ultimate goal of autonomy:

1. That Air Corps schools and technical establishments must be retained under the direct control of the chief of the Air Corps, in peace and war, and must not be decentralized to corps area commanders. (WPD concurred in this recommendation but G–3 was strongly opposed to it.)

2. That the chief of the Air Corps should in peacetime exercise tactical and technical control of Air Corps units wherever located and regardless of the duty to which assigned. (The entire General Staff was opposed to this contention, although WPD was willing to concede that the chief of the Air Corps should exercise supervision over the training of Air Corps units and should establish the policies and doctrines for that training.)

Diametrically counter to Air Corps aspirations and concepts of air power was the WPD opinion that ". . . cooperation with ground forces in campaign will be the greatest contribution the Air Corps can make to national success in war and that the only method by which such cooperation can be secured is by placing units of the GHQ Air Force, as well as corps and army observation units, in routine peacetime training under control of those who would command them in war—that is the Corps Area Commanders who would, in war, become Army and Corps Commanders."[40] There were additional points raised by General Foulois, all intended to give the Air Corps autonomy. But the Air Corps was defeated in all of the major skirmishes of this controversy when the Chief of Staff approved the recommendations of the General Staff in the matters under dispute.[41]

The entire Air Corps controversy served no immediate purpose other than to delay some of the mobilization plans then being prepared

---

[40] Memo, WPD to CofS, 20 Sep 33, sub: Revision of Army Regulations Affecting the Air Corps. WPD 3561–25. DRB, TAG.

[41] Memo, WPD to Ch of Air Corps, 13 Oct 33, sub: Revision of Army Regulations Affecting the Air Corps. *Ibid.* The Air Corps unsuccessfully revived the discussion in 1934. See: Memo, Lt Col J. E. Fickel to DCofS, 30 Jan 34, sub: Study on Command of the GHQ Air Force. *Ibid.*

for the Air Corps. It was clearly indicated, however, that the court martial of Brig. Gen. William Mitchell had not settled the status of the Air Corps within the services and that the question of air power versus balanced forces was to continue to shadow with increasing intensity all mobilization planning.

War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933

On 15 July 1933 the revised Mobilization Plan (less the A to J tables which pertained to supply computations and were for the use of the Assistant Secretary of War and the supply branches) was submitted to the Chief of Staff for approval and, with minor changes, was approved by him on 7 August 1933. The War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933 was published and issued to the field on 18 August 1933.[42] That same day another revision was issued of the "Directive for Four Army Organization"[43] (last revised on 6 February 1933), which included changes made in the newly revised mobilization plan and the Army Regulations pertaining to mobilization. The Mobilization Plan, 1933, in essence, was based on the concepts of the four-army organization and General MacArthur's insistence on an "Immediate Readiness Force." Some of the changes intended for the 1931 revision, which had never been published, were included in the 1933 Plan. In theory there were basic differences between the 1928 and the 1933 plans; in actuality the differences between the plans were hardly significant in their practical implementing provisions.

The surface changes brought about by the concept of the "Immediate Readiness Force" were as follows:

1. (a) The 1928 Plan had envisaged an orderly mobilization of the manpower of the United States over a long period of time which, at its conclusion, would produce a huge Army. It contained no provisions for a minor mobilization which might not require several million men: such minor mobilizations were to be taken care of in the special mobilization plans and were not included in the General Mobilization Plan.

(b) The 1933 Plan, in its stated purpose, provided for the mobilization of the manpower of the United States or *such part thereof* as might be necessary. It was intended to cover all mobilizations, large and small, without the need of any supplementary special mobilization plans which were, therefore, abolished.

2. To facilitate the mobilization of the "Immediate Readiness Force," all Organized Reserve units were eliminated from the early mobilization, and inactive Regular Army units substituted for them.

---

[42] The 1933 Plan omitted the adjective "General" from its title. For a copy of War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933, see: AG 381 (7–7–33) (1). National Archives.

[43] Memo, CofS to CG's, armies and corps areas, 18 Aug 33, sub: Development of Four Army Organization. WPD 3561–27. DRB, TAG.

By this means, mobilization could be initiated by the President without Congressional action. A statement to this effect was included in the 1933 Plan.

3. The 1933 Plan emphasized to a degree far greater than all previous mobilization plans, the employment of intensive volunteer recruiting to fill up units for the "Immediate Readiness Force."

4. The 1933 Plan based its M–day force on the actual strength of the Regular Army and National Guard on that day rather than on the theoretical 700,000 men which had been the point of departure in the 1928 Plan.

The mobilization periods in the 1933 Plan were divided into intervals of 30 days, each with definitely stipulated objectives. The first two periods comprised the *initial mobilization*, the effort which was to produce a highly mobile, well-integrated and balanced striking force; the last nine periods comprised the *subsequent mobilization*, which was to produce the mass army, if necessary, to back up and sustain the punch thrown by the striking force produced in the initial mobilization. [*Table 52* compares manpower procurement in the 1928 and 1933 plans.]

The 1933 Plan realistically started on M-day with the actual strength of 118,000 enlisted men for the Regular Army and 172,000 enlisted men for the National Guard, as contrasted with the theoretical M-day total of 700,000 Regular Army and National Guard enlisted men in the 1928 Plan. The personnel allocated to the Air Corps totaled 36,861 for the initial mobilization and 26,775 for the subsequent mobilization, a grand total of 63,636. Two years later, revisions of these allocations gave the Air Corps 94,141 for the initial mobilization and 121,020 for the subsequent mobilization, a total of 215,161 and an increase of more than 238 percent. In that two-year period the General Staff apparently became increasingly cognizant of the influence of air power.

The vigorous doubts concerning the rate of manpower procurement which had been expressed in some of the G–1 studies were reflected, in some degree, in the 1933 Plan by allowing additional time for manpower procurement. Where in the 1928 Plan it had been assumed that all personnel included in that plan would have been procured by M+5, the 1933 Plan estimated that it would be M+6. Where in the 1928 Plan it had been assumed that all personnel intended for the theater of operations would be ready by M+10, the 1933 Plan assumed that it would be M+12 before this ultimate goal of mobilization was achieved.

Several provisions in the 1933 Plan were indicative of the trend towards increasing centralized supervision over mobilization by the War Department. The 1933 Plan contained a statement that the ". . . War Department will exercise directing and supervisory control in the execution of this plan, issue schedules of troop requirements

*Table 52. Manpower Procurement, 1928 and 1933 Plans Compared**

Mobilization periods for forces and personnel	Troops	Number mobilized 1928 Plan	Number mobilized 1933 Plan	1933 Plan Time Personnel procured (for planning purposes)	1933 Plan Time ready for theater of operation
Initial Mobilization	(Regular Army and National Guard units).				
First objective	Active units of RA and NG, and those inactive units and replacements necessary for their completion, support, and maintenance.	700, 000	1,277,851 (estimated).	----------	Active RA ready on M-day. Federally recognized NG ready M-day to M+10 (days). Inactive units by M+3.
Second objective	Inactive RA and NG units to balance above force and furnish replacements to bring to and maintain at war strength all units of initial mobilization.	1, 695, 372	812,351	M+2	M+3 to M+6
Subsequent Mobilization	(Includes all Organized Reserve units.)				
First objective	Entire period covers all units not previously mobilized. Each objective contains balanced forces for reinforcement of the four armies, GHQ reserve, GHQ air force, and replacements.	311, 983	As of 18 Jul 33, not yet subdivided 2,409,798.	M+3	Mobilization begins when personnel for initial mobilization are procured. Training time for new regiments 4 mo. and new divisions 6 mo.
Second objective		427, 504		M+4	
Third objective		482, 006		M+5	
Fourth objective		685, 082		M+6	
		4, 301, 947	4,500,000 (approximately).		

*The personnel procurement charts of the War Department Mobilization Plan 1933 were revised and refined several times to correct the lack of detail in the original version.

for the theater of operations, and for other purposes." The activities exempt from corps area control, which in the 1928 Plan had been limited to the Army War College, the United States Military Academy, and War Department transportation offices, were expanded in the 1933 Plan to include additional service school plants (to be designated later); all War Department depots and remount installations; all production and procurement activities under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary of War; all ports of embarkation and embarkation centers; arms and service boards, laboratories, experimental and research installations which existed at stations transferred on M-day to corps area jurisdiction. An indirect reference directing corps area commanders to show in detail in their plans the "mobilization centers . . . they intend to establish" indicated that the concept of local mobilization responsibility for implementation had been abandoned.

The 1933 Plan was supplemented by four comprehensive Army Regulations: AR 120–10, "Mobilization"; AR 130–10, "National Guard; Call and Draft into Federal Service"; AR 160–10, "Armies"; and AR 170–10, "Corps Areas and Departments." There was a provision in the 1933 Plan for a comprehensive series of War Department "Mobilization Regulations," already prepared or in the course of preparation,[44] which prescribed in detail procedures to be employed by the corps area commanders during mobilization. These regulations included:

General Staff Division Supervision		*Mobilization Regulation*
G–1	1–1	"Procurement and Reception of Volunteers During Mobilization."
G–1	1–2	"Military Welfare and Recreation."
G–1	1–3	"Classification of Enlisted Men."
G–1	1–4	"Personnel Procurement through Selective Service."
G–1	1–5	"Standards of Physical Examinations During those Mobilization for Which Selective Service is Planned."
G–1	1–6	"Procurement of Officers."
G–1	1–7	"Wartime Classification of Commissioned Personnel."
G–1	1–8	"Initial Assignments of Regular Army Officers for Mobilization."
G–2	2–1	"Military Intelligence."
G–3	3–1	"Training."
G–3	3–2	"Air Corps Mobilization."
G–4	4–1	"Transportation."
G–4	4–2	"Shelter and Facilities."
G–4	4–3	"Hospitalization."
G–4	4–4	"Supply."

[44] Both of the G–3 MR's were delayed several years to the obvious detriment to mobilization planning by lower units.

The 1928 Plan had made reference to a few of these Mobilization Regulations which were then only in tentative draft form without specific number or much detail. Their more usable inclusion in the 1933 Plan pointed the corps area commanders in the direction which the War Department intended they should go during mobilization.

New in the 1933 Plan were, of course, the duties and responsibilities of the four-army commanders which were briefly described as:

1. Supervision of the training of their armies and of their concentration in the theater of operations when ordered.

2. Within the priorities established by the War Department, the prescribing of priorities in training, equipment, supplies, and transportation for the units of their armies.

3. The mobilization and training of army and corps staffs.

The corps area commanders' responsibilities, which in the 1928 Plan had included "all military activities" except for certain areas specifically exempted, were reduced in 1933 to the mobilization of all troops and zone of the interior installations not specifically exempted. Except for tactical army and corps staffs, the planning and implementation of mobilization was left with the corps areas.

As was to be expected from the Chief of Staff's ideas, the 1933 Plan placed considerably more faith on volunteer enlistments. The 1928 Plan had limited such enlistments to units mobilized during the first period; the 1933 Plan did not provide for any limitation of volunteer enlistment until after procurement from selective service was effective. A new provision in the 1933 Plan provided for procurement and utilization of limited service personnel in the Zone of the Interior. The data in the 1933 Plan concerning corps area service commands was somewhat less definite than in the 1928 Plan. As it was, there was widespread unfamiliarity with these service commands, their mission, and intended operations, all of which were so important to mobilization implementation.

The provision in the 1928 Plan which provided for the procurement and training of enlisted cadres for each inactive Regular Army and Organized Reserve unit prior to their mobilization was continued in the 1933 Plan. The 1933 Plan made no change in the training of officer candidates; this was to be accomplished in schools set up by the corps area commanders. Service schools and the Reserve Officers Training Corps were discontinued in the 1933 Plan as they had been in 1928. The short-range need for Regular Army officers was so overwhelming that it continued to obscure the long-range need for officers trained for higher command and staff assignments.

The mechanics of supply in the corps areas was essentially the same in the 1933 Plan as in 1928. Each provided for one supply point in each corps area; the added provision in the 1933 Plan, which allotted the corps area commanders credits on War Department supply depots,

added some flexibility. Also of value were the more detailed and specific provisions and procedures for local procurement which were contained in MR 4–4.

The 1933 Plan's priorities for the assignment of personnel for the objectives of the initial mobilization were somewhat better formulated than in previous plans. The tables which were included with the 1933 Plan described in detail:

1. The units to be mobilized by name and number;
2. Where and when mobilized;
3. When ready for theater of operation;
4. The number of men in every category by 30 day periods;
5. The corps area and War Department overhead organizations;
6. Tables for the organization of enlisted cadres.

The overall effect of War Department Mobilization Plan 1933 was not essentially different from that of 1928, although at the time of its appearance it was hailed as a startlingly new and presumably vastly improved approach to mobilization planning. The concept of four armies set up in advance, all mobilizing concurrently, was indeed new and different from the old concept of six armies being mobilized progressively but this new concept was integrated with the older mobilization concepts For all practical purposes, the 1933 Mobilization Plan simply adapted the figures, procedures, and tables of the 1928 Plan to the four-army organization. There were some variations in the timetable, but in 1933, as in 1928, the end result would have been an army of over 4,000,000 men mobilized in about six months, all of whom would be fit and ready to fight in some theater of operations in less than a year. The 1933 Plan, on paper, provided an immediate readiness force prepared to fight almost at once. Even before the plan was published, authoritative staff studies had made it clear that neither the men nor the equipment for that immediate readiness force could be procured nor fitted together into an integrated fighting machine in the time expected. The 1933 Mobilization Plan was a step forward in its concept of the four-army organization and the immediate readiness force, but these concepts were in the realm of pure theory. The laboratory work necessary to translate theory into practical, usable fact had not been successfully accomplished in the 1933 Plan.

The basic problems which had so perplexed the planners who worked on the 1933 Plan had not been solved by the time of its publication but had been skirted or glossed over. Included in these basic problems were:

1. An accurate estimate of a possible rate of manpower procurement.

2. Precise determination of how much equipment and materiel would be necessary for mobilization, where it was to be procured, and how fast.

3. An accurate corollary between manpower procurement and materiel procurement.

4. Precise determination of when volunteer enlistment should terminate and selective service begin.

5. Coherent balancing of manpower and equipment procurement for the Army (including the Air Corps) and the Navy.

6. The method whereby the small Regular Army could be utilized as an immediate readiness force at the same time that it was providing the framework for a vast mobilization of a citizen army.

7. The formula whereby corps area service commands could mobilize themselves at the same time that they were mobilizing millions of men.

8. The determination of an optimum delineation between centralized supervision of mobilization by the War Department and decentralized implementation by corps areas and army commanders.

9. The integration of a comprehensive military research and development program with mobilization plans.

10. Closer, faster coordination between the General Staff mobilization planners and the Assistant Secretary of War's industrial mobilization planners.

Even before the 1933 Plan was published, the General Staff was engaged in studies which highlighted its imperfections and impracticability. All General Staff divisions, with the exception of G–2, engaged in these studies. The staff divisions which were concerned with the most doubtful elements of the 1933 Plan, materiel procurement and manpower procurement, were, of course, G–4 and G–1. It was understandable, therefore, that these were the staff divisions which most intensified their efforts to produce evidence not only to prove what could *not* be done but what *could* be done.

The G–4 problems were the more involved and intricate, for they involved the immediate procuring of existing types of equipment for the 1,000,000 men of the initial mobilization as well as improved types of equipment for eventual use. There was an unfortunate belief not only in Congress but in some echelons of the General Staff that equipment for those 1,000,000 men was no severe problem since it already was stored in Army depots (World War I surplus) or could be made readily available from commercial sources.[45] Unfortunately, technology had made considerable strides since World War I and changes in tables of organization and equipment had been so many and so varied that there was critical shortages of materiel for the 1,000,000 even though the World War I surplus was overabundant in some no longer usable items.

[45] "The initial mobilization included no units for which equipment was not now on hand or could be procured by the time the units needed it." Memo, WPD to G4, Mar 34, sub: Revision of Six-Year War Department Programs. G–4/29552. Copy in AG 111 (6–5–36) Misc. D–M. DRB, TAG.

The Six-Year Programs

G–4 had begun considering this dual problem of providing enough materiel to satisfy the immediate needs of mobilization and to have procurable enough improved materiel for the ultimate mobilization while the 1933 Mobilization Plan was still being drafted. On 16 September 1932, G–4, in a memorandum to all the supply services, directed that preparation of a coordinated research and development plan to cover the six-year period, 1934–40.[46] Although this memorandum indicated little hope for funds for research and rearmament programs, nevertheless it made the point clear that priorities were desirable for items in those programs so that whatever funds were made available could be properly allocated. From this memorandum there rapidly developed the "War Department Six-Year Programs" whose two objections—(1) research and development and (2) rearmament and reequipment—hopefully had as a goal the equipping of the first 1,000,000 men of the Mobilization Plan; the same 1,000,000 men for whom WPD, in a fine example of lack of staff coordination, in 1934 was still assuming that equipment was neatly stocked and ready.[47]

The Six-Year Programs, visionary as they may have been initially in their hopes of attainment, were practical, sound, and well-formulated in their detail. The 1933 "Policy for Mechanization and Motorization," established on 22 November 1933 as a part of the overall program, was the first coherent War Department staff effort after World War I to take military cognizance of the significant improvements which had been made and were being made by industry in the fields of wheeled and track vehicles. Beginning in 1933, G–4 studied the possibility of obtaining some of the funds being appropriated to relieve the economic depression for implementing the Six-Year Programs. It was, therefore, with hope as well as vision that G–4 in 1934 began to prepare a revision of the Six-Year Programs. Not only the supply services but also the combat arms and the corps area commanders were called on for data to be used in this revision.[48] At this time the eventual goal of the program was expanded to provide equipment not only for the 1,000,000 men of the initial mobilization, but also for personnel and units additional thereto who were needed to balance that force. WPD, in its comments to the G–4 staff study recommending a revision of the Six-Year Program, had concurred but had recommended that

[46] G–4 memo, 16 Sep 32, sub: Research and Development, Rearmament and Reequipment, Progress. G–4/29552. DRB, TAG.

[47] Memo, WPD to G–4, Mar 34, sub: Revision of Six-Year War Department Programs. G–4/29552. Copy in AG 111 (6–5–36) Misc. D–M. DRB, TAG.

[48] Ltr, TAG to all chs of branches and services and CG's, Armies and corps, 24 Mar 34, sub: Revision of Six-Year War Department Programs (F. Y. 1936 to F. Y. 1941). AG 111 (3–14–34) Misc. M–D. Copy in AG 111 (6–5–36) Misc. D–M. DRB, TAG.

the program be expanded ". . . to provide standardized equipment for units not now included in the initial mobilization but which should be so included when the equipment therefore becomes available." [49] G–4 heartily concurred in this recommendation and adopted it for its own use.

In a progress report to the Deputy Chief of Staff on 7 September 1934, G–4 asserted that the War Department could not be content with partially equipping the first million men but that equipment for certain units to make up a balanced force in the subsequent mobilization should be provided for also. In response to the G–4 request for comments, G–3 prepared a priority listing of active Regular Army units for rearmament and reequipment and recommended a priority for research and development as follows:

First priority to be given to:
- Mechanization
- Motorization (special types)
- Aircraft
- Chemical
- Radio (mechanization and aircraft)
- Shoulder Semi-Automatic Rifle

Second priority to be given to:
- Antiaircraft Guns
- Antitank Guns
- Self-Propelled Guns

Third priority to be given to:
- New means for other arms and services
- Improvement in existing means [50]

Army Budgetary Problems

Closely related to the Six-Year Programs was the general Army budgetary situation in the 1930's. Congress had established an executive budget system for the Federal Government when it passed the Budget and Accounting Act of June 10, 1921. That act created the Bureau of the Budget which acted on behalf of the President in receiving requests for appropriations from the executive departments including the War Department. Procedure under the Budget and Accounting Act required the Secretary of War to submit to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget an estimate of the requirements necessary to sustain the Army for all purposes during the next fiscal

[49] Memo, WPD to G–4, Mar 34, sub: Revision of Six-Year War Department Programs. G–4/29552. Copy in AG 111 (6–5–36) Misc. D–M. DRB, TAG.

[50] Memo, G–3 to G–4, 14 Apr 34, sub: Revision of Six-Year War Department Programs. G–3/33046. Copy in AG 111 (6–5–36) Misc. D–M. DRB, TAG.

year. These estimates, after being reviewed by the Bureau of the Budget and considered in connection with those submitted by the other executive departments, with all estimates weighed and balanced within the financial program prescribed by the President were returned to the Secretary of War with information as to the total amount allocated to the War Department for all purposes for the fiscal year in question. Usually the War Department General Staff then had to reconsider its original estimates and whittle them down to meet the limits imposed by the Bureau of the Budget. This whittled-down estimate was then resubmitted by the Secretary of War to the Director of the Budget with a supplementary estimate of items which the Secretary felt were also essential but which exceeded the Budget Bureau's original limit. Upon approval by the Budget Bureau of the revised estimates of the War Department, these estimates, together with those of all the other executive departments, were transmitted to Congress by the President as the budget for the fiscal year in question.

The War Department was obliged by law to support the President's budget requests before the Congress. The Budget and Accounting Act specifically provided:

> No estimate or request for an appropriation and no request for an increase in an item of any such estimate or request, and no recommendation as to how the revenue needs of the Government should be met, shall be submitted to Congress or any committee thereof by any officer or employee of any department or establishment, unless at the request of either House of Congress.[51]

During most of the period 1921–39 there were no major threats of war as far as the United States was concerned, and the successive Presidents and Congresses were not disposed to spend large sums for war preparations. The Nation was absorbed with its return to "normalcy" and later with the great economic depression of the 1930's. Although inclined to view with alarm the condition of the Army, the War Department was not inclined to risk censure by recommending extensive military appropriations. The War Department rarely submitted budgetary requests for what was considered necessary to procure the required men and materiel for the Army. Prior to 1938 the Bureau of the Budget rarely called on the War Department to justify the requests it had made but slashed those requests on the basis of its own judgment. And the Congress, during those years of peace, was not disposed to delve into the state of the Nation's defenses. The Secretaries of War and the Chiefs of Staff sounded warnings in their annual reports, but few read those reports and of those who read them fewer still were influenced by them. Occasionally, a Chief of Staff

[51] 42 *Stat.* 21.

did speak up before Congress, but even then it was more to express frustration than to give advice, as in the following instance:

> The responsibility for the skeletonization of all elements of the Army rests squarely upon two groups, the Budget and the Congress. . . . because the Budget does not send the figures up here, that does not relieve the Congress of the United States from raising and maintaining armies, . . . The Constitution places the final responsibility not upon the Budget, not upon the War Department, but upon one group alone, and that is the Congress of the United States.[52]

Sen. Royal S. Copeland, chairman of the Senate subcommittee on Military Appropriations, admitted that ". . . Congress may have hidden behind the petticoats of the Budget." [53]

There was sufficient blame for the Army's budgetary problems to charge them not only to the Congress and the Bureau of the Budget but also to the War Department for its diffidence in recommending what it believed was right and for its too great concern with political expediency. [See *table 53* for a summary of the budget requests and appropriations, 1934–39.] All three were, perhaps, equally guilty during the late 1920's and early 1930's. Even as late as 1934 and 1935, the relatively meager Army budgetary requests were radically reduced by the Budget Bureau and were subsequently reduced still further by the Congress. During those years, however, the Congress was aware that the War Department would receive allocations from emergency PWA and WPA funds, but they could be utilized only for public works and real estate maintenance and did not add one man or gun to the Army's combat strength. Finally, the War Department felt impelled to request more combat readiness funds for fiscal year 1936. These the Bureau of the Budget cut by approximately $30,000,000 or something better than 8 per cent of the amount requested. However, Congress not only restored the amount but added $2,000,000 to it: enough to give the Army the 165,000 enlisted men it so urgently needed.

A year earlier, in fiscal year 1935, the Congress had authorized in its appropriations an enlisted strength of 165,000 men although the Budget Bureau had only recommended a strength of 118,570 men. That year the President had released only enough of the appropriated money to permit the Army to expand to 147,000 men. Again in fiscal 1936, the Administration doled out only enough of the money, appropriated by Congress, for the Army's strength to rise to 158,620. It was not until fiscal year 1938 that the War Department's long-sought goal of 165,000 men was reached but by that time the 165,000-man

---

[52] Statement. Gen MacArthur in *Hearings* before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U. S. Senate, 73d Cong., 2d sess., on War Department Appropriation Bill for 1935, p. 26, as cited in Elias Huzar, *The Purse and the Sword* (Cornell University Press, 1950), pp. 149–50.

[53] *Ibid.*

*Table 53. Military Estimates of the War Department and the President and Appropriations by the Congress**

Fiscal year	Estimate requested by the War Department		Total reductions made in the Bureau of the Budget	Estimates sent by the President to the Congress		Total changes made by the Congress	Authorized by the Congress		Allocations from Emergency funds	Total of military funds
	Cash	Contract authority		Cash	Contract authority		Cash [a]	Contract authority		
1934	320, 900, 513	0	40, 153, 672	277, 746, 841	3, 000, 000	−680, 460	277, 066, 381	3, 000, 000	34, 069, 422	314, 135, 803
1935	305, 271, 321	0	16, 311, 166	285, 960, 155	3, 000, 000	−5, 098, 061	280, 862, 094	3, 000, 000	8, 857, 678	292, 719, 772
1936	361, 351, 154	0	29, 551, 877	331, 799, 277	0	+31, 425, 680	355, 538, 204	7, 686, 753	9, 551, 451	372, 776, 408
1937	467, 022, 915	0	75, 957, 405	383, 065, 510	8, 000, 000	+10, 849, 135	388, 244, 859	13, 669, 786	18, 069, 820	419, 984, 465
1938	468, 204, 851	0	31, 709, 515	426, 033, 336	10, 462, 000	+3, 377, 087	417, 985, 029	21, 887, 394	74, 939, 334	514, 811, 757
1939	584, 002, 130	46, 801, 000	32, 787, 114	532, 088, 122	65, 927, 894	+13, 832, 375	531, 001, 997	80, 846, 394	31, 097, 625	642, 946, 016

[a] It should be noted that any cash appropriated in any given year to liquidate contract authority for a previous year or years is included in this column and in the *Total of Military Funds* column, and that a duplication therefore exists in these columns in the amount of cash appropriated to liquidate contract authority.

*Source: Incl 1, "Appropriations, War Department Military Establishment, Fiscal Years 1932 through 1941" to ltr, Pearl Harbor Investigating Comm to Hon. F. B. Keefe, HR, 19 Oct 45. WDSBV 334. Copy in Budget Div, OCA; *Congressional Record*, vol. 88, pt. 4, p. 5493.

Army was no longer the ultimate goal and had even been passed as an intermediate goal.[54]

No Money for Research

The hopes of G–4 for an expanding military budget during the middle 1930's were not realized to any appreciable degree until late 1939 and thereafter, but the plans which were made for spending the money that was not forthcoming were of inestimable value in spending the small amount of money that had been made available. The peacetime Army in 1939 was not well-equipped, but it was as well-equipped as it could have been with the funds provided. The G–4 plans did insure that those funds were allocated in accordance with a coherent, well-formulated long-range program.[55]

The G–4 expectations that some NRA, WPA, PWA, or similar relief agency funds might be allocated for defense purposes were realized in July 1933 when the President allocated $2,500,000 of such funds to Government arsenals for additional munitions manufacture, but the opposition against this use of relief money was so loud that Congress, in the second National Recovery Administration appropriation bill, forbade the expending of relief money for munitions manufacture, a prohibition which continued in effect until 1937.[56] From a morale standpoint, the "Final Report of the War Department

---

[54] Huzar, *op. cit.*, p. 144. Another problem in the War Department's budgetary operations was the allocation of its appropriated funds into rigid budget compartments. The Bureau of the Budget established over one hundred compartments for which specific sums were requested for the War Department and for which the Congress appropriated specific sums. Money allocated to one compartment could not be diverted to any other compartment. As late as fiscal 1941 the regular and supplementary military appropriations acts allocated about $13.5 billion dollars to the War Department in 111 compartments. The Adjutant General's Department, for example, was given $1,797,856 in the regular appropriation. Even if that Department had required but $1,797,855 the dollar saved could not have been utilized by any other War Department agency. The same regular appropriation allocated $6,768,000 for War Department personnel services in the District of Columbia broken down into 19 rigid categories. Since budgets were prepared two years in advance, presumably the Secretary of War was expected to know down to the last clerk how much administrative assistance he would need two years later in the 19 specified categories. The rigidity of peacetime fiscal procedures severely impeded flexible operations by the War Department when the defense program made flexibility mandatory.

[55] How scarce the money was which the Army was given to spend for new equipment and for research is recounted in Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950), n. p. 31; beginning in 1930, the annual percentage of allowances for new military equipment in the War Department budget was: 1930—8.5%; 1931—9.2%; 1932—9.6%; 1933—6.2%; 1934—3.2%; 1935—7.6%; 1936—15.3%; 1937—16.3%; 1938—14.1%; 1939—18.5%. As late as 1939, there was allocated only five million dollars, 1.1% of the Army budget, for research and development. H. D. Cater, "Annotations of War Department Spokesmen Relative to the Inadequacy of the National Defense During the Period 1919 to 1941" (MS in Gen Ref Off, OCMH) estimates that of $6,169,300,000 military appropriations for the Army from 1925–1940 (incl), 8.3% was for Air Corps equipment and 5.6% for ground forces' arms and equipment: the balance of 86.1% was for "recurrent charges"—i. e., pay, clothing, subsistence—"and improvement of plant."

[56] Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

Special Committee on the Army Air Corps" (Baker Board), which recommended not only increased funds for Air Corps research and development but also for modernizing the whole Army, may have been stimulating to G–4, but neither the President nor his Budget Bureau appear to have been impressed by the Board's gentle criticism of them for their failure to approve that increase in funds.[57]

After 1934 the General Staff planners were increasingly aware of the influence on mobilization of rearmament, reequipment, research, and development. The average expenditures for research and equipment in the Army, during the period 1924–33 had been $4,600,000, hardly a significant amount. During late 1934 and early 1935, when Budget planning was in progress for fiscal year 1937, Brig. Gen. R. E. Callan, ACofS, G–4, stirred by the Baker Board's recommendation and by the studies of his own staff, proposed a continuing research and development program calling for $9,000,000 annually: $5,000,000 for the Air Force and $4,000,000 for the rest of the Army. Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, with some doubt at what the attitude of Congress might be, approved the $9,000,000 figure for planning purposes. So convincing were the arguments made by the supply services for research funds that G–4 approved requests for $14,000,000 which General Drum cut to $9,064,500.[58] This amount, considered by G–4 to be something less than an absolute minimum, was even more severely cut to $7,160,400 by the President's Budget Advisory Committee.[59]

Exactly the same procedure was repeated the following year in the budget work for fiscal year 1938. The supply services submitted requests for $13,000,000 which G–4 reduced to $8,231,000. This amount, approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff, was again cut by the Budget Advisory Committee to $7,011,360. The Congress did not have the opportunity to weigh the merits of the Army's requests for more money for research; indeed, the Congress did not even know the requests had been made. The fact that about $2,500,000 more was allocated for research in each of the fiscal years 1937 and 1938 over the preceding 10 years is perhaps less significant than the fact that the allocation in each of these two fiscal years was arbitrarily cut

[57] The Special Committee, headed by Newton D. Baker, was composed of four other civilians, including Dr. Karl T. Compton and Mr. James H. Doolittle, and of five military members, including Maj Gen Hugh A. Drum, Deputy Chief of Staff, and Maj Gen B. D. Foulois, Chief of the Air Corps. The Committee, popularly known as the Baker Board, was convened in Apr 34, as a result of the Air Corps' experiences in carrying the mail. In its final report submitted in July 34, the Baker Board, in addition to the recommendations already mentioned above, rejected a separate Air Force but urged better integrated Army and Navy defense cooperation through existing media, as the Joint Army-Navy Board which, it was strongly implied, should have operative as well as deliberative functions.

[58] Memo, ACofS, G–4, for CofS, with DCofS approval, 30 Jan 35, sub: Research and Development Program, FY 1937. File G–4/29552. DRB, TAG.

[59] Memo, ACofS, G–4, for CofS, 10 Oct 35, sub: Research and Development Program, FY 1938. *Ibid.*

$2,000,000 below what was recommended by the Army as absolute minimum.[60]

By 1936 there had been a complete change in the General Staff policy makers. A new G–4, Brig. Gen. George R. Spalding, and a new Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, with the approval of the new Chief of Staff, Gen. Malin Craig, changed the research policy, which they felt was taking up so much time, effort, and money that the Army would never get equipped. General Spalding directed the supply services to cease diverting money and time to research on unessential items, and to concentrate on getting the Army equipped with the best material currently available.[61] This policy was to result in some major errors, as the purchase and issue of the 37-mm antitank gun, which was worthless before it was adopted; but it also provided the Army with an excellent antiaircraft gun, and the invaluable 81-mm and 60-mm mortars. The decisions which the General Staff had to make in several of these instances were not easy. In the case of the 37-mm antitank gun, for example, the tactical ground forces were pressing urgently for *immediate* issue of antitank guns, of which they had none, while the chief of Ordnance was advising strongly against the procurement of the 37-mm gun (the only one available for immediate procurement in quantity) and urging further ordnance research to produce a more satisfactory gun. The General Staff's decision—to accede to ground force pleas for an antitank gun *now*—was not precisely the right decision, but it was in accord with what was basically a proper policy: to get the Army reequipped *now*.

The emphasis on research priorities for critically necessary equipment had shifted materially since 1934 when the first recommended priority listing had been set up. By 1937, the equipment which was to receive highest research and development priority was in the fields of:

1. Detection of approach of hostile aircraft.
2. Fire control equipment for antiaircraft artillery.
3. Improved aerial mapping and map reproduction techniques.
4. Antimechanized weapons.
5. Aircraft and aircraft propulsion.
6. Improved aerial navigation equipment.[62]

The highest priorities were thus assigned to primarily defensive weapons with the possible exception of part of the air research. Anti-

[60] For a more complete account of the struggle for research and development funds, see: Watson, *op. cit.*, ch. II.

[61] Memo, ACofS, G–4, for CofS, 30 Oct 36, sub: Research and Development for FY 1939. G–4/29552. DRB, TAG.

[62] Memo, ACofS, G–4, for CofS, 10 Mar 37, sub: War Dept Research and Development Program, FY 1939. *Ibid.*

mechanized weapons were on the high priority list, but tanks and other mechanized offensive weapons were omitted.

The G–4 effort to restrict rampant research and to concentrate on essentials was a short-lived program. The services, after a relatively brief period during which their requests for research funds were somewhat reduced, soon were increasing their estimates for the expanding needs of critical items of equipment. In view of the deteriorating world situation, G–4, in spite of his own policy, found it impossible to disapprove many of these requests; the Budget Bureau, however, was still reducing them as late as 1939. By mid-1939 the President's decision in favor of air rearmament broke down the Bureau of the Budget's resistance to research expenditures, which in fiscal year 1940 rose to a new high of $12,942,810. But even this was dwarfed by the appropriations for fiscal year 1941 (after the collapse of France and the disaster of Dunkirk suddenly brought the war very close): $25,000,000 for Army research, *other than Air Corps;* $102,000,000 for the Air Corps alone, $42,540,012 of which was in connection with the heavy bomber program so long frowned upon by the General Staff and disapproved officially as late as 1938.

The Congress blamed the Army for errors attributable to inadequate research, such as the 37-mm antitank gun. The Army had standardized an inefficient weapon at a time when other nations were developing far superior weapons; our failure to produce a better weapon was due to inadequate and even nonexistent research conducted by Army Ordnance. This made it easy to blame the Army, but the injustice of these charges was too much for G–4 who was so close to the situation that barbs cast at the Army research program hit him first. G–4 reminded the Chief of Staff that his estimates had been arbitrarily slashed by the Bureau of the Budget which had not consulted G–4 on where the cuts should be made. The blame, G–4 felt, was properly the Budget Bureau's. General Craig agreed with G–4 that the Budget Bureau should be blamed officially, but did nothing about it.[63]

As late as 1940 the mechanics of developing a new piece of equipment were so slow and cumbersome that the Chief Signal Officer, Maj. Gen. J. O. Mauborgne, personally discussed the matter with Gen. George C. Marshall, then Chief of Staff. General Mauborgne complained that in accordance with established procedure, it would take about six years to get a new device to the combat arm that had requested it, and that 27 months of that time was consumed in budget red tape. The general substantiated his report with a chart outlining the theoretical progress of a new item, but he could better have proved his point by using progress charts of factual items, as the EE–8 field telephone, which took 18 years and 29 steps from request to delivery.

[63] Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

The Logistical Feasibility of the 1933 Mobilization Plan

Reequipping the Army, along with the necessary research and development, constituted but one of the two major planning problems of G–4. The second problem, equally complex, was to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the mobilization of manpower, contemplated by the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933, could be adequately equipped and supplied. G–4, the supply services, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War had been convinced even before the 1933 Mobilization Plan was published that it set impossible goals for industry, but the need was for statistical facts to convince G–3, WPD, and the Chief of Staff. By the early spring of 1934, the tables of organization and allowances on which to base the new supply studies were ready.[64]

G–4 was prompt to prepare a directive to the chiefs of supply arms and services calling upon them, on the basis of the tables issued, to compute the requirements of the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933 up to M+11, including therein maintenance and distribution factors, but *not* including provisions for the building of theater of operations reserve supplies.[65] The G–4 recommended directive was approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff on 2 May 1934 and was dispatched to the supply arms and services on 7 May 1934.[66]

In spite of G–4 pressure to expedite the computation of mobilization requirements, it was a year before the desired data was being submitted by the supply arms and services. As fast as the lists of requirements were received, they were quickly checked by G–4, and then forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of War for comment. The Planning Branch of the Assistant Secretary's Office replied in each instance that procurement plans for the requirements of the 1933 Mobilization Plan had not yet been prepared by the respective supply services and that data was therefore not yet available ". . . on which to base a categorical answer as to procurement possibilities." But the Assistant Secretary pessimistically continued, ". . . Since the industrial load under the 1933 Plan does not differ materially from that under the 1924 Plan, it would appear that many important items cannot be obtained during the time period covered by the 1933 Mobilization Plan." [67]

---

[64] Sec: Memo for TAG, 14 Apr 34, sub: War Planning Requirements. G–4/13765–89. Copy in AG 381 (4–4–34) (Misc.) D–M, National Archives.

[65] *Ibid.* Maintenance factors were defined as "providing for the stocks required to maintain initial issues"; distribution factors as "providing for the stocks to enable the total issues for any period to be made as needed." Computation of requirements for the building of theater reserve supplies were to be included in the logistic annexes of the various color plans.

[66] TAG ltr of May 34, sub: War Planning Requirements. *Ibid.*

[67] 2d Ind, OASW to TAG, to ltr, Ch of Ord, 7 Mar 35, sub: Troop Requirements under the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933. AG 381 (3–7–35) (Misc.) D, National Archives. The same indorsement was by the OASW on all the requirement lists referred for comment.

It was hardly surprising that the supply services had not yet prepared procurement plans based on the 1933 Mobilization Plan's requirements since they had just finished computing the requirements. It will be recalled that the supply services first computed requirements under the aegis of G–4 and then continued computations to ascertain whether procurement could meet those requirements. These latter computations were done under the direction and supervision of the Assistant Secretary of War.

Although the complete analysis of procurement capabilities for the 1933 Mobilization Plan was not to be completed until October 1936, spot checks of various items of ordnance, signal corps, and aviation equipment, made by the supply services, the Office of the Assistant Secretary, and at the Army Industrial College showed conclusively that production would fall far behind requirements in critical items of technical equipment. This verified the complete lack of balance between contemplated manpower mobilization and the supply factor.

As early as 1934, student committees at the Army War College were familiar enough with some of these studies to have serious doubts about the practicability of the 1933 Mobilization Plan from the supply viewpoint and were pointing out that ". . . The system of mobilization should provide for close coordination between the mobilization of manpower and the supply of essential military equipment, munitions, and supplies that are or can be available at a given time." [68] The committee pointed out the following defects in the 1933 Plan:

1. The expected rate of production of units ready to fight was impracticable.
2. The Regular Army was given duties incompatible with its depleted strength.
3. The plan placed undue reliance upon the use of untrained troops in the theater of operations.
4. War reserves, in certain important particulars, were inadequate to meet the requirements of the units sent to the theater of operations.
5. The plan was incomplete inasmuch as it had not then been completely coordinated with the potential supply of munitions.[69]

The War College study's significance is enhanced by the close relationship which existed then between students at the War College and the War Department General Staff. The views expressed in student studies and reports were unquestionably colored by interviews which they had with members of the General Staff and by perusal of General Staff studies. The doubts at the War College concerning the supply adequacy of the 1933 Mobilization Plan reflected the views

[68] Rpt, Com No. 2, AWC, 29 Sep 34, sub: Mobilization Plans. G–3 Course No. 12 (1934–35). Army War College.
[69] *Ibid.*

of G–4 and the Planning Branch, Office of the Assistant Secretary, and the uneasiness about the manpower procurement rate indicated the new thinking then manifesting itself for the first time in the G–1 Division.

The Personnel Feasibility of the 1933 Mobilization Plan

During the mobilization planning from 1920 to 1933, the planners had waivered back and forth on the issue of supply probability, but they had always been optimistic concerning manpower probability. Occasionally, some uneasiness may have been expressed about the feasibility of training the vast hordes who were to be procured so rapidly; and even less occasionally, fear was expressed that the dispatch of untrained troops to the theater of operations might have an unfortunate effect on combat efficiency. But these were minor discordant notes. The insistence of General MacArthur in 1932 on increased emphasis on voluntary enlistments had forced the personnel planners to abandon their unrealistic plan of instituting selective service on M-day. This in turn helped force the personnel planners into making the ". . . painstaking analysis of the basic problem of procurement, induction, classification, and assignment of personnel for mobilization" which was to pull the manpower prop from under the 1933 Mobilization Plan as surely and decidedly more abruptly than G–4 had pulled out the supply prop.[70]

The G–1 studies in 1932 and 1933 were initially concerned with the impossible demands being made in mobilization plans for Regular Army officers. The weakness of the 1933 Mobilization Plan in this respect was so manifest that G–1 was impelled to make further studies to try to find the best method of utilizing Regular officers during a mobilization. No satisfactory solution was immediately found; the G–1 recommendation that Regular officers be shunted from assignment to assignment during mobilization had obvious limitations. Also subject to increasing criticism was the G–1 prepared mobilization regulation which provided that each peacetime Regular Army table of organization officer position be given a mobilization assignment, and that whatever regular officer was occupying the peacetime position would on M-day move over to the mobilization slot. This solution was widely heralded as sound and feasible when first advanced, but disadvantages soon became apparent requiring further staff study.

The reports of the Baker Board and of the Special Committee of the General Council on the Employment of the Army Air Corps (Drum Board), both of which had recommended expansion of the Air Corps, made necessary G–1 studies not only to provide plans for

[70] G–1, "Notes on War Planning and Mobilization Planning," 1 Jul 37. G–1/14821. Copy in AG 381 (8–12–37) (2). National Archives. This is a valuable summary of G–1's views throughout this period.

such Air Corps increases but also to review and bring up to date Major Army Project No. 1 (the plan for a 165,000-man Regular Army). This was necessary since it was the view of the Chief of Staff that personnel increases in the Air Corps should be balanced by vital increases in the ground forces. No opportunity was lost between 1933 and 1938 to press for the accomplishment of Major Army Project No. 1.[71]

As the G–1 Division worked on solutions to these problems, it realized that they could be solved only by a comprehensive, detailed study which would embrace all of the personnel problems incident to mobilization. G–1 recommended to the Chief of Staff ". . . that certain matters of vital importance should be examined into . . . before Project No. 1 can be set up upon a sound basis." Included in these matters were:

1. The organization of the arms and services.
2. The principles of organization to be emphasized.
3. The organization of infantry and cavalry divisions including mechanized, motorized and animalized units and the peacetime distribution.
4. The extent to which the arms should be mechanized.
5. The determination of an organization for a basic unit of a mechanized force, contributions to be made by the arms and services concerned.
6. The organization of the services within the field army.
7. The proportion of antiaircraft to be initially organized.
8. The ability of the ROTC system as set up to procure reserve officers according to branch needs.[72]

G–1 suggested that to work on these studies there be constituted, under G–1 supervision, a General Staff committee from the G–1 and G–3 staff divisions.[73] The comments from the other staff divisions were favorable, but G–3 felt that the committee should have members from *all* the General Staff divisions and that it should be under G–3 supervision, since organization, the main item on the proposed agenda, was a G–3 staff responsibility. G–3 further emphasized that a restudy of the organization of the Army was long overdue since it had not been done comprehensively since 1920. The existing organization, which had been designed for a Regular Army of 280,000 and a National Guard of 400,000, had become confused by reductions in strength, by technical progress, and by tactical changes. Piecemeal attempts to adapt the old organization had produced six different approved tables of organization: War Strength, Peace Strength, Initial Strength, Peace Strength (modified), Peace Strength (Special), and Special Strength.[74]

---

[71] Memo, DCofS to G–1, 27 Oct 33, sub: Report of Special Committee of the General Council on the Employment of the Army Air Corps. G–1/13305. DRB, TAG.

[72] Memo, G–1 for CofS, 21 Nov 33, sub: Report of Special Committee of the General Council on the Employment of the Army Air Corps. *Ibid.*

[73] *Ibid.*

[74] *Ibid.*

The combined recommendations of G–1 and G–3 were approved in March 1934 when a General Staff committee, consisting of one officer from each of the five General Staff divisions, was constituted by direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff to be under the supervision of G–3. Prior to the formation of this committee, G–1 had prepared and submitted to the Chief of Staff a study on how to implement Army Project No. 1 should it be approved by the Congress.[75] This study produced additional convincing data in support of the recommendation for a 165,000-man Army. At Fort Monmouth early in September 1934, Brig. Gen. Andrew Moses, ACofS, G–1, in a critique following a mobilization test summarized the argument for Army Project No. 1: "The mission of the Army on M-Day is twofold: it must provide a covering force and it must conduct a mobilization of our manpower while the covering force checks the invader. At its present strength, it *may* accomplish the first mission, but *not both*. The remedy lies in the modest increase of our regular establishment required to bring it to a strength of 165,000. With this strength the task would not be easy but it could be accomplished." [76]

It hardly required the protracted labor and research of a General Staff committee to convince G–1 that the 1933 Mobilization Plan's target of about 900,000 men to be procured by volunteer enlistment within 30 days after M-day was set far above the limits which could possibly be reached by any known manpower procurement device. The most cursory study revealed that only about 96,000 volunteers had rushed to the Colors during the first 30 days of World War I. This disquieting fact, plus the uncertainty and doubt engendered by the pacifist trends which were prevalent in the Nation during the 1930's, made it appear extremely probable that the figure of 900,000 volunteers was unattainable.

Mobilization of the Civilian Conservation Corps

Army activities were sidetracked and a test mobilization conducted when the Army on 10 April 1933 took over control of the Civilian Conservation Corps (excepting only the functions of selecting recruits and of supervising technical work in the forests). The immediate objective of the War Department became the assembly of approximately 300,000 men—more than were enlisted during the Spanish-American War—, establishing them in a series of small camps in various and often isolated regions throughout the United States, and making therein adequate provision for health, welfare, and maintenance. On

[75] Congress approved Army Project No. 1 in fiscal year 1935–36, but, due to the refusal of the Administration to allocate the money appropriated by the Congress, it was not until fiscal 1938 that Army Project No. 1 was attained. By that time an Army of 165,000 was no longer the goal of the War Department.

[76] *Army and Navy Journal*, 15 Sep 34.



Figure 7. Civilian Conservation Corps.

1 July the War Department reported that the mobilization had been completed on schedule. Within 7 weeks the assembly of the Corps had been accomplished and its units had been transported to 1,315 camps, distributed throughout the country. With few exceptions each camp comprised two Regular officers, one Reserve officer, four enlisted men of the Regular Army, and about two hundred men of the CCC. A total of 3,109 officers of the Regular Army, 532 officers of the Regular Navy and the Marine Corps, and 1,774 Reserve officers were on duty in the camps as of 1 July 1933.[77]

In order to accomplish this mobilization so rapidly and to make available approximately 3,000 Regular officers normal activities had to be sharply curtailed. The officers were obtained by ordering early graduation at schools, by stripping Regular units, and by withdrawing large numbers of Regular instructors from the ROTC, the ORC, and the National Guard. Hardest hit of all activities was the peacetime training of Regular Army officers and enlisted men which came to a virtual standstill, thereby almost destroying the readiness of units for immediate and effective employment on emergency duty.

The Chief of Staff's insistence that this was a dangerous situation finally convinced Congress later that year to grant the authority to call a number of Reserve officers to active duty, thereby releasing Regular officers then serving in the camps. And selected members of the CCC itself were trained in duties that made possible the relief of most of the Army enlisted men.

[77] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933*, p. 6.

The overall effect of the CCC on military preparedness has never been fully appraised. Beneficial aspects included: (1) the training in administration and leadership afforded some Reserve officers; (2) the testing of mobilization forms and procedures on a moderate scale; (3) the discipline given to the young men at the camps. Unfavorable aspects, which outweighed the benefits derived, included: (1) the expenditure of many of the war reserve supplies of such things as clothing, blankets, field accoutrements, etc.; (2) the hampering of Army training by requiring large numbers of officers and enlisted men to administer the CCC which in effect demobilized the Regular Army for a period of months in 1933–34; (3) the curtailment of courses at Army schools to make available officers for CCC administration. The Army was scrupulously careful during the entire period of its supervision of the CCC *not* to provide any military training for the enrollees.

Selective Service Planning Becomes Functional

From 1934 on, G–1 pressed for a reduction in the manpower procurement rate in mobilization planning and reemphasized selective service as the best way to procure manpower for military purposes. General MacArthur's stress on volunteer recruiting had been embodied in the 1933 Mobilization Plan, but the principle of stressing volunteer recruiting had never been accepted by the General Staff as an infallible part of mobilization policy.

The preparation of recommended selective service legislation had been basically accomplished by the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee in the first decade after World War I. During the late 1920's and early 1930's the small but zealous Selective Service Branch of G–1 (which at times consisted of only one officer who was also given other duties), without any legal authority but with cooperation from all of the state adjutants general, filled in details in the selective service plan. The Nation was subdivided into some 6,000 selective service districts in the G–1 plans which also laid down policies and uniform procedures. Actual implementation of selective service in these plans was decentralized to the individual states. In conformance with the G–1 selective service plan, each state adjutant general prepared complete, detailed plans for the operation of selective service in all of the districts included in his state. The state plans were in *functional* detail, even to the composition of the local boards. In all of this early planning, G–1 was able to work smoothly and quickly; the G–1 planners avoided the possibility of staff planning delays by the simple expedient of neither consulting the rest of the staff for concurrences nor of appealing to the corps areas for recommendations. Selective service was purely a G–1 staff problem, and G–1 so handled it. It was not until February 1936 when the state plans for the wartime

operation of selective service were practically complete, that G–1 proposed to make the corps area commanders familiar with the status of selective service plans; this was not, however, in order to get their opinions on how it should be done but rather to tell them how it was going to be done and what they were expected to do to help get it done.[78]

There were other mobilization personnel matters, too, which G–1 felt required clarification, correction, or additional detail in the corps area mobilization plans. To take care of all these matters, G–1 recommended that a conference of all corps area G–1's be held in Washington early in May 1936, a recommendation which was approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff on 18 February 1936.[79]

The G–1 conference was held in Washington 4–16 May 1936. The agenda included the following topics:

1. Recruiting and reception plan for volunteers.
2. Classification of enlisted men.
3. Procuring of specialists.
4. Procurement and reception of manpower through selective service.
5. Status of present selective service plans for each corps area.
6. Procurement and classification of officers.
7. Status of mobilization assignment of Reserve officers; number available; and manner of their assignment.
8. Replacements and provisions for procuring.
9. Welfare and recreation.
10. Use of limited service men.
11. Use of civilians.
12. Initial mobilization assignment of Regular officers.
13. Procurement of nurses.
14. Strength of corps area service commands.
15. Particular G–1 problems of the different corps areas.[80]

The conference program included lectures on various phases of mobilization by War Department experts and concluded with the organization of the conferees into two committees who were given several days to prepare the outline and subject matter of the G–1 features of a mobilization plan.[81] During the conference the program was expanded to include:

1. A detailed discussion of a proposed War Department policy concerning a procurement objective for the Officers' Reserve Corps under War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933.

---

[78] Memo, G–1 for CofS, 11 Feb 36, sub: Conference in Washington of the Corps Area Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, G–1. G–1/14204. DRB, TAG.

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] Memo, G–1 to TAG, 20 Feb 36, sub: Conference in Washington, D. C. of the Corps Area ACofS for Personnel, G–1, May 4–16, 1936. *Ibid.*

[81] Copy of the program is inclosed with memo, G–1 for CofS, 13 Mar 36, sub: A program for Conference of Corps Area G–1's. *Ibid.*

2. Suggested organization, in detail, of corps area staffs for the preparation of corps area mobilization plans.

3. The report of a third committee organized to make recommendations for the standardization of corps area mobilization plans.[82]

Significantly, the conferees, in their committee work, proceeded on the assumption that the 1933 Mobilization Plan would be completely rewritten. The committee reports, as well as all lectures and discussions, were included in the report on the conference made to the Chief of Staff.[83] So valuable was this conference that G–1 recommended, and the Deputy Chief of Staff approved, a follow-up conference for the following year. Impressed by the results of the G–1 conference, Brig. Gen. George R. Spalding, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–4, recommended that a similar conference of corps area G–4's be held in April 1937 when it was hoped progress on revision of the 1933 Mobilization Plan would be far enough along to warrant such a conference. The Deputy Chief of Staff also approved the proposed G–4 conference.[84]

A High Pressure Recruiting Plan

At the G–1 conference on 4–16 May 1936, in the period devoted to discussion of plans for the "Recruitment and Reception of Volunteers," new ideas were broached concerning high pressure recruitment campaigns to be handled essentially by the same kind of local people as were to handle selective service machinery. G–1 believed that there would probably be a period after M-day before selective service machinery was procuring military manpower and when the Army would have to recruit vigorously and extensively. G–1 was convinced, however, that the Regular Army could not spare the personnel to conduct widespread recruiting campaigns, and even if such personnel could be spared, G–1 did not feel that they could conduct such a campaign satisfactorily.[85] Therefore, G–1 had instituted studies which planned for the use of local community agencies in conducting the recruiting campaigns within an organizational framework which would roughly parallel the state selective service organizations. With the cooperation of the state adjutants general and with the added support of not only local communities but of such patriotic and fraternal orders as the American Legion, Rotary, Elks, Lions, Kiwanis, Masons, Knights of Columbus, Chambers of Commerce, etc., G–1 felt that not only could a successful recruiting operation be accomplished from M-day until selective service made further recruiting unnecessary, but that it could be done with practically no

[82] Memo, G–1 for CofS, 23 May 36, sub: Report on Conference in War Dept of Corps Area G–1's, May 4–16, 1936. *Ibid.*

[83] *Ibid.*

[84] Memo, G–4 to CofS, 27 May 36, sub: Report on Conference in War Dept of Corps Area G–1's, 4–16 May 36. G–4/20052–91. DRB, TAG.

[85] Memo, G–1 for CofS, 21 May 36, sub: General Plan to Set Up Civilian Agencies to Aid Recruiting Agencies. G–1/13308–91. Filed with G–1/14204–2. DRB, TAG.

drain of Regular Army personnel. The Deputy Chief of Staff concurred in this planning on 12 June 1936, but he qualified his concurrence by approving its continuation "in principle" only.[86] The approval, however qualified, was sufficient for G–1 to develop this planning to a considerable degree.

The G–1 ideas were presented to the G–1 conference by Col. Harry C. Kramer of the Specialist's Reserve, who had been put on extended active duty and detailed to General Staff duty with G–1 in 1928 for the specific purpose of assisting in selective service planning. That job was so well along that he was given the added mission of developing the volunteer recruitment plan along the lines desired by G–1 and for selling that plan whenever it needed selling: i. e., to the other divisions of the General Staff, to the Chief of Staff, to the corps area commanders, to the state adjutants general, etc. Colonel Kramer expounded so well the idea of recruiting accomplished by local communities that the favorable reaction at the G–1 conference encouraged the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, to recommend wider dissemination of this still incomplete plan. In furtherance of G–1's desire for more widespread reaction to the idea of state cooperation in implementing volunteer recruiting during the early stages of mobilization, letters were dispatched to all corps area commanders in November 1936 containing a synopsis of the contemplated plan and requesting recommendations.[87] The response of all of the corps area commanders was so enthusiastic that the plan was pushed with sustained vigor by G–1. The approval and cooperation of the state adjutants general was also enthusiastic. In 1937 G1 turned the plan over to the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee for final polishing and for the addition of the necessary implementing details of organization. Most of this work was to be accomplished by the states themselves under the supervision of their respective adjutants general. By 1940 most of the states had prepared these plans which were reviewed and commented upon at the periodic selective service conferences.[88] The fact that the plan for state cooperation in volunteer recruiting (Civilian Volunteer Effort—CVE) was not ultimately used because selective service began sooner than had ever been anticipated when a mobilization occurred does not detract from the value of the staff work which went into that plan.

Staff Doubts About the 1933 Mobilization Plan Become Fixed

Within a year after the publication of War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933, G–1 was ranged alongside G–4 and the Assistant Secre-

[86] *Ibid.*

[87] Memo, G–1 for TAG, 19 Nov 36, sub: Enlistment of State Cooperation in Mobilization. G–1/14402–2. DRB, TAG. The letters were dispatched by TAG on 27 Nov 36.

[88] For example, see: Rpt, Com No. 4, Selective Service Conference, Jackson Barracks, La., 1940, "Summary of Volunteer Recruiting Plan." Copy in G–1/14402–38. DRB, TAG. The file G–1/14402–2 (DRB, TAG) contains basic material on which this section is based.

tary of War in the firm conviction that the 1933 Plan was impractical and could not be carried out. These three staff divisions made statistical studies during 1933–35 which they hoped would convince the rest of the General Staff (G–3 and WPD) and the Chief of Staff that a major revision of the 1933 Plan was not merely desirable but acutely necessary. The appointment of a new Chief of Staff, Gen. Malin Craig, on 2 October 1935 made their task easier. General Craig, who had served as chief of Cavalry, as G–3, War Department General Staff, as a corps area commander, and as a commandant of the Army War College, was disposed to be interested in facts not assumptions and was concerned more with what *could* be done than with what *should* be done.

Within one month after taking over as Chief of Staff, General Craig, at a conference with all of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, affirmed in unmistakable terms his interest in and concern for the status of preparedness for mobilization. To amplify and make a matter of record the oral comments of the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff published a memorandum for the Assistant Chiefs of Staff in which he bluntly directed that ". . . it is desired more specifically that we take stock of the actual situation rather than rest content with the War Department plan which envisages what we hope to do or ought to do." [89] Specifically, the Deputy Chief of Staff informed the staff that ". . . it is of vital importance that the high commannd know:—

> First: Can we get the men envisaged in this period [the Initial Mobilization] of the mobilization? . . .
>
> Second: Assuming that we can get the men, have determinations been reached as to the initial assembly points of all the units prescribed for the initial mobilization?
>
> Third: Are practicable plans in existence for the provision of adequate shelter, food, and clothing at those points?
>
> Fourth: Exactly what is the status of the War Reserve with respect to military equipment for the units prescribed for this period of the mobilization?
>
> Fifth: Do the plans for the assembly of personnel cover adequately the processing into units of the individuals that are expected to volunteer?
>
> Sixth: Have the Corps Area Commanders solved the problems of their Corps Area Service Commands?" [90]

To further accentuate the point that the Chief of Staff wanted to know exactly what kind of a mobilization could be accomplished now, the directive was concluded by informing the Assistant Chief of Staff that at a conference to be held about 15 January 1936 General Craig would ask ". . . whether, if February 1, 1936 were to be announced as M Day, the objective set for the first 30 days could be accomplished. If not, what part of it could we reasonably expect to put into effect?" [91]

---

[89] Memo, DCofS for AC'sofS, 27 Nov 35, sub: Status of Preparedness for Mobilization. Copy in G–4/20052. DRB, TAG.

[90] *Ibid.*

[91] *Ibid.*

It was reasonably obvious, once the General Staff digested General Craig's insistence on practical information, that some change in the Mobilization Plan, 1933 would be forthcoming. The extent of the change and the timing of it were the only uncertain factors. Prior to the 15 January 1936 conference, G–1, G–3, G–4 and WPD submitted memoranda to the Chief of Staff answering the questions which had been set forth in the directive of 27 November 1935.

G–1 reported to the Chief of Staff that:

(1) The manpower contemplated to be mobilized during the first month under the War Department Mobilization Plan 1933, could not be obtained.

(2) Plans were, in general, inadequate for processing into units the men procured by voluntary enlistment.

(3) All corps area commanders had not solved the problems involved in their service commands.

(4) The mobilization plans of the various echelons were incomplete.

(5) Had mobilization occurred at that time [1 February 1936], the objectives set for the first thirty days of mobilization could not have been achieved.[92]

The report of G–4 was less emphatic but equally disquieting. The questions of the Chief of Staff had been concerned only with the first 30 days of mobilization; therefore, is was only this period which G–4 considered for the adequacy of logistic arrangements and resources. G–4 reported that:

a. It may be concluded that when all mobilization plans shall have been completed, and upon 15 days' notice, the forces to be mobilized during the first 30 days after M-day:

(1) Can be fed, clothed, transported and sheltered in a reasonably satisfactory manner.

(2) Can be supplied with required equipment from storage or procurement *except for airplanes, tanks, combat cars, scout cars, antiaircraft guns, searchlights, antiaircraft fire control equipment, .50 caliber machine guns, ponton equipment,* and possibly *organizational motor equipment.* There will be shortages in the stocks on hand of *gas masks, radio and telephone equipment,* and *equipment for medical regiments.* For reconditioning and preparation for shipment to troops of artillery materiel, a period of 90 days will be required.

(3) Unless the resources, in clothing and certain essential items of organizational equipment, can be increased *a more deliberate rate of mobilization seems to be indicated.*[93] [Italics author's.]

G–4 further advised that any extensive changes in Mobilization Plan, 1933 be delayed until all supporting plans had been completed and the tables of organization, currently being revised, were ready. There was justification for these words of caution for the procedure of changing War Department mobilization plans frequently had meant that all estimates and plans based on the preceding plan were discarded

[92] G–1, "Notes on War Planning and Mobilization Planning," 1 Jul 37. G–1/14821. Copy in AG 381 (8–12–37) (2). National Archives. This is a valuable summary of G–1's views throughout this period.

[93] Memo, G–4 for CofS, 14 Jan 36, sub: Status of Preparedness for Mobilization. G–4/20052–89. DRB, TAG.

before they were finished. G–4 was anxious to complete the collation of procurement statistics so that he could accurately gauge not only what could *not* be procured, but what *could* be procured and in accordance with a probable time schedule. The concern for waiting for the publication of the new tables of organization was also justifiable, for every change in tables of organization meant changes in requirements which made necessary extensive recomputations by the supply services.

The G–3 Division, which had prepared the 1933 Mobilization Plan and which would have to prepare any revision or change of that plan, prepared the most extensive analysis for the Chief of Staff. The gist of the G–3 analysis was that the 1933 Mobilization Plan was in no sense the final approved solution but ". . . must still be considered in study form and subject to future revision." [94] Factors which made such a revision an imminent necessity included a long list of changes in organization and redesignation of units already approved or awaiting approval; the clearly apparent need for clarifying and simplifying the 1933 Plan, and for prescribing ". . . a certain degree of uniformity in the preparation of subordinate plans and in the organization of the corps areas for mobilization"; the G–1 uncertainty about the rate of procurement of personnel by voluntary enlistment (although G–3 was still not convinced that volunteers could not be procured as fast as they could be processed). All of these considerations, G–3 conceded, made it ". . . apparent that the present War Department Mobilization Plan should be revised in the near future." With cautious hope, however, G–3 still felt that the revision should be approached ". . . not with the idea of making a totally new plan but rather with the object of improving, clarifying, and bringing up to date the present plan." Buried in the analysis was the reluctant admission that: ". . . If a date in the near future were to be announced as M Day, it is doubtful if the objective set for the first 30 days of mobilization would be accomplished in its entirety." G–3 felt there would be difficulty in mobilizing the active National Guard units by M+10. The only elements of the initial mobilization which G–3 was reasonably sure *could* be mobilized under the 1933 Plan were the active Regular Army units in the continental United States: about 110,000 out of the initial mobilization's 1,200,000 men or something less than 10 per cent.[95]

G–3 also felt, as had G–4, that the best time for the revision of the 1933 Plan would be when the new tables of organization were ready. Pending the completion of those tables, G–3 recommended that the Chief of Staff, in a classified letter to all individuals and officers required to keep mobilization plans directly based on the War Department Mobilization Plan, advise them that a revision of the plan was contemplated; remind them that mobilization planning was so impor-

[94] Memo G–3 for CofS, 13 Jan 33, sub: Status of War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933. G–3/6541–Gen–505. DRB, TAG.

[95] *Ibid.* See also Incl 1 and 2.

tant as to constitute one of the major responsibilities of all commanders and their staffs; announce that mobilization tests would be henceforth annually conducted by all commanders and chiefs of activities charged with keeping mobilization plans based on the War Department Plan; call for constructive criticism of the 1933 Plan to be submitted by 1 July 1936 to the War Department; and direct that work on the incompleted parts of present mobilization plans be continued. The Chief of Staff incorporated the G–3 recommendations in a letter dispatched 14 February 1936 over his personal signature.[96]

Whether the G–3 belief that mobilization planning had been neglected in some corps areas was justified or not, there could be no question but that there was an almost complete lack of uniformity in the plans themselves. In the preparation of these corps area mobilization plans the nine commanders with their imagination unrestrained had produced nine decidedly diversified documents. This diversity was so complete that had all the corps plans been good, they would have initially been difficult to comprehend by any one who had not had great prior familiarity with them. But most of the corps plans were not good. None of them solved the problem of establishing the corps area service commands; none of them adequately made provision for the procurement and training of cadres for units to be activated during the mobilization, although some corps areas plans planned to withdraw cadres from Regular Army units, a practice specifically contrary to instructions in the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933. Some of them, in parts of their plans, repeated verbatim the War Department Plan, without adding any of the additional specific, implementing details which the Department had decentralized to the corps area commanders. The problems of shelter and construction were not satisfactorily solved in any of the corps plans.

Probably many of these errors both of commission and omission were attributable to the low esteem which some corps area commanders evinced toward mobilization planning and which was best indicated by the inexperience and inadequacy of the personnel assigned to that planning. But in a sense, the flaws in the corps area plans reflected the same flaws in the War Department Plan; the lack of uniformity in the corps area plans was due to the failure of the War Department to prescribe uniformity. Many of the mobilization plans of the services—Finance, Signal, Medical, Quartermaster, and Air Corps—which had to be used by the corps area commanders in the preparation of their plans, were not ready. The problems of establishing the corps area service commands, of providing cadres for future units, of better providing for shelter and construction were insolvable on the corps area level.

---

[96] CofS ltr, 14 Feb 36, sub: Status of War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933. AG 381 (1–13–36) (Mis.) M–C. National Archives.

The Early Mobilization Tests Prove Little

In its report to the Chief of Staff on the status of mobilization planning 13 January 1936, G–3 stated that the mobilization tests of 1934 and 1935 had failed to disclose any major structural weaknesses in the 1933 Plan. ". . . In the reports on the Mobilization Tests of 1934 and 1935 by corps area commanders and chiefs of arms and services there was little to indicate that the War Department plan was not considered workable and basically sound." [97]

This statement was not a condemnation of mobilization tests themselves but of the manner in which they had been directed, conducted, and reported upon. The War Department directives to the corps area and service commanders concerning mobilization tests in 1934 and 1935 had been so broad and general as to allow the commanders concerned considerable initiative and latitude in the conduct of the tests. In addition, the War Department emphasis was clearly on the completeness of the plans rather than on their efficiency or practicality. The tests were conducted on a piecemeal basis with no attempt made to tie them together in such a way as would give an overall picture of mobilization. The inevitable result was a series of unrelated tests, widely divergent in scope and character. These were not particularly valid tests because according to the 1933 Mobilization Plan most Regular officers assigned to an active unit would move over to other mobilization assignments on M-day, and the equipment and trained enlisted personnel of Regular Army units would not be available to the agencies charged with the conduct of mobilization on M-day.

Of some 15 mobilization tests of various kinds directed during 1934 and 1935, no corps area conducted all of them, 13 being the maximum and 4 the minimum for any one corps area. Most of the tests were paper exercises involving only a few officers. Other than for completeness of subordinate plans, these mobilization tests usually covered only personnel procedures, as reception, processing, and, to a limited degree, training.

It is true that the reports on such tests as were conducted were not submitted in any functional detail by the corps area and other commanders but this failure of the corps area commanders to give the War Department the detailed, specific reports which were necessary was basically the fault of the War Department. The War Department directives for these tests never listed the information desired. Consequently, information on which to base constructive changes in the 1933 Plan was not obtained from the 1934 and 1935 mobilization tests.[98]

---

[97] Memo, G–3 to CofS, 13 Jan 36, sub: Status of War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933. G–3/6541–Gen–505. DRB, TAG.

[98] Rpt, Com No. 2, AWC, 19 Oct 36, sub: Mobilization. G–3 Course No. 15 (1936–37). Army War College.

It was not until 1936, under pressure by General Craig, that War Department directives for mobilization tests moved in the direction of specifying comprehensive tests for *all* elements of mobilization plans integrated into a common objective. These were the tests which were to give support to the G–1 and G–4 contentions that the manpower procurement rate of 1933 Mobilization Plan was ". . . questionable of attainment and that for this rate the supply demands are doubtful of fulfillment." [99]

The Field Joins the Staff in Criticizing the 1933 Plan

The constructive criticism of the 1933 Mobilization Plan which the Chief of Staff in his letter of 19 February 1936 had directed be submitted by 1 July 1936 flowed in with increasing volume as that date neared. Many of the reports submitted were of the valueless type, generally termed in military phraseology "negative reports." Some commander and staff chiefs, however, made valuable comments on such phases of the 1933 Plan as pertained to their own command, division, arm, or service. The acting chief of the Air Corps (who shortly thereafter became chief of the Air Corps and continued as such until after the conclusion of World War II, Brig. Gen. H. H. Arnold) confined his recommendations to the thesis of giving to the Air Corps all control and responsibility for everything pertaining to Air Corps personnel and materiel; his report was far less constructive as a critique of the 1933 Mobilization Plan than a plea for a separate Air Corps, in effect if not in name.[100] Other chiefs of arms, while primarily concerned with increasing the number of their units to be included in the initial mobilization, nevertheless were objective enough to make some recommendations for the 1933 Plan as a whole. The reports of several of the corps area commanders were especially valuable, in that they showed thought, judgment, and an awareness of what General Craig was after.[101]

The major recommendations and comments were as follows:

1. The War Department Mobilization Plan should specify as objective only what was truly attainable.
2. Units designated to take the field on M-day should have an effective fighting strength.
3. Provisions in the 1933 Plan concerning cadres for later units lacked clarity and had to be cleared up to ensure an adequate means of providing such cadres.
4. The 1933 Plan had a tendency to prescribe decentralized operation by corps areas without giving sufficient consideration to

---

[99] *Ibid.*

[100] Ltr, Actg Ch of Air Corps to TAG, 29 Jun 36, sub: Revision of War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933. AG 381 (7–7–33) (1) sec. 1. National Archives.

[101] All of the reports submitted can be found in AG 381 (7–7–33) (1) sec. 1, "War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1933 (General)." National Archives.

whether the means available to corps areas commanders were commensurate with the tasks assigned.

5. The initial rate of manpower procurement in the 1933 Plan was unattainable and would have to be reduced; the expectations from volunteer recruiting were far too high.

6. Critical material could *not* be produced fast enough or soon enough to meet the schedules of the 1933 Plan.

7. Officer candidates should be trained in schools organized and operated by the War Department.

8. Mobilization assignments of officers should be made by the War Department rather than by the corps areas since the War Department maintained the 201 files of all officers and transferred officers at its own discretion without consulting the corps areas. In the interests of simplicity the War Department should limit mobilization assignments to essential, key positions rather than try to give the last second lieutenant some kind of mobilization assignment.

9. More specific plans should be made for the utilization of limited service personnel.

10. Plans for the utilization of civilians in zone of the interior installations should be expanded.

11. Plans to utilize the Regular Army as an M-Day covering force as well as the nucleus of the expanding citizen army were impossible of attainment unless the Regular Army was substantially increased prior to M-day.

12. Provisions of the 1933 Plan for the corps area service commands were entirely inadequate for the operation of the mobilization machinery for some months after M-day. The corps area service commands should have some cadre prior to M-day if they were to function on M-day, and they should be fully staffed long before the time set in the 1933 Plan.

13. The 1933 Plan to utilize Federal, state, and municipal buildings for troop shelter during mobilization was impractical since those buildings most likely would not be available during wartime. During the expanding economy of a war boom civilian buildings would also not be available. Therefore, to insure adequate shelter in vitally necessary training areas, the War Department should plan at once to construct at least one divisional camp in each corps area to partially obviate the necessity for the initial use of makeshift shelter which would be bad for morale, combat efficiency, and public opinion. Furthermore, a definite policy on construction and shelter should be established in the War Department Mobilization Plan since the War Department's policy to avoid construction was not practical and in the end would be more expensive than a practical construction program.

14. Uniformity in corps area mobilization plans should be prescribed by the War Department.

15. New tables of organization were long overdue and vitally necessary for all components of the Army.

16. Instructions pertaining to Air Corps mobilization were so confused and conflicting in the 1933 Plan and its accompanying tables that they should be completely rewritten.

17. The plan to close service schools and to disperse the faculties of these schools should be reconsidered since such an action would require a long period of time before the schools could be restaffed and reequipped to function.

18. The troop basis for computation of supply requirements should be considerably simplified by the elimination of small units from the computations and by making the division and comparably sized major units the basic yardstick for computing supply requirements.

The Last Days of the 1933 Plan

As this tide of criticism cast increasingly grave doubts on the basic soundness of the 1933 Plan, G–3 worked on a revision, to patch up some of the more obvious loopholes. The 1936 revision, which G–3 prepared in draft, was an improvement in form and content over the 1933 Plan. It was simpler and more coherent; it provided greater centralized supervision by the War Department, prescribed greater uniformity in subordinate plans, and, to a limited degree, retarded the mobilization rate by providing three objectives for the initial mobilization, instead of the previous two. But, as General Craig studied the constructive criticisms of the 1933 Plan then pouring in, as he reviewed the results of the practical mobilization tests of 1936, and as he pored over G–1 and G–4 studies, he became more and more convinced that the 1933 Plan was so unrealistic that it could not be salvaged. The tremendous amount of work which had gone into the preparation of the 1933 Plan may have in part influenced the Chief of Staff to delay the scrapping of the plan until he could consider the G–3 revision which was being prepared. Probably, however, the principal reason for the delay was the desire to await the completion of the new tables of organization then under preparation and the overall survey of procurement possibilities which the Planning Branch, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, had been working on for well over a year.

The procurement study was completed in October 1936. It was a detailed, comprehensive survey which, after exhaustive statistical analysis, flatly concluded that the requirements of the 1933 Mobilization Plan could *not* be met, and that the maximum monthly increment of men which could be equipped and maintained logistically during

the first 9 months after M-day was 133,000; after M+9 industry could sustain a monthly increment of 400,000 men. The cost of war reserves to take up the slack for the first nine months of mobilization under the 1933 Plan was estimated at $2,160,000,000; if war reserves were limited to the first 1,000,000 men of the 1933 Plan, the cost would be reduced to the still staggering and impossible (in 1936) sum of $1,040,000,000. The utter impossibility of supplying and equipping the forces contemplated by the 1933 Plan, during the period M-day to M+9, either by industrial production or from a stockpile of war reserves, made it strongly advisable, indeed mandatory, in the views of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, that the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933 be so revised as to make it more compatible with these realistic facts. A subsidiary recommendation of the survey was that this future revision of the mobilization plan be simplified in respects which would make easier and more rapid the computation of requirements.[102] This study made a marked impression on Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring who forwarded it to the Chief of Staff with a request that he have it analyzed and, if he deemed it advisable, to consider a more feasible, if less grandiose, mobilization plan.[103]

This study was the last straw for General Craig, who had already decided on a complete revision of the 1933 Plan and who was only waiting for this procurement study and for the new tables of organization to direct its initiation. In mid-December, the Chief of Staff decided neither to wait for the analysis of the procurement study (which was being made by G–4 and which was not completed until 13 January 1937)[104] nor for the still pending new tables of organization. On 16 December 1936, General Craig directed the War Department General Staff to begin work *at once* on a practical "protective mobilization plan" which, when completed, would replace the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933 as a basis for mobilization.

---

[102] OASW Study, "Procurement Possibilities Under the 1933 Mobilization Plan," Oct 36. Copy in AG 381 (12-8-36). National Archives.

[103] Memo, SW for Gen Craig, 8 Dec 36. *Ibid.*

[104] Unused memo, G4 for CofS, 13 Jan 36, sub: Study—Procurement Possibilities Under 1933 Mobilization Plan. G 4 20052 101. DRB, TAG.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PROTECTIVE MOBILIZATION PLAN

General Craig's directive to the War Department General Staff to begin work on a Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP) had been issued 16 December 1936, and the General Staff had begun work on the new plan the following day. Rumors of this drastic policy change quickly filtered down to subordinate commanders and chiefs of arms and services. To allay these rumors, G–3, supported by the other General Staff divisions, on 15 January 1937 recommended to the Chief of Staff that a letter containing a frank statement be sent to the commanders and staff officers concerned confirming the decision to begin work on the Protective Mobilization Plan. This letter would advise subordinate commanders that pending the War Department's completion of the new plan they should continue work on their mobilization plans still using the 1933 Plan as a basis but directing that all further computations of supply requirements for the 1933 Plan be discontinued. This action was quickly approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff and the letter was dispatched by The Adjutant General 6 February 1937.[1]

The decision to scrap the 1933 Mobilization Plan and to begin the construction of a practical, realistic Protective Mobilization Plan was primarily General Craig's. It was a decision which he arrived at on the basis of experience gained in several key assignments including that of corps area commander, and after careful consideration of staff studies supplemented by constructive criticism from the field and from the mobilization tests. But it was a decision which required courage as well as judgment, for the War Department for the first time since the end of World War I was to picture mobilization as it would actually be. The profound influence which General Craig during his tour as Chief of Staff had on preparing the Army of the United States for World War II has never been widely known or appreciated except by the professional soldiers who were closely associated with him during those years.

[1] Memo, G–3 to CofS, 25 Jan 37, sub: War Department Mobilization Plan. G–3/6541–Gen–525. Copy in AG 381 (1–25–37). National Archives: TAG ltr, 6 Feb 37, sub: War Department Mobilization Plan. AG 381 (1–25–37) (Misc.) C–M. National Archives. See also: Lecture, Col (later Maj Gen) John H. Hester, Ch, Mob Br, G3, before Army War College, 30 Sep 37, "The Protective Mobilization Plan." G–3 Course No. 4 (1937–38). Army War College.




Figure 8. The General Staff, September 1938.

The First Installments of the PMP

Fear of a mobilization planning hiatus, caused by the interment of the 1933 Plan before the birth of the Protective Mobilization Plan, spurred the planners not only to work fast but also to publish the new plans in fragments, as each piece was completed in enough detail to be usable. The first fragment to be published announced the composition and times of mobilization of the initial elements of the Protective Mobilization Plan, a force which was divided into three sections:

Section I—The Initial Protective Force (IPF)—400,000 men (composed of zone of interior Regular Army units plus the National Guard).

Section II—The IPF plus augmentation to 1,000,000 men.

Section III—Sections I and II augmented to 1,500,000 men.[2]

This letter provided the supply services and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War sufficient data to permit limited resumption of requirements and procurement planning; it also was an encouraging

[2] TAG ltr with accompanying troop basis tables, 23 Apr 37, sub: The Protective Mobilization Plan. AG 381 (4-10-37) (Misc.) C-M. National Archives.

indication that progress on the new plan was being made. But it was not enough to permit the corps area or other commanders to begin their portions of the Protective Mobilization Plan.

To further aid the supply planners two supplementary letters directed in precise detail the preparation of status reports for war reserve items based on Sections I, II, and III of the 23 April 1937 troop basis tables These status reports were published on 17 December 1937.[3] But within less than a month after they were published, the War Department issued a new set of troop basis tables which invalidated the status reports just submitted and made necessary a recomputation of the requirements which had just been made.[4]

The Procurement Planners Request More Information

These exercises in arithmetic dissatisfied the Planning Branch in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, not only because of the time wasted but because it was felt that the practice of basing procurement planning on initial requirements only was inherently unsound. The views of the Planning Branch were that:

> For intelligent procurement planning the *ultimate procurement objective must be known.* For noncommercial items production must be initiated on M-Day for the full requirements for twelve to fifteen months. Requirements for initial mobilization only are inadequate for procurement planning in such items. After procurement plans have been made for full requirements it is perfectly possible to make plans for lesser objectives first with view to expansion when and if ordered.[5]

The needs of the procurement planners for an overall mobilization picture were not met by the publication on 14 March 1938 of the Initial Military Program of the Protective Mobilization Plan with several inclosures and annexes; for this, the completed Protective Mobilization Plan, 1938 was limited to Sections I and II of the letter of 23 April 1937, which provided for an approximate total of only 1,000,000 men.[6] The 1938 PMP did refer to extensions of mobilization to a total force of four field armies plus necessary GHQ reserve and harbor defense units, but stated that plans for these extensions, which were termed "augmentations," would be deferred until the initial military program was substantially complete.

---

[3] TAG ltr, 25 May 37, sub: Status Reports, War Reserve. AG 381.4 (5–14–37) (Misc.) D–M. National Archives; TAG ltr, 20 Aug 37, sub: Computation of Requirements for the War Reserve Under the Protective Mobilization Plan. AG 381.4 (8–28–37) (Misc.) D–M. National Archives; TAG ltr, 17 Dec 37, sub: The War Reserve. AG 381.4 (11–8–37) (Misc.) National Archives.

[4] TAG ltr, 10 Jan 38, sub: The Protective Mobilization Plan, 1938. AG 381 (12–22–37) (Misc.) C–M. National Archives.

[5] Memo, Ch, Planning Br, OASW, to Exec, OASW, 10 May 38, sub: Basis for Computation of Procurement Requirements. AG 381 (5–10–38). National Archives.

[6] TAG ltr, 14 Mar 38, sub: The PMP 1938. AG 381 (2–28–38) (Misc.) C–M. National Archives.

In the face of this situation, with no authoritative basis for the computation of the entire procurement requirements and with the certainty that the prolonged lack of such a basis would seriously slow down procurement planning, the Procurement Plans Division of the Assistant Secretary of War's Planning Branch in consultation with the G–3 Mobilization Branch prepared an approximate troop basis for a total force of approximately 4,000,000 men. In the preparation of these tables, the procurement planners first formulated the data which was necessary for their purpose:

1. Designation of units mobilized.
2. Designation of tables of organization used.
3. Unit mobilization strength.
4. Number of units mobilized each month.
5. Number of units in ZI each month.
6. Number of units in TO each month.
7. Similar data for individuals mobilized for War Department overhead, corps area service commands and Replacements.[7]

In order to insure that all of the supply services would have uniform data on which to base their computations, which had *not* been the case heretofore, the Planning Branch prepared two tables which were to be used by all services in their computations of requirements: Table *A* pertained to units and was intended for the computation of requirements for organizational equipment, and Table *B* was a manpower table and was intended for the computation of requirements for individual equipment. Tables *A* and *B* were to survive as the troop basis for procurement planning under the Protection Mobilization Plan and its augmentation plans. Their relative stability was to simplify procurement planning for the following three years.[8]

The 1938 PMP: All Installments

The Protective Mobilization Plan, 1938 was published in so many fragments that to view it comprehensively the bits which composed it had to be fitted together very much like a jigsaw puzzle. These fragments were issued as follows:

1. The initial announcement was made on 6 February 1937 that a new War Department mobilization plan was to be prepared.
2. The first installment of the PMP covering the IPF and the first two augmentations plus troop basis tables was issued 23 April 1937.
3. First changes in the first installment were issued 28 June 1937.
4. A corrected copy of the first installment with a new set of troop basis tables was issued on 10 January 1938.

---

[7] Memo, Ch. Planning Br, OASW to Exec, OASW, 10 May 38, sub: Basis for computation of Production Requirements. AG 381 (5–10–38). National Archives.
[8] *Ibid.*

5. The initial military program of the PMP was issued on 14 March 1938 with five inclosures. The initial military program consisted of the IPF and the first augmentation.

6. Revisions were issued 20 June 1938.

7. Additional revisions and tables were issued 20 July 1938.[9]

The Protective Mobilization Plans were not only the first mobilization plans to be based completely on realism but were also the first plans which successfully achieved real succinctness and simplicity without the sacrifice of coherence. The 1938 version of the PMP, however, contained so many mechanical flaws, which became apparent almost as soon as it was published, that a revision to eliminate these deficiencies in the basic plan was quickly prepared and ready for the Chief of Staff's approval on 31 October 1938.[10] The 1939 PMP was approved by the Chief of Staff on 14 December 1938.[11]

The 1939 PMP

The Protective Mobilization Plan, 1939 consisted of 5 sections totaling 12 pages and supplemented by 10 annexes.[12] Section I, containing general provisions, briefly gave the nature and scope of the plan:

> . . . [It] provides for the mobilization of a moderate, balanced force for the defense of United States territory. It provides initially:
>
> (1) A force of moderate size progressively available for operation in the field beginning on M Day.
>
> (2) Harbor defense troops.
>
> (3) Reinforcements for overseas garrisons.
>
> (4) Certain other troops either for use as cadres to expedite the mobilization of additional forces or, if necessary, for immediate use.
>
> (5) The installations necessary for the mobilization and maintenance of the troops to be mobilized.

In the 1938 PMP the planners, perhaps from habit, had inserted the customary provision calling for annual revision of the plan as of 1 October, to be effective on the succeeding 10 April. The 1939 PMP, indeed, was in accordance with this provision. But by 1939 the

---

[9] Copies of these installments which were all issued as TAG ltrs may be found in the following files: 6 Feb 37 in ltr, AG 381 (1–25–37) (Misc) C–M; 23 Apr 37 in ltr, AG 381 4–10–37) (Misc) C–M; 28 Jun 37 in ltr, AG 381 (6–9–37) (Misc) C–M; 10 Jan 38 in ltr, AG 381 (12–22–37) (Misc) C–M; 14 Mar 38 in ltr, AG 381 (2–28–38) (Misc) C–M; 20 Jun 38 in ltr, AG 381 (4–7–38) (Misc) C–M; 20 Jul 38 in ltr, AG 381 (7–9–38) (Misc) C–M. All in National Archives.

[10] Memo, G–3 for CofS, 31 Oct 38, sub: The Protective Mobilization Plan, 1939. G–3/6541–Gen–525. Copy in AG 381 (10–31–38) (Misc) C–M. National Archives.

[11] TAG ltr, 22 Dec 38, sub: The Protective Mobilization Plan, 1939. AG 381 (10–31–38) (Misc) C–M. National Archives.

[12] The annexes to the 1939 PMP were as follows: No. 1. Outline of Mobilization; No. 2. Reception Centers and Training Establishments; No. 3. Training of Officer and Enlisted Specialists; No. 4. Composition of War Department Overhead; No. 5. Personnel for War Department Overhead; No. 6. Personnel for Corps Area Service Commands; No. 7. Units and Individuals to be Mobilized; No. 8. Cadres for Inactive Units which begin mobilization after M+1; No. 9. Distribution of Subordinate Plans; and No. 10. Number and Designation of Annexes to Subordinate Mobilization Plans.

planners had given this provision more thought and had altered it to provide that only minor revisions be made annually on 1 October and that major revisions be made only when absolutely necessary. After the first year's experience with the Protective Mobilization Plan the War Department planners were convinced that they finally had emerged with a plan so fundamentally sound that it could be kept on a permanent basis. Annual revisions, it was pointed out, made it impossible for subordinate agencies to complete their plans before the new War Department plan made them obsolete.[13]

Section II of the plan, pertaining to personnel, was brief and contained, for the most part, only references to the pertinent annexes to the plan and to applicable mobilization regulations. One provision of the plan, however, limited Negro military manpower to 9 percent of the total mobilized strength. Section III, pertaining to military intelligence, simply referred to the basic military intelligence mobilization regulation [MR 2–1] which covered that subject in detail. Section IV, "Organization and Training and Related Subjects," also contained, for the most part, only references to the appropriate annexes and to the mobilization regulations.

Section V, "Supply and Related Subjects," was in considerable detail due to the fact that Mobilization Regulations of the G–4 series, which pertained to supply, were in the process of being extensively revised and hence were not available as references. The 1939 PMP clarified some supply ambiguities of the 1938 Plan and fixed with greater definiteness supply responsibilities. Centralized overall control by the War Department was the dominant keynote of the supply provisions with only a few functions decentralized. There was clearly apparent a conscious effort to keep supply procedures during mobilization in accordance with peacetime procedure.

The 1939 revision of the Protective Mobilization Plan, less annexes, was forwarded to the Chief of Staff on 31 October 1938 for approval. Annexes were delayed because of still pending revisions of certain tables of organization. Pending the completion of these 1939 Annexes, the 1938 ones would continue in effect. The Chief of Staff approved the text of the 1939 PMP on 14 December 1938, and it was published and distributed on 22 December 1938 to be effective as of 10 April 1939.[14]

The functional details of the Protective Mobilization Plan remained essentially the same, except for refinements, during its three revisions, and the structural concepts of the plan did not vary at all. These latter were, mainly:

---

[13] Memo for CofS, 31 Oct 38, sub: The PMP, 1939. G–3/6541–Gen–525. Copy in AG 381 (10–31–38) (Misc.) C–M. National Archives.

See footnotes on pages 1113–15.

[14] TAG ltr, 22 Dec 38, sub: The Protective Mobilization Plan, 1939. AG 381 (10–31–38) (Misc.) C–M. National Archives.

1. The PMP proper was intended to be extremely brief. All basic policies, procedural methods, and implementing detail were to be in the vastly expanded and improved mobilization regulations and in the tabular or graphic annexes to the plan itself, which would consist principally of references to the applicable MR's and annexes with a minimum of amplifying or clarifying detail.

2. Procedures of supply, administration, and training would initially continue during mobilization with as little change from peacetime procedures as possible. This insistence on familiar processes, it was felt, by forestalling changes and unfamiliar new methods would facilitate efficiency and eliminate confusion and misdirection.

3. Control of mobilization would be centralized in the War Department, with only slight control being decentralized to corps area commanders and other subordinate commands.

4. Most of the implementing details of mobilization would continue to be decentralized to corps area commanders and would appear in the corps area mobilization plans. But in performing these functions, the corps area commanders, in effect, would be only carrying out the orders and fulfilling the instructions of the War Department.

Part I, Annex 7 (Units to be mobilized), the first of the annexes to the 1939 PMP to be completed, was submitted to the Chief of Staff on 24 January 1939 for approval.[15] These tables, which replaced the similarly designated tables of the 1938 PMP, listed the units to be mobilized for the Protective Mobilization Force. The 1939 version differed from its predecessor in the following particulars:

1. Army troops considered essential for the initial functioning of two armies in the field were provided in the 1939 version, instead of the one complete set of Army troops for a type army which had been in the 1938 plan.

2. Component elements of major units were listed in the 1939 table. The 1938 table had indicated the major unit, as the 3d Infantry Division, and had shown only those component units of the division which were *not* in actual existence on M-day.

3. The 1939 table advanced the mobilization of 17 Regular Army inactive antiaircraft regiments from the period M+3—M+4 to the period M—M+1, a change made possible by the favorable prospect of procuring critical equipment for those regiments much sooner than was anticipated in 1938.[16]

---

[15] Memo, G–3 for CofS, 24 Jan 39, sub: PMP, 1939. G 3/6541 Gen 549. Copy in AG 381 (1–24–39) (Misc.) C. M. National Archives.

[16] Appropriations for the fiscal year 1939 permitted initiation of procurement of these critical items except for searchlights and 37mm guns. In lieu of the 37mm guns, it was planned to utilize 50 cal. machine guns for the 17 AA regiments, and to substitute 30 cal. machine guns for the 50 cal. guns which would go to the AA regiments. Although the 50 cal. machine gun was hardly a desirable substitute AA weapon for the 37mm AA gun, and the absence of searchlights presumably would have disarmed these AA regiments at

4. Three National Guard cavalry divisions (the 21st, 22d, and 23d) were included in the 1939 Plan for *immediate* mobilization at existing strength, to be raised to war strength during the period M+2—M+3. The 1938 table had shown these units as "mobilization deferred."

5. Various other minor changes in the status of inactive units were made in an effort to better balance the Protective Mobilization Force. The Signal Corps, for example, was severed of its last connection with the Air Corps by the demobilization of its meteorological companies which were reconstituted as Air Corps Weather Observation Squadrons.

Part I, Annex 7, to the 1939 PMP was approved by the Chief of Staff on 3 February 1939 and distributed on 6 February 1939.[17] There was urgent need for this annex, for the letter of 22 December 1938 transmitting the text of the 1939 PMP had advised subordinate commanders that: "It is especially important that computations of shortages of equipment and supply be initiated without delay and submitted by March 15, 1939." Inasmuch as these computations were based directly on Part I of Annex 7, it was essential that its publication not be delayed if the computations were to be actually made on schedule.

On 16 February 1939, all remaining annexes except 5 (Personnel for War Department Overhead) and 6 (Personnel for Corps Area Service Commands) were forwarded to the Chief of Staff for approval, which was given on 1 March 1939. These annexes were published and distributed one day later.[18] Except for the two delayed annexes the Protective Mobilization Plan 1939 was in coherent form by 2 March 1939. At that time, the overall War Department's mobilization plan consisted of the following:

I. The Protective Mobilization Plan, 1939 (published 22 December 1938) with 10 annexes:

A. Annex 1 (published 2 March 1939).

An "Outline of Mobilization" which, in one graphic table, showed all units with their strengths included in the Initial Protective Force and in the remainder of the Protective Mobilization Plan (less augmentations). [See *table 54.*]

---

night when air attacks could most probably be expected, G–3 felt that the psychological effect of these regiments, even with obsolete equipment, warranted their inclusion in the PMP. There was at the time considerable political pressure being brought to bear on members of the Congress from coastal cities for AA protection. Although Congress had made available funds for AA equipment procurement in 1939 it could not be procured for at least a year. G–3 felt it wise to include the 17 additional AA regiments in the PMP immediately. See: Memo for CofS, 31 Jan 39, sub: Advancing the time when 17 Inactive AA Regiments. . . . G–3 6541 C. A.–69. DRB, TAG.

[17] TAG ltr, 6 Feb 39, sub: The PMP, 1939. AG 381 (1–24–39) (Misc.) C–M. National Archives.

[18] TAG ltr, 2 Mar 39, sub: The PMP 1939. AG 381 (2–16–39) (Misc.) C–M National Archives.

B. Annex 2 (published 2 March 1939).
A graphic table listing reception centers, unit training centers, and enlisted replacement centers to be established. This 1939 annex, together with a revised MR 3–1 (approved 14 December 1938), strengthened to a considerable degree War Department control over these training centers. As in the 1938 version, the War Department in 1939 prescribed the location for all of these establishments, the units to be trained there, the processing times and numbers, etc.; it also stated that although the operation of these centers would be under corps area commanders, the War Department, making full use of chiefs of services, would:
1. Issue training programs for units and individuals.
2. Exercise general supervision of the conduct of training by frequent inspection.
3. Make the mobilization assignment of Regular Army commissioned personnel to the command and staff of each training establishment.
4. Retain direct control over all specialized replacement centers (Signal, Ordnance, CWS, Cavalry, Tanks, Engineers, Field Artillery, and Air Corps) located at exempted posts and stations.

C. Annex 3 (published 2 March 1939).
Contained details concerning the training of officer and enlisted specialists and refresher courses for officers, location of such schools, attendance, quotas, etc. All of these schools were to be under War Department control.

D. Annex 4 (published 2 March 1939).
Furnished the composition of War Department overhead, with a breakdown of War Department activities, stations under War Department control, etc.

E. Annex 5 (Not ready in March 1939).
To contain the authorized overhead for War Department activities, but was not yet ready. (This annex, less subannexes, was ready on 26 September 1939; but was not distributed until the subannexes were ready on 1 March 1940.)

F. Annex 6 (Not ready in March 1939).
To contain the authorized overhead for corps area activities.

G. Annex 7, part I (published 6 February 1939).
A graphic table listing all units of the Protective Mobilization Plan to be mobilized and the times therefore.

H. Annex 7, part II (published 2 March 1939).
A graphic table listing all individuals, by arm and service, to be procured each month in each corps area for units, cadres, and replacements. The total of filler and loss replacements

Table 54. The Protective Mobilization Plan, 1939, Outline of Mobilization

The Protective Mobilization Plan

The protective mobilization plan

The Initial Protective Force

Remainder of the Protective Mobilization Plan

		The Initial Protective Force						Remainder of the Protective Mobilization Plan																			
		1	2		3		4	5 (See note 8)		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15	
		Units and individuals	Existing strength		To be procured M-30M for the IPF		Available for use by 30M	To be procured (note 9)								Available for use by—											
								M-30M		31M-60M		61M-90M		91M-120M		60M		90M		120M		150M		180M		210M		240M	
			O	EM	O	EM	O	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
		UNITS														Figures are cumulative											
	1	4 RA divisions	1,410	43,877	1,213	6,441	2,623	1,311	6,664	56	2,317	.....	1,008	.....	.....	2,623	50,318	2,623	50,318	2,623	50,318	2,777	53,866	2,777	53,866	2,777	53,866	2,777	53,866
	2	18 NG divisions	10,772	140,834	1,484	96,295	12,256	1,484	96,295	214	553	.....	3,568	.....	.....	12,256	237,129	12,256	237,129	12,256	237,129	12,470	241,250	12,470	241,250	12,470	241,250	12,470	241,250
		4 Corps headquarters and corps troops for 4 corps:																										
	3	RA units	35	926	343	1,827	378	2,079	27,707	152	13,605	21	5,060	.....	1,791	406	3,321	830	13,953	1,806	35,925	2,266	47,318	2,266	47,318	2,287	49,109	2,287	49,109
	4	NG units	345	990	.....	360	270	28	928	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	298	1,918	298	1,918	298	1,918	298	1,918	298	1,918	298	1,918	298	1,918
		2 Army headquarters and army troops essential for 2 armies:																										
	5	RA units	98	3,145	345	3,716	443	1,674	13,727	350	11,618	.....	4,508	.....	.....	755	10,181	1,059	16,804	1,851	23,649	2,122	32,998	2,122	32,998	2,122	32,998	2,122	32,998
	6	NG units	291	3,138	.....	1,869	274	64	3,082	12	486	.....	168	.....	.....	274	5,007	317	6,167	317	6,167	350	6,874	350	6,874	350	6,874	350	6,874
	7	2 Army headquarters (officers only)	5	.....	151	.....	156	151	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	156	.....	156	.....	156	.....	156	.....	156	.....	156	.....	156	.....
		GHQ Reserve units:																										
	8	GHQ air force	402	7,015	986	4,389	1,388	986	4,389	.....	.....	30	.....	.....	890	1,388	11,404	1,388	11,404	1,388	11,404	1,388	11,404	1,388	11,404	1,388	11,404	1,418	12,294
	9	2 RA cavalry divisions	354	8,818	343	1,644	697	660	2,395	12	6,461	12	470	.....	262	697	10,462	697	10,462	697	10,462	1,026	18,106	1,026	18,106	1,026	18,106	1,038	18,408
	10	1 NG cavalry division	290	3,386	98	2,743	388	214	3,552	3	1,809	6	127	.....	131	388	6,129	424	6,730	424	6,730	507	8,855	507	8,855	507	8,855	513	9,005
	11	3 NG cavalry divisions (partly active) (note 1)	589	7,748	.....	.....	589	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	589	7,748	589	7,748	589	7,748	589	7,748	589	7,748	589	7,748	589	7,748
		Other GHQ Reserve units:																										
	12	RA units	422	12,135	481	3,193	903	5,440	36,507	1,001	64,066	5	22,613	.....	55	1,234	22,324	1,332	24,284	5,107	96,574	6,536	122,922	6,714	132,456	6,868	135,376	6,868	135,376
	13	NG units	1,549	22,100	152	15,031	1,701	393	17,668	.....	2,294	.....	.....	.....	.....	1,701	37,131	1,701	37,131	1,874	40,884	1,942	42,062	1,942	42,062	1,942	42,062	1,942	42,062
		Harbor defense troops:																										
	14	RA units	164	5,386	296	424	460	1,162	10,197	.....	10,839	193	442	.....	3,540	460	5,810	478	6,098	802	14,256	1,140	22,634	1,326	26,422	1,326	26,422	1,519	30,404
	15	NG units	536	6,575	32	7,424	568	193	9,281	.....	2,280	.....	.....	.....	.....	566	12,999	566	13,999	629	15,551	727	18,136	727	18,136	727	18,136	727	18,136
		Total (Initial Protective Force):																										
	16	RA units	2,890	81,302	4,158	21,634	7,048	102,936																				
	17	NG units	14,372	184,771	1,766	123,722	16,046	308,493																				
	18	Grand total (Initial Protective Force), RA and NG	17,262	266,073	5,924	145,356	23,094	411,429																				
		UNITS (NOT IN IPF)																										
	19	5 RA divisions (partly active) (note 3)	402	12,921			732	871	3,681	.....	10,329	.....	.....	.....	.....	732	15,630	732	15,630	732	15,630	1,273	26,931	1,273	26,931	1,273	26,931	1,273	26,931
	20	RA colored units of infantry and cavalry (note 1)	113	3,155			.....	291	5,047	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	404	8,202	404	8,202	404	8,202	404	8,202	404	8,202	404	8,202
	21	Antiaircraft troops for 5 additional corps	.....	.....			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	385	985	.....	9,030	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	385	10,015
		Total (in units) (Protective Mobilization Plan):																										
	22	RA units	3,405	97,378			7,760	14,625	110,314	1,571	119,235	646	35,106	.....	15,568	8,451	129,450	9,699	157,155	15,266	266,420	19,088	344,381	19,452	357,798	19,627	362,414	20,247	377,601
	23	NG units	14,372	184,771			16,046	2,376	130,806	229	7,422	6	3,863	.....	131	16,072	309,061	16,151	310,822	16,387	316,127	16,883	326,843	16,883	326,843	16,883	326,843	16,889	326,993
	24	Grand total (in units) (PMP), RA and NG	17,777	282,149			23,826	17,001	241,120	1,800	126,657	652	38,969	.....	15,699	24,523	438,511	25,850	467,977	31,653	582,547	35,971	671,224	36,335	684,546	36,510	689,257	37,136	704,594
		INDIVIDUALS																										
	25	War Department overhead and corps area service commands (estimated)	6,800	30,000			15,400	8,600	42,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	15,400	72,500	15,400	72,500	15,400	72,500	15,400	72,500	15,400	72,500	15,400	72,500	15,400	72,500
	26	Fillers for overseas garrisons	.....	.....			1,640	1,640	21,060	250	4,355	.....	.....	.....	.....	1,890	25,415	1,890	25,415	1,890	25,415	1,890	25,415	1,890	25,415	1,890	25,415	1,890	25,415
	27	Fillers—peace to war (note 1)	.....	.....			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	9,533	67,174	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	9,533	167,174	9,533	167,174	9,533	167,174	9,533	167,174
	28	Air Corps technical personnel (note 6)	.....	.....			.....	912	4,812	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	106	589	127	969	148	1,349	156	1,405	156	1,405	300	2,296	912	4,812
	29	Less replacements	.....	.....			1,565	4,697	84,797	2,178	37,418	1,100	26,478	1,216	27,107	3,131	56,531	4,697	84,797	5,423	97,269	6,875	122,215	7,978	148,693	9,191	175,800	9,191	175,800
	30	Total (individuals)	6,800	30,000			18,605	15,849	153,169	2,428	41,773	10,490	92,625	1,216	27,107	20,527	155,035	22,114	183,681	22,861	196,533	33,854	388,709	34,954	415,187	36,314	443,185	36,926	445,701
	31	Total (Protective Mobilization Plan)	24,577	312,149			42,431	32,850	394,289	4,228	168,430	11,142	131,594	1,216	42,806	45,050	593,546	47,964	651,658	54,514	779,080	69,825	1,059,933	71,289	1,099,733	72,824	1,132,442	74,062	1,180,295

For personnel to be procured M-30M, see column 5.

Notes: 1. Units beginning their mobilization during M-30M mobilize at peace strength *except* units which have no Tables of Organization for peace; RA colored regiments of Infantry and Cavalry which mobilize at war strength; and certain NG Cavalry units which mobilize at existing strength. For individuals required to raise these units to war strength, see line 27.

2. All units which begin their mobilization after 30M mobilize at war strength. Officers, Warrant Officers and Enlisted Cadres are shown to be procured one month prior to the mobilization of these units.

3. Active RA units are available on M Day at existing strength. They will be built up to peace strength on M Day or as soon thereafter as practicable. If not needed, the 5 partly active Divisions (line 19) will be withheld and raised to reinforced brigades, available as such by 150M.

4. It is assumed for planning purposes that selective service will begin to produce processed men ready for assignment by 61M. Until such time, personnel will be procured by voluntary enlistment and from the Regular Army Reserve.

5. All strengths of enlisted men (EM) shown include warrant officers. Nurses are not included.

6. For inactive Air Corps units, except those available for use by 30M, only nontechnical Air Corps personnel has been included in the strengths under "Units." The technical Air Corps personnel for all such units has been included under "Individuals," line 28.

7. For units mobilized in Overseas Departments, see appropriate defense projects. Figures pertaining to such units are not included in this annex.

8. Figures in column 5 show the number procured during the period M-30M, *including* the number procured during the same period for the IPF. The latter are shown in column 3.

9. Officers to be procured as shown in columns 5, 6, 7 and 8 include those now available.

in the 1939 version exceeded those of 1938 by approximately 113,000, occasioned by increases in some of the recently revised tables of organization.

I. Annex 8 (published 2 March 1939).
A table indicating the replacement centers to furnish cadres for all units mobilized after M+1.

J. Annex 9 (published 2 March 1939).
A distribution list for all subordinate mobilization plans.

K. Annex 10 (published 2 March 1939).
Prescribed the number and designation of annexes to subordinate mobilization plans.

II. Mobilization Regulations:
A. Mobilization Regulations, General.
B. Mobilization Regulations Series 1—Personnel matters.
C. Mobilization Regulations Series 2—Intelligence matters.
D. Mobilization Regulations Series 3—Organization and Training matters.
E. Mobilization Regulations Series 4—Supply and Logistics matters (in a process of revision in 1939, not available for use; MR 4–1 was published on 5 January 1940; MR 4–2 was approved on 6 December 1939).

III. War Department letters, supplementary to the MR's and to the PMP with its annexes.

IV. Mobilization matters contained in the classified strategic color plans.

V. Mobilization Training Programs (MTP's). By referring back and forth to all of these basic mobilization directives, the intended functioning of the Protective Mobilization Plan emerged reasonably coherent.

The PMP was *not* the complete War Department Mobilization Plan but only that part of it which would throw mobilization machinery into gear and thereby provide enough power to meet the initial requirements of any possible emergency. The complete War Department Mobilization Plan included the PMP plus all of the augmentations thereto. The purpose of the PMP was to mobilize at the maximum rate consistent with manpower and materiel procurement a *moderate sized, balanced* force consisting of approximately 1,000,000 enlisted men with their necessary officers.[19]

The 1939 PMP Analyzed

The hard core of the Protective Mobilization Plan consisted of the forces in being—Regular Army and National Guard—which would

[19] The 1938 PMP included 1,044,553 enlisted men and 66,940 officers; the 1939 PMP expanded the goals to 1,150,295 enlisted men and 74,062 officers; the 1940 PMP revised these tables to 1,137,151 enlisted men and 87,511 officers.

be organized, equipped, trained, and present in the United States ready for tactical deployment.[20] There may have been doubts about the status of training and equipment, but these forces in being were at least organized and present. This nucleus comprised roughly 80,000 Regular Army troops and 180,000 National Guardsmen who would be available for useful action on M-day. The PMP, however, planned for at least a grace period of 30 days after M-day before hostilities would commence. During that 30-day period it was anticipated that some 300,000 to 400,000 Volunteers would flock to the Colors and somewhere between 100,000 to 125,000 would be promptly assigned to the Regular Army and National Guard tactical units. At the end of M+1, the Initial Protective Force—the hard core of the PMP—would have ready to fight a force of some 20,000 officers and 400,000 enlisted men organized in 4 Regular Army infantry divisions,[21] 18 National Guard infantry divisions, corps troops of four corps, army troops for two armies, and various GHQ reserve and harbor defense troops. Five more partly active Regular Army infantry divisions would also be ready in the United States and could be deployed tactically if absolutely necessary. It was hoped that these divisions would not be needed immediately and could, therefore, be withheld and raised to wartime strength infantry brigades available for use by M+5. Supplementing these combat forces at M+1 would be the War Department and corps area service command overheads comprising some 7,000 officers and 30,000 enlisted men.

During the second month of mobilization it was estimated that the number of volunteers would have dwindled to less than 200,000 men, about 75 percent of whom would be assigned to units of the Initial Protective Force and 25 percent to overhead. Selective service would begin functioning at M+2, and thereafter the decisive procurement factor would be materiel which, insofar as organizational equipment was concerned, could provide for a balanced force of 150,000 men monthly. This rate of 150,000 men per month, however, could be exceeded to provide replacements and fillers who would require individual rather than organizational equipment, and to provide men for units whose organizational equipment could be procured faster.

Inasmuch as the four Regular Army infantry divisions for the initial mobilization of the IPF were not at even their emaciated peace strength, the PMP supplied missing units for them by further skeletonizing the already skeletonized five additional Regular Army

[20] This analysis of the 1939 PMP is based on a careful examination of the plan and its annexes and two lectures before the Army War College. See: Lecture, Col (later Maj Gen) John H. Hester, Ch. Mob Br, G-3, before the Army War College, "The Protective Mobilization Plan," 13 Dec 38. Mob. #2, 1938-39. Army War College; and lecture, Lt Col (later, Maj Gen) Harry L. Twaddle, Ch, Mob Br, G-3, before the Army War College, "The War Department Mobilization Plan," 30 Sep 39. G-3 Course No. 13 (1939-40) Army War College.

[21] The 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Inf Divs.

divisions (5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th Infantry Divisions). Inactive headquarters and service units which could not be activated by the transfer of active units would at least be organized promptly by utilizing cadres derived from zone of interior installations and then filled to strength by adding men with previous service from the Regular Army Reserve (RAR).[22] Unfortunately, the PMP had so many places to put members of the RAR that there were not enough Reservists to go around. The Regular Army Reserve, had it been inexhaustible, could have been utilized to bring Regular Army active units up to peace strength, to furnish fillers for Regular Army inactive units scheduled for activation within the first 30 days after M-day, to furnish cadres for the zone of the interior installations, as corps area service commands, replacement training centers, reception stations, etc. But even the most careful pruning of lower priority units would not fill the four Regular Army divisions of the Initial Protective Force to even peacetime strength by M+1. Certain artillery units were missing entirely and other artillery units were short some batteries. These inactive units and missing batteries were scheduled for later mobilization and would be made available for use only after they were organized, equipped, and trained. All units of the IPF were to be mobilized at peace strength, and the fillers to bring them to war strength would not be procured until after M+3. Since these fillers would be raw recruits, they would be made available to their parent units only after undergoing training at a replacement center—a delay of from three to four months.

The PMP was justifiably concerned about cadres for the units whose mobilization would begin after M+1. Sufficient Reserve officers were believed available to cadre almost all of the new units in the Protective Mobilization Plan, but the enlisted cadres for these units were not as readly available. The solution arrived at was to select at reception stations the men who showed the most promise and to forward them to designated replacement centers for intensive training. Shortly before a particular unit was scheduled to begin its mobilization, a final selection would be made at the replacement center of the cadre

[22] The National Defense Act of 1920 contained a provision authorizing an Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC) but this provision had been vitiated for many years by the War Department disinterest, which resulted in Congress not providing any funds for the ERC. The War Department, beginning about 1930, began to place increasing emphasis on the need for such an enlisted reserve, and recommendations to that effect were annually included in the reports of the Secretary of War. In 1937 Congress authorized in addition to the ERC, a Regular Army Reserve (RAR) to be composed of men honorably discharged from the Regular Army after serving one or more enlistments. Enlistment in the RAR began on 1 Jul 38. The War Department hoped this Reserve would increase to a strength of 75,000. The RA Reservist was given a small monthly stipend which, because of the economic depression, attracted over 20,000 men during the first year. The ERC, which continued alongside the RAR but without any remuneration to induce enlistments, had a strength of about 3,000. In 1941 the President ordered the RAR into active duty; of some 28,099 then in the RAR, 12,260 came on duty, the remainder being deferred for physical reasons, occupations, dependencies, etc. See: *Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, 1932–41*

for that unit. In that selection, the replacement center commander could replace inept members of the tentatively selected cadre with better qualified trainees. This cadre would then be forwarded to the unit training center at which the particular unit was to be organized and trained. The solution was intended to avoid the disrupting effects of taking cadres from existing combat units, a practice which tends to delay those combat units in achieving optimum combat efficiency. The PMP contained specific instructions concerning which replacement training centers would furnish cadres for what units. All units to be mobilized after M+1, that is all units of the PMP not included in the Initial Protective Force, would be mobilized at full war strength.

The Protective Mobilization Plan specified the location of reception centers, unit training centers, and enlisted replacement centers and indicated where each unit would begin and complete its organization and training. All Regular Army active units were to mobilize at their home stations where the concentration plans of army strategical plans would pick them up. Active National Guard units, after being inducted into Federal service, were to be moved to unit training centers in the South to complete their organization and training. It was hoped that the situation would permit the Guard divisions, after their induction into Federal service, to continue recruiting in their own localities and to have time for additional training. Although these Guard divisions were part of the immediate readiness forces, it was well realized that their combat efficiency might be something less than desirable when they were inducted into Federal service.

It was clearly acknowledged that zone of interior installations, as corps area service commands, reception centers, replacement and unit training centers, depots, etc., could not secure enough Regular Army or prior service personnel to have an appreciable effect on their efficiency. It was realized that these installations, which comprised the working machinery for mobilization, would have to function as soon as they were created. This problem, which had not been solved in any previous mobilization plan, continued completely unsolved in the PMP which made but two suggestions in reference to it:

1. That peacetime training be given to the Reserve, Regular, and Retired officers who would be assigned to those installations.

2. That the other personnel assigned to operate those installations be trained concurrently with their performance of assigned duties.

Training during mobilization was to be strictly supervised by the War Department. Not only were the training programs for all units, the training locations for all units, and the training faculty for all centers prescribed, but the service schools were retained under direct War Department control. With the same lack of foresight which had been found in previous mobilization plans, the PMP closed the Army

War College and Army Industrial College for the duration of the war. The PMP, however, authorized the continuation of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, which would offer three month's courses for command and staff training. The special service schools, i. e., the Infantry School at Fort Benning, the Artillery School at Fort Sill, the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, etc., also would continue to operate under direct War Department control and would conduct successive short courses for the refresher and specialist training of officers. Officer candidate courses would be conducted initially at the special service schools only, although it was believed that these latter courses would not be necessary for the first two months of mobilization. If the emergency continued, however, it was planned not only to begin officer candidate courses at the special service schools but at such other locations as would be necessary to meet the demand for more officers.

Except for recruits enlisted by unit recruiting during the first 60 days after M-day, the general scheme of the PMP contemplated that all enlisted men procured would go first to a corps area reception center. At the reception center, men would be processed, i. e., physically examined, interviewed, classified, issued some basic clothing and individual equipment, etc., and then those accepted for general service would flow out via one of two methods:

1. Filler replacements to bring active Regular Army or National Guard units to mobilization strength would go direct to those units.

2. Others would be forwarded to enlisted replacement centers for basic training. From the replacement centers, the pipelines flowed as follows:

   1. To replacement depots for eventual shipment as replacements to units overseas.

   2. To the unit training area of new units being activated as cadres and fillers.

   3. To the unit training area of units already active and organized but at reduced strength as fillers.

   4. To specialist schools, either at existing special service schools, or, if necessary, at civilian trade schools.

In spite of the recommendations made in 1937 by several corps area commanders that mobilization plans should include provision for the construction of adequate housing and other facilities in each corps area for large units and for training centers, the War Department planners remained convinced that during mobilization there would be no need for an extensive troop housing construction program. The General Staff believed that mobilized forces would be hurried to theaters of operation so rapidly that the relatively small amount of troop housing in the United States could be successively utilized by

units mobilized in accordance with the progressive schedules of the PMP. To provide the additional housing which would inevitably be necessary at unit training centers and replacement training centers, the PMP located such centers in the South and prescribed that tentage be used. The mobilization planners forbade corps area commanders to authorize the construction of any building costing in excess of $2,500 or of any construction program costing over $50,000 *without specific prior War Department approval.* The effect of this restriction was for the corps area commanders to assume that there would be no point in conducting surveys or in making plans for adequate construction at training camps since there would be no possibility of getting them approved.

The PMP provided for the expansion of medical facilities which would be required in the Zone of Interior. It prescribed that maximum use be made of War Department hospital facilities under control of corps area commanders; and it directed the corps area commanders to make surveys of the normal average number of vacant beds in Veterans Administration facilities, Public Health hospitals, and the Indian Medical Service hospitals whose location was such as to make their use feasible for the hospitalization of Army personnel during mobilization. This provision was not particularly well considered nor does The Surgeon General appear to have been consulted. First, the idea of parceling out Army casualties in driblets to fill the empty beds of hospitals not under military control was certainly not sound. Second, the data which the corps area commanders were directed to secure by surveys was readily available at the respective headquarters of the Veterans Administration, Public Health Service, and Bureau of Indian Affairs in Washington. Third, in its hospital provision the PMP had completely forgotten one of the most successful and notable lessons of World War I: the formation of military hospitals by civilian institutions—hospitals, medical schools, colleges, and universities. It was well after the publication of the Protective Mobilization Plan that The Surgeon General of the Army reminded the General Staff of the outstanding success of volunteer affiliated hospitals in World War I and requested approval for reinstitution of the system.

The supply system set up by the PMP was designed and intended to adapt peacetime machinery and processes to mobilization. Class I Supply (food and forage), for example, was to continue initially during mobilization to be processed as in peacetime. Other classes of supplies, (Classes II, III, IV, and V), however, would at M-day cease to be issued on requisition but would be automatically issued by the supply services based on credits which in turn would be determined by statements of requirements computed in most instances by corps area commanders.

The Flaws in the PMP

The mobilization planners were well aware of and freely admitted that the PMP did *not* achieve a balanced force in the sense that it would be an effective fighting army. Although it was impossible in a general mobilization plan to determine exactly where the fighting would take place, nevertheless the corps, army, and service units in the PMP were far short of what would have been necessary had the fighting been in the United States itself, let alone overseas. So apparent were the deficiencies in artillery, engineer, signal, medical, and quartermaster supporting units that at least one mobilization planner admitted that ". . . the Initial Protective Force as it now exists is not an effective combat force." [23] To give the IPF more fighting balance the PMP planners hoped that the necessary units could be activated gradually, as the President saw fit to recommend and the Congress to approve extensions and expansion of the armed forces prior to an actual emergency. In the event that M-day arrived while the Army was still in its state of impotent size, the planners estimated that it would take four months from M-day to activate, equip, and train the units necessary to give the IPF combat efficiency.

The PMP planners can hardly be criticized for including in the plan for immediate use only those units which actually existed and could be used. Indeed, this realistic insistence on things as they were was a primary virtue of the PMP. The 1938 PMP, for example, started out with a GHQ Air Force of 400 officers and some 7,000 men. In the 1939 PMP, by M+8 the GHQ Air Force had expanded to 1,400 officers and 12,000 men.[24] By 1940, the pressure of events had caught up with and passed the mobilization planners. The GHQ Air Force by then had already expanded to 715 officers and nearly 19,000 men and it was contemplated that by M+8 the Air Corps would have over 3,000 officers and more than 30,000 men.

Similarly, the 1938 and 1939 PMP's had visualized an armored force consisting of a mechanized cavalry brigade and one tank regiment. Even in 1940, the PMP armored force contemplated for M+8 was still only a mechanized cavalry brigade and three tank regiments, nor did the plans for the augmentations to the PMP visualize any notable expansion of armor. The first augmentation plan would have expanded the mechanized cavalry brigade into a mechanized division and would have activated some additional GHQ Reserve units. Suc-

[23] Hester, lecture, *op. cit.*, 13 Dec. 38.

[24] Unquestionably, failure of the early PMP to provide more adequately for air forces was due not only to miscalculation of the aircraft necessary in modern warfare but also to the adverse influence caused by doubts as to the speed of aircraft production and procurement. It would certainly have been futile to fill the Air Corps with men appreciably faster than weapons and aircraft would be ready for them to train with and use. In 1937, the aircraft manufacturing industry in the United States was not large enough to afford any hope that starting from scratch at M-day it could produce planes in desired quantities in less than two years.

ceeding augmentation plans called for more infantry divisions but the goal of one armored division in an army of 4,000,000 men was unbelievably modest. No cognizance appears to have been taken of the use of armor in the wars in Spain and China in the late 1930's. Expected delay in production and procurement was part of the answer again, but the inescapable fact is that the mobilization planners underestimated armor as woefully as they had airpower.

There is no doubt but what the troop basis in the 1938, 1939, and 1940 Protective Mobilization Plans was tactically and logistically unsound. But that troop basis did provide a point of departure on which changes could be based. The troops of the IPF, if they did not constitute a force adequate for modern warfare, at least did provide a system for the mobilization of men and equipment actually in existence.

CHAPTER XV

INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PLANNING, 1920–39 [1]

Industrial Mobilization Planning—A War Department Responsibility

Until World War I it had been a tradition in the United States that at the end of a war the Nation would return as rapidly as possible to a civilian peacetime status and that the military machine which had been built up during the war would be instantaneously stripped of all its essential parts. This tradition was broken, in some respects, by the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920.

The ineffectiveness of military procurement and industrial mobilization during World War I resulted in the inclusion by Congress in the National Defense Act of 1920 of a provision which it was hoped would remedy this situation in future emergencies:

> Hereafter, in addition to such other duties as may be assigned him by the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, under the supervision of the Secretary of War, shall be charged with the supervision of the procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War Department pertaining thereto and the assurance of adequate provision for mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs. . . . There shall be detailed to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War from the branches engaged in procurement such numbers of officers and civilian employees as may be authorized by regulations approved by the Secretary of War. . . .
>
> Under the direction of the Secretary of War, Chiefs of Branches of the Army charged with the procurement of supplies for the Army shall report direct to the Assistant Secretary of War regarding all matters of procurement.[2]

By this act the Assistant Secretary was charged not only with current Army procurement and plans for future Army procurement, but also with the task of preparing plans for the mobilization of American industry to be used whenever another major war occurred. It had become an established fact during World War I that major wars henceforth were "total wars" comprehending the whole of the warring

[1] This chapter on industrial mobilization planning 1920–39 is based in great part on the excellent studies prepared by the Historical Section, Office of The Quartermaster General, during World War II. Extensive use has been made of Harold W. Thatcher's *Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 1920–1940* ("QMC Historical Studies," No. IV [Washington, 1943]). Background material was obtained from Thomas M. Pitkin and Herbert R. Rifkind's *Procurement Planning in the Quartermaster Corps, 1920–1940* ("QMC Historical Studies," No. 1 [Washington, 1943]).

[2] Act of June 4, 1920. 41 *Stat.* 764.

nations' economy and manpower. Within this concept, the mobilization planning task assigned to the Assistant Secretary required integrating into one smoothly functioning machine the huge industrial capacity of the United States together with its economic resources and wealth.

The confusion concerning overlapping and divided mobilization responsibilities assigned to the Assistant Secretary and to the General Staff were resolved by the Harbord Board and by War Department General Orders No. 41, 16 August 1921, on the common sense decision that the General Staff's responsibility was to determine what was needed, how much, and when; the Assistant Secretary's responsibility was to procure materiel to meet these requirements in the quantities and at the times stipulated, and, more difficult, to plan for economic mobilization.[3] Over such matters as supervision of research and development, standardization of specifications, and storage control both the General Staff and the Assistant Secretary could assume responsibility, with inevitable friction developing. The General Staff assumed responsibility for all three of these functions, but an Army Regulation [4] recognized the Assistant Secretary's vested interests in at least one of them by directing the technical services to cooperate with the Assistant Secretary on standardization, but through the General Staff. The situation was not definitively clarified until the publication of AR 5–5, 16 July 1932, which assigned responsibility for the issues in doubt to the Assistant Secretary. [See *chart 16.*]


One other issue between the General Staff and the Office of the Assistant Secretary that caused difficulties was the allotment of budgetary funds which was under the supervision of the General Staff. Inevitably, fixed current expenses of the Army were given preference to planning funds since there would be understandable difficulties in cutting down on such fixed items as pay, food, and clothing for the forces in being. The funds allotted to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for future planning were, therefore, rather limited and were not, as a matter of strict fact, even allotted specifically for that purpose; they were so entangled in other fund allotments that it was difficult for the General Staff to determine exactly how much it was authorizing to the Assistant Secretary for procurement planning.[5] It was not until 1939 that that Assistant Secretary of War was as-

[3] For a more complete discussion see ch. XII, this study. In Sep 21, the SW, in a directive to the ASW, assigned to him sole responsibility for planning economic mobilization; this directive served to confirm definitely what, in some respects, may have been only implied by the Harbord Board recommendations and by WD GO 41, 1921; see also: *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1922.*

[4] AR 850–25, 15 Dec. 24.

[5] In a 1927 study for the CofS, G–4 estimated that during the fiscal years 1927–29 somewhere between $100,000 to $350,000 annually had been allocated to the ASW for procurement planning. See: Memo, G–4 to CofS, 25 Oct 27. G–4/22986 in AG File 381. National Archives.

*Chart 16. War Department Responsibilities in Preparing for an Emergency, March 1930.**



1. The chart shows the broad division of War Department functions, connected with the preparation for war, between the General Staff and the Assistant Secretary.

2. Coordination between the General Staff and Assistant Secretary is essential at all times and easy to secure because the Secretary of War is responsible for both.

3. In carrying out functions marked (a), coordination with outside agencies is essential. This is not so easy to secure in all cases because there is no agency, except the President, responsible for the completeness and sufficiency of War Plans.

**Source:* Harold W. Thatcher, *Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 1920–40* ("QMC Historical Studies," No. IV [Washington, 1943]), chart facing p. 10.

signed responsibility for supervising the budgetary estimates for procurement planning in the War Department.[6]

Thus the three basic industrial mobilization planning agencies established in the 1920's and developed in the 1930's were:

1. The Planning Branch, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War.
2. The Army Industrial College.
3. The Army and Navy Munitions Board.

The Planning Branch

Under the National Defense Act of 1920 the technical or supply services of the Army—Quartermaster, Engineers, Signal Corps, Ordnance, Chemical Corps, Medical Department, and Air Corps—had a dual responsibility. They had to prepare, under General Staff supervision, the data for requirements; but once these statistics had been collated and approved by the General Staff, the services were responsible to the Assistant Secretary for preparing the data on how and where to procure the material which they had already determined to be the requirements. In 1921 the Assistant Secretary decided to set up his own organization and to deal directly with the technical-supply services rather than through G–4.

Col. H. B. Ferguson, a student at the Army War College, was withdrawn from his class and given the mission of organizing procurement planning for the Assistant Secretary.[7] Colonel Ferguson began by requesting recommendations from the chiefs of the technical services. After studying these recommendations, the first organization step was taken on 25 October 1921 by the publication of Memorandum Orders No. 1, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War:

> There is hereby established as part of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War a Procurement Division. This Division is specifically charged with the supervision of procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War Department pertaining thereto, and the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of material and industrial organizations essential to war-time needs. . . .
>
> There are hereby established the following branches of the Procurement Division:
>
> (a) Planning Branch.
>
> (b) Current Supply Branch.[8]

The Planning Branch was assigned not only the major missions of planning for wartime procurement and for industrial mobilization,

---

[6] Lecture, Col H. K. Rutherford, Ch., Pl Br, OASW, before the Army Industrial College, "The Planning Branch, OASW" 6 Jan 40. Industrial College of the Armed Forces Library.

[7] Four other members of the class at the Army War College were assigned to assist Col Ferguson after their graduation. See: Minutes of Meeting of Orientation Conference No. 14, 4 Dec 34, sub: Planning Branch. Planning Branch Records. Filed with Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. National Archives. Hereafter cited as Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.

[8] Thatcher, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

but was also made the agent of the Assistant Secretary for dealing with the Navy and other governmental departments on all matters pertaining to the allotment of industrial facilities and materials required for war. Colonel Ferguson was made head of the Procurement Division, and Col. C. M. Salzman of the Planning Branch. Seven more officers were selected by the various technical services for assignment in the Planning Branch.[9]

For some years the Planning Branch was the only agency engaged in industrial mobilization planning. Later when the Army Industrial College was established to assist in the work, and still later in the 1930's when the revitalized Army and Navy Munitions Board assumed sponsorship of mobilization planning, the Planning Branch, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, continued to do the bulk of the work. There were changes in the organizational structure of the Planning Branch which were designed principally to correlate the framework of the Planning Branch with the Army and Navy Munitions Board. It was not until after the United States entered World War II that the Planning Branch under that name disappeared as an indirect result of the creation of the Office of the Under Secretary of War and most of its functions were assigned to a new Resources Branch in the Office of the Under Secretary.[10]

The Army Industrial College

During the first years of the existence of the Planning Branch, officers newly assigned to it were instructed and indoctrinated by intensive reading of the World War I records of the War Industries Board and the other mobilization agencies of that war, as well as by all studies made by the Planning Branch. This indoctrination by reading, which required at least half a year, had to be completed before the officer was put to work on mobilization planning. Several farsighted officers suggested to Assistant Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis in 1923 that a school be organized to train officers for work in the field of industrial mobilization.[11] Assistant Secretary Davis recommended this to Secretary of War Weeks whose approval was followed by the official establishment, on 25 February 1924, of—

> . . . A college to be known as the Army Industrial College . . . for the purpose of training Army officers in the useful knowledge pertaining to the super-

[9] The Planning Branch was initially subdivided into 10 sections: Statistical, Requirements, Industrial Policy, Purchase, Production Allocation, Labor, Finance, Foreign Relations, Transportation, and Storage. See: *Report of the Secretary of War, 1921,* p. 120.

[10] Office Order No. 78, Planning Branch, OUSW, 19 Feb 42. Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.

[11] See: Memo, Maj Gen James H. Burns to Commandant, Army Industrial College, 21 Feb 41. Copy in HIS 400.3 (22 Aug 53). Spec Studies, History of Mil Mobilization. OCMH. Gen Burns was one of the active leaders in the movement to establish the Army Industrial College.

vision of procurement of all military supplies in time of war and to the assurance of adequate provisions for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs.[12]

The same general orders assigned supervision of the fledgling Industrial College to the Assistant Secretary of War, rather than to the General Staff which supervised all other general service schools.

The initial student body had nine officers; the initial course was for five months. But from these beginnings, this school, primarily for staff officers, expanded to a position in the fields of grand logistics and mobilization planning analogous to the Army War College's position in the field of military strategy and tactics.

The Industrial College continued to expand and to grow in stature in its specialized field of military education. As its prestige increased, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the line of the Army requested and were allotted student quotas. But resistance to the college within the Army for some years discouraged able officers from attending for they felt that graduation from such a school would have less professional advantage than graduation from the Army War College. After the middle of the 1930's, the Industrial College's prestige had increased to a degree that officers sought admission there as well as at the Army War College realizing that the two schools were mutually beneficial.

The curriculum at the Industrial College dealt primarily with practical fundamentals. Special lectures included business leaders in various fields who in the closed sessions at the College spoke freely (business leaders from the first gave the college full cooperation) and faculty members from eminent educational institutions, as the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration and the Carnegie School of Technology. Many of the study subjects assigned to committees at the Industrial College concerned current problems of the Planning Branch, and the committee solutions in many instances, were of solid, practical assistance to the Planning Branch.[13] The Assistant Secretary of War felt, in 1938, that the commendable progress of Army-Navy cooperative planning, which occurred during the 1930's [14] was attributable to ". . . the fact that we have taken into the [Industrial] College the Navy and Marine [Corps] officers detailed, not as guests but on exactly the same basis as our own students." [15]

---

[12] WD GO 7, 5 Feb 24.

[13] The class of 1938–39 provided valuable assistance in the revision of the annexes to the 1939 Industrial Mobilization Plan; see: Memo, Col C. Hines to ASW, 3 Oct 39. Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.

[14] Most notably evidenced by the functioning of the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board.

[15] "Annual Report of Assistant Secretary of War" *Annual Report of Secretary of War, 1940*, p. 8. For a comprehensive account of the history of the Industrial College see studies written by Cols Ferguson, McCain, Hagen, Kalton in Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives. See also: Thatcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–42.

The Army and Navy Munitions Board

The third mobilization planning agency to emerge after World War I was the Army and Navy Munitions Board, which was suggested by the Assistant Secretary of War in a memorandum dated 15 February 1922. The proposal was approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy on 29 June 1922. The Army and Navy Munitions Board consisted of the Assistant Secretaries of War and Navy with such assistants and committees as they considered necessary.[16] On 7 October 1922, a joint letter prepared by the Assistant Secretaries and approved by the Secretaries outlined the committees to be organized under the new Board. The creation of the Army and Navy Munitions Board and its subsidiary committees was announced in War Department General Orders No. 51, 29 November 1922, which also established its mission as ". . . coordinating the planning for acquiring munitions and supplies required for Army and Navy Departments for war purposes or to meet the needs of any joint plans" and of ". . . evolving a suitable legislative program which will enable the procurement program to be put into effect."

It was clearly understood by both War and Navy Departments that the Army and Navy Munitions Board was not subordinate to the Army and Navy Joint Board but was parallel to it. Actions contemplated and decisions made by the Munitions Board would be referred to the Joint Board for comment before being sent to the Department Secretaries but only when such actions and decisions affected joint war plans.[17] For the first 10 years of its existence the Munitions Board had no power and very little life because of disagreements between the Army and Navy planners. The Army favored a general mobilization plan; the Navy, more nearly on a mobilization footing, was interested in specific color plans. For years there was no meeting of minds, and in this impasse the Munitions Board stagnated.

The General Staff, faced with no effective means for coordinating planning with the Navy, went ahead for many years preparing and revising general mobilization plans without including the Navy in those plans. The one notable example of joint planning was in connection with selective service which was handled by the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee. The Planning Branch, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, went ahead by itself with economic mobilization planning. As this planning matured there was increasing concern with the obvious difficulty of organizing industrial production and allotting facilities without making provision for the Navy

[16] Lecture, Comdr Paul Hendren, before the Army Industrial College, "Organization and Functions of the Army and Navy Munitions Board," 19 Feb 36. Industrial College of the Armed Forces Library.

[17] Hendren, lecture, *op. cit.*, 19 Feb 36. The Joint Army and Navy Board had been set up in 1903 to make recommendations to the Secretaries of War and Navy on matters involving cooperation of the Army and Navy.

which, in time of war, would so clearly require an appreciable portion of resources, industries, and facilities. In 1930, Maj. Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a study prepared for Brig. Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, pointed up the problem:

> One of the difficulties encountered in agreeing upon an organization, is the lack of close cooperation and coordination (or rather lack of mutual understanding) between the Army and the Navy. It is useless to assert the fault lies wholly with either side . . . above all, lack of appreciation in the highest positions of the great importance and deadly seriousness of the problem involved, have prevented that meeting of minds between the personnel of these two departments which is a prerequisite to a successful solution.[18]

The early months of 1930 marked the low point in Navy aloofness to industrial mobilization planning. The plan for industrial mobilization which the Planning Branch completed in 1930 pointedly referred to the lack of Navy cooperation in its preparation.[19] After June 1930 a more cooperative policy on the part of the Navy was noted which was evidenced by the furnishing to the Army planners lists of facilities which the Navy considered essential for some of its production, and by the establishment of joint machinery for coordinating the industrial plans of the two services.[20] By 1931 the Assistant Secretary of War could state in his annual report: "I am particularly gratified to report that the procurement activities of the War and Navy Departments are being constantly brought into close co-ordination." [21]

In February 1932 the Army and Navy Munitions Board was reorganized to consist of the Assistant Secretaries of War and Navy, an Executive Committee (composed of the executive to the Assistant Secretary of War and the director of the Planning Branch representing the War Department and the director of the Material Division and the chief of the Procurement Planning Section of the Material Division from the Office of Naval Operations representing the Navy Department), a secretary and eight divisions: Price Control, Legal and Contract, Standardization and Specifications, Commodities, Facilities, Power, Transportation, and Labor. It was given definite missions to:

> a. Formulate and keep up to date such pertinent plans and policies as in the opinion of the two Departments [War and Navy] should be adopted by the Federal Government for coordinating and controlling national industrial effort in an emergency.
>
> b. Assure the necessary coordination in procurement war plans of the two Departments, and in all plans, studies, and appendices thereto intended to

---

[18] Maj Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Peace Time Difficulties of Procurement Planning," Jan 30. Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives. As cited in Thatcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–45.

[19] Plan for Governmental Organization for War and for Industrial Mobilization May 1930, app. I. Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.

[20] Memo, Ch, Pl Br, OASW (Col J. D. Fife) to Gen Moseley, 19 Jun 30. *Ibid.*

[21] "Annual Report of the Assistant Secretary of War," in *Annual Report of Secretary of War, 1931,* p. 25.

facilitate the Government's efforts in emergency to promote orderly mobilization of industry.

c. Form and direct the activities of such joint committees as may be necessary to consider, investigate, and make recommendations concerning pertinent subjects falling within the purview of the board's responsibilities.[22]

The Army and Navy Munitions Board in 1933 took over the sponsorship of the Industrial Mobilization Plan, and coordinated divergent Army-Navy viewpoints in that plan. This signal achievement of the Munitions Board was recognized by the War Department on innumerable occasions.[23] The Munitions Board also was responsible for the compilation of lists of strategic and critical materials.

The resurgence of the Army and Navy Munitions Board in the 1930's improved industrial mobilization planning and in a more tangible sense provided effective coordination between the Army and Navy in such planning. However, the Navy's concern still was primarily current procurement for a force in being since the Navy on M-day would actively go to war with ships and tools actually in existence. The Army, however, on M-day would have to start expanding rapidly and was primarily concerned with lining up industries and the national economy to insure future procurement for that tremendous expansion. In practice it followed, therefore, that although the Army and Navy were cooperating under the aegis of the Army and Navy Munitions Board which had taken over the responsibility of the Industrial Mobilization Plan, the bulk of the spadework on the plan continued to be done by the War Department through the agency of the Assistant Secretary of War's Planning Branch.

The Army and Navy Munitions Board existed without specific legal sanction (and consequently without specific appropriations) until 1 July 1939. Then the President directed that this board, along with certain other joint boards, should henceforth operate ". . . under the direction and supervision of the President" and that matters which the board could not settle by Army-Navy agreement should be forwarded to the President for decision.[24] The transformation of the Munitions Board into an executive agency gave it a permanent status which the Secretary of War or the Secretary of Navy could not change. Congress gave legal recognition to the Munitions Board on 7 July 1939 by a statute directing the Secretaries of War, Navy, and Interior to act jointly through the Army and Navy Munitions Board to stockpile certain strategic and critical materials.[25] As in the case of other industrial planning agencies, the Munitions Board, when

[22] Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933, app. VII, p. 70.

[23] "Report of the Assistant Secretary of War" in *Annual Reports of Secretary of War, 1934*, p. 28.

[24] *1939 Supplement to the Code of Federal Regulations of the United States of America* (Washington, 1940) p. 259.

[25] Act of July 7, 1939. 53 *Stat.* 811.

war became more imminent, moved perceptibly from planning activities to active operations as the coordinator and agent for the services in actual procurement.[26]

Early Implementation of Industrial Planning

The term "industrial mobilization" was used as early as 1923 to distinguish certain phases of mobilization planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War from that planning connected purely with procurement and from the military mobilization planning being done by the General Staff. One of the earliest definitions for industrial mobilization was: "Mobilization of industry for military purposes during a national emergency is the operation of adjusting peace-time energy and industry to meet the essential requirements of national life, and the maximum requirements of military effort, with a minimum disturbance of normal conditions." [27]

The intent of Congress in the National Defense Act of 1920 was that the fumbling in World War I industrial preparedness measures was not to be repeated. Industrial mobilization planning was to make sure that munitions would be speedily, economically, and effectively supplied when Congress, at the outbreak of war, voted the money to buy them. At first, the Assistant Secretary and his planning aides concentrated on a side issue—procurement planning—to the nearly complete exclusion of industrial mobilization planning. To some degree, perhaps, procurement plans constituted an intermediate goal which had to be attained before the ultimate goal of an industrial mobilization plan could be reached.

The earliest of the written plans was prepared by the Planning Branch in February 1922; it consisted of an outline for a plan to be prepared in three volumes. Volume I would consist of tables of organization for the wartime operations of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, of the seven technical-supply services throughout the Zone of the Interior, and of the civilian superagency, analogous to the World War I War Industries Board. Volume II would consist of legislative measures necessary to implement other provisions of the overall plan. Volume III would contain brief, descriptive instructions on how to determine requirements for raw materials, factories, labor, transportation, and power, but would not include the requirements themselves. Of these three volumes contemplated in this initial outline, partial data had already been prepared for Volume I only.[28]

It was during this period that disagreements arose between the General Staff and the Planning Branch concerning requirements, the

[26] "Report of the Under Secretary of War for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1941." in *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1941,* p. 40.

[27] AR 120–10, 1924.

[28] Outline of War Plans, Feb. 22. Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.

Planning Branch insisting that the General Staff mobilization plans demanded more materiel than could be procured. The argument had become heated when the Planning Branch insisted that the initial task was for the General Staff to determine exact requirements down to all specific items and the General Staff insisted that it would not lower its sights until the Planning Branch came up with definite figures on what could be procured. In those early days the Planning Branch had available so little data it was easier to fight the problem than to solve it. As a result of the General Staff-Planning Branch friction, the Assistant Secretary and his Planning Branch intensified and expedited their planning.

During the rest of that year the outline of February 1922 underwent a succession of changes, tending to elaborate and expand it as more studies were completed. The plan which was ready on 31 December 1922 was in six parts: (1) Office of the Assistant Secretary of War—Mission; (2) Organization of [Supply] Branches for War-Time Procurement; (3) Requirements; (4) Strategic Raw Materials; (5) Specific Procurement War Plans; (6) Legislative Plan. Each part was subdivided into annexes but like the first plan this also was principally an outline. In spite of what this War Plan for Industrial Mobilization, 1922 did not contain, its concept of what it should contain indicated that the Planning Branch was ready to start working on a comprehensive procurement plan although under the title of an industrial mobilization plan. A recommendation for an annual revision of the plan was not approved, but Colonel Ferguson called for an actual revision by 31 December 1923 in order that the Assistant Secretary, prior to the expiration of his term of office could submit a more complete plan to the War Council.[29]

The revision called for by Colonel Ferguson was duly prepared by early 1924 and entitled Industrial Mobilization, Basic Plan. Basically, the so-called 1924 Plan was still an outline, but was appreciably an improvement over the 1923 Outline. Organization charts, which seemed easier to prepare than other parts, still bulked large in this plan. The seven technical-supply branches were specifically directed to prepare their own annexes to contain mission, organization, and plans for the accomplishment of their procurement functions. There was included in the plan's introduction some charts correlating the probable supply rate with the General Staff expected mobilization curve; there was also some specific data on war reserve stocks on hand

[29] The War Council had been created by Secretary of War Baker on 20 Dec 17 as a sort of coordinating body for the very top chiefs of the War Department but with considerable powers over supply and organization. Section 5 *b* of the National Defense Act of 1920, as amended, had reconstituted the War Council by statute to consist of the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, and the Chief of Staff. Its mission was "to consider policies affecting both the military and the munitions problems of the War Department," and on these matters to establish the official War Department policy. The Council was thus ideally designed to act as a referee-coordinator-conciliator between the General Staff and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War.

and requirement types and specifications. The Legislative Appendix had in it specific drafts of several proposed bills and executive proclamations. Indicative of the broadening scope of the planning was the section dealing with superagencies (defined as ". . . an agency established by act of Congress or by the President, under Congressional authority for the purpose of coordinating, adjusting and conserving the available agencies and resources so as to promptly and adequately meet the maximum requirements of the military forces and the essential needs of the civilian populations.")[30] Such agencies, the plan further pointed out, might be necessary to control several critically important economic activities, as raw materials, facilities,[31] transportation-communication, power, fuel, priorities, price control, etc. Except for this roster of probably necessary superagencies and a casual reference to certain factors involved in industrial mobilization, the 1924 Plan was still primarily a procurement plan. The encouraging thing was that it was a better procurement plan than the one before.[32]

The keystone of industrial mobilization planning from the first was naturally the same hypothetical M-day used in General Staff mobilization planning. As defined by the War Department, M-day was ". . . the date designated in War Department orders as the first day of mobilization." As far as the definition was concerned M-day could conceivably precede a declaration of war (as indeed it did in World War II), but the tendency was to assume that M-day was synonymous with the date of war declaration. In the light of American practice and thinking, it was inconceivable in the 1920's and early 1930's that the United States would ever begin mobilizing before the outbreak of war.

The Basic Procurement Plans

After 1925 there were to be no revisions for several years of Industrial Mobilization, Basic Plan, 1924. The concentrated effort was on the completion of that plan rather than on the changing of it. In 1928, there was published a Basic Procurement Plan (BPP) which summarized briefly the basic principles designed to control government procurement during wartime when extraordinary military demands would tend to cause bidding competition between the Government's procurement agencies. One innovation provided for war service committees. These were voluntary associations of the leaders in

[30] Thatcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 66–67.

[31] "Facility," a term frequently employed in industrial mobilization planning, means a factory or industrial plant. A "factory" manufactures finished end products—items of issue to meet direct requirements. A "plant" fabricates raw materials—indirect requirements which are needed for the manufacture of items of issue. (Definitions are in OASW, "War Time Procurement, Principles and Organization," 1 Dec 25, p. 6. Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.)

[32] Industrial Mobilization Basic Plan, 1924. *Ibid.*

each industry to provide liaison between their respective industries and the War Department, thereby facilitating the planning for employment of those industries and the control and regulation of those industries during war. Such war service committees were first created and extensively used during World War I, so that they were innovations only in the sense that this was the first time they appeared in the post-World War I mobilization planning. Also new in the 1928 BPP was the section on industrial relations, covering labor, transportation, and power. The war labor code contained therein provided for tighter control of labor, and by some of its provisions would have made possible quasi-coercive persuasion of both labor itself and industrial use of labor,[33] to a degree considerably greater than any of the prior plans prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary. The transportation provisions, as far as the railroads were concerned, were implemented by an agreement worked out with a committee of the American Association of Railway Executives that called for the railroads to be self-operated during war unless the emergency became so severe as to require the Government to take over the railroads to insure continuous and efficient operation. The War Department, after World War I experience, had no desire to get into the railroad business unless absolutely necessary.

The Basic Procurement Plan, 1928 was given a minor revision in 1929 and a somewhat more extensive one in 1930. In the latter revision, a new section was added containing specific instructions for the purchase of certain supplies locally during war; instructions concerning the civilian district advisors for the procurement districts, issued in previous plans, were expanded.

By 1930, the plans and procedures for wartime procurement had been worked out in considerable functional detail, and in some of them had been implemented to an encouraging degree. Positive, concrete implementations included: (1) the organization of the Nation into 14 procurement districts, a sound decentralizing arrangement based on the experience of the War Industries Board in World War I; (2) the allocation of industrial facilities to the various technical supply services;[34] (3) the completion of 65 percent of the computation of requirements for the more than 4,000 items believed needed for war; (4) the formulation of a plan for wartime control of the railroads which had the whole-hearted concurrence of the railroads' executive leaders and which had been approved by the President; (5) the securing of the good will of business in general by the War Department, as was evi-

[33] Basic Procurement Plan, 1928. *Ibid.*

[34] By the end of fiscal year 1927, the ASW reported that there were 20,245 allocations, 370 of which had been jointly made to two or more War Department supply services and 205 jointly to Army-Navy supply services. Later the number of allocations was cut in half by a decision to allocate only facilities of items difficult to manufacture or procure.

denced by cooperation in plan surveys, etc.;[35] and (6) the initiation of a comprehensive program for building up a pool of reserve officers, who in time of war could be utilized in procurement work.[36]

The planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War had come to the point where the planners were anxious to display the plans publicly. This desire for publicity was, as a strict matter of fact, based not so much on pride of achievement as it was on the already recognized awareness that the successful accomplishment of the drastic, far-reaching measures contemplated in industrial mobilization planning could be done only with public approval and that this could be won only by first informing the public. Several studies were made on the subject of publicity in the Planning Branch. Some excellent practical results were secured as was evidenced by favorable comments which began to appear in the press concerning the scope and effectiveness of the mobilization planning being done in the Office of the Assistant Secretary.[37]

In 1932, the War Department Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, in a memorandum for the Chief of Staff reminded him that a plan had already been prepared by G–1 for a selective service advertising group for wartime use and suggested that this group could and should be utilized for all War Department and even Navy advertising needs during war. The staff of the selective service advertising group consisted of 16 Reserve officers, all of them of great prominence, in the fields of advertising, publicity, and radio, and several of whom had been associated with George Creel in various advertising endeavors during World War I. This G–1 study suggested that the advertising group could, on the emergence of a public information office, an agency contemplated by the then current industrial mobilization plans, merge its activities with that agency. The reasonableness of the G–1 plan and the prestige of the civilians associated with it was sufficient to convince the General Staff and the Assistant Secretary of War of its soundness; they all concurred.[38] Unfortunately, the plan would become func-

[35] Indicative of this pleasant relationship was the War Department Business Council, organized in 1926 and composed of 15 prominent industrialists who, serving without pay, advised the Army planners on procurement matters.

[36] This program included the grant of Reserve commissions to business executives of proven experience, and the "Munitions Battalion Plan" providing for the selection of 400 college undergraduates who would, at the conclusion of their junior years, be given three months of intensive basic, military training at Fort Washington, Md. When the colleges reopened in the fall, they would return to their classrooms where, for the next nine months, the Army would pay their tuition plus the pay and allowances of an enlisted man. After graduation the men in the Munitions Battalion would come back into service for six months. Then commissioned in the Reserve, they would return to a civilian status where they would acquire business experience. In the event of war they would be recalled for assignment to military procurement duties. This well-conceived program was abandoned after one year because of lack of funds.

[37] One of the best of these press reports was an extensive article on the first page of the editorial section of The [Washington] *Evening Star*, 9 Oct 27.

[38] Memo, ACofS, G–1, to CofS, 19 Sep 32. G–1/8645–74 in AG 381 (G–19–32). National Archives.

tional only with the outbreak of war. Since there was no provision in it for peacetime advertising by the War Department, the early publicity efforts of the Assistant Secretary's Office to sell the Industrial Mobilization Plan to the country appear to have had no effective follow-up during the 1930's. The War Department continued to be desirous of good public relations during that period and certainly approved of wide public knowledge of industrial mobilization planning, but it failed to effectively implement these good intentions.

Industrial Mobilization Planning

As the decade 1920–1930 neared its end, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, having made great strides in procurement planning, began to apply itself more intensively to industrial mobilization planning. There were initiated a whole "series of studies, conferences and negotiations . . . [on] the broader aspects of developing a system under which the President could efficiently control and direct American industry in a grave emergency." [39] To prod this industrial mobilization planning along at as fast a pace as possible, Brig. Gen. George Van Horn Moseley was assigned to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War in the summer of 1929.[40]

By November 1929 General Moseley had guided to completion the first true industrial mobilization plan which was entitled "Plan for Government Organization for War" and popularly dubbed the "Hurley Plan" since it was produced while Mr. Hurley was Assistant Secretary. It was admittedly a tentative plan, produced only as a point of departure. As such, it was widely circulated within the War Department and to qualified persons outside for criticism and comment. The review of the Hurley Plan by Bernard Baruch was perhaps the most detailed and comprehensive critique. Mr. Baruch approved the principles but disapproved and criticized almost everything else in the plan. It diverged too far from the proved lessons of World War I. There was one innovation in the plan to which Mr. Baruch and practically everyone else objected: and that was the provision for the creation on M-day of a new Cabinet post— the Department of Munitions. All Army and Navy procurement during wartime would be centralized in the Department of Munitions which would be coordinated with the overall superagency called the Administration of National Resources in the "Hurley Plan."

This had been a conception of General Moseley himself who, as a result of his World War I experiences, had been advocating ". . .

[39] "Annual Report of the Assistant Secretary of War," *Annual Report of Secretary of War, 1931.* The planning work referred to was begun in 1929 when Patrick J. Hurley was the Assistant Secretary.

[40] Gen Moseley during the period of a little over a year that he was assigned to the OASW was executive assistant to the ASW in charge of industrial preparedness.

a Department of National Defense with one secretary and with four undersecretaries—one for the Army, one for the Navy, one for Air, and one for Munitions. . . . Some such solution must come eventually to draw the Army and Navy together in one big military force charged with the single mission of the defense of this country." [41] General Moseley's views on unification were somewhat ahead of his time. The objection of Mr. Baruch, as well as that of other critics of the Hurley Plan, to the separate Department of Munitions was based not on its unification overtones but rather on the belief that such a new department at the outbreak of war would so disrupt Army and Navy procurement plans and methods as to do more harm than good.

Revisions of the Hurley Plan based on these criticisms and suggestions received were drafted one after the other, so that by 1 February 1930 General Moseley wrote Mr. Baruch that ". . . Since our conference last November, . . . the subject [industrial mobilization] has been under constant study in this office. As a result of your suggestions, we have altered the proposed organization considerably." [42] And as the changes and revisions brought the plan close to Mr. Baruch's recommendations, he gave it a tentative and cautious blessing: " . . . The revised plan is a distinct improvement . . . the first indication . . . that the essence of the principles used by the War Industries Board has been grasped." [43]

By November 1930, the changes, revisions, and redrafts had finally met General Moseley's exacting demands. Late that month the plan mimeographed under the title of Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930 was ready to make its formal debut before the War Policies Commission which was to hold its first session some two months later. The desire to have a comprehensive industrial mobilization plan ready for the commission may have caused the planners to slur over too briefly plans for Army and Navy cooperation on industrial mobilization,[44] but the period of this plan's preparation was not one of cordial Army-Navy planning relationships; it was after the issuance of the Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930 that the Army and Navy began to cooperate in industrial mobilization planning.

Creation of the War Policies Commission

Interest in mobilization matters during the 1920's was not generated solely within the Military Establishment of the United States. The veterans of World War I, who had served in the armed forces with

[41] Ltr, Moseley to Baruch, 12 Nov 29. Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.

[42] Ltr, Moseley to Baruch, 1 Feb 30. *Ibid.* At least three draft revisions were completed by May 1930. See: Thatcher, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

[43] Ltr, Baruch to Moseley, 4 Feb 30. Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.

[44] See: Memo, ACofS, WPD (Brig Gen C. S. Simonds), to CofS, 11 Feb 31; and memo, Col J. P. Hasson, Dir, Pl Br, to Col Carr, 5 May 31. *Ibid.*

low pay, and the noncombatant civilians, who had seen prices in the United States skyrocket far beyond their incomes, resented the allegedly high wages paid for labor and the tremendous profits reportedly made by many industrial and business firms as a result of the war. There was widespread insistence that "it must not happen again." The organization of the American Legion and the resurgence of the Veterans of Foreign Wars gave the veterans the necessary voice with which to address both the Congress and the general public. During the 1920's while the early industrial mobilization plans were being worked out, there was close cooperation between the War Department and the Veterans' organizations—particularly the American Legion—in stimulating Congressional interest in industrial mobilization matters. Officers from the Planning Branch worked with the Legion Committee in the drafting of the Legion legislative proposals.[45]

As a result of these proposals, bills to promote peace by taking the profit out of war were introduced in Congress as early as 1922.[46] Although approved substantially by Presidents Harding and Coolidge and indorsed by both parties at the National Conventions in 1924 and 1928, the Legion proposals never came to a vote in either House in the 67th, 68th, or 69th Congress.

Throughout 1927 the War Department still favored the principle of legislation in the Capper-Johnson bills over the deliberative commission in the McSwain Resolution. The American Legion, however, realizing that the Capper-Johnson bills were not likely even to come before either House of Congress in the foreseeable future, swung its full support to the McSwain resolution. The latter resolution was reintroduced in the House by Rep. J. Mayhew Wainwright in the first session of the 70th Congress.[47] In the second session of the 70th Congress, Sen. David A. Reed (R., Pa.) sponsored a similar resolution in the Senate.[48] The American Legion now massed its full support for these resolutions.

The Wainwright-Reed resolutions were again introduced at the first session of the 71st Congress in April 1929. Although the General

[45] See: Memo, G–3 to CofS, 3 Feb 22; memo, Lt Col J. D. Fife to Col Ferguson, 7 Jun 22; and ltr, J. D. Markey to ASW, 8 Mar 24. All in *ibid.*

[46] H. J. Res. 384, H. R. 13201, 13081, 13317, 67th Cong., 2d sess., introduced on 21 Sep 22 by Rep. Royal C. Johnson, a Legionnaire, provided for a draft of manpower for military purposes after the declaration of a national emergency by Congress, a draft of material resources and industrial organizations in case of war, and the elimination of profit from war by fixing prices for commodities and services and by war-income and excess-profits tax laws. H. J. Res. 400, 67th Cong., 2d sess., introduced by Rep. John J. McSwain, provided for a bipartisan commission to investigate and propose legislation for the mobilization of manpower and resources in the event of an emergency. Officially the War Department favored the Johnson bill over the McSwain resolution. See: CofS study, "Legislation to Authorize Drafting of Personnel and Resources in War." 12 April 29. AG 381. National Archives. See also: Ltr. SW to Rep. McSwain, 27 Jan 23. Pl Br Rec, OSW, National Archives.

[47] H. J. Res. 264, 70th Cong., 1st sess.

[48] H. J. Res. 41; S. J. Res. 20, 70th Cong., 2d sess.

Staff quite probably felt that the wording of their proposed similar resolution was better, nevertheless they realized the wisdom and expediency of backing the already introduced Wainwright-Reed version. The opposition to the Wainwright-Reed resolutions was now fading fast; both the American Legion and the War Department were supporting them.

The resolution was passed by the House 1 April 1930 and by the Senate 2 June 1930. On 27 June 1930 President Hoover signed the resolution creating a War Policies Commission " . . . to study and consider amending the Constitution of the United States to provide that private property may be taken by Congress for public use during war and methods of generalizing the burdens and to remove the profits of war, together with a study of policies to be pursued in the event of war . . ." Labor was reassured by a provision " . . . That said commission shall not consider and shall not report upon the conscription of labor." The Commission was to be composed of four members of the House of Representatives, four members of the Senate, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, and the Attorney General.[49]

The charter of the Commission was sufficiently broad to comprehend practically all matters pertaining to defense policies. However, the Commission by its own decision restricted the scope of its hearings and deliberations to the review of industrial mobilization planning and the determination of the need for additional statutory power to regulate the economy of the Nation during periods of great emergency. This was certainly far less than the General Staff desired; had the War Department drawn up the agenda, it would probably have included all matters related to the adequacy of the defense establishment, with heavy emphasis on the inadequacy of current appropriations to sustain the National Defense Act of 1920.

Within its self-imposed limitations, the War Policies Commission started to work, holding its first meeting 21 January 1931. Witnesses presumed qualified were invited to appear to testify and did so—at their own expense. Included among these witnesses were prominent industrialists, economists, political personages, labor leaders, spokesmen for veterans organizations, and Army and Navy officers—many of whom had been key figures in the industrial mobilization machinery developed during World War I. Only two positive

[49] The members of the Commission were: SW Patrick J. Hurley (elected chairman), Sec of Navy Charles F. Adams, Sec of Agriculture Arthur M. Hyde, Sec of Commerce Robert P. Lamont, Sec of Labor William N. Doak, Atty Gen William Mitchell, Sen David A. Reed, Sen Arthur H. Vandenberg, Sen Joseph T. Robinson, Sen Claude A. Swanson, Rep Lindley H. Hodley, Rep William P. Holiday, Rep Ross A. Collins and Rep John J. McSwain. H. J. Res. 251, 71st Cong., 2d sess, 27 Jun 30. Copy in H Doc 271, *War Policies Commission Documents,* 72d Cong., 1st sess., 12 Mar 32, pp. 892–93.

programs were offered before the commission: the War Department's Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930 and the detailed blueprint of Bernard Baruch.

Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930

The Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930 was presented to the War Policies Commission 13 May 1931 by three War Department spokesmen: the Assistant Secretary of War (Frederick H. Payne), the Chief of Staff (Gen. Douglas MacArthur), and the Deputy Chief of Staff (by then Maj. Gen. George Van Horn Moseley).[50] General MacArthur had chief responsibility for presenting the details of Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930. In his statement he several times reiterated that control of industry in wartime was a function of the President to be exercised through civilian agencies and that the success of all wartime emergency measures contemplated in the planning was basically dependent on public opinion. Additional points emphasized by General MacArthur included these:

1. Existing cabinet departments were not adaptable to accomplishing the extraordinary, emergency, and temporary tasks of wartime mobilization.

2. "Effective use of labor, in wartime as in peacetime, can be had only through labor's *voluntary cooperation* [author's italics]." [51]

3. ". . . The enactment of detailed laws at a time when war is not imminent is not desirable because such action would probably result in measures so rigid . . . as to be a hindrance rather than an assistance in the changed conditions of any future emergency." [52]

4. The tools to control the national economy in wartime should be:

a. Preference lists and priorities for facilities and commodities, including raw materials.

b. Price control.

c. Commandeering, when necessary, but only then.

d. Control of foreign trade by a licensing system.

e. Use of government corporations when and where advisable.

5. "Prompt resumption of normal peace conditions upon the termination of the war. During the progress of any war, the President should appoint a committee to study and prepare plans for demobilization." [53] General MacArthur suggested that inflation would be reduced by the operation of the Industrial Mobilization Plan, by tax laws to recapture unusual profits, and by a national registration of wealth taken at the outset or soon after the beginning of a war (these

[50] For a copy of this testimony see: *War Policies Commission Documents*, pp. 351–93; for a copy of Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930, see: *Ibid.*, pp. 395–470.

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 375.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 377.

last two measures were not included in the Industrial Mobilization Plan itself).

The Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930, included an introduction, two main parts, and five appendixes. Part I was entitled "Essential steps of a complete plan for industrial mobilization"; and Part II, "Existing plans for industrial mobilization." Part II included the Army procurement plan, plans for controlling industrial and economic resources in war, and organizational plans. The five appendixes included supplementary material.[54]

The Army Procurement Plan was in outline form. It set forth the general principles which the Assistant Secretary of War would follow in wartime procurement policies. The plans for controlling industrial and economic resources in war included plans for priorities, price controls, commandeering, trade with foreign countries, and government corporations. The organizational plans were the most detailed and were supplemented by excellent organizational charts. Believing that the regular departments could not cope with the problems of war, the 1930 IMP proposed the creation of four superagencies: Director of War Industries, Director of Selective Service, Director of Public Relations, and an Administrator of Labor. These four officials together with the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations would have constituted the President's War Cabinet. Government corporations would have been created to handle war trade, war finance, shipping, marine insurance, and power. [See *charts 17* and *18.*] The organization and operations of all of these wartime superagencies and corporations were spelled out in some detail and illustrated by supplementary charts.


Baruch Proposals

The second plan presented to the War Policies Commission was the plan outlined by Bernard M. Baruch in testimony before the Commission on 6 March 1931 and 22 May 1931.[55] The Baruch plan was admittedly based on the experiences of World War I. Mr. Baruch, in formulating his blueprint, had used his own broad experience, that of associates from the World War I War Industries Board (notably Brig. Gen. Hugh Johnson), and the collated advice of economic, sociological, statistical, and political science expert-consultants whose services Mr. Baruch had personally employed. The value of Mr.

[54] App. 1, "The successive steps in procurement planning"; App. 2, "Organization of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War"; App. 3, "Drafts of laws which may be enacted in war to assist in setting up and operating the proposed organizations"; App. 4, "Personnel required as a nucleus for the Office of the Director of War Industry"; App. 5. "List of supporting plans."

[55] For a copy of this testimony see: *War Policies Commission Documents,* pp. 30–72, 794–841.


*Chart 17. War Organization of the Executive Department Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930.**



a Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations to be present in an advisory capacity on military and naval matters.

**Source: War Policies Commission Documents, p. 416.*

Chart 18. Organization for the Mobilization of the Industries of The United States for War, 1930 IMP.*



*Source: *War Policies Commission Documents*, p. 418.

Baruch's testimony and arguments was enhanced by his clearly evident sincerity and devotion to public service. He had nothing to sell; he was no idealist; but rather he was a practical realist who saw things as they were, and as they were likely to continue to be in the foreseeable future.

Mr. Baruch predicated his plan on the basic assumption that major wars henceforth entailed not merely the mobilization of armed forces but the mobilization of the entire nation for war in order to ensure objectives without whose attainment the war could not be successfully won. In essence, it closely resembled the official Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930 (which had been revised in 1929–30 after Mr. Baruch's critical review of the first draft) with the following essential differences:

1. The War Department seemed to favor the "piece meal" approach to price control; Mr. Baruch unequivocably favored a general, fixed ceiling over all prices.

2. Mr. Baruch felt that the War Department plan did not have sufficient *practical* provisions for civilian needs.

3. The plant surveys, facility allocations, etc., which in the Industrial Mobilization Plan were done by the armed services, under Mr. Baruch's plan would have been done by civilian experts from the industry concerned.

4. In general, Mr. Baruch's plan envisaged more advance planning being done by civilians, particularly competent civilians from industry. Thus the two coherent, comprehensive programs brought before the War Policies Commission differed only in smaller details.

The War Policies Commission Report

The War Policies Commission concluded public hearings on 22 May 1931. Some ten months later, the Commission made its final report to the President with a brief list of recommendations. In general, these recommendations approved the War Department Industrial Mobilization Plan although there were a few specific dissents.

Recommendations of the Commission which constituted approval of the War Department's industrial mobilization planning were:

1. That in the absence of a Constitutional amendment clearly defining the power of the Congress to prevent profiteering and to stabilize prices in time of war the Congress should empower the President to take measures to stabilize and adjust prices in time of war; that Congress should also ensure to the Government the use of any and all private property necessary for the prosecution of the war without giving the owner thereof profit due to the war.

2. That the Congress should empower the President to reorganize and make such additions to the executive departments in wartime as might be needed to assure adequate control of all national resources.

3. That in time of peace there should be continuous industrial mobilization planning by the Federal Government, especially by the War and Navy Departments, and that these plans should be in a constant state of revision to keep them current, with major reexamination and revision every two years submitted to appropriate congressional committees.

The recommendations for a 95 percent tax on all individual and corporate incomes, above the previous three-year income, was not too wide a deviation from the War Department's tentatively recommended 6 percent profit. Only two of the Commission's recommendations diverged sharply from the War Department's program. Most important of these divergences was the Commission's recommendation indorsing a Constitutional amendment to define clearly the power of the Congress to prevent profiteering and to stabilize prices. The second divergence was the Commission's outright opposition to the constriction of private property, a principle which seemed to be embodied to a degree in one of the bills in the Legislative Appendix to the Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930.

Rep. Ross A. Collins (Dem., Miss.) was the only member of the Commission to dissent from its recommendations, principally because of the endorsement they gave to the Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930. The Mississippi Congressman remained ". . . firmly convinced . . . that any war planning as now carried on by the War Department will be in the end result in the administration of price-fixing laws and the regulation of civilian activities by military and naval officers if the recommendations of the majority members of the Commission are finally adopted by the Congress." [56]

The record of the War Policies Commission received wide publicity and the initial press reaction to the Industrial Mobilization Plan was, for the most part, favorable. But the War Department had badly miscalculated its public relations, and critics of the plan, who soon made themselves heard, were better able to influence public opinion. It was unfortunate that the attacks on the Industrial Mobilization Plan were to obtain far wider publicity than the plan itself which, even after it was published and available to the public, was never widely read nor understood. The War Department, although it certainly seemed to be aware of the tremendous importance of public opinion, did not, during the period between World Wars I and II, seem to understand nearly as well how to influence public opinion.

The Flaws in the Early Plans

The inherent soundness of the Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930 was perhaps best evidenced by the fact that it was to be the foundation

[56] *War Policies Commission, Final Recommendation, Minority Report,* 3 Mar 32, signed only by Ross A. Collins.

on which the succeeding industrial mobilization plans of the late 1930's were built. Its concepts, with few exceptions, were to be proved sound. Its efforts to learn from the past, especially from the lessons of World War I, were sincere and painstaking. In retrospect, however, certain basic flaws can be seen in the approach to industrial mobilization planning. These flaws, clearly evident in the 1930 Plan, were continued in the succeeding plans although sometimes some of the outward manifestations of the flaws were removed. Most important of these was the belief that the existing executive and other governmental agencies should not be employed as *any* of the government's tools for industrial mobilization. This inevitably stirred up hostility among the existing government agencies. Another flaw in the early planning, which was not to be corrected until 1940, was the lack of an agency in the Planning Branch to collate, evaluate, and disseminate statistics. Facts and figures were being accumulated, yet for many years there were no means provided for weighing or correlating them.

The tendency of the officers in the Planning Branch to concentrate the bulk of the planning within that Branch was advised against by Mr. Baruch who felt that the various industries and their leaders should conduct much of the planning. There was some fear, however, that these leaders might have too many axes of their own to grind. This same attitude was evidenced in regard to labor organizations and leaders. As a result most of the individual industrial and labor leaders who had been consulted were in accord and in sympathy with the Industrial Mobilization Plans, but the bulk of them were unfamiliar with those plans. This failure of the planners to include civilian experts from industry, labor, and government in the detailed early planning was a serious tactical error, although Mr. Baruch's idea of letting them do the actual planning probably went too far.

Although the planners were aware of the importance of permitting sufficient production of consumer goods to maintain civilian morale, they did not make plans to implement this purpose. No studies were made on what consumer goods would have to be continued in production, in what amounts, or at what factories. There was practically no planning done or correlating military production requirements with civilian requirements. Here again, Mr. Baruch's advice was not heeded. The omission of civilian production needs from the planning meant that none of the planning formulae could be accurate since one of the basic factors in all of the equations was missing.

The planners also failed to take into consideration the fact that in a future war the United States might have to assist wartime allies with munitions. In World War I the United States' war effort had not been adversely affected to a material degree by assistance to the Allies. Indeed, the converse had been true, since the Allies had assisted the United States with armaments and other munitions. In

the 1930's the foreign policy of the United States was predominantly isolationist, and the military policy of the Nation, which was mainly defensive, was in line with that foreign policy. In the early 1930's, at least, the staff planners could not foresee the sudden changes which would take place in those policies.

In the 1930's the United States was in the midst of a great economic depression. Public opinion in the United States was predominantly opposed to war. The very terms of the agencies in the Industrial Mobilization Plans—*War* Industries, *War* Resources, *War* Trade, *War* Finance, *War* Labor, etc.—offended the sensibilities of United States public opinion. It would have been easy to omit the word "war" in many places and to substitute the term "defense." Even the Navy bureaus, which would have so much to do with industrial mobilization and procurement in wartime, were deeply suspicious of and amazingly unfamiliar with the Industrial Mobilization Plans which, beginning in 1933, were sponsored by the Army and Navy Munitions Board.[57]

The report of the War Policies Commission added up to an expression of confidence in the industrial mobilization planning being done by the War Department, but the report had no practical results. The recommendations of the Commission were introduced in Congress for enactment into legislation, but none were passed by either the Senate or the House. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, however, continued to revise and expand industrial mobilization planning as had been recommended by the War Policies Commission and as was required by the National Defense Act of 1920.

The Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933

The second of the Industrial Mobilization Plans, which was published in 1933, was a conscientious effort to expand the 1931 version and to improve it. The criticisms of the planning which had been made before the War Policies Commission were carefully considered by the planners. The 1933 revision perhaps was most notable because it was the first industrial mobilization plan on which the Navy had collaborated through the medium of a functioning Army and Navy Munitions Board. "The labors of the two Departments [Army and Navy] have been coordinated by the Army and Navy Munitions Board." [58]

The organization of the Executive Branch for wartime purposes was changed and expanded in the revised plan to a considerable extent although some of the changes were merely in nomenclature. The key superagency was redesignated the War Industries Administration

[57] Robert H. Connery, *The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II* (Princeton, 1951), ch. III.

[58] Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933, p. v.

headed by a War Industries Administrator instead of the 1931 Director of War Industry. The general functions of the latter were the same, but its internal organization was streamlined and centralized to integrate its functioning with the Army and Navy Munitions Board and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. [See *chart 19.*] Of the five agencies listed in the 1931 IMP as Government War Corporations, one, War Trade, in the 1933 IMP was promoted to a superagency; two, Power and War Finance, survived relatively unchanged, and two disappeared with a footnote. [See *chart 20.*]

The number of superagencies was expanded by the promotion of War Trade to that status, by the creation of a Capital Issues Committee, and by moving Price Control from its 1931 status as a mere staff section of the War Industries Directorate to independent, superagency rank. Although the importance of Price Control was thus signalized, the War Department policy in regard to it was still hazy and ambiguous. The policies which would govern the implementation of whatever price control program was adopted was clear-cut enough, but it was difficult to determine whether the War Department was for the piecemeal approach or the fixed-ceiling method of Mr. Baruch. The War Department, however uncertain it was on this major policy decision, was by 1933 convinced that the exercise of price controls by the President in wartime would require specific legislation by the Congress.[59]


Although it was apparent in the 1933 revision that the War Department had not altered its feeling concerning the inadvisability of employing existing government departments and agencies for emergency war controls, there was a faint gesture of good will to at least some of those existing agencies:

> . . . the existing executive structure is maintained for carrying on, under necessary restrictions, the usual statutory duties. Full use is made of those departments which in peace-time have been granted special powers for use during periods of emergency and of those whose peace-time functions are of the same nature as those to be performed during an emergency. Thus the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Trade Commission, and various bureaus of the several executive departments habitually perform duties which be extremely important functions of war-time control.[60]

The provisions for the handling of labor were expanded to considerable detail in the 1933 IMP. It is of some interest to note that in the initial staff work on the labor provisions of the 1933 IMP, the American Federation of Labor, which was the only large union at the time, was consulted to the exclusion of other labor groups, organized and unorganized. The resulting solution was one which would put


[59] *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Chart 19. Organization of the Administration of War Industries, 1933 IMP.*



*Source: *Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933.*

Chart 20. Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government of The United States, 1933 IMP.*



[a] To be composed of the Secretaries of War and Navy, the Administrators of: War Industries, War Trade, War Labor, Public Relations and Selective Service, and the Chairman of the Price Control Committee. Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations to be present in an advisory capacity on military and naval matters.

**Source: Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933.*

the American Federation of Labor firmly in the saddle as the representative of all labor during the period of war or emergency. This solution was viewed with misgivings and mistrust by the General Staff, by the Navy, and by the Joint Selective Service Committee.[61] It was feared that the American Federation of Labor might exercise undue influence in determining industrial deferments. This labor experience convinced the planners that it was unwise to consult labor organizations and that they should consult only individual labor leaders in the future.

In their revised form, the labor provisions of the 1933 IMP provided for a highly centralized Federal labor organization in wartime to control all matters of labor employment and mediation which in World War I and in subsequent planning had been scattered among several agencies. The Department of Labor was ignored in the 1933 IMP; all of its employment and conciliation services were to be transferred in wartime to the superagency War Labor Administration.[62]

A certain amount of latent fear of the IMP was aroused in labor circles which was for the most part due to unfortunate wording in the 1933 IMP; for example, the 1933 plan used the word "*voluntary*" in connection with labor less frequently than had the 1931 plan. The 1933 IMP described the qualifications of the War Labor Administrator as ". . . an outstanding industrial leader who is thoroughly familiar with the problems entering into the relationship of employer and employee and who is capable of dispassionate judgment in their solution."[63] Further, the 1933 IMP ominously suggested that children under 16 years of age might have to be employed in industry or agriculture during the later stages of an emergency, and that some of the existing legislation protecting women in industry, by limitation of hours and by other conditions, might have to be suspended during wartime.

The Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933 had eight appendixes, one containing legislation, one on the organization and functions of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, and one for each of six superagencies: War Industries Administration, War Trade Administration, War Labor Administration, Public Relations Administration, Selective Service Administration, and Price Control Committee. The 1931 Procurement Appendix, although omitted from the 1933 IMP, was partly incorporated into the main body of the revised plan.[64] The

[61] Memo, Brig Gen Andrew Moses, ACofS, G–4, for the ASOW, 14 Jun 32. Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives. See other comments in same file.

[62] Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933, p. 44.

[63] *Ibid.*, pp. 35–36.

[64] The Basic Procurement Plan, first issued in 1928 and revised in 1930, was considerably revised in 1933. By 1933, it was felt that the continued existence of a separate procurement plan was probably not necessary, since most of its provisions had been incorporated into the Industrial Mobilization Plan. The 1933 revision of the Basic Procurement Plan

Legislative Appendix contained, in proper form, the legislation which the War Department deemed necessary for enactment at the outset of war, including: (1) a draft of manpower bill; (2) a bill to make available to the President the Nation's material resources; (3) a bill providing for the acquisition of private property; (4) a bill providing for a marine war risk insurance agency; (5) a bill for a war trade agency; (6) a bill for a war finance agency; (7) a bill creating a capital issues committee. The War Department was following the policy established by Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley that this legislation should not be enacted in time of peace but should be held in readiness for prompt enactment by the Congress after a declaration of war.

Reaction of the Nye Committee [65]

The Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933 was reviewed by the Special Committee of the Senate Investigating the Munitions Industry—popularly called the Nye Committee—in much the same manner as the War Policies Commission had reviewed the 1931 IMP. The approach of the Nye Committee, however, was entirely different.

> . . . The earlier investigation had been chiefly interested in the effectiveness of the War Department's plan as an instrument of industrial mobilization. But the Nye Committee concentrated its attention on the social and economic aspects of the proposed wartime controls. In its hearings the committee subjected the plan to searching criticism, stressing particularly the inequality of the burdens imposed on capital and labor, its lack of effective safeguards against profiteering, and its inadequate protection of civil liberties.[66]

Weighing Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933 on the scales of social and economic reform, the Nye Committee found much to criticize. The basic fact that the Industrial Mobilization Plan was patterned, in most respects, on the industrial mobilization machinery which had been pieced together during World War I was sufficient reason for the Nye Committee to assume that where there had been malfunctioning of that machinery during World War I, there would be similar malfunctioning whenever it was used again. Hence, the Industrial Mobilization Plan's provisions for price control and for elimination of profiteering were criticized as falling short of the mark. The labor provisions of the 1933 IMP, the committee feared, could result in the conscription of labor and would put labor at the mercy of employers. The Nye Committee also feared that the public relations provisions of the 1933 IMP would inevitably result in press censorship (a possibility which War Department testimony conceded

---

was the last to appear. Thereafter, procurement data not included in the Industrial Mobilization Plan was covered in Planning Branch circulars which first appeared in 1932 and were revised thereafter generally every two years.

[65] The chairman of this committee was Sen. Gerald P. Nye (Rep.) of North Dakota.

[66] Tobin and Bidwell, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

as probable). The committee opposed this portion of the plan although no consideration was given to whether press censorship was desirable or necessary during wartime.

After criticizing provisions of Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933, the Nye Committee made its own recommendations which paralleled the 1933 IMP to an amazing degree. The Nye Committee recommended war taxes to capture not only war profits but a considerable share of normal profits. The manpower draft would have been eliminated and a draft of management in essential war industries substituted. All provisions for government control of public relations would have been eliminated. Some of the recommendations were obviously unsound; the elimination of selective service, for example, would have negated one of the lessons of all the wars of the United States. The stringent tax rates recommended by the Nye Committee would have eliminated the incentive to produce—the yardstick which the War Department had been using. As for censorship and public relations, World War II was to indicate which had the sounder conception, the War Department or the Nye Committee.

The War Department, far from discouraged by the opposition to Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933 by the Nye Committee, was encouraged by the publicity given that plan at the hearings, and particularly by the inability of the committee to substantially shake the plan's basic structure. Certainly it was significant and encouraging that the Nye Committee's own recommended solution was, in the main, patterned on the War Department's Industrial Mobilization Plan. The Assistant Secretary of War reported with pride: ". . . The thorough analysis of this plan (Industrial Mobilization) by the Special Senate Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry confirmed its inherent soundness." [67]

Changes in Plans and Policies

Work was resumed on the revision and perfection of the Industrial Mobilization Plan. The Army and Navy Munitions Board prepared a plan for a transition organization to implement industrial mobilization during the period immediately following a declaration of war, when the superagencies would be fully occupied with getting themselves organized and functioning. The transition organization would be the Army and Navy Munitions Board itself, which, it was pointed out, was the only agency existing in peacetime that understood the work of the wartime superagencies. Further provisions of this plan were for the Army and Navy Munitions Board to turn over all industrial mobilization controls to the key superagency, the

[67] "Report, Assistant Secretary of War for Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1936," *Annual Report of Secretary of War, 1936*, p. 19.

War Industries Administration, which it was assumed would be the first superagency created in functional form. As the other superagencies began functioning, the War Industries Administration would turn over to each of them its respective control functions. There was questionable tact in one provision of this plan of the Army and Navy Munitions Board: ". . . In order to make the War Industries Administration *responsive to the needs of the Army and Navy* [italics author's], it is proposed to take from the Army and Navy Munitions Board and from the Army and Navy Departments a limited number of seasoned officer personnel . . . to assist the administrator of the War Industries Administration and to act as advisors to him." [68] To facilitate the transition of industrial mobilization control from the Army and Navy Munitions Board to War Industries Administration, it was proposed that the Army and Navy Munitions Board be reorganized so as to conform in its structure to that planned for the War Industries Administration.[69] This proposal, that the nation's economy at the outset of a war be controlled for a time by Army and Navy officers, however well meant in purpose, aroused opposition even among those who approved of other provisions of the industrial mobilization planning but who were inclined to look somewhat askance at military control of industry.

During the years 1933–36 both Houses of Congress were deluged by a flood of bills covering various phases of the industrial mobilization. Since the Congress was well aware of the War Department's interest in all matters pertaining to industrial mobilization, most of these bills were referred to the War Department for comment. The studies which preceded these comments and the comments themselves unmistakably indicated another tack in the War Department's attitude toward the passage of such legislation in peacetime. It will be remembered that from 1921 to 1929 the War Department favored the enactment of mobilization legislation in peacetime but that beginning in 1929 under the influence of Patrick J. Hurley the policy shifted to opposing the *enactment* of such legislation in peacetime and favored instead the *preparation* of such legislation for enactment at the outset of war. About 1935, the attitude of the War Department shifted back in favor of peacetime enactment of mobilization legislation. Certainly there was strong indication that within the Congress there was not only sentiment for preparedness legislation but that some members were determined to press for enactment of such measures, if need be without War Department approval but preferably with such approval. The reshift in policy was made apparent, early in 1935, in the comments of Secretary of War George H. Dern on the proposed

[68] Memo, Committee to Develop Organization for Transition Phase to Executive Committee, NAMB, 19 Jul 34. Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.
[69] *Ibid.*

legislation: "The provisions of the bill, if enacted into law, should go far toward equalizing the burdens of war, preventing profiteering, and reducing the cost of war." [70] Inasmuch as this letter had been prepared for Mr. Dern in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, it was clear that the industrial mobilization planners were changing their views preparatory to enactment of legislation. Within a month, additional studies made in the Planning Branch on H. R. 5529 confirmed this policy shift.[71]

The General Staff, although aware of the industrial mobilization planners' policy shift, was still somewhat dubious. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, Brig. Gen. Andrew Moses, in his comments on the selective service provisions of H. R. 5529, was willing to concede that:

> . . . If this bill is enacted into law, there will be for the first time in our history, legislation on our statute books in peace time that will empower the President to effect a general mobilization and will enable the War and Navy Departments to formulate plans that will be founded on a basic law. Such completed plans would be of great value in time of war in the saving of time in the placing of our forces in the field.[72]

But after making this concession, General Moses continued:

> . . . the policy in the past has been *not* to press for the passage of a Selective Service law in time of peace. . . . If the Selective Service Law . . . is brought before the Congress for debate it is impossible to predict the probable Congressional action, whereas if the law is kept up to date and ready to be introduced when needed, the temper of the country and the pressure of war will enable legislation to be passed more nearly in accord with what is desired by those responsible for the defense of the nation.

Weighing the pros and cons, General Moses concluded that the War Department should oppose the pending legislation. In view of this difference of opinion between the General Staff and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, study of H. R. 5529 by the War Department was prolonged and was expanded to get the views of the Navy Department and the Army and Navy Munitions Board. Before a definite policy decision was made by the War Department, the House of Representatives, on 9 April 1935, passed the bill by the decisive vote of 368 to 15.

The decision of the War Department ultimately was to support H. R. 5529. It was passed by the House substantially in accord with the War Department's Industrial Mobilization Plan. In the Senate, however, the bill was referred to the Nye Committee, which without altering its basic structure amended enough of its provisions to incur

---

[70] Ltr, Dern to Rep H. J. McSwain, Chm, HMAC, 26 Feb 35. AG 381. National Archives. Comments on H. R. 4124, "A Bill to Provide for the National Security and Defense."

[71] Memo, Lt Col C. T. Howis to Exec, OASW, 9 Mar 35, sub: H. R. 5529. Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.

[72] Memo, G–1 for CofS, 4 Mar 35. G–1/13784. Copy in AG 381 (2–19–35). National Archives.

War Department objections. In commenting on H. R. 5529, as amended by the Nye Committee, Secretary of War George H. Dern firmly restated the new War Department policy of indorsement of peacetime mobilization legislation. He concurred with the general scope and purpose of the bill, but he as firmly opposed some of the Nye Committee amendments. Mr. Dern refused to comment on the tax provisions of the bill but warned that "... the tax provisions must not be of such a nature as to hinder the procurement of munitions when the necessity for their manufacture arises." [73] The Nye Committee provision for a draft of management was unequivocably opposed by the War Department which pointed out that other provisions of the bill gave ample power to coerce any industry into full support of the war effort. The War Department recommended, too, that the bill include a provision for the creation of the key superagency (i. e., the War Industries Administration in the Industrial Mobilization Plan) that price control be delegated to a separate key agency, and that certain other minor modifications be made. Mr. Dern concluded by stating that the views expressed by the War Department had been coordinated with the Navy Department, and with the Army and Navy Munitions Board. H. R. 5529 never came to a vote in the Senate.

Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1936

In February 1936 a revision of the Industrial Mobilization Plan was ready in tentative draft form and was circulated to the interested agencies of the War Department, including the staff of the Army Industrial College.[74] The General Staff, which had concurred in Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933, was in a more critical mood in 1936; it was suddenly realized that two of the appendixes in the 1936 draft plan encroached on the General Staff domain.[75] The General Staff resented the inclusion in the Industrial Mobilization Plan of detailed data on selective service, which was a planning function of the General Staff and of the Joint Army Navy Selective Service Committee. Furthermore, the transition plan which provided that the Army and Navy Munitions Board act as an interim agent for the War Industries Administration and that it control all public relations, including censorship, propaganda, and publicity for manpower procurement, until the organization of the proper superagency (Public Relations Administration) was viewed with disfavor.[76] The General Staff

[73] Ltr, Dern to Sen Sheppard, Chm, SMAC, 17 May 35. AG 381 (5–6–35). National Archives.

[74] For General Staff circulation, see: Ltr, ASW Woodring to CofS, 17 Feb 36. AG 381 (2–17–36). National Archives.

[75] These were the appendixes on selective service and public relations, app. V and IV respectively.

[76] Memo for CofS, 31 Mar 36. G–4/30252–1. Copy in AG 381 (2–17–36). National Archives.

recommended that the draft of Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1936 be revised so as to limit it to matters pertaining to industrial mobilization. It was further recommended that the Joint Army and Navy Board [77] ". . . should consider the various features of the Industrial Mobilization Plan with a view to setting up appropriate joint agencies in addition to those now authorized and to prescribing for such agencies the necessary instructions for their establishment and operation in an emergency." [78]

The Joint Army-Navy Board concurred in the General Staff objections to the tentative draft of Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1936. These objections were discussed at a conference between the Assistant Secretary of War and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army at which it was agreed that the sections of the Industrial Mobilization Plan on selective service and public relations would be deleted from the plan, and that the General Staff or the Joint Board would promptly begin work on revision of those plans so they could be published with Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1936. With the above reservations the General Staff concurred in Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1936. The Joint Army and Navy Board recommended that a special Joint Army and Navy Public Relations Committee should be appointed to prepare a joint plan for a wartime Public Relations Administration and that the already existing Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee be given the mission of writing a selective service appendix to the Industrial Mobilization Plan.[79] These recommendations were promptly approved by the Secretaries of War and Navy. But it was not until August 1937 that an approved version of Appendix IV on public relations was ready, and it was 1938 before Appendix V on selective service was ready. Since Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1936 was ready for the printer on 7 August 1936, the Selective Service and Public Relations Appendixes necessarily were omitted and were each represented by the statement: "The organization, duties, and procedure for this Administration are being revised by appropriate agencies, and, when completed, will be included in the next revision of the industrial mobilization plan." [80]

Undoubtedly the most significant innovation in Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1936 was the constant evidence of Army and Navy cooperative planning through the Army and Navy Munitions Board.

---

[77] This Joint Army and Navy Board is not to be confused with the Army and Navy Munitions Board. The former board was established in 1903 to resolve interservice strategic problems; the latter board handled interservice procurement and industrial mobilization problems.

[78] *Ibid.*

[79] J. B. No. 325, Serial No. 592–1, 16 Dec 36. Copy in AG 381. National Archives.

[80] Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1936. p. 45. The assumption in Tobin and Bidwell's *Mobilizing Civilian America*, pp. 49 and 109, that the appendixes on selective service and public relations were omitted from the 1936 Plan because of the criticism of the Nye Committee is incorrect.

Although the plan was still predominantly an Army one, provisions in it were indicative of growing Army-Navy cooperation. The 1936 IMP like all of the revisions, had changes in terminology for the emergency agencies. The War Industries Administration now became the War Resources Administration, the Price Control Committee became the Price Control Commission, the Capital Issues Committee became the War Finance Commission, but these changes did not materially affect the emergency organizational framework. The examples of War Service Corporations, which had been in the 1933 IMP, were omitted from the 1936 version, which made only minor changes in the organization chart. The planners' aversion to giving existing agencies and departments emergency wartime powers and functions was as patent in 1936 as it had been in 1933 and 1931, but the planners were aware of the changing trends.

In the 1936 IMP the War Resources Administration, the key superagency, was to be established promptly at the outset of war to assume all of the functions destined for all the superagencies until the other superagencies were organized and ready to do the job themselves.[81] The War Resources Administration was to be created by Executive order under implied wartime powers without waiting for additional enabling legislation by the Congress. Although the War Resources Administration was clearly indicated as the key superagency, it was not given coordinating control over the other superagencies, all of which reported directly to the President. This weakness was corrected in the final revision of the IMP in 1939.

It was in the Legislative Appendix that the most striking changes were made from the 1933 IMP. The earlier plan had included drafts of seven bills, the 1936 included but two although one of these contained practically all that had been included in six of the earlier bills. The War Department, having concurred in the all-inclusive H. R. 5529, simply inserted it, with some changes, as one of the two bills in the Legislative Appendix of the 1936 plan. The only other bill included in the Legislative Appendix was one to establish a Bureau of Marine Risk Insurance, which had not been included in the otherwise all-inclusive revision of H. R. 5529. The establishment of the superagencies was to be accomplished by Presidential proclamations, drafts of which were also included in the Legislative Appendix, as was a draft proclamation setting up control over exports.

Criticism of the Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1936 came from the customary two directions: constructive criticism from those friendly to industrial mobilization planning; destructive criticism from those hostile to military activity in that field. The War Department, still desirous of wide publicity for the plan, mailed copies of it to anyone

[81] Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1936, p. 17.

who made a request and invited criticism from many persons believed qualified to comment. In response to such an invitation, Brig. Gen. Hugh S. Johnson was critical of the too great detail in the plan, of its failure to adopt the Baruch fixed ceiling price control concept, and for its lack of cognizance of the new developments in governmental organization. ". . . in the main however," Johnson concluded, "it [the 1936 plan] is a necessary and a very valuable piece of work." [82]

Criticism from an unexpected source came from Secretary of State Cordell Hull who, although friendly to the plan and to the planning, took issue with the plan's provisions for control over exports and imports to be exercised by the War Trade Administration. Such control, he feared, might adversely affect his cherished reciprocal trade program and thereby have a similar bad effect on foreign relations.[83] Mr. Woodring was quick to soothe the Secretary of State by assurances that it was expected that the State Department would be fully represented in the War Trade Administration and that the next revision of the plan would include a specific clause to that effect.[84]

Again, the severest but most constructive critic of the plan was Mr. Baruch. In general, his criticisms of the 1936 IMP followed the same pattern as for the previous plans. He was impatient with the plan's failure to adequately consider the production needs of the civilian population.[85] He was insistent that industrial mobilization must be implemented under civilian control and that specific plans for the utilization of industry should be made by the civilian, industrial experts in the respective fields of industry. Baruch felt that plans for plant surveys, plant expansions, power utilization, etc., should be made by the industries concerned and not by the armed services. The plan's provision for the Army and Navy Munitions Board to study critical commodities, including those for the essential needs of the civil population, was frowned upon, for Mr. Baruch felt such studies should be made by civilian commodity committees which should be functioning now rather than in the distant future. The Army and Navy Munitions Board itself, Baruch advised, should have a civilian chairman who reported directly to the Assistant Secretary of War. The War Department's persistence in favoring the piecemeal approach to price control continued to irritate Baruch.

The comments of Mr. Baruch on the 1936 plan were the type of constructive criticism which the War Department was seeking.[86] The

[82] Ltr, Hugh S. Johnson to ASW Louis Johnson, 24 May 37. Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.

[83] Ltr, Sec of State Hull to SW Woodring, 12 Apr 37. *Ibid.*

[84] Ltr, SW Woodring to Sec of State Hull, 28 Apr 37. *Ibid.*

[85] The 1936 Plan was the first one to even mention the problem of civilian needs but only with a statement that: ". . . Adequate provisions must be made to meet the necessities of the civilian population."

[86] Mr. Baruch's comments on the 1936 Plan are in marginal notations which he made on the copy of the plan sent to him. This copy with the notations and brief accompanying letter dated 1 Oct 37 is in Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.

plan, however, was severely criticized by a wide range of writers and organizations.[87] This mass of unfavorable publicity forced the War Department to conclude that the plan had not been made sufficiently complete or clear, a deficiency which it was hoped could be remedied in the next revision.[88]

During the interim between the 1936 and 1939 plans, the threat of war in Europe aroused a slight interest in industrial mobilization matters in the United States. Planning Branch, Col. C. T. Harris, Jr., recommended that qualified officers be sent to London to study what was being done there, but the State Department objected. Some of the desired information was secured, however, from the military attaches in European countries who were sent a list of questions pertaining to mobilization which were of interest to the Planning Branch.

The Congress, aroused by the course of world events, gave the mobilization planners encouragement in several instances:

1. The clause in Army appropriations acts which had annually limited the number of officers engaged in procurement and industrial mobilization to the largest number so employed during the fiscal year 1929 was omitted from the Army Appropriations Act, 1938, thereby permitting the Planning Branch to increase its staff.

2. In 1938, the Congress, for the first time, reacted favorably to War Department requests for funds for educational orders. The initial congressional grant was $2,000,000 annually for each fiscal year beginning with 1939, but by the Act of April 3, 1939, the Congress increased this to $34,500,000 to be made available during the fiscal years 1939–1941, inclusive, with $2,000,000 additional to be allocated during the four years beginning in 1942.

3. In June 1939, the Congress passed an act authorizing the Secretaries of War, Navy, and Interior, through the mediums of the Army and Navy Munitions Board and the Secretary of the Treasury, to purchase for stockpile purposes $100,000,000 worth of strategic materials. Unfortunately, the effect of this act was nullified to a considerable degree by an initial allocation of only $10,000,000, 10 per cent of the full amount authorized. The same act allocated $500,000 to the Bureau of Mines and $150,000 to the Geological Survey to investigate and develop new sources of ores and other needed minerals.[89]

During this period the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War was more alert in its efforts not only to publicize the Industrial Mobilization Plan, but to publicize it favorably. Louis Johnson, who became

[87] Donald Keyhoe, "If War Comes—Uncle Sam's Plan for You," *American Magazine* (Dec 37); *Forbes Magazine* (Oct 39); Gordon Carroll, "When America Marches to War," *American Mercury;* Dorothy Thompson, two articles in the *Saturday Evening Post* (Fall, 1937); H. E. Fey, "M-Day Marches on," *Christian Century* (12 Jan 38); etc.

[88] Ltr, Col Rutherford to Col Scott, 6 Dec 38. Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.

[89] *Stat.* 811. The stockpiling program really began in 1938, when the Congress appropriated $3,500,000 for the Navy to purchase tin, manganese, tungsten, chrome, optical glass, and manila fiber. See: 50 *Stat.* 96.

Assistant Secretary in 1937, gave speeches, wrote articles, and conferred with factory heads from coast to coast, in his efforts to explain and to clarify the purposes and scope of the Industrial Mobilization Plan. The effects were generally favorable, particularly among business men, who as a class moved from indifference to approval and lukewarm support of the plan. Business magazines began to publish laudatory discussions of the plan, but, unfortunately, the circulation of these magazines was somewhat limited.[90]

Specific steps toward the revision of the 1936 IMP were taken with the appointment in February 1938 of a board of officers from the Planning Branch to review the plan and its supporting documents and to recommend its revision.[91]

In March 1939, this board was directed to work jointly with committees of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. In May 1939, a tentative draft of the revision was ready and was circulated to interested staff agencies and to some qualified civilians for comment and criticism. On 28 October 1939, the printing of the last Industrial Mobilization Plan to appear before World War II was completed.

Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1939

The 1939 version of the Industrial Mobilization Plan was completely rewritten; prior revisions had changed provisions but, in general, had retained the phraseology and format of preceding plans. There were three basic conceptual changes in the 1939 IMP which Assistant Secretary of War Johnson summarized as follows:

> (1) It recognizes the changes in governmental structure during the past few years and proposes to use existing agencies to their fullest extent, but at the same time retaining the executive control in the hands of the War Resources Administrator or other emergency administrations;
>
> (2) It recognizes that there will be one super-agency, herein designated the War Resources Administration, operating for and under the President; all other agencies will be required to accept and fully support the guiding priority policies enunciated by the War Resources Administration;
>
> (3) No annexes or appendixes are published.[92]

The recognition accorded to existing governmental agencies, while it was far more extensive than in the preceding plans, was limited to the functioning of but three of the agencies in the plan. The proposed functions of the War Finance Administration was already being carried out by the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve Board, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Export-Import Bank. Since these functions were the same, the 1939 plan reasonably ". . . considered

---

[90] For an example of such articles, see: "Scheduling Production for War" in *Business Week*, 22 Oct. 38.

[91] Office Order No. 23, Planning Branch, OASW, Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.

[92] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1939*, p. 20.

that their actual administration should be left in the hands of existing agencies." [93] With the same reasonableness, the War Trade Administration section advised that "The closest liaison must be maintained between the United States Maritime Commission, the Departments of State, Commerce, and Agriculture and the Commodities Division of the War Resources Administration." [94] Finally, the Price Control Authority section had a statement that "The authority should be composed of representatives of industry, of the War Resources Administration, of Labor, and of those permanent Government departments and agencies most concerned with price control." [95]


The grant of overall coordinating power to the War Resources Administration was an important and desirable correction of what had been a major weakness in the 1936 IMP. In the 1939 IMP the War Resources Administration was ". . . placed between the other administrations and the President for purposes of coordination, acting as his executive assistant." [96] [For detailed organizational outline see *charts 21* and *22*.]

The 1939 IMP carefully emphasized that actual industrial mobilization would be under complete civilian control. The transition role to be played by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, during the period when the War Resources Administration was being organized, was clearly defined as a temporary one. Greater emphasis was placed on the need for speed in the creation of the War Resources Administration. The 1939 IMP was the first one to indicate an appreciation of certain additional problems inherent in an economic mobilization for all-out war—such as the necessity for spreading war contracts throughout the country.[97] The 1939 IMP was also the first plan to show concern for the nation's economy *after* the successful conclusion of a war.[98] But the 1939 plan did not offer detailed solutions for any of these problems which it raised, probably because of the shortage of time and personnel.

The broad generalities of the basic plan are hardly indicative of its scope unless it is considered together with the several annexes which, although classified secret and reproduced separately, continued to be an integral part of it.[99] The omission of the annexes from the published plan was stated to be due to the impossibility of revising them fast enough to keep pace with the changes occurring in government organization. At the time the main body of the Industrial Mobiliza-


[93] Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1939, p. 11.
[94] *Ibid.*
[95] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[96] Memo, Col Charles Hines to ASOW, 3 Oct 39. Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.
[97] Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1939, p. 7.
[98] *Ibid.*, pp. 12–13. Gen MacArthur, before the War Policies Commission had shown an awareness of this problem, but the Industrial Mobilization Plans of 1931, 1933, and 1936 had no follow-up on the problem of reconversion.
[99] Annex was the word used in the 1939 plan for the term appendix in the earlier plans.

Chart 22. War Resources Administration, 1939 IMP.*



*Source: *Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1939.*

Chart 21. Suggested Organization for Coordination of National Resources and Mobilization of Industry in Time of Major War.*



◦ Indicates that heads of these Sections, Divisions or Administrations are members of Advisory Council.

*Source: *Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1939.*

tion Plan was published in October 1939, there were eight annexes completed—war trade, war finance, facilities, commodities, price control, labor, power and fuel, and transportation—and two more—priorities and a transition annex—were still being worked on. The annexes, which were in mimeographed form only, contained considerably more detail than had the appendixes which they replaced.

It was in the annexes that there appeared the new concept of a gradual mobilization which would go through successive stages of increasing intensity, a radical departure from the prior all-pervading M-day concept. The successive mobilization stages, as the various annexes envisaged them, were: (1) a period of U. S. neutrality after a major foreign war had begun or was imminent; (2) a transition period of emergency during the first part of which the armed services would secretly expand their mobilization activities and during the latter part of which mobilization activities for war would be brought into the open; (3) the period after the United States entered the war when industrial mobilization, with all of its controls, went into full operation. This change in concept was due primarily to two factors: first, the General Staff's Protective Mobilization Plans [See chapter XIV, this study]; and second, the fact that President Roosevelt, soon after Munich (September 1938), had had his staff study Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1936, then current. The M-day concept in that plan displeased the President and his advisers who foresaw that the United States might have to begin mobilizing gradually and covertly until the sentiment in this country against foreign involvement was overcome.[100]

The Price Control Annex contained information on the organization of the Price Control Authority and stated that price controls should be inaugurated as early as practicable over the necessities of life.[101] It did not establish a detailed price control policy or system, conceivably because price control had not been satisfactorily solved during World War I and, in the absence of proven lessons, the planners were hesitant and unsure.

In the Labor Annex the planners continued on the basic assumption that the manpower pool in the United States was inexhaustible and that the only consideration which would affect the quantity of men brought into the services was strategic need. Qualitatively, the Labor Annex continued firm in the advocacy of deferments for occupational reasons.[102] It further recommended the adoption of machinery which would insure fair, prompt, and uniform conciliation,

[100] Connery, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[101] Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1939, Price Control Annex. Copies of annexes are in Pl Br Rec, OSW. National Archives.

[102] Labor Annex, 1939, p. 35.

mediation, and adjustment of disputes and the establishment of a War Labor Arbitration Commission.[103]

The Power and Fuel Annex gave assurances that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War had plans for: (1) an accurate listing of military power and fuel requirements; (2) an annual survey of electric power generating and distributing facilities in the Nation; (3) spreading the war load in accordance with the power and fuel capabilities of the several industrial areas; (4) close coordination between power, fuel, and transportation control agencies to meet any development shortages: (5) Government assistance, financial or otherwise, to insure timely increase in the industrial capacity of a potentially critical area, with particular reference to power, fuel, transportation, and finance.[104]

The Transportation Annex went considerably beyond the previous plans in consideration of possible methods of controlling transportation. It had been the accepted thesis in the previous plans that the railroad carriers would operate under their own management and that Government control over them would be exercised by priorities and embargoes. The 1939 IMP, however, considered four possible ways of controlling transportation:

1. Normal, peacetime operation subject to peacetime regulatory control as by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
2. Voluntary cooperation among the carriers each of which, however, would continue to be operated by its own management.
3. Complete government control of operations.
4. Coordination and control of demands on and use of transportation facilities by a designated government agency (any or all of the Federal, state, and private regulatory agencies could be utilized) exercising the minimum control needed to get the desired ends, but the actual operation and administration of the various carriers to remain under their own control.[105]

The last method, which was really a compromise of the other three methods, was the one favored by the War Department. Basically, it was not much different from what had been proposed in the three earlier IMP's. Although there was no draft of any legislation in this annex, there was a statement that legislation would be needed to implement the plans for transportation control. Such legislation would be needed to—(1) expand the control powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission to include all means of interstate transportation;

[103] It was to take the Roosevelt administration several months after the emergency began to reach a solution which differed but little from this one when it created the National War Labor Board 12 Jan 42.

[104] Power and Fuel Annex, 1939, pp. 22ff.

[105] Transportation Annex, 1939, pp. 5ff.

(2) suspend restrictive Federal and state statutes which might conceivably interfere with coordination of transportation agencies; (3) clarify the Federal Possession and Control Act of August 29, 1916; (4) amend the Reorganization Act of 1939 so as to permit the President to further redistribute functions among executive agencies.[106]

There was no legislative annex in the 1939 Plan, but three of the annexes (War Trade, War Finance, and Price Control) included a draft of a bill, in all three instances the same bill. In substance, this draft bill resembled the bill to make available to the President the manpower and material resources of the Nation which had been included in the 1931 and 1933 Plans.[107] But the title of the draft bill in the 1939 Plan's annexes began: "A Bill to prevent profiteering in time of war and to equalize the burdens of war." For the first time, the armed services, yielding to public opinion, conceded that the elimination of profit, rather than military efficiency, should have at least lip priority in a mobilization law. Provisions in the recommended bill would give the President authority, during war or an emergency declared by the Congress, to fix prices, wages, and rents; to determine priorities; to requisition supplies; to issue regulations intended to prevent waste, hoarding, and profiteering; to license all businesses and services except the publication of newspapers, periodicals, and books; to create new government agencies and to reorganize old ones; and to suspend the whole or any part of any law or laws of the United States which impeded procurement activities by and for the military and naval establishment. There were also included brief selective service and public relations provisions, similar to those in the 1931 and 1933 plans. And there was a section which provided that during war there shall be in effect a system of public finance to absorb all profits above a fair normal return which was to be defined by Congress and which at the same time would make possible the financing of the war with a minimum disturbance of our economic structure. The mobilization planners were careful not to make any recommendations to accomplish this but recommended that the Secretary of the Treasury make a continuing study of the problem and submit appropriate plans to Congress.

At the time of publication of the Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1939, it was still apparently the desire of the War and Navy Departments that implementing mobilization legislation should be passed well in advance of war, so that it would be ready for use when that great emergency came. By the end of 1940, the War Department, however, made another policy shift, back to the Hurley doctrine of having mobi-

---

[106] *Ibid.*, pp. 58ff.

[107] In the 1936 Plan, H. R. 5529 had been substituted for it. The failure of H. R. 5529 to be enacted into law by 1939 apparently convinced the mobilization planners that there was little to be gained by continued support of legislation in that precise form.

lization legislation ready but to be enacted only after the emergency of war occurred.

This latter shift was probably due to a combination of several factors, all of them stemming from the suspicion and distrust of the plan which continued to be felt and voiced by so many segments of public opinion, including an articulate bloc in Congress. It must have been felt that pressure from the service departments for this industrial mobilization legislation would have an adverse effect on the enactment of certain preparedness measures which the Congress seemed to be viewing with more favor. Hence, in the interests of current needs, it was decided to postpone the future needs provided for in the legislative proposals of the Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1939 to a more propitious time in the future.

Criticism of the 1939 IMP continued, in the main, to be hostile. The regular government agencies had become more articulate in their opposition to the plan for its insistence on new emergency agencies rather than employment of the existing agencies.[108] Indicative of the persistent hostility of a small but loudly vocal segment of Congress was the charge in a speech made on the floor of the House by Rep. Paul W. Shafer of Michigan that the Industrial Mobilization Plan would clothe the President, as Commander in Chief, with full and complete dictatorial powers and that the Constitutional rights of every man, woman, and child in the United States would be suspended.[109]

The 1939 Plan's tentative but hardly detailed concern for demobilization caused still more suspicion of the plan itself. Rep. Roy Woodruff, also of Michigan, assailed the mild suggestion in the plan that it might be necessary to extend wartime controls into the demobilization period, if such controls were then necessary.[110] The Washington representative of the National Grange, Mr. Fred Brenckman, viewed with alarm this proposal to continue some controls into the demobilization period and also took a dim view of the Industrial Mobilization Plan's failure to represent farmers on agencies proposed in the plan. This lining up of the farm bloc against the Industrial Mobilization Plan swelled to a formidable extent the tide of public opinion against the plan. Labor continued hostile to the plan. The 1939 Plan, however, was the first one to be criticized publicly because the controls it recommended *were not stringent enough.*[111]

The preparation and perfection of the Industrial Mobilization Plans took place in a turbulent era. During the great economic de-

[108] William D. Boutwell (ed.), *America Prepares for Tomorrow* (New York, 1941), p. 46; Joseph P. Harris, "The Emergency National Defense Organization," *Public Administration Review* (1940), I, p. 19.

[109] *Congressional Record,* vol. 86, pp. 5247–51.

[110] *Ibid.,* p. 6904.

[111] See: Albert Carr, *America's Last Chance* (New York, 1940), p. 91; and A. P. Wolfson, *M-Day: Banking and Finance* (Cambridge, 1940), p. 89.

pression of the 1930's, America's production capacity depreciated as facilities stood idle. The business world which emerged from World War I was blamed by many for the boom and bust of the 1920's. Pacificism was widespread in the United States, and public opinion was suspicious of any sort of preparedness activity. It was not an ideal time in which to plan for industrial mobilization as the Assistant Secretary of War was required to do by law. Yet the 1930's were also the decade in which Hitler came to power in Germany; Mussolini invaded Ethiopia; Japan undertook its rampages in Manchuria and China; and the world grimly watched Spain turned into a testing ground for competing ideologies as well as competing armies. Increasing world tensions were to culminate with the beginning of World War II in September 1939.

PART FOUR

WORLD WAR II

CHAPTER XVI

THE BEGINNINGS OF MOBILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

. . . In the years between World War I and World War II little was done to maintain an adequate armed force in this Nation. During that period many persons in the executive and legislative branches of the Government, as well as in the military agencies, evidenced an attitude of complacency regarding our national defense. This same attitude also existed among large segments of the American people. Largely as a result of this attitude, congressional appropriations for the support of our national defense were reduced to a dangerous minimum during the 20-year period prior to World War II. This Nation should not again make the same costly error.[1]

Rearmament Begins

Military Planning in the United States between World Wars I and II was based on the premise that mobilization would begin on a specific M-day which would mark the end of peace and the beginning of war. Because of the gradual involvement of the United States in World War II there was no M-day such as the planners had visualized. Actually it is impossible to determine the exact day that the United States began its mobilization. The beginning of the gradual rearmament program, however, can be approximated although rearmament continued for an appreciable period before it developed into an actual mobilization. Certainly the Navy would set the date for the beginning of rearmament earlier than the Army. The naval construction program began as early as 1934 and increased appreciably after the President's message to the Congress on 28 January 1938. The naval program was prompted by Japanese resurgence in the Pacific after announcing in 1933 its withdrawal from the League of Nations and from the naval limitations agreements of 1922 and 1930. The naval program was undertaken first because of the time necessary to build fleets and the fact that the Navy would probably be the first service to meet the enemy. Then, too, the Navy was always more sensitive to foreign policy and was perhaps closer to the Roosevelt administration

[1] S. Rpt. 110, pt. 7, 79th Cong. 2d sess., "Investigation of the National Defense Program : Additional Report," 3 Sep 46, p. 3.

than the Army. Thus, 28 January 1938 probably becomes closest to marking the beginning of American rearmament after World War I.[2]

The most important rearmament date for the Army was 14 November 1938. On that date President Roosevelt, at a White House conference attended by his topmost civilian and military advisers, laid out a program for the expansion of the Army or, more specifically, the Air Corps component of the Army.[3] The President reviewed the growing military might of the Axis powers which he proposed to counter by manufacturing airplanes at a vastly accelerated rate. Significantly, the President asserted that the United States must be prepared to defend the entire Western Hemisphere. There was passing mention of the need for more antiaircraft artillery units, but the President strongly emphasized aircraft production. His immediate goal was a $500,000,000 program for 10,000 planes: 2,500 training, 3,750 line combat, and 3,750 reserve combat planes. The War Department was given the mission of filling in the details of the proposals broadly outlined at the conference. Thus the President gave life to the academic plans of the General Staff. Unhappily, from the Staff's point of view, the President not only got rearmament moving, but he got it moving in a direction different from what staff studies had determined to be desirable.

Prior to the President's conference, the General Staff's plans had shown a restrained awareness of the need for greater air strength,[4] but the lukewarm concern for this deficiency had been immersed within the overall plan for creating, some day, a well-balanced army. The President's directive ran counter to the balanced army concept. The General Staff planners had to carry out the rearmament program as set by the President, but for the ensuing three years they were never to cease trying to restore the balanced army concept. Never wholly successful in these efforts, the staff planners did eventually influence the direction of rearmament and mobilization to an appreciable degree. But usually the pressure of events and the demands of a changing situation, rather than the arguments and pleas of the Staff, were to be decisive in the frequent policy changes which occurred during early rearmament and later mobilization.

For perhaps a month before the definite Presidential proposals were made at the 14 November conference, there had been a distinct in-

---

[2] In his message of 28 Jan 38 the President requested only $17,000,000 for the Army which was not enough to be of much significance beyond assurance that the President was aware that the Army was underfinanced.

[3] With the President at this conference were Harry Hopkins; Sec of Treasury, Henry Morgenthau; ASOW, Louis B. Johnson; Treasury General Counsel, Herman Oliphant; Solicitor Gen (later Atty Gen and Supreme Court Justice), Robert Jackson; CofS, Gen Malin Craig; DCofS, Brig Gen George C. Marshall; Chf of Air Corps, Maj Gen H. H. Arnold; Exec Asst to ASOW, Col James H. Burns; and the military and naval aides of the President. Gen Arnold took notes at the conference which he later submitted to the CofS. A copy of these notes is in CofS Emergency Files, Binder 3. DRB, TAG.

[4] See: WPD File 3807. DRB, TAG.

crease in staff planning for rearmament. The October studies, however, based as they were on the balanced army concept, advocated the purchase principally of ordnance materiel needed for the whole Initial Protective Force (IPF) of the Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP). After 14 November these plans had to be changed because of the President's insistence on aircraft alone.

Within 24 hours after the President's 14 November conference, Acting Secretary of War, Louis B. Johnson called on the Chief of Staff for a detailed Army augmentation program, projected for two years, to include not only what the President had asked for in airplanes, airplane factories, and supplementary air materiel, but also to include what had not been asked for: specifically, budget estimates to provide materiel for the PMP forces and to put industry on a solid footing for later expansion to meet the munitions demands of a full mobilization.[5] This was certainly more than the President had requested and there was nothing in the Acting Secretary's memorandum to limit the amount of expenditures. In this atmosphere Deputy Chief of Staff Marshall enjoined the General Staff to make haste in producing the requested plans and advised shortcutting normal General Staff procedure by use of "informality."[6]

Adherence to the Balanced Army Concept

Assistant Secretary of War, Louis B. Johnson (at the time Acting Secretary), Chief of Staff, Gen. Malin Craig, and the General Staff united in an effort to maintain the balanced army concept and to read into the President's 14 November conference authority for an extensive balanced military program. Thus the chief of the Air Corps in preparing plans for the President's 10,000-plane program made the assumption that the airplanes requested by the President had to be matched by an air corps expanded to fly and maintain them. Whether such was the intent of the President is conjectural.[7]

The study requested by the Assistant Secretary was prepared in WPD and after two revisions was ready on 30 November 1938.[8] In

[5] Concerning this last item, Mr. Johnson had in mind the following: (1) educational orders; (2) retooling of government arsenals with the best available machinery; (3) definite plans for manufacture of critical PMP equipment, i. e. materiel of a noncommercial nature which would require considerable time to procure; (4) completion of unfinished plant surveys; (5) reserve supplies of machine tools for munitions manufacture; (6) buildup of a stockpile of critical and strategic raw materials. Memo, Actg SW to CofS, 15 Nov 38. Copy in WPD 3674. DRB, TAG.

[6] Memo, DCofS to GS, 17 Nov 38, sub: Supplementary estimates for fiscal year 1940. *Ibid.*

[7] At least one of the planners was convinced that the President from the first was primarily interested in increased aircraft production in order to be able to furnish planes to the Allies and that an expanded air corps was *not* contemplated during those early days of rearmament. Whatever the President's idea was in 1938, as the war advanced he voiced his determination in 1940 to use American aircraft production facilities to aid the Allies to a point which the SW contended cut our own forces short. See: Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[8] The initial version, dated 25 Nov 38, and the 1st revision, dated 28 Nov 38, were changed to conform with changes penciled in the margin by the DCofS, Gen. Marshall. For copies of these studies see: WPD 3674–10. DRB, TAG.

the preamble to the study WPD advised that the naval expansion program, the projected Army Air Corps increase, and the President's reiteration of our traditional policy of hemisphere defense (the Monroe Doctrine") made it necessary to expand the ground forces. To secure Panama, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Alaska, and continental United States and to be prepared to protect South America the Army established missions which the ". . . Air Forces alone cannot accomplish." [9] To create a balanced force which could accomplish these missions WPD recommended, in addition to Air Corps increases, a Regular Army strength increase over a two-year period of 58,483 and a National Guard increase of 35,814. [For geographical distribution of these recommended increases see *table 55.*] These estimated strength

*Table 55. Geographical Distribution of Increase Recommended for the Regular Army and National Guard, 30 November 1938**

Location	Recommended Regular Army increase	Recommended National Guard increase
Total	116, 364	37, 834
Air Corps	57, 881	2, 020
Ground Forces	58, 483	35, 814
Panama	11, 070	0
Hawaii	3, 907	2, 134
Alaska (for Air Base)	80	0
Puerto Rico	725	758
Expeditionary Force	29, 208	2, 677
Continental United States	13, 493	30, 245

**Source:* WPD Memo, 30 Nov 38. WPD 3674-10. DRB, TAG.

increases were supported by comments amplifying the defense needs of each area. There was no request for strengthening the Philippine Islands,[10] but the Panama Canal Zone was to be appreciably strengthened. This would strengthen the Alaska-Hawaii-Panama line while maintaining only a defensive position west of that line.

The WPD two-year augmentation program would provide for immediate readiness:

[9] Memo, WPD to CofS, 30 Nov 38. *Ibid.*

[10] The dearth of personnel, equipment, and funds 1921–34 had forced the Army to "write off" the defense of the Philippines. On 24 Mar 34 the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed making the Philippines a self-governing commonwealth until 1946 when they would receive complete independence. The War Department did not want to expend funds in an area about to become independent. However, because the American flag still flew over the Philippines it was necessary in 1940 to include the islands in defense plans. For pertinent General Staff planning during the entire period see: WPD Files 3251. DRB, TAG; Watson, *op. cit.*, ch. XIII, is an excellent summary; see also: Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning For Coalition Warfare 1941–1942* in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953).

1. Seven infantry divisions (five Regular Army, one National Guard, one composite RA–NG).
2. Two cavalry divisions.
3. Forty-one antiaircraft regiments (an increase over the long-sought goal of 34 AA regts. In 1938, there were 5 RA AA regts, at reduced strength).[11]
4. Materiel for the PMP Initial Protective Force of 730,000 plus the 270,000 reinforcements to be procured by M+5.
5. One active corps headquarters with its special troops.
6. Spare parts units: artillery, signal, medical, etc.
7. Ten thousand airplanes (5,620 combat planes; 3,750 trainers; 630 other types) with the personnel to fly and maintain 50 per cent of them.
8. Aids to industrial mobilization.
9. Some stockpiles of strategic materials.[12]

The cost of the additional forces for this two-year program, less aircraft, was estimated at $117,000,000 for the first year; $155,000,000 for the second year; and $76,000,000 annually thereafter.[13]

The units which WPD included in the recommended expansion of the Army followed the outline of the Protective Mobilization Plan and were intended to provide the premobilization balanced forces which the planners had so long felt necessary. The continued lack of staff appreciation of the importance of armor in the balanced forces was indicated by the recommendation for only one Regular Army mechanized division and one National Guard mechanized brigade. But the return of an offensive spirit in the plans was significant. Prior to this no striking force had been planned for until some time after M-day; rather the planners had envisioned a passive defense of the United States and its possessions (less Philippines). The hope of increased funds was reflected in plans for a task force in immediate readiness to implement the policy of hemisphere defense (Monroe Doctrine).[14]

The WPD study was submitted to the President whose reaction must have been considerably less than favorable, for a few days later Acting Secretary of War Johnson, in a personal letter to General Craig, requested additional justification for the augmentation program for submission to the President.[15] In response to this plea,

[11] There was considerable national interest in AA defense. AG 381, beginning 1938, contains many letters from civic organizations and private citizens from the east and west coasts, demanding more AA defense for their areas. The concern was reflected in congressional interest in AA defense, marked in congressional hearings on defense appropriations. See also: *Hearings* before the Committee on Appropriations, U. S. Senate, 76th Cong., 3d sess., on H. R. 9209, pp. 412–13.

[12] WPD Memo, 30 Nov 38. WPD 3674–10. DRB, TAG.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] For this shift from defensive to offensive psychology in War Department plans see: WPD 4175–2 and WPD 3748–17. DRB, TAG.

[15] Ltr, Actg SW to CofS, 10 Dec 38. Copy in WPD 3674–10. DRB, TAG.

WPD prepared another study restating the recommendations for the two-year augmentation program, emphasizing anew the need for balanced forces and stressing the Nazi-Fascist threats to South and Central America.[16]

The tide of rearmament did not yet equal the Staff's expectations. At another White House meeting, President Roosevelt chided his topmost military advisers for reading so much into the 14 November conference statements. He had asked for 10,000 airplanes to cost $500,000,000, and the planners were coming up with programs substantially in excess of $500,000,000 but which contained substantially less than 10,000 airplanes. During the discussion which followed, the President was induced to promise the Navy $100,000,000 from some source other than the $500,000,000 for rearmament; to give $200,000,000 of the rearmament money for ground force PMP rearmaments; and to suballocate $120,000,000 of the remaining $300,000,000 to the Air Corps for air bases and air armaments other than aircraft. The Air Corps emerged with but $180,000,000 for aircraft and the President insisted these should be combat aircraft.[17] Subsequently, an Air Corps program for 5,500 to 6,000 planes, both combat and trainer—the so-called Woodring Program—was set up by the Secretary of War and eventually enacted into legislation.[18] The Air Corps, dreaming of 10,000 airplanes, had awakened to only 5,500; but the ground forces, dreaming of nearly 100,000 more men, had awakened to none at all.

The General Staff continued to make studies concerning Army augmentation. On 29 December 1938 WPD prepared a three-year augmentation program, apparently on the theory that three small increases might be more easily obtained than two large ones. Projected strength increases were more modest in the three-year program: only 2,071 officers and 37,092 enlisted men for Regular Army ground forces and 2,080 officers and 30,517 enlisted men for the National Guard.[19] This, however, was an "irreducible minimum" considered necessary for the immediate security of the United States. It totally disregarded additional training units which mobilization would require as well as special type units (antitank units, signal battalions, etc.). This minimum increase was expanded in a later study dated 3 January 1939 to include an additional 3,424 officers, 350 nurses, and 36,920 enlisted men for Regular Army ground forces making a total of 5,495 officers, 350 nurses, and 74,012 enlisted men.

Simultaneously with the WPD studies, G–1 and G–3 drew up a joint study on 28 December 1938 which came to the conclusion, after de-

[16] Memo, WPD for CofS for submission to ASOW, 17 Dec 38. Copy in *ibid.*

[17] Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 142–43.

[18] See: Legislation for proposed air expansion program and other pertinent material in AG 580 (12–14–38). National Archives.

[19] Memo for CofS, 29 Dec 38, sub: An Augmentation Program for the Army, WPD 3674–11. DRB, TAG.

tailed consideration of personnel requirements, that the Regular Army needed an augmentation of 5,717 officers, 150 warrant officers, 64,157 enlisted men, 256 nurses, or a total of 70,280. Thus two independent General Staff studies arrived at approximately the same conclusion for augmenting the Regular Army.

However sound the reasoning and the facts in these General Staff studies, the Chief of Staff and his Deputy had received approval from the President only for some purchases of materiel for ground forces in addition to the major Air Corps increases; they had *not* received approval for any augmentation of ground force personnel. They were understandably not disposed to recommend before Congress what had been disapproved by the President, nor did they want to jeopardize hopes for congressional approval of the vitally needed materiel appropriations by asking for too much too fast. In this disturbing dilemma—how to compromise between asking for what was believed necessary and what was considered politically expedient at the time—the decision was made to concentrate on getting the appropriations for materiel. But in the event the congressional committees asked the proper questions, it was decided to be ready with some advice on ground force augmentations for some later date. In response to a request from the Deputy Chief of Staff, WPD prepared a study containing this "reasoned advice." It was in this study, containing "a justification indicating the method of approach to the personnel question, if, as, and when the Chief is called upon to make some recommendations," that there appeared the suggestion that ground force increases be recommended for filling five complete infantry divisions.[20] It was pointed out that psychologically five divisions would make a far more favorable impression on Congressmen than a request for a bulk increase in ground forces of some 20,000 men. The WPD study was personally revised by General Marshall and, after some further polishing by the Staff, was resubmitted to him with two versions (a one-page and a two-page version) of a related study, "The Most Serious Weakness in our National Defense System," prepared by WPD and concurred in by the entire General Staff.[21] The gist of these studies was that while Germany had 90 divisions, Italy 45, and Japan 50 actively employed on the China mainland alone, the United States had not a single complete division. In view of the threat of dictator nations, the most serious weakness in the United States defense system was the lack of a mobile ground force. It therefore was mandatory for security that five infantry divisions be made ready by a personnel increase of 1,800 officers and 23,000 men.[22]

[20] Memo, WPD to DCofS, 20 Jan 39. WPD 3674–13. DRB, TAG.
[21] WPD Study, 2 Feb 39. *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid.*

The feeling and conviction in the General Staff was so strong that augmentation of ground forces was mandatory that early in February 1939 (when congressional committees were conducting hearings on military appropriations) the Chief of Staff in a confidential mimeographed letter advised the General Staff, the chiefs of arms, and the chief of the National Guard Bureau that since ". . . under the terms of the President's message, and the statements of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff before committees of Congress . . . no recommendations were made regarding increases for mobile ground forces . . . [the] Chief of Staff desires that this attitude be clearly maintained by all representatives of the War Department who may be called on to testify before Committees of Congress." Having imposed this gag, the letter modified it a bit by referring to an attached inclosure containing the War Department's views concerning the need for a mobile force of five divisions: views which were to be offered only in response to Congressional questions and then only as something for eventual and not present accomplishment.[23] The War Department was bound by the President's desires and, as had become the custom, would advise the Congress only within the scope of those desires unless the Congress specifically probed deeper for more information.

When appearing before the Senate Military Affairs Committee on 21 February the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Marshall, confined himself principally, except for the Air Corps increases, to recommending materiel improvements for the ground forces: notably the adoption of the new Garand rifle, the modernization of field artillery (by adapting the old 75-mm gun to high speed travel and by increasing its traverse and elevation), the purchase of additional antiaircraft ordnance sufficient for 34 AA regiments, and the replenishment of ammunition in low supply. Personnel increases were recommended only for the Air Corps and for increasing the 5 extant Regular Army AA and 10 National Guard AA regiments. The bulk of the Regular Army AA increases were to man AA defenses in Panama. In keeping with the Chief of Staff's warning letter General Marshall in reponse to committee questions only touched upon the sad state of the ground forces and made no recommendations for increasing them except for Air Corps program and for the Panama garrison.[24]

The Forces in Being, 30 June 1939

The beginning of World War II in Europe in September 1939 helped to convert rearmament in the United States into mobilization. The strength of the Regular Army (including Philippine Scouts) on 30 June 1939 was 13,039 officers, 775 warrant officers, and 174,079 en-

[23] WD ltr, 9 Feb 39, sub: WD Attitude Regarding Additional Personnel for Mobile Army. AG 320.2 (2–7–39) (Misc) (F–M). Copy in *ibid.*

[24] *Hearings*, SMAC, 76th Cong., 1st sess., on HR 3791, 21 Feb 39, pp. 285–90.

listed men, or a total of 187,893.[25] The National Guard on that same date totaled 199,491.[26] But these numbers were hardly a qualitative indication of strength. Some 50,002 officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army were dispersed in overseas possessions. [See *table 56.*] The 137,891 officers and enlisted men remaining in the continental United States were scattered in 130 posts mostly of battalion size. Tactically, the continental forces included nine square (World War I type) infantry divisions, but these were woefully understrength and dispersed. The table of organization (TO) peace strength of a square infantry division was 14,000 men[27] and included 12 infantry battalions, 18 batteries (4 guns each) of field artillery, and 28 special

*Table 56. Size and Distribution of the Regular Army, 30 June 1939**

	Total	Officers	Warrant officers	Enlisted men
Regular Army	187, 893	13, 039	775	174, 079
Continental United States	137, 891	10, 055	633	127, 203
Overseas	50, 002	2, 984	142	46, 876
Hawaii	21, 475	854	54	20, 567
Panama	13, 451	423	36	12, 992
Alaska	418	13	0	405
Puerto Rico	925	50	3	872
Philippines:				
Regular Army	4, 514	540	49	3, 925
Philippine Scouts	6, 406	39	0	6, 367
Retired Officers on Active Duty	7	7	0	0
Miscellaneous	[a] 2, 806	1, 058	0	1, 748

[a] Includes military attachés, personnel on leave and en route to and from oversea garrisons, on special detached duty, on duty with United States district engineer offices, and constructing quartermasters.

*Source: *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1939,* p. 56, table C.

companies (signal, engineers, tanks, medical, ordnance, etc.). [For actual strength of these divisions at the beginning of 1939 see *table 57.*] The 1st, 2d, and 3d Infantry Divisions were under peace strength, but they had divisional framework; the other six divisions were but understrength brigades.

In addition to the nine infantry divisions at various stages of incompleteness, there were the 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions (each about 1,200 men under peace strength), a mechanized cavalry brigade of about peace strength (but some 2,300 men under war strength), and a few miscellaneous separate units (infantry regiments, tank regiments less tanks, service units, etc., not included in the divisions). The Air Corps, whose program for expansion had not yet materialized into

[25] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1939,* p. 56, table C.
[26] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1941,* p. 71.
[27] War strength was approximately 20,000 officers and enlisted men.

*Table 57. Strength of Infantry Divisions, 2 February 1939**

Division	Actual strength	Peace strength shortage	Shortage (units)
1st	8, 800	5, 200	1 inf bn; 8 FA btrys; 12 spec cos;
2d	10, 000	4, 000	6 FA btrys; 13 spec cos;
3d	8, 500	5, 500	1 inf bn; 8FA btrys; 14 spec cos;
4th	4, 400	9, 600	4 inf bns; 5 FA btrys; 20 spec cos;
5th	3, 800	10, 200	6 inf bns; 16 FA btrys; 25 spec cos;
6th	3, 400	10, 600	6 inf bns; 16 FA btrys; 26 spec cos;
7th	3, 500	10, 500	7 inf bns; 15 FA btrys; 25 spec cos;
8th	4, 200	9, 800	8 inf bns; 15 FA btrys; 17 spec cos;
9th	2, 500	11, 500	7 inf bns; 16 FA btrys; 23 spec cos;

**Source:* Memo, WPD for DCofS, 2 Feb 39, sub: Need for Five Divisions. WPD 3674-13. DRB, TAG.

planes and men, had an aggregate strength of 22,387 on 30 June 1939.[28]

On 30 June 1939 the National Guard was organized in 18 divisions (two per corps area) with an overall strength of some 200,000 men. The Guard's 48 training nights and 2 weeks of field duty per year were not enough to adequately train this citizen force. It was a force in being, but requiring extensive training before combat.

The equipment of the Regular Army and the National Guard was of World War I vintage and therefore frequently obsolete. The Field Artillery, for example, still had the French 75-mm gun as its basic weapon although there had been developed in Germany the admittedly superior 105-mm howitzer and in this country the American version of it. The infantryman was still armed with the Springfield rifle, an excellent weapon but inferior to the semiautomatic Garand rifle, developed by a civilian employee of the Ordnance Department. The infantry still used the World War I Stokes 3-inch mortar, an inaccurate weapon which had been made obsolete by the far superior, precision Stokes-Brandt 81-mm and 60-mm mortars. The basic antitank (AT) gun in the hands of troops was the 50 cal. machine gun, entirely inadequate for the purpose intended. The 37-mm AT gun developed by Ordnance was then considered an excellent weapon, but when General Marshall was testifying before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, in February 1939, he reported of the 37-mm that ". . . at present we have only one gun." [29] (This 37-mm AT subsequently did not prove much better than the 50 cal. machine gun as an antitank weapon.) There were serious shortages in motor transport and signal equipment. Of less importance was the obsolescence or inadequacy of a host of field items, such as helmets and field ranges.

[28] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1939*, p. 52.
[29] *Hearings*, SMAC, 76th Cong., 1st sess., on HR 3791, 21 Feb. 39, p. 286.

Where improved equipment was already available, as in the case of mortars, motor transport, field ranges, rifles, etc., only congressional appropriations and time were necessary to correct deficiencies. But where acceptable materiel had not been developed due to lack of adequate research, the cost and the time required were appreciably greater. This was to be the case for tanks, signal equipment, antitank and antiaircraft guns, etc.[30]

The first increases in Army personnel in 1939 came by indirection. For three years (1936–38) the Congress had authorized an Army of 165,000 men, but the President had not allocated the funds for this increase until fiscal 1939. Each year the Congress had written into the appropriations act for that fiscal year a restriction that the 165,000 figure was to be the *maximum* average.[31]

This restriction was hardly a serious one in 1938 when the Congress had considered fiscal 1939 appropriations; 165,000 men seemed adequate and, indeed, met what had been the fondest Army hopes for many years.[32] But in late 1938 and early 1939, the pressure of events made the 165,000 restriction so unrealistic that the Congress, in a supplemental military appropriations act, not only eliminated the restrictive provision but allocated additional sums for pay of the Army beyond the expectations of the staff planners.[33] Thus, without specific legislation for an increase of Army personnel, the Congress made possible an Army strength of 210,000 men. Recruiting efforts were enthusiastically set with their sights on that goal. Most of the new enlistees were allocated to the Air Corps and to the Panama garrison, principally for antiaircraft units. By 30 November 1939 Regular Army enlisted strength had swelled to 200,390 exclusive of Philippine Scouts.[34] But again the pressure of events made an ultimate goal an intermediate one even before it was attained.

The uneasy lull between war and peace which existed during the post-Munich months was utilized by the General Staff to revise many of the existing plans for mobilization in addition to the efforts made to initiate premobilization Army augmentation. Studies were made concerning the possibility of converting the Civilian Conservation

[30] In commenting on the shortage of antitank weapons in this period Maj Gen Harry L. Twaddle, USA-Ret. states: " . . . pending the development of the 90-mm gun and its mounting on a chassis as an antitank weapon, the Army was hardpressed for anything that would stop a tank. The 37-mm gun had proven entirely inadequate. The problem was given the G–3 Division, and after many trials and errors, came up with a 'stop-gap' solution by having the Ordnance mount the obsolescent 75-mm gun on a half-track. After field testing, the unusual combination was accepted wholeheartedly, as it furnished a much-needed measure of security during the interim." See: 1st ind, Maj Gen Harry L. Twaddle to Ch, Mil History, 5 Aug 53, sub: Comments on Mobilization MS. HIS 400.3. Spec Studies, History of Mil Mobilization. OCMH.

[31] 53 *Stat.* 592.

[32] The 165,000 figure originated in Major Army Project No. 1 dated 1 Nov 29. See ch. XIII, section entitled "Studies of Needs for the Initial Mobilization," this study.

[33] 53 *Stat.* 992.

[34] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1940*, p. 31, table B.

Corps into a quasi-military organization, and other studies considered improvement of Reserve and National Guard officer training. It was decided that it was possible but not desirable to utilize the CCC organization and camps for military purposes.[35]

G–4 Estimates of Cost of Implementing the PMP

After Europe had moved nearer to war with the absorption of Czechoslovakia by Germany in March 1939, in violation of the Munich agreement, the Chief of Staff had ordered G–4 to prepare a complete study of what budgetary and legislative action was necessary to procure authority and funds for first priority items under the Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP) essential for the first year.[36] So current was the G–4 planning that a comprehensive and detailed response was submitted to General Craig on 5 May, hardly more than a week after the request was made. The measures and appropriations necessary to insure supply readiness in the event of a major emergency were set up in the G–4 report under three classifications:

1. A procurement program for critical items required to complete the Protective Mobilization Plan (estimated at approximately 730,000 men in units). Estimated cost: $295,376,000.

2. A speed-up program for expediting production of critical items. Estimated cost: $69,569,149.

3. A procurement program for essential (but not critical) items required for the Protective Mobilization Plan. Estimated cost: $618,389,340. In the event the mechanized cavalry brigade then included in the PMP was expanded to a mechanized division, a measure in the planning phase, then the additional critical items made necessary would add $4,028,540 to the estimates.[37]

The total appropriations recommended in the G–4 memorandum of 5 May 1939 added up to $987,373,689 broken down as follows:

Item	*Amount*
Total	$987, 373, 689
Total less Mech. Cav. Div	983, 345, 149
For Critical Items PMP	295, 376, 000
For expediting Production (by overtime, 3 shift operations, etc.)	69, 569, 149
For Essential Items, PMP	618, 400, 000
For Critical Items for Mech. Cav. Div	4, 028, 540

This recommendation for appropriations of nearly one billion dollars was in addition to amounts allocated to the Army by Congress in the appropriations for fiscal 1940 and to the $110,000,000 appropriated in

[35] See studies filed in G–4/CCC–9800, G–3–3696, and G–1–15588–1. DRB, TAG.

[36] Memo, CofS for ACofS, G–4, 26 Apr 39, sub: Preparedness-Supply. OCS 21060–6. DRB, TAG.

[37] Memo, ACofS, G–4, for CofS, 5 May 39. G–4/31349. DRB, TAG.

the second deficiency bill for fiscal 1939. Although G–4 recommended approval for the entire outlay, an awareness was apparent in the report that such approval might not be immediately forthcoming. Therefore the nearly $300,000,000 worth of critical items was broken down into three priorities of $100,000,000 each. The G–4 report contained the customary reminder that there would be a time lag of months and even years between appropriations and the delivery of military products. The PMP shortage tabulated in the report which it was proposed to remedy by the $1,000,000,000 outlay were modest indeed in comparison with the requirements which were to be made mandatory by a war which was only 30 months away.[38]

The G–4 study, like so many preceding it, produced no immediate tangible results, for the President was not yet disposed to make additional demands on the Congress for vast sums for rearmament. The study did, however, serve to keep G–4 plans current and comprehensive so that the data necessary for submission to Congress would be ready when the time came.

A New Chief of Staff and Immediate Action Plans

Gen. Malin Craig went on terminal leave 1 July 1939 prior to his retirement on 31 August. He was succeeded as Chief of Staff by his former Deputy, Maj. Gen. George C. Marshall, who continued intensive premobilization planning by all divisions of the General Staff. In anticipation of the imminent outbreak of war in Europe, General Marshall on 18 August 1939 approved several "immediate action" measures to be prepared in detail by the General Staff and to be ready for use when the war finally began.[39] These measures were in two groups: (1) those which could be initiated by the Chief Executive in the event of a national emergency;[40] (2) those which required Congressional legislation prior to implementation.[41] The staff plans for the latter included drafts of suggested legislation. Many of these measures had previously been the subject of staff studies and

[38] Among the critical shortages pointed out by G4 were the following:

Item	*On hand fiscal year 1940*	*1940 PMP requirements*	*Shortages*
Guns, 37-mm, AA	480	1,103	623
Rifle, cal. 30, M–1	168,575	227,034	58,459
Mortar, 60-mm	1,838	3,756	1,918
Mortar, 81-mm	656	853	197
Shell, 60-mm (All types)	573,362	2,413,362	1,840,000
Shell, 81-mm (All types)	419,559	595,760	176,227

See: *Ibid.*

[39] Memo, Sec. GS, to all divs, GS, 18 Aug 39, sub: Immediate Action Measures. OCS 21060–8 and G–4/31347. DRB, TAG.

[40] Included in this category were reinforcement of garrisons in Panama and Puerto Rico; increase of Regular Army and National Guard to peace strength; speed-up of construction work in Alaska, Panama, and Puerto Rico; measures against sabotage; speed-up of Air Corps program, etc.

[41] Included in this category were appropriations and authorizations for increasing materiel and manpower and for expanding industrial mobilization.

the Chief of Staff's directive of 18 August 1939 required principally the revision and expansion of existing plans.[42]

War in Europe: The United States Takes a Small Step Toward Mobilization

The war began in Europe on 1 September 1939 when Germany attacked Poland; England and France declared war on Germany 3 September. The plans which the United States had prepared for this long-expected contingency had been based on the fixed assumption that the Regular Army would be promptly increased to its full authorized strength of 280,000. On 5 September 1939, a day after he had conferred with the President at the White House, General Marshall unequivocally stated at a staff conference that the President had approved this strength of 280,000. On 6 September WPD was directed to prepare by 8 September letters from the Secretary of War to the President recommending the increase of the Regular Army to 280,000 and the National Guard to 435,000 and also to prepare the drafts of letters from the President to the Secretary of War directing such increases.[43] Also on 6 September a WPD memorandum informed the General Staff that the Chief of Staff had approved the 280,000 strength with the following priorities:

First Priority: to bring 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Infantry Divisions, less some trains and service elements, to full peace strength.

Second Priority: to provide essential corps troops for two corps; to provide essential GHQ troops.

Third Priority: to raise the five existing AA regiments to full peace strength and to activate four more AA regiments at peace strength.

Fourth Priority: to raise the 5th—9th Infantry Divisions, less one regiment and certain trains and service units each, to peace strength.

Fifth Priority: to increase existing overhead strength by 5 per cent to support the expansion.[44]

On 7 September General Marshall must have received information from the White House that the President had changed his mind, for in a memorandum to the Secretary of War the Chief of Staff argued for 250,000 men for the Regular Army and 320,000 for the National Guard.[45] But that same day the President made his decision that the

[42] Copies of these plans, with their accompanying charts, may be found in G–1/15588–3; G–4/31773; CofS Files, Emergency Measures, 1939–40, Binder 1. DRB, TAG.

[43] Memo, CofS for ACofS, WPD, 6 Sep 39. OCS 20822–53. Copy in WPD 3674–16. DRB, TAG.

[44] Memo, WPD to G–1, G–2, G–3, 6 Sep 39, sub: Priorities for increase in the Regular Army. WPD 3674–17. DRB, TAG.

[45] Memo, CofS for SW, 7 Sep 39. CofS Files, Emergency Measures, 1939–40. Binder 3. DRB, TAG.

Army increases would be substantially less than what had been anticipated: the Regular Army would be increased to 227,000 men by adding 17,000 men, and the National Guard would be increased to only 235,000 men. The draft of the letter from the Secretary of War to the President recommending the increases and the implementing Executive order were prepared by the Secretary of the General Staff.[46] On 8 September 1939 the President declared a national emergency by Executive order (rather than by the more informal letter to the Secretary of War which had been considered) and directed the limited increases in the Regular Army and National Guard. The same order also authorized the expansion of the Regular Army officers' corps by placing reserve officers on extended active duty.[47] In a memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff (Brig. Gen. [later Maj. Gen.] L. D. Gasser) on 8 September General Marshall stated that the President ". . . cannot consider at this time more than the first increment, as he thought that was all the public would be ready to accept without undue excitement. He indicated that he would give us further increases up to the figures we proposed. . . . Our people can proceed in their planning on the basis of an increase to 250,000 for the Regular establishment, and an increase of 126,000 for the National Guard—provided that no publicity is given." [48]

The staff study to utilize the unexpectedly meager increase pointedly referred to it as the ". . . First increment of 17,000 men." It was to provide for: (1) streamlining the Regular Army 1st to 5th Divisions at peace strength; (2) essential corps, army, and GHQ troops sufficient for one corps; (3) filling out the five existing AA regiments to peace strength; (4) peace strength for four reinforced brigades in order to put them in shape for eventual expansion to streamlined triangular divisions.[49] The National Guard increases were allocated as follows:

Organization	*Increase*
Total	43,000
Corps, army or GHQ troops	2,000
18 square inf divs (combat elements of 80 per cent peace strength; other div elements at 75 per cent peace strength)	30,000
13 AA regiments (at 84 per cent peace strength)	6,000
Harbor defense units	5,000

In addition, National armory drills were increased from 48 to 60 per year, and, field training was increased from 15 to 21 days. Of im-

[46] See: Memo for CofS, 8 Sep 39, sub: Increases in the RA and NG. WPD 3674–16. DRB, TAG; TAG ltr. AG 320.2 (9–8–39). National Archives.

[47] EO 8244. The proclamation of a national emergency is in 4 *F. R.* 3851, 8 Sep 39.

[48] Memo, CofS for DCofS, 8 Sep 39, sub: Increases in the Army. Copy in WPD 3674–16. DRB, TAG.

[49] Memo, WPD to ACofS, G–1, G–2, G–3, G–4, 9 Sep 39. WPD 3674–17. DRB, TAG. Actual National Guard strength on 8 Sep 39 had declined to 192,000 men although authorized strength then was 200,000.

portance too, as a first step, was the $12,000,000 which the President granted to the Secretary of War for Army motorization.

By the middle of September the eventuality of additional Army increases had become so certain that a General Staff memorandum stated an approved "Policy on Organization of the Regular Army" which predicated national defense on the immediate availability of:

1. Appropriate defenses for our five major overseas possessions.
2. Adequate protection for essential fleet bases in the United States.
3. The organization and framework for wartime expansion.
4. A balanced striking force of ground troops and aviation with which to counter any hostile seizure of strategic positions which could threaten the United States or any of its possessions.[50] The sketchy troop basis in this memorandum was expanded six weeks later in a followup letter circulated not only to the General Staff divisions but also the chiefs of arms and services. G–1, G–3, and G–4 were directed to prepare plans in sufficient detail to implement on short notice the Army's augmentation to 280,000.[51]

The Planning Vision Expands

The WPD planners expanded their strategic horizons as they gauged foreign policy from the public speeches of the President and from the skimpy liaison with the State Department. They envisaged not merely a Regular Army of 280,000 but one of 330,000, and an immediate expansion of the National Guard from 235,000 to 320,000, and then to 425,000. The WPD and G–3 studies were increasingly concerned with balancing the Army by the projected augmentations to enable it to perform what were now deduced to be its missions. The President's views on hemisphere defense (expressed in November 1938) and his approval (in April 1938) of the Standing Liaison Committee of the State, War, and Navy Departments had changed War Department planning from a passive to an active defense attitude.[52]

The Navy, during this period, also based its long-range defense planning on what it surmised our foreign policy to be. Adm. Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations 1939–42, explained to the Congress in 1945 the difficulties of such defense planning:

> The Foreign policy of the United States has never been very clearly defined—certainly not fixed—and it must have been necessary for the President and the State Department to feel their way along carefully in many situations.

---

[50] Memo, Sec, GS, for G–1, G–2, G–3, G–4, WPD, and TAG. 19 Sep 39. OCS 21060–30. Copies in WPD 3674–17 and G–1/15588–33. DRB, TAG.

[51] TAG ltr, 30 Oct 39, sub: Increase in the RA to 280,000. AG 320.2 (10–27–39) E–C. Copy in WPD 3674–16. DRB, TAG.

[52] In April 1938 Presidential approval was granted to set up a standing committee consisting of the second-ranking officers of State, War, and Navy Departments for continuous liaison "both at home and abroad . . . and of the Foreign Service and the two combatant services. . . ." For details of the creation of this committee, see: Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 89–91.

> It was impossible, however, for the Navy to plan on the basis of a well-known and clearly defined foreign policy . . . to prepare well considered "Tension Plans" we need a planning machinery that includes the State Department and possibly the Treasury Department as well as the War and Navy Departments. . . . We do not, however, have regularly set up planning machinery that brings in the State Department. It is true that we have frequent consultation with the State Departmen, but things are not planned in advance, and often we do not receive advance information of State Department action which might well have affected our own activities.[53]

One step which had expanded the planning vision had been the unofficial Anglo-American naval staff conversations in early 1938 which culminated in an understanding that the fleets of each nation could use the home seas of the other in the event of a common war with Japan. These naval staff conversations and the "understanding" were strictly unofficial.[54] But the President was fully aware of the agenda of the conversations and of the understandings reached; indeed, he had personally instructed Capt. (later Adm.) Royal E. Ingersoll, USN, who represented the United States, prior to his departure for London in December 1937. Thus the concern of the strategic planners was concentrated on hemisphere defense and on a possible war with Japan, for these were the public and private foreign policy interests of the President as they were then known to the planners.

In this atmosphere, the Joint Army and Navy Board, the coordinating agency for Army-Navy strategic planning which had scrapped the academic 1928 Orange Plan in November 1937, began applying itself to strategic planning in keeping with the names available and with the Nation's foreign policy as reported in the morning newspapers. The result of the strategic planning was a new Orange Plan approved early in 1938.[55]

Inevitably the planning for hemisphere defense had to include estimates of possible enemies; and just as inevitably these possible enemies which constituted a threat to the Monroe Doctrine were concluded to be the Fascist powers: Germany and Italy. Since the threat in the Far East was Japan, it was assumed early in the planning that Germany, Italy, and Japan would be in alliance. The Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Army and Navy Board as early as January 1939 was correct in its analysis of alignments hostile to the United States. It recommended that American policy recognize the preeminent importance of the Atlantic and Caribbean areas and that the Pacific area be given a lower strategic priority. The planners estimated that if Germany, Italy, and Japan simultaneously attacked

[53] Testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 31 Dec 45. See *Pearl Harbor Attack* (Washington, 1946), pt. 5, p. 2115.

[54] These naval conversations were not reported to Congress until Adm R. E. Ingersoll testified 12 Feb 46 before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. *Ibid.*, pt. 9, pp. 4272–78.

[55] JB File 325, 1937–38. DRB, TAG.

the United States our active defense of the Western Hemisphere would make a passive defense in the Pacific necessary for some time. They correctly surmised that Japan might initiate hostilities by a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor intended either to inflict major damage on our Fleet units or to blockade the Fleet there.[56]

Continuing studies of the possibility of a two ocean war lead the Joint Planning Committee late in 1939 to produce five planning directives, each one based on somewhat different military and political considerations, but all of them predicated on what was assumed to be the Nation's foreign policy as it could be inferred by the staff planners. Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) George V. Strong requested that the President *express* a policy for the staff planners rather than to let them infer one, since Army and Navy inferences were not always in accord, but this plea was not answered.[57]

The five plans were designated "RAINBOW Plans," for the contemplated wars with several enemies in contrast to the color plans which had been concerned with only one foe. The concepts and missions within the five RAINBOW planning directives were as follows:

RAINBOW 1: Prevent the violation of the Monroe Doctrine in letter or spirit by protecting the United States, its possessions, and sea commerce, and by protecting that part of the Western Hemisphere from which the vital interests of the United States could be jeopardized.

RAINBOW 2: Provide the hemispheric defense encompassed in RAINBOW 1, sustain the interests of the democratic powers in the Pacific, and defeat enemy forces in the Pacific.

RAINBOW 3: Provide the hemispheric defense of RAINBOW 1 and insure the protection of United States vital interests in the western Pacific by securing control there.

RAINBOW 4: Provide the hemispheric defense of RAINBOW 1 by dispatch of United States task forces wherever deemed necessary to South America or to the eastern Atlantic.

RAINBOW 5: Provide the hemispheric defense of RAINBOW 1 and 4 and ultimately send task forces to the eastern Atlantic, to Africa, or Europe where in cooperation with Great Britain and France they would effect the decisive defeat of Germany and Italy.[58]

All of the RAINBOW planning directives envisaged certainly an active defense, and the last three were postulated indeed on an aggressive defense. RAINBOW 3 and 4 certainly seemed to call for the extension of our security frontiers well beyond the continental limits of the United States and its possession and the seizure of vital strategic

[56] JPC Studies, 21 Apr 39, sec. V; JB 325, sec. 634. DRB, TAG.

[57] Memo, ACofS, WPD, for CofS, 2 May 39. WPD 4175. DRB, TAG.

[58] Memo. WPD, 31 Jul 41. WPD 3493-12. DRB, TAG. See also: Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

areas to prevent their being taken over by a future enemy. RAINBOW 5 went still further in its all out aggressive-defense concept. The President must have been familiar with the concepts of all of the RAINBOW plans long before they were ready in detail. In fact, on 5 July 1939 the President had directed the Joint Board to report directly to him as Commander in Chief.[59]

The RAINBOW plans, as they emerged from the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Board, were not finished, detailed plans; they were merely directives for planning. The implementing details were to be produced by the strategic planning agencies of the Army and Navy. In the Army this agency was, of course, WPD. WPD and its opposite number in the Navy had Joint Army-Navy War Plan 1 (RAINBOW 1) ready in sufficient detail on 27 July 1939 to submit it to the Joint Board, which approved and forwarded it to the President who, in turn, gave it his oral approval on 14 October 1939.[60] Following the approval of the detailed plans for RAINBOW 1, the Joint Board in April 1940 assigned the following priorities for the additional RAINBOW directives:

1. Completion of RAINBOW 2
2. Development of RAINBOW 3
3. Development of RAINBOW 5
4. Completion of RAINBOW 3
5. Completion of RAINBOW 5
6. Development of RAINBOW 4 [61]

At the time—April 1940—the Joint Planners assumed that Great Britain and France would be able to continue effective control in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and that the United States, in the event it was drawn into the conflict, would be able to concentrate its attention on the Japanese partner of the Axis in the Pacific. This assumption was abruptly invalidated by the defeat of France in May-June 1940, and the threat that Great Britain might also fall. The Joint Planners, under the impact of this contingency, gave first priority to RAINBOW 4, which was then applicable. The Joint Planning Committee submitted to the Joint Board on 31 May 1940 a draft of RAINBOW 4, which was approved on 7 June 1940.

WPD, swamped by its work on RAINBOW 2 and 3, entrusted detailed Army planning for RAINBOW 4 to a special committee of nine officers from the Army War College, which had suspended operations in June 1940. This committee of nine worked rapidly on RAINBOW 4 plans and sufficiently completed them for approval by

[59] *Federal Register*, Doc. 30–2343.

[60] The fully detailed "Army Operations and Concentration Plans, RAINBOW 1" were submitted by WPD to the Chief of Staff in July 1940 and were approved by him the same month. See: WPD 4175–11. DRB, TAG.

[61] JB directive to JPC, 10 Apr 40; JB 325, Serial 642. DRB, TAG.

the President on 14 August 1940.[62] But by that time the topmost RAINBOW planning priority was shifting to RAINBOW 5 because of the continued resistance of Great Britain. Therefore, WPD devoted most of its efforts during the last half of 1940 and early 1941 to RAINBOW 5. RAINBOW 2 and 3 were canceled by the Joint Board on 6 August 1941. RAINBOW 1 and 4 were not formally canceled by the Joint Board until 4 May 1942 although they too were strategically defunct certainly by August 1941, for by then the premise on which they were based—the defeat or neutralization of Britain—had receded as a probability.

The War Plans Division of the General Staff was ahead of the other staff divisions in its awareness of the actual foreign policy of the President, but it was well into 1941 before even WPD could be certain that United States foreign policy would not stop short of entry into the European war. All through 1940 and well into 1941 the President in his public speeches denied that there was any intention to send United States armies to Europe.[63]

There is nothing in the records to indicate that the staff planners of the War Department during 1939, 1940, or early 1941 received any direct information from the Chief Executive that the United States might go to war in Europe. WPD inferences that such a contingency was possible must have been slowly acquired from such Executive policy commitments as:

1. The President's implied approval of the Anglo-American naval conversations in January 1938.
2. The President's tacit approval of the later RAINBOW planning.
3. The American-British staff conferences in London during August and September 1940 whose conferees were referred to as the Anglo-American Standardization Committee.
4. The President's tacit approval of the American-British Staff Conversations in 1941.[64] The liaison thereby established was continued through the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington and U. S. Special Observers in London.
5. The materiel aid to the Allies prior to lend-lease.
6. The "Destroyers for Bases" deal with Britain, 2 September 1940.
7. The American-British-Dutch (ABD) conversations in the spring of 1941.

---

[62] JB Serial 642–4. DRB, TAG. The JPC had submitted RAINBOW 4 plans to the JB on 31 May 40. These plans had been approved by the Secretaries of War and Navy early in Jun 40.

[63] For the repeated public utterances of the President that this country was not going to war, see: Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War* (New Haven, 1948).

[64] The conversations were held 29 Jan–27 Mar 41. The accords reached were set down in ABC–1 and ABC–2. DRB, TAG.

8. The enactment of lend-lease, 11 March 1941.

9. The decision of the President on 16 April 1941 to establish naval neutrality patrols in the Atlantic.

10. The Atlantic Conference, August 1941.[65]

The cumulative conclusion reached by WPD was that the United States would enter the war sooner or later; but this WPD conclusion, although certainly firm by the spring of 1941, was only tentative in the summer of 1940.[66]

Mobilization planning and execution were impeded during 1939 and early 1940 by the fact that most of that planning was predicated on defense of the Western Hemisphere and not on participation in a global war. Only WPD in that 1939–40 period included inferences of a global war in its studies having a bearing on mobilization. WPD's increasing advocacy for expansion of the Air Corps was characteristic of this trend. The WPD recommendation to increase strategic aircraft was the first major recognition by a General Staff division of the Air Corps' conception of the role of strategic air power. The changed WPD views on the desirability of long-range aircraft were stated before the Air Board set up by General Craig on 13 March 1939. The Air Board's report calling for strategic air bases necessary to insure adequate radius of action for our aircraft echoed WPD studies of that period.[67]

In addition to seeing the desirability of having aircraft available for use in the event of participation in a global war, the WPD planners never lost sight of the fact that mobile ground forces would be indispensable for that war. Within the General Staff, WPD in 1939 and through 1940 strongly urged that the troop basis for the IPF of the Protective Mobilization Plan be revised so as to keep active only whole units, such as divisions, at sufficient strength in order to permit their immediate employment. WPD argued:

> In our mobile field forces, emphasis should be placed upon a compact organization of essential units. . . . The policy of maintaining organizations below effective strengths should be definitely abandoned for a policy of frankly discarding organizations when a reduction in strength precludes their retention as effective units. Our tendency in the past of "watering our stock" through the maintenance of a large number of organizations with strengths below the minimum required for early effective operation has been a source of misleading ourselves and the Congress into belief in a higher state of preparedness than actually exists.[68]

---

[65] For further coverage of the emergence of American foreign policy, see: Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 367–410; Cline, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–49; and Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, which gives detailed coverage of this subject.

[66] See memo, Col (later Maj Gen) Jonathan W. Anderson for CofS, 16 Apr 41, sub: Strategic Considerations. WPD 4402–09. DRB, TAG.

[67] See WPD file 3748 for WPD views on the use of aviation. DRB, TAG.

[68] Memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Dec 39. WPD 3674–25. DRB, TAG.

WPD asserted that the distribution of strength of the Regular Army of 227,000 men was an example of this "watered stock," which should be corrected by altering the distribution of the Army as follows:

Approved distribution	*Distribution recommended by WPD*
5 triangular divisions	6 triangular divisions
1 cavalry brigade (mechanized)	2 cavalry brigades (mechanized)
1 FA bn (75-mm how., pk)	2 FA regiments (75-mm how., pk)
1 FA battery (240-mm how.)	1 FA battalion (240-mm how.)
6 tank battalions	4 tank battalions

Personnel required for the additional infantry division and mechanized cavalry brigade could be obtained by inactivating certain nondivisional infantry regiments and field artillery regiments, and by arbitrarily decreasing enlisted overhead through the elimination of unnecessary jobs and the employment of civilians.[69] G–3, whose inferences concerning the policy of the President were not the same as those of WPD, was engrossed in problems incident to the expansion of the Army. G–3 persisted in the assumption that the expansion of the Army was for hemisphere defense only and therefore did not concur in the WPD recommendations. ". . . An additional cavalry brigade (mechanized) is not an essential organization in the mobile force for employment in hemisphere defense." [70]

The uncertainty felt by elements of the General Staff concerning the United States foreign policy was evident in a directive which the Secretary of the General Staff forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, in which he assumed that after the Army had reached a 280,000-man strength there would be a necessity for *reducing* this strength. G–3 was called on for recommendations as to how to implement such a reduction.[71] Commenting on this directive, G–3 stated:

> Since our national defense policy (hemisphere defense) has remained unchanged during the present period of "limited emergency" it is believed that an augmentation to 280,000 would have for its main purpose the strengthening of that policy together with the enforcement of a strict neutrality. It seems probable that only in the event that the present "limited emergency" is changed to a "major emergency" will authority be granted to increase the Army above 280,000.[72]

It was in response to this memorandum that WPD argued that peace strength for an active unit must never be less than a minimum effective strength and that the composition of the Army at any strength should provide the most usable balanced force possible at that strength. WPD forcibly argued in the same memorandum to G–3 that to plan reduction in the size of the Army was unrealistic, impractical, and unwarranted at that time, nevertheless, if such plans had to be made, they should ". . . consist of a series of outline organizations, relatively

---

[69] *Ibid.*
[70] Memo for CofS, 29 Dec 39, sub: WD Policy. G–3/6541–Gen–614. DRB, TAG.
[71] Memo, Sec, GS, to G–3, 16 Nov 39. OCS 20822–63. DRB, TAG.
[72] Memo for WPD, 25 Nov 39. G–3/6541–Gen–599. DRB, TAG.

complete, integrated throughout, differing in strength by approximately 10,000 men and each designed for the most advantageous or the least disastrous effect upon our current problems in national defense." [73] By way of concrete illustration, WPD included with this memorandum a table of recommended Army organization at strengths from 210,000 to 330,000.

The Plans Outstrip the Implementation

In an Executive order issued 8 September 1939, the same day as the declaration of a national emergency, the President had authorized a 17,000-man increase to bring the Regular Army to a strength of 227,000 men. This increase had been a disappointment to the General Staff which had hoped for an increase of the Army to 280,000 men. Although the General Staff was ready to expand the Army, The Adjutant General, who was charged with the actual implementation of the expansion, needed additional information before he could recruit men to bring the Army up to its new strength. Specifically, The Adjutant General requested detailed information concerning the allocation of recruits to units and stations. While this information was being collated by the chiefs of arms and services, men eager to enlist were being turned away at Army recruiting stations and told to come back in a couple of weeks.

Immediately following the President's authorization of an Army increase on 8 September, the Chief of Staff decided to triangularize the Regular Army divisions. This decision was based on extensive General Staff studies. The new tables of organization and tables of basic allowances were not completed, however, and there was some understandable confusion, initially, when units converted to a new organization whose structure was still somewhat vague.[74]

The further decision of the Chief of Staff in September 1939 to concentrate the five Regular Army divisions then in the process of reorganization appears to have been made without any preliminary General Staff study. After the decision was made, G–3 was directed to prepare the implementing plans ". . . as soon as possible . . . for the concentration and training of the five Regular Army divisions, the first and second Cavalry divisions, and miscellaneous corps and army units." [75]

The pressure of work on the General Staff increased. Although the main theory of staff procedure was that the Chief of Staff established a policy or requested a study and the General Staff operated within the framework of those instructions, in practice most policies origi-

---

[73] Memo, WPD to G–3, 12 Dec 39. WPD 3674–25. DRB, TAG.

[74] The reorganization was directed in TAG ltr, 16 Sep 39, sub: Reorganization of the Infantry Division. AG 320.2 (9–16–39) (MC). National Archives. Of the 22 TO's in the new division, only 4 had been published by 16 Sep 39, the other 18 were being prepared.

[75] Memo, OCS, for ACofS, G–3, 28 Sep 39. Copy in WPD 3674–17. DRB, TAG.

nated in studies at lower General Staff levels. Studies were circulated for concurrence and revision among the divisions of the General Staff concerned and then were sent to the Chief of Staff or his Deputy for review and decision. Only a small percentage of the studies made by the General Staff were ever used or reached the Chief of Staff's office. Although General Staff procedures worked quite well, occasionally an important matter was delayed or overlooked. This was frequently due to the tendency of the General Staff to make all plans and to centralize authority for making decisions to implement those plans within the General Staff itself.

The security classification of many of the General Staff plans was probably partly responsible for the failure to notify lower command echelons of impending action in time for them to properly plan their implementation. But even more responsible was the desire of the General Staff to keep its fingers in everything. There is a tendency of all higher Army staffs to assume that lower staffs are less competent and that the higher staff, separated by time and distance from a contemplated action, can nevertheless most effectively give detailed instructions for the accomplishment of that action. The inevitable result of such staff policy is for the lower staffs to lose initiative and to tend to carry out the instructions of the higher headquarters literally without discerning, critical judgment.

It was not until November 1939 that the army commanders and corps area commanders were assembled in Washington and informed of the current War Department expansion program and its objectives for the immediate future. These objectives, as described at the conference, included:

1. 280,000 men for the Regular Army, allocated as follows:
   a. Nine Regular Army divisions.
   b. Troops for 2 corps.
   c. Minimum Army and GHQ troops plus Air Corps.
   d. Overhead and foreign possessions.
2. Distribution for the projected force of 280,000 Regulars was to be as follows:

Strength distribution	*Number*
Total	280,000
Overseas (Including Ground and Air)	70,200
Expeditionary Force	57,000
Ground Force (5 Divisions, Corps, Headquarters, 2d Corps Troops or 2 Corps)	50,600
Air Force (365 Planes)	6,400
Requirements in the United States	152,800
Ground Force	82,600
Air Force	24,650
Overhead	45,550

3. National Guard strength of 320,000 (a projected increase of 85,000).

4. Materiel

Item	*Amount*
Total	[a] $662,000,000
Critical Items (Weapons, Ammunition, Tanks, Combat Cars, etc.) for a PMP Force of 750,000 Men Plus 250,000 Replacements	300,000,000
Essential Items for the Same PMP Force	317,000,000
Facilities, Arsenals, Depots	45,000,000

[a] Of this amount, only $92,000,000 had been provided in correct appropriations, leaving a balance of $570,000,000.

5. Priorities for these projected army expansions were as follows:

First Priority—materiel	$570,000,000
Second Priority—Personnel increases of RA to 280,000 and of NG to 320,000.[76]	

[76] Notes of conference with Army and corps commanders, 30 Nov 39. Copy is in G–4/31683. DRB, TAG.

The conference was informed rather sketchily of divisional concentration plans and of projected large-scale maneuvers. The increasingly vexing command relationship between the army commanders (who had just recently been made lieutenant generals by congressional authorization) and the corps area commanders was touched upon. The army commanders were told they would be responsible for all matters directly related to preparation for war, as field training for units larger than a division, the organization for coastal frontier defenses within the respective army area, and also the supervision of all war and mobilization planning. The corps area commanders would be responsible for all matters of routine training, control, and administration including the employment, training, and administration of divisions and smaller units and the actual preparation of mobilization plans. This was hardly a clarification of the hazy division of command of functions but rather a restatement of previous War Department views.[77]

In the months which followed the beginning of the war in Europe, the General Staff became increasingly concerned with implementing, bit by bit, the provisions of the Protective Mobilization Plan. G–3 and WPD produced a continuing series of studies on units to be activated with each increase in Regular Army strength. Studies were made and remade on the composition of a Regular Army of 242,000, 280,000, and 330,000. The Protective Mobilization Plan's troop basis was the foundation for all of these plans. And, as that plan came closer and closer to realization, errors in its provisions and in the troop basis were discovered which required still further study.

One of these errors was the plan's provisions for bringing Reserve officers to active duty. The increasing strength of the Regular Army made it mandatory to place Reserve officers on active duty to supple-

[77] *Ibid.*

ment the some 14,000 Regular officers. All of the mobilization plans, including the PMP, had made elaborately detailed assignments of Reserve officers to specific organizations of active and inactive Regular Army units, Organized Reserve units, etc., in keeping with the overall concept of a mobilization on the European model. It was this concept which visualized mobilization as being touched off on an M-day when the entire manpower of the Nation would become available for waging war. The gradual increase in the Army which occurred through late 1939 and 1940 occurred without an M-day and without the United States being at war. What was occurring was a premobilization period for which the mobilization planners had not made adequate plans. The elaborate plans for the employment of Reserve officers were disrupted; selection of officers for active duty had to be made not on the basis of their assignment in mobilization plans but on the basis of their availability. The G–1 Division of the General Staff, when the planning fallacy was realized, was quick to analyze the difficulties and to make the following corrections:

1. The peacetime procurement objective for Reserve officers was revised so as to include allotments based on detailed studies of requirements and availabilities. Such allotments of Reserve officers were made for units, installations, overseas fillers, loss replacements, etc., based on estimated needs.

2. Assignment of inactive Reserve officers was restricted, within corps areas, to key corps area service command positions, to "affiliated" units, and to provisional training units of the Air Corps Reserve. Instructions were made clear that assignments to Regular Army inactive units in peacetime were for peacetime purposes only.

3. A training program was instituted for the Reserve officers assigned to key positions in zone of the interior installations.

4. Promotion of Reserve officers by arm and service, within tables of grades allocated to corps areas, was instituted. This promotion system was in accordance with a national policy set up by G–1 but decentralized for operation to the respective arms and services and further adjustable by corps area commanders to meet with local needs. This was an example of centralized planning and supervision with decentralized implementation which was not practiced often enough during the early phases of mobilization.[78]

---

[78] For the new policies on peacetime procurement objectives for Reserve officers see: MR 1–2, MR 1–3 (new members), 1939, and TAG ltr, 10 Jul 39, supplementary thereto. AG 381 (6–8–39) Misc. M–A. National Archives. See also: TAG ltr, 16 Sep 39, sub: Personnel Requirements for Mobilization—Current Instructions Supplementary to MR 1–2. AG 381 (9–12–39) M–A–M. (Amended and republished 18 Jan 1940); TAG ltr, 1 Feb 40, sub: Assignment and Promotion Procedures for Reserve Officers. AG 320.2 ORC (1–10–40) (M–A–M); TAG ltr, 29 Jan 40, sub: Officers' Peacetime Procurement Objectives for Mobilization. AG 381 (11–21–39) M–A–M; TAG ltr, 20 Apr 40, sub: Peacetime Organization of Reserve Officers on Inactive Status in RA Inactive Units. AG 320.2 ORC (3–26–40) M–A–M. All filed in National Archives. For the old policies on the same subject see: G–1/10951 File. DRB, TAG. See also: MR Series 1 (old number) 1938.

The troop basis of the Protective Mobilization Plan had received its first major jolt when the President's insistence on airplanes impelled the mobilization planners to expand the Air Corps at a rate far beyond that set up in the PMP. This change in the plan was not entirely unforeseen because WPD since 1938 had been advocating greater preponderance of air strength in the mobilization plans. But in 1940 the ground force units included in the PMP with its augmentations were also reviewed with increasing doubt and uncertainty. The G–3 refusal to increase armored strength in the PMP in 1939 was a professional miscalculation approved by higher authorities.[79] The WPD recommendations for modest increases in armored strength in the PMP troop basis were not the only evidence of staff dissatisfaction with that troop basis. Both G–1 and G–4 were convinced that the inadequate provisions in the PMP for service units and for zone of the interior installations would result in the stripping of combat units to fill those overhead units that would be immediately essential during a full-scale mobilization. The failure of the PMP to make adequate provision for such necessary installations as reception centers, replacement training centers, corps area headquarters, etc. was worrying G–1 early in 1940, but remedial suggestions ran counter to the WPD insistence that the PMP include only combat readiness units. The G–1 and G–4 dissatisfaction with the failure of the PMP to provide sufficient service units (Signal Corps, Quartermaster, Engineers, etc.) was concurred in by G–3 and more agreeably considered by WPD since the argument was irrefutable that combat units would be unable to function without their accompanying services. WPD not only concurred with some G–4 proposals to increase slightly the number of service units in the PMP but also advised that service units be organized so as to be able to function in small units, such as companies or even platoons. The chiefs of arms and services preferred the organization of their units in regiments from which detachments would be made when necessary (which was all the time). WPD was so strongly opposed to this ". . . complication and unnecessary expansion in the chain of command and to the uneconomical employment of overhead" that it recommended that the matter be referred to the Chief of Staff for decision.[80] Both WPD and G–1 opposed what were considered unreasonable demands for service units being made by the Air Corps.[81]

As the War Department became increasingly convinced that the strength of the Regular Army would soon be increased to 280,000 (the

[79] Among the reasons for this error were the lack of funds to carry on research for the development of armored vehicles, the expense of armored equipment, the inadequate reports made by our military attachés abroad, and the failure to properly evaluate the attaché reports which were made.

[80] Memo for ACofS, G–3, 25 Nov 39, sub: Organization of Services. WPD 3674–23. DRB, TAG.

[81] Memo for ACofS, G–3, 9 Mar 40, sub: Ordnance Service for GHQ, Air Force. *Ibid.*

figure set in the National Defense Act of 1920) and that it very probably would be expanded beyond that figure, the Chief of Staff raised a question concerning the reason why Congress arrived at that figure of 280,000 in 1920. After a quick review of the record, WPD informed General Marshall that the 280,000 figure had been set by Congress as a compromise strength based on the conflicting testimony of many military witnesses. Since most of these witnesses were of the snap opinion that a Regular Army strength between 225,000 and 300,000 was desirable, the Congress, influenced by their opinions and by desire for economy, arbitrarily set the peacetime Regular Army strength at 280,000. But WPD learned from retired Brig. Gen. John McA. Palmer, who had been active in the formulation of the National Defense Act of 1920, that: "It was the evident intent of Congress at the time that the strength of 280,000 men finally arrived at would not be immutable but would be subject to variation if changed world conditions indicated the desirability of modifying our plan of national defense." [82]

In spite of the sniping at the troop basis of the Protective Mobilization Plan in late 1939 and early 1940, that troop basis, except for the Air Corps, continued in the main unchanged and was the keystone of the mobilization planning and implementation which was then occurring. The Regular Army objective of 280,000, approved in September 1939, had followed fairly closely the pattern set in the PMP.[83]

The National Guard's Uncertain Status in Premobilization Plans

After approval of the War Department policy of a Regular Army objective of 280,000, the Chief of Staff directed WPD and G–3 to collaborate in the preparation of a similar National Guard objective.[84] The studies which went into the preparation of this National Guard objective indicate that the General Staff still considered the Guard an integral part of the Army of the United States whenever it would be mobilized. Based on that premise, WPD stated that the ". . . National Guard must include mobile organizations so balanced that their combination with the Regular Army will produce the larger tactical units, i. e., Corps and Armies." [85]

The WPD recommendations for a fixed policy on National Guard organization with a strength of 320,000 were approved in principle

[82] Memos for CofS, 21 and 26 Feb. 40, sub: Basis of Strength for the RA. WPD 3674–26. DRB, TAG.

[83] There were some minor differences, most notably the bringing of Regular Army 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Infantry Divisions to full peace strength; the PMP had provided for each being only at brigade strength. This was really merely a change made necessary by the new triangular organization of divisions which had eliminated brigades.

[84] Memos, CofS for G–3 and WPD, 19 Sep. 39. OCS 16810–71. DRB. TAG.

[85] Memo for CofS, 1 Dec 39, sub : WD Policy on a National Guard objective. WPD 3674–18. DRB, TAG.

by Maj. Gen. Albert H. Blanding, the chief of the National Guard Bureau although he doubted that such units as general service engineer regiments could be raised in the National Guard. General Blanding also cautioned WPD not to count on transferring to other new units men left over from future triangularization of National Guard divisions since "National Guard units have to be dealt with as such." [86]

The Chief of Staff approved the WPD National Guard recommendations only for planning purposes. He agreed with the chief of the National Guard Bureau that some of the new National Guard units proposed by WPD would be hard to organize" . . . because of lack of public appeal, unsuitability for state employment, and also because of high cost of providing storage for certain types of equipment." [87] The Chief of Staff also felt that an increase of the National Guard to 320,000 would probably compel the War Department to revise its viewpoint that the primary mission and status of the National Guard was as state forces since the states very probably would take the stand that 320,000 Guardsmen were not necessary for state purposes. Although the provision for necessary corps, army, and GHQ units in the WPD objective for the Guard was conceded to be desirable, the Chief of Staff cautioned WPD that there could be anticipated great congressional and public clamor for more aircraft and antiaircraft troops and that the diversion of Guard units to satisfy that demand would be less harmful than the diversion of Regular Army units for such purposes. The program for activating new units in an expanded Guard should therefore consider that contingency.[88]

Although the planning approval by the Chief of Staff for WPD's National Guard objectives had been only lukewarm, the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD (Brig. Gen. [later Maj. Gen.] George V. Strong), reiterated the concept of the Guard as an integral component in the mobilized forces of the United States at a meeting of the National Guard division commanders (18 infantry and 4 cavalry) held in Washington 17–19 March 1940. The Guard was particularly counted on by WPD not only to reinforce the Regular Army but to provide balanced mobile forces to form, in conjunction with the Regular Army, the larger tactical units, i. e., corps and armies. General Strong also voiced the PMP's provision that for planning purposes it was assumed that the Guard's infantry divisions would be ready for defensive operations by M+1.[89] The National Guard studies, however, continued in a planning and not "approved objective" state.

---

[86] Memo, Ch. NG Bur, to ACofS, WPD, 14 Dec 39. Copy in *Ibid.*

[87] Memo, CofS for ACofS, WPD, 3 Jan 40, sub: Augmentation of the National Guard to 320,000. *Ibid.*

[88] *Ibid.*

[89] Memo for Gen Strong, 16 Mar 40, sub: Notes on Mission Assigned to the NG under the IPF and the PMP. *Ibid.*

The Regular Army Continues to Expand

The period of relative inactivity in the war in Europe ended abruptly 9 April 1940 when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway. On 10 May Germany attacked the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg. The Netherlands surrendered on 14 May and Belgium on 27 May. German units swept to the English Channel capturing Boulonge 26 May, thereby separating the British and French Armies and forcing the British evacuation through Dunkirk with heavy losses of men and equipment. The German sweep into France continued, and Italy entered the war against France and England on 10 June. A defeated France signed an armistice on 22 June. In the brief period from 9 April to 22 June 1940 all of western Europe except England had fallen under German control and an attack on that country seemed imminent. Most American thinking and planning had been predicated on the invincibility of the French Army and its Maginot Line. The events in Europe had a tremendous effect on the United States military preparedness program. There was a swing in public opinion throughout the country and in the Congress towards greater defense preparations.

The Regular Army in two successive jumps reached its authorized legal limit of 280,000 men. In a message to Congress on 16 May 1940 the President requested an increase in the size of the Army to 242,000 enlisted men. The War Department then requested the supplemental appropriations covering the personnel and materiel for this increase. Anticipating favorable action by Congress, the Secretary of War on 28 May 1940 directed The Adjutant General (the Army's recruiting agent) to increase the enlisted strength of the Army to 242,000 by 30 June 1940.[90] Since this increase had been expected, the General Staff had plans ready to absorb the 15,000 men as follows:

1. One additional triangular infantry division (making a total of six)
2. A second set of essential corps troops
3. Completion of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (mechanized) at peace strength
4. One partial engineer regiment (aviation)
5. One FA regiment plus 2 battalions (75-mm howitzer pack) less combat trains
6. One FA battalion (240-mm howitzer)
7. School troops
8. Miscellaneous ZI units.[91]

[90] Mem, SW for TAG, 28 May 40, sub: Increase in Enlisted Strength to 242,000. Copy in G–1/15588–171. DRB, TAG.

[91] See material filed with G–1/15588–157. DRB, TAG.

Accompanying the 15,000 enlisted increase was the call of 728 more Reserve officers for six months of extended active duty.[92] Following the message of the President to Congress on 16 May 1940 and the War Department's supplemental requests for appropriations to bring the enlisted strength of the Army to 242,000 men, the Congress, without any request by the President or the War Department, appropriated sufficient funds to bring the Regular Army to what was then its full statutory strength of 280,000 by the Supplemental Appropriations Act of June 13, 1940.[93]

On 17 June 1940, after this unexpected increase in supplemental appropriations by the Congress, the Secretary of War directed The Adjutant General to increase the Regular Army enlisted strength to 280,000 by 31 August 1940.[94] Prior to this action, The Judge Advocate General had submitted an opinion that, although the maximum aggregate enlisted strength of the Regular Army (including Philippine Scouts and flying cadets) was 280,000, the statutory limitations on enlisted strength in branches was not mandatory; the President, as Commander in Chief, could exceed those limitations as he deemed necessary, provided that the overall maximum of 280,000 was not exceeded.[95]

The General Staff plans ready for this additional 38,000-man increase provided for completing three more triangular divisions, for filling the 1st Cavalry Division, for some additional army and GHQ reserve troops and GHQ Air Corps services, for reinforcing garrisons in Alaska and Puerto Rico, and for expanding zone of the interior installations. But since the President in his message of 16 May 1940 had advocated an accelerated expansion of the Air Corps by 2,748 flying cadets and some 7,000 enlisted men, the organization of the 9th Infantry Division (triangular) was necessarily deferred to make manpower available for the Air Corps.[96]

The increase in the Army to 280,000 men was not absorbed before plans for even further increases were being made necessary by events in Europe. On 27 May 1940, the day Belgium surrendered, the Chief of Staff directed the Deputy Chief and through him G–3 to ". . . get under way with definite studies or plans for further military development." [97] As a basis for such planning, the following objectives were set forth:

---

[92] Additional Memo, G–1 to CofS, 17 May 40, sub: Additional officers required if RA is increased from enlisted strength of 227,000 to 242,000. *Ibid.*

[93] The vote in the Senate for the supplemental appropriations bill was 74 to 0; while not unanimous, the House vote, too, was decisive.

[94] Memo for TAG, 17 Jun 40, sub: Increase in Enlisted Strength to 280,000. G–1/15588–161. DRB, TAG.

[95] Memo for CofS, 29 May 40, sub: Authorized enlisted strength of RA and of Branches of the Army. *Ibid.*

[96] Memo for ACofS, G–3, 16 May 40. OCS 20822 and WPD 3674–27; memo for CofS, 23 May 40, sub: Utilization of 38,000 enlisted increase in RA. G–3/6541–Gen–634 and WPD 3674–27. DRB, TAG.

[97] Memo for ACofS, G–3, 27 May 40. OCS 20822–27. DRB, TAG.

Existing Forces: Approximately 500,000 to be ready for continuous combat by 1 July 1941.

Protective Mobilization Plan: Approximately double the existing forces to be in a similar state of preparation by January 1942.

First Augmentation Beyond PMP: Either one and a half or two million men to be in a similar condition of preparation by July 1942.

The objectives within the three phases, it was explained, were not definitely fixed and were subject to change if studies indicated such was desirable. Points suggested by the Chief of Staff for inclusion in the studies directed were:

1. Initial distribution of forces, including those in the continental United States, those intended for task forces under color plans, and those for overseas garrisons.

2. Recruiting, to include loss and filler replacements and the effectiveness of volunteer methods; the desirability of calling all or portions of the National Guard into service and, if only units were called, which ones.

3. Such related matters as procurement, shelter, training, equipment, supply, fiscal requirements, etc.[98]

The plans for Regular Army increases then ready provided for increases up to a total strength of 330,000 which was enough manpower to bring all Regular Army PMP units to full peacetime strength. Staff restudy of these plans, even prior to the Chief of Staff's directive of 27 May, brought forth a reminder from WPD that before intelligent plans could be made for increasing the Regular Army it was essential that a policy be determined for expansion of the National Guard.[99] This WPD study pointed out that the Regular Army and National Guard were inextricably woven together in plans for national defense and that the balanced force projected in the plans could be achieved only if both components were considered together. The WPD study recommended that the objectives set up for the National Guard in the WPD memorandum of 1 December 1939 be approved by the Chief of Staff and implemented.

In a follow-up memorandum WPD asserted that since the National Guard as organized did not form a balanced complement to the Regular Army and could not fulfill any defense requirements without extended field training, it was necessary to increase the Regular Army to a 530,000-man strength. WPD stated that commitments under RAINBOW 1 would probably require 177,000 mobile troops for service outside continental United States within 45 days after an emergency arose; RAINBOW 4 requirements would be even greater: some

[98] *Ibid.*

[99] Memo, WPD for CofS, May 40, sub: Increase in Regular Army above 280,000. WPD 3674–28. DBR, TAG.

270,000 men for outside continental United States by the end of 180 days. The 275,000-man mobile striking force which should be available with a Regular Army strength of 530,000 would include:

2 sets of army troops, skeletonized
5 corps headquarters, skeletonized
4 sets of corps troops, essentially complete
3 mechanized divisions
1 horse cavalry division
9 triangular infantry divisions
4 heavy infantry divisions (square)
essential GHQ units (including Air)

The 255,000-man balance would be allocated to zone of the interior installations, harbor defenses, additional aviation, overseas garrisons, etc.

WPD recognized that a Regular Army strength of 530,000 could not be immediately obtained and *might not ever be attainable by voluntary enlistments.* Nevertheless, WPD urged that a Regular Army strength of 530,000 should be the minimum objective for planning purposes and for procurement purposes. WPD reasoned that better planning for expansion of the Regular Army could be accomplished by setting a distant large objective rather than by a series of small installments as had been done in the past.[100]

The WPD proposals were not wholly concurred in by the rest of the General Staff. G–1 and G–2 agreed that volunteering would *not* produce enough men for any Regular Army strength in excess of 375,000. G–1, G–3, and G–4 agreed that Congress would not approve a Regular Army increase to 530,000. G–4 further warned that even if such an increase were authorized, it would be impossible to supply such a force without diverting to it equipment earmarked for the National Guard. Such action, G–4 continued, would tend to destroy the Guard, thereby nullifying the National Defense Act of 1920 and would arouse bitter oppositions in the Guard, in Congress, and throughout the Nation.[101] Although G–3 concurred in the addition of 3 mechanized divisions to the PMP, that Division was opposed to the WPD advocacy of heavy (square) infantry divisions. G–3 stated that the adoption of the triangular organization had settled the infantry division's organization in the best way and that any reversion to the old square organization was not only tactically unsound but would tend to confuse procurement planning and operational logistics.[102] WPD yielded on the

[100] Memo for CofS, 13 Jun 40, sub: Premobilization Objective for the Regular Army. WPD 3674–30. DRB, TAG.

[101] Memo for WPD, Jun 40, sub: Premobilization Objective for the Regular Army. G–4/31763. DRB, TAG.

[102] Memo for WPD, 10 Jun 40, sub: Premobilization Objective for RA. G–3/6541–Gen–646. DRB, TAG.

four heavy divisions and substituted four triangular divisions.[103] The Chief of Staff noted the WPD study with its accompanying nonconcurrences on 24 June 1940, but he took no action on it. Subsequent events left these recommendations, considered so visionary when proposed, far behind in a matter of weeks.

One beneficial result of the WPD study was that G–4, whose concurrence had been requested, thereby learned that the General Staff was actively planning for further Regular Army increases. The Deputy Chief of Staff (Brig. Gen. [later Maj. Gen.] L. D. Gasser) had verbally directed only G–1 (Brig. Gen. [later Maj. Gen.] William E. Shedd), G–3 (Maj. Gen. F. M. Andrews), and WPD (Brig Gen. [later Maj. Gen.] George V. Strong), to participate in the augmentation studies. G–4 recommended that they be included in the General Staff divisions participating in these studies because their advice concerning materiel and service units for an expanding combat army presumably would be indispensable. The recommendation was approved by the Chief of Staff.[104]

The flood of augmentation studies led the Chief of Staff to remind the planners to emphasize *units* to be obtained rather than round numbers of enlisted men—a reminder which moved General Strong, whose WPD division had originally made the recommendation several months previously, to pencil "Cheers!" on the memorandum.[105] The Chief of Staff's planning directive of 27 May 1940 also had included WPD's suggestion that better planning would be accomplished for Army expansion by setting a more distant planning objective. Indeed, this was belated recognition of the soundness of the procurement studies made in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. G–3 now began to prepare more detailed plans for the nebulous augmentations in the Protective Mobilization Plan.

The unusual circumstances of a mobilization occurring without the expected M-day and without the United States being at war could no longer be ignored. G–3, however, still made an effort to keep the planning orderly by fully implementing the Protective Mobilization Plan before becoming involved in implementing the augmentations. On 18 June 1940 G–3 sought staff concurrence for an expansion of the Army to be based on the priorities which had been set up in the Protective Mobilization Plan.[106]

This continuing concern for a relatively gradual expansion of the Regular Army was not merely the result of the planners' desire to see

---

[103] Artillery officers in WPD prior to WW II never completely accepted the triangular division which they felt cut down the number of artillery-infantry battalion teams and materially weakened a division's fighting strength.

[104] Memo for DCofS, 4 Jun 40, sub: Request for G–4 representation on the WD Board for the determination of Troop Bases. OCS 20822–79. DRB, TAG.

[105] Memo for G–1, G–3, G–4, WPD, and B and LP, 10 Jun 40. OCS 20822–80. Copy in WPD 3674–32. DRB, TAG.

[106] Memo for G–1, G–2, G–4, and WPD, 18 Jun 40 sub: Priorities for Expansion of the Army of the United States During Mobilization. G–3/6541–GenZ645. DRB, TAG.

their plans carried out but was consistent with the policy of the Chief of Staff and of the General Staff not to request more personnel for the Army than could be assimilated. A gradually expanding Regular Army would furnish increasing numbers of trained cadres who could be employed to expand the Army further. It was a kind of expansible progression which was envisaged: basically in keeping with Upton's theory that the Regular Army furnish the cadres for vastly expanded wartime armies.

Mobilization Begins: National Guard and Selective Service Proposals

On 31 May 1940 the President requested legislative authority from the Congress to bring the National Guard into Federal service. The President had legal authority to call the Guard into Federal service without any action by the Congress, but under such an Executive call it would have been legally impossible to use the Guard outside the United States. Furthermore, congressional appropriations were required to meet the costs of National Guard mobilization.[107] However, on 1 June 1940 General Marshall carefully explained to Congress that the President's recommendation was not for immediate mobilization of the Guard but was a stand-by measure to be employed when and if necessary at some later time. General Marshall emphasized: "The War Department is opposed to ordering the National Guard out for active duty." [108] Three days later, General Marshall gave substantially the same information to the House Military Affairs Committee, which was then considering the President's request for authority to call out the National Guard (H. J. Res. 555). On this occasion General Marshall emphasized to a greater degree the necessity for congressional authority to call National Guard *units* into Federal service; it was emphasized that only four National Guard divisions would be called and those only if the war situation made it necessary.

That same day, 4 June 1940, the Chief of Staff in a memorandum for the Secretary of War for transmission to the President recommended an increase in the Regular Army to 400,000 enlisted men. To bring the Army up to a strength of 400,000, General Marshall advocated using the "Civilian Volunteer Effort" (CVE), a high pressure civilian recruiting plan which had been drawn up under G–1 supervision. General Marshall also included in this memorandum the arguments of the General Staff for *not* calling the National Guard into Federal service. Mobilization of the Guard prior to the outbreak of

[107] For the President's message see: *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York, 1941), IX, p. 252.

[108] Press statement, CofS, 1 Jun 40, sub: Use of National Guard. CofS Emergency File, Binder 2. DRB, TAG.

war was opposed because it was felt that the Regular Army personnel, the materiel, and the time which would be necessary to train and equip the Guard could be more advantageously employed to train a larger Regular Army for future cadre use.[109]

But even as the Chief of Staff was advising against the immediate mobilization of the National Guard, as some of the General Staff studies recommended, there were other staff studies which indicated the inevitability of an early call of the Guard into Federal service. For if the Regular Army was to be expanded to provide cadres for still greater expansion, it would be impossible for a Regular Army even 400,000 strong to also provide the large task force commitments under RAINBOW 1 and 4. Even if the strength of 530,000 men which WPD had declared was necessary for the Regular Army was authorized, the emphasis was almost entirely on creating an Initial Protective Force without the National Guard; there were *no* provisions included in the WPD recommended 530,000 strength for sufficient cadres to train the men who would come into the service in the event of an all-out mobilization. Even if the Regular Army were granted authority to expand to 1,000,000 men, it would be necessary to divert men from the IPF to furnish cadres for later Regular Army increments. If the Regular Army was to maintain a combat-ready Initial Protective Force which might be dispatched with all its men and equipment anywhere within the Western Hemisphere at a moment's notice, then the only forces and equipment which would be available to train men during the all-out mobilization to follow were in the National Guard. Since it was universally agreed that the Guard was not well-trained and probably would not become well-trained unless in Federal service, the inevitable solution was to mobilize and federalize the entire Guard for a tour of extended active duty.

The Joint Army and Navy Board appreciated the situation clearly when on 7 June 1940 (only three days after the Chief of Staff was advising the President against immediate mobilization of the Guard) it included in its recommendations for RAINBOW 4 the mobilization of the National Guard. On 17 June 1940, only three days after a WPD study had advised against Guard mobilization, Brig. Gen. George V. Strong (WPD) and Maj. Gen. F. M. Andrews (G–3) urged the Chief of Staff at a conference to recommend the mobilization of

[109] Memo, CofS for SW, and memo, SW for President, 4 Jun 40, sub: Expansion of forces. CofS Emergency File, Binder 2. DRB, TAG. As late as 14 Jun 40 WPD opposed mobilizing the Guard unless the international situation developed to a point where the Allied fleets were lost or unless it was decided to implement RAINBOW 4 prior to Allied defeat. See: Memo for CofS, 14 Jun 40, sub: Mobilization of the National Guard. WPD 4310–1. DRB, TAG. RAINBOW 4, it will be recalled, envisaged extensive military operations in the Western Hemisphere.

the entire National Guard, for it now seemed to the General Staff that RAINBOW 4's implementation was ominously imminent.[110]

An even more momentous mobilization measure, however, had been conceived by some energetic private citizens and was disturbing the even tenor of staff planning—a peacetime draft. True, the War Department had had ready for years a well-defined selective service plan prepared by the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee, but this was for implementation *after* we went to war and not before. The General Staff was certainly not opposed to the principle of a peacetime draft; indeed, staff studies had already argued that any expansion of the Regular Army beyond 400,000 would be impossible without a draft of some kind. Nevertheless, there was a determined disinclination in the War Department to indorse such a measure at that time. Among the reasons for that reluctance were the following:

1. Most important of all, the President was opposed to advocating a peacetime draft at that time. The War Department could not back such a precedent-shattering measure which was contrary to the expressed policy of the Chief Executive.
2. The Chief of Staff and several of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff were convinced that such a measure did not have any conceivable chance of passing Congress. This view was also held by the President and his political advisers.
3. A peacetime draft would increase the Army so rapidly that all plans for progressive expansion would necessarily be disrupted.
4. It was felt that advocacy of such a measure by the War Department would be bad public relations for the Army and would endanger the materiel appropriations measures then pending in Congress.

Peacetime Selective Service: A Civilian Proposal

"One of the most surprising aspects of the case is that this measure [the draft], a vital impulse to the upbuilding of American defenses more than a year before Pearl Harbor, was designed and given its initial push, not by Army or Navy or White House, but by a mere handful of farsighted and energetic civilians." [111] The impetus for a peacetime draft had developed out of two dinners held in New York in May 1940 by the "Executive Committee" of the Military Training Camps Association, an organization of participants and sponsors of the Civilian Military Training Camps (which developed from the

[110] Notes of conference in OCS, 17 Jun 40, in Gen Strong's testimony in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 15, pp. 1908–10.

[111] Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 192. The implementation of selective service, however, would not have been possible without the long-range planning done by the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee.

Plattsburg Camps just prior to World War I).[112] The War Department abstained from joining openly in the draft agitation during the first three weeks of June. As late as 25 June, the Acting Secretary of War (Louis B. Johnson) was urging the President to approve the Civilian Volunteer Effort (CVE) plan to spur enlistments.[113]

On 20 June 1940 Sen. Edward R. Burke (Dem., Neb.) and Rep. (former Sen.) James W. Wadsworth (Rep., N. Y.) introduced the bill for peacetime selective service in their respective Houses of Congress. The bill gained impressive support in Congress, from the press, and from the public. The same day the bill was introduced in Congress the President nominated Henry L. Stimson to succeed Harry H. Woodring as Secretary of War. At the same time the President nominated Frank Knox as Secretary of the Navy. Both Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox were leaders in the Republican Party, and both were pronounced internationalists. Mr. Stimson had served as Secretary of War from May 1911 to March 1913, had seen active service as a colonel in World War I, had served as Governor General of the Philippine Islands 1927–29, and had been Secretary of State from March 1929 to March 1933; he was 72 years old when President Roosevelt nominated him for Secretary of War.[114]

Although Mr. Stimson's nomination was not confirmed until 9 July, he made his influence felt in the War Department during the interim. Mr. Stimson personally made it clear to the Chief of Staff and to other members of the General Staff that he was in favor of the draft measure and that he expected the War Department to support it. He succeeded in squashing the CVE and reconciled General Staff ideas on a draft with those of the supporters of the Burke-Wadsworth bill. The Chief of Staff officially abandoned CVE on 22 June (the same day France signed an armistice with Germany); on that day he joined Adm. Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, in a joint recommendation to the President that selective service be enacted and that it be followed by full military and naval mobilization.[115] The Presi-

[112] The second dinner was attended by such influential persons as Grenville Clark, Henry L. Stimson, Robert P. Patterson, William J. Donovan, Julius Ochs Adler, Elihu Root, Jr., Brig Gen John McA. Palmer, USA-Ret., etc. For an account of the efforts of these civilians to obtain a peacetime draft see: Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 189–97; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1947), pp. 345–48. For a very detailed account see: Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., "A History of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 from Inception to Enactment" (Unpublished thesis, Harvard University, Apr 51).

[113] Ltr, Actg SW to the President, 25 Jun 40. CofS Emergency File, Binder 2. DRB, TAG.

[114] Mr. Stimson brought three assistants of subsequent note into the War Department during his first months as Secretary: Robert P. Patterson, Assistant Secretary (title changed to Under Secretary 16 Dec. 40), 31 Jul 40—27 Sep 45; John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary, 22 Apr 41—29 Dec 45; and Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary for Air, 22 Apr 41—8 Dec 45.

[115] Joint memo, CofS and CNO for President, 22 Jun 40. Copy in WPD 4250. DRB, TAG.




Figure 9. World War II draft.

dent by his selection of Mr. Stimson and by other acts changed his position on selective service in peacetime and supported the Burke-Wadsworth bill.

Other factors which had caused the War Department to remain aloof from peacetime selective service in early June were no longer decisive. The War Department, through the Chief of Staff, not only recommended before congressional committees that the draft measure be passed but also recommended as a necessary concomitant the mobilization of the entire National Guard for a full year.[116] The logic and justice of coupling the mobilization of the Guard with selective service were unmistakable. The expansion of the Army faster than the Regular Army could provide cadres or equipment left only the National Guard to provide these essential items. Furthermore, as the Joint Army and Navy Board had recommended and as the General Staff had become aware, the need of trained tactical units to replace Regular Army task forces which might be dispatched on short notice anywhere within the Western Hemisphere made it mandatory to give the Guard the active service and training necessary so it could fill that breech. Also it would have been unfair to draft civilian citizens into service without at the same time calling to active duty the Guard whose members had a quasi-military status.

A joint resolution was passed by Congress 27 August 1940 authorizing the President to call the National Guard and other Reserve com-

[116] See: CofS testimony, 12 Jul 40, in *Hearings* before SMAC, 76th Cong., 3d sess., on S. 4146, pp. 330–31. See also: CofS testimony, 22 Jul 40, in *Hearings* before Committee on Appropriations, H. R., 76th Cong., 3d sess., on H. R. 10263 (Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriations Bill for 1941), pp. 126ff.

ponents to active duty for 12 months; after extensive committee consideration and floor debate the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 was passed on 16 September.[117] Both measures contained the same limitation on employment of the forces: ". . . [they] shall not be employed beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere except in the Territories and possessions of the United States, including the Philippine Islands."

While these legislative steps were being taken during the summer of 1940 a formidable backlog of General Staff work developed which required studies, plans, and implementing details: (1) plans to bring the National Guard into Federal service and to provide it with housing, training, and additional equipment; (2) plans for the reception, housing, equipping, and training of the manpower which selective service would make available; (3) plans for augmenting the Army to 4,000,000 men because of the insistence of the procurement planners on exactly what was wanted and when; (4) plans to determine what the strength of the Regular Army should be in this mobilizing force of Regulars, National Guardsmen, and Selectees; (5) plans to determine a proper organization for the future Army of the United States and what was to be done with the Guardsmen and Selectees after they had completed their year of service; (6) and finally the strategic and tactical plans to employ these mobilized forces if and when the United States went to war. Much of this planning was necessarily concurrent during that hectic summer of 1940.

[117] S. J. Res. 286, 27 Aug. 40, in 54 *Stat.* 858 and S. 4164, 16 Sep. 40, in 54 *Stat.* 885. The final votes on the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 were: in the Senate 47 to 25 with 23 not voting and in the House 232 to 124 with 2 present and 71 not voting.

CHAPTER XVII

MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES AND PROBLEMS

Events of the summer and fall of 1940 combined to produce a major military mobilization effort in the United States. Although that effort did not constitute a total mobilization, it progressed well beyond what could be termed a premobilization program. The Army was in the process of increasing from a total strength of 264,118 on 30 June 1940 to 1,455,565 on 30 June 1941.[1] Staggering appropriations by the Congress provided the financial means for equipping the Army and instituting industrial mobilization. Although the country was still technically at peace, the Army was getting about all that it wanted and needed in the way of personnel and materiel. But even in this era of military abundance the General Staff faced many major mobilization problems ranging from overhead organization to details of the training program.

The Establishment of GHQ

One of the most pressing mobilization problems in the summer of 1940 was the development and supervision of the training program. The mobilization plans had envisaged some three or four months of intensive training for men and units after which they would be loaded aboard ships and sent overseas for operations. But in the 1940 situation, men and units were going to be mobilized in the United States and trained for at least one year without any immediate operations in view. The United States was still technically at peace. The G–3 Division, the General Staff agency within whose purview training came, was fully occupied with planning and policy making. Inspections of training made by G–3 and other General Staff officers during 1940 were limited to brief inspections of some of the major maneuvers. It was evident that the problem of supervising and controlling training was going to be a formidable one with the National Guard and large numbers of selectees about to enter the service.

One possible solution for this problem would have been to expand the G–3 Division sufficiently to enable it to cope with training. But this solution was not feasible for two reasons: (1) there were restrictions on the number of General Staff officers on duty in Washington;[2]

[1] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1941*, p. 104, table A.

[2] Sec. V, National Defense Act of 1920 limited the number to 93. It was not until 2 Jul 40 that this restriction was removed. 54 *Stat.* 713.

(2) theoretically, the General Staff was not supposed to assume operating functions.

In the report of the Harbord Board in 1921 and in all of the subsequent mobilization plans which the General Staff had prepared, provision had been made for a General Headquarters (GHQ) based in concept and in form on the GHQ of General Pershing's World War I AEF.[3] This GHQ was to be an operational headquarters for the command of actual field operations. According to the early plans, whenever mobilization began, key personnel for GHQ would be provided by elements of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff and augmented by officers drawn from the current class at the Army War College. In the later plans, officers from other General Staff divisions were given GHQ mobilization assignments. Mobilization plans were always based on this GHQ concept, which, like all other mobilization plans prior to 1940, envisaged mobilization as a sudden all-out effort.[4]

To solve the training dilemma, therefore, General Headquarters U. S. Army, was activated on 26 July 1940. GHQ was not to assume immediately the mission intended for it in the Protective Mobilization Plan but was to gradually expand its functions as the mobilization progressed. The name GHQ for a training supervisory agency was misleading because usually GHQ referred to the highest field operational command. GHQ, however, was designated as the agency to supervise training with the view that it would ultimately direct those men in tactical operations. The War Department General Staff relinquished supervision of training but at the same time centralized control of training in a subordinate command directly under the Chief of Staff. The directive which created GHQ made it clear that the new headquarters would initially have as its only function the supervision of training for tactical combat units of the four field armies, GHQ aviation (the tactical units of the Air Corps), tactical units of the newly created armored force, harbor defense troops, and miscellaneous GHQ reserves.[5]

In accordance with plans, General Marshall, as Chief of Staff, was also commanding general, Field Forces; GHQ was his headquarters as commanding general, Field Forces. As his chief of staff at GHQ General Marshall designated Brig. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Lesley J.

[3] See: AR 10–15, 25 Nov 21, with changes of 1933 and 1936.

[4] It was early realized by the staff planners that WPD would have to continue as a GS division during a war. By 1938 the nucleus of WPD, which it was planned would be assigned to GHQ in the event of mobilization, had been reduced to a very few officers—some three or four for the G–3 Div of GHQ. By 1938 officers were also assigned to GHQ from other GS divisions. See: TAG ltr, 8 Apr 38, sub: Annual Mobilization Assignments of RA Officers. AG 320.2 (3–26–38) (Exec) YPD. National Archives. See also Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), ch. II.

[5] TAG ltr, 26 Jul 40, sub: GHQ. AG 320.2 (7–25–40) M (Ret) M–OCS. DRB, TAG.

McNair, who for the previous year had been commandant at the Command and General Staff School. GHQ was located at the Army War College in Washington. Although General Marshall never lost interest in training, the pressure of other duties was such that he intrusted to General McNair from the outset full operational direction at GHQ. There were but seven officers initially assigned to assist General McNair, but such was the energy of that small staff that it very quickly began to make its influence felt on training.[6]

The broad training policies which General McNair insisted upon were in accord with traditional Army plans that training be progressive and that the most important foundation for all training was good basic training for individuals. The even tenor of the progressive training program was upset by many factors including changing tables of organization, equipment shortages, lack of trained instructors, demands for specialists, and the deterioration of both the quantity and the quality of manpower for the ground forces. These training problems were all eventually corrected as mobilization and training progressed.

The first major problem which GHQ encountered was the confused command and staff relationship between itself and the armies, corps areas, Air Corps, and the War Department General Staff. General McNair tried to solve this troubled command-staff relationship within four days after he took over as chief of staff at GHQ on 3 August 1940. Since there was no immediate overseas mission for an expeditionary force which GHQ presumably was to create and lead, General McNair recommended the superimposing of a theater of operations on the Zone of the Interior. To implement this proposal General McNair recommended that henceforth corps areas be limited in their functions to purely administrative zone of the interior functions and that the tactical armies, corps, divisions, etc., should function as though they were operating in a foreign theater.[7] These recommendations were partially implemented in October 1940 when the four armies were separated from the corps areas and given staffs of their own. Previously the senior corps area commander in each army area had commanded both his corps and the area army.

But the implementing directive with its subsequent changes did not untangle the command-staff relationship as completely as General

[6] The staff at GHQ expanded very slowly. By Jun 41 it had increased only to 29 officers and 64 enlisted men. After Jun 41 GHQ began to expand as it acquired additional functions in keeping with the concepts of the mobilization plan. By 1 Dec 41 there were 76 officers and 178 enlisted men in GHQ, and on 9 Mar 42 the totals had increased to 137 officers and 327 enlisted men. See: Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1947), p. 24. This volume contains the best available study of the organization, expansion, and reorganization of GHQ.

[7] 1st ind, 7 Aug 40, to memo for CofS, 19 Jul 40, sub: Division Training, and GHQ. G–3/42980. DRB, TAG.

McNair had hoped. GHQ was not given the administrative authority their logistical support during maneuvers. Corps area commanders in the Zone of the Interior; this administrative authority, which General McNair believed GHQ should exercise, was retained by the War Department General Staff. Army commanders were made responsible for the training of all tactical troops within their areas and for their logistical support during maneuvers. Corps area commanders were responsible for the zone of the interior supply system, for the construction, maintenance, and repairs of all fixed installations and harbor defense installations, and for the training of their own service troops.[8] But even within these defined limits of authority, there were conflicts and confusion. Interpretations of the directives were influenced by the personalities of the different commanders concerned. In logistical matters the chain of command led from the army commanders through the corps areas to the War Department G–4. In training matters the army commanders looked directly to GHQ. The solution which General McNair had recommended and which he had failed to obtain would have established, in effect, a theater of operations in the Zone of the Interior under GHQ command.[9] Instead of being the supreme command headquarters of the tactical forces in the Zone of the Interior, GHQ for the first year of its existence served as an appendage to the G–3 Division of the War Department General Staff to supervise training.

The mobilization plan concept of GHQ as an operational headquarters responsible for the employment of task forces began to be implemented in 1941. There were probably two principal reasons for this expansion of the GHQ mission from that of training to include the planning for and conduct of military operations all over the world: (1) the War Department General Staff was becoming so burdened with the tremendous volume of work connected with the mobilization that some delegation of responsibility was mandatory; (2) war appeared to be so imminent that the need for an operating headquarters, analagous to General Pershing's Headquarters in World War I, was considered imperative although the situation was quite different from that in World War I.

Preliminary to the expansion of GHQ's mission, four defense commands for the continental United States were established on 17 March 1941 each under one of the four field army commanders [see *chart 23*]. These were designated Northeast (later Eastern), Central, Southern,

[8] AG ltr to Chiefs of Arms and Services and CG's, all Armies, Corps Areas, and Divisions, 30 Sep 40, sub: Organization, Training, and Administration of the Army. AG 320.2 (9–27–40) M–C. See also: Change, thereto, 19 Oct 40. AG 320.2 (10–14–40) M–C–M. Copies in WPD 3561–38. DRB, TAG.

[9] Greenfield and Others, *op. cit.*, p. 9.




Chart 23. Defense Commands Established 17 March 1941.

Western (including Alaska).[10] The mission of the four defense commands was to prepare plans for the defense of their allocated area and in the event of an attack to implement those plans promptly. The defense commands were very important initially, but they dwindled in importance later as the need for hemispheric defense plans receded. The Caribbean Command, organized in January 1941, continued independent of the four continental commands.

On 25 March 1941 GHQ was given a warning order to increase its staff sufficiently to enable it to assume responsibility for the planning activities of the four continental defense commands, and on 3 July 1941 GHQ was formally given authority to plan and command military operations in addition to its mission of supervising ground forces training. This grant of authority gave GHQ control of the organization and command of task forces thereby freeing WPD to concentrate on the preparation of high level strategic plans; implementing plans and execution were assigned to GHQ.[11] Six officers from WPD headed by Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Harry J. Malony were assigned to assist GHQ in its new responsibilities. General Malony was made GHQ deputy chief of staff. The GHQ staff was expanded and reorganized several times to cope with its two missions: supervising ground forces training, and planning and conducting military operations.[12] [For organization of GHQ after 3 July 1941 *see chart 24.*]

GHQ took over the major defense commands on the following dates:

Command	*Date Assigned to GHQ*
Four Continental U. S. Defense Commands	3 Jul 41
Bermuda Base Command	15 Jul 41
Newfoundland Base Command	19 Jul 41
U. S. Army Units in Greenland (constituted Greenland Base Command under GHQ, on 26 Nov 41).	19 Jul 41
Caribbean Defense Command	1 Dec 41
Western Theater of Operations (formerly Western Defense Command, including Alaska).	14 Dec 41
Eastern Theater of Operations (formerly Eastern Defense Command, but including Newfoundland).	24 Dec 41
U. S. Forces in British Isles	2 Jan 42

Command of the Hawaiian and Philippine Departments never was vested in GHQ nor the Pacific Ocean areas beyond the western North American coastline.


GHQ prepared and implemented (in whole or in part) 16 operational plans for task forces, prepared plans for several expeditionary

[10] Memo for CofS, 13 Mar 41, sub: Defense Plans—Continental U. S. WPD 4247–9; WD ltr, 17 Mar 41, same subject. AG 320.2 (2–28–41) M–WPD–M. DRB, TAG. The Alaska Defense Command created in Feb 41 was placed under the Western Defense Command 17 Mar 41.

[11] WD ltr, 25 Mar 41, sub: Defense Plans—Continental U. S. AG 320.2 (3–24–41) M–WPD–M; WD ltr, 3 Jul 41, sub: Enlargement of the Functions of GHQ. AG 320.2 (R) (6–19–41) MC–E–M. DRB, TAG.

[12] For the conflict between the two "occupational" branches of the GHQ staff see: Greenfield and Others, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–31.

Chart 24. Organization of GHQ after 3 July 1941.*



[a] Except ground services and other forces assigned to Air Forces.

[b] Except active air defense by interceptor command.

[c] GHQ exercises superior command of theaters of operation, task forces, defense commands, base commands, overseas garrisons, and reserves after these are passed to its control by War Department.

**Source:* AR 95–5; FM 101–5; T/O 300–1. Filed in AG 320.2 (6–19–41) MC–E–M. DRB, TAG.

767–876 O–65 (Face page 386)

forces, and coordinated plans for the widely scattered bases and commands within its jurisdiction. To accomplish this tremendous planning job, GHQ set up a kind of assembly line for the production of plans which worked surprisingly well.[13] When the war began on 7 December 1941, GHQ was, to a considerable degree, accomplishing the mission assigned to it in the mobilization plans. GHQ also enabled the Chief of Staff and the General Staff to accomplish their high level staff planning through the appreciable reduction of their work load. In spite of these accomplishments, GHQ never fully achieved or fulfilled the purpose envisaged for it in the mobilization plans.

The vague overlapping of command authority was such that GHQ never had full operational authority. After the Army Air Forces acquired an effective autonomy on 20 June 1941, they, in particular, were outside of GHQ jurisdiction. The difficulties in planning defensive or offensive operations without control of air or logistics were practically insurmountable.[14] Also the War Department General Staff was unwilling to yield all of the supervising control which GHQ felt was necessary. General McNair himself was primarily interested in his training mission. He had not requested, nor is there any evidence to indicate that he wanted, the operational functions given to GHQ on 3 July 1941.[15] Several attempts to increase GHQ authority and responsibilities resulted only in redefinitions without any basic changes. It was apparent prior to 7 December 1941 that a more drastic solution for the War Department's confused top staff and command organization was necessary. Either GHQ would have to be given greater command and logistics authority, or some other means would have to be taken to effectively mobilize the War Department itself.

The Mobilization Progresses

All through the month of July and early August 1940 there was feverish staff work in the G–3 Division of the General Staff on a program for bringing successive increments of the National Guard and Selective Service trainees into the service. It was apparent by the end of July that the lack of housing facilities precluded the simultaneous mobilization of all units of the National Guard. The instructions which the War Department Budget Officer had issued to the estimating agencies on 8 July to estimate additional costs for fiscal year 1941 for a Regular Army and National Guard PMP force of 1,200,000 had to be changed, for that directive had assumed that *all* of

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 20–22.

[14] AR 95–5, "AAF, General Provisions," 20 Jun 41; see also: Greenfield and Others, *op. cit.*, pp. 115ff.

[15] Greenfield and Others, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

the Guard would be mobilized in September 1940.[16] By 30 July 1940, G–3 had prepared a station list for National Guard units on first priority whose induction date was set for 16 September 1940. In this first priority were four infantry divisions (the 44th, 30th, 45th, and 41st), seven coast artillery regiments (AA), three coast artillery regiments (155-mm gun), eight coast artillery regiments (harbor defense), and four Air Corps observation squadrons.[17] Two weeks later, after consultation with representatives of all divisions of the WDGS (except G–2), with representatives of the chiefs of arms and services having direct interest, and with representatives of the committee engaged in the preparation of war plans at the Army War College,[18] G–3 prepared time-priority tables for induction of all National Guard units and Selective Service men.[19]

Ten days after this study was approved by the Chief of Staff, the following three major policy decisions forced revisions:

1. New tables of organization were approved.
2. One strength TO (with a 10 percent basic increase) was approved for all units.
3. National Guard cavalry units, omitted from the G–3 timetable, were given a high priority and were to be reorganized and converted to reconnaissance units.[20]

Since all of these decisions increased the manpower requirements of the troop basis, G–3 recommended changes to make the timetables conform to manpower availability as follows:

1. Organize nine RA triangular divisions under the new TO.
2. Organize all other RA units at war strength less 10 percent basic increase.
3. Organize NG units at war strength less 10 percent basic increase.
4. Organize infantry regiments of NG divisions (72 regiments) the same as infantry regiments in triangular divisions, but with a strength of 2,660 instead of 3,296.

These G–3 recommendations were approved on 28 August 1941. The decision to induct the National Guard at peace strength instead of at actual strength increased the authorized National Guard strength by 104,010. Consequently, due to the limitation of funds appropriated, the number of selective service inductees was reduced by the same number.[21]

---

[16] Memo, BOWD to Estimating Agencies, 8 Jul 40, sub: Force of 1,200,000. BOWD 111/PMP. Copy in WPD 4209–13. DRB, TAG.

[17] TAG ltr to all army and corps area CG's and the chiefs of services, 30 Jul 40, sub: Induction of Certain National Guard Units into Federal Service. AG 325 (7–22–40) M–C–M. DRB, TAG.

[18] The RAINBOW 4 Planning Committee.

[19] Memo for CofS, 14 Aug 40, sub: Determination of Additional Costs for Fiscal Year 1941. G–3/6541–Gen–652. Copy in WPD 4310–10. DRB, TAG.

[20] Memo for CofS, 24 Aug 40, sub: Effect of Recent Decisions on G–3/6541–Gen–652. G–3/43338. Copy in *ibid.*

[21] Ltr to chiefs of estimating agencies, 27 Aug 40, sub: Determination of Additional Costs. BOWD 111/Draftees, 1941. Copy in WPD 4209–15. DRB, TAG.

Actual inductions of both National Guard and Selective Service draftees fell appreciably behind the goals set in the timetables. The struggling construction program was one of the main reasons for this slowdown.[22] It was to be well into the spring of 1941 before the National Guard was fully mustered into Federal service—nearly six months later than G–3 had planned. The induction of Selective Service men also fell materially behind the G–3 timetable and was some 66,000 men short of expectations at the end of fiscal year 1941. [For the actual timetable for all elements of the expanding Army in FY 1941 see *table 58.*]

The Problem of Regular Army Distribution in the Mobilizing Forces

While all of the basic components of the Army were mobilizing, the General Staff continued to have doubts as to whether the short-range need for small combat-ready task forces or the long-range need for large, well-balanced, training armies should take precedence. This led to a series of studies on what the maximum strength of the Regular Army should be. If it were going to be necessary to dispatch task forces all over the Western Hemisphere, then it would be necessary to increase the Regular Army beyond the 375,000 strength authorized by Congress. The National Guard and selectees were scheduled to serve for only one year and were prohibited by law from being sent outside the Western Hemisphere. But if such task forces were not necessary and if National policy envisaged our eventual participation in World War II, a smaller Regular Army and a large number of Selective Service inductees were necessary. The solution to this problem had to be based on estimates of Axis capabilities and intentions as well as on inferences as to where the United States foreign policy was leading.

In June 1940 G–1 had recommended a Regular Army maximum strength of 500,000; the Chief of Staff had favored 400,000; and WPD, accepting the preeminent importance of task forces for the Western Hemisphere, advocated a strength of 750,000. In Congress a proposed House bill which had set Regular Army strength at 375,000 was amended in committee to 400,000; in the Senate an amendment to a similar bill would have increased the Regular Army to 750,000. The chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee (Sen. Morris Sheppard) asked the War Department to clarify its views. Answers prepared by the Office of the Chief of Staff and by G–1 together with WPD (neither of which was used) set the figure respectively at 400,000 and 750,000.[23]

---

[22] The timetable construction estimates proved far too optimistic especially for cantonments. It had been estimated that tent camps for which utilities existed would be completed in 2 months; tent camps which had to have utilities constructed, 3 months; and cantonments which had to have utilities constructed, 3 months. See: G–3 6541–Gen–652. DRB, TAG.

[23] Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 198–99. See also: G–1/15588–173. DRB, TAG.

Table 58. Personnel Enlisted, Called to Active Duty, or Inducted in Fiscal Year 1941, by Month and Component *

Month	Total all components	Regular Army					National Guard			Selectees
		Total	Regular Army	Army of the United States with the Regular Army [a]	Regular Army Reserve on active duty	Philippine Scouts	Total	National Guard in Federal service	Army of the United States with the National Guard [a]	
Total	1, 248, 393	325, 629	302, 357	1, 498	12, 190	9, 584	293, 491	272, 599	20, 892	629, 273
1940:										
July	32, 642	32, 642	31, 995	0	0	647	0	0	0	0
August	39, 165	39, 165	38, 689	0	0	476	0	0	0	0
September	114, 556	43, 060	42, 572	5	0	483	71, 496	57, 770	13, 726	0
October	83, 246	44, 653	43, 412	854	0	387	38, 593	35, 548	3, 045	0
November	71, 738	25, 699	24, 755	639	0	305	32, 233	31, 052	1, 181	13, 806
December	37, 363	18, 601	18, 348	0	0	253	13, 241	12, 852	389	5, 521
1941:										
January	143, 223	24, 772	24, 537	0	0	235	44, 818	44, 280	538	73, 633
February	188, 051	34, 796	17, 645	0	12, 190	4, 961	63, 017	62, 656	361	90, 238
March	194, 092	16, 982	15, 630	0	0	1, 352	23, 673	23, 447	226	153, 437
April	143, 255	13, 073	12, 844	0	0	229	5, 200	4, 528	672	124, 982
May	76, 017	13, 374	13, 247	0	0	127	187	0	187	62, 456
June	125, 045	18, 812	18, 683	0	0	129	1, 033	466	567	105, 200

[a] Consists of one-year enlistments in the Army of the United States.

* *Source: Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1941*, p. 134.

The General Staff consideration of the role of the Regular Army in mobilizing an Army continued over a period of months. As Great Britain's resistance continued and the danger of a quick German victory over her decreased, the immediate need for American task forces diminished. The General Staff was able to plan a long-range program based on fewer Regular Army soldiers and more selective service inductees. G–3 engaged in a series of studies designed to determine what the proportion of three-year Regular Army men and one-year Selective Service men should be in the different arms, services, and units of the Army. The Air Corps, for example, due to the length of its technical training, desired a very high proportion of three-year Regular Army enlisted men. The one-year draftee was not economical for the Air Corps or for any of the other arms which would no sooner get him trained than they would lose him when his one year of service was over.

In order to provide the Air Corps with sufficient three-year men, the Chief of Staff suggested to G–3 (Maj. Gen. F. M. Andrews) in September that either the Regular Army be increased beyond 400,000 or, alternatively, that the three-year men in the ground forces be decreased as the number of one-year trainees increased, with the resultant savings in three-year men being given to the Air Corps.[24] G–3 recommended that the authorized strength of the Regular Army be increased to 500,000 men, the same figure which G–1 had initially advocated in June 1940.[25] In the midst of this discussion it was discovered that the Third Supplemental Appropriations Act, then before Congress, did not put any fixed limit on the size of the Regular Army except indirectly by the amount of money appropriated. The Deputy Chief of Staff (Maj. Gen. William Bryden) therefore recommended that the War Department let the matter ride and base the relative proportion of Regular Army to selective service trainees on available funds and a careful study of needs.[26]

G–3 (Brig. Gen. [later Maj. Gen.] Harry L. Twaddle) prepared a careful study of the proportionate needs for the three-year Regular Army men and one-year selective service trainees. WPD, G–1, and the chiefs of arms and services participated in the preparation of the study. Recommendations submitted to the Chief of Staff in January 1941 set the percentage of three-year Regular Army enlisted men in an Army of 1,183,808 men at 42.3 per cent. This G–3 study was approved by the Chief of Staff 29 January 1941. A day later G–1 accepted the G–3 strength recommendation and suggested that no action be taken to

[24] Memo for G–3, 17 Sep 40, initialed "GCM." OCS 30722–89. Copy in G–1/15588–173. DRB, TAG.

[25] Memo for CofS, 26 Sep 40. G–3/43792. DRB, TAG.

[26] Memo, DCofS to G–1, 26 Sep 40. OCS 20822–89. Copy in G–1/15588–173. DRB, TAG. The Third Supplemental Appropriations Act, passed 8 Oct 40, put no limit on the enlisted strength of the Army. See also: Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

change the authorized strength of the Regular Army.[27] This, however, did not settle the percentage of Regular Army strength in the mobilizing units. The discussion was renewed a few months later when the one year of service of the National Guard and the first selective service men was about to terminate.

The Fight for Draft Extension

The Protective Mobilization Plan, whose whole basic concept had been predicated on the belief that mobilization meant all-out war, was continuously modified by the events of the partial mobilization in the summer of 1940. By the end of 1940 the General Staff was confronted with yet another unforeseen contingency: the possible interruption of mobilization by a demobilization which would occur at a time when the situation seemed to indicate that war was closer and mobilization should be speeded up. The National Guard had been called into Federal service for only one year, and the Selective Service men had been drafter for only one year. The utilization of both the National Guard and selectees had not been on the assumption that they were on loan for only one year. The Army of the United States was built up as the National Guard and selectees were integrated into it. Demobilization of the Guard and the first year selectees would leave the Army emasculated. The General Staff in the fall of 1940 was aware of the serious nature of this approaching problem. If the Congress extended the one-year term of both the Guard and the selectees, the problem would be solved. But if the Congress did *not* extend the one-year term, then the Guard and selectees would go home; and the General Staff would need to have ready complete plans for rebuilding the shattered Army. These alternatives were informally discussed at General Staff conference on 13 December 1940.[28]

Early in January 1941, G–3 had ready four long-range plans for the organization of the Army which were circulated for comment. One of these plans, however, proposed such fundamental changes in the National Guard establishment that the study was hurriedly withdrawn from circulation.[29] G–3 prepared another study which proposed improvements in the reserve program without any radical changes in the National Guard. This plan left the National Guard in its dual status (Federal and state), but proposed to improve its commissioned personnel and to restrict its enlisted personnel to men who had completed a year of Selective Service training. The Guard

[27] Memo for CofS, 3 Jan 41, sub: Strength of RA, FY 1942. G–3/43792; memo. G–1 for DCofS, 30 Jan 41, sub: Proposed Change in Strength of the RA. OCS 20822–94. Both in G–1/15588–173. DRB, TAG.

[28] Notes of Conference in CofS Files, "Notes on Conferences . . ., 26 Sep 40–31 Dec 40," Binder 6. DRB, TAG.

[29] Unused G–3 memo, Jan 41, sub: Long Range Plans for the Organization of the Army. WPD 3674–46. DRB, TAG.

would constitute the first reserve. Other elements of the plan provided—

1. Annual training for inactive National Guard units.

2. An Organized Reserve with ex-trainees as enlisted personnel and with affiliation to RA units for the second reserve.[30] This less explosive plan received prompt staff concurrence and was approved by the Chief of Staff for planning purposes.

As early as February, however, it appeared likely to WPD that the Guard would remain in service beyond its year. The status of the National Guard was becoming a question of rising national interest during the spring of 1941. The Guardsmen themselves and their families were not only interested but considerably concerned. Congress began to ask questions. General Marshall, who was asked the questions, was unable to give definite answers, for this was a matter of high policy and the President had not yet made the decision. During April, May, and June 1941, the issue was at stake—the decision not yet made. War Department spokesmen were in an unenviable position, for the demand for information was becoming more and more insistent, especially from Guardsmen whose morale could not help but be shaken by the uncertainty and rumors concerning their immediate future. The General Staff by February 1941 was ready to make recommendations on Guard retention in service. It was June, however, before the President formally asked for those recommendations. On 20 June the Chief of Staff recommended to the Secretary of War that the National Guard and the Reserve officers be retained in service beyond their one year. On 24 June the Secretary of War endorsed there recommendations and forwarded them to the President.[31]

During July the proposal was discussed in the committee rooms and on the floors of Congress. To the extension of time in service and for the National Guard and Reserve officers was added the same extension for selective service men. General Marshall's cogent arguments and pleas before several congressional committees carried considerable weight, for he told simply and well what would happen to the United States Army if the National Guard, selective service trainees, and Reserve officers all went home after one year of service.[32] The Senate approved the extension of service on 7 August 1941, and in the House the bill passed by a vote of 203 to 202 on 12 August 1941.[33]

While the service extension remtained in doubt, G–3 continued to work on a long-range plan for the organization of the Army. By 17 July 41 the plan was in approved outline form. The plan provided—

---

[30] Memo for WPD, 10 Feb. 41, sub; Plan for Organization of the Army of the United States. G–3/6457–345 and WPD 3674–50. DRB, TAG.

[31] Memo, CofS for SW, 20 Jun 41, no sub. OCS 16701. DRB, TAG.

[32] Statement by Gen G. C. Marshall on retention of selectee and reserve components in active service in *Hearings* before SMAC, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 9 Jul 41; *Hearings* before SMAC, 77th Cong., 1st sess., on S. J. R. 92, 17 Jul 41; *Hearings* before HMAC, 77th Cong., 1st sess., on H. J. R., 203, 1941.

[33] For a condensed account of the extension of service see: Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 214–31.

1. *A First Reserve*, composed of the National Guard whose status would be altered as follows:
   a. Enlistment in the Guard would be restricted to men who had completed one year of active training.
   b. Sources for National Guard officers would be restricted to meet higher Federal standards.
   c. Inactive National Guard as constituted would be eliminated; substituted for it would be a Federally controlled inactive National Guard which would have assigned to it officers and enlisted Reservists with one year's active service and which would have a training program.
2. *A Second Reserve*, consisting of Organized Reserve units.
   a. Officers and trainees with at least one year's training would be assigned to these units.
   b. Organized Reserve units would be affiliated with Regular Army units to establish closer bonds between the two and to facilitate training of Organized Reserve units.
   c. Within availability of funds, Organized Reserve units would have annual field training.
3. *A Third Reserve*, comprising a pool of less active older commissioned and enlisted reserve personnel.[34]

This plan contemplated necessary changes in the National Defense Act of 1920 and was still being considered when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

The margin of congressional approval in the fight for the extension of the service of the National Guard and selectees had been narrow. Because of this the General Staff began forming units composed entirely of three-year men for task force service. Another factor was that there was no geographical limitation on the employment of the Regular Army while the National Guard and selectees could not be sent outside the Western Hemisphere.[35] Once the precaution was taken to provide immediately available Regular Army task forces, the G–3 Division resumed its planning for the approved eventual augmentation of the Army, first to 2,800,000 men, then to 4,100,000.

The G–3 Division was working plans for the first increment in this continuing expansion when an attack from an unexpected quarter was made on the military program. The President, instead of approving the planned increases, was determined to reduce the size of the Army. The President's attitude was seemingly inconsistent because at the same time he was considering the reduction in size he was also considering plans for the occupation of additional Atlantic bases by American ground forces. It is difficult to understand the President's

[34] Memo for WPD, 17 Jul 41, sub: Plan (in outline) for Organization of the Army of the United States. G–3/6457–345. Copy in WPD 3674–50. DRB, TAG.
[35] See: WPD 3674–64. DRB, TAG.

reasoning, but possibly he felt that it was more important at the time to give materiel coming off production lines to British and Russian forces already fighting than to American forces in training. Although he was given complete support by the Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretaries and although he had the most effective arguments all of the General Staff divisions could prepare, the Chief of Staff at a White House Conference on 22 September 1941 was unsuccessful in his attempt to dissuade the President from reducing the Army.[36]

At the same time WPD prepared a study to implement the proposed reduction in strength which also was ready on 22 September. This study recommended specific reduction priorities beginning with a progressive demobilization of National Guard. [See *table 59.*] WPD

*Table 59. Recommended Priorities for Reduction of the Army, 22 September 1941**

Priority	Recommended Reduction	Approximate Reduction in the Army		
		Total	NG Enlisted	Selectee
	Total	584, 000	250, 000	334, 000
1	Convert all NG divisions from square to triangular, inactivating the surplus units	90, 000	50, 000	40, 000
2	Inactivate all NG divisions and brigades (at triangular strength)	244, 000	130, 000	114, 000
3	Inactivate all other NG units (Harbor Defense and Antiaircraft principally)	126, 000	70, 000	56, 000
4	Inactivate all RA labor units	10, 000	.....	10, 000
5	Inactivate 2d Cavalry Division or convert to more useful form	8, 000	.....	8, 000
6	Inactivate six GHQ infantry regiments	16, 000	.....	16, 000
7	Inactivate other service units	10, 000	.....	10, 000
8	Reduce WD overhead, corps area service commands, and replacement training center capacity	80, 000	.....	80, 000

**Source:* Memo for COFS, 22 Sep 41, sub: Priorities for Reduction of the Strength of the Army. WPD 3674-65. ORB, TAG.

estimated that it would take six months to accomplish the full reduction of 584,000 men that the reduction would leave the Army comparatively ineffective.[37]

Plans for the reduction, based on deactivating National Guard divisions progressively, were worked out in detail at conference of G–1, G–3, WPD, and GHQ representatives during October and November 1941. By 5 November 1941 the conferees had agreed on a deactiva-

[36] Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 362–65.

[37] Memo for CofS, 22 Sep 41, sub: Priorities for Reduction of the Strength of the Army. WPD 3674-65. DRB, TAG.

tion schedule for the 18 National Guard divisions to begin in February 1942. They also proposed an Army paper expansion to 126 divisions within three years by the formation of Reserve divisions stocked with National Guardsmen and men who had completed selective service training, as follows: [38]

Division component:	*Number*
Total	126
Regular Army	9
Training	18
Active Organized Reserve	18
National Guard inactive	18
Organized Reserve inactive	63

On 7 December 1941 both of these plans were dropped.

7 December 1941

The attack on Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941 marked the end of mobilization prior to war and the beginning of mobilization during war. A survey of the results of the 15 months of peacetime mobilization is a tribute to the Protective Mobilization Plan. The induction, reception, and activation procedures established in that plan were followed for the most part and were eminently successful. The replacement training procedures prescribed in the PMP, modified only to meet current situations, were of considerable assistance. The corps area protective mobilization plans, required by the War Department PMP and prepared in conformance with it, were largely followed insofar as mobilization procedures and machinery were concerned. The familiarity with that machinery and with those procedures, which the corps area staffs developed by their study of the PMP and by their preparation of plans based on it, was of value. Admittedly, the PMP was very rarely followed with absolute exactness, but the plan foresaw that this might happen and, therefore, placed heavy emphasis on flexibility in its implementation. The PMP served as the basis for procurement implementation which began in 1940. Here again, it must be admitted that the basis was not satisfactory in the long run, but it furnished the point of departure on which further estimates were based. The activation procedures for new units, set up in the PMP and amplified by GHQ, were working well.[39] The program for affiliated hospitals was ready for implementation. In summation, the mobilization machinery and procedures of the PMP were sound and were of overwhelming practical, functional value during the mobilization period which preceded 7 December 1941.

[38] Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 365–66; WPD 3674–69. DRB, TAG.

[39] For a description of these procedures see: Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington 1948), pp. 429–94.

By the day war came to America, the following major units had been mobilized in the United States:

Major Unit	*Number*	*Remarks*
Divisions	36	
Infantry	29	10 Regular Army, 18 National Guard, 1 Army of the United States.
Armored	5	4 Regular Army, 1 Army of the United States.
Cavalry	2	Regular Army
Air Groups	64	

The strength of the Army 31 December 1941 was 1,686,403. [See *table 60* for a breakdown of this strength by branches.] On 5 December 1941, 29 reception centers and 21 replacement training centers were in operation. The reception centers were in operation in time for the beginning of Selective Service, and the replacement centers began functioning in March 1941. [See *tables 61* and *62* for the location of these centers with their capacities as of 30 June 1941.]

Table 60. Strength of the Army by Duty Branch: 31 December 1941 *

Branch	Strength	Percent
Total	1,686,403	100.0
Ground Arms [a]	885,624	52.5
Infantry	438,881	26.0
Cavalry	59,804	3.6
Field Artillery	202,951	12.0
Coast Artillery	183,988	10.9
Service Branches	443,213	26.3
Adjutant General	996	0.1
Engineers	93,109	5.5
Signal	51,463	3.0
Medical (including Army Nurse Corps)	131,060	7.8
Ordnance	35,518	2.1
Quartermaster	124,483	7.4
Chemical	6,584	0.4
Air Corps	275,889	16.4
All Others [b]	81,677	4.8

[a] Includes Armored Force.

[b] Consists of following branches: General Officers, General Staff Corps, Inspector General's Department, Military Intelligence, Corps of Chaplains, Finance Department, Judge Advocate General's Department, Detached List, No Branch Assigned, Warrant Officers, and USMA Professors.

* *Source.* "The United States Army in World War II: Statistics—Military Personnel." MS in OC H, Gen Ref Off.

Table 61. Reception Centers, 30 June 1941 *

Location	Capacity	Location	Capacity
Fort Devens, Mass	2, 000	Camp Grant, Ill	2, 500
Fort Niagara, N. Y	1, 000	Fort Sheridan, Ill	1, 000
Camp Upton, N. Y	2, 000	Fort Snelling, Minn	1, 000
Fort Dix, N. J	2, 000	Fort Des Moines, Iowa	700
New Cumberland Depot, Pa	1, 000	Fort Leavenworth, Kans	1, 000
Fort Meade, Md	1, 500	Jefferson Barracks, Mo	1, 000
Camp Lee, Va	1, 000	Camp Robinson, Ark	500
Fort Bragg, N. C	1, 000	Fort Sill, Okla	1, 000
Fort McPherson, Ga	1, 000	Fort Sam Houston, Tex	1, 000
Camp Blanding, Fla	500	Fort Bliss, Tex	1, 000
Camp Shelby, Miss	1, 000	Fort Douglas, Utah	500
Fort Custer, Mich	1, 000	Fort Lewis, Wash	1, 000
Fort Hayes, Ohio	1, 000	Presidio of Monterey, Calif	1, 000
Fort Thomas, Ohio	1, 500	Fort MacArthur, Calif	1, 000
Fort Harrison, Ind	1, 000		

*Source: *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1941*, chart 6, facing p. 78.

Table 62. Replacement Training Centers, 30 June 1941 *

Location	Branch	Capacity	
		White	Negro
Ground Combat:			
Camp Croft, S. C	Infantry	15, 000	1, 500
Camp Wheeler, Ga	Infantry	15, 000	1, 500
Camp Wolters, Tex	Infantry	15, 000	2, 000
Camp Roberts, Calif	Infantry	15, 000	------
Camp Roberts, Calif	Field Arty	6, 000	------
Fort Sill, Okla	Field Arty	7, 000	1, 000
Fort Bragg, N. C	Field Arty	15, 000	1, 500
Fort Knox, Ky	Armor	8, 485	515
Camp Callan, Calif	Coast Arty	7, 500	------
Camp Wallace, Tex	Coast Arty	7, 000	600
Fort Eustis, Va	Coast Arty	14, 000	800
Fort Riley, Kans	Cavalry	6, 500	500
Ground Service:			
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md	Ordnance	4, 800	1, 000
Edgewood Arsenal, Md	Chemical	800	200
Camp Grant, Ill	Medical	7, 000	------
Camp Lee, Va	Medical	7, 000	500
Camp Lee, Va	QM	9, 500	2, 500
Fort Warren, Wyo	QM	5, 500	1, 500
Fort Leonard Wood, Mo	Engineer	7, 500	3, 000
Fort Belvoir, Va	Engineer	7, 500	3, 000
Fort Monmouth, N. J	Signal Corps	7, 000	------

*Source: *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1941*, chart 7, facing p. 78.

War Department Reorganization, 9 March 1942

One of the first problems on which action was taken after Pearl Harbor was the confused staff-command relationships between the General Staff, the Air Forces, and GHQ. A formal study of the staff-command relationship was made by a special committee appointed in August 1941.[40] A plan for a complete War Department reorganization along the lines eventually followed was proposed by the War Plans Division representative, Lt. Col. (later Lt. Gen.) William K. Harrison. WPD itself was not willing to support such a drastic proposal at that time. This idea of complete reorganization was taken over and sponsored by the Air Forces in its campaign to increase its own autonomy. On 25 November 1941 the Chief of Staff approved the principle of a major staff reorganization and asked WPD to study the Air Forces proposals. Colonel Harrison, whose own earlier study was very similar to the Air Forces proposals, was designated as the WPD officer to take charge of the reorganization study. He was assisted by Lt. Col. (later Lt. Gen.) Laurence S. Kuter, WDGS (Air Corps), Office of the Chief of Staff. Maj. Gen. (later Gen.) Joseph T. McNarney was assigned to work out final details of the reorganization in January 1942 with Colonels Harrison and Kuter. The final version of the reorganization plan was submitted to the Chief of Staff 31 January 1942. The principal features of the plan were as follows:

1. The War Department General Staff would exercise strategic direction over and control operations of the field armies and would determine all overall basic military requirements and policies.

   a. The General Staff would resume direction of all defense commands and theaters of operations. The planning and supervision of the execution of operations exercised by GHQ would be turned over to WPD of the General Staff (renamed Operations Division [OPD] 23 March 1941). GHQ as such would cease to exist.

2. Three zone of the interior commands were to be created to which the General Staff would delegate operating duties connected with zone of the interior administration, supply, organization, and training.

   a. *Army Ground Forces* (AGF), which would be responsible for all training in the United States and would have assigned to it:

---

[40] Gen McNair had proposed in Jul 41 that the authority of GHQ be increased; he also stated: "Unless GHQ can be freed from the complications of War Department organization, there is little advantage and some disadvantage in having a GHQ." Memo, GHQ to CofS, 25 Jul 41, sub: Defense Commands. WPD 4558, Tab. 1. See also, GHQ for WPD, 2 Sep 41, sub: Functions, Responsibility, and Authority of GHQ. WPD 4558, Tab. 10. DRB, TAG.

(1) The combat arms (less Engineers and Signal Corps).

(2) The new quasi-arms.

(3) The functions of the offices of the chiefs of arms which were abolished.

b. *Services of Supply* (SOS), which would take over all supply and logistical functions in the Zone of the Interior and would absorb all of the technical and administrative services plus the Engineer and Signal Corps. The chiefs of these services and arms would remain existent but under the command of the commanding general, SOS.[41]

c. *Army Air Forces* (AAF), which would take over all planning, logistical, tactical, administrative, and strategic air functions.[42] The recommended reorganization plan was approved by General Marshall, Secretary of War Stimson, and President Roosevelt in February 1942. The reorganization was directed by Executive Order 9082, 28 February 1942, to go into effect 9 March.[43] [For organizational details see *charts 25*, *26*, *27*, and *28*.]

The reorganization of the War Department in March 1942 followed the usual practice in the United States of changing staff organization at the beginning of a war. Because of the problems in staff organization in World War I, mobilization planning during the period 1920–41 had devoted considerable study to the constitution of a General Staff which would be geared for war. This planning had been intensive, for it was realized that a staff breakdown in wartime which required drastic changes might be harmful to the prosecution of a war. The 1941 General Staff was based on a study of past experiences, but there were several weaknesses in the functioning and organization of that Staff. These weaknesses included such factors as the lack of clear-cut responsibility down through the major command channels of the Army as evidenced by the General Staff-Air Forces-GHQ confused staff-command relationships. The General Staff had not acquired sufficient appreciation of the practical necessity for delegating or decentralizing the implementation of detailed planning and operations to lower headquarters. There was also a lack of coordination of staff planning within the General Staff and the War Department. The failure to coordinate the replacement planning of G–1 and G–3 is an example of


---

[41] The SOS was renamed the Army Service Forces (ASF) 12 Mar 43.

[42] Memo, McNarney to CofS, 31 Jan 41, sub: Reorganization of WD. WDSCA 020 (1942). OCS Records. DRB, TAG.


[43] WD Bul 11, 3 Mar 42, contains a copy of EO 9082: WD Cir. 59, 2 Mar 42, directed the necessary changes and contained the new organization charts. For more detailed accounts of the planning and incidents leading up to the 9 Mar 42 reorganization see: Greenfield and Others, *op. cit.*, pp. 148–55; Cline, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–74, 90–95; and Frederick S. Haydon, "War Department Reorganization, August 1941—March 1942," *Military Affairs*, XVI (1952), pp. 12–29 and 97–114.

*Chart 25. Organization of the Army, 9 March 1942**



*Source: WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42.


*Chart 26. Organization of The Army Ground Forces, 9 March 1942.**



o1. Military characteristics.
2. Equipment development.
3. Tables of Basic Allowances.
4. Operational changes.
5. Preparation of training publications and T of O.

*Source: WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42.


Chart 27. Organization of the Army Air Forces, 9 March 1942.



*Source: WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42.

767-876 O-65 (Face page 602)

*Chart 28. Organization of The Services of Supply, 9 March 1942.**



a Acts as Comptroller for the War Department.
b Requirements, programs, including consolidation of Air Force requirements with other requirements.
c Includes Air requirements.
d Each operating division is responsible for the training of personnel pertaining to its functions.
e Reports direct to Secretary of War for civil functions.
f Design, development, purchase, production, storage, issue, maintenance.

g Includes Ports of Embarkation and regulating and reconsignment stations; liaison with Air Force for assignment of space.
h Includes present supply functions of CAC.
i Field agents of the Operating Divisions on designated functions.
j Personnel, classification, assignment, allotments; National Guard Bureau; Reserve and ROTC affairs.
k Deals directly with Secretary of War regarding courts-martial and certain legal matters.

*Source: WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42.

the lack of staff coordination; the failure of the General Staff and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War to coordinate manpower and industrial procurement plans is another.

The War Department and the General Staff on 7 December 1941 were not organized for waging a global war. But there is reasonable doubt whether it was necessary to virtually destroy the G–1, G–3, and G–4 Divisions of the Staff which occurred after the reorganization of 9 March 1942. The three great decentralized commands, AGF, AAF, and SOS (later ASF), would probably have functioned as well if not better had they continued under the overall supervision of a streamlined General Staff. "Never in the experience of the [War] Department had there been effected such a co-ordinate concentration of control and direction." [44]

The effects of the reorganization of 1942 were for some time harmful to the operation of the replacement system, to the training program, and to some phases of the world-wide logistic program. The principal value of the General Staff as a supervisory agency for the entire Army was destroyed. Radical changes in staff organization hamper planning and operations during the transition period. When that transition period occurs at the beginning of a war, mobilization is inevitably retarded.

Mobilization Training Problems

Problems developed in the summer of 1940 because of the failure to make timely provision for the establishment of reception centers, and confusion resulted when the reception centers had to be set up almost simultaneously with their first operations.[45] Ths was followed by the failure to have replacement training centers ready for the first increments of selective service men which made it necessary to assign these men to Regular Army units and to mustered-in National Guard units for basic training. In Regular Army units this made necessary advanced training for some men simultaneous with recruit training for others. In National Guard units the state of training was such that men who were themselves incompletely trained were called on to give basic training to raw selectees. Mobilization plans and regulations had made no provisions for assembling the cadres—officer and noncommissioned—of the National Guard units enough in advance to train them to receive and in turn train their

[44] Hayden, *Military Affairs*, XVI (1952), p. 114.

[45] MR's 3–1, 1–5, 1–7, and corps area mobilization plans contained instructions on the organization of reception centers which were reasonably adequate; the difficulties were caused by delaying their establishment too long.



Figure 10. Training obstacles, World War II.

units when mobilized. This deficiency was eventually corrected by GHP.[46]

The shortage of skilled officers and noncommissioned officers which the General Staff had foreseen was now a fact. The National Guard had on its rosters many officers and noncommissioned officers who because of a lack of adequate training were not adept either in military skills or leadership. Some were over-age in grade or physically unfit; others were basically inept and had to be removed; but most of them eventually improved with training. The period, however, when they were receiving their own training was concurrent with the training which they were imparting to their recruits. The immediate need for large numbers of additional officers was filled by extending the active duty tours of capable Reserve officers already in the service and by calling still more Reserve officers to active duty. On 30 June 1940, 2,710 Reserve officers were on active duty; on 30 June 1941, the number had increased to 57,039 or more than 50 per cent of the number eligible for such duty.[47]

---

[46] Memo, CofS for Gen McNair, 15 Oct 40. OCS 16810–175. The first high level staff conference on RTC's to which reference could be found was held 12 Sep 40. See: Memo, G–3, for G–1, G–4, WPD, and Chiefs of Arms and Services, 10 Sep 40, sub: Enlisted Replacement Establishments. G–3/42659. Copy in WPD 3674–44. DRB, TAG. At this conference the GS appears to have considered high policy rather than implementing techniques. GHQ was established 26 Jul 40.

[47] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1941*, p. 109.

An acute shortage of equipment with which to conduct training was initially due to the inevitable time lag between the placing of orders and the delivery of the equipment. Later this shortage was intensified by the demands of lend-lease.[48] Even high priority infantry divisions during 1940 were short of such new equipment as 60-mm and 81-mm mortars, mortar ammunition, signal equipment, antitank guns, etc. Less favored divisions were not merely short of modern equipment: they were completely without it. The shortage of new equipment in the 3d Infantry Division and the even greater shortage of equipment in the 41st Infantry Division (National Guard), when it was concentrated at the Camp Murray area of Fort Lewis, Wash., had a bad effect on training.[49]

Training Weaknesses

The 1940 maneuvers began with the 3d Infantry Division's amphibious operations (January-May 1940) in the neighborhood of Camp Ord (later Fort Ord), Calif. Before the year was over, practically all tactical troops in the United States participated in maneuvers which demonstrated that much of the Regular Army training prior to 1940 had emphasized leadership, administration, and technical skills, but had neglected tactical proficiency. These weaknesses in minor tactics were widely publicized in critiques, inspection reports, and in newspaper accounts.[50]

The maneuvers turned a bright spotlight on the then current training weaknesses in the Army: lack of equipment, poor minor tactics, lack of basic leadership in many units, and some inept command leadership by officers of high rank. These training weaknesses were corrected not by the maneuvers themselves but by tedious, basic small-unit training. The maneuvers were excellent for staff training, but this could have been accomplished as well by Command Post Exercises (CPX). Basic training for recruits did not require large maneuvers, nor did it require the tremendous areas of the maneuver grounds. The weaknesses in leadership were to be corrected also by arduous training and by the more drastic solution of eliminating the unfit.[51]

---

[48] See ch. XIX, this study.

[49] Based on personal experience of the author (Lt Col M. A. Kreidberg), who was in the 3d Inf Div during the period 1938–43 and personally experienced and observed these shortages during training and on maneuvers.

[50] For G1 inspection rpts see: G–1/15588–39 to 164; for summary of G–2 inspection reports see: Notes of Conf in Office of DCofS, 27 Aug 40. Miscellaneous Conferences (20 May–25 Sep 40), Binder 3. DRB, TAG; and for newspaper criticism and summary of critiques see: The *New York Times*, 23 Aug 40.

[51] Elimination of inept junior Reserve and NG officers was a relatively simple administrative matter, but the elimination of higher ranking Reserve and NG officers was more difficult because many of them had considerable political influence. Elimination of inept RA officers was a cumbersome, difficult process which was finally simplified by PL 190, 29 Jul 41. For the efforts of the CofS to get this legislation enacted and more detailed discussion of the entire leadership problem see: Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 241.

The Pedagogical Training Tools

The training literature and methods of instruction employed in the United States Army, beginning with the initial mobilization in 1940, were of inestimable value in the eventually successful training program. Not only was the subject matter contained in the training literature valuable, but the wide distribution of this written material made it readily available to the new officer and noncommissioned officer and even to the recruit. The lack of any adequate training literature had had an unfortunate effect on training in World War I, and following that war the General Staff and the Army War College conducted intensive studies on the preparation and use of training literature. By 1930 four types of War Department training publications were being prepared and issued: (1) training regulations—pamphlets prepared under the direction of the chiefs of branches and issued in a loose-leaf form similar to Army Regulations; (2) technical regulations—pamphlets dealing with complicated technical military subjects and equipment; (3) training manuals—pamphlets containing instructional material on military and nonmilitary subjects similar to the training regulations; and (4) field manuals—pamphlets and books prepared under the supervision of the chiefs of branches usually at service schools or by special boards. The field manuals were originally designed for use in the field, but because they were the best military instructional publications available, their use was greatly expanded.[52]

During the 1930's there were frequent revisions of existing training publications and a tremendous increase in the number of new ones covering new weapons, new organizations, and their adaptation to tactical concepts. After considerable discussion and debate the decision was made in 1938 to simplify the existing training literature. This was to be accomplished by eliminating the training regulations and replacing them with revised and expanded field manuals.[53] Due to the far reaching organizational changes of 1939–40 and to the new weapons and material being procured under the rearmament program, it was necessary to revise nearly all of the field manuals. The directive giving instructions on field manual revisions stated that lecture-style writing, duplication, and minutiae should be eliminated by careful editing; that simplicity of method in tactics and techniques be maintained; that training literature be made extensive enough to cover the wide variety of military skills made necessary by modern war; and that "In writing the texts, sight must not be lost of mobiliza-

[52] For background on training literature and its development see material in G–3/17627. DRB, TAG; and AG 062.12. National Archives.

[53] Memo, G–3 to TAG, 6 Jun 38, sub: Training in literature. AG 062.12 (6–6–38) (1). National Archives. Decision was announced in TR 1–10, 3 Jan 39.

tion requirements." [54] Revision of old manuals and the writing of new ones was well on its way to completion by the end of 1940. The faculties of the service schools and of the Command and General Staff School did most of the wiriting.[55] The G–2 Division of the General Staff did a great deal of work on the preparation of intelligence manuals, which had been previously underemphasized, in the period 1937–40.[56] In order to keep the training manuals current, their revision continued all through World War II.

The policy of decentralizing the preparation of manuals to service schools and special boards was not changed during the war although it incurred some Staff dissatisfaction because of the slowness of the work and the difficulty of coordinating the work of the different service schools to avoid duplication. To correct these weaknesses in the decentralized program AGF G–3 recommended that a centralized training literature division be established in the Replacement and School Command under a general officer.[57] In disapproving this recommendation General McNair stated:

> I have seen both sides of this picture—literature written in Washington and literature written at schools. I have no hesitation in stating that literature written in schools is superior for instructing the uninstructed, for the very simple reason that it is written by people who are experienced in teaching, who have met instructional hurdles and know what is necessary to overcome them. . . . We have a system of literature which is more complete and far superior to anything which we have had at any previous time.[58]

Instead of a centralized training literature division, General McNair decided that there should be increased standardization of format and editing by AGF. The basic policy of decentralized production of manuals was not changed by Army Ground Forces. The Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces used a similar decentralized system in the preparation of their manuals.

Supplementing the written manuals were a tremendous variety of visual aids. Since World War I the Army at its branch schools and in its troop training had developed to an ever increasing extent the use of charts, films, slides, film-strips, sand tables, mock-ups, models, pictures, battle courses, and other devices designed to assist the spoken word by direct appeal to the eye. The old adage that "one picture is worth a thousand words" had become firmly entrenched as an Army maxim. As funds became available in increasing amounts after 1940, the "training aids" program was tremendously expanded. Charts,

---

[54] Ltr, TAG to all chiefs of arms and services, 1 May 39, sub: Training Literature. AG 062.12 (4–25–39) Pub. C. National Archives. See also: WD Cir 75, 27 Sep 39.

[55] The Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth had discontinued its regular course in Feb 40; the faculty there prepared some 250 training manuals during the interim period before the initiation of the abbreviated wartime courses.

[56] Lt Col (later Brig Gen) P. M. Robinett was primarily responsible for initiating, obtaining approval of, and pushing to completion the G–2 field manual project.

[57] Informal memo, AGF to CofS 22 Oct 43. AGF 461 FM's. Binder 2. DRB, TAG.

[58] *Ibid.*, 3d Comment, 1 Nov 43.

maps, film strips, models, etc., were produced in large quantities and widely distributed for use in training. The respective arms and services drew up the specifications for what they wanted and the War Department and AGF exercised only remote supervisory control. The vast resources, technical skill, and dramatic artistry of the motion picture industry were enlisted to produce effective training films covering an extraordinary range of subjects.[59] In addition to the production of all varieties of visual aids by the major commands of the Army, subordinate commands supplemented the program by constructing still additional visual aids in their training aids shops, which, when the situation permitted, went down at least to the regimental level and frequently to the battalion level.

Included in the subsidiary plans of the Protective Mobilization Plan had been the Mobilization Training Program (MTP's) which were schedules of time allotments for training subjects in a desired sequence. In peacetime, training schedules had not conformed to a very rigid pattern. Each company, troop, battery, squadron, or similar small unit generally prepared a master schedule for an entire year which included certain mandatory training subjects. The sequence of subjects and the hours allotted to them were matters for the unit commander to decide in keeping with his own desires and the exigencies of training facilities and climate. The MTP's, which were prescribed late in 1940, however, were rigid in their schedules, allowing only such changes as were made necessary by local conditions. There was a somewhat different MTP for each basic arm and service. The experiences of the war were reflected in successive revisions of the MTP's: not only in prescribed subjects but in hours allotted to each and in the overall time length for the various phases of the program. The time allotted for basic training of replacements, for example, was to vary from 13 weeks to 17, to 8, to 14, back to 13, and again to 17; in each instance the change was made to meet some new situation, usually a heavy demand for replacements in a theater of operations. The MTP's standardized training in a desirable format and were of inestimable assistance to inexperienced officers. The skilled, competent officer, however, was sometimes hampered by the inflexibility of the MTP's although AGF considered the MTP's primarily as training aids and not as inflexible training directives. Directives of this type should always be flexible enough to permit the able officers to exercise their ingenuity and professional skill.

Also developed during this period were the Subject Schedules, each of which was, in effect, a syllabus of instructions for a subject in an MTP. The Subject Schedule contained information on what training aids and training equipment were required and desirable for that subject and also contained an outline of how the subject should be

[59] For a catalog of training films and dates of their production see: SR 110–1–1, Oct 51.

taught. Prepared by the branch schools, they were of great assistance to the inexperienced instructor.

These were the major pedagogical tools utilized for training the mobilized forces. But there were subsidiary tools, too. There were the War Department training circulars which were generally used to direct some change in a field manual or other training manual that had to be effected before the manual could be revised. There were the training letters and directives published by Army Ground Forces, the Replacement and School Command, the Armored Command, and all other commands down to and including the battalion. Many of these communications established broad training policies, emphasized current deficiencies and necessary corrective action, or prescribed special training. There was a tendency, however, for some of this subsidiary published material to be repetitious. The mass of unnecessary paper work that required reading and answering was such that small unit commanders, especially at the battalion company level, found it necessary to spend hours behind a desk when they could have been better employed supervising training.[60]

The methods of instruction which had been developed in the Army and used for training during the mobilization were based on the soundest of pedagogical principles: (1) Preparation; (2) Explanation; (3) Demonstration; (4) Application; and (5) Examination. It was a system that emphasized "learning by doing"; it was a system, too, which was perhaps as efficient in the mass imparting of knowledge as has ever been developed. Its most serious handicap was the chronic shortages of equipment. It was hard to have a man "do it" when the weapon or the piece of equipment "to do it with" was not available. Ingenious methods were evolved to overcome this handicap, the more successful of which were the pooling of equipment and the use of training committees at the training centers. These committees of officers and noncommissioned officers were specially trained to conduct some phase of training; they would be assigned all of the equipment and training aids pertaining to that training subject which were available at their post and would then teach the subject successively to all units.[61] The testing phase of training was not only concurrent with the other training phases but also followed them. AGF evolved an elaborate system of MTP tests and combat proficiency tests for platoon, company (battery), and battalion intended to determine the combat readiness of the units being tested as well as the efficiency of the training methods employed. These tests, however, sometimes failed

[60] Based on personal experiences and opinions of the author (Lt Col M. A. Kreidberg).

[61] The chief weakness of this program was the fact that the instructors became limited experts and were not properly prepared for combat service themselves. Statement, Brig Gen P. M. Robinett (Ret), 6 Apr 53. AGF did not favor training committees except for training of instructors. Comment, Maj Gen J. M. Lentz, on this MS, 22 Aug 53. HIS 400.3, Spec Studies, History of Mil Mobilization. OCMH.

to measure training effectiveness as well as desired because they lacked combat realism.[62]

The training manuals, procedures, and methods which the Regular Army had ready for use when mobilization began in 1940 were the result of careful study and planning begun immediately after the conclusion of World War I. No phase of the mobilization was more successfully accomplished than the training program, which became increasingly efficient throughout World War II as the new officers and noncommissioned officers became familiar with the Army's pedagogical methods, as the lessons of combat became available, as training was freed from the safety restrictions of peacetime and became dangerously real, and as supervision of training at all levels became more effective. The pioneer work of the chiefs of arms and services and the work of the service schools contributed greatly to the success of the training program during World War II. GHQ and AGF also made major contributions to the training program, particularly in the field of large maneuvers.

The Army Schools During Mobilization

The protective Mobilization Plan with its amplifying Mobilization Regulations had prescribed that the Army War College, the Army Industrial College, and the Command and General Staff School would discontinue their normal school missions at the beginning of the mobilization. The Command and General Staff School, after the discontinuance of its normal peacetime course, was to be prepared to give abbreviated three-month courses in command-staff procedures.[63] No provision was made, however, for wartime courses at the Army War College or the Army Industrial College, which were the top level schools in the heirachy of the Army educational system. The Military Academy at West Point was to continue its courses except that the first class might be graduated, commissioned, and assigned to duty ahead of time.[64]

The service schools were upon mobilization to discontinue all of their normal peacetime courses for Regulars, National Guardsmen, and Reservists, but were to establish instead the following wartime courses of about 30 days duration:

1. Refresher courses for officers.
2. Specialist courses for officers.
3. Officer candidate course (three months).
4. Enlisted special courses.[65]

---

[62] For a more detailed description of training procedures see: Palmer and Others, *op. cit.*, pp. 442ff.

[63] MR 3–1, 23 Nov 40, par. 22.

[64] *Ibid.*, par. 19. This eliminated the serious error made in World War I when the course at West Point was shortened to one year.

[65] *Ibid.*, par. 20.

For those officers and noncommissioned officers who could not be spared long enough to attend War Department schools during the periods of mobilization and war, Mobilization Regulations directed the continuance of unit and post troop schools whose subject matter would be geared to current needs.[66]

These school policies of the Protective Mobilization Plan and of Mobilization Regulations were followed closely during the mobilization. The Army War College and the Army Industrial College suspended their operations in June 1940 and did not resume until after the war. The Command and General Staff School discontinued its normal course in February 1940 and initiated the shortened course program in November 1940. The special service schools (the Infantry School, etc.) discontinued their peacetime courses in June 1940, but that summer they initiated special wartime courses.[67]

In most instances the refresher courses for officers in the special service schools became basic courses in which an intensive effort was made to provide basic instruction for the company grade National Guard and Reserve officers being brought into the service. The curricula at the special service schools were intended to teach not only basic knowledge but to teach it in such a manner as to make the students capable instructors. During the course of the war the emphasis of the service school program was shifted from basic courses to officer candidate and advanced officer courses. It was found desirable early in 1942 to provide one-month special courses at the service schools for the officer cadres of divisions to be activated. As new commands emerged, new service schools were created with them: the Armored School, Tank Destroyer School, and Antiaircraft Artillery School.[68]

The officer candidate school program was held in abeyance during the 1940 phase of mobilization. The General Staff believed that since the mobilization was limited to a maximum goal of but 1,400,000 men it was unnecessary to create a source of new officers. The pool of National Guard and Reserve officers was sufficiently large to meet the needs for the maximum Army then contemplated.[69] In 1940 opposition to activating officer candidate schools was based on a feeling that the creation of a surplus of officers would tend to aggravate personnel problems in an Army of 1,400,000. The Chief of Staff, however, felt that for morale purposes the opportunity to earn commissions should be offered to men in the ranks, especially Selective Service men. It was for morale purposes, therefore, that General Marshall directed

[66] *Ibid.*, par. 24.

[67] AG ind, 22 Jun 40, on memo from ch of Inf, 18 Jun 40. AG 352.01 (6–18–40) MC. See also: WD ltr to chiefs of branches, 31 Jul 40, sub: Courses of Special Service Schools. AG 352.01 (7–26–40) M–C. DRB, TAG.

[68] For more detailed data and statistics concerning these service schools see: Palmer and Others, *op. cit.*, pp. 259 ff.

[69] Memo for Ch, Pub Rel Br, 19 Dec 40, sub: The ROTC. G–1/14165–105. DRB, TAG.

that the officer candidate school program be organized on a limited basis. The first officer candidate schools for infantry, field artillery, coast artillery, cavalry, armored, signal corps, ordnance, engineers, quartermaster, and medical administrative corps candidates were established on a limited basis in July 1941. By the end of that year the combined output of all of these schools was but 1,389 officers. There was a tremendous expansion of the officer candidate school program after Pearl Harbor along the lines laid down in the Protective Mobilization Plan but with the number of candidates vastly increased. The Army Ground Forces officer candidate schools alone graduated 136,131 men.[70]

In its essentials, the school program envisaged in the mobilization plans was implemented and was eminently successful. There were changes made in curricula and in emphasis which were designed to meet current situations and which were accomplished with flexibility and smoothness.[71] The reluctance of the General Staff to implement the officer candidate school phase of the program, had it not been overcome by the decision of the Chief of Staff, could well have had unfortunate effects during the accelerated mobilization in 1942. But fortunately this departure from the PMP did not occur.

The greatest weakness of the school program as planned and as executed was the discontinuance of the Army War College and the Army Industrial College for the duration of the mobilization and the war. The shortage of officers trained for high staff and command assignment became acute before the first year of the war was over.[72] This serious weakness was partially corrected by the flood of graduates turned out by the 27 intensive abbreviated staff classes at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth. But these short courses, however intensive, could hardly qualify officers for any higher assignment than the division level. Corps, armies, theaters, and the War Department were to suffer increasingly from the shortage of staff officers trained for the higher levels. It is difficult to state positively that the products of the Army War College and the Army Industrial

[70] For pertinent memoranda and directives see: AG 352 (9–19–40) (3 sec. 1, pt. 1. DRB, TAG. See also: Palmer and Others, *op, cit.*, pp. 308, 325–28. In a comment on this manuscript, 11 Aug 53, Gen Wade H Haislip, USA-Ret, who served as ACofS, G–1, 19 Feb 41 to 19 Jan 42 stated: "As G–1, I urged G–3 to expand the OCS to meet future requirements but without result. The consequence was a later great shortage of 2nd Lieutenants, followed by an expansion of the OCS far beyond normal requirements in order to make up the shortage, and then a later reduction of OCS capacity to maintain necessary placements." HIS 400.3, Spec Studies, Hist of Mil Mobilization. OCMH.

[71] For details on school operations see: Palmer and Others, *ip. cit.*, "Service Schools of the Army Ground Forces," pp. 241–320, and "The Training of Officer Candidates," pp. 321–65.

[72] For pertinent memoranda see: G–1 New Divs Policy File. DRB, TAG. Another factor accentuating the shortage of highly trained officers was the fact that the foreign garrisons were staffed almost 100 percent by Regular Army officer complements. G–1 protests on this matter were overruled by the Chief of Staff. See: Ltr, Gen Wade H. Haislip to Ch, Mil Hist, 11 Aug 53. HIS 400.3, Spec Studies, Hist of Mil Mobilization. OCMH.

College would have had a beneficial influence on high level staff planning during and following the war, but on the basis of the influence of those two schools in the mobilization planning, on the early phases of mobilization, and on the conduct of the war, it is reasonable to infer that their sudden elimination in 1940 was an error of judgment in which the current need for officers was allowed to outweigh the eventual greater need for officers trained for higher staff levels.[73]

Censorship and Public Information

The problem of coordinating public relations, propaganda, and censorship was a formidable one in World War II. Almost all old line governmental agencies and all of the new agencies were well aware of the value of public relations and had within their organizational framework personnel to publicize the agency in a favorable light. None of the agencies was in favor of a centralized control of their public-relations programs.

An Office of Facts and Figures was established in October 1941 with the mission of publicizing the status and progress of the national defense effort and the defense activities and policies of the government, but it had no power to coordinate information programs of other governmental agencies beyond occasional advice.[74] And advice was hardly enough to ensure coordination.

When Pearl Harbor was attacked there was no organization in the United States to censor information of value to the enemy nor to disseminate war information. There were in existence plans for such organizations prepared after 20 years of study by a Joint Army-Navy Committee. The President adopted, with minor changes, the Army-Navy censorship plan (which he had previously approved for planning purposes on 4 June 1941), when he created the Office of Censorship.[75] The Office of Censorship was headed by a civilian director,

[73] There is a definite division of opinion in staff circles as to whether the closing of the Army War College and the Army Industrial College was an error of judgment. In a comment on this matter Maj Gen Harry L. Twaddle, USA-Ret, who served as ACofS, G–3, 23 Nov 40 to 8 Apr 41 and 24 Apr 41 to 25 Mar 42 and had just previously served as Ch, G–3 Mobilization Br, on 5 Aug 53, stated:

"It is felt that criticism concerning the provision in all mobilization plans for closing the Army War College and the Army Industrial College is unduly drastic. Talk to any former planner and he will agree that had it been feasible and practicable these institutions should have been continued in operation during an emergency. This ideal provision was not practicable because of the paucity of officers and required training, experience and leadership qualities to fill higher command and staff positions in newly-organized units. To have provided staff, faculty and students for the institutions would in effect have robbed command and staff of the 'cream of the crop' and would have deprived the officers themselves early advancement to higher grades. . . .

"In my opinion, it cannot be stated truthfully that the mobilization planners 'lacked vision' . . . in making provisions in plans for closing the Army War College and the Army Industrial College during an emergency. On the contrary, they displayed sound judgment influenced by unalterable conditions." HIS 400.3, Spec Studies, Hist of Mil Mobilization, OCMH.

[74] EO 892, 24 Oct 41. 6 *Federal Register* 5477.

[75] EO 8985, 19 Dec 41. 6 *Federal Register* 6625; 55 *Stat.* 838.

Byron Price. Its two principal operating divisions were a Cable Division to censor cable and radio communications, operated by Naval personnel, and a Postal Division to censor mail, operated by Army personnel. Domestic press and radio were placed under voluntary codes published by the director of Censorship along the lines of the World War I program.[76]

The President decided not to use the Army-Navy censorship plan's provision for war information. Instead of centralizing the dissemination of such information, as the Joint Army-Navy plan had recommended and as had been done in World War I by George Creel's Committee on Public Information, the President's decision left dissemination of information in a chaotic state. The following agencies initially had information disseminating offices:

Government agency	*Kind of news disseminated*
War Department	War news; accrediting of war correspondents
Navy Department	War news; accrediting of war correspondents
State Department	Diplomatic news
Division of Information, OEM	News from OEM agencies
Office of Facts and Figures	War information programs and some domestic information
Office of Government Reports	Answered queries from state and local governments, citizens' organizations, and the public
Foreign Information Service of the Coordinator on Information	News to all foreign countries except Latin America
Coordinator in Inter-American Affairs	News to Latin American countries
Public Advice and Counsel Division, Office of Civilian Defense	News of civil defense


There was no coordination or correlation between the various news disseminating agencies, and none of them was subject to censorship by the Office of Censorship. The confusion and cross purposes in dissemination of information both at home and abroad became so severe that demands for reorganization of the news agencies became widespread. The solution finally arrived at was the creation of the Office of War Information (OWI) in June 1942 headed by Elmer Davis.[77]

But the lessons of World War I still were not heeded. OWI did not become the sole agency for dissemination of information. It incorporated a few of the governmental news agencies in existence, but others continued to exist and thrive subject only to coordinating control of OWI. [See *chart 29* for the consolidation of information agencies.] The problems of coordination were so formidable that

[76] For governing principles of this voluntary code see: Bureau of the Budget *The United States at War* (Washington, 1946), pp. 208–09.

[77] EO 9182, 13 Jun 42. 7 *Federal Register* 4468.

*Chart 29. Consolidation of Information Agencies**



NOTE: Does not include the functions of voluntary censorship of mass media and of censorship of international communications between civilians which were performed by the Office of Censorship after December 1941.

Source: Bureau of the Budget.

even after two years of effort the job was not accomplished properly. The governmental information agencies subject to OWI coordination resented and vigorously resisted it. The confusion, quarrels, and security breeches which stemmed from the organizational imperfections of the war information agencies and policies incurred well-merited congressional criticism. The overall conclusion is that the information dissemination activities of the United States during World War II were not as well managed as they might have been.

CHAPTER XVIII

TROOP PROCUREMENT BASES

The Fluctuating Troop Bases, 1940–44

The rapid changes in the Protective Mobilization Plan's troop basis, which occurred during 1940, so destroyed its planning value that WPD recommended a revision within a few weeks after the PMP troop basis had been approved and published.[1] By the end of 1940 so much of the Protective Mobilization Plan was being implemented that it had ceased to be a plan for future use but was a blueprint for present operations. Only the troop basis required future planning for other elements of the PMP were either operating or were being modified to meet changing needs. As early as November 1939 all responsible agencies of the War Department were directed *not* to submit revised mobilization plans to the War Department for review during 1940.[2] One year later in December 1940 preparation of subordinate plans based on the War Department 1940 PMP was suspended.[3] Only the troop basis of the Protective Mobilization Plan continued to be used for planning purposes. [See *table 63* for troop basis at the end of 1940.]

The preparation of the troop basis was the responsibility of the G–3 Division of the General Staff. WPD was always consulted on what units were necessary for strategic reasons and G–4 was occasionally consulted on the possibility of equipping the troops in the basis, but the actual staff work was done by G–3 alone until mid-1941. Beginning then, other staff divisions gave the troop basis independent and intensive study and emerged with solutions which only occasionally were in harmony and almost never in complete statistical agreement. G–3 continued to prepare troop bases principally from an organizational and training viewpoint. WPD (OPD after March 1942) prepared troop bases from the overall strategic viewpoint of how many and what kind of divisions and other units were necessary to

[1] Memo for G–3, 23 Jul 40, sub: Revision of Current Annex 7, Part 1, the PMP. WPD 4274. DRB, TAG.

[2] TAG ltr, 29 Nov 39, sub: Protective Mobilization Plans. AG 381 (11–10–39) M–C–M. Copy in *ibid.*

[3] TAG ltr, 10 Dec 40, sub: Suspension of the preparation of subordinate plans based on the War Dept PMP, 1940. AG 381 (11–23–40) M–C–M. Copy in WPD 4274–6. DRB, TAG.

*Table 63. Troop Basis for Fiscal Year 1941 as of December 1940**

Major units	Fiscal year 1941		Full Protective Mobilization Plan table of organization, less basics		1941 augmentation	
	Units	Strength	Units	Strength	Units	Strength
Total	-----	2, 976, 000	-----	1, 418, 100	-----	1, 557, 900
Infantry divisions (triangular, foot)	21	307, 000	8	105, 300	13	201, 700
Infantry divisions (triangular, motorized)	6	93, 000	1	13, 900	5	79, 100
Infantry divisions (square)	18	383, 000	18	316, 400	-----	66, 600
Armored divisions	8	96, 000	4	43, 200	4	52, 800
Cavalry divisions	2	22, 000	1+	17, 500	(+)	4, 500
Air Corps and Air Corps services (54 groups and National Guard)	-----	[a] 424, 000	-----	189, 300	-----	[a] 234, 700
Overseas garrisons	-----	105, 000	-----	95, 000	-----	10, 000
Corps troops	9	139, 000	[b] 9	105, 700	-----	33, 300
Army troops	[b] 4	98, 000	[b] 4	82, 600	-----	15, 400
GHQ reserve troops	-----	692, 000	-----	123, 400	-----	568, 600
Harbor defense troops	-----	61, 000	-----	46, 500	-----	14, 500
WD overhead and corps area service commands	-----	220, 000	-----	161, 100	-----	58, 900
Trainees	-----	310, 000	-----	118, 200	-----	191, 800
Bases	-----	26, 000	-----	0	-----	26, 000

[a] Includes 153,000 augmentation for fiscal year 1942.

[b] Organizations only partially completed.

**Source:* Tabs A to L accompanying TAG ltrs, sub: Determination of Additional Costs for Fiscal Year 1941, under the assumption that the National Guard will be ordered into Federal service and selective service will become effective, 18 Sep 40. AG 111 (9-17-40) M-C-M; 28 Sep 40, AG 111 (9-26-40) M-C-M; 17 Oct 40, AG 111 (10-17-40) M-C-M; 26 Oct 40, AG 111 (10-24-40) M-C-M; together with numbered changes thereto. DRB, TAG.

defeat the Axis Powers. G–4 and the Office of the Under Secretary used the WPD figures to estimate ultimate materiel procurement requirements. The Joint Army and Navy Board and its successor the Joint Chiefs of Staff had planning committees which worked on the manpower problem from the point of view of proper overall allocation to the respective services, industry, and agriculture. GHQ (later AGF) prepared solutions based on tactical concepts and influenced by available information on approved strategic decisions. In mid-1941, G–2, alarmed by what was going on in Europe, engaged in troop-basis planning for a short time. In 1943 a special committee appointed by the Chief of Staff also considered the troop basis at length and in detail. Before the war was over almost every Staff division studied troop bases. Since each division came up with a different solution, many of which were approved for the purposes for

which they had been prepared, there was understandable confusion concerning what was *the* troop basis at any given time.[4]

The troop basis documents can be collected into three principal summary groups:

1. *The War Department Troop Basis*, which was issued irregularly at first by the G–3 Division of the General Staff. In 1944–45, this troop basis became a very formal document. It provided the basis for the activation and organization of combat divisions and other units. This troop basis had its beginning in the Protective Mobilization Plan's Annex 7, Part 1.

2. *The Victory Program Troop Basis*, initially prepared by WPD (later OPD), which expressed strategic plans in terms of troop units. This troop basis was used for long-range materiel production calculations.

3. *Troop Basis in JCS Studies*, which were concerned primarily with the overall allocation of available manpower.

During 1941, while G–3 was still working unilaterally, it prepared and published three revisions of the troop basis. The first two revisions recommended an Army of approximately 1,500,000. The third revision was made necessary by Congress' decision to keep the National Guard, Reservists, and selectees in service for an additional year to increase the strength to 1,847,885. [For a summary of these three troop bases see *table 64.*]

The Victory Program

WPD's venture into extensive troop-basis planning came as the result of rising pressures from G–4, the Under Secretary of War (Robert M. Patterson), and the Office of Production Management, all of whom wanted some very long-range planning on the ultimate munitions that the United States would have to produce to defeat the Axis Powers. The intermediate goals of munitions for 2,000,000 men now and 4,000,000 men later, set in the Munitions Program of 30 June 1940, were not complete enough to satisfy the procurement planners who were anxious to set their sights on the final goal whatever it might be. The problem, a complicated one, was made even more difficult by the almost insatiable demands for aid and lend-lease for Great Britain. (The Lend-Lease Act was passed 11 March 1941.)

The Chief of Staff in May 1941 reacted to these pressures and directed WPD to make a rough, strategic estimate of the ultimate munitions production required of the United States.[5] WPD assigned

[4] Even the *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1945* . . . p. 102, is not correct in its troop basis calculations. Estimates from several different documents are confused, and the dates of some of these estimates are incorrect.

[5] Notes of Conference, 21 May 41. CofS Files, "Notes on Conferences," Binder 15. DRB, TAG.

*Table 64. Summary of Troop Bases Prepared by G3 During 1941**

Major units	Troop basis					
	29 January 1941		8 May 1941		17 November 1941	
	Units	Strength	Units	Strength	Units	Strength
Total	-----	1, 418, 097	-----	1, 570, 686	-----	1, 847, 885
Regular Army and trainees	-----	1, 168, 097	-----	1, 320, 686	-----	----------
Infantry divisions (triangular)	15	223, 689	15	215, 963	10	132, 203
Infantry divisions (square)	0	0	0	0	18	[a] 253, 833
Armored divisions	6	66, 108	6	66, 108	6	66, 192
Cavalry divisions	2	20, 154	2	17, 903	2	17, 910
Sets of corps troops	9	69, 055	9	69, 195	9	[b] 80, 859
Sets of armored corps troops	2	2, 108	1	1, 543	1	[c] 725
Sets of army troops	2	[d] 63, 148	2+	[d] 64, 924	2+	[e] 67, 109
Air Corps and Air Corps services	-----	202, 312	-----	336, 869	-----	494, 865
Base forces	-----	21, 526	-----	27, 547	-----	31, 170
GHQ reserve troops	-----	110, 228	-----	107, 072	-----	170, 928
Harbor defenses	-----	29, 783	-----	27, 155	-----	33, 803
Overseas departments (less Air Corps)	-----	59, 705	-----	70, 130	-----	[f] 88, 375
Philippine Scouts	-----	12, 000	-----	12, 000	-----	12, 000
Alaskan garrison (less Air Corps)	-----	6, 692	-----	6, 692	-----	22, 129
Overhead (WD and corps area service commands)	-----	124, 227	-----	143, 435	-----	190, 413
Trainees	-----	157, 362	-----	160, 225	-----	185, 371
National Guard [g]	-----	250, 000	-----	250, 000	-----	----------

[a] NG in Federal service.

[b] In first two bases, four sets of corps troops were complete and five partially full. In 17 Nov 41 basis all nine were partially full.

[c] Only at partial strength.

[d] 72 percent complete.

[e] Two sets of army troops plus an additional headquarters.

[f] Includes two training divisions overseas.

[g] NG in state service.

**Source:* Memo, G-3 to WPD, 1 Feb 41, sub: Revised Troop Basis, Fiscal Year 1942, with inclosures. G-3/16613-320; AG ltr, 14 May 41, sub: Revision of Troop Unit Basis, Fiscal Year 1942. AG 320.2 (5-13-41) MC-C-M; AG ltr, 17 Nov 41, sub: Revised Troop Unit Basis, 1942, AG 320.2 (5-14-41) MC-C-M. Copies of all in WPD 3674-48. DRB, TAG.

Maj. (later Lt. Gen.) Albert C. Wedemeyer to take charge of the study in which all General Staff divisions were to participate. Major Wedemeyer had already started on this study when the President, reacting to the same pressures as General Marshall, called on the Secretaries of War and Navy to collaborate in the preparation of a general

report ". . . on the munitions and mechanical equipment of all types which . . . would be required to exceed by an appropriate amount that available to our potential enemies. From your report we should be able to establish a munitions objective indicating the industrial capacity which this nation will require." [6] The President's message of 9 July 1941 increased the importance of and gave impetus to Major Wedemeyer's study, which was in rough form by that time. The message also cleared up the extent to which the President was willing to plan for all-out war. Major Wedemeyer's initial estimate was ". . . based on a more or less nebulous national policy, in that the extent to which our Government intends to commit itself with reference to the defeat of the Axis Powers has not as yet been clearly defined." [7] Major Wedemeyer amplified his study in accordance with the President's desires. Although the emphasis was on materiel production statistics, Major Wedemeyer's approach to the problem was considerably different from that of an industrial or economic statistician. He first computed the manpower which would be available to use munitions in the Army by subtracting from the total available manpower pool the men needed for industry, agriculture, and the Navy. After arriving at that figure, he computed the units—infantry divisions, armored divisions, bombardment groups, pursuit groups, etc.—which were necessary to fight the war in various theaters. These were based on G–2 estimates of forces and munitions available to the Axis powers. After this troop basis was prepared, the computations were made on the necessary number of rifles, tanks, airplanes, etc. These final computations on materiel were what the President had asked for. There was one additional complication before the Victory Program was ready; on 30 August the President directed the estimates be revised to include lend-lease production for Russia.

The completed WPD Victory Program was transmitted to the President through the Secretary of War on 25 September 1941. The Victory Program contained not only a troop basis and a statistical estimate of the materiel and munitions ultimately necessary, but it provided also a comprehensive survey of the War Department's strategic concepts.[8] The total strength estimate in the Victory Program troop basis (8,795,658) and the actual ultimate strength of the United States Army in World War II (8,291,331) were remarkably close although there was a wide discrepancy between the estimated and ultimate number of divisions. [see *table 65* for a summary of the Victory Program trop basis and the actual strength of the Army 31 May 1945.] From a mobilization standpoint the fact that the Victory Program was a unilateral War Department estimate and that the Navy Department pre-

[6] A copy of this letter from the President, 9 Jul 41, is in WPD 4491–1. DRB, TAG.
[7] Memo for CofS, 16 Jul 41, sub: Strategic Estimate. WPD 4510. DRB, TAG.
[8] For a comprehensive summary of the Victory Program see Watson, *op. cit.*, ch. XI.

*Table 65. Comparison of Victory Program Troop Basis, 25 September 1941 and Size of the Army, 31 May 1945**

Units

Major units	Victory Program	Actual 31 May 1945
Armies	5	12
Corps	23	24
Armored corps	18	0
Divisions	213	89
Infantry	71	66
Infantry, motorized	61	0
Airborne	10	5
Armored	61	16
Mountain	10	1
Air Force Groups	195	243
Pursuit (fighter)	54	71
Bombardment (all types)	107	125
Photo (reconnaissance)	2	13
Transport (troop carrier)	32	29
Composite	0	5

Strength

Strength allocations	Victory Program	Actual 31 May 1945
Total	8, 795, 658	8, 291, 336
Ground Forces	6, 745, 658	5, 980, 900
Military bases and outlying possessions	346, 217	----------
Potential task forces	2, 199, 441	----------
Brazil	86, 646	----------
Colombia, Peru, Ecuador	37, 239	----------
First Army	776, 262	----------
Third Army	589, 435	----------
Fourth Army	709, 859	----------
Strategic reserves	3, 000, 000	----------
Zone of Interior-fixed defenses	1, 200, 000	----------
Air Forces	2, 050, 000	2, 310, 436
Combat	1, 100, 000	----------
Zone of Interior service units	950, 000	----------

**Source:* Victory Program figures are from "Joint Board Estimate of United States Overall Production Requirements," 11 Sep 41, app. II. JB 335 (Serial 707). Copy in WPD 4494. DRB, TAG. World War II Statistics were compiled by Gen Ref Off, OCMH.

pared its own estimate tended to detract somewhat from its overall value as a blueprint for ultimate industrial production.[9]

[9] The Joint Board's attempt to reconcile Army-Navy differences in Sep 41 was not entirely successful. *Ibid.*, pp. 356–58.

There were differences between the Victory Program troop basis and the composition of the Army in May 1945, but these differences were not all planning errors. The elimination of motorized divisions from the Army was based on tactical and logistical lessons which were not available in 1941. The reduction of armored divisions from 61 to 16 was necessary because tank production could not meet the needs of both the Army and Lend-Lease. Furthermore, whether so many armored divisions would have been tactically desirable is debatable. The emphasis on armor in the Victory Program was due to its impressive employment by the Germans. The sharp reduction in mountain divisions from 10 to 1 was based on tactical requirements. The startlingly successful German airborne attack on Crete in May 1941 probably was the basis for including 10 airborne divisions in the Victory Program, and the reduction in airborne divisions from 10 to 5 was based on subsequent experience. The estimate of ultimate manpower needs came remarkably close to actuality; but the proportion of service troops to combat troops in the Victory Program fell far below ultimate needs. The overcalculation in the Victory Program on antiaircraft artillery needs was a natural one in 1941 when the Axis air strength and potential were so menacing. The eventual achievement by the Allies of an air superiority so overwhelming as to approach air supremacy could not be foreseen in 1941. The Victory Program's concern and planning for shipping to carry and sustain the war effort was based on a well-learned lesson from World War I.[10]

The Victory Program achieved its chief purpose by establishing munitions production goals for American industry. Its corollary purpose of establishing a long-range troop basis was not so successful at first, for in the fall of 1941 the President was inclined to decrease rather than to increase the Army. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 prevented the reduction of the Army from being put into effect and converted the Victory Program into the War Munitions Program. The preparation of intermediate troop bases became necessary.

WPD's post-Pearl Harbor version of a troop basis was the first one completed.[11] This revision of the Victory Program's troop basis, modified by G–3, G–4, and Air Force estimates, was circulated through the Staff divisions by 27 December 1941. Herein, the long-range estimate was for an Army of 213 divisions and a strength of 10,199,101 by 30 June 1944. The intermediate objective was for 71 divisions

[10] G–4 also gave the critical shipping factor considerable staff study. See: Memo for WPD, 5 Aug 41, sub: Overall Requirements to Defeat Our Potential Enemies. G–4/32488. Copy in WPD 4494–4. DRB, TAG.

[11] GHQ, one day before Pearl Harbor, had estimated that the United States would need 200 divisions before undertaking offensive action. Memo for G–3, WDGS, 6 Dec 41, sub: Organized Reserves. GHQ/320.2/58. DRB, TAG.

and a strength of 3,973,205 by 31 December 1942. Again this WPD version was intended for use in supply planning.[12]

1942, 1943 Troop Bases

The G–3 troop basis to guide the organization and activation of actual units appeared in January 1942. This troop basis concerned itself only with the intermediate goal to be reached by the end of 1942 and visualized a total army strength of 3,600,000 by 31 December 1942—somewhat less than WPD's estimate. In the number of divisions, however, the two troop bases were exactly alike: 59 infantry, 10 armored, and 2 cavalry divisions. This G–3 troop basis, approved by the Secretary of War 15 January, was circulated by memorandum to the Staff divisions that same day and was formalized a few days later as the 1942 Troop Basis.[13] The manpower needs were greatly increased when it became necessary to support BOLERO, and the President himself increased the 1942 Troop Basis 750,000 men to a new total of 4,350,000.[14] Even this sizable increase was not enough. In July another 101,530 men were added and in September the 1942 Troop Basis was increased to 5,000,000 men.[15]

While G–3 (Maj. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards) was revising the 1942 Troop Basis the Division was working on a troop basis for 1943. At about the same time it was estimated that about 350 divisions would be needed to win the war.[16] In May 1942 OPD (Maj. Gen. [later General of the Army] Dwight D. Eisenhower) had recommended a total of 140 divisions by the end of 1943 (an increase of 67 divisions for that year) and a total of 187 divisions by the end of 1944 (an increase of 47 divisions for that year).[17] But G–3 was wary of such optimism for the 1943 goal. The G–3 troop basis for 1943 proposed a 1943 total goal of 111 divisions and an overall strength of 8,208,000 (7,533,000 enlisted men, 675,000 officers). Not only the current man-

[12] Memo for G–4 27 Dec 41, sub: Troop Basis for Victory Program. Filed in envelope with WPD 4494–26; memo, Maj Wedemeyer for Gen Gerow, 7 Jan 42, sub: Victory Program. Folder Book with WPD 4494; memo for CofS, 11 Jan 42, no sub. WPD 3674–82. DRB, TAG.

[13] Memo for WPD, 15 Jan 42, sub: Mobilization and Training Plan. G–3/6457–433. Copy in WPD 3674–83; Copy of 1942 Troop Basis in WPD 3674–90. DRB, TAG.

[14] WD ltr, 20 May 42, sub: Increased Strength of the Army, Calendar Year 1942. AG 320.2/121 (5–19–42) M–C–M. DRB, TAG. One day earlier the CofS had counted on only 600,000 more men, but the President increased this figure by 150,000. See: Memo, OCS (Sec, GS) for WDGS, AGF, AFF, SOS, 19 May 42. Copy in OPD 320.2, BOLERO, Case 8. DRB, TAG. BOLERO was the code name given to the build-up of strength in the British Isles for two possible cross-channel operations, SLEDGEHAMMER (1942) and ROUNDUP (1943).

[15] WD ltr, 18 Jul 42, sub: Unit Basis for Mobilization and Training, 1942. AG 320.2 (7–3–42) MS–C–M; JPS 94/1, 31 Aug 42; Minutes, JCS, 31st Meeting, 1 Sep 42; memo, Adm Leahy for President, 30 Sep 42, no sub. Copy in JPS 57/5/D in ABC 370.01. (7–25–42), Sec 2. DRB, TAG.

[16] G–3 memo for CofS, 15 Sep 42, sub: Mobilization Plans. G–3 320 (9–15–42). Copy in OPD Exec Book 6, Exec File 3. DRB, TAG.

[17] Memo for G–3, 23 May 42, sub: Major Troop Unit Requirements for 1942, 1943, and 1944. OPD 320.2/190. DRB, TAG.

power troubles influenced G–3 but such ponderable planning factors as shipping and construction limitations, manpower demands of agriculture and industry, equipment shortages, and the uncertainty concerning the time of mass employment of ground forces.[18] The G–3 estimates of 7,533,000 enlisted men, 675,000 officers, and 111 divisions were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the President in September 1942.[19]

After obtaining approval for the 1943 Troop Basis, G–3 began to doubt that 111 divisions could be organized by the end of 1943. Procurement difficulties had made cutbacks necessary in ground force equipment which was already in short supply; the abandonment of the projected plans for 1942 and 1943 invasions of the European mainland had decreased the immediate need for maximum numbers of ground divisions; shipping estimates limited the probability of overseas troop movement to Europe to 4,170,000 men by the end of 1944 with a possible maximum of 3,000,000 men if ship sinkings continued heavy (and of these maximums, some 1,000,000 spaces were reserved for the Air Force).[20]

In view of these factors the G–3 official troop basis called for only 100 divisions by the end of 1943 and kept enlisted strength at 7,533,000 and officer strength at 675,000; the planning assumption was to keep the mobilization rate high in 1943 and then in 1944, when more ground combat equipment became available, to form additional divisions by transferring men already in the service to the combat arms. A surplus of men above the needs of the troop basis units would be a welcome novelty.[21] An excellent innovation in the 1943 Troop Basis was the inclusion of officers; the 1942 Troop Basis had shown only enlisted totals. The 1943 Troop Basis, too, was a more scientific appraisal of military manpower potential than its predecessors. The qualitative factors of logistics (supply, equipment, shipping, etc.), strategy, tactical requirements, and farm-industry manpower needs now could be deduced with reasonable precision rather than by considered guesses. The result was that the 1943 Troop Basis, with its overall total of 8,208,000, was a reasonably accurate estimate of ultimate Army

[18] Memo for CofS 5 Feb 42, sub: Augmentation of Army for Calendar Year, 1943. G–3/6457–448 in WPD 3674–91; memo, DCofS, AGF, for AGF G–3, 10 Jun 42, sub: Troop Basis for 1943. GHQ 320.2/210. DRB, TAG. Initially, WD G–3 recommended 110 divisions, but subsequently increased it to 111 divisions.

[19] JPS 57/3, 21 Sep 42, sub: Troop Bases for all Services, Calendar Year, 1943. Although the G–3 estimates included in this study referred to 111 divisions, the total of divisions in the breakdown came to 114, the same number that AGF recommended later that month. Ltr to TAG, 30 Sep 42, sub: Troop Basis 1943. AGF/320.2/4 (TB 43). DRB, TAG.

[20] Memo, J. K. Woolnough, OPD, for Gen Wedemeyer, 12 Nov 42, sub: Strength of the Army for the Calendar Year 1943. Filed with JPS 57/6. ABC 370.01 (7–25–42) Sec. 2. DRB, TAG.

[21] Memo, G–3 for CG's, AGF and SOS, 24 Nov 42, sub: Troop Unit Basis, 1943. G–3 320.2 Gen (11–24–42). This troop basis was only slightly revised in memo, G–3 for CG's, AGF and SOS, 25 Jan 32, sub: Troop Unit Basis, 1943. G–3 320.2 Gen (1–25–43). DRB, TAG.

strength. The Army G–3 planners reached this solution before the other planning agencies did. The Joint Staff planners in November 1942 estimated Army strength at 10,572,000 on 31 December 1944 and an ultimate strength of 13,594,000 with 334 divisions by 31 December 1948. These estimates were disapproved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as excessive and were returned to the Joint Staff planners for restudy and reduction.[22]

The Army continued to exercise moderation in its ultimate troop basis goal. A special committee of the General Staff in March and April 1943 reiterated a maximum Army strength of 8,200,000 but inaccurately forecast 155 divisions from this total.[23] Influenced by this Army moderation, the Joint Staff planners, in a restudy prepared about the same time, estimated Army strength at 8,248,000 for 1944 with 100 divisions.[24] These JSP estimates were also rejected, this time by the Joint Deputy Chief of Staff, as being excessive.[25]

In an effort to secure a final definitive troop basis, General Marshall appointed another special committee, headed by Col. Ray T. Maddocks of OPD ". . . to investigate the possibility of decreasing the total number of ground divisions required in our troop basis." [26] In its report the special committee considered the changed strategic situation in mid-1943 contrasted with that at the beginning of the war when the first Victory Program had been drawn up. Russia, contrary to expectations, had *not* collapsed and was launching massive offensives which were pinning down large numbers of Axis divisions; the Allied air offensive had achieved air superiority sooner and more successfully than anticipated. These favorable factors, the committee reasoned, had lessened the need for American ground forces and especially combat divisions. The report, therefore, recommended a reduction of 591,000 from the official 1943 Troop Basis. [See *table 66.*] To effect the reduction in division strength (by 355,836), the report recommended deferring 12 divisions not yet activated and filling to strength only 88 active divisions with all their supporting and service units.[27] The Special Committee's recommendations, with only minor revisions, were incorporated into several draft revisions of the 1943 Troop Basis prepared by G–3 during September and October 1943. The approved revision stayed within the 7,700,000 overall ceiling, but instead of the 88 divisions recommended in the Maddocks Report, there were 90.[28]

---

[22] *Minutes* of JCS 44th Meeting, 1 Dec. 42. See also: JCS 154, 24 Nov 42, and JCS 154/1, 24 Dec 42. DRB, TAG.

[23] Rpt, Special Army Committee, 15 Mar 43 (revised 28 Apr 43), sub: Survey of Current Military Program. Filed in envelope with OPD 320.2, case 678. DRB, TAG.

[24] JPS 57/8, 26 Apr 43, with ann. B to app. F, 23 Apr 43. DRB, TAG. The overall total cut enlisted men strength by 150,000, since the 1944 estimate included for the first time 150,000 WAAC's.

[25] JPS 57/9/D, 12 Jun 43. DRB, TAG. The 40,000 discrepancy over the 8,208,000 figure in the 1943 Troop Basis included nurses who were not included in the previous total.

*Table 66. Revision of the 1943 Troop Basis; 1 June 1943**

Strength allocations	1943 troop basis	Recommended troop basis	Reduction or increase
Total	8, 248, 000	7, 657, 000	−591, 000
Officers (less Army nurses)	675, 000	613, 000	−62, 000
Army nurses	40, 000	40, 000	0
Enlisted	7, 533, 000	7, 004, 000	−529, 000
Air Forces and services	2, 200, 000	2, 200, 000	0
Divisions	1, 422, 918	1, 067, 082	−355, 836
Nondivision combat units	1, 409, 167	1, 308, 248	−100, 919
Nondivision service units	1, 153, 275	1, 196, 981	+43, 706
Overhead, Zone of Interior	503, 000	458, 000	−45, 000
Overhead, overseas	60, 000	70, 000	+10, 000
Trainees in replacement training center	316, 000	288, 000	−28, 000
OCS candidates	42, 000	25, 000	−17, 000
Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP)	150, 000	150, 000	0
Office of Strategic Services (OSS)	5, 000	5, 000	0
Pipeline	271, 640	235, 689	−35, 951

**Source:* Rpt, Special Army Committee, 1 Jun 43, sub: Revision of Current Military Program. Filed in envelope with OPD 320.2, Case 50. DRB, TAG.

1944 Troop Basis

The adoption of the revision by the War Department at the prompting of the Chief of Staff necessarily led OPD in turn to revise its Victory Program in October 1943 to make it conform with the decisions of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War.[29] This October revision of the Victory Program stayed below the 7,700,000-man ceiling with 90 divisions on 31 December 1943 but set the minimum division goal for 1944 at 105 with a possible increase to 126 if necessary.[30] The 105-division OPD program for 1944 influenced the initial G-3 studies for the 1944 Trop Basis, the first of which was ready in draft form on 28 October 1943. It proposed 105 divisions and an overall strength of 7,700,000 men by 31 December 1944.[31] As finally approved, the 1944 Troop Basis maintained the Army strength ceiling

[26] Memo for Col Nelson, 21 May 43, sub: Troop Basis. OPD 320.2, Case 819. Copy in JCS 154/2. DRB, TAG.

[27] Rpt, Special Army Committee, 1 Jun 43, sub: Revision of the Current Military Program. Filed with OPD 320.2, Case 50. DRB, TAG. An attached "Brief" 7 Jun 43 has each recommendation marked "OK, G. C. M." There is also a note by the CofS: "This paper has the approval of the Secretary of War, 6/15/43. G. C. M."

[28] G-3 memo for CofS, 2 Oct 43, sub: Troop Basis, 1943. Copy in ABC 370.01 (7-25-42) Sec 4; memo, G-3 for CG's AGF, ASF, AAF, 15 Oct 43, sub: Troop Basis, 1943. G-3 320 TB (15 Oct 43). DRB, TAG.

[29] The OPD Victory Program revised 15 Jun 43 had kept the 8,248,000 overall manpower goal for the Army to include 116 divisions.

[30] Memo for CofS, 21 Oct 43 (revised 15 Nov 43), sub: Victory Program Troop Basis. OPD 400 WMP, Case 63. DRB, TAG.

[31] Memo, G-3 for G-1, G-4, OPD, 28 Oct 43, sub: Troop Basis, 1944. Copy in OPD 320.2, Case 819. DRB, TAG.

at 7,700,000 and the divisions at 90.[32] This was the final divisional troop basis for the war except for one revision which reduced the number of divisions to 89, when it was decided to inactivate the 2d Cavalry Division. [See *table 67* for the final version of Army manpower allocation approved by the Joint Chiefs on 9 November 1943 and by the President on 15 November 1943.]

*Table 67. Army Manpower Allocation Program, 15 November 1943**

Category	Allotment (officers and enlisted)
Total	* 7, 700, 000
Air Forces	2, 210, 565
Combat Air Forces	516, 667
Air Corps services	607, 569
Replacement establishment	401, 639
Operating overhead (Zone of Interior and overseas)	684, 690
Ground Forces	3, 399, 176
Divisions	1, 367, 888
Combat support (nondivision, antiaircraft artillery, armored, cavalry, engineer, tank destroyer, etc.)	1, 238, 683
Service support (Nondivision medical, military police, signal, etc.)	464, 686
Replacement establishment	234, 500
Operating overhead	93, 419
Service Forces	1, 517, 475
Service Units (adjutant general, chemical, engineers, medical, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, etc.)	1, 102, 532
Replacement establishment	108, 500
Operating overhead	306, 443
Miscellaneous	572, 784
Army specialized training program	30, 000
Chief of Staff group	8, 627
Civilian agencies group	925
Development battalions	5, 000
Distribution factor	246, 734
Joint Chiefs of Staff group	102
Men in hospitals (60 days or more)	60, 000
Military District of Washington	1, 000
Office of Strategic Services	6, 115
Overseas overhead	205, 000
Secretary of War group	181
Veterans Administration	5, 100
War Department replacement training reserve	4, 000

* Consists of the following: Commissioned officers—700,000 (including 6,500 in Women's Army Corps); warrant officers—30,000; Army Nurse Corps—40,000; enlisted personnel—6,930,000 (including 143,500 in Women's Army Corps).

**Source:* JCS 154/7, 10 Nov 43; JCS 154/8, 15 Nov 43. DRB, TAG.

[32] Troop Basis, Calendar Year 1944, approved by the DCofS on 15 Jan 44. Copy in envelope with *ibid.*

The changing patterns of the successive troop bases were undoubtedly influenced by the changing strategic and tactical situation. Once a troop basis was changed to conform with current and projected war plans, theoretically it should have been a precise blueprint for expansion of the Army, but such was *not* the case. No troop basis was implemented as planned. Units not in the troop basis were activated, making it impossible to inactivate other units which were in the Troop Basis.

The Question of Armor in the Troop Bases

The first major assault on the 1941–42 troop bases came when the G–2 Division of the General Staff evaluated modern battle forces and came to the conclusion that the infantry division with its basic infantry-artillery team might well be supplanted by the tank-air team.[33] If this evaluation were correct, then obviously the existent 1941 Troop Basis and the projected 1942 Troop Basis would have to be radically revised. The G–2 study produced a number of related evaluations by G–3, WPD, GHQ, and the newly activated Armored Force.[34] Although the G–2 belief in the preeminence of the tank-air team was not concurred in even by the commanding general of the Armored Forces, there was substantial staff agreement (except for General McNair) that the percentage of armored divisions to infantry divisions should be increased, that motorized divisions should be increased, and that antiaircraft artillery should be given more emphasis. General McNair disagreed with what he inferred was the opinion of WPD, the Armored Force, and G–2 ". . . that the tank is superior to all other ground weapons; and, as a corollary, that troops in general have no place on the battlefield of today unless behind armor." [35] Nor could General McNair see any organic need for a motorized division in the United States Army. The German development of the motorized division, he believed, was justifiable only because in the German infantry division transportation was animal drawn. General McNair only concurred fully in the recommendation for more antiaircraft artillery. The G–2 basic study and the other staff evaluations, which it evoked, were to have considerable influence on the troop bases prepared for 1942 and 1943. The influence of the Armored Force and the subsequent activation and influence of the Antiaircraft Artillery Command and the Tank Destroyer Center were partly attributable to these 1941 evaluations of modern battle forces. It was not until March 1943 that General McNair's views concerning organic motorized divisions were accepted by the General Staff.

---

[33] Memo for CofS, 1 Mar 41, sub: Evaluation of Modern Battle Forces. G–2/2016–1297. Copy in WPD 3674–52. DRB, TAG.

[34] Copies of all of these studies are in WPD 3674–52. DRB, TAG.

[35] Memo for WPD, 9 May 41, sub: Evaluation of Modern Battle Forces. GHQ 052. Copy in *ibid.*

The Leaks in the Troop Basis

Reallocation of Manpower

The 1942 Troop Basis was nearly thrown out of balance by the leaks which developed when manpower allocated for specific units was reallocated. The early leaks of manpower went to provide cadres for units to be activated. The Protective Mobilization Plan and Mobilization Regulations had contemplated cadres provided by parent organizations during the early phases of mobilization; eventually, however, the PMP and MR's had intended for enlisted cadres to be provided by the replacement training centers, but the replacement training center program was changed in 1942 from its originally planned purposes. Neither the PMP nor related plans foresaw the heavy strain put on existing ground units by the recruiting for aviation cadets conducted by the Air Forces and by parachute quotas (requests for these types of training by a physically qualified enlisted man had to be approved no matter how vital a job the man had in his unit). Lesser losses, but still considerable in the overall aggregate, were officer candidate school quotas, enlisted specialist school quotas, and discharges for any reason. These losses from the TO strength of a unit made necessary the diversion of men, intended for fillers for new units, to existing units or loss replacements. Since the troop basis, prior to the initiation of combat, had not anticipated or provided for any considerable number of loss replacements, losses due to the various noncombat factors already cited had to be replaced by subtracting fillers from units not yet active or in the process of being activated. When it came time for these later units to be filled, they were unable to secure the manpower provided for them in the troop basis, for it had already been expended. Arithmetically, the explanation was simple. But a solution was not so easily arrived at.

General McNair's early recommendation that units be activated 10 per cent overstrength to take care of inevitable manpower attrition was not approved by the War Department which, instead, followed the policy of activating ground force units at TO strength less basics, about 10 per cent of TO strength.[36] Later in 1942 when the pinch on manpower had tightened further, War Department G–3 (Brig. Gen. [later Maj. Gen.] Harry L. Twaddle) proposed an additional 15 per cent reduction from TO strength for units newly activated; this would have meant that during their first few months of training units would have been at not over 75 per cent of TO strength. Theoretically, the missing 25 per cent would have been furnished to units as they were about to enter combat. Thus a unit entering combat would have as one-fourth of its strength men who had little or no training and

[36] *Minutes*, GHQ Staff Conference, 28 Jan 42. GHQ Files. DRB, TAG.

teamwork within the unit.[37] The G–3 proposal for the 15 per cent additional reduction in TO strength was not approved, principally because of Army Ground Forces objections.[38] An impasse rapidly developed because of the War Department's insistence on activating not only all of the new units projected in the 1942 Troop Basis but many more, and because of the reluctance of GHQ (later AGF) to having combat units at less than TO strength.

The resistance of GHQ (AGF) to understrength combat units was based on sound reasons. The TO's for combat units which had been drawn up in 1940 and 1941 had stripped those units of all reserve fat. The triangular division, for example, was properly referred to as "streamlined" for it had been pared of all reserve elements in an effort to make it a hard-hitting, mobile, offensive team. Its losses, whenever they were sustained, would be replenished not from any reserve in the division but from the replacement program. The old square division, with its additional infantry regiment and overall strength of some 28,000 men, had had some reserve manpower. The triangular division purposely did not. The same principle of streamlining had been applied to other combat unit TO. Therefore, a combat unit's TO strength was what was needed at all times in combat. Whenever that strength went down, the unit's combat efficiency decreased no matter what its training, leadership, equipment, and spirit. Since every man in a TO unit had a specific combat assignment within the combat team, it was necessary that all be trained at the same time if the team was to function properly. The Protective Mobilization Plan had accepted this concept and had predicated its replacement plan on providing loss replacements for combat units when casualties began to occur. The PMP, however, had not anticipated that loss replacements would be necessary in considerable numbers for combat units before they actually sustained combat casualties. This explains General McNair's resistance to the activation of combat units at strength less than that necessary for their proper combat efficiency. He was, however, always willing to revise TO whenever it could be proved to him that such action would eliminate any additional reserve fat which was not necessary for the first day of combat.

The War Department General Staff's insistence on activating a maximum number of new units after 7 December 1941 was also understandable. The United States was now at war. Strategic concepts were confused and fluid. It was not known just when or where the

[37] Many unit commanders of the 3d Inf Div, prior to embarking for the Sicilian campaign, preferred to leave such newly received replacements behind in Africa rather than take any chances on their disrupting the carefully made plans for the initial landing in Sicily. Based on personal experience of the author (Lt Col M. A. Kreidberg).

[38] Memo for WD G–3, 19 Mar 42, sub: Reduction in Authorized Strength of Certain Units Included in Troop Basis 1942. AG 320.2/9. DRB, TAG.

United States might have to defend itself against additional enemy attacks. Nor was it known exactly when it would be necessary for the United States to launch counteroffensives. In this tense uncertainty the War Department wanted a maximum number of combat units available even at reduced strength. It was partly for this reason that the War Department at this time abandoned the replacement training concepts of the Protective Mobilization Plan. The 21 replacement training centers active on 7 December 1941 could not begin to produce filler replacements to provide for the 37 new divisions and the service units in the 1942 Troop Basis. The most obvious solution—to increase the number of replacement training centers to meet the expanded demands for fillers—was discarded by the Chief of Staff for two reasons: (1) the already mentioned overriding desire to have available as fast as possible a maximum number of combat units, principally divisions; (2) the disinclination of the Chief of Staff to allocate materials, labor, and dollars for the construction of new training centers.[39] General Marshall was willing at the time to expand only the capacities of the existing replacement training centers and to complete two additional but previously authorized branch immaterial training centers at Fort McClellan, Ala., and Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark. This decision radically upset the replacement program of the PMP and its related plans, which had set two goals for the replacement training centers (RTC's): (1) providing filler replacements, including enlisted cadres, for newly activated units; (2) providing loss replacements for units in combat. Henceforth, the RTC's presumably would provide loss replacements primarily and filler replacements only for units with very high shipping priorities.

Newly activated combat units would receive their fillers straight from reception centers and thus, in the midst of initial organizational problems, they would each become a miniature training center. This delayed a division's readiness for overseas shipment. In addition, most units activated were also to become miniature replacement depots, periodically siphoning off some of their partially trained men to newer units or to higher priority units and receiving in return either no men or more raw recruits from the reception centers. This was not conducive to good training, morale, or eventual combat efficiency.

The replacement training centers as of 7 December 1941 had been geared to accomplish the first goal of their PMP program of providing filler replacements for new units. Many of the service RTC's had capacities comparable to and in some instances greater than those of the combat arms. In the combat arm, RTC's surprisingly large num-

[39] Memo, Brig Gen H. R. Bull to G–3, 3 Jan 42, sub: Report of a Conference with General Marshall.. AG 381 (12–27–41) (2). Copy in WPD 3674–90; memo for CofS, 27 Dec 41, sub: Mobilization and Training Plan 1942 (revised). G–3/6457–433 and AG 381 (12–27–41). (2). Copy in WPD 3674–89. DRB, TAG.

ber of specialists, cooks, clerks, artificers, mechanics, etc., were being trained in proportion to the numbers of riflemen, machine gunners, mortar men, artillerymen, etc. The PMP had planned this in order to provide the requisite numbers of specialists to fill all slots in projected new units. The diversion of the RTC emphasis to its second goal of providing loss replacements made necessary changes in the RTC specialist capacities. Obviously, fewer cooks, clerks, etc., would become combat casualties than riflemen. In 1942, however, the RTC's did not change over to training only combat riflemen. Instead, the War Department directed that new ordnance units receive 36.1 per cent of their TO strength from the RTC's, that new quartermaster units receive 41.7 per cent, and new signal units 48.2 per cent.[40] In mid-1942 United States forces were not committed to combat in any appreciable numbers and hence were incurring few or no combat losses which required replacements. The Philippines were written off at this time and replacements could not be sent to the forces there; the limited United States offensive in the South Pacific at Guadalcanal did not begin until August 1942; and the extensive operations in North Africa were not until November 1942.

The proportion of service units to combat units was out of balance in both the Protective Mobilization Plan and the 1942 Troop Basis. This was not precisely a planning blind spot, since G–4 studies in 1940–41 had repeatedly advised that the troop basis was deficient in service troops. It was a calculated risk based on the faulty premise that combat units would be needed first and that service units could be organized later. Service units were needed at the beginning of operations and had to have a high priority. The buildup in Great Britain in 1942 for projected operations in Africa and Europe and the similar but smaller buildup in Australia for limited offensives in the Far East made service troops necessary even before combat forces. The need for service troops led to activation of such units far in excess of the troop basis. The fact that many of the service units required technicians whose specialized training was apt to be prolonged seemed to make it advisable that the services receive the basically trained output of the RTC's in order to be able to concentrate on technical training. Thus the War Department policy was to assign the bulk of RTC graduates in 1942 to newly activated, high priority, service units. An increase of 50,000 in the RTC capacity was primarily intended to be funneled into service units although the infantry and armored replacement centers were the ones whose capacity was increased.[41]

---

[40] Memo to CG's, AGF, SOS, 28 Jul 42, sub: Allocation of Additional RTC Capacity to be Provided under the Mobilization Plan 1943. G–3 320.2 (7–28–42) in AG 320.2/295. DRB, TAG.

[41] *Ibid.*, memo for CG, AGF, 27 May 42, sub: Employment of RTC's. G–3 320 (RTC) in AG 354.1/56 (RTC). DRB, TAG.

The activation in 1942 of service units in excess of the troop basis constituted one of the major leaks in the 1942 Troop basis and was one of the major reasons why men were not available in sufficient numbers to fill units—notably ground combat units—which had been authorized. But there were still other sources for manpower leaks in the troop basis. The new quasi-arms—the Armored Force (established 10 July 1940), the Antiaircraft Command (established 9 March 1942), the Tank Destroyer Center (activated 1 December 1941, designated Tank Destroyer Command on 9 March 1942, and redesignated Tank Destroyer Center on 14 August 1942), and the Airborne Command (activated 23 March 1942)—were initially allowed considerable independence. These arms requested the activation of units far beyond what was included in the troop basis. The War Department, during 1942, approved these requests liberally and created another major leak in the troop basis.

Army Specialized Training Program

Still another drain on manpower was the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) approved in September 1942 and instituted in December 1942. This program was designed to provide technical and professional training for a maximum of 150,000 selected enlisted men, who, after completing basic training, were allocated to various colleges and universities to enroll in scientific, engineering, medical, and language courses. While in school these men continued to receive a few hours of military training weekly in addition to their academic work. The theory was that without such a program, if the war were to last for four years or more, the national stock of professional and scientific graduates of universities would be seriously depleted. The military coloration given to the ASTP was to avoid some of the manifest deficiencies of the Student Army Training Corps (SATC) program of World War I. It was assumed, too, that when the ASTP student received his academic degree, he would receive a commission and would return to the Army to provide the benefits of his higher education. The ultimate commissioning of ASTP graduates, however, was not a firm commitment.[42]

There does not appear to have been any study made in the War Department which recommended the ASTP program for *military reasons.* General McNair, indeed, was one of many who opposed the ASTP's establishment.[43] The principal reasons for the establishment of ASTP appear to have been: (1) the pressure exerted by colleges and universities which would have become so depleted of

[42] WD memo for CG, SOS, 25 Sep 42, sub: The Army College Training Programs Necessary to Provide Required College-Trained Men for Future Needs. G–1 353; WD memo W 350–144–42, 23 Dec 42, sub: Army and Navy Plans for the Use of College Facilities. For additional documents pertaining to the ASTP see AG 353/(ASTP), 1943. DRB, TAG.

[43] Memo for CG, SOS, 4 Oct 42, sub: The Army College Training Program. AGF 353/119. DRB, TAG; memo for CG, SOS, 11 Dec 42, same sub. *Ibid.*

students as to face serious financial problems without such a program; (2) the belief that the measure would encourage Congress to lower the draft age to 18 years; and (3) the desire to compete with the Navy and AAF college programs which were hoarding manpower. Whether these reasons justified the removal of 150,000 men from an Army which was already short 330,000 men for its Ground Force requirements alone is certainly questionable. The further fact that qualitatively the men so deferred were from the short-supply higher intelligence classifications from which Army leadership was largely selected casts even greater doubt on the validity of the ASTP.[44]

Special Units

Of negligible importance in its overall effect on the troop basis but of importance because of its implications was the method used to recruit men for the newly organized Ranger units during 1942–43. The Rangers were authorized to recruit within other organizations; any qualified man who requested reassignment to the Rangers (the same as aviation cadets and parachutists) had to be so reassigned, no matter what his importance or assignment in his old organization.[45]

Theater commanders, also, in an understandable eagerness to insure enough units to accomplish their missions, requested activation of units in addition to the troop basis. The same psychology motivated lesser headquarters. The harassed War Department, unwilling to deny commanders units they insisted were vital to their successful operations, approved many of these additional requests for activa-

[44] In a detailed comment on the ASTP Program Maj Gen Harry L. Twaddle, USA-Ret, former ACofS, G–3, stated as follows:

"The decision to institute the ASTP Program was made without prior recommendation of G–3. G–3 favored and instituted the utilization of civilian trade schools for the training of certain specialists who would return to their respective units upon completion of courses, but never considered the plan of sending a large number of outstanding selectees to institutions to pursue educational courses. The underlying reason for institution of the ASTP Program was to prevent some colleges and universities from going into bankruptcy. From a strictly mobilization viewpoint, the value of the program was nil. In fact the sudden loss of some 150,000 highly qualified young men, having completed basic training and possessing latent ability as leaders was a severe blow to mobilization planners and unit commanders.

"In 1944 when demand for replacements forced curtailment of the ASTP Program, students were sent as fillers to several combat units. Seventeen hundred (1700) of these outstanding young men came to my division [95th] just prior to shipment overseas. They came to the division in the grade of private first class only to find all TO positions filled. The opportunity of early advancement in grade was denied them. The adverse effect on morale of the group was apparent. Not only the division but the Army as a whole lost valued leadership by forced assignment of these men to inferior positions.

"The ASTP Program proved a distinct set-back to orderly mobilization. In future mobilization planning schools, colleges and universities should be utilized for the training of specialists for the direct benefit of the armed forces and not for the institutions."

1st Ind, Twaddle to Ch, Mil Hist, 5 Aug 53. Filed with HIS 400.3, Spec Studies, History of Mil Mobilization. OCMH.

[45] Permitting high quality men to be siphoned off by such special units as aviation cadets, parachute battalions, and Rangers has so many harmful implications as to warrant discontinuance of such practices in mobilization planning or implementation. The entire matter of the need for over-specialized units itself is one that should be given considered staff study before including such units in future troop bases.

tion of units not in the troop basis. In addition to authorized units, the theater commanders frequently formed provisional units, especially in their communication zones. Replacements intended to fill combat losses of fighting units were skimmed off to fill provisional units which never appeared in any troop basis. In part, the War Department was at fault, for neither the PMP plans nor the strategic plans had made adequate provision for theater overhead. A G–1 study in 1940 had warned that because of this planning omission large numbers of loss replacements would never reach combat units but would be drained off into provisional administrative units in the communications zone.[46] The prophecy was fulfilled, for by 31 October 1943 the War Department had shipped overseas 340,616 loss replacements while there had been only 97,809 battle casualties. Many of these unaccounted for men had gone into provisional units.[47]

The Efforts to Repair the Troop Basis Leaks

So many leaks in the troop basis had developed by mid-1942 that even the successive increases of manpower allocations to the Army during 1942 were not sufficient to meet all demands. The War Department G–3 reported in June 1942 ". . . that in some cases sufficient forethought is not exercised to utilize units already provided for in the Troop Unit Basis." [48] The War Department General Staff had lost control of the troop basis.

Unilaterally, during 1942, the three major commands—AGF, AAF, SOS—attempted to reestablish the troop basis. A major recommendation of each of these commands was to decelerate the activation schedule of the troop basis, but each command recommended that the deceleration be applied to the other two commands. Obviously none of the three commands had sufficient grasp of the overall strategic and manpower factors to provide an unbiased solution. Therefore, General McNair urged the War Department General Staff to regain firm control over the troop basis.[49]

While the War Department slowly regained control, various expedients were adopted during 1942 and 1943 to prevent the troop basis from being completely ignored. These expedients included:

1. Slow-down in the activation schedules. It was, however, not easy to interrupt the activation of a unit as large as a division once the process started. The preactivation procedures in March 1942 involved 172 officers and 1190 enlisted cadremen and led to wastage of

[46] Memo, G–1, May 40. Copy in GHQ and Theater File. DRB, TAG.

[47] WD ltr, 20 Jun 44, sub: Replacements. AG 370.5 (11 Dec 43). DRB, TAG; See also: Statistical Volumes in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. MS in OCA, DA.

[48] Memo for CG's. AGF, AAF, SOS, 11 Jun 42, sub: Troop Unit Basis 1942. G–3 320.2 (6–11–42). DRB, TAG.

[49] Memo for WD G–3, 18 Aug 42, sub: Revision of Activation Schedule. AGF 320.2/263. DRB, TAG.

manpower and considerable confusion when a division activation already underway was postponed.[50]

2. Stripping of low priority units to fill higher priority units. This expedient was frequently resorted to and imposed a tremendous training handicap on the unit so stripped. In addition, an adverse effect on morale and eventual combat efficiency of units was inevitable. It had been planned to avoid this World War I expedient in World War II and it was not done nearly as often but it was unfortunate that it had to be done at all.

3. Reductions in tables of organization. This was actually not an expedient but a continuation of planned policy. Whenever experience, especially combat experience, indicated wastage of manpower or equipment, it was planned policy to revise the TO in question to make it conform with actual needs.

Although these measures failed to stop leaks in the troop basis completely, at least they prevented the complete discarding of the 1942 Troop Basis. How serious the leaks had been can be ascertained by an appraisal of the results of manpower mobilization at the end of 1942. In that first year of the war, the overall strength of the United States Army had swelled from 1,686,403 to 5,397,674. The 37 new divisions which had been projected in the 1942 Troop Basis had all been activated, not always on time, but nevertheless activated. Many other units had been activated too, which had not been in the troop basis. Manpower shortages in the units which had been activated reached staggering proportions in September 1942. The Ground Forces were short 330,000 enlisted men or 30 per cent of their allocation; the Service Forces were short 34,000 or 5 per cent; the Air Forces 103,000 or 16 per cent. The decline in emphasis on the distribution of ground combat soldiers in proportion to service forces occurred during this same period. [See *table 68.*] Henceforth, until the end of the war, for every man in the ground combat arms there was to be one man in the service branches.

*Table 68. Comparison of Percentage of Total Strength in Combat and Service Branches, 1942**

Branches	Percentage 31 December 1941	Percentage 31 December 1942
Total	100	100
Ground combat arms	53	36
Service branches	26	34
Air Corps	16	24
All others	5	6

**Source:* Greenfield and Others, *op. cit.*, p. 210

[50] This cadre strength of March 1942 was successively increased until by the end of 1942 an infantry division cadre consisted of 216 officers and 1460 enlisted men.

The Apportioning of Quality: Classification and Assignment

During the planning between the World Wars elaborate studies on the classification of Regular officers and enlisted men, volunteers, and selectees had been prepared under G–1 supervision. This classification system was designed to determine intelligence, physical proficiency, and aptitudes so as to fit men into the best of a wide variety of Military Occupational Specialties (MOS's).[51] The classification procedures were planned in detail and were employed during the initial phases of the mobilization. The services of skilled psychologists were employed by the Army to revise and improve these classification procedures and the tests which were part of them. The adoption of punched, coded, qualification cards and business machine methods improved still further the tools of classification.

During the initial phases of mobilization until March 1942 enlisted men coming into the service were given classification tests and were assigned primarily on the basis of occupational skill and secondarily on the basis of intelligence. On the basis of occupational skill, Service Forces and Air Forces got the bulk of the men so qualified, for the primary skills of the ground combat soldiers were unlike any civilian trade or profession. Although it was unintentional, assignment of men to the SOS and AAF because of occupational skills gave those forces an edge on intelligence since generally the men skilled in trades and professions or from the upper intelligence strata of society. As far as intelligence alone was concerned, however, and where occupational skill was not a qualifying factor, the plans were to allot men equally among all the services and arms. This was done until 1 March 1942. But in February 1942 the Air Force convinced the War Department that these plans for apportioning manpower qualitatively should be changed so that 75 percent of the white men that the Air Corps received from reception centers would have AGCT (Army General Classification Test—a kind of intelligence test) scores of 100 or over. This new policy went into effect in March 1942. The depressing effect on Ground Force intellectual quality was considerable. [See *table 69.*]

Until 1943 the volunteer recruiting programs of the Air Forces, Marines, Navy, and the Navy-Marine V–12 college program were draining off from the aggregate manpower pool men from the upper intelligence classification. Men of higher intelligence after being assigned to the ground combat arms were also subject to reassignment. The aviation cadet program (the Air Forces retained these men even if they had been "washed out" of flight training), the officer candidate schools (many combat arm men were sent to service OCS schools

[51] MR 1–5, 1 Oct 40 MR 1–8, 18 Sep 40; AR 615–25; MR 1–9, 15 Oct 42 (revised 19 Apr 44).

Table 69. Percentage Distribution by AGCT Classes of Men Assigned by Reception Centers to Ground Combat Branch Replacement Training Centers Before and After 1 March 1942 *

Combat branch	Percentage distribution 1 September 1941–28 February 1942					Percentage distribution 1 March 1942–31 August 1942				
	Total	AGCT Class [a]				Total	AGCT Class [a]			
		I	II	III	IV and V		I	II	III	IV and V
Infantry	100. 0	6. 7	26. 5	31. 2	35. 6	100. 0	5. 3	22. 1	29. 0	43. 6
Field artillery	100. 0	6. 3	25. 9	31. 2	36. 6	100. 0	4. 6	19. 5	29. 4	46. 5
Coast artillery	100. 0	6. 4	25. 9	31. 6	36. 1	100. 0	4. 6	21. 5	31. 7	42. 2
Armored	100. 0	7. 4	28. 0	32. 7	31. 9	100. 0	5. 3	23. 2	32. 6	38. 9
Cavalry	100. 0	7. 1	27. 2	30. 8	34. 9	100. 0	4. 4	21. 4	31. 3	42. 9

[a] The men with the highest AGCT scores were in Class I, the lowest in Class V.

* *Source:* Palmer and Others, *op. cit.*, pp. 15–16.

and were permanently lost to the combat arms), and the ASTP all took men from the already depleted supply of high intelligence men in the ground combat arms. These departures from planned personnel assignment policies by lowering the intelligence level of men assigned to the ground combat arms inevitably hampered and slowed the training of ground units and later decreased the combat efficiency of those units. The undeniable fact that the Air Forces and the Service Forces needed intelligent men did not offset the equally undeniable fact that modern ground combat also required intelligent, physically fit men.

General McNair argued repeatedly that the preferential policy of giving the Air Force more than its share of high intelligence men was doing irreparable harm to the ground combat arms. These arguments were concurred in by Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, SOS, by War Department G–1 and G–3, and The Inspector General of the Army. In spite of these arguments the preferential assignment policy for the Air Forces, although modified in some degree, remained in effect until early 1944. During that period the Air Forces were so oversupplied with high intelligence men that they were wasted in jobs not requiring any great degree of intelligence.[52]

Although General Somervell had joined General McNair in opposing the Air Forces' getting first preference on high intelligence men, the Service Forces commander was convinced that Ground Forces should receive fewer men with high AGCT scores than Service Forces ". . . because of greater requirements for such personnel in Army Service Forces." In this argument for quality, Army Ground Forces was at a considerable disadvantage, for the other claimant, Army Services Forces, by its control of the War Department's Adjutant General's Office, was able to define the rules. In effect, one of the players was also the umpire.[53]

The protests of General McNair, echoed by all ground combat unit commanders, that ground combat units must have a more equitable proportion of men with high intelligence, were finally heeded by the War Department in 1944 when the results of combat were adding considerable persuasiveness and force to the Ground Forces contentions. The corrective measures adopted closely followed the recommendations General McNair advocated 1942–44. The measures adopted were as follows:

1. Preferential assignment of high intelligence personnel to the Air Forces was discontinued on 1 June 1943 although men at recep-

[52] WD memo for CofS, 25 Nov 42, sub: Assignment of Recruits to Arms and Services from Reception Centers. IG report in Tab 5, G–1 220.31 in AG 220.31 (6–2–42). DRB, TAG.

[53] A detailed account of the qualitative manpower problems of World War II is contained in Palmer and Others, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–86 see also: Lerwill, *op. cit.*

tion centers were able to volunteer for aviation cadet training until March 1944.

2. Individual recruiting for aviation cadets by the Air Forces at reception centers was ordered stopped in August 1943. In November 1943 AGF and ASF replacement centers were put off limits as a source of aviation cadets, and in March 1944 the War Department directed that no aviation cadet would thereafter come from any AGF or ASF unit.[54]

3. The ASTP was abruptly curtailed in February 1944 and most of the men in it became infantry privates.[55] From the military viewpoint the program had been costly because it had deprived the Army of intelligent manpower when it was most needed.

Other measures which were of assistance to the combat branches in alleviating their manpower deficiencies included the following:

1. Limited service men were utilized in appreciable numbers beginning in August 1942. The initial program for their utilization, however, was not well formulated, and it was not until November 1943 that limited service men were effectively utilized by the three major commands. The fiction of eliminating "limited service" as a classification was a confusing factor, for it made it more difficult to keep track of men who could perform creditably in assignments which did not require such prime physical condition as combat did.[56]

2. Increased recognition of the importance of the combat infantryman was achieved by astute public relations, good publicity (the "Ernie Pyle school" of journalism), special badges (Expert Infantryman and Combat Infantryman), more liberal award of decorations (Bronze Star Medal), special pay, more grades and ratings, but most of all, by the public's growing awareness during 1943–44 that the infantry was bearing a heavy load, that it was suffering a far greater number of battle casualties than any of the other arms or services, and that the progress of the war seemed to be measured by the slow feet of the infantryman rather than the fleet wings of the Air Force.

---

[54] Palmer and Others, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[55] DF to CG, ASF, 16 Feb 44, sub: Reduction of ASTP. G–1 353 (ASTP). DRB, TAG.

[56] During the period of mobilization planning 1920–40, there had been an awareness in the GS of the need for utilizing men of limited physical capacity in a war effort. The PMP's contained well-formulated plans for their use. The slow mobilization rate in 1940–41 produced more than enough manpower for all of the current needs of the Army. Hence, the War Department did not implement MR 1–8, 18 Sep 40 (par. 5 and sec. II), pertaining to utilization of limited service personnel. It was so easy to get general service men in the desired quantities that it did not seem profitable to train limited service men. In 1942 when the manpower pool was being drained so rapidly recourse was made to limited service men. By that time most commanders were unwilling to exchange general service men who had been trained for and were filling key jobs for unknown men. The resistance of commanders to limited service men during 1942–43 and errors in the adoption of the program for them delayed their effective employment until near the end of the war.

3. A physical profile system for classifying men more precisely was finally adopted, experimentally, in February 1944.[57] The physical profile system, as first implemented, did not eliminate occupational aptitude as primary factor for assignment, but by June 1944 physical qualification had become the primary qualification and occupational aptitude a secondary consideration except for a few critically needed specialists.[58] By the time the physical profile system of classification and assignment was put into full effect the war was very nearly over, and the bulk of military manpower had already been brought into the service and was not affected by the new system. The physical profile system, therefore, did not have an appreciable influence during World War II, nor did it receive a thorough test.

4. The transfer of high intelligence men from units which had a surplus of such men to the combat branches also began in 1944. In March of that year, the War Department directed the Air Forces to transfer 30,000 surplus aviation cadets to Ground and Service Forces; of these Ground Forces got some 24,000.[59] Earlier in 1944 the War Department had ordered the three major commands to reassign physically fit men in zone of the interior administrative slots to overseas activities. The vacated jobs in the Zone of the Interior would be filled by limited service men, WAC's, or civilians.[60] Ground Forces and Service Forces were able to comply with this directive with reasonable speed; but the Air Forces, one-third of whose strength was in the Zone of the Interior, found it more difficult and was slower to effect the reassignment of personnel. Later in the year, the War Department ordered the Air Forces and Service Forces each to transfer to Ground Forces 25,000 enlisted men physically qualified for overseas duty.[61] All of these transfers, which brought some 200,000 additional men to combat units from other services, improved Ground Forces physically and intellectually. The action belatedly corrected the basic miscalculation on the qualitative manpower needs of the various services.

Negro Military Manpower

The classification and assignment of Negro personnel, who constituted an appreciable part of the aggregate manpower pool, was superficially covered in the Protective Mobilization Plan. The General Staff had accepted the idea that the percentage of Negroes in the

---

[57] Memo for CofS, 24 Feb 44, sub: Physical Profile. G–1 201.5. AG 220.01/1 (Phys Prof.) DRB, TAG.

[58] WD memo, 6 Jun 44, sub: Assignment of Enlisted Men from Reception Centers. AG 15–44. DRB, TAG.

[59] Memo for CG, AGF, 29 Mar 44, sub: Allotment of Personnel Released by Army Air Forces. G–3 220.3 (24 Mar 44) in AG 220.3/2119; see also: AAF memo to WD AG–3. *Ibid.*

[60] Immediate Action WD ltr, 14 Jan 44, sub: Utilization of Manpower Based on Physical Capacity. AG 220.3 (14 Jan. 44). AG 327.3/101 (LS). DRB, TAG.

[61] Memo for CG, AAF, 30 Oct 44, sub: Transfer of Enlisted Men. G–3 220 as amended 23 Nov 44. DRB, TAG.

armed services should be the same as in the population at large so that the Negro could contribute his share to the war effort. This percentage, based on census figures, varied from 9 to 10 per cent. The troop basis of the PMP contained a number of Negro units but not proportionate to the Negro manpower that eventually would accrue to the Army during a full mobilization. The PMP, too, failed to make any qualitative classification of Negro manpower. The result was that during the initial mobilization many Negro units were organized whose general intelligence level, as measured by the Army General Classification Tests which were based on an assumption of literacy, was considerably lower than that of similar white units. Since training programs and schedules were based on a median level of intelligence, Negro units could not be trained as fast or as easily as white units. Selective service provisions and a press release from the White House, which was considered as a directive by the Army, made it necessary for the Army to assimilate a proportionate number of Negro enlisted men.[62] The draft percentage of Negroes came to 10.6 per cent, which was only slightly higher than Army estimates. For the most part Negroes were kept in separate units which meant that a Negro infantry division would be composed in considerable part (varying from 75 per cent to 90 per cent) of men in the low AGCT classifications.

The Army did not solve the problem of Negro manpower utilization during World War II. Of expedients tried, the employment of a proportionate number of Negroes with whites seemed to be successful; but one proposal, that the proportion be one Negro to every 10.6 whites, was an oversimplification.[63]

Replacement Planning

Some replacement planning had been included in all of the mobilization plans drawn up during the period 1920–40. Gen. Charles P. Summerall, during his term as Chief of Staff, 1926–30, had been keenly interested in a realistic replacement plan prepared in considerable detail, for he foresaw the need for 100 per cent replacements during the first three months of a major war.[64] Such a detailed plan was ready and published in 1936.[65] This 1936 replacement plan was subsequently revised and was included in the 1938, 1939, and 1940 versions of the Protective Mobilization Plan. Further supplementing and

[62] See : 1st ind, Maj Gen Harry L. Twaddle to Ch, Mil Hist, 5 Aug 43. HIS 400.3, Special Studies, History of Mil Mobilization. OCMH. Maj Gen Lewis B. Hershey states that ". . . neither the Navy nor the Army Air Corps at any time assimilated anywhere near their numbers of men [Negro]." Ltr, Hershey to Ch, Mil Hist, 19 Jan 54. *Ibid.*

[63] Palmer and Others, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

[64] Memo, Rpt of Conf, CofS with GS, no date [probably 1927], no sub. Misc records of WDGS. DRB, TAG. See also : Lerwill, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 15–16.

[65] C&GS, *Manual for Commanders of Large Units,* II : "Organization and Administration." Copy in NWC Library.

amplifying the replacement provisions of the PMP were loss replacement tables prepared under G–1 supervision. These tables, which refined Medical Corps gross casualty tables to show numbers of casualties by arm and service, were intended to make easier the stocking of replacements to meet combat losses.[66]

In 1939, Mobilization Regulations pertaining to the replacement system (MR 1–11) were revised to emphasize the necessity for stocking necessary replacements in the communications zone in time so they could be readily forwarded to armies, corps, and divisions as they incurred combat losses. The responsibility for this anticipatory replacement stockage was put on the army commander.[67] Even this added emphasis failed to completely satisfy the Chief of Staff who felt that the replacement plans should be even more specific, precise, and detailed.[68] Although an amplifying study was prepared, G–1 felt that the regulations pertaining to replacements were in adequate detail and should not be expanded. A revision of MR 1–11 published on 1 April 1940 made few changes but did shift responsibility for timely stockage of replacements from army commanders to the ". . . commanders responsible for the maintenance at proper levels of replacement installations."

Operational Changes in Replacement Plans

The replacement plans of the PMP as shown in MR 1–11, in Field Manual 100–10, 1940, and in subsidiary PMP plans were simple, readily understood, and practical. War Department G–1 was familiar with what was projected and supervised pertinent phases of the plan as they became operational in 1940 and 1941. The War Department Adjutant General kept the manpower records. Requisitions for fillers came to TAG who filled the requisitions with shipments of graduates from replacement training centers or with shipments of recruit inductees from reception centers. The system was working reasonably well and in accordance with plans at the end of 1941. Its principal weakness was the failure of G–1 and G–3, both of whom had staff responsibility for phases of replacement operation, to coordinate their replacement activities.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought immediate changes in replacement plans and operations. The provision of filler replacements from RTC's for ground combat units was disrupted; the troop basis was nearly washed away in a flood of activations of nontroop basis units; changes in classification and assignment procedures adversely affected the qualitative assignment of men to ground combat units; quantitatively, ground force replacements fell so far behind

[66] Memo for G–1, 10 Dec 38, sub: Office Memorandum for the Computation of Loss Replacements. G–1/15460. DRB, TAG.
[67] MR 1–11, 8 Sep 39.
[68] Memo for G–3, 26 Sep 39. OCS 21097–2. DRB, TAG.

the activation schedule that tactical units were stripped time and time again to provide fillers for other tactical units of higher priority; the calculations of pipeline requirements and ground combat losses, especially for infantry units, had been woefully underestimated further upsetting the replacement system.

Perhaps the severest disruption of replacement plans and operations was caused by the War Department reorganization of 9 March 1942. That staff upheavel left War Department G–1, who had been the General Staff supervisor of many phases of the replacement system's operations, stripped of personnel and influence. G–1 was pressured into abdicating its replacement system powers to the Commanding General, Services of Supply (later Army Service Forces), who had incorporated into his realm the War Department Adjutant General's Department which performed the replacement bookkeeping. Whether it was intended in War Department Circular 59, 9 March 1942, for G–1 to lost as much staff power as he did is not material. SOS (ASF), in fact, took over most of the supervisory functions not only of G–1 but of G–4 too. Included in the powers which SOS assumed, whether usurped or bestowed, was responsibility for the operation of the world wide Army replacement system.

Unfortunately, Army Service Forces did not have available the overall strategic picture which was necessary for proper execution of a replacement system for an Army deployed all over the world. Furthermore, the Army Service Forces, which controlled the replacement system, was one of the three principal claimants of the product of that system. The suspicion was strong in Army Ground Forces that when there were not enough fillers produced by the replacement system the shortages were more likely to show up in Ground Forces allotments than in those for Service Forces.

Army Ground Forces had been unwilling to assume any responsibility for the replacement system other than to train replacements. The administration of the replacement system, including the distribution of replacements to the theaters which requisitioned them, should be, General McNair insisted, a function and responsibility of Army Service Forces. Included within that administrative responsibility would be the establishment of zone of the interior replacement depots where replacements would be assembled, checked, provided with necessary equipment not in their possession, and stocked in storage until loaded aboard transports to fill requisitions from the overseas theaters. Such depots were not set up by Army Service Forces until January 1943, nine months after the War Department reorganization and eight months after the War Department had specifically directed Army Service Forces to set up two such depots, one on each coast.[69]

[69] Memo to CG, SOS, 26 Apr 42, sub: Personnel Replacement Depots. G–3 320 (3–3–42). Filed in AG File 680.1/5. DRB, TAG.

The zone of the interior replacement depots, finally established by Service Forces in January 1943 at Shenango, Pa., and Camp Beale, Calif., were so unsatisfactory in their processing of replacements that Army Ground Forces reluctantly (but convinced that it was necessary), set up two additional zone of the interior replacement depots to process Ground Force replacements for overseas. The Ground Force zone of the interior replacement depots were set up operationally in August 1943 at Fort Meade, Md., and Fort Ord, Calif.[70] Additional AGF replacement depots were set up in June 1945 at Ft. Riley, Kans., and Camp Adair, Oreg.

In March 1943 the War Department decentralized authority to the three major commands to assign their own allotments of inductees which were henceforth made in bulk.[71] In principle this was an extension of decentralization, but in effect it was an additional abdication of General Staff authority, for there was no provision for General Staff supervision. G–1 of the General Staff was no longer charged with supervising the replacement system's operations.

The War Department's miscalculations of combat losses admittedly disrupted replacement stocks and resulted in critical shortages and unfortunate misassignments. While regrettable, such miscalculations probably could not have been avoided. The estimates of losses were admittedly calculated guesses, for there was no data available on which to compute precise loss statistics. The infantry losses particularly were far heavier than anticipated; staff calculations had believed that strategic and tactical air power would so lighten the load for the ground forces that infantry losses would be less than in World War I. That was not correct, but it was an understandable error. A perfect replacement system would exist if accurate estimates of the numbers and time of losses could be made for all arms and services so that necessary replacements could be shipped to the communications zone replacement depots just in time to fill requisitions from combat units. Such perfect estimates are impossible.

The replacement system of the PMP and of World War II was based on *individual* replacements; there was no provision for *unit* replacement. Theoretically, the principle of individual replacement was sound. But in practice there came a point after a ground unit had been in combat for a long time and had suffered heavy casualties when the combat efficiency of that unit, even if losses were promptly made up by replacements, declined to such a degree as to seriously impair the unit's value for combat operations. Lt. Gen. (later Gen.) Jacob L. Devers summarized this problem as follows:

---

[70] Lerwill, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 252–53.

[71] WD ltr to CG's, AGF, AAF, SOS, sub: Decentralization of Personnel Procedure. AG 220.31 (2–5–43). DRB, TAG.

> It has been demonstrated here that divisions should not be left in the line longer than 30 to 40 days in an active theater. If you do this, as has been done in this theater [Italy], everybody gets tired, then they get careless, and there are tremendous sick rates and casualty rates. Everybody should know this. The result is that you feed replacements into a machine in the line, and it is like throwing good money after bad.[72]

Although there were many studies and proposals made to institute unit rotation to supplement the individual replacement system, the difficulties in setting up the change were so manifold that the war had ended before any unit rotation plan could be tested. The dangers of keeping combat units in the line too long was so thoroughly proved in World War II as to make it mandatory that future mobilization plans contain ample provisions for unit rotation of combat units as well as individual replacement of combat losses.[73]

The Division Slice as a Measuring Device

The recurrent manpower shortage which plagued Army Ground Forces during World War II inevitably led to studies concerning the causes. Even the ultimate victory could not disprove one or another of the only two possible answers: either the United States had barely enough manpower to insure final victory in World War II, or the United States wasted manpower. The dangerous manpower shortages during World War II were in ground combat units. To have increased these ground combat units would have meant decreasing the strength which had been allotted to the Air Forces and to the Service Forces.[74] Obviously in modern warfare there is a minimum strength beneath which the Air Force and the Service Force strengths cannot be decreased. The problem, then, is to provide sufficient manpower for air and service elements, but, at the same time, to find more men for ground combat units than were found during World War II.

One of the measuring devices used by military staff officers to find this solution during World War II came to be called the "division slice." This is a manpower figure which includes the strength of an average combat division plus proportionate shares of the corps, army, lines of communication, and zone of interior units in its rear and is arrived at by dividing the world-wide strength of an army by the number of divisions in that army. For example, in World War II on 31 May 1945 there were 89 divisions in existence and the total Army strength (less AAF) was 5,980,900. Dividing the total strength by 89 gives a division slice of 67,201 on 31 May 1945. Since the average

---

[72] Personal ltr, Gen Devers to Gen McNair, 4 Feb 44. McNair correspondence. DRB, TAG.

[73] For a summary of the studies see: Lerwill, *op. cit.*, ch XI. See also: Memo, Dr. E. P. Learned and Dr. Dan T. Smith for DCofS, 20 Jun 45, sub: Review of WD Personnel Replacement System. AG 320.2/520. DRB, TAG.

[74] This study includes no analysis of manpower policies in the Navy.

actual strength of the 89 divisions on 31 May 1945 was 13,710 men, for every man in a division there were 4 others behind him, theoretically sustaining him in one way or another. However, dividing world-wide strength by the number of divisions does not always actually reflect what can properly be ascribed to division support. For example, the China-Burma-India Theater in World War II operated without a single division, so that in any worldwide computation of the Army division slice the CBI troops show up as support to divisions in the Mediterranean theater, the European theater, and Pacific area. Neither are varying length supply lines and the necessity for protection of those supply lines brought out in a worldwide Army division slice.

There are two main dangers in using division slice statistics as the basis for staff studies in manpower allocations such as the preparation of troop bases. The first of these dangers is to accept figures at their mathematical value without any qualitative analysis of factors which influence and are included in the mathematical values but which do not show in numerical statistics. The second danger is to justify the percentages in a certain division slice not on their own considered merits but by attacking the validity and the credibility of other division slices.[75]

A division-slice yardstick cannot be devised which will fit all wars. Obviously, as communications lines lengthen more service elements are needed to maintain those lengthened lines and more combat support troops are needed to protect them. Fighting on interior lines during the last years of the war, Germany needed a far smaller division slice than the United States fighting all over the world. Other factors which will influence the size of the division slice are the armament and equipment of the division which is being supported. A capsule logistics comparison of the infantry division in World Wars I and II follows:

World War I		*World War II*	
Motor vehicles (319 of which were motorcycles)	1,123	Motor vehicles	1,453
Machine guns, cal .50	0	Machine guns, cal .50	237
Mortars	36	Mortars	114
Launchers, rocket	0	Launchers, rocket	558
Guns, submachine	0	Guns, submachine	295
Daily ammunition expenditure per division (tons)	47.2	Daily ammunition expenditure per division, ETO (tons)	111.2
Supply requirements, each AEF soldier per day (lbs)	59	Supply requirements, each ETO soldier per day (lbs)	67

The World War II division, although about half the size in men of the World War I division, required far more gasoline, ammunition,

[75] For a comprehensive comparison of the two division slices for the two world wars see: Col Carl T. Schmidt, "The Division Slice in Two World Wars," *Military Review*, XXXI (Oct 51), pp. 51–62.

vehicles, and equipment of all kinds. World War I, too, as far as the United States was concerned, was fought on one front where considerable logistical support of all kinds was furnished by the Allies. World War II was fought all over the world; we not only had to provide most of our own logistical support but we had to provide such support for allies. The logistical output of World War II far exceeded that of World War I.

Since one of the ways to measure efficiency of any operation is to compare it with some similar operation, it has been common in staff studies to compare the proportion of combat men in World War II Army with those in World War I. [See *table 70* for such a comparison.] However, the wide differences between World War I and World War II divisions and the variations in the methods of waging the two wars seriously detract from a statistical comparison of division slices. It is practically impossible to establish a common denominator division for statistically accurate comparative purposes of the two World Wars.

The comparison of the division slices of the two World Wars becomes increasingly unsatisfactory in its applicable lessons as the many factors which influenced those respective slices are analyzed. Indeed, the more painstaking the comparison, the more certain the conclusion that comparisons of division slices of different wars may indicate some wastage of manpower in one or another of the wars, but that definitive conclusions can be drawn only from a study of each war by itself and of the factors which influenced the disposition and allocation of military manpower.

An examination of the World War II division slice indicates the following wastages and misapplications of military manpower:

1. The division slice at the outset of the war was overbalanced in combat elements and underbalanced in service elements. As a result, some combat units were idle for months after they were ready for combat while at the same time service units were not available for use when they were needed. This misapplication was due to faulty troop basis planning.

2. Later the pendulum swung the other way and the division slice became underbalanced in combat elements and overbalanced in service elements. The reasons for this included:

a. The great latitude theater commanders had in forming provisional units not provided for in the troop basis.

b. The decline of the General Staff after 9 March 1942 as the supervising and controlling agency for world-wide army activities.

c. The tendency to overmechanize units to a point of diminishing military utility. Every additional vehicle sent overseas required cargo space to get it there and required maintenance supplies to keep it functioning.

*Table 70. The Army in Two World Wars**

Troop basis distribution of strength

Type of troops	Reported strength 15 November 1918	Peak WW II strength 31 May 1945
Total Army	3, 704, 630	8, 291, 336
Total less Air Force types	3, 514, 137	5, 977, 135
Ground combat units	1, 660, 011	1, 941, 027
Divisions	933, 862	1, 220, 230
Combat nondivisional units [a]	726, 149	720, 797
Combat support [b] and service units	945, 470	1, 847, 199
Students and replacements	454, 863	928, 128
Overhead and other troops	453, 793	[c] 1, 260, 791
Total Air Force types	[d] 190, 493	[e] 2, 314, 201

Percentage distribution by type

Type of troops	Total Army		Total less air types		Ground combat types	
	1918	1945	1918	1945	1918	1945
Total Army	100. 0	100. 0	------	------	------	------
Total less Air Force types	94. 9	72. 1	100. 0	100. 0	------	------
Ground combat units	44. 8	23. 4	47. 3	32. 5	100. 0	100. 0
Divisions	25. 2	14. 7	26. 6	20. 4	56. 3	63. 9
Combat nondivisional units [a]	19. 6	8. 7	20. 7	12. 1	43. 7	37. 2
Combat support [b] and service units	25. 5	22. 3	26. 7	30. 9	[f] 56. 9	[f] 95. 2
Students and replacements	12. 3	15. 2	13. 0	15. 5	[f] 27. 4	[f] 47. 8
Overhead and other troops	12. 3	27. 9	13. 0	21. 1	[f] 27. 4	[f] 65. 0
Total Air Force types	5. 1	14. 8	------	------	------	------

[a] Hq of field armies and corps, plus antiaircraft, coast and field artillery, armored, cavalry, infantry, and tank destroyer units.

[b] Ground force type units of chemical, engineers, medical, military police, ordnance, quartermaster, and signal, plus ground force type bands.

[c] Includes air personnel in overhead of theaters of operations and other overseas commands, together with air personnel hospital patients, prisoners, reception center inductees and other Army-wide troops not specifically shown as air personnel.

[d] Includes only "Air Service" troops and those classified in 1918 under "Aircraft Production" and "Military Aeronautics."

[e] Includes air-type TO units, Air students and replacements and Army Air Forces overhead in ZI. Will not agree with Air Force Statistical Control report of strength as shown in Table 26.

[f] Percent to Ground combat types, not percentage distribution.

**Source:* WDGS, Statistics Branch, Personnel Statistics Report, A-21, Strength of Army, dated 5 Dec 1918; WDGS, Strength Accounting and Reporting Office, Strength of Army report dated 1 June 1945.

d. The miscalculation on the number of men who would be in the pipeline and unavailable for productive military activity.

e. The overzealous concern to provide troops overseas with the luxury living standards of peacetime United States.[76]

f. The poor supply discipline of American units overseas whose wastage of supplies and equipment put a heavy load on service elements of the division slice.[77]

g. Duplicated services for Army, Navy, and Air Forces, and conflicting standards for the same kinds of service.

h. Overspecialization of many service units.

3. Many elements of the division slice manned by able-bodied men could have been filled by limited-service personnel and women.

4. Adequate account was never taken of the availability of and the employment of indigenous labor all over the world.

5. Dissipation of manpower into such luxury programs as the ASTP, and overcalculations on the need for aviation cadets, antiaircraft artillery, etc.

6. Failure to eliminate units no longer needed for the purposes created and to reemploy their personnel.

The lessons learned from the experience with division slices in two world wars are clear cut:

1. The division slice is a valuable staff yardstick for allocating manpower and for determining troop bases.

2. The calculation of a division slice should not be based on what it was in previous wars nor on what it is in other armies. It must be scientifically determined by the following steps:

a. The manpower, armament, equipment, and vehicles for a division must be sufficient to insure maximum military returns. There should not be one more howitzer or one more ¼-ton truck in an infantry division than is justifiable both from tactical and logistical considerations. Where the additional howitzer and vehicle require more logistical time and manpower and energy to maintain than they produce tactically, they should be eliminated from the TO.

b. The determination of the combat support elements necessary for a division should be carefully considered.

c. Service elements necessary to sustain the division and its combat support must be determined for varying distances of the line of communications. The longer the communications line, the more men needed to maintain it. If the line of communications is through friendly territory, the number of troops to guard it is not great; if hostile, then large numbers of troops are needed.

d. Service units should be trained to provide a variety of services, thereby avoiding wasteful overspecialization. They should be trained

[76] For an indictment of this factor see: Col S. L. A. Marshall, "Mobilization and the Nation," *Combat Forces Journal*, I (Aug, Sep 50).

[77] *Ibid.*

to fight, reducing the necessity of combat troops to guard the lines of communication.[78]

e. The troop bases for probable theaters must be a considered estimate of the precise units which will be required in the division slice.

f. The pipeline requirements in time and manpower for the different theaters and the varying lengths of communications lines should be estimated more accurately.

g. The proper application of limited service personnel and women where usable within the division slice should be given careful consideration.

h. Plans should be made for the use of indigenous labor in all appropriate situations, and this labor should be paid at the prevailing wage scales in the localities concerned.

i. The utilization of local products, both agricultural and industrial, should be better planned for and accomplished.[79] The less materiel required for shipment to our armies overseas, the fewer people in the division slice necessary to process that shipment.

j. The War Department General Staff should retain world-wide supervisory control of the troop basis. Some flexibility in division slices for wars in various theaters is necessary, for no plan can be so precise as to calculate exactly a troop basis and a division slice. The assumption that a theater commander is the only one who can determine exactly the true proportions of his division slice as a result of his actual experience on the ground is desirable perhaps, but is impossible of attainment unless there is an unlimited supply of manpower, armaments, and other equipment. That was not the case in the United States in World War II, nor is it likely to be the case in any future war. The effects of the General Staff's loss of control over the world-wide troop basis were bluntly described by General McNair:

> The overhead of headquarters in this war is viewed as staggering. We have the advantage of the most modern equipment in communications and transportation, which should operate to reduce overhead but acually is operating to increase overhead instead. . . . If commanders are allowed to indicate their own needs, experience has shown repeatedly and almost invariably that there will be no end to the increases demanded. Headquarters will go on increasing so long as this policy is followed. The results are apparent in our theaters all over the world.[80]

k. The disciplinary training of officers and enlisted men should be standardized at a high level. The serious wastage factor in poorly trained divisions during both world wars imposed a severe strain on the service elements of the division slice.

---

[78] It would be necessary to exclude medical troops from combat training for other service troops in order not to conflict with international agreements.

[79] The shipment of oranges, as a troop ration item, from the United States to Africa in late 1942, when the huge orange crop there was available for purchase, is an example of this failure to live off the country.

[80] Memo for WD G–3, 15 Oct 43, sub: TOE's for Corps. AGF 322/4 (Corps). DRB, TAG.

CHAPTER XIX

LOGISTIC INFLUENCES ON MOBILIZATION

> . . . We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation, and at the same time we will harness and speed up the use of these resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have the equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense. . . .[1]

Military Appropriations Are Increased

While the Congress had been debating Selective Service and the mobilization of the National Guard in the summer of 1940, the staff planners in the War Department gave preeminent attention to the manpower augmentation plans on which the progress of industrial mobilization depended. As far as appropriations were concerned, the Congress, for the first time since World War I, asked the military merely how much they wanted and needed. There had been a transition period of but a few months, October 1939 to May 1940, between the era of military parsimony and that of military abundance. The G–4 study of 5 May 1939 which called for rearmament expenditures of a billion dollars had served only as a planning exercise; the President had not deemed it expedient to recommend such expenditures to Congress at that early date.[2]

Following the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, G4 had hopefully prepared two expenditure programs: (1) a short-range program to provide for current critical and essential needs which totaled some $879,000,000; (2) a longer-range armament program which was an up-to-date revision of the G–4 study of 5 May 1939 and, like it, had a price of $1,000,000,000.[3] Neither of these programs got beyond the discussion stage, for the President decided on 26 October that he would request only $120,000,000 from Congress to supplement the Army's appropriations for fiscal 1940.[4] Inasmuch as Army budget programs are prepared about two years in advance, it was too late to include in the regular program for fiscal 1941 the costs of Army expansion directed by the President on 8 September 1939. Any hopes that G4

[1] Speech of Pres Franklin D. Roosevelt, 10 Jun 40, cited in *Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy,* 1931–1941 (Dept of State Pub No. 1853), p. 74.

[2] Memo, ACofS, G–4, for CofS, 5 May 39, sub: Preparedness Supply. G–4/31349. DRB, TAG.

[3] Intraoffice memo, G–4, 5 Oct 39, sub: Supplemental Directive 1941. G–4/31990–7; memo for CofS, 4 Oct 39, sub: Special Program for National Defense. G–4/31349–1. DRB, TAG.

[4] Memo for record, 26 Oct 39. G–4/31990–8. DRB, TAG.

might have had of including the long-range armament program in the supplemental budget estimates for fiscal 1941 were dashed by notification from the Secretary of the General Staff on 16 November that the Bureau of the Budget had directed those estimates be limited to the amounts required for the maintenance, equipment, and training of the Regular Army and National Guard as augmented by the Executive order of 8 September 1939.[5]

The War Department regular budget for fiscal 1941 was considered by the House Appropriations Committee in February 1940; on 23 February General Marshall discussed its provisions before the committee. The War Department requested some $853,356,754 cash, plus $67,780,500 in contract authorizations, a total of $921,137,254. Although the committee listened appreciatively to the arguments of the Chief of Staff, it felt the requests were too large. The appropriations bill, as reported out by the committee and passed by the House, cut the requests by $68,357,660 in cash and $43,780,500 in contract authorizations, an overall reduction of $112,138,160 or approximately 12 percent.[6]

In April 1940 the Chief of Staff requested the Military Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee to restore only $65,878,630 or slightly more than one-half of the House cuts in the War Department budget. But that same day the Chief of Staff had stated that the War Department had immediate needs for considerably more money for men and materiel than was requested in the total War Department budget for fiscal 1941. Indeed, General Marshall was specific on how much money he felt was necessary over and above the budget requests for fiscal 1941: an immediate need of $280,000,000 for critical armament and $19,000,000 for additional personnel.[7]

But even as the Chief of Staff was speaking to the Senate committee on 30 April, the transition period was ending. The success of the German armies in Europe and the potential threat to the United States were no longer minimized. The attitude of the senators now was not where military appropriations could be pared but where they should be increased. The era of military abundance had arrived, and mobilization gathered momentum.

G–4 was ready on 7 May with another revision of its PMP rearmament program. This time the revised estimates included the cost not

[5] Memo for ASW and G–1, G–2, G–3, G–4, WPD, 16 Nov 39, sub: Supplemental estimates Fiscal Year 1941. OCS 21052–31. Copies in G–4/31190–7 and WPD 4209–2. DRB, TAG.

[6] The testimony of the CofS is in *Hearings* before the Committee on Appropriations, U. S. House, 76th Cong., 3d sess. on H. R. 9209, 1940, "Military Estimates of Appropriations Bill for 1941." Copies of the CofS testimony, together with studies which went into the preparation of those requests and the CofS defense of them, are in G–4/31190. DRB, TAG.

[7] *Hearings* before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U. S. Senate, 76th Cong., 3d sess., on H. R. 9209, 1940. Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 166, conjectures that the CofS at the direction of the President asked the Senate Committee on 30 Apr to restore only 50 per cent of the House cuts.

only for providing all critical and essential equipment for the PMP force (the 1940 PMP revision called for 1,224,662 officers and enlisted men) but also for mobilizing this force, constructing the shelter for it, sustaining it for a year with training costs incident thereto, and for augmenting the Air Corps to 5,800 airplanes which was somewhat beyond the previous 5,500 plane goal.[8]

The President sensed the new public sentiment as evidenced by the Senate and reacted decisively to take full advantage of it. Under this favorable pressure—from the President, the senators, and from public opinion—the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, in memoranda and in conferences, reemphasized the critical necessity for huge supplemental appropriations.[9] The President's message to Congress on 16 May requested $732,000,000 of these supplemental appropriations and set a production objective of 50,000 planes per year. The Senate Appropriations Committee, one day later, combined everything the War Department had asked for up to that point into the pending appropriations bill for fiscal 1941. In addition, the Senate added the funds for a Regular Army strength of 280,000 enlisted men. The total came to $1,499,323,322 cash and $257,229,636 in contract authorization, but two days later the Senate unanimously approved it. The House, with hardly less enthusiasm, accepted the Senate revision, which became law when the President signed it on 13 June.

Before the month of May was over, G–4 had ready further appropriation requests for $506,274,000 to provide for additional tanks, aircraft, air corps ordnance materiel, and antiaircraft guns.[10] Also the United States Army was beginning to create an armored force: the mechanized cavalry brigade of the PMP was to be transformed into two armored divisions and equipment for two more armored divisions was to be put on order. At the urging of the Assistant Secretary of War's office, $200,000,000 was added to the G–4 estimates to hasten the expansion of plant facilities. The President approved the entire request and forwarded it to the Congress on 31 May.[11] The Congress again not only approved everything asked for in the President's message but in addition authorized and provided funds to expand the

[8] Memo for CofS, 7 May 40, sub: Program for National Defense. G–4/31349–1. DRB, TAG.

[9] See material in CofS Files, Emergency File (11 May–16 Aug 40), Binder 2. DRB, TAG. For a survey of public opinion see: The *Fortune* Survey XXXII, "The War," in supplement to *Fortune*, July 1940.

[10] Memo for CofS, 27 May 40, sub: Supplemental Estimates FY 1941. G–4/31190–12. Copy in WPD 4209–1. DRB, TAG. See also: Memo, CofS for SW, 28 May 40, sub: Supplemental Estimates, FY 1941. CofS Files, Emergency File (11 May–16 Aug 40), Binder 2. DRB, TAG.

[11] Memo, prepared by CofS for SW for transmission to President, 29 May 40, sub: Draft for Presidential Message. CofS Files, Emergency File (11 May–16 Aug 40), Binder 2. DRB, TAG.

Regular Army to 375,000 men. This, the first Army Supplemental Appropriations Act, Fiscal 1941, became law on 26 June 1940.[12]

Early Materiel Plans and Programs

The appropriations to provide for the expansion of the Army were being passed far faster than the Army could expand. There were no specific plans immediately ready for assimilating the 95,000 men added by Congress, but by early July a plan was approved by the Chief of Staff. The Ground Forces were allotted 55,000 of the men and the Air Corps 40,000. The ground force augmentation was distributed to provide two armored divisions (the inactivated 7th Cavalry Brigade [Mechanized] furnished the cadres for both divisions but its units went into the 1st Armored Division), a ninth triangular infantry division, and miscellaneous corps, army, and GHQ reserve units.[13] Although the appropriations exceeded the plans for implementation, the G–4 proposals of 7 May 1940 had included recommendations for mobilizing all of the men of the Protective Mobilization Plan. The Congress had provided funds for the purchase of much of the materiel necessary to equip this PMP force. The next logical step was to follow up the G–4 recommendation and provide for the mobilization of the men comprising the PMP. Late in May 1940 G–4 was directed to review the 7 May study and, in effect, to extract from it all recommendations which had not yet been acted upon but which were still pertinent.[14] G–4's revised program, ready for the Chief of Staff on 6 June and approved by him on 15 June, called for $3,233,000,000 in addition to the nearly $3,000,000,000 already appropriated for the Army Fiscal 1941. This new request was to be used to mobilize the entire Protective Mobilization Force, to sustain it for one year, to provide equipment for it which had not been included in previous estimates, and to set up as a force in being the WPD aviation objective.[15]

Although the initial draft of a directive prepared by G–4 for the estimating agencies contained a provision for computing pay estimates for both a "voluntary enlistment plan" and a selective service plan, this directive was not issued.[16] A revised directive which was issued on 8 July 1940 assumed that the National Guard would be ordered into Federal service in September 1940 and that all personnel procured, except for the Guard, would be through operation of selec-

[12] *Annual Report of Secretary of War, 1940.*

[13] Memo for WPD, 9 Jul 40, sub: Station List for an Enlisted Increase of 54,014 in Ground Troops of RA. G–3/41389. Copy in WPD 3674–37. DRB, TAG.

[14] Memo, Sec, GS, to G–4, 24 May 40, sub: Program for National Defense. G–4/31349–1. DRB, TAG.

[15] Memo for CofS, 6 Jun 40, sub: Program for National Defense. *Ibid.* Copy in WPD 4321. DRB, TAG.

[16] Unissued memo, 21 Jun 40, sub: Estimates—Program for National Defense. G–4/31773. DRB, TAG.

tive service.[17] The General Staff, by the end of the first week in July, was reasonably certain that mobilization of the National Guard, selective service, and M-day were all just around the corner.

It was at precisely this time, when the General Staff was working so feverishly on plans for increasing the Army in being to its full PMP strength of some 1,200,000 men, that the procurement planners forced the issue of making more specific the plans for ultimate long-range expansion of the Army. The issue was precipitated when Mr. William S. Knudsen, the production expert on the newly reactivated Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense [see ch. XX this study], at a conference on 11 June 1940 bluntly demanded of Assistant Secretary of War Louis B. Johnson a specific answer to the question: "How much munitions productive capacity does this country need and how rapidly must it become available?"[18] Col. (later Maj. Gen.) James H. Burns, Executive in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, had been requesting this information from the General Staff for nearly two years. Mr. Knudsen's request could not be postponed. On 13 June 1940 Colonel Burns gave the Assistant Secretary of War a recommended answer to Mr. Knudsen's questions. As far as the Air Corps was concerned the answer was easy, for the President himself in an address to Congress 16 May had set a production objective of 50,000 airplanes per year to meet the air needs of both the Army and Navy. To break this broad air goal into a more detailed timetable, Colonel Burns recommended:

1. Creation of a rate of production sufficient to meet the needs of a combat status air army corresponding to a ground army of 1,000,000 men by 1 October 1941. This would require for the Army a yearly aircraft output of 9,000 planes.
2. Increase in aircraft production sufficient to double the above air army by 1 January 1942. This would require annual aircraft production of 18,000 planes for the Army.
3. Increase in aircraft production sufficient again to double the size of the air army by 1 April 1942. This would require annual aircraft production of 36,000 planes for the Army.

Colonel Burns reminded that there were as yet no long-range approved objectives for the ground forces and proposed that the following program be adopted to fill that void:

1. Sufficient production to meet the needs of a combat status ground army of 1,000,000 men by 1 October 1941.

---

[17] Ltr to Chiefs of Estimating Agencies, 8 Jul 40, sub: Determination of Additional Costs for FY 1941 Under the Assumption that the strengths of the RA and NG will be Increased from 375,000 and 235,000 Respectively, to the PMP Force of Approximately 1,200,000. BOWD 111/PMP, Force of 1,200,000. Copy in WPD 4209-13. DRB, TAG.

[18] Memo for record, Lt Col (later Lt Gen) Henry S. Aurand, sub: Munitions Program of 20 Jun and 30 Jun 40. G-4/31773. DRB, TAG.

2. Sufficient production to meet the needs of a combat status ground army of 2,000,000 men by 1 January 1942.

3. Sufficient production to meet the needs of a combat status ground army of 4,000,000 men by 1 April 1942.[19]

On the same day, 13 June 1940, Mr. Johnson, with the approval of Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring, forwarded Colonel Burns' memorandum to Mr. Knudsen with a strong endorsement. At the bottom of the memorandum General Marshall had appended and signed: "I concur in the above quantity objectives, but I consider it of imperative importance that means be found to advance the date for the needs of the first million herein scheduled for October 1, 1941."[20] Copies of this correspondence were forwarded by Mr. Johnson to the President that same day. Colonel Burns' criticism of the War Department in his memorandum for not preparing definite time and quantity objectives for an Army larger than 1,000,000 men was on the whole justified. The Protective Mobilization Plan, it is true, did have references to augmentations which would eventually build the Army up to 4,000,000 men, but no specific timetable for these increases was included in the PMP. The directive of the Chief of Staff on 27 May had set quantitative and time objectives essentially the same as those in Colonel Burns' recommendations of 13 June but the General Staff had not yet translated that directive into effective detail.

Without waiting for the President to approve the broad objectives in Colonel Burns' memorandum of 13 June 1940, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War prepared a more elaborate munitions program in which the detailed data was provided by the "troop basis for the computation of supply requirements for the Protective Mobilization Plan and Augmentation Plans, revised 1939," and for which cost analyses had already been made in the Office of the Assistant Secretary,[21] but there does not appear to have been any consultation with the General Staff in the formulation of this program. The President in a conference with Mr. Knudsen orally approved the objectives for further planning on 18 June 1940. By 18 June sufficient work had been done for the Assistant Secretary to advise Mr. Knudsen that the costs of the program over a two-year period would be approximately as follows:

---

[19] Memo, Col Burns to ASW, 13 Jun 40, sub: National Policy on Munitions Productive Capacity (concurred in by Gen Wesson, Ch of Ord, and Gen Arnold, Ch of Air Corps). *Ibid.* See also: Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 172–77. In his memo Col Burns flatly stated that only the President, with the support of Congress, could really furnish the answer to Mr. Knudsen. But he inferred that the War Department had been remiss in not supplying definite time and quantity objectives for an army larger than 1,000,000 men.

[20] Memo, ASW to Mr. Knudsen, 13 Jun 40. Copy in G–4/31773. DRB, TAG.

[21] TAG ltr, 19 Jul 39, sub: Troop Basis for Computation of Requirements. AG 381 (6–10–39) (Misc) D., with Tables A and B. National Archives.

Total	$11,000,000,000 plus
Ordnance program	6,000,000,000 plus
Airplane program	3,000,000,000
Other supply departments	2,000,000,000

Mr. Johnson stated that to get this stupendous program underway would require, in addition to what Congress had already appropriated, a minimum of $5,000,000,000—half in cash, half in contract authorizations.[22]

The Munitions Program of 20 June 1940

Two days later, on 20 June 1940, the comprehensive program was ready for Mr. Knudsen in a mimeographed report of many pages. The overall costs had been reduced from $11,000,000,000 to $7,300,000,000 by direction of the President and were summarized as follows:

Program	*Amount*
Total	$7,317,959,672
Procurement Program	6,436,659,672
Air Corps	1,390,298,360
Ordnance Department	4,398,951,021
Chemical Warfare Service	0
Signal Corps	119,431,593
Engineer Corps	47,200,000
Medical Department	0
Quartermaster Corps	477,506,855
Coast Artillery Corps	3,271,843
Production Capacity Program	[a] 881,300,000
Air Corps	165,000,000
Ordnance Department	914,300,000
Chemical Warfare Service	2,000,000

[a] This is an adjusted total resulting from the subtraction of $200,000,000 for estimates pending before Congress and expected to be granted. The unadjusted total for the program was $1,081,300,000.

Hopefully Mr. Johnson informed Mr. Knudsen that it was not expected that more than 50 per cent of the program could be procured the first year and therefore that the $7,000,000,000 should be half cash, half contract authorization.[24]

The General Staff got its first look at this comprehensive program on 24 June 1940 when Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen. and DCofS) Richard C. Moore, ACofS, G–4, called a conference in his office to discuss it.[24] This staff conference noted that the troop basis for the munitions program of 20 June 1940 was superseded by that

[22] Memo, ASW to Mr. Knudsen, 18 Jun 40. G–4/31773. Copy in WPD 4321. DRB, TAG.

[23] Memo, ASW to Mr. Knudsen, 20 Jun 40, sub: Munitions Program of 20 Jun 40. Copy in *ibid.* DRB, TAG.

[24] Present at this conference with Gen Moore were Brig Gen (later Lt Gen) F. M. Andrews, ACofS, G–3; Brig Gen (later Maj Gen) George V. Strong, ACofS, WPD; Col (later Maj Gen) J. W. Anderson, WPD; Col (later Maj Gen) R. W. Crawford, WPD; Lt Col (later Lt Gen) H. S. Aurand, G–4; Maj (later Maj Gen) R. W. Hasbrouck, G–3, and Maj (later Col) B. R. Olmstead, Ord.

of the Protective Mobilization Plan, 1940 and that this latter troop basis was even then in the process of being futher revised. The 20 June program, for example, made its infantry division computations on the basis of the square division (which had been converted to the triangular organization a year before); and it had no provision for armored divisions which had been provided for in recent revisions of the troop basis. Obviously the 20 June program was inaccurate since its basic data was no longer correct. A General Staff committee was promptly appointed by General Moore to revise the program to make it consistent with the new troop basis and the current tables of organization.[25]

This committee worked rapidly: on day after it had convened, G–4 had ready for the Chief of Staff recommended revisions which provided for the new units in the PMP, for augmentations which had been omitted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary, and for changes in tables of allowances made necessary by the new tables of organization. The monetary effect of these revisions was to increase the overall cost of the program by $695,490,202, making a new grand total of $8,013,449,874. The Chief of Staff approved the recommended revisions and forwarded them to the Assistant Secretary of War on 26 June 1940.[26] The troop basis for major units in this rapidly evolved committee report was as follows:

Units	*Remarks*
15 AA battalions	Additional to PMP and augmentations
40 tank battalions, medium	Additional to PMP and augmentations
10 tank battalions, heavy	Additional to PMP and augmentations
12 armored divisions	Additional to PMP and augmentations
18 infantry divisions, square (NG)	No change, PMP
51 infantry divisions, triangular	PMP, except for changed provision that 12 of these divisions be motorized
6 cavalry divisions, horse	Reduction of 6 from PMP

The organizational changes which required major recomputation of costs were the considerable additions of mortars, AT guns, and 105-mm howitzers to all infantry divisions and the addition of a reconnaissance troop to the triangular infantry division. Anticipating approval of the revisions, G–4 directed the chiefs of the supply services to recompute the costs of the 20 June program in accordance with the General Staff changes.[27]

---

[25] The members of the committee were Col J. W. Anderson (WPD) Col R. W. Crawford (WPD), Maj R. W. Hasbrouck (G3), and Lt Col H. S. Aurand (G4). See: Notes of Conf in Gen Moore's office, 24 Jun 40, made by Lt Col Aurand, sub: Munitions Program of 20 Jun 40. G–4/31773. DRB, TAG.

[26] Memo for CofS, 25 Jun 40, sub: Revision of Munitions Program of 20 Jun 40. *Ibid.*: memo for ASW, 26 Jun 40, sub: Munitions Program of 20 Jun 40. Copy *ibid.*

[27] Memo for Chs of supply arms and services, 26 Jun 40, sub: Army Requirements for a force of 4,000,000 Men. *Ibid.*

It was becoming apparent, however, that a program requiring an appropriation of over 8 billion dollars was not realistic under the conditions existing at that moment. The Chief of Staff therefore held a conference on 27 June at which it was agreed that the program should be reduced for the present. General Moore then directed that the 4,000,000-man total be disregarded and that the G–4 computations be based on a 2,000,000-man total instead.[28]

This decision on 27 June to concentrate on a 2,000,000-man Army came at a crucial moment in relation to the war in Europe. Italy had entered the war on 10 June, and France had signed an armistice on 22 June. The fate of the British Isles seemed to be hanging in the balance. The prospect was increasing daily that the United States might become involved in Europe or have to defend the Western Hemisphere. Strategic plans were changing to meet the new situation. In these circumstances, the concern of the War Department for placing a 2,000,000-man Army on combat footing as fast as possible can be readily understood.

At a conference on 28 June, Mr. Johnson (Acting Secretary of War), Mr. Knudsen, General Marshall, and Colonel Burns reached an agreement to revise the Munitions Program of 20 June. The reduced goals were as follows:

1. Procurement of all equipment for 1,000,000 men on combat status.
2. Procurement of important long-term items of supply and equipment for 2,000,000 men on combat status.
3. Production facilities capable of eventually supplying 4,000,000 men on combat status.
4. Procurement of 18,000 military airplanes (less 2,181 planes already appropriated for).

---

[28] Memo for record, Lt Col Aurand, 9 Jul 40. *Ibid.* See also: Comments, Maj Gen Richard C. Moore on this MS, Aug 53. HIS 400.3, Special Studies, History of Military Mobilization. OCMH. The specific reasons for this change at that particular moment are not clear. Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 177, surmises that Mr. Knudsen and his associate Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., had reported that the production goals for a 4,000,000-man Army could not be met within the designated time limits unless the time schedule for the intermediate goal of 2,000,000 men was appreciably set back. This surmise is supported by memo, CofS to Actg SW, 27 Jun 40, sub: Revisions of the Munitions Program of 20 Jun 40. Copy in WPD 4321. DRB, TAG. Therein the CofS makes the following observations:

"The program for 4,000,000 men has been in the War Department plans for many years as the visualization of our maximum effort in man power. In the present situation in Europe and the Far East, and under the 1939 policy of hemisphere defense, a force, aside from considerations of planes and mechanization, of 2,000,000 men would seem more nearly to represent our major necessity as a basis for procuring equipment. It is feared that an over-demand for munitions might have the effect of delaying, rather than expediting actual production of the munitions urgently needed before October. . . .

"For the present, as to requirements for ground forces, it is not believed desirable to go further than the 2,000,000-man basis . . . for the reason that the strategic necessities for additional men do not appear sufficiently urgent, as now visualized, to justify complicating the already tremendous task of producing the planes and their related munitions, and the mechanized material, as well as the ground force requirements, for the 2,000,000-man effort. If time does not permit the preparation of a new schedule of requirements for the 2,000,000 ground force program, it is suggested that 60% of the present totals . . . be taken as the basis of adjustment for ground forces."

5. Production facilities capable of an annual output of 18,000 complete airplanes annually, together with necessary engines and all other accessories and supplies for such aircraft.

6. Necessary storage for all of the above.[29]

Again the General Staff and the supply services worked rapidly, for on 1 July the Chief of Staff forwarded to the Acting Secretary figures for the revised military program which came to $5,896,971,287.[30]

Also on 28 June the revised program had been considered at a White House conference during which the President had suggested several changes or modifications in the program including the following:

1. Limiting the total to $4,000,000,000 for fiscal year 1941 of which not over $2,500,000,000 would be cash.

2. Deferring for 12 months if possible the financing of new plants, which were to be government built and operated, and to make full use of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for such financing.

3. Eliminating from the procurement program if possible such commercially available items as shoes, blankets, underwear, and motor vehicles.

4. Making full use of commercial storage.

5. Providing necessary quantities of critical items, airplanes, and productive capacity.[31]

The Munitions Program of 30 June 1940

In accordance with the President's desires the munitions program was revised again by the simple expedient of deferring certain portions for future financing.[32] This revision was considered at a White House conference 3 July at which time, after an additional reduction in cash requirements of $100,000,000 (and consequent increase in the same amount for contract authorizations), it was tentatively approved by the President.[33] At the same conference the President approved the Chief of Staff's recommendation not to include in this program requests for $966,125,984 necessary for mobilizing the Army at full PMP strength. On 5 July 1940 hearings were held on the program by the Bureau of the Budget after which there was still another White House conference on 8 July where it was decided to cut $75,000,000 from the production facilities portion of the program, but the President agreed to make this amount available from other

[29] Memo, Actng SW for CofS, 28 Jun 40. Copy in G–4/31773. DRB, TAG.

[30] Memo, CofS for Actng SW, 1 Jul 40, sub: Revision of Munitions Program of 20 Jun 40. *Ibid.*

[31] Memo, Actng SW for CofS, 1 Jul 40, sub: White House Conference 1 Jul 40 on Munitions Program of 30 Jun 40. *Ibid.* See also: Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

[32] Memo, CofS for Actng SW, 2 Jul 40, sub: Program of Adequate Preparedness for the Army. G–4/31773. DRB, TAG.

[33] Memo for record, Col Burns, 3 Jul 40, sub: White House Conference on Munitions Program of 30 Jun 40. *Ibid.*

*Table 71. Comparison of Munitions Programs of June 1940 for 2,000,000-Man Army**

Category	Program of 20 June [a]	Amended program of 20 June	Initial program of 30 June	Program of 30 June as revised 2 July	Program of 30 June final version
Total	$7, 317, 959, 672	$6, 812, 995, 904	$5, 896, 971, 287	$3, 986, 995, 417	$3, 911, 995, 417
Essential Items	477, 506, 855	173, 650, 881	412, 027, 300	206, 000, 000	206, 000, 000
Air Force	1, 390, 298, 360	1, 731, 695, 904	1, 974, 741, 376	1, 664, 741, 376	1, 664, 741, 376
Productive capacity	881, 300, 000	881, 300, 000	788, 255, 000	400, 000, 000	325, 000, 000
Critical items	4, 568, 854, 457	4, 026, 349, 119	2, 286, 254, 041	1, 586, 254, 041	1, 586, 254, 041
Storage and distribution	0	0	435, 693, 570	130, 000, 000	130, 000, 000

[a] Original program of 20 June was based on 4,000,000 men.

**Source:* Documents in G-4/31773. DRB, TAG.

funds.[34] [For a comparative analysis of the evolution of the Munitions Program see *table 71.*]

The major troop elements, less Air Corps, for which the President asked Congress on 10 July for an additional four billion dollars worth of equipment were as follows: [35]

Troop Element	*Strength*
Total	2,181,302
GHQ and reserve troops (including our ComZ troops)	771,382
4 army hq and army troops for 2 armies	65,000
9 corps hq and corps troops for 9 corps	135,000
27 infantry divisions, triangular	378,000
18 infantry divisions, square (NG)	320,000
8 armored divisions	69,920
6 cavalry divisions, horse	50,000
Harbor defense	70,000
War Department and corps area overhead	210,000
Overseas garrisons	112,000

Planning Deficiencies

The evolution of this total mobilization program was based on months and years of staff work. The rapidity with which the supply services were able to furnish cost data was possible only because of the continuing studies which were being made. The work of the General Staff on the Protective Mobilization Plan proved invaluable, for the keystone of the defense program was the Protective Mobilization Plan. Without it there would have been the same floundering in June 1940 as there had been in April 1917. But in June 1940 indications were clearly visible that the planning procedures and plans were not completely adequate. The continuing lack of close liaison between the PMP planners of the General Staff and the procurement planners of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War was deplorably evident in the munitions program of 20 June 1940. The failure of the General Staff to set time and quantity objectives for ultimate mobilization was a serious planning error. Another planning deficiency had been the failure to give implementing detail to the broad PMP plans to receive, house, equip, and train the manpower to be mobilized. Errors in the troop basis of the Protective Mobilization Plan had been corrected as far as the Air Corps was concerned in late 1939, but the errors concerning certain types of arms and armored forces were not corrected until mid–1940.[36]

[34] Memo for record, Lt Col Aurand, 9 Jul 40. *Ibid.*

[35] Memo, G–3, 28 Jun 40, sub: Troop Basis for Increasing the 1940 WD PMP to a force of approximately 2,000,000 (less Air Corps). Table D. Copy in *ibid.*

[36] The WPD stated in a memo dated 29 Jul 40 that auxiliary arms, such as artillery, mechanized forces, air elements, etc., were unnecessary. See: Memo, WPD to G–2, 29 Jul 40, sub: Reply to letter of Mr. Grenville Clark. WPD 3674–39. DRB, TAG.

Almost three months elapsed between the introduction of the Selective Service bill on 20 June 1940 and its enactment 16 September. The Chief of Staff first publicly supported the measure in testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee 12 July; at the same time he recommended that the National Guard be called to active duty for 12 months (the President had first requested authority to call part of the Guard to active duty on 31 May). Authority to call the Guard into Federal service was granted by Congress 27 August. It is somewhat difficult to understand the reproaches which Congress incurred for delaying to enact this legislation. As late as mid-June 1940 the President, the Chief of Staff, and the General Staff had believed it impossible to obtain enactment at all during peacetime, because the legislation involved so radical a departure from American traditions and policy. The delay, it was to be later charged, added to the difficulties in receiving and caring for the Guardsmen and the Selectees, for the advent of cold weather so soon after Congress passed the manpower mobilization measures of 1940 increased construction costs, delayed construction, resulted in discomforts to men, and in general multiplied difficulties.[37] It is true that until Congress passed this legislation and appropriated enabling funds, the War Department was unable to purchase additional land for camp sites or to begin any preliminary construction; but there was much that could have been done by the War Department which would have facilitated the mobilization when it was finally authorized but which was *not* done.

The Initial Camp Construction Program

As early as 20 May 1940, 11 days before the President's initial request for authority to mobilize National Guard units, G–4 had asked The Quartermaster General to check on the utilities and facilities at the principal and alternate National Guard concentration and training camp locations designated in the Protective Mobilization Plan's Annex II. In the same directive, G–4 requested The Quartermaster General to supply cost-time estimates for installing facilities at camps where they were lacking or were inadequate.[38] National Guard camp data was kept both by the Construction Division of The Quartermaster General's Department and by the National Guard Bureau, but the premise on which this information was based was a brief use of these camps preparatory to overseas shipment of the units. The last time the information on these camps had been brought up to date had been in the spring of 1938 when G–4 had requested a report from

[37] It was 16 Sep 40 before the first priority units of the NG were mustered into Federal service. The first drawing under SSS was 16 Oct, and the first selectees were given 30 days of leave before reporting to their reception stations.

[38] Memo for QMG, 20 May 40, sub: Concentration and Training Areas for NG Divisions. G–4/31735. DRB, TAG.

the chief of the National Guard Bureau.[39] In the information request of 20 May it was apparent that the camps would be occupied for an indefinite period and that they would have to be suitable for the protracted training of a division. On 24 June, the chief of Construction Division, Quartermaster General's Department, forwarded the information for *permanent* posts but informed G–4 that the data for state camps was incomplete and that topographical and other engineering data for these camps was almost entirely lacking. Specific doubts concerning the adequacy of several of these camps, including Camp Blanding, Fla., and Camp San Luis Obispo, Calif., were expressed in this report which concluded with the recommendation that engineering surveys be conducted at all camp sites where information was lacking or was of doubtful accuracy.[40] The recommended surveys were *not* directed by G–4 whose only action in the matter was to call for some informal investigation by and reports from the corps area commanders whose answers were of no engineering value.[41]

On 11 July 1940, the Chief of Staff directed G–3 to prepare a new station list for National Guard units on their entry into Federal service since it was then apparent that the station list in the 1940 PMP, Annex II, would have to be revised. The principal reasons for the revision were that so many of the camps did not have adequate terrain, firing ranges, or the climate necessary for training, nor did they have utilities available for year around occupancy.[42] The new station list, which was ready on 30 July 1940, located four National Guard divisions, three AA regiments, and four observation squadrons in northern stations "for strategic reasons" as recommended by WPD; the rest of the National Guard camps were in the more temperate southern and far western states.[43] The Chief of Staff approved this new station list promptly, whereupon G–4 requested approval from the corps area commanders concerned for the camps and, if approved, directed them to make preliminary arrangements to secure the land from the respective states.[44] All of the initial camps were located

[39] See G–4/20052–110, Apr–Jul 38. DRB, TAG; NGB 685–1, Apr–Jul 38. National Archives; AG 381 (4–11–38) (Misc) D. National Archives. While it is true that Mobilization Regulations 3–1, 3 Apr 39 (revised 23 Nov 40), did not definitely fix General Staff responsibility for the location of mobilization camp sites, there seemed to be staff agreement that G–3 would pick the sites but that G–4 would check them for logistics, terrain, utilities, and construction adequacy.

[40] Memo for G–4, 24 Jun 40, sub: Concentration and Training Areas for NG Divisions. QM 652. DRB, TAG.

[41] Memo to TAG for dispatch to CA's, 11 Jul 40, sub: Suitable locations for concentration of War Strength NG divisions. G–4/31735; ltrs from CG, 8th CA and CG, 9th CA are in *ibid.* DRB, TAG.

[42] Memo for WPD, 11 Jul 40, sub: Training Centers for NG Units When Ordered Into the Federal Service. G–3/6613–291. Copy in WPD 4310–3. DRB, TAG.

[43] Memo for G–3, 15 Jul 40 sub: Training Centers for NG Units. WPD 4310–3; memo for CofS, 30 Jul 40, sub: Station List for NG Units. G–3/6613–291. Copy in G–4/31948. DRB, TAG.

[44] Memo for TAG for dispatch to CA's, 1 Aug 40, sub: Camp Sites for NG Units. G–4/31735. DRB, TAG.




Figure 11. World War II construction.

on Federal or state lands which the War Department later stated could be secured faster without the delays of condemnation proceedings. Another dominant reason for selecting state or Federal lands was the knowledge that they would cost less.

Because of the need for haste, the corps area commanders conducted no surveys but approved the camp sites in a matter of hours in most instances, six days in the slowest case. Although it is doubtful if funds were available to make detailed engineering surveys, the failure to make any sort of engineering surveys resulted in construction difficulties in several of the camps. Parts of Camp Blanding, for example, were in a swampland below the level of an adjoining lake.[45]

The Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program (Truman Committee) investigated the early camp and cantonment construction program thoroughly. That committee commented on the selection of camp sites as follows:

> The first essential for camp construction was the selection of a proper site. The War Department had given little or no attention to this subject until after the bill to provide for camp construction was actually before the Congress. The reason for this lack assigned by the War Department is that it had devoted its energies to planning a mobilization based on the theory that no defense program would be undertaken prior to a declaration of war. It was therefore in the position of having plans for a situation which did not occur and none for the situation which did occur. Even after the War Department

[45] In a comment on this subject in Aug 53, Maj Gen Richard C. Moore, USA-Ret, stated: "Of course one can see some of the mistakes in retrospect, but the lack of funds and uncertainty as to the mobilization period was responsible for some headlong action when funds became available. . . . The War Department was reluctant to embark on costly construction programs until it became evident that no other course was practicable." See: HIS 400.3, Special Studies, History of Mil Mobilization. OCMH. There is of course the possibility that political considerations influenced the selection of some camp sites. See: 1st Ind, Maj Gen Harry L. Twaddle, USA-Ret, to Ch, Mil Hist, 5 Aug 53. *Ibid.*

had requested appropriations for the camps, it did not make engineering surveys or proper plans.[46]

The committee summarized the reasons for the greatly increased cost of the initial camp construction program as follows:

> Most of the cost of the program over and above that contained in original estimates may be accounted for by the following factors:
>
> 1. Lack of adequate initial plans.
> 2. Lack of adequate organization, both for planning and construction due to peacetime restriction on funds.
> 3. Inexperience on temporary construction.
> 4. Lack of experience on the part of the War Department, architect-engineers and contractors on projects of such magnitude.
> 5. Speed in construction because of military objective. Haste makes waste.
> 6. Additional facilities ordered by the War Department after the original estimates were made.
> 7. Increased cost of materials.
> 8. Increased cost of labor due to overtime, rise in wage levels, and inefficiency of some labor.
> 9. Abnormal working conditions due to building in the winter season.
> 10. The difficulty in many instances of constructing camps in out-of-the-way places.
> 11. The use of a cost-plus-a-fixed fee arrangement on most contracts.[47]

The Later Camp Construction Program

The deficiencies in the early camp construction program were conspicuously corrected for similar programs which followed when sufficient funds became available. In December 1940 the General Staff, foreseeing the need for additional camp construction, adopted sound planning procedure to ensure that the sites selected for new camps would meet engineering construction as well as troop training criteria. The procedure developed was for G–3 to set up a list of desirable criteria for training purposes and to designate general areas where it was desired to locate new camps; G–4 and The Quartermaster General would then establish criteria for construction purposes. This data was then to be referred to The Quartermaster General who would direct zone quartermasters to make exhaustive engineering surveys of the areas designated by G–3 to determine which specific locations in the general area most closely met the G–3—G–4 criteria. These surveys were then submitted in written form to the corps area commanders together with the basic G–3—G–4 criteria. The corps area commanders would then designate boards consisting of an engineer officer,

[46] S Rpt 480, pt 2, 77th Cong., 1st sess., "Investigation of the National Defense Program: Camp and Cantonment Construction," 14 Aug 41, p. 7.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 34. In a terse comment on point 6 the committee stated:

"The War Department's estimates did not include an allowance to pay for the namby-pamby attitude now assumed toward the men who were called for the purpose of creating an army. No allowances were made for recreational facilities, guest houses for mama and papa and visiting sweeties, or for high-priced and high-powered sewage-disposal plants.

"The War Department did not even think of the necessity for heavy roads and parking spaces for motorized equipment nor for adequate storage facilities for gasoline."

a medical officer, the zone construction quartermaster, a line officer, and usually a representative of the army commander, who would go over the reports, make field reconnaissances, and submit recommended campsite locations in a priority order. These recommendations were then forwarded to the War Department, through the army commander concerned, for final decision.[48]

The system of General Staff determination of policy and overall supervision but decentralization of implementing responsibility to the commander on the spot proved eminently successful. As far as could be determined there was no major criticism of camp site selections nor of the tremendous camp construction programs after this system was instituted.[49] Time was available to make the detailed surveys required before succeeding camp construction programs got under way, but there had been time between 1 June and 16 September 1940 to make similar surveys if plans had been available to guide them.

The construction of airfields and air training installations proceeded more smoothly from the beginning for several reasons:

1. Airfields and other air installations required, as a rule, not over 2,000 acres: a divisional camp required from 40,000 to 100,000 acres.
2. Many municipal, county, and other private airfields already existed which could be utilized by the Air Force after some expansion.
3. The engineering requirements for runways were exacting enough to make engineering surveys mandatory.
4. The amount of construction for the smaller Air Forces installations was far less than that required for ground force cantonments.

The First Materiel Time Estimates Prove Too Optimistic

The tremendous armaments which the Congress authorized and appropriated for in 1940 were encouraging to the staff planners, but the basic concern of the troop commanders was when the equipment and armaments would be available for issue to troops. G–4 began calculations in the summer of 1940 to determine when minimum monthly requirements would first be produced and what the expected deliveries of equipment would be in the intervening months before minimum monthly requirements were produced.[50] Aware of the Chief of Staff's desire for haste, G–4 planned to use the answers to these two questions to determine the items where accelerated production or increased productive capacity would be necessary so that requirements

---

[48] Ltrs, TAG to CG's, all armies, 27 Jan, 12 Feb 41, etc. sub: Plans for Increased Housing for the Army. AG 601.1 M–D–M. All filed in AG 611.1–8. See also: Memo for record, 31 Dec 40. G–4/30552. DRB, TAG.

[49] The Truman Committee in a 15 Jan 42 report indicated that considerable improvement had been made in the handling of the vast camp construction program. See: S Rpt 480, pt 5, 77th Cong., 2d sess., "Investigation of the National Defense Program: Additional Report," 15 Jan 42, pp. 176–79.

[50] Memo for Col Spaulding, 8 Aug 40, sub: Time Factor in Requirements. G–4/31773. DRB, TAG.

for 2,000,000 men could be met by 1 January 1942.[51] The first of these comprehensive tables of "Time Objectives for Requirements" was ready on 26 August 1940.[52] Within a month, however, this estimate had been invalidated by increases in the troop basis for Air Corps units, service units, replacement and reception centers, and by revision upward in TO's and TBA's.[53] Not only was more money needed, which was no longer a problem, but more time, and time was still a problem.

G4 continued to revise the time objectives during the last months of 1940, but it became increasingly apparent and was frequently pointed out by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War that the G–4 estimates were too optimistic and could not be met for several critical items. All of these early estimates were predicated on the assumption that all necessary American armament production would go to U. S. forces. This assumption, which as early as 1938 had been proved incorrect for aircraft, became fallacious for all armaments during 1940 and 1941.

The resistance of the Air Corps to foreign purchases of planes produced in American factories initially had been based on the fear that such sales would divulge secret technological developments. On that stand the Air Corps had been overruled in May 1938 by the Chief of Staff, General Craig.[54] There may have been some political undertones for that decision, but the stated reason was that such cash and carry sales to foreign nations would help build up the production capacity of the United States aircraft industry and would tend to keep the Air Corps from buying planes which would become obsolete before they were used. The following year, when munitions purchases in the United States by foreign nations, including some from South America, spread to items other than airplanes, War Department policy continued to favor such purchases for the same reason: that they expanded United States munitions productive capacity. But now there was a qualifying proviso that such munitions sales were desirable only if they did not delay the Army's current procurement program.[55]

Foreign Purchases Impede U. S. Mobilization

In 1940 the increasing volume of munitions purchases by foreign nations began to interfere with the procurement of equipment for the United States Army, and the War Department began to oppose any

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] "Initial Equipment for Forces of PMP and Two Million Men." Filed in *ibid.*

[53] Memo for CofS, 28 Sep 40, sub: Deficiencies of the Munitions Program of 30 Jun 40. *Ibid.*

[54] Memo for Gen Krueger, ACofS, WPD, 11 May 38. WPD 2091–36. DRB, TAG.

[55] Memo, DCofS (Gen Marshall), 22 Mar 39, sub: Joint Resolution on Sale of Ordnance to South American Republics (S. J. R. 89). AG 400.3295; G–4 File 31317. DRB, TAG.

further sales of munitions abroad.[56] The War Department, its resistance crumbling before the President's avowed intention to continue such sales, reexamined its position and decided that it was still possible to permit foreign nations to purchase American munitions where the purchases served as educational orders and would thereby help American industry to tool up for war. However, G–4, G–2, and the chief of Ordnance cautioned that the need for secrecy should be carefully weighed against industrial preparedness and that a group of secret items should not be released for foreign sale under any conditions.[57] The Chief of Staff returned this study without action; on 25 March 1940 he suggested a watered-down version of it which was approved by the Secretary of War and by the President.[58] Because Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring was hostile to foreign purchasers of American munitions, the President designated Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. to handle liaison with foreign nations desiring U. S. munitions.[59]

The sales of American-made war planes to the British and French during 1940 was so hampering the Air Corps training program that in May of that year War Department resistance to release of planes already in Air Corps possession was strong enough to keep the planes from being released. Subsequently, War Department resistance to release of more planes to Britain was again broken by Presidential pressure. In September 1940 the President directed even division of bomber production with Britain.[60] The limited number of planes being provided for the Air Corps by the end of 1940 was reducing the training quotas for pilots by 50 per cent.[61]

During 1940 the sale of munitions not only from current production but from Army reserve supplies increased in volume. Technically, these latter items were described as surplus, but they were surplus only on the basis of equipment then on order but which had not yet been delivered to the Army. Most of the weapons so sold were necessary for PMP forces whenever they were mobilized. The General Staff opposed these sales not only on national security grounds but also because of their uncertain legality. In spite of this opposition Army reserve weapons and ammunition of all kinds continued to be sold to the British during the rest of 1940. By the end of 1940, the reserve of .30 caliber ammunition was not only critically low, but there appeared no prospect of appreciable production increases within a year.[62]

---

[56] Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 303–04.

[57] Memo for CofS, 7 Mar 40, sub: Policy on the Determination of What Designs Should and What Should Not Be Released for Foreign Sale. G–4/31687. DRB, TAG.

[58] Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 300, 367.

[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 305–06.

[61] Memo for CofS, 13 Nov 40, sub: Effect of Turning Aircraft Over to the British. WPD 4323–6. DRB, TAG.

[62] Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 310–16.

Munitions aid to Britain adversely affected the munitions procurement objectives for American forces and had a subsequent effect on training and the entire buildup. Furthermore, the failure to coordinate Britain's constantly increasing demands for more munitions from the United States with American procurement objectives made it impossible for the industrial mobilizers to set their sights accurately, nor was it possible to set up any kind of allocation program for the American and the British armies since requirements for both were still relatively fluid.

Lend-Lease

The lend-lease legislation was prepared in the winter of 1940–41 without the knowledge of the General Staff, which first learned of the proposal when it was almost ready for submission to Congress. The administration's reasons for proposing this measure seem to have been to help finance continued British munitions purchases in the United States and to devise a scheme for coordinating American and British requirements since the British presumably would have to set up and follow a long-range requirements program to comply with lend-lease provisions. Despite some initial doubts, the General Staff went on record in favor of lend-lease enactment. On 11 March 1941 lend-lease became law.[63]

The hope that lend-lease would ensure a coordinated British-American requirements program was not realized for several months. The agencies set up to accomplish that goal were not at first given direct responsibility for doing it, as WPD reminded the Chief of Staff in May 1941: "This organization for Defense Aid is seriously deficient in that it includes no agency directly charged with the responsibility of assuring coordination between plans for production and distribution of means and our strategic plans and policy, drawn in the national interest of the United States." [64] The WPD recommendation that this coordination be granted to the Joint Board and its Joint Planning Committee was approved by the Chief of Staff on 14 May 1941.[65] The subsequent development of the Victory Program later in 1941 was part of the effort involved in effecting coordination of procurement requirements for the United States and Britain. Britain was the principal claimant and recipient of lend-lease munitions, but after the German attack on Russia on 22 June 1941 Russia had a lend-lease priority second only to that of Great Britain.[66] [For some indication of the volume of lend-lease shipments see *table 72.*]

---

[63] *Ibid.*, pp. 321–26; PL 11, 77th Cong., 1st sess.

[64] Memo for CofS, 12 May 41, sub: Coordination of Planning and Supply. WPD 4321–12. DRB, TAG.

[65] *Ibid.*

[66] Out of approximately $25,100,000,000 in WD lend-lease shipments, Great Britain received 58 per cent, USSR 23 per cent. See: "The United States Army in World War II: Statistics—Lend-Lease," pp. 1, 6–7. 2–3.7 AJJ. OCMH, Gen Ref Off.

*Table 72.—Representative Quantities of War Department Lend-Lease Shipments: 1941–1945**

Item	Total	British Empire	China	French Forces	U. S. S. R.	American Republics	Other
Tanks	37, 323	27, 755	100	1, 406	7, 172	840	50
Light tanks	10, 835	7, 668	100	651	1, 683	683	50
Medium tanks	26, 475	20, 075	0	755	5, 488	157	0
Heavy tanks	13	12	0	0	1	0	0
Trucks	792, 404	292, 256	24, 991	27, 176	432, 659	9, 359	5, 963
Light trucks (1-ton and under)	240, 015	127, 755	11, 982	15, 880	77, 972	4, 796	1, 630
Medium trucks (1½ to under 2½-tons)	259, 948	97, 112	2, 616	4, 402	151, 053	2, 581	2, 184
Light-heavy trucks (2½-ton)	245, 300	26, 898	10, 230	5, 896	200, 662	1, 688	16
Heavy-heavy trucks (over 2½-ton)	47, 141	40, 491	163	1, 088	2, 972	294	2, 133
Airplanes	43, 021	26, 165	1, 378	1, 417	11, 450	2, 089	522
Heavy bombers	2, 399	2, 396	0	0	1	2	0
Medium bombers	2, 863	1, 424	131	164	865	30	249
Light bombers	7, 127	3, 697	28	166	3, 066	142	28
Fighters	17, 182	8, 720	679	723	6, 695	230	135
Transports	4, 837	3, 604	120	183	739	133	58
Trainers	7, 333	5, 356	420	28	84	1, 400	45
Communications and observation	528	222	0	153	0	146	7
Other airplanes	6	0	0	0	0	6	0
Glider planes	746	746	0	0	0	0	0

Airplane engines	48, 388	41, 522	551	0	4, 980	1, 232	103
Portable field telephones	478, 420	95, 616	24, 757	8, 999	343, 416	4, 547	1, 085
Heavy field artillery (240-mm, 155-mm, etc.)	1, 282	1, 129	36	85	0	20	12
Light field and antitank weapons (75-mm and less)	9, 911	5, 511	2, 493	851	463	435	158
Rifles, .303 and .30 caliber, all types	1, 843, 797	1, 425, 725	299, 712	69, 129	1	9, 230	40, 000
Submachine gun, .45 caliber, all types	880, 195	652, 407	63, 251	20, 856	137, 729	2, 272	3, 680
Binoculars, 6 x 30 mil and degree reticle, all models	134, 938	94, 481	4, 085	19, 786	15, 124	1, 362	100

Source: "The United States Army in World War II: Statistics—Lend-Lease," pp. 25-29, 33. 2-3.7 AJJ, OCMH, Gen Ref Off.

The difficulties in trying to distribute American munitions production among American forces and those of allied and friendly nations were very great both before and after the enactment of lend-lease. Unquestionably, lend-lease had great influence on the mobilization of the United States Army. Since the sale of aircraft was the first appreciable item in the foreign aid program, the United States Air Corps was the first branch of the Army to feel its effects. Not only was the size of the Air Corps necessarily kept far below what was considered tactically and strategically necessary in 1940 and 1941, but the training of pilots was severely curtailed because of the shortage of planes. During 1940 when the fate of Britain, then under massive German aerial assault and threatened by seaborne invasion, hung in the balance, the Chief of Staff, the chief of the Air Corps, and the General Staff were gravely concerned about the inability of the United States to train pilots who might soon be necessary to secure the United States. The risk taken in continuing to supply Britain with planes in those trying days was thus a calculated one, and it was a risk that the military chiefs in the War Department would not have dared to take had the final decision been theirs. Nor would the Chief of Staff or the General Staff have dared to take the risk of selling PMP reserve stocks of munitions as surplus in 1940. Maj. (later Gen.) Walter Bedell Smith expressed the General Staff view when Maj. Gen. Edwin M. Watson, the President's aide, asked his opinion concerning a Morgenthau recommendation to sell 500 75-mm guns, with appropriate ammunition, from PMP reserve stocks to allied governments in 1940:

> I replied that if the War Department could be assured that we would not be called upon for a general mobilization within two years . . . the transaction was perfectly safe, but that if we were required to mobilize after having released guns necessary for this mobilization and were found to be short in artillery materiel . . . everyone who was a party to the deal might hope to be found hanging from a lamp post. Whereupon General Watson took the paper in to the President who ok'd the transaction.[67]

The Congress, too, seemed to be distrustful of the shipment of essential munitions abroad, for by an Act of June 28, 1940, the transfer of any more Army or Navy munitions to foreign nations was prohibited unless the Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations certified that those munitions were not essential to the defense of the United States. The effect of this law was negligible because the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations were both subordinates of the President and had to follow his lead in continuing and even increasing munitions aid to Britain. The passage of the Lend-Lease Act, 11 March 1941, in effect reversed congressional views expressed in the Act of June 28, 1940.

[67] Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

The measurable effects of foreign munitions aid during the production buildup on other elements of the Army besides the Air Corps increased as mobilization continued. As new units were activated they could not be provided with their TO equipment. The ideal balance between procurement of men and procurement of materiel, which had been one of the objectives of the PMP planners, was upset by the end of 1940. During 1941, while the situation certainly did not improve, neither did it deteriorate beyond repair. The number of new units activated in 1941 did not place an intolerable strain on the materiel production program. The 18 National Guard divisions came into service with equipment; the Regular Army infantry divisions had equipment also. Some of the 4 Regular Army armored divisions felt the immediate pinch of equipment shortages as did some of the new air units. The equipment of the 29 active infantry divisions in 1941 was, however, in most instances worn out and obsolescent. The new TO's prescribed newer kinds of equipment, but this new, improved materiel was available to the Army only in small quantities.

At this time the General Staff decided to assign a priority rating to all units in the Army. Units with the highest priority ratings got the critically short equipment first. It was a basically sound decision, for, as a result of it, the tactical integrity of units was maintained. In the meantime, units of low priority were still able to carry on a training program with their outmoded equipment. One of the biggest problems from late 1940 through 1941 was the shortage of ammunition. Training allowances for ammunition were reduced some 40 per cent as early as February 1941.[68] The shortages of ammunition, armored force equipment, and aircraft during late 1940 and 1941 were for the most part directly attributable to the sale of American munitions to foreign nations. The shortages of other new equipment such as signal equipment, 105–mm howitzers, 60– and 81–mm mortars, AA guns, motor transport, etc., were due partly to foreign munitions sales and partly to the fact that the productive capacity for these items was still not very great.

Equipment Shortages, 1941–43

After 7 December 1941 equipment shortages rapidly increased. New units were activated at a vastly accelerated rate and for these neither new TO equipment nor obsolescent old equipment was available. The priority rating for allocation of equipment was expanded. All units were divided into two classifications: divisional and nondivisional. Units in each classification were given A, B, or C priorities, A being the highest and C the lowest. Within each priority rating there were

[68] Notes on Conferences . . . Feb. 41, Notes on General Council Meeting, 19 Feb 41, in CofS Files, Binder 10, DRB, TAG.

additional graduations: A–1 was higher than A–2: A–1–a was higher than A–1–b, and so on. Equipment was so critically short that this fine shading of priorities was necessary to ensure combat units due for immediate overseas shipment first available equipment. Units in A priority were to be issued 100 per cent of their authorized equipment. Units in B and C priorities were "training units," not scheduled for overseas. If they were divisional units, they were to receive 50 per cent of their authorized equipment at activation; if they were non-divisional, they were to receive 20 per cent of some kinds of equipment, 50 per cent of other less critical kinds at activation. Normally, units were activated in a low C priority and remained in a low B or C rating group until earmarked for shipment, when their priority would rise and they would begin to receive more equipment including the items in critically short supply. No unit in a B or C priority could receive any item until all units with A priority had received full allowance of that item. As a result B and C priority units frequently failed even to see certain kinds of their authorized equipment until they rose to an A priority rating. Equipment could not be transferred from an A priority unit to a unit in a lower priority. Since B and C units would all be short the more critical items of equipment at the same time, Army Ground Forces could not transfer the equipment among the lower priority units for training purposes.

Additional training time allowed units promoted to an A priority before shipment overseas was frequently so brief that they were unable to get any training with new and sometimes complicated equipment before they were called upon to use it in combat. In some instances, new equipment of a completely unfamiliar kind was assigned to troops as they were loading aboard transports. In November 1942 units of the 3d Infantry Division, en route to Africa as part of General Patton's Western Task Force, found in the holds of their ships crates with instructions lettered on them forbidding their opening until the force was at sea. When opened, the crates were found to contain a kind of stovepipe device with ammunition apparently designed to fit it. No one aboard the transport had ever seen this equipment, which much later was identified as the 2.36 Rocket Launcher (subsequently commonly known as the "Bazooka"). Since it obviously was an ordnance weapon, one deck on the starboard side of the transport was cleared of personnel while two officer volunteers experimented with the new device. After some deductive study, one of the pipes was loaded, aimed at the Atlantic Ocean, and fired. The roar and back-blast of the device was entirely unexpected and was followed by prolonged, enthusiastic cheers from men crowding the decks as close as they were permitted to get to the scene of the experiment. Later target practice with the device was conducted on the ship, firing into the sea. The rocket launchers were utilized to excellent effect against

concrete emplacements (although intended for use against tanks) during the three days of fighting which precede the capitulation of Casablanca.[69]

Some units were sent overseas and into combat with obsolescent equipment. For example, " . . . the 1st Armored Division, which left the United States for Great Britain in April 1942, was still equipped with obsolescent M3 light and medium tanks, radio equipment field glasses, and training ammunition, and without bazookas and observation planes. Later (important elements of that Division went into action in Africa with obsolescent equipment and suffered accordingly.[70]

So serious were the equipment shortages in 1942 that it was not unusual for AGF units in B and C priorities to have some of their meager equipment taken from them to give to A priority units due for shipment. Training equipment in the Zone of the Interior tended to deteriorate from constant use in spite of AGF directives to maintain and conserve it. As a unit advanced to an A priority and received new TO equipment it left its old equipment behind for a C priority unit just being activated. Although there were certainly disadvantages to training with old equipment, it meant large financial savings and was especially good as maintenance training.

All through 1941, 1942, and the first six months of 1943, ammunition was in critically short supply. Training allowances were cut between 33 and 40 percent. The need for ammunition at a certain phase of training is most imperative; if it is not available when needed, training is badly impaired. Such was the case until about the middle of July 1943. By then, ammunition productive capacity had been expanded to a point where it was able to take care of most of the demands of American forces overseas, those in training in the Zone of the Interior, and those of foreign forces allied with the United States.

Approximately two-thirds of Army Ground Forces units in mid-1943 were in B and C priority classifications.[71] Even had the priority percentages for allocation of equipment been met, it can readily be understood that a unit receiving but 20 percent of its equipment at activation would have considerable difficulty in accomplishing its training program. In practice, however, it was frequently impossible during 1942 to issue as much equipment to an activated unit as its priority required. Inspection reports of newly activated units in 1942 emphasized the increasing equipment shortages.[72]

---

[69] Based on the personal knowledge and experience of the author, Lt Col M. A. Kreidberg.

[70] Statement, Brig Gen P. M. Robinett (Ret), 13 Apr 53. Copy in author's files.

[71] AGF ltr to Procurement Review Board, 29 Jul 43, sub: Status of Equipment in the Army Ground Forces. AG 475/347 (31 Jul 43). Filed in AGF 401.1. DRB, TAG.

[72] Memo, AGF G–4 for AGR CofS, 5 Aug 42, sub: Report of G–4 Inspection Trip, 26 Jul–1 Aug 42. AGF 331.1/1250; Memo, AGR G–4 for AGF CofS, sub: Report of G–4 Inspection Trip, 31 Aug–4 Sep 42. AG 33.1/1355; IG inspection reports in AGF File 333/1; Memo for AGF CofS, 10 Nov 43, sub: Revision of Victory Program Troop Basis. AGF 185 (Vic Prog TB); Reports of AGF Observers in AGF File 319/1 (Foreign Observers). DRB, TAG.

Army Ground Forces never gave up trying to divert more of the equipment coming off production lines to units in training. In July 1943 General McNair recommended that the allotment of TO equipment to divisions be raised from 50 percent to 100 percent at the end of six months of training so that the divisions could get at least a modicum of training with all equipment before going overseas. OPD disapproved the request: the equipment was just not available unless lend-lease commitments were cut which could not be done because of strategic reasons.[73] At the same time, General McNair unsuccessfully urged that nondivisional units receive 50 percent of their TO equipment at activation, instead of 20 percent, and 100 percent TO equipment after four months of training.[74] There were many somber warnings from AGF that the shortages of equipment were adversely affecting training.[75] [See *table 73* for a list of representative training shortages in February 1943.]

*Table 73. Shortages in Representative Items of Training Equipment, 28 February 1943**

Item [a]	Training allowance	On hand	Shortages
Flame Thrower, Portable M–1	1, 872	288	1, 584
Binoculars, M–3	109, 271	57, 043	52, 228
Car, armored, light M–8	2, 547	172	2, 375
Gun, submachine, cal .45	73, 210	49, 176	24, 034
Howitzer, 105–mm	2, 312	1, 653	659
Mortar, 60–mm M–2	4, 713	2, 586	2, 127
Mortar, 81–mm M1	3, 675	1, 943	1, 732
Rifles and carbines, all types	1, 313, 746	612, 725	701, 021
Rifle, BAR	24, 682	7, 437	17, 245
Truck, 2½ T Cargo, 6 x 6	70, 045	33, 813	36, 232
Radio Set SCR–510	8, 290	2, 912	5, 378
Switchboard, BD–71	5, 387	2, 597	2, 790

[a] Armored shortages are not shown since the Armored Command at the time requisitioned its own equipment and compiled its own reports.

**Source.* AGF ltr to CG, ASF, 6 Apr 43, sub: Equipment for Army Ground Forces. AGF 401–1. DRB, TAG.

The ingenuity and native skills of commanders and instructors helped to cope with the equipment shortages in training. Trucks were used to simulate tanks, pipes for mortars and artillery, blocks of wood for mines, sticks for rifles, etc. Mock-ups of every variety were improvised to take the place of the unavailable equipment. All

[73] AGF Memo for CofS, 3 Jul 43, with OPD ind, 26 Jul 43, sub: Policies Governing Issues of Equipment. AGF 320.2/22 (TUB 43). DRB, TAG.

[74] *Ibid.*

[75] See: AGF ltr to CG, ASF, 6 Apr 43, sub: Equipment for Army Ground Forces. AGF 401.1. DRB, TAG.

of these expedients helped to some degree, but they were far from enough. The conclusion is reasonably certain that many American divisions were less efficient in their first combat actions than they would have been had more of their TO equipment and training ammunition allowances been available during their period of training. Lessening of combat efficiency is always measurable in greater numbers of casualties, as well as lack of tactical success.[76]

The diversion of equipment to lend-lease and the consequent shortages of equipment for American units in training was a calculated risk. The PMP had planned and hoped for balance between personnel and equipment procurement. The failure to achieve this part of the PMP was not due to faulty planning but to the unforeseen and tremendous allocations of materiel to lend-lease and its predecessor foreign aid programs. The principle of the PMP, however, that training and combat efficiency are best achieved when equipment is available for men as they are mobilized was proved sound.

---

[76] AGF Board Ltr to CG, AGF, 21 Nov 43, sub: Report 82, AGF Board. AFHQ-NATO 319.1 (NATO) with inclosures. DRB, TAG.

CHAPTER XX

INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION ORGANIZATION [1]

The Industrial Mobilization Plan Discarded

For a time it appeared reasonable to suppose that the Industrial Mobilization Plan, produced after years of planning by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and by the supply services, would be used, if not in whole at least in part, for the accomplishment of the industrial phases of the expanding mobilization. It was true that the Industrial Mobilization Plan had been attacked by left-wing groups, but such opinions were not rated very high in the War Department. Congress had shown considerable interest in the Industrial Mobilization Plan; in 1938 some 13 bills to implement one or another of the provisions of the IMP had been introduced in Congress. As late as December 1940 Sen. Robert A. Taft had introduced a bill to put into effect many of the provisions of the IMP. True, Congress had not passed any of these measures, but conceivably that was because the time was not ripe.

The War Resources Board

Assistant Secretary of War Louis B. Johnson was an enthusiastic sponsor of the IMP and believed that the plan could and would be utilized. When Mr. Johnson and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison announced the formation of a War Resources Board (WRB) on 9 August 1939, the Industrial Mobilization Plan appeared to be on its way to being implemented. Mr. Johnson in his welcome to members of the Board informed them that in the event of emergency and war, the War Resources Board would become a superagency analogous in its powers and functions to the War Industries Board of World War I. Unfortunately, the creation of this War Resources Board in 1939 signalized the beginning of the end of the IMP.

The personnel of the War Resources Board included prominent industrialists and business men,[2] but the failure to include representa-

[1] This chapter is based principally on material contained in *The United States at War, op. cit.*

[2] Edward Stettinius, Jr., U. S. Steel; John Lee Pratt, General Motors; Robert E. Wood, Sears, Roebuck; Walter S. Gifford, American Telephone and Telegraph; John Hancock, Lehman Brothers; Harold G. Moulton, President of Brookings Institution; and Karl T. Compton, President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

tives of labor and agriculture on the Board led to criticism.[3] The War Resources Board reviewed the Industrial Mobilization Plan, surveyed inventories of key industries, and studied the problem of skilled labor supply in the event of war. The Board's insistence for precise facts and statistical figures was the direct cause of the establishment of the Statistical Branch in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War.

The criticism aroused by the Board's composition was so strong that the President within six weeks announced that the WRB would be inactivated as soon as its report was submitted. The report, submitted in October 1939, generally approved the provisions of the Industrial Mobilization Plan, except that it disapproved a centralization of authority in one superagency and favored instead several coordinate superagencies. Nevertheless, the report was not made public, probably because the President wanted to let the War Resources Board disband without further criticism and because war had begun in Europe on 1 September 1939, and the WRB and the IMP were associated with the involvement of the United States in war.

The Office of Emergency Management

The disbandment of the War Resources Board indicated that the Industrial Mobilization Plan was dormant as far as executive planning in the United States was concerned, but the office of the Assistant Secretary of War still hoped that it might be revived. It became reasonably apparent that this hope was futile when the President on 25 May 1940 established by administrative order an Office for Emergency Management (OEM) in the Executive Office of the President. The OEM is sometimes forgotten in the bewildering series of war agencies because it was one of the earliest and disappeared first. During its existence, OEM served two purposes:

1. It helped coordinate and direct emergency agencies which were beginning to mushroom by serving as a sort of secretariat for the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense.
2. Together with the Advisory Commission it provided from within its organization the seeds from which some of the important war agencies grew, including the National Labor Relations Board, Office of Civilian Defense, Office of Defense Transportation, War Food Administration, War Manpower Commission, National Housing Agency, and Office of Price Administration.

The Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense

The OEM, however, was almost immediately overshadowed when the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense, which

[3] See editorial in the [Washington] *Evening Star*, 8 Oct 39; The *Washington Daily News*, 22 Aug 39, has the critical comments of Maj Gen Hugh Johnson.

was still authorized by virtue of the National Defense Act of 1916, was reestablished 28 May 1940. The membership of the Advisory Commission was selected with political astuteness.[4] The advisors made no pretense of reporting to the legal fiction of a Council of National Defense (composed of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor) but reported directly and individually to the President. The Advisory Commission was an administrative monstrosity with seven independent legs and no head, but it worked far better than might have been expected because of the competence of the advisors. Although they reported individually to the President, they met often to correlate their policies to a degree. They had no authority to compel action, but they were able to accomplish much by advice, suggestions, pleas, and arguments. As the industrial mobilization progressed, however, it became apparent that more effective supervision was needed. Facilities, machine tools, and materials were becoming exceedingly scarce. Manufacturers, faced with rising civilian demands, were increasingly reluctant to accept munitions orders; nor were they willing at their own risk to expand productive facilities. As the production market tightened, even the procurement agencies of the Army and Navy were disinclined to accept advice from an Advisory Commission which could not guarantee delivery of end products.[5]

The Office of Production Management

The next major agency established was the Office of Production Management (OPM).[6] This agency was a curiously blended compromise of many pressures. Since its mission was to stimulate production, an industrial production tycoon, William M. Knudsen, was made its director general; but since labor's support was also essential, Sidney Hillman was made its associate director general. The Secretaries of War and Navy were members of the OPM Council, which was the policy organization. The OPM itself, under the dual leadership of Knudsen and Hillman, was given overall responsibility for

[4] The members of the Advisory Commission and the spheres of their advisory capacity were: Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., industrial materials; William S. Knudsen, industrial production; Sidney Hillman, labor; Leon Henderson, price stabilization; Chester C. Davis, agriculture; Ralph Budd, transportation; and Harriet Elliot, consumer protection.

[5] Donald M. Nelson, *Arsenal of Democracy* (New York, 1946), p. 103, mentions an example of the work done under the supervision of the Advisory Commission:

"One of the fine pieces of work done by NDAC was performed by Robert T. Stevens of J. P. Stevens & Co., working closely with the Department of Purchases. He arranged for a very large shipment of wool to be brought in from Australia late in 1940 before shipping channels became clogged. Having this wool stockpile in the country prevented us from ever being short of wool and enabled us to have clothing made for the Army with very little interference with civilian supply. During World War I, with even smaller purchases, we were constantly in trouble over wool. Stevens later became a colonel in the Quartermaster Corps and was one of General Gregory's very able assistants."

[6] EO 8629. 7 Jan 41. 6 *Federal Register* 191.

defense production, including the coordination of the many government agencies involved.

The organization of the OPM contained three functional divisions (Purchases, Production, Priorities) and two staff divisions (Bureau of Research and Statistics and the Production Planning Board). The three functional divisions operated with relative independence, each with its own commodity and industry branches. The result was overlapping of functions, duplication of liaison groups, red tape, contradictions, delays, and chaotic confusion. Business men, industrial representatives, and Army and Navy procurement officers seeking decisions were shunted back and forth from division to division, sometimes for days and weeks. To correct this situation OPM was eventually reorganized along commodity or industry lines as had been proposed in the Industrial Mobilization Plan. The only compelling force at OPM's disposal was the priorities power, whose latent influence was so great and so clearly understood that the power itself did not have to be exercised until late in 1941.[7] With the exception of that one year, the OPM, like the Advisory Commission (which faded out of existence in October 1941), could only advise, needle, cajole, or coordinate.

The Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supplies

In April 1941 another agency, the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply (OPACS), was created by Executive order.[8] It was charged with responsibility for civilian supply and price controls and was intended to prevent such evils as price spirals, profiteering, inflation, and hoarding. OPACS had no power to set price controls but could only advise.

The OPM, in spite of its restricted power and its two-headed leadership, functioned reasonably well after its June 1941 reorganization. A dispute between OPM and OPACS (headed by Leon Henderson) was resolved in August 1941 in favor of OPM, which was granted power over all priorities. As an aftermath of the controversy OPM was again reorganized (two new divisions, materials and civilian supply, were added); OPACS was reorganized and redesignated the Office of Price Administration (OPA); and a new agency, the Supply Priorities and Allocation Board (SPAB), was established on 28 August 1941 as a policy-making and coordinating hub for the entire defense program.

Instances of common membership in OPM, OPA, and SPAB thoroughly confused lines of authority. A subordinate in one agency could be and was the senior in another of the agencies. SPAB had

[7] *The United States at War, op. cit.*, p. 55.
[8] EO 8734, 11 Apr 41. 6 *Federal Register* 1941.

power to determine the total requirements of materials and commodities needed for defense, civilian, and other purposes and to determine policies and make regulations governing allocations and priorities of commodities among the various claimant agencies. SPAB was powerful even though it was a top-level policy agency only, with no operating functions. Its decisions were implemented by OPM, OPA, the Army and the Navy.

The War Production Board

Because of its confused cross-channeling of authority which conceivably would have resulted in friction and stalemate, SPAB did not survive long after the entrance of the United States into the war. On 16 January 1942 OPM and SPAB were abolished and the War Production Board (WPB) was set up in their place.[9] Mr. Donald M. Nelson was named chairman of the War Production Board, and Mr. Knudsen went to the War Department as top advisor on production with the rank of lieutenant general.

The tremendous powers granted to the WPB and its chairman were not far from those envisaged in the Industrial Mobilization Plan for the top superagency and certainly afforded greater control over the American economy than any previous industrial agency. Those powers included:

1. General direction of the war procurement and production program.
2. Determination of the policies, plans, and procedures of the several Federal departments and agencies having influence upon war procurement and production.
3. Administration of priority grants and the allocation of vital materials and production facilities.

The chairman, Mr. Nelson, could overrule his Board, for its functions were only to advise and assist him. Under his expressed powers the chairman of WPB could have taken over all military procurement; however, he chose not to do so because of the peculiar nature of military specifications and equipment. When confusion still existed in economic mobilization after WPB was created, the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program (Truman Committee) reported on 11 March 1943:

> . . . Mr. Nelson informed the committee that he had sufficient authority to take any action that might be necessary and that he proposed to exercise his powers and get the job done. . . . Had Mr. Nelson proceeded accordingly, many of the difficulties with which he has been confronted in recent months might never have arisen. Instead, Mr. Nelson delegated most of his powers to the War and Navy Departments, and to a succession of so-called czars. This

[9] EO 9024, 16 Jan 42. 7 *Federal Register* 329.

made it difficult for him to exercise the functions for which he was appointed. At the same time, none of the separate agencies had sufficient authority to act alone.[10]

This was sharp criticism, but either Mr. Nelson was the wrong man for the job or else the WPB was created so late that it was impossible for its chairman to successfully challenge existent, entrenched agencies which were made subordinate to WPB. The frequent reorganizations of WPB, together with the tangled maze of its relationships with other agencies, continued to delay, harass, and anger business men who needed decisions. WPB was so fully occupied with directing the flow of materials that by 1943 it had relinquished overall control of economic mobilization.

The Office of War Mobilization

The increasing volume of criticism at this "buck passing," which was impeding and slowing down economic mobilization, led the President on 27 May 1943 to establish the Office of War Mobilization (OWM) with Mr. James F. Byrnes as director. The OWM was given authority over all functions that had been WPB's and in addition was given control over manpower. Mr. Byrnes exercised control by listening to arguments from disputing agencies after conflicts had developed and by making the necessary decisions. The concept in the Industrial Mobilization Plan was for the War Resources Administrator to have information flow to him in advance so he could make decisions before dissensions occurred impeding mobilization. It was too late to fulfill that concept when Mr. Byrnes assumed the difficult job as head of OWM.

Other Emergency Economic Mobilization Agencies


Other emergency agencies which were created to meet special problems during the war were:

1. *The War Manpower Commission* (WMC), created by Executive order on 18 April 1942 with the mission of ensuring effective coordination of the mobilization and utilization of manpower in the prosecution of the war.[11] Paul V. McNutt was chairman of WMC. WMC was not an operational agency and had no power to draft, assign, or punish civilian workers. Manpower procurement and allocation activities were divided among a host of operating agencies, including the Army, Navy, Selective Service System, Department of Labor, Department of Agriculture, the Federal Security Agency, Civil Service Commission, and WPB. WMC was never an effective coor-

[10] S. Rpt. 10, pt. 4, 78th Cong., 1st sess., "Investigation of the National Defense Program: Second Annual Report," 11 Mar 43.

[11] EO 9139, 18 Apr 42. 7 *Federal Register* 2919.

Chart 30. Development of the War Organization.



Source: Bureau of the Budget.

dinator and in striving to become an operating agency met with frustration and ineffectiveness.[12]

2. *The War Shipping Administration* (WSA), created by executive order on 7 February 1942 and charged with all matters pertaining to shipping, except combatant and transport ships operated by the Navy, Coast Guard, and Army.[13] The War Shipping Administrator was Adm. Emory S. Land and his deputy was Lewis W. Douglas, who handled ship utilization and priorities.

3. *The Office of Price Administration* (OPA), created initially by executive order but later given statutory authority. It had the mission of stabilizing prices, wages, and salaries on the level of 15 September 1942 and of controlling rationing.[14] Leon Henderson was OPA administrator.

4. *The Office of Defense Transportation* (ODT), created by executive order on 18 December 1941 with the mission of coordinating transportation policies and activities of governmental and private transportation agencies in the Zone of the Interior.[15] This agency functioned very closely as planned in the Industrial Mobilization Plan. Joseph B. Eastman was director of ODT.

5. *The War Food Administration*, first established as the Food Production Administration, a subsidiary agency of the Department of Agriculture. It was later made an independent agency but continued to operate within the Department of Agriculture.[16]

6. A host of other emergency agencies also created in 1941–42 included the Coordinator of Information, the Office of Civilian Defense, the Economic Defense Board, the Petroleum Coordinator, and the National Defense Mediation Board.[17] [For a graphic description of the evolution of the economic control agencies see *chart 30.*]

The Purposes Served by the Industrial Mobilization Plan

The economic mobilization provisions of the Industrial Mobilization Plan were not used by the Executive agencies of the Government during World War II. However, the procurement provisions of the IMP were used by the War Department procurement agencies during the war but only to a limited degree. The procurement provisions hinged on the allocation of facilities to the Army and Navy. The progressive mobilization which occurred in 1939, 1940, and 1941

[12] One exception to this general statement was the WMC Procurement and Assignment Service for Physicians, Dentists, and Veterinarians which attempted to control the number of medical practitioners assigned to the Army and Navy within limits so that an adequate number would be left in the civilian community. See: Comment, Ch Historian, Hist Unit, AMeS, on this MS, 2 Oct 53. HIS 400.3, Spec Studies, History of Mil Mobilization. OCMH.

[13] EO 9054, 7 Feb 42. 7 *Federal Register* 837.

[14] 56 *Stat.* 29.

[15] EO 8989, 18 Dec 41. 6 *Federal Register* 6725.

[16] EO 9280, 5 Dec 42. 7 *Federal Register* 10179; EO 9322, 26 Mar 43. 8 *Federal Register* 3807; EO 9334, 19 Apr 43. 8 *Federal Register* 5423.

[17] For a complete list of the war agencies, see *The United States at War, op. cit.*, app. I.

destroyed the original allocation principle, because, in that slow mobilization, both the Army and the Navy continued to let contracts by bids rather than by negotiation with allocated facilities. The Army and the Navy were understandably hesitant about negotiating contracts in peacetime which might incur congressional displeasure. Even after Congress authorized the letting of contracts by negotiation on 2 July 1940, the War Department procurement agencies persisted in letting some contracts by competitive bids until 3 March 1942 when the chairman of the War Production Board issued an order requiring that contracts be negotiated and competitive bids be discontinued. The huge flood of orders which came from Europe in 1940 and 1941 had gone to so many of the factories which were on the facilities allocations lists of the Army that those factories presumably were not available for the missions assigned to them in the IMP.

In spite of these handicaps, it appears that the Ordnance, Signal, Engineer, Air Force, and Chemical Warfare procurement services, on the basis of the plant surveys and industrial contracts they had made in connection with the IMP, had become so familiar with factory capabilities that even when competitive bids were resorted to, their contracts in a surprising number of cases went to allocated facilities as surely as if the contracts had been negotiated. In April 1941 the Chief of Ordnance stated that 95 percent by amount and 91 percent by number of ordnance contracts had been placed in accordance with prewar plans. In July 1941 Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson stated before the Truman Committee:

> When the burden of the present defense program was placed on the Department, the supply services immediately started operating under the industrial mobilization plan. They promptly placed orders for munitions with plants previously allocated, using informal competition wherever possible. In this way, the Ordnance Department has placed 85 percent of its orders for small arms, artillery, and ammunition components with industrial concerns already familiar with the problems.[18]

A sample study by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces of available statistics of Navy, Ordnance Department, Air Forces, Signal Corps, Corps of Engineers, and Chemical Warfare Service procurement activities during various periods of World War II reached the following findings:

1. 95 percent of the value of war contracts was awarded to allocated facilities.

2. 63 percent of the plants receiving contracts were allocated facilities.

3. 85 percent of allocated facilities were engaged in war production.

The discrepancy between findings 1 and 2 indicates that allocated facilities were receiving the bulk of the contracts and that divergences

[18] A copy of this testimony is in WPD 3674-66. DRB, TAG.

from the procurement plan were for small contracts. The failure to include quartermaster and medical procurement activities in the study was due to the fact that the items purchased by these services were easily obtainable and so could be readily procured by competitive bids at any time or any place.[19]

It appears then that, although the plan for allocated facilities was not followed exactly as contemplated in the Industrial Mobilization Plan, the results expected of the plan were substantially achieved. In this respect the Industrial Mobilization Plan was utilized and was of considerable assistance in procurement implementation.

The Army-Navy Munitions Board (ANMB) did not play the part intended for it in the Industrial Mobilization Plan. It had been planned that this Board would provide guidance for industrial mobilization during the interim period after M-day while the War Resources Administration of the IMP was getting itself organized. By 7 December 1941 the progress of mobilization had been such that several emergency mobilization agencies were already functioning.

During 1942 the ANMB's most important function was to set priorities for all contracts of the Army, Navy, Maritime Commission, Coast Guard, and for some lend-lease orders. The ANMB was the medium through which the armed services presented their requirements to the War Production Board; the united front thus represented by the ANMB was a strong position for ensuring service priorities in disputed matters before the War Production Board. Later, in November 1942, during a WPB shakeup, most of the personnel from the ANMB were transferred to the industry divisions of the WPB which effectively split the Army-Navy united front on priorities. Thereafter each service represented itself before WPB. The ANMB declined in influence and was limited in its activity to determining priorities only. On 28 July 1943 in another reorganization approved by the President, the ANMB was left with only the function of directing the work of the Strategic Materials Committee.

The supply services of the Army and the Navy both misestimated to a considerable degree the amounts of strategic materials which they would eventually need for munitions. The IMP estimates for a 4,000,000-man Army included the following material estimates which were in error:[20]

Material	*IMP estimate*	*1942 estimate*
Aluminum	500,000,000 lbs	1,000,000,000 lbs.(+)
Copper	25,000 tons	1,000,000 tons.
Silk	13,000,000 lbs	3,000,000 lbs.

In copper and aluminum the estimates were far too low; in silk they were too high. Admittedly, the Army's estimates of materials needed

[19] *Use of the Industrial Mobilization Plan in World War II.* (The Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Department of Research Publication No. R 63, [Washington, 1945].)

[20] *The United States at War, op. cit.*, p. 81.

were inaccurate; in most cases they were far too modest. Part of the errors were due to the fact that the initial Army estimates understandably had not included lend-lease requirements. But even discounting lend-lease, the Army's estimates were not accurate. This error was caused by the lack of an adequate statistics agency in the War Department until 1940. Although the requirements estimates of the IMP were not always correct, they served to get the industrial production program going. The Army in 1940 knew pretty well what it wanted, but it wasn't sure exactly how much.

There have been many reasons offered for the failure to utilize the industrial mobilization provisions of the Industrial Mobilization Plan. Actually so many factors were involved that it is impossible to find any one single factor which was primarily responsible. Following are some of the reasons:

1. The Industrial Mobilization Plan was prepared almost entirely by military agencies. In the National Defense Act of 1920 the Congress had directed the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War to prepare such a plan. Unfortunately the War Department took the wording of that law too literally. The essentially military origin of the IMP was undoubtedly one of the chief reasons why the plan failed to win greater public acceptance and support.

2. The IMP was rigidly based on the M-day concept and so lacked the flexibility necessary for adaptation to the gradual mobilization which occurred.

3. The IMP envisaged a one-front war, such as World War I, and hence lacked many of the details necessary for a global war.

4. The industrial mobilization planners lacked objectivity to a degree where they were unwilling to correlate the new and old governmental line agencies with the emergency agencies. The resistance of these established agencies to the IMP was a tremendous influence. Similarly, the IMP was based on all new legislation and made no effort to employ any existing legislation which might have been used advantageously.[21] There were other reasons, many of them political

[21] The Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program listed three main reasons why the IMP was not used:

". . . the industrial mobilization plan was never invoked before or during World War II. Any number of reasons have been offered in explanation of the failure to enact the plan. Without attempting to assess responsibility for this situation, the committee feels it is significant from the point of view of our future national defense to mention three principal contributing factors:

1. The gradual nature of our economic involvement in World War II was undoubtedly primarily responsible for the failure to invoke the industrial mobilization plan according to schedule.

2. Public opinion prior to the outbreak of war was sharply divided as to the role this country should play in the European conflict.

3. Congress had never repealed the National Defense Act of 1916 setting up the advisory council method of defense organization; it never gave legislative sanction to the industrial mobilization plan revision of 1939, and it failed to remove or suspend such restrictive legislation as, for example, the competitive bidding system."

See: S. Rpt. 440, pt. 4, 80th Cong., 2d sess., "Investigation of the National Defense Program: Industrial Mobilization for War," 28 Apr 48, pp. 6–7.

and beyond the scope of the plan, why the Industrial Mobilization Plan was not implemented by the President in 1940. In practice the preparation of economic mobilization plans was handled principally by the President's Bureau of the Budget which made no use of the IMP. Economic mobilization machinery was improvised by a system of trial and error. The surprising thing is that almost exactly the same trials and errors were made as had been made during World War I. The implementation of economic mobilization in 1940–43 ignored the principal lesson of World I: that economic mobilization, to be effectively accomplished, requires coordinated, integrated action by all agencies connected with the mobilization. The confused economic mobilization of World War II undoubtedly hampered production by many months. How much that delay cost in men, money, materials probably will never be determined.

The Industrial Mobilization Plan was far from perfect, but it deserved some consideration, for it was based on 20 years of intensive study. It could not have been fully implemented for World War II, but some of its provisions could have been utilized to the National advantage.[22] Those which were utilized, notably the procurement provisions, were of inestimable value. The IMP should have been used more often for reference by those who created the economic mobilization plans which were used. Many of the mobilization agencies finally established were similar to those recommended in the IMP [See *table 74*], but they would have evolved much more rapidly if the IMP had been followed more closely. The Special Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program's appraisal of the industrial mobilization organization was perhaps the most accurate: "The history of Government controls during World War II was one of improvisation, frequently successful, but confusing and very often resulting in duplication and inefficiency.[23]

---

[22] For the comment of one wartime leader on the IMP see extract from testimony by James M. Forrestal before the Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program in *ibid.*, pp. 12–13:

"Secretary Forrestal. The Army-Navy Munitions Board between World Wars I and II prepared a series of industrial mobilization plans, the last being the revision of 1939. This series of plans, and especially the revision of 1939, attempted to apply the lessons learned in the War Industries Board of World War I, as outlined by Mr. Bernard Baruch. The 1939 plan set a pattern for the production of military supplies and equipment in time of war for the control of the factors of production. It also set forth the wartime organization for carrying out these functions.

"The plan was, of course, not perfect, as any such plan must necessarily be imperfect when it is based on intangibles and assumptions. In many ways it was too generalized. . . . It did not recognize the extent to which the country's economy must contribute to modern war, an understandable shortcoming, since very few people recognized this fact. Hitler did, incidentally largely as a result of reading Mr. Baruch's volume."

[23] S. Rpt. 110, pt. 7, 79th Cong., 2d sess., "Investigation of the National Defense Program: Additional Report," 3 Sep 46, p. 10.

*Table 74. Comparison of Agencies Planned in the 1939 Industrial Mobilization Plan with Agencies as They Existed in 1945.**

1939 Industrial Mobilization Plan	Corresponding 1945 Agency
War Resources Administration	War Production Board Office of War Mobilization
Public Relations Administration	Office of War Information
War Finance Administration	War Finance Division of the Treasury Department Federal Reserve Board Reconstruction Finance Corporation
War Trade Administration	Foreign Economic Administration
War Labor Administration	War Manpower Commission
Price Control Authority	Office of Price Administration
Selective Service Administration	Selective Service System

**Source:* Compiled by the authors.

CHAPTER XXI

THE LESSONS OF MANY WARS

The 20th century wars in which the United States engaged repeated again some of the lessons of the earlier wars. *It can still be said that the United States has never adequately and fully planned for a mobilization before it occurred.* One of the principal causes for this lack of planning has been the Nation's constant failure to coordinate military policy with foreign policy. Without such coordination, no adequate defense policy can ever be determined.

Closely related to this basic cause for inadequate mobilization planning has been the reluctance of the Nation's leaders to confide in Congress and the people in time to permit certain defense measures to be taken. It has never been historically proven that Congress and the people of the United States cannot be told bad news in advance of war itself. It has been proven, however, that Congress has many times failed to enact mobilization legislation in good time because of the lack of adequate information that such legislation was necessary. It has been proven, too, that the Congress, when it is convinced that an emergency exists, usually exercises good judgment; but the Congress has sometimes failed to look very closely into the defense needs of the Nation. Too often the Congress has been content to follow the lead of the Chief Executive although the Constitution places the responsibility for raising and maintaining armies on the Congress. It has been abundantly proven in all of the wars in which the United States has engaged that time cannot be bought at any price. That lesson requires no elaboration.

Lessons from prior wars which had been remembered and assimilated prior to World War II include:

1. Volunteering will *not* produce sufficient military manpower for a large-scale, protracted war. A system of selective service is mandatory.

2. Officer candidate selection should be on a standard basis of merit which can best be administered under Federal control. Officer standards and training should be set high enough to eliminate the inept.

3. Individual basic training must be conducted in accordance with a well-formulated program, for a definite period of time, and under proper supervision. Adequate training literature and training aids

should be a planned part of that program. Individual training can most economically be imparted at training centers specifically entrusted with that one mission. [Individual basic training should be given to everyone to insure flexibility of assignment and reassignment as needed.]

4. Unit training and specialist training are most efficient when they come after good, individual basic training.

5. Mobilization of manpower is best accomplished when it is guided by plans prepared well in advance.

Lessons which were new in World War II or which acquired greater significance included:

1. Manpower in a major war is so scarce that plans to utilize it must be comprehensive and must be prepared well in advance of mobilization. The Army, Navy, Air Force, industry, and agriculture should all be allocated definite shares of the total available manpower. Plans for such allocation must be flexible. Voluntary enlistments must be prohibited and selective service used to procure the services' share of the national manpower pool.

2. Classification and assignment of military manpower qualitatively must be in accordance with an overall plan for all services, whereby intelligence, physical stamina, leadership aptitudes, and mechanical skills are allotted in accordance with service needs.

3. The manpower pool must be supplemented from the first by the following means:

a. Planned utilization of women.

b. Planned utilization of limited service personnel, such utilization to be based on accurately determined physical capacities.

c. Planned utilization of indigenous personnel, wherever they can be found and employed.

d. Planned utilization of prisoners of war.

e. Planned utilization of children, *if that becomes necessary.*

4. The division slice, as a planning device, must be based first on manpower allocated, then on carefully considered combat and logistic needs. It must be flexible enough to meet varying situations in different theaters, but it must be rigid enough to discourage departures from troop bases which will not conform to manpower availability.

5. Control and supervision of the military war effort should be centralized in the War Department General Staff, but implementation of that effort must be decentralized to as great a degree as feasible.

6. All military staffs in peacetime should function, as nearly as possible, as it is expected they will in wartime. The confusion caused by violent staff reorganizations during war must be avoided.

7. The quality of personnel on the War Department General Staff, as well as other staffs, must be maintained during mobilization and war. The higher staff schools must be continued in operation.

8. Mobilization plans must include provision for partial as well as all-out mobilizations.

9. Economic mobilization must be in accordance with a well-articulated, complete national plan. This plan must be prepared well in advance by a staff agency which is truly national in its composition. Piecemeal trial and error economic mobilization can lose a war or at least add to the cost of the war in lives, money, and time. Accurate statistics must be kept as part of the industrial mobilization plan.

10. A replacement system for war must include provisions for both individual and unit replacement and rotation.

11. The manpower and economic mobilization plans should be geared together so that equipment is ready for men as they are mobilized. Plans should also be made to utilize obsolete equipment whenever feasible in initial training.

12. The Reserve program for the armed services must be improved so that Reserve military organizations can provide not only organization and equipment but also men with usable military skills. When the training time necessary for a Reserve unit is as long as that for a newly activated unit filled with recruits, it is obvious that that Reserve is not reasonably efficient. There was no efficient Reserve system which adequately met mobilization requirements in World War II except the ROTC. The planning for an efficient Reserve system must be predicated on the following:

a. The Reserve program must be so adapted that it will provide for elements which are militarily practicable after mobilization. Such elements should include the National Guard, the ORC, and the ROTC.

b. The Reserve program must impart maximum military skills which can be retained sufficiently to be available at mobilization. Certain military skills, which are not retained easily, can best be imparted by intensive instruction after mobilization.

The most important lesson to be learned is that the United States must do better the next time it mobilizes. A great deal of progress has been made since the first mobilization in 1775, but the perfect solution has not yet been reached. The problems of military mobilization remain a challenge to the statesmen and soldiers of the future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography that follows does not include the Department of the Army records that comprise the source for a large part of the study. Most of these documents which are cited in the footnotes can be found in the Departmental Records Branch of the Adjutant General's Office. Permission to examine the highly classified OPD, ABC, and JCS files must be obtained in writing from G–3 and JCS.

Adams, George W. *Doctors in Blue; The Medical History of the Union Army in the Civil War.* New York, 1952.

Adams, Henry. *History of the United States.* New York, 1889–91. 9 vols.

Alexander, Arthur J. "How Maryland Tried to Raise Her Continental Quotas," *Maryland Historical Magazine,* XLII (1947), 193–95.

———. "Pennsylvania's Revolutionary Militia," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography,* LXIX (1945), 15–25.

Alger, Russell A. *The Spanish-American War.* New York, 1901.

Ayres, Leonard P. "Military Drill in High Schools," *The School Review,* XXV (1917), 157–60.

Bailey, Thomas A. *A Diplomatic History of the American People.* 4th ed.; New York, 1950.

Baruch, Bernard M. *American Industry in the War.* New York, 1941.

Batchelder, Roger. *Watching and Waiting on the Border.* Cambridge, 1917.

Baylies, Francis. *Narrative of Major General Wool's Campaign in Mexico.* Albany, 1851.

Beard, Charles A. *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War.* New Haven, 1948.

Binkhimer, William E. *Historical Sketch of the Organization, Administration, Materiel and Tactics of the Artillery, United States Army.* Washington, 1884.

Black, Robert C. III. *The Railroads of the Confederacy.* Chapel Hill, 1952.

Bliss, D. C. "Military Training in the High School," *The School Review,* XXV (1917), 165–66.

Boutwell, William D. (ed.). *America Prepares for Tomorrow.* New York, 1941.

Bowman, Allen. *The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army.* Washington, 1943.

Brackett, Albert G. *General Lane's Brigade in Central Mexico.* Cincinnati, 1854. Rare Book Collection, Library of Congress.

Breckinbridge, Henry. *Preparedness.* New York, 1916.

Briggs, John E. "The Enlistment of Iowa Troops During the Civil War," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics,* XV (1917).

Brooks, Noah. *Henry Knox, A Soldier of the Revolution.* New York, 1900.

Building American Military Camps. 1918. Folio prepared by Stone and Webster (contractors).

Bullard, Arthur. *Mobilizing America.* New York, 1917.

Callan, John F. *The Military Laws of the United States.* Philadelphia, 1863.

Carr, Albert. *America's Last Chance.* New York, 1940.

Carter, William H. *Creation of the American General Staff.* Washington, 1924. (S Doc 119, 68th Cong., 1st sess.)

———. *The American Army.* Indianapolis, 1915.

Ceremonies at the Laying of the Corner Stone of the Army War College Building, February 21, 1903. Washington, 1903.

Clarkson, Grosvenor B. *Industrial America in the World War.* Cambridge, 1923.

Commager, Henry S. *The Blue and the Gray.* New York, 1950. 2 vols.

Connery, Robert H. *The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II.* Princeton, 1951.

Coulter, E. Merton. *The Confederate States of America, 1861–1865.* Louisiana State University Press, 1950.

Crawford, Samuel W. *The Genesis of the Civil War.* New York, 1887.

Creel, George. *How We Advertised America.* New York, 1920.

———. *Rebel at Large.* New York, 1947.

———. "Wyoming's Answer to Militarism," *Everybody's Magazine,* XXXIV (1916), 150–59.

Crowder, Enoch H. *The Spirit of Selective Service,* New York, 1920.

Crowell, Benedict. *America's Munitions, 1917–1918.* Washington, 1919.

——— and Robert F. Wilson, *The Armies of Industry,* New Haven, 1921. 2 vols.

———. *The Giant Hand.* New Haven, 1921.

———. *The Road to France.* New Haven, 1921. 2 vols.

Curtis, Edward E. *The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution.* New Haven, 1926.

Dabney, Charles W. *The Colleges and National Defense.* Washington, 1898. (U. S. Dept of Agriculture, Office of Experiment Stations, Circular No. 40.)

Davis, Jefferson. *Short History of the Confederate States.* New York, 1890.

Dickinson, John. *The Building of an Army.* New York, 1922.

Drummond, Garrett B. "Military Training in the Secondary Schools of America," *Infantry Journal,* XXXI (1927), 611.

Duggan, Joseph C. *The Legislative and Statutory Development of the Federal Concept of Conscription for Military Service.* Washington, 1946.

Dupuy, Ernest. *Men of West Point.* New York, 1951.

Durborow, H. L. "Preparing While We Wait," *The School Review,* XXV (1917), 156.

Eliot, Ellsworth, Jr. *West Point in the Confederacy.* New York, 1941.

Elliott, Charles Winslow. *Winfield Scott, the Soldier and the Man.* New York, 1937.

Ellis, William A. *History of Norwich University 1819–1911.* Montpelier, 1911.

Fitzpatrick, Edward A. *Conscription and America.* Milwaukee, 1940.

Fitzpatrick, John C. (ed.). *The Writings of George Washington.* Washington, 1931–44. 39 vols.

Flower, Frank A. *Edwin McMasters Stanton.* Akron, 1905.

Force, Peter (ed.). *American Archives.* Washington, 1837–53.

Ford, Worthington C. (ed.). *General Orders Issued by Major-General Israel Putnam When in Command of the Highlands in the Summer and Fall of 1777.* Brooklyn, 1893.

———. *General Orders Issued by Major-General William Heath.* Brooklyn, 1890.

——— and Others (ed.). *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789.* Washington, 1904–37. 34 vols.

Fox, William F. *Regimental Losses in the American Civil War.* Albany, 1889.
Freeman, Douglas S. *George Washington.* New York, 1948. 5 vols.
French, Allen. *The Day of Concord and Lexington.* Boston, 1925.
———. *The First Year of the American Revolution.* Cambridge, 1934.
Frothingham, Thomas G. *The American Reinforcement in the World War.* New York, 1927.
Ganoe, William A. *The History of the United States Army.* New York, 1924.
Gleaves, Albert. *A History of the Transport Service, 1917–1919.* New York, 1921.
Graham, Whidden. "Our Schoolboy Soldiers," *Munsey's Magazine,* XV (1896), 459.
Grant, Ulysses S. *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant.* New York, 1885. 2 vols.
Gray, Wood. *The Hidden Civil War.* New York, 1942.
Greene, George W. *The Life of Nathanael Greene.* Cambridge, 1871. 3 vols.
"Growing Momentum of the Movement for Universal Military Training," *Current Opinion,* LXI (1916), 77.
Hagedorn, Hermann. *Leonard Wood.* New York, 1931. 2 vols.
Hagood, Johnson. *The Services of Supply.* Cambridge, 1927.
Harris, Joseph P. "The Emergency National Defense Organization," *Public Administration Review,* I (1940), 19.
Hatch, Louis C. *The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army.* New York, 1904.
Heitman, Francis B. *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army.* Washington, 1903. 2 vols.
Hemenway, Abby M. (ed.). *Vermont Historical Gazeteer.* Burlington, 1871.
Hendrick, Burton J. *Lincoln's War Cabinet.* Boston, 1946.
———. *Statesmen of the Lost Cause.* Boston, 1939.
Henry, Robert S. *The Story of the Confederacy.* New York, 1931.
———. *The Story of the Mexican War.* New York, 1950.
Henschen, Sigmund. "The Collapse of Our Militia," *Forum,* LVI (1916), 295–96.
Hesseltine, William B. *Lincoln and the War Governors.* New York, 1948.
Higginson, Thomas W. "Regular and Volunteer Officers," *Atlantic Monthly,* XIV (1864).
Hittle, James D. *The Military Staff.* Harrisburg, 1944.
Huidekoper, Frederick L. *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States.* New York, 1915.
Hurley, Edward N. *The Bridge to France.* Philadelphia, 1927.
Huzar, Elias. *The Purse and the Sword.* Cornell University Press, 1950.
Ingersoll, Lurton D. *A History of the War Department of the United States.* Washington, 1880.
———. *Iowa and the Rebellion.* Philadelphia, 1867.
Jacobs, James Ripley. *The Beginning of the U. S. Army, 1783–1812.* Princeton, 1947.
Jervey, Henry. "Mobilization of the Emergency Army." Lecture before General Staff College, 3 Jan 20. Copy in AWC Library.
Jessup, Philip C. *Elihu Root.* New York, 1938. 2 vols.
Johnson, Hugh. "The Lamb Rampant," *Everybody's Magazine,* XVIII (1908), 301.
Langer, William L. *An Encyclopedia of World History.* Cambridge, 1948.
Latour, A. Lacarriere. *Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814–15.* Philadelphia, 1816.

Leland, Waldo G. and Newton D. Mereness. (Comps.) *Introduction to the American Official Sources for the Economic and Social History of the World War.* New Haven, 1926.

Lincoln, George A., William S. Stone, and Thomas H. Harvey. *Economics of National Security.* New York, 1950.

Ling, Ping. "Military Training in the Public Schools," *The Pedagogical Seminary,* XXV (1918), 251–75.

McClellan, George B. *McClellan's Own Story.* New York, 1887.

March, Peyton C. *The Nation at War.* Garden City, 1932.

Marshall, S. L. A. "Mobility and the Nations," *Combat Forces Journal,* I (1950).

Martin, Franklin H. *Digest of the Proceedings of the Council of National Defense During the World War.* Washington, 1935.

Marvin, George. "Marking Time with Mexico," *World's Work,* XXXII (1916), 531–33.

Mather, Frank J. Jr. "The Continental Army," *Unpopular Review,* V (1916), 227.

Maurice, Sir Frederick. *Governments and War.* London, 1926. [Also published as *Statesmen and Soldiers of the Civil War.* Boston, 1926.]

Mead, Spencer P. "The First American Soldiers," *The Journal of American History,* I (1907), 123–28.

Meneely, Alexander Howard. *The War Department, 1861.* New York, 1928.

Merz, Charles. "The Truth of It," *Everybody's Magazine,* XXXV (1916), 434–35.

Miles, Nelson A. *Serving the Republic.* New York, 1911.

"Military Drill in the Public Schools," *Literary Digest,* LIII (1916), 186.

Military History of Kentucky. (Federal Writers Project, Kentucky). Frankfort, 1939.

"Military Training in the Schools and Colleges," *Educational Review,* LIV (1917), 59. [Report of the National Education Association Committee on Military Training.]

Millis, Walter. *Road to War, America 1914–1917.* Boston, 1935.

———. *The Martial Spirit.* Cambridge, 1931.

Mobilizing America's Resources For The War. Philadelphia, 1918. [American Academy of Political and Social Science.]

"Mobilizing the National Guard—A Lesson on Preparedness," *Current Opinion,* LXI (1916), 76.

Mock, James R. *Censorship 1917.* Princeton, 1941.

——— and Cedric Larson, *Words That Won the War.* Princeton, 1939.

Mook, H. Telfer. "Training Days in New England," *The New England Quarterly,* XI (1938), 695.

Moore, Albert B. *Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy.* New York, 1924.

Morison, Samuel E., and Henry S. Commager. *The Growth of the American Republic.* 4th ed.; New York, 1950. 2 vols.

Nelson, Donald M. *Arsenal of Democracy.* New York, 1946.

Nelson, Otto. *National Security and the General Staff.* Washington, 1946.

Nevins, Allan (ed.). *Polk, The Diary of a President, 1845–1849.* New York, 1952.

Niles, Hezekiah. *Niles' Weekly Register.* Baltimore, 1811–49.

Orton, Edward. *The Status of the Military Department in the Land-Grant Colleges.* Washington, 1914.

Osgood, Herbert L. *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century.* New York, 1904. 3 vols.

————. *The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century.* New York, 1924. 4 vols.

Palmer, Frederick. *John J. Pershing.* Harrisburg, 1948.

Palmer, John McAuley. *America in Arms.* New Haven, 1941.

————. *Newton D. Baker, America at War.* New York, 1931. 2 vols.

————. *Washington-Lincoln-Wilson, Three War Statesmen.* New York, 1930.

Pargellis, Stanley M. *Military Affairs in North America, 1748–1765.* New York, 1936.

Patrick, Rembert W. *Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet.* Baton Rouge, 1944.

Perry, Ralph Barton. *The Plattsburg Movement.* New York, 1921.

Pershing, John J. *My Experiences in the World War.* New York, 1931. 2 vols.

Peterson, Horace C. *Propaganda For War.* Norman, Okla., 1939.

Pride, Woodbury F. *The History of Fort Riley.* Fort Riley, 1926.

Reeves, Ira L. *Military Education in the United States.* Burlington, 1914.

Richardson, James D. (Comp.). *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1902.* Washington, 1896–99. 10 vols.

Schmidt, Carl T. "The Division Slice in Two World Wars," *Military Review,* XXXI (1951), 51–62.

Schwan, Theodore. *Report on the Organization of the German Army.* Washington, 1894.

Scott, Hugh L. *Some Memories of a Soldier.* New York, 1928.

Scott, Winfield. *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL. D.* New York, 1864.

Shannon, Fred A. *The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861–1865.* Cleveland, 1928. 2 vols.

Sharpe, Philip B. *The Rifle in America.* New York, 1938.

Sheridan, Philip H. *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan.* New York, 1888. 2 vols.

Sherman, William T. *Personal Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman.* 3d ed.; New York, 1890. 2 vols.

Smith, Justin H. *The War With Mexico.* New York, 1919. 2 vols.

Smith, Paul T. "Militia in the United States from 1846 to 1860," *Indiana Magazine of History,* XV (1919), 20–47.

Spencer, Samuel R. Jr. "A History of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 from Inception to Enactment." Unpublished thesis. Harvard University, Apr 1951. 2 volumes.

Steever, E. Z. "The Wyoming Plan of Military Training for the Schools," *The School Review,* XXV (1917), 148.

Steiner, Bernard C. *The Life and Correspondence of James McHenry.* Cleveland, 1907.

Stephenson, Orlando W. "The Supply of Gunpowder in 1776," *American Historical Review,* XXX (1925).

Stillé, Charles J. *Major-General Anthony Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line in the Continental Army.* Philadelphia, 1893.

Stimson, Henry L. and McGeorge Bundy. *On Active Service in Peace and War.* New York, 1947.

Sullivan, Mark. *Over Here, 1914–1918.* New York, 1933. (Vol. 5 of "Our Times").

Tansill, Charles C. *America Goes to War.* Boston, 1938.

Teal, John N. "Operations of the United States Shipping Board." Feb 1921. Monograph in Library of Congress.

"The Failure of Compulsory Military Training in the Schools of New York," *Advocate of Peace*, LXXXI–LXXXII (1919–20), 167–70.

Titherington, Richard H. *A History of the Spanish-American War of 1898.* New York, 1900.

Tobin, Harold J. and Percy W. Bidwell. *Mobilizing Civilian America.* New York, 1940.

Todd, Frederick P. "Our National Guard: An Introduction to Its History," *Military Affairs*, V (1941), 73–86, 152–70.

United States Army (or War Department):

Annual Reports.

Ayres, Leonard P. *The War With Germany, A Statistical Summary.* Washington, 1919.

Correspondence Relating to the War With Spain. 2 vols.

Final Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War, July 15, 1919. Washington, 1919.

[*First*] *Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War, December 20, 1917.* Washington, 1918.

Military Training in Public Schools. Washington, 1915.

Mobilization of Industries and Utilization of the Commercial and Industrial Resources of the Country for War Purposes in Emergency. Washington, 1916.

National Army Cantonments, Plans and Photographs, June 1918. Washington, 1918.

National Guard and Special Camps, Plans and Photographs, June 1918. Washington, 1918.

Order of Battle of the U. S. Land Forces in the World War (1917–1919): Zone of the Interior. Washington, 1949.

Report of the Director and General Manager of the Military Railroads of the United States in *Reports of the United States Military Railroad Department and the Provost Marshal General.* Washington, 1866. 2 vols. [H Ex Doc 1, 39th Cong., 1st sess.]

Report of the Provost Marshal General in *Reports of the United States Military Railroad Department and the Provost Marshal General.* Washington, 1866. 2 vols. [H Ex Doc 1, 39th Cong., 1st sess.]

Second Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War, December 20, 1918. Washington, 1919.

Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States. Washington, 1915.

Statistical Comparison of Universal and Voluntary Military Service. Washington, 1916.

Statistical Exhibit of Strength of Volunteer Forces Called Into Service During the War With Spain. Washington, 1899.

Study on Educational Institutions Giving Military Training as a Source for a Supply of Officers for a National Army. Washington, 1915.

The Army Almanac. Washington, 1950.

The Proper Relationship Between the Army and the Press in War. Washington, 1915.

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington, 1880–1901. 130 vols.

Thomas, Robert S. "The United States Army 1914–1923." MS, Gen Ref Off, OCMH.

United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919. Washington, 1948. 17 vols.

United States Army in World War II:

Cline, Ray S. *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division.* Washington, 1951.

Greenfield, Kent Roberts, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley. *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops.* Washington, 1947.

Matloff, Maurice and Edwin M. Snell. *Strategic Planning For Coalition Warfare 1941–1942.* Washington, 1953.

Palmer, Robert R., Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast. *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, Washington, 1948.

Watson, Mark S. *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations.* Washington, 1950.

Cater, Harold D. "Evolution of the American General Staff." MS in Gen Ref Off, OCMH.

United States Army, Office Chief of Military History:

Lerwill, Leonard L. *The Personnel Replacement System in the U. S. Army.* Washington, 1954. [DA Pam 20–211.]

Sparrow, John C. *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army.* Washington, 1952 [DA Pam 20–210.]

United States Government (Miscellaneous):

Bureau of the Budget. *The United States at War.* Washington, 1946.

Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information. Washington, 1920.

First Annual Report of the United States Shipping Board, December 1, 1917. Washington, 1918.

Handbook of Federal World War Agencies and Their Records 1917–1921. Washington, 1943.

Minutes of the Council of National Defense (Sen. Comm. Print No. 7). Published by Special Sen. Comm. Investigating the Munitions Industry. 74th Cong. 2d sess.

Minutes of the General Munitions Board. (Sen. Comm. Print No. 6). Published by Special Sen. Comm. Investigating the Munitions Industry. 74th Cong. 2d sess.

Report of the War Trade Board. Washington, 1920.

Second Annual Report of the United States Shipping Board, December 1, 1918. Washington, 1919.

Upham, Cyril B. "Arms and Equipment for the Iowa Troops in the Civil War," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, XVI (1918).

Upton. Emory. *The Armies of Asia and Europe.* New York, 1878.

———. *The Military Policy of the United States.* Washington, 1907.

Wagner, Arthur L. *Report of the Santiago Campaign 1898.* Kansas City, 1908.

Waldeck, Ruby W. "Missouri in the Spanish American War." *The Missouri Historical Review*, XXX (1935–36), 365–400.

Washington, Henry A. (ed.). *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson.* Washington, 1853–54. 9 vols.

Weber, Thomas. *The Northern Railroads in the Civil War: 1861–1865.* New York, 1952.

Wheeler, Joseph. *The Santiago Campaign 1898.* Boston, 1898.

Wiley, Bell I. *Southern Negroes 1861–1865.* New Haven, 1938.

Wilkerson, Marcus M. *Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War.* Baton Rouge, 1932.

Willoughby, William F. *Government Organization in War Time and After.* New York, 1919.

Wolfson, A. P. *M-Day: Banking and Finance.* Cambridge, 1940.

Wood, Eric Fisher. "The New Army Act and the Militia," *Century,* XCII (1916), 801–02.

Wood, Leonard. *The Military Obligation of Citizenship.* Princeton, 1915.

Young, Ernest W. *The Wilson Administration and the Great War.* Boston, 1922.

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES TROOPS PARTICIPATING IN MAJOR WARS*

Line Number	War	Troops participating	Died and wounded				
			Total [a]	Died			Wounds not mortal
				Total deaths	Deaths among battle casualties	Other deaths	
		A	B	C	D	E	F
1	War of the Revolution, 1775–1783	[b]			[c] 4, 044	[d]	6, 004
2	War of 1812, 1812–1815	[e]			1, 950	[d]	4, 000
3	War with Mexico, 1846–1848	115, 847	17, 373	13, 271	1, 721	11, 550	4, 102
4	Civil War, 1861–1865 [f]	[g] 2, 325, 000	639, 568	[h] 359, 528	110, 238	249, 290	[i] 280, 040
5	War with Spain, 1898	280, 564	[j] 4, 024	2, 430	369	2, 061	1, 594
6	World War I, 1917–1918	[k] 4, 057, 101	313, 619	119, 956	[l] 50, 510	69, 446	[l] 193, 663
7	World War II, 1941–1945 [m]	[n] 10, 420, 000	[o] 884, 135	318, 274	[p] 234, 874	[q] 83, 400	[p] 565, 861

[a] Excludes captured and interned and missing in action who were subsequently returned to military control.

[b] The number that served probably did not exceed 250,000.

[c] Based on available records; the total number was probably much greater.

[d] No figures available on deaths by disease or other causes.

[e] The Regular Army, Militia, and Volunteer force totaled about 530,000; the number of individuals who actually served cannot be estimated, since the majority of this force was employed for short intervals at various times and many served or enlisted eight or ten times.

[f] Union Army only.

[g] Approximate.

[h] Actual number believed to be somewhat larger because many of the records, especially of Confederate prisons, are far from complete.

[i] This figure is believed to be understated.

[j] Data are for the period 1 May through 31 August 1898, although hostilities actually were suspended on 12 August 1898; deaths incurred between 1 September 1898 and ratification of the treaty of peace by the U. S. on 6 February 1899 and by Spain on 19 March 1899 are not included.

[k] Number who served between 5 April 1917 and 12 November 1918.

[l] Includes American forces in northern Russia and American forces in Siberia in 1919 and 1920.

[m] Includes data for Army Air Forces.

[n] Number who served between 1 December 1941 and 31 August 1945 (Japanese surrendered on 2 September 1945).

[o] Data are for the period 1 December 1941 through 31 December 1946, the date hostilities were declared terminated by Presidential Proclamation No. 2714.

[p] All but 51 deaths and 81 wounds not mortal resulted from battle casualties incurred between 1 December 1941 and 31 August 1945 (see footnote *n*).

[q] An estimated 72,000 of these occurred between 1 December 1941 and 31 August 1945 (see footnote *n*).

Sources:

Line 1. All figures from *Army Almanac*, p. 411.
Fn. *b* from Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army*, II, p. 280.
Fn. *c* and *d* from *Army Almanac*, p. 411.

Line 2. col. D—*Army Almanac*, p. 411 (Heitman, *op cit.*, p. 281, gives 1,877 deaths)
col. F—*Army Almanac*, p. 411 and Heitman, *op. cit.*, p. 281.
Fn. *d*—*Army Almanac*, p. 411.
Fn. *e*.—*Army Almanac*, p. 411 and Heitman, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

Line 3. All data from Heitman, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

Line 4. All data, columns A through E from Heitman, *op. cit.*, pp. 285–86.
col. F—*Army Almanac*, p. 411.

*Prepared by PRAD, OCA, 1 Oct 52; rev. 26 Feb 53.

fn. *f*—Heitman, *op. cit.*, pp. 285–86.
fn. *g*—Heitman, *op. cit.*, p. 285.
fn. *h*—Heitman, *op. cit.*, p. 286 and *Army Almanac*, p. 411.
fn. *i*—*Army Almanac*, p. 411.

Line 5. col. A—Heitman, *op cit.*, p. 289 and *Army Almanac*, p. 411.
cols. B through F—*The Report of the Adjutant General for 1899* (table facing p. 10).
fn. *j*—*Data on cessations of hostilities from *Report of the Secretary of War for 1899*, p. 3.

Line 6. col. A—Statistics Branch, WDGS Special Report No. 213, 30 June 31.
cols. D and F—*Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1926*, p. 240.
col. E—*Army Almanac*, p. 411.
fn. *k*—Special Report No. 213, *op. cit.*
fn. *l*—*Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1926*, p. 191.

Line 7. col. A—G-1 estimate.
cols. D, E, and F—Copy for final report of battle casualties and deaths during World War II.
fn. *m*—Copy for final report of battle casualties and deaths during World War II.
fn. *n*—G-1 estimate for number who served. Date of Japanese surrender from *Army Almanac*, p. 614.
fn. *o*, *p* and *q*—Same as footnote *m*.

APPENDIX B*

MILITARY SERVICE OF PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES

Name	State	Term of office		Summary of military service
		From—	To—	
George Washington	Va	30 Apr 1789	4 Mar 1797	Served as lt col and col in Virginia Militia 1754–58; on General Braddock's staff in 1755; appointed C-in-C of armed forces of the Colonies 15 Jun 1775; resigned 23 Dec 1783; commissioned lt gen and appointed to command of US Army on a standby basis 3 Jul 1798; died 14 Dec 1799.
John Adams	Mass	4 Mar 1797	4 Mar 1801	No record of service.
Thomas Jefferson	Va	4 Mar 1801	4 Mar 1809	No record of service.
James Madison	Va	4 Mar 1809	4 Mar 1817	No record of service.
James Monroe	Va	4 Mar 1817	4 Mar 1825	2d lt to maj in Revolutionary War serving from 28 Sep 1775 to 20 Dec 1778.
John Q. Adams	Mass	4 Mar 1825	4 Mar 1829	No record of service.
Andrew Jackson	Tenn	4 Mar 1829	4 Mar 1837	Maj gen of Volunteers 1812–14; brig gen in US Army 19 Apr 1814; maj gen in US Army 1 May 1814; discharged 1 Jun 1821.
Martin Van Buren	N. Y	4 Mar 1837	4 Mar 1841	No record of service.
William H. Harrison	Ohio	4 Mar 1841	4 Apr 1841	Ensign to capt in US Army 1791–98; resigned 1 Jun 1798; appointed brig gen, US Army, 22 Aug 1812 and maj gen 2 Mar 1813; resigned 31 May 1814.
John Tyler	Va	4 Apr 1841	4 Mar 1845	Raised a company for the defense of Richmond in 1813.

James K. Polk	Tenn	4 Mar 1845	4 Mar 1849	No record of service.
Zachary Taylor	La	4 Mar 1849	9 Jul 1850	Rose from 1st lt, 3 May 1808 to maj gen 29 Jun 1846, US Army, with service in War of 1812 and Mexican War; out of service only from 15 Jun 1815 to 17 May 1816; resigned 31 Jan 1849.
Millard Fillmore	N. Y	9 Jul 1850	4 Mar 1853	No record of service.
Franklin Pierce	N. H	4 Mar 1853	4 Mar 1857	Private to brig gen of Volunteers 1846–48 for service in Mexican War.
James Buchanan	Pa	4 Mar 1857	4 Mar 1861	No record of service.
Abraham Lincoln	Ill	4 Mar 1861	15 Apr 1865	Capt of Volunteers 21 Apr 1832–27 May 1832; private in Volunteers 29 May 1832–16 Jun 1832 during Black Hawk War.
Andrew Johnson	Tenn	15 Apr 1865	4 Mar 1869	Brig gen of Volunteers 4 Mar 1862–3 Mar 1865 serving as military governor of Tennessee.
Ulysses S. Grant	D. C	4 Mar 1869	4 Mar 1877	Cadet USMA 1839–43; rose from brevet 2d lt to capt 1 Jul 1843; resigned 31 Jul 1854 with service in Mexican War; col of Volunteers 17 Jun 1861 to gen US Army 25 Jul 1866; commanding general, US Army, 12 Mar 1864–3 Mar 1869.
Rutherford B. Hayes	Ohio	4 Mar 1877	4 Mar 1881	Maj of Volunteers 27 Jun 1861 to brig gen of Volunteers 19 Oct 1864; brevet maj gen 13 Mar 1865; resigned 8 Jun 1865.
James A Garfield	Ohio	4 Mar 1881	19 Sep 1881	Lt col of Volunteers 21 Aug 1861 to maj gen of Volunteers 19 Sep 1863; resigned 5 Dec 1863.
Chester A. Arthur	N. Y	20 Sep 1881	4 Mar 1885	Inspector general and quartermaster general of New York Militia in Civil War. No Federal service.
Grover Cleveland	N. Y	4 Mar 1885	4 Mar 1889	No record of service.
Benjamin Harrison	Ind	4 Mar 1889	4 Mar 1893	2d lt of Volunteers 14 Jul 1862 to col of Volunteers 7 Aug 1862; brevet brig gen 23 Jan 1865; mustered out 8 Jun 1865.
Grover Cleveland	N. Y	4 Mar 1893	4 Mar 1897	No record of service.

*Compiled by the General Reference Office, of the Chief of Military History.

APPENDIX B*—Continued

Name	State	Term of office		Summary of military service
		From—	To—	
William McKinley	Ohio	4 Mar 1897	14 Sep 1901	Private in Volunteers 23 Jun 1861 to capt of Volunteers 25 Jul 1864; brevet maj 13 Mar 1865; mustered out 26 Jul 1865.
Theodore Roosevelt	N. Y.	14 Sep 1901	4 Mar 1909	Lt col of Volunteers 6 May 1898 to col 11 Jul 1898; mustered out 15 Sep 1898.
William H. Taft	Ohio	4 Mar 1909	4 Mar 1913	No record of service.
Woodrow Wilson	N. J.	4 Mar 1913	4 Mar 1921	No record of service.
Warren G. Harding	Ohio	4 Mar 1921	2 Aug 1923	No record of service.
Calvin Coolidge	Mass.	3 Aug 1923	4 Mar 1929	No record of service.
Herbert Hoover	Calif.	4 Mar 1929	4 Mar 1933	No record of service.
Franklin D. Roosevelt	N. Y.	4 Mar 1933	12 Apr 1945	No record of service.
Harry S. Truman	Mo.	12 Apr 1945	20 Jan 1953	1st lt in National Guard 1917 (entered Guard in 1905) to capt 11 Nov 1918; remained in Reserves after WW I; col in Reserves 1927.
Dwight D. Eisenhower	N. Y.	20 Jan 1953		Cadet USMA 1911–15; 2d lt in RA 12 Jun 1915 to General of the Army 20 Dec 1944; Chief of Staff 19 Nov 1945 to 7 Feb 1948; resigned 18 Jul 1952; served in WW I and commanded ETO in WW II.

*Compiled by the General Reference, Office of the Chief of Military History.

APPENDIX C*

MILITARY SERVICE OF THE SECRETARIES OF WAR

Name	State	Term of office		Summary of military service
		From—	To—	
Henry Knox	Mass	12 Sep 1789	31 Dec 1794	Col 17 Nov 1775 to maj gen 22 Mar 1782 in Continental Army; senior general in the Army 23 Dec 1783 to 20 Jun 1784; Secretary of War under Continental Congress 8 Mar 1783 to 30 Apr 1789.
Timothy Pickering	Mass	2 Jan 1795	10 Dec 1795	Col in Mass. Militia at beginning of war; col and AG, to Gen Washington 18 Jun 1777–13 Jan 1778; member of Board of War 7 Nov 1777–5 Aug 1780; col and QMG Continental Army 5 Aug 1780–25 Jul 1785.
James McHenry	Md	27 Jan 1796	13 May 1800	Surgeon 10 Aug 1776; taken prisoner 16 Nov 1776; exchanged 5 Mar 1778; assistant secretary to Gen Washington 15 May 1778; maj Continental Army 30 Oct 1780–22 Dec 1781.
Samuel Dexter	Mass	13 May 1800	31 Jan 1801	No record of service.
Henry Dearborn	Conn	5 Mar 1801	7 Mar 1809	Capt in Minuteman Co Apr 1775; capt 23 Apr 1775; prisoner 31 Dec 1775; exchanged 10 Mar 1777; maj to lt col serving until 1 Mar 1783; also served as maj gen 27 Jan 1812 to 15 Jun 1815 after serving as Secretary of War.
William Eustis	Mass	7 Mar 1809	13 Jan 1813	Surgeon in Army during Revolutionary War from Apr to Dec 1776 and from 6 Oct 1780 to end of war.

*Compiled by the General Reference, Office of the Chief of Military History.

APPENDIX C*—Continued

Name	State	Term of office		Summary of military service
		From—	To—	
John Armstrong	N. Y.	13 Jan 1813	27 Sep 1814	Served as Volunteer in Quebec Expedition 1775, maj 3 Jan 1777; served until end of Revolution; brig gen, US Army, 6 Jul 1812; resigned 13 Jan 1813.
James Monroe	Va.	27 Sep 1814	2 Mar 1815	2d lt to maj in Revolutionary War serving from 28 Sep 1775 to 20 Dec 1778.
William H. Crawford	Ga.	1 Aug 1815	22 Oct 1816	No record of service.
John C. Calhoun	S. C.	8 Oct 1817	7 Mar 1825	No record of service.
James Barbour	Va.	7 Mar 1825	23 May 1828	No record of service.
Peter Buel Porter	N. Y.	26 May 1828	9 Mar 1829	Maj gen, New York Militia 1812–15 with active service in the War of 1812.
John H. Eaton	Tenn.	9 Mar 1829	18 Jun 1831	No record of service.
Lewis Cass	Ohio	1 Aug 1831	5 Oct 1836	Col Ohio Militia in 1812; col 27th Infantry, US Army, 20 Feb 1813; brig gen 12 Mar 1813; resigned 1 May 1814.
Joel R. Poinsett	S. C.	7 Mar 1837	5 Mar 1841	No record of service.
John Bell	Tenn.	5 Mar 1841	13 Sep 1841	No record of service.
John C. Spencer	N. Y.	12 Oct 1841	3 Mar 1843	No record of service.
James M. Porter	Pa.	8 Mar 1843	30 Jan 1844	No record of service.
William Wilkins	N. Y.	15 Feb 1844	4 Mar 1845	No record of service.
William L. Marcy	N. Y.	6 Mar 1845	4 Mar 1849	No record of service.
George W. Crawford	Ga.	8 Mar 1849	23 Jul 1850	No record of service.
Charles M. Conrad	La.	15 Aug 1850	7 Mar 1853	No record of service.
Jefferson Davis	Miss.	7 Mar 1853	6 Mar 1857	Cadet USMA 1824–28; Brevet 2d lt 1 Jul 1828 to 1st lt 4 Mar 1833; resigned 30 Jun 1835; col of Volunteers 18 Jul 1846 to 12 Jul 1847 serving in the Mexican War.

John B. Floyd	Va	6 Mar	1857	29 Dec	1860	No service before Secretary of War; served as a maj gen in the Confederate Army in 1861.
Joseph Holt	Ky	18 Jan	1861	5 Mar	1861	No service before Secretary of War; Judge Advocate General, US Army, 3 Sep 1862–1 Dec 1875.
Simon Cameron	Pa	5 Mar	1861	14 Jan	1862	No record of service.
Edwin M. Stanton	Ohio	20 Jan	1862	28 May	1868	No record of service.
John M. Schofield	Ill	1 Jun	1868	13 Mar	1869	Cadet USMA 1849–53; brevet 2d lt 1 Jul 1853 to brig gen US Army 30 Nov 1864; maj gen of Volunteers 29 Nov 1862; mustered out of Volunteers 1 Sep 1866; after serving as Secretary of War became a maj gen in US Army 4 Mar 1869 and lt gen 5 Feb 1895; served as Commanding General of the Army 14 Aug 1888 to 29 Sep 1895.
John A. Rawlins	Ill	13 Mar	1869	6 Sep	1869	Capt of Volunteers 30 Aug 1861 to brig gen of Volunteers 11 Aug 1863; served as chief of staff to Gen Grant after he became Commanding General 12 Mar 1864; resigned 12 Mar 1865.
William W. Belknap	Iowa	25 Oct	1869	2 Mar	1876	Maj of Volunteers 7 Dec 1861 to brig gen of Volunteers 30 Jul 1864; brevet maj gen 13 Mar 1865; mustered out 24 Aug 1865; served with Army in West under Grant and Sherman.
Alphonso Taft	Ohio	8 Mar	1876	22 May	1876	No record of service.
James Donald Cameron	Pa	22 May	1876	3 Mar	1877	No record of service.
George W. McCrary	Iowa	12 Mar	1877	10 Dec	1879	No record of service.
Alexander Ramsey	Minn	10 Dec	1879	5 Mar	1881	No record of service.
Robert Todd Lincoln	Ill	5 Mar	1881	5 Mar	1885	Capt of Volunteers 11 Feb 1865; resigned 10 Jun 1865; served as an assistant AG.
William C. Endicott	Mass	5 Mar	1885	5 Mar	1889	No record of service.
Redfield Proctor	Vt	5 Mar	1889	5 Nov	1891	1st lt of Volunteers 20 Jun 1861 to maj 25 Sep 1861; resigned 11 Jul 1862; col of Volunteers 22 Oct 1862; mustered out 5 Aug 1863.

*Compiled by the General Reference Office, Office of the Chief of Military History.

APPENDIX C*—Continued

Name	State	Term of office		Summary of military service
		From—	To—	
Stephen B. Elkins	W. Va	17 Dec 1891	5 Mar 1893	No record of service.
Daniel S. Lamont	N. Y	5 Mar 1893	5 Mar 1897	No record of service.
Russell A. Alger	Mich	5 Mar 1897	1 Aug 1899	Capt of Volunteers 2 Oct 1861 to col of Volunteers 11 Jun 1863; brevet brig gen and brevet maj gen 11 Jun 1865; resigned 20 Sep 1864.
Elihu Root	N. Y	1 Aug 1899	31 Jan 1904	No record of service.
William H. Taft	Ohio	1 Feb 1904	30 Jun 1908	No record of service.
Luke E. Wright	Tenn	1 Jul 1908	11 Mar 1909	No record of service.
Jacob M. Dickinson	Tenn	12 Mar 1909	21 May 1911	No record of service.
Henry L. Stimson	N. Y	22 May 1911	4 Mar 1913	No service before first term as Secretary of War.
Lindley M. Garrison	N. J	5 Mar 1913	10 Feb 1916	No record of service.
Newton D. Baker	Ohio	9 Mar 1916	4 Mar 1921	No service before becoming Secretary of War; col in ORC Mar 1921.
John W. Weeks	Mass	5 Mar 1921	13 Oct 1925	US Naval Academy 1877–81; midshipman US Navy 1881–83; active in Naval Militia in Massachusetts 1890–99; active service in Spanish-American War.
Dwight F. Davis	Mo	14 Oct 1925	5 Mar 1929	Capt to lt col in WW I; col in ORC 1923; Assistant Secretary of War 1923–25.
James W. Good	Iowa	6 Mar 1929	18 Nov 1929	No record of service.
Patrick J. Hurley	Okla	9 Dec 1929	3 Mar 1933	Private to capt, Indian Territorial Volunteer Militia 1902–07; capt Oklahoma National Guard 1914–17; maj to lt col in JAG in WW I; col ORC after WW I; Assistant Secretary of War 6 Mar 1929 to 9 Dec 1929; brig gen 29 Jan 1942 to maj gen Dec 1943; reverted to inactive status 11 Dec 1944.

George H. Dern	Utah	4 Mar	1933	27 Aug	1936	No record of service.
Harry H. Woodring	Kans	25 Sep	1936	20 Jun	1940	Private, Tank Corps, in WW I; Assistant Secretary of War 6 Apr 1933 to 25 Sep 1936.
Henry L. Stimson	N. Y	10 Jul	1940	21 Sep	1945	Secretary of War 22 May 1911 to 4 Mar 1913; attended Plattsburg summer camp 1916; maj JAG, 28 May 1917 to col, FA, 3 Sep 1918 in WW I; honorably discharged 9 Dec 1918; col ORC Dec 1921 to brig gen ORC Jun 1922.
Robert P. Patterson	N. Y	27 Sep	1945	18 Jul	1947	Private N. Y. National Guard 1914–16; 2d lt 15 May 1917 to maj 26 Mar 1919; wounded in action in France 16 Aug 1918; honorably discharged 27 May 1919; Assistant, then Under Secretary of War 31 Jul 1940 to 27 Sep 1945.
Kenneth C. Royall	N. C	19 Jul	1947	17 Sep	1947	2d lt 15 Aug 1917 to 1st lt 17 Jan 1918 in FA; col 5 Jun 1942 to brig gen 3 Nov 1943 serving in Fiscal Div, Army Service Forces; Special Assistant to Secretary of War Apr 1945; Under Secretary of War 9 Nov 1945 to 19 Jul 1947.

SECRETARIES OF THE ARMY

Kenneth C. Royall	N. C	17 Sep	1947	27 Apr	1949	See directly above.
Gordon Gray	N. C	20 Jul	1949	12 Apr	1950	Private, AUS 1942; 2d lt, Inf, 1942; separated in grade of capt 1945; Assistant Secretary of the Army 24 Sep 1947 to 20 Jun 1949.
Frank Pace, Jr	Ark	12 Apr	1950	20 Jan	1953	2d lt, Army Air Force, 1942; separated in grade of maj.
Robert T. B. Stevens	N. J	4 Feb	1953			2d lt, FA, in WW I; col, QMC, in WW II.

*Compiled by the General Reference Office, Office of the Chief of Military History.

APPENDIX D*

SENIOR OFFICERS AND COMMANDING GENERALS OF THE ARMY

Name	Home State	From—	To—
Gen. George Washington	Va	17 Jun 1775	23 Dec 1783
Maj. Gen. Henry Knox	Mass	23 Dec 1783	20 Jun 1784
Capt. John Doughty	N. Y	20 Jun 1784	12 Aug 1784
Lt. Col. Josiah Harmar	Pa	12 Aug 1784	4 Mar 1791
Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair	Pa	4 Mar 1791	5 Mar 1792
Maj. Gen. Anthony Wayne	Pa	13 Mar 1792	15 Dec 1796
Brig. Gen. James Wilkinson	Md	15 Dec 1796	13 Jul 1798
Lt. Gen. George Washington	Va	13 Jul 1798	14 Dec 1799
Maj. Gen. Alexander Hamilton	N. Y	14 Dec 1799	15 Jun 1800
Brig. Gen James Wilkinson	Md	15 Jun 1800	27 Jan 1812
Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn	Conn	27 Jan 1812	15 Jun 1815
Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown	N. Y	15 Jun 1815	24 Feb 1828
Maj. Gen. Alexander Macomb	N. Y	29 May 1828	25 Jun 1841
Brevet Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott	Va	5 Jul 1841	1 Nov 1861
Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan	Pa	1 Nov 1861	11 Mar 1862
Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck	N. Y	23 Jul 1862	9 Mar 1864
Gen. Ulysses S. Grant	Ill	9 Mar 1864	4 Mar 1869
Gen. William T. Sherman	Ohio	8 Mar 1869	1 Nov 1883
Gen. Philip H. Sheridan	Ohio	1 Nov 1883	5 Aug 1888
Lt. Gen. John M. Schofield	Ill	14 Aug 1888	29 Sep 1895
Lt. Gen. Nelson A. Miles	Mass	5 Oct 1895	8 Aug 1903

*From the end of the Revolutionary War to 1 June 1821 no officer was formally designated to command the entire Army of the United States with one exception: the Congress provided for the appointment of a commanding general in an act of 28 May 1798, and General Washington accepted this appointment on a standby basis but never assumed actual command of the Army. Until 1821 the commanders of the geographical departments reported directly to the Secretary of War and there was merely a senior ranking general in the Army. At the time of the reduction of the Army in 1821 Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown was assigned to command the Army and from that time on the department commanders generally reported to the Commanding General or the General-in-Chief as he was sometimes referred to. There were two interruptions in this procedure: the first was during and after General Scott's campaign in Mexico when no one was assigned to command the Army from 24 November 1846 to 11 May 1849, and the second was during the Civil War when no officer was assigned to overall command 11 March 1862 to 23 July 1862. Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States* (Washington, 1903), I, p. 17.

APPENDIX E*

CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

Name	Home State	From—	To—
Lt. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young	Pa	15 Aug 1903	8 Jan 1904
Lt. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee	Ohio	9 Jan 1904	14 Jan 1906
Maj. Gen. John C. Bates	Mo	15 Jan 1906	13 Apr 1906
Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell	Ky	14 Apr 1906	21 Apr 1910
Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood	Mass	22 Apr 1910	20 Apr 1914
Maj. Gen. William W. Wotherspoon	D. C	21 Apr 1914	15 Nov 1914
Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott	N. J	16 Nov 1914	21 Sep 1917
Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss	Pa	22 Sep 1917	18 May 1918
Maj. Gen. Peyton C. March	Pa	19 May 1918	30 Jun 1921
General of the Armies John J. Pershing	Mo	1 Jul 1921	13 Sep 1924
Maj. Gen. John L. Hines	W. Va	14 Sep 1924	20 Nov 1926
Gen. Charles P. Summerall	Fla	21 Nov 1926	20 Nov 1930
Gen. Douglas MacArthur	Wis	21 Nov 1930	1 Oct 1935
Gen. Malin Craig	Pa	2 Oct 1935	31 Aug 1939
General of the Army George C. Marshall	Pa	1 Sep 1939	18 Nov 1945
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower	Kans	19 Nov 1945	7 Feb 1948
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley	Mo	7 Feb 1948	16 Aug 1949
Gen. J. Lawton Collins	La	16 Aug 1949	16 Aug 1953
Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway	Va	16 Aug 1953	

**The Army Almanac* (Washington, 1950), pp. 52–53.

APPENDIX F

STEPS TAKEN BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT LOOKING TOWARD THE PREPARATION FOR WAR

PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE HOSTILITIES WITH GERMANY

The Chief of Staff, on Feb. 1, 1917, directed the War College Division to submit a plan of action in case hostilities with Germany "occur in the near future", and on Feb. 3, 1917, that division submitted a memorandum on "Preparation for possible hostilities with Germany", in which the following recommendations were made:

Delay without Publicity.	1. That all orders directing the muster out of organizations of the Organized Militia or the National Guard be suspended.
Done.	2. That all department commanders be directed to give such protection as they deem advisable, considering the forces at their disposal, to all critical points, military forts, important railroad bridges, tunnels, docks and canal locks and to munition plants, government buildings and property.
Done.	That all Federal Troops within their respective departments be placed at the disposal of the department commander.
Not yet.	That department commanders be authorized to subdivide
Done.	their departments into such districts as they deem necessary.
Yes.	That a list of the munition plants in the several departments as compiled by the Chief of Ordnance be furnished department commanders.
Yes. When need appears.	That Federal civil authorities be directed to cooperate with department commanders in the performance of the duties specified herein and that department commanders be authorized to request the cooperation of state and municipal authorities.
Not yet.	3. That all National Guard and Organized Militia not now in the service of the United States should be called out and placed at the disposal of department commanders.
Not yet.	4. The establishment of a national secret service under military control.
Not yet.	5. Legislation authorizing the President to call by proclamation upon all aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States to submit to registration and surveillance by such agencies of the Federal government as he may direct, and in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by him and providing a penalty of fine and imprisonment for failure to obey such prescriptions. Also legislative provision for payment to informers of portions of fines so imposed.
This legislation ought to pass. Will see Dent.	6. The establishment of a national censorship substantially as recommended by the Chief of Staff and as submitted to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Military Committees in the form of proposed legislation by the Secretary of War under date of January 8, 1917.

Approved in principle. No action until condition arises.

7. If a state of war should arise between the United States and the Central powers a large body of troops would be required before the restoration of peace. But the War College Division earnestly recommends that no American troops be employed in active service in any European theatre until after an adequate period of training, and that during this period all available trained officers and men in the Regular Army or the National Guard be employed in training the new levies called into service. It should, therefore, be our policy at first to devote all our energies to raising troops in sufficient numbers to exert a substantial influence in a later stage of the war. Partially trained troops will be entirely unfit for such duty, and even if our regular forces and National Guard could be spared from training duty, their number is too small to exert any influence. It is the opinion of the War College Division that we should organize, train and equip an army of one million five hundred thousand men as soon as possible. The War College Division recommends that legislation be enacted authorizing the drafting of the men necessary for military training and service and that volunteers be not called.

Approved in principle. Reserved for conference with State Department.

8. As soon as a rupture occurs and war appears certain, steps should be taken immediately to establish a basis of cooperation between our own government and the governments of other nations engaged in war with the Central powers. Our action, to be effective, must be based upon some definite understanding between ourselves and other belligerents engaged in seeking a common end. In the beginning our cooperation should be solely naval and economic, but ultimately it may include joint military operations in some theatre of war to be determined by agreement with other nations. Intelligent cooperation for such a contingency must rest upon understanding and foreknowledge. Without such understanding and foreknowledge it will be impossible to prepare plans of any value for offensive operations.

Approved.

9. The War College Division recommends the adoption of definite policies before the study of plans for organization or operations are undertaken.

Approved.

10. In view of the present emergency, the War College Division recommends that immediate legislation be requested of Congress rescinding all restrictions imposed on the power of the President for the employment of officers of the Army.

The Secretary of War personally considered the recommendations and made the marginal notes on the memorandum in his own handwriting.

The Chief of Staff made, and the Secretary of War approved, the following addition to the memorandum:

Approved.

Legislation should be put through for the General Staff before recommended at once, also censorship. Authority should be gotten to purchase a large amount of clothing, shoes, and other materials to supply the National Guard and 500,000 Volunteers besides the Regular Army. H. L. Scott.

APPENDIX G

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION

10 JACKSON PLACE: : : : : WASHINGTON, D. C.

WHAT THE GOVERNMENT ASKS OF THE PRESS

The desires of the Government, with respect to the concealment from the enemy of military policies, plans, and movements, are set forth in the following specific requests. They go to the press of the United States directly from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, and represent the thought and advice of their technical advisers. They do not apply to news dispatches censored by military authority with the expeditionary forces or in those cases where the Government itself, in the form of official statements, may find it necessary or expedient to make public information covered by these requests.

For the protection of our military and naval forces and of merchant shipping it is requested that secrecy be observed in all matters of:

1. Advance information of the routes and schedules of troop movements. (See par. 5.)
2. Information tending to disclose the number of troops in the expeditionary forces abroad.
3. Information calculated to disclose the location of the permanent base or bases abroad.
4. Information that would disclose the location of American units or the eventual position of the American forces at the front.
5. Information tending to disclose an eventual or actual port of embarkation; or information of the movement of military forces toward seaports or of the assembling of military forces at seaports from which inference might be drawn of any intention to embark them for service abroad; and information of the assembling of transports or convoys; and information of the embarkation itself.
6. Information of the arrival at any European port of American war vessels, transports, or any portion of any expeditionary force, combatant or noncombatant.
7. Information of the time of departure of merchant ships from American or European ports, or information of the ports from which they sailed, or informed of their cargoes.
8. Information indicating the port of arrival of incoming ships from European ports or after their arrival indicating or hinting at, the port at which the ship arrived.
9. Information as to convoys and as to the sighting of friendly or enemy ships, whether naval or merchant.
10. Information of the locality, number, or identity of vessels belonging to our own Navy or to the navies of any country at war with Germany.
11. Information of the coast or anti-aircraft defenses of the United States. Any information of their very existence, as well as the number, nature, or position of their guns, is dangerous.
12. Information of the laying of mines or mine fields or of any harbor defenses.
13. Information of the aircraft and appurtenances used at Government aviation school for experimental tests under military authority, and information of contracts and production of air material, and information tending to disclose the numbers and organization of the air division, excepting when authorized by the Committee on Public Information.
14. Information of all Government devices and experiments in war material, excepting when authorized by the Committee on Public Information.
15. Information of secret notices issued to mariners or other confidential instructions issued by the Navy or the Department of Commerce relating to lights, lightships, buoys, or other guides to navigation.
16. Information as to the number, size, character, or location of ships of the Navy ordered laid down at any port or shipyard, or in actual process of construction; or information that they are launched or in commission.

17. Information of the train or boat schedules of traveling official missions in transit through the United States.
18. Information of the transportation of munitions or of war material.

PHOTOGRAPHS.

Photographs conveying the information specified above should not be published.

These requests go to the press without larger authority than the necessities of the war-making branches. Their enforcement is a matter for the press itself. To the overwhelming proportion of newspapers who have given unselfish, patriotic adherence to the voluntary agreement, the Government extends its gratitude and high appreciation.

THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION.
By GEORGE CREEL, Chairman.

January 1, 1918.

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1966—O-230-583