# TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

WALTER G. HERMES



KOREAN WAR
50th Anniversary

*UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR*

# TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT

*by*

*Walter G. Hermes*




*CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY*

*UNITED STATES ARMY*

*WASHINGTON, D.C., 1992*

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-60002

First Printed 1966—CMH Pub 20-3-1

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328
ISBN 0-16-035957-0

UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR

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. . . to Those Who Served

# Foreword

This is the second of five volumes to be published in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR. When completed, these volumes will present a comprehensive account of U.S. Army activities in what was once euphemistically termed a police action. *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* covers the last two years in the Korean War and treats the seemingly interminable armistice negotiations and the violent but sporadic fighting at the front.

The scene therefore frequently shifts from the dialectic, propaganda, and frustrations at the conference table to the battles on key hills and at key outposts. The author presents a solid and meaningful reconstruction of the truce negotiations; he develops the issues debated and captures the color of the arguments and the arguers. The planning and events that guided or influenced the proceedings on the United Nations side are thoroughly explained. The volume abounds in object lessons and case studies that illustrate problems American officers may encounter in negotiating with Communists. Problems encountered by the U.N. high command in handling recalcitrant Communist prisoners of war within the spirit and letter of the Geneva Convention are explained with clarity and sympathy.

*Truce Tent and Fighting Front* is offered to all thoughtful citizens—military and civilian—as a contribution to the literature of limited war.

Washington, D.C.
18 June 1965

HAL C. PATTISON
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History

# The Author

Walter G. Hermes received his M.A. from Boston University and his Ph.D. in History from Georgetown University.

During World War II he served with the U.S. Army in radio intelligence and military government assignments. After the war he attended the University of Denver and the University of California at Los Angeles.

Dr. Hermes joined the Office of the Chief of Military History in 1949. For many years he served as Department of the Army representative on the Department of Defense Liaison Committee with the Department of State on the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series insofar as they covered World War II and the international conferences of that period. Dr. Hermes is at present a member of the Current History Branch of the Office of the Chief of Military History.

He has assisted Dr. Maurice Matloff in the preparation of the volume *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944* in the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series, and has edited the volume by Maj. Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War* in the ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES.

# Preface

This volume is offered as a contribution to the politico-military history of the Korean War. Unlike nearly all of the previous wars waged by the United States, the conflict in Korea brought no military victory; in fact, during the last two years of the struggle neither side sought to settle the issue decisively on the battlefield. In this respect the Korean War had no modern American counterpart. It resembled most the War of 1812 when the nation had also carried on a desultory war while it attempted to negotiate a peace with the British. More important fighting, in both cases, went on at the peace table than on the field of combat.

Although the action at the front from July 1951 to July 1953 was inconclusive, there was a definite interrelationship between the intensity of the fighting and the status of affairs at the truce meetings. Both the United Nations Command and its opponents tried with some success to induce more reasonable negotiating attitudes in their adversaries through the application of limited military pressure.

Under the command system operating during the Korean War, the U.S. Army was given executive responsibility for carrying out U.S. military policy in Korea and for negotiating the truce agreement. Thus, the volume crosses service and departmental lines. General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander in Chief, Far East Command, and his successor, General Mark W. Clark, commanded U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine forces as well as Republic of Korea units. As Commanders in Chief, United Nations Command, they also controlled ground, air, and naval forces contributed by some members of the United Nations for the prosecution of the war in Korea. Although the armistice negotiations were supposed to be strictly military in nature, political elements entered the discussions and the Army often had to participate in formulating and carrying out the policy adopted by the President and his advisors. Army officers, through Army channels, frequently handled not only military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea, but economic and political affairs as well. The Army story in Korea, therefore, is more than a service account; in essence, it is the American story of the struggle for peace during the war.

For the focus of the volume, the activities of the theater commander were chosen as the most appropriate. From this intermediate point the author could shift to Washington for policy decisions that affected the war,

or move easily to the truce tent or the fighting front in Korea to show how the policy was carried out. The theater commander served as a moderator between the world of policy and the world of action, leaving his imprint on both.

The unavailability of reliable documentation of the Communist Chinese and North Korean plans, objectives, and casualties has forced the author to rely upon the U.S. intelligence estimates for information in these areas. While the information contained in these estimates cannot be regarded as firm or precise, it was the best available when the volume was written.

Since the last two years of the war produced few large-scale ground operations, battlefront coverage has been selective. Major operations are, of course, described in some detail, but to attempt to cover the hundreds of hill actions, patrols, and raids would require an over-sized volume cluttered with monotonous detail. The emphasis, therefore, has been placed upon small-scale actions involving U.S. Army units that most typically portray the fighting of a given period.

No attempt has been made to do more than summarize the combat operations of the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marines during the last two years of the war, as these services have published, or are in the process of publishing, their own detailed accounts. Similarly, the Republic of Korea and many of the other participants in the United Nations Command have published, or presumably will publish at some future time, accounts of their participation. The contributions made by the other U.S. services and by the other nations of the United Nations Command in Korea deserve full consideration and credit, but the author felt it was quite proper to devote the majority of his attention to U.S. Army units in the combat portions of the volume.

The problem of dating the many radio messages exchanged between Washington and the Far East has been met by accepting the date on the document used. The time differences between the two areas meant that different dates were used in each place for the same message, but it was felt that any attempt to change all the dates to Washington time or to Tokyo time might lead to further confusion. In most cases the difference of a day meant little substantively and the messages can be identified and located by number as well as by date.

In the course of researching and writing this volume the author has received help from many sources, both within and without the Office of the Chief of Military History, and gladly acknowledges his indebtedness. He owes special debts of gratitude to Col. Joseph Rockis, former Chief of the Histories Division, OCMH, and to Dr. Maurice Matloff, Chief, Current History Branch, OCMH, for their steadfast confidence and support during the initial phases of the project. For their many helpful suggestions and wise counsel the author is also deeply grateful to Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief Historian, Dr. John Miller, jr., Deputy Chief Historian, Mr.

Billy C. Mossman, General History Branch, and Dr. Robert W. Coakley, General History Branch, all of the Office of the Chief of Military History, as well as to Mr. James F. Schnabel, JCS Historical Division, Mr. Wilber W. Hoare, JCS Historical Division, and Dr. Jules Davids, Georgetown University.

Without the cheerful and efficient documentary research assistance of Mrs. Lois Aldridge and Mrs. Hazel Ward of the World War II Division, National Archives and Records Service, the author's task would have been far more difficult. In the Office of the Chief of Military History the personnel of the General Reference Branch under Mr. Israel Wice and his successor, Mr. Charles F. Romanus, have provided services too numerous to mention.

The volume was edited by Mr. David Jaffé, whose interest and professional skill were welcomed throughout the writing and revision of the manuscript. Mrs. Marion P. Grimes performed yeoman service as assistant editor and Mrs. Frances R. Burdette ably assisted in the preparation of the manuscript for the printer. The index was prepared by Mr. Nicholas J. Anthony.

The author was fortunate in having the maps drawn under the direction of Mr. Billy C. Mossman, whose knowledge of the terrains and the records to be researched left little to be desired. The photographs were skillfully selected by Miss Ruth A. Phillips.

It is perhaps needless to say that any substantive errors that remain in the manuscript are solely the responsibility of the author.

In conclusion the author would be remiss if he failed to express his appreciation of the encouragement that he received throughout the writing of this volume from his wife, Esther Festa Hermes.

Washington, D.C.
18 June 1965

WALTER G. HERMES

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Illustrations are from Department of Defense files.

# CHAPTER I

# Introduction

After a year of bitter combat, the war in Korea lost momentum. By the first of July 1951, the war of movement had come to an end and a new, more static phase began. As the battle lines stabilized, the impetus for a political settlement of the conflict mounted. This shift in emphasis introduced a new set of values and changed the complexion of the fighting completely. For the rest of the war, battle was to be the handmaiden of policy rather than its consort.

The first year had been quite different. When the military forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea moved southward across the 38th Parallel in June 1950, the United Nations had supported the efforts of the Republic of Korea to halt the Communist invasion. The United States bore the brunt of the burden as the United Nations had first contained, then driven back the North Koreans in defeat. Only the entry of the Chinese Communists into the war in November had prevented the United Nations from attaining a clear-cut military victory as well as a potential political triumph in the unification of Korea.

But from this point on, the war had become more complicated. The expansion of the conflict to include Red China might also presage the entry of the Soviet Union at a future date. Political considerations increasingly overshadowed the battleground as the Chinese Communists forced the U.N. units to draw back of the 38th Parallel. To defeat the North Korean forces had been one thing; the immense manpower reserves of China and possibly the Soviet Union were another. After U.N. counterattacks had pushed the Communists back to the general area of the 38th Parallel, the prospects for a military victory for either side without a tremendous expenditure of lives and matériel became evanescent. The time for a reappraisal had arrived.

There could be little doubt that the outbreak in Korea was but a segment of the larger contest between the Soviet Union and the United States. The major question revolved about the importance of that segment. Was Korea simply a local test of power, a part of the continuous Communist probing for soft spots that could be easily brought under control by direct action? Or could it become something more serious—the first step toward World War III if the Soviet Union felt her basic interests threatened by a setback in Korea? The search for an answer to this problem was to plague the United States and her allies throughout the war and to exert a profound influence on the direction of political and military affairs.

### *The Battleground*

Before the war broke out in mid-1950, few people in the Western World either knew or cared to know a great deal about Korea or its people. Under the impact of war, knowledge became essential. Old books on the subject were dusted and new ones were quickly rushed to the printers. Maps of Korea filled the newspapers and slowly some of the strange-sounding names became familiar to the man on the street. The candle of indifference was replaced by the searchlight of interest as Korean geography and history assumed new importance.

Korea shares a long, common frontier with Manchuria along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers and touches the Soviet Union at the mouth of the Tumen. From the northernmost bend of the Tumen, Korea extends some 600 miles to the southern tip of the peninsula with a width varying from slightly over 100 miles at the waist to approximately 220 miles at its broadest part. The dominant feature of the topography is the mountainous Taebaek chain covering northeastern Korea and running south along the eastern coast. As one observer has remarked: "There is no spot in the country in which a mountain does not form a part of the landscape." [1] The mountain slopes dip sharply down to the sea in the east, but are more gentle in the west. Roads, railroads, and the communications network follow the valleys and mountain passes in the broken terrain.

Korea is an agricultural country raising most of its dry crops in the north and the bulk of its rice in the south. The majority of its heavy industry and hydroelectric development is located in the north. Average precipitation and mean temperatures are similar to those in the Middle Atlantic States of the United States, but the winters are much colder and over 80 percent of the rainfall is concentrated in the seven months between April and October. Floods are fairly frequent during this period.

With such a long salt-water frontier, fishing villages dot the coast of Korea. Ironically, the best ports are on the southern and western coasts, where tidal variations are more extreme. There are few good harbors on the Sea of Japan which has a tidal range of only about three feet.

Located at the strategic crossroads of east Asia, Korea has had a long and checkered history. For many centuries the peninsula experienced a series of petty wars between rival powers seeking to establish hegemony. Finally, during the seventh century, the kingdom of Silla managed with Chinese aid to gain control of most of Korea. The influence of Chinese civilization at this time brought about Korean acceptance of the Confucian system of social relationships and left a lasting imprint upon Korean ethics, morals, arts, and literature. Despite invasions of barbarian hordes during succeeding centuries, Korea remained faithful on the whole to its father-son relationship with China and regarded itself as inferior to its mentor.[2]

[1] E. de Schweinitz Brunner, quoted in Andrew J. Grajdanzev, *Modern Korea* (New York: The John Day Company, 1944), p. 9.

[2] An excellent account of early Korean history and the Confucian system of association of nations may be found in M. Frederick Nelson, *Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1946).

When the Western nations attempted to establish commercial relations with Korea in the mid-nineteenth century, they encountered a steadfast resistance to any contacts with foreigners. Unfamiliar with the Confucian tradition, which placed Korea in the position of a son or younger brother to China, the West misinterpreted the relationship and considered it a vassal state to China. But China disclaimed suzerainty over Korea and the Japanese later used this admission in their efforts to detach Korea completely from China.

Japan, whose interest in Korea had covered many centuries, understood the Confucian relationship perfectly, yet its desire to extend the Japanese Empire and to secure its flanks led to economic penetration of Korea in 1876. By applying pressure on the Chinese, Japan secured a commercial treaty that opened some of Korea's ports.

Six years later the United States also concluded a treaty of peace, amity, commerce, and navigation with Korea. As a result of this agreement the United States sent its first military assistance group to Korea in 1888, when several military instructors were dispatched to train the Korean Army. By introducing U.S. participation in the opening of Korea, the able Chinese statesman, Li Hung-chang, sought to balance Japanese political aims with American commercial interest.

As Li attempted to strengthen China's position in Korea from 1885 to 1894, he clashed directly with the Japanese and the rivalry erupted into war. The Japanese emerged victorious, and by the treaty of 1895 Korea was completely cut off from the old familiar ties with China. Clumsily Japan tried to adopt the orphan, but Japanese intrigue miscued in 1896 when the Korean queen, who opposed Japanese control, was murdered. Popular reaction in Korea forced the Japanese to desist for the time being and the Korean king turned to the Russians to neutralize Japanese influence.

The Russians proved to be as inept as the Japanese as they quickly tried to secure valuable mining, lumber, and commercial concessions. Thus, when the Russian representatives inadvertently gave the king a chance to dispense with further Russian assistance in 1898, the latter, much to the discomfort of the Russians, eagerly seized his opportunity.

Although both Russia and Japan were temporarily checked in their plans for gaining the favored position in Korea, they watched each other jealously for the next few years. Finally in 1904 the Japanese decided to halt Russian maneuvering in Manchuria and Korea. The Russo-Japanese War ended with another Japanese triumph and this time they were determined not to lose the prize. Japanese administrators, officials, and police moved into Korea and gradually increased their control. Japanese diplomats negotiated successfully for British and American acceptance of their special interests in Korea. The Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905 traded U.S. acquiescence to Japanese suzerainty over Korea for Japanese denial of aggressive designs upon the Philippines. When formal annexation of Korea by the Japanese occurred in 1910, there was little protest except from the Koreans themselves.

During the next thirty-five years, Korea became a Japanese colony. There were several Korean attempts at rebellion, but the Japanese swiftly suppressed

any opposition and tightened their control. Japanese officials and spies blanketed the peninsula and helped the Japanese police maintain strict order. In the meantime they exploited the country economically and attempted to assimilate it culturally. They modernized the industrial and communications system of Korea considerably. When World War II began, Korea became an armed camp and an important part of the Japanese war base.

In late 1943, Korean patriots received their first words of outside encouragement. In the Cairo Declaration of 1 December, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill of the United Kingdom, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China issued the following statement: "The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." [3]

The patriots might have been a little less enthusiastic if they could have listened to the conversation of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Joseph V. Stalin of the Soviet Union at Yalta in February 1945. In discussing a possible four-power trusteeship for Korea in the postwar period, Roosevelt stated that he thought it would take twenty to thirty years before Korea was ready for complete independence. The Soviet leader hoped it would take less time, but he was pleased that the President felt that no foreign troops should be stationed in the liberated country.[4]

When the Soviet Union later declared war upon Japan in August 1945, it adhered to the Potsdam Declaration of 28 July 1945 and joined the United States, the United Kingdom, and China in supporting the independence of Korea "in due course." [5]

During the hectic days of early August 1945, the necessity for a quick decision on the division of responsibility for accepting the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea became pressing. The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the 6th and 9th of August and Russia's entry into the war on the 8th proved to be the final straw that broke Japan's back. But while the Japanese were negotiating, the Russians prepared to invade Korea. The situation called for immediate action and U.S. War Department planners suggested the 38th Parallel of north latitude as an arbitrary dividing line of operations. The Americans would receive the surrender of Japanese forces south of the parallel and the Russians would have the same responsibility to the north.[6]

By 14 August, the Army recommendation had been approved by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the State Department, and, finally, by President Harry S. Truman. The next day, the President proposed to Marshal Stalin that the 38th Parallel be accepted as the demarcation line between the American and Russian operational zones of responsibility. On 16 August Stalin agreed and orders were issued to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, con-

[3] Department of State, *In Quest of Peace and Security: Selected Documents on American Foreign Policy, 1941–51* (Washington, 1951), p. 10.

[4] Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, 1955), p. 770.

[5] Department of State, *The Conflict in Korea* (Washington, 1951), p. 2.

[6] For a detailed study of the decision to use the 38th Parallel as a dividing line, see Paul C. McGrath, The 38th Parallel Division. MS in OCMH.

taining detailed instructions on procedures and arrangements for receiving the surrender and including the provision concerning the 38th Parallel.

With Russian forces already advancing into Korea and American troops still some six hundred miles away on Okinawa, the 38th Parallel seemed to be an advantageous line for the latter. Without the zonal agreement, there was a distinct possibility that the Russians could occupy all of Korea before American soldiers could reach the peninsula. There was no intention on the part of the Americans that the 38th Parallel should serve any purpose other than as a temporary line of convenience. The development of the line into a permanent wall came later.

The line of division was arbitrary. It cut across roads, rivers, and railroads willy-nilly and separated the primarily agricultural south from the more industrialized north. There were about 16,000,000 people in the 37,000 square miles of the southern zone and 9,000,000 in the 48,000 square miles to the north. As for regional differences, there were shades of the American Civil War period. The North Korean "Yankee" was more likely to be independent and hard working and to own his own farm, while the "Southerner" was apt to be more tractable and a tenant farmer. The "Southerners" looked down upon their northern countrymen as unpolished troublemakers and the North Koreans viewed their southern neighbors as lazy rascals.[7]

These regional prejudices, under normal conditions, might not have amounted to a great deal, since they exist to some degree in most countries. Unfortunately for Korea, the conditions that developed after the end of World War II were not normal. The collapse of the Axis nations brought an inevitable shifting of the balance of international power. A divergence between American and Soviet policies had appeared even before the defeat of their common enemies and the temporary relief from tension that the end of a war usually brings did not follow World War II. Instead, a period of mounting pressure began during which the basic conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States became more and more apparent. In the contest of these titans, Korea was but one of the prizes.

### *The Ideological Conflict, 1945–50*

When the first U.S. troops arrived at Seoul in early September 1945, Korean civil affairs were in a state of complete confusion. With the country in dire need of assistance—economic, financial, administrative, and political—the American military commander, Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, decided to retain many of the Japanese officials temporarily to provide order and continuity in the period of the transfer of power. In time, he felt, they could be gradually replaced by American civil affairs officers or by newly trained Koreans.

A quick storm of protest arose from the politically minded Koreans. After forty years of subjugation, they wanted all of the Japanese removed and sent home as soon as possible. The excitement generated by the prospects of independence would brook no halfway measures at this point and General

[7] George M. McCune with Arthur L. Gray, Jr., *Korea Today* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 58–59.

Hodge was forced to speed up the process of replacing and repatriating the Japanese officials. This successful use of political pressure upon the American military leaders established a pattern that the Koreans would skillfully repeat many times in the years ahead.

With the removal of the Japanese under way, the American occupation forces created a small Korean constabulary, armed with Japanese small arms and rifles to preserve internal order. Dozens of political parties had sprung up overnight and each claimed to have the support of the majority of the people. Demonstrations and altercations between the partisans became common in South Korea as the rival factions strove for improved positions.[8] But General Hodge soon became convinced that none of the political parties had either the broad support that it claimed or the political experience necessary for assuming the tremendous task of rehabilitating Korea. He steadfastly opposed the recognition of any provisional government for Korea at that time.

The problem of channeling the mounting Korean nationalism into productive areas was made increasingly difficult by the failure of the Russians to remove the artificial barrier imposed at the 38th Parallel. Efforts at the military level to dispose of the political wall proved unavailing and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes finally took up the matter directly with the Soviet Union. At the meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December 1945, he and Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav M. Molotov agreed to establish a joint commission to consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations on the formation of a provisional government. The commission would also submit proposals for putting into effect a four-power trusteeship over Korea for a period of up to five years.[9]

The reaction of most of South Korea's political parties to the concept of trusteeship was violent. With the scent of independence in the air, they were firmly opposed to five more years of foreign control. But their vehement protests succeeded only in providing the Soviet Union with a political weapon. When the Joint Commission met in March 1946, the Soviet representatives stated that they would not consult with any parties or organizations that had opposed the idea of trusteeship. Since this would have eliminated all of South Korea's important political parties, except for the Communists, the United States refused to accept the Soviet interpretation and the meetings adjourned sine die in May.[10]

In the meantime, the Russians built up the Communist Party organization in North Korea and brought in an exiled Korean Communist, who called himself Kim Il Sung after a former guerrilla hero, to assume the leadership in late 1945. With the façade of a native government, the Soviet Union carried out its program and by mid-1946 had managed to withdraw all but 10,000 of its troops from Korea.

The split between the north and the south became more permanent as later

[8] For the sake of convenience the American zone of occupation and the later Republic of Korea (ROK) will be referred to as South Korea and the Russian zone of occupation and the later Democratic People's Republic of Korea will be referred to as North Korea.

[9] Department of State, *Korea's Independence* (Washington, 1947), pp. 18–19.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.

efforts of General Hodge to negotiate with the Soviet commander in Korea were ignored. As the north became more oriented toward the Soviet Union politically, economically, and militarily, the south tended to depend increasingly upon the United States for assistance. As President Truman pointed out in July 1946, Korea had become "an ideological battleground upon which our entire success in Asia may depend." [11]

With both of the great powers pursuing their own goals in Korea and elsewhere, the prospects for unification grew more remote. The United States began to concentrate to a greater extent on establishing sound economic and fiscal policies and the formation of a trained civil administration in South Korea. And looking ahead to the future, the problem of creating a defense force came in for more detailed study. By November 1946 the native constabulary had been expanded to 5,000 and the basis for a South Korean army had been laid.

Secretary of State George C. Marshall made another effort to come to terms with the Russians in the spring of 1947 and succeeded in obtaining a reconvening of the Joint Commission in May. But, after a promising start, the meetings foundered once more on the exclusion of political parties opposed to trusteeship.

Faced with the possibility of another long impasse, the United States decided to place the Korean question before the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1947. The lack of agreement with the Soviet Union posed the alternatives of either continuing the occupation of southern Korea indefinitely —a course becoming more unpopular in the United States and offering a mounting of the tensions between the South Koreans and the occupation force—or of withdrawal. The United States balked at the latter action, for weakness in Korea would probably have adverse repercussions in the Far East, especially in Japan and China. The United Nations offered another recourse.

The Soviet Union tried to forestall the United States by proposing that all troops be withdrawn from Korea in early 1948, but the Americans refused to be diverted. After some discussion, the General Assembly approved in principle the U.S. resolution calling for over-all elections in early 1948 under U.N. observation, to be followed by the withdrawal of foreign troops after a legal government was formed. The Soviet Union served notice that it would neither permit U.N. observers to enter the North Korean zone nor would it consent to general elections.

While a U.N. commission investigated conditions in South Korea, the United States began to increase the Korean constabulary in preparation for the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops.[12] The Joint Chiefs of Staff had authorized an expansion of the police force to 50,000 men, equipped with light and heavy weapons, and provided for additional U.S. officers and men to train them.

After the U.N. commission completed its inquiry in February 1948, it recommended that elections be held in as

[11] Ltr, Truman to Edwin S. Pauley, 16 Jul 46, in S/W Korea.

[12] A short account of the problems of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea may be found in Department of State, *Korea, 1945 to 1948* (Washington, 1948), pp. 10ff.

much of Korea as possible by May. The General Assembly quickly approved the commission's proposals and General Hodge made the arrangements for the elections. On 10 May over 92 percent of the registered voters in South Korea went to the polls and selected their representatives to a National Assembly. A constitution was soon drawn up and adopted and Syngman Rhee was chosen the first President of the Republic of Korea on 15 August 1948.

The Communists in North Korea had carried on a vigorous campaign opposing the elections in South Korea, but the failure of their attempt necessitated another approach. On 9 September they established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which claimed jurisdiction over all Korea. The Soviet Union and its satellites swiftly recognized the new government and the USSR announced that all Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Korea by the end of the year.

Despite the willingness of the U.S. Army to match the Soviet plan and withdraw its forces from Korea, neither President Rhee nor the State Department desired such quick action. They doubted the ability of the new South Korean Army to maintain internal security and deter Communist aggression. Besides, the U.S. Army had agreed to remain until the South Korean security forces could be trained and equipped. Thus, at the end of 1948 some 16,000 American soldiers still were stationed in Korea.[13]

The occupation of Korea was drawing to a close, however, for the U.S. Army desired to do away with this commitment. It saw little strategic value in Korea and wanted to use the troops located there in other areas. General MacArthur believed that U.S. forces would be dissipated in any large-scale Communist attack on Korea. Furthermore, budgetary limitations dictated that the Army withdraw by the end of June.

In March 1949, the United States agreed to support a South Korean Army of 65,000 to meet some of the misgivings of President Rhee. And when American forces were withdrawn on 30 June, the Provisional Military Advisory Group set up in August 1948 to train the South Korean Army was redesignated the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG). About 500 officers and men were included in the group that was to complete the instruction of the South Korean military forces.[14]

KMAG faced a difficult situation. For though the United States wanted the new army to be able to repel Communist aggression, it did not intend to make it powerful enough to launch any attack upon North Korea. Therefore, when equipment was assigned to the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), tanks, heavy guns, and aircraft were withheld. Even the equipment allocated to the ROKA was slow in arriving. Thus, despite expansion of the ROKA to 100,000 men in 1950, its arms and equipment were more suitable to a police force than to an army. KMAG decided to train the South Koreans in individual arms first

[13] For a good short account of the U.S. Army in Korea from 1945–50, see Lt. Col. James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, a forthcoming volume in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR, Chapter II.

[14] See Major Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War* (Washington, 1962) for a detailed account of the U.S. advisory group and its work.

and some progress was made along this line. In the field of leadership for the ROKA, the task proved less easy. Political appointments were customary and resulted in weak military leadership. In addition there were language barriers to be overcome and a constant struggle to secure training time for the eight South Korean divisions that had been organized. Guerrilla activity demanded their use in stamping out centers of Communist and bandit resistance in South Korea. On the whole, the ROKA had made a beginning by mid-1950, but was far from being a well-trained or well-equipped force.

Across the 38th Parallel the Russians had fashioned a more potent force. Leavened with Korean veterans of the Chinese civil war, the North Korean Army had grown to 135,000 men by June 1950 and included some heavy arms and equipment. Not only did the Communists have heavy artillery, armor, and planes but they were also better trained.

Border clashes broke out along the parallel during early 1950 and Communist political propaganda in South Korea mounted. After the elections of May 1950 in South Korea failed to strengthen their cause, the Communists decided upon sterner action. They demanded new elections, to establish a legislative body for all Korea with unification under the Communists as the objective. When the South Koreans refused to accept their proposals, the Communists launched a full-scale attack on 25 June 1950 across the Parallel.

### *The First Year, 1950–51*

The United States reacted swiftly to the North Korean invasion and immediately presented the problem to the United Nations. Within hours of the attack the U.N. Security Council demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces back to the 38th Parallel.[15] When the North Koreans continued to advance, the Security Council passed a resolution on 27 June urging U.N. members to provide military assistance to South Korea. President Truman quickly ordered General MacArthur to send air and naval forces to aid the ROK troops and when these proved insufficient to halt the fast-moving Communist battle forces, the President instructed MacArthur to commit U.S. ground units, too.[16]

Since other members of the United Nations indicated that they intended to send contingents to Korea, the U.N. Security Council asked the United States to form a unified command and appoint a commander. President Truman accepted the responsibility of American leadership and named MacArthur as the first U.N. commander. MacArthur would receive his instructions through the Army Chief of Staff, acting as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[17] The U.N. commander appointed

[15] The Soviet member was absent from the Security Council in protest against the continuance of a Nationalist Chinese representative on the council instead of a Communist Chinese.

[16] The complete account of these events and the plans and operations of the first year of the war will be found in: (1) Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, 1961); (2) Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year; and (3) Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow. All in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR. The last two are in preparation.

[17] The Joint Chiefs of Staff consisted of General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff.

Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker and his Eighth Army to take charge of all U.N. ground forces in Korea. President Rhee later placed the ROK Army units under General Walker.

Although the United Nations sought to bolster the South Korean cause, the war proceeded at a disastrous pace. Taking full advantage of surprise and superior troops, the North Korean Army overran the ROK defenses at the 38th Parallel and reached Seoul in four days. The South Korean forces fell back, broken and disorganized. To slow down the victorious advance of the North Koreans, General MacArthur was forced to commit his major ground units on a piecemeal basis and trade space for time. Finally, the U.S. and ROK defensive lines were driven back to a narrow perimeter around the port of Pusan in the southeastern corner of the peninsula.

As the battle lines stabilized along the Pusan Perimeter, the initial advantage of the North Koreans passed. They had counted upon overwhelming ROK resistance and securing control of all of South Korea before American aid could become effective. The extension of the conflict exposed their own weaknesses. Their longer lines of supply and communication became more vulnerable to U.N. air attack and their small navy was destroyed by the U.S. naval forces which imposed a blockade on the Korean coast. With the arrival of U.S. reinforcements and the reorganization of ROK troops into effective combat units, MacArthur was able to plan a counterattack.

Leaving Walker to carry out a co-ordinated ground attack upon the perimeter, MacArthur organized a separate corps, the U.S. X, for an amphibious assault behind the North Korean lines. In mid-September, Army and Marine forces landed at Inch'on and quickly recaptured Seoul. The Eighth Army broke through the North Korean ring and raced north to link up with the amphibious attack. With their rear threatened, the Communists fell back behind the 38th Parallel as best they could—defeated but still resisting.

The *status quo* was restored but was that enough? The North Koreans could reorganize and try again. Now seemed to be the propitious moment to destroy the enemy army and unify Korea. Prompted by the United States, the United Nations gave tacit approval in early October and the U.N. forces pushed northward against token resistance. The goal became military victory and political unification rather than repelling aggression and restoring the old situation. So quickly had the modest aims of June been expanded by the heady successes of September.

With triumph on the horizon, the Eighth Army rolled ahead toward the Yalu and the X Corps made another amphibious landing on the east coast. The war appeared to be just about over when reports of Chinese troops in Korea were confirmed at the end of October. After a brief moment of doubt, MacArthur decided to continue the advance to the Yalu. The Chinese reaction to MacArthur's move was swift and violent as they launched strong attacks that halted and then turned back the U.N. forces. By December they had followed the withdrawing Eighth Army south of the 38th Parallel and in early January they retook Seoul. With the precipitous transformation of victory into a galling reverse, a thorough reappraisal of the situation appeared mandatory.

The U.N. Command (UNC) had gambled, even as the North Koreans had initially, on concluding the war before the Russians or Chinese could intervene effectively while hoping that they would not intervene at all. And like the North Koreans, the U.N. Command forfeited its wager, as the Chinese recouped the Communist losses. Combining Confucian concepts with Communist dialectic, the Chinese appeared to be reasserting their ancient role of father-elder brother to Korea and after a lapse of fifty-five years again assumed a dominant part in determining the destiny of Korea.[18]

The entry of the Communist Chinese into the war and the retreat of the UNC forces led to a resurgence of domestic and Congressional pressure upon President Truman to use atomic weapons in Korea to attain military victory. Earlier the President had told the press on 27 July that he was not even considering the use of atomic bombs in Korea.[19] The fact that the Soviet Union had exploded its first atomic bomb in 1949 and broken the U.S. monopoly may have had some influence upon this decision, but it is just as possible that the fluid nature of the war and the moral implications of using the terrible weapon again may also have served as deterrents.[20] At any rate, the pressure had eased as the UNC forces had gained the ascendancy and it was not until late November that the Chinese threat gave it fresh impetus. The President, however, declared in a press conference on 30 November that although the use of all weapons at the United States' disposal, including the atom bomb, had been considered, he did not want to see the bomb employed on innocent people who had nothing to do with military aggression.[21] The continued reluctance of the President to use the bomb in Korea unless it was absolutely necessary was strongly bolstered by the obvious disinclination of its principal allies—Great Britain and France—to risk a possible broadening of



PRESIDENT TRUMAN

[18] For an absorbing account of the development of Chinese interest in the Korean War and the Chinese decision to enter the conflict, see Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960). Whiting maintains that the North Korean attack was planned and directed by the Soviet Union and that although Communist China was probably informed of the plan late in 1949 or early in 1950, it had no direct responsibility for its initiation or outcome.

[19] New York *Times*, July 28, 1950.

[20] The influential *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* maintained in an editorial on 24 July 1950 that the atom bomb would be utterly useless in Korea since the destruction of the North Korean capital, for example, would not destroy the fighting capacity of the enemy's army.

[21] New York *Times*, December 1, 1950.



SECRETARY MARSHALL AND GENERAL RIDGWAY *leave the Dai Ichi Building, Tokyo.*

the war that the introduction of atomic bombs might have produced. Unless circumstances changed radically, it appeared that atomic weapons would be kept in reserve.

By mid-January 1951, the tempo of the war slackened. The Chinese had outdistanced their suppliers and began to suffer heavier casualties. Under a new commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, the Eighth Army stiffened and struck back at the enemy.[22] But the question of military victory was no longer dominant. China's immense manpower potentialities presented the prospect of a long, costly, and expanded war that none of the United Nations desired. Little could be expected in the way of U.N. reinforcements, since most of the contributing countries had other commitments. Without sizable increments the possibility of defeating China appeared forlorn. As the battle lines became more stable, the United Nations started to look upon a negotiated settlement of the Korean problem as the best method of ending the war.

The initial approach of the United Nations to the Peiping government on arranging a cease-fire met with no encouragement. General Ridgway soon provided the United Nations with a more potent persuader. Moving forward cautiously, the Eighth Army advanced for the second time toward the 38th Parallel inflicting heavy losses upon

[22] General Walker was killed in an accident in December.



GENERAL VAN FLEET

the Communist troops. Seoul was taken again in March and constant pressure was applied upon the Communist forces. As the U.N. troops edged closer to the old boundary line, resistance stiffened. But the general situation had improved in favor of the United Nations.

While the Eighth Army was pressing forward, General MacArthur was relieved of the U.N. command by the President.[23] Since the entry of the Chinese into the war, MacArthur had voiced deep differences of opinion with the President, his advisors, and the U.N. members participating in Korea over the conduct of the war. In April, President Truman decided to replace MacArthur with Ridgway; Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet became Eighth Army commander.

Communist counterattacks in late April and May were repulsed, but the United States was inclined to proceed cautiously. The JCS withheld permission for any general advance by Ridgway without its approval. Although the U.N. commander still had the mission of destroying the Communist armed forces in Korea, he was instructed to accomplish this objective subject to the overriding considerations of the security of his forces and his basic mission of defending Japan. On the other hand, he was authorized to conduct limited tactical operations that might be desirable to insure the safety of his command, maintain contact with the enemy, and keep the latter off balance.[24] The Eighth Army would repel aggression and inflict maximum personnel losses upon the Communist forces. By this line of resistance the United States hoped to make further Communist efforts to advance in Korea too costly and to induce them to consider negotiation as an alternative. With the Eighth Army ensconced north of the 38th Parallel for the most part, Van Fleet shifted to the defensive in mid-June.

The cycle was now complete. The United States had returned to the same position it had held so uncomfortably in 1947–48. It wanted very much to end the Korean commitment, but could not withdraw without an unacceptable loss of face both at home and abroad. The American public was not accustomed to entering into a fight with the current international bully and then not

[23] A full account of the relief of MacArthur will be found in Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year. The Senate investigation of this action is covered in Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, 82d Congress, 1st Session, *Military Situation in the Far East, 1951*, Parts 1–5.

[24] Msg, JCS 90000, JCS to CINCFE, 1 May 51.

giving him a decisive beating. A stalemate or draw might not be popular in the United States, yet the alternative would probably be even less agreeable. To drive the Communists out of North Korea might entail the bombing of the Chinese mainland and the blockade of the Chinese coast with large expenditures of men and matériel and could lead to the possible outbreak of a global war with Soviet participation. In addition, the allies of the United States in the Korean conflict were strongly opposed to another large-scale effort to settle the war militarily. Although they recognized the value of Korea as a symbol of resistance to Communist encroachment, they had other problems and commitments to take into consideration. The European powers were concerned over Soviet capabilities on the European continent. While the Soviet Union and its satellites retained the power to ignite brush fires around the world, deep involvement in Korea seemed unwise. They had gone along with the United States in the endeavor by MacArthur to settle the Korean problem on the battlefield in the hope that this would end the troublesome affair quickly. With the reversal in North Korea fresh in their minds, it was not surprising that they displayed little enthusiasm for a second attempt. Only the Republic of Korea was anxious to prosecute the war energetically to a successful conclusion, but, without the assistance of the United States, it lacked the power. The United States might have provided the power, but the prize did not seem to justify the effort or the risks. The Korean War had already had an unfortunate effect in delaying the build-up of the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by which the United States hoped to strengthen its defensive position vis-à-vis the USSR. To seek military victory now might result in further postponement in strengthening the West's defense in Europe besides incurring prohibitive expenditure of lives and money and the risk of World War III. Discretion appeared the better part of valor at this point and a negotiated settlement preferable to military decision.

## CHAPTER II

# The Initial Negotiations

Despite the willingness of the United Nations to bring the Korean conflict to a close by negotiations, the prospects for a peaceful settlement based on a unified, democratic, and independent Korea appeared dim in the late spring of 1951. The United Nations' efforts in the opening months of the year had been ignored by the Chinese Government at Peiping and the latter had given no indication that it was inclined to discuss a cessation of hostilities except on its own terms. Since the Peiping conditions included the withdrawal of the UNC forces from Korea, the return of Taiwan to Red China, and the seating of a Chinese Communist delegate to the United Nations, there was little chance that the United States would accept them. In the face of this stalemate, patience and continued military pressure seemed to be the most potent UNC weapon.

### *Preliminary Arrangements*

After the Communist offensive in May had been turned back, many U.N. observers were optimistic that the Chinese might now find the cost of carrying on the war too high in casualties and equipment and be more receptive to negotiations. Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations, proffered another peace bid in early June and U.N. diplomats sought to fashion a proposal palatable to the Communists.

The first sign of a change in the Communist position came from a radio address by the Soviet representative to the United Nations on June 23. Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob Malik, speaking on the U.N. "Price of Peace" radio program, stated that the Soviet peoples believed that a peaceful settlement could be achieved in Korea. As a first step, he suggested that the belligerents could start discussing the possibilities of a cease-fire and an armistice "providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel." [1] If both sides had a "sincere desire" to end the fighting in Korea, he felt that this would not be too great a price to pay for peace.[2]

Although the Peiping government approved Malik's suggestions several days later, it served notice that it had not given up hope of pressing its own terms. Yet despite the warning note from the Chinese Communists, initial reaction to the Soviet proposal was cautiously favorable among the United Nations. The very

[1] For literary reasons, the terms "armistice," "truce," and "cease-fire" have been used interchangeably throughout this volume. According to the Office of the Judge Advocate General, "truce" signifies a temporary interruption of fighting between local forces for some reason such as the collection of the dead and wounded. The word "armistice" has a similar connotation, but is utilized to cover a temporary cessation of hostilities on a broader scale. "Cease-fire" applies when all acts of war are halted, bringing about an informal end to the war and stabilizing the situation until formal negotiations can be completed.

[2] New York *Times*, June 24, 1951.

existence of a disposition to negotiate was a welcome sign and they awaited a further amplification of the vague references to peace and of procedures acceptable to the Communists.

It did not take long. On the 27th, Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko informed American Ambassador Alan G. Kirk in Moscow that the armistice should be negotiated by the field commanders and should be limited to strictly military questions without involving any political or territorial matters. In the meantime, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, appearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in support of the foreign aid bill, mentioned in passing that the U.S. military objectives in Korea would be satisfied if the Communists withdrew behind the 38th Parallel and gave adequate guarantees against a renewal of aggression.[3] It is interesting to note that each side quickly used the reported statements of the opposition in arguing its own position after the negotiations began.

Whatever doubt may have existed over the authority of the Unified Command to initiate and conduct cease-fire negotiations was soon dispelled by the U.N. legal advisor, Abraham Feller. He informed Secretary General Lie that the United States had the right to conclude a cease-fire or armistice without further authorization from the United Nations as long as the negotiations were limited to military matters and the end result was reported to the Security Council.[4]

With the United Nations sanctioning the leadership of the United States in the discussions with the Communists, General Ridgway was instructed to broach the matter to the Commander in Chief, Communist Forces Korea.[5] On 30 June, Ridgway broadcast via radio his willingness to establish a date for the first meeting and suggested to the Communist leader that a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan Harbor might be a suitable place.[6]

On the same day, Ridgway was advised on the general policy and objectives of the United States in negotiating a cease-fire with the Communists. These instructions provided the framework for the American position during the negotiations.[7]

The principal military interests of the United States were securing a cessation of hostilities, assurance against the resumption of fighting, and the protection of the security of U.N. forces. Recognizing quite clearly that the Communists might not want to reach a permanent political settlement in Korea, the U.S. political and military leaders advised Ridgway that it was essential to obtain a military agreement that would be acceptable to the United States over an extended period of time. Severely restricting the Far East commander to military matters, they cautioned him against discussing political questions and

[3] New York *Times*, June 27, 29, 1951.

[4] Leland M. Goodrich, *Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 184.

[5] The U.N. leaders were not certain who was in actual military command of the enemy forces in Korea, therefore the title was made all-inclusive.

[6] (1) Msg, JCS 95258, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Jun 51. (2) UNC/FEC, Staff Sec Rpt, Office of CinC and CofS, Jun 51.

[7] For a discussion of the making of U.S. policy during the Korean War, see Chapter IV, below. In general, the JCS, the Departments of Defense and State, the National Security Council, and the President participated in the formation and approval of political-military national policy. Ridgway's channel of communication was via the Department of the Army and the JCS.

placed not only the disposition of Taiwan and the seating of Communist China in the United Nations in this category but also the 38th Parallel. These problems should be considered at the political level.

To provide flexibility in dealing with the Communists, U.S. leaders held that the U.S. negotiators could adopt initial positions more advantageous than they expected to obtain, but care must be taken that a retreat to the minimum acceptable position should remain open. They did not want the United States to be accused of bad faith in its negotiating.

As for specific details, the U.S. leaders felt that a military armistice commission with equal representation from both sides should be established. This commission should have the right of free and unlimited access to all Korea and power to carry out its task of insuring that the conditions of the armistice were met. Until the commission was prepared to function, the armistice would not become effective. On the battlefield a demilitarized zone twenty miles wide should be set up based on the positions occupied at the time the truce was signed. There would be no reinforcement of troops or augmentation of matériel and equipment except on a one-for-one replacement basis. In the matter of prisoners of war, they would be exchanged as quickly as possible on a similar basis, one for one. In the meantime, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross should be permitted to visit all prisoner of war (POW) camps to render such assistance as they could until the arrangements were completed.[8]

[8] Msg, JCS 95354, JCS to Ridgway, 30 Jun 51.

After receiving these instructions, General Ridgway delegated the responsibility for the preparation of detailed plans and physical arrangements for the truce talks to the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), headed by Brig. Gen. Edwin K. Wright.[9] Working closely with this group, Ridgway drafted an agenda and on 1 July forwarded it to the JCS, together with the names of the representatives he had selected to represent the United Nations at the conference table. To head the delegation, he had chosen Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, a tough veteran of the Pacific campaigns in World War II. Supporting Joy there would be: Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, Deputy Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, who had led an infantry regiment in the European war; Maj. Gen. Laurence C. Craigie, Vice Commander, Far East Air Forces, who had commanded a fighter wing in North Africa; Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, Deputy Chief of Staff, Naval Forces, Far East, also known as "31-Knot" Burke because of his handling of destroyers at top speed in the Pacific war; and Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, Commanding General, ROK I Corps, a young and able Korean combat commander.[10]

Ridgway also informed the JCS that he intended to send another message to the Communists, who had not yet an-

[9] General MacArthur had established JSPOG on 20 August 1949 and staffed the group with Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives. The group had responsibility for high level planning in the theater and served as the principal planning agency for the U.N. Command during the Korean War.

[10] General Ridgway later stated that he had selected Admiral Joy personally and then he and Joy had picked the other members of the delegation after consultation. Interv, author with Ridgway, 11 Dec 61. In OCMH.



KAESONG

swered his first broadcast, suggesting a preliminary meeting of liaison officers either at Wonsan Airfield or on the main Seoul-Kaesong highway between Kaesong and the Imjin River. The liaison officers could arrange the details of time, place, and procedures to be followed for the meeting of the chief delegates.[11]

Before Ridgway could send the second message, the Communists broadcast a reply. Following their customary policy of never accepting a proposal *in toto,* they suggested that the representatives meet at Kaesong, the old capital of Korea located just below the 38th Parallel thirty-five miles northwest of Seoul, sometime between 10 and 15 July. The United Nations commander thought Kaesong would be satisfactory, but was disturbed at an implication that the Communists believed that military operations would be suspended during the negotiations. He wanted to inform them that there would be no cessation of hostilities prior to the conclusion of the armistice. In addition, he desired to ask them to advance the first meeting so that the negotiations could get under way immediately.[12]

Sensitive to the propaganda potentiality of the last request, the U.S. leaders refused to allow the U.N. Command to be placed in the role of petitioner. "We must not appear eager," they told Ridgway, "to advance [the] date of meeting."

[11] Msg, CX 66160, Ridgway to JCS, 1 Jul 51, DA-IN 10033.

[12] Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 2 Jul 51, DA-IN 10135.

They approved his other suggestions and told him that if he had to refer to the Chinese commander, Peng Teh-huai, by title, he should designate him Commanding General, Chinese Communist Forces in Korea rather than as Commander of the Chinese Volunteers, which the Chinese preferred.[13] On 4 July, Kim Il Sung, as Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and Peng Teh-huai agreed to the preliminary meeting of the liaison officers and proposed 8 July as the date.[14]

Although the Communists appeared willing to initiate discussions, reports from the front indicated that they were gathering forces and supplies for another major offensive in mid-July. Air reconnaissance disclosed increased sightings of vehicular and rail traffic moving south and made Ridgway skeptical of Communist good faith in conducting armistice negotiations. To give the U.N. Command a stronger moral position in the face of the enemy troop and equipment build-up, Ridgway suggested that the deployment of a fighter-bomber wing scheduled for movement to the theater be deferred until a more opportune moment. But the U.S. leaders had already taken the propaganda aspects of the shipment into consideration and told Ridgway that a postponement now would only weaken the UNC posture.[15]

On 6 July, Ridgway informed his representatives of his personal views on the forthcoming negotiations. Implacable opposition to communism was the basic U.S. premise and the delegates would lead from strength not weakness in the truce conference. On the other hand, he recognized that patience would be mandatory, since lengthy and frequent propaganda speeches would be inevitable. The wisest course, he counseled, would be to ignore them. If any opportunity arose to detach Communist China from the Soviet Union bloc or to increase the tension between them without becoming involved politically, the UNC delegation should seek to exploit it.

In dealing with Orientals, the General went on, great care had to be taken not to cause them to "lose face." A "Golden Bridge" of withdrawal from a situation was of high importance to the Oriental. Since there might also be some difficulty with semantics, considering that English, Chinese, and Korean translations would be used, care would have to be taken to insure against basic and sustained misunderstandings arising from inaccuracies in translation.

Ridgway concluded by pointing out that if the negotiators could cap the military defeat of the Communists in Korea with successful and skillful handling of the armistice conversations, "history may record that Communist military aggression reached its high water mark in Korea, and that thereafter Communism itself began its recession in Asia." [16]

To buttress the military members of the truce teams, General Ridgway intended to keep Ambassador John J. Muccio and U.S. Political Advisor William J. Sebald at Munsan-ni, some

[13] Msg, JCS 95438, JCS to CINCUNC, 2 Jul 51.

[14] Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 5 Jul 51, DA-IN 11098.

[15] (1) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 2 Jul 51, DA-IN 10135. (2) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 5 Jul 51, DA-IN 11527. (3) Msg, JCS 95735, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Jul 51.

[16] Memo, Gen Ridgway for General and Flag Officer Members of the U.N. Delegation, 6 Jul 51, in UNC/FEC files.

twenty-odd miles north of Seoul, where a tent camp had been established for the UNC negotiators. But the Army leaders in Washington reacted very strongly to the suggestion that these two well-known diplomats provide political guidance. It might give the Communists the impression that the talks would go beyond the military stage, and furthermore, because of Sebald's connection with Japanese affairs and the proposed peace treaty, the Army was very anxious not to associate the imminent Japanese treaty negotiations with the cease-fire talks. As a result, Ridgway asked Sebald to go back to Tokyo and Muccio to remain at Seoul.[17]

Before the truce talks opened, the U.S. leaders decided to bring Ridgway's directives up to date. They informed him that his mission as the United Nations commander was to inflict maximum personnel and matériel losses upon the enemy in Korea consistent with the security of the forces under his command. His main objective would be to attain a settlement to terminate the hostilities. Appropriate arrangements in support of this included establishing the authority of the ROK over all of Korea south of the 38th Parallel, providing for the withdrawal by stages of non-Korean troops, and permitting the building of ROK military power to deter or repel further North Korean aggression. He could carry out ground, amphibious, airborne, air, and naval operations in Korea that might support his mission, insure the safety of his command, or harass the enemy, but certain restrictions were imposed. No air or naval operations against Communist China, the USSR, the hydroelectric installations along the Yalu, or Rashin (Najin) near the Soviet border would be carried out without JCS permission. Nor could any bombing be permitted within twelve miles of the Soviet frontier. In case the Soviet Union intervened in the war, the U.N. commander was to assume the strategic defensive and report to the JCS, making preparations for the temporary withdrawal of UNC forces to Japan.

As Commander in Chief, Far East, Ridgway also had certain U.S. responsibilities. He would defend Taiwan and the Pescadores by air and naval action only and also defend Japan in the event of a Soviet attack. The same restrictions were placed upon him against attacking Chinese or Soviet territory and he was reminded that only the President had the authority to order preventive action against concentrations of forces on the Chinese mainland.[18]

These directives supplemented the instructions on the conduct of the armistice negotiations and together they delineated the realm of action open to Ridgway for the immediate future. Whether the restrictions laid down by the Washington leaders would be lifted or firmly adhered to would apparently depend upon Communist behavior at the negotiations.

### *The Measure of the Opposition*

On 8 July, the UNC liaison officers, led by Col. Andrew J. Kinney, USAF, set out from Munsan-ni by helicopter. They landed near Kaesong, where the Communists met and escorted them to the first meeting across the conference

[17] UNC/FEC Staff Sec, Rpt, Office of CinC and CofS, Jul 51, p. 7.

[18] (1) Msg, JCS 95977, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jul 51. (2) Msg, JCS 95978, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jul 51.

table. Before the Communists could forestall them, the UNC liaison officers walked in and sat down facing the south, causing a great deal of agitation among their counterparts. According to oriental tradition in negotiating peace, the conquering nation faces the south and the defeated state the north.[19]

The initial exchange was formal and without cordiality. Refreshments were declined by the UNC party and the amenities were quickly dispensed with. As the first order of business, Kinney submitted the list of UNC delegates and requested the names of the Communist representatives. But evidently the enemy intended to look over the UNC list before they revealed their own selections, for they proposed a three-hour recess so that they could receive instructions from their superiors.

Food, liquor, and cigarettes were again offered to the liaison group at this time, but were refused. Kinney sent back to the helicopters for the lunch they had brought with them.

After the recess the Communists announced their delegation, headed by Lt. Gen. Nam Il of the Korean People's Army. The first meeting would take place on 10 July in Kaesong and the Communists would clear the road from the outpost of Panmunjom, some six miles east of Kaesong. UNC vehicles would be marked with white flags and the Communists would assume responsibility for the safety of UNC personnel en route and in the conference area. All members of the UNC group would wear arm brassards for identification except the delegates themselves. As for convoys moving to and from Kaesong, Kinney informed the Communists that these would be exempt from attack provided they were properly marked with white flags or squares and provided that the time and route of the convoys were communicated to the U.N. Command. Kinney later reported that the Communist attitude had been co-operative.[20]

The motor convoy of the UNC delegation, bearing large white flags, was halted at the outpost of Panmunjom, on the morning of the 10th, while the Communists made "preparations" for their safe conduct. When the convoy reached Kaesong, the nature of these "preparations" became apparent. Three vehicles filled with Communist officers in full dress swung in front of the line and posed as victors as the procession drove through Kaesong. Communist photographers gave full picture coverage to this parade.[21]

On the shoulder of a hill on the outskirts of Kaesong, the convoy stopped before a large granite mansion. This was supposed to be the UNC resthouse and consultation area, but since the UNC officers suspected that the Communists might have wired the house and might be listening in, very little serious conversation was conducted inside the building. After a brief pause, the delegates moved down the road to the conference area.

[19] When the main delegations convened two days later, the Communists took no chances on a repetition of this situation and for the remainder of the negotiations the UNC representatives were provided with a northern exposure. See Admiral C. Turner Joy, *How Communists Negotiate* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), pp. 3–4.

[20] (1) Mtg between Liaison Officers at Kaesong, 8 Jul 51, in G–3 Liaison Officers Rpts, 8 Jul–15 Aug 51. (2) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 8 Jul 51, DA–IN 12369.

[21] Col. J. C. Murray, "The Korea Truce Talks: First Phase," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 79, No. 9 (September, 1953), p. 982.



U.N. LIAISON OFFICERS BEING MET BY COMMUNISTS *who will escort them to Kaesong. Left to right: Colonel Murray and Colonel Kinney; Lt. Col. Lee Soo Young of the ROK Army; Lt. Richard Underwood, Korean interpreter; and CWO Kenneth Wu, Chinese interpreter for the U.S. Army.*

Before the war the teahouse chosen by the Communists as the site of the meetings had been a fashionable restaurant that had provided music and dancing girls. Now it was bullet scarred and some of the buildings had been damaged. Armed Communists guards were everywhere as the negotiators were conducted to an inner courtyard and entered the conference room.

General Nam sat in a high chair facing south and Admiral Joy was provided a low chair on the opposite side of the table giving the Communists an advantage in the seating.[22] Even in small things, the Communists would not allow themselves to be outdone. When the UNC delegation placed a small U.N. flag in a brass stand in front of them on the table, the Communists countered by producing a flag in a larger stand at the afternoon meeting.

In dress the contrast among the dele

[22] Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, pp. 4–5.

gates was striking. Except for General Paik, who was clad in fatigues, the UNC officers wore comfortable summer tans. The Chinese wore plain, drab uniforms without insignia, but the North Koreans with high-collar dress blouses, full insignia, and high leather boots were the sartorial champions.

The leader of the Communist delegation, General Nam, had other qualifications besides his neatness and correct military bearing. Although only in his late thirties, he was Chief of Staff of the North Korean Army and also Vice Premier of the North Korean state. Educated in Manchuria, he spoke Chinese and Russian as well as Korean.

Assisting General Nam at the conference table were Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho, Chief of the Reconnaissance Bureau of the North Korean Army and a former Vice Minister of Commerce; Maj. Gen. Chang Pyong San, Chief of Staff, *I Corps,* North Korean Army, a late addition to the Communist delegation; Lt. Gen. Teng Hua, commander of the *15th Army Group* of the Chinese Communist Army, who had joined the Communist Party in 1929 and made the Long March to Yenan; and Maj. Gen. Hsieh Fang, Chief of Propaganda of Northeast Military District of China, who was reported to have played a major role in the 1936 kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek. Communist representatives in most cases had as much political as military experience and this provided another point of difference between the two delegations, for the UNC negotiators were all professional military men.

In his opening address, Admiral Joy tried to counter this political advantage. He stated quite bluntly that the UNC representatives intended to discuss only



U.N. LIAISON GROUP *and its Communist escort arrive at the rest house, Kaesong.*

military matters relating to Korea and would not consider political or economic subjects. Until agreement on the armistice terms was reached, he went on, and a military armistice commission was ready to function, hostilities would continue. He then presented the nine-point agenda drawn up by the U.N. Command: 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. Location of and authority for International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) representatives to visit prisoner of war camps. 3. Limitation of discussion to purely military matters related to Korea only. 4. Cessation of hostilities and of acts of armed force in Korea under conditions that would assure against resumption of hostilities and acts

of armed force in Korea; 5. Agreement on a demilitarized zone across Korea. 6. Composition, authority, and functions of a military armistice commission. 7. Agreement on principle of inspection within Korea by military observer teams, functioning under a military armistice commission. 8. Composition and functions of these teams. 9. Arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war.

Nam then proceeded to state the Communist position. Basically it called for a return to the old *status quo*, with both sides withdrawing to the 38th Parallel and removing all foreign troops from Korea. He proposed an immediate cease-fire and the establishment of a 20-kilometer demilitarized zone along the 38th Parallel. Once this was done, the question of prisoners of war could be discussed. The Chinese delegate, General Teng, supported Nam on each point.

But Admiral Joy refused to be led into any discussion of substantive matters at this time and asked for the Communist agenda. He pointed out that these were political subjects and outside the purview of the negotiations.

After the noon recess, restrictions placed by the Communists upon the free movement of the UNC couriers in the conference area drew a protest from Admiral Joy. He also broached the desirability of bringing twenty U.N. newsmen and photographers along with the UNC delegation to the conference area, since Communist photographers were being given full access. In reply General Nam seemed to agree that both sides should have an equal press and picture coverage of the conference, but he hedged on allowing UNC personnel freedom of movement, arguing that safety was the chief factor in imposing the restrictions. He would contact his superior, Kim Il Sung, on the question of newsmen.

In presenting the Communist agenda, Nam followed the old precept that the best defense is an offense. He attacked the UNC program as unduly long and repetitious. Since the matter of ICRC representatives visiting POW camps was connected with the over-all POW item, it should be taken up when the general problem was considered. U.N. Item 3 concerning the limitation of discussions of military matters pertaining to Korea only was unnecessary, he continued, for the meetings were confined to military matters anyway. As for Items 4 and 5, the cessation of hostilities and establishment of a demilitarized zone, they were not concrete. They should be set forth clearly and then the supplementary matters contained in the next three UNC items in regard to a military armistice commission and inspection teams could be settled. The final subject would be prisoners of war. In conclusion Nam held that the shorter five-point agenda presented by the Communists was more proper and would allow the subjects to be discussed in their correct order: 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. Establishment of the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between the two sides and establishment of a demilitarized zone, as basic conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Korea. 3. Withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea. 4. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease-fire and armistice in Korea. 5. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war following the armistice.

Acceptance of this agenda would have



FORMER TEA HOUSE WHERE THE KAESONG CONFERENCES WERE HELD

settled the question of the 38th Parallel and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea at the outset, so Admiral Joy refused to discuss any specific line of demarcation. He maintained that the U.N. Command would consider a line of demarcation and a demilitarized zone but not the 38th Parallel as the demarcation line. As for the withdrawal of foreign troops, Joy reiterated that this was a political substantive question that could be discussed after an armistice was agreed upon. The first subject to be taken up, he said, was the adoption of the agenda and this could be followed by Items 4 and 5 of the UNC proposal, the cessation of hostilities and the agreement on a demilitarized zone.[23]

At the close of the first meeting, the initial objectives of the Communists in the truce negotiations seemed clear—a return to the 38th Parallel and the clearing of foreign troops from Korea. Once these were attained and the balance of military power redressed in their favor, it would be possible for them to carry on the remainder of the negotiations at their own pace and inclination.

[23] Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs, Armistice Proposal in Korea, 10 Jul 51, in G–3 091 Korea, 348.



U.N. ARMISTICE DELEGATES TO THE FIRST SESSION. *Left to right: General Hodes, General Craigie, Admiral Joy, General Paik Sun Yup of the ROK Army, and Admiral Burke.*

### *Battle of the Agenda*

On the night of 10 July, U.N. newsmen at Munsan-ni set up a betting pool on the length of the armistice negotiations. The "pessimists" guessed that it would take six weeks.[24] As it turned out, a fortnight passed before the conferees could reach agreement on the agenda alone.

The second meeting on the 11th found each side defending its own program and attacking the opposing agenda. Admiral Joy attempted to press the matter of ICRC visits to POW camps as a humanitarian measure, but Nam Il quickly picked this argument up and turned it against the U.N. Command. Since this was a meeting to consider military matters, not humanitarian, he could not see what business it had on the agenda. As long as the UNC delegation insisted on excluding nonmilitary matters, the Communists had a point.

There was no progress on other agenda items. To the Communist brief on the 38th Parallel, Admiral Joy rejoined that the U.N. Command "is completely uninterested in any imaginary line across Korea which has no military significance to the existing military situation." But the Communists refused to modify their stand on this or on the withdrawal of foreign forces.

In reply to Joy's protest on the restrictions imposed on the movement of vehicles, Nam agreed to permit free movement of properly marked vehicles

[24] Rutherford M. Poats, *Decision in Korea* (New York: The McBride Company, 1954), p. 204.




THE COMMUNIST REPRESENTATIVES. *Left to right: Maj. Gen. Hsieh Fang and Lt. Gen. Teng Hua of the Chinese People's Army; General Nam Il, Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho, and General Chang Pyong San of the North Korean Army.*

provided the Communist liaison officers were informed beforehand. He denied, however, the UNC requests for granting U.N. newsmen immediate access to the conferences. Since General Ridgway had assembled the newsmen at Munsan-ni on the assumption that they would be permitted to cover all of the negotiations, Admiral Joy refused to accept the Communist rejection. He informed Nam that the UNC delegation would return with the newsmen or not at all. This firm position surprised the Communists and placed the burden squarely on their shoulders—either accept the newsmen or delay the negotiations.[25]

When the liaison officers met the following morning at Panmunjom, the Communists held firm, perhaps to find out whether the U.N. Command was bluffing or not. In any event the UNC liaison officers informed the enemy that the motor convoy with the newsmen would be at Panmunjom at 0900. If the newsmen were not allowed to pass, the whole convoy would return to Munsan-ni.

Matching determination with determination, the Communists held up the convoy and would not permit the newsmen to go to the conference area, whereupon the whole convoy returned to the base camp. The next two days were spent in debate at the liaison officer level, with the Communists urging the UNC delegation to revive the talks and the

[25] Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs, Armistice Proposal in Korea, 11 Jul 51, in G–3 091 Korea, 348.


THE KAESONG CONFERENCE SITE
1 July 1951
LIMITS OF NEUTRAL ZONE
5 0 5 MILES
5 0 5 KILOMETERS
Yesong R.
KAESONG
Panmunjom
Imjin R.
Munsan-ni
Uijongbu
Han R.
SEOUL
KIMPO AIRFIELD
YONGDUNG-PO
INCHON
H. C. Brewer, Jr.

*MAP 1*

latter steadfastly refusing to go back until the newsmen accompanied them.[26]

General Ridgway had the complete support of his superiors in Washington on this matter, and they also had approved his decision to insist upon full reciprocity of treatment at the armistice negotiations. To secure this they felt that the Kaesong area should be completely demilitarized and armed guards should be removed from the Kaesong-Munsan road.[27]

By 15 July the Communists decided to concede and the third plenary meeting was arranged for the afternoon. Accompanied by the twenty newsmen, the U.N. delegation returned to Kaesong and promptly pressed for equality of treatment en route and in the conference area. A 5-mile circle should be drawn around Kaesong and all armed personnel should be eliminated, argued Admiral Joy. Furthermore, freedom of vehicular movement between Panmunjom and the conference area without prior notice should be recognized. The Communists, agreeing in principle, suggested that the liaison officers work out this problem. *(Map 1)*

Since the Communists had assured the U.N. Command that only military matters would be discussed at the meetings, Joy agreed to drop Item 3 from the UNC agenda. As for the visit of ICRC representatives to POW camps, Joy informed the enemy that this could be taken up when POW's were considered. Thus the U.N. Command dropped two of its nine items at the third meeting. But the Communists clung firmly to the 38th Parallel and showed no signs of giving ground.[28]

Behind the scenes the UNC staff officers worked feverishly as they sought to discover chinks in the enemy's negotiating armor. Each night in anticipation of the next day's meeting two or three of the staff officers would prepare position papers and the other members of the UNC delegation would sit around and pick them to pieces. After several hours of critical examination, the position papers were boiled down to the bare essentials and considered ready for presentation to the Communists. This process of long hours of searching examination was supplemented by informal discussions, and it also established a pattern that was to be repeated again and again as the negotiations went on.[29]

The first break in the Communist position came at the fourth meeting on 15 July. The UNC delegation had revised its agenda and condensed it to four points: 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. Establishment of a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea. 3. Concrete arrangements for a cease-fire and armistice that would insure against a resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea periling a final peace settlement. *a.* Military armistice commission, including composition, authority and functions. *b.* Military observer teams, including composition, authority, and functions. 4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.

[26] UNC/FEC Staff Sec Rpt, Office of CinC and CofS, Jul 51, pp. 12–15.

[27] Msg, JCS 96160, JCS to CINCUNC, 13 Jul 51.

[28] Transcript of Proceedings, Mtg, Armistice Proposal in Korea, 15 Jul 51, in G–3 Korea, 348/3.

[29] Interv, author with Brig Gen James A. Norell, 12 Jun 61. General Norell served as staff officer at Kaesong and Panmunjom.

After a 2-hour recess to study the new agenda, the Communists made their first real concession. They accepted the general statement of Item 2, although they affirmed their intent to insist on the 38th Parallel in the substantive discussions. They also agreed that Item 3 was an improvement and they would examine it further. As the area of disagreement narrowed, it became apparent that the biggest obstacle remaining was the withdrawal of foreign troops.[30]

On the following day the Communists used a negotiating tactic that soon became standard—they outwaited the UNC delegates and induced the latter to speak first, obviously hoping that they would offer a concession of some kind that the Communists could seize upon. After Admiral Joy had explained the functions of the military armistice commission and the observer teams, General Nam declared that UNC Item 3 was still too specific. He suggested a shorter, more general statement, which the U.N. Command accepted on the 18th at the sixth meeting. With agreement on Items 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the UNC agenda attained, the UNC delegation was ready to open the substantive discussions, but the Communists continued to insist on the inclusion of the item on the withdrawal of foreign troops.[31]

Despite the adamant position of the U.N. Command on this matter, Nam Il returned to the attack at the next session and with a hint of sarcasm declared: "War is not travel and troops are not tourists. Should the cease-fire be ordered and armistice achieved, yet the foreign armed forces still stay where they are, it is clear that the intention is not possible to let them enjoy the scenic beauties of Korea. . . ." Possibly Nam had never seen the recruiting posters in the United States, but, at any rate, the speech made little impression upon the UNC delegation.[32]

Secretary of State Acheson issued a strong statement to the press supporting the UNC position on the 19th. Making it clear that UNC troops would stay in Korea until a genuine peace was firmly established, he maintained that Korea's neighbors knew that the UNC forces posed no threat to them. "Once before," he concluded, "foreign forces were withdrawn from Korea as a part of a U.N. plan to reach a final settlement of the Korean problem. The Communists defied this effort and committed aggression against the Republic of Korea. The Korean people can be assured that a repetition of this act will not be tolerated." [33] Ridgway was pleased by the content and timing of the Acheson statement and felt that it would have a beneficial effect the negotiations.[34]

At the close of the meeting on the 19th, Admiral Joy queried Ridgway as to whether he could recess the conversations until the Communists had something new to offer. But the U.N. commander was unwilling to use this tactic at this stage of the negotiations. The onus for any break must fall on the

[30] Transcript of Proceedings, Mtg, Armistice Proposal in Korea, 16 Jul 51, in G–3 091 Korea, 348/3.

[31] Transcripts of Proceedings, Mtgs, Armistice Proposal in Korea, 17, 18 Jul 51, in G–3 091 Korea, 348/3.

[32] Transcripts of Proceedings, Mtg, Armistice Proposal in Korea, 19 Jul 51, in G–3 091 Korea, 348/3.

[33] Msg, JCS 96802, JCS to CINCUNC (Adv), 19 Jul 51.

[34] Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Jul 51, DA–IN 16716.

Communists.[35] He recommended, however, that the UNC delegation take a stronger attitude toward the many discourtesies and the rudeness that the Communists had displayed in recent meetings. In the future, he went on, Joy's replies, under similar provocation, should be "terse, blunt, forceful and as rude as his remarks may occasion." [36]

Realizing that the withdrawal of foreign troops issue might deadlock the conference or even cause the Communists to break off negotiations, the Washington leaders suggested that a slightly different approach be tried. The UNC delegation could offer a broad agenda item that would allow the Communists to discuss the matter unilaterally without committing the U.N. Command to anything. If this failed, Ridgway could agree to discussing at some future date a mutual reduction of forces. The Washington leaders definitely preferred the first solution.[37]

Nature provided a brief interlude for the negotiators on 20 July. The Panmunjom River flooded and damaged the bridge so that the UNC delegation could not cross. One of the translators, 1st Lt. Kenneth Wu, climbed across the broken bridge and hiked to the outpost at Panmunjom to carry the news to the Communists. Although the bridge was repaired by the next day, it did not bring the negotiators any closer together mentally. At the end of this meeting, the Communists tried another tack. They asked for a four-day recess to allow both sides to reconsider. Reluctantly the UNC delegation agreed.[38]

When the conferees reconvened on the 25th, the Communists made one last attempt to place the withdrawal of troops on the agenda, but the UNC representatives held firm. At the afternoon session the Communists suddenly agreed to drop this controversial subject. Instead they proposed to add a fifth item—Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides. They announced their intention to suggest a high-level conference to consider the question of withdrawal of troops by stages soon after the military agreement was reached. Although this was vague, Admiral Joy felt that it did indicate a desire on the part of the Communists to get on to the substantive discussions. He reported that Nam Il was more intense and nervous at the meeting and that the Chinese delegates seemed to be taking a more active part. As for the concession itself, he believed that the Communists were trying to save face by securing acceptance of the new Item 5 at the same time they gave in on the withdrawal issue.[39]

With Washington approval of the new Communists proposal, the agenda was complete and the first matter—the adoption of the agenda—concluded. Item 2—Fixing a military demarcation line,

[35] (1) Msg, HNC 116, Joy to CINCFE, 19 Jul 51. (2) Msg, CINCFE to CINCUNC (Adv), 21 Jul 51. Both in UNC/FEC Staff Sec Rpt, Office of CinC and CofS, Jul 51, incls 11 and 13.

[36] Hq UNC/FEC, History of the Korean War—Korean Armistice Negotiations (hereafter cited as Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations), July 1951–May 1952, vol. 2, ch. I, pp. 35–36. MS in OCMH.

[37] Msg, JCS 96802, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jul 51.

[38] Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs, Armistice Proposal at Kaesong, 21 Jul 51, in G–3 091 Korea, 348/5.

[39] Msg, HNC 136, CINCUNC (Adv) to Ridgway, 25 Jul 51, in UNC/FEC Staff Sec Rpt, Office of CinC and CofS, Jul 51, incl 15.

between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic consideration for a cessation of hostilities in Korea—was in general accordance with the U.N. position and avoided mention of the 38th Parallel. The Communists had insisted on shortening the several U.N. agenda proposals relating to cease-fire arrangements and Item 3 reflected their work—Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease-fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority, and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of a cease-fire and armistice. Item 4—Arrangements relating to prisoners of war—had not been tampered with nor had the Communist suggestion for Item 5. The greatest casualties in the battle of the agenda—the question of withdrawal of foreign troops and the visit of ICRC representatives to the prisoner of war camps—had suffered mere flesh wounds and would reappear later in the substantive discussions.

### *Reaction at the Front*

With the initiation of negotiations, the tempo of operations on the battlefield slackened. The prospect of an early end to the fighting made U.N. commanders and troops eager to prevent any unnecessary loss of life. But some small-scale, limited-objective attacks were mounted and frequent patrols were sent out to collect information on enemy activities and to prevent the U.N. troops from losing their fighting edge.

General Ridgway was keenly aware of probable deterioration in troop morale once the shooting war stopped since he had witnessed the soldier demonstrations in Europe at the close of World War II.[40] Foreseeing that the truce talks might produce a similar situation, he informed Van Fleet on 4 July of his views. Phrases such as "Let's get the boys back home" and "the war-weary troops" were being used again, he pointed out. To Ridgway's way of thinking there could be "no greater tragedy" for the free world than to have a repetition of the "disgraceful" conduct of American troops after the last war. To forestall any recurrence, Ridgway went on, Van Fleet should take any steps that judgment and common sense dictated to eliminate the development of unfavorable attitudes. He suggested an educational program aimed at the "unequivocal necessity" for preparedness in Korea until satisfactory peace terms had been "finally" agreed to by all parties. Ridgway realized that some people might disapprove of his action, but maintained that if this were "thought control," then he was in favor of it. Otherwise the United States would "cowardly surrender" all that it had been fighting for. A similar message to his superiors won assurance that they would combat the rise of like attitudes at home in the event a truce was signed in Korea.[41]

Although an enemy offensive failed to materialize in mid-July, intelligence sources indicated that the Communists were developing their potential and had the capability to launch an attack if and

[40] At the close of World War II, American soldiers had staged demonstrations abroad to put pressure upon the U.S. political and military leaders to return the soldiers home quickly.

[41] Ridgway's letter to Van Fleet is quoted in Ltr, Hodes to Brig Gen Paul F. Yount, CG 2d Logistical Comd, 7 Jul 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Jul 51. For the JCS exchange, see: (1) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 4 Jul 51, DA–IN, 10908; (2) Msg, JCS 96032, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Jul 51.

when the negotiations broke down. Ridgway directed his air and naval commanders to use their air power to the maximum to interdict road and rail communications lines and to punish the enemy wherever he might be in Korea. At General Van Fleet's urging, Ridgway also sought to build up the level of ammunition in Korea to a 45-day supply, so that Eighth Army would be prepared to meet a large-scale enemy offensive.[42]

The slowdown on the ground front did not prevent the U.N. commander from applying pressure on the enemy in other ways. On 21 July he informed the JCS that he intended to carry out a massive air strike on the North Korean capital, P'yongyang. After warning the civilian population of several cities by leaflet that an air attack would be made on one of them, he would send his bombers and fighters over P'yongyang on the first suitable day after July 24. The Communists had stored considerable quantities of supplies and equipment at P'yongyang and it was a key transportation center.[43]

The Washington leaders immediately questioned the wisdom of a large-scale bombing raid at this time. In view of the serious political implications involved, they asked Ridgway to defer the attack on P'yongyang. The U.N. commander realized that a big air assault might have repercussions on the negotiations, but pointed out that to permit the enemy to grow stronger than the U.N. Command could mean a heavy loss in American lives if the Communists discontinued the discussions and resumed the offensive. A successful air strike would naturally reduce the enemy capacity to attack and increase the pressure upon him to negotiate. Although Ridgway admitted that his views were based on the local situation rather than the global picture, he felt obliged to inform the JCS of the dangers in allowing the Communists to augment their strength.[44]

Two days later, Ridgway advised the Joint Chiefs that he could omit all advance warning to the civil populace since air force attacks on military installations in urban areas had been made previously and the people notified. In addition, notice of the raid would permit the enemy to improve his defense measures and reduce the tactical benefits of a strike.[45]

In any event the U.S. leaders reconsidered. They considered it undesirable to distribute warning leaflets for they thought this would give undue publicity to the raid. They also did not want to single out P'yongyang as a target for an all-out strike while the conferences were in session, since in the eyes of the world this might appear to be an attempt to break off the truce negotiations. However, if Ridgway would treat the mission as a routine utilization of air power and if he felt that P'yongyang was the most important objective, they would consent.[46]

Because of bad weather, the strike was not mounted until July 30. Even then, weather conditions were not ideal and all attacks planned for light and medium bombers had to be canceled. Nevertheless the Air Force flew close to 450 fighter and fighter-bomber sorties.

[42] UNC/FEC Staff Sec Rpt, Office of CinC and CofS, Jul 51, pp. 30ff.

[43] Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 21 Jul 51, DA–IN 17293.

[44] (1) Msg, JCS 96938, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Jul 51. (2) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 23 Jul 51, DA–IN 17620.

[45] Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 25 Jul 51, DA–IN 18440.

[46] Msg, JCS 97223, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Jul 51.

Smoke and heavy cloud coverage made evaluation of the raid damage difficult.[47]

As the battle of the agenda came to an end—on 26 July—the U.N. commander toured the front lines. In a cheerful report to General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, he described the Eighth Army as full of confidence and in high spirits. Training was progressing satisfactorily and recent replacements were in good physical and mental condition. Despite the rainy season, logistical capacity was unimpaired. Troop commanders had turned up no evidence of a "going home attitude" in their units.[48]

Despite the optimism occasioned by this tour, Ridgway cautioned his commanders to be ready to meet the most dangerous capability that the enemy could exercise. He estimated that an offensive might come either when negotiations broke down or during the Japanese peace conference.[49]

Up to this point, the outlook was hopeful. An agenda had been accepted, morale was good, and the UNC forces held strong defense positions. If the early compromises by the Communists were any indication of their desire for peace, the outlook for a quick settlement was favorable. But the picture was not all rosy. The enemy was increasing his strength steadily and could launch a full-scale offensive at any time. And although the Communists had apparently conceded several major points on the agenda, there was no doubt that they would bring them up again in the substantive discussions. Behind the UNC lines, the government of Syngman Rhee was highly perturbed about the possibility of an armistice that might leave Korea permanently divided and had begun to agitate against any compromise with the Communists. The storm warnings were clear and promised that the course of the truce negotiators might be strewn with obstacles. If the negotiations bogged down, the battlefield would also be affected. A loss of confidence in the outcome at Kaesong could easily lead to an expansion of combat operations. With the price of failure larger casualty lists, the center of interest continued to focus on the negotiations as the substantive discussions got under way.

[47] FEAF Comd Reference Book, 1 Aug 51, p. 7.

[48] UNC/FEC Staff Sec, Rpt, Office of CinC and CofS, Jul 51, p. 32.

[49] Memo for Rcd, 26 Jul 51, no sub, in UNC/FEC Staff Sec, Rpt, Office of CinC and CofS, Jul 51, incl 18.

# CHAPTER III

# Point and Counterpoint

On the eve of the opening of the substantive discussions at Kaesong, the Soviet Union launched a new peace offensive. The Russians suggested a five-power peace pact to include Communist China and the banning of atomic weapons as steps that would lead to an easing of world tensions.[1] As the United States was in the midst of preparations for the Japanese peace treaty conference and also currently negotiating defensive pacts with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, the vague Russian proposals aroused little enthusiasm among the American leaders.[2] The confluence of circumstances intimated that the Soviet peace drive was mainly inspired by a desire for favorable propaganda that might disrupt the American undertakings.

The dovetailing of the Communist peace movement with the armistice discussions did not cause any important alterations in the U.S. plans for concluding the treaty with Japan or the defensive pacts. Nor did it have any great effect upon the Korean negotiations. For the uncompromising position concerning the 38th Parallel adopted by the enemy delegates at Kaesong soon dispelled any illusion that they were eager for a truce except on their own terms.

## *The 38th Parallel*

The search for a satisfactory formula for attaining a truce was hindered by the strong positions taken by both sides at the outset. As soon as the agenda was settled, General Nam quickly turned back to the 38th Parallel. Since the boundary had been recognized by all nations as the dividing line before the war, Nam urged that it be restored. Each side held territory north and south of the Parallel and neither would incur any great disadvantage by re-establishing the *status quo*. To create a demilitarized zone, Nam proposed that a 20-kilometer strip along the parallel be cleared of troops. Such a realignment of forces and readjustment of territory would be fair and just, Nam maintained.[3]

The UNC rebuttal followed on 27 July. Admiral Joy ended the preliminary skirmishing and came out strongly in favor of a truce line based on battle realities rather than the 38th Parallel. Pointing out that the Communist and U.N. forces had crossed the parallel no less than four times during the last thir-

[1] Other members of the pact would be the United States, United Kingdom, USSR, and France.

[2] See article of the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Warren R. Austin, "International Unity Against Shifting Soviet Tactics," in Dept of State *Bulletin*, vol. XXV, No. 637 (September 10, 1951), pp. 425ff. See also New York *Times*, August 7, 1951.

[3] Transcript of Proceedings, Tenth Session, Conf at Kaesong, 26 Jul 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs.

teen months, he argued that this fact alone proved the unsuitability of the parallel as a demarcation line. An effective delineation of a demilitarized zone must be made on practical military grounds, Joy continued, and should not be influenced by consideration of ultimate political objectives; for a military armistice an imaginary geographical line such as the 38th Parallel had no validity whatsoever.

Ruling out the parallel as a line of demarcation, Joy advanced the UNC proposal. There were three battle zones to be considered, he maintained, the ground zone, the sea zone, and the air zone. Although the UNC forces occupied definite positions on the ground, they had superiority in the air over all Korea and controlled the entire Korean seacoast. Since the Communists would gain freedom of movement and be able to rebuild within their sector of Korea when the air and sea power of the U.N. Command were confined by a cease-fire and therefore would gain more than the U.N. Command through a truce, Joy suggested that the Communists should compensate the UNC by making concessions on the ground. On the map that he presented to the enemy delegates, UNC staff officers had drawn a demilitarized zone twenty miles wide considerably to the north of the ground positions then occupied by the UNC forces.[4] This initial offer sought, of course, far more then the UNC delegates expected to secure, but even so, it was a novel approach—an attempt to break total military power into its component parts and give them separate values for bargaining purposes.

The Communist reaction was a swift and rude rejection. "Ridiculous," was Nam's comment on the 28th as he asserted that military power was the sum total of the power of all arms of the forces. The UNC battle lines, he went on, were the concentrated expression of the military effectiveness of its land, air, and sea forces. Although the present battle lines were variable, Nam felt that the 38th Parallel approximately reflected the current situation and should be accepted as the line of demarcation.

After rebuking Nam for his rudeness and bluster, Joy proceeded to defend the UNC proposal. Ground progress did not always indicate the status of a war, he contended, for Japan was defeated without a single soldier setting foot on the Japanese home islands.[5]

Nam refused to accept this statement. He derided the American claim that the United States had defeated Japan. Anyone knew, Nam said, that it was the Korean people's struggle, the Chinese people's war, and the Soviet Union's resistance that brought Japan to her knees. Had not the United States fought Japan for three years without victory until the Soviet Army entered the war and dealt Japan a crushing blow? "Can these historical facts be negated lightly?" he concluded.[6]

Since each side obviously was using a different history book, Admiral Joy did not pursue this subject. Instead he continued to point out the additional advantages that would accrue to the Communists if a truce was signed. They could repair their roads, bridges, and railroads, bring up supplies needed for the health and well-being of their

[4] *Ibid.*, Eleventh Session, 27 Jul 51.

[5] *Ibid.*, Twelfth Session, 28 Jul 51.

[6] *Ibid.*, Thirteenth Session, 29 Jul 51.

troops, and restore and rehabilitate their towns and facilities.[7]

The Communists were not interested in the admiral's arguments. They clung steadfastly to the 38th Parallel as July passed by and the dog days of August began. The daily sessions became routine as each side presented the same arguments and refused to concede or compromise. Since apparently the support of Marshall and Acheson had helped convince the Communists that the United States would remain firm on the troop withdrawal issue, Joy suggested to Ridgway that high-level backing for the UNC position on Item 2 might also have a beneficial effect.[8] He felt that the conference could break up over this matter for Nam would not even discuss a proposal not hinged on the 38th Parallel.[9]

In the midst of this impasse, a strange incident occurred. During the lunch hour on 4 August a fully armed company of Chinese troops marched past the UNC delegation house in clear violation of the neutrality of the conference zone. This was a double violation, in fact, for not only were there supposed to be no armed troops within a half mile of the conference site but also all troops within a 5-mile radius of Kaesong were to be equipped with sidearms only. When the conference resumed that afternoon, Joy immediately entered a strong protest and Nam promised to investigate.[10]

Whether the Communists wished to demonstrate their control of the conference site for propaganda purposes or simply made a mistake proved immaterial. General Ridgway decided to adopt a strong position and informed Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai that the UNC delegation would not hold any further conversations with the Communists until a satisfactory explanation of the violation and assurances that it would not happen again were received.

The first reply from the Communists stated that the troops were guards responsible for police functions and that they had passed through the area by error. Instructions had been issued to prevent a recurrence. But although Admiral Joy recommended that the U.N. Command accept this response, Ridgway determined to press for an inspection team of equal representation to be organized and to carry out a full inspection of the entire neutral zone before the next meeting. Ridgway felt that the violation was either a deliberate attempt to intimidate or was due to gross carelessness or lack of discipline.[11]

On the morning of the 6th, a second message was broadcast in Korean, English, and Japanese by the Communists. Although the Korean and English versions were courteous and asked that the U.N. delegation return to Kaesong, the Japanese broadcast had an insolent and peremptory ending. Ridgway asked for permission to turn down the Communist explanation, but his superiors considered that the enemy had in effect accepted the UNC conditions. They instructed Ridgway to broadcast his acceptance and at the same time to warn the Communists that the resumption of the talks was conditional upon their com-

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Msg, HNC 148, Joy to Ridgway, 28 Jul 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 45–D.

[9] Msg, HNC 175, Joy to Ridgway, 4 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 60–C.

[10] Transcript of Proceedings, Nineteenth Session, Conf at Kaesong, 4 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs.

[11] Msg, C 68381, Ridgway to Joy, 6 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 65.

plete compliance with the guarantees of the neutralization of the Kaesong area.[12] Perforce Ridgway agreed, but he vented some of his indignation at the Communists in a message to Joy. Blasting the enemy as men who considered courtesy a concession and concession a weakness, he enjoined Joy to "govern your utterances accordingly and you will employ such language and methods as these treacherous Communists cannot fail to understand, and understanding respect." [13]

After a 5-day hiatus, the conference resumed on 10 August. Joy quickly informed General Nam that the UNC delegation was through discussing or considering the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line. Immediately the Communists protested against this attempt to limit the discussion, but Joy soon pointed out that his stand governed only the UNC response and in no way prevented the Communists from talking about the 38th Parallel. A very curious interlude ensued. For two hours and ten minutes the two delegations faced each other in frozen silence punctuated only by the occasional nervous tapping of Nam's cigarette lighter on the table. Finally Admiral Joy broke the sound barrier and suggested that the conferees turn to Item 3, since no agreement could be reached on the line of demarcation. The Communists refused.[14]

Again General Ridgway urged his superiors to support a strong course of action. He proposed to give the Communists seventy-two hours to modify their adamant position. If they still would not budge, then they would be told that by their own deliberate act they had terminated the negotiations. But the Washington leaders disapproved. They had no intention of presenting an ultimatum at this stage of the discussions. If and when the conferences were broken off, the onus should fall squarely upon the Communists. After all, they pointed out, the 38th Parallel might not be the breaking point and it would take time for Moscow and Peiping to amend their stand. Past experience in dealing with the Communists had shown that long and protracted discussions were standard procedure. Calmness, patience, perseverance, and firmness should characterize the U.N. delegation attitude. This approach, they concluded, would subject the enemy to the greatest strain while sustaining the unity and strength of the UNC position.[15]

On 12 August the Communist representatives returned to the attack. "You should know that truth is not afraid of repetition, and needs repetition," admonished General Nam as he argued the case for the 38th Parallel. Unfortunately there was no common agreement on what "truth" was or whose "truth" was more "truthful" than the other's. Nam termed the U.N. proposal for ground compensation "absurd and arrogant" and his own as "reasonable," while Joy attacked the Communists' "inflexible and unreal stand" and defended his own "reasonable" procedure.[16] Since neither side

[12] Msg, JCS 98216, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Aug 51.

[13] Msg, C 68554, Ridgway to CINCUNC (Adv), 8 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 68–A–1.

[14] Transcript of Proceedings, Twentieth Session, Conf at Kaesong, 10 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs.

[15] (1) Msg, C 68672, CINCFE to JCS, 10 Aug 51. (2) Msg, JCS 98637, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Aug 51. (3) Msg, JCS 98713, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Aug 51. All in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 72.

[16] Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-second Session, Conf at Kaesong, 12 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs.

wished to show any sign of weakness nor to make concessions without a *quid pro quo,* the sparring in the battle of words continued for several days with no progress.

The Communists fought hard against a land advance of the UNC forces as compensation. As *Pravda* put it, "The Korean people have not agreed to the negotiations in Kaesong in order to make a deal with the American usurpers over their own territory." [17] But although the UNC delegation admitted that its proposed demarcation line was entirely within the Communist-controlled area and offered to make some territorial adjustments based on the current battle line and over-all military situation, it held firmly to the concept of compensation.[18]

Finally in an effort to break the deadlock, Admiral Joy made an important suggestion that was to have a considerable effect upon the conduct of the negotiations. On 15 August he proposed that a subcommittee of one delegate and two assistants from each side be formed. He believed that a less formal round-the-table exchange might be conducive to freer discussion and might produce a feasible plan for solving Item 2. On the following day the Communists accepted, but not without raising the number of delegates to two instead of one. They nominated Generals Lee and Hsieh, and Joy named General Hodes and later Admiral Burke, as his representatives. While the subcommittee attempted to work out its recommendations, the plenary meetings would stand in recess.[19]

The first subdelegate discussion took place on 17 August, and although no concrete progress resulted, the atmosphere was more relaxed. General Hsieh seemed to like this type of exchange. He spoke frequently and acted as a moderator when the comments became sharp. As the talk flowed back and forth around the small table, there was even a tendency on the part of the Communists to consider the demarcation line on the map.

At the second session the UNC delegates managed to shock the Communists by offering to toss a coin to decide which side should make the first new proposal. The Communists could not imagine having an important point turn on the flipping of a coin. Nevertheless they did bring forth a map that slightly modified their stand on the 38th Parallel. On the east they gave the U.N. Command about four kilometers and they took about the same amount in western Korea. Later they went further. They proposed to do away with all previous maps and to start afresh. Although they refused to answer several pointed questions on the 38th Parallel, General Hodes and Admiral Burke felt that the Communists might be ready to discuss other solutions, provided that the U.N. Command made the opening gambit.[20]

When the third session convened on the 19th, Hodes suggested that, for discussion purposes, the conferees assume that all air and naval effectiveness was reflected in the battle line. The Com-

[17] Quoted in Carl Berger, *The Korea Knot: A Military-Political History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), p. 144.

[18] Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Sessions, Conf at Kaesong, 13, 14 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs.

[19] *Ibid.,* Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth Sessions, 15, 16 Aug 51.

[20] Summary of Proceedings, First and Second Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 17, 18 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Subdelegation Mtgs.

munists were willing to talk on this basis, but warily waited for the U.N. Command to make a definite new proposition. After two days of fruitless fencing, the Communists retreated further from their position on the 38th Parallel. They indicated that if the U.N. Command would give up the concept of compensation, they would present a proposal based upon adjustments along the battle line. Since this was a definite step forward, the UNC delegates agreed to the principle of adjustment. The meeting of the 22d adjourned with the possibility of agreement much closer at hand.[21]

General Ridgway was encouraged. Anticipating that the Communists might be willing to discuss the "line of contact" as opposed to the "general area of the battle line," he asked and secured approval for his plan to settle on a demilitarized zone not less than four miles wide with the line of contact as the median.[22]

Unfortunately the promise of progress in the subdelegation meetings was short-lived. A succession of incidents stemming from alleged violations of the neutral zone around Kaesong led the Communists to call off the meetings on the night of the 22d.

### *The Incidents*

Charges and countercharges of violations of the conference area and of the neutrality arrangements had been rampant from the outset of the negotiations. Following the Communist refusal to admit the UNC newsmen, the UNC delegation had insisted upon an agreement on rules and regulations governing the conference area. In brief this established a neutral zone with a 5-mile radius centered on the traffic circle in Kaesong. Each side agreed to refrain from hostile acts in this zone and all military forces except those performing and equipped for military police functions would be withdrawn. No armed personnel would be stationed within a half mile of the conference house. During daylight hours the U.N. delegation was given unrestricted use of the road between Panmunjom and Kaesong without prior notification of the Communists. The U.N. liaison officers had already informed their counterparts at the first meeting on 8 July that Communist convoys to and from Kaesong, if marked with white crosses and if the U.N. Command was alerted as to their time and route, would not be attacked. These arrangements seemed fairly clear and simple, yet alleged infractions were charged almost at once.

On 16 July the Communists claimed that UNC soldiers had fired in the direction of Panmunjom. Although no one was injured or any damage committed, the Communists stated that this was an act of armed force within the neutral zone. Investigation by the U.N. Command showed that some firing in the general area of Panmunjom had taken place, but no evidence indicated either that the fire had entered the neutral zone or that the UNC forces had done the firing.[23] In any event, the Communists did not pursue the matter.

[21] *Ibid.*, Third and Sixth Sessions, 19, 22 Aug 51.

[22] (1) Msg, C 69346, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 109. (2) Msg, JCS 99477, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Aug 51.

[23] Rpt of Investigation, Col James C. Murray for CINCUNC, sub: Rpt of Investigation Alleged Violation of Neutral Zone, 18 Jul 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.

Five days later Col. Chang Chun San, the North Korean liaison officer, informed Colonel Kinney that UNC planes had strafed the Communist delegation's supply trucks marked with white flags at Hwangju and Sariwon. But since the Communists had not notified the UNC of the movement of this convoy, the U.N. Command refused to assume any responsibility for damages incurred under such circumstances. With the enemy using the roads between P'yongyang and Kaesong to build up his strength, Ridgway did not intend to extend blanket immunity to all vehicles bearing white markings, for the UNC suspected that the Communists might well use this device to slip through men and matériel for the front. Furthermore, the U.N. Command had to take the word of the Communists that a strafing had actually occurred, for no investigations were carried on outside the conference area. Ridgway told Admiral Joy to inform the enemy that unless advance warning was given, vehicles would be attacked wherever found.[24]

The first two incidents were relatively minor and the Communists did not raise too much fuss over them. It may have come as quite a shock or revelation to them when the U.N. Command strongly protested against the already mentioned violation of the conference area by a company of fully armed Chinese Communist troops on 4 August and suspended the meetings for five days until satisfactory assurances against recurrence were received from Generals Kim and Peng. With the U.N. Command garnering favorable publicity from the incident and putting the Communists on the defensive, the enemy may have decided to launch a counteroffensive.

On 8 August, while the recess continued, the Communists reported that two UNC violations of the neutrality arrangements had been committed the previous day. First, UNC planes had assaulted a supply truck marked with a white flag at Sibyon-ni, and, second, about forty UNC troops had closed on the bridge at Panmunjom and several had fired at unarmed Communist personnel. Again, but without much success, the UNC liaison officers patiently tried to convince their opposites that prior notification of convoy movements was the only guarantee of immunity. The Communists insisted that the white markings were sufficient. After a thorough investigation of the second charge, Admiral Joy found that no UNC units had been in the Panmunjom area at that time and therefore could not have been responsible for the shooting. Because of a delay of twenty-eight hours by the Communists in laying this claim, Joy questioned its validity.[25]

Less than a week later, on 13 August, another strafing attack on three Communist supply vehicles took place in the vicinity of Sibyon-ni and again the enemy protested. Admiral Joy's acknowledgement was brief and stated in part: "In view of the fact that no notification of this movement was received, no action on the part of the United Nations Com-

[24] (1) Msg, HNC 133, CINCUNC (Adv) to FEAF, 25 Jul 51. (2) Msg, CX 67744, CINCFE to CINCFE (Adv), 26 Jul 51. Both in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 35.

[25] (1) Rpts of Investigation, sub: Summary of Protest and Replies Concerning Alleged Violation of 7 Aug 51, no date, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation. (2) Msg, CX 68595, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 71.

mand is neccessary and none is contemplated." [26]

The spate of incidents led the Communists to request that the liaison officers meet and work out more satisfactory arrangements. In mid-August Colonel Kinney and Col. James C. Murray (a Marine Corps officer) held a series of conferences with Colonel Chang and reached agreement on a number of items. But even as they sought to attain final accord, several new incidents occurred.

One was another truck strafing, but the second was of a more serious nature. On 19 August a Chinese military police platoon, patrolling near the village of Songgong-ni in the neutral zone, was ambushed and the platoon leader was killed and another soldier wounded. The Communists immediately protested and accused the U.N. Command of breaching the old agreement. While the UNC officers investigated the charge, the enemy made the most of the incident. In the subdelegation meeting on the 20th, the Communist representatives recessed the session early so as to attend the funeral of the platoon leader and invited General Hodes and Admiral Burke to go along with them. This placed the UNC delegates in an embarrassing position, for if they accepted, the Communists would be sure to take pictures and publicize and probably distort the reasons for their presence. Hodes and Burke decided to decline and hastened to their helicopter at the close of the meeting. Somewhat apprehensive lest the Communists stop them en route and escort them to the last rites, they made it safely to the plane and took off as quickly as possible for Munsan-ni.[27]

Despite conflicting testimony, investigation showed that the patrol had been ambushed, but that no U.N. or ROK units had been close to Songgong-ni at that time. Since some witnesses stated that several members of the attacking force had worn civilian clothes and had been seen in the area before, the UNC officers surmised that they were partisans friendly to the ROK but acting independently.[28] Needless to say, the Communists were not satisfied with this explanation and made full use of the incident for propaganda purposes.

Before the furore caused by this episode had died away, the Communists summoned Colonel Kinney from his bed in the early morning hours of the 23d to lodge another protest. Upon his arrival at Kaesong, Colonel Chang and his Chinese colleague, Lt. Col. Tsai Cheng-wen, informed him excitedly that a UNC plane had bombed the conference site. Despite the darkness and a driving rain, Kinney and his associates inspected the evidence. Although there were several small holes, the so-called bomb fragments appeared to be parts of an aircraft oil tank and an engine nacelle. The Communists claimed that one of the bombs had been napalm, but nowhere was there any badly scorched earth area that a napalm explosion would have caused. After viewing the evidence, Kinney termed the whole affair "nonsense."

[26] Ltr, Joy to Nam, 14 Aug 51, no sub, Tab 7 in Rpt of Investigation, sub: Summary of Protest . . . Strafing at Sib Yon Ni, no date, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.

[27] Interv, author with Col Howard S. Levie, Staff Officer for Subcommittee on item 2, 7 Mar 58. In OCMH.

[28] Rpt of Investigation, sub: Summary of Protest . . . 19 Aug 51, Communist Patrol Ambushed, Communist Truck Attacked, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.

Whereupon Chang retorted that "all meetings from this time" were called off.

As the UNC party drove to Panmunjom, the Communist liaison officers overtook them and urged them to return and complete the investigation. Kinney preferred to wait until daylight but Chang and Tsai insisted that new evidence had been uncovered. Reluctantly Kinney returned and was shown two more small holes, several small burned patches, and some pieces of aircraft metal. There was an odor of gasoline and a substance in one of the holes might have been a low-grade napalm that had not been ignited. When the U.N. investigators requested that all the evidence remain in place until it could be inspected by daylight, the Communists refused. They intended to gather it all for analysis and considered the investigation over.[29]

There were many elements in this affair that pointed to a deliberate attempt on the part of the Communists to arrange an incident to suspend the negotiations. In the first place, the Fifth Air Force maintained that it had no planes up in the area. Secondly, the plane that supposedly dropped the bombs had its headlights on, a procedure contrary to all UNC practice. Thirdly, the bomb pattern of the craters was such that, in the opinion of the UNC investigators, no single plane could have made them. In addition to these technical objections and the flimsiness of the evidence, the haste of the Communists and their eagerness to gather in the fragments for analysis and the quickness with which the low-echelon liaison officer was able to call off the meetings made the Communist motives suspect. As Ridgway informed the JCS, this decision must have been made in advance and at the highest level. As he saw it, there were three possible reasons for the Communists action: 1. They wanted an excuse to break off the negotiations, with the blame falling on the UNC. 2. They wanted to stall to mesh the timing of the conference talks with the Japanese peace treaty and the Russian peace offensive. 3. They desired a suspension to strengthen their propaganda position and to regain the initiative in the negotiations.[30]

Ridgway's suggestions did not exhaust the list. There were several other interesting variations. Disappointment in the failure of the United States to invite Communist China to the San Francisco peace conference on Japan was one suggestion at the time. Another theory reasoned that the Communists had thought the UNC proposal for subdelegation meetings meant that the U.N. Command was ready to compromise on the 38th Parallel and when this hope proved false, decided to play for time while they worked out their next move.[31]

Whatever the motivations might be, the truce talks entered a long period of suspension. The UNC rejection of responsibility for the bombing of Kaesong

[29] Rpt of Investigation, sub: Summary of Protest and Replies . . . Bombing of Kaesong, no date, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.

[30] Msg, CX 69566, CINCFE to JCS, 24 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 116.

[31] William H. Vatcher, Jr., *Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958), pp. 66–67.



INVESTIGATING A POSSIBLE NEUTRALITY VIOLATION. *Colonel Darrow (third from left), with U.N. and Chinese representatives, examines a pine branch allegedly broken by machine gun strafing northwest of Kaesong.*

elicited many angry Communist responses but the UNC held firm. In the meantime the Communists entered several new charges of UNC violations. They claimed that a UNC plane had dropped a flare in the Kaesong area on 29 August; that UNC forces had attacked a patrol and fired shots across the bridge at Panmunjom on 30 August; and that UNC planes had bombed Kaesong a second time on 1 September. Investigation of these charges by UNC officers revealed that no UNC planes could have committed the air incidents and that partisan forces were probably responsible for the ground action.[32]

Both Ridgway and Joy felt strongly that the best way to lessen the possibility of further incidents was to change the negotiation site. The former had recommended that a new location be proposed in early August and after the avalanche of incidents during that month, Joy reinforced him stoutly. The U.S. leaders

[32] Rpts of Investigation, sub: Summaries of Protest and Replies . . . Flare Dropped Over Kaesong, etc., no dates, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.

were willing to have the U.N. Command put forward a suggestion, but at this point they did not wish to make a change in site a mandatory prerequisite to a resumption of negotiations.[33]

The one encouraging factor lay in the Communists' willingness to continue the battle of words over the violations. If they seriously intended to break off the negotiations completely, they had created a situation in which they could have withdrawn and blamed the U.N. Command. Despite the lack of substance in most of their accusations, they had seized the propaganda initiative and forced the UNC on to the defensive. The U.N. Command could calmly refute the Communist claims again and again, but the flood of incidents tended to obscure the denials. However as September wore on, there were indications that the Communists had attained their objective, whether it was time or the initiative, and were prepared to reopen negotiations.[34]

Strangely enough, the occasion was another incident, only this time it was a real violation of the neutral zone. On 10 September a plane from the 3d Bomb Group strafed Kaesong through a navigational error by the pilot. Fortunately no damage was incurred, but the Communists entered a formal protest. As soon as the investigation disclosed that a UNC plane had committed the attack, Admiral Joy wrote and apologized for the infraction. This drew what could be considered almost a friendly response from the Communists on 19 September. In view of the UNC willingness to assume responsibility for this violation, Kim and Peng suggested to Ridgway that the delegates resume the negotiations at Kaesong immediately.[35]

But Ridgway was unwilling to reopen the negotiations until there was a definite improvement in the physical setup. The Communists had previously brushed aside his suggestion that the site be changed, but he determined that the conditions for a resumption must be settled at the liaison officer level and not by the delegates. At the same time he intended to press for a new location.[36]

Communist opposition to any change in the site and to the liaison officers working out the details of neutralizing the truce zone threatened to lengthen the recess. The Communists were reluctant to give their liaison officers the authority necessary for coming to an agreement on either point. Nevertheless, Kinney reported after the first meeting of the liaison officers on 25 September that they seemed anxious to get the delegation together. He felt that patience and firmness would finally gain the establishment of satisfactory conditions.[37]

In Washington, intelligence sources

[33] (1) Msgs, HNC 264 and HNC 272, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 24, 28 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 118–B and 121–B. (2) Msg, C 50115, CINCFE to JCS, 3 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 131–B. (3) Msg, JCS 80658, JCS to CINCFE, 5 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 135.

[34] On 8 September, 48 of the 51 nations which had been at war with Japan signed the peace treaty at San Francisco. Only the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia failed to sign. The successful conclusion of the treaty may also have influenced the Communists to resume negotiations.

[35] (1) Msg, CX 50634, CINCFE to JCS, 11 Sep 51. (2) Ltr, Joy to Nam, no sub, 11 Sep 51. (3) Ltr, Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai to Ridgway, no sub, 19 Sep 51. All in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.

[36] Msg, C 51315, CINCUNC to JCS, 21 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 147–A.

[37] (1) Msg, HNC 315, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 24 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 150. (2) Msg, HNC 323, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 25 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 159.

were reluctant to attach any special significance to the signs of Communist anxiety. Since the Communist position in Korea had not deteriorated, they held that no new line of action seemed imminent and that the Russians may have directed a resumption for their own military or political purposes.[38]

In any event Ridgway and his staff drew up a plan of action. Since Chairman of the JCS General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and State Department Counselor Charles E. Bohlen were in the Far East, Ridgway submitted his proposed policy to them and secured their approval. The plan posed three alternatives based on Communist reactions. If they accepted a change of site, the UNC delegation would offer a 4-kilometer demilitarized zone based generally along the line of contact. As long as the Communists clung to Kaesong but no break seemed imminent, the U.N. Command would push for a new site without categorically excluding Kaesong. The third alternative would rise if a break seemed likely: the U.N. commander would send a message with a map to the Communists indicating the proposed demilitarized zone and subdelegations would be suggested to discuss this at a place acceptable to both sides.[39] Bohlen later reported that Ridgway and his staff felt that the U.N. Command had made steady concessions to the Communists on procedural matters and had possibly created an appearance of weakness that the military situation did not justify. Bohlen recommended that Ridgway be firmly supported on the matter of a new site even though it seemed to him to be an artificial issue.[40]

While Ridgway pursued his pressure campaign, exchanging letters with Kim and Peng on the higher level and backing a staunch stand at the liaison officers meetings, several new incidents took place. On 19 September a South Korean invasion of the neutral zone occurred. Four unarmed ROK soldiers with full Red Cross insignia lost their way and crossed the bridge at Panmunjom on a truck loaded with DDT. The bewildered health team and the truck were immediately taken into custody, no doubt on suspicion of conducting biological warfare, and were only released upon the signing of a receipt by the UNC liaison officers.[41]

On 7 October a UNC B–26 crossed the neutral zone, but no attack was made. The crew was officially reprimanded for the overflight. Five days later a more serious violation drew a strong protest from the Communists. On 12 October a flight of UNC F–80's passed over the neutral area en route home. One of them cleared its machine guns and accidentally killed a 12-year-old Korean boy and wounded his 2-year-old brother. Although the U.N. Command accepted the responsibility for this unfortunate affair and tendered its deep regrets, the atmosphere at the liaison officers meeting underwent a sudden change.[42]

[38] JCS 1776/253, 25 Sep 51, title: Evolution of Recent Developments Pertaining to Cease-Fire Talks in Korea.

[39] Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 1 Oct 51, DA–IN 2201.

[40] Memo, Bohlen for Secy State, 4 Oct 51, sub: Rpt on Trip to Japan and Korea with General Bradley, in G–3 333 Pacific, 12.

[41] Msg, HNC 309, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 19 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 146–B.

[42] (1) Msg, A 4757, CG FEAF to CINCFE, 12 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 184. (2) Msg, HNC 353, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 12 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 199. (3) Msg, HNC 359, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 14 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 203.

Until this latest episode progress had been encouraging. The patience and firmness of the U.N. Command had won several concessions from the Communists. Under steady pressure the latter had at last consented on 7 October to a transfer of the site from Kaesong to Panmunjom, where both sides would assume responsibility for protecting the conference area.[43] Ridgway immediately instructed Van Fleet to be ready to take over the high ground east of Panmunjom as soon as final arrangements for the reopening of negotiations were concluded.[44]

When the liaison officers met on 10 October, the Communists refused initially to discuss anything but the time and date of the next meeting of the delegates. Colonel Chang was rather abrupt in his treatment of the UNC officers, but the Chinese liaison officer, Colonel Tsai, intervened and smoothed over the situation. He accepted the documents and map of the neutral area offered by Colonel Murray and later escorted Murray to the door of the tent while his senior, Chang, stood silently by.[45] Such an overt action by the junior officer provided a good example of where the real power lay.

As soon as the Communists realized that the U.N. Command was not going to hold a meeting on higher level until the liaison officers established the rules and regulations, they reluctantly agreed to work out the details at the staff conferences. Relations between the lower echelons had become comparatively cordial and prospects for quick agreement on the conditions for resumption appeared bright when the 12 October incident cast its shadow. Overnight the Communists reverted to the old frigid formality and tempers grew short. The following exchange between Kinney and Chang during a long and trying session on the 16th was symptomatic of the new climate of opinion:

Kinney: I find that it is becoming a habit of Colonel Chang to read me a lesson on how to conduct my portion of this particular discussion.

Chang: It seems to me that Colonel Kinney is worrying about things about which he should not worry. Inasmuch as I am not in a position of being an instructor of Colonel Kinney, I have no responsibility for educating him.

Kinney: I am glad that you realize that.[46]

Despite this turn in the personal relationships, the points of official differences narrowed. Since the site was moving to Panmunjom, the U.N. Command wished to limit the neutral area around Kaesong to 3,000 yards rather than five miles. Such a contraction would lessen the area in which incidents could occur. But the Communists fought this proposal strongly and would not agree to delimitation below three miles. The UNC representatives finally compromised and accepted this figure both for Kaesong and the U.N. base camp at Munsan-ni.[47]


[43] Msg, CX 52498, CINCFE to JCS, 8 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 179.

[44] Msg, CX 52506, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 8 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 188.


[45] Msg, HNC 345, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 10 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 189.

[46] Memo for Rcd, 16 Oct 51, sub: Liaison Officers' Mtg Held at Panmunjom, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Liaison Officers Mtgs.

[47] (1) Msg, C 53096, CINCFE to JCS, 16 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 206. (2) Msg, HNC 374, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 20 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 213.


KAESONG
PANMUNJOM
Songgong-ni
Chongdam-dong
Changchon
THE ARMISTICE CONFERENCE AREA
22 October 1951
LIMITS OF NEUTRAL ZONE
Elevations in meters
1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 YARDS
1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 METERS

*MAP 2*


Changdan
MUNSAN-NI
UNC
BASE CAMP
Imjin
R
H.C. Brewer, Jr.

A second important item that blocked final agreement concerned the violations of the air space over the neutral zone. After the many instances of UNC planes flying over the area through navigational error or because of the weather conditions, the UNC negotiators wished to eliminate accidental invasion of the air space as a violation. The Communists insisted for some time that this was a hostile act of armed force, but at last agreed to compromise and recognized that there might be weather and technical conditions beyond human control under which aircraft might fly over the conference area but without any intent to attack or damage it.[48]

On 22 October the liaison officers signed the new security agreement which embodied most of the features desired by the U.N. Command. Besides the restriction of the Kaesong area to three miles and the provision on accidental overflight of the neutral zone, the UNC was also able to except itself from responsibility for the acts committed by irregulars or partisans not under its control. This had been another troublesome matter and the cause of several Communist complaints in the past. A 1,000-yard circle around Panmunjom was neutralized as was a 200-meter area on each side of the road from Kaesong to Panmunjom to Munsan. *(Map 2)* In the Panmunjom area each side agreed to station 2 military police officers and 15 men armed with small arms while the conference was in session and 1 officer and 5 men during other periods. The Communists offered to supply the delegation conference tent and the U.N. Command to provide flooring, space heating, and lights for the tent. Otherwise each side would take care of its own needs in the conference area. To help prevent violations of the air space, the U.N. Command agreed to set up a searchlight and barrage balloons at Panmunjom.[49]

Having secured the agreement, the UNC delegates hoped to steal a march upon the Communists. Admiral Joy anticipated that the Communists intended to discuss the security arrangements all over again at the delegate level, so he dispatched a letter to Nam ratifying the liaison officers' accord and told Nam that he would await the Communist concurrence before resuming negotiations. Colonel Kinney also informed Chang that UNC security troops were moving in to the high ground east of Panmunjom to eliminate the possibility of incidents from this quarter.[50]

General Nam signed the Communist ratification on 24 October and the first meeting of the delegates was scheduled for the following day. Thus after two months the truce conference resumed, but what had happened in the meantime? There seemed little doubt that the Communists had regained the propaganda initiative. Despite the staged incidents and the question of validity of others, there had been enough actual violations to provide the leaven for the Communist case. If this were the Communist objective in suspending the meet-

[48] (1) Msg, HNC 374, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 20 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 213. (2) Msg, HNC 376, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 21 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 215.

[49] Memo for Rcd, Liaison Officers' Mtg Held at Panmunjom, 21, 22 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Liaison Officers Mtgs.

[50] Msg, HNC 381, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 22 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 220.

ings, the mission had been successfully accomplished. But if the Communists had hoped to alter the UNC position on the 38th Parallel and secure substantial concessions by this propaganda campaign, they had failed. Their action had only strengthened the UNC determination not to concede.

On the other hand the Communist tactics had several by-products. The delay in the negotiations led to increased UNC pressure on the battlefield and in the air. It provided time for additional training of the South Korean forces and for the National Police Reserve in Japan. And it also allowed the United States ample opportunity to consider the short- and long-range situations in the Far East.

## CHAPTER IV

# A Time for Preparation

As the Korean War entered its second year, American policy had made a full turn. When the Communists had launched their attack in mid-1950, the U.S. objective had been to contain the enemy advance and to restore the *status quo*. As the battle situation improved, this modest goal had been expanded in September and October to the unification of all Korea under a democratic regime. With the advent of the Chinese Communist forces, the bright dream of unification quickly faded and the United States again focused upon the re-establishment of the prewar political situation.

The fluctuation of military fortunes at the front was reflected in the military plans. While the UNC forces were falling back toward Pusan under the enemy's initial onslaught, evacuation of Korea and a general withdrawal to Japan appeared imminent. The triumph at Inch'on had banished such pessimistic ideas and temporarily induced a feeling of aggressive confidence in the ability of the UNC troops to unify the country. But the Chinese reintroduced the possibility of evacuation as they drove the UNC units back in November and December. The difficulties of fighting a war across the Sea of Japan returned to plague the planners.

The barometric changes in plans as the battle skies clouded or cleared reached an equilibrium in the spring of 1951. As the fighting became stabilized close to the 38th Parallel and especially after the relief of General MacArthur in April, reliance on military victory in Korea had waned. The costs had become too high and the risks too great. Still the war continued and had to be prosecuted until a settlement was secured. This had turned the thoughts of the American leaders to the negotiation of an armistice. Barring Soviet entry into the conflict and the outbreak of a global war, a truce seemed to offer the best prospect of liquidating the Korean commitment of redressing the balance of U.S. military aid in favor of Europe and of rebuilding the strategic reserves at home.

War without victory posed a new and difficult set of questions to the American military leaders who had been taught that victory was the objective. With the inception of the armistice negotiations, they no longer sought to win by a knockout, but rather on points. They had to hurt the enemy enough to influence him to accept the UNC terms for a settlement, yet not enough to provoke an all-out counterattack and a possible widening of the struggle. The United States must win the decision, but not decisively.

### *Conduct of the War—The Washington Side*

The determination of the ways and

means to attain a satisfactory decision in Korea rested ultimately with the President, of course. As Commander in Chief of the military forces of the United States, Mr. Truman required all but the most routine directives on the Korean War to pass through his office for his approval or rejection.[1] Since the United States had been given full power by the United Nations to form a unified command, Mr. Truman had no responsibility to clear his strategic decisions with any U.N. agency. (*Chart 1*) His close and complete control of important decisions and plans relating to Korea must be kept continually in mind, for even though his role in many cases consisted mainly of approval or disapproval, his was the final decision.

The President's chief advisory group was the National Security Council (NSC), composed of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. Other members of the executive branch, such as the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, could be appointed by Mr. Truman to serve on the council but he chose not to do so. The principal duties of the NSC were to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to national security and then to advise the President on the most suitable course of action to be followed.[2]

On the civilian level in July 1951, the President's foremost assistant in defense matters was the Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall.[3] Under Marshall were the three service Secretaries—Frank Pace, Jr., of the Army; Francis P. Matthews of the Navy; and Thomas K. Finletter of the Air Force—and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General of the Army Omar N. Bradley was Chairman of the JCS with General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy, and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, as the service representatives.[4]

As members of the JCS, Collins, Sherman, and Vandenberg were the principal military advisors to the Secretary of Defense and the President and not subject to the jurisdiction of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in such matters as the preparation of strategic plans and the strategic direction of military forces. In their service capacities as Chiefs of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations, they were responsible to the service Secretaries, however. General Bradley had no vote as chairman, but he did preside over the meetings and deliberations of the JCS and represented the group in the meetings with the Presi-


[1] For an interesting discussion of the military conduct of the war, see the article, "Truman," by Wilber W. Hoare, Jr., in Ernest R. May, ed., *The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief* (New York: George Braziller, 1960).

[2] The composition and functions of the NSC are described in the *United States Government Organization Manual 1951–1952*, prepared by the General Services Administration, National Archives and Records Service, Federal Register Division (Washington, no date), p. 63.

[3] General Marshall, after a distinguished career as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, in World War II and service as Secretary of State, was recalled from retirement in September 1950, to replace Secretary Louis Johnson. A special waiver had to be passed by Congress on this occasion, since Marshall still held his General of the Army rank and the law barred military officers from holding the post of Secretary of Defense.

[4] Admiral Sherman died of a heart attack on 22 July. He was replaced by Admiral William M. Fechteler on 1 August.

CHART 1—CHANNELS OF COMMAND, JULY 1951




[a] The U.N. Security Council had no command authority, but did receive biweekly reports from the U.N. commander.

[b] The Army Chief of Staff acted as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[c] The UNC/FEC exercised operational control only over the air and naval forces under its command.

[d] Although Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, had not been inactivated, it did not become operational until 1 October 1952.

[e] The Military Advisory Group for Korea was assigned to Eighth Army command. It continued to discharge its mission of assisting the ROK Army and provided liaison between the Eighth Army and the ROK Army.

dent, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense.[5]

To insure close co-ordination between the military and political officials who were responsible for preparing plans and positions of policy relating to the Korean War, Secretary Marshall had ordered the resumption of informal consultations between State Department and Defense officials and instituted weekly meetings between representatives of the State Department and the JCS.[6] Hence, proposed military actions with political implications were discussed with the State Department and cleared with the Secretary of State before being submitted to the President.

Below the Defense-JCS-State Department policy and strategic directive level came the unified commands. After World War II the JCS had created a number of unified commands on a geographic basis. These operated under the strategic command of the JCS who in turn delegated executive responsibility to the service which was considered to have primary interest in the command. In the case of the Far East Command (FEC), the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, was given executive responsibility and within the Army General Collins had made the G–3 staff division his executive agent. The latter usually transmitted the decisions and instructions agreed upon at the higher levels to General Ridgway and also helped to formulate the Army position that General Collins presented to the JCS on matters affecting the Far East Command and its prosecution of the war.[7]

Therefore, if General Ridgway and his staff devised a plan or a course of action that they wished to have approved, the following procedure would customarily be followed. Upon receipt of the Far East Command recommendation, G–3 would pass it on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the other services for study. G–3 would then co-ordinate with interested staff divisions in the Army to prepare an official Army position that General Collins could present to his fellow members of the JCS. If the FEC recommendation transcended military matters, State Department officials would be consulted and their approval would be sought. Then the recommendation, perhaps in a form amended by the JCS and State, would go up to the Secretary of Defense for his comments before it finally reached the President's desk for final approval. The process appeared cumbersome, but if the need for decision was urgent, a consultation or meeting between the parties involved could often produce quick agreement on the position or positions to be set forth for the President. Thus, behind every important decision taken in the Korean War lay the staff mechanism—gathering information, preparing, co-ordinating, and assessing plans and policies, and presenting recommendations that were forwarded through channels up the military-political ladder to the President.

Not all of the plans and proposals emanated from the theater, however, since frequently the G–3 or JCS staffs initiated their own. These were usually co-ordinated with the Far East Command be-

[5] *U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1951–52*, pp. 116ff.

[6] Hoare, "Truman" in *The Ultimate Decision*, p. 197. The State-Defense meetings had been discontinued under Secretary of Defense Johnson.

[7] See Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, Chapter III.

fore they ascended the ladder for comments and suggestions.

### *The JCS Ponder*

Within the staff mechanism a number of alternatives on the Korean War were prepared in the early spring of 1951 and the JCS presented them to Secretary Marshall. Unless there was a general war or a sudden great influx of Soviet volunteers in Korea that might jeopardize the UNC forces, the JCS believed that the UNC troops should stay in the peninsula. They recognized that military action alone would not solve the Korean problem and that there probably would not be any solution until world tensions relaxed. In the meantime the American forces should pursue their current course of exerting pressure upon the Communists in Korea in the hope that eventually a favorable political settlement might result that would not sacrifice the U.S. position on Taiwan or on a seat for Communist China in the United Nations. The JCS also felt that South Korean forces should be created in the interim to take over the major part of the military burden in Korea.[8]

If, however, the war should spread and the Communist Chinese expanded their actions outside Korea, the JCS were also prepared. In early June they directed the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), at Hawaii, to work out a plan for blockading the China coast in case the U.N. forces were compelled to evacuate Korea. Despite Ridgway's protest that CINCPAC would probably want naval reinforcements at a time when Ridgway would need every ship under his command to carry out the evacuation, the JCS refused to divide the responsibility for the planning of the blockade. The command organization in such an event would be settled on the basis of actual conditions, they maintained, and nothing would be taken away from Ridgway without specific JCS instructions.[9]

The naval blockade might also be a weapon if the truce negotiations broke down. Shortly after the conferees met at Kaesong in July, the JCS advised Marshall that increased military pressure would have to be applied upon the enemy if he would not come to terms. Although general war with China was to be avoided, they recommended that: the United States be kept ready for general war on relatively short notice; many of the restrictions imposed on Ridgway's ground and air operations should be lifted if the negotiations failed; and Japanese defense forces and South Korean military units should be developed, trained, and equipped as quickly as possible. The United States should immediately urge the other United Nations participating in Korea: to support a naval blockade; to bring additional political and economic pressure upon China; and to increase their forces in Korea.[10]


After the long recess over the incidents terminated, the JCS in early November revised some of these recommendations. For one thing, the Communist build-up of fighter strength in Manchuria during the summer and early fall ruled out the

[8] Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 5 Apr 51, sub: Mil Action in Korea, in G–3 091 Korea, 167/4.

[9] (1) Msg, JCS 92847, JCS to CINCPAC, 1 Jun 51. (2) Msg, CX 65297, CINCFE to JCS, 19 Jun 51. (3) Msg, JCS 80240, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Aug 51.

[10] Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 13 Jul 51, sub: U.S. Courses of Action in Korea. In OCMH.

CHART 2—U.N. COMMAND/FAR EAST COMMAND, MAJOR GROUND FORCES, 1 JULY 1951




Source: Hq Eighth Army, Command Report, ACofS, G–3, bk. 4, pt. 1, 1 Jul 51; DOD General Officers Assignment List, 1 Jul 51, in OCMH files.

lifting of the restriction of "hot" pursuit of Communist planes across the Manchurian border. In July this would have been profitable; now the cost would be excessive. However, the JCS did believe that the growing Communist air strength had reached a dangerous point and the United States might be forced to move quickly and unilaterally against specific Chinese air bases if the scale of enemy air activity jeopardized the security of U.S. forces in Korea. To meet this contingency and to allow Ridgway more freedom in planning air and ground operations in the event the negotiations were ended, the JCS favored giving the U.N. commander broader powers. They realized that only substantial increases in men and equipment could produce a military victory, but the wider range of discretion would allow Ridgway to exert pressure as he saw fit with the forces at his disposal. Pointing out that the American public might grow weary of an indecisive war if the truce talks were not successful and might demand adoption of measures capable of securing military victory, the JCS recommended that the National Security Council reconsider a U.S. policy in case a negotiated settlement proved impossible.[11]

The general outlines of the JCS strategy were simple. Unless a global war broke out, the U.S. forces would remain in Korea and exert pressure upon the enemy to encourage him to negotiate. There would be no military victory in this limited war, but the U.N. commander would have considerable latitude in the use of the military forces under his command. Patience, perseverance, and pressure keynoted the U.S. position, but would these be enough to persuade the enemy to come to terms?

[11] Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 3 Nov 51, sub: U.S. Courses of Action in Korea. In OCMH.

### *Of Men and Arms*

It was a formidable task that the JCS had given to General Ridgway and his United Nations Command. The colorful Ridgway, with his ever-present hand grenade, had proved himself an able combat commander and administrator. Not only was he responsible for the conduct of operations in Korea as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) and the defense of the Far East Command area as Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), but also the administration of Japan as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP), and of the Ryukyus as Governor of these islands. (*See Chart 1.*)

Most of the officers on Ridgway's staff performed multiple duties as he used them interchangeably in the UNC, FEC, and SCAP headquarters. Lt. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey, for example, was chief of staff for all three commands.

The ground weapon of the U.N. Command in Korea was the Eighth Army under General Van Fleet, which included ROK and UNC units participating in the war. Organized into 4 corps, the Eighth Army had a reported strength of 554,577 men at the end of June. Seven of its 17 divisions were American and the remaining 10 were ROK. In addition, there were 4 brigades, 1 separate regiment, and 9 separate battalions. (*Chart 2*) The breakdown in strength figures showed 253,250 U.S. troops, 28,061 other U.N. personnel, 260,548 ROK troops, and 12,718 Koreans who were assigned to serve with the U.S. units (Ko-

rean Augmentation to the U.S. Army [KATUSA]).[12]

During the Communist offensives in the spring of 1951 the Eighth Army had shown itself a highly skilled battle force capable of absorbing the stiff punches of the enemy and of dealing stern punishment in return. Although it did not have sufficient strength to insure a decisive military victory in Korea, it was fully competent to man the defense as long as the war remained limited.

Under the circumstances General Ridgway sought to strengthen the defensive power of his forces in Korea. With the battle lines fairly stable, he requested that his artillery capabilities be increased. The enemy, he pointed out to the JCS, was particularly susceptible to the potential of massed artillery fire when he attacked. If five 155-mm. howitzer, four 8-inch howitzer, one 155-mm. gun, and two observation battalions were added to the Eighth Army's artillery, Ridgway felt that it could inflict even greater losses upon the enemy.[13]

There was little question over the desirability of this augmentation in Washington, but Ridgway's requirements were only a part of the picture. Actually the artillery increases when added to Ridgway's other requests would necessitate raising the FEC troop ceiling by 57,000 spaces if all were approved. As G–3 pointed out to General Collins, the only way that the Army could fill Ridgway's demands completely would be by increasing the over-all strength of the Army establishment. Since this was not practicable at the moment, G–3 suggested that by taking 5,000 men from the General Reserve and 5,000 from the shipment scheduled to strengthen the European Command, at least part of FEC's needs could be met.[14]

With the Chief of Staff's support, the JCS on 17 August approved an increase of five AAA battalions and four field artillery battalions for Ridgway's command. These along with other assorted units totaling over 13,000 men were to be shipped in the fall.[15] Thus by cutting back the General Reserve and delaying the European build-up, the Army leaders in Washington tried to fill some of Ridgway's most urgent priorities.


The Washington staff was under no illusion insofar as enemy potential was concerned. It realized that dragging out the negotiations through the summer had allowed the Communists to build up their forces. At any time, the enemy could launch an offensive with a manpower superiority of up to 4 to 1 at the point of contact, lasting nearly a month, and using up to 46 Chinese and North Korean divisions and 1,100 aircraft. To oppose this offensive Ridgway could muster the 17 divisions in Korea, but would this be enough to halt the enemy threat? The situation in the United States was not particularly hopeful. Of the 7 Army divisions stationed at home only 3 were fully trained in September 1951. One of these, the 82d Airborne, was *the* strategic reserve; the other 2, the 28th and 43d Infantry Divisions, were scheduled

[12] DF, OCA to OCMH, 7 Oct 54, sub: ROK and U.N. Ground Force Strength in Korea: In OCMH.

[13] Msg, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jun 51, DA–IN 7369. The nondivisional artillery assigned to Eighth Army on 1 July 1951 included seven 155-mm. howitzer battalions, two 155-mm. gun battalions, and two 8-inch howitzer battalions.

[14] Summary Sheet, Maj Gen Robinson E. Duff for CofS, 2 Jul 51, sub: Re-evaluation of FA Requirements, in G–3 320.2 Pacific, 300.

[15] Msg, G–3 to CINCFE, 22 Aug 51, DA–OUT 99608.




GENERAL RIDGWAY AT THE FRONT

to go to Europe in October and November. The 11th Airborne would finish its divisional training cycle in November and go into the strategic reserve, but the remaining 3—the 31st and 47th Infantry and the 1st Armored Divisions—would not be available until early 1952. Thus an emergency in Korea would mean that the European Command would again be delayed in reaching its full strength.[16]

The thinly spread U.S. forces had to cover strategic points around the globe in readiness for the broadening of the Korean War or for the outbreak of a new conflict. It was also natural that each major theater commander should suffer from the disease known in World War II as "localitis." Whenever the theater commander became so immersed in his own problems that he tended to overlook the world-wide responsibilities of the military services, he was liable to fall prey to this familiar malady. In fairness it should be noted that General Ridgway's case was moderate, but nonetheless he worked diligently to secure reinforcements, especially air and sea additions, during the summer of 1951. Ridgway was worried about the Soviet threat to Japan and in the event of an expanded war, he wanted to have a little extra air and naval strength to contain any Soviet drive and a firm commitment from the JCS that they would replace his air and naval losses. The JCS explained that his command could be built up only at the expense of other vital areas and that allocations in case a war with the USSR broke out would have to depend on world conditions at the time.[17] But this failed to satisfy Ridgway. In September he again expressed his concern lest the Russian reaction over the signing of the Japanese peace treaty and the uncertain situation in Germany lead to an attack upon Japan. Once more he asked for naval and air reinforcements in vain. The JCS evidently did not feel that his anxiety over Russian intentions warranted any major shifts in the deployment of the U.S. armed forces.[18]

As long as the international situation held firm and the enemy in Korea continued to be cautious in risking its air power, the JCS had a point. The Far East Air Forces, commanded by Lt. Gen.

[16] Memo, Maj Gen Reuben E. Jenkins for CofS, 12 Sep 51, sub: Reinforcement of the FEC, in G–3 320.2 Pacific, 60/23.

[17] (1) Msg, C 68161, CINCFE to JCS, 2 Aug 51, DA–IN 1426. (2) Msg, JCS 99220, JCS to CINCFE, 17 Aug 51.

[18] (1) Msg, C 51095, CINCFE to JCS, 19 Sep 51, DA–IN 17897. (2) Msg, JCS 82084, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Sep 51.

Otto P. Weyland, provided medium bomber support of operations in Korea with 99 B–29's of the Strategic Air Command based on Okinawa and Japan. For tactical air support, the Fifth Air Force, under Maj. Gen. Frank F. Everest, had a light bomber wing, three fighter-bomber wings, and two fighter-interceptor wings—all based on South Korean airfields—and a light bomber wing and a fighter-escort wing stationed in Japan. The bulk of the land-based 1st Marine Air Wing was under the operational control of the Fifth Air Force. In addition the Australians and South Africans had each furnished a squadron of fighters.[19] Although the type of plane varied from the propeller-driven F–51 Mustang to the F–86 Sabrejet, the UNC air forces enjoyed air superiority over Korea. Bombers and fighters, new and old, roamed the length of the peninsula virtually unchallenged except at or near the frontier along the Yalu.

Carrier-based naval air squadrons furnished additional tactical air support from the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea. On 1 July 1951, Task Force 77 of the Seventh Fleet ranged off the northeastern coast of Korea. Under Rear Adm. George R. Henderson, Task Force 77 contained three carriers, the USS *Princeton,* the USS *Bon Homme Richard,* and the USS *Boxer,* the battleship *New Jersey,* two heavy cruisers, the USS *Los Angeles* and the USS *Helena,* and eighteen destroyers. Planes from the carriers not only flew close support missions for the ground forces but also carried out reconnaissance and antisubmarine patrols and interdicted the North Korean railroad net.

In the Yellow Sea and east coastal waters off Korea, Task Force 95, commanded by Rear Adm. Ingolf N. Kiland, formed the U.N. Blockading and Escort Force. Headed by the carriers USS *Sicily* and H.M.S. *Glory,* this force consisted of 85 ships, many provided by other members of the United Nations and by South Korea. Naval units supplied gunfire support along the coast line, patrolled the offshore waters, and controlled the sea approaches to North Korea.

A third naval force, Amphibious Task Force 90, under Rear Adm. George C. Dyer, stood by in Japanese and Korean waters to render support to any amphibious undertakings. In the meantime, Dyer's forces worked with the blockading UNC naval units.[20]

Neither the Chinese nor the North Koreans offered more than nuisance opposition to the UNC naval forces. Although the powerful Russian submarine fleet lurked in the background as a potential menace in case of a spreading of the war, the chief danger to the UNC ships lay in the numerous mines sown by the Communists along the coasts.

Unless there was a radical change in the global situation, the UNC air and naval strength seemed more than adequate to cope with the enemy. Exercising complete control of the Korean air and seaways, the U.N. Command's greatest vulnerability was on the ground.

[19] USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950–30 June 1952, pp. 84–89, 98–100.

[20] COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt, an. 29 to FEC Comd Rpt, Jul 51.

*Developing the ROK Army*

The major weakness in the ground forces under General Ridgway was qualitative rather than quantitative. Ten of the seventeen UNC divisions belonged to the ROK Army and for diverse reasons the South Korean troops had on occasion proved to be unreliable in time of crisis. Since the United States intended to place more responsibility for the defense of South Korea upon native forces whether the negotiations were successful or not, it became essential to improve the caliber of the ROK Army.

At least part of the blame for the condition of the ROK forces had to be shared by the United States. Partially because it had no desire to offend the USSR and partially because of a distrust of the political leadership in South Korea, the United States had supported the formation of a mobile, lightly armed constabulary in 1945 to preserve internal order during the occupation period rather than a hard-core defense establishment. Even after American troops had been withdrawn in 1949, the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea had only 500 men to help train an army that quickly grew to 100,000 in 1950.[21]

The lack of adequate personnel to provide comprehensive coverage of the South Korean Army down to the battalion level and to fully support the Korean Army school system was but one problem. When the advisors attempted to explain tactics or to give the nomenclature of weapons, they were confronted by the refusal of the Koreans to use Japanese and by the inadequacies of the Korean language, which had failed to keep pace with the technological development of weapons and warfare. Names and expressions had to be invented and the lack of standardization of nomenclature produced confusion and delay in training.

Since the defense assistance funds allocated to the Republic of Korea were limited in 1949–50, heavy equipment and weapons were not provided. As a result, when the war broke out, the ROK Army had little heavy armament and encountered great difficulty in coping with the North Korean tanks and artillery. Some ROK divisions had not even completed the company phase of their training by June 1950 and many soldiers were unfamiliar with their own weapons. To cap the tragedy, the leadership of the ROK Army from top to bottom suffered from political appointments and incompetency was rife from company to division level.

The North Korean invaders easily smashed the ROK Army and forced a complete rebuilding and reorganization of ROK forces. In the haste to stem the enemy advance, recruits were rushed into uniform, given weapons but little or no training, and then sent to the front to plug a gap in the line. Such hit-and-miss efforts to meet the emergency were the best that could be done under the circumstances, but the deficiencies in training, equipment, and leadership remained. By October 1950, however, MacArthur had 5 ROK divisions in action and 5 more in the process of activation and organization. He recommended that a postwar army of 10 divisions with a total strength of 250,000 men be authorized, and the De-

[21] For a detailed account of the KMAG effort and the difficulties encountered, see Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea.*

partment of the Army and the President approved in early November.[22]

Under the impact of the Chinese Communists entry into the war the ROK Army suffered another catastrophe. The defects in leadership and training again caused defeat and disintegration of the ROK units and necessitated further reconstitution and rebuilding. Despite his doubts as to the value of South Korean troops, MacArthur clung to the ten-division ROK Army as sufficient to maintain order and repel aggression in the postwar period.[23]

Syngman Rhee and his government did not share MacArthur's misgivings over the fighting capability of the ROK soldier. After MacArthur's recall in April, they launched a campaign in the United Nations and in the United States to have an additional ten divisions organized and equipped with American arms. Unfortunately, the ROK request was poorly timed for on 22 April a ROK division broke and ran before inferior enemy forces.[24] This incident endangered the UNC line and caused General Van Fleet to urge Ambassador Muccio to take up the matter with Rhee personally.

Until the lack of leadership was remedied, Van Fleet warned, there should be no further talk about increasing the ROK forces. What the South Koreans needed most were good leaders, better training, and a greater desire to fight for their country.[25] Muccio handed Rhee a letter covering these points on 5 May.

Evidently Van Fleet's comments made little impression upon the ROK President, for less than two weeks later he informed the press that if the United States would equip his already well-trained divisions, U.S. troops could be withdrawn from Korea. Reaction in the Army against letting Rhee make such obviously false statements unchallenged was immediate. Ambassador Muccio was told to reiterate in the strongest terms the concern of the United States over the issuance of damaging and flagrant statements so contrary to the facts of the matter.[26]

The reasons behind Rhee's conduct became somewhat clearer as the armistice negotiations opened in July. He and his government were pledged to continue the drive for Korean unification. With a military stalemate in the offing, the ROK Government feared that the UNC troops might withdraw and leave the Republic of Korea undefended. Despite assurances from Muccio and other official U.S. visitors to Seoul that no such course was contemplated, Rhee and his counselors remained skeptical.[27] ROK political opposition to the armistice and pressure in behalf of an expanded ROK Army represented their response to the challenge. If an armistice was negotiated, the ROK leaders probably wanted to be sure that they

[22] (1) C 67296, CINCFE to DA, 24 Oct 50, DA-IN 4541. (2) CX 67400, CINCFE to DA, 25 Oct 50, DA-IN 4938. (3) Memo, Secy Army for the President, 1 Nov 50, sub: Logistic Support of Republic of Korea Army, G-3 KMAG file, folder 2, bk. 1, tab E.

[23] Msg, C 59376, CINCFE to DA, 5 Apr 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 51, G-3 sec, pt. III, tab 4.

[24] CINCFE Presentation to Archibald S. Alexander, Under Secy Army, no date, in G-3 091 Korea, 187/7.

[25] Ltr, Van Fleet to Muccio, 3 May 51, no sub, in G-3 091 Korea, 411.

[26] JCS 1776/225, 7 Jun 51, title: President Rhee's (ROK) Statements.

[27] Msg, 100438, Muccio to SCAP, 10 Jul 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 11.

would be in a position to at least defend themselves and possibly to finish the task of unification on their own later.[28]

In the meantime, both Washington and FEC headquarters investigated the problem of improving the battlefield performance of the ROK Army. The Army G–3, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, visited the Far East Command in early May and spoke out in defense of the ROK forces. Everyone had been criticizing the South Korean Army for the lack of leadership, he reported to General Collins, but the hasty and inadequate training that was unavoidable under the circumstances and the absence of proper support units might have resulted in a loss of confidence under battle conditions. Basic training, he pointed out, often lasted only ten days for recruits and emphasis had been placed particularly upon keeping units in action. Little attention had been given to long-range planning for the creation of an effective ROK military force in a year or two.[29] Taylor's point was well taken, but the press of immediate needs had permitted no other course in the past.

In the Far East Command, General Ridgway ordered investigation of ways and means to bolster South Korean leadership. One way to accomplish this, Col. Gilman C. Mudgett, Eighth Army G–3, suggested, would be to set up a training command similar to the Replacement and School Command of World War II.[30] Ridgway and Van Fleet approved the training command concept and selected Col. Arthur S. Champeny to direct the program. After a quick survey in Korea, Champeny flew to Washington to look over the U.S. service schools and training methods. Since he felt that the South Korean Army needed infantry and artillery officers most, he recommended that groups of 150 to 200 ROK officers be assigned at a time to the Infantry and Artillery Schools in the United States. With G–3 approval of his plan, Champeny returned to Japan to work out the details. For fiscal year 1952, Champeny estimated that 150 infantry and 100 artillery officers could be sent to the United States to take a special twenty-week course. At the end of September 1951 the first students reported to the schools.[31]


While Champeny was busy establishing his Replacement Training and School Command in Korea, Ridgway forwarded his views on the ROK Army to General Collins on 22 July. The first requirement for any military organization, the FEC commander began, was an officer and noncommissioned officer corps—competent, aggressive, and loyal. There was no such group in the ROK Army and it would take a long time to develop one. If contemplated school, replacement, and training plans were carried out and if the war continued at its present tempo, the ROK Army might become completely effective in three years. Were the armistice to be signed,

[28] See Msg, 192311, Muccio to SCAP, 19 Jul 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 24.

[29] Memo, Taylor for CofS, 15 May 51, sub: Rpt of G–3 Visit to FEC, in G–3 333 Pacific, 10.

[30] Comment Sheet (sgd Mudgett), 4 May 51, sub: Troop Leadership School for Senior Korean Officers, in KMAG file AG 353, KCRC.

[31] (1) Memo, Gen John E. Hull for Secy Army, 17 Jul 51, sub: Development of ROK Officers and Noncommissioned Officer Corps, in G–3 350.2 Korea, 4/5. (2) Msg, CINCFE to G–3, 20 Aug 51, DA–IN 7542. (2) Summary Sheet, Maj Gen Reubin E. Jenkins for CofS and Secy Army, 2 Oct 51, sub: ROKA Replacement Training . . ., in G–3 350.2 Korea, 10/3.



PRESIDENT RHEE WITH AMBASSADOR MUCCIO

Ridgway continued, the task might be done in two years. He went on to point out that the ROK officer candidate course had been lengthened from eighteen to twenty-four weeks and that each ROK division would be given a nine-week rehabilitation program. By training ROK officers in U.S. service schools and centralizing all ROK training installations, Ridgway hoped to make the results of the school system more satisfactory. However, he maintained, the Department of the Army would have to help, too. KMAG would need more personnel to man the training installations, and automatic weapons, artillery, and tanks would have to be provided for ROK units as they showed ability to use these profitably. The ten-division South Korean army had to develop its own service units and these would have to be equipped by the United States. Finally, Ridgway recommended that constant pressure be applied on the ROK Government to take strict disciplinary measures against corrupt, incompetent, and cowardly officers and government officials.[32]

During the summer of 1951 with the benefit of the lull on the battlefield that succeeded the opening of negotiations, Ridgway and his staff went ahead with

[32] Msg, CX 67484, Ridgway to Hull, 22 Jul 51, DA-IN 17555.



GENERAL TAYLOR

their plans. New tables of organization and equipment for the ROK units were developed and the KMAG staff was expanded to 1,308 officers and men by the end of September.[33] The ROK school system was revised and by the first of October it was operating with a capacity of over 10,000 students. At the Replacement Training Center, Champeny, now a brigadier general, had facilities for 23,460 trainees. Schools for training infantry, artillery, and technical officers were in operation and the Korean Military Academy and the Command and General Staff School were due to resume courses in early 1952. All of the instruction at these schools was designed and conducted to instill leadership and improve the technical qualifications of the ROK students.[34] By and large there was a general feeling that definite progress had been made and that given time and training the ROK units would prove to be just as capable as the North Korean units.[35]

The future strength of the ROK Army was as yet undetermined, for ten divisions seemed to be all that the South Koreans could develop within two or three years. As General Taylor informed Secretary of the Army Pace in August, the long-range requirements depended on too many intangibles to be clearly estimated then. The outcome of the war, the political destiny of Korea, future U.S.–Korean policy, the success of the short-range program, and the ability of the United States to equip additional divisions in view of its global requirements would help shape the long-range plan.[36]

One of the by-products of the peace negotiations, therefore, was the provision of time to strengthen the ROK Army by proper training and instruction. During the summer interlude, although the Communist forces were also built up and became capable of major offensives, it was possible for Ridgway and Van Fleet and their staffs to devote considerable attention to the ROK Army task with some degree of success. At the same time, the two leaders interested

[33] Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 161.

[34] (1) Msg, CX 50942, CINCFE to DA, 16 Sep 51, DA–IN 17089. (2) Summary Sheet, Jenkins for CofS, 2 Oct 51, sub: ROKA Replacement Training and School Comd Brochure, in G–3 350.2 Korea, 10/3.

[35] (1) Memo, Alexander for Deputy Secy Defense, 5 Sep 51, sub: Training and Equipping the South Korean Army, in G–3 091 Korea, 354/2. (2) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 14 Nov 51, sub: Rpt of Field Training, ROK Army, in G–3 333 Pacific, 15.

[36] Memo, Taylor for Secy Army, 24 Aug 51, sub: Directives to CINCFE Respecting the ROK Force to be Developed, in G–3 091 Korea, 187/3.

themselves in a related problem—the United Nations forces fighting beside the ROK and U.S. troops in Korea.

### *Maintaining U.N. Support*

When the war had broken out in June 1950, the United States had been anxious to secure the support of as many U.N. members as possible. It had welcomed contributions, large and small, in its desire to elicit military help and moral sustenance against the Communist aggression in Korea.[37] Gradually combat, support, and medical units from nineteen other U.N. countries joined the United States and the Republic of Korea. Ranging in size from a small battalion of 600 men to a brigade of 6,000, this heterogeneous collection had grown to over 28,000 ground troops by the end of June 1951.[38]

The United Kingdom, Canada, and Turkey had each shipped a brigade, and other members of the British Commonwealth, including Australia and New Zealand, had formed a fourth. Belgium-Luxembourg, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and Thailand provided battalions. From India, Norway, and Sweden had come medical and hospital units and Denmark had sent a hospital ship. Naval line forces were contributed



COLONEL CHAMPENY

by the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Colombia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Thailand and air squadrons by Australia, Canada, and the Union of South Africa.

Welding this complex group into a cohesive and effective war machine proved to be a formidable task. The forces of each nation arrived in different stages of combat readiness. Some, such as the British Commonwealth troops, presented few problems since they were well trained and well equipped, and soon set up their own supply lines and oriented their own units. Since the Commonwealth soldiers all spoke English, there were no linguistic difficulties or major communications problems.[39]

[37] The one exception had been the 33,000 troops offered by Chiang Kai-shek in June 1950. Because of the possibility of political complications with the Communist Chinese and the deficiencies in training and equipment of the Nationalist forces, President Truman decided to take the advice of his political and military advisors. He declined Chiang's proffer. See Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs,* 2 vols. (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1955), vol. II, p. 343.

[38] For a breakdown of U.S., U.N., and ROK ground forces at this period, see Appendix A–1, below.

[39] A detailed account of the problems of coordinating the U.N. forces will be found in two FEC studies, one by Maj. Sam F. Gaziano and the other by Maj. William J. Fox, both entitled Inter-Allied Cooperation During Combat Operations. MSS in OCMH.



KMAG Instructor Addressing ROK Troops Through an Interpreter

But when the Philippine Combat Battalion arrived in September 1950, the need for a reception center to equip, train, and orient new units became apparent. The following month the U.N. Reception Center at Taegu opened and helped to prepare the Turkish, Thai, Indian, Dutch, French, Greek, Ethiopian, Belgian, Luxembourg, and Colombian forces for their advent into combat.

As soon as the U.N. units were judged ready, they were usually attached to U.S. outfits—the battalions to U.S. regiments and the brigades to U.S. divisions. The British Commonwealth forces were amalgamated into brigades and attached to the U.S. I Corps. The parent units provided administrative, logistical, and operational support and guidance. By working together on a long-term basis both parent and attached groups developed an *esprit de corps* that fostered a better team effort.

U.S. commanders used the U.N. troops according to their capabilities for defensive or offensive missions. Since the terrain was mountainous and the winter weather severe, some national forces—like the Greek and Turk—were easily

acclimatized, while others, like the Thailanders who were from a flat, warm country, had more difficulty in adjusting themselves. Many of the U.N. military groups, such as the Filipino and Greek, had been trained by U.S. officers and had become accustomed to U.S. weapons, equipment, and tactical doctrine. Others had to become familiar with U.S. methods and machines and the linguistic barrier did not make this hurdle any easier.

Customs and traditions also played a role in forging the international army. Religious restrictions and national dietary habits made considerable accommodation of food supplies necessary. As Moslems, the Turks would eat no pork and the Indians who were Hindu would touch no beef. The French, Dutch, and Belgians liked more bread and potatoes than the Americans and the Thailanders had to have more rice and hot sauces. Eventually each nation secured satisfactory rations, but only after a good deal of improvisation and juggling of food stores.

Although the differences in diet, training, and equipment were obstacles, they were not insurmountable and after a period of trial and error, improvement usually resulted. There were several continuing problems, however, that were not so easily solved. Despite the fact that all of the United Nations involved in the Korean War had resisted the Communist aggression, there was a wide spread of opinion on the ways and means to bring the conflict to an end. President Truman had repudiated the MacArthur approach which had threatened an expansion of the war to the Chinese mainland, but there were strong elements in the United States that still insisted that there was no substitute for military victory.

The chief bone of contention was Communist China and several nations, such as Great Britain and France, feared that domestic pressure might lead the United States to pursue an aggressive policy of bombardment, blockade, and support for an invasion of the mainland by Chiang Kai-shek's forces.[40] The initiation of the armistice talks may have allayed some of the fears, but the possibility that the discussions might fail remained. What the American reaction in such an event might be posed a ticklish problem, for neither the prospect of a long war of attrition nor of an expanded conflict against Communist China offered any occasion for cheer.

Another subject that kept raising its head concerned the size of the U.N. units in Korea. Although General MacArthur initially had suggested that units of approximately 1,000 men with equipment and artillery support be sent, both Ridgway and Van Fleet came to feel in the late spring of 1951 that the member nations should be encouraged to increase their forces to not less than a regimental combat team or brigade. Each regimental combat team or brigade should have its own integrated artillery, logistic, and administrative support and should be trained prior to its arrival in Korea.[41]

Without doubt this would have relieved U.S. units of the bulk of their responsibility for other U.N. forces, but the anticipation that an armistice would be negotiated soon changed the picture. On the eve of the armistice negotiations, Ridgway did a volte-face and recom-

[40] See Memo, D. A. (Acheson) for Bradley, 12 May 51, no sub, in G–3 091 Korea, 176.

[41] Msg, CINCFE to DA, 1 Jun 51, DA–IN 19078.

mended that no U.N. forces be materially increased until the results of the truce discussions became apparent.[42]

During the summer Ridgway had difficulty in even maintaining the current U.N. strength. Both the French and the Belgians had to make special efforts to provide replacements for their battalions. By August the French had rushed fillers to Korea and were at full strength, but the Belgian problem proved more complex. Since only volunteers could be sent overseas, the Belgians had to offer extra incentive pay and short tours of duty before they could secure the additional troops. These were airlifted in October to bring the Belgian battalion back to its normal complement.[43]

A somewhat unusual supply system sustained the UNC forces in Korea. When the first U.S. troops landed on the peninsula in 1950, a logistical command was established to provide base support. Later, as supply lines lengthened, an army service area and forward supply points were organized. Since Korea was in effect a theater of operations, the next step ordinarily would have been to set up a communications zone headquarters to take over rear area logistics and to permit the army commander to devote full time to front-line operations. But Ridgway as Eighth Army commander had insisted that his responsibility begin at the shore line and Van Fleet had made no effort to alter this arrangement. Thus, the Eighth Army commander exercised control over the Korean railroad net, rear area security, civil affairs, ROKA training, and prisoners of war as well as over his logistical support. The 2d Logistical Command, under Brig. Gen. Paul F. Yount, with headquarters at Pusan was responsible for direct logistical support and was the primary agency for placing requisitions upon the Japan Logistical Command. Through Pusan, the chief gateway to Korea, ran three different supply lines—one for the United States and the majority of the UNC forces, a second for the British Commonwealth contingents, and the third for the ROK units. The United States system was the largest by far and provided the Commonwealth forces with perishable foods and petroleum products and the ROK forces with war materials in addition to the total support it gave to the American and other U.N. troops.[44]

Although the United States furnished the major portion of the supplies and equipment for most of the U.N. contingents as well as numerous service functions, it expected eventually to be reimbursed for these goods and services. The approach might differ in individual cases, but the problem of reimbursement continued throughout the war. And the Army had the task of keeping the books so that when the subject came up, it could present fair and reasonable estimates of the charges involved. The Eighth Army had to submit weekly and monthly reports on equipment, ammunition, and supplies furnished to the U.N. units, plus an estimate of handling charges. In the spring of 1951, Eighth

[42] Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 6 Jul 51, DA–IN 11527.

[43] (1) Msg, Duff to CINCFE, 6 Jul 51, DA–95739. (2) Msg, Jenkins to CINCFE, 1 Sep 51, DA–80536. (3) Msg, Eddleman to CINCFE, 23 Oct 51, DA–84922.

[44] (1) Military History Detachment, 8086th Army Unit, Eighth Army, Monograph, Organization of the Korean Communications Zone, pp. 1–2. In OCMH. (2) Eighth Army, Monograph, Logistical Problems and Their Solutions, p. 20. In OCMH.



PORT OF PUSAN

Army attempted to set up a system whereby the bill could be figured out on the basis of so many dollars-per-man-per-day, but this was superseded in June. The Department of the Army decided to substitute a cost and replacement factor as the basis for compiling the amounts to be reimbursed.[45] The timing of the final settlement rested with the political and military leaders in Washington, of course, but whatever the system used to compute the bill or the method employed to collect it, the Eighth Army had to carry the administrative and bookkeeping burden. As long as the war lasted and the United States retained the responsibility for supplying its allies, this was a job that would have to be done.

All in all, the summer and early fall of 1951 proved to be a time for preparation. While the U.S. leaders considered broad plans for the prosecution of the war if the peace negotiations failed, General Ridgway and his staff sought to improve the combat efficiency of the forces in the United Nations Command and to intensify the program for build-

[45] Fox, Inter-Allied Cooperation During Combat Operations, MS, pp. 167ff.

ing a more reliable ROK Army. On the sidelines the U.N. countries with troops in Korea watched the developments at the conference table intently for the outcome would affect their own plans and preparations.

Yet despite the hum of activity, a note of uncertainty permeated the scene. The on-again, off-again character of the peace talks made all planning tentative. Although the United States was pursuing a policy of constant military pressure upon the enemy in Korea, its plans were flexible and opportunistic rather than firm at this point. In some ways the trends were reminiscent of the war against Japan in 1943–44. The United States was attempting to build up a native army in Korea even as it had sought to create a ground force in China. And though the United States was supplying the bulk of the resources and effective manpower, there were allies to be consulted and placated just as there had been in the Pacific war. Flexibility and opportunism had keynoted the mid-war period against Japan, too, but the final objective then had been unconditional surrender rather than a negotiated peace. Another point of similarity was the role of the Soviet Union waiting in the wings. Only this time it would play the villain's part instead of the friend in need if it entered the war.

The air of indecision as the United States and its allies awaited the results of the peace negotiations was reflected on the battlefield as well as behind the scenes. With the opening of the truce talks, action at the front had begun to take its cue from the course of events at Kaesong.




D. Holmes, Jr.

MAP I

# CHAPTER V

# The New War

After the United Nations Command had halted the enemy offensive in the spring of 1951, there had been no effort by the Eighth Army to launch a counterattack. It was not that General Van Fleet's forces lacked the capability to force the enemy to withdraw "far north" of the 38th Parallel, but the question was "how far to push in order to accomplish the greatest damage." Any advance north of the Parallel would shorten the supply and communications lines of the Communists and correspondingly increase those of the Eighth Army. The tasks of reconstituting the destroyed transport facilities in North Korea and of assuming civil affairs functions in that desolated area would also be considerable. Most important of all, Van Fleet had to keep in mind two overriding factors: he did not have sufficient forces to destroy the enemy by maneuver and encirclement; and he could not advance beyond the KANSAS-WYOMING defense lines that straddled the 38th Parallel without the express permission of the JCS and General Ridgway.[1] In view of these restricting elements and the reluctance of the majority of the nations composing the U.N. Command to advance again toward the Yalu, it was hardly surprising that in June 1951 Van Fleet concluded: "Continued pursuit of the enemy was neither practical nor expedient. The most profitable employment for the Eighth Army, therefore, was to establish a defense line on the nearest commanding terrain north of Parallel 38, and from there to push forward in a limited advance to accomplish the maximum destruction to the enemy consistent with minimum danger to the integrity of the Eighth Army." [2]

The decision to strengthen the defensive lines of the Eighth Army and to confine offensive action at the front to limited advances marked the end of the fluid phase of the Korean War and the start of the new war.

## *The KANSAS-WYOMING Line*

Line KANSAS, the defense line selected by Van Fleet, began near the mouth of the Imjin River twenty miles north of Seoul and snaked its way to the northeast on the south side of the river through low barren elevations which gradually gave way to higher, moderately wooded hills. (*Map I*) Where the Imjin crossed the 38th Parallel, KANSAS veered eastward and upward toward the Hwach'on Reservoir and then angled northeastward again across the steep,

[1] Directives restricting Van Fleet's actions appear in: (1) Ltr of Instr, Ridgway to CG Eighth Army, 25 Apr 51, in JSPOG 411, Staff Studies on Advances North of the 38th Parallel, 9 Apr–20 Jun 51. (2) Msg, JCS 90000, JCS to CINCFE, 1 May 51.

[2] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 51, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 7–8.

forested South Taebaek Mountains until it reached the east coast some twenty-five miles north of the 38th Parallel. The terrain from the Hwach'on Reservoir to the east coast was particularly rugged. The mountain slopes rose sharply, especially on the west and south faces, and good roads were almost nonexistent. The defensive strength of KANSAS was increased by full use of the dominating terrain and the numerous water barriers along the route.

Guarding the approaches to KANSAS on the western front, Line WYOMING looped northeastward from the mouth of the Imjin towards Ch'orwon, swung east to Kumhwa, and then fell off to the southeast until it rejoined KANSAS near the Hwach'on Reservoir. In the spring of 1951 it served as an outpost line screening KANSAS.

Although Line KANSAS permitted the enemy to retain control of the communication complex of the area called the Iron Triangle (Ch'orwon-Kumhwa-P'yonggang), Van Fleet felt that the line afforded the UNC forces the advantages of a defensible terrain, a satisfactory road and railroad net, and logistic support. In the event of a cease-fire he recommended in early June that the Eighth Army be at least ten miles in advance of Line KANSAS in case a 10-mile withdrawal by both sides to form a buffer zone be made part of the terms. For planning purposes Ridgway agreed.[3]

In the meantime, Van Fleet instructed his corps commanders to fortify Line KANSAS in depth and to build hasty field fortifications along the advance Line WYOMING to delay and blunt the force of enemy assaults before they reached KANSAS. On the eastern end of the front, the U.S. X and ROK I Corps would establish patrol bases ahead of the main line of resistance to maintain contact with the enemy. To prevent enemy agents from posing as peasants in order to gather intelligence, Van Fleet told his commanders to clear the battle area of all Korean civilians, who were to be evacuated to the rear.[4]

Since the terrain became more mountainous in the east and was served by a poor communications network, Van Fleet had deployed his four corps accordingly, with the ROK I Corps forming the eastern anchor, flanked by the U.S. X Corps in the east central sector, the U.S. IX Corps in the west central area, and the U.S. I Corps defending the broadest sector on the west. The first three corps fronts were narrower because of the rugged mountains and lack of good roads. Most of the ROK divisions were placed where the least logistical support could be provided since they required less to live on and fewer auxiliary units.[5]

By 1 July the main fortifications of Line KANSAS were nearly complete. To expedite the work, Van Fleet had sent three South Korean National Guard divisions forward to serve as labor troops, one to each U.S. corps. The log-and-sandbag bunkers and deep, narrow

[3] (1) Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCUNC, 9 Jul 51, sub: Location of EUSAK During a Cease-Fire (Military Viewpoint). (2) Ltr, Ridgway to CG Eighth Army, 22 Jun 51, same sub. Both in FEC, JSPOG 411, title: Staff Studies on Advances North of the 38th Parallel, 9 Apr–20 Jun 51.

[4] For Van Fleet's instructions, see: (1) Ltr of Instr, Van Fleet to CG's U.S. I, IX, X Corps, 1 Jun 51, and (2) Ltr of Instr, Van Fleet to CG I ROK Corps, 1 Jun 51. Both in FEC, JSPOG 411, title: Staff Studies on Advances North of the 38th Parallel, 9 Apr–20 Jun 51.

[5] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 51, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 8–10.

trenches along the KANSAS line resembled World War I entrenchments. Bunkers, usually adjoining and forward of lateral trenches, housed automatic rifles and machine guns. Most of the bunkers were dug into hillsides or saddles on the military crests with the larger ones on the higher hills serving as forward command and observation posts.

Known as "hootchies" in the Army vernacular, the bunkers were usually built with solid overhead cover and separate living quarters behind the battle stations. Each reflected the ingenuity of its occupants in providing the comforts of home, such as cots, flooring, and furniture.

Along the lateral trenches, the riflemen and rocket-launching crews notched revetted bays for firing their weapons and slightly behind them recoilless rifle emplacements were dug in and revetted with sandbags. In defilade on the reverse slope of the hills, protected mortar firing positions were constructed and roads were cut to permit tanks to move up and fire from parapeted front-line positions. Camouflage nets and shubbery were used extensively to conceal the bunkers and prepared positions.

To delay enemy offensives barbed wire fences were laid out and mines were planted in patterns that would funnel attackers into the heaviest defense fires. In the U.S. I and IX Corps sectors, where WYOMING positions were occupied rather than KANSAS, the troops plotted mine fields and dug the holes, then stored the mines nearby to be buried when and if a retreat from Line WYOMING should prove necessary.[6]

Structural weaknesses soon appeared in many of the hasty fortifications. Bunker roofs collapsed when an inadequate number of supporting timbers were used and the heavy July rains caved in a number of bunkers built in terrain where erosion was swift. These were relocated and rebuilt. Inspection and experience revealed other defects in the defense line. When shubbery was allowed to wither, it clearly delineated the emplacement positions and well-beaten paths in front of the bunkers had the same effect. Indiscriminate clearing of trees and shrubs in front of firing positions also disclosed the defense line. In some sectors improper placing of barbed wire restricted the fields of fire and tactical wire strung too close to front-line positions permitted the enemy to toss hand grenades into the trench area. But most of the deficiencies had been corrected by the end of July and Line KANSAS was considered strong enough to stop anything less than a full-scale enemy offensive.

Instead of the usual general and combat outpost system, Eighth Army organized its outposts as a series of patrol bases.[7] Developed initially by front-line units across the army front while reserve troops strengthened defense positions, patrol bases afforded depth to the defense line. They were established up to ten miles in front of the main battle line on commanding terrain and in most cases were not mutually supporting.

[6] For a more detailed account of the KANSAS line, see Maj Billy C. Mossman, The War in Korea, vol. III, ch. III. MS in OCMH.

[7] General and combat outposts were organized to provide warnings of enemy attacks and to fight delaying actions only, while the patrol bases became outposts that were to be defended except in the case of an all-out enemy offensive. The patrol base was used in Italy during World War II, but did not become standard technique until the Korean War.

They were later manned by reserve troops, usually a reinforced company, for distances up to 2,000 yards and by a battalion or regiment at the more advanced bases. Operating within range of their supporting medium artillery, patrol base commanders could maintain contact with the enemy, determine enemy dispositions by vigorous patrolling, capture enemy prisoners, and provide warning of attack by absorbing the first assaults. Trip flares, mines, barbed wire, planned fields of fire, as well as extra ammunition and firepower, made the patrol base a difficult position to penetrate. The bases were often subjected to the favorite Chinese and North Korean tactic—the night attack—but they were harder to infiltrate than outpost lines and units could withdraw intact to the main line of resistance in the event of a major offensive.[8]

The patrol base system and the lull in operations during July caused by the armistice negotiations gave the Eighth Army time to improve the defenses of Line WYOMING, too. General Van Fleet decided to add depth to his defenses by making WYOMING a permanent line and on 30 July he told his corps commanders that it would be regarded as the main line of resistance. Only in the event of heavy losses would the Eighth Army withdraw to Line KANSAS to launch its counterattack.[9]

By midsummer the pattern was set. The Eighth Army had established its defensive positions and was prepared either to conduct local offensive operations or to punish any attempt by the enemy to penetrate the KANSAS-WYOMING lines.

### *The Enemy*

Despite the steady build-up of Communist forces during June and July, the expected offensive was not launched. Instead the enemy continued to bring up supplies by rail and road and to strengthen his defensive positions. Since casualties were light on both sides during the early summer slowdown in the fighting and the Communists maintained a high flow of replacements, their offensive capability mounted.[10]

On 1 July the Communist forces in Korea totaled 459,200 men, according to Eighth Army intelligence estimates. Of these 248,100 were Chinese and the remainder North Korean. In addition, there were 7,500 North Korean guerrillas operating in South Korea. (*Table 1*)

Technically the command of the Communist troops in Korea was vested in a Combined Headquarters, headed by Premier Kim Il Sung and staffed by North Korean and Chinese officers. Actually enemy operations appear to have been directed by General Peng Teh-huai, from Headquarters, Chinese People's Volunteer Army, in Mukden. Combined Headquarters served as a clearinghouse and message center but the Chinese made certain that their commanders would receive the instructions from Mukden by using direct channels of communication as well. At the front the Chinese had five army group headquarters, each of which controlled two or more armies. (*Chart 3*)

[8] See C. C. De Reus, "The Perimeter Pays Off," in *Combat Forces Journal*, vol. 3, No. 5 (December, 1952).

[9] Msg, GX 894 TAC, CG Eighth Army to CG's I, IX, and X U.S. Corps, 30 Jul 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, an. 4, pt. III, incl 11.

[10] UNC/FEC, Rpt, Jul 51, pp. 4–5.

TABLE 1—EIGHTH ARMY ESTIMATE OF ENEMY FORCES
1 JULY 1951

| Units[a] | Total Strength | Units[a] | Total Strength |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chinese Communist Forces | 248,100 | Korean People's Army | 211,100 |
| 12th Army | | I Corps | |
| 31st, 34th, 35th Divisions | 16,100 | 8th, 19th, 47th Divisions | 15,800 |
| 15th Army | | II Corps | |
| 29th, 44th, 45th Divisions | 14,400 | 2d, 13th, 27th Divisions | 18,700 |
| 20th Army | | III Corps | |
| 58th, 59th, 60th Divisions | 16,400 | 1st, 15th, 45th Divisions | 30,400 |
| 26th Army | | IV Corps | |
| 76th, 77th, 78th Divisions | 19,700 | 4th, 5th, 105th Armored Divisions, 26th Brigade | 29,200 |
| 27th Army | | V Corps | |
| 79th, 80th, 81st Divisions | 26,000 | 6th, 12th, 32d Divisions | 14,300 |
| 38th Army | | VI Corps | |
| 112th, 113th, 114th Divisions | 13,900 | 9th, 17th Mechanized, 18th, 23d Divisions | 35,500 |
| 39th Army | | VII Corps | |
| 115th, 116th, 117th Divisions | 24,000 | 3d, 24th, 37th, 46th Divisions, 63d Brigade | 35,500 |
| 40th Army | | Other forces | 31,700 |
| 118th, 119th, 120th Divisions | 18,500 | | |
| 42d Army | | | |
| 124th, 125th, 126th Divisions | 29,000 | | |
| 47th Army | | | |
| 140th Division | 8,500 | | |
| 60th Army | | | |
| 179th, 180th, 181st Divisions | 13,900 | | |
| 63d Army | | | |
| 187th, 188th, 189th Divisions | 13,900 | | |
| 64th Army | | | |
| 190th, 191st, 192d Divisions | 17,700 | | |
| 65th Army | | | |
| 193d, 194th, 195th Divisions | 16,100 | | |


[a] Besides these units, Eighth Army Intelligence officers suspected but had not as yet confirmed the presence of six other Chinese armies and two-thirds of a seventh.

*Source:* Eighth Army G–2 Estimate of Enemy Strength and Locations, 1 Jul 51; Eighth Army G–2 OB Br, CCF Army Histories, 1 Dec 54. Both in ACSI Doc Library DA.

In the Chinese military organization the army was the principal self-sufficient tactical unit. At full strength it had between 21,000 and 30,000 men, roughly comparable to one and a half to two U.S. divisions. Each army contained three divisions and usually included an artillery regiment, security, reconnaissance, engineer, and transport battalions, a signal company, and an army hospital.[11] Owing to battle losses during the spring offensives the thirteen plus Chinese armies in Korea were at reduced strength on 1 July. Seven were deployed along

[11] DA Pamphlet 30–51, September 1952, Handbook on the Chinese Communist Army.

CHART 3—CHAIN OF COMMAND OF ENEMY FORCES, 1 JULY 1951




Source: (1) Hq FEC MIS, FEC Intel Digest, 16–30 Sep 51, p. 5. (2) Hq USAFFE (Adv), G–2 Intel Digests, 16–31 Jan 53, pp. 32–33; 1–15 Feb 53, pp. 26–28; 16–28 Feb 53, pp. 27–28. (3) Hq FEC MIS, History of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52. All in ACSI Doc Lib DA.

or close to the central front and the other six were in reserve.[12]

The Chinese Communist infantry division was triangular and an average regiment consisted of approximately 3,000 men. Armed with a miscellaneous collection of Russian, Japanese, American, and domestically manufactured copies of foreign weapons, the firepower of a typical regiment might be drawn from the following weapons: 180 pistols, 400 rifles and carbines, 217 submachine guns, 60 light machine guns, 18 heavy machine guns, nine 12.7-mm. antiaircraft machine guns, twenty-seven 60-mm. mortars, twelve 81- or 82-mm. mortars, four 120-mm. mortars, six 57-mm. recoilless rifles, 18 rocket launchers, and four 70-mm. infantry howitzers. The artillery regiment, which was attached to each division, usually consisted of three battalions and contained 36 pieces. Chinese artillery weapons were of Russian, Japanese, and American manufacture and ranged from 75-mm. guns to 155-mm. howitzers.[13]

The Chinese had shown themselves to be good soldiers. During the first six months of 1951 they had maintained a fluid battle line and had sought to entice the U.N. Command to overextend its forces which they would then try to destroy in detail. Real estate meant little to the Chinese and withdrawal was as important a part of their tactics as was the advance. Herein lay a deep difference between the Chinese and the North Koreans, for the latter fought for the land and consistently showed a strong disinclination to abandon territory.[14]

Premier Kim Il Sung, the titular commander of General Headquarters, Korean People's Army, at P'yongyang, left direct control over the North Korean forces to his Deputy Commander, Marshal Choe Yong Gun, and Chief of Staff, Nam Il. On the battlefield the highest tactical echelon of command was Front Headquarters under Lt. Gen. Kim Ung, an able and energetic combat leader.[15]

The North Korean military organization varied in several ways from the Chinese. The corps was the main North Korean tactical unit and customarily approximated two American divisions in strength. But the component divisions of the corps, unlike the Chinese Army in this respect, varied from time to time: the North Koreans were flexible and shifted divisions from corps to corps as the need arose. There were seven North Korean corps in July 1951, and all were in the line—three on the west coast and four on the east. In addition to guarding the flanks against UNC amphibious landings, they anchored the Communist line at the front.

Although the Communist forces could match the U.N. troops in manpower, they were deficient in artillery and armor. According to gun sightings and shell reports, the enemy had about 350 artillery pieces spread along the front in July. The majority were 75-mm. and 76-mm. with some 105-mm., 122-mm.,

[12] See Situation Map, 1 Jul 51. The *39th Army*, with the *115th*, *116th*, and *117th Divisions*, was at Song'chon and the *38th*, with the *112th*, *113th*, and *114th* Divisions, and the *40th*, with the *118th*, *119th* and *120th Divisions*, were unlocated. Eighth Army G–2 Estimate of Enemy Strength and Locations, 1 Jul 51, in ACSI files.

[13] DA Pamphlet 30–51, September 1952, Handbook on the Chinese Communist Army, pp. 37–39, 89.

[14] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, sec. I, Narrative, p. 2.

[15] Hq FEC MIS, Hist of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52, pp. 84–95.

and a few 150-mm. guns and howitzers. Neither the Chinese nor the North Korean infantry units had organic armor. All of the Chinese armored divisions were in China and the lone North Korean tank division was stationed on the west coast north of P'yongyang.[16]

The enemy offensive capability mounted during July despite the lack of armor and heavy artillery and there were indications that the Communists might be preparing to challenge the almost complete domination of the air enjoyed by the Far East Air Forces (FEAF). Intelligence estimates placed total aircraft based in Manchuria and available to the enemy at 1,050, including 595 fighters, 175 ground aircraft, 100 transports, and 180 training and reconnaissance planes. Some 445 of the fighters were jet-propelled and included the fast Russian MIG–15 which was in some respects superior to the best UNC fighters. FEAF estimated that the Russians were furnishing the aircraft as quickly as the Chinese Communist Air Force trained pilots and maintenance personnel.[17]

Since the enemy's passive attitude appeared to be a repetition of earlier instances when the Communists had withdrawn behind a screening force and prepared for the next offensive, the Eighth Army remained alert and wary. Van Fleet did not appear to be particularly concerned. In a conference with the new commander of the U.S. I Corps, Maj. Gen. John W. (Iron Mike) O'Daniel, on 24 July, Van Fleet said:

". . . if the enemy merely assembles what forces he has, he can only make a limited objective attack, but if he has brought in several more army groups —and frankly we don't know; he could have added up to two more army groups —and has a good amount of supply forward, he may be able to launch an all-out offensive. I don't think he's that strong, but we must be prepared to meet his maximum capability and we must be ready to meet him if the cease-fire negotiations fail." [18]

### *The UNC Takes the Initiative*

Although Van Fleet felt that the Eighth Army could best meet and punish the enemy at the KANSAS-WYOMING line under the present conditions, he and his staff prepared an offensive plan at Ridgway's request. Submitted in early July, Plan OVERWHELMING outlined a campaign that would take the Eighth Army to the P'yongyang-Wonsan line starting about 1 September, provided that certain conditions were satisfied. If there were a major deterioration of enemy forces or a withdrawal to the north, if the mission of the Eighth Army were changed, or if additional forces were allocated to the Eighth Army, Van Fleet thought that OVERWHELMING might be feasible.[19]

On 10 July the Joint Chiefs removed their requirement that Ridgway secure their prior approval of all major ground operations, but the Far East commander took no action on OVERWHELMING.[20] The rather formidable set of conditions that Van Fleet had attached to the plan

[16] Eighth Army G–2 PIR 458, 5 Jul 51; PIR 380, 27 Jul 51; PIR 392, 8 Aug 51.

[17] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, sec I, Narrative, p. 7.

[18] Quoted in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, sec. I, Narrative, p. 72.

[19] FEC JSPOG Study 602, Plan OVERWHELMING, no date.

[20] Msg, JCS 95977, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jul 51.

coupled with the initiation of the armistice negotiations argued for a cautious approach to any large-scale offensive at this time. Ridgway therefore decided to observe the course of the peace talks before he acted on OVERWHELMING.[21]

Van Fleet could still launch limited attacks on his own initiative, but the selection of Kaesong as the truce site eliminated one of the areas that he planned to raid. The possibility of an armistice, moreover, made both sides reluctant to expend men and equipment during most of July. Thus, it was not until the end of the month that Van Fleet issued his first attack order since early June.

The Eighth Army shift from the passive defense was fostered by both external and internal developments. Since the enemy had used the respite on the battlefield to build up his stocks and to bring his combat units up to strength, Van Fleet wanted to probe the Communist defenses, determine the disposition of the enemy troops, and prevent them from employing their mounting offensive capabilities by keeping them off balance.[22] In addition, Van Fleet was aware that the combat efficiency of the Eighth Army had slipped during the latter part of July. Patrols were conducted indifferently and failed to bring in prisoners. Gathering intelligence became an increasingly difficult task. Even a stepped-up training program was not enough to restore the ability and will of the Eighth Army to fight. Inactivity and the hope that the armistice talks would prove successful were a tough combination to defeat. As Van Fleet pointed out later: "A sitdown army is subject to collapse at the first sign of an enemy effort. . . . As Commander of the Eighth Army, I couldn't allow my forces to become soft and dormant." [23]


In the course of disturbing the enemy's dispositions and of sharpening the fighting edge of the Eighth Army troops, Van Fleet also hoped to improve his own defense positions along the front. There were several areas where the seizure of dominant terrain would remove sags in the line or threats to the UNC lines of communication. One of the sags that Van Fleet wanted to eliminate existed in the rugged Taebaek Mountains in the U.S. X Corps sector.

Twenty miles northeast of the Hwach'on Reservoir lay a circular valley known as the Punchbowl and rimmed by hills rising sharply to heights of 1,000 to 2,000 feet above the valley floor. (*Map 3*) The Soyang River ran south in the valley to the east of the Punchbowl, and on the west the So-ch'on River and one of its tributaries separated the Punchbowl from the next series of ridges. In July the North Koreans held the commanding terrain ringing the Punchbowl on the west, north, and east whence they could observe the UNC defenses and troop movements and could direct artillery fire upon the KANSAS line. Seizure of the enemy positions on the high ground would lessen the threat of attacks developing from these heights aimed at splitting the X and ROK I Corps along the corps boundary which ran to the east of the Punchbowl; it

[21] FEC G–3 Study, title: Review of Current CINCFE Letters of Instruction in the Light of JCS 95977 and JCS 95978, 14 Jul 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, an. 4, pt. III, incl 13.

[22] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, sec. I, Narrative, p. 8.

[23] Statement of Van Fleet, 30 Sep 51, in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XXV, No. 641 (October 8, 1951), p. 589.




*MAP 3*

would also allow the Eighth Army to straighten and shorten its lines in the sector and permit Van Fleet to build up larger reserve forces.[24] On 21 July Van Fleet directed the X Corps to draw up plans for seizing the west rim of the Punchbowl.

In late July the U.S. 2d Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, won a foothold on the western edge of the Punchbowl when the 38th Infantry Regiment captured and set up a patrol base on Hill 1179 called Taeu San.[25] Unusually heavy rains that made roads and trails impassable and restricted air and artillery support delayed the launching of further operations in the Punchbowl area until mid-August.[26] Diversionary raids in the U.S. I Corps sector in the west on 4 and 8 August had encountered little enemy opposition; most of the difficulties came from the swollen rivers and treacherous roads.[27]

[24] (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 51, bk. 1, CG's Jnl, 21 Jul 51. (2) Hq U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, p. 45. (3) Hq U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, p. 3.

[25] U.S. 2d Div, Comd Rpt, Jul 51. Hill numbers indicate height in meters.

[26] Rainfall measured nearly twenty inches in August.

[27] Hq U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, pp. 8–18.



THE PUNCHBOWL

On 18 August the weather had improved sufficiently to permit the summer campaign to get under way. ROK troops from the 11th and Capital Divisions of the ROK I Corps and from the ROK 8th Division of the U.S. X Corps attacked a J-shaped ridge that lay northeast of the Punchbowl. Hill 1031, the highest peak of the ridge, was little more than five miles from the northeast rim of the Punchbowl. The ROK forces under the command of General Paik Sun Yup, ROK I Corps, met with stubborn resistance from elements of the North Korean *45th*, *13th*, and *2d Divisions* who were dug in on the ridge. For eleven days General Paik's forces fought to drive the North Koreans from their strongly fortified positions. While troops from the ROK 8th Division struck north against the hook of the J, the bulk of Paik's men swung in from the east and southeast against the stem. The attacking troops reached their objectives on the ridge lines, but were not reinforced in time to withstand the enemy counterattacks that swiftly followed. The pattern of attack and counterattack without a decision continued until General Van Fleet visited Paik's headquarters and pointed out his tactical mistake. In the next attempt Paik reinforced the



2D U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION TROOPS ON BLOODY RIDGE

attack, seized the hook of the J Ridge on 27 August and cleared the stem two days later.[28] Possession of the J Ridge provided protection for the Eighth Army supply route along the Soyang Valley and permitted the ROK I Corps to observe and fire upon enemy positions and troop movements north of the Punchbowl.

On the same day—18 August—that the attack against the J Ridge had begun, the 36th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division had attempted to seize another ridge west of the Punchbowl. Van Fleet had directed Maj. Gen. Clovis E. Byers, the new commander of the U.S. X Corps, to eliminate important enemy observation posts that directed heavy and accurate artillery fire upon Line KANSAS position from the ridge, some two miles west and slightly south of Hill 1179. Since Van Fleet believed that the South Korean troops lacked self-confidence and needed experience to develop faith in their own abilities, he instructed Byers to use ROK units in the assault.[29] Byers in turn attached the 36th Regiment to the U.S. 2d Division.

The objective was an east-west ridge with three peaks, the highest at the west-

[28] (1) Hq, Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, sec. 1, Narrative, pp. 62–78. (2) Eighth Army, G–3 Jnls, 18–27 Aug 51. (3) U.S. X Corps, G–3 Jnls, 18–27 Aug 51. (4) Gen Byer's Diary, 18–28 Aug 51.

[29] (1) Msg, GX 1172, Van Fleet to CG U.S. X Corps, 12 Aug 51. (2) Msg, GX 1202, Van Fleet to CG U.S. X Corps, 14 Aug 51. Both in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, G–3 sec., bk. 4, pt. 3.

ern end rising to 983 meters. The ridge formed the crossbar of an H-shaped hill mass that overlooked the forward positions of the 2d Division some two miles south of Hill 983. After five days of repeated frontal assaults the ROK 36th Regiment took the ridge, later called Bloody Ridge, but then had to withdraw under heavy North Korean pressure.[30] General Ruffner, the 2d Division commander, had to commit elements of the U.S. 9th Regiment to support the South Koreans, but still the enemy refused to give ground.[31] The North Koreans were protected by thick mine fields and strongly built bunkers that resisted destruction by anything less than accurate direct fire. With ample supplies of automatic weapons and hand grenades, they waited in their bunkers until the UNC artillery and air support ceased. Then, as the Eighth Army soldiers labored up the last few yards of the steep slopes, the Communist troops would move out into their firing positions and send a hail of bullets and grenades at the attackers.

The steadily mounting casualty lists led to a decline in morale among the men of the ROK 36th Regiment. On 27 August some units of the regiment broke and ran, spreading panic among the elements of the U.S. 9th Regiment as well.[32] The deterioration of the situation on Bloody Ridge led General Byers on 28 August to alter his approach and he decided upon a limited advance along the whole corps front, starting on 31 August. By applying pressure over a broad front, Byers hoped to force the enemy to disperse his firepower and to halt the flow of enemy reinforcements to Bloody Ridge. Thus, Byers rearranged divisional objectives along the corps front. The seizure of the northwest rim of the Punchbowl was assigned to the ROK 5th Division and the northeast rim was given to the U.S. 1st Marine Division. While the 2d Division renewed its efforts to take Bloody Ridge, the ROK 7th Division would attack and capture terrain west of the ridge.

Although the 1st Marine Division and its attached Korean Marine troops met little opposition on 31 August as they began their advance, the enemy forces stiffened the following day. Yet despite the increasing resistance the marines were able to push forward and take several hills on the northern rim of the Punchbowl. By a stroke of good fortune, the N.K. *III Corps* was in the process of moving from the ROK I Corps front and of taking over the defense of this sector from the N.K. *II Corps*. As the N.K. *2d Division* began the relief of the N.K. *1st Division*, the marines hit the latter's positions. By the time the relief was completed, in the opening days of September, the marines had won control

[30] The newspaper *Stars and Stripes* named this action and evidently confused many of the men who participated in the attack, since they wondered where all this excitement was taking place and did not suspect that they were the center of attention. They were not inclined to regard the action as a particularly bloody operation. See Capt Edward C. Williamson, Capt Pierce W. Briscoe, 1st Lt Martin Blumenson, and 1st Lt John Mewha, "Bloody Ridge," August-September 1951. MS in OCMH, p. 1.

[31] Account of the attack on Bloody Ridge is based on: (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Aug 51 and Sep 51; (2) Eighth Army G-3 Jnls, 17 Aug-5 Sep 51; (3) U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpts, Aug and Sep 51; (4) U.S. X Corps, G-3 Jnls, 17 Aug-5 Sep 51; (5) U.S. 2d Div, Comd Rpts, Aug and Sep 51; (6) Williamson *et al.*, "Bloody Ridge."

[32] See Interv with Col John M. Lynch, CO, 9th Inf Regt, in Williamson *et al.*, "Bloody Ridge," p. 71.

of the northern lip of the Punchbowl.[33]

The 9th Infantry attacks on Bloody Ridge at the end of August and the opening days of September, on the other hand, failed to dislodge the enemy, whereupon Byers and Brig. Gen. Thomas E. de Shazo, who had temporarily taken command of the 2d Division, laid out a double envelopment of Bloody Ridge using elements of the U.S. 23d and 38th Regiments while the 9th continued its assault on the ridge itself.[34]

On 4 and 5 September the anticlimax came. With surprising ease the 2d Division forces advanced and took over Bloody Ridge. The North Koreans, weakened by heavy losses, had finally evacuated their positions and left substantial stores of supplies and over 500 dead on the heights. After almost three weeks of fighting and over 2,700 U.N. and ROK casualties, the Eighth Army had won its objective. According to 2d Division estimates, the defense of Bloody Ridge had cost the enemy over 15,000 casualties.[35]

The advance by the X Corps in August demonstrated once again the reluctance of the North Koreans to part with any of their territory. Taking excellent advantage of the terrain and constructing well-placed defenses, they had fought bitterly to hold on to their observation posts on Bloody Ridge. Only when the attack had been broadened to apply pressure at several points along the corps front, and the 2d Division had committed elements of all three of the division's regiments, and only after enemy forces suffered severe casualties, did the North Koreans concede and evacuate the ridge.

### *Heartbreak Ridge*

In any event Bloody Ridge had its after effects. During the battle Van Fleet had submitted an outline plan, called TALONS, to Ridgway envisioning an advance ranging from one to almost fifteen miles to remove the sag in the Eighth Army's eastern front. Ridgway had turned down more ambitious plans for an amphibious landing near Wonsan and for a deep advance into North Korea, but he had no objection to a modest ground offensive.[36] Preparations for TALONS continued until 5 September, when Van Fleet evidently took a close look at the final casualty totals of the Bloody Ridge fight. Since TALONS would be on a much larger scale, Van Fleet decided that the operation was not worth the probable cost in lives and matériel. Instead he informed Ridgway that he favored sustaining his "tidying up" on the Eighth Army right flank during the remainder of September, using "elbowing" tactics without any definite

[33] U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, sec. I, pp. 8–9.

[34] General Ruffner went home on normal rotation on 1 September and Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, the new commander, did not arrive until 20 September.

[35] Casualties: 2d Div and attached units, 18 Aug–5 Sep, killed in action, 326; wounded in action, 2,032; missing in action 414; total, 2,772. Enemy casualties: counted killed in action, 1,389; estimated killed, 4,288; estimated wounded, 9,422; prisoners, 264; total, 15,363. See Williamson *et al.*, "Bloody Ridge," pp. 203, 211. It should be remembered that the estimated killed and wounded figures are educated guesses and may be at considerable variance with the actual enemy casualties.

[36] (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 47–48, 52. (2) Msg, GX 1174 TAC, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 12 Aug 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, G–3 sec., bk. 4, pt. 3. (3) Msg, C 69168, Ridgway to JCS, 18 Aug 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, an. 4, pt. III, incl 16.



HEARTBREAK RIDGE

objective line assigned. Around 1 October he would stop his offensive operations in the east, then launch an attack in the west by the U.S. I Corps about the middle of the month, provided the armistice negotiations permitted. If this I Corps maneuver were successful, Van Fleet would follow up with an amphibious operation on the east coast near Tongch'on. This would link up with a land advance northeast from Kumhwa.

The quick change in plans by the Eighth Army commander caught Ridgway by surprise, but he interposed no objection to the continuance of the limited objective attacks on an opportunistic basis. The proposed amphibious assault, however, Ridgway would only approve for planning purposes.[37]

Acting swiftly, Van Fleet issued a general directive to his corps commanders on 8 September emphasizing limited objective attacks, reconnaissance, and patrolling.[38] He followed up the directive the same day with instructions to the X Corps to take the ridge just north of

[37] (1) Msg, C 50314, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 7 Sep 51, Paper 17. (2) Msg, GX 1636 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 7 Sep 51, Paper 19. (3) Msg, C 50405, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 8 Sep 51, Paper 20. All in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Sep 51.

[38] Msg, CG 1656 TAC, Van Fleet to CG U.S. I, U.S. IX, U.S. X, and ROK I Corps, 8 Sep 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Sep 51, G–3 sec., bk. 4, incls 6–10.

Bloody Ridge and another north of the Punchbowl. Since the North Koreans opposite the X Corps had just sustained a defeat on Bloody Ridge, Van Fleet thought that immediate thrusts would keep the enemy off balance and would gain the new ridge lines before the Communists had a chance to recover.[39]

The X Corps assigned the task of taking the peaks north of Bloody Ridge to the U.S. 2d Division. The objective was the southern tip of a long, narrow ridge running north and south between the Mundung-ni Valley on the west and the Sat'ae-ri Valley on the east; spur ridges arching east and west from the main ridge caused one observer to describe the objective as the "spinal column of a fish, with hundreds of vertebrae." [40] Possession of the central ridge would prevent the enemy from using the adjacent valleys to attack the X Corps defense lines west of the Punchbowl.

Heartbreak Ridge, as the objective was later named by news correspondents covering the action, had three main peaks. At the southern terminus was Hill 894 which commanded the approach from Bloody Ridge, three miles to the south; Hill 931, the highest peak in the ridge, lay 1,300 yards to the north; and 2,100 yards north of Hill 931 rose the needlelike projection of Hill 851.

After withdrawing from Bloody Ridge, the North Koreans had fallen back to prepared bunkers, trenches, and gun positions covering the approach ridges to Heartbreak that were just as strongly fortified and as well camouflaged as those previously encountered by the 2d Division. The respite between the end of the Bloody Ridge battle on 5 September and the assault on Heartbreak Ridge eight days later permitted the North Koreans to strengthen their defenses even further and to reinforce the units guarding the ridge and its approaches. In the Mundung-ni Valley the North Korean *12th Division* of the *III Corps* controlled the hills on the western side of the Suip-ch'on River and the *6th Division* of the same corps was responsible for the Heartbreak Ridge and Sat'ae-ri Valley sectors. Aerial photos had disclosed that the enemy had been very active in the Heartbreak Ridge area, grouping artillery and mortar units in the valleys flanking the ridge. But the heavy woods and undergrowth had veiled the elaborate enemy fortifications from the camera's eye and concealed the fact that the 2d Division was again faced with the task of breaching the enemy's main line of resistance.

Within the 2d Division there was considerable difference of opinion on the extent of the expected enemy reaction to an attack on Heartbreak Ridge. Col. Edwin A. Walker, the artillery commander, felt that the North Koreans would "fight like hell" for it, while some members of the staff contemplated that the enemy response would be less vigorous. General de Shazo, the acting division commander, evidently was among the latter group. He decided to use one regiment—the 23d—rather than two in

[39] Msg, GX 1659 TAC, Van Fleet to CG U.S. X Corps, 8 Sep 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, G–3 sec., bk. 4, incls 6–10.

[40] Maj Edward C. Williamson, Maj Pierce W. Briscoe, Capt Martin Blumenson, and 1st Lt. John Mewha, Action on "Heartbreak Ridge," p. 3. MS in OCMH. The following account of the Heartbreak Ridge battle is based on: (1) the above account and its companion MS, Heartbreak Ridge, September-October 1951, also in OCMH; (2) U.S. 2d Div, Comd Rpts, Sep and Oct 51; (3) Mossman, The War in Korea, vol. III, chs. VI and VII.

the assault force. Approaching from the east across the Sat'ae-ri Valley, the 23d, under Col. James Y. Adams, would cut Heartbreak between Hills 931 and 851. One battalion would then turn north to seize Hill 851 while a second would move south to capture Hills 931 and 894. As soon as Hill 894 came under the control of the 23d, the 9th Infantry, under Col. John M. Lynch, would advance and take Hill 728, 2,000 yards to the west and slightly south of Hill 894.

On 13 September the elements of the 2d Division were in position and ready to attack. The French Battalion, under Lt. Col. Ralph Monclar, had taken over the positions of the 38th Infantry Regiment on Hill 868, a little over two miles east of Hill 931, and the 38th had become the division reserve with responsibility for surveillance of the KANSAS line. The 9th Regiment was poised to advance on Hill 728 when the 23d Regiment gained Hill 894. Direct support for the 23d Regiment would come from the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, under Lt. Col. Linton S. Boatright, and its 105-mm. howitzers, while the 503d Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. howitzer), 96th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. howitzer), 38th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzer), and Battery C of the 780th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch howitzer) provided general support. The 37th and 38th Field Artillery Battalions were located about three miles southeast of Heartbreak Ridge. The 96th and 503rd were approximately seven miles south and nine miles southeast of the objective respectively, while the battery from the 780th was near Yach'on-ni, about eleven miles south of Heartbreak.

At 0530 the artillery preparation began and for thirty minutes the guns pounded enemy positions on or near Heartbreak Ridge. Then Colonel Adams, a 6-foot 6-inch West Pointer, gave the signal to start the 23d's attack. The 3d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Virgil E. Craven, led the way in a column of companies, followed by the 2d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Henry F. Daniels. As the assault troops moved north from Hill 702 up the Sat'ae-ri Valley to reach the east-west spur ridge that would serve as the approach to Heartbreak, the North Koreans spotted them. Heavy artillery and mortar fire from Heartbreak Ridge positions and from the heights around Sat'ae-ri town began to pour in on the men of the 23d Regiment. Despite the growing number of casualties, Craven's forces pressed on, closely followed by Daniels' men. As the 3d Battalion arrived at the east-west spur and headed up the hill to split the Heartbreak Ridge line, it ran into a hornet's nest. The *1st Regiment* of the N.K. *6th Division* manned a series of concealed, mutually supporting bunkers that covered the approach ridge with machine guns and small arms. Added to the artillery and mortar fire that the enemy observers were directing upon the two attack battalions, the automatic weapons and rifle fire forced the assault force to halt and dig in on the toe of the spur. The prospects for a swift penetration of the enemy lines vanished as night fell; the 23d had come up against the main defenses of the North Koreans and another Bloody Ridge experience loomed ahead.

When reports of the 23d's situation reached General de Shazo, he realized that he had underestimated the enemy's defensive capacity. Since the 9th Regi-

ment, under Colonel Lynch, was already in position for its contemplated attack on Hill 728, de Shazo directed Lynch on 14 September to use his regiment against Hill 894 instead. A successful seizure of Hill 894 could relieve some of the pressure on the 23d Regiment.

The 2d Battalion of the 9th Regiment advanced from Yao'dong up the southwest shoulder of Hill 894 on 14 September, supported by tanks of Company B, 72d Tank Battalion, the heavy mortar company, and a battalion of 155-mm. howitzers. By nightfall the 2d Battalion had climbed to within 650 yards of the crest of Hill 894 against light enemy resistance. The attack continued on 15 September and by afternoon, the height was swept clear of the enemy. Up to this point the 2d Battalion had had only eleven casualties, but the next two days cost the battalion over two hundred more as the North Koreans counterattacked fiercely and repeatedly in a vain effort to drive it off the crest.

Possession of Hill 894 by the 9th Regiment failed, however, to relieve the pressure on the 23d as it sought again to cut the ridge line between Hills 931 and 851. The enemy's firepower kept the assault forces pinned down on the lower slopes. On 16 September Colonel Adams ordered his 2d and 3d Battalions to shift from the column formation they had been using to attack abreast. Thus, while the 3d Battalion renewed its drive due west, the 2d Battalion swung to the southwest and approached Hill 931 along another spur. In the meantime, C Company of the 1st Battalion passed through the positions of the 9th Regiment on Hill 894 and tried to take Hill 931 from the south. The three-point attack made little headway against the heavy curtain of fire laid down by the enemy.

Secure in their strongly fortified bunkers, the North Korean defenders waited until the artillery and air support given to the 2d Division assault forces was lifted and then returned to their firing positions. As the 23d Regiment's soldiers climbed the last few yards toward the crest, the North Koreans opened up with their automatic weapons, rifles, and grenades. Since the enemy controlled the Mundung-ni Valley which offered defiladed and less steep access routes to Heartbreak Ridge, the problem of reinforcements and resupply was not difficult to resolve. In fact, General Hong Nim, commander of the N.K. *6th Division,* managed to send the fresh *13th Regiment* in to replace the *1st Regiment* on 16 September without any trouble.

For the U.S. 2d Division, the outlook was rather grim. The narrow Pia-ri Valley, southwest of Heartbreak, was jammed with vehicles and exposed to enemy artillery and mortar fire. Korean civilian porters frequently abandoned their loads along the trails and bolted for cover when the enemy got too close. To keep the front-line units supplied with food, water, ammunition, and equipment and to evacuate the casualties often required that American infantrymen double as carriers and litter bearers. The rugged terrain and the close enemy surveillance of the approaches to Heartbreak Ridge made their jobs very hazardous and time consuming, for it could take up to ten hours to bring down a litter case from the forward positions held by the 23d Regiment.

The stalemate on the ridge led Colonel Lynch on 19 September to suggest a broadening of the attack to

dissipate the enemy's concentrated resistance. He urged General de Shazo to let 1st Battalion of his 9th Regiment move across the Mundung-ni Valley and seize Hills 867 and 1024 located about three and four miles, respectively, southwest of Hill 894. If the enemy assumed that this attack marked the beginning of an envelopment of Heartbreak Ridge from the west, he might well divert men and guns to block the challenge, Lynch reasoned. But de Shazo rejected the proposal since General Byers, the X Corps commander, had earlier directed that Hill 931 be given first priority.

When Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, the new 2d Division commander, arrived the following day, he decided that Lynch's plan was sound. He ordered Lynch to take Hills 867 and 1024 and the 9th Infantry commander scheduled the attack on Hill 1024 for 23 September; Hill 867 would be seized after Hill 1024 fell. In the meantime, Van Fleet told Byers that it would be desirable for the X Corps to advance its western flank to bring the front line into phase with the U.S. IX Corps'. Thus, Byers, on 22 September, directed the ROK 7th Division to capture Hill 1142, located about 2,000 yards northwest of Hill 1024. The double-barreled attack upon Hills 1024 and 1142 might well cause the North Koreans to take the threat seriously and lessen their capacity to resist on Heartbreak Ridge.

The attacks by the 23d Infantry against Heartbreak Ridge had continued on 21 and 22 September with little success. The 1st Battalion, under Maj. George H. Williams, Jr., had tried again to take Hill 931 from the south, while Daniels' 2d Battalion came in from the north. Elements of the 1st Battalion briefly won their way to the crest on 23 September, but could not withstand the enemy's counterattack. An early morning assault from the east by a company from the *3d Regiment,* N.K. *12th Division,* produced a fierce fight that decimated the 1st Battalion. When his ammunition ran out, Williams had to pull back his men from Hill 931.[41]

Across the Mundung-ni Valley the diversionary attacks against Hills 1024 and 1142 by the 9th Regiment and the ROK 7th Division made good progress. On 25 September the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, cleared the crest of Hill 1024 and the ROK 7th Division won Hill 1142 the following day. Recognizing the threat to neighboring Hill 867, a key terrain feature dominating the valley to the north, the North Koreans quickly shifted the *3d Regiment,* N.K. *6th Division,* from Heatbreak Ridge to defend the hill.

The North Korean deployment, however, did not help the embattled 23d Regiment to capture Hill 931. Although the French Battalion replaced the 2d Battalion and tried to advance south along the ridge line while the 1st Battalion sought to press north toward the crest of 931, the N.K. *15th Regiment* fought them off on 26 September. The 23d's regimental tanks were able to move far enough north in the Sat'ae-ri Valley to send direct fire against some of the enemy's bunkers covering the eastern approaches to Heartbreak, but could not destroy the heavy mortars and machine guns that halted the 2d Division attack.

After almost two weeks of futile pounding at the enemy's defenses on

[41] The *3d Regiment* remained on Hill 931 until 26 September when it was relieved by the *15th Regiment,* N.K. *6th Division.*

Heartbreak, Colonel Adams told General Young on 26 September that it was "suicide" to continue adhering to the original plan. His own 23d Regiment had already taken over 950 casualties and the division total for the period was over 1,670. As Colonel Lynch had the week before, Adams favored broadening the attack and dispersing the enemy's capacity to resist on Heartbreak. He felt that if the North Korean forces in the vicinity of Heartbreak were engaged and unable to spare reinforcements or replacements for the N.K. *15th Regiment,* the 23d could wear the enemy regiment down and win the ridge.

By 27 September Young and the corps commander, General Byers, had come to agree with Adams and further assaults by the 23d on Heartbreak were called off. Analyzing the initial attempts of 2d Division to take Heartbreak, Young later characterized them as a "fiasco" because of the piecemeal commitment of units and the failure to organize fire support teams. The enemy mortars were especially effective, he pointed out, causing about 85 percent of the division's casualties up to this point.

In the new plan that the division G–3, Maj. Thomas W. Mellon, prepared in late September, the earlier mistakes were to be avoided. All three regiments of the division would launch concentrated and co-ordinated attacks, supported by all the division's artillery, by a full-scale armored drive by the 72d Tank Battalion up the Mundung-ni Valley, and by tank-infantry task force action in the Sat'ae-ri Valley. When the division issued the operation order on 2 October under the code name TOUCHDOWN, General Young assigned the following objectives to his regiments. The 9th Infantry would advance on the western side of the Mundung-ni Valley and seize Hills 867, 1005, 980, and 1040. To the 23d went the task of securing Hill 931 and the ridge line running west of that peak. In addition, the 23d would be ready to attack Hill 728 or to help the 38th capture it, as the case might be, and to take Hill 520, west of Hill 851. The 38th would secure Hill 485 and then provide infantry support to the 72d Tank Battalion. Target date for TOUCHDOWN was 5 October.

The preparations for TOUCHDOWN required a period of tremendous activity on the part of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion and its commander, Lt. Col. Robert W. Love. The road along the Mundung-ni Valley was a rough track unsuitable for the medium Sherman tanks of the 72d Tank Battalion and to get it quickly into condition to carry the M4's was a herculean task.[42] But Love and his men were willing to try if they had adequate fire cover while they worked.

Craters dotted the track and the North Koreans had planted mines along the way. At one point they had heaped large rocks six feet high and sprinkled the pile with hand grenades, each with its pin pulled. The 2d Engineers put 110 pounds of explosives around this roadblock and detonated the grenades when the explosives went off. Rock from neighboring cliff walls was blasted to provide fill for the craters. Working with shovels because their bulldozers were undergoing repair and would, in any case, have drawn artillery fire from

[42] For an interesting account of the TOUCHDOWN operation, see the article by Lt. Col. Virgil E. Craven, "Operation Touchdown Won Heartbreak Ridge" in *Combat Forces Journal* (December 1953), vol. 4, No. 5, pp. 24ff.

the enemy on the heights further up the valley, the engineers fashioned a usable road. To take care of the mines along the trail, they placed chain blocks of tetranol at 50-foot intervals on the sides of the track and then set them off. The explosions detonated the mines nearby. When the craters and mines were too dense, the engineers shifted the road to the stream bed, which had not been mined, and cleared the boulders blocking the way. Bit by bit they advanced northward up the valley.

While the engineers prepared the path for the tank attack, the 2d Division regiments received replacements to bring their battalions up to full strength and built up their supplies of food, equipment, and ammunition for the upcoming operation. The 23d Regiment pulled each of its battalions out of the line for forty-eight hours so that the replacements could be integrated while the unit was in reserve rather than on the line. The division established supply points forward of Line KANSAS to insure that the operation did not fail because of ammunition shortages.

General Young also wanted to be certain that his battalion commanders would make full use of all the firepower at their disposal. Each battalion had to submit fire plans showing how it intended to employ its tanks, automatic weapons, small arms, and mortars in TOUCHDOWN. Sand-table models of the Heartbreak Ridge sector were used extensively in positioning the division's weapons in the best possible locations.

Early in October, the three regiments moved into their attack positions. The 9th was on the left flank, ready to advance upon Hill 867 while the 38th, under Col. Frank T. Mildren, was going up the Mundung-ni Valley. The 38th would stop near Saegonbae, southwest of Hill 894. The 3d Battalion of the 38th was to be the division reserve and could be used only with the permission of General Young. The attached Netherlands Battalion, however, provided the 38th with three full battalions. On Heartbreak Ridge the 23d Infantry maintained two of its four battalions on the lines between Hills 894, 931, and 851.

To protect the division's right flank in the Sat'ae-ri Valley area and to distract the enemy, a task force under Maj. Kenneth R. Sturman of the 23d Infantry Regiment was organized on 3 October. Composed of the 23d Tank Company, the 2d Reconnaissance Company, a French pioneer platoon, and an infantry company from the special divisional security forces, Task Force Sturman, as it was called, had the secondary mission of destroying enemy bunkers on the east side of Heartbreak Ridge and of acting as a decoy to draw enemy fire away from the 23d Infantry foot soldiers on the ridge.

On 4 October forty-nine fighter-bombers worked over the divisional sector and the Sturman force raided the Sat'ae-ri Valley. The other units of the 2d underwent final rehearsals for the attack scheduled for 2100 hours the next night. Fire support teams usually consisting of a combination of mortars, machine guns, rifles, and automatic weapons that could be called upon by the attacking infantry whenever the need arose were set up and given dry runs. The additional firepower would be extremely valuable against enemy bunkers and strongpoints.

In the late afternoon of 5 October, the artillery preparation opened up as the

division's artillery battalions began to pummel the defending enemy units facing the 9th and 38th Regiments in the Mundung-ni Valley area. Deployed from west to east the *3d Regiment,* N.K. *12th Division,* occupied Hill 867; the *1st Regiment,* N.K. *6th Division,* was spread from Hill 636 northwest to Hill 974; and the *15th Regiment,* N.K. *6th Division,* was dug in on Hill 931. As a result of the constant pressure exerted by the 2d Division on these units during September and early October, none of them had a strength that reached a thousand men. The N.K. *12th* and *6th Divisions* were both far understrength by the eve of TOUCHDOWN.

Air strikes by Marine Corsairs sent napalm, rockets, and machine gun bullets into the North Korean lines before the attack jumped off that evening. On the west the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, pressed on toward Hill 867 and by 7 October had won the crest, meeting only light resistance. The battalion then swung northwest toward Hill 960 while the 1st Battalion mounted an attack north against Hill 666. Both hills fell on 8 October. Then the 9th pushed on to Hill 1005 northwest of Hill 666 and after a bayonet assault took possession on 10 October. On the following day the ROK 8th Division gained Hill 1050 and the Kim Il Sung range to the west of the 9th Regiment.[43]

The 38th Regiment, in the meantime, had also made excellent progress. Colonel Mildren's troops had had a windfall on 4 October when they discovered that the enemy had abandoned Hill 485, a mile south of Hill 728. By noon on 6 October the 1st Battalion had advanced from Hill 485 and seized Hill 728 against only light enemy opposition. The 2d Battalion deployed up the Mundung-ni Valley and attacked Hill 636 which fell on 7 October. Possession of these two hills furnished cover for Colonel Love's engineers, who could now complete the tank trail for the 72d Tank Battalion's advance. The 72d, commanded by Lt. Col. John O. Woods, was attached to the 38th on 7 October and the regiment was given three new objectives: Hill 605, 2,000 yards north of Hill 636; the Hill 905–Hill 974 ridge which extended northwest from Hill 636 toward Hill 1220 on the Kim Il Sung range; and Hill 841, a thousand yards north of Hill 974.

Up on Heartbreak Ridge the 23d Regiment was also able to report encouraging news. Colonel Adams' battle plan had directed Major Williams' 1st Battalion to exert diversionary pressure north against Hill 851, while the French Battalion feinted south toward Hill 931. Daniels' 2d Battalion would hit Hill 931 from the south with Craven's 3d Battalion as reserve behind Daniels. Under cover of night and the distractions provided for the enemy by the rest of the division, Daniels' troops moved out. Enemy fire came in quickly upon the battalion, but the North Koreans could not concentrate all their attention upon this assault. With the 3d Battalion in support, Daniels' force slowly approached Hill 931. To preserve the element of surprise, there had been no artillery preparation. The 37th Field Artillery Battalion opened up on all known enemy mortar positions as the attack got under way. The effectiveness of the countermortar fire helped the 23d infantrymen as they closed with the North Koreans after only light losses.

[43] The ROK 8th Division had relieved the ROK 7th Division on 29 September.

Flame throwers, grenades, and small arms rooted the enemy from the formidable bunkers that had blocked the 23d's advance for so many weeks. By 0300 the 2d and 3d Battalions had won the southern half of Hill 931. The expected enemy counterattack came and was repulsed. With the coming of daylight, the advance was renewed. The French Battalion moved in from the north and the 2d and 3d Battalions pressed on to meet it; before noon Hill 931 finally belonged to the 23d Infantry.

Craven's 3d Battalion then pushed on to join the 1st Battalion in its assault against the last objective on Heartbreak Ridge—Hill 851. In the Sat'ae-ri Valley, Sturman's tanks sustained their daylight raids and continued to blast away at the bunkers on the eastern slopes of Hill 851. On the west, in the Mundung-ni Valley, Woods's 72d Tank Battalion awaited the go-ahead signal from Love's engineers.

On 10 October the engineers finished their task and the 72d's Shermans, accompanied by Company L, 38th Infantry, and an engineer platoon, began to rumble north up the valley. By a fortunate coincidence the enemy was caught in the middle of relieving the rapidly disintegrating elements of the N.K. *V Corps* in the Heartbreak Ridge–Mundung-ni sector. Advance elements of the *204th Division,* CCF *68th Army,* were in the process of taking over positions already vacated by the North Koreans. The tank thrust coupled with the general forward movement of the rest of the 2d Division found the Chinese still in the open en route to their new positions. Woods's tankers raced to the town of Mundung-ni and beyond, taking losses on the way, but inflicting heavy losses upon the Chinese troops and cutting off the supply and replacement routes up the western slopes of Heartbreak Ridge. At intervals of about 100 yards the tanks, operating without infantry in the northern reaches of the valley, were able to cover each other and fire at targets of opportunity. They disrupted the enemy relief completely and made the task of the infantry much lighter in the days that followed. It was apparent that the enemy had thought that tanks could not be used in Mundung-ni Valley and the feat of Love's engineers in opening a road had taken him by surprise.

The battle, however, was not quite over. The 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, took advantage of the tank advance to seize Hill 605, but the 2d Battalion's attempts to capture Hill 905 were blunted on 10 October. The next day the 2d Battalion overcame enemy opposition and the 1st Battalion took Hill 900. On 12 October the 1st Battalion pushed on toward the Kim Il Sung range and captured Hill 974. The final objective of the 38th—Hill 1220—fell on 15 October.

On Heartbreak Ridge the *23d Regiment,* N.K. *13th Division,* defended Hill 851, backed by its sister regiments, the *21st* and *19th.* The *21st* was to the immediate rear and the *19th* defended the Sat'ae-ri Valley. On 10 October, Colonel Daniels' 2d Battalion had swung down from Heartbreak Ridge and taken possession of Hill 520, a little over a mile south of the town of Mundung-ni. Hill 520 was the end of an east-west ridge spur leading to Hill 851. During the next two days, the 1st and French Battalions inched north toward the objective, bunker by bunker, taking few prisoners in the bitter fighting. The North Koreans and their Chinese allies

who had succeeded in joining them on Hill 951 had to be killed or wounded before they would cease resistance. Colonel Craven's 3d Battalion shifted to the spur between Hills 520 and 851 to apply pressure from the west. Finally at daybreak on 13 October, Monclar's French troops stormed the peak and after thirty days of hard combat, Heartbreak Ridge was in the possession of the 23d Infantry to stay.

The costs of the long battle were high for both sides. The 2d Division had suffered over 3,700 casualties during the 13 September–15 October period, with the 23d Regiment and its attached French Battalion incurring almost half of this total.[44] On the enemy side the North Korean *6th, 12th,* and *13th Divisions* and the CCF *204th Division* all suffered heavily. Estimates by the 2d Division of the enemy's losses totaled close to 25,000 men.[45] Approximately half of these casualties had come during the TOUCHDOWN operation.

The increase in casualties had been accompanied by a similar rise in ammunition expenditures. Besides the millions of rounds of small arms ammunition that were used, the 2d Division infantrymen received the following artillery support: 76-mm. gun—62,000 rounds; 105-mm. howitzer—401,000 rounds; 155-mm. howitzer—84,000 rounds; and 8-inch howitzer—13,000 rounds. The division's mortar crews sent over 119,000 rounds of 60-mm., 81-mm., and 4.2-inch mortar fire and the 57-mm. and 75-mm. recoilless rifle teams directed nearly 18,000 rounds at the enemy.[46] Although there were shortages in some types of ammunition at the theater level, Van Fleet had given the 2d Division commander permission to fire "all the ammunition thought necessary to take the positions." When 81-mm. mortar shells became short in supply, the 4.2-inch were used more frequently. To keep the 4.2-inch mortars in operation, an airlift from Pusan brought 2,500 rounds a day for four days, while a special rail shipment with 25,000 rounds was rushed to the front.

To supplement the artillery support given the division, the Fifth Air Force flew 842 sorties over the Heartbreak Ridge area and loosed 250 tons of bombs on the enemy.[47] Against the deep bunkers of the North Koreans, anything less than a direct hit was ineffective, but Colonel Adams felt that the air strikes were good for morale. He also gave the fighter-bombers credit for neutralizing artillery and mortar fire during a battalion relief on 27 September so that the 23d could make the shift without casualties.[48]

There were many points of similarity between the Heartbreak Ridge struggle and its immediate predecessor—Bloody Ridge. In both cases the North Koreans had organized strong defensive positions in depth and had had the advantage of

[44] 2d Division casualties included 597 killed, 3,064 wounded, and 84 missing. The 23d Regiment took 1,832 casualties. See Williamson *et al.*, Action on "Heartbreak Ridge," pp. 17n, 18n, 26n.

[45] The estimates included 1,473 counted killed, 8,389 estimated killed, 14,204 estimated wounded, and 606 prisoners of war. See Williamson *et al.*, Heartbreak Ridge, sec. III, tab D, extracts from the CG's File, U.S. 2d Inf Div.

[46] *Ibid.*, sec. III, tab A, Ammunition Expenditures.

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] Williamson *et al.*, Action on "Heartbreak Ridge," p. 33.

defiladed routes to bring in logistical support and reinforcements. The UNC forces had to advance over exposed routes which the enemy artillery and mortar fire covered very effectively. The 2d Division advance was extremely hazardous and slow as long as the North Koreans were allowed to concentrate their fire on relatively few targets.

In both attacks, enemy capabilities and will to resist had been underestimated. Each had been planned as a small-scale advance to straighten out a front-line sag and each had suffered from a lack of adequate reserves to reinforce and consolidate the objectives after they were won. After the North Koreans counterattacked the Eighth Army forces, the latter had been compelled to withdraw. At Heartbreak the corps commander, General Byers, had not permitted the 2d Division to use the 38th Regiment until Operation TOUCHDOWN, although it was apparent long before then that the 23d would not be able to take the ridge as long as the enemy could focus his attention upon Colonel Adams' units. The 38th had remained the divisional reserve until October despite the need for its services.

At the command level the 2d Division had had a change in leadership during the two operations. General de Shazo had taken over the division while the Bloody Ridge fight was still in progress and he in turn had been succeeded by Young after the Heartbreak contest was well under way. Each had brought the operation he had inherited to a successful conclusion, but only after a considerable expansion of the original battle plan.

Final attainment of the objective had occurred when the pressure upon the enemy had been applied at several points rather than one. Then, unable to funnel in replacements to all the threatened positions or to concentrate his artillery and mortar fire within a small area, the enemy had reluctantly withdrawn to his next defense line. Frequently, despite the artillery, tank, and air support given to the U.N. foot soldiers, the North Koreans would leave only after they had been flushed from their bunkers by infantry weapons. The North Koreans at Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges had fought with determination and courage throughout the battles until attrition and superior strength had forced them to yield their real estate.

With the successful conclusion of the TOUCHDOWN operation X Corps had removed the sag in the Punchbowl area and in the lines held by the U.S. 2d and ROK 8th Divisions to the west of the Punchbowl. Advances of over five miles along this front had shortened the X Corps' lines and had brought them into phase with those of the U.S. IX Corps to the west.

### *Advance in the West*

Shortly after the Heartbreak Ridge operation got under way in September, General Van Fleet and his staff drew up plans for an ambitious advance in the U.S. I and IX Corps sectors. Since the important Ch'orwon-Kumhwa railroad was exposed to enemy artillery fire and attack, Plan CUDGEL envisioned a 15-kilometer drive forward from WYOMING to protect the railroad line and to force the enemy to give up his forward positions. Besides improving communications in central Korea, Van Fleet intended to use the railroad to support a follow-up operation in October which

he had named WRANGLER.[49] The latter was equally ambitious, for it aimed at cutting off the North Korean forces opposing the ROK I and U.S. X Corps on the right flank of the Eighth Army by an amphibious operation on the east coast. If this operation were successful, the forward line of the Eighth Army would run between P'yonggang and Kojo.[50] For the landing force, Van Fleet proposed to use U.S. Marine forces with a ROK division following them into the Kojo beach area. The Eighth Army commander frankly recognized that this operation would be a calculated risk and might lead to a dangerous enemy counterthrust on the west flank as the amphibious forces tried to link up with the U.S. IX Corps along the Kumsong-Kojo road.[51]

Although Van Fleet asked Ridgway for a quick decision on CUDGEL and WRANGLER, he discarded them himself within a few days just as he had canceled out TALONS earlier in the month. Consideration of the probable costs of CUDGEL led him to accept instead a substitute plan submitted by General O'Daniel, the I Corps commander, at the end of September. O'Daniel outlined a modest 10-kilometer advance by the I Corps to a new defense line called JAMESTOWN, which would allow that corps to strengthen its supply lines by reducing the truck hauls during the winter months. JAMESTOWN began on the west bank of the Imjin River a little over 9 miles northeast of Munsan-ni, then arched gently northeast to the town of Samich'on on the Sami-ch'on River. For that next 10 miles JAMESTOWN ran northeast, rejoining the Imjin River near the town of Kyeho-dong, then hugged the high ground south of the Yokkokch'on for about 12 miles until it reached the area of Chut'oso, six miles northwest of Ch'orwon. From Chut'oso, JAMESTOWN ran east by north for about 10 miles, ending approximately 5 miles northeast of Ch'orwon at the village of Chungasan. Seizure of the key terrain features along this line would screen the Yonch'on–Ch'orwon Valley lines of communication from enemy observation and artillery fire, permit development of the Seoul-Ch'orwon-Kumhwa railroad line, and allow the main line of resistance to be advanced. (*Map II*) In addition, the I Corps offensive would keep the enemy off balance and prevent the Eighth Army troops from getting stale.[52]

October was a good month for operations in the west central part of Korea, since the weather was usually dry. This permitted full air support and eliminated the problems of flash floods and heavy mud. Terrain in the I Corps sector varied from low lands in the west to small, steep hills in the center and low rolling hills on the eastern fringes of the corps boundary.


To carry out Operation COMMANDO, as the I Corps advance was called, General O'Daniel planned to use four divisions from his own corps and one from the neighboring U.S. IX Corps to prevent the development of a sag along the

[49] Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 19 Sep 51, sub: Outline Plan CUDGEL, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper 31.

[50] Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 23 Sep 51, sub: Ground Opns in Korea, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper 34.

[51] Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 25 Sep 51, sub: Outline Plan WRANGLER, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper 35.

[52] Msg, GX 2180 TAC, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 3 Oct 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, G-3 Jnl, 3 Oct 51, tab J-4.




H. C. Brewer, Jr.

MAP II

corps boundaries. On the corps' western flank the ROK 1st Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Bak Lim Hang, would leave Line WYOMING, cross the Imjin River, and move toward Kaesong. The British Commonwealth Division, under General A. J. H. Cassels, was on the eastern flank of the ROK 1st and would take the high ground between Samich'on and Kyeho-dong. Still farther east, the 1st Cavalry Division, under Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Harrold, would move to the northwest on an 8-mile front between Kyeho-dong and Kamgol.[53] On the corps' right flank, Maj. Gen. Robert H. Soule's 3d Division would advance and capture Hill 281, six miles northwest of Ch'orwon, and Hills 373 and 324, seven miles west by north of the city. The 3d Division would also link up at Chungasan with the IX Corps' 25th Division, now commanded by Maj. Gen. Ira P. Swift, as the 25th advanced to take over defensible terrain north of the confluence of the Hant'an and Namdae Rivers northeast of Ch'orwon.[54]

Elements, of four Chinese armies—the *65th, 64th, 47th,* and *42d*—would have to be pushed back before JAMESTOWN could be reached, but as Van Fleet remarked to the press on 30 September, the basic mission of the Eighth Army was to seek out and destroy the enemy.[55]

When COMMANDO began on 3 October, the enemy centered his resistance in the 1st Cavalry Division zone. The ROK 1st, 1st Commonwealth, 3d, and 25th Divisions met only light to moderate opposition as they advanced to take their assigned objectives along the JAMESTOWN line, but the 1st Cavalry Division units had to battle for every foot of ground. Elements of the *139th* and *141st Divisions* of the CFF *47th Army* manned the enemy's main line of resistance facing the 1st Cavalry Division and they had constructed defenses similar to those encountered on Heartbreak Ridge—strong bunkers supporting each other with automatic weapons fire, and with heavy concentrations of artillery and mortars interdicting the approach routes to the hills and ridges. Barbed wire aprons and mines guarded the trenches and bunkers and the Chinese were well stocked in ammunition and supplies.[56]

General Harrold had the 70th Tank Battalion under Maj. Carroll McFalls, Jr., and the 16th Reconnaissance Company operate as a task force on his left flank. The mission of the Task Force Mac, as it was called, was to advance along the east bank of the Imjin River toward Kyeho-dong, tieing in with the 1st Commonwealth Division's move to the west and protecting the left flank of the 5th Cavalry Regiment. The 5th Cavalry, commanded by Col. Irving Lehrfeld, and the 7th Cavalry, under Col. Dan Gilmer, would attack abreast across the division front. The 8th Cavalry, with Col. Eugene J. Field in command, was the divisional reserve. All of the division artillery battalions would participate in the operation. The 61st and 82d Field Artillery Battalions, 105-mm.

[53] Maj. Gen. Charles D. Palmer had been rotated to the United States in July.

[54] Eighth Army, G–3 Periodic Report, 2 Oct 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 1951, G–3 sec., incls 1–5.

[55] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec. I, Narrative, p. 31.

[56] The following account of the 1st Cavalry Division's advance is based upon: (1) 1st Cav Div, Comd Rpt, Oct 51; (2) 5th Cav Regt, Comd Rpt, Oct 51; (3) 7th Cav Regt, Comd Rpt, Oct 51; (4) 8th Cav Regt, Comd Rpt, Oct 51.

and 155-mm. howitzers respectively, would support the 5th Cavalry, and the 77th and 99th (–) Field Artillery Battalions— both 105-mm howitzer—would support the 7th Cavalry. For general artillery support, I Corps made available to the 1st Cavalry division the following field artillery battalion units; the 936th Battalion (155-mm. howitzer); A Battery, 17th (8-inch howitzer); and A and B Batteries, 204th Battalion (155-mm. guns). The battalions were along the main line of resistance, 4 to 6 miles from Line JAMESTOWN.

An hour before the attack was launched, the artillery along the I Corps front began to soften up the enemy defense positions. Then at 0600 on 3 October the five UNC divisions moved out. In the 1st Cavalry Division sector the enemy response was immediate and violent. Task Force Mac on the left flank encountered heavy mine concentrations coupled with strong artillery and mortar fire; by the end of the day, it had made little progress. As Colonel Lehrfeld's 5th Cavalry assaulted the four intermediate hill objectives facing the regiment—Hills 222, 272, 346, and 287—the Chinese refused to give way. The enemy forces directed artillery and mortar fire at the 5th's three battalions as they labored up the hills, and as soon as the I Corps artillery lifted, the Chinese rushed out to their fighting positions and added heavy small arms, automatic weapons, and grenade fire to halt the attack. Six attempts by the 3d Battalion won a foothold on Hill 272, but enemy pressure forced a withdrawal later in the day. Only against Hill 222 could the 5th register any lasting success; after a frontal assault by the 3d Battalion, the Chinese had to abandon the hill and fall back to the north.

The situation in the 7th Cavalry's area to the east was quite similar. Attacking with the 3d, Greek, and 2d Battalions abreast, Colonel Gilmer's troops attempted to storm Hills 418 and 313 along with the ridge and high ground extending from these points. Both the Greek and the 2d Battalion won their way to the ridge line only to suffer heavy casualties from the Chinese counterattacks that followed; neither could hold on. Many positions changed hands three or four times during the course of the day as bitter hand-to-hand fighting marked the intensity of the enemy's resistance.

By the end of the first day, the supporting artillery had fired over 15,000 rounds at the enemy and the Chinese had committed the bulk of their *2d Artillery Division* to help block the advance of the 1st Cavalry Division. The enemy's willingness to use most of his available artillery against the 1st Cavalry was accompanied by bolder employment of the artillery pieces in direct support and counterbattery roles. In the process enemy artillery locations were revealed and soon began to receive attention from both the I Corps artillery and Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers.

Despite heavy fighting on 4 October, there was little forward progress. Elements of the 8th Cavalry reinforced the 7th Cavalry on the right and assaulted the ridges west of Hill 418, but the enemy clung tenaciously to his positions. When he was driven off, he expended manpower freely to retake the lost ground. Each enemy company was using ten to twelve machine guns and large quantities of hand grenades. The latter

caused the bulk of the 1st Cavalry Division's casualties as the close combat grew more bitter. During the day elements of the CCF *140th Division* moved up to reinforce the *139th Division* which had been hard hit by the 1st Cavalry's continued battering of the enemy positions. The 1st Cavalry, in its drive towards the Yokkok-ch'on and Line JAMESTOWN, now had to contend with the bulk of the elite *47th Army*.

The first crack in the Chinese defense line came on 5 October, when the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, discovered that the enemy had withdrawn from Hill 418 during the night. By afternoon the 1st Battalion cleared the ridge 1,400 yards to the northeast and was able to tie in with the 15th Regiment, U.S. 3d Division. The 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, then moved up the ridge southwest of Hill 418 and occupied Hill 313 without opposition. On the following day the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, launched an attack on Hill 334, 2,200 yards west of Hill 418, and after two attempts, seized the objective. Heavy enemy counterattacks, day and night, were beaten back. At Hill 287, over 4,000 yards southwest of Hill 334, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, fought its way toward the crest and held on to part of the hill at nightfall. Prisoners of war taken on 5–6 October indicated that the Chinese were falling back on new prepared defense lines 5–7,000 yards to the northwest and that many units had been decimated in the opening days of the offensive; food and ammunition stocks, they also reported, were becoming exhausted.

On 7 October the 7th Cavalry completed the seizure of Hill 287 and sent the 3d Battalion to take Hill 347, a little over two miles southwest of Hill 418. Attacking from the south and southeast, the 3d Battalion began to clear the hill at the end of the day. The fall of Hill 347 meant that the 1st Cavalry now dominated the high ground comprising JAMESTOWN in the northeastern half of the divisional sector.

The breach in the northeast had little immediate effect upon the Chinese defense of the hills across the 5th Cavalry front, however, and the relentless hammering of artillery, mortar, and tank fire against the formidable bunker system failed to produce a breakthrough. Even air strikes with napalm and 1,000-pound bombs made little impression upon the enemy defenders, since the Chinese had constructed an intricate trench system and numerous escape routes that negated most of the effects of the air attacks. The dogged enemy defense—in many cases to the last man—took a heavy toll of 1st Cavalry Division forces and frequently produced a situation in which the American assault forces attained an objective in insufficient strength to resist the fierce enemy counterattacks that followed.

After eight days of UNC pressure against Hills 346, 230, and 272, the Chinese still refused to give ground. But the incessant punishment they had absorbed and the drain in manpower and ammunition stocks were beginning to tell. On the night of 12 October the Chinese abandoned Hill 272 and Colonel Field's 8th Cavalry troops took possession the next day without contact.

Control of Hill 272 opened the eastern approach to the key hill in the enemy's remaining defense line—Hill 346. On 15 October a new operational plan, called POLECHARGE, was put into effect. The 5th Cavalry was reinforced with the

Belgian Battalion from the U.S. 3d Division and given the mission of taking Hill 346 and then pushing on to Line JAMESTOWN. The 8th Cavalry would move in from Hill 272 and if necessary assist the 5th Cavalry. Early on 16 October the assault got under way, but again the enemy firepower stopped the 5th Cavalry's advance. The 8th Cavalry's drive northeast of Hill 346 made some progress, yet could not flank the objective. For the next two days the 5th and 8th sustained the pressure on Hill 346 without success. Then on 18 October the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, moved forward and took the hill against virtually no opposition. Hill 230 fell the same day to the 3d Battalion. By 19 October the 1st Cavalry Division had seized the last of its objectives on the JAMESTOWN line as the enemy retreated north of the Yokkok-ch'on to his next line of defense.

The sensitivity of the Chinese to the 1st Cavalry Division's advance toward their supply base at Sangnyong-ni did not end with the completion of COMMANDO. Although divisional patrols could range freely some 3–4,000 yards in front of the main line of resistance positions on the east, the enemy reacted strongly to every attempt to send probes and patrols across the Yokkok-ch'on towards Sangnyong-ni. During the COMMANDO operation, the Chinese had shown how valuable they considered the control of the terrain in this area. For the first time they had shifted from the fluid defense system that formed part of their basic tactical doctrine and had dug in in depth. The deep bunkers, complex system of trenches, and large stocks of food, supplies, and ammunition stored at the front-line positions showed that they intended to stay and defend in place. When the 1st Cavalry Division tried to storm the enemy's main line of resistance, the Chinese poured in first-class reinforcements, freely expended their ammunition stocks, and fought fanatically to hold on. Only when losses in men and exhaustion of ammunition supplies forced them to withdraw, could the 1st Cavalry take possession of the JAMESTOWN line. Intelligence reports at I Corps headquarters pointed out that there seemed to be a definite lack of interest among the Chinese commanders in the fate of front-line regiments which had been ordered to resist to the end. According to the G–2 officers, this suggested that the Chinese might have come around to the belief that fewer troops would be lost through these tactics than in trying to retake lost territory with heavy counterattacks.[57]

In any case the cost to the enemy had been high. I Corps estimates of enemy losses during the 3–19 October period placed the total at well over 21,000 men, including over 500 prisoners. Close to 16,000 casualties had been inflicted upon the enemy by the 1st Cavalry Division alone, as it reduced the crack CCF *47th Army* to half strength. But the I Corps had not escaped untouched; it had taken over 4,000 casualties during the 17-day operation, with the 1st Cavalry suffering over 2,900 of the total.[58] In the process of absorbing losses the I Corps had improved its defensive position and kept the enemy from launching an offensive of his own.

While the I Corps sought to organize

[57] U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec. I, pp. 16–27.

[58] Hq, I Corps, Operation COMMANDO, ans. H and K. MS in OCMH.

the gains of COMMANDO, the U.S. IX Corps made plans to launch a similar operation toward Kumsong. On 9 October, General Van Fleet visited IX Corps headquarters and found Lt. Gen. William H. Hoge and his division commanders eager to carry out local advances along the corps front. The objectives would be to improve the defensive positions of the divisions in the line and to maintain pressure upon the enemy. Since both of these coincided with Eighth Army directives, Van Fleet gave his approval.[59] In case of a successful IX Corps advance, however, there would be one disadvantage. The sag in the X Corps lines, which had just been eliminated, would be replaced by a bulge on the IX Corps' front.

The U.S. 24th Division, the ROK 2d, and ROK 6th Division were selected to make the advance to a line about four miles south of Kumsong. The American division was flanked on either side by the South Korean divisions and was expected to provide tank support for the ROK 2d. On 13 October units of the three divisions moved out and registered gains of almost two miles the first day. During the night the Chinese mounted several counterattacks which were successfully beaten off. Despite stubborn resistance and intense concentrations of artillery fire, the IX Corps troops pushed ahead slowly during the next few days and reached the objective line by 17 October. The favorable outcome led Hoge to direct another advance two miles closer to Kumsong. Here the attackers would establish a strong outpost line and patrol aggressively to maintain contact with the enemy.

[59] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 44–45.

The pattern set up during the initial phase of the IX Corps advance repeated itself during the second phase. Hoge reported that the enemy reaction seemed to be one of delay rather than a serious effort to hold the line. Chinese attacks varied from platoon to battalion size and most frequently were launched during the night or just before dawn. Heavy artillery and mortar fire accompanied the enemy drives and hand grenades were used plentifully. By 20 October, however, the IX Corps had won through to its second objective line and began to organize the defense. During the following days the 24th Division sent out several tank forays. One penetrated into Kumsong itself and blew up several buildings and a tunnel.[60]

When the action came to an end on 23 October, Van Fleet commended the 2d and 6th ROK Divisions for their excellent showing against the enemy. They had taken their objectives and beaten off the Chinese counterattacks. The sensitivity of the Communists to probes and advances in the Kumsong area was demonstrated by the severe losses that they sustained in the 13–23 October period while trying to delay the IX Corps offensive.[61]

### *Internal Changes*

The limited offensives of the Eighth Army petered out in late October as the truce negotiations resumed at Panmunjom and another lull set in on the battle-

[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 50, 56, 61.

[61] Casualty estimates for the enemy listed 12,711 known killed, 16,818 additional estimated killed, and 1,022 prisoners in the IX Corps area between 13–23 October. The UNC forces lost 710 killed, 3,714 wounded, and 73 missing. Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 61–62.

field. General Van Fleet took advantage of the respite by transferring several of his battered X Corps divisions into reserve positions. By exchanging the U.S. 7th Division with its attached Ethiopian Battalion from the U.S. IX Corps and the U.S. 2d and the French Battalion, Van Fleet was able to use the latter as IX Corps reserves. He also switched the ROK 5th Division over to the ROK I Corps reserve sector and sent the ROK 3d Division to the X Corps.[62]

One change of particular significance took place on 1 October. The all-Negro 24th Infantry Regiment was inactivated and the 14th Infantry Regiment replaced it as the third regiment of the 25th Division. During the first year of the war some dissatisfaction had been expressed by senior officers of the division with the combat performance of the 24th Regiment, but the regiment had been established by law in 1866 and its disposition presented special problems.[63]

The gradual shift in Army integration policies and the exigencies of the battle situation in Korea finally offered a solution. Since World War II a number of studies had been made on the better utilization of Negro personnel within the Army and several steps had been taken prior to the outbreak of the Korean conflict.[64] Army regulations issued in January 1950 stated that all manpower would be utilized to obtain maximum efficiency in the Army without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.[65] While these regulations did not require integration of units, they did make it possible. In March 1950 the Army followed up by abolishing the recruiting quotas which limited the number of Negroes that could be enlisted.[66]

With the outbreak of war, Negro enlistments grew and Negro units in Korea had little difficulty in maintaining their authorized strength. By early 1951 Eighth Army personnel officers began to assign excess Negro personnel to understrength white units and the results were highly gratifying on the whole. The performance of Negroes in integrated combat organizations improved over their past performance, and there was no appreciable lowering of morale among the white personnel of these units. Fears of hostility and tension between the Negroes and white soldiers in integrated outfits proved to be largely groundless.[67]

The favorable experience in integration in Korea led General Ridgway in May 1951 to recommend the use of a percentage of Negro troops in all units in the Far East Command as a means of improving the over-all combat effective-

[62] In minor changes during the August–October period, the 10th Philippine Combat Battalion became the 20th Philippine Combat Battalion on 6 September. In the British Commonwealth Division the Royal Ulster Rifles were relieved by a battalion of the Royal Norfolk Regiment on 18 October and prepared to return to Hong Kong. See Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Sep and Oct 51, sec. I, Narrative. In one command change, Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Cross took over the command of the U.S. 3d Division on 20 October as General Soule was sent home on regular rotation.

[63] For an account of the 24th Regiment's early battle experience, see Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 190–95, 365–75, 438–41, 479–86.

[64] For a discussion of the developments before the Korean War, see *Freedom to Serve: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services*, A Report by the President's committee, Charles Fahy, Chairman (Washington, 1950).

[65] Army Special Regulations 600–629–1, 16 Jan 50.

[66] *Freedom to Serve*, app. C.

[67] An excellent study on the Korean experience in integration will be found in Operations Research Office Report ORO–R–11, *The Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army* (Washington: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1955).

ness of his forces. As a first step in eliminating the all-Negro infantry units, he proposed to inactivate the 24th Regiment and to distribute its personnel among all-white or integrated organizations in the Far East Command. The Department of the Army approved on 1 July and later in the month announced that the process of integration of combat units in the FEC would be spread over six months and that service-type units would also be effected eventually.[68]

In addition to the integration of the 24th Regiment's personnel as of 1 October, several other all-Negro units were split up during the late summer and early fall of 1951. The Negroes in the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, were distributed throughout the U.S. 2d Division and those in the 3d Battalion 15th Infantry Regiment, were integrated with other infantry elements in the U.S. 3d Division. Some members of the 64th Tank Battalion and of the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion were sent to white tank and armored field artillery units in exchange for white personnel. In some cases, the asterisks which designated an outfit as Negro were dropped and integration took place whenever the unit was placed in reserve and the exchanges of personnel could be easily carried out.[69]

[68] (1) DA, Press Release, 26 Jul 51. In OCMH. (2) Hq FEC Mil Hist Sec, History of the Korean War, vol. III, Part 2, Personnel Problems, prepared by 1st Lt Charles G. Cleaver, pp. 150ff. MS in OCMH.

[69] Hq FEC MHS, Hist of the Korean War, vol. III, pt. 2, Personnel Problems, prepared by Lt Cleaver, pp. 150ff. By the end of the war in July 1953, over 90 percent of the total Negro personnel in the Army were serving in integrated units. See ACofS, G–1, "Utilization of Negro Manpower," in Summary of Major Events and Problems, 1953. MS in OCMH.

### *Air Operations*


Although the bulk of the fighting in Korea from August to October was carried out on the ground, the Far East Air Forces and the Navy forces under General Ridgway both contributed a great deal directly and indirectly to the success of the ground operations.

The Fifth Air Force under General Everest concentrated most of its fighter, fighter-bomber, and light-bomber effort on the interdiction of the Communist lines of communications. Railroads, bridges, highways, marshaling yards, and supply points were hit repeatedly to slow down the southward movement of enemy troops and equipment. During August, Everest inaugurated a rail interdiction program called STRANGLE which emphasized rail cutting.[70] His pilots soon had a new theme song — "We've Been Working on the Railroads."[71] The attention devoted to rear area interdiction lessened the amount of close air support for the front-line troops, but Everest felt that a large-scale effort might uproot the enemy's logistical setup.[72] To complement the daytime strikes, the Fifth Air Force's B–26's searched out enemy motor transport at night. Everest hoped that

[70] The term STRANGLE had been loosely used for rail interdiction operations from April 1951 on, but more properly covers the August 1951–March 1952 period. See USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 51–30 Jun 52, pp. 161–62, for a discussion of the name. It is interesting to note that STRANGLE had been used in World War II in the Italian campaign of 1944 to cover a similar interdiction program. See *The War Reports of General George C. Marshall, General H. H. Arnold, and Admiral Ernest J. King* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1947), p. 381.

[71] John Dille, *Substitute for Victory* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954), p. 62.

[72] Ltr, CG 5th AF to CG Eighth Army, 23 Aug 51, sub: Fifth AF Opns.



NORTH KOREAN RAIL LINE AFTER INTERDICTION BOMBING

his forces could weaken the Communist forward supply chain and reduce the enemy's capability to resist the Eighth Army's ground attacks. And Van Fleet was willing to let him try, since he was still considering TALONS at the time.[73]

After cancellation of TALONS, Everest and Van Fleet decided that 96 fighter sorties a day would be sufficient to provide close air support for the Eighth Army's limited offensives. The main emphasis remained on the interdiction program but the Fifth Air Force commander wanted to maintain the proficiency of his pilots and ground control officers in close support missions.[74]

Constant pressure by air upon the enemy's rail lines began to pay off in October. Intelligence reports indicated that the lines were being destroyed faster than the enemy could repair them. Initially the pilots had directed most of their attention to railroad bridges, but

[73] Msg, GX 1365 TAC, CG Eighth Army to CG 5th Air Force, 24 Aug 51.

[74] (1) Msg, GX 1691 TAC, CG Eighth Army to CG's U.S. I, IX, X Corps, and ROK I Corps *et al.*, 10 Sep 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, G–3 sec., bk. 4, incl 6–10. (2) USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50–30 Jun 52, p. 199.

the Communists had become skillful in devising methods to bypass or repair the cut bridges. They stockpiled spare sections close to the important bridges and were able to restore service quickly. In any event the Fifth Air Force changed tactics and inaugurated a system of multiple cuts. By damaging or destroying the rails at dozens of places, they slowed down enemy repair efforts. There was an interesting parallel between the success of this tactic and the UNC experiences at Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges. As long as the UNC concentration of forces at certain key points was maintained, the enemy was able to cope with the situation. But once the U.N. Command spread its attack and applied pressure in many places, the Communists found themselves in difficulty. They were forced to cannibalize spur lines and marshaling yards to keep the main lines open. The only respite for the harassed Communists came when the weather restricted flying.[75]

In the meantime the medium bombers of the Strategic Air Command had also assisted in the air assault upon the enemy's rear areas. After the first attack upon P'yongyang in July had had but modest results, General Ridgway expressed his "keen disappointment" that FEAF had not been able to bring massed air power to bear against P'yongyang. He instructed General Weyland, the FEAF commander, to prepare another strike and urged him to take all possible care that the weather should be suitable this time.[76]

On 14 August good weather prevailed over the target area. FEAF sent sixty-six B–29 medium bombers and fifty-six fighters over the enemy capital and considerable damage was effected. Although no enemy aircraft were seen, enemy antiaircraft fire was so intense and accurate that six fighter planes were lost.[77]

Ridgway also pressed for JCS permission to bomb the North Korean port of Rashin which lay close to the Soviet border. General MacArthur had not been allowed to raid this important town because of the dangers of violating the Soviet frontier through navigational error. But Ridgway told the JCS on 1 August that his air reconnaissance had discovered extensive stockpiling of material at Rashin and he desired to destroy the industrial area of the port by naval shelling and aerial bombing. Not only was the town a key highway and railway center, he reported, but it also had extensive oil storage facilities and rail repair shops that supported the enemy supply lines. Ridgway was convinced that FEAF could destroy Rashin without invading Russian territory.[78]

Since the United Nations commander had but limited means for applying pressure upon the enemy, the JCS supported his stand. They told Secretary Marshall on 10 August that Ridgway's reasons seemed to be perfectly valid from the military point of view. Since they believed that a show of military strength rather than weakness would achieve the U.N. objectives in Korea, they advised the Secretary of Defense that: "It would be most desirable to take all possible measures within the scope of operations

[75] FEAF Comd Rpt, Oct 51.

[76] Memo for Rcd, 1 Aug 51, sub: Conf on FEAF Opns, in FEC files.

[77] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, G–3 Staff Sec Rpt, Aug 51.

[78] Msg, C 68131, CINCFE to JCS, 1 Aug 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 51, an. 4, pt. III, incl 16.

in Korea to deter the Communist supply build-up and thereby obviate the possible needless loss of lives among United Nations Troops." [79]

Marshall and President Truman agreed with the JCS and the path was cleared for the bombing of Rashin. But some restrictions still applied. The Joint Chiefs told Ridgway he was not to use any naval vessels to shell the city nor would he give any unusual publicity to the air attacks which would be carried out by fully briefed crews and under visual conditions only.[80]

In the meantime Ridgway and his advisors concluded that the marshaling yards in Rashin offered the most valuable targets. Rather than conduct mass raids, the FEC commander felt that regular daily efforts would utilize his B–29's most effectively. Besides, weather conditions at Rashin during this time of the year were too uncertain to mount major strikes.[81]

The first attack was made on 25 August by thirty-five B–29's under favorable weather conditions. Escorted by twenty-four Navy fighters, the pilots of the medium bombers claimed excellent results and not a plane was lost.[82]

Although August was a quiet month insofar as enemy air activity was concerned, there was a distinct increase in the number of planes sighted in September. Not only were there more planes but the Communists pilots were more aggressive. Previously they had remained fairly close to their Manchurian sanctuary, but in September they began to roam further south in substantial flights.

The Russian MIG–15 was the workhorse of the Communist air force. Superior to the American jet fighters in its ability to climb, dive, and accelerate, the MIG–15 was used with greater proficiency by the Chinese pilots as the fall began. Using the sun as a backdrop to prevent detection and the element of surprise as tactics, the enemy aviators became bolder. During the third week of October they demonstrated how much they had learned when they shot down five B–29's and damaged eight more. Only six of the medium bombers had been lost during the whole war up to this point.[83]

The rise in enemy air sorties and the new aggressive spirit of the Communist flyers reached its peak as the peace negotiators prepared to meet at Panmunjom. Whether this activity was designed principally to influence the conference discussions or signified that the enemy was actually ready now to seriously challenge the UNC control of the North Korean skies remained to be seen.

### *The War at Sea*

Naval operations during the August–October period complemented the air and ground attacks for the most part. Naval and Marine aircraft struck at the Communist communications, supply areas, and troop positions and although weather conditions were unfavorable during much of August, they mounted over 7,300 sorties.

During the bombing of Rashin on 25


[79] Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 10 Aug 51, sub: Removal of Restriction Against Attacks on (Rashin) Najin.

[80] Msg, JCS 98632, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Aug 51.

[81] Msg, C 68643, CINCFE to JCS, 10 Aug 51, DA–IN 4248.

[82] FEAF Comd Rpt, Aug 51, p. 2.

[83] FEAF Comd Rpts, Sep and Oct 51.



USS New Jersey Firing Her 16-inch Guns Near the 38th Parallel

August, Navy fighters escorted the B–29's–the first time that this had happened during the Korean War.[84] And when the Air Force launched its rail-cutting program in September, the naval squadrons from Task Force 77 shifted from close support and bridge interdiction operations and helped to cripple the enemy rail transport.

With British naval aircraft assistance, Task Force 77 struck at Wonsan on 18–19 September and then raided Kojo on 10 October with Australian carrier planes participating in the attack.[85] Marine aviation in the meantime concentrated on close air support and provided air strikes along the front lines for the limited ground offensives.[86]

Naval surface craft also furnished aid and assistance to the ground forces with the resumption of naval gunfire support in the ROK I Corps sector in August. To create a diversion on the east coast and draw the N.K. forces away from the X Corps and ROK I Corps area during the August offensive, Ridgway ordered

[84] COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Aug 51, pp. 2–1 through 2–6.

[85] COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Sep–Oct 51, pp. 1–16, 1–17.

[86] *Ibid.*

Admiral Joy to carry out a large-scale amphibious demonstration at Changjon.

On 31 August the amphibious forces arrived at the target area. First the fire support group poured high explosives on the beach with the battleship *New Jersey* providing the big guns. When the surface craft completed their task, naval air forces followed with a rocket saturation of the beach area. Landing boats were lowered from the transports and the troops took their stations. After a pass at the beach, they returned to their mother ships and the surface craft moved in for a few final salvos.[87] The operation was completed without any incidents or losses and probably caused some anxious moments among the North Korean defenders around Changjon.

Farther north the UNC naval forces continued their seige of Wonsan. Daily this important enemy port received naval bombardment. Twice during August British Royal Marine Commandos landed near Wonsan and raided enemy installations. On 5 October Hungnam was also bombarded, but the resistance to this move proved intense. During the fight the USS *Ernest G. Small*, a radar picket destroyer, was mined and suffered heavy damage.[88]

Over on the west coast, UNC naval forces mounted a special strike in the Han River area on 3 October. Besides the damage inflicted upon enemy installations, the raid demonstrated UNC naval superiority quite convincingly as the attacking elements operated in the closed Han estuary waters and returned without loss.[89]

Naval blockade along the coast, surface raids and bombardment behind the front lines, and naval gunfire to assist the ground attack formed but one side of the coin. On the other lay the close air support of the Marine squadrons, the interdiction co-operation of the Navy planes and their service as escort fighters. And behind the scenes, the Navy provided amphibious training experience to the Army divisions stationed in Japan, so that they might be ready to enter combat quickly if the need arose.

The great question mark in the naval situation was the Russian submarine fleet in the Pacific. Here was the ever-present challenge to the UNC control of the seas. While furnishing surface and air support to the Eighth Army in Korea, the naval command had to keep a watchful eye on the Soviet activities at Vladivostok.

### *Postlude*

During the summer and early fall of 1951 the United States and its allies adopted a double-barreled approach to the problem of ending the war in Korea. The negotiations at Kaesong provided a politico-diplomatic method of reaching agreement on the terms of settlement while the outbreak of limited offensives at the front coupled with air and naval action exerted military pressures upon the Communists to conclude an armistice before their position deteriorated further.

The punishing "elbowing forward" tactics of the Eighth Army during the

[87] (1) *Ibid.*, Aug 51, pp. 2–11, 2–14, 2–15. (2) Msg, CX 69607, CINCFE TO COMNAVFE, 25 Aug 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Aug 51, Paper 40.

[88] COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt, Aug and Sep–Oct 51, sec. 2.

[89] *Ibid.*, Sep–Oct 51, pp. 2–8.

August–October period had inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy forces, both Chinese and North Korean. Despite the constant reports that the Communist logistical build-up continued, intelligence estimates at the end of October indicated that the enemy offensive capabilities had probably been reduced and that there were no definite signs that the foe intended to launch an attack in the immediate future.[90] It was evident that the U.N. Command had seized the battlefield initiative and forced the enemy to go on the defensive. By keeping the Communists off balance by raids, probing attacks, and small offensives, the U.N. Command had neutralized the enemy's ability to mount a large-scale drive and in the process had destroyed thousands of North Korean and Chinese soldiers. General Van Fleet's forces had erected a stout defense line and then set the pattern of the fighting for the new war—the battle for dominating terrain. The efforts of the X Corps at Heartbreak Ridge and the reaching of the JAMESTOWN line were to be duplicated again and again in the months ahead in grim but monotonous fashion. In this contest there would be no knockout blow but rather a constant jabbing and counterpunching to wear out the opponent.

If some of the lessons experienced during the ridge battles had proved costly to the UNC forces as well as to the enemy, it was to be hoped that the same mistakes would not be made again. The Communist tenacity and courage in holding well-fortified positions had been amply demonstrated and the UNC had several times made the error of underestimating the enemy's will and ability to resist. Dispersion of the enemy forces and resources paid off both on the ground and in the air during the period when the UNC had capitalized on the inferior communications system of the Communists.

Despite the military advantage that the UNC had gained in the field, the Communists still held the propaganda initiative won in the battle of incidents waged during the long recess of the truce negotiations. The one tended to offset the other to some degree, but as the peace discussions resumed in late October, the improved military position of the UNC along the front could not help but strengthen the hand of Admiral Joy and his staff in the coming debate over the demarcation line.

[90] Msg, DA 85150, DA to CINCFE, 26 Oct 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Oct 51, Paper 27.

## CHAPTER VI

# The Resumption of Negotiations

As the final arrangements for the reconvening of the truce negotiations were made in October 1951, developments on the international scene gave no indication that a quick settlement of the Korean War might be in the offing. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in strengthening their military capabilities and those of their allies.

In the United States President Truman signed the National Security Act on 10 October and Congress voted over seven billion dollars for foreign economic, technical, and military aid ten days later. The new National Security Agency established under the act would co-ordinate all of the foreign aid programs. The bulk of the military aid would go to the countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to help bolster their ability to defend themselves against aggression. On 22 October the members of NATO agreed to permit Greece and Turkey to join the organization, thus broadening the NATO area of responsibility considerably. Of the fourteen nations now included in NATO, eleven were contributing units to the United Nations Command.[1]

The Soviet Union in the meantime had exploded its second and third atomic bombs in October, serving notice that it had embarked upon an ambitious nuclear program. Stalin publicly pledged friendship to Communist China and received a message of thanks from Kim Il Sung of North Korea for Russian assistance to the N.K. forces. In Moscow Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky informed the U.S. Ambassador that the Soviet Union would not bring pressure upon the Communist negotiators in Korea to modify their truce demands. Thus, the prospects for swift action on the conclusion of an armistice dwindled even before the meetings resumed.

### *The Line of Demarcation*

On 24 October a fleet of nine 2½-ton trucks moved out of Munsan-ni and crossed the Imjin River. Loaded with tents and equipment the convoy rolled into the tiny village of Panmunjom and its cluster of mud huts. Swiftly the tent city to house the conferees rose and a crew of forty men worked intently to install the flooring, lighting, and heating that the approach of cold weather now made necessary. By the following day the new site was ready.

The main conference area had several large tents set aside for joint use and three that were to be at the disposal of the UNC delegates and the press. Half a mile south the service echelons set up

[1] The United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey were represented in the UNC. In November Italy sent a medical unit to Korea, leaving only Iceland, which had no armed forces, and Portugal unrepresented.

the mess, communications, security, and engineer facilities that would support the negotiations and aid in neutralizing the truce conference area. Overnight, Panmunjom became famous.

When the delegates convened on 25 October in the big conference tent, it almost seemed as though there had been no hiatus. The Communists were formally correct and meticulous as always, and only the presence of two new faces on their side of the table gave evidence of change. Nam Il introduced General Pien Chang-wu and Maj. Gen. Chung Tu Hwan who had replaced Teng Hua and Chang Pyong San respectively as Chinese and North Korean delegates. Admiral Joy in turn presented the credentials of Maj. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon, head of the ROK Field Training Command, and now the ROK representative in lieu of General Paik Sun Yup.

Since both sides had accepted the security arrangements worked out by the liaison officers during the long recess, the Communists proposed that a joint office of the liaison officers be established to supervise the details of the agreement. The UNC delegates agreed that the liaison officers should handle the investigation of incidents and carry out inspections at the truce site. This minor matter settled, Nam suggested that the meetings of the subdelegates on the line of demarcation be resumed. The same four delegates, General Hodes and Admiral Burke for the U.N. Command and Generals Lee and Hsieh for the Communists, were named to meet on Item 2 that afternoon.[2]

During the August sessions on the line of demarcation, it will be remembered, the UNC negotiators had given up their initial stand that air and naval effectiveness be reflected in the battle line and the Communists had indicated that they might be ready to discuss a line other than the 38th Parallel.[3] Ridgway had won approval to settle on a demilitarized zone not less than four miles wide with the line of contact as the median just before the Communists called off the meetings.

In the interim the UNC delegation had not been idle. Joy informed Ridgway in mid-October that he and his staff had worked up a short paper and had mapped out a specific demilitarized zone based on the line of contact. He did not intend to make the map the sole basis of discussion, but he would not permit any major alterations to be made in the UNC line.[4]

Thus, the UNC subdelegation was ready to present the new proposal at the first meeting, but the initial exchanges between General Hodes and General Lee developed into a sparring match:

Gen. Lee: Do you have any idea about the military demarcation line?

Gen. Hodes: We ended the last conference before the suspension by asking for your proposal. Do you have one?

Gen. Lee: We would like your opinion first.


Gen. Hodes: We gave our opinion many times, and asked for your proposal based on our proposal. As it was your proposal to have the subdelegation meeting, we expected you to have a proposal. Let's have it.

Gen. Lee: You said you had made a new

[2] (1) Transcript of Proceedings, 27th Session, Mtg at Panmunjom, on the Armistice Proposal, 25 Oct 51. (2) Msg, HNC 388, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 25 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 231.

[3] See Chapter III, above.

[4] (1) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 13 Oct 51, DA-IN 6758. (2) Msg, HNC 361, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 15 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 197.



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proposal, but we have heard nothing new which will break the deadlock.

Gen. Hodes: That's right, you haven't.

Gen. Lee: We have established a subcommittee to break the deadlock. The deadlock can be broken only if we have a mutually satisfactory proposal.

Gen. Hodes: Right. What is your proposal to break the deadlock?

After the better part of an hour was spent continuing this stimulating conversation, the UNC delegates decided that the Communists had no proposal to offer. Following a short recess, they made the opening gambit—a concrete demilitarized zone traced on the map. In general, Hodes explained, the zone was based upon the line of contact, but in order to make each side's defenses more secure the UNC forces would withdraw along the east coast and in the Kumsong area and the Communists would be expected to do the same in the Kaesong area. Not unexpectedly, the Communists rejected this proposal the following day and countered with a map of their own that was much more favorable to them. Their adjustments gave the U.N. Command some indefensible territory on the Ongjin and Yonan Peninsulas in return for the J-Ridge, Bloody, and Heartbreak Ridges, the Punchbowl, Kumhwa, and Ch'orwon. Hodes, in turn,



GENERAL PIEN CHANG-WU ARRIVES

found the Communist suggestion unacceptable, but at least a start had been made and the enemy had not mentioned the 38th Parallel.[5]

Although General Lee stoutly asserted that the Communists were not "merchants," but rather "military men of revolutionary spirit," when Hodes inquired whether the enemy position was for bargaining purposes, the horse trading began. The crux of the matter was the Kaesong area which the UNC delegates claimed was necessary to protect the approach to Seoul. If the site for the negotiations had not been placed at Kaesong, the UNC forces would probably have taken the city, Hodes declared. And besides, since the U.N. Command would have to give up the offshore islands that it controlled adjoining enemy-held territory, Kaesong would be fair compensation. Hodes pointed out that the Communists would also benefit from the UNC withdrawals from the areas around Kaesong and Kumsong, but

[5] Summaries of Proceedings, Seventh and Eighth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 25 and 26 Oct 51, in FEC Subdelegates Mtgs on item 2, vol. I. All meetings through 5 November will be found in this file.

the enemy wanted no part of a trade that would involve the loss of Kaesong.[6] Possession of Kaesong was important politically and psychologically as well as militarily since it lay south of the 38th Parallel and the ROK Government had been insisting upon its return. As a symbol it was worth far more than a greater amount of territory in central or east Korea.[7]

At first the Communists were willing to barter. They were agreeable to an exchange on the central and eastern fronts to straighten out the line of defense. But, as the UNC delegates persisted in their demand for Kaesong, the enemy lost interest. After several fruitless days of discussion, the Communists proposed a 4-kilometer demilitarized zone based solely on the line of contact. This, they asserted, was their best and last proposal.[8]

General Ridgway had thought that the UNC map which had been presented would be the final offer with only minor changes permitted. But his superiors reminded him that the U.S. minimum position was the maintenance of the security of Line KANSAS. If KANSAS had an adequate outpost line of resistance, certain adjustments in the proposed line of demarcation on the map would appear to be practicable, they informed the Far East commander on 30 October.[9]

The instructions from Washington and the determined Communist stand on Kaesong led Ridgway to issue new orders on 2 November. He told the UNC delegates to retreat to the second-line position which placed the city in the demilitarized zone. The last concession, Ridgway went on, would be to concede the Kaesong area, provided that the Communists agreed to the adjustments on the eastern and central fronts and permitted the UNC forces to locate its outpost line of resistance on the west bank of the Imjin River.[10]

For the next two days Hodes and Burke conducted a dogged campaign to budge the Communists, but to no avail. The enemy was firmly resolved not to give up Kaesong. By 4 November Ridgway and Joy had decided that a settlement based on the battle line with appropriate minor adjustments would be the best they could hope for.[11]

When the subdelegations met on the following day, General Hodes presented the UNC compromise offer. This accepted a 4-kilometer demarcation zone based on the actual line of contact at the time of the signing of the armistice with "appropriate adjustments." Three officers from each side would work out the battle line and would be prepared to give it to the delegation prior to the completion of the truce. In the meantime, the UNC proposal recommended that the conferees proceed to other items on the agenda.[12]

The Communists showered a barrage of questions on Hodes and Burke, but their interest swiftly waned when they

[6] Summary of Proceedings, Ninth Session, Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 27 Oct 51.

[7] Msg, HNC 430, Ridgway to JCS, 8 Nov 51, DA-IN 17036.

[8] Summary of Proceedings, Thirteenth Session, Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 31 Oct 51.

[9] (1) Msg, CX 56073, Ridgway to JCS, 28 Oct 51, DA-IN 12729. (2) Msg, JCS 85537, JCS to Ridgway, 30 Oct 51.

[10] Msg, C 56412, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 2 Nov 51, in FEC 387.2 bk. III, 247.

[11] Msg, HNC 423, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 4 Nov 51. (2) Msg C 56599, CINCUNC to American Embassy, Pusan, 4 Nov 51. Both in FEC 387.2,

[12] Summary of Proceedings, Eighteenth Session, Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 5 Nov 51.

discovered that the UNC delegation would not rule Kaesong out of any future adjustments that might be made. Then General Lee launched his assault. Item 2 must be settled now, he declared, and a military demarcation zone fixed before discussion of other agenda items could begin. Postponement of the matter until the armistice was signed was out of the question, Lee and his colleague, Hsieh, maintained, since agreement in principle was not enough. The Communists insisted that the current line be determined and that it should serve as the line of demarcation, despite Hodes's assertion that the present line would have no validity unless the truce was completed quickly. Otherwise, a new line and demilitarized zone reflecting changes on the battlefield would have to be agreed upon.[13]

To Admiral Joy the enemy's stand indicated that the Communists intended to make the line of demarcation worked out at this time a permanent rather than a temporary settlement and he thought that this effort should be resisted.[14] In Washington, U.S. political and military leaders agreed, but with definite reservations. If the UNC delegation maintained a hard-and-fast stand on Kaesong and the line of demarcation too long, they told Ridgway, it would appear to be a major concession when the UNC finally accepted the Communist position. Public opinion at home, Ridgway was told, would not understand a breakdown of negotiations over Kaesong, in the face of recent Communist concessions. Therefore, if the Communists flatly rejected the UNC proposal to postpone agreement on the line of demarcation, the enemy's line of contact in the Kaesong area should be accepted quickly. To prevent the Communists from making the line of demarcation permanent, they suggested to Ridgway that a time limit be set for the completion of the other agenda items. If no agreement was reached at the expiration of the limiting period, the demilitarized zone would be subject to revision.[15]

General Ridgway did not object to the JCS counsel on Kaesong, but he felt strongly that agreement to the present line of contact as a permanent line, subject only to minor adjustments, would be a mistake. In the 8 November subdelegate meeting, Ridgway pointed out, the Communists had indicated that they did not think that any major change in the battle lines had taken place since July. If the summer and fall campaigns of the Eighth Army were thus ignored, then the enemy obviously intended to cling closely to whatever line was now determined upon. This would in itself amount to a *de facto* cease-fire during the time period set and time extensions would doubtlessly be sought by the Communists and granted by the U.N. Command for the settlement of other agenda items. A cease-fire while the negotiations were still going on would be to the great disadvantage of the U.N. Command, in Ridgway's opinion, and if he had to give up Kaesong, he wanted to stand inflexibly upon the principle that the line of contact on the effective

[13] Summary of Proceedings, Nineteenth Session, Subdelegation Mtg on item 2, 6 Nov 51. All meetings of the subdelegation on item 2 from 6 November–27 November 1951 are in FEC Subdelegation Meetings, Agenda item 2, volume II.

[14] Msg, HNC 426, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 6 Nov 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 263.

[15] Msg, JCS 86291, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Nov 51.

date of the armistice must be the line of demarcation.[16]

The JCS were not willing to go quite so far. They agreed that the UNC delegation should press for acceptance of a postponed line of demarcation, but not that this would be the final position. Since the Communists had made substantial concessions on the location of the line, the JCS thought that an early agreement satisfying the UNC major requirements should be sought. Otherwise the enemy might even revert to its former stand on the 38th Parallel.[17]

In the meantime the subdelegation meetings had reached an impasse. The Communists grew more adamant in their stand for a 4-kilometer zone based on the line of contact with no adjustments either at the present or in the final settlement. They paid little attention to Hodes's charge that they wanted the demarcation line settled so that they could take their time on the other agenda items.[18]

The session on 14 November was particularly spirited. After General Lee admitted that agreement to a demarcation line now would amount to a *de facto* cease-fire, Hodes attacked the concept. General Hsieh became annoyed and then abusive. He called Hodes "Turtle egg" —an especially insulting term in Chinese.[19] "Only the Devil," he charged later, could believe that the U.N. had good faith and loved peace. Hsieh also slurringly referred to Admiral Joy as "the senior delegate of your delegation, whose name I forget." [20]

Although the UNC delegates ignored the insults, Hodes evened the score the following day in a reference to Nam Il as "your senior delegate whose name I trust you are able to recall." But progress in the negotiations outside the jibe level was slow.[21]

Military and political leaders in Washington were becoming impatient and on 14 November they instructed Ridgway to accept the Communist line of demarcation in the interest of reaching an early agreement. Since the Communist proposal not only met the U.S. basic position on the maintenance of the security of Line KANSAS, but also provided protection for Line WYOMING, they did not consider that agreement amounted to concession. By placing a time limit of one month for the completion of the rest of the agenda, they evidently hoped to forestall a slowdown of operations for an extended period of time and to spur the enemy to greater speed in the negotiations. They told Ridgway that the military pressure upon the enemy should not be lessened, but at the same time admitted that no major change in the line of contact favorable to the United States was likely during the next month. Air and naval action, on the other hand, would not be affected by the agreement.[22]

The UNC delegation earnestly sought to eke some advantage from the enemy as they readied their next offer, but with little success. Each day they would relax

[16] Msg, HNC 430, Ridgway to JCS, 8 Nov 51, DA–IN 17036.

[17] Msg, JCS 86654, JCS to CINCFE, 9 Nov 51.

[18] Summaries of Proceedings, Twenty-third and Twenty-fifth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 10 and 12 Nov 51.

[19] According to Chinese legend, a female turtle had to be fertilized by a snake.

[20] Summary of Proceedings, Twenty-seventh Session, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 14 Nov 51.

[21] Summary of Proceedings, Twenty-eighth Session, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 15 Nov 51.

[22] Msg, JCS 86804, JCS to CINCFE, 13 Nov 51. (2) Msg, JCS 86969, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Nov 51.




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MAP III

over a few games of solitaire or bridge to ease the strain of dealing with their stubborn opponents before they took up the cudgels again. Finally on 17 November, they reluctantly presented the new proposal which met the Communist position on the line of demarcation, but tacked on the thirty-day time limit.[23]

After several days of questions and careful study of the UNC proposal, the Communists were almost satisfied. Still they held out for UNC agreement that the line of demarcation would not be revised until after the other agenda items were settled. Although the expiration of the thirty-day limit without the conclusion of a truce would witness the termination of the line of demarcation's validity, the psychological effect of placing it along the existing line of contact might carry over into the post-thirty-day period. The U.N. Command balked briefly, then accepted the enemy's proposal. By 23 November the staff officers were hard at work tracing out the battle line.[24]

Disputes over the real location of the line of contact that the staff officers could not agree upon were referred back to the subdelegation and in the course of one such discussion an unusual incident took place. As both sides claimed possession of a particular hill in the central sector, General Hodes arranged for a telephone connection between the conferees and the officer in charge on the hill in question. In Hsieh's presence he called the unit commander and confirmed that the U.N. Command still controlled the hill. This annoyed Hsieh and he whispered in Chinese to his staff officer, "never mind. It will be ours tonight." Lieutenant Wu, the UNC interpreter overheard this remark and when he repeated it to Hodes later on, the UNC force on the disputed hill was alerted for an attack.[25] However, despite the warning, superior Chinese forces drove the UNC forces off the hill and Hodes had to admit the next day that the enemy now had possession and had to adjust the line of contact.

By 27 November the last details were ironed out and the demarcation line agreed upon. (*Map III*) With its task completed, the subdelegation on Item 2 adjourned at the end of its thirty-seventh session.

It had been a tortuous road that the subdelegates had followed since 17 August when they had held their first meeting. Initially the UNC representatives had labored to move the enemy from its stand on the 38th Parallel and toward a settlement along the actual line of contact. This had been successful. During the long suspension of the talks the Eighth Army had carried out its offensives and won improved positions along most of the front. When the conference resumed in late October, the UNC delegation had an additional objective —to secure, or at least demilitarize

[23] Summary of Proceedings, Thirtieth Session, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 17 Nov 51. According to Admiral Burke, both he and Hodes felt that their usefulness to the delegation had ended at this point. After they had taken such strong stands, Burke wrote, the order to concede would mark them as "pushovers" in the eyes of the Communists. See Ltr, Burke to Mrs. A. A. Burke, 16 Nov 51. In OCMH.

[24] Summaries of Proceedings, Thirty-first, Thirty-second, Thirty-third, Thirty-fourth, and Thirty-fifth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 2, 18–23 Nov 51.

[25] Interv, Lt Col James F. Schnabel with Lt Wu, March 1952. In OCMH.



COLONEL MURRAY AND COLONEL CHANG INITIAL A LINE OF DEMARCATION MAP

Kaesong. But this meant a departure from the concept of the line of contact, since the Communists still held Kaesong. Despite all the arguments and inducements that the U.N. Command had unveiled, the enemy remained unimpressed and became more firmly resolved to keep Kaesong.

While the United Nations Command delegates still felt that they might get Kaesong, they had been willing to sit down and draw a line of demarcation right away. But as chances for Kaesong became slimmer, they changed their attitude and attempted to defer mapping out the line until the armistice was ready to be signed, in the hope that the situation would be altered and the Communists might be more amenable to giving up Kaesong at that time.

The Communists, on the other hand, had been more consistent. Once they had discarded the 38th Parallel, they had shifted to the line of contact. After a brief flirtation with the idea of adjustments, they had been quickly disenchanted by the UNC insistence upon adjusting the Kaesong area out of Com-

munist hands. From this point onward the enemy delegates clung steadfastly to an immediate settlement on the line of contact with no adjustments other than those involving minor terrain features.

Although the Communists had been forced to concede on the 38th Parallel, they had won on establishing a line of demarcation that lasted until the closing moments of the war.[26] Admiral Joy later wrote that he regarded this as a turning point in the negotiations, for the United States lacked military pressure to lever the Communists into more reasonable attitude after this agreement and Joy believed that it cost the United States a full year of war in Korea.[27] Whether this was true or not, the President and his advisors had decided that the U.N. Command should compromise in the interests of securing an earlier armistice and in view of the fact that the enemy had already made considerable concessions. With Item 2 finally out of the way, work could now begin on Item 3, the setting up of the machinery to administer the truce.

### *Opening Skirmishes on Item 3*

The early instructions to Ridgway had been quite specific on the several points that were to be taken up under Item 3. They stated that the Military Armistice Commission and its observer teams must have free and unlimited access to all of Korea so that they could inspect whenever necessary to insure compliance with the terms of the armistice. They also informed Ridgway that there should be no reinforcing the number of personnel or increasing the amount of war equipment during the armistice period. This, of course, did not preclude the exchange of individuals or units on a man-for-man basis or the replacement of worn-out equipment.[28] These two principles in modified form—the right to inspection and replacement but no augmentation—formed the cornerstones of the UNC approach to Item 3.

The modifications stemmed from the field. On 1 August Admiral Joy suggested that along with no augmentation of troops or equipment the U.N Command should insist that there be no construction or rehabilitation of airfields.[29] Two months later, Ridgway attempted to clarify the UNC position on free and unlimited inspection. Pointing out to the JCS that the enemy had indicated its willingness to permit inspection in the demilitarized zone, but had consistently resisted observation or inspection in territory under its exclusive control, Ridgway questioned the need for unlimited inspection. Insistence upon this principle might prolong or even cause the Communists to break off the negotiations. In the opinion of the United Nations commander, inspection at selected ground, sea, and air ports of entry would provide sufficient security for his forces. Moreover, he believed that the Communists would exploit the right to unlimited inspection in the intelligence field to an unacceptable degree if it were granted them. Under the circumstance Ridgway felt that the UNC initial position on inspection should insist upon: observation by joint teams

[26] For the discussion of the effects of the line of demarcation upon the battlefield, see Chapter IX, below.

[27] Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, p. 129.

[28] Msg, JCS 95354, JCS to CINCFE, 30 Jun 51.

[29] Msg, HNC 164, Joy to Ridgway, 1 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 54.

at ground, sea, and air ports of entry and communication centers, with freedom of movement for those teams over principal transportation lines; joint aerial observation and photoreconnaissance over all Korea; and complete joint observation of the demilitarized zone. As a final position, the UNC delegation could concede aerial observation and photoreconnaissance. His superiors approved the initial position several weeks later, but reserved judgment on any modifications until the negotiations disclosed the Communist position more thoroughly.[30] As Maj. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, the Army G–3, pointed out to General Collins, the Air Force was strongly opposed to sacrificing aerial observation and it might turn out that the Communists would prefer to dispense with the ground observer teams.[31]

As negotiations on Item 2 drew to a close in November, General Collins and Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolté experienced some doubts about Communist acceptance of the inspection principle. The real deterrent to a resumption of hostilities, they felt, lay in the maintenance of sufficient power in the Korean area rather than in inspection. Since the Communists might prefer to permit the negotiations to be broken off over this issue, the Chief of Staff and his Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, General Bolté, questioned whether inspection would actually provide security for the U.N. Command and how it could best be carried out.[32]

Ridgway's answer on 23 November reinforced his earlier stand. In his defense of the need for inspection he reminded the JCS that enemy air power had been steadily increasing. In recent weeks it had challenged the UNC air effort south of the Ch'ongch'on River. If the enemy air bases were set up and maintained in North Korea, they could eventually pose a serious threat to Japan in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. For Ridgway the principle of inspection, which the United States had been insisting upon since the initiation of negotiations with the USSR in 1946 over the control of atomic energy, was a basic U.S. position and could not be discarded in Korea without having an adverse reaction upon future negotiations with the USSR. As for the mechanics of inspection, he believed that forty joint teams, some located permanently at ports of entry and others roving, could cover Korea adequately. If the enemy would not accept inspection, Ridgway felt that the UNC delegation should be authorized to break off negotiations.[33]

Several days later the U.S. leaders informed Ridgway that he should present his initial position requiring inspection on Item 3 and then modify it by conceding aerial observation and photoreconnaissance if it proved necessary. However, they were still firmly opposed to having the onus for cutting off the negotiations over this point fall on the U.N. Command. Any decision to cease

[30] (1) Msg, C 52227, CINCFE to JCS, 4 Oct 51, DA-IN 3575. (2) Msg, JCS 84817, JCS to CINCFE, 24 Oct 51.

[31] (1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 11 Oct 51, sub: Clarification of the Degree of Inspection, in G–3 091 Korea, 200. (2) General Jenkins succeeded General Taylor as G–3 on 1 August 1951. Taylor became Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration.

[32] Msg, CSUSA (sgd Bolté) to CINCFE, 19 Nov 51, DA-87452.

[33] Msg, CX 57838, Ridgway to JCS, 23 Nov 31, DA-IN 2085.

the discussions, they declared, must be made by the Communists.[34]

When the plenary session at Panmunjom resumed on 27 November, there was one newcomer to the conference table. Maj. Gen. Howard M. Turner, who had commanded a bombardment division of the Eighth Air Force during World War II and more recently had been commanding general of the Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines, replaced General Craigie.

After Admiral Joy had presented Turner's credentials, he immediately broached a new subject. To save time in the discussions that would take place on Item 4, Joy proposed that prisoner of war data covering the names and nationalities of all the prisoners and the location of POW camps be exchanged so that each side could study the information in advance of the formal meetings. Nam Il acknowledged the suggestion and then proceeded to discuss Item 3.

In Nam's opinion, Item 3 could be settled quite easily if the five principles he now advanced were accepted by the UNC delegates. The first declared that all armed forces should cease hostilities on the day the armistice was signed. Within three days all armed forces should be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone and within five days should be cleared from the rear areas, coastal islands, and waters of each side. These were principles 2 and 3. Each side would agree that there would be no armed forces or action in the demilitarized zone as the fourth principle, and finally both sides would designate an equal number of members to form an armistice commission to be jointly responsible for the concrete arrangements and for the supervision of the implementation of the agreement.

Basically there was little in the Communist proposal to quarrel with, as far as it went. But Admiral Joy was quick to point out to Nam that it failed to cover important areas. The mechanics for beginning a cease-fire and for clearing all the troops from the demilitarized zone were fairly simple, Joy maintained, but it was essential that both sides adopt measures to reduce the possibility of a resumption of hostilities. There were several ways in which this could be done. Neither side should build up its military supplies, equipment, or personnel in Korea during the armistice and restrictions should be placed upon the construction and rehabilitation of military facilities for offensive purposes. If both sides accepted these conditions, Joy went on, neither would acquire a significant advantage. To assure compliance with these limitations, Joy proposed that a supervisory organization, with joint observer teams, be established and given sufficient authority and freedom of movement to keep all Korea under surveillance. The UNC 7-point formula for solving Item 3 in effect broadened and clarified the Communist five principles.[35]

But the enemy soon indicated that it would not accept the UNC extension of the Communist proposal in its initial form and on the 28th the attack began. Nam centered his guns upon the UNC

[34] Msg, JCS 88226, JCS to CINCFE, 28 Nov 51.

[35] Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-eighth Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 27 Nov 51, in FEC, Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs of the Mil Armistice Conf, 25 Oct 51–19 Feb 52, vol. III (hereafter cited as FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. III).

restrictions upon increases in forces, supplies, equipment, and facilities and the granting of free access to all of Korea for the joint observer teams. As far as the Communists were concerned, Nam declared, they believed that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea was a necessary condition for a final peaceful solution of the Korean problem. However, the U.N. Command insisted that this be handled by the political conference to follow the armistice and the matter of restrictions and reduction of forces belonged, therefore, in the province of the political conference. Insofar as the UNC proposal for the observer teams was concerned, this was "entirely unnecessary" since there would be no restrictions applicable under the military armistice and consequently no need for inspection. Thus, by disposing of the restrictions, the Communists shrugged off the inspection principle, too.

As the UNC delegation counterattacked, Admiral Joy dismissed the Communist references to the withdrawal of foreign troops as inappropriate. The enemy's 5-point plan, Joy went on, was too limited in scope to provide the "bridge to peace" that the Communists spoke so frequently about. He then proceeded to explain the UNC seven principles in more detail and pointedly emphasized that restrictions on the build-up of forces must be part of any armistice that the U.N. Command would accept.[36]

The main battle lines were now plainly discernible. Since the U.N. Command enjoyed a military advantage in the air over the Communists, it desired to maintain the *status quo* and preserve its superior air capability during the armistice period. Hence the UNC insistence upon no increase in military facilities, which, in essence, meant airfields. To make sure that the enemy did not violate this principle required that its companion, inspection, be also included. The Communists, on the other hand, were just as determined to oppose any restrictions upon their opportunity to strengthen their air capability during a truce. If they could avoid agreement upon this principle, there would be no need for inspection.

The ensuing week witnessed a continuous maneuvering for position on both sides. Defending its 7-point program, the U.N. Command argued that either side could reduce its forces and capabilities during the armistice if it so desired, but since the length of time that the armistice would endure was unknown, it was vital for the security of the UNC forces that there be no upsetting of the balance of military power.[37] The enemy delegates in rebuttal charged that the U.N. Command was attempting to prevent the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Korea, and to intervene in the internal affairs of the People's Republic. This was quickly denied by the U.N. Command, which asserted that only airfields would be affected by the restrictions. Roads, railroads, and other facilities could be restored.[38]

On 3 December, the Communists made the first concession. They offered to expand their original five points to seven. Principles 6 and 7 read as follows:

[36] *Ibid.*, Twenty-ninth Session, 28 Nov 51.

[37] *Ibid.*, Thirtieth Session, 29 Nov 51.

[38] *Ibid.*, Thirty-second, Thirty-third Sessions, 30 Nov, 1, 2 Dec 51.

6. In order to insure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to introduce into Korea any military forces, weapons, and ammunition under any pretext. 7. In order to supervise the strict implementation of the stipulation of paragraph 6, both sides agree to invite representatives of nations neutral in the Korean war to form a supervisory organ to be responsible for conducting necessary inspection, beyond the demilitarized zone, of such ports of entry in the rear as mutually agreed upon by both sides, and to report to the joint armistice commission the results of inspection.[39]

The new Communist proposals threw the UNC delegation on the defensive as they were unprepared for either the drastic restrictions upon all military forces and equipment or for the introduction of neutral nations to perform the task of inspection.[40] After a brief recess they submitted a list of questions to clarify the new points and then suggested that Item 3 be given over to a subdelegation to work out a solution.[41] While the UNC delegates explored the implications of the Communist move, there would be time to get new instructions from Washington.

On 4 December the enemy accepted the UNC proposal for establishing a subdelegation and appointed Generals Lee and Hsieh as members. Admiral Joy named Generals Turner and Hodes.



GENERAL NAM IL *and one of his staff officers after the meeting of 27 November 1951.*

When the subdelegation met that afternoon, Lee soon made it clear that there would be no rotation of personnel or replenishment of equipment under the Communist plan and that his side would brook no interference with the reconstruction of facilities in North Korea. The latter was a purely internal matter and inspection was out of the question. In the course of the next session, Lee also revealed that the Communists had not fully developed their concept of the organization and utilization of the neutral nations group. Possibly three to five nations would be invited by both sides, Lee stated, and the neutral organ would operate independently out of agreed-upon ports of entry. As for the Military Armistice Commission, its duties and

[39] *Ibid.*, Thirty-fourth Session, 3 Dec 51.

[40] The term "neutral nations" was used very loosely during the negotiations and usually meant those nations that did not have military forces in Korea. The United States would not recognize the USSR as a neutral and the Communists undoubtedly would not have allowed Nationalist China to be placed in this category.

[41] Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-fourth Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 3 Dec 51, FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. III.

authority would be limited strictly to the demilitarized zone.[42]

After studying the Communist's explanation of the neutral nations' role, Joy and his staff were hopeful but cynical. They felt that a deal might be worked out within a reasonable time. Since they placed little faith in the enemy's promises and thought that the Communists would eventually find some way to circumvent effective inspection behind the lines anyway, the neutral nations' solution might answer the needs of the U.N. Command as well as a military armistice commission.[43] But until guidance arrived from Washington, Joy admitted that all the U.N. Command could do was to delay and stall by asking questions and criticizing the Communist proposal. He urged the submission of a UNC counterproposal to regain the initiative: one that would insist upon rotation and replenishment but would create a neutral nations organization in place of the Military Armistice Commission, would drop the claims of the U.N. Command to retain coastal islands north of the demarcation line after the armistice, and also would cease to demand restrictions against rehabilitating airfields, only against constructing new airfields. In his opinion, this would give the U.N. Command all that it required and be very hard for the Communists to refuse.[44]

General Ridgway agreed that the U.N. Command had to take a stand soon or face the prospect of an unfavorable reaction throughout the free world. On 7 December he pressed the JCS to at least announce the points on which the U.N. Command would not concede. First and foremost of these, he held, was the divorcement of the neutral nations' inspection teams from the authority of the Military Armistice Commission. Differing sharply with the UNC Panmunjom delegation, Ridgway wanted to reject categorically this portion of the Communist proposal, since he felt its acceptance would permit the injection of all sorts of political matters foreign to a military armistice.[45]

As no immediate answer to Ridgway's message was forthcoming, the subdelegation continued to mark time. Two new officers, Admiral Libby and Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, sat in at the 6 December meeting and thereafter to gain familiarity with the issues and Communist techniques. But until a new policy was laid out, the discussion by the UNC delegation had to be vague and could not get down to cases.

It should not be assumed, however, that the JCS were inactive during the period. Policy had to be worked out with the State Department and since the United States was engaged in political and military conversations with the British in early December, the Joint Chiefs were inclined to be cautious. Under the circumstances they preferred not to take irrevocable positions at this stage of the negotiations.[46]

[42] Transcripts of Proceedings, First and Second Sessions, Subdelegates Mtgs on Agenda item 3, dated 4, 5 Dec 51, in FEC Subdelegates Mtgs on Agenda item 3, vol. I (hereafter cited as FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol. I).

[43] Msg, HNC 521, Joy to CINCUNC, 5 Dec 51, in FEC Msgs, Dec 51.

[44] Msg, HNC 523, Joy to CINCUNC, 6 Dec 51, in FEC Msgs, Dec 51.

[45] Msgs, CINCFE to JCS, 7 Dec 51, DA-IN 7082 and 7121, in G-3 091 Korea, 213/3.

[46] Msg, JCS 88877, JCS to CINCFE, 5 Dec 51.

By 7 December, after consultation with Secretaries Marshall and Acheson, the JCS had hammered out a new position and requested the President to approve it. Pointing out that there were four main issues at stake on Item 3, they told the President that there could be no shift in the UNC stand on rotation and replenishment, since these were essential. Some concessions could be made in permitting the rehabilitation of facilities, but any decision relating to airfields under this concession would have to be referred to Washington if it became the last obstacle to an armistice. As a final position, the JCS went on, the U.N. Command would agree to withdraw from islands north of the demarcation line and to the use of neutral teams of observers. However, the neutral nations selected to provide the observers must be mutually agreed to by both sides and the teams must be responsible to and subject to direction and supervision of the Military Armistice Commission.[47]

At first President Truman objected to a policy allowing the enemy to rehabilitate its roads, railroads, and other facilities which the United States and its allies had destroyed at great expense in lives and matériel. But the JCS explained that there was a strong feeling, particularly in the State Department, that the armistice might be the only agreement reached on Korea for a long time and that it would be impossible to prohibit rehabilitation over an extensive period. Furthermore, the United States itself intended to carry out a program of reconstruction and rehabilitation in South Korea. The President bowed to these arguments and approved the new instructions which were forwarded to Ridgway on 11 December.[48]

On that same day there were indications that the week's delay in the negotiations might have been beneficial. The U.N. Command had been constantly urging the Communists to set up a subdelegation on Item 4 in order to exchange prisoner of war data and the enemy finally agreed to meet that afternoon. General Lee and Colonel Tsai would take over the negotiations on Item 4 while General Hsieh and Colonel Chang would carry on the discussions on Item 3.

Later during the debate, Hsieh made the first break in the deadlock when he asked in a tentative fashion whether the UNC would accept the idea of the neutral nations carrying out inspections if the Communists gave in on the maintenance of forces and agreed that there be a single directing head rather than two organs supervising the armistice. Although Hsieh apparently was just probing the UNC position, there was now a possibility of a compromise.[49]

Armed with the instructions from Washington and the hint from Hsieh that the Communists might be receptive to a modification of their stand, the UNC delegation presented a new package proposal on 12 December. It featured the concession by the U.N. Command of the islands along the coast and in territorial waters north of the demarcation

[47] Msg, JCS 89114, JCS to Naval Aide USS *Williamsburg*, 7 Dec 51.

[48] Msg, President to JCS, 8 Dec 51, DA–IN 7586. (2) Msg, JCS 89118, JCS to Naval Aide USS *Williamsburg*, 8 Dec 51. (3) Msg, JCS 89173, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Dec 51.

[49] Transcript of Proceedings, Eighth Session, Subdelegates Mtgs on item 3, 11 Dec 51, in FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol. I.

line and agreement to the concept that the neutral nations acceptable to both sides furnish personnel for the observer teams. On the other hand, the Communists must permit rotation and replenishment and agree that the neutral nations be under the Military Armistice Commission. There was no change in the UNC stand on airfields, and reconstruction and rehabilitation were still forbidden. Since this was a package proposal, Turner told Hsieh that it must be accepted *in toto* or not at all.[50]

Hsieh spent the next session attacking the UNC plan, and Turner in turn counterattacked. When Hsieh assailed the rotation and replenishment principle, Turner pointed out that acceptance of the Communist view would in effect constitute the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea since attrition eventually would eliminate all but native troops. The enemy had agreed to discuss this problem under Item 5 and not Item 3, Turner maintained, scoring a point.[51]

On 14 December Hsieh presented an alternate suggestion which accepted the UNC concessions and in return offered to permit the U.N. Command to rotate 5,000 men a month. Turner ridiculed the low figure. Upon further questioning, Hsieh admitted that even the 5,000 rotatees would have to be approved by the Military Armistice Commission each month and that the Communists could conceivably veto any rotation if they so desired since they would have equal membership in this group. This made the enemy's proposal even more unacceptable and the negotiations began to bog down again.[52]

Thus, by mid-December, the Communists had shown a disposition to compromise on inspection—the issue which the JCS and the UNC leaders had feared might be the greatest stumbling block to an agreement on Item 3. True, there remained many details to be worked out on the composition of the neutral nations organization and its duties and relationship to the Military Armistice Commission, but the principle, at least, had been accepted. The enemy was also willing to retreat from its extreme stand against rotation provided a suitable *quid pro quo* was offered. But the price for this concession—freedom to develop and rehabilitate airfields during an armistice —was one that the U.N. Command was vehemently opposed to.

General Ridgway flew to Korea on 17 December and after canvassing the members of the UNC delegation forwarded an estimate of the situation to the JCS. Concerned with the approach of the thirty-day deadline on the line of demarcation, he told his superiors that an extension, unless it was for a very short period of time and the conclusion of the negotiations was in sight, would have a harmful effect upon his forces. He admitted that neither he nor his staff were agreed upon what the Communists intentions were, but argued that the best way to expose them lay in setting out the UNC firm position in unequivocal language. Warning that the time could come when the UNC might have to face a breaking off in the negotiations, he felt that the decision to meet such a crisis

[50] *Ibid.*, Ninth Session, 12 Dec 51.
[51] *Ibid.*, Tenth Session, 13 Dec 51.
[52] *Ibid.*, Eleventh and Twelfth Sessions, 14 and 15 Dec 51.

should be readied in advance. Ridgway especially deprecated the policy pursued in the past of abandoning positions since this had only tended to make the enemy more obdurate and demanding.

Then, turning to the problems at hand, he strongly urged that the U.N. Command stick to its stand on airfields and rotation. In addition, the U.N. Command should insist upon neutral aerial inspection and photoreconnaissance to watch the enemy's airfields and for free movement of neutral observer teams throughout Korea over major lines of communication. The tasks assigned to the Military Armistice Commission and the neutral observer teams should be made mandatory so that the Communists could not block action by these organs. In the opinion of himself and his staff, the critical matter was airfields and the making of an armistice might well hinge on the acceptance or nonacceptance of this principle.[53]

### *Domestic Problems and Foreign Pressures*

After meeting with the State Department and securing Presidential approval, the JCS replied to Ridgway the following day. The Washington leaders appreciated the fine effort that Ridgway and the UNC delegation were making despite many difficulties. But the consensus of official opinion held that a political conference after the armistice would probably be unsuccessful and consequently the armistice might be the only agreement for some time. In that event its character must provide for a greater degree of permanency and the conditions imposed must be of a type that could be enforced over a long period. The U.S. political and military leaders felt that Communist violations of the armistice would probably consist of demonstrations, threats, and equivocations rather than renewed aggression. And in their view the major deterrent to another outbreak of hostilities in Korea would be the Communist realization that further aggression would bring full retribution. The United States was working on a declaration to this effect which would be signed by as many of the United Nations participating in the Korean War as could be persuaded; it would be issued after the conclusion of the armistice. The United Kingdom had already indicated that it would support such a statement.

In the light of these considerations. U.S. leaders preferred not to take final positions on all the issues now under discussion, as this would destroy the ability of the United States to maneuver or adjust if new elements were introduced by the Communists. Neither did they care to establish a given point at which the negotiations would be broken off. Instead they listed the positions that Ridgway and his staff should now support. Since it would be impracticable to enforce the rehabilitation of airfields for any length of time, they were willing to permit some airfields, excluding those suitable for jet operations, to be rebuilt and maintained. As for aerial observation, this was desirable but not essential and should not be a part of the UNC final position. Either adequate rotation of personnel should be authorized or as long as there was no over-all increase in forces, no limit at all should be fixed.

[53] Msg, HNC 588, Ridgway to JCS, 18 Dec 51, DA-IN 11132.


In the matter of replenishment, the important issue was that there be no augmentation of combat aircraft. On this Ridgway should be adamant. The Washington leaders agreed that the neutral observer teams should be stationed at the major ports of entry and have freedom to move wherever their duties demanded. It would not be necessary to have all the observer teams in place when the armistice went into effect, but the Military Armistice Commission and some of the teams should be on hand. If the deadline of 27 December approached and progress was still being made in the negotiations, Ridgway was authorized to propose an extension of up to fifteen days.[54]

The differences in approach to the intricate task of negotiating with the Communists were sharply delineated in this exchange between Ridgway and his superiors. The Far East commander and his staff believed that continuing concessions could only indicate weakness to the enemy and that the best course was one of strength and firmness. Only when the Communists realized that the U.N. Command intended to cling steadfastly to its principles and would yield no more, would they get down seriously to the business of fashioning an armistice. The Washington leaders, on the other hand, inclined toward a flexible approach based upon the practical necessities for a long armistice period. This meant playing the Communist game of shifting, adjusting, and maneuvering for advantages and avoiding fixed positions that might precipitate a break in the negotiations. Inherent in this approach were the hope that eventually a reasonable and workable armistice agreement would be reached that would end the hostilities in Korea, and the knowledge that as long as the U.N. Command continued to be willing to negotiate, the Communists would be forced to bear the onus for a breaking off of the conference. The influence of this latter consideration upon the thinking of the government in Washington was constant and important.

For behind the American leaders the pressure for an early solution to the Korean War through a cease-fire and armistice was mounting. By mid-December the desire to halt the growing casualty lists and to free U.S. and U.N. forces in Korea for redeployment elsewhere became stronger. As the negotiations dragged on, the allies of the United States became more reluctant to apply additional measures against Communist China and disinclined to contribute more troops to Korea. It was also evident that as long as the war continued and the United States poured resources into a hot war, the flow of military assistance to areas engaged in the cold war had to be restricted. Influences at home and abroad increasingly favored a minimum settlement of the Korean War by means of an armistice and the unification of Korea by political means.

Since the National Security Council recommended in December that the United States adhere to the policy of avoiding a general war with China and the USSR and of seeking an acceptable settlement in Korea that would not jeopardize the U.S. positions regarding Taiwan, a seat for Communist China in the United Nations, or vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the chances that the war would be broadened in the near

[54] Msg, JCS 90083, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Dec 51.



CHURCHILL IN WASHINGTON, *January 1952. Left to right, front row: Secretary Acheson, Mr. Churchill, Secretary Lovett, and Anthony Eden. Standing: Admiral Sir Roderick R. McGrigor, W. Averell Harriman, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Sir Norman Brook, and General Bradley.*

future appeared small. The council preferred to continue the course now being pursued—limited war and economic pressure upon Red China backed by the support of the majority of the United Nations—until a satisfactory armistice was concluded. This would be followed by efforts to reach a political settlement of the Korean problem, but in the meantime the ROK Army would be strengthened and prepared to deter or repel a further attempt by the Communists to take over South Korea. The council was now convinced that with proper training and equipment the ROK Army could eventually bear the brunt of the defense of South Korea. Only if the armistice negotiations failed, would the council consider the additional measures of mobilization and forms of military pressure to solve the situation.

The NSC decision deferred the imposition of a naval blockade against

China and the extension of the air war into Manchuria.[55] And since the United States did not feel that the United Nations would support a stricter economic embargo on China at this time, there seemed to be little profit in pursuing that matter either.

Perhaps the case of the British may serve as a graphic illustration of this point. The British had been undergoing a period of economic crisis since World War II and were loathe to place additional restrictions upon their trade with Communist China. It was natural that they should also be concerned about the exposed position of Hong Kong if more pressure were to be applied against the Chinese Communists and that they should view the growing air strength of the enemy's air force in Korea uneasily. Under the circumstances they were most anxious to limit the war to the Korean Peninsula until a settlement could be worked out at the truce table.[56]

British uncertainties over American policy led to consultations in Washington during late December and January. While British military leaders discussed the implications of broadening U.N. action against Communist China with their American counterparts at the military level, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden conferred with President Truman and his advisors.

Fundamentally, divergencies in policy stemmed from the attitudes of the two countries toward Communist China and Nationalist China. Since the British had recognized the former and established trade relations, they were inclined to regard the new regime as a permanent one. The United States, on the other hand, felt that as long as Communist China remained aggressive and showed no signs of changing its attitude toward the West, there was no point in according the Communists the advantages that recognition would entail, such as a seat in the United Nations or formal trade relations. Besides, the United States had certain obligations toward Chiang Kai-shek and the Taiwan government, which it could not easily avoid. Since the United States acknowledged the economic interests of the British in the Far East, the U.S. policy planners felt that the British must in turn realize that the United States must bear the major responsibility for the area and supply the power to meet this responsibility.[57]

Although the conferences produced no changes in either British or American policy, the two countries were able to reassure each other. Neither desired an extension of the Korean War and so long as there was no collapse of negotiations, their differences in regard to Communist China could be adjusted. What might happen if the enemy did not agree to an armistice or breached it was also discussed, but since the United States had not reached a firm decision on an alternate course of action, no positive information could be given to the British.[58]

Actually there seemed to be little choice for the United States unless the situation altered. For those who still believed that a military decision in Korea was either desirable or necessary to settle

[55] JCS 2004/46, 13 Dec 51, title: Method of Curtailment of Wartime Trade with Communist China.

[56] JCS 1776/272, 27 Dec 51, title: Korea.

[57] JCS 2118/28, 28 Dec 51, title: Divergence of U.S. and British Policies Respecting China.

[58] Msg, 130305, State Dept to SCAP, 13 Jan 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 52, G–3 sec., an. 4, pt. III, tab 15.

the conflict, even if it meant taking on Communist China, General Bolté, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, had some sobering counsel at the end of December. He told Assistant Secretary of the Army Karl R. Bendetsen that the United States had no certain current military capability for reaching a favorable decision in the Far East and no knowledge of how long it would take to acquire such a capability. Only by a drastic change in the global strategy of the United States or through an all-out mobilization of national resources could the military capability be immediately increased. As Bolté pointed out, the first course might cause great danger to the national security and the second would create grave economic problems. Either might play directly into the hands of the Soviet Union.[59]

From General Ridgway came confirmation of Bolté's position. In commenting upon the apparent willingness of the U.S. policy makers to rely upon a post-armistice U.N. declaration threatening a spread of the war if the Communists made a truce and then broke it, he stated frankly that: ". . . conscience compels me to reiterate my conviction that with presently available military forces this command would be incapable of imposing a threat to Communist China sufficient in itself to deter it from renewed aggression." [60]

But, as General Collins pointed out to the JCS on 10 January, the very fact that the proposed U.N. declaration did not necessarily restrict a future outbreak of hostilities to Korea posed a new set of circumstances. Under the recent NSC decision the ROK forces would be increased, trained, and equipped to assume the responsibility for the defense of their own territory. Depending upon conditions at the time, the United States might or might not intervene again in Korea if the Communists violated an armistice agreement. In any event the JCS informed Ridgway that he would prepare only contingency plans for U.S. intervention.[61]



GENERAL COLLINS

As long as the negotiations continued, however, the prospects for increasing the U.S. effort in Korea appeared forlorn. The shift foreshadowed by the National Security Council action was toward a gradual disengagement provided that a

[59] Memo, Bolté for Asst Secy Army (Gen Mgmt), 28 Dec 51, sub: Comments on Memo . . . Asst Secy Army (Gen Mgmt), in G–3 091 Korea, 348/24.

[60] Msg, CX 61348, Ridgway to JCS, 13 Jan 52, DA–IN 19740.

[61] (1) Memo, Collins for JCS, 10 Jan 52, sub: Renewed U.S. Intervention in Korea . . . , in G–3 091 Korea 3. (2) Msg, DA–93080, G–3 to CINCFE, 27 Jan 52.

truce could be arranged. But meantime the Joint Chiefs were faced with the problem of sustaining the present rate of military build-up until the world situation improved. Whether the President or Congress would be receptive to further augmentation of the armed forces while the stalemate in Korea remained unbroken was still a moot question.

With the action on the battlefield still at a low ebb and with little hope of accelerating the pace, the sharpest clashes took place over the conference table. The airfield question limited agreement on Item 3 and a new battle was about to break out over the disposition of prisoners of war.

## CHAPTER VII

# Prisoners of War

On the surface the problem of prisoners of war seemed simple. The United States was a signatory to the Geneva Convention of 1949 although it had not ratified the convention when the war began. The North Korean Foreign Minister had declared shortly after the outbreak of war in 1950 that his government would abide by its stipulations. Since the opening sentence of Article 118 of the convention clearly stated: "Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities," there seemed little reason for dispute. Yet difficulties arose at the outset of the discussions on the exchange of prisoners and steadily mounted as the issue became surcharged with emotional elements. A series of conflicts broke out between the rights of the individual and those of the majority, between human rights and legal rights, and between humanitarianism and Communist Party pride. As the controversy became very involved, a glance at the contributing factors would appear to be in order.

### *Voluntary Repatriation*

Early in its history the United States had come into contact with the principle of voluntary repatriation or the right of each individual prisoner to choose whether he wanted to return home or not. At the close of the Revolutionary War the Treaty of Paris of 1783 had simply stated: "All prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty. . . ." Thousands of British and German soldiers decided to stay in the new country and to live under the new form of government rather than go back to Europe.[1]

But this experience had been the exception to the rule. The common practice was to exchange all prisoners of war at the end of a conflict. When the 1929 Geneva Convention was fashioned, compulsory repatriation was taken for granted since it was generally accepted that the great majority of prisoners would wish to return home as soon as a war was finished. World War II added a new chapter to the handling of prisoners of war when the Soviet Union retained large numbers of German and Japanese prisoners for a long period after the war to assist in the rehabilitation of the USSR. Perhaps to prevent a recurrence of this action, the delegates to the Geneva Conference in 1949 strengthened the article dealing with repatriation. It became a flat statement prescribing quick and compulsory repatriation.[2]

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[1] See Lt. Col. George G. Lewis and Capt. John Mewha, *History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776–1945*, DA Pamphlet 20–213, June 1955, p. 20.

[2] DA Pamphlet No. 20–150, October 1950, Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, Article 118, p. 129.

But in their zeal to protect the right of each prisoner to return home swiftly, the delegates ignored the other side of the coin. They failed to incorporate escape provisions to cover the possible exceptions—the prisoners who might be afraid to go back, those who had fallen out of sympathy with their national regimes, and those who preferred the ways of their captors.

The omission was soon revealed by the Korean War. The Communists, however, did not allow a scrap of paper to deprive them of an advantage. As soon as they began to accumulate prisoners in mid-1950, they set about re-educating and incorporating as many as possible of the former ROK soldiers into the Korean People's Army. When the United Nations Command turned the tables after the Inch'on landing in September 1950, no such easy solution was permissible. Respecting the provisions of the Geneva Convention, the UNC sent its ever-increasing bag of prisoners, military and civilian, back to the stockades and faithfully reported the names to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). It was inevitable that some of the ex-ROK soldiers should fall into UNC hands and many of them now claimed that they had been impressed into the Communist forces. This was the initial complication.

When the Chinese entered the war in late 1950, another element was added. For among the Chinese troops were many quondam members of the Nationalist armies of Chiang Kai-shek. During the civil war there had been wholesale desertions and surrenders and the Communists had taken the former Nationalists into their military organization en masse. Disaffection was widespread in their ranks and once they had become prisoners of the UNC, many soon demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm for a return to Communist control.[3]

As the number of enemy prisoners mounted and their composition grew more complex, the problem of their ultimate disposition came to the fore. On the eve of the opening of the truce negotiations in July, Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Army Chief of Psychological Warfare, voiced his concern over the possible fate of the former Nationalist soldiers in the event of an armistice. Many of these men, he told General Collins, claimed that they were forced to join the Communist army. If they were now compelled to return, they might well be faced with heavy punishment or even execution because they had surrendered to the U.N. Command. To forestall this McClure presented a clever, if somewhat debatable solution. Since the bulk of the ex-Nationalist prisoners would probably elect to go to Taiwan if they were given a choice and since it could be officially considered a part of China, he urged the repatriation of the group to Taiwan. In this fashion the United States would avoid the experience of World War II when it had consented to the forcible repatriation of prisoners to the Soviet Union. At the same time, McClure went on, future psychological warfare operations would be strengthened since if enemy soldiers were confident that they would not be repatriated, they would be more likely to surrender.[4]

The McClure approach deserved fur-

[3] Msg, C 67842, CINCFE to CINCUNC (Adv), 28 Jul 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 1, 44.

[4] Memo, McClure for CofS, 5 Jul 51, sub: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners, in G-3 383.6, 4.

ther consideration, in Collins' opinion, and he submitted it in expanded form to the JCS on 6 July. Although the United States had not ratified the Geneva Convention, Collins and the Army Judge Advocate General felt that it was committed to the principles expressed therein. On the other hand, the Chief of Staff thought that provided adequate safeguards for the protection and safe return of UNC prisoners were arranged, General Ridgway could repatriate all Chinese prisoners claiming Nationalist sympathies to Taiwan on the technical ground that it was still part of China. Collins was willing to go even further. If it could be accomplished without prejudice to the rapid recovery of UNC prisoners, he suggested that no Chinese or North Korean prisoners should be forced to go back to Communist-controlled territory without their full consent.[5]

While the Taiwan proposition complied with the letter of the Geneva Convention and could be defended, the voluntary repatriation concept advocated by the Chief of Staff was clearly at variance with the provisions of the convention. General Ridgway, when asked for his comments, was quick to point this out. The adoption of voluntary repatriation at this time, Ridgway declared, might establish a precedent that would work to the disadvantage of the United States in future wars. In addition, the Communists might make use of this breach of the convention to formulate adverse propaganda and influence the borderline countries not yet committed to communism. Despite these disadvantages, Ridgway felt that the concept had definite merit.[6]

Further support for voluntary repatriation came from the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the senior advisory group to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the committee recommended that since the problem transcended military considerations, it should be handled on a higher governmental level. Final approval, the committee concluded, should come from the General Assembly of the United Nations. General Jenkins, the Army G–3, disagreed strongly, for he felt that giving the matter to the General Assembly would result in no decision at all on the basic policy. His arguments won over the JCS and General Collins was instructed to inform Ridgway that he could develop a UNC position for planning purposes based on the principle of voluntary repatriation.[7]

During the long recess over the incidents at Kaesong, there was a gradual change within the Defense Department. Robert A. Lovett, who succeeded General Marshall on 17 September as Secretary of Defense, keynoted this shift. Referring to the instructions of 30 June to Ridgway on prisoner of war exchange, he declared that the Communists might not consent to negotiate on a one-for-one basis and might well insist upon an all-for-all agreement.[8] This possibility immediately cast a pall over the doctrine of voluntary repatriation, for the primary consideration was to secure the speedy return of all UNC prisoners. In a one-

[5] Memo, CofS U.S. Army for JCS, 6 Jul 51, sub: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K Prisoners, in G–3 383.6, 4.

[6] Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Jul 51, DA–IN 17240.

[7] (1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 7 Aug 51, sub: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners, in G–3 383.6, 4/4. (2) Msg, DA–99024, G–3 to CINCFE, 15 Aug 51.

[8] Memo, Lovett for JCS, 25 Sep 51, no sub, incl to JCS 2095/5.

for-one exchange, the UNC could easily have held back the enemy prisoners who did not want to return to the Communists until all the UNC prisoners were turned over. An all-for-all agreement would void this plan completely.

General Jenkins reflected the new climate of opinion in early October when he counseled the Chief of Staff to accept the Lovett argument that the UNC should be ready to agree to an all-for-all exchange if the enemy refused to deal on any other basis. Since Ridgway's armistice instructions were about to be revised in preparation for the resumption of the truce talks and since voluntary repatriation was contrary to the Geneva Convention anyway, the Army G–3 did not think that the principle should be reaffirmed. Collins and his JCS colleagues agreed.[9]

This appeared to be the end of voluntary repatriation. In Tokyo General Ridgway had also shifted his ground. Unless there were a one-for-one exchange, he told the JCS, he did not see how he could hold back the prisoners unwilling to be repatriated. The United Nations Command had avoided the subject of nonrepatriation in its psychological warfare program and had not offered asylum to the Communist soldiers. Instead it had promised food, medical care, and good treatment to all, plus permission to the North Koreans to return home as soon as practicable. And to the Chinese troops, it had proffered the chance to save their lives.[10]

Although voluntary repatriation was now de-emphasized, some progress was made on the reclassification of prisoners held in the UNC camps. Among the thousands of men captured by the United Nations Command, there were many who claimed South Korean residence. These fell into five general classes: 1. Volunteers from civilian status who joined the North Korean forces; 2. Personnel impressed into North Korean military units from civilian life; 3. ROKA personnel captured and impressed into the enemy army; 4. ROKA personnel mistakenly taken into custody while in a straggler status; and 5. "Innocent bystanders" who joined prisoner of war groups or broke into the stockades to get fed or were picked up on suspicion of being North Korean soldiers in civilian clothes. Both the Far East Command Provost Marshal General and Judge Advocate General felt that only classes 2 and 5 could be properly reclassified as civilian internees; the others should be held.[11]

There were then about 40,000 South Koreans in UNC custody who had earlier been impressed into the North Korean Army, according to Ridgway's estimates, and with JCS approval he began to reclassify members of this group as civilian internees. He intended to parole individuals from this category acceptable to the ROK Government to local officials gradually when the situation seemed opportune.[12]

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[9] (1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 9 Oct 51, sub: Policy on Repatriation . . . , in G–3 383.6, 4/9. (2) Decision on JCS 2095/7, 12 Oct 51.

[10] Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Oct 51, DA–IN 12414. (2) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 15 Nov 51, DA–IN 15530. (3) JCS 2095/8, 9 Nov 51, title: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners.

[11] Memo, Lt Col D. T. Hamersley, SGS, for Asst CofS G–1 FEC, 8 Nov 51, sub: Investigation and Release of ROKA Personnel in UN POW Enclosures, in FEC SGS Corresp File, 1 Jul–31 Dec 51.

[12] (1) JCS 2095/8, 9 Nov 51, title: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners. (2) Memo, Collins for Secy Defense, 15 Nov 51, same sub, in G–3 383.6, 4/14.

After discussion of Item 3 began in late November, Ridgway submitted his proposed approach to the prisoner of war problem to the JCS on the 28th. Before he would enter into substantive matters, he intended to insist upon delivery of names, numbers, and locations of all UNC prisoners held by the enemy. Initially he would attempt to secure a one-for-one exchange. If this were successful, the U.N. Command could withhold the prisoners it desired. If, on the other hand, the enemy refused, he would agree to an all-for-all exchange, even though it meant turning over suspected war criminals, intelligence prospects, soldiers who had aided the U.N. Command, and individuals who did not want to go back.[13]

Faced with the immediate problem of deciding whether or not to sacrifice the unwilling repatriates, the JCS again debated the question without reaching a solution. Torn between their natural concern for the safety of the UNC prisoners and their humanitarian desire not to force enemy prisoners to return to the Communists, they could see no sure method of safeguarding both groups. As a suggestion they informed Ridgway that he might try to secure an agreement providing for the screening of all prisoners by joint teams prior to their release. If, during the screening, a prisoner did not wish to be repatriated, he could remain under the jurisdiction of his captor. But there were frank indications that the JCS did not put a great deal of faith in the possible success of this maneuver since they told both the Secretary of Defense and Ridgway that they would welcome any suggestion for resolving the question. In the meantime they authorized the U.N. Commander to go ahead on the basis of his 28 November proposal.[14]

By the time the subdelegation on Item 4 opened its meetings on 11 December, the principle of voluntary repatriation was placed in a strange position—neither in nor out of UNC planning. To the JCS and to Ridgway it was a desirable objective that should be attained, but no one was sure if or how it could be won. On the other hand, there seemed to be no overriding reason for adhering to the concept in the event the Communists balked or showed a disposition to withhold the UNC prisoners in retaliation. As the talks began, the fate of voluntary repatriation appeared to depend mainly upon future Communist actions and reactions in handling the prisoner of war problem.

### *The Period of Reconnaissance*

The repeated efforts of the UNC delegation to initiate discussions on Item 4 concurrently with those on Item 3 finally bore fruit on 11 December when the Communists agreed to hold a subdelegation meeting that afternoon. Across the conference table the familiar faces of Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho and Col. Tsai Cheng-wen indicated that the enemy had assigned two of its ablest negotiators to the task. On the UNC side, Rear Adm. Ruthven E. Libby, who had just replaced Admiral Burke officially, and Col. George W. Hickman, Jr., USA, were

[13] Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 28 Nov 51, DA-IN 3785.

[14] (1) Decision on JCS 2095/10, 4 Dec 51, Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners. (2) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 7 Dec 51, sub: Proposed Dispatch to CINCFE in Regard to PW's, in G-3 383.6, 5. (3) Msg, JCS 89172, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Dec 51.

chosen to match wits with the Communists. Libby was a fiery sea dog with a salty tongue who had no difficulty in coping with the best or the worst that the enemy had to offer. He combined quickness of mind, common sense, and spirit in an admirable blend and made an ideal negotiator for dealing with the Communists. Colonel Hickman was intelligent and capable, experienced in staff work, and provided added balance to the UNC team.[15]

After the credentials were presented, General Lee made the opening move. The prisoner of war issue could be settled very quickly, he declared, if all POW's were released and allowed to go home after the armistice. Provided that the conferees could agree upon this principle, Lee thought that everything else fell into the category of details and could be straightened out without too much trouble. But since, the UNC delegation was not authorized to start the substantive discussions until the enemy furnished current lists of prisoners, Libby ignored the Communist gambit. Instead he pressed for the exchange of POW information and for permission for the International Committee of the Red Cross representatives to visit the prisoner of war camps. In the preliminary sparring that followed, Libby hinted that the UNC general position on POW's was fashioned around a fair and equitable exchange of prisoners along with suitable supervision to insure that they received humane treatment and comfort until they were repatriated. Naturally, Libby told Lee, the U.N. Command desired to establish a priority for the transfer of sick and wounded prisoners.

Lee was interested in probing the significance of some of the vague terms that Libby had used in setting forth the UNC approach, but the admiral was not ready to get down to specifics at this stage. All that Lee found out was that a "fair and equitable exchange" meant that neither side should gain an undue military advantage over the other if hostilities resumed before a final peace settlement was concluded.[16]

After the first session was over, Admiral Joy informed Ridgway that it appeared that the Communists were going to support an all-for-all exchange and would oppose a one-for-one trade no matter how it might be modified.[17] At the moment, however, Ridgway was interested in supporting the visits of ICRC representatives to the camps and he was trying to marshal strong backing from his superiors. The latter were quite willing to have the U.N. Command secure such a concession from the enemy, but did not want the visits to become an issue.[18]

The next few days were spent in exploring and establishing the lines of battle. Libby concentrated his comments on the failure of the Communists to observe the Geneva Convention. Although the North Koreans had promised to comply with the Geneva rules in 1950, they had reported only 110 names of prison-

[15] Hickman later became the Army Judge Advocate General.

[16] Transcript of Proceedings, First Session, Subdelegation on item 4, 11 Dec 51, in FEC Subdelegation Mtgs, item 4, 11–25 Dec 51 (hereafter cited as FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. I).

[17] Msg, HNC 541, Joy to CINCUNC, 11 Dec 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 5, 1951, case 349.

[18] (1) Msg, CX 59155, Ridgway to JCS, 11 Dec 51. (2) Msg, JCS 89474, JCS to CINCFE, 12 Dec 51. Both in FEC 387.2, bk. 5, 1951, case 349.

ers taken during the early fighting and then ceased. The United Nations Command had been obliged to gather later POW information via Communist news media and radio broadcasts. Before the general problem of prisoners could be discussed intelligently, Libby maintained, the U.N. Command would have to know the names, locations, and nationalities of all the prisoners in enemy custody. He also reminded General Lee that the convention also provided for the visits of ICRC teams.

Lee was nothing loath to use the convention for his base of argument. The only difference was that he had his own favorite articles. First and foremost was Article 118 supporting all-for-all repatriation on a compulsory basis. There was no doubt of the Communist hostility to any suggestion of a one-for-one exchange and Lee sought doggedly to determine whether the U.N. Command intended to insist upon this. Despite Libby's successful evasion of debate, the enemy's position was very clear. On 12 December Lee followed up with a definite proposal featuring the acceptance by both sides of the all-for-all principle. Once this was conceded, the Communists were willing to provide POW lists and to carry out the actual transfer of prisoners at Panmunjom. They remained adamantly opposed to any visits by ICRC representatives, however, and Lee made it plain that these were " out of the question." [19]

In the absence of substantive discussions, the mid-December meetings were frequently devoted to assaults upon the opponent's position. Occasionally there was a lighter moment. Since the Communists admitted that the POW data were necessary yet refused to release them, Libby accused the Communists of wanting to take a bath without soap or water. Lee promptly retorted that they were ready with soap and water, but the U.N. Command would not get into the tub. The most important thing, Lee claimed, was to free the prisoners and not to worry too much about giving each other lists.[20] In any case both sides seemed eager to take the other to the cleaners; the big problem was to settle which one would be cleaned.

The Communists agreed to furnish POW data on 18 December. A four-day recess followed to allow both sides to check the information. For the U.N. Command the lists submitted by the enemy proved to be a definite disappointment. During the first months of the war, the Communists had reported via news releases and radio broadcasts the capture of over 65,000 prisoners. Yet their lists showed that they now held only 7,142 ROK soldiers and 4,417 U.N. personnel, or a total of 11,559 prisoners.[21] Since the ROK Army carried over 88,000 men missing in action and the United States over 11,500 in the same category, the discrepancy was particularly large. The disparity was even more striking when compared with the UNC record. Out of 188,000 men listed as missing by the Communists, the U.N. Command held over 132,000 prisoners of war and in addition had another 37,000 recently reclassified as civilian internees.

When the first shock over the small

[19] Transcripts of Proceedings, Second and Fourth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 12 and 14 Dec 51, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. I.

[20] *Ibid.*, Fifth Session, 15 Dec 51.

[21] The UNC POW list was broken down as follows: 3,198 U.S.; 234 Turkish; 10 French; 1 Dutch; 40 Filipino; 1 Greek; 4 South African; 919 U.K.; 6 Australian; 1 Canadian; and 3 "Japanese." The Japanese later proved to be U.S. citizens.

number of names listed by the Communists wore off, Admiral Joy and Ridgway decided to send a cold and factual letter to the enemy leaders requesting an explanation. Until they received an answer, the UNC delegation would attack the all-for-all plan and probe the enemy position fully. It would present no counterproposal.[22]

The Communists were not entirely satisfied with the United Nations lists either. When the meetings resumed on 22 December, General Lee charged that there were shortages of 44,259 names on one list and 1,456 on another. Libby explained that the bulk of the missing persons consisted of former residents of the Republic of Korea who had been taken prisoner under suspicious or hostile circumstances. During the spring of 1951 the U.N. Command had thoroughly screened its prisoners and discovered that a large number of them had been caught in the flow of war or had been impressed into the North Korean armed forces. Prisoners in these categories had been separated from those who had voluntarily joined the Communists and 37,000 had been reclassified as civilian internees. In addition, Libby went on, the U.N. Command was in the process of screening another 16,000 prisoners who had proven to be ROK citizens and these would not be repatriated either.

Branding Libby's arguments "cute and strange," Lee quickly protested this unilateral action. It was not the place of residence but the army in which a man served that determined whether he should be repatriated or not, Lee maintained.

Libby declined to debate the point and instead counterattacked in another quarter. Just how, he asked, did the Communists propose to justify the exchange of some ten thousand prisoners held by them for the hundred-odd thousand in UNC possession? Reminding Lee that General Hsieh in the Item 3 discussions had clearly stated that there should be no increase of military forces after the armistice, Libby charged that an all-for-all swap would add the equivalent of ten divisions to the Communist forces. Then, turning to the POW lists, he requested that Lee explain why only 7,142 ROK soldiers were included when the enemy had claimed that they had captured tens of thousands.[23]

From intelligence reports and POW interviews, the U.N. Command was well aware that the North Koreans had incorporated a large number of former ROK Army personnel into the Communist armed forces. Although the prospects for their return were not bright, Joy and Ridgway agreed that the UNC negotiators would at least attempt to get them back.[24] At the same time the demand for the onetime ROK Army members would serve as a counterweight to the enemy's request for the return of the 37,000 reclassified civilian internees.

Admiral Libby pressed the attack during the holiday meetings. He told Lee that the Communists had not reported all the prisoners that they held. This drew a hot denial from his opposite.

[22] (1) Msgs, HNC 605 and 607, Joy to CINCUNC, 20 and 21 Dec 51, in FEC Messages, Dec 51. (2) Msg, C 59779, Ridgway to CINCUNC (Adv), 21 Dec 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 5, 1951, case 385.

[23] Transcript of Proceedings, Ninth Session, Subdelegation on item 4, 22 Dec 51, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. I.

[24] Msg, HNC 618, Joy to CINCUNC, 22 Dec 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 5, 1951, case 396.

The lists were small, Lee declared, because his side had re-educated and released thousands of prisoners at the front. If this were true, Libby swiftly rejoined, why had only 177 returned to the UNC lines. He believed that the lists were small because so many ROK soldiers had been forced to join the Communist army. This was not so, Lee maintained, only volunteers were allowed to become members of their forces.[25]

During this exploratory period much of the wrangling centered about the apparent inability of either side to furnish the other with accurate information. The discrepancies between the numbers missing in action and those reported as prisoners by the Communists made the UNC delegation question the sincerity of the enemy lists. But the UNC was not blameless, since it had submitted more names of prisoners to the International Committee of the Red Cross at Geneva than it now had on hand. As it turned out, more than 2,000 POW's had been sent through the processing line twice and the later lack of co-operation shown by many Communist soldiers in providing identifying information had made it difficult to correct errors. Other enemy prisoners had escaped or disappeared, increasing the inconsistencies in the UNC figures. Recognizing the vulnerability of the UNC position as long as the variances persisted, Joy requested a complete audit of all POW's so that he could present an up-to-date, accurate, and complete list to the enemy.[26]

While this census was going on, Joy hoped to collect more information on the attitudes of the Chinese and North Korean prisoners toward repatriation and to find out how strongly the ROK Government felt about the recovery of ROK civilians in enemy custody.[27] Behind this search for knowledge lay the case for voluntary repatriation. Without an estimate of the numbers of enemy POW's who would refuse repatriation or of the reaction of the ROK officials toward the principle, the U.N. Command could place itself in an awkward and exposed position.

As the New Year began, Admiral Libby brought up the civilian internee question. Although this was a delicate matter, more political than military, General Lee had demonstrated at an earlier meeting that his side was not opposed to its inclusion. In the course of the discussion that followed the sides agreed that after the armistice was signed displaced civilians would be allowed to go to the area of their choice. Libby pressed his advantage. Since the military commanders would have the task of supervising the movement of the civilians, he argued successfully that the agreement should be written into the armistice stipulations.

Once this matter was settled, Libby was ready to present the first UNC substantive proposal. There were three major areas of disagreement to be resolved, he began. Both parties wanted all of the prisoners released, but the U.N. Command wished to do this under an equitable formula. Secondly, there was the

[25] Transcripts of Proceedings, Tenth through Seventeenth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 23–30 Dec 51, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vols. I and II.

[26] Msg, HNC 682, Joy to CINCUNC, 30 Dec 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, G–3 Jnl, 30 Dec 51, tab J–8.

[27] (1) Msg, HNC 619, CINCUNC (Adv) to CG EUSAK (Main), 22 Dec 51. (2) Msg, HNC 629 CINCUNC (Adv) to American Embassy Pusan, for Muccio, 23 Dec 51. Both in FEC Msgs Dec 51.

disposition of the ex-ROK soldiers who had been impressed into the North Korean Army. The United Nations Command desired all in this category returned to POW status. And lastly, there was the question of what standards to use in determining to which side a prisoner belonged: the UNC claimed that the place of residence should be the deciding factor and the Communists maintained that the army in which a man served when captured should establish his nationality.

The U.N. Command proposed to solve these differences, Libby continued, by a fair compromise. It would accept the concept advanced and advocated by the Communists that a soldier who becomes a prisoner can, upon his "release," exercise his individual option as to whether he will return to his own army or join the other side. The UNC wished to extend this principle to all prisoners, military and civilian. To supervise the interviews of the prisoners, Libby suggested the ICRC. All POW's in excess of the one-for-one exchange would be paroled and could not fight against their captor again. None of those who refused repatriation would be allowed to bear arms against the other side, Libby concluded.[28]

It was neatly done. Since the Communists had permitted the ROK troops captured in the early stages of the war to join the North Korean forces or to choose release at the front, they had practiced voluntary repatriation. At that time it had been to their advantage to swell their ranks and to lighten the burden of guarding large numbers of prisoners. Now this policy was being turned against them. They had provided the United Nations Command with a propaganda lever and with only a comparatively small bag of prisoners to bargain with, the Communists were placed at a distinct disadvantage. If a large proportion of the prisoners in UNC hands refused to return to communism, the adverse publicity would be hard to combat, no matter how it was rationalized. Unusual as the doctrine of voluntary repatriation might be, its humanitarian aspects were bound to appeal to a large part of the world. Only on legal grounds could the principle be freely attacked and whether this would be successful in the face of world opinion was a matter for conjecture.

Obversely, the United States and its allies were now officially linked with voluntary repatriation. Although it was in the nature of trial marriage, the possibility existed that once public opinion had been marshaled in its support divorce might prove to be out of the question.

### *The Communists Reject Voluntary Repatriation*

The first reaction of the Communists to the UNC proposal of 2 January was not unexpected. On the following morning Lee led the assault. Calling the plan "absurd," he insisted that it was a one-for-one exchange. In his complete rejection of the proposal, Lee waxed eloquent. "The release and repatriation of prisoners of war is not a trade of slaves," he charged, nor was the twentieth century "the barbarous age of slavery." He paid no attention to Libby's explanations nor to the admiral's barbed references to the inconsistencies of the

[28] Transcripts of Proceedings, Nineteenth and Twentieth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 1–2 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. II.

Communist position in attacking a policy that they themselves had introduced in the Korean War.[29]

But Libby was not easily put off. He twitted Lee for his concern over the possible defection of the Chinese Communist soldiers. After all, he reminded Lee, the Chinese troops were all volunteers according to the enemy's own avowals and part of "an army composed entirely of men eager to fight for the Korean People's Army." If this were true, Libby went on, he could not understand why the Communists were worried about any of these volunteers not wanting to go back home. When Lee refused to rise to this bait, and persisted in branding the UNC proposal a slave trade, Libby became ironic. "Your analysis is faulty, your arguments are specious, and your conclusions are wrong," he told Lee, "outside of that it was a nice piece of work." [30]

Despite the spirited accusations of the Communists, Admiral Joy detected a ray of hope behind the façade. He noted that although they had termed the UNC proposal too unreasonable to discuss, they had soon begun to argue its merits.[31]

In the subdelegation meetings, Admiral Libby tried to dispel some of the hostility of General Lee by careful explanation of the UNC proposal of 2 January. But the detailed statements had little effect upon the Communist delegate. As January wore on, Lee became more abusive in his attacks and Libby had to rebuke him several times for his slurring remarks about Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai-shek, and the United Nations Command.[32]

It did no good to point out the incongruities of the Communist opposition to voluntary repatriation after they had introduced and practiced the principle. Lee had no hesitation in accusing the U.N. Command of educating the POW's politically to influence their choice even though he had admitted at an earlier meeting that the Communists had re-educated many UNC prisoners and then released them at the front. On the other hand, even Lee could see the somewhat distorted humor in his own arguments at times. At the meeting on 11 January as he defended the Communist system of prisoner education and called it righteous and benevolent, he become so convulsed with laughter that he could scarcely finish his remarks.[33]

When Libby charged that the North Koreans had impressed thousands of ROK soldiers into their army, Lee denied it vehemently. He asserted with a straight face that only volunteers could serve in the Communist forces. And despite the fact that the enemy had violated the Geneva Convention many times since the war began, the Communists extracted the last measure of benefit in propaganda and argument from the provisions that favored their own positions and blithely ignored the rest.[34]

There was little progress made on Item 4 during mid-January. The efforts

[29] *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Session, 3 Jan 52.

[30] *Ibid.*, Twenty-second and Twenty-third Sessions, 4–5 Jan 52.

[31] Msgs, HNC 715 and 716, Joy to CINCUNC, 4 Jan 52, in FEC Msgs, Jan 52.

[32] Transcripts of Proceedings, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 6–7 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. II.

[33] Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (Jul 51–May 52), vol. 2, ch. III, p. 50.

[34] Transcripts of Proceedings, Twenty-sixth and Thirty-first Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 8 and 13 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vols. II and III.

of Admiral Libby to indicate the advantages that would accrue to the Communists if they accepted the UNC proposals were regarded with deep suspicion by General Lee. He reminded Libby that the U.N. Command was not doing any favors for the Communists and could not without betraying its own cause and interest.[35] When Libby confirmed the Communist apprehension that the Chinese POW's would be allowed to choose between Communist China and Nationalist China, Colonel Tsai became very agitated. The Chinese people, he declared, "will never tolerate it and will fight to the end." [36] Under questioning, Tsai refused to state whether he was speaking for the Chinese Volunteers in Korea or all the Chinese people.

In view of the static condition of the negotiations, General Ridgway requested that the JCS approve a final position for the UNC delegation. But all that the JCS could provide was a quasi-final position. On 15 January they authorized Ridgway to agree to an all-for-all exchange provided that no forceful return of POW's would be required. However, since this position would be taken only as a last resort and since public pressure might influence the President to modify this stand in the interim, there was in reality nothing conclusive to the JCS instructions. The UNC delegation was to continue its attempts to secure an agreement on the return of selected U.N. and ROK civilians held by the Communists. To convince the enemy that the U.N. Command was not using voluntary repatriation as a pretext for holding on to most of the prisoners the possibility was suggested that Ridgway might conduct, under ICRC supervision, a poll of the POW's to discover the approximate number desiring repatriation. It was also proposed that at the proper moment Ridgway might transfer the POW problem back to the plenary conference and present a trade to the enemy—the U.N. Command conceding on the airfield issue while the Communists agreed to the UNC prisoner proposal.[37] This was the first indication of the package deal that was to be drawn up in April.

In his reply on 19 January the U.N. commander agreed that it might be possible to combine unresolved issues once these could be reduced to a minimum. He did not favor a poll of the prisoners since he believed that one of the strongest points of the UNC proposal was that the POW choice would be expressed at the exchange point in the presence of representatives of both sides and of neutral observers. As the UNC delegation had denied the existence of any program to influence or coerce the decision of the POW's, the Communists might very well seize upon the poll as a means of prejudicing the prisoners' choice and refuse to accept the results. If the International Committee of the Red Cross conducted the poll, the enemy would have further cause to impugn its neutrality. There was little doubt that the Communists already regarded the ICRC as a UNC agent and not as a neutral body anyway. Besides, Ridgway concluded, he and his staff did not think that the enemy had any real concern about the numbers of prisoners who might return to them, "it is the principle which is anathema to

[35] *Ibid.*, Thirty-second Session, 14 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. III.

[36] *Ibid.*, Thirty-fourth Session, 16 Jan 52.

[37] Msg, JCS 92059, JCS to CINCFE, 15 Jan 52.

them since the question of the individual versus the state is the essential difference between democracy and communism." [38]

To listen to General Lee as he denounced the UNC proposal in the subdelegation meetings as immoral and inhumanitarian might have confused the casual observer into believing that the Communists were the ones who were concerned over the plight of the individual. But when Admiral Libby asked him to cite an example, he dodged the question deftly and after a long speech wound up asking a couple of questions of his own. The exchange that followed illustrated the tenor of the conversations and the Communist technique.

Admiral Libby: "You are extremely adept at refusing to give a direct answer to any question which our side asks; you are also extremely adept at capping your refusal to answer a question with two or three questions of your own, and then insisting that we must answer them. That is typical of the whole spirit with which your side approaches these negotiations. You have made blanket charges against our proposal: that it is immoral, that it is inhumanitarian, that it is unfair, and that it is unreasonable. When we attempt to pin you down, to get you to show how in the simplest case—in any one particular—our proposal is any one of these things, you wiggle out of it, you will not answer. You will not answer because you can not answer. . . .

General Lee: "One thing we have found through the meeting is that when you try to delay the time of the meeting, you say we did not give any answer, although we really have given one; and when we shrewdly pursue any question, you say we make a smoke screen. . . . This seems to be your only weapon and this is a special stunt which you alone have. . . . But we have a sound standpoint. We love truth and righteousness and standing upon the truth, we do our work; and from righteousness and truth, we speak and insist.[39]

Whether the Communists were standing on the truth or trampling it was unimportant, for the key fact was that they would not recognize the principle of voluntary repatriation. They argued steadfastly and with considerable justice that it was in conflict with the Geneva Convention. To provide Admiral Libby with some counterarguments, the State Department forwarded its interpretation of the convention on 22 January. Under Article 6, it pointed out, parties to a conflict could make special agreements covering prisoners of war as long as the prisoners were not deprived of their rights under the rest of the convention. Since the spirit of the convention was to protect individuals, the State Department felt that voluntary repatriation was not inconsistent with its provisions.[40] Thus, there was some legal as well as abundant humanitarian justification for the UNC position in the interpretation of the State Department.

The Communists not only opposed voluntary repatriation, but strongly challenged the parole features of the UNC proposal. Since all the prisoners who would be paroled belonged to the Communists, the enemy delegates claimed that it was a unilateral requirement upon their side. Admiral Joy was inclined to agree with them and suggested that there were two possible solutions. Either he could be given authority to extend the parole feature to both sides to guarantee that repatriated POW's would not be

[38] Msg, CX 61829, Ridgway to JCS, 19 Jan 52, DA-IN 2276.

[39] Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-first Session, Subdelegation on item 4, 23 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. III.

[40] Msg, JCS 92490, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Jan 52.

permitted or compelled to bear arms against the other side or he should be allowed to drop the parole feature entirely from the UNC position. Since the ROK Government opposed the paroling of prisoners and the Communists probably would not let the detail stop them from reusing their recovered personnel, General Ridgway agreed that Joy could delete the requirements at his own discretion.[41]

Actually concession even on minor matters was contrary to Admiral Joy's usual stand. Both he and Ridgway felt that the enemy regarded concessions as signs of weakness. In a published interview in late January 1952, Joy declared that patience and unmistakable firmness backed by applied military power were the elements that influenced the Communists. In the presence of a military stalemate, he was doing his best to negotiate an effective and stable armistice. But unless the enemy had a change of heart voluntarily, sufficient military force would have to be applied to induce such a change, Joy maintained.[42]

One of the stumbling blocks in the path of the UNC negotiators during January had been the inability to present the Communists with a complete and accurate list of the prisoners in its hands. The normal delays occasioned by the necessity to check over a hundred thousand men and women were compounded by the technical failure of the mimeographing machines which turned out illegible copies of the lists. With the enemy delegates constantly reminding Admiral Libby of the UNC promise to produce a corrected roster, the admiral in turn sought to apply the pressure upon Eighth Army headquarters to supply the data. But it was not until January 28 that Libby was able to hand over the new lists. According to these, there were 20,720 Chinese, and 111,360 Koreans, or a total of 132,080 prisoners in U.N. custody. This was less than the 13 December roster, but the 394-man differential was due to reclassifications to civilian internees, Libby explained. He also told Lee that the U.N. Command had completed work on the 44,000 reclassified civilian internees and was ready to exchange this information on 72-hour notice if and when the enemy would agree to supply similar data on the 65,000 prisoners captured by them.[43]

Although Lee ignored the last offer, he did begin to demonstrate some signs of resuming negotiations. On 3 February he introduced a Communist counterproposal, designed to meet most of the UNC requirements except on the voluntary repatriation issue. The enemy was willing to promise that none of the POW's would again take part in acts of war and to allow the ICRC representatives along with Chinese and North Korean Red Cross members to attend the camps, but held steadfastly to an all-for-all exchange.[44]

Recognizing a more co-operative attitude across the table, Libby tried to set-

[41] (1) Msg, HNC 785, Joy to CINCUNC, 22 Jan 52. (2) Msg, CX 62010, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 23 Jan 52. Both in FEC Msgs, Jan 52.

[42] An interview with Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, "Russia Calls the Turn in Korea—Chinese do the Arguing," in *U.S. News and World Report* (January 25, 1952), pp. 24–25. See also Msg C 62217, Ridgway to JCS, 25 Jan 5, DA–IN 4540.

[43] Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-sixth Session, Subdelegation on item 4, 28 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. IV.

[44] Communist Proposal of 3 Feb, incl to Transcript of Proceedings, Fifty-second Session, Subdelegation on item 4, 3 Feb 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. IV.

tle some of the details. He told Lee that the parole item should be made less ambiguous. First, it should apply solely to soldiers and not civilians, and secondly the agreement should pertain only to the Korean War since some of the soldiers were professionals and forbidding them to engage in acts of war in the future would deprive them of their living. Libby suggested that the staff officers get together and work out the particulars. On 5 February Lee consented. He also agreed that the parole feature should bind only the soldiers and be valid just for the Korean War, but warned the UNC delegation again that the Communists would not accept the ICRC as a neutral agency.[45]

As the staff officers conferences began on 6 February, Admiral Joy submitted a candid report on Item 4. The delegation felt that the Communists would not offer additional lists of prisoners, but thought that the U.N. Command could assure that it received back all on the present rosters by giving itself ninety days to dispose of its larger holdings of POW's while granting the enemy only thirty days to return the smaller numbers in Communist custody. Provided the U.N. Command was willing to accept the good faith of the enemy as sufficient guarantee, the delegation thought that provision for the return of all ROK civilians who lived south of the present line of demarcation and wanted to be repatriated could be written into the armistice agreement. As for the ex-ROK soldiers now serving in the North Korean Army, Joy and his staff held that this was a hopeless cause and asked for permission to drop the matter at an appropriate moment.[46] Washington officials concurred, but stipulated that agreements on the return of both Korean and U.N. civilians be written into the armistice terms regardless of whether specific safeguards were included.[47]

It was evident from Joy's report and from staff conversations with the admiral that he had little confidence that the Communists would conclude a satisfactory armistice in the near future. Not only did he believe that the enemy would never concede on voluntary repatriation, but he also felt that the U.N. was on unsound ground in insisting upon the principle. Most prisoners in his opinion surrendered because they were hungry, poorly equipped, or out of ammunition and not because they were promised nonrepatriation. Joy thought that now that the Communists had stabilized positions, good supplies, food, equipment, and ammunition, they would be content to maintain the *status quo* and negotiate as long as time seemed to be operating to their advantage. In the past the negotiations had been influenced by considerations other than military even though they were basically a military matter. Until the armistice effort concentrated upon a direct and simple approach to resolve the remaining issues, Joy did not feel that it woud be successful. And if the direct effort failed, he still was convinced that the negotiations should be terminated.[48]

[45] Transcripts of Proceedings, Fifty-third and Fifty-fourth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 4 and 5 Feb 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. IV.

[46] Msg, CX 63013, CINCUNC to JCS, 6 Feb 52, DA–IN 102022.

[47] Msg, JCS 900383, JCS to CINCUNC (Adv) for Ridgway, 6 Feb 52.

[48] Msg, OT 577, Col James R. Davidson to DA, 12 Feb 52, DA–IN 104519.

As voluntary repatriation threatened to stall progress at Panmunjom, General McClure, one of the founding fathers of the doctrine, suggested a new approach which would avoid the term completely. The U.N. Command would agree to an all-for-all exchange but since there were many prisoners who claimed they were impressed or did not live in an area controlled by the Communists, and others who might claim political asylum, prisoners in these categories would be held and the matter referred to the governments concerned under Item 5 as essentially political rather than military. McClure thought that this suggestion might allow the Communists to save face and should be broached on the staff officer level.[49]

Another avenue was explored in Washington during the early part of 1952 that offered a more daring solution to the nonrepatriate problem. When Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl D. Johnson and Vice Chief of Staff General John E. Hull were in Tokyo in mid-February, they broached to General Ridgway the concept of unilateral release of all nonrepatriates. Once the prisoners were freed, the U.N. Command could present the Communists with a *fait accompli* and then attempt to ride out the storm of protests that would follow. This plan also had the advantage of allowing the enemy to save face. But Ridgway was not yet ready to abandon the old approach. He looked with disfavor upon schemes to reclassify and release certain categories unilaterally. Although he still was not enthusiastic about screening the prisoners before they were about to be exchanged, if it had to be done he preferred a quick, single-day screening that would be done openly. Each prisoner would be informed that the choice would be final and segregated as soon as he made it.[50]

Before he resorted to screening, Ridgway wanted to try and trade off the rehabilitation of airfields for voluntary repatriation. If this failed, he would go ahead and screen the prisoners and then propose an all-for-all exchange of the remaining POW's. Were the Communists to insist, he would grant the airfield rehabilitation as a final concession. In his opinion, the linking of the issues would permit a breaking off of the negotiations to occur over two points rather than one.[51]

Ridgway's chief objection to the ideas advanced for the release of the prisoners who indicated that they would forcibly resist repatriation stemmed from his belief that subterfuge at this time would nullify the prestige that the UNC had won in supporting voluntary repatriation. He feared that the UNC might be accused of treachery and deceit such as had characterized the enemy's dealings and that the lives of the prisoners in Communist hands might be endangered. Under the circumstances he recommended that voluntary repatriation and airfields be presented in one package and then if the enemy refused to accept the former, the UNC should be author-

[49] Memo for Rcd, by Gen McClure, sub: POW Exchange, 16 Feb 52, in G–3 383.6, sec. I, 4.

[50] Suggestions that the nonrepatriate prisoners be released unilaterally to break the deadlock were advanced several times during the last year and a half of the war and were always disapproved. See below, Chapters VIII, XII, and XVII; also Vatcher, *Panmunjom*, pp. 157–58.

[51] Memo for Rcd (sgd M. B. Ridgway), 19 Feb 52, no sub, in G–3 383.6, 5/1.

ized to announce its final position on no forced repatriation.[52]

Despite the arguments of Ridgway, the President decided to go ahead with the plan to remove from POW status the prisoners that might be expected to resist repatriation violently because of their fear of the consequences if they returned to enemy control.[53] If the Communists rejected a voluntary repatriation–airfield trade, Ridgway would remove the names of the violent resisters from the POW lists and indicate that the UNC was willing to agree to an all-for-all exchange on the basis of the revised list.[54] This would be the final U.S. position and one full of intriguing possibilities if it were used, for it would mean that the U.N. Command would be utilizing the enemy's own tactics in handling the prisoner of war problem unilaterally. How the Communists would react to this turnabout was unknown, but one thing was certain—they would protest loudly and at length.

By the first of March, the negotiations on Item 4 had been narrowed to one issue—voluntary or forced repatriation. The details of the exchange would be easily settled as soon as this principle was decided. But the Communists gave no sign that their adamant opposition to any form of voluntary repatriation—no matter how it was disguised—was weakening. The UNC position, too, had hardened during January and February. Although the ideal objective of full voluntary repatriation seemed unattainable, the UNC delegation had finally received the support of the U.S. policy makers to hold out firmly for no forced repatriation and had been further armed by authority to effect a unilateral release of nonrepatriates. Now it appeared to be a question of whether the irresistible force or the immovable object or perhaps both would have to give way.

[52] Msg, C 64383, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Feb 52, DA-IN 109858.

[53] (1) Msg, JCS 902159, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Feb 52. (2) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 5 Feb 52, sub: Armistice Negotiations in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 15.

[54] Memo, Maj Gen Clyde D. Eddleman for CofS, 4 Mar 52, sub: Status of Korean Armistice Negotiations as of 4 March, in G-3 091, Korea, 23.

# CHAPTER VIII

# The Package Proposal

The dramatic development of the prisoner of war issue during the winter months tended to obscure the questions of a more technical nature confronting the two delegations at Panmunjom. Human emotions were involved in the fate of the men confined behind the barbed wire, while the matter of airfield construction and rehabilitation appeared dull and prosaic in comparison. Yet the struggle in the conference tent over Item 3 was every bit as spirited as the dispute over the prisoners; for the delegates of both sides were also military technicians. They understood only too well that the disposition of the prisoners of war was a transient problem which would be short-lived no matter which way it was finally decided. The keeping of the truce, on the other hand, seemed likely to become a long-term affair that might plague the Korean scene for years to come. Under these conditions it seemed essential to assure that adequate safeguards and guarantees were written into the armistice agreement.

## *Narrowing the Issues*

By mid-December the discussion on Item 3 had disclosed the main areas of disagreement. First and foremost among these was the knotty question of airfields which had engendered the bulk of the arguments. And close behind lay the matter of rotation, the composition of the neutral nations observer teams, and the number of ports that were to be permitted to handle rotation and replenishment of men and supplies. These promised to be the most difficult to settle, since the positions taken by the two sides were so far apart.

It was at this juncture that the UNC delegation lost another of its capable spokesmen. General Hodes was given another assignment just a few days after Admiral Burke had been transferred. Able and tough, the two men had worked well together and proved themselves competent to match the best that the enemy had to offer in the negotiations. Instead of Hodes, General Ferenbaugh, who had been serving his apprenticeship for several weeks, joined General Turner on 17 December as a full-fledged delegate.[1] It was a difficult task that faced the new Army representative for he not only had to replace General Hodes but also had to contend with the best man on the Communist team —the sometimes profane but always efficient General Hsieh.

[1] Ferenbaugh had served with the Operations Division of the General Staff and as an assistant division commander of the 83d Division in World War II. In January 1951 he had taken over as commander of the 7th Division in Korea. Ferenbaugh's experience with political affairs during his tenure on the General Staff provided him with a good background for handling the negotiations.

In the skirmishes that had taken place so far the U.N. Command had adopted an adamant position against the construction or rehabilitation of airfields and the Communists had refused to listen to any argument imposing restrictions on their freedom to do as they pleased in this matter. Several times during the debates in the latter half of December, Hsieh had intimated that his side would be willing to forget its objections to rotation and replenishment if the U.N. Command would reciprocate on the airfield issue, but his hints fell upon barren ground.[2]

In an attempt to break the impasse, the negotiators briefly turned the problem over to their staff officers for several days to see if they could narrow the differences in a less formal atmosphere, but this proved to be a futile hope.[3] The arrival of the thirty-day limit on the line of demarcation on 27 December was marked by no significant change in the negotiations or on the battlefield. It appeared that the forebodings that the line might become a permanent one until an armistice was signed were well founded.

Toward the end of December the United Nations Command offered a concession. If the Communists would accept the restrictions on airfields, the UNC would forego aerial observation and photoreconnaissance flights. The enemy reaction seemed to sustain the oft-repeated complaints of Ridgway and Joy over the unwisdom of giving the Communists an opportunity to get something for nothing. Hsieh accepted the concession most willingly, but would not budge in his stand on the airfields. Furthermore, he told Turner frankly: "you want to sit on top of other people's heads, and when you come down from that position you say that is a concession on your part."[4] The implication that the U.N. Command had simply receded from an unreasonable and untenable position rather than offered something of value was plain. In Admiral Joy's opinion, the weakening of the UNC position merely hardened the enemy's determination to secure further concession on the airfield issue.[5]

The Communists were well advised on this score, for during the latter part of December, there had been a steady deterioration in the United Nations resolution to insist upon a strict limitation of airfield construction and rehabilitation. This could be traced to the growing reliance on the part of the United States upon a "broader sanction" declaration to be issued as soon as an armistice was signed.[6] As the emphasis shifted from dependence upon control of local conditions in Korea to the threat of a larger war if the armistice were violated, the airfield question became less important, especially since it was recognized that it would be difficult if not impossible to prevent the enemy from rehabilitating and building airfields once the armistice went into effect.

To General Ridgway this trend was disturbing. He failed to see how the U.N. Command could pose a deterrent threat to a later outbreak of hostilities if the enemy were permitted to strengthen

[2] Transcripts of Proceedings, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 3, 19–20 Dec 51, in FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol. II.

[3] *Ibid.*, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Sessions, 20 and 22 Dec 51.

[4] *Ibid.*, Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth Sessions, 29 Dec 51 and 2 Jan 52.

[5] Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, pp. 123–24.

[6] See Chapter VI, above.



THE UNC DELEGATES, DECEMBER 1951. *Left to right: General Turner, Admiral Libby, and General Ferenbaugh.*

its air capabilities at will while the UNC air power remained static or decreased. He felt that the Communists sensed the lack of a firm and final UNC position on airfields and that newspaper reports from the United States intimating that the U.N. Command was considering further concessions did not help the situation.[7]

Ridgway's brief for a hard and fast stand was too late. On 10 January the U.S. military and political leaders informed him that his final position would be the omission of any prohibition on airfield construction or rehabilitation if the issue became the sole obstacle to an armistice. But until the Communists showed that this would be their breaking point, there should be no open concession. As a suggestion they urged that the delegations settle all the other matters outstanding under Items 3, 4, and 5 and defer further discussion of airfields until then. At that time, the U.N. Command could drop the airfields requirements if the Communists would sign the armistice. In this way, they argued, the concession could soon be followed by the U.N. declaration including the "broader sanction" of an expanded war. The

[7] Msg, C 60961, Ridgway to DA, 7 Jan 52, DA–IN 17600.

issuance of the declaration should counteract the propaganda value that the enemy might attempt to gain from the UNC retreat on airfields.[8]

With considerable misgivings, Ridgway agreed. He did not have the confidence that his superiors possessed in the possible effectiveness of the U.N. declaration, but he proposed to shunt the airfield question aside if the enemy would consent. Under the present conditions, he was extremely dubious that the Communists would neglect to press their advantage. Anticipating further concessions, he believed that they would refuse to take up new topics until the matter was settled.[9]

There were no immediate effects of the Washington instructions in the tent at Panmunjom, for an opportune moment had to be selected for the presentation of the UNC proposal. In the meantime, the arguments between Turner and Ferenbaugh on the one hand and the wily Hsieh on the other continued. The latter stood foursquare behind the slogan "no interference in internal affairs" whenever the UNC delegates brought up airfields. Hsieh's concern over the invasion of North Korea's sovereign rights led Turner to question his sincerity. Since the North Korean air force was depleted, whose sovereign rights was Hsieh interested in—North Korea's or China's, Turner asked. The Chinese general ignored the question.[10]

On 9 January the Communist delegation introduced a new version of Item 3 that was closer to the objectives that the U.N. Command sought. But as a matter of tactics Turner attacked the weak points and omissions in the enemy's proposal. He could not understand, he told Hsieh, why the Communists were willing to allow the neutral nations observation teams to inspect behind the lines—a clear case of internal interference in his opinion—and yet balked at airfield restrictions. But Hsieh could see no inconsistency in the two matters. The neutral nations were acceptable as a measure to stave off foreign interference, he maintained.

There was no provision for restrictions upon airfields in the Communist version, but it did permit replenishment of military personnel, aircraft, weapons, and ammunition as long as there were no increases. Since this had been the UNC contention from the beginning, Turner quickly took a leaf from Hsieh's book and termed this provision no concession at all, but merely recognition of the justness and reasonableness of the UNC stand. Although Turner turned down the Communist offering because it ignored the airfield issue, the area of dispute was growing smaller.[11] The enemy's withdrawal from a firm antireplenishment position served to compensate for the UNC surrender of aerial inspection and photoreconnaissance and indicated that there was still room to bargain on Item 3 as long as the discussion avoided airfields.

In any event there was a gradual shift in the UNC drive to secure modification of the enemy attitude during mid-Janu-

[8] Msgs, JCS 91600, and JCS 91606 to CINCFE, 10 Jan 52.

[9] Msg, C 61348, Ridgway to JCS, 13 Jan 52, DA–IN 19740.

[10] Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-fifth Session, Subdelegation Mtg on item 3, 8 Jan 52, in FEC Subdelegation Mtgs on item 3, 8 Jan–19 Apr 52, vol. III (hereafter cited as FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol. III).

[11] *Ibid.*, Thirty-sixth Session, 9 Jan 52.

ary. The UNC delegates directed their fire at the Communist motives in insisting upon freedom to rebuild their airfields, but the attempts to pin down General Hsieh were unsuccessful. He insisted that an agreement not to introduce any reinforcing aircraft into Korea covered the UNC objections yet refused to state categorically that the Communists would not increase their military air capability during an armistice. This placed the matter in the realm of good faith and since the U.N. Command was unwilling to lean on so slim a reed, little progress was made.[12]

Hsieh was not content to remain on the defensive, however, for he vigorously attacked the UNC concept that the balance of military capabilities in Korea should be maintained after the armistice. It was a familiar argument urging that the state of war should be eliminated entirely and all foreign forces withdrawn from Korea; still, on the surface at least, it sounded reasonable. The Chinese general asserted that it would be impossible to retain the *status quo* during a truce since the U.N. Command was already engaged in increasing its postarmistice strength by expanding the ROK Army.[13] Hsieh did not mention that the Communists were engaged in the same task with the North Korean forces, but he had a point.

In late January, the U.N. Command decided that the time was propitious to turn the problem of working out the details on Item 3 over to the staff officers. This would permit further discussion of airfields to be postponed as the Washington leaders had suggested and allow the negotiation of some of the minor differences to be given more attention. Hsieh agreed on 27 January that the subdelegation should recess until the staff officers finished their efforts.[14] If the latter could eliminate all issues except the question of airfields, the U.N. Command would then be in a better position to offer a final trade.

### *Settlement of Item 5*

As the staff officers began their meetings, General Ridgway and Admiral Joy determined to suggest simultaneous discussion of Item 5 of the agenda. It will be remembered that this had been simply stated in July as "Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides." The was intentionally vague, since the United States had no desire to commit itself in advance on political matters beyond the purview of the military armistice.

In early December General Ridgway and his staff had drawn up an initial position that hewed closely to the July formula. Each side would recommend to the governments concerned a political conference to discuss appropriate matters left unsolved by the armistice agreement. This was a nice indefinite proposal that would bind no one.[15]

Two weeks later, the President and his advisors decided that mention should

[12] *Ibid.*, Thirty-seventh through Forty-fifth Sessions, 10 Jan–18 Jan 52. During the 18 January meeting, Hsieh became quite profane again, but the U.N.C delegates had come to realize that his bark was worse than his bite and paid little heed.

[13] *Ibid.*, Forty-sixth and Fifty-first Sessions, 14 Jan and 24 Jan 52.

[14] (1) Msg, C 62064, Ridgway to Collins, 23 Jan 52, DA–IN 3851. (2) Transcripts of Proceedings, Fifty-second and Fifty-fourth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 3, 25 and 27 Jan 52, in FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol. III.

[15] Msg, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 5 Dec 51, DA–IN 7008.



GENERAL YU CHAE HEUNG, GENERAL HARRISON, AND ADMIRAL JOY *at Panmunjom.*

be made of the unification of Korea under an independent, democratic government, and they instructed Ridgway to include this in his first approach to the Communists. If the enemy insisted upon a reference to the withdrawal of foreign troops, they authorized the Far East commander to put it in.[16] They cautioned him a few days later, however, not to make any commitment on the countries that would participate in the political conference nor on the form or forum of the discussions.[17] These details would be left open to settlement on a political level after the armistice was signed.

Ridgway initially did not question these instructions, but by the end of January he had some second thoughts. Suppose the Communists tried to insert the names of the countries that would take part in the political talks, he asked his superiors, should he reject all names or accept only the North Korean and Chinese Communist Governments? And since the enemy probably would press for the inclusion of a ninety-day time limit for calling a conference, the U.N. commander felt that he could make the U.N.

[16] Msg, JCS 90083, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Dec 51.
[17] Msg, JCS 90388, JCS to CINCFE, 24 Dec 51.

proposal more palatable to the Communists by anticipating this move.[18] The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs had no objection to the latter suggestion, but they were still reluctant to have names of countries mentioned in the agreement. If it became necessary, on the other hand, they conceded that the recommendation to take steps at a political level to deal with matters unresolved by the military armistice might be addressed to the specific states concerned. The Soviet Union would be addressed only as a member of the United Nations and not as an individual government.[19]

Thus, on the eve of the reconvening of the plenary conference in early February, the United States position on Item 5 was extremely cautious. Since the outlook for an early and satisfactory solution of the political situation in Korea did not appear to be encouraging, the American political and military leaders preferred to go very slowly and to operate on an opportunistic basis. Foreseeing a long and involved struggle with the Communists over Korea's future, they favored a flexible approach with few or no advance commitments. Under these conditions, if no final arrangement could be reached, the chances for working out a *modus vivendi* would be improved.

The Communists had insisted that the principles involved in Item 5 be taken up in a plenary session, and on 6 February the full delegation met once again. Joy presented two new members of the UNC group, Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., and Maj. Gen. Yu Chae Heung, to General Nam. Harrison replaced General Ferenbaugh and Yu took the place of Gen. Lee Hyung Koon.[20]

As soon as the amenities were disposed of, Nam introduced the Communist solution to Item 5. He proposed that within three months after the armistice was signed, each side should appoint five representatives to hold a political conference. As for the topics to be discussed, Nam listed three: 1. withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea; 2. specific recommendations for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question; and 3. other problems related to peace in Korea.[21]

After a three-day recess the U.N. Command made its counterproposal. Since Ridgway felt that the differences between the two sides were not large, he recommended that the UNC version adopt as much of the Communist wording as possible and the JCS agreed. Nevertheless, reference to five representatives was eliminated and the withdrawal of "foreign troops" became "non-Korean troops." Under the third topic the Communists had listed for discussion, the U.N. Command had changed the wording so that it now read, "Other Korean questions related to peace." The Republic of Korea was named along with the United Nations as an addressee for the recommendation of the military commanders and the portion pertaining to the political conference was made more vague.[22]

[18] Msg, CX 62465, Ridgway to JCS, 30 Jan 52, DA-IN 6207.

[19] Msg, JCS 900075, JCS to CINCFE, 1 Feb 52.

[20] General Harrison was the deputy commander of the Eighth Army. He had served in the Operations Division of the General Staff and as assistant division commander of the 30th Division during World War II and on the staff of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, in the postwar period. General Yu was Vice Chief of Staff of the ROK Army.

[21] Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-sixth Session, Mtgs on the Mil Armistice Conf, 6 Feb 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. III.

[22] *Ibid.*, Thirty-seventh Session, 9 Feb 52.

Most of these changes were minor but the Communists preferred their own proposal and a week's debate ensued. The U.N. Command made it clear that it did not intend to recommend that the political authorities discuss any matter not directly related to Korea since this lay outside the UNC province. When the Communists complained that the U.N. Command did not represent all the United Nations and that use of this term would be incorrect, Joy countered that the Chinese Volunteers did not represent the People's Republic of China either. He told Nam that the UNC was willing to drop all references to specific governments in the recommendations if the enemy so desired.[23]

Finally on 16 February, the Communists brought forth a revised proposal:

> In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the government of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

With the understanding that "foreign" meant non-Korean forces and that "etc." did not pertain to matters outside of Korea, the U.N. Command accepted the Communist version *in toto* on 17 February.[24]

As Joy informed General Ridgway, the Communist statement afforded the wide latitude desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and could be interpreted in almost any fashion since at best it was only a recommendation.[25]

It had only taken eleven days to reach an agreement on Item 5—by far the best record of all. Even the agenda had taken longer. Perhaps because of its very vagueness, both sides could easily accept such a noncommittal statement since in essence it settled nothing and promised little. If it later became inconvenient or unnecessary, it could be ignored. On the other hand, if both sides found it worth pursuing, a conference could be called. Regardless of the meaninglessness of Item 5, three items were now out of the way. But the discussion on Items 3 and 4 showed no signs of a imminent meeting of the minds and they were the most important of all.

### *The Horse Traders*

Since the perplexing problem of airfields had been temporarily shelved, the staff officers on Item 3 were able to concentrate on the less troublesome details in late January. Cols. Don O. Darrow and Kinney of the Air Force and Lt. Col. Howard S. Levie of the Army had to cope with Colonel Chang of the North Korean Army and Col. Pu Shan of the Chinese Communist forces—all in all a very competent group of officers.

To get these informal talks under way, the UNC delegation had prepared a draft armistice covering all the topics to be considered under Item 3. Actually there were four main areas that the UNC

[23] *Ibid.*, Thirty-eighth through Fortieth Session, 9–12 Feb 52.

[24] *Ibid.*, Forty-first and Forty-second Sessions, 16–17 Feb 52.

[25] Msg, HNC 924, Joy to CINCUNC, 16 Feb 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, an. 1, case 58.

staff officers hoped to settle: rotation; the number of ports to handle rotation and replenishment; the composition of the neutral nations' supervisory organ and inspection teams; and the control of coastal islands still in dispute. The draft armistice submitted by the U.N. Command provided a convenient point of departure for the staff conferences.

There was a refreshing atmosphere in the truce tent during the first meetings that followed. On the Communist side there was less haranguing and speechmaking; their staff officers had an air of serious intent to make progress. They were inclined to accept as much of the UNC wording as possible and their suggested changes were frequently regarded as improvements by the U.N. Command.[26]

Nevertheless, the Communists were not ready to surrender, despite their more businesslike approach. They opened the discussion of rotation by expressing great astonishment at the "enormous" figure of 75,000 per month proposed by the U.N. Command. It may be remembered that earlier they had offered to permit a monthly rotation of 5,000 and the U.N. Command had declared this would be totally insufficient. In the bargaining that followed, rotation and the number of ports that would be permitted to handle the flow of personnel and equipment were closely linked together. The Communist staff officers were disposed to place the UNC suggestion that twelve ports be used in North Korea and ten in South Korea in the same category as the 75,000 rotation figure.[27]

Gradually the differences between the two sides shrank. The enemy offered 25,000 for rotation and the U.N. Command lowered its figure to 40,000, provided that the Communists accepted eight ports of entry on each side. In a counterproposal, Colonel Chang put forward a total of 25,000, excluding personnel leaving or entering on rest and rehabilitation passes and those on temporary duty, but he insisted on limiting the number of ports to three for each side.[28]

At this point General Ridgway and his staff wanted to take a final position, holding fast to the 40,000 figure and reducing the number of ports to six. They believed that the enemy would give in if confronted with a firm offer. In Washington, however, the Department of Defense and State did not wish the negotiations to break down over such relatively minor issues, but they agreed to a stand at 40,000 and six ports per side provided there were no implied ultimatum.[29]

By mid-February the UNC requirements had decreased to seven ports and 40,000 men, while the enemy had expanded its proposals to four ports and 30,000 men. The dickering went on for another week and then the U.N. Com-

[26] Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (Jul 51–May 52), vol. 2, ch. II, p. 58.

[27] The North Korean ports included: Sinuiju, Manp'ojin, Hyesanjin, Hoeryong, Ch'ongjin, Sinanju, Hamhung, P'yongyang, Wonsan, Pyoktong, Songjin, and Haeju. The ports in South Korea were: Seoul, Yangyang, Ch'ungju, Taejon, Andong, Chonju, Taegu, Wonju, Sunch'on, and Pusan. See First Mtg of Staff Officers on Details of Agreement of Agenda item 3, 27 Jan 52, in G–3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, bk. I.

[28] Seventh through Eleventh Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, 3–7 Feb 52, in G–3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, bk. I.

[29] (1) Msg, CX 63438, Ridgway to JCS, 12 Feb 52, DA–IN 104463. (2) Msg, JCS 901022, JCS to CINCFE, 13 Feb 52.

mand went down to 35,000 men and six ports and the Communists came up to 35,000 men and five ports per side.[30]

With only one port separating the two sides from agreement, General Ridgway gave Joy permission on 7 March to settle for five ports if and when he felt that it would encourage settlement of other problems. Ridgway was worried at that time about the growing indication that the Communists intended to use the neutral nation's inspection teams to examine classified equipment closely for the collection of technical intelligence. He felt that the wording of the armistice agreement must insure that this would not happen.[31]

This was a rather odd turnabout, since traditionally the Communists had opposed inspection and argued that good faith was enough. As Colonel Kinney pointed out to Chang in the staff officer meetings, the Communists had originally tried to apply restrictions on all activities of the inspection teams, but now were insisting upon the full rights of the teams to examine all equipment carefully.[32] The aftermath to this switch on inspection laid the Communists' sincerity on the subject open to question, however, for when Kinney offered to settle for five ports if the enemy would give up detailed inspection, Chang quickly accepted on 15 March.[33] Regardless of whether the Communists were using inspection solely for bargaining purposes or not, the matter of rotation and ports of entry were now agreed upon at 35,000 men per month and five ports of entry per side.[34]

Insofar as the question of coastal islands was concerned, the Communists proved to be particularly amenable. On 3 February they agreed to let the U.N. Command retain control over the five island groups under dispute on the west coast of Korea.[35] The U.N. Command had expected a fight on this provision of the draft armistice, but the enemy had surprisingly decided not to contest it.[36]

There was some discussion on the topic of coastal waters which the U.N. Command had defined as comprising a distance of three miles from shore at mean low tide. The Communists were reluctant to go into the subject, since they felt that it did not matter what the distance might be, provided each side ceased naval blockade and patrol in its opponent's waters. When the UNC officers pressed for a 3-mile limit to prevent unintentional violations, the Communists came out in support of a 12-mile zone. This slowed the UNC eagerness to have a precise figure written into the armistice, for the United States preferred not to set a precedent by accepting a 12-mile definition of coastal waters in

[30] Fourteenth through Twenty-seventh Mtg of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, 10–23 Feb 52, in G–3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, bk. II.

[31] Memo, Ridgway for Joy, 7 Mar 52, sub: Armistice Negotiations, in FEC SGS Corresp File, 1 Jan–31 Dec 52.

[32] Forty-sixth Mtg of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, 13 Mar 52, in G–3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, bk. III.

[33] Forty-eighth and Forty-ninth Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, 15–16 Mar 52, in G–3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, bk. III.

[34] The final list of ports included: Sinuiju, Ch'ongjin, Hungnam (for Hamhung), Manp'ojin and Sinanju in North Korea and Inch'on (for Seoul), Taegu, Pusan, Kangnung (instead of Yangyang) and Kunsan (for Chonju) in South Korea.

[35] These were Paengnyong-do, Paechong-do, Soch'ong-do, K'unyonp'yong-do, and U-do—all located below the 38th Parallel.

[36] Seventh Mtg of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, 3 Feb 52, in G–3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, bk. I.

Korea. The upshot was that both sides took the matter under further consideration.[37]

Three of the four issues that the staff officers wished to settle had proved open to negotiation and bargaining, but the fourth—the composition of the neutral nations supervisory organ and inspection teams—soon developed into a bottleneck second only to the airfields dispute. It may be recalled that the original Communist suggestion that neutral nations serve on the supervisory organ had been general and vague. As General Lee had defined "neutral nation," the term meant a nation that had not participated in the fighting in Korea. He had indicated that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and Sweden would qualify under this description.[38]

When Ridgway had asked for guidance, his superiors responded quickly that as UNC choices, Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway would be acceptable if they would consent to serve. As for the possible Communist selections, there was no real difference among the satellites and any three would be agreed to. Under no circumstances, however, would the USSR be considered acceptable as a neutral nation, they warned.[39] Here was the crux of the matter, for despite the fact that the Soviet Union had not formally intervened in the Korean War, the United States did not doubt that she was delivering both moral and physical sustenance to the Chinese and North Korean Communists. By no stretch of the imagination could the Russians be considered neutral in the estimation of the American military and political leaders, and they showed an early and fixed determination to deny them a neutral status. The trump card in the U.S. hand was the agreement with the Communists that the neutral nations must be acceptable to both sides. The power of the veto—long a favorite Russian weapon—might now be turned against the USSR.

Diplomatic approaches to Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway during December drew affirmative responses and Ridgway was authorized to nominate them as the UNC selections at an appropriate moment.[40] The opportunity did not arise until 1 February when the U.N. Command submitted its choices in the staff officer meeting, but the Communists were in no hurry. Despite frequent reminders and proddings, it was not until the 16th that they named Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. The U.N. Command immediately accepted the first two and rejected the Soviet Union.[41]

Since Ridgway's superiors hoped that the Communists would not insist upon the inclusion of the USSR, they preferred to de-emphasize Russian participation in the war as the reason for the UNC rejection. Unless the enemy persisted, they favored giving no reason at all. If the enemy pressed for an explana-

[37] Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (Jul 51–May 52), vol. 2, ch. II, pp. 64–65.

[38] Transcript of Proceedings, Second Session, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 3, 5 Dec 51, in FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol. I.

[39] (1) Msg, C 59130, CINCFE to JCS, 11 Dec 51, DA–IN 8536. (2) Msg, JCS 89473, JCS to CINCFE, 12 Dec 51. This message was approved by the JCS, State and Defense Departments, and the President.

[40] Msg, JCS 90381, JCS to CINCFE, 24 Dec 51, DA–OUT 90381. Army and State Departments approved this message.

[41] Twentieth Mtg of the Staff Officers . . . on item 3, 16 Feb 52, in G–3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, bk. II.

tion, the U.N. Command could fall back upon the proximity of the Soviet Union and its record of past participation in Korea as disqualifying factors.[42]

Ridgway and Joy agreed with the appraisal so far as it went, but warned that the staff officers suspected that the enemy might be trying to lay the groundwork for a trade of concessions on rotation and ports in return for acceptance of the Soviet Union. If this were true, then the U.N. Command would be better off telling the Communists unequivocally that the USSR would never be acceptable before the enemy involved its prestige.[43] Not prepared to take this step until other possibilities had been exhausted, the Washington leaders told Ridgway that the U.N. Command might offer to drop Norway if the Communists would reciprocate on the Soviet Union.[44]

On 25 February the UNC staff officers followed through on these instructions, but Colonel Chang and his assistants refused to bargain. Their continued insistence upon the USSR convinced Ridgway that the U.N. Command must make a final stand on the issue. The JCS consulted with their colleagues at the Defense and State Department level and received Presidential approval to inform Ridgway that the United States was willing to have the UNC refusal to accept the USSR made "firm and irrevocable." Ridgway might proffer an alternative solution of the problem concomitantly with the rejection, if he thought agreement could be gained. They suggested that both sides select nations, regardless of their status in the Korean War, to man the supervisory organ and inspection teams. This would include the United States for the UNC side and the Communists could appoint the Soviet Union if they wished.[45] Since this would divorce the Russians from a neutral designation, there was no objection to the Russians serving on frankly partisan organs.

When the Communists showed no interest in forming nonneutral groups to conduct supervision and inspection, the staff officers were forced to put the matter aside. Their earnest efforts had resulted in the solution of the rotation, port, and coastal island controversies, as well as the settlement of a number of lesser details on Item 3. By mid-March only differences over airfields and the Soviet Union remained outstanding.

As the negotiations ground to a standstill in both Item 3 and Item 4, Admiral Joy and staff took stock of the over-all truce situation and concluded that there were two promising methods of obtaining a satisfactory armistice from the enemy. The more drastic solution entailed the presentation of a complete armistice document incorporating some concessions to the enemy along with an ultimatum. Either the Communists would have to accept within a stated time limit or the negotiations would be terminated and hostilities resumed. Such a course would require a high-level decision and willingness to open up on the battlefield if the ultimatum were turned down, but Joy believed that it offered

[42] Msg, DA 901353, G-3 to CINCFE, 17 Feb 52.

[43] (1) Msg, C 63913, Ridgway to JCS, 19 Feb 52, DA-IN 107012. (2) Msg, C 63918, Ridgway to JCS, 19 Feb 52, DA-IN 107018.

[44] (1) Msg, JCS 901451, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Feb 52. (2) Msg, DA 901845, CofS to CINCFE, 23 Feb 52. Norway was selected since it had supported the U.N. action in Korea.

[45] (1) Msg, CX 64342, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Feb 52, DA-IN 109768. (2) Msg, JCS 902160, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Feb 52.



UNC DELEGATES AT THEIR BASE CAMP IN MUNSAN-NI. *Admiral Joy is in the center with clasped hands.*

the best hope for a quick and favorable settlement.

The second choice would be the submission of a complete armistice document without the open ultimatum. The enemy delegates would be informed that this was the final UNC effort and only minor changes in wording would be considered. The plenary sessions would recess and the United Nations Command would decline to enter into further substantive discussions. Although there would be no breaking off of the negotiations, since the liaison officers would be available for consultation, the UNC position would not be altered nor any further concessions made.[46]

In brief, Joy and his associates advocated the threat of force or the combined use of the recess and an inflexible front on the major issues to produce an armistice. As Ridgway pointed out, both of the suggested courses were ultimatums; the chief difference was that the alternative course had no time limit. Either one would bring censure to the U.N. Command if the negotiations were

[46] Msg, HNC 1027, Joy to CINCUNC, 9 Mar 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. 1, CofS, incl 27.

broken off and this would be contrary to the JCS instructions. Despite the advantages in the Joy suggestions, Ridgway did not think that the time was ripe for the open or the implied ultimatum as yet.[47]

This was Ridgway vis-à-vis the UNC delegation, acting as a moderating influence and tempering the bolder and riskier proposals emanating from Panmunjom. On the other side of the coin was Ridgway, the theater commander, versus the Washington policy makers. Here was the more aggressive leader urging the adoption of a determined plan of action that would make the enemy realize that the U.N. Command would grant no more concessions. Just one day after he told Joy that he should continue the "present course of action" in the truce negotiations, he sent off a frank appraisal of the situation to the JCS.

Neither he nor his staff knew whether the Communists wanted an armistice or not, he told the Joint Chiefs on 11 March, or how they really felt on the current issues. On the other hand, it was clear that the enemy attitude was becoming more arrogant and obdurate and that the position of the UNC delegates was deteriorating daily. To arrest this trend, the U.N. Command either had to take a public, hard and fast stand backed by official support from Washington and as many of the U.N. participants in Korea as possible or apply the one influence that the Communists evidently respected—force. Since the latter seemed to be out of the question, he strongly pressed for an open and flat rejection of the Soviet Union's membership on the neutral nations supervisory commission as a first step in attaining a final position.[48]

Army staff members in Washington supported the U.N. commander's argument for stiffening the Panmunjom front. However, G–3 questioned the advisability of approaching the issues on a piecemeal basis. Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, the Deputy G–3, told the Chief of Staff that the impact would be far greater if the major unsolved problems were presented in a single package. Then if the Communists would not accept and the negotiations ended, the U.N. Command would be in a stronger position for having made an effort to break the deadlock. Secretary of State Acheson favored the idea of an over-all proposal, Eddleman added.[49] So, too, did General Collins, his fellow Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. But before a single package could be fashioned, they wanted the issues reduced to an absolute minimum. Then, when an impasse developed at the subdelegation level and Ridgway was prepared to segregate and reclassify the nonrepatriate prisoners, the U.N. commander would have the plenary conference assemble. Joy would deliver a letter from Ridgway to Kim and Peng urging a personal meeting of the commanders. If the Communists agreed, Ridgway would present the package on an all-or-nothing basis. The U.N. Command would concede on airfields and

[47] Msg, C 65020, CINCFE to CINCUNC (Adv), 10 Mar 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. 1, incl 28.

[48] Msg, HNC 1033, Ridgway to JCS, 11 Mar 52, DA–IN 114495.

[49] Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 11 Mar 52, sub: Courses of Action in the Korean Armistice Negotiations, in G–3 091 Korea, 3/7.

the Communists would be expected to give in on forcible repatriation and the Soviet Union. Although there would be no substantive debate, the Washington proposal went on, the liaison officers would remain available and the UNC delegates would be willing to meet to explain their proposal.[50]

Ridgway must have been taken aback by the new proposal. He had just turned down a similar method of approach by Joy and then within a week to receive from his superiors a counterpart which he liked even less must have astonished him. In any event he recovered quickly and protested vigorously. A meeting of the field commanders would imply authority which he did not believe existed on the Communist side and would cause untold administrative delays. Moreover, the U.N. Command would be asking the enemy to concede on two issues while it yielded on a single one. As for the segregation and reclassification of POW's, he opposed any such action since it might jeopardize the lives of the prisoners in Communist hands. The Soviet Union he was extremely reluctant to accept on any terms, even on a frankly partisan commission. If a package were to be offered to the enemy, the U.N. Command should be given authority to indicate that refusal would mean termination of the negotiations in the UNC eyes. His own recommendations, he concluded, had not changed. First eliminate the Soviet Union controversy—then a package deal could be presented.[51]

The U.S. political and military leaders were willing to meet some of the objections Ridgway raised. If he did not want to confer with the Communist commanders, a plenary session of the delegates would serve. They had believed that Ridgway's presence would help underline the seriousness of the final proposal and the importance that the U.N. Command attached to it. Although they had seen no indication of an early solution to the USSR issue, they would be happy to have this solved before the package was offered. The essential factor here, they reminded Ridgway, was not Russian participation on the supervisory commission, but designation of the Soviet Union as a neutral nation. A compromise that avoided the latter would be perfectly acceptable.

With this out of the way, the Washington leaders got down to some cold facts. They did not want an ultimatum delivered openly or implied with the package proposal. Since the United States and its allies had little inclination to undertake increased military action to back an ultimatum, it could only be an empty gesture. If there were to be a break over the package offer, the blame must still fall upon the enemy.[52]

This was a frank admission by the JCS that neither the United States nor its fellow nations in Korea wanted a resumption of full-scale hostilities and had no intention of posing an idle threat that the Communists might challenge. Few actions could do more danger to the UNC cause politically than a bluff that the enemy called. After this message, talk of ultimatums dwindled. Ridgway continued to oppose the USSR's participation in any capacity, but, from this time on, he tended to support the con-

[50] Msg, JCS 903687, JCS to CINCFE, 15 Mar 52.

[51] Msg, C 65430, CINCFE to JCS, 17 Mar 52, DA-IN 116955.

[52] Msg, JCS 904101, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Mar 52.

cept of a package proposal as the best hope for an armistice.[53]

By the first of April, the staff officers had been in conference for over nine weeks. Despite the real progress they had made on the lesser problems and on many details of Item 3, the question of airfields and the Soviet Union still remained unsolved. So, on 3 April, the subdelegation reconvened, with General Harrison replacing Ferenbaugh as the Army member. The U.N. Command accepted Hsieh's suggestion that the agreements reached by the staff officers be confirmed, but this was the last accord. The arguments took up where they had left off and the meetings became shorter and shorter. At the 14 April session, a record time of fifteen seconds elapsed between the opening and closing of the meeting.[54] With both sides refusing to budge an inch, the staff took over again on 20 April. In the meantime the discussions on prisoners of war had reached a new climax.

### *Screening the POW's*

During February the staff officers had met twenty-two times to discuss Item 4. Despite their earnest efforts, the chief bone of contention—forced repatriation—still remained. Some of the details were cleared up, but the Communists were reluctant to settle subsidiary matters until the controlling principle was determined. In the face of the unwillingness of both sides to retreat further until all possibilities had been tried and exhausted, agreement was no nearer at the end of February than it had been a month earlier.

The subdelegations reconvened for a series of meetings during the first half of March with a similar lack of success. Admiral Libby pressed for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, for the delivery of POW packages, and for formation of joint Red Cross teams to visit the camps, but Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho would not consider a piecemeal approach to a settlement.[55]

Instead, Lee attacked the U.S. stand on "no forced repatriation," which he characterized as a verbal trick rather than a concession by the U.N. Command. He again charged that the United Nations Command intended to hand over the Chinese prisoners to the enemy of the Chinese people—Chiang Kai-shek. And in between his jousts with Libby on the main topic, Lee found the subject of the recent riots of prisoners on Koje-do rewarding. The outbreak of violence on 18 February at the UNC prisoner camps made good propaganda for the Communist delegate.[56]

In fact Lee became so enthusiastic in his work that Libby had to ask him not to scream at him. He was not deaf, the Admiral declared, and, besides, he did not understand Korean and much of the effect of the emotional delivery was lost in the translation.[57]

After two fruitless weeks of debate,

[53] Msg, C 65650, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Mar 52, DA-IN 118696.

[54] Transcripts of Proceedings, Fifty-fifth through Sixty-sixth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 3, 3–14 Apr 52, in FEC Transcripts of Proceedings, Subdelegation on item 3, vol. III, 8 Jan–19 Apr 52.

[55] *Ibid.*, Fifty-sixth through Fifty-eighth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 29 Feb–2 Mar 52, in FEC Subdelegates Mtgs on item 4, vol. IV, 28 Jan–7 Mar 52.

[56] For more detail on this riot, see Chapter XI, below.

[57] *Ibid.*, Fifty-ninth and Sixtieth Sessions, 3–4 Mar 52.

the staff officers took up the task again. The shifting of problems back and forth between the subdelegation and staff officers during the January to April period was reminiscent of a café that had two orchestras so that there would be no interruption to the dancing. In this case, however, both combinations featured the same kind of music—discordant and cacophonous—making it impossible to dance.

In an effort to introduce a new note to the proceedings, General Ridgway decided to explore another line at the staff officer level in mid-March. It will be recalled that he had been given permission to remove prisoners who might forcibly resist repatriation because of their fear of the consequences from POW status. With this object in mind Ridgway now wanted to find out whether revised lists eliminating all in this category by overt screening might be acceptable to the Communists. The nonrepatriates could then be called special refugees or some such name and all the other prisoners would be exchanged. To screen the prisoners unilaterally and covertly, Ridgway and his staff felt, might gravely imperil the safe return or even the lives of the UNC prisoners in enemy custody, but the Communists might consent to an overt screening.[58]

His superiors were a little dubious, since they feared that the enemy might try to revise the lists of UNC prisoners downward if Ridgway attempted openly to prune the Communist rosters.[59] On the contrary, Ridgway rebutted, the enemy would never accept a *fait accompli* brought about by secret and unilateral action. Only by allaying Communist suspicion of UNC double-dealing could the United Nations Command protect itself against retaliatory measures. He and his staff thought that the enemy might agree to a trial screening.[60]

In the staff officer meetings there were increasing signs that the Communists were shifting their ground. They hinted on 22 March that there might be cases among the prisoners that could be given special consideration before the present lists were checked. And they also intimated that the initiation of closed, executive sessions might promote freer conversation. The UNC officers quickly followed up by proposing executive meetings until one side or the other desired to revert to the open conference again and the Communists agreed.[61]

This marked a definite turn for the better, but the enemy soon demonstrated that they would give "special consideration" only to the prisoners who had been former residents of the Republic of Korea. In no case would North Koreans or Chinese be placed in special categories, they insisted. Their hatred of Chiang and fear that the Chinese would be sent to Taiwan if they were not repatriated came through again and again during the staff sessions in late March.[62]

One of the major weaknesses of the UNC proposals on revising the POW lists was the fact that the UNC staff had

[58] Msg, CX 65424, Ridgway to JCS, 17 Mar 52, DA-IN 116952.

[59] Msg, JCS 904101, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Mar 52.

[60] Msg, C 65650, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Mar 52, DA-IN 118696.

[61] Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth Mtgs of Staff Officers on Details of Agreements on item 4, 22–23 Mar 52, in G–3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 4.

[62] Thirty-sixth Mtg of Staff Officers on Details . . . on item 4, 29 Mar 52, in G–3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 4.

no idea as to just how many prisoners would refuse repatriation. Based on guesswork, General Hickey, UNC chief of staff, estimated that of the 132,000 military prisoners, about 28,000 would prefer not to go home, but probably only 16,000 would resist repatriation. And of the 37,000 civilian internees, 30,000 would elect not to return and 2,000 would put up a fight to prevent going back. He thought that over half of the 20,000 Chinese prisoners would use every means at their disposal to present a solid block of opposition since they were well organized, disciplined, and controlled by strong leaders with Nationalist sympathies.[63]

Early in April, Colonel Hickman, UNC staff officer, told his counterpart, Colonel Tsai, that the U.N. Command was reluctant to take a poll to form a rough estimate of the number of military repatriates, but about 116,000 might be involved in an exchange.[64] The figure of 116,000 tallied with the estimate of General Hickey which was admittedly a guess, but it evidently intrigued the Communists. It also may have been a tactical error on the part of the U.N. Command, for it misled the enemy into thinking that they would recover approximately that number of prisoners. At any rate, Colonel Tsai suggested on 2 April that both sides immediately check their lists and defer the debate on principles until this was completed. The Communists showed a desire to get a round figure of those who would forcibly resist repatriation in the obvious hope that the number would be no more than around 16,000. Two days later Hickman agreed and asked if the Communists would issue an amnesty statement before the screening to reassure the prisoners that they would not be punished when they returned. Although the enemy officers protested that such a statement would be unnecessary since the Communists desired nothing more than to return the prisoners to a peaceful life, they lost little time in providing the U.N. Command with a florid amnesty declaration on 6 April. This statement was given wide publicity throughout all the prisoner camps before the screening to encourage as many prisoners as possible to go home.[65]

The insistence of the Communists upon a round figure implied their tacit assent to the screening process and removed most of the previous objections to revising the prisoner lists. After Ridgway had conferred with Joy at Munsanni, he submitted his plan to carry out the interviewing and segregating of the POW's. The screening and separation of repatriates from nonrepatriates would be a one-shot operation, he told the JCS, and no one would be allowed to change his mind once he had made his choice. The Communists would expect to receive whatever number was announced by the U.N. Command, he went on, so no downward revisions could be made after the enemy was informed. In his opinion, screening was inevitable sooner or later and the quicker it was done the better. He frankly admitted that an ex-

[63] Memo, Hickey for Hull, no date, no sub, in G–3 383.6, 5/1. This memo dates approximately in mid-February 1952.

[64] Thirty-ninth Mtg of Staff Officers on Details . . . on item 4, 1 Apr 52, in G–3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 4.

[65] (1) Fortieth, Forty-first Mtgs of Staff Officers on Details . . . on item 4, 2 and 4 Apr 52. (2) Msg, Tsai to Hickman, 6 Apr 52. Both in G–3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 4.

plosive situation existed in the POW camps and the U.N. Command did not have the capability on hand to break up the camps into small dispersed units to reduce the danger.

Once the screening was finished, Ridgway intended to give the totals to the enemy, reclassifying the nonrepatriates and ROK residents who did not want to go to North Korea into a status other than POW. If the Communists accepted these figures, he would follow up by an effort to trade airfield restrictions for the dropping of USSR, thus completing the armistice. If the enemy did not accept the figures, Ridgway would present a package proposal with the same objectives on which the U.N. Command would stand firm.[66]

Permission was received on 3 April to start the screening at once and two days later Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to initiate Plan SCATTER.[67] This plan was openly designed to make the maximum number of POW's available for repatriation. All were cautioned beforehand not to discuss the choice they had made with other prisoners prior to the interview lest they be subjected to violence and injury to force a change of mind. The final nature of the decision was strongly stressed to make each man think it over carefully. As each prisoner approached the interview area, he carried his clothing and equipment with him, so that there would be no need to return to his former enclosure if he chose not to return. In the interview that followed the unarmed interrogating officer or clerk related the disadvantages of refusal and the uncertainties that would face the nonrepatriates. He also warned the prisoner of the fate that might befall his family if he did not return. Then the prisoner was told again of the Communist amnesty that had been offered and asked a series of seven questions: 1. Will you voluntarily be repatriated to North Korea (China)? 2. Would you forcibly resist repatriation? 3. Have you carefully considered the impact of such action on your family? 4. Do you realize that you may remain here at Koje-do long after those electing repatriation have been returned home? 5. Do you realize that the UNC cannot promise that you will be sent to any certain place? 6. Are you still determined that you would violently resist repatriation? 7. What would you do if you were repatriated in spite of this decision? If at any point the POW indicated that he would accept repatriation, the questions ceased. On the other hand, if he mentioned suicide, fight to the death, escape, etc., the POW was segregated and put in a new compound.[68]

On 8 April Van Fleet began the screening. For the most part it proceeded smoothly and the separation of the nonrepatriates from those who wanted to return was accomplished without serious incident. But there were seven compounds containing over 37,000 determined North Korean Communists who would not permit the UNC teams to screen them. In one of these compounds, an altercation between the prisoners and ROK guards erupted into stone throwing and then to the use of machine gun

[66] Msg, HNC 1118, Ridgway to JCS, 3 Apr 52, DA-IN 123736.

[67] (1) Msg, JCS 905426, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Apr 52. (2) Msg, CX 66469, Ridgway to JCS, 5 Apr 52, DA-IN 124553.

[68] (1) Msg, C 66649, Ridgway to G-3, 10 Apr 52, DA-IN 126222. (2) Msg, C 67178, Ridgway to G-3, 19 Apr 52, DA-IN 129603.

fire. Before the fighting could be stopped, there were seven dead and sixty-five other casualties.[69]

Despite the opposition of the ardent Communist elements, the results of the first three days of screening were amazing even to the U.N. Command. With approximately half of the 132,000 interviews completed, over 40,000 prisoners had declared that they would forcibly resist repatriation.[70] It was a surprising demonstration of the strength of feeling among the POW's that must have been heartening to the psychological warfare experts, but it immediately cast a pall over the prospects for an armistice. Even were all the unscreened prisoners to return, the total would bear little resemblance to the 116,000 the Communists anticipated.

In the days that followed the U.N. Command made no attempt to screen the seven recalcitrant compounds and automatically put the prisoners in these enclosures among the repatriates. The remainder of the POW's and civilian internees were sent through the interviews, and by 15 April Ridgway was able to provide the JCS with the "round" figure the Communists desired. Of the over 170,000 military and civilian prisoners in UNC hands, only about 70,000 would return to the Communists without the use of force, he told the Joint Chiefs. Since he realized that the enemy was not going to be happy about these figures, Ridgway proposed to permit either an international neutral body or joint Red Cross teams to rescreen all of the nonrepatriates if the Communists so desired. If they turned this suggestion down, then the UNC delegation would move back into plenary sessions and would present the package proposal.[71]

Although the 70,000 figure was by no means final, the JCS agreed that the U.N. Command should convey it to the enemy right away rather than risk a leak to the press. At the meeting of the staff officers on 19 April Colonel Hickman calmly informed Tsai that 7,200 civilian internees, 3,800 ROK prisoners, 53,900 North Koreans, and 5,100 Chinese—a total of 70,000 men—would be available for repatriation. The effect was dramatic! For once Tsai was speechless, overcome with emotion. When he finally recovered himself enough to talk, he quickly requested a recess ostensibly to study the figures.[72] The evident shock to Tsai intimated that the Communists were completely unprepared for such a low estimate and the immediate recess was probably necessary not only for him to regain his composure but also to get new instructions from his superiors.

The tenor of these instructions was crystal clear the following day. The Communists felt that they had been deliberately deceived by the UNC's earlier estimate of 116,000 and Tsai mounted a full-scale assault upon the 70,000 figure. It was "completely impossible for us to consider," he cried, and "you flagrantly repudiated what

[69] (1) Msg, C 66761, Ridgway to G–3, 11 Apr 52, DA–IN 126801. (2) Msg, C 66838, Ridgway to G–3, 12 Apr 52, DA–IN 127294. Casualties included: 4 ROK dead, 4 wounded, 1 U.S. lieutenant wounded; 3 North Korean dead, 60 wounded. See below, Chapter XI, for further details on prisoners' refusal to be screened.

[70] Msg, CX 66734, CINCUNC to G–3, 11 Apr 52, DA–IN 126732.

[71] Msg, CX 66953, Ridgway to JCS, 15 Apr 52, DA–IN 128107.

[72] Forty-second Mtg of Staff Officers on Details . . . on item 4, 19 Apr 52, in G–3 Mtgs of Staff Officers on . . . item 4.

you said before." In a counterblast, Hickman charged that the U.N. Command had felt the same sort of dismay when they had been given the 11,559-prisoner figure by the Communists in December. The UNC had conducted the screening in the fairest way possible and the percentage of prisoners that the Communists would get back was far greater than the 20 percent that the 12,000 UNC prisoners represented.[73]

Through the wrangling that ensued during the next few days, one fact stood out. The Communists had been stung once by the screening procedure and they would have nothing more to do with it. They repulsed the offers to permit rescreening by neutral or Red Cross teams summarily and insisted that the U.N. Command come up with a more favorable figure.[74] The screening process which momentarily seemed to be a way to break the deadlock had merely resulted in increasing it. In justice to the U.N. Command, they had acted in good faith. Regrettably they had given the enemy a rough initial estimate based on what turned out to be incomplete and inaccurate information. During the interviews the UNC teams had sought to discourage the nonrepatriates as much as possible and encourage the POW's to go home. On the other side, it is not difficult to understand the attitude of the Communists and their feeling that they had been duped and led into a propaganda trap. Their natural suspicion of the motives of the U.N. Command needed little impetus to assume the worst.

### *The Package Is Delivered*

The violent Communist opposition to the results of the UNC screening delimited the course of events at Panmunjom. If the POW issue could have been settled, Ridgway could probably have exchanged the airfield rehabilitation concession for the exclusion of Soviet Union and completed the armistice. Rejection of the no forced repatriation concept meant that a package proposal would have to include three issues and that one side would have to give way on two points. This complicated the matter since it introduced a sense of imbalance allowing an apparent advantage to the side that secured the two concessions. Under the circumstances it might well have been better to have had a fourth issue, real or manufactured, which the U.N. Command could have used to sweeten the pill that they now wanted the enemy to swallow.

While the enemy was launching its broadsides at the screening procedure, Ridgway made his final arrangements for presenting the package deal. He planned to support the UNC offer with a strong statement that might convince the Communists that this was the final position for the United Nations Command. Either the enemy must accept the whole package without debate or the responsibility for continued hostilities would rest on its shoulders. To bolster his stand, Ridgway asked that public statements along this line be made by

[73] Forty-third Mtg of the Staff Officers . . . on item 4, 20 Apr 52, in G–3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . item 4. Hickman later said that his counterattack actually caused Tsai to blush for the first and only time during the meetings. Interv, author with Maj Gen George W. Hickman, Jr., 7 Mar 58. In OCMH.

[74] Forty-fourth through Forty-sixth Mtgs of the Staff Officers . . . on item 4, 21–23 Apr 52, in G–3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 4.

the U.S. Government and other U.N. participants.[75]

Ridgway's superiors, however, were not willing to go quite so far. As long as the truce meetings remained in executive session, public statements were not possible, they pointed out. In the second place, they did not want Ridgway or the U.S. Government to make statements that could be interpreted as ultimatums. Uncompromising declarations might decrease the probability of Communist acceptance of the package and raise domestic and international expectations of quick military action if the enemy did not accept the proposal. In any case they moderated Ridgway's approach to eliminate the implication of an ultimatum.[76] At the same time, the JCS and its staff worked diligently with the political advisors to fashion a statement that President Truman could release to support the UNC position.[77]

Judging from the actions of the Communists at the staff officer level, the executive meetings were about to end. On 24 April Colonel Tsai threatened to return to open meetings and the following day he carried out the threat. The Communists immediately issued a long résumé of the April developments and the U.N. Command countered with a release setting forth its own version. As the debate moved out into the open again, Colonel Hickman requested a recess so that the UNC could make the last-minute arrangements for the formal delivery of its offer.[78]

General Ridgway and Admiral Joy were not concerned at this point whether the sessions were secret or open. In their opinion there was little need for secrecy since the separate elements of the package deal had been fully publicized in the press.[79] But the military and political leaders in Washington disagreed. The open sessions generated more heat than light, they maintained, and they therefore preferred an executive meeting of the plenary conference. Then if the Communists disregarded the understanding to gain the propaganda initiative or if they turned down the suggestion for the executive meetings, the onus for failure to reach agreement in the negotiations would fall upon the enemy.[80]

Through the liaison officers the plenary conference was set up for April 28. When the delegates met, Admiral Joy requested an executive session and after a recess, the Communists agreed.[81] Joy then went over the outstanding issues carefully and set forth the UNC solution which had been incorporated into a complete draft of the armistice. All mention of the rehabilitation of airfields, had been deleted and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was to be formed of Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The paragraph referring to the disposition of POW's read as follows:

All prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice

[75] Msg, CX 67235, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Apr 52, DA-IN 129944.

[76] Msg, JCS 906923, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Apr 52. This message was drafted by State and approved by the services, Defense Department, and the President.

[77] Msg, JCS 907375, JCS to CINCFE, 26 Apr 52.

[78] Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (Jul 51–May 52), vol. 2, ch. III, pp. 97–98.

[79] Msg, C 67640, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Apr 52, DA-IN 132562.

[80] Msg, JCS 907378, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Apr 52.

[81] Besides Admiral Joy, the UNC delegation now consisted of Harrison, Turner, Libby, and Yu. The Communists were represented by Nam, Hsieh, Lee, General Pien Chang-wu, and Rear Adm. Kim Won Mu, who had replaced Maj. Gen. Chung Tu Hwan.

Agreement becomes effective shall be released and repatriated as soon as possible. The release and repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be effected in conformity with lists which have been exchanged and have been checked by the respective sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.[82]

In effect this meant that the U.N. Command would swap the 70,000 repatriates that it held for the 12,000 in enemy custody, since it intended to reclassify the nonrepatriates into a status other than POW in the meantime.

The package proposal created as much stir as a pebble dropped into the ocean. Nam simply stated that "our side fails to see how your proposal of this morning can really be of help to the overall settlement of the remaining issues" and then called for an indefinite recess.[83] Under the circumstances the Communists reaction was not surprising. The UNC offer had revealed nothing that the enemy had not anticipated as a result of discussions in the U.S. and U.N. press before the presentation. If it accomplished anything, it did reduce the number of issues to one—the number of POW's who would be repatriated. The other two soon canceled each other out, but as long as there remained such a wide discrepancy between the 70,000 figure that the U.N. Command had offered and the 116,000 the Communists expected, hopes for an early armistice would be small.

Yet despite the indifferent reception that the enemy had given the package proposal, this was a key moment in the negotiations. The UNC had officially fallen back upon its "final and irrevocable" position and the period of debate was over. There had been no ultimatum or threat of increased activity at the front, but the U.N. Command had passed the crossroads and embarked upon a firm course. Patience and firmness—the old standbys—were to be the chief weapons in the battles that lay ahead rather than force. In the meantime the battle at the front would go on as it had all winter, essentially a defensive war on both sides. Fought within carefully defined boundaries and under tacit rules, the war of the active defense nonetheless continued and took its daily toll of casualties.

[82] Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-fourth Session, 28 Apr 52, in FEC Transcripts of Proceedings, Msgs on the Mil Armistice Conf, vol. IV, 28 Apr–3 Jun 52.

[83] *Ibid.*

# CHAPTER IX

# "The Active Defense"

When the armistice negotiations resumed at the new site at Panmunjom in late October 1951, Item 2—the line of demarcation—was still in dispute and the knotty problems arising from Items 3 and 4 but dimly envisioned. In the light of past experience, however, the task of threshing out a truce proposal acceptable to both sides promised to become a long, drawn-out affair.

There was little doubt that the punishment dealt out as the Eighth Army "elbowed forward" into the enemy positions had sorely depleted the offensive capabilities of the Communists and had influenced them to return to the conference table. But whether they had come back to conclude an agreement or simply to continue the discussions remained to be seen.

Under the circumstances there were two courses of action open to the U.N. Command: (1) it could have the Eighth Army sustain the pressure built up by the summer campaigns upon the enemy until a satisfactory settlement was reached; or (2) it could accept the Communist reappearance at the negotiations as a sign that the enemy was now willing to end the fighting. If the latter proved correct and a line of demarcation was to be established along the general trace of the battle front, then further sustained fighting and heavy casualties would be wasteful and unnecessary. On the other hand, if the Communists intended to use the negotiations to win a breathing period while they replenished their battered forces and strengthened their defenses, the first course offered certain long-term advantages. It might be far less costly to keep up the limited offensive punch already developed and maintain the initiative until an agreement was signed rather than to permit the enemy to regain his balance and settle down to a long war of attrition.

## *A Choice Is Made*

On 27 October, just three days after the truce talks reopened, General Van Fleet set up a plan for an advance into the Iron Triangle on the west and beyond Kumsong on the east. Using the U.S. I and IX Corps, he intended to take over the high ground north of the Ch'orwon-Kumhwa Railroad and establish a firm screen along a new defensive line called DULUTH, south of P'yonggang and north of Kumsong. After the IX Corps attained the dominating terrain around Kumsong, it would push on to the northeast along the road to Tongch'on. In the meantime, the ROK I Corps would move forward along the east coastal road to Tongch'on and link up with the IX Corps just south of the town.[1]

[1] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec 1, Narrative, p. 68.

The operation toward Tongch'on, called SUNDIAL, eliminated the amphibious operation which the earlier WRANGLER plan had envisaged for the east coast, but the objectives were the same—to cut off the North Korean forces caught between the double envelopment and to set up a new defensive line. As things turned out, SUNDIAL was short-lived, for on 31 October Van Fleet was instructed to postpone his attack toward Line DULUTH until he received further orders from Ridgway. The debate over the line of demilitarization was the reason for the delay, since the JCS believed that ultimately the U.N. Command might have to modify its stand and withdraw several kilometers to the south. If this proved to be true, there seemed to be little reason to take casualties for territory that would soon have to be evacuated.[2]

On 5 November Van Fleet again sought permission to move toward DULUTH, but without success. Ridgway waited until 11 November, then canceled the operation. Without the preliminary advance to DULUTH, SUNDIAL was automatically ruled out.[3] A new wait-and-see policy at UNC headquarters was inaugurated with the elimination of the DULUTH-SUNDIAL offensives.

As the line of demarcation assumed increasing importance to the battlefield, planning at the UNC and Eighth Army headquarters operated on a contingent basis. If the negotiations broke down or became hopelessly ruined, then an offensive might be launched. Plans for an advance to the Wonsan-P'yongyang line and even as far as the Yalu were brought up to date, but Ridgway thought that under present circumstances neither of these offensives would be worth the casualties they would cost.[4]

The lack of enthusiasm for ambitious offensive operations while the line of demarcation was being arranged was clearly reflected in Ridgway's 12 November directive to Van Fleet to assume the "active defense." Along the general trace of present positions, the order ran, Van Fleet would seize terrain most suitable for defense. He would, however, limit his offensive action to the taking of outpost positions not requiring the commitment of more than one division. At the same time, the Eighth Army commander would be prepared to exploit favorable opportunities to inflict heavy casualties upon the enemy.[5]

On the following day the JCS sustained the UNC approach. They considered the line of contact existing at that time to be acceptable as the line of demarcation and that contact expected in the next month would not affect its acceptability. "Ground action could still continue even though gains and losses would not be of significance to location line . . . ," the JCS concluded.[6] With the JCS and Ridgway in agreement over the unwisdom of other than minimum operations at the front, the fighting settled down to small-scale actions and patrolling.

Evidently the JCS and Ridgway both believed that the Communists were

[2] Msg, C 56283, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army (Adv), 31 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 245.

[3] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, pp. 4–5.

[4] Memo, E.K.W. [Edwin K. Wright], no addressee, no sub, 8 Nov 51, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 410, Feasibility of Offensive Operations.

[5] Msg, CX 57143, CINCFE to JCS, 12 Nov 51, DA–IN 18285.

[6] Msg, JCS 86804, JCS to CINCFE, 13 Nov 51.

ready to come to terms or perhaps the wish was father to the thought. At any rate Ridgway informed Chief of Staff Collins that he believed the Communists had been badly hurt by the UNC offensives and wanted the earliest possible suspension of hostilities. He pointed to a speech by Andrei Vishinsky, Russian Foreign Minister, before the U.N. General Assembly on 8 November, in which he proposed a cessation of the Korean fighting within ten days and also to the report of the UNC delegates at Panmunjom that the enemy seemed to want an immediate *de facto* cease-fire as indication of the Communist desire for a speedy end to the Korean War.[7] Army intelligence authorities in Washington were cautiously inclined to agree.[8]

In the light of this general feeling of optimism in Tokyo and Washington, it was not surprising that Eighth Army should absorb some of the complacency. As soon as the line of demarcation was agreed upon on 27 November, Van Fleet told his corps commander that they would make sure that every UNC soldier was aware that hostilities would continue until an armistice was signed. He then went on to instruct them that:

> Eighth Army should clearly demonstrate a willingness to reach an agreement while preparing for offensive action if negotiations are unduly prolonged to this end. A willingness to reach an agreement will be demonstrated by: Reducing operations to the minimum essential to maintain present positions regardless of the agreed-upon military demarcation line. Counterattacks to regain key terrain lost to enemy assault will be the only offensive action taken unless otherwise directed by this headquarters. Every effort will be made to prevent unnecessary casualties.[9]

The Van Fleet order in effect hinged Eighth Army operations upon the enemy's actions and granted what amounted to a cease-fire if the enemy so desired. As the order filtered down to the small unit level, few commanders were willing to risk the lives of their troops unless it became a case of necessity. But when the war correspondents in Korea found out about Van Fleet's instructions, they broke the story, charging that the order had "brought Korean ground fighting to a complete, if temporary, halt." [10]

Since this charge was essentially true, it caused embarrassment in Washington and in the UNC headquarters. The Associated Press implied that the halt had come on orders possibly from the White House itself and a strong statement was issued by the President on 29 November to counteract the impression. On the other side of the world, Ridgway was quick to explain that Eighth Army had assumed "a function entirely outside its field of responsibility" and that efforts were being made to correct any false impressions that might have been drawn from the Eighth Army order.[11] Artillery fire began to sound again from the UNC lines and Ridgway reported on the 29th that 68 patrols had been sent out and 14 separate attacks repulsed ranging from two

[7] Msg, C 57297, CINCFE to DA, 16 Nov 51, in Hq Eighth Army Opnl Planning Files, Nov 51.

[8] Msg, DA 87685, DA to CG Eighth Army, 23 Nov 51.

[9] Msg, G 3192 TAC, EUSAK to CG 187th Abn Regt, 27 Nov 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Nov 51.

[10] Msg, C 58327, CINCFE to JCS, 30 Nov 51, in FEC, 387.2, bk. 4, 1951, Paper 316.

[11] (1) *Ibid.* (2) Msg, G 3247 THC, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 30 Nov 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 4, 1951, Paper 315.

squads to a regiment in size.[12] The unfavorable publicity from the news stories put an end to the virtual cease-fire and insured that at least lip service would be paid to the oft-repeated avowal that hostilities would continue until an armistice was signed.

But a choice had been made, for as soon as the Washington leaders and the U.N. Command had agreed to the line of demarcation and the thirty-day deadline that went with it, they had also tacitly recognized that further large-scale offensive operations would not be mounted unless the Communists broke off or mired down the negotiations. As long as the enemy continued to discuss the matters under debate, there was little danger that the U.N. Command would again resort to strong ground pressure on the battlefield. In the air and from the sea no such limitations applied. Here the mastery of the UNC still prevailed and casualties could be kept low. But the war for real estate that might eventually be forfeited under an armistice offered little inducement. The winter that lay ahead promised to be filled with frustration for the ground soldier unless agreement at Panmunjom followed swiftly upon the heels of the drawing of the line of demarcation.

### *The War of Position*

Memories of the first winter in Korea and its hardships were still fresh in the minds of the UNC troops. The swiftness of the advance into North Korea and the equally rapid withdrawal that followed in late 1950 had dislocated the supply and distribution lines of the U.N. Command and resulted in shortages of heavy winter clothing and equipment among some units at the front. By the fall of 1951, with the war entering a static phase, the situation was well in hand. Distribution was a comparatively simple matter and experience had led to the modification and improvement of many items of clothing and equipment.


The advent of the cold weather seemed to favor the UNC forces slightly. For the most part, the U.N. Command held the south slopes of the hills and mountains which were frequently free of snow and warmed by the sun. The enemy had to look into the sun and into the deep shadows cast by its rays. In the rear areas, the UNC accommodations were much more comfortable than those of the Communists.

Offsetting those advantages, however, was the enemy ability to overcome the rigors imposed by weather and terrain. The Communist soldiers, many of whom were already acclimated to the weather of North Korea and North China, had borne the harsh winter of 1950–51 with less physical distress than the U.N. Command. Under trying conditions, they had managed to live off the land and to fight vigorously on rations that would barely have provided subsistence for the majority of the U.S. troops.[13]

And although the UNC forces were adequately supplied with clothing and cold-weather equipment, these were only as good as the men who used them. To remain outdoors in the often arctic cold of the Korean mountains for any length of time required a high degree of cold-weather discipline. What good did it do to provide the soldiers with insulated

[12] Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 29 Nov 51, DA–IN 4170.

[13] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, p. 32.



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boots if they did not keep spare, dry socks on hand and did not change socks often? Among many of the UNC troops, a winter environment team sent out from Washington reported, there was a fear of frostbite and a lack of knowledge of how to prevent it. This resulted in a high cold-injury incidence and reduced the time that could be devoted to patrol and ambush to an almost ineffective level. Even the bunkers and front-line shelters reflected a lack of ingenuity, the team went on, and were devoid of the simplest principles of winterization.[14]

As the ground became frozen, new problems arose for the infantryman. Ordinary entrenching tools were adequate for digging as long as the ground was not frozen more than three inches, but tended to break under sterner tests. Picks and shovels were better suited to the task, but were too ponderous to be carried by the troops. One infantry unit met the situation by issuing a 2-pound block of TNT to each soldier for use in breaking through the frozen top layer.[15]

The distaste of the UNC troops for winter fighting was but an added factor in the course of the ground war. Paramount, of course, was the disinclination on both sides to disturb the *status quo* radically during the negotiations. But when the cold weather was combined

[14] DA, Winter Environment Team, Report on Winter Combat Problems, December 1951–February 1952, in G–3 091 Korea, Bulky, 62/2.

[15] *Ibid.*

with the halfhearted ground maneuvers, a note of restraint reminiscent of the summer lull of July pervaded the battlefield. The policy of "live and let live" was immediately reflected in the lower casualty reports.

Before the agreement on the line of demarcation on 27 November, the desire for better positions did produce a number of minor engagements along the front. Basically it was a battle for hills and the pattern became all too familiar. The experience of the ROK 9th Division in November was repeated across the trace of battle. Fighting for Hill 395 (White Horse Hill) northwest of Ch'orwon in the U.S. I Corps sector, the ROK 9th first lost the hill on 5 November, then retook it the following day; lost it again on 16 November and recaptured it once more on the 17th.[16] Counterattack! Take the hill! Hold the hill!—these were the key commands that dominated the winter war.

During the daylight hours the Eighth Army sent out its patrols and small-scale raids which the enemy sought to intercept. Enemy action, on the other hand, took place chiefly at night, under cover of darkness and unhindered by air surveillance. The Communists confined themselves primarily to patrols and limited probes of the UNC defensive positions.[17]

The principal clash during November took place in the IX Corps sector east of Kumsong. On 17–18 November the ROK 6th Division, supported by two tank companies of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division and the attached ROK 21st Regimental Combat Team, moved out on a 7-mile front toward a new defense line. Despite strong resistance from elements of the Chinese 68th Army, the ROK division advanced up to two miles. Reaching the new line on the 18th, they dug in against Chinese counterattacks and succeeded in beating them off.[18]

As the discussions on the line of demarcation came to an end in late November, a change in Chinese tactics was completed. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese had begun to shift from their customary tactics based upon fluid warfare during the early autumn.[19] The static conditions of December allowed them to finish their switch to fixed, positional warfare. Adopting a defense-in-depth pattern, both Chinese and North Koreans proceeded to fortify their lines. Digging in on hills, they set up gun replacements and personnel shelters interconnected by communication and supply trenches. Everything at hand —logs, rocks, and sand—was used to provide overhead cover and to protect their troops against anything but a direct hit. On the reverse slopes their trenches followed the contours and were 5 to 6 feet deep. Small one-man shelters were dug into the rear wall every 15 to 20 feet. Through the crown of the hill, the Communists fashioned other trenches leading to machine gun and rifle positions along the front and to kitchen and ammunition supply points at the rear. In some cases, they tunneled through the hills and hollowed out huge underground bunkers. Using high terrain features effectively, they laid out fire patterns and often employed personnel shelters as alternate firing positions.

[16] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, pp. 17–18.
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, sec I, Narrative, p. 47.
[19] See Chapter V, above.

The enemy firing positions were practically artillery proof and certainly mortar proof.[20]

The U.N. Command had made little attempt to disturb the enemy's efforts to strengthen his defenses. Not that the thirty-day limit on the line of demarcation dictated a suspension of hostilities, but rather a self-imposed restriction on large-scale operations in December precluded any moves of great tactical significance. The Eighth Army "reduced its offensive operations during the month as a demonstration of good faith." In turn the Communists launched mostly company and platoon-sized attacks on the UNC outposts. Only rarely was a battalion-sized assault mounted.[21]

Lest the Eighth Army lose its edge completely, Van Fleet instructed his corps commanders "to keep the Army sharp through smell of gunpowder and the enemy" by intensifying their programs to capture prisoners of war through ambush. If it appeared that the peace talks would fail, new plans would be prepared around 20 December for a series of limited objective attacks in January designed to strengthen defensive positions.[22] With the Communists improving their positions daily, further "elbowing forward" might prove more costly than it had been during the August–October period. As for the capture of prisoners of war via the ambush method for intelligence purposes, the total log for December was a paltry 247, only a quarter of what it had been the previous month.[23]

As the thirty-day limit expired on 27 December, Ridgway asked Van Fleet for a report on his plans to return to the offensive. The Eighth Army commander's reply showed clearly the change in the tactical situation. He contemplated no offensive action in the near future. In the eyes of his commanders, minor attacks to strengthen the present UNC positions would be costly and without value. The UNC defensive line was strong and could be held against the enemy. Obviously, the Communists were now well entrenched and immune to normal artillery preparation. Only by bold assault could the enemy be dislodged and this could not be done at a low cost. The benefits to be won, Van Fleet concluded, would not justify the casualties certain to be incurred.[24]

More ambitious plans for an advance to the P'yongyang-Wonsan line met with a similar response. The Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group found that while such an operation was feasible and could be logistically mounted, it would probably mean that close to 200,000 UNC casualties would be registered. General Weyland, FEAF commander, was not in favor of extending the UNC lines so close to the Communist air bases in Manchuria and suggested a more modest advance as an alternative. And the Navy pointed out that naval vessels and amphibious forces might suffer considerably if the enemy mounted major air attacks from bases in North Korea.[25] Under the existing conditions, there seemed to be little possibility of more

[20] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, p. 36.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 16.
[22] Eighth Army CofS Jnl, Dec 51, tab 4.
[23] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, Table 1.

[24] (1) Msg, C 60195, CINCFE to Van Fleet, 27 Dec 51. (2) Msg, G 3758 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 31 Dec 51. Both in Hq Eighth Army Opnl Planning Files, Dec 5.
[25] JSPOG Staff Study, 10 Dec 51, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 410, Feasibility of Offensive Operations.

than academic consideration of large-scale offensive ventures at the end of 1951. The losses would be too heavy and the reaction of the USSR uncertain. As long as the desire to settle the war through negotiation remained predominant, it was doubtful that other than minor ground activity would be allowed.

The calm on the battlefield, however, did permit more attention to be paid to one troublesome problem that bothered the U.N. Command almost from the beginning of the Korean War. Behind the lines in South Korea there were over 8,000 guerrillas and bandits, 5,400 of whom were reported armed. Concentrated mainly in the mountains of the rugged Chiri-san area of southwestern Korea, they were a constant thorn in the side of the ROK Government. Although they were chiefly of nuisance value, there was always the chance that in the event of a major offensive, they could pose a real and dangerous threat to supply and communication lines and to rear areas.[26]

During November there was an upsurge in raiding operations as the guerrillas launched well-co-ordinated attacks upon rail lines and installations. Fortunately, the raids were lacking in sufficient strength to follow through and inflict serious damage, but Van Fleet decided that the time had come to eliminate this irritation. In mid-November he ordered the ROK Army to set up a task force composed of the ROK Capital and ROK 8th Divisions, both minus their artillery units. Van Fleet wanted the group organized and ready to stamp out guerrilla activity by the first of December. Since the Chiri-san held the core of guerrilla resistance, Van Fleet directed that the first phase of the task force operations cover this mountainous stretch some twenty miles northwest of Chinju.[27]

On 1 December the ROK Government took the first step by declaring martial law in southwestern Korea. This restricted the movement of civilians, established a curfew, and severed telephone connections between villages. On the following day Task Force Paik, named after the commander, Lt. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, initiated its antiguerrilla campaign, sardonically called RAT-KILLER. Moving in from a 163-mile perimeter, Task Force Paik closed on the Chiri-san. The ROK 8th Division pushed southward toward the crest of the mountains and the Capital Division edged northward to meet it. Blocking forces, composed of National Police, youth regiments, and security forces located in the area, were stationed at strategic positions to cut off escape routes. As the net was drawn tighter, groups of from ten to five hundred guerrillas were flushed, but only light opposition developed. After twelve days, Task Force Paik ended the first phase on 14 December with a total of 1,612 reported killed and 1,842 prisoners.[28]

The hunt shifted north to Cholla Pukto Province for Phase II with the mountains around Chonju the chief objectives. From 19 December to 4 January the ROK 8th and Capital Divi-

[26] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, pt. I, Narrative, p. 8.

[27] (1) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, p. 34. (2) Ltr, Van Fleet to CofS ROK Army, 14 Nov 51, no sub, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Nov 51.

[28] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, G–3 sec. bk. 4, incls 1–5, p. 7.

sions ranged the hills and sought to trap the guerrillas and bandits hiding in the rough terrain. By the end of December it was estimated that over 4,000 men had been killed and another 4,000 had been captured.[29]

When Phase III opened on 6 January, the task force returned to the Chiri-san to catch the guerrillas who had filtered back into the area after Phase I. On 19 January, the Capital Division carried out the most significant action of the campaign. While the ROK 26th Regiment took up blocking positions north of the mountains, the ROK 1st and Cavalry Regiments attacked from the south, in two consecutive rings. Although one small group broke through the inner ring, it was caught by the outer circle of troops. What was believed to be the core of the resistance forces in South Korea perished or was taken prisoner during this drive. When Phase III ended at the close of January, over 19,000 guerrillas and bandits had been killed or captured in the RATKILLER operation.[30] The last phase became a mopping-up effort against light and scattered resistance. The ROK 8th Division returned to the front in early February, while the Capital Division's mobile units sought to catch up with the remnants of the guerrillas. RATKILLER officially terminated on 15 March, when the local authorities took over the task.[31]



CAPTURED GUERRILLAS, CHIRI-SAN *area.*

While Task Force Paik carried out its campaign in South Korea, action at the front was limited to the patrol clashes and small forays that characterized the defensive, positional war. Chinese forces attacked ROK 1st Division positions on the western front near Punji-ri and managed to drive the ROK forces off in early January. Later in the month, raids by elements of the U.S. 45th Infantry Division south of Mabang-ni drew strong enemy reactions.[32] But there was no major change in the line of contact.

Although there was little activity on the battlefield, several interesting experiments were conducted during the

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[30] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 52, G–3 sec., bk. 4, incls 1–5, pp. 4–5.

[31] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Feb and Mar 52, G–3 sec., bk. 4, incls 1–5. Although there were reportedly only 8,000 guerrillas in southwestern Korea before RATKILLER and supposedly over 9,000 were killed and captured during the operation, Ridgway's headquarters estimated in March that there were still over 3,000 guerrillas left in the area. Either there were far more guerrillas to begin with or a great many innocent bystanders were caught up in the dragnet.

[32] The 45th Division had just replaced the 1st Cavalry Division. See below, p. 203.

winter months. Van Fleet was rather disappointed in the lack of improvement of his artillery units. He wrote Ridgway in December that until early October "there was not a single instance in which a 155-mm. self-propelled gun had been used for close direct fire destruction of enemy bunkers, although this had been developed and extensively used by U.S. forces in World War II against the Siegfried Line." [33]

Thus, in January, the U.S. I Corps artillery mounted project HIGHBOY. Heavy artillery and armored vehicles were placed on the tops of hills where they could pour direct fire into the enemy positions and bunkers that could not be damaged by normal artillery and mortar fire. Van Fleet noted some progress in the system of reducing enemy fortifications located on steep mountain slopes, but the basic problem remained unsolved.[34]

The second experiment was more intriguing, though perhaps even less rewarding. Designed to confuse the Communists and lead them into miscues, Operation CLAM-UP imposed silence along the front lines from 10–15 February. No patrols were sent out; no artillery was fired; and no air support permitted within 20,000 yards of the front. Theoretically this change of tactics was supposed to arouse the curiosity of the enemy and make him think that the UNC troops had pulled back from their positions. Then when the enemy sent out his patrols to investigate, the U.N. Command would net a big bag of prisoners by ambushing them. In practice, the enemy was not fooled and used the period of respite to strengthen his defensive positions. When the Eighth Army resumed full-scale patrolling at the end of the period, only a few prisoners were taken.[35] The stratagem was not repeated.

In a third field, the results were much more promising. The rough terrain in Korea had proved to be well suited for the use of helicopters. The light and easily maneuverable aircraft could land in small clearings and evacuate the wounded or bring in needed supplies to isolated units. In Korea the Eighth Army soon discovered another use for them. On 11 November, Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 lifted 950 troops to the front and brought back an equal number and the following month it effected the relief of a second battalion.[36]

The performance of the Marine helicopters convinced General Ridgway that the multipurpose craft were vital necessities in Korea. He recommended that four Army helicopter battalions be made available to the Far East Command to supplement the Marine squadron. In order to insure a steady flow of replacement craft, he suggested that procurement be started on a scale that would permit manufacturers to expand production immediately.[37]

In December, Marine and Air Force helicopters recorded another first. During the summer of 1951, the hospital ship USS *Consolation* had been fitted with a helicopter landing platform. An-

[33] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 52, pp. 83–84.

[34] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 52, G–3 sec., an. 5, p. 5.

[35] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, p. 24.

[36] COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Nov–Dec 51, p. 1-10. For an interesting account of the developments and use of Marine helicopters in the Korean War, see Lynn Montross, *Cavalry in the Sky: The Story of the U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954).

[37] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, pp. 88–89.

chored at a small port on the east coast of Korea just above the 38th Parallel, the *Consolation* received 245 patients flown in from front-line battle aid stations during the holiday season and early January. These were emergency cases in which speedy attention often meant the difference between life and death or the loss or saving of a limb. In as little as five minutes the egg-beaters could make the trip from aid station to ship and in forty-five seconds they could unload the wounded and clear the deck. Even in choppy seas, when small boats could not be used, the helicopters carried out their mission. The success of the operation was hailed by the captain of the *Consolation* as "one of the greatest advances made in years for handling of battle casualties." [38]

Yet despite the improved facilities for rushing the wounded to the hospitals, there were many who fell who were beyond medical help. The task of patrolling and probing was both monotonous and deadly—monotonous in its dull routine and deadly in the slow but steady toll of casualties that it claimed. No matter how cautious the commanders might be in risking lives unnecessarily, enemy artillery and mortar fire often found their target and enemy ambushes and probes caused the list of dead and wounded to mount. It was a frustrating period of the war—deadlock at the truce negotiations at Panmunjom and stalemate at the front. In many ways the Korean ground war in 1952 seemed to be an anomaly—a throwback to the Western Front of World War I rather than a successor to World War II. The static quality of the battlefield, the defense in depth with its barbed wire and intricate series of trenches, the accent on artillery and mortar fire and the everlasting patrols and raids—all harked back to the 1914–18 period. There were many points of difference, of course, for the airplane had become far more important in the intervening years and gas warfare had been shelved. Better sanitation facilities and the discovery of DDT made life more livable in Korea than it had been in France. But there was no denying the similarities and for troops and officers trained in the war of movement, in fluid tactics, the return to another era necessitated a period of adjustment and many of the lessons of World War I had to be relearned.



155-MM. SELF-PROPELLED GUN

[38] COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Jan 52, pp. 10-1, 10-2.



EVACUATING A WOUNDED ROK SOLDIER BY HELICOPTER

Under most circumstances the dragging out of the negotiations and the inaction at the front might have led to a deterioration in morale, but in March the Army G–3, General Jenkins, confirmed Van Fleet's avowal that Eighth Army morale was high. On a trip along the battle trace he found both commanders and troops were confident of their ability to resist anything the enemy could throw at them.[39] Van Fleet attributed the healthy mental state of his troops to the liberal rotation policy that had been adopted early in 1951.[40]

To qualify for rotation during the winter of 1951–52 a soldier had to have nine months of service in the combat zone in Korea or a total of thirty-six points. Each month at the front was worth four points and service elsewhere in Korea was valued at two points a month. From the summer of 1951 on, increasing numbers of personnel became eligible for relief. During the fall and winter of 1951–52 between fifteen and twenty thousand men were rotated each month and this was an important factor in sustaining troop morale. On the other hand, rotation lowered troop efficiency considerably, since it became difficult to maintain training standards and to fash-

[39] Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 25 Mar 52, sub: Rpt of Staff Visit to FEC . . . , in G–3 333 Pacific, 2.

[40] Interv with General Van Fleet, in *U.S. News and World Report*, vol. XXXII, No. 13 (March 28, 1952).

ion battle-hardened teams as long as the units remained in a state of constant flux. The replacements had to undergo a period of indoctrination and of testing before they became battle-wise and by that time another new group of replacements would be on hand to be absorbed. Fortunately, the combat requirements at the time made few demands for veteran troops and the rotation system worked fairly well.

The inactivity at the front did not mean that there was a lack of planning. On the contrary, during the winter and early spring, Van Fleet's staff forwarded plans to Ridgway setting forth a variety of limited operations that might be carried out. The first arrived early in February and was called BIG STICK. It proposed to destroy the Communist supply complex based on Sibyon-ni and to advance the Eighth Army left flank to the Yesong River. In the process Kaesong would be captured and four Chinese armies dispersed at an expected cost of over 11,000 UNC casualties. BIG STICK could be mounted with present capabilities about 15 April and would use an amphibious feint on the east coast by the 1st Marine Division to bolster its chances of success.[41]

On Washington's birthday, Van Fleet followed up with a second offering. This was a more limited operation called HOME COMING and contemplated using only ROK troops. The objectives of HOME COMING were similar to BIG STICK in that the Yesong River would again be the target, but the attack toward Sibyon-ni and the amphibious feint would be omitted. Kaesong would be regained and Van Fleet considered that the recovery of the old capital of Korea would be an excellent tonic for his ROK forces. If BIG STICK were ruled out, Van Fleet wanted to try HOME COMING about 1 April.[42]

Since the negotiations at Panmunjom were making some progress by the end of February, Ridgway did not favor any operation that would lead to a rise in casualties. "Pending further orders," he informed Van Fleet in early March, "offensive action will be limited to such reconnaissance and counter-offensive measures as necessary to provide for the security of your forces." [43]

The lack of enthusiasm for his offensive plans at Ridgway's headquarters did not prevent Van Fleet from trying again on 1 April. Still anxious to use his ROK divisions in a series of limited objective attacks, he set up CHOPSTICK 6 and CHOPSTICK 16. The first envisaged the envelopment of the high ground south of P'yonggang by a reinforced ROK division, and the second laid out a two-division attack to drive the enemy from the area east and south of the Nam River in eastern Korea. In both plans, the ROK forces would be strongly supported by air and artillery and could take advantage of their cross-country mobility and gain valuable training. Ridgway, however, did not like the terrain on the defensive line set up for CHOPSTICK 6, and he turned it down. He approved the concept of CHOPSTICK 16 on 16 April and left its execution to the discretion of Van Fleet with the proviso that no U.S.

[41] Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 4 Feb 52, sub: Ltr of Transmittal, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Feb 52, Paper 7.

[42] Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 22 Feb 52, sub: Outline Plan HOME COMING, in Hq Eighth Army Gen Admin Files, Feb 52, Paper 68.

[43] Msg, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 2 Mar 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal Msg File, 1949–52.

troops would be used and that he would be notified before the operation was carried out. But, as had happened so often in the past, Van Fleet decided to suspend CHOPSTICK 16 indefinitely on 29 April—the day after the package proposal was presented at Panmunjom.[44] Once again the negotiations made their influence felt upon the battlefield.

### *Night Patrol*

The UNC decision to forego limited objective attacks in the spring of 1952 meant that the Eighth Army would continue to make contact with the enemy through patrols and raids unless the Communists changed their tactics. From an intelligence point of view patrols and raids often proved to be quite futile; few prisoners were taken and frequently no enemy contact was effected. Yet the planning and carrying out of these activities kept the front-line troops alert and gave them valuable experience and training under combat conditions.

In April 1952 each Eighth Army regiment at the front usually sent out at least one patrol and set up several ambushes for the enemy every night. The assignment to carry out the daily patrol was rotated among the battalions and companies of the regiment, customarily by a prepared roster indicating the responsibility for patrols some two to three weeks in advance. Thus in late March, Company K, 15th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, learned that it had drawn the assignment for 16 April.

The 15th Infantry, commanded by Col. William T. Moore, occupied a sector southwest of Ch'orwon and west of Yonch'on. Company K, under 1st Lt. Sylvanus Smith, was responsible for a piece of the front about eight miles west of Yonch'on, just to the west of the big double horseshoe bend of the Imjin River.[45] In this area the terrain was made up of small hills flanked by flat valleys covered with rice paddies.

Since the patrol mission was to bring back prisoners, the choice of objectives was extremely limited. The Chinese maintained only three positions within patrolling distance of Company K and the routes to these objectives were well known to both sides. As it turned out, the 3d Battalion commander, Lt. Col. Gene R. Welch, selected a position manned by what appeared to be a Chinese reinforced rifle platoon, located about 1,500 meters north of the main line of resistance. On a boot-shaped hill, called Italy, some 150 meters high, the enemy outpost kept watch over the activities of the 3d Division units to the south. Five hundred meters to the east of Italy across a broad rice valley with a meandering stream lay Greece, a many-ridged hill that resembled the Greek peninsula in its outline.

Lieutenant Smith drew up the patrol plan and had it approved at battalion and regimental level. It visualized two rifle platoons reinforced by a machine gun section from Company M moving out in three groups during the evening toward Italy. The security group, composed of the machine gun section and a rifle squad, would take its position on Hill 128 overlooking the valley between

[44] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, p. 3.

[45] The following account is based upon Hq Eighth Army, Night Combat Patrol by Co K, 15th U.S. Inf, 16–17 Apr 52, prepared by Majs Robert H. Fechtman and William J. Fox. MS in OCMH.

Italy and Greece. One rifle platoon, serving as the base of fire group, would move forward to Italy and halt 350 meters from the Chinese outpost. Once the base of fire group got into position, the assault platoon would pass through and attack the outpost from the southwest. Each group would have a telephone (EE–8) and a radio (SCR–300) to maintain contact with the others and with battalion in case it became necessary to request aid or the laying down of preplanned artillery fire along the patrol route. The handles were removed from the phones to eliminate the ringing and noise which might betray the patrol's position and the instruments were to be spliced into the assault line running forward from the main line of resistance. Flare signals were arranged but not used during the patrol. To provide preparation fire, two batteries of 155-mm. guns and one battery of 105-mm. howitzers would fire for five minutes after the base of fire group got into position on Italy. Two 105-mm. howitzers would continue to fire until the assault group was ready to attack the objective.

Since the patrol was to be conducted at night, the riflemen selected to go on the mission were given intensive training in night fire techniques. Using battery-operated lights to simulate enemy fire, the riflemen were taught to aim low and take advantage of ricochets. Sand-table models of the patrol route and objective were carefully studied and the patrol leaders were flown over the whole area to familiarize themselves with the terrain. Since most of the personnel already had been over the ground on several occasions, the members of the patrol were thoroughly briefed by the evening of 16 April. They were also informed that a regimental patrol would set up an ambush on Greece that night.

The majority of the riflemen carried M1 rifles with about 140 rounds of ammunition and two or three hand grenades apiece. The light machine guns in the base of fire group were provided with 1,000 rounds of ammunition and the crews also carried carbines. Each man wore a protective nylon vest for protection against shell fragments. In the security group heavy machine guns were substituted for light at the last moment, since they were to be used in a fixed support mission and the heavier mount would give more accurate overhead and indirect fire.

A hard rain had turned the ground into a sea of mud on 16 April and the night was dark, chilly, and windy with temperatures in the mid-fifties. At 2110 hours the security group under Lieutenant Smith led the way through the barbed wire and mine fields fronting the company positions. Next came the assault group, led by M/Sgt. George Curry, composed of 26 men of the 2d Platoon and 3 aidmen and 2 communications men from company headquarters. The base of fire group, under 2d Lt. John A. Sherzer, the patrol leader, completed the column as it sloshed through the muck down into the valley below. Sherzer had 26 men from his own 1st Platoon, 1 aidman, and 2 communications men. There were also 12 Korean litter bearers accompanying the assault and base of fire groups in the event of casualties.

Smith's security force had no trouble as they climbed Hill 128 and emplaced their machine guns. But a sudden explosion from the mine field in front of the company positions soon halted the assault group. Sgts. Frederick O. Brown

and William Upton went back to investigate and discovered that one of the medics and a Korean litter bearer had started late. Losing their way in the dark, they had wandered into the mine field and tripped a mine. Fortunately the mine had fallen forward into an old foxhole, so that the blast had carried away from the two men, who were unharmed. Brown located the approximate spot where the mine had exploded and notified battalion headquarters to rescue the men.

By the time Brown and Upton joined the waiting patrol, a half hour had been lost. As the assault group resumed its advance and rounded the shoulder of Hill 128, another element of delay entered the picture. From the 1st Battalion sector off to the right, flares went off lighting up the two platoons as they swung to the west up the valley leading to Greece and Italy. Everytime a flare illuminated the sky, the patrol hit the ground and waited until the glare subsided. Pleas back to the battalion to have the flares stopped were unsuccessful.

The snaillike pace of the patrol was further slowed by the practice of halting the groups in place whenever a burnt-out cluster of huts was encountered. Cpl. William Chilquist, in charge of the lead squad, checked the huts thoroughly to be sure that none of the enemy was lurking in the ruins. Between the flares and the three groups of huts along the route that had to be reconnoitered, it was well after 2300 hours by the time the patrol reached the last burnt-out settlement close to the foot of Italy.

Since the assault platoon now had to cross a broad stretch of open ground to get to the selected approach ridge to Italy, the base of fire group set up four light machine guns along the bank of the small stream traversing the valley. With Chilquist's squad leading, Sergeant Curry's force moved in single file across the exposed area along the top of an earthen paddy dike where the footing was less sloppy. At 3-yard intervals, the members of the platoon then began to climb to the first small rise on Italy. As the lead elements reached this spot, a voice, speaking in conventional Chinese, broke the silence. A quick word of command, a few seconds of quiet, and then the chatter of a burp gun shattered the night. From the lower reaches of Greece, machine gun and rifle fire swiftly joined in as the Chinese sprang their ambush. Evidently the enemy had set their trap along the north-south valley between Italy and Greece, expecting the patrol to approach their outpost by this route which had been used many times by Americans in the past. Only the fact that the ridge rather than the valley had been chosen as the access path prevented a greater catastrophe.

The initial enemy burst tore through the assault patrol and hit four men. A rifle bullet pierced the protective vest of Pfc. John L. Masnari, one of the BAR men, and ripped into his chest. Mortally wounded, he told his buddies not to bother about applying first aid, moaned slightly, asked for a priest, and then died a few minutes later. He was the first man to be killed in Korea while wearing body armor. The other three men took wounds in the head, arm, and leg—painful, but not critical injuries.

After the shock of the Chinese onslaught wore off, the assault platoon became angry and opened up with every available weapon on the enemy. Ser-

geant Curry tried the phone to inform the other groups and battalion of his situation, but the instrument did not work. The radio was of no assistance either, since the aerial had been put out of action by a Chinese slug. For the moment, the assault platoon was completely on its own.

Back at the battalion headquarters, Colonel Welch knew that something had gone wrong, but refused to lay on artillery fire until the patrol's location could be pinpointed; otherwise, he might shell his own men. The base of fire group, in the meantime, took cover when the enemy opened up by jumping into the hip-deep stream, since there were no rocks or fences and only one tree to crouch behind. One of the machine gunners was caught by an enemy burst of fire and took four or five bullets in his leg—the only casualty in Sherzer's platoon.

For ten minutes the two engaged platoons from Company K exchanged brisk fire with the Chinese, then the enemy troops withdrew. Curry's force, with four casualties, no communications, very little ammunition left, and the element of surprise gone, decided to pull back and rejoin Sherzer's group. Since the Korean litter bearers had dropped their loads and headed back toward the UNC lines at the outbreak of the fight, Curry's platoon had to carry its own dead and wounded. Using M1's and field jackets, the men fashioned supplementary makeshift litters and started back down the hill; there was no further enemy fire.

Shortly after midnight, the two platoons combined forces and communications with headquarters were re-established. The flares from the 1st Battalion still were going off, despite the urgent pleas of Sergeant Brown to "get the damned flares out." This meant that the patrol and its wounded had to drop or be dropped quickly each time a flare dissipated the darkness. Not only did this delay the return of the patrol, but the rough handling also made the trip very painful for the wounded. The men of the base of fire platoon, in addition, were wet and chilly from their stay in the stream. Nevertheless, the combined group inched their way back toward Company L's position, where they could get the litters through the barbed wire obstacles with less difficulty. At 0330 hours the weary patrol crept into the 3d Battalion lines and gratefully gulped down the hot coffee and doughnuts that awaited them.

Meanwhile the regimental ambush party set up on Greece had moved forward and covered the area used by the Chinese to ambush Company K's patrol; they found no signs of the enemy. In the morning, however, a battalion raiding group discovered a bloody cap and a number of bloody bandages on Greece, indicating that the 8,000 rounds of ammunition fired by the 3d Division patrol at the enemy had found some targets.[46]

Since the patrol route had been screened the afternoon before, the Chinese evidently had sent their ambush party into position during the early evening hours. Lieutenant Sherzer recommended that a screening force be sent ahead of the main patrol in the future to guard against further ambushes. The battalion commander decided that in the next patrol action the screening force would cover the patrol route by day and

[46] The patrol estimated that the enemy suffered five killed and twenty wounded in the fight.

then would remain in position until it was contacted by the night patrol.

Company K's experience was but one of hundreds encountered by the Eighth Army during the winter and spring of 1951–52. Some patrols were more successful and managed to bring back a prisoner. Others exchanged shots with the enemy and inflicted casualties, but made no close contact. Many returned with negative reports, for they had found no one to capture or even to shoot at. Patrol, raid, and ambush by the Eighth Army was matched by similar action by the Communists, for this was the pattern of ground fighting for the period.

Taken as a whole the ground war from November 1951 to April 1952 produced few surprises and little change in the defensive positions held by either side. The Chinese dragon kept to his caves and bunkers and appeared chiefly at night, while the American eagle devoted his activity to the sky and hunted mostly by day. As the pressure on the ground subsided, the emphasis on the war in the air mounted. The Air Force, Marine, and Navy planes and pilots provided the main offensive punch during the long winter.

### *Interdiction and Harassment*

The term "offensive punch" may be a trifle misleading in the case of the air interdiction campaign in Korea, since basically this was a defensive action. It was designed as a preventive measure to keep the Communists from building up sufficient supplies and ammunition to launch a general offensive rather than as preparation or support for a UNC attack. During the summer and early fall of 1951 both Air Force and Navy efforts had begun to concentrate on disrupting the enemy's supply lines with some success.[47] It was not surprising, therefore, that when the truce negotiations resumed at Panmunjom in October and ground operations sputtered out, the interdiction or STRANGLE operations received top priority.

By striking at enemy communication lines and supply points, the U.N. Command could take full advantage of its dominance of the air over North Korea and make good use of the mobile firepower represented in its air forces. The destruction of enemy equipment and war matériel would hinder the development of reserve stocks so necessary for a sustained offensive, and the disruption of transportation lines would further snarl the logistics problems facing the Communists. Even on minimum rations, the feeding and supplying of one-half to three-quarters of a million men represented a real challenge to the enemy so long as UNC planes ranged constantly overhead.

Thus, during the November to April period, the Far East Air Forces averaged over 9,000 sorties a month on interdiction and armored reconnaissance missions while close air support sorties varied from 339 to 2,461 a month.[48] Although the interdiction campaign was undertaken with the approval of General Van Fleet, the disparity between the two efforts occasioned some comment at the time and in this connection the FEAF commander, General Weyland, later wrote a defense of the distribution that bears repeating:

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[47] See Chapter V, above.

[48] (1) FEAF, Comd Rpts, Nov 51–Apr 52, vol. I. (2) FEAF Command Reference Book, May 1952, p 11.

I might suggest that all of us should keep in mind limitations of air forces as well as their capabilities. Continuous close support along a static front requires dispersed and sustained firepower against pinpoint targets. With conventional weapons there is no opportunity to exploit the characteristic mobility and firepower of air forces against worthwhile concentrations. In a static situation close support is an expensive substitute for artillery fire. It pays its greatest dividends when the enemy's sustained capability has been crippled and his logistics cut to a minimum while his forces are immobilized by interdiction and armed reconnaissance. Then decisive efforts can be obtained as the close support effort is massed in coordination with determined ground action.

Thus in the fall of 1951 it would have been sheer folly not to have concentrated the bulk of our effort against interdiction targets in the enemy rear areas. Otherwise the available fire power would have been expended ineffectively against relatively invulnerable targets along the front, while the enemy was left free to build up his resources to launch and *sustain* a general offensive. Such a general offensive, if it could have been sustained with adequate supplies and ammunition, might well have been decisive. Failure to appreciate these facts caused some adverse comment about the amount of close support given the Army, particularly during late 1951 and early 1952.[49]

In view of the situation on the ground in this period, there was considerable justice in Weyland's observations. There were no important ground offensives that got beyond the tentative planning or contingent phase and even limited objective attacks found little favor after November 1951. With the enemy well dug in and protected by heavy overhead shelter, only accurate flat trajectory fire or a direct hit by a bomb had any effect upon him. Airplanes could not possibly provide the former and found it extremely difficult to carry out pinpoint bombing of such small and well-camouflaged targets. As long as the war remained static, interdiction seemed to be the most efficient use of the UNC air capability.

The other side of the coin was the effect of the interdiction campaign upon the enemy. As the pace of STRANGLE quickened in November, Air Force and Navy pilots sought to cripple the railroads of North Korea. Fighters and fighter-bombers attacked locomotives, railroad cars, and vehicular traffic as well without serious challenge from the Communist air forces. Light bombers (B–26's) covered the main supply routes at night and medium bombers (B–29's) kept the enemy airfields unserviceable in addition to bombing marshaling yards and flying close support missions.[50] On 18 November carrier-based aircraft inaugurated a combined program of bridge and rail destruction. Naval reconnaissance jets carrying 1,000-pound bomb loads were sent out regularly for the first time in the war against rail facilities and proved to be excellent at cutting roads. By December it often took the enemy as much as three days to repair the railroad breaks he had previously restored in a single day. Yet, despite this, rail traffic continued to move.[51] The Communists succeeded in bringing up and issuing winter clothing to the troops even though it often had to be hand-carried on a piecemeal basis. Interdiction made

[49] General Otto P. Weyland, "The Air Campaign in Korea" in *Air University Quarterly Review*, vol. 6, No. 3 (Fall, 1953), pp. 20–21.

[50] FEAF, Comd Rpt, Nov 51, vol. I, p. 24.

[51] COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt, Nov–Dec 51, pp. 1-3, 1-4.

transportation more difficult, but not impossible.[52]

One reason for the failure of STRANGLE to live up to the expectations of the optimistic code name was the ingenuity of the enemy in devising countermeasures to negate the interdiction program. At the key railroad junction at Sunch'on, northeast of P'yongyang, pilots reported in early November that the railroad bridge was still out of service since two spans were missing. It was only after a night photo was taken that the U.N. Command discovered that the Communists brought up removable spans each night and had been using the bridge right along.[53]

Early in January, General Ridgway sent his assessment of the interdiction program to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was convinced that the air campaign had slowed down the enemy's supply operations, and raised the time required to get supplies to the front. It had also diverted personnel and material from the front to maintain and protect the line of communications. By destroying rail and road transportation and a significant quantity of the goods carried, interdiction had placed increased demands upon the production facilities of Communist China and the USSR. These were all valuable, Ridgway went on, but under static defense conditions the Communists were still able to support their troops adequately, and the UNC air forces within their current resources could not hope to prevent them from continuing to do so. Over a period of time the enemy could manage to stockpile supplies at the front and to build up his forces as well, the UNC commander maintained, and improvement of Communist countermeasures and repair capabilities would weaken the effects of the interdiction program in the future.[54] In other words, although the enemy was being hurt and impeded in his build-up, Ridgway believed that unless there was a change in the battle situation in which the Communists were forced to increase their expenditures of supplies and ammunition, eventually they would be in a position to launch and sustain a major offensive.

Contrary to the usual pattern of events, things improved before they got worse. During January, the carriers *Essex, Valley Forge* and *Antietam* devoted their attention to track cutting. Each carrier was assigned two or three 12-mile sectors to cut and naval aircraft subjected stretches from 1,500 to 4,000 yards in length to such concentrated bombing that almost total destruction of the roadbed resulted. They then followed up by constant surveillance to prevent quick repair. This shift in tactics evidently caught the enemy by surprise and cuts remained unrepaired for as much as ten days. During the last two weeks in January the rail line from Kowon to Wonsan was kept out of operation.[55]

To meet the UNC challenge, the enemy shifted his antiaircraft guns to the threatened areas and began to take a heavier toll of the attacking planes. In turn, the naval planes sought to counteract the antiaircraft concentration. A flak suppression strike was mounted with jets

[52] UNC/FEC Comd Rpt, Dec 51, p. 37.

[53] USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50–30 Jun 52, pp. 149–51.

[54] Msg, C 60744, Ridgway to JCS, 4 Jan 52, DA–IN 16359.

[55] COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Jan 52, pp. 1-2, 1-3.

hitting the antiaircraft just before the prop-driven planes arrived to bomb the rail lines. This proved effective especially after photoreconnaissance had spotted antiaircraft positions in advance.[56]

In addition to heavier flak concentrations, the Communists also used their manpower resources to the hilt. The North Korean railroad bureau had three brigades of 7,700 men each that devoted full time to railroad repair. At each major station 50 men were assigned to handle the more skilled tasks and 10-man teams were spaced every four miles along the tracks. As soon as a rail walker reported a break, these units swung into action. Local labor was rushed to the scene to refill the holes and rebuild roadbeds. At night the experienced crews could move in and restore the ties and rails. The Fifth Air Force estimated that as many as 500,000 soldiers and civilians were engaged at one time or another in counteracting STRANGLE.[57]

The increasing effectiveness of the Communist crews and labor forces was attested by the naval pilots in February: "The Communists have constantly been able to repair a given stretch of track on a vital rail line in twelve hours or less. On occasion repair crews were found repairing fresh cuts while strikes were still being made." [58] Primitive as his tools and methods might be, the enemy managed to restore service quickly and that was all that counted in this battle of machines against men.

The Communists were also making full use of the many tunnels in the mountainous terrain to conceal their trains during the daylight hours. Ammunition and fuel cars were placed in the middle section of the trains, so that UNC attempts to skip bombs into the tunnel mouths resulted merely in temporarily blocking the entrances. With local labor the Communists were able to clear the debris quickly and proceed on their way by nightfall.[59]

At any rate the returns from STRANGLE became less and less in the face of the Communist countermeasures and the costs mounted. Even the weather seemed designed to help the enemy, for as the ground froze many of the bombs bounced off the hard surface and exploded harmlessly in the air. Some even sent their blast upwards and damaged low-flying UNC planes. Finally, in March, after the spring thaws began, FEAF decided to initiate a new phase, which was called SATURATE, based on the tactics used by the Navy in January. By focusing the destructive power of the air forces upon a specific stretch of roadbed on an around-the-clock basis, FEAF hoped to wreak havoc with rail service. An intense effort on 25–26 March against the line between Chongju and Sinanju proved disappointing. Although 307 fighter-bombers, 161 fighters, and 8 B–26's were used in the strikes, the Communists repaired the breaks in six days and in the meantime, other portions of the rail net were free from interference.[60]

The greatest weakness in the cycle of rail attack lay in the inability of the UNC to devise effective techniques to

[56] *Ibid.*, pp 1-4.

[57] USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50–30 Jun 52, 157.

[58] COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Feb 52, pp. 1-4.

[59] *Ibid.*, Mar 52, pp. 2-4.

[60] USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50–30 Jun 52, pp. 153–54.

continue the bombing at night and during the foul weather. Despite the constant destruction of rail and bridges by day, the enemy was organized to cope with the air assault and repair the damage quickly at night and during poor flying weather. By the end of April the interdiction campaign had reached an impasse. Based upon past experience, it was evident that the air forces available to General Ridgway could not maintain the sustained effort required to keep the railroads inoperable. And obversely, it was also apparent by this time that the large augmentations that would be needed to do the job adequately were out of the question.[61]

In assessing the value of interdiction, Eighth Army had these thoughtful words to pass on to Ridgway in mid-March:

> The success of the interdiction program can best be estimated by assuming its absence. If there had been no Operation STRANGLE the enemy would now have a rail head in the vicinity of SIBYON-NI served by an excellent double track line and in the central sector he would have another important rail head somewhere between PYONGGANG and SEPO-RI. In this event, his expenditure of artillery and mortar ammunition could have been increased many times.
>
> The air interdiction program has not been able to prevent the enemy from accumulating supplies at the front in a static situation. It has, however, been a major factor in preventing the enemy from attaining equality or superiority in artillery and other weapons employed at the front. Thus it has also decreased the offensive and defensive capability of the enemy.[62]

Although the interdiction operations in the air were more widely publicized, naval surface vessels also contributed to the effort, especially along the eastern coast of North Korea. During poor flying weather the 5-inch guns of the fleet destroyers kept the coastal railroad under fire. The destroyer barrages could not make the initial break in the rails, but they could help keep the line cut by harassing fire.[63]

Heavy naval ships concentrated on troop targets along the east coast. The battleships *New Jersey* and *Wisconsin,* the heavy cruisers *Toledo, Los Angeles, Rochester,* and *St. Paul,* and the light cruiser *Manchester* supported the ROK I Corps during November and December close to the bomb line.[64] Farther north British Royal Marine Commando units carried out several raids on Tanch'on and one on Wonsan Harbor during December. In the meantime, the Communists became active on the west coast. Under cover of night they landed raiding parties on offshore islands held by ROK adherents north of the 38th Parallel. The vulnerability of many of these islands lying close to the coast to seizure by determined enemy efforts led Admiral Joy to seek ways and means to strengthen the guerrilla garrisons. By adding ROK Marine units as reinforcements to the guerrillas, Joy hoped to stiffen their defensive capabilities.[65] On 6 January the responsibility for island defense north of the 38th Parallel was turned over to the Navy, and Task Force 95 was given the task of providing sup-

[61] See below, Chapters XIV and XV.

[62] Ltr, with incls, Lt George F. Bless, AG, to CINCFE, 19 Mar 52, sub: Air Interdiction Program, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Mar 52, Paper 21.

[63] COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Nov–Dec 51, pp. 2-7.

[64] *Ibid.,* pp. 2-2.

[65] *Ibid.,* pp. 2-3, 2-10.

port for the ROK marines and guerrillas holding the outposts.[66]

As the island defenses were tightened, the Communists encountered more resistance in their amphibious operations. In February a battalion-sized attack on the island of Yang-do about twenty miles northeast of Songjin on the east coast was repulsed as United States and New Zealand surface vessels helped the ROK marines and guerrillas. Eleven sampans were sunk by naval gunfire and over 75 of the attacking forces were killed.[67] After this setback the enemy shifted his attack back to the west coast and in March overwhelmed the Korean Marine garrison on Ho-do which lay about twenty miles southwest of Chinnamp'o. Although the enemy withdrew after three days, Ho-do was not reoccupied since it lay too close to the mainland and was open to follow-up raids.[68]

While the battle for the islands went on, the JCS considered the possibility of introducing a more dramatic note into the war. In early February they recommended that the Air Force and the Navy conduct a sweep along the China coast to spur the Chinese in the peace negotiations. But the State Department did not want to cause Prime Minister Churchill any further embarrassment. Since British opposition leaders had been accusing Churchilll of approving new courses of action in the Korean War during his January visit to Washington, the State Department felt that a China sweep at this time would tend to confirm these suspicions.[69]


[66] *Ibid.*, Jan 52, pp. 2-6, 2-7.
[67] *Ibid.*, Feb 52, pp. 2-3, 3-6.
[68] *Ibid.*, Mar 52, pp. 2-6, 2-7.
[69] Memo, Fechteler for Secy Defense, 8 Feb 1952, sub: Proposed Sweep Along the China Coast, in G-3 091 China, 4/2.

The commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, picked up the idea of a China sweep in March, but General Ridgway, too, had some doubts. He told Radford that while he favored such an operation at an opportune moment, he felt that it would cause adverse political repercussions if it were carried out at that time. Under the circumstances, Ridgway preferred to hold off and wait for further developments at Panmunjom.[70]

The postponement of the carrier sweep delayed the introduction of a change in pace in naval operations until the following month. In mid-April, however, the carriers *Boxer* and *Philippine Sea* sent out four strikes against the important communications center of Ch'ongjin and dropped 200 tons of heavy bombs on the city. From the sea the cruiser *St. Paul* and three destroyers fired their 8- and 5-inch guns at Ch'ongjin for a whole day. Not only was considerable damage done to installations, but the naval pilots also got welcome relief from the monotonous rail interdiction campaign.[71]

Naval operations during the November–April period produced little major excitement. The North Korean port of Wonsan received its daily bombardment and mine sweepers ploughed their way with regularity along the coast. Almost every month hits were scored on UNC vessels by the Communist shore batteries, but the damages were usually small and the casualties low. The interdiction campaign occupied the bulk of the carrier planes, but the Marine air squadrons

[70] Msg, CX 65327, CINCFE to CINCPAC, 15 Mar 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. 1, incl 4.
[71] COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Apr 52, pp. 1-4.



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managed to devote most of their attack to close air support missions. Nórmal blockade and reconnaissance operations continued as in the past, with a close watch on the enemy build-up. Although there was no significant change in the use of the Communist air potential during the period, the danger of sudden and powerful strikes was always a possibility and the UNC naval forces had to remain alert and ready for hostile air action.

### *The Shifting of the Balance*

The paralyzing effect of the truce negotiations upon the battlefield was demonstrated time and time again during the winter and spring of 1951–52. In the shuffle one offensive plan after another was examined and discarded either as being too costly in casualties or too likely to have an adverse influence upon the course of negotiations. Some of the ramifications of the pursuit of the "active defense" have already been considered in connection with the ground, air, and sea campaigns, but there were others that deserve to be examined.

As soon as the war settled down into its static phase, the number of casualties

dropped dramatically. Estimates of Communist casualties fell from 80,000 in October 1951 to 50,000 in November, to 20,000 a month in December and January, and then hovered between the 11–13,000 a month mark through April.[72] During the same period the UNC battle casualty rate decreased from 20,000 in October to 11,000 in November, to 3,000 a month in December and January and remained under the 2,500-a-month mark from February through April.[73]

The sinking casualty figures could have a number of end results: an expanding replacement pool; a cutback in the number of replacements requisitioned each month to keep the front-line units up to strength; or the initiation of a rotation program to relieve front-line troops. The Communists decided on the first course of action in their desire to improve their position vis-á-vis the U.N. Command. From a low of 377,000 men on 1 November, the Chinese Communists grew to an estimated 570,000 on 1 December and a total of 642,000 by the first of the year.[74] The North Koreans evidently were not required to do more than maintain their forces at about 225,000 men during the last months of 1951.[75]

The UNC, on the other hand, chose the third alternative. During the six months between 1 November and 30 April, U.S. ground force strength, including the marines, dropped from 264,670 to 260,479. Each month between 16,000 and 28,000 replacements were sent out from the United States and men who had served enough time at the front to qualify for rotation were sent home. As has been noted before, the policy helped to sustain morale but it also served to depress the relative strength of the UNC ground forces vis-á-vis the Communists. Despite a small increase in the contributions of the other U.N. countries—from 33,258 to 35,912—and an almost 60,000-man rise in ROK ground force strength—from 281,800 to 341,113—during the same six months' span, enemy superiority in manpower continued to mount.[76]

Just how much the enemy had improved his military position since the initiation of negotiations in July became apparent in a comparative estimate submitted by the Army G–2, Maj. Gen. Alexander R. Bolling, in late April. In

[72] Estimates of enemy casualties under fixed positional war conditions are difficult to confirm and probably tend to be excessively high. During the November–April period the UNC estimated that the Communists suffered 88,000 dead and 40,000 wounded, a proportion of two killed to one wounded. Contrast this rather unusual statistic with the more normal proportion of UNC casualties during the same period—4,600 killed, 21,000 wounded, and 800 missing in action, a ratio of one death to four other casualties. Statistics may be found in the UNC/FEC reports for the period.

[73] Naturally there were also many nonbattle casualties—victims of sickness and accidents—and these were usually far more numerous than the battle casualties. The Greek Battalion, however, after a year in Korea, reported only 79 nonbattle casualties as opposed to 350 battle casualties, a complete reversal of the usual ratio. Investigation revealed that the Greeks simply held no sick call. See Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 25 Mar 52, sub: Rpt of Staff Visit to FEC, in G–3 333 Pacific, 2.

[74] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpts, Nov, Dec 51. There were 8 Chinese armies on the front with 6 armies and 1 armored division in reserve behind the front and 3 armies and 2 infantry divisions in the rear reserve at the end of December. In addition there were 5 artillery divisions and 35,000 security troops. See Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, bk. 3, G–2 sec., incls 5–8.

[75] *Ibid.* There were still seven N.K. corps plus a mechanized division (the *17th*) and the N.K. *23d Brigade*. Only three corps—the *I*, *II*, and *III*—were at the front and all were located in the east coast sector.

[76] DF, OCA to OCMH, 31 Jul 53, sub: ROK and UN Ground Forces Strength in Korea. In OCMH.

the ten months, enemy strength mounted from 502,000 with 72 divisions to 866,000 with 82 divisions. Artillery supplies quintupled from 8,000 rounds to over 40,000 rounds and artillery units climbed from 4 CCF divisions and some underequipped North Korean units to 8 CCF divisions and 4 well-equipped N.K. brigades. From practically no armor in July, the Communists now had 2 Chinese armored divisions, 1 North Korean armored division, and 1 mechanized division, with an estimated 520 tanks and self-propelled guns. Most of the new material was of Russian design or manufacture. Supply problems had lessened for the Communist forces during the negotiation interval and the combat efficiency of the enemy had shown steady improvement.[77] Certainly the Communists had made good use of the respite generated by the truce talks and were in excellent position to continue the stalemate as long as it suited them.

In the air a similar development had taken place. Bolling estimated that the Communists had raised their forces in Manchuria from about 500 planes in July to approximately 1,250 in April, of which about 800 were Russian jets. Seventy-five transports had also been added to the enemy air fleet.[78] Actually the Communist air forces had imitated the pattern set forth on the ground. Although their air capability had increased steadily, they had made no serious attempt to challenge the UNC during the winter and early spring. They flew an estimated peak of 4,000 jet sorties in December, but thereafter the total declined to about 2,300 in April. After 1 January they made little attempt to keep their airfields in North Korea serviceable and few enemy fighters strayed south of Sinanju.[79] The air potential was there, but like the ground challenge, it seemed to be latent rather than patent during the dormant phase of the war.

Despite the quiescence of the enemy, General Ridgway and his staff were worried about the growth of Communist air power. As he told the JCS in December, he believed that he needed a total of eight F–86 Sabrejet wings to maintain a bare numerical parity with the enemy in fighter-interceptor strength.[80] But his message met with little encouragement in Washington. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee pointed out that Ridgway had five squadrons of F–86's or one and two-thirds wings now. To provide him with six and one-third more wings was impossible, since U.S. production amounted to only thirteen planes a month and Canada's production of twenty a month was committed to NATO. The JCS realized that they could not fill Ridgway's request, but they attempted to work out a lesser increase. In early January a carrier was being sent to the Pacific and he could have that if he wanted it; there was also one Marine jet squadron due to arrive in the western Pacific in January that could be assigned to the Far East Command.[81]

These were frankly stopgap measures,

[77] Memo, Bolling for ACofS G–2, 25 Apr 52, sub: SE–25, Communist Short Term Intentions in Korea, in G–3 091 Korea, 59.

[78] *Ibid.*

[79] FEAF Comment to Staff Study, 24 Apr 52, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 407, Korean Air Opns 12 Dec 51.

[80] Msg, CX 59092, CINCFE to JCS, 10 Dec 51, DA–IN 8325.

[81] (1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 14 Dec 51, sub: Augmentation of FEAF, in G–3 320.2 Pacific, 81/2. (2) Msg, JCS 89641, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Dec 51.

but the Air Force staff examined its resources and quickly came up with several suggestions. Three squadrons of F–94 Starfire all-weather fighters could be spared from the Air Defense Command in the United States although it would mean sending pilots who had already served a tour in Korea back again. The Air Force also wanted to have the State Department negotiate the release of seventy-five F–86's in the U.K. and seventy-five in Canada which could then be shipped to Korea if crews were available. This would cut Canadian air defense to a minimum and delay the build-up of NATO air forces, but under the circumstances, Army planners joined their Air Force counterparts in supporting Ridgway's need for additional air power as being more urgent.[82]

As it turned out, the upshot of all the efforts to increase Ridgway's fighter force was a fairly modest augmentation, but considering the complicated factors involved it was a good try. One squadron of F–94's was sent to the Far East Command in February and the United States made arrangements with the Canadian Government to purchase sixty F–86's at ten per month. Adding this to the U.S. production available would enable Ridgway to achieve by June two operational full strength F–86 wings that would be backed by a 50-percent reserve.[83]

The carrier *Philippine Sea* arrived in the Far East in January to fulfill the JCS promise of another carrier, but Admiral William M. Fechteler, the Chief of Naval Operations, notified the JCS that it could not remain permanently unless the Navy were allowed to retain two carriers due for retirement as a result of the reconversion program then under way. The Air Force opposed the retention since it thought that the Navy could transfer two carriers from the Atlantic-Mediterranean on a temporary basis. In the absence of agreement on this matter among the JCS, Secretary Lovett ruled that the Navy was justified in hanging on to the carriers as long as there was no sign of settlement in the Far East and the possibility of a widening of the war existed. If reduction was made in American naval forces in the European area, unfortunate political repercussions might result. The President agreed and Ridgway was informed that he could keep the additional carrier until either a truce was arranged or his air forces were built up to a point where he could release the carrier.[84]

Ridgway was less fortunate in his plea to the Chief of Staff for additional antiaircraft battalions. It will be remembered that Collins had granted him an increase of 5 battalions in mid-1951 and 4 of these had arrived in the theater by November. But the growth of enemy air power and the construction of several UNC airfields had created new requirements for antiaircraft defense. Accordingly, in January, the Far East commander asked for 9 more battalions to be sent as soon as possible. In this instance, he encountered a stone wall. There were no AAA battalions that could be spared, Collins told him, in view of the many world-wide U.S. commitments.[85]

[82] Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 27 Dec 51, sub: Air Reinforcement for Korea, in G–3 091 Korea, 219.

[83] Msg, JCS 900404, JCS to CINCFE, 7 Feb 1952.

[84] Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 5 Feb 1952, sub: Deployment of Aircraft Carriers to the Western Pacific, in G–3 320.2 Pacific, 2.

[85] (1) Msg, CX 61561, CINCFE to DA, 16 Jan 52, DA–IN 945. (2) Msg, DA 92425, CSUSA to CINCFE, 18 Jan 52.

Lack of action on the battlefield dimmed prospects for large augmentations to the UNC but did permit several shifts within the command. Without doubt the most important of these transfers involved the movement of the U.S. 45th and 40th Infantry Divisions from Japan to Korea to take the places of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division.

On the surface this appeared to be a routine rotation of divisions, but actually there was considerable background to the exchange. The 40th and 45th were both National Guard divisions that had been sent to Japan in April 1951 to finish their training while furnishing extra security for Japan. In view of the interest of Congress in the commitment of National Guard divisions to combat, the Army sought and received confirmation from Ridgway in July that he did not intend to commit either of the divisions to combat piecemeal.[86]

In August the JCS informed Ridgway that they wanted the divisions employed in Korea when they completed their training and the U.N. commander agreed. But the development of the summer offensive caused Ridgway to change his mind. He did not want to give up combat-wise divisions for untrained troops as long as there was any danger of an enemy counteroffensive. Besides, he told the JCS, a transfer would disrupt his ability to defend Japan for a period of three months while the transfer was taking place.[87]

In Washington, the Army G–3, General Jenkins, disagreed. He thought the risk in leaving Japan partially exposed temporarily to be far less than the threat in Korea. Furthermore, he pointed out to Collins, many of the National Guardsmen in the 40th and 45th would come to the end of their term of service in August 1952 and would have to be sent home. He recommended that one National Guard division be shipped to Korea and then, at an opportune moment, one of the combat divisions could be withdrawn and rotated to Japan. This process could be repeated later on with the second division. Both the JCS and the President approved of this procedure in mid-September.[88]

But Ridgway was not convinced. He held that until at least 15 November the danger of a Soviet move against Japan would still be possible. The Russian reaction to the Japanese peace treaty was as yet unclear and the situation in Germany was also doubtful. He urged postponement of any movement until November when the matter could be reviewed. In the light of Ridgway's reclama, the JCS, with Presidential approval, rescinded their directive to effect the National Guard transfer.[89]

When early November arrived, Ridgway changed his reasons for objecting to the shift of the two divisions to Korea. Although the Eighth Army had completed the fall offensive by this time, Ridgway did not want to reduce its combat effectiveness in case other operations might be carried out to put pressure

[86] Summary Sheet, Jenkins for CofS, 10 Aug 51, sub: Employment of 40th and 45th Infantry Divs, in G–3 320.2 Pacific, 60/15.

[87] Msg, CINCFE to DA, 3 Sep 51, DA–IN 12693.

[88] (1) Memo, Jenkins to CofS, 14 Sep 51, sub: Rotation of 40th and 45th Divs to Korea, in G–3 320.2 Pacific, 60/18. (2) Msg, DA 81600, G–3 to Eddleman, 15 Sep 51.

[89] (1) Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 19 Sep 51, DA–IN 17897. (2) Msg, JCS 82084, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Sep 51.

upon the enemy in the negotiations. Instead he urged that restrictions against using the National Guard divisions for replacements be lifted.[90]

General Collins would have no part of this. In his opinion an attempt to break up the divisions would invoke a storm of protests from Congress and imply that the National Guard divisions were not fit for combat duty after a year of training. He informed Ridgway that it appeared mandatory to use the divisions as units as soon as possible before their time expired.[91]

The Chief of Staff's arguments settled the matter. On 20 November, General Hickey told Van Fleet that the 45th Division would begin its movement in December to replace the 1st Cavalry Division.[92]

When the actual transfer began, the Far East Command employed a technique that had been developed during World War II in the Pacific. In 1944 the 38th Division had been shipped to Hawaii, disembarked, and had taken over the quarters, equipment, and weapons of the 6th Division. The 6th had been loaded on the ships that had brought the 38th and had then been sent to the Southwest Pacific. By using the same shipping for both relieving and relieved elements and swapping all heavy equipment and supplies, all the men would have to carry would be personal arms and equipment. It was an economical method that obviated on- and offloading of divisional equipment and speeded up the whole exchange procedure.[93]

The 45th and 1st Cavalry Divisions began their rotation cycle in early December. As the first echelon—the 180th Infantry Regiment—arrived on 5 December, it was assigned to the U.S. I Corps. Two days later, the 5th Cavalry Regiment sailed for Hokkaido to become part of the U.S. XVI Corps. On 17 December the 179th Regiment reached Inch'on and the following day the 7th Cavalry Regiment left for Japan. The final echelon—the 279th Regiment—came into Korea on 29 December and on the 30th the 8th Cavalry Regiment completed the exchange. By that time the 180th Regiment had taken its place on the line and received its baptism of fire.[94]

With the experience of this shift under its belt, the Far East Command prepared for the second step. The warning order for the exchange of the 40th Division and the 24th Division was issued in December and in early January the movement commenced. The 24th Division left behind the 5th Infantry Regiment which had been attached to it in Korea, since it was contemplated that the 34th Infantry Regiment which was organic to the 24th Division would rejoin it in Japan. By early February the 40th Division had taken over the responsibility of the 24th in the IX Corps area near Kumsong. The smoothness of the operation was reflected in the story of the gunner in a 24th Division artillery unit who was engaged in carrying out a fire mission. He reportedly passed the lan-

[90] Msg, C 56484, CINCFE to DA, 3 Nov 51, DA-IN 15036.

[91] Msg, DA 87224, Collins to CINCFE, 16 Nov 51.

[92] Ltr of Instr, Hickey to CG Eighth Army, 20 Nov 51, no sub, in G-3 320.2 Pacific, 80.

[93] See Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944*, UNITED STATES IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), p. 463.

[94] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, G-3 sec., bk. 4, incls 1–5, pp. 4–5.

yard to his 40th Division replacement and set out for the waiting trucks while his guns sent a 40th Division salute to his departure at the enemy.[95]

All in all, the divisional exchanges were very efficiently carried out with a minimum of disruption to the fighting strength of the Eighth Army. In assessing tht performance of the 40th and 45th Divisions in April, the Eighth Army G–3 concluded that the combat effectiveness of the two new divisions after a short period in combat was equal to the old divisions that had been decimated by the rotation program.[96]

Although the exchange of the four divisions was the largest during the six-month period under consideration, lesser moves were also effected to take advantage of the static phase of the war. In March the ROK 8th Division completed its role in the antiguerrilla campaign and relieved the 1st Marine Division on the U.S. X Corps front. Van Fleet moved the marines to the west flank on 25 March and pulled back the ROK 1st Division. He felt that the marines' amphibious capability could be exploited in the anchor position and in the meantime Seoul could be better protected.[97]

The rotation problem also struck some of the United Nations units that had been in Korea for a year or more. In November Van Fleet established the pattern for rotation of non-U.S. forces in Korea. The French Government wished to withdraw its battalion from the line for three months while replacements were brought in and the battalion was reorganized. But Van Fleet strongly opposed this procedure. Instead he urged that the participating nations send a trained replacement unit to Korea. After its arrival the exchange could be carried out in the immediate rear area with no loss of combat effectiveness to the Eighth Army.[98] Van Fleet's recommendations were approved and rotation of U.N. units followed this method of relief in the future.

In late March the first increment of an Ethiopian replacement battalion reached Korea and the Ethiopian rotatees returned home on the same ships. And in April the Australian Government sent a second infantry battalion—the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment—to join its sister 3d Battalion.[99]

The lull on the battlefield also permitted General Van Fleet to reconstitute in early April the ROK II Corps which had been eliminated after the Communists had twice overrun it, once in the fall of 1950 and then again in early 1951. The new ROK II Corps consisted of the ROK 3d, 6th, and Capital Divisions and was commanded by General Paik Sun Yup. The corps boundaries between the U.S. IX and X Corps were redrawn and the ROK II assumed control of a sector from Kumsong to T'ongson'gol, fifteen miles to the southeast.[100] (*Map IV*)

[95] The problems and solutions to the 40th Division–24th Division movement are set forth in Capt. James L. Holton, "Operation Changey-Changey" in *National Defense Transportation Journal*, vol. VIII, No. 3 (May–June, 1952).

[96] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, G–3 sec., bk. 4, incl 1–5.

[97] (1) Msg, E 4871 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 9 Mar 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin File, Mar 52. (2) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, sec. I, Narrative.

[98] (1) Msg, DA 86544, G–3 to CINCFE, 10 Nov 51. (2) Msg, G 2932 TAC, CE Eighth Army to CINCFE, 12 Nov 51, in Hq Eighth Army Opnl Planning Files, Nov 51.

[99] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, pp. 85–95.

[100] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, G–3 sec., bk. 4, incls 1–5.

There was little question but that rotation and realignment of troops were made fairly simple by the absence of activity on the ground, but the over-all effect could only mean at best the maintenance of the *status quo* for the U.N. Command. At the worst it could lead to a weakening of Ridgway's forces as rotation drained off his experienced combat troops and replaced them with unproven soldiers.

In the meantime the enemy had improved his defenses, increased his forces, and stockpiled supplies. Six months of the "active defense" had produced a monotonous war of position with the Communists now firmly ensconced behind well-prepared and fortified defense lines. The patrol and the ambush, reminiscent of the Indian wars in the nineteenth century, furnished the chief action on the ground, but even these encounters were limited to a very small scale.

With the ground forces on both sides carefully leashed, the center of attraction shifted to the air war. The Communist transport and supply network was crippled by the interdiction campaign and enemy capabilities were sufficiently blunted so that a major attack no longer appeared likely.

The enemy was stronger and better prepared by April 1952, but still not eager to change the tenor of the war. As long as there was no break in the negotiations and there were no outstanding pressures on the battlefield, the Communists appeared ready to continue their present tactics of defense at the front and attack in the discussions and in the propaganda field. The UNC, on the other hand, pursued the defense all along the line with the possible exception of the air and sea war and even these could be termed as much defensive as offensive. And, behind the UNC lines, other problems, produced in part as by-products of the static war, came to light.

## CHAPTER X

# Behind the Lines

A settlement of the truce negotiations or a continuation of the hot war might have obscured several of the problems that became important during the winter of 1951–52. But the absence of conclusive developments either at Panmunjom or on the battlefield focused more attention upon the flow of affairs in the rear areas. The lack of decision in the debates and at the front did not obviate the need for decisions behind the scenes. Regardless of the details of the eventual agreement at Panmunjom, the basic problem of the Communist threat in the Far East would remain. By November 1951 it was evident that no military decision would be won or even sought. What, then, would come after the armistice?

Since World War II the United States had provided the chief opposition to the spread of communism all over the world. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, formed in 1949, offered a nucleus for resisting further Communist aggrandizement in Europe. By the close of 1951 the United States had built up the American forces on the European continent to six divisions and was asking the other NATO member nations to increase their contributions. Progress was slow since rearmament and upkeep of armed forces were expensive items and the threat of war in Europe did not appear to be critical. In February 1952, however, an event of considerable importance for NATO took place when the NATO conference held at Lisbon approved plans for a fifty-division NATO ground force that would include German elements for the first time. The news of the rearmament of West Germany and its future participation in NATO evoked protests from the Soviet Union, but these were rejected by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The addition of West Germany forged another link in the European defense line, but whether this link would be a source of strength or a weakening liability was as yet unknown.

In the Far East, on the other hand, the United States stood alone. The colonial commitments of Great Britain and France in Africa and Southeast Asia ruled out hope of major assistance from them in the near future. Unless the United States wanted to continue to shoulder the burden, only one practical alternative remained—to tap the manpower potential at hand in the Far East. To fashion an effective force that would have the training and equipment as well as the will to fight against Communist encroachments would be expensive and time consuming, but not as costly as maintaining large numbers of U.S. troops in the area. Fortunately a start had been made in the Republic of Korea, Nationalist China, the Philippines,



ROK Army Recruits Receiving Initial Issue of Clothing and Equipment

and Japan. Military assistance advisory groups had begun the long-term tasks of developing national forces to withstand aggression. The main problem would be to strengthen and accelerate the military aid program so that ultimately the United States could delegate some of the responsibility for the defense of the Far East against Communist expansion.

### *Improving the ROK Army*

As long as the war continued, the Republic of Korea would remain the most critical link in the defense chain. Here lay the direct threat to a nation sponsored and supported by the United States —a threat that could not be ignored or evaded without endangering the entire U.S. position in the Far East. To meet the Communist challenge the bulk of the U.S. military forces in the Far East had been committed to the war in 1950 and reinforcements from the United States had quickly followed with a resultant drain upon the strategic reserve. The only hope for halting this flow of manpower seemed to rest in the substitution of Korean troops for U.S. soldiers. But before Korean forces could take over and successfully defend their own liberties, much remained to be done.



KMAG INSTRUCTOR CORRECTS THE BAR FIRING POSITION FOR ROK TRAINEE

The Army, as has been mentioned previously, had begun to work on the task.[1] Operating through the Korean Military Advisory Group, active steps were under way to improve the quality and efficiency of the ROK Army. Both the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Pace, and the Chief of Staff were personally interested in the progress of the KMAG plan of action and this helped to remove some of the obstacles that had hampered the program.[2]

[1] See Chapter IV, above.

[2] Msg, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 3 Sep 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper 9.

Basically the chief impediment had been time. Until the pressure on the battlefield had lessened, it was impossible to withdraw units for training or refresher courses. Replacements frequently were rushed up to the front lines with insufficient instruction in tactics and weapons. It was a wasteful process, but, under the circumstances, necessary.

When the fighting slacked off in July, General Ridgway and his advisors began to devote more attention to the adequate preparation of men and units for combat. The raw material supplied by the ROK was good, although often undernour-

ished. If properly led, the average Korean youth showed courage, stamina, and a great deal of native patience—all excellent qualities, especially in a defensive war. Despite the variable performance of the South Korean forces during the first year of the war, military observers were convinced that most of their worst moments could be traced directly to poor leadership and lack of training. It was against these weaknesses that KMAG launched its main assaults.

In the program outlined by Ridgway in July 1951, the chief objective was to correct the leadership problem by re-establishing and reinvigorating the South Korean military school system. Now that time was available, he hoped eventually to create a professionally competent officer and noncommissioned officer corps.[3] This did not promise to be an easy project. The ROK Army did not pay its officers or enlisted men more than a pittance, considering the inflationary trend of the South Korean economy. It was hardly surprising that many of the officers should try to make ends meet by resorting to questionable expedients, but it was not conducive to the creation of a good army when these same officers put personal benefits ahead of military necessity. In spite the continual pressure that KMAG applied upon the ROK Government to take severe disciplinary measures against corrupt officers, the problem was likely to remain until the officers received sufficient compensation to support themselves and their families.[4]

Another element in the complex undertaking of building a capable officer corps was the instilling of confidence at all levels—confidence in the officers among the soldiers and confidence of the officers in themselves. The average South Korean officer was young, and in many cases regiments were commanded by men under thirty. Yet despite the leavening factor of youth, caution was characteristic. In the absence of higher authority or direct command, juniors were usually reluctant to act lest they offend their superiors. The dearth of initiative would not be simple to compensate for. It was a basic deficiency that arose from the emphasis that the Koreans placed upon rank and seniority—you bowed to those above you and bullied those below you. As long as this condition lasted, few ROK officers would be willing to risk offending their superiors by taking independent action. To counter this tendency, KMAG instructors would have to exert skill and patience over a considerable length of time.[5]

While KMAG attempted to implant confidence, initiative, and professional skill in the upper echelons, a Field Training Command was put into operation behind the lines to bolster the morale of the soldiers. As each ROK division was rotated through a nine-week course of basic training, refresher instruction in weapons and tactics helped to weld the fighting units into better combat teams. The success of the course of training led to the establish-

[3] Msg, CX 50942, CINCFE to DA, 16 Sep 51, in Hq Eighth Army, Opnl Planning Files, Sep 51, Paper 28.

[4] (1) Kenneth W. Myers, The U.S. Military Advisory Group to the ROK, Part IV, KMAG's Wartime Experiences, 11 July 1951–27 July 1953, pp. 26–27, 189. MS in OCMH. (Hereafter cited as Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experiences). (2) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 9 Nov 51, sub: To Determine What Can be Done Now to Make Better Use of Korean Manpower, in G–3 091 Korea, 187/7.

[5] Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experiences, pp. 26–27, 189.

ment of three additional camps—one in each corps area—in September 1951.[6]

By the beginning of November 1951 considerable progress was made in the organization of the school and training system. The Replacement Training and School Command under General Champeny had acquired additional personnel and was ready to handle large groups.[7] To centralize training installations the RTSC recommended that the Infantry School, Artillery School, and Signal School all be relocated at Kwangju in southwestern Korea, about 120 miles west of Pusan. The consolidated school opened in early January and was given a new name the following month—The Korean Army Training Center. Up to 15,000 troops could be instructed at one time at this installation.[8]

At the officer candidate school level the course was extended from eighteen to twenty-four weeks to provide extra training for the new company grade officers. And on 1 January 1951 the Korean Military Academy reopened its doors at Chinhae near Pusan with a full four-year curriculum patterned after West Point. For field grade officers a Command and General Staff School was established at Taegu and officially launched on 11 December 1951.[9]

In the meantime 150 ROK officers attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and another 100 took the course at the Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. From this group trained in U.S. schools the Army hoped to recruit the future instructors for the ROK Army. As a whole, the officers chosen to go to the U.S. service schools were the pick of the crop and did well at their studies. The chief problem, as usual, was that of language and interpreters had to be sent along with the students, but many of the latter took advantage of their tour in the United States and learned some English as well. Since few Americans learned to speak Korean, this was to be of great value when these officers later returned to Korea. The problem of communication between Korean and American soldiers was a continuing and perplexing one, especially when technical exchanges took place. The first group of ROK officers graduated from the U.S. schools in March 1952 and a second contingent of 250 officers left Korea the same month to begin the next cycle.[10]

The growing effort in behalf of the ROK Army increased the demands upon KMAG and led to a request from Ridgway that the group be augmented. On 1 November the Department of the Army approved an expansion of over 800 spaces for KMAG, bringing its total strength to over 1,800 officers and men.[11]

As the ROK Army began to improve in quality, Acting Secretary of Defense William C. Foster raised the question of its ultimate quantity. On 10 November he requested the JCS views on the mission and size of the postwar ROK defense force.[12] Since both MacArthur and

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 134–36.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 128–31.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 201–04.

[10] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 174–79. (2) Memo, Jenkins for DCofS, 21 Nov 51, sub: ROKA Students . . . , in G–3 350.2 Korea, 5/16.

[11] Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 9 Nov 51, sub: To Determine What Can Be Done Now to Make Better Use of Korean Manpower . . . , in G–3 091 Korea, 187/7.

[12] Memo, Foster for JCS, 10 Nov 51, sub: Post-Hostilities Military Forces of the ROK, in G–3 091 Korea, 208.

Ridgway had consistently favored a ten-division, 250,000-man army the JCS recommended that this figure be maintained despite the fact that the President and his advisors had decided in the meantime to increase ROK military strength.[13] The Joint Chiefs informed the Secretary of Defense in late January 1952 that the ROK economy did not have the capability to sustain a significant expansion of military forces in the near future. In their opinion, the present ROK units, when properly trained, equipped, and led, should constitute a sufficient deterrent to further aggression or, if the occasion demanded, could delay Communist advance until reinforcements could be brought in.[14] The ROK Government was in the throes of a serious financial crisis as a result of steady inflation and hardly in a position to assume additional heavy expenses, it is true, but this was but one facet to the problem. It should not be forgotten that the United States had made commitments to supply many of the military requirements of its NATO allies and was about to sponsor the renascence of the Japanese defense forces as well. With U.S. production not on a full war scale and with heavy demands at home and abroad to be met, it appeared that ROK Army expansion would have to await a more opportune moment.

The ROK Government and its most effective spokesman, President Rhee, did not, of course, agree that an army of ten divisions would be enough to defend South Korea in the postwar period, but the matter lay quiescent until late March 1952. During an inspection trip to Korea, Secretary of the Navy Dan Kimball discovered that General Van Fleet favored the formation of ten additional ROK divisions. When he reported this item to the Army Policy Council upon his return there was considerable consternation. This was the first intimation that the Army had received of strong support for ROK Army expansion and it was a little humiliating to have to get the information from the Navy. In any event General Hull immediately asked Ridgway for an explanation.[15]

Ridgway was just as surprised as his superiors had been and forthwith queried Van Fleet. In this roundabout manner he was finally informed by the Eighth Army commander that the latter did believe in the expansion of the ROK Army to twenty divisions. Van Fleet maintained that the ROK had the manpower and the desire to fight and the United States could support ROK troops in Korea much more economically than American forces. As a conclusion to a somewhat amazing performance, Van Fleet referred his commander to an interview he had just had published in the *U.S. News and World Report*, if Ridgway desired more information on his views.[16]

Whatever Ridgway's personal reaction to this turn of events may have been, he exercised remarkable restraint. He told Hull that he had not seen Van Fleet's magazine interview, but nevertheless he flatly disagreed with his subordinate on doubling the ROK Army. Not only was the ROK economy unable to

[13] See Chapter VI, above.

[14] Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 23 Jan 52, sub: Post-Hostilities Military Forces of the ROK.

[15] Msg, DA 905814, Hull to Ridgway, 9 Apr 52.

[16] Msg, G 5347 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 9 Apr 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 18. See also Interv with General Van Fleet, in *U.S. News and World Report*, vol. XXXII, No. 13 (March 28, 1952).



MAIN ACADEMIC BUILDING OF THE KOREAN MILITARY ACADEMY, CHINHAE

sustain additional forces, but he thought that the development of the Japanese defense forces should be given preference at this time. The training program for the ROK ten-division army was just beginning to bear fruit, he went on, but it would take another ten months before it was completed. If the United States started to organize ten additional divisions it would require eigtheen months to prepare them for action and the United States would also have to furnish all subsistence, clothing, and pay. Although he had the utmost respect for General Van Fleet, Ridgway informed Hull that "His outlook, however, in this particular case is in my opinion quite naturally focused almost exclusively on the Korean situation, as that situation affects the U.S. I cannot believe due consideration has been accorded to the inseparable relation of the Japanese, Chinese Nationalists, and Southeast Asia military programs to which the United States Government is committed, or which it has under study." [17]

General Ridgway's disapproval was enough to prevent an increase in the ROK ground forces and when he left the Far East Command in May for a new assignment as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, no change had been made in the size of the army. In the matter of ROK air and marine forces, however, the Far East commander ran into more difficulty. The ROK Air

[17] Msg, CX 66647, Ridgway to Hull, 8 Apr 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 19.

Force was small and equipped with propeller-driven planes. In Ridgway's view, a 4,000-man air force with seventeen obsolescent fighters and twenty-nine miscellaneous craft could offer no real opposition to a future Communist air sweep and would probably be wiped out quickly. Maintenance of a tiny, impotent force was wasteful, Ridgway continued, since in the event of renewed aggression the United States would still have to provide air support for the ROK. "A second best Air Force is worse than none," he told the JCS.[18] But the U.N. commander found that it was next to impossible to abolish a service once it gained a firm foothold. The JCS showed no disposition to tamper with the ROK Air Force and no action was taken on Ridgway's recommendation.

The same reception met his proposal to dispense with a separate marine force after the war. To his way of thinking, a marine division would require separate overhead and support elements that would duplicate those of the Army and this needless expense would have to be borne by the U.S. taxpayer.[19] The U.S. Navy, however, had already established both a Naval Advisory Group and a Marine Advisory Group to the ROK in February, and Ridgway's plea went unheeded.[20]

Despite the mixed success of Ridgway's efforts to restrict the size of the ROK armed forces, he and his staff did manage to effect several internal improvements aimed at bolstering the efficiency of the ROK troops. In November Ridgway authorized Van Fleet to increase the strength of the Korean Service Corps to 60,000 men. This would permit all the laborers and carriers in the combat areas to be organized and brought under tight control and discipline. It would also assure the fighting corps of more reliable service support. Eventually Ridgway planned to raise the ceiling of the Korean Service Corps to 75,000.[21]

The U.N. commander also made efforts to correct one of the basic weaknesses of the ROK Army—the lack of adequate integral artillery support. In the past ROK divisions had been forced to rely upon U.S. artillery support for most of their offensive and defensive missions. Only one 105-mm. howitzer battalion was assigned to each ROK division as opposed to three 105-mm. and one 155-mm. battalions in each U.S. division. In addition, the latter had tank support and more heavy mortar companies available to perform its tasks. Previously the Eighth Army and Far East Command staffs had argued that the rough terrain, lack of roads, and resupply problems added to the dearth of trained artillerymen and unavailability of equipment had precluded expanding the ROK artillery. But as the war lengthened and settled into its static phase, many of these objections were overcome. In September four ROK 155-mm. howitzer battalions were authorized for activation before the end of the year. These battalions were trained for eight weeks by U.S. corps personnel. Three headquarters batteries and six 105-mm. howitzer battalions were added in November and began their training in January 1952.

[18] Msg, C 65987, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Mar 52, DA-IN 121000.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Feb 52, pp. 4-2, 4-3.

[21] Msg, CINCFE to DA, 18 Nov 51, DA-IN 354.

Finally in March Ridgway approved a full complement of three 105-mm. and one 155-mm. howitzer battalions for each of the ten ROK divisions. In May the Department of the Army sent interim authorization for the Far East Command to proceed with this program.[22]

The process of improving the ROK Army was well on its way by April 1952. Schools and training programs to raise the leadership level and confidence of the troops had been started and began to produce demonstrable results. Increased service and combat support to bolster the ROK forces in combat was being organized and equipped. Given time, the ROK Army could become one of the better armies in the Far East.

### *Relations With the ROK*

Military affairs were but one aspect of the problem of conducting a war on the soil of an ally. As the United States had discovered during the World War II campaigns in China, politics played an important role that seemed to increase in inverse ratio to the pressures generated at the front. If the fighting were heavy and external crises dominated the scene, internal politics might be played down or overshadowed. But a static war permitted domestic dissensions to come to the surface and frequently required delicate and diplomatic handling. The situation in South Korea followed this pattern during the armistice period and was to occasion many a tense moment for the U.N. Command in its efforts to fight a war and conclude a peace at the same time.

When the armistice negotiations were initiated, President Rhee and his government had firmly opposed a compromise settlement with the Communists. They had no desire to return to the *status quo* that had been so unsatisfactory in the prewar period and regarded the time as ripe for the unification of Korea —under ROK hegemony. As long as the talks appeared to be making little progress, there was scant reason for vehement action on their part. During the breakdown of negotiations in August, a ROK spokesman had frankly welcomed the turn of events and claimed that the Communists had simply used the discussions as a cover for their military build-up.[23]

On 20 September, Rhee set forth his terms for dealing with the enemy—terms that the Communists could not possibly accept without admitting defeat. First the Chinese should withdraw from Korea and the North Koreans should be disarmed. Then the latter would be given full representation in the Korean National Assembly and presumably this would settle the whole problem. The ROK President felt that the Communists should be given a time limit for acceptance; otherwise the negotiations should be concluded. In his opinion, the enemy was using the talks to humiliate and discredit the United Nations in the eyes of the Communist world.[24]

After the negotiations resumed in October, the ROK Government expressed its dissatisfaction in many ways. A favorite method was through "spontaneous" demonstrations similar to the one staged by students in Pusan in early December. Close to 500 students gathered and paraded through the city carrying signs

[22] (1) Msg, DA 909826, G–3 to CINCFE, 27 May 52. (2) Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experience, pp. 87–96.

[23] New York *Times*, August 24, 1951.

[24] New York *Times*, September 21, 1951.

and placards bearing such anticease-fire slogans as "No Armistice Without Unification." [25] These apparent popular outbursts of indignation against the truce meetings could be mounted quickly whenever there seemed to be a possibility of agreement at Panmunjom.

The continual ROK agitation and hints from Rhee that the government might not observe the terms of an armistice disturbed General Ridgway. It may be remembered that the UNC control over the ROK armed forces rested upon Rhee's July 1950 letter to MacArthur assigning command to the latter and anyone he delegated for the duration of the hostilities only. In the months that had followed the ROK Government had faithfully observed this pledge and it had not been considered necessary to seek a firm written understanding on the matter. But by early 1952 Ridgway felt that a formal agreement covering the armistice period should be secured to forestall independent action by the Republic of Korea in opposition to the truce stipulations. Unless the ROK military forces remained under UNC control after the truce was concluded, there was a distinct possibility that the truce would be short-lived. Under the circumstances, Ridgway urged a high-level governmental approach to secure a written commitment on armed forces and, at the same time, to stop the ROK antiarmistice campaign.[26]

While the U.S. political and military leaders recognized the danger, they doubted that the proper moment had arrived to negotiate with the ROK Government on the future control of its military power. To reach an understanding while ROK emotions were running high might result in the imposition of conditions unacceptable to the U.N. Command and jeopardize the achievement of an armistice. Therefore they preferred to work out the terms of the truce first and use the presence of UNC forces in Korea and the supply and training of South Korean troops as persuasive points to gain ROK compliance later.[27]

They were more sympathetic to the suggestion that President Truman might make an appeal to Rhee to halt the massive ROK assault on the armistice. On 4 March the President informed Rhee of the concern of the United States over the ROK attitude toward the truce. He pointed out that the U.N. unity of purpose in Korea must be maintained at all costs since divergencies might threaten the support of the U.N. and then issued a note of warning:

> The degree of assistance which your Government and the people of Korea will continue to receive in repelling the aggression, in seeking a just political settlement, and in repairing the ravages of that aggression will inevitably be influenced by the sense of responsibility demonstrated by your Government, its ability to maintain the unity of the Korean people, and its devotion to democratic ideals.[28]

The stress that the President laid on the relationship between ROK actions and U.N. assistance could not but have its effect upon President Rhee and his

[25] Msg, 070801, American Embassy, Pusan, to SCAP, 7 Dec 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov–Dec 51, an. 1, incl 45.

[26] Msg, CX 64241, Ridgway to JCS, 25 Feb 52, DA–IN 109112.

[27] Msg, JCS 902158, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Feb 52. This message was drafted by the State Department and cleared with the JCS, Defense Department, and the President.

[28] Msg, DA 902912, Eddleman to CINCFE, 6 Mar 52. This transmitted the Truman message to Rhee.



AN ANTIARMISTICE DEMONSTRATION IN SEOUL

staff. From the close of World War II down to the outbreak of the Korean War the United States had made substantial contributions to the South Korean economy. When the war began in 1950, again it was the United States which had taken the lead in sending military and economic aid. Food, clothing, and supplies for the thousands who were displaced and for the sick and wounded were provided not only for humanitarian motives, but also with the realization that unrest and disease within the UNC area would complicate the military operations then under way. The United States also had long-range plans for relief and rehabilitation that it intended to carry out under U.N. auspices as soon as the war was over. It had taken the lead in proposing and supporting the formation of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) that was established on 1 December 1950 and had provided the new agency the bulk of its funds.[29]

[29] For a discussion of U.S. aid policy in Korea see Gene M. Lyons, "American Policy and the United Nations Program for Korean Reconstruction," in *International Organization*, vol. XII, No. 2 (1958), pp. 180–92.

Although the prolongation of the war delayed the effective functioning of UNKRA, the U.N. Command set up the U.N. Civil Assistance Command in Korea under the Eighth Army in early 1951 to prevent disease and unrest. Designed to safeguard the security of the rear areas, UNCACK engaged primarily in relief work, providing consumer goods to meet the immediate needs of the civilian population. The comparative inactivity at the front during the truce negotiations permitted reconstruction and rehabilitation to begin while the fighting was still going on. By the end of 1951, Ridgway and the UNKRA officials had fashioned a working agreement that allowed UNKRA to start on a limited reconstruction program subject to the approval of the UNC.[30]

Thus the actual control over relief and economic assistance to South Korea remained under UNC control as long as military operations continued and for a six-month period after an armistice was concluded. This, of course, strengthened the hand of Ridgway in his dealings with the ROK Government. But the exigencies of war and the pouring into Korea of U.S. money, goods, and services led to a repetition of the U.S. experience in China in World War II. The undeveloped economy of the ROK, disrupted by war and essentially agricultural, could not absorb the added purchasing power that large military expenditures brought into being. While the ROK Government resorted to the printing press to meet the demands for more currency in connection with military operations, it could not siphon off the growing supply of money in circulation by increasing industrial production or by larger imports of consumer goods. U.S. aid helped somewhat, but the $150,000,000 that had been expended by 15 September 1951, plus fifty million dollars' worth of services and ten million dollars in raw materials could not stem the tide of inflation.[31]


By January 1952 the ROK financial situation had become critical. Although the deficit spending indulged in by the ROK Government and the bank credit expansion practices that were permitted contributed to the inflationary trend, the ROK officials placed the principal blame upon the advances in Korean *won* made to the UNC for military requirements. They charged that the U.N. Command had failed to settle in dollars for the *won* issued and intimated that they would not be able to provide more currency to the UNC after January.[32]

By an agreement signed on 28 July 1950 the ROK Government had pledged itself to supply the currency needed by the UNC and to defer the settlement of claims arising from this procedure until a time satisfactory to both parties. The hint that the ROK might not meet its obligation worried Ridgway. He had no objection to making monthly settlements in dollars for the *won* advances as long as the UNC retained some control over ROK foreign exchange. To help counteract inflation he proposed that the UNC secure ROK currency by sale of imported commodities to the Korean people and by purchasing *won* at the

[30] Memo of Understanding between UNC and U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency, 21 Dec 51.

[31] Msg, CINCUNC to DA, 20 Sep 51, DA-IN 18653.

[32] Msg, C 62218, Ridgway to Collins, 25 Jan 52, DA-IN 4572.



UNLOADING RICE FOR SOUTH KOREANS FROM THE ANDREW JACKSON, PUSAN

best rate through any legal source.[33] In addition, Ridgway believed that by making book settlement for UNC services, with no actual use of money, the amount of currency in circulation could be held down.[34]

But the ROK Government balked at permitting the U.N. Command to maintain control of its foreign exchange and negotiations between the two came to a halt in February. In the meantime the UNC had drawn eight million dollars' worth of *won* in January as opposed to only six million dollars' worth in December and Ridgway asked Van Fleet to give his personal attention to the problem of holding down expenditures involving the use of *won*.[35] The gravity of the spiralling inflation can be easily seen in the increase of currency in circulation between 1 July 1951 and 1 March 1952

[33] The legal exchange rate of 6,000 *won* to the dollar was not considered to be approximate to actual value of the *won*. In January 1952 a rate of 12,000 *won* to the dollar would have been closer to the actual value.

[34] (1) Msg, CX 60526, CINCFE to G–3, 31 Dec 51, DA–IN 15295. (2) Msg, CINCFE to G–3, 24 Jan 52, DA–IN 4192.

[35] Msg, C 63175, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 9 Feb 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, an. 1, incl 24.

—from 122 billion to 812 billion *won*.[36]

The impasse in the financial negotiations and the ever-rising inflation coupled with the ROK attitude toward the armistice and domestic complications in the ROK Government prompted Ridgway and Ambassador Muccio to suggest in early March that a high-level mission be sent from Washington to reach an understanding on the entire field of ROK–UNC relations.[37] Impressed by the urgency of Ridgway's request, the Department of the Army moved quickly to prepare for the dispatch of a mission. Defense and State Department approval was soon obtained. On 28 March the President named Clarence E. Meyer, head of the Mutual Security Administration mission to Austria, as chief of the delegation. The Department of State agreed to act as monitor since the mission was given a broad directive to negotiate "financial, economic and other appropriate agreements between the United States or the Unified Command and the Republic of Korea." [38]

The end result was an agreement signed on 24 May between the Unified Command and the ROK. Considering the political turmoil that was rampant in South Korea and the strong feelings expressed about national sovereignty, the Meyer understanding represented a fair compromise. The most important provision established a Combined Economic Board with one Unified Command and one ROK member to promote effective economic co-ordination. The board would make recommendations that would be binding on the use of all foreign exchange and integrate it with the UNC assistance programs. As for the UNC *won* advances, the Unified Command agreed to settle up for all advances made between 1 January 1952 and 31 May 1952 at the 6,000-*won*-to-a-dollar rate. Claims for 1950–51 would be deferred until a later date and claims for future months would be paid for at a more realistic rate than 6,000 to 1. Ten percent of the amount advanced each month would be written off by the ROK Government as its contribution to the war effort. In addition, the ROK Government agreed to take internal measures to control inflation and the Unified Command would attempt to draw *won* from the market by bringing in as many salable goods as possible.[39]

If both sides made sincere efforts to carry out the terms of this agreement, the economic situation in Korea could improve considerably in the near future. Whether this might also have a favorable influence upon the political and armistice problems was another matter. By May 1952 the armistice negotiations had again reached a stalemate and ROK agitation against the truce had subsided, but President Rhee's internal conflict with his fellow politicians threatened to build up into another crisis. In any case

[36] Charles N. Henning, *Economic and Related Political Factors in Civil Affairs Operations, Republic of Korea*, ORO Study T–211 (Washington: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1952), p. 43.

[37] (1) Msg, C 65015, Ridgway to CofS, 10 Mar 52, DA–IN 114192. (2) Msg, C 65121, Ridgway to CofS, 12 Mar 52, DA–IN 115005.

[38] Draft Directive, sub: Terms of Reference for the Unified Command Mission to the ROK, no date, in G–3 091 Korea, 42/11. A copy of this directive was sent to Meyer in Japan in April.

[39] Ltr, Meyer to Osborn, no sub, 24 May 1952, to G–3, 091 Korea, 42/16. The United States agreed to pay $75,000,000 for the January–May 1952 period and an initial payment of $35,000,000 was made on 29 July.

the U.N. Command might only have adjusted the economic differences in time to be dragged into the political arena. But, at least, one thorn in ROK–UNC relations had been amicably removed.

### *The Japanese Take a Hand*

All of General Ridgway's problems behind the lines did not involve the Republic of Korea directly, but many had an influence upon events taking place on the peninsula. Across the Sea of Japan new and complicating elements were introduced in late 1951 and early 1952. From the outset of the war the United States had used the islands of Japan as a huge supply and staging base for the UNC forces fighting in Korea. In his role as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Ridgway could employ the facilities available in Japan as he saw fit to support the UNC effort. The signing of the peace treaty in September 1951, however, foreshadowed a period of change as the military government closed out its regime and the Japanese civil authorities once more assumed control of their nation's affairs. In the interim, arrangements had to be made defining the relationship between the U.S. military and civil representatives and the Japanese Government and provision had to be made for the defense of Japan.

Under the Security Treaty signed on 8 September between the United States and Japan, the former was granted the right to maintain armed forces on the islands until the Japanese could build up sufficient strength to defend themselves. The conditions governing the disposition of U.S. troops and the use of Japanese facilities would be worked out by an administrative agreement between the two countries.[40]

Since the end of the war in Korea remained uncertain and the utilization of Japanese facilities and ports appeared necessary as long as the conflict continued, the Security Treaty afforded the legal basis for the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan. Even under optimum conditions, it would take considerable time for the Japanese to organize, train, and equip adequate units to defend Japan on their own. And the renunciation of war by the Japanese constitution would make the development of armed forces a delicate matter.

Fortunately, insofar as Japanese defense forces were concerned, a start had been made in mid-1950 shortly after the Korean War began. When General MacArthur realized that he would have to deploy the majority of his U.S. units to Korea, he authorized the Japanese officials to set up a National Police Reserve force of 75,000 men. Although the organization ostensibly was formed to preserve internal order, the recruits went through a thirteen-week basic training course during which they became familiar with small weapons and then moved into an eighteen-week course which stressed small unit training and used machine guns and rocket launchers. In June 1951 the Police Reserve engaged in battalion maneuvers. When the armistice negotiations got under way in July, the force was organized into four infantry divisions of 15,200 men each, but it lacked heavy equipment and had not had

[40] See the text of the treaty in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XXV, No. 638 (September 17, 1951), pp. 463–65.

sufficient training to qualify for other than internal security functions.[41]

Despite these deficiencies, in May 1951 President Truman approved planning and budgeting for sufficient material to equip ten National Police Reserve Japan (NPRJ) divisions by 1 July 1952. After studying the political and economic factors involved, Ridgway recommended in September that a phased expansion to a balanced ten-division force be adopted. The difficult part, in his opinion, would be the preparation of Japanese public opinion for training of the NPRJ with heavy equipment and armament. This would have to be done by the Japanese Government and Ridgway would see Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida on this point soon.[42]

While arrangements for an increased NPRJ went forward in Tokyo, the Department of the Army came up with some disconcerting facts. General Collins informed Ridgway in mid-December that a lack of funds might force the drastic reduction of the NPRJ program. There was no money available from the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and funds for the NPRJ had been cut from the Army fiscal year 1953 budget. Under the circumstances Collins advised Ridgway to revise his plans and endeavor to get along on the funds already allocated.[43]

Ridgway was shocked. "It is to me incredible that from a national defense budget of $57 billion, we cannot find the relatively meager funds required to support the rapid establishment of a small Japanese army. . . . For each dollar expended, it is my considered opinion that the U.S. can purchase more security through the creation of Japanese forces than can be purchased by similar expenditures in any other nation in the world, including the United States." The alternative, Ridgway went on, would be to maintain U.S. troops at far greater cost in the Far East. He did not see how he could discuss the NPRJ matter any further with the Japanese until a firm U.S. policy was forthcoming. Vacillation on the part of the United States would create a similar response in the Japanese. If the United States desired to expand the NPRJ more slowly, this might fit in very well with Japanese desires, but Ridgway regarded the proposed cutback "as nothing less than catastrophic to the vital interests of our country." [44]

The fervent plea of the Far East commander produced a quick reaction in Washington, and by 23 December, Collins was able to allay Ridgway's apprehensions. Secretary Lovett had approved the inclusion of three hundred million dollars in the Army budget for the Japanese defense program.[45]

Armed with this reassurance, the SCAP staff reviewed NPRJ planning and recommended on 1 January 1952 that priority during the first stage of the expansion be accorded to nondivisional combat units, such as antiaircraft, tank, and artillery, rather than to the formation of new divisions.[46] But further implication from Washington that the UNC program could not be carried out in its present form led to another round

[41] CINCFE G–3 Presentation to Asst Secy Army Alexander, no date, in G–3 091 Korea, 187/7.
[42] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, pp. 35–36.
[43] Msg, DA 89795, CofS to CINCFE, 18 Dec 51.
[44] Msg, C 59752, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Dec 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 4, incl 1.
[45] Msg, DA 90318, CofS to CINCFE, 23 Dec 51.
[46] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, pp. 43–44.

of messages. The upshot of the affair was that a SCAP delegation, headed by Maj. Gen. William F. Marquat, was sent to the United States in late January to thresh out the matter. After five weeks of consultation, the Army and SCAP representatives fashioned a *modus operandi* acceptable to both groups. Ridgway would complete the equipping of the four divisions already established and see to it that they became and remained combat-ready in the future. During the next fiscal year the NPRJ would be increased to six divisions with supporting units and the expansion to ten divisions would be phased over fiscal 1954 and 1955, as funds and equipment became available.[47]

Actually the decision to stretch out the expansion program was not influenced by the lack of money and equipment alone. As it turned out, the Japanese Government had no desire to move quickly in rearming the country. Prime Minister Yoshida would not approve an increase of the NPRJ beyond 110,000 for the 1953 fiscal year. Although SCAP pressed for an augmentation to between 150–180,000, Yoshida declined to make a commitment until after general elections were held in early 1953.[48] Since Japanese reluctance to rearm swiftly dovetailed with U.S. financial and production deficiencies in connection with the program, the slowdown in developing adequate Japanese defense forces probably represented a workable compromise.

In the meantime Japanese public opinion could be conditioned for the return of Japan to a position of responsibility in the Far East. The United States intended to help Japan by assisting the nation to secure access to raw materials and markets and by encouraging Japanese industry to provide the means by which the country could once again defend itself. Some offshore procurement of ammunition and equipment might be arranged to give the Japanese munitions industry a start, but the Department of the Army felt that the main task had to be accomplished by the Japanese themselves.[49]

The re-emergence of Japan as a sovereign nation spawned a host of other problems as well. To General Ridgway in his role as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, one of the most important was the future status of the U.S. and U.N. military forces in Japan. After the peace treaty was ratified, the occupation would end and SCAP would be abolished. Before the latter came to pass, Ridgway wanted to settle the future relationship between the UNC/FEC and the Japanese Government.

On 18 September he outlined his approach to the subject to the JCS. Ridgway pointed out that while theoretically Japan would enjoy full political control, its national security would depend for some time upon both Japanese and U.S. forces. Since this was a military reality, the Far East commander felt that he should have adequate authority to counteract any threat to the security of the U.S. forces under his command and to deal directly with the Japanese Government on all military matters. His orders should come, as in the past, from the

[47] Msg, DA 902603, CofS to CINCFE, 4 Mar 52.

[48] Memo, Civil Affairs Sec SCAP to CofS SCAP, 28 Feb 52, sub: Conf by SCAP with Prime Minister Yoshida, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. 1, incl 11.

[49] Msg, DA 902855, DA to SCAP, 7 Mar 52.

JCS or their superiors. He would, of course, co-ordinate with the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission to Japan whenever it was necessary.[50]

The prospective end of military rule in Japan and the return of civilian control, however, had a concomitant—the restoration of normal diplomatic relations and of the pre-eminence of the U.S. Ambassador in intergovernmental intercourse. On 22 December the Army informed Ridgway that the JCS had submitted most of his recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, but that the chief of the diplomatic mission would take precedence over him and be the channel for all governmental matters except those specifically of a military nature.[51]

During February and March, State and Defense Department representatives worked out further compromises in detail, but it was not until April that they arrived at an agreement that was satisfactory to both sides and approved by the President. It provided that the Ambassador would be responsible for all government relations between the United States and Japan, but that Ridgway would not be subordinate to him in military matters. The Far East commander could negotiate directly with the Japanese Government on security, defense, and military assistance affairs and was authorized to appoint the U.S. member of the newly formed Joint Committee.[52]

Ridgway had insisted upon receiving his orders directly from the JCS and their superiors and this channel of command remained as before. His authority to select the U.S. representative of the Joint Committee also came from the JCS as he had desired. The Joint Committee stemmed from the Administrative Agreement signed on 28 February 1952 between the United States and Japan in Tokyo. In the process of establishing the terms under which U.S. forces would remain in Japan and contribute to Japanese defense, a Joint Committee with one U.S. and one Japanese member was set up for consultation on the implementation of the agreement. Since such complex matters as the use of ports and facilities, custom regulations, taxes, postal privileges, and legal jurisdiction were covered, the Joint Committee was held necessary to straighten out differences of opinion.[53]

On 28 April the occupation of Japan ended and U.S. military forces assumed a new and diminished position as guests and allies rather than conquerors. But since there would be a long period during which Japanese security would be dependent upon U.S. forces, the Far East commander and his staff retained considerable prestige. The need for protection until Japanese defense forces were ready to take over the major responsibility argued that Ridgway and his successors would wield a goodly measure of influence in Japanese affairs despite the loss of the bulk of their powers. On the other hand, civilian ascendancy had been re-established and the importance of the U.S. Ambassador was certain to increase as military dependence upon the United States lessened.

[50] Msg, C 50742, CINCFE to JCS, 13 Sep 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, an. 4, incl 10.

[51] Msg, DA 90317, G–3 to CINCFE, 22 Dec 51.

[52] (1) Msg, JCS 905965, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Apr 52. (2) Msg, JCS 907213, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Apr 52.

[53] See text of Administrative Agreement of 28 February 1952, in Dept of State *Bulletin*, vol. XXVI, No. 663 (March 10, 1952), pp. 383ff.

The Far East commander meanwhile had the problem of finding out where the Japanese forces would fit into the overall defense picture. Would they fight as separate units or be integrated with U.S. troops if war broke out? Would they come under U.S. supreme command or remain under their own leadership? As yet, no intergovernmental arrangement on the control of Japanese security forces had been reached and the Administrative Agreement merely provided for consultation between the two governments if hostilities threatened. These questions would have to be settled definitively and quickly, General Ridgway believed, and the development of the security forces of Japan closely correlated with those of the Republic of Korea lest they get out of proper balance.[54] Since the United States was sponsoring both nations and bad feeling existed between them, the formation of formidable military forces on one side might eventually lead to an unstable situation unless it were matched by a similar development on the other. It seemed apparent by the end of April that although the Japanese were now officially in the game on their own, the United States would be supplying the stakes with which they would play. It would be part of the U.S. task to make sure that the Japanese played along with and not against the other members of the team.

### *Ammunition Shortages*

The complexities of dealing with the ROK and Japanese Governments seem quite simple when compared to the perplexing and tortuous labyrinth of ammunition shortages. In the spring of 1953 a Senate subcommittee conducted a lengthy investigation of the matter and heard from Van Fleet and Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond as well as Washington defense officials. The testimony given revealed the confusion that existed at the time on the causes and effects of the shortages.[55] Much of the confusion stemmed from the lack of background information on the subject.[56]

At the end of World War II, the United States had a tremendous inventory of ammunition on hand, but unfortunately it was not a balanced stock. There were enormous quantities of some types of ammunition and only small amounts of others. The hasty demobilization that followed stripped the Ordnance Department of the military and civilian personnel that might have properly assessed and cared for the huge inventories of ammunition in its custody. During the years preceding the Korean War, powder packed in cotton bags and fuzes made of substitute metals deteriorated. The Army drew freely upon the big stockpile for training purposes yet made no real effort to replace consumption or to balance the items in stock. Lack of personnel to take a complete inventory and the drive for economy among the Armed Forces contributed to this oversight. Ammunition was expen-

[54] (1) Msg, C 66619, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Apr 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 12. (2) Msg, C 67740, Ridgway to DA, 29 Apr 52, DA-IN 133087.

[55] *Hearings* Before the Preparedness Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 83d Congress, 1st session, on Ammunition Shortages in the Armed Services, 1953.

[56] The following summary is based upon the excellent study made by the former Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Maj. Gen. William O. Reeder, after the war was over, and entitled: The Korean Ammunition Shortage. Copy in OCMH files.

sive and the amounts on hand seemed adequate for years to come under peacetime conditions.

The lack of postwar orders sent the ammunition industry into eclipse. Manufacturers converted to civilian goods and purchased available surplus machine tools to service the booming demands for consumer items that the war had held in leash. When the United States entered the Korean struggle so suddenly in 1950, ammunition facilities and plants were at a low ebb and the prosperity then prevalent made businessmen reluctant to reconvert their factories to wartime products. Another element that restrained a shift to the immediate production of ammunition was the prevalent belief that the Korean War would be short and did not warrant a sizable dislocation of the U.S. industrial effort. Even after this fallacy was shattered by the entry of the Chinese into the war in late 1950, the policy of butter and guns continued and no large-scale mobilization of industry took place.

The sense of complacency that pervaded the nation during the early phase of the Korean War cost dearly, for valuable time was lost in getting the languishing munitions industry back on its feet. Under optimum conditions it took from eighteen to twenty-four months after funds were voted to produce finished ammunition in quantity. Since Congress did not approve the first large appropriation for ammunition until early January 1951, this meant that even under optimum conditions the end products of this money could not arrive on the scene until late 1952 or early 1953.

In the meantime the U.S. and ROK forces in Korea had to live off the stockpile. Fortunately, in addition to the supply of finished rounds of ammunition, there were also large quantities of component parts available that could be used. Since the first months of the war were characterized by a high degree of mobility that required less artillery expenditure, it appeared that the shells on hand and those that could be readily finished were sufficient to carry the United States and its allies through the war.[57]

As the war ground to a slower pace in mid-1951, artillery assumed a new importance. Static warfare required more artillery missions to harass and interdict the enemy. This meant that the day of supply—the average number of rounds that a gun was expected to fire daily over a considerable period of time—had to be raised.[58] Since the day of supply in turn determined the number of shells that were held in reserve in the Far East Command, an expansion in reserve stocks followed.[59] The increased demands upon the stockpiles and the knowledge that there was no possibility of replenishing the heavy consumption of artillery rounds until at least late 1952 formed the backdrop to the events of the fall of 1951.

Concern over the theater artillery situation began to arise during the battle for Bloody Ridge in August–September 1951. 2d Division artillerymen fired over 153,000 rounds during the fight and the 15th Field Artillery Battalion

[57] It should be noted that small arms ammunition was always plentiful and caused no concern.

[58] The day of supply was based upon World War II experience.

[59] The reserve was computed by multiplying the day of supply by the number of guns on hand and then multiplying the result by seventy-five days, which was the safety-level factor in case deliveries should be halted or cut off for a period.

set a new record for light battalions by firing 14,425 rounds in twenty-four hours. By the end of the action artillery supplies in the theater reserve were greatly reduced but no rationing was introduced except for illuminating shells which were in very short supply.[60]

Despite denials from the divisions that ammunition was wasted or misused, thousands of rounds of 105-mm. howitzer ammunition were hurled fruitlessly against enemy bunkers on Bloody Ridge. The high trajectory of their fire lessened the chances of direct hits upon the Communist strongpoints and reduced their penetrating power. The job of knocking out the pillboxes and bunkers had to be done by the heavier and more accurate 8-inch howitzers with concrete-piercing shells set for delayed firing and by flat trajectory gun fire. It is interesting to note that after the battle Van Fleet issued a warning against waste of 8-inch and 105-mm. howitzer ammunition since these were then in short supply and at the same time the Eighth Army commander advocated the use of 155-mm. ammunition instead.[61]

During the assault on Heartbreak Ridge, however, Van Fleet imposed no restrictions upon the 2d Division artillery. But because of the heavy expenditures, local deficits appeared. For example, 4.2-inch mortars had to be used when 81-mm. ammunition ran low and air and rail shipments to the front had to be made to keep the 4.2-inch ammunition on hand.[62] It was not surprising that the sustained barrages quickly consumed the supplies on hand in the firing units since original plans for the taking of Heartbreak Ridge envisioned the task as a relatively short and simple one.

The I Corps COMMANDO operation in October demonstrated another phase in the ammunition saga. When the Communists massed their artillery against this advance, UNC guns depleted the stores at ammunition supply points and I Corps had to place restrictions on its artillery units. As it pointed out later, the I Corps did this not only to replenish the supply points, but also to compel units to use up the ammunition they were stockpiling in excess of what they were normally allowed to have on hand.[63] Stockpiling was a long-established practice to guard against sudden emergencies and to provide a cushion in case supplies were temporarily cut off.

Although the experiences during the August–October period had to do with local and temporary shortages that were due to a high volume of daily fire, General Ridgway decided to bring the matter to the attention of the JCS. The withdrawals had left the theater artillery reserve in a weakened condition and, in Ridgway's opinion, had revealed the danger in accepting World War II rates of daily fire for the Korean War. World War II corps had far more artillery battalions assigned to them than did the corps in Korea and could maintain a lesser rate of fire per gun each day to carry out comparable missions successfully. With relatively fewer guns and Communist artillery strength constantly mounting, the U.S. artillery units in Korea had to fire more frequently. Ridg-

[60] Williamson *et al.*, "Bloody Ridge," ch. V Aug–Sep 51, pp. 27–28.

[61] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Sep 51, sec. I, Narrative.

[62] Williamson *et al.*, Action on "Heartbreak Ridge," p. 32.

[63] U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Oct 51, sec. I, pp. 63, 75.

way argued earnestly for an increase in the day of supply for his 8-inch, 105-mm., and 155-mm. howitzers and for his 155-mm. guns, pointing out the grim relationship between artillery and casualties:

> Whatever may have been the impression of our operations in Korea to date, artillery has been and remains the great killer of Communists. It remains the great saver of soldiers, American and Allied. There is a direct relation between the piles of shells in the Ammunition supply points and the piles of corpses in the graves registration collecting points. The bigger the former, the smaller the latter and vice versa.[64]

The increase for his heavy caliber howitzers and guns were but one part of Ridgway's request. If they were granted, he wanted to raise the reserve of these shells from 75 to 90 days as quickly as possible. He in turn would augment the supplies in Korea from 30 to 40 days and keep 20 days' supply in the pipeline leaving only 30 days' reserve in Japan.[65] But even as Ridgway sent off his request, he informed Van Fleet that the Eighth Army would have to live within its ammunition income in November. Since it would take considerable time to build up the theater reserve again, "There must be no mental reservation that regardless of disapproval of subordinate commanders wishes for ammunition that such ammunition will be supplied in case stocks get low. Your ammunition resources, present and predicted, are as stated above. Their increase is beyond the capability of this theater." [66]

The approval of Ridgway's requests on 20 October did not, of course, produce an immediate improvement in the ammunition situation in the FEC.[67] But the end of the fall campaign and the negotiation of the line of demarcation stabilized the battle line and lowered the intensity of the fighting. The possibility that an armistice might be concluded soon led Van Fleet to secure Ridgway's permission in early December to bring his ammunition level up to a forty-five day reserve rather than thirty. Van Fleet feared that the Communists might succeed in getting a clause freezing ammunition stocks at their current level written into the armistice and preferred to bolster his own before this happened.[68]

At the end of 1951, the ammunition tale took a new twist. The records of ammunition expenditures during the summer and fall campaigns evidently were brought to Ridgway's attention and disturbed him deeply. Although it was too late to do anything about the ammunition already spent, the Far East commander decided that the phenomenal rates of fire were due to "either extravagant waste or expenditure of ammunition, or misuse of artillery, or both." Since excessive use of artillery shells imposed heavier demands upon U.S. industry and drained raw materials, Ridgway told Van Fleet to maintain constant supervision lest the performance be repeated.[69]

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[64] Msg, CX 53171, CINCFE to JCS, 17 Oct 51, in FEC G–3 471 Ammunition.

[65] *Ibid.*

[66] Msg, CX 53155, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 17 Oct 51, in Hq Eighth Army Opnl Planning Files, Oct 51, p. 17. The Department of the Army daily rate authorized was: 50 rounds of 150-mm., 33 rounds of 155-mm., and 20 rounds of 8-inch howitzer shells. Ridgway had asked that these be raised to 55, 40, and 50, respectively.

[67] Msg, DA 84571, DA to CINCFE, 20 Oct 51.

[68] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov–Dec 51, CofS sec., an. 1, p. 8.

[69] Msg, C 60169, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 26 Dec 51, in FEC G–3 471 Ammunition.

This was a serious charge and Van Fleet was not inclined to let it pass unchallenged. He did not believe that there had been either waste or misuse of artillery and warned against rigid comparisons of World War II firings with those in Korea. "Based on World War II European standards," he went on, "I estimate that the Eighth Army is short approximately 70 battalions of field artillery. Hence, the greatly reduced intensity of field artillery battalions per mile of front, has required more rounds per individual tube to achieve the effectiveness required. The effectiveness of one volley from four battalions is far greater than four volleys from one battalion." He admitted using his artillery freely to kill the enemy during the offensives, but, taking a leaf from Ridgway's own book, he reminded the Far East commander that if he had tried to take the objectives with limited artillery fire, the casualty lists of the Eighth Army would have been materially higher. In closing, Van Fleet maintained that he kept a watchful eye on the ammunition level and that he had conserved a considerable amount of shells during the static October–December period.[70]

As the Ridgway–Van Fleet exchange mirrored the increasing concern in the Far East Command over the situation, supply officials in Washington offered little hope that there would be improvement in the calibers that were short until late in 1952.[71] Mortar ammunition and shells for 8-inch guns and 155-mm. howitzers became less plentiful during the winter months and there was no prospect of relief in the heavy shell category in the near future.[72]

The time lag between obligating funds for ammunition production and the delivery of the finished shells was emphasized during early 1952. Despite the fact that billions of dollars of contracts had been let, the end result in many cases was still six months or more in the offing. In the meantime shortages in the Far East Command became more difficult to explain to Congress and the U.S. public. Although little was happening at the front in Korea and efforts were made to restrict nonessential artillery missions, General Collins felt that expenditures were still too heavy. Pointing out that two and a half billion dollars of the three and a half requested for Army procurement in fiscal year 1953 must be spent for ammunition, Collins asked Ridgway on 10 March to see whether major reductions should not be made at once and retained unless large-scale fighting resumed. Ridgway in turn assigned the problem to Van Fleet.[73]

Considering the small number of casualties inflicted upon the enemy during the early part of 1952, the Eighth Army's expenditures of artillery ammunition appeared rather high.[74] But Van Fleet was quick to remind Ridgway that during

[70] Msg, G 3789 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 29 Dec 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov–Dec 51, CinC and CofS sec., an. 1, incl 12.

[71] Memo, Magruder (G–4) for ACofS G–3, 28 Dec 51, sub: Augmentation from FEC, in G–3 320.2 Pacific, 79/1.

[72] Memo, Col Davidson, G–3, for Asst CofS G–3, 29 Feb 52, sub: Rpt of Staff Visits During Period 23 Jan–19 Feb 52, in G–3 333 Pacific, 1.

[73] (1) Msg, DA 903815, Collins to Ridgway, 10 Mar 52. (2) Msg, C 66253, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 2 Apr 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 8.

[74] In January 1952, FEC expended 57,000 tons of ammunition costing about $114,000,000. Estimated enemy casualties were about 20,000, so that each enemy casualty on the average took $5,700 worth of ammunition before he was injured or killed. See Check Sheet, EKW [Wright] for CofS, 31 Mar 52, FEC G–3 471 Ammunition.

the winter months, Eighth Army had used less than 60 percent of the ammunition allocated it and at present rates would expend about three-quarters of a billion dollars worth in 1952. Heavy mortar ammunition was under rigid allocation already and could not be reduced further, Van Fleet continued. If savings were mandatory, the only category that he could afford to reduce was interdictory fire. Since 66 percent of Eighth Army's missions were interdictory, as against 19 percent for counterbattery and 15 percent for meeting enemy actions, Van Fleet was ordering his corps commanders to cut interdictory fire by 20 percent, but this was as far as he could go.[75]

When Ridgway replied to Collins on 9 April, he had increased the estimate of ammunition costs for 1952 to slightly over one billion dollars, but after reporting the 20-percent reduction contemplated by Van Fleet in interdictory fire, Ridgway struck at the heart of the matter:

> It still seems to me that the most fundamental factors in this problem are the ones most frequently obscured by the search for economies. Those factors are that we are at war in Korea, and that ammunition must be provided to meet essential requirements, both of expenditures and stock levels. Provided these requirements are reasonable, economy ceases to be a factor. The only alternative is to effect savings of dollars by expenditure of lives.[76]

By the end of April several facts were readily apparent. The huge ammunition stockpile left over from World War II had been a blessing and a curse. For while it had provided a substantial backlog on which the United States could draw to meet the demands of Korea, the imbalance in its stocks had gone unnoticed and the very mass of the stockpile had introduced a dangerous sense of complacency. The expectation of a short war had fostered this complacency and permitted the rebuilding of the defunct ammunition industry to be delayed. Compounding the situation, the lack of industrial mobilization that followed the outbreak of the war led to further setbacks in the battle for ammunition production. In the meantime the imbalances had come to light and, as it happened, many of these were in mortar and howitzer ammunition that were most in demand for the artillery war that set in from mid-1951 on. The tremendous costs of the ammunition program that were cited in late 1951 and early 1952 reflected the decelerated pace of the war and served as an excuse for reducing the rate of expenditure of ammunition. A lower rate of daily fire in turn would help alleviate the problem of dwindling ammunition reserves in the essential categories. On the other hand, restrictions in the number of rounds that could be used each day caused the man at the front to complain and brought the whole matter to the attention of Congress and the public.

Despite the charges and countercharges in the ammunition free-for-all, the principal enemy was time. Until production could begin on a scale that would replenish stocks as well as current needs, the ammunition crises would go on. The rationing which was adopted in the winter and spring of 1952 was a temporary expedient to bridge the gap

[75] Msg, G 5322 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 7 Apr 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 9.
[76] Msg, C 66608, CINCFE to Collins, 9 Apr 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 10.

between the decreasing stockpile and new production, but until the transition was complete, shortages and expedients would be the rule.

The disadvantages of fighting even a small war without an adequate production base in being or capable of quick expansion are readily discernible in the ammunition situation of 1951 and 1952. Feeding the hungry maw of the Far East Command drained the reserves in the United States and led to reductions in allocations for the Army units in Europe. An expansion of the war might well have been catastrophic for no amount of money or effort could buy the most priceless commodity—time.

Fortunately, the Communists matched the UNC in their disinclination to press the fight on the battlefield or to broaden the war. It appeared that as long as the moderate pace of the conflict continued, U.S. ammunition supplies would be sufficient to maintain the *status quo* until new production took up the slack.

### *Propaganda Assault*

The general indisposition toward combat in early 1952 confined itself wholly to the front and did not extend to the battle behind the lines for world opinion. Since words had proven themselves effective in the matter of the incidents during the summer and fall of 1951, the Communists began once again to increase the flow and intensity of their propaganda. As events at the conference table at Panmunjom revealed the basic differences in approach to the problem still outstanding, the enemy fell back upon its tried and tested method of exerting pressure upon the UNC by means of a series of new "incidents."

Although there had been several violations of the neutral zone and of the agreements made between the Communists and the UNC on convoys to the Panmunjom area, the enemy's reaction to these breaches had been mild during December and January. A B–26 light bomber had strafed a truck in the Kaesong sector on 11 December because of the pilot's navigational error and another pilot had unloaded a bomb on Kaesong on 17 January instead of dropping his pylon fuel tank. On the following day a prescheduled air strike on a bridge at Hanp'o-ri, some 18 miles north of Kaesong, caught the Communist convoy to Panmunjom as it approached the bridge and damaged one of the trucks. The enemy accepted the expressions of regret in each instance and made no attempt to use the incidents for other purposes.[77]

As the negotiations began to bog down over Items 3 and 4 at Panmunjom, indications of a new propaganda campaign were disclosed in February. In a United Nations meeting Soviet Delegate Jacob Malik accused the United States of using poison gas in Korea. While this was not the first time the charge had been leveled, it seemed significant that Malik had made it himself. It caused a flurry in Washington since it might be a warning that the Communists were preparing to employ gas warfare themselves. On the other hand, the enemy may have discovered that Ridgway had ordered all his commanders to organize, equip, and train their forces to defend themselves against chemical, biological, and radio-

[77] (1) Msg, HNC 535, Joy to CINCUNC, 11 Dec 51, in FEC Msgs, Dec 51. (2) Liaison Officers Mtg at Panmunjom, 23 Jan 52, in G–3 Liaison Officers Mtg at Panmunjom, bk. II, 1952.

logical attack and deduced from this that the UNC was getting ready to introduce new forms of warfare.[78] The Ridgway order was purely routine, but the enemy could not be certain of this.

At any rate the Communists evidently were taking no chances and attempted to forestall the possible use of chemical warfare. Actually the Far East Command was in no position to launch a gas attack. The theater was not permitted to stock toxic chemicals, in the first place, and there was also a shortage of over 50,000 gas masks in the Far East. Because the individual soldier in World War II had frequently been inclined to discard his gas mask, none had been issued in Korea. Instead they were stored at depots where they could be distributed within twenty-four hours.[79] The absence of toxic materials in the FEC and the lack of special preparation within the theater to wage or defend against chemical warfare belied the Communist charges, but as so frequently happens, accusations, no matter how false, leave residual damage.

Before the furore over the poison gas had completely died down, the enemy opened a full-scale attack in another quarter. In late February radio broadcasts from Moscow, Peiping, and P'yongyang openly charged the United States of conducting bacteriological warfare in North Korea and Manchuria. Enemy newspapers picked up the story and related how UNC planes had dumped infected insects and materials and artillery had fired shells filled with bacterial agents into Communist areas. Complete with pictures, one article "proved" that on 17 February a UNC plane had dropped a weapon north of P'yongyang filled with hideous, infected flies that could live and fly in snowy weather.[80]

Intelligence reports estimated that the Communists were not only trying to discredit the United States through this campaign but also were attempting to cover up their lack of success in preventing and controlling epidemics and to whip up new enthusiasm for the Korean War in China and among Communist sympathizers throughout Asia.[81] In 1951 there had been extensive typhus, cholera, typhoid, and smallpox outbreaks in North Korea and it was quite possible that the enemy expected reoccurrences and desired a scapegoat.

Despite strong and immediate denials of the use of germ warfare by Secretary of State Acheson and other officials in Washington, there was evidence that some Asian countries were lending credence to the enemy's claims. Both the State and Defense Departments began to show concern as the attack grew more intense and instructed Ridgway to do all he could in the way of categoric disavowals if the subject were brought up at Panmunjom.[82] In the meantime the State Department sent an invitation to the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva suggesting that the United States would

[78] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 51.

[79] Check Sheet, JHR [Col Jacquard H. Rothschild] to G–3, 9 Feb 52, sub: Questions Arising From Statement Made By Soviet Delegate Malik Before U.N., in FEC G–3 471.6 Bombs, etc.

[80] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, p. 31. For an interesting discussion of the germ warfare charges of this period, see John Clews, *The Communists' New Weapon—Germ Warfare* (London: Lincoln Pragers, 1953). See also the statement of U.S. Representative to the UN Assembly, Ernest A. Gross, 27 March 1953 and 8 April 1953, in Dept of State *Bulletin*, vol. XXVIII, No. 722 (April 27, 1953)

[81] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, p. 32.

[82] Msg, JCS 903060, JCS to CINCFE, 7 Mar 52.

welcome a full investigation of the Communist charges by a disinterested body to reveal the falsity of the enemy propaganda.[83] The ICRC accepted the U.S. offer in mid-March, but there was little hope that the Communists would have anything to do with representatives of a committee that they regarded as an agent of the United Nations Command and not as a disinterested body.[84]

On 8 March Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai had hinted at another facet of the antigerm campaign. In a broadcast he implied that if the Chinese caught U.S. Air Force personnel engaged in spreading disease over China, they would be treated as war criminals. The Air Force could not let this threat go unchallenged and the JCS told Ridgway to issue a strong statement holding the Communists responsible for proper treatment of prisoners of war. At the same time he could again deny the accusations and warn the enemy against using an epidemic to mask ill treatment of prisoners. Army G–3 held that this would allow the UNC to shift over to the propaganda offensive.[85]

As Ridgway prepared his statement, the U.N. World Health Organization volunteered to send technical assistance to North Korea to help combat disease and epidemics and the United States quickly agreed that the WHO should communicate directly with the Communists on this matter. If the enemy refused to receive WHO teams, it would tend to discredit the charges and reflect badly upon the Communist concern for the welfare of their people.[86]

Although the propaganda drive gathered momentum during March and April with the Communists reporting the dropping of infected spiders, fleas, beetles carrying anthrax, voles carrying plague, and even poisoned clams in North Korea and in China, the rejection of the ICRC and WHO offers to investigate the incidents and to aid in the control of disease did much to weaken the effect of the later claims.[87] Besides, the Communists were about to be given a far more potent propaganda weapon as the trouble that had been simmering for months in the UNC prisoner of war camps reached the boiling stage.

[83] (1) Msg, DA 903096, G–3 to CINCFE, 8 Mar 52. (2) Msg, C 64368, CINCFE to DA, 9 Mar 52, DA–IN 114029.

[84] Msg, JCS 903547, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Mar 52.

[85] (1) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 11 Mar 52, sub: Chinese Communist Threat . . . , in G–3 385, 8. (2) Msg, JCS 903686, JCS to CINCFE, 15 Mar 52. This message was drafted by the Air Force and cleared by the JCS, Defense and State Departments, and the President.

[86] (1) Msg, C 65348, Ridgway to JCS, 16 Mar 52, DA–IN 116709. (2) Msg, JCS 903780, JCS to CINCFE, 17 Mar 52.

[87] (1) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, p. 24. (2) Clews, *The Communists' New Weapon—Germ Warfare*, pp. 14–24.

# CHAPTER XI

# Koje-do

Although the situation in the prisoner of war camps did not attain international prominence until May 1952, there had been numerous indications of the potential danger prior to that time. Riots, demonstrations, and violence had become common in the compounds housing the Communist prisoners, but the U.N. Command had preferred to cope with them on a day-to-day basis. The hope that a truce soon would be negotiated and eliminate the need for drastic UNC actions fostered a policy of delay. In turn, the lack of strong UNC measures encouraged the Communist prisoners to become bolder and more demanding. As UNC control dissipated, the enemy prisoners took charge of their compounds and began to plan for a coup that would focus the eyes of the world upon the whole prisoner of war problem.

This remarkable turnabout wherein prisoners dealt with their captors on what amounted to terms of equality must properly begin with the landings at Inch'on in September 1950.

## *The Seeds Are Planted*

After the surprise attack at Inch'on and the follow-up advance by the Eighth Army, the North Korean Army began to fall back. But large numbers of the enemy were taken prisoner in the swift maneuver and sent to the rear. The bag of prisoners rose from under a thousand in August 1950 to over 130,000 in November. Unfortunately, little provision had been made for so many prisoners and facilities to confine, clothe, and feed them were not available. In addition, there were not enough men on hand to guard the prisoners nor were the guards assigned adequately trained for their mission.[1] The quantity and quality of the security forces continued to plague the UNC prison-camp commanders in the months that lay ahead.

While the prisoners were housed near Pusan, there was a tendency for former ROK personnel who had been impressed into the North Korean Army and later recaptured by the UNC to take over the leadership in the compounds. Since these ex-ROK soldiers professed themselves to be anti-Communist and were usually favored by the ROK guards, they were able to win positions of power and control.

As the prisoner total reached 137,000 in January 1951, the UNC decided to isolate captured personnel on Koje-do, an island off the southern coast of Korea. But before the move was made, the South Korean prisoners were segregated from the North Koreans. This left a power vacu-

[1] Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 2.

um in many of the compounds that were abruptly deprived of their leaders.[2]

On Koje-do security problems were reduced, but there were serious engineering obstacles to be overcome. Since there were little or no natural water resources on the island, Col. Hartley F. Dame, the first camp commander, had to build dams and store rain water to service the 118,000 natives, 100,000 refugees, and 150,000 prisoners.[3] Construction began in January on the first enclosure of UNC Prisoner of War Camp Number 1 and by the end of the month over 50,000 POW's were moved from the mainland to Koje-do.[4]

Swiftly, in two rock-strewn valleys on the north coast, four enclosures, each subdivided into eight compounds, were built. Originally intended to hold 700–1,200 men apiece, the compounds were soon jammed to five times their capacity. Since available land was at a premium on the island, the space between the compounds soon had to be used to confine the prisoners too. This conserved the construction of facilities and the number of guards required to police the enclosures, but complicated the task of managing the crowded camp. Packing thousands of men into a small area with only barbed wire separating each compound from the next permitted a free exchange of thought and an opportunity to plan and execute mass demonstrations and riots. With the number of security personnel limited and usually of inferior caliber, proper control was difficult at the outset and later became impossible. But the elusive hope of an imminent armistice and a rapid solution of the prisoner problem delayed corrective action.[5]

It is only fair to point out that although there were frequent instances of unrest and occasional outbreaks of resistance during the first months of the Koje-do prison camp's existence, much of the early trouble could be traced to the fact that ROK guards were used extensively. Resentment between ROK and North Korean soldiers flared into angry words, threats, and blows very easily. Part of the tension stemmed from the circumstance that at first the prisoners drew better rations than the guards, but eventually this discrepancy was adjusted. In the internecine disputes the U.S. security troops operated at a disadvantage since they knew little or no Korean and were reluctant to interfere. Bad blood between guards and prisoners, however, formed only one segment of the problem.

Although the United States had not ratified the Geneva Convention of 1949 on prisoners of war, it had volunteered to observe its provisions.[6] The Geneva Convention, however, was designed primarily to protect the rights of the prisoners. It completely failed to foresee the development of hard-core, organized prisoner groups such as those that grew up on Koje-do in 1951–52 or to provide protection for the captor nation in dealing with stubborn resistance. In their


[2] Samuel M. Myers and William E. Bradbury, The Political Behavior of Korean and Chinese Prisoners of War in the Korean Conflict: A Historical Analysis, Tech Rpt 50 (Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University, 1958), p. 65.

[3] Interv with Col Dame, 20 Oct 59. In OCMH.

[4] Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp. 2–3.

[5] (1) Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, vol. II, tab F. (2) Interv with Col Dame, 20 Oct 59. (3) Interv with Col Maurice J. Fitzgerald, 2 Dec 59. In OCMH.

[6] See Chapter VII, above.



PRISONERS IN A COMPOUND OF THE KOJE-DO POW CAMP

zeal for defending the prisoners from hardship, injustice, and brutality, the makers spelled out in detail the privileges of the prisoners and the restrictions upon the captor nation, but evidently could not visualize a situation in which the prisoners would organize and present an active threat to the captor nation.[7] Under these conditions every effort at violence by the prisoners that was countered by force reflected badly upon the U.N. Command. Regardless of the provocation given by the prisoners, the UNC appeared to be an armed bully abusing the defenseless captives and the Communists capitalized on this situation.

The outbreaks of dissension and open resistance were desultory until the negotiations at Kaesong got under way. Then the prisoners realized that their future was at stake. Many had professed strong anti-Communist sentiments and were afraid to return, while others, anticipating repatriation, swung clearly to the side of Communist groups in the compounds. From North Korea, agents were sent to the front lines and permitted themselves to be captured so that they could infiltrate the prison camps. Working through refugees, civilians, and local guerrillas, the agents were able to keep

[7] DA Pamphlet 20–150, October 1950, Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims.



PRISONERS LEARN TO WORK TIN IN THE KOJE-DO CAMP

in touch with their headquarters and to plan, organize, and stage incidents at will. Inside the camps, messages were passed visually by signals, hurled by rocks from compound to compound, or communicated by word of mouth. The hospital compound served as a clearing-house for information and was one of the centers of Communist resistance. Although the agents wielded the actual power in the compounds, they usually concealed themselves behind the nominal commanders and operated carefully to cloak their identities. And behind the agents stood their chiefs, none other than Lt. Gen. Nam Il and Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho, the principal North Korean delegates to the armistice conference.[8] The close connection between Panmunjom and the prison camps provided another instance of the Communists' untiring efforts in using every possible measure

[8] Hq UNC/FEC MIS, The Communist War in POW Camps, 28 January 1953, pp. 6–8. This account is based upon seized enemy documents, interviews with prisoners and captured enemy agents, and intelligence reports.

to exert pressure upon the course of the armistice talks.

As the Communists struggled for control of the compounds, a defensive countermovement was launched by the non-Communist elements. Former Chinese Nationalist soldiers and North Korean anti-Communists engaged in bloody clashes with their opponents. When oral persuasion failed, there was little hesitancy on both sides to resort to fists, clubs, and homemade weapons. Kangaroo courts tried stubborn prisoners and sentences were quick and often fatal. Since UNC personnel did not enter the compounds at night and the prisoners were usually either afraid or unwilling to talk, the beatings and murders went unpunished.[9] It should also be noted that even if the beaten prisoners had been willing to give evidence against their attackers, as sometimes happened, the camp commander was not in a position to prosecute. He was not permitted by his superiors in Washington to institute judicial procedures against the culprits. Deprived of this weapon of disciplinary control, the prison command was forced to operate under a distinct disadvantage.[10]

Another instance in which higher headquarters contributed unwittingly to the discontent of the prison camp stemmed from an information and education program instituted in 1951 to keep the prisoners occupied profitably. For the Communists the orientation course became the chief target of criticism and abuse. Although attendance at these lectures was purely voluntary, the subject matter contrasted the advantages of democracy with the fallacies of communism in an unmistakable manner and the Communists protested vehemently. It should be noted that by far the greater portion of the education program aimed at assisting the prisoners in developing vocational and technical skills to help them after their release.[11] The Communists readily accepted the instruction in metalworking and soon began to produce weapons of all varieties instead of sanitation utensils, stoves, and garden tools and used these arms to gain interior control in the compounds whenever they could.

In September 1951 fifteen prisoners were murdered by a self-appointed people's court. Three more were killed when rioting broke out on the 19th in Compound 78. Troops had to be rushed in to restore order and remove two hundred prisoners who were in fear of their lives. As unrest mounted, the 2d Logistical Command, in charge of all prison camps, asked Van Fleet for more security personnel. Pointing out that protracted confinement, uncertainty over the future, and Communist agitation against the UNC information and education program had combined to produce increasing tension among the prisoners, the chief of staff of the 2d Logistical Command also reminded Van Fleet that the caliber of the guard troops left much to be desired.[12]


The September disturbances led to a visit by Van Fleet and a reinforcing and

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 26–28.

[10] Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, vol. II, tab E.

[11] Msg, C 50603, CINCUNC to DA, 21 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 83.

[12] (1) Ltr, Col Albert C. Morgan to CG Eighth Army, 18 Sep 51, sub: Security for POW's in Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, vol. II, tab A–10. (2) Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, vol. II, tab H.



A COMMUNIST POW LEADER, KOJE-DO

reorganization of the prison security forces. From the opening of the camp in January down to mid-September when Col. Maurice J. Fitzgerald assumed command, there had been eight different commanders or about one a month. As Fitzgerald later commented, "Koje-do was a graveyard of commanders." [13] Van Fleet's recognition of the difficulties of the problems led to the activation of the 8137th Military Police Group in October. Besides three assigned battalions, four additional escort guard companies were attached to the group. In November one battalion of the 23d Infantry Regiment was made available for duty on Koje-do and by December over 9,000 U.S. and ROK personnel were stationed on the island. This was still some 6,000 fewer then the number requested.[14]

During December the rival factions—Communist and anti-Communist—vied for control of the compounds with both sides meting out beatings and other punishment freely. A large-scale rock fight between compounds on 18 December was followed by riots and demonstrations. Fourteen deaths and twenty-four other casualties resulted from this flare-up.[15]

The acceleration of violence could be attributed in large part to the inauguration of the screening process in the prison camps. General Yount, commanding the 2d Logistical Command, later told the Far East commander: "Until the inception of the screening program, American personnel had full access to compounds and were able to administer them in a satisfactory manner although never to the degree desired." [16]

In November and December over 37,000 prisoners had been screened and reclassified as civilian internees.[17] As more prisoners indicated that they did not wish to be repatriated or evinced anti-Communist sympathies, the sensitivity of the Communist prisoners to screening intensified. Thus, when the commander of Koje-do camp decided early in January 1952 to give the civilian internees a second screening, the basic ingredients for trouble were on hand. The object of the second round of interviews by ROK civilian teams was to correct the mistakes

[13] Interv with Col Fitzgerald, 2 Dec 59. In OCMH.

[14] Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, vol. II, tab 3, pp. 8–9; tab G, Chart 3.

[15] Msg, CX 69250, Clark to CofS, 28 May 52, DA-IN 144360.

[16] Gen Yount's Statement to Gen Clark, no date, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File.

[17] See Chapter VII, above.

made in the first series and also to segregate the nonrepatriates from the staunch Communist elements.

Despite numerous incidents all the civilian internee compounds were screened during January and early February except for the 5,600 inmates of Compound 62. Here the Communists had firm control and refused to permit the teams to enter. The compound leader stated flatly that all the members of Compound 62 desired to return to North Korea and there was no sense in wasting time in screening. Since the ROK teams were equally determined to carry out their assignment, the 3d Battalion of the 27th Infantry Regiment moved in during the early hours of 18 February and took up positions in front of the compound.[18] With bayonets fixed, the four companies passed through the gate and divided the compound into four segments. But the Communists refused to bow to the show of force. Streaming out of the barracks, they converged on the infantry with pick handles, knives, axes, flails, and tent poles. Others hurled rocks as they advanced and screamed their defiance. Between 1,000–1,500 internees pressed the attack and the soldiers were forced to resort to concussion grenades. When the grenades failed to stop the assault, the UNC troops opened fire. Fifty-five prisoners were killed immediately and 22 more died at the hospital, with over 140 other casualties as against 1 U.S. killed and 38 wounded. This was a high price for the Communists to pay, but human life counted for little. In any event the Communists won their point, for the infantry withdrew and the compound was not screened.[19]



GENERAL DODD

The fear that the story might leak out to the Communists in a distorted version led the U.N. Command to release an official account placing the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Communist compound leaders. The Department of the Army instructed Ridgway to make it clear that only 1,500 of the inmates took part in the outbreak and that only civilian internees—not prisoners of war—were involved.[20] In view of

[18] The 27th Regiment of the 25th Infantry Division was called the Wolfhounds and had been moved to Koje-do during January to bolster the security forces.

[19] (1) Msg, G 71528, Van Fleet to CINCUNC, 19 Feb 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, an. 1, incl 11. (2) Msg, G 71542, Van Fleet to CINCUNC, 19 Feb 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, an. 1, incl 12. (3) Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 7.

[20] (1) Msg, G 4615 TAC, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 20 Feb 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, an. 1, incl 14. (2) Msg, DA 901675, CSUSA to CINCFE, 20 Feb 52. (3) Msg, DA 901709, CSUSA to CINCFE, 22 Feb 52.

the outcry that the Communist delegates at Panmunjom were certain to make over the affair, this was an especially important point. Civilian internees could be considered an internal affair of the ROK Government and outside the purview of the truce conference.[21]

But Communist protests at Panmunjom were not the only results of the battle of Compound 62. On 20 February Van Fleet appointed Brig. Gen. Francis T. Dodd as commandant of the camp to tighten up discipline, and the following week Van Fleet received some new instructions from Tokyo:

> In regard to the control of the POW's at Koje-do, the recent riot in Compound 62 gives strong evidence that many of the compounds may be controlled by the violent leadership of Communists or anti-Communist groups. This subversive control is extremely dangerous and can result in further embarrassment to the U.N.C. Armistice negotiations, particularly if any mass screening or segregation is directed within a short period of time. I desire your personal handling of this planning. I wish to point out the grave potential consequences of further rioting, and therefore the urgent requirement for the most effective practicable control over POW's.[22]

Although the orders from Ridgway covered both Communists and anti-Communists, the latter were co-operative in their relations with the UNC personnel and ruthless only when they encountered Communist sympathizers in their midst. The hatred between the two groups led to another bloody encounter on 13 March. As an anti-Communist detail passed a hostile compound, ardent Communists stoned the detail and its ROK guards. Without orders the guards retaliated with gunfire. Before the ROK contingent could be brought under control, 12 prisoners were killed and 26 were wounded while 1 ROK civilian and 1 U.S. officer, who tried to stop the shooting, were injured.[23]

April was a momentous month for the prisoners on Koje-do. On 2 April the Communists showed their interest in finding out the exact number of prisoners that would be returned to their control if screening was carried out. Spurred by this indication that the enemy might be willing to break the deadlock on voluntary repatriation, the U.N. Command inaugurated a new screening program on 8 April to produce a firm figure.[24] During the days that followed, UNC teams interviewed the prisoners in all but seven compounds, where 37,000 North Koreans refused to permit the teams to enter. As noted previously, the results of the screening amazed even the most optimistic of the UNC when only about 70,000 of the 170,000 military and civilian prisoners consented to go back to the Communists voluntarily. The enemy, on the other hand, was at first stunned and then became violently indignant, having been led to expect that a much higher percentage of repatriates would be turned up by the screening. Negotiations at Panmunjom again came to a standstill and the Communists renewed their attack upon the whole concept of screening. In view of the close connection between the enemy truce delegates and the prison camps, it was

[21] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. 1.

[22] Memo, Maj Gen Bryan L. Milburn, G–1 FEC, for Gen Van Fleet, 29 Feb 52, sub: Planning for POW's . . . , in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.

[23] (1) Msg, CX 65213, CINCUNC to JCS, 14 Mar 52, DA–IN 115842. (2) Msg, CX 65281, CINCUNC to JCS, 14 Mar 52, DA–IN 115919.

[24] See Chapter VIII, above.



PICTURE OF STALIN DISPLAYED DURING A POW DEMONSTRATION, KOJE-DO

not surprising that the agitation of the Communists over the unfavorable implications of the UNC screening should communicate itself quickly to the loyal Communist compounds.

During the interviewing period, Van Fleet had informed Ridgway that he was segregating and removing the anti-Communist prisoners to the mainland. Although the separation would mean more administrative personnel and more equipment would be required to organize and supervise the increased number of camps, Van Fleet felt that dispersal would lessen the possibility of incidents.[25] Segregation and dispersal, however, had a negative side as well, for the removal of anti-Communists and their replacement by pro-Communists in the compounds on Koje-do could not help but strengthen the hand of the Communist compound leaders. Relieved of the necessity to conduct internecine strife, they could now be assured of wholehearted support from the inmates of their compounds as they directed their efforts against the U.N. Command. An

[25] Msg, GX 5410 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 13 Apr 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal Msg File, 1949–52.

energetic campaign to discredit the screening program backed by all the Communist compounds was made easier by the transfer of the chief opposition to the mainland and the alteration of the balance of power on the island.

In addition to the general political unrest that permeated the Communist enclosures, a quite fortuitous element of discontent complicated the scene in early April. Up until this time responsibility for the provision of the grain component of the prisoners' ration had rested with the ROK Army. But the ROK Government informed the Eighth Army in March that it could no longer bear the burden and Van Fleet in turn told the 2d Logistical Command that it would have to secure the grain through U.S. Army channels. Unfortunately, the U.N. Civil Assistance Command could not supply grain in the prescribed ratio of one-half rice and one-half other grains without sufficient advance time to fill the order. Instead a one-third rice, one-third barley, and one-third wheat ration was apportioned to the prisoners in April and this occasioned an avalanche of complaints.[26]

The 17 compounds occupied by the Communist prisoners at the end of April included 10 that had been screened and 7 that had resisted all efforts to interview them. There was little doubt in Van Fleet's mind that force would have to be used and casualties expected if the recalcitrant compounds were to be screened.[27] As he prepared plans to use force, Van Fleet warned Ridgway on 28 April that the prisoners already screened would probably demonstrate violently when UNC forces moved into the compounds still holding out. In anticipation of trouble Van Fleet moved the 3d Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment to Koje-do to reinforce the 38th Infantry Regiment and ordered the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment and the ROK 20th Regiment to Pusan. Barring accident, he intended to begin screening shortly after the 1st of May.[28]

Confronted with almost certain violence, Ridgway decided to ask for permission to cancel forced screening:

> These compounds are well organized and effective control cannot be exercised within them without use of such great degree of force as might verge on the brutal and result in killing and wounding quite a number of inmates. While I can exercise such forced screening, I believe that the risk of violence and violence involved, both to U.N.C. personnel and to the inmates themselves, would not warrant this course of action. Further, the unfavorable publicity which would probably result . . . would provide immediate and effective Communist material. . . .[29]

This request and Ridgway's plan to list the prisoners in the unscreened compounds as desiring repatriation were approved. Although failure to interview all the inmates in these enclosures might well prevent some prisoners from choosing nonrepatriation, Ridgway's superiors held that if the prisoners felt strongly enough about not returning to Communist control, they would somehow make their wishes known.[30]

[26] Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, vol. II, pp. 13ff.

[27] Msg, GX 5410 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 13 Apr 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal Msg File, 1949–52.

[28] Msg, GX 5637 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 28 Apr 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 52, an. 1, incl 73.

[29] Msg, CX 67750, CINCFE to JCS, 29 Apr 52, DA-IN 133133.

[30] (1) Msg, JCS 907528, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Apr 52. (2) Msg, JCS 908093, JCS to CINCFE, 7 May 52.

As forced screening was cast into limbo, the prospects for a relaxation of tension on Koje-do should have improved. But in early May, after a tour of inspection, Col. Robert T. Chaplin, provost marshal of the Far East Command, reported that there was a dangerous lack of control within the Communist compounds, with the prisoners refusing even to bring in their own food and supplies. The possibility of new incidents that might embarrass the U.N. Command, especially at Panmunjom, led Ridgway to remind Van Fleet that proper control had to be maintained regardless of whether screening was conducted or not.[31] As it happened, Van Fleet was more concerned over the fact that Colonel Chaplin had not informed Eighth Army of his impressions first than he was over the prisoner-camp situation. There was no cause for "undue anxiety" about Koje-do, he told Ridgway on 5 May.[32]

Actually Eighth Army officers admitted freely that UNC authorities could not enter the compounds, inspect sanitation, supervise medical support, or work the Communists prisoners as they desired. They exercised an external control only, in that UNC security forces did prevent the prisoners from escaping.[33] Thus, on 7 May the Communist prisoners and the UNC appeared to have reached a stalemate. The former had interior control, but could not get out without violence; and the latter had exterior control, but could not get in without violence. With the cancellation of forced screening, the U.N. Command indicated that it was willing to accept the *status quo* rather than initiate another wave of bloodshed in the camps. The next move was up to the Communists.


### *The Time of Ripening*

It did not take long for the Communist prisoners to act. As investigation later revealed, they had become familiar with the habits of General Dodd, the camp commandant, during the spring and by the beginning of May they had readied a plan. Well aware that Dodd was anxious to lessen the tension in the camp, they also knew that he often went unarmed to the sally ports of the compounds and talked to the leaders. This system of personal contact kept Dodd in close touch with camp problems, but it exposed him to an element of risk. Only the guards carried weapons on Koje-do and there were no locks on the compounds gates, since work details were constantly passing in and out. Security personnel were not authorized to shoot save in case of grave emergency or in self-defense, and were not permitted to keep a round in the chamber of their guns. In the past the Communists had successfully kidnapped several UNC soldiers and although they had later released them unharmed after Communist complaints had been heard, the practice was neither new nor unknown. Since the technique had proved profitable in previous instances, the enemy prisoners evidently decided to spread their net for the biggest fish of all—the camp com-

[31] Msg, CX 67988, Ridgway to CG Eighth Army, 5 May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, an. 1, incl 56.

[32] Msg, GX 5746 TAC, Van Fleet to Ridgway, 5 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal Msg File, 1949–52.

[33] Extract, Visit to Eighth Army Headquarters with Col Chaplin, 8 May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, an. 1, incl 58.



A KOJE-DO COMMANDANT TALKING TO POW's *at a compound gate during a demonstration.*

mandant. Taking advantage of his willingness to come to them, they made careful plans.[34]

On the evening of 6 May members of a Communist work detail from Compound 76 refused to enter the enclosure until they had spoken to Lt. Col. Wilbur R. Raven, commanding officer of the 94th Military Police Battalion and the compound. The prisoners told Raven that guards had beaten members of the compound and searched them for contraband. When he promised to investigate the charges, they seemed satisfied, but asked to see General Dodd on the next day to discuss matters of importance. Raven was noncommittal since he did not wish the prisoners to imagine that they could summon the commandant at will, but he promised to pass the message on to the general.[35]

Since the prisoners indicated that they would be willing to let themselves be listed and fingerprinted if Dodd would come and talk to them, the trap was

[34] Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp. 12ff. The compound leaders were afraid that the UNC would transfer them to another area if they left the safety of their own compounds. This made them reluctant to go to Dodd's office and if Dodd wanted to talk to them, he had to go to the compound.

[35] Statement of Col Raven, 12 May 52, before a Board of Officers at Koje-do, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Proceedings of Board of Officers.

shrewdly baited. Dodd had just been instructed to complete an accurate roster and identification of all the remaining prisoners of war on Koje-do and the chance to win a bloodless victory was too good to be missed.

Colonel Raven finished his discussions with the leaders of Compound 76 shortly after 1400 on 7 May and Dodd drove up a few minutes later. As usual they talked with the unlocked gate of the sally port between them and the Communists launched a whole series of questions concerning items of food and clothing they felt they should be issued. Then branching into the political field they asked about the truce negotiations. Several times they invited Dodd and Raven to come inside and sit down so that they could carry on the discussion in a more comfortable atmosphere. Raven turned down these suggestions bluntly since he himself had previously been seized and held. More prisoners had meanwhile gathered in the sally port and Dodd permitted them to approach and listen to the conversation. In the midst of the talk, a work detail turning in tents for salvage came through the sally port and the outer door was opened to let them pass out. It remained ajar and the prisoners drew closer to Dodd and Raven as if to finish their discussion. Suddenly they leaped forward and began to drag the two officers into the compound. Raven grabbed hold of a post until the guards rushed up and used their bayonets to force the prisoners back, but Dodd was hauled quickly inside the compound, whisked behind a row of blankets draped along the inner barbed wire fence, and hurried to a tent that was prepared for him. The prisoners told him that the kidnapping had been planned and that the other compounds would have made an attempt to seize him if the opportunity had arisen.[36]

With the successful completion of the first step disposed of, the Communists lost no time in carrying out the second phase. Within a few minutes of Dodd's capture, they hoisted a large sign announcing—"We capture Dodd. As long as our demand will be solved, his safety is secured. If there happen brutal act such as shooting, his life is danger." [37] The threat was soon followed by the first note from Dodd that he was all right and asking that no troops be sent in to release him until after 1700.[38] Apparently General Dodd felt that he could persuade the prisoners to let him go by that time.

In the meantime word had passed swiftly back to General Yount, the commanding general of the 2d Logistical Command, and through him to Van Fleet, of the capture of Dodd. Van Fleet immediately instructed Yount not to use force to effect Dodd's release unless Eighth Army approved such action. Yount in turn sent his chief of staff, Col. William H. Craig, by air to Koje-do to assume command.[39] Repeating Van Fleet's injunction not to use force, Yount told Craig: "We are to talk them out. Obviously if somebody makes mass break we most certainly will resist. . . . But unless they attempt such a thing, under no circumstances use fire to get them out. Wait them out. One thing above all, approach it calmly. If we get them excited only God knows what will hap-

[36] (1) *Ibid.* (2) Statement of Gen Dodd, 14 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Proceedings of Board of Officers.

[37] Exhibit O[4(2)], in FEC Gen Admin Files, Exhibits.

[38] Exhibit N[4(2)], in FEC Gen Admin Files, Exhibits.

[39] *Ibid.*



GENERAL COLSON

pen." [40] The fear of a concerted attempt to break out of the compounds and the resultant casualties that both the UNC and prisoners would probably suffer dominated this conversation and mirrored the first reaction of Dodd's superiors to the potential explosiveness of the situation. A major uprising would mean violence and unfavorable publicity that the enemy would exploit.

Dodd's actions in Compound 76 complemented this desire to localize the incident. He consented to act as go-between for the prisoners and relayed their demands to the outside. A telephone was installed and upon Dodd's recommendation, representatives from all of the other compounds were brought to Compound 76 for a meeting to work out the demands that would be submitted to the U.N. Command. Colonel Craig attempted to use one of the senior North Korean officers, Col. Lee Hak Koo, to talk inmates of Compound 76 into releasing Dodd, but Lee, as soon as he was permitted to enter the compound, remained and became the spokesman of the prisoners.[41]

As the Communist representatives met on the night of the seventh, Dodd urged that no troops be employed to get him since he did not think he would be harmed.[42] This was a reasonable assumption, since if anything happened to Dodd, the Communists would have nothing to bargain with. In any event, Dodd's plea coincided with the wishes of Yount and Van Fleet at this point. Colonel Craig, stalling for time, agreed to sit tight. With the UNC troops under general alert orders, the night of 7 May passed uneasily.[43]

One fact seemed evident—the Communists had won the first round. Not only had they managed to kidnap Dodd, but they had also succeeded in using him to open negotiations. Playing upon the UNC fears of a general breakout of prisoners and the concern over Dodd's life, they pressed their advantage to the hilt.

As the prisoner representatives reconvened the next day, they presented Dodd with a list of their demands. The chief preoccupation of the prisoners during this early phase concerned the formation and recognition by the UNC of an associ-

[40] Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 21.

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23.

[42] Exhibits M[4(2)] and M[4(4)], in FEC Gen Admin Files, Exhibits.

[43] Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp. 23–24.

ation of the prisoners with telephone facilities between the compounds and two vehicles for intracompound travel. Dodd consented to most of the items of equipment that the prisoners were insisting upon even though he had no command authority to make any agreements. After the meeting concluded, the representatives wanted to return to their compounds and report to the rest of the prisoners; thus another delay ensued. General Yount refused to allow them to leave until Van Fleet overruled him late in the afternoon. By the time the representatives discussed events with their compound mates and returned to Compound 76, evening had begun.[44]

While the prisoners were carrying on their conversations, Colonel Craig sent for trained machine gun crews, grenades, and gas masks. The 3d Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment boarded an LST (landing ship, tank) at Pusan and set out for Koje-do. ROK Navy picket boats ringed the island in case of a major escape attempt and Navy, Marine, and Air Force planes remained on alert. Company B of the 64th Medium Tank Battalion was detached from the 3d Infantry Division and started to rumble toward Pusan. And from the U.S. I Corps, Van Fleet sent Brig. Gen. Charles F. Colson, chief of staff, to take charge of the camp and get Dodd out. The selection of a combat leader to resolve the crisis indicated that a military solution would now be tried. Colson had no knowledge of conditions on Koje-do until he was chosen and only a sketchy acquaintance with the issues being discussed at Panmunjom.[45]

As Colson assumed command, Van Fleet confirmed this impression that military measures would now be employed. His first instructions to Yount set forth the steps to be followed quite clearly. First official written demands were to be delivered to Compound 76 asking that Dodd be freed immediately. At the same time the prisoners would be informed that Dodd no longer was in command and could make no decisions. If they refused to let him go, Yount would set a time limit and warn the Communists that they would be held responsible for Dodd's safety when force was used. As soon as the deadline expired, Yount would enter the compound by force, release Dodd, and gain full control.[46] Yount passed Van Fleet's orders on to Colson late on 8 May.

There were other factors that had to be considered as the drama unfolded. Within the compound Dodd was treated royally. The prisoners did all they could to provide him with small comforts and permitted medicine for his ulcers to be brought in. They applied no physical pressure whatsoever, yet they left no doubt that Dodd would be the first casualty and that they would resist violently any attempt to rescue him by force. Under the circumstances they expected Dodd to co-operate and help them reach a bloodless settlement and Dodd decided to comply.

Early on the morning of 9 May Colson sent in his first official demand for Dodd's safe deliverance and six hours later he issued a second order. When Col. Lee Hak Koo finally responded, he countered with the statement that Dodd

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.

[45] Interv, author with Gen Colson, 4 Oct 59. In OCMH.

[46] Msg, GX 5775 TAC, CG EUSAK to CG 2d Logistical Comd, 8 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Exhibits.

had already admitted that he had practiced "inhuman massacre and murderous barbarity" against the prisoners. Recognizing Colson as the new camp commander, Lee asked him to join Dodd at the compound meeting.[47] Obviously, the Communists had no intentions of letting Dodd go until they had resolved their differences with the U.N. Command.

The refusal of the prisoners to meet Colson's order should have led to the presentation of an ultimatum with a time limit, but Colson decided to wait until the tanks arrived from the mainland before he tried force. Since the tanks would not arrive until late on the 9th, the action to bring the compound into line could not begin until the following morning. Both Yount and Maj. Gen. Orlando Mood, chief of staff of the Eighth Army, agreed to this postponement.[48] In the meantime Colson intended to put a halt to further concessions to the prisoners; his first move in this direction was to stop the POW representatives from circulating back and forth between their compounds and Compound 76.[49]

Perturbed by the stiffening attitude of Colson and the apparent preparations for action around the compound, the Communists evidently became nervous and had Dodd ask Colson whether they could hold their meeting without fear of interruption. They again promised that Dodd would be freed after the meeting if all went well. Since the U.N. Command was not going to make a move until 10 May anyway, the prisoners were informed that they could meet in safety.[50]

As the prisoners convened on the 9th, the capture of Dodd assumed a new perspective. They informed their hostage that they were going to discuss the alleged brutalities committed against their members, repatriation and screening, as well as the prisoner of war association.[51] Whether the expansion of the Communists' objectives was spurred by their success in using Dodd and the willingness of the UNC to negotiate or was a planned development is difficult to determine—it may well have been a combination of these elements that emboldened them to press their luck.

Setting themselves up as a people's court, the prisoners drew up a list of nineteen counts of death and/or injury to compound inmates and had Dodd answer to each charge. Although they were generally disposed to accept his explanations and dismiss the accusations, the spectacle of prisoners, still captive and surrounded by heavily armed troops, trying the kidnapped commanding officer of the prison camp on criminal counts and making him defend his record was without parallel in modern military history.[52]

While the Communists sat in judgment upon Dodd, Colson had the 38th

[47] (1) Ltr, Colson to POW Compound 76, 9 May 52, Exhibit $E^{4(6)}$. (2) Ltrs, Lee to Colson, 9 May 52, Exhibits $E^{4(2)}$ and $E^{4(1)}$. Both in FEC Gen Admin Files, Exhibits.

[48] Teleconf, Mood and Yount, 9 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May–15 May 52, tab 20.

[49] Teleconf, Colson and Yount, 9 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May 52, tab 28.

[50] Teleconf, Gen Dodd and Col Alvin T. Bowers, G–2, 2d Logistical Comd, 9 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May–15 May 52, Tab 34.

[51] Teleconvs, Colson and Dodd, 9 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May–15 May 52, tabs 38 and 39.

[52] *Ibid.*

Infantry Regiment reinforce the guards on all the compounds and had automatic weapons set up in pairs at strategic locations. He directed Lt. Col. William J. Kernan, commanding officer of the 38th, to prepare a plan for forcible entry into Compound 76, using tanks, flamethrowers, armored cars, .50-caliber multiple mounts, tear gas, riot guns, and the like, with a target date of 1000 on 10 May.[53]

In the early afternoon, Van Fleet flew into Koje-do for a conference. He had discussed the situation with Ridgway and his appointed successor, General Mark W. Clark, who had just arrived in the Far East, and they were all agreed that no press or photo coverage of the emergency would be permitted.[54] They wanted Colson to be sure to give every opportunity to nonbelligerent prisoners to surrender peaceably while he engaged in battle for control of the compound. Van Fleet added that he did not think that U.S. troops should go into the compound, until firepower from the outside had forced obedience and driven the prisoners into small adjacent compounds that had been constructed in the meantime. If necessary he was willing to grant the prisoners' request for an association with equipment and communication facilities, but he reminded Colson that he had full authority to use all the force required to release Dodd and secure proper control and discipline. Regardless of the outcome of this affair, Van Fleet wanted dispersion of the compounds carried out. He left the timing of the Compound 76 operation in Colson's hands, but the negotiating period should end at 1000 on 10 May.[55]



GENERAL CLARK

Dodd's trial dragged on through the afternoon as the translation process was slow and laborious. By dusk it was evident that the proceedings would not finish that night and Dodd phoned Colson asking for an extension until noon the next day. He felt that they would keep their promise to let him go as soon as the meeting finished. But Eighth Army refused to alter the 1000 deadline and Colson passed the word back to Dodd. It was at this point that the Communists asserted that they had in-

[53] Ltr of Instr, Colson to Staff, 8137th Army Unit *et al.*, 9 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Proceedings of Board of Officers.

[54] General Clark served as U.S. commander in Italy during World War II, then became American High Commissioner for Austria after the war. He was Commanding General, Army Field Forces, prior to his assignment as CINCFE.

[55] CG Conf at 091340 May at Koje-do, tab 55, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May–15 May 52.

tended to conduct meetings for ten days, but in the light of the UNC stand they would attempt to complete their work in the morning.[56]

During the night of 9–10 May, twenty tanks, five equipped with flamethrowers, arrived on Koje-do and were brought into position. Extra wire was laid and the sixteen small compounds were ready to receive the prisoners of Compound 76. All of the guns were in place and gas masks were issued; the last-minute preparations were completed and the troops tried to get some rest. When Dodd and Colson spoke to each other for the last time that night, they said goodbye, since neither expected Dodd to be alive when the operation was over.[57]

There was another dampening note as heavy rain began shortly after dark and came down steadily all night. As dawn signaled its arrival, fog obscured the compounds. Yet Colson was ready to go in despite the weather. He held out little hope to Yount that the Communists would release Dodd since this would be "silly" on their part and he placed little trust in their good faith.[58]

But as daylight broke on the tense island the prisoners' latest demands reached Colson. Since he and Dodd had already agreed to most of the eleven requests on the prisoner of war association, the Communists wasted little time on this matter. Instead they directed their attack against UNC prisoner policy, repatriation, and screening. Although the English translation is awkward and some of the phrases difficult to understand, this bold demand deserves quotation in full.

1. Immediate ceasing the barbarous behavior, insults, torture, forcible protest with blood writing, threatening, confinement, mass murdering, gun and machine gun shooting, using poison gas, germ weapons, experiment object of A-Bomb, by your command. You should guarantee PW's human rights and individual life with the base on the International Law.

2. Immediate stopping the so-called illegal and unreasonable volunteer repatriation of NKPA and CPVA PW's.

3. Immediate ceasing the forcible investigation (Screening) which thousands of PW's of NKPA and CPVA be rearmed and falled in slavery, permanently and illegally.

4. Immediate recognition of the P.W. Representative Group (Commission) consisted of NKPA and CPVA PW's and close cooperation to it by your command. This Representative Group will turn in Brig. Gen. Dodd, USA, on your hand after we receive the satisfactory declaration to resolve the above items by your command. We will wait for your warm and sincere answer.[59]

The Communist objectives were now fully in the open, for admission by the U.N. Command of the validity of the first three demands would discredit the screening process and repatriation policy backed so strongly by the UNC delegation at Panmunjom. If the UNC was violating the Geneva Convention and conducting a reign of terror in the prison camps, as the Communist prisoners charged, then how much reliance could the rest of the world place in the screening figures released by the United Nations Command?

[56] (1) Teleconvs, Yount, Bowers and Colson, Yount and Mood, 9 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May–15 May 52, tabs 48 and 49. (2) 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 35.

[57] Interv, author with Colson, 4 Oct 59. In OCMH.

[58] Teleconv, Yount and Colson, 9 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May–15 May 52, tab 57.

[59] Msg No. 2, Lee to CG Koje-do PW Camp, 10 May 52, Exhibit E[4(8)], in FEC Gen Admin Files, Exhibits.

Colson had already sent a final request to Compound 76 to free Dodd, but the receipt of the four demands and of two other pieces of information gave him pause. A disturbing report from his intelligence officer indicated that the other compounds were ready to stage a mass breakout as soon as he launched his attack and, as if to substantiate this item, the native villages near the compound were deserted.[60] The prospect of a large number of casualties, on both sides, including General Dodd, decided Colson. Since the UNC had not committed most of the charges leveled by the prisoners, he called Yount and simply told him that Colson could inform Dodd that the accusations were not true. Colson was willing to recognize the POW association, but had no jurisdiction over the problem of repatriation. If Yount could get authority to renounce nominal screening, Colson thought he could fashion an answer acceptable to the prisoners. General Mood felt that nominal screening could be dropped and gave his approval to Yount to go ahead.[61]

Naturally the Communists wanted Colson's answer in writing and this destroyed any hope of meeting the 1000 deadline. For some reason the translator available to Colson was not particularly quick or accurate and this slowed down the negotiating process.[62] At any rate, Colson postponed taking action and sent off an answer to the prisoners:

1. With reference to your item 1 of that message, I am forced to tell you that we are not and have not committed any of the offenses which you allege. I can assure you that we will continue in that policy and the prisoners of war can expect humane treatment in this camp.
2. Reference your item two regarding voluntary repatriation of NKPA and CPVA PW, that is a matter which is being discussed at Panmunjom, and over which I have no control or influence.
3. Regarding your item three pertaining to forcible investigation (screening), I can inform you that after General Dodd's release, unharmed, there will be no more forcible screening of PW's in this camp, nor will any attempt be made at nominal screening.
4. Reference your item four, we have no objection to the organization of a PW representative group or commission consisting of NKPA and CPVA PW, and are willing to work out the details of such an organization as soon as practicable after General Dodd's release.

Colson added that Dodd must be freed by noon and no later.[63]

With the exception of the word "more" in Item 3, Colson's reply was noncommittal and the Communists refused to accept it or release Dodd. Always opportunistic, they were determined to win more from the U.N. Command before they surrendered their trump card. The haggling began in the late morning and lasted until evening as the prisoners argued about the wording of Colson's answer.[64]

[60] Interv, author with Colson, 4 Oct 59. In OCMH.

[61] Teleconvs, Yount and Colson, tab 60, Yount and Mood, tab 61, 10 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May–15 May 52.

[62] See Teleconv, Bowers and Murray, 10 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May–15 May 52, tab 85. It was unfortunate that a first-class translator was not called in until too late to help in these intricate negotiations, but it should be remembered that the decision to negotiate did not come until the morning of the 10th.

[63] Ltr, Colson to Compound 76, 10 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May–15 May 52, tab 55.

[64] Msgs Nos. 4 and 5, Lee to Colson, 10 May 52, Exhibits $E^{4(6)}$ and $E^{4(12)}$, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Exhibits.

As the antagonists on Koje-do wrangled over the details, Ridgway and Van Fleet encountered increasing difficulty in finding out what was going on. When news of the four demands seeped back to UNC headquarters, Ridgway had attempted to forestall Colson's reply, but had been too late. He realized the propaganda value of an admission of the prisoners' charges, but Van Fleet had assured him that Colson's answer carried no implied acknowledgment of illegal or reprehensible acts.[65] As the afternoon drew to a close and no report of Colson's negotiations arrived in Tokyo, Ridgway became impatient. Pointing out that incalculable damage might be done to the UNC cause if Colson accepted the prisoners' demands, he complained of the lack of information from Koje-do. "I have still been unable to get an accurate prompt record of action taken by your camp commander in response to these latest Communist demands. I am seriously handicapped thereby in the issuance of further instructions." [66]

Actually Van Fleet knew little more than Ridgway at this point. Colson had been so busy that even Yount was not completely abreast of all the developments. When the noon deadline passed without incident, Dodd phoned Colson and presented the prisoners' case. He argued that there had been incidents in the past when prisoners had been killed and Colson's answer simply denied everything. Most of the difficulties stemmed from semantics, Dodd admitted, but until these were cleared up, the Communists would not free him. With the prisoner leaders sitting beside, him, Dodd passed on their and his own suggestions for preparing Colson's reply in an acceptable form and then offered to write in the changes that the prisoners considered mandatory. Colson agreed and informed Yount in general terms of the prisoners' objections.[67]

After a second version failed to satisfy the Communists, Colson attempted to meet their demands clearly so that there would be no further excuse for delay:

1. With reference to your item 1 of that message, I do admit that there has been instances of bloodshed where many PW have been killed and wounded by UN Forces. I can assure in the future that PW can expect humane treatment in this camp according to the principles of International Law. I will do all within my power to eliminate further violence and bloodshed. If such incidents happen in the future, I will be responsible.

2. Reference your item 2 regarding voluntary repatriation of Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army PW, that is a matter which is being discussed at Panmunjom. I have no control or influence over the decisions at the peace conference.

3. Regarding your item 3 pertaining to forcible investigation (screening), I can inform you that after General Dodd's release, unharmed, there will be no more forcible screening or any rearming of PW in this camp, nor will any attempt be made at nominal screening.

4. Reference your item 4, we approve the organization of a PW representative group or commission consisting of Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army, PW, according to the details agreed to by Gen Dodd and approved by me.

[65] Teleconv, Hickey and Van Fleet, 10 May 52, in FEC, Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File.

[66] Msg, C 68268, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 10 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File.

[67] (1) Testimony of Colson before Board of Officers, 12 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Proceedings of Board of Officers. (2) Teleconv, Yount and Colson, 10 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May–15 May 52, tab 74.

The release hour was advanced to 2000 since so much time had been consumed in translating and discussing the changes.[68]

By the time the final version had been translated and examined by the prisoners, it was evening and the Communists endeavored to add one last oriental touch to what Yount called the "comic opera." They wanted to hold Dodd overnight so that they might hold a little ceremony in the morning. In recognition of his services Dodd was to be decked with flowers and escorted to the gate. But Colson had had enough and would concede no more. He demanded that Dodd be brought out that night as agreed and the Communists decided that they could afford to give in now that they had won their main objectives. At 2130 Dodd walked out of Compound 76 and was immediately taken to a place where he could be kept incommunicado.[69]

The "comic opera" with all the overtones of a tragedy reached its climax with the release of Dodd, but the aftermath promised to be just as exciting. Before the repercussions of the incident are discussed, however, a brief analysis of the affair might be helpful.

There is little doubt that the conditions on Koje-do were clearly known by Ridgway and Van Fleet before the kidnapping took place. For several weeks UNC personnel had not been permitted to enter many of the compounds and the possibility of violence was no secret. Koje-do was like a chronic appendix; the Far East Command and Eighth Army knew it would have to undergo radical treatment sooner or later, but they preferred to postpone the operation until the situation became acute.

Since the prisoners had set up a definite plan to capture Dodd, they probably would have seized him eventually. His contacts with the prisoners laid him open to kidnapping and as long as they refused to come out of the compounds to talk to him, it meant that unless he used force to bring the prisoner leaders out, he had to go to them or break off relations with them. In view of his orders to complete the fingerprinting and rostering of the prisoners and the disinclination to employ violent means, Dodd had little choice. Better security procedures, locks on the gates, a screen of guards between Dodd and the prisoners during the talks, might have prevented the kidnapping, but Dodd was careless in this respect and placed too much confidence in the prisoners' sincerity and good faith.

Actually the seizure of Dodd in itself might have been relatively unimportant. It was only when the Communists skilfully used Dodd as a pawn and then backed his capture with the threat of a mass breakout that they were able to practice extortion in so bold a fashion. Despite the fact that there were over eleven thousand armed troops supported by tanks and other weapons and despite the instructions from Ridgway and Van Fleet to employ force if Dodd was not freed, the Communists carried off the honors. What had begun as a military problem to be solved by military means

[68] (1) Testimony of Colson before Board of Officers, 12 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Proceedings of Board of Officers. (2) Transcript of Conference in Office of DCofS FEC, 18 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File. Colson had confused his second and third letters in his earlier testimony. The version quoted above was the third and final letter accepted by the Communists.

[69] (1) Teleconvs, Craig and Yount, 10 May 52, tab 81 and tab 97; Yount and Mood, 10 May 52, tab 103. All in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May–15 May 52.

became a political problem settled on the prisoners' terms. The Communists had seized the initiative and never relinquished it. Using the menace of massive resistance as a club, they successfully blocked the use of force and played upon the desire of Colson to bring the affair to a bloodless conclusion.

During the last day of negotiations Dodd's role as intermediary became more vital. Given a new lease on life by the postponement of action, he labored zealously to help work out a formula that the prisoners would accept. Under these circumstances, the concessions that he urged upon Colson tended to favor the Communist position on the controversial items. The pressure of time and of translation added to confusion. It is evident that the Communists knew what they wanted and that Dodd and Colson were more interested in preventing casualties than they were in denying political and propaganda advantages to the enemy.

Unfortunately the hurried and continual negotiations cut down the flow of information to higher headquarters or the statements open to distortion or misinterpretation might have been caught in time and excised. As it turned out, Colson traded Dodd's life for a propaganda weapon that was far more valuable to the Communists than the lives of their prisoners of war.

It would not be fair to close without mentioning two matters that were bound up in the Dodd incident and in the events that followed. If force had been employed, there was the distinct possibility that reprisals might have been taken against the UNC prisoners under Communist control. And secondly, the attainment of Communist aims in these negotiations may very well have softened later resistance in the prison camps. While it is impossible to judge the importance of these probabilities, they should not be forgotten or overlooked.

### *Bitter Harvest*

Although Van Fleet tended to discount the value of the Colson letter, Clark and his superiors in Washington were quite concerned. They realized the damaging implications that the Communists would be certain to utilize. Phrases like "I can assure in the future that PW can expect humane treatment" implied that the prisoners had not received humane treatment in the past. The promise that there would be "no more forcible screening or rearming of PW in this camp . . ." conveyed an entirely erroneous impression since there never had been any rearming of prisoners and forcible screening had been canceled.[70]

Since the press was becoming impatient for more information, Clark decided to publish a statement on the incident. He included both the prisoners' demands and Colson's reply. Dodd also met the press and issued a brief account of his capture and release.[71] In general the response to the affair and the letter was unfavorable and at Panmunjom the Communist delegates made full use of the propaganda value of the epi

[70] (1) FEC Memo for Rcd, Teleconv, Clark and Van Fleet, 12 May 52. (2) DA–CINCFE Teleconf, 13 May 52. Both in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File.

[71] Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 45–46. Colson later stated that he never understood why Clark published his letter and aggravated the situation. See interview of the author with General Colson, 4 October 1959. In OCMH.

sode to discomfort the UNC representatives.

At 2d Logistical Command headquarters, Yount established a board to investigate the matter and it found Dodd and Colson blameless. This did not satisfy Van Fleet, who felt that Dodd had not conducted himself properly nor had his advice to Colson been fitting under the circumstances. He recommended administrative action against Dodd and an administrative reprimand for Colson.[72] Clark was even more severe; he proposed reduction in grade to colonel for both Dodd and Colson and an administrative reprimand to Yount for failing to catch several damaging phrases in Colson's statement.[73] The Department of the Army approved Clark's action.

The quick and summary punishment of the key officers involved did not solve the problem of what to do about Colson's statement or the more basic question of how to clean up the long-standing conditions in the prison camps. Although the Washington leaders did not want to "repudiate" the letter, they told Clark to deny its validity on the grounds that it was obtained under duress and Colson had not had the authority to accept the false charges contained in the Communist demands.[74] The first count was no doubt true but the second was certainly moot.

Denial was not enough for the press, and on 27 May Collins gave Clark permission to issue a concise and factual release. The Chief of Staff felt that the U.N. Command had always abided by the Geneva Convention and allowed the ICRC regular access to the camps. Clark's account, he went on, should stress this and emphasize that the incidents stemmed from the actions of the fanatical, die-hard Communists. In closing, the Far East commander should outline the corrective measures being taken.[75]

In the wake of Koje-do came a series of actions. The stiffening attitude of the UNC revealed itself first at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10 at Pusan for hospital cases. Among the patients and attached work details, 3,500 in Compounds 1, 2, and 3 had not been screened and segregated. Hoping to forestall concerted action, the camp commander, Lt. Col. John Bostic, informed the prisoners on 11 May that food and water would be available only at the new quarters prepared for them. He planned to screen and segregate the nonpatients first as they moved to the new compounds and then take care of the sick. Although he had two battalions of infantry in positions around the three compounds, only Compound 3 made any attempt to negotiate conditions under which they would be screened and moved. Bostic refused to treat with the leaders of Compound 3; the other compounds simply remained indifferent to his order.[76]

After a deceptively quiet night, the prisoners became restive. Signs were painted, flags waved, demonstrations mounted, and patriotic songs sung as feelings ran high. Infantrymen of the 15th Regiment surrounded the com-

[72] See: (1) Rpt of Board of Officers, 12–15 May 52; (2) Memo, Van Fleet for CINCFE, 16 May 52, sub: Proceedings of Board of Officers. Both in FEC Gen Admin Files, Proceedings of Board of Officers.

[73] Ltr, Clark to TAG, 20 May 52, sub: Proceedings of Board of Officers, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File.

[74] (1) Msg, JCS 908789, JCS to CINCFE, 15 May 52. (2) Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 46.

[75] Msg, DA 909857, CofS to CINCFE, 27 May 52.

[76] Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp. 56–57.



GENERAL BOATNER

pounds with fixed bayonets and a couple of tanks were wheeled into positions, but no attempt was made to start the screening.[77]

Despite complaints from the prisoners, they made no effort to comply with Bostic's instructions. Compound 3 set up sandbags during the night of 12 May but no further violence occurred. On the next day, loudspeakers started to hammer home the UNC orders over and over again, yet the prisoners laughed at offers of hot food and cigarettes available to them in the new compounds.[78]

A few stray shots were fired on the 14th and the prisoners hurled rocks at the guards, but the deadlock continued. To break the impasse, Van Fleet permitted several ICRC representatives to interview the prisoners. Compound 1 requested the first conference with the Red Cross men and then the other compounds followed suit. The prisoners became quieter after the ICRC talks, but they were not ready to obey Bostic's orders. On 15 May Yount won Van Fleet's approval to put the emphasis on control rather than screening, with the prisoners not screened to remain unrostered until a settlement was reached at Panmunjom. Armed with this authority and with ICRC help, Bostic reached an agreement with the leaders of Compound 1 on 17 May. There was no screening and the prisoners moved without incident to their new compound.[79]

Hope that the other two compounds would follow the example of Compound 1 proved forlorn. On 19 May, Van Fleet approved the use of force to clear the recalcitrant compounds. After a brief announcement the following morning warning the prisoners that this was their last chance to obey, infantry teams entered Compound 3 and advanced against mounting resistance. Armed with stones, flails, sharpened tent poles, steel pipes, and knives, the defiant prisoners screamed insults and challenges. The infantry maintained excellent discipline, using tear gas and concussion grenades to break up the prisoners' opposition. Herding the prisoners into a corner, the U.N. troops forced them into their new compound. Only one prisoner was killed and twenty-nine were wounded as

[77] Teleconv, Bostic and Yount, 12 May 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May–15 May 52, Tab 172.

[78] Teleconvs, Bostic and Murray, SGS; Bostic and Col Morton P. Brooks, 2d Logistical Comd, Bostic and Murray; 13 May 52. All in 2d Logistical Comd, Telecon File, vol. I, 7 May–15 May 52, tabs 179, 181, 191.

[79] Ltr, Craig to CO 93d Mil Police Bn, 17 May 52, sub: Segregation of Personnel, in 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, vol. II, May 52, tab 2.

against one U.S. injury. The example of Compound 3 evidently was borne home to Compound 2, for on 21 May they put up no resistance as the infantrymen moved them into new quarters without casualties to either side.[80]

Whether the prisoners were screened or not became secondary after the Dodd incident. Van Fleet was most anxious to regain control over all the compounds and he had his staff examine the situation carefully in mid-May. They submitted three alternatives on 16 May: 1. Remove all prisoners from Korea; 2. Disperse the prisoners within Korea; and 3. Combine 1 and 2 by removing some prisoners and dispersing the rest. If all of the POW's were transferred out of the country, the Eighth Army commander would be free to concentrate on his primary mission and be relieved of a rear area security problem. Under the third alternative, at least some of the prisoners would be shifted and the Eighth Army responsibility lessened. Van Fleet preferred the first, but found the third more desirable than the retention of all of the prisoners in Korea. Dispersal within Korea would ensure better control, to be sure, but it would entail more logistic support and more administrative and security personnel. But Clark did not accept the movement of any of the prisoners out of Korea and he instructed Van Fleet to go ahead with his dispersal plan as quickly as possible. He was willing to send the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team to Van Fleet to aid in the operation. Additional tank support would have to be supplied by Eighth Army if it were required.[81]

Besides the reinforcement of the Koje-do forces, Van Fleet intended to construct barricades and roadblocks at strategic points until he was prepared to deconcentrate the prisoners. The new enclosures would be located on Koje-do, Cheju-do, and on the mainland and he estimated that twenty-two enclosures, each holding 4,000 prisoners and at least one-half mile apart, would be sufficient. Compounds would be limited to 500 men apiece with double fencing and concertina wire between compounds. When the new camps were finished, Van Fleet was going to try to use the prisoners' representatives to induce them to move voluntarily. But if resistance developed, as he expected it would, food and water would be withheld and the prisoners would receive these only at the new compounds. As a last resort, he would employ force. Both Clark and his superiors agreed that although the plan might incur unfavorable publicity and had to be handled carefully, the Communist control on Koje-do had to be broken.[82]

Van Fleet accepted the recommendations that ICRC assistance be utilized as much as possible and that other UNC contingents be added to the forces on Koje-do. He had the Netherlands Battalion already on the island and he would send a U.K. company, a Canadian Company, and a Greek company to provide

[80] (1) Memo for Rcd, by Col Craig, 21 May 52, sub: Opns at No. 10, in 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, vol. II, May 52. (2) Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp. 60–61.

[81] (1) Msg, C 68728, Clark to CG Eighth Army, 20 May 52, in FEC Prisoners of War. (2) Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp. 62–64.

[82] (1) Msg, CX 68852, Clark to JCS, 17 May 52, DA–IN 140107. (2) Msg, JCS 909231, JCS to CINCFE, 20 May 52.




A Few of the Weapons Seized in Compound 76

a U.N. flavor. As for the press, normal coverage facilities would be provided.[83]

To supervise the difficult task of moving the prisoners, Van Fleet appointed Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner, assistant division commander of the 2d Division, as the new commander of Koje-do.[84] Using infantrymen as well as engineers, Boatner pushed the construction of the smaller, stronger enclosures by working his troops in two twelve-hour shifts. He also moved over 6,000 civilians away from the camp and off the island.[85]

By early June Boatner was prepared to test his plan for securing control of the Communist compounds. Despite repeated orders to remove the Communist flags that were being boldly flown in Compounds 85, 96, and 60, the prisoners ignored Boatner's commands. On 4 June, infantrymen from the 38th Regiment supported by two tanks moved quickly into Compound 85. While the tanks smashed down the flagpoles, the troops tore down signs, burnt the Communist banners, and rescued ten bound prisoners. Half an hour later they repeated their success at Compound 96 and brought out seventy-five prisoners who wished to be freed of Communist domination. The only enemy flags still aloft were in Compound 60 and the infantry did not need the tanks for this job. Using tear gas, they went in and chopped down the poles. Not a single casualty was suffered by either side during these quick strikes.[86] Although the prisoners restored the flagpoles the following day, the experience gained in the exercise seemed helpful.

Satisfied by this test run, Boatner decided to tackle the big task next. On the morning of 10 June, he ordered Col. Lee Hak Koo to assemble the prisoners of Compound 76 in groups of 150 in the center of the compound and to be prepared to move them out. Instead the prisoners brought forth their knives, spears, and tent poles and took their positions in trenches, ready to resist. Crack paratroopers of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team wasted little time as they advanced without firing a shot. Employing concussion grenades, tear gas, bayonets, and fists, they drove or dragged the prisoners out of the trenches. As a half-dozen Patton tanks rolled in and trained their guns on the last 300 prisoners still fighting, resistance collapsed. Colonel Lee was captured and dragged by the seat of his pants out of the compound. The other prisoners were hustled into trucks, transported to the new compounds, fingerprinted, and given new clothing. During the two-and-a-half-hour battle, 31 prisoners were killed, many by the Communists themselves, and 139 were wounded. One U.S. soldier was speared to death and 14 were injured.[87] After Compound 76 had been cleared, a tally of weapons showed 3,000 spears, 4,500 knives, 1,000 gasoline grenades, plus an undetermined number of clubs, hatchets, barbed wire flails, and hammers. These weapons had been fash-

[83] Msg, G 6001 TAC, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 21 May 52, in FEC Prisoners of War.

[84] Msg, G 5849 TAC, Van Fleet to Clark, 13 May 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Gen Clark's File.

[85] Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 66.

[86] Teleconf, Lt Hall and Maj John E. Murray, 4 Jun 52, in 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, tab 1.

[87] Hq 2d Logistical Comd, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, vol. I, tab 5.




CROSS WHERE MURDERED POW'S WERE FOUND IN A DITCH. *Two more crosses mark similar burying places.*

ioned out of scrap materials and metal-tipped tent poles by the prisoners.[88]

The aftermath proved how quickly the lesson was learned. After leaders of Compounds 78 and 77 had witnessed the fight, they swiftly agreed to move wherever Boatner wanted them to. In Compound 77 the bodies of sixteen murdered men were found. The show of force was effective in eliminating the core of Communist defiance and paved the way for the relatively uneventful transfer of the other compounds on Koje-do to their new stockades during the rest of June.

With the dispersal plan successfully completed, Clark decided to remove the POW problem from Eighth Army jurisdiction. On 10 July the Korean Communications Zone was established under the Far East Command and took over responsibility for rear area activities from the Eighth Army.[89] One of the lessons that had to be relearned during the Koje-do affair was that an army commander should not be burdened with the administration of his communications zone,

[88] UNC Rpt No. 47, 1–15 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 76.

[89] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52.



ONE OF THE NEW COMPOUNDS ON KOJE-DO, *showing the double rows of barbed wire surrounding each enclosure. An evacuated village in the background is being burned to prevent the exchange of information between prisoners and villagers.*

since the distraction could not fail to detract from his efficiency in carrying out his primary mission—to fight the enemy.

There were other lessons that were brought home during this period. In most cases, after a prisoner was captured, he might attempt to escape and this was about as far as he would go. With the Communists a new element of experience was added. The Communist prisoner's service did not end with his capture but frequently became more important. In the prison camp his responsibilities shifted from the military to politico-military duties. Easy to organize and well-disciplined, the loyal Communist prisoners required strict control or they would exploit their position for propaganda purposes. Death or injury was readily accepted if the ends were worthwhile and soft treatment merely made them more insolent and disobedient. Only force and strength were respected, for these they recognized and understood. As for the administration of the Communist prison camps, the necessity for high quality personnel at all levels was plain. Unless the leadership and security forces were well briefed politically and alert, the Communist

would miss no opportunity to cause trouble. At Koje-do the lack of information of what was going on inside the compounds pointed up another deficiency. Trained counterintelligence agents had to be planted inside to keep the camp commander advised on the plans and activities of the prisoners and to prevent surprises like the Dodd capture from happening.

In assessing the effects of the Koje-do incidents, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that they seriously weakened the international support that the UNC Command had been getting on its screening program and on voluntary repatriation. In Great Britain, questions were raised in Parliament implying that the screening in April had been improperly or ineffectively carried out. Japanese press opinion reflected a growing suspicion that the U.S authorities had lost control of the screening process and permitted ROK pressure to be exerted directly or indirectly against repatriation. As General Jenkins, Army G–3, pointed out to General Collins early in June: "The cumulative effect of sentiment such as that reflected above may tend to obscure the UNC principle of no forcible repatriation, and appear to make the armistice hinge on the questionable results of a discredited screening operation." [90]

The presence of International Committee of the Red Cross representatives during the clean-up activities at Pusan and Koje-do did little to enhance the reputation of the UNC prisoner of war policies. Although the ICRC could offer little constructive advice on how the UNC could regain control and admitted that the prisoners were committing many illegal acts, they protested vigorously against the tactics of the UNC. Violence, withholding food and water—even if these were available elsewhere—and the use of force on hospital patients were heavily scored and the reports that the ICRC submitted to Geneva were bound to evoke an unfavorable reaction in many quarters.[91]

Despite the fact that focus shifted from Koje-do as the dispersal program brought the Communist prisoners under tighter controls, the mushroom cloud of doubt and suspicion that hovered over the Koje-do episode could not help but make the task of the UNC delegates at Panmunjom more complex.

[90] Memo, DA 145230, Jenkins for CofS, 3 Jun 52, sub: International Concern over UNC Prisoners Screening Opns, in G–3 091 Korea, 8/33.

[91] Msg, CX 69236, Clark to JCS, 28 May 52, DA–IN 144163. This forwarded a letter from Dr. Otto Lehner of the ICRC to Clark.

# CHAPTER XII

# Summer of Frustration

At the outset Admiral Joy and his fellow delegates paid little attention to the kidnapping of General Dodd. They were preoccupied with the difficult task of convincing the Communists that the package proposal of 28 April was a firm and final offer and not just an interim UNC position. Moreover, there were no indications at the start that the abduction represented more than another incident in the prisoner of war camps. Not until the contents of the Colson letter were revealed did the full impact of the Communist coup affect them.

For the enemy the riots at Koje-do and the Colson letter provided a custom-made weapon to discredit the basic stand of the United Nations Command on the only issue that remained—repatriation. The Communists eagerly seized the opportunity to weaken the UNC position in the eyes of the world and in the process to strengthen their own case of the repatriation of all prisoners of war.

### *Aftermath of the Package Proposal*

The relentless attack on the UNC concept of no forced repatriation was scarcely interrupted by the presentation of the package proposal. Actually there had been little hope that the Communists would concede on two issues while the U.N. Command gave in on only one, so that the enemy's rejection had not been unexpected. The net result of the proposal was to eliminate the question of the rehabilitation of airfields and the USSR as a member of the supervisory commission as issues and to focus the spotlight of attention unswervingly upon the disposition of prisoners.

Although the prospects of enemy acceptance of the UNC proposal were remote, General Ridgway felt that they could be materially improved by resolute backing of his position at the highest level in the United States and among the other United Nations participating in Korea. He recommended a strong statement that would bluntly inform the Communists that this was the final offer.[1] But neither the military services, the State Department, nor the United States' allies wished to go so far. They were perfectly willing to issue communiques demonstrating their support of the UNC stand and implying that this was the last and best offer, but not to put it so baldly that it could be interpreted as an ultimatum. If a break in the negotiations were to occur, they still desired to let the Communists bear the onus.[2]

The President, however, did not want

[1] (1) Msg, CX 67235, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Apr 52, DA-IN 129944. (2) Msg, C 67655, Ridgway to JCS, 28 Apr 52, DA-IN 132680.

[2] Msg, JCS 907676, JCS to CINCFE, 30 Apr 52.

to prevent Joy from using the terms "final" and irrevocable" in the statements on the package deal, but his own official statement on 7 May reflected a more moderate approach. It contained no flat assertion that this was the end of bargaining and left the door open to future maneuvering.[3]

With the Communist delegation holding firm on their counterproposal for the exchange of the 12,000 prisoners of war in their custody for the 132,000 held by the U.N. Command, both Ridgway and Joy became convinced that there no longer existed any reason for meeting in executive session. On 6 May Joy told General Nam that the UNC desired to return to open meetings and the Communists give their consent.[4]

The reversion to open sessions the following day had no effect upon the proceedings. The Communists would have nothing to do with the UNC's offer to permit rescreening of all the nonrepatriates by Red Cross or neutral agencies, and charged the UNC with intent to prevent 100,000 prisoners from returning home.[5]

At this juncture the Dodd incident and the Colson letter supplied the enemy with fresh ammunition for its assault on the UNC screening procedure. On 16 May, Nam launched the following broadside:

> As long as your side does not change this peremptory attitude and give up your unreasonable proposal, our side will continue to expose at these conferences the absurdity of your proposal. Since you are insisting upon your absurd proposition, you will not be able to escape the inevitable consequences of your such [sic] insistence. The so-called screening is totally absurd and impermissible. The so-called result of your so-called screening is doubly absurd and wholly concocted by your side. The commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp has already declared to the whole world the utter bankruptcy of your proposition.[6]

Four days later he lodged this accusation with the UNC delegates:

> The unshakable fact is that our captured personnel would rather die than yield to your design of retaining them as your cannon fodder. The unshakable fact is that public confessions of the commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp have killed and buried the myth that our captured personnel refused to be repatriated. In spite of all your threats and violence, our captured personnel rose in heroic and just resistance against your forced screening. The commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp could not but confess before the whole world your inhuman treatment and murderous violence against our captured personnel, and the criminal and unlawful acts committed by your side in screening and re-arming war prisoners by force.[7]

These samples of the continuous attack sustained by the Communists during May were difficult to refute and, internationally, the damage to the UNC position on repatriation and screening

[3] (Msg, JCS 907937, JCS to CINCFE, 2 May 52. (2) Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. II, pp. 460–61.

[4] (1) Msg, HNC 1211, Joy to CINCUNC, 2 May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, CinC and CofS sec., incl 30. (2) Msg, C 67976, Ridgway to CINCUNC (Adv), 4 May 52, in same place, incl 31. (3) Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-ninth Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 6 May 52, in FEC Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs on Mil Armistice, 28 Apr–3 Jun 52, vol. 41 (hereafter cited as FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.

[5] Transcript of Proceedings, Fifteenth Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 7 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.

[6] *Ibid.*, Fifty-ninth Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 16 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.

[7] *Ibid.*, Sixty-third Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 20 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.

was considerable. Although the situation on Koje-do provided the bulk of the grist for the Communist mill, the enemy produced a steady stream of additional charges. On 11 May, Nam stated, UNC planes bombed a Communist prisoner of war camp and injured a number of UNC personnel. The next day, Nam informed Joy, supply trucks en route to Panmunjom were strafed, and on 14 May parachute flares were dropped on the neutral conference area and strafing carried out.[8] While the UNC representatives denied responsibility for some of these accusations, there were enough infractions to place the UNC delegation constantly on the defensive.

In the midst of the Communist barrage, Admiral Joy's tour as chief spokesman at Panmunjom came to an end. In his farewell speech on 22 May, Joy managed to strike back at the enemy. Recalling that on 10 July 1951 he had stressed that "the success or failure of the negotiations begun here today depends directly upon the good faith of the delegations present," he pointed out that that hope had proved to be forlorn. The Communists had caviled over procedural matters, manufactured spurious issues, denied agreements, and indulged in abuse and invective. when all else failed, the admiral charged. Comparing the records of the two sides, he noted that "they are as different as night and day. No amount of propaganda, however oft repeated, can hide your ignoble record." Joy urged the acceptance of the package proposal, then concluded: "After ten months and 12 days I feel there is nothing more for me to do. There is nothing left to negotiate. I now turn over the unenviable job of further dealings with you to Major General William K. Harrison, who succeeds me as Senior Delegate of the United Nations Command Delegation. May God be with him." [9]

Joy had done well in a difficult situation. Despite frequent harassment he had restrained himself and maintained the dignity of his office under trying circumstances. Yet whenever weak points in the Communist arguments had appeared, he had hit hard. During the ten months that he had led the delegation, all of the issues under discussion had been settled with the exception of repatriation of prisoners. And even on this thorny problem, the debate was over. One side or the other would have to give in before an armistice agreement could be reached. As Joy left the Far East, he could contemplate his accomplishments with some satisfaction. The deadlock on repatriation was not his responsibility and all other matters had been successfully negotiated. In many instances he had attained more than expected and if, in some cases, the United States also had had to surrender more than it had bargained for, this was a normal part of negotiating and certainly no vital objectives had been given up.

There was little doubt that Joy had often grown restive at the caution exercised by his superiors in their dealings with the Communists and wished to adopt a firmer position. Yet despite his personal conviction that continued haggling with the enemy would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and

[8] *Ibid.*, Fifty-eighth Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 15 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.

[9] *Ibid.*, Sixty-fifth Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 22 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.

indecision by the Communists, he had suppressed his own feelings and carried on the negotiations with patience and forbearance.

The composition of the UNC delegation underwent several other changes during the latter part of May. As General Harrison moved up to assume the duties of chief delegate, Brig. Gen. Frank C. McConnell took over his position as Army representative.[10] On 28 May, Brig. Gen. Lee Han Lim replaced Maj. Gen. Yu Chae Heung as ROK Army delegate. The replacements in both instances were of lower rank than their predecessors, possibly because there remained little to be done and major generals could be better utilized elsewhere. At any rate, the rotation of personnel had little effect upon the UNC policies and attitudes in the truce tents.

### *Variations on a Theme*

While the Communist delegates probed for weak spots in the UNC defenses, the internal conflict over a stiffer approach to the enemy continued. General Harrison staunchly supported Joy's pleas for avoiding any signs of weakness. In their opinion daily sessions with the enemy could only lead the Communists to believe that the UNC was still ready to bargain. Actually both Joy and Harrison would have preferred an immediate indefinite suspension of the negotiations until the Communists indicated that they were prepared to accept the UNC proposals.[11]

General Clark soon came to agree with his negotiators at Panmunjom. He granted the argument that regular meetings with the enemy did provide the UNC with ample opportunity to remind the Communists and, of course, the rest of the world of the fairness of its 28 April proposal. Obversely, however, he pointed out, they also afforded the enemy an excellent means of exploiting the deterioration of the UNC position after the Koje-do incident. The Communist attack was constantly being refueled by fresh charges and thus was more dramatic and newsworthy. Constant repetition of the UNC formula —no matter how attractive the original concept might be—had only resulted in diminishing returns in press coverage and had allowed the enemy to retain the initiative.[12]

To counter the present Communist advantage and convince the enemy that the U.N. Command would not alter its stand, Clark suggested at the end of May several possibilities that might be adopted as alternatives to indefinite suspension of the truce talks. These included: turning over the problem of rescreening to the liaison officers; one week recesses; delaying tactics by postponing meetings shortly before they were scheduled to convene; and launching a strong propaganda counterattack against

[10] General McConnell had spent a great part of his career in organizing and training troops. During World War II he had devoted himself to the preparation of antiaircraft units for combat and after the war he assisted in training Philippine ground forces.

[11] (1) Msg, HNC 1236, Joy to CINCUNC, 12 May 52, in UNC/FEC Comd Rpt, May 52, CinC and CofS sec., incl 35. (2) Msg, HNC 1277, Harrison to CINCUNC, 30 May 52, in same place, incl 50.

[12] (1) Msg, JCS 908988, JCS to CINCFE, 16 May 52. (2) Msg, C 69351, Clark to JCS, 31 May 52, DA-IN 145230.

the enemy. But Clark did not recommend them. Instead he felt that the UNC should meet as infrequently as possible with the Communists until it had completed its final rosters of all those who were willing to return to the control of the enemy. When the lists were ready, the new firm figures should be presented and if the Communists did not accept them, the UNC would recess unilaterally until they did.[13]

The use of the expanded repatriation lists led to another point of debate during May between U.S. leaders in Washington and the U.N. Command. As rescreening proceeded during late April and early May, it became apparent that not 70,000 but over 80,000 prisoners and civilian internees wished to be sent back. The obvious disadvantage in revealing the increase to the enemy immediately lay in the fact that the Communists would probably assume that this was another interim figure and adopt a policy of delay anticipating further augmentation of the repatriate totals. On the other hand, knowledge of a 2-percent boost might well spur Communist acceptance of the UNC offer. Admiral Joy and General Harrison wanted to submit the revised estimate to the enemy through the liaison officers, but their superiors were less inclined to act in haste. They pointed out that since many of the prisoners included in the new figures were members of compounds that were completely unscreened because of the threat of violence, a considerable number might refuse to be repatriated at the time of exchange and the Communist would deem this a breach of faith.[14]

After the Koje-do affair, the Washington leaders felt even more strongly about informing the enemy of the 80,000-plus figure. In their opinion, it could only strengthen the Communist allegation that the initial screening had been conducted improperly and had no validity. This, in turn, could weaken the support that the United States was receiving from its allies and the neutral nations.[15]

The refusal of the Washington leaders to release the new figure limited the UNC negotiators to a defense of the 28 April proposal. On 23 May—the second day of Harrison's assumption of the role of chief delegate—the Communists presented him with an opportunity to call a three-day recess to the talks. Despite the expressed Washington desire that daily sessions be held as long as the Communists wished them, Harrison postponed the next meeting until 27 May. This contrary action brought a query from the U.S. leaders, but Clark held it was per-

[13] Msg, C 69351, Clark to JCS, 31 May 52, DA-IN 145230.

[14] (1) Msg, HNC 1214, Joy to CINCUNC, 5 May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, CinC and CofS sec., incl 38. (2) Msg, CX 67989, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 5 May 52, in same place, incl 39.

[15] Msg, JCS 909104, JCS to CINCFE, 18 May 52. Eighth Army tallies as of 16 May had produced the following results on those to be repatriated:

| Category | Screened | Unscreened (Koje-do) |
|---|---|---|
| Total | 39,485 | 43,803 |
| North Korean | 26,161 | 37,624 |
| South Korean | 4,287 | 64 |
| Chinese | 5,236 | — |
| Civilian internees | 3,801 | 6,115 |

In addition there were 3,500 unscreened personnel at Pusan. See Msg, CX 68567, Clark to JCS, 16 May 52, DA-IN 139602.

fectly proper under the circumstances since the enemy had agreed to the recess. Technically, the U.N. Command had a point and soon won permission to ask for additional recesses on this basis in the future provided that none was longer than four days.[16]

Although the approach of the Washington political and military chiefs to the Communists might have seemed overcautious or perhaps oversolicitous under other conditions, there were several factors on the international scene that strongly influenced their actions during the hectic month of May 1952. As they informed Clark in early June, the strong support that the UNC had won for the principle of nonforcible repatriation had been undermined by the incidents on Koje-do. Many of the United States' principal allies were urging that some type of rescreening take place now rather than prior to the armistice. If the United States invoked a unilateral indefinite suspension of the talks at this juncture, the Soviet Union might take advantage of the opportunity and bring the matter before the U.N. Security Council. In the opinion of the Washington chiefs, the question of the number of prisoners to be returned appeared to be all-important. They felt that a total of 100,000, if it included all of the Chinese, might be acceptable to the Communists, but a figure in the eighty thousands would only cast further doubts on the original screening process.

To restore confidence in the UNC's position, they suggested a step that might alleviate the situation. A group of countries not participating in the conflict might be requested to send representatives to interrogate the nonrepatriates prior to the armistice. This could be accomplished with Communist observers on hand and with both sides agreeing to abide by the results. If the enemy refused to participate, the U.N. Command could proceed unilaterally and present the corrected figures to the Communists. If they did not accept these, the UNC would recess indefinitely.[17]

On the same day—6 June—that the Washington leaders forwarded this explanation of the difficulties facing them at home and their suggestions for possible solution of the impasse, they also informed Clark that they were going to inaugurate an intensified campaign to counteract the increased flow of Communist propaganda. The enemy was engaged in a world-wide "Hate America" attack, they maintained, using biological warfare and prisoner of war charges as the chief ingredients. If Clark agreed, they were prepared to set up an Interdepartmental Watch Committee with representatives of Defense, State, and Central Intelligence Agency to work on quick exchange of information and the development of countermeasures to the enemy's sowing of doubt and suspicion.[18]

General Clark was quite willing to have the committee established, but he felt that the strongest weapon that the U.N. Command could employ against the enemy was truth. The removal of the "shroud of secrecy" from all matters, save those vital to military security, and the prompt release of full and factual information to the press would be the best method to insure domestic and

[16] (1) Msg, CX 68975, Clark to DA, 23 May 52, DA-IN 142347. (2) Msg, JCS 909747, JCS to CINCFE, 26 May 52.

[17] Msg, JCS 910484, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Jun 52.

[18] Msg, JCS 910473, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Jun 52.

world support in the long run, he believed. He pointed out that although many of the stories emanating from Koje-do had not reflected credit on the UNC, the situation was improving and the freedom accorded to the press was producing increasingly favorable results.[19]

The Communist propaganda campaign produced one side effect that the enemy probably did not anticipate. While there appeared to be a chance that an armistice might be concluded during March and April, Ridgway had decided to hold all civilian internees until a final settlement was reached. He did not wish to endanger a quick agreement by releasing prematurely the civilian internees desiring to remain in the Republic of Korea. But as the prospects for agreement receded in May, the reasons for delaying action on the civilian internees became less important. The primary deterrent to immediate release—the adverse effect upon the negotiations—was no longer considered valid in view of the depressed state of affairs at Panmunjom.

As Harrison informed Clark in early June, the Communists had already accorded the civilian internees special status when they accepted the prisoner lists of 18 December. He felt there was little risk that the enemy would break off the negotiations over the freeing of these people nor would the Communists retaliate by holding on to UNC prisoners since this would violate the principle they had been defending so staunchly. Doubtlessly, Harrison continued, the Communist propaganda machine would attempt to make full use of this unilateral action as delaying or preventing an armistice, but at this stage the propaganda was being issued at such a rapid rate that a little more or less would make no difference. Clark, in informing the JCS of his intention to make the release, agreed with Harrison's analysis and went on to add that the continued detention of the internees had been a constant source of irritation to Rhee and the ROK people. He did not think that letting the internees go free would have any impact upon the internal crisis in the ROK Government at this time and it would materially reduce the logistical burden imposed upon the Far East Command and result in a savings of vitally needed administrative personnel.[20]

With the Army supporting Clark's argument, the JCS, the State Department, and the President consented on 10 June to the release of the civilian internees.[21] Two days later Clark forwarded his schedule and his plans to co-ordinate the discharge of some 27,000 internees with the ROK Government. The rate of release, he noted, would depend upon the ability of the Republic of Korea to receive the internees, but a minimum of sixty days would be necessary to do the job in an orderly fashion. Responsibility would rest with the 2d Logistical Command for drawing up lists and providing transport and subsistence en route with the UNC Civil Assistance Command furnishing liaison with the ROK Government, insuring that no interference with military operations re-

[19] Msg, C 69888, Clark to JCS, 9 Jun 52, DA-IN 148276.

[20] Msg, CX 69687, Clark to JCS, 5 Jun 52, DA-IN 146933. For the ROK internal crisis, see Chapter XIV, below.

[21] (1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 6 Jun 52, sub: Proposal by CINCFE to Release Civilian Internees, in G-3 383.6, 24. (2) Msg, JCS 910811, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jun 52.

sulted, issuing thirty-day rations to each internee as he was freed, and assisting the ROK Government in the task of distributing the civilians to their areas of residence. Clark thought that the unscreened internees should and could be screened before the 27,000 were discharged lest the release influence the choice of those left unscreened. On 13 June the Clark plan was approved.[22]

Screening the recalcitrant civilian internees was but one aspect of the problem facing Clark during June. On Koje-do General Boatner was still engaged in wresting control of several of the compounds from the enemy prisoners. Clark wanted this task to be completed as quickly as possible and the remainder of the unscreened prisoners of war to be polled. Once this was finished, the U.N. Command would be in possession of more accurate figures on the number of repatriates. If the United States desired eventually to have the nonrepatriates rescreened by neutral nations before the armistice, Clark declared, the job would be much simpler since all the hard-core Communists would be in the repatriate compounds and would not have to be rescreened.[23]

The U.S. leaders agreed and Clark informed them of the Eighth Army plan for concluding the segregation of prisoners. In general, the procedure paralleled that followed in April. Prisoners would be rostered and fingerprinted first, then taken to the interview tent. If a prisoner refused to answer the questions or indicated he would not resist repatriation violently, he was placed on the list to be repatriated and assigned to a repatriate compound.[24]

By the end of June the last compound had been screened and a new total of slightly over 83,000 repatriates segregated.[25] The question of whether to disclose the revised figures to the enemy immediately came under discussion again. General Bradley evidently felt as Clark and Harrison did on the subject. The danger that the Communists would learn of the corrected total through a leak or via their quite competent intelligence system argued for a quick presentation of the figures at Panmunjom, but the Department of the Army was still reluctant. The possibility of further discrediting of the original screening process at this time and the lack of decision over a later rescreening by neutral nations prompted G–3 to urge that the U.N. Command confirm the 83,000 figure only in the event that it were discovered by the Communists.[26]

On 3 July the Washington leaders effected a compromise between the two positions. Clark was authorized to

[22] (1) Msg, CX 50051, Clark to JCS, 12 Jun 52, DA–IN 149495. (2) Msg, JCS 911250, JCS to CINCUNC, 13 Jun 52.

[23] Msg, CX 50050, Clark to JCS, 12 Jun 52, DA–IN 149501.

[24] Msg, CX 50636, CINCUNC to JCS, 22 Jun 52, DA–IN 153229.

[25] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, p. 69. The complete breakdown was as follows:

| Category | Total | Repatriates | Nonrepatriates |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total | 169,938 | 83,071 | 86,867 |
| North Koreans | 96,542 | 62,169 | 34,373 |
| Chinese | 20,800 | 6,388 | 14,412 |
| South Koreans | 16,304 | 4,560 | 11,744 |
| Civilian internees | 36,292 | 9,954 | 26,338 |

[26] (1) Msg, CX 51050, CINCUNC to JCS, 28 Jun 52, DA–IN 155625. (2) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 30 Jun and 1 Jul 52, sub: Proposal to Submit to the Communists a New Final Figure . . . , in G–3 091 Korea, 8/37.



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divulge the revised numbers to the enemy, but only if the Communists insisted upon discussing them.[27]

In the meantime, Clark and his staff completed their preparations for the return of the internees to civilian life. On 23 June Harrison quietly announced at Panmunjom that the UNC intended to release 27,000 internees in the near future. As expected, the Communists bitterly protested this action as unilateral and designed to delay the fashioning of an armistice. But Harrison made no effort to explain or defend his statement. As far as the UNC was concerned, he told Nam, this was an internal matter and passed on to the enemy as a point of information and not as a subject for debate.[28] One week later the first group of 1,800 internees were moved from Yongch'on to their homes throughout South Korea and by mid-July about 10,000 had been set free.[29]

On the whole, June was an uneventful month at Panmunjom. Harrison resorted several times to three-day recesses despite Nam Il's remonstrations but there was little change in the course of

[27] Msg, JCS 912791, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 52.

[28] Transcript of Proceedings, Eighty-eighth Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 23 Jun 52, in FEC Main Delegate's Mtgs, vol. V, 4 Jun–23 Jul 52.

[29] Msg, G 74961, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 2 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS sec., Supporting Docs, tab 63.

negotiations.[30] The recess from 8 to 10 June drew a letter of protest from Kim and Peng and a brief, firm response from Clark affirming the right of either side to request recesses in the event there were no new proposals to discuss. Whether the enemy was worried and feared that the U.N. Command might be preparing to break off relations, as Clark and Harrison asserted, or simply did not want to lose the daily forum for its complaints and charges, was difficult to assess, but in either case the recess could do little harm to the UNC cause.[31]

There were two changes in the composition of the UNC delegation in late June and early July. On 22 June fiery, capable Admiral Libby attended his last meeting at Panmunjom and was replaced the following day by Rear Adm. John C. Daniel.[32] At the beginning of July another veteran member of the team finished his service as a negotiator. General Turner, who had so often clashed with Hsieh Fang on airfields and other Item 3 matters, was rotated and replaced by Brig. Gen. Joseph T. Morris, USAF.[33] With the departure of Turner, Harrison became senior in length of service on the delegation as well as chief delegate.

The lack of progress and prospects at Panmunjom was reflected in a plan that Harrison presented at the end of June to Clark. He recommended that the revised figures be given to the Communists. If they refused to accept a settlement on the basis of these totals, then an attempt to secure rescreening by neutral nations should be carried out. Were the enemy still reluctant to conclude an armistice after rescreening was finished and firm and final figures furnished, then the U.N. Command would simply release and parole all prisoners except those desiring repatriation. The negotiations would remain at recess until the Communists conceded the *fait accompli* and signed an armistice.[34] The resuscitation of the concept of unilateral release of nonrepatriates met with little encouragement from Harrison's superiors but the possibilities were intriguing. Although the Communists would have protested vociferously, it might well have permitted them to save face and eventually to give in more gracefully on repatriation.

As July began there was a brief flurry of excitement at Panmunjom. Both sides had agreed on every article of the draft armistice except Article 51. At the meeting on 1 July Harrison discussed this article and urged the enemy to accept it as written: "All prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be released and repatriated as soon as possible. The release and repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be effected in conformity with lists which have been exchanged and have been checked by the respective sides prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement." The interest of the Com-

[30] The meetings recessed from 8 to 10 June, from 18 to 20 June, and from 28 to 30 June.

[31] (1) Msg, CX 69901, Clark to JCS, 10 Jun 52, DA-IN 148567. (2) Msg, JCS 910892, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jun 52.

[32] Admiral Daniel had seen extensive service as a destroyer commander during World War II and had organized and commanded the Navy's first underwater demolition team for the Sicily invasion of 1943.

[33] General Morris was an engineer who had commanded the VIII and later the XII Air Force Service Commands during World War II and more recently had served as commanding general of the Spokane Air Depot.

[34] Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 52–Jul 53), vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 54–55.

munist delegation was immediately stirred, for they evidently considered that the U.N. Command, in bringing this matter up, was about to alter its basic position. Harrison, on the other hand, became very optimistic that the more conciliatory attitude evidenced by Nam Il meant that the enemy really wanted an armistice. Since the enemy desired more than 100,000 repatriated, Harrison proposed to juggle the figures and permit the Communists to save face. 83,000 would be repatriated directly, 26,000 internees were then being released, and there were 11,000 South Koreans that would be released. This would give a total of 121,000, but only 83,000 actual repatriations to the Communists need be made.[35]

Neither Clark nor his superiors in Washington shared Harrison's feeling that the Communists were ready to change their stand and advised him to secure further elaboration from the enemy delegation. As the Washington leaders noted, there was as yet no solution to the question of the disposition of the Chinese prisoners and this was basic to any final agreement.[36]

One effect of the discussion of Article 51 was immediately noticeable; the propaganda attack on the UNC faded to a whisper. On 3 July the Communists asked for executive sessions the next day so that the article could be thoroughly considered and the UNC consented. But the inception of the closed meetings soon revealed how far apart the two delegations were on Article 51. Both agreed to the article as it was written, but the interpretations accorded were widely divergent. The phrase "held in custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective" was the crux of the matter. The U.N. Command contemplated changing the nomenclature or categories of the prisoners who did not desire repatriation and removing them from prisoner status prior to the effective date of the armistice. To the Communists, the phrase included all prisoners on the 18 December lists. They were willing to except the prisoners living below the 38th Parallel, but all others must be returned. As soon as they discovered that the UNC envisioned submitting new lists based upon the screening results, the Communists quickly became disenchanted. Nam told Harrison frankly on 6 July that if the UNC could come up with a figure approximating 110,000 and including all the Chinese prisoners, an armistice could easily be concluded.[37]


Although the sparring continued for several days, neither side gave ground. The Communists were waiting for a UNC concession and had no interest in juggling figures—they wanted 110,000 bodies returned to them.[38] After another week of stalemate, Clark and Harrison concluded that presentation of the 83,000 figure offered the only hope to break the

[35] (1) Transcript of Proceedings, Ninety-third Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 1 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. V, 4 Jun–23 Jul 52. (2) Msg, HNC 1364, Harrison to CINCUNC, 3 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS sec., Supporting Docs, tab 32.

[36] (1) Msg, C 51299, Clark to CINCUNC (Adv), 3 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS sec., Supporting Docs, tab 33. (2) Msg, JCS 912791, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 52.

[37] Transcripts of Proceedings, Ninety-fourth through Ninety-seventh Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 3–6 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. V, 4 Jun–23 Jul 52.

[38] Msg, HNC 1371, Harrison to CINCUNC, 6 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS sec., Supporting Docs, tab 38.




THE UNC DELEGATES AT PANMUNJOM, 6 JULY 1952: *Generals Lee Han Lim (ROK Army), Morris, Harrison, and McConnell and Admiral Daniel.*

impasse. The leaders in Washington finally agreed provided that the UNC did not express the number in such a way as to preclude later expansion in case of rescreening by an impartial agency.[39]

On 13 July Harrison informed Nam that revised tallies showed that 76,600 Koreans and 6,400 Chinese desired repatriation and suggested that new, up-to-date lists be prepared. After a five-day recess to study the figures, Nam completely rejected them. He was perfectly willing to have the lists rechecked as long as the final total approximated 110,000, he added.[40]

The Communists refusal to accept the UNC figures evidently occasioned some second thoughts in Washington. G–3 forwarded a suggestion that the release of civilian internees be suspended so that the final list of persons to be repatriated might be increased. In his reply Clark could find little to recommend in this concept. To the enemy the important prisoners were the Chinese and not the

[39] (1) Msg, C 51780, Clark to JCS, 11 Jul 52, DA–IN 159939. (2) Msg, JCS 913383, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Jul 52.

[40] Transcripts of Proceedings, 104th and 105th Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 13 and 18 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. V, 4 Jun–23 Jul 52.

Koreans, he noted, and the Communists did not appear to be too concerned over the fate of the internees. On the other hand, Clark went on, interruption of the release program would cause the ROK Government to become upset, the internees to turn restless, and the Communists to have a propaganda holiday.[41] The Army did not pursue the subject further.

From Washington also came a proposal that the U.N. Command free all Chinese prisoners and permit the enemy to send representatives to persuade them to return home. No force would be allowed, of course, and neutral observers would be invited to watch the operation. When Harrison learned of this scheme, he protested strongly. To his way of thinking, the enemy agents would swarm over the prisoners and it would be extremely difficult to rid the camps of them. If the Communist agents were successful in getting a large number of prisoners to return, Harrison argued, it would reflect very badly upon the UNC defense of screening and nonforcible repatriation.[42]

While Clark also had serious doubts about the feasibility of this plan, he was willing to try it in the event that the alternatives previously advanced failed. To cut down on some of the dangers inherent in the proposal, he advocated that reindoctrination of the nonrepatriates by enemy representatives be attempted after an armistice was effective with a specific time limit and a ceiling upon the number of Communist representatives to be sent. Recalling his World War II experience, he reminded the JCS that the Russians had carried out a similar operation in Austria when the war ended. Their teams had invested displaced person camps and used every subversive means available, including espionage. In their wake violence and a wave of suicides had followed and Clark feared that this might well be repeated.[43]

The incidence of fresh suggestions reflected the realization that the Communists were less than happy over the revised figures submitted. With the end of the brief era of good feeling on 18 July, the Communist attack on the UNC at Panmunjom and via press and radio recommenced. One week later, Nam Il asked that the executive meetings of the delegates be ended on the 26th and that the staff officers resume their conferences on the details of the armistice.[44]

Since there seemed to be little point in holding executive sessions while the enemy remained in an uncompromising frame of mind, Clark's superiors consented to a return of open meetings. They then inaugurated a new stage in the UNC handling of the repatriations by giving Clark and Harrison permission to propose and carry out immediately, if necessary, a seven-day recess in the plenary meetings as soon as they saw fit.[45]

Harrison wasted little time. On 26 July he advised the enemy delegates that the staff officers' meetings could begin again, but that the plenary session should

[41] (1) Msg, DA 913958, G–3 to CINCFE, 18 Jul 52. (2) Msg, C 52204, Clark to G–3, 19 Jul 52, DA–IN 162816.

[42] (1) Msg, JCS 913758, JCS to CINCFE, 18 Jul 52. (2) Msg, HNC 1410, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 18 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 52.

[43] Msg, CX 52284, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 53.

[44] Transcript of Proceedings, 112th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 25 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52–15 May 53.

[45] Msg, JCS 914523, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Jul 52.

take a seven-day recess in the meantime. When Nam opposed a break in the high-level discussions, Harrison made a few brief, but cutting remarks:

> In these meetings we have been restrained in our statements and have tried to be accurately factual. Your statements, on the other hand, have demonstrated utter hypocrisy. You have said we want to retain your personnel. What we know and what the world knows as a fact is that those prisoners are afraid to be returned as slaves to the tender mercies of Communist control.
>
> You have said we violate the Geneva Convention—a covenant intended to protect the rights of individual human beings, not the tyranny of totalitarian rulers. Probably no government or armies have more consistently ignored or violated the Geneva Convention than you have. You have no moral right to raise the issue or the question of the Geneva Convention. You have made utterly false statements about our actions. Such lies are recognized by everybody as typical of Communist propaganda.

Finishing his speech, Harrison added that the UNC delegation would return on 3 August. Then he and his staff rose and walked out of the tent without giving Nam a chance to reply.[46]

As the era of the one-week recesses began, three months of frustrating bargaining ended. The 28 April proposal had resulted in narrowing the three outstanding issues to one, but settlement of the prisoner of war problem was no closer in July than it had been in April. A year of negotiation had produced an estimated 2,000,000 words of discussion and nearly 800 hours of meetings.[47]

Many troublesome questions had been dealt with through compromise, but now both sides had maneuvered themselves into positions that severely limited negotiations. Yet the search for a solution continued, for the pressures to conclude the Korean conflict increased as the war dragged on indecisively and the casualties continued to grow.

### *Narrowing the Choices*

Although many plans were proffered and alternate approaches were advanced during the summer by individuals and nations for ending the Korean War, none of the proposals presented an answer that would satisfy both sides and none could as long as they remained diametrically opposed in their principles. What then remained to be done? In Munsan-ni, Tokyo, and Washington this question was accorded mounting attention during the waning weeks of the summer.

At the truce site there were four plenary meetings during August—one every eight days starting on the 2d. Aside from name-calling indulged in by the Communists and the unsuccessful attempt by Harrison to drive a wedge between the Chinese and the North Koreans by stressing the inequity in the importance granted the Chinese prisoners and the casual way in which the fate of the North Koreans was being handled, the sessions contained little of note.[48]

The U.N. Command deliberately spaced the meetings at these intervals and made no effort to introduce anything

[46] Transcript of Proceedings, 113th Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 26 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtg, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52–15 May 53.

[47] Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 52–Jul 53), vol. 3, pt. 1, p. 67.

[48] Transcripts of Proceedings, 114th–117th Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 3, 11, 19, 27 Aug 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52–15 May 53.

new. And while the U.N. Command sought to convince the Communists through this procedure that their stand was firm, Clark did his best to apply maximum air pressure against enemy targets.[49] Only routine publicity was given to the air strikes and they were justified on military grounds alone. The U.S. leaders did not wish to engage Communist prestige so seriously that agreement to an armistice might be further delayed.[50]

In line with the build-up of pressure upon the enemy, Clark investigated the possibility of releasing the 11,000 South Koreans who were still in the custody of the UNC. His judge advocate informed him in early August that the only legal basis for taking such action lay in Article 5 of the Geneva Convention which covered doubtful cases. The holding power, in this instance the UNC, could convene a "competent tribunal" according to Article 5 to determine the status of these doubtful cases. If the tribunal found that these prisoners should not be classified as POW's, then they might be freed. Under the circumstances, Clark told Harrison, there were three simple criteria for recommending release of a prisoner: 1. residence south of 38th Parallel prior to 25 June 1950; 2. after screening, election not to return to Communist control; and 3. profession of allegiance to the Republic of Korea.

The tribunals, Clark went on, could be composed of U.S. and ROK personnel or include other U.N. representatives if this could be arranged. As for telling the Communists, the UNC delegation could either make a perfunctory announcement, explaining the legal basis for the action or not raise the matter at all. If the enemy protested under the latter plan, Harrison could use the argument employed in the case of the civilian internees, that this was a purely internal affair. Harrison preferred this approach.[51]

On 25 August Clark embarked upon the more difficult task of securing approval of his plan in Washington. As it happened, his request arrived while the State and Defense Departments were considering the significance of the Sino-Soviet talks at Moscow and the issuance of a Presidential statement. The State Department was reluctant to consent to anything that might prejudice such a statement.[52]

After the decision to discard the project for a Presidential release in early September, the State Department dropped its objections. A State-JCS meeting on 8 September concluded that the South Koreans should be let go before the U.N. Command presented new suggestions on prisoner exchange to the Communists. One week later Clark was instructed to go ahead, but not on the basis of the tribunal system. Instead, in the interest of speed, he should follow the policy set up during the release of the civilian internees. As the Army G–3 had pointed out, if Clark reclassified the 11,000 immediately as civilian internees, then he could quickly screen and release

[49] Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 7 Aug 52, sub: Re Armistice Negotiations in Korea, in G–3 091 Korea, 8/44. For air pressure, see Chapter XIV, below.

[50] Msg, JCS 915579, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Aug 52.

[51] (1) Msg, CX 53436, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 10 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 29. (2) Msg, HNC 1472, Harrison to CINCUNC, 10 Aug 52, in same place, tab 30.

[52] (1) Msg, CX 54177, Clark to JCS, 25 Aug 52, DA–IN 176419. (2) Msg, DA 917089, G–3 to CINCFE, 27 Aug 52.

them without bothering with the cumbersome tribunals.[53]

Clark waited until after the plenary session of 20 September was over before he announced that 11,000 South Koreans who had been improperly classified primarily because of the great dislocation of population in late 1950 and early 1951 were now in the civilian internee category. Their release would begin about 1 October and take about six weeks to complete.[54] As planned, the delay in publicizing this action prevented the Communists from using the 20 September meeting for their protests, but Nam sent a strong letter decrying this unilateral disposition of prisoners of war to Harrison on 24 September.[55] The UNC ignored Nam's warnings against carrying out the plan.

While the U.N. Command was applying military and political pressure upon the enemy through the air campaign and the release of civilian internees, Clark and his staff began to sift through the various solutions put forward for resolving the POW question. These ranged from rescreening the prisoners by neutral nations teams to the outright discharge of all the nonrepatriates, as suggested by Harrison in June. As Clark saw the situation in August, it was time to assemble all the alternatives acceptable in the UNC and present them to the Communists in a final package proposal. If the Communists turned them all down, then the UNC could either recess indefinitely or terminate the negotiations.[56]

When Clark consulted him, Harrison had a number of reservations on the type of proposal that should be made to the enemy. He did not want to include any plan that might leave the nonrepatriates to the mercy of a nation on which the Communists might apply pressure. Neither did he desire a postarmistice political conference to determine a prisoner's fate—all issues should be worked out before a truce was signed. If the Communists persisted in refusing to swallow nonrepatriation in its various guises, Harrison still felt that the UNC should let all the nonrepatriates go free.[57]

Although Clark was not ready to accept Harrison's last suggestion, he evidently did come to agree that the prisoner problem should not be handed over to a later political conference. On 1 September he forwarded his recommendations for a final approach to the Communists. The keynote remained UNC firmness backed by public and international opinion. Pointing out that most of the proposals made since 28 April were similar to or modifications of the plans already rejected by the enemy, troducing new variations could only make the Communists think that the Clark maintained that to continue in- U.N. Command had as yet not reached its final position.

[53] (1) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 11 Sep 52, sub: Release of 11,000 Anti-Communist South Korean POW's, in G–3, 383.6, 28/5. (2) Msg, JCS 918515, JCS to CINCFE, 15 Sep 52. This message was approved by the JCS, Defense and State Departments, and the President.

[54] Msg, CX 55410, CINCFE to JCS, 19 Sep 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 25.

[55] Ltr, Nam to Harrison, 24 Sep 52, no sub, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 27.

[56] Msg, C 53390, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 9 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 35.

[57] Msg, HNC 1473, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 20 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 36.

Therefore, at one plenary session, he went on, Harrison would preface his presentation of the last UNC offer with some carefully chosen remarks on the differences between the UNC and Communist attitudes and performances on POW matters and note that most of the controversy had hinged on the disposition of 14,000 Chinese, presumably volunteers. After his opening remarks, Harrison would review the choices previously offered and turned down by the enemy and then set forth the other alternatives acceptable to the UNC. All of the latter were contingent upon the signing of the armistice first and, of course, the acceptance of the principle of nonrepatriation.

In Clark's opinion, five merited consideration: (1) All nonrepatriates would be delivered to the demilitarized zone and released from military control. There would be no screening or interview and the ex-prisoner would then go to the side of his choice. Observers could be military or civilian, participants or neutrals, as the Communists wished. (2) All nonrepatriates would be delivered to the demilitarized zone and turned over to representatives of impartial nations for disposition with both sides agreeing to abide by the decisions of this body. (3) Both sides would agree that the supervision, control, and responsibility for the determination of the ultimate disposition of all nonrepatriates would pass to a group of impartial nations once the armistice was signed. (4) Both sides would maintain custody of their nonrepatriates until a group of mutually acceptable impartial nations decided on their disposition. (5) Nonrepatriates would be delivered to custody of impartial nations either in or outside of Korea and disposed of by this group. The last four proposals, Clark went on, would require time limits to insure that disposition was concluded before a political conference was convened. Harrison, after finishing his presentation, would recess unilaterally to give the Communists time to study the alternatives thoroughly. In the meantime wide publicity and strong U.S. and U.N. support should be accorded to the UNC proposals. Were the enemy to refuse this offering, then the UNC would recess indefinitely until the enemy either accepted or submitted new solutions in writing.

As far as Clark was concerned, Communist rejection would signify the end of military negotiations since further discussion would be pointless. If the UNC plan were carried out in this manner, he concluded, the Communists would have to demonstrate whether they really wanted an armistice or not.[58]

It was evident that neither Clark nor Harrison believed that the enemy would accept any of the alternatives. But both were convinced that it would be very unwise to permit the matter of the prisoners to be handed over to a postarmistice political conference. While the fate of the prisoners was decided on the political level, the Communists could improve their military position substantially and the U.N. Command would be unable to employ its air and naval power to induce a quicker settlement.[59]

Thus, when the JCS informed Clark on 9 September that a proposed Department of State plan involving the

[58] Msg, C 54499, Clark to JCS, 1 Sep 52, DA-IN 179066.

[59] Msg, HNC 1503, Harrison to CINCUNC, 6 Sep 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 10.

exchange of 12,000 UNC prisoners for 83,000 Communists with the nonrepatriates to be left for subsequent repatriation was again under consideration, Clark was not enthusiastic. If such a plan were to be used, Clark told the JCS two days later, then it should be brought forward as a last resort only after the other alternatives had been rejected. Although the State Department had not accepted four of Clark's five alternatives for turning over nonrepatriates to impartial nations for disposition, it was more receptive to his suggestion for bringing the nonrepatriates to the demilitarized zone, releasing them from military control, and then letting them choose their own side without interview or screening.[60]

Clark's objections to "subsequent negotiations" after an armistice were supported by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense in mid-September. During meetings between State and Defense Department officials, Secretary Lovett and Admirals Fechteler and Libby opposed the suggestion of State that the President issue a proclamation based upon the Mexican recommendation urging the exchange of those desiring repatriation and the deferral of further consideration of the nonrepatriates problem until a later date. Fechteler and Libby felt that once an armistice was signed, the U.S. public would increase pressure upon the government to bring the boys back home and the U.S. military position in Korea would deteriorate while the Communists improved their capabilities. By the time subsequent negotiations got under way, the enemy would have attained a decided advantage militarily and could use this as a club to gain its objectives.[61]

Since efforts to reconcile the State-Defense differences were unsuccessful, President Truman had to make the decision on 24 September and he approved the Defense view, ruling out the possibility of postponing the nonrepatriate question to the postarmistice period. The following day G–3 prepared new instructions for Clark and the President accepted them.[62]

The general procedure set forth in the message approved by the President followed closely that recommended by Clark on 1 September. But the discard of the proposals to handle the nonrepatriates either by handing them over to a group of impartial nations or to a subsequent conference for disposition narrowed the number of new choices to three.[63] In presenting them to the enemy, Clark told Harrison, he should exercise care not to make a commitment that the Chinese prisoners would not be permitted to go to Taiwan.[64]

Mr. Truman sent a personal word of encouragement to Clark the day before the meeting at Panmunjom. He expressed his hope that the UNC proposal would be made "with utmost firmness and without subsequent debate." If the Communists failed to accept the UNC offer and indefinite recess was invoked by the UNC delegates, it would be essential that "the military pressure should

[60] (1) Msg, JCS 917910, JCS to CINCFE, 9 Sep 52. (2) Msg, CX 55003, Clark to JCS, 11 Sep 52, DA-IN 182579.

[61] Memo of Conv, 17 Sep 52, sub: State-Defense Conf on Korean Armistice Negotiations.

[62] Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 6 Oct 52, sub: Summary of Actions with Respect to the Armistice Negotiations, in G–3 091 Korea, 70.

[63] Msg, JCS 919368, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Sep 52.

[64] Msg, CX 55856, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 26 Sep 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 18.

not be lessened" during the period ahead, the President concluded.[65]

On 28 September, just five months after the package proposal of April had been delivered, Harrison opened the session with a brief restatement of the previous plans brought forward by the U.N. Command breaking the POW deadlock. He then proceeded to the alternatives, all of which were dependent upon the prior formal acceptance of an armistice: (a) All prisoners would be brought to the demilitarized zone, identified, and checked off by one or a combination of Red Cross and joint military teams. They would then be considered as fully repatriated. If a prisoner stated at this time that he desired to return to the side that had detained him, he would be free to so do. In that case, he would assume civilian status and would not be employed again in acts of war in the Korean conflict. (b) All prisoners desiring repatriation would be exchanged expeditiously. All nonrepatriates would be delivered to the demilitarized zone in small groups, released from military control, and then interviewed by representatives of countries not participating in the Korean hostilities. This could be done with or without military representation and under the observation of the ICRC, joint Red Cross teams, or joint military teams, as the Communists desired. (c) All prisoners wishing repatriation would be exchanged as quickly as possible. All nonrepatriates would be delivered to the demilitarized zone and freed from military control. Then, without questioning, interview, or screening, each individual so released would be free to go to the side of his choice. This plan also could be carried out under military or civilian observers if the Communists so wished.

To give the enemy delegates time to consider the new choices, Harrison proposed a ten-day recess, but Nam asked that the meeting reconvene that afternoon. At that time he expressed his disappointment in the UNC proposals. "You have only used different forms and ways to decorate the unreasonable demand upon which your side has persistently insisted," he charged. The Communists would continue to demand full repatriation, he concluded, but were agreeable to a recess of ten days so that the U.N. Command might reconsider its basic stand.[66]

The meeting on 8 October repeated the Communist rejection of the UNC offering. After Nam finished, Harrison began a thirty-four minute speech in which he covered the Communist responsibility for starting the war in Korea and the UNC's many efforts to reach a reasonable settlement. The UNC had now reached the end of the trail; it had no further proposals to make. Furthermore, the UNC did not intend to come to Panmunjom merely to listen to the abuse and false propaganda issued by the Communist delegation. Therefore, Harrison continued, the UNC was declaring a recess until the Communists were willing to accept one of the UNC plans or submit in writing a constructive proposal of its own. With that, Harrison and the rest of the UNC delegation rose and left the conference tent.[67]


The talking stage was over; it was

[65] Msg, Truman to Clark, 27 Sep 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal Msg File, 1949–52.

[66] Transcript of Proceedings, 121st Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 28 Sep 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52–15 May 53.

[67] Transcript of Proceedings, 122d Session, Military Armistice Conf, 8 Oct 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52–15 May 53.

now a matter of "fish or cut bait." But the prospects for an armistice appeared no closer than they had been after the April proposal. As long as the UNC persistently opposed no forcible repatriation and the Communists stubbornly insisted upon full repatriation, compromise appeared impossible without one side conceding political defeat. Neither the United States nor the Communists seemed willing to apply sufficient force to insure a military victory that might have produced conditions amenable to a political defeat. At the front the defense lines grew stronger each month and although the air assault was a constant thorn in the side of the enemy, there was considerable doubt whether it alone could provide sufficient pressure to make the Communists desire an armistice. Without a powerful stimulus, the enemy had no special incentive to seek peace other than on its own terms. Operating within a fairly rigid set of restrictions, the U.N. Command had a complex task —just how much military pressure could and should be applied against the enemy to induce him to make concessions and yet not provoke a resumption of large-scale war.




H. C. Brewer, Jr.

MAP IV

# CHAPTER XIII

# Stalemate

I emphatically disagree with so-called military experts who say that victory was ours for the taking at any time during my period of command with the limited forces at our disposal and without widening the scope of the conflict. We never had enough men, whereas the enemy had sufficient manpower not only to block our offensives, but to make and hold small gains of his own. . . . To have pushed it [the war] to a conclusion would have required more trained divisions and more supporting air and naval forces, would have incurred heavy casualties and would have necessitated lifting our self-imposed ban on attacks on the enemy sanctuary north of the Yalu.[1]

So argued General Clark some months after the signing of the armistice. What he was saying, in effect, was that there was no disposition in Washington toward undertaking the risks or the losses that military victory would have demanded during the year when he was in command. The limitations within which the Far East Command had to operate and the strength ceilings imposed upon the Eighth Army insured that no all-out effort against the enemy could be mounted. On the other hand, the Communist forces of Kim and Peng evidently labored under similar restrictions. They made no attempt to strike at the Japanese base area, giving it the same inviolability that the UNC granted Manchuria. At the front, Communists troops reacted strongly to attack, yet showed no signs of preparing to resume major offensive operations of their own. The rules were tacit, but nonetheless observed in mid-1952; this was a sparring match and not a fight for the championship.

[1] Mark W. Clark, "The Truth About Korea," *Colliers*, vol. 133, No. 3 (February 5, 1954), pp. 34–35.

## *Holding the Line*

Across the front the two opponents were fairly evenly matched. Stretched from the west coast to the Taebaeks lay eight Chinese armies numbering an estimated 207,800 men and there were three North Korean corps anchoring the eastern end of the line with 83,000 troops. (*See Map IV.*) Four U.S. Army divisions, the 1st Marine Division, the Commonwealth Division, and nine ROK divisions, totaling 247,554 soldiers, faced the enemy. In depth of manpower the Communists enjoyed a much greater advantage, for an estimated 422,000 Chinese, 185,300 North Koreans, and 10,000 Soviet or satellite troops disposed throughout North Korea supported the front-line forces. Thus, the 617,300 enemy troops in the immediate and general reserve plus the 290,800 on the firing line formed an estimated grand total of 908,100 Communist soldiers in North

Korea on 1 May 1952.[2] The average strength of UNC forces in South Korea during May was a little less than 700,000.[3]

The presentation of the package proposal in late April occasioned no interruption in the general pattern of operations at the front. Characterized by patrols, probes, raids, and limited-objective attacks, the active defense generated only a low level of ground action. It was a contest of light jabs and feints with neither side attempting to sting the other into a violent, large-scale reaction.[4]

Since the lull on the battlefield imposed no severe strain upon the Eighth Army's combat troops, Van Fleet instructed his corps commanders in mid-May to take full advantage of the respite to improve their defensive positions. Noting that many of the present deficiencies stemmed from the haste in planning and setting up the installations, he ordered special attention to be given to relocating bunkers below the topographical crest of hills, to resiting automatic weapons to obtain maximum grazing and flanking fires, and to strengthening bunkers to withstand light artillery and mortar fire. In addition, he wanted more tactical wire laid down and increased consideration devoted to the problem of draining communications trenches and bunkers before the rainy season arrived.[5]

Intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was carrying out similar action. Although prisoner of war interrogations revealed no Communist preparations for an imminent offensive, the enemy was engaged in improving the quality of his bunkers, planting mines, and stringing more barbed wire. The enemy defensive positions in many places extended twenty miles to the rear with adequate lines of communication.[6]

Perhaps more significant was the steady growth of enemy artillery firepower during the spring of 1952. From a total of 710 active pieces in April the enemy by June increased the number along the front to 884. The chief mission of the Communist artillery was to provide close support for the infantry on offense and defense and gradually enemy fire had become more accurate. Using eight to ten pieces, enemy massed-fire techniques also improved. The Communists employed deceptive measures such as the firing of alternate, widely spaced guns, numerous firing positions, and a number of roving guns to make the task of accurate location of pieces more difficult for UNC units. By moving his artillery frequently and not concentrating the guns for long in any one sector, the enemy hindered effective counterbattery fire by the U.N. Command. Intelligence estimated that the Communists had about 500 prepared positions opposite the ROK II Corps alone in May.[7] Also impressive was the steady climb in the number of rounds directed at UNC positions. From a daily average of 2,388 rounds in April, the enemy almost tripled his fire in June to 6,843

[2] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 7.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 44. The breakdown was as follows: Eighth Army, 229,893; U.S. Marines, 26,843; Fifth Air Force, 35,951; U.N. Forces (less U.S. and ROK), 34,026; ROK, 366,466; total, 693,179.

[4] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 13.

[5] Msg, GX 5831 TAG, CG EUSAK to CG I U.S. Corps *et al.*, 11 May 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 52, bk. 4, pt. 2, incl 11.

[6] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, p. 29.

[7] *Ibid.*, May 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 18–20.

rounds a day.[8] The increase in ammunition fired demonstrated that the enemy had over a period of months gradually increased his forward supply levels.

To counteract the mounting effect of Communist artillery fire, Clark investigated the feasibility of utilizing two 280–mm. battalions, then being organized in the United States, to provide the Eighth Army with more firepower and longer-range weapons. Unfortunately these battalions would not be available until the end of 1952 and the Joint Chiefs were loath to make a definite commitment so far in advance.[9]

The enemy was not alone in improving his artillery techniques during the spring. As the Communists conducted a series of nightly probes in the ROK 1st Division sector in May, the troops began to practice a ruse designed to inflict heavier enemy casualties. When the Chinese attacked, the ROK soldiers resisted for five to ten minutes, then withdrew slightly. After giving the enemy time to occupy the evacuated positions, artillery, previously zeroed in on the outposts, opened up. Within a half hour to an hour the Chinese usually withdrew and although the forces involved were seldom large, enemy losses were comparatively high.[10]

### *Old Baldy*

Operations along the Eighth Army front during May were confined to small-scale actions that were quickly broken off by both sides when the exchanges threatened to grow to larger proportions. (*Map 4*) In early June, however, the tempo began to pick up.


The U.S. 45th Division of the I Corps manned main line of resistance positions from Hill 281, five miles northeast of Ch'orwon, to the village of Togun-gol, about eleven miles east of Ch'orwon. Except for Hill 281, all of the 45th Division front lines lay south of the Yokkok-ch'on which meandered through a rice paddy valley overlooked by low-lying, forested hills. Elements of the CCF *38th* and *39th Armies* controlled the dominant terrain to the north and in many cases were close enough to the 45th Division's main lines to enjoy excellent observation of the division's activities and to have convenient bases for dispatching their nightly raids and probes. The enemy's advantages became a matter of concern to Maj. Gen. David L. Ruffner when he assumed command of the division in late May, for they pointed up the lack of a strong outpost line of resistance. If the 45th Division could establish a chain of strong outposts across its front, it could deny enemy observers the use of much of the surrounding terrain dominated by the outposts and could also provide additional defensive depth to the division's lines.

In early June General Ruffner and his staff selected eleven outpost sites situated at strategic locations in front of the division and decided that these sites would be taken and occupied on a 24-hour basis beginning on the night of 6 June. A twelfth objective would be raided and the enemy positions destroyed later during the two-phase operation, which was to be called

[8] *Ibid.*, Apr and Jun 52, sec. I, Narrative.

[9] (1) Msg, CX 69787, CINCFE to JCS, 7 Jun 52, DA-IN 147813. (2) Msg, JCS 911155, JCS to CINCFE, 13 Jun 52.

[10] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 29.




*MAP 4*

COUNTER.[11] Anticipating that the enemy might react quickly and strongly to the UNC move, Ruffner instructed his regimental commanders to carry out the operations after dark and to follow up immediately with sufficient reinforcements to fortify the outposts before daybreak.

The 279th Infantry Regiment, under Col. Preston J. C. Murphy, held the eastern half of the divisional front, and would take and hold objectives 1–6 and the 180th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Ellis B. Ritchie, would seize and occupy objectives 7, 9, 10, and 11. Objective 8, known as Outpost EERIE, would be taken at a later date.[12]

Opposing the 45th Division from east to west were elements of the *338th* and *339th Regiments, 113th Division,* CCF *38th Army; 350th* and *349th Regiments, 117th Division,* CCF *39th Army;* and the

[11] Opnl Instr No. 58, in Hq 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G–3 sec., bk. VI.

[12] *Ibid.*

*344th Regiment, 115th Division,* CCF *39th Army.* The other infantry components of the *113th, 115th,* and *117th Divisions* were in reserve, as was the *116th Division,* CCF *39th Army.* The Chinese had over ten battalions of artillery positioned along the front in direct or general support roles.[13]

Several air strikes on known enemy strongpoints close to the outpost objectives took place during the daylight hours of 6 June. Then, after dark, Murphy and Ritchie sent out their units, ranging from a squad to almost a company, to take possession of the outposts. Evidently the enemy had not anticipated the operation, for the attack units encountered little opposition except at Outpost 10 on Hill 255 and Outpost 11 on Hill 266. The former, which was to become better known as Porkchop Hill, was taken by two platoons from I Company, 180th Infantry, after a 55-minute fire fight with two Chinese platoons. On Hill 266, which had won the name of Old Baldy when artillery and mortar fire destroyed the trees on its crest, two squads from A Company, 180th Infantry, exchanged small arms and automatic weapons fire with two enemy squads, then withdrew and directed artillery fire upon the Chinese.

Pfc. James Ortega, a forward observer for the 171st Field Artillery Battalion, jumped into a trench and directed the artillery concentration which pounded the top of the hill with 500 rounds. When the artillery ceased, the men from A Company again probed the enemy's positions. Meeting intense fire, M/Sgt. John O. White took a squad, reinforced by a BAR and machine gun, and made a sweep to the rear of the enemy. "We saw a group of soldiers and thought they were our own men at first," he later reported. "We advanced to within 25 feet of them when we heard Chinese voices. Then we opened up and saw five men run out and get hit." As the enemy resistance crumbled, the infantrymen from A Company pushed their way toward the crest of Old Baldy. Enemy artillery immediately began to come in. "There were no bunkers or trenches to get into," M/Sgt. Gerald Marlin related afterward," so we started digging while the shells burst all around us. I almost crawled into my helmet." Despite the enemy fire, the A Company squads hung on and took possession of Old Baldy shortly after midnight.[14]

Once the outposts were seized, the task of organizing them defensively got under way. Aided by Korean Service Corps personnel the men of the 279th and 180th Infantry Regiments brought in construction and fortification materials and worked through the night. They built bunkers with overhead protection so that their own artillery could use proximity fuze shells when an enemy attack drew close to the outpost. They ringed the outposts with barbed wire and placed mines along the avenues of approach which were also covered by automatic weapons. Whenever possible, they sited their machine guns and recoilless rifles in positions where they could provide support to adjacent outposts. Signal personnel set up communications to the rear and laterally to other outposts by radio and wire and porters

[13] (1) U.S. 279th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, S-3 Jnl. (2) U.S. 180th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, pp. 9-10.

[14] (1) U.S. 180th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, POR 178, 7 Jun 52. (2) 45th Division *News* (13 Jun 52), pp. 1, 4.

brought in stockpiles of ammunition. Back on the main line of resistance, infantry, tank, and artillery support weapons had drawn up fire plans to furnish the outposts with protective fires and a prebriefed reinforcing element was prepared to go to the immediate assistance of each outpost in the event of enemy attack. By morning the new 24-hour outposts were ready to withstand counterattacks, and garrison forces of from 18 to 44 men were left behind as the bulk of the forces from the 279th and 180th Infantry Regiments withdrew to the main line of resistance.[15]

Chinese probes and attacks on the outposts during the next few days met with no success despite an increase in their artillery and mortar support. At Porkchop Hill the outposts of the 180th Infantry Regiment repulsed several enemy drives of up to a company in strength.

On 11 June General Ruffner directed that the second phase of Plan COUNTER be carried out the following day. While two platoons of the 245th Tank Battalion mounted a diversionary raid along the Yokkok-ch'on valley from Chut'oso westward to the town of Orijong, the 180th Infantry would use up to three rifle companies to seize and hold Outpost 8 (EERIE) and to destroy enemy installations in the vicinity of the town of Pokkae (Objective A).[16]

Two platoons from B Company, 245th Tank Battalion, under the command of 1st Lt. Eugene S. Kastner, launched the raid toward Orijong at 0600 and ran into difficulty. Six tanks were disabled by enemy mines en route, but the remainder fired at enemy bunkers and gun positions on the hill mass west of Orijong and then withdrew. Five of the disabled tanks were later recovered.[17] In the meantime, K Company, 180th Infantry, under Capt. Richard J. Shaw, and one platoon of the regimental tank company moved north to the Pokkae area and engaged the enemy. The infantry closed in to hand grenade range, but found that the Chinese had honeycombed the heights east of the town with bunkers, trenches, and tunnels. Since there was little hope of penetrating and destroying the strong enemy installations on the hill, the raiding party broke contact and returned to the main line of resistance. Losses were light, with four men wounded and one tank disabled for the raiders, while the enemy suffered an estimated sixty-five casualties.[18]

After an air strike by Fifth Air Force fighter planes and an artillery and mortar barrage on EERIE, E and F Companies, 180th Infantry, under 1st Lt. John D. Scandling and Capt. Jack M. Tiller, respectively, attacked from the southeast against heavy small arms, automatic weapon, artillery, and mortar fire and took the objective. G Company, 180th Infantry, quickly moved up under the command of 1st Lt. Richard M. Lee to reinforce its sister companies before the expected enemy counterattack took place. The Chinese came back strongly and casualties were heavy on both sides, but the 180th Infantry units hung on tenaciously until the enemy broke off the

[15] See U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G–3 sec., bk. VI, tab 11.

[16] Opns Order No. 29, Plan COUNTER (Phase II), 12 Jun 52, in U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G–3 sec., bk. VI.

[17] 245th Tank Bn, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, S–3 sec.

[18] U.S. 45th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G–3 sec., POR 283, 13 Jun 52.

engagement. During the next two days the Chinese attempted fruitlessly to drive the 45th Division from EERIE.[19]

From a Chinese document captured later came an entirely different account of the action in this section:

From 0500 hours on 12 June 52, the enemy [the UNC] fought against us on Hill 190.8 and battled heroically for 5 days. The result of the fighting on the 16th was 2300 enemy casualties and 9 tanks destroyed. We had an honorable victory as above.

At 0550 hours on 12 June 52, enemy attacked our positions on Hill 190.8 with a force of 7 companies and 74 tanks which were covered by airplanes against our 1st Co, 50th Co.

We met the attackers and killed and injured them. At 0900 hours, they finally occupied Hill 190.8. About 5–6 squads of the 1st Co., the defending force on Hill 190.8 began tunnel warfare. At 2237 hours, the 3d Co. counterattacked against the enemy under cover of heavy artillery barrage and reoccupied the position. Casualties inflicted against the enemy amounted to 772 personnel and 8 tanks destroyed.

In the dawn of the 13th the enemy attacked our 1st Co. positions on the 1st, 2d and unknown hill with a force of 5 companies and 15 tanks which were given air cover by 12 planes. The intense battle continued until 1500 hours. We counterattacked with the 2d Co, 5th Co and the 1st Co. Enemy casualties were 600 personnel and 2 tanks destroyed.

For 2 days from 14th to 15th, the enemy attacked the 2d unknown hill continuously but the enemy was repulsed. The enemy casualties were 56 personnel.

On this night of the 15th, our 50th Co and 51st Co counterattacked in large force against the enemy who occupied both of the hills by attacking with a force of 7 companies which were covered by artillery fire and tanks. After bombarding the positions for 35 minutes, we made a sudden attack upon them. At approximately 0130 hours on June 16th, the battle ended victoriously.

An estimated enemy force of over 1000 men who attacked both of the hills were annihilated.

Meanwhile, in another spot, 4 squads making up the main force bravely resisted the enemies in tunnel warfare and achieved victory.[20]

The Chinese resort to tunnel warfare led to the sealing of tunnel entrances by the UNC troops. According to later prisoner of war interrogations, Chinese officers had killed a number of soldiers in the tunnels because the latter had wished to dig their way out and surrender to the U.N. Command. After the 45th Division forces secured the hills, they opened the tunnels and captured the Chinese who were still alive and willing to give up.[21]

On 16 June the 179th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Joseph C. Sandlin, relieved the 180th on the line and took over the outpost positions on Old Baldy, Porkchop, and EERIE. Enemy attacks during the next ten days ranged from platoon to battalion strength, demonstrating the Communist determination to eliminate these outposts. By the same token the 45th Division's repulse of the many enemy efforts along this line attested to the division's equal determination not to be dislodged.[22]

The contest for Old Baldy became very heated on 26 June. The hill was

[19] *Ibid.*, POR's 283 and 284, 13 and 14 Jun 52.

[20] Document Captured by 11th ROK Regiment During the Action on Hill 168, in 45th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, ACofS G–2 sec., an. 2 to PIR 191, 30 Jun 52.

[21] See 45th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, ACofS G–2 sec., POW Interrogation Rpts, 17 Jun 52.

[22] See U.S. 179th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, S–3 Jnl, 16–25 Jun 52.

the high point of an east-west ridge and dominated the terrain to the north, west, and south. Almost 1,000 feet west of the crest the Chinese had established positions that posed a constant threat to the 45th Division outpost and the 179th Infantry Regiment's troops in the area. Colonel Sandlin decided to destroy the enemy strongpoints. Early in the morning the 179th Infantry Regiment vacated its outpost on Old Baldy to permit air strikes and artillery and mortar barrages to be placed on the enemy positions. Eight fighter-bombers from the Fifth Air Force dropped bombs and loosed rockets and machine gun fire; then 45th Division artillery and mortar units began to lay concentrations on the enemy strongpoints.

C Company (Reinforced), 179th Infantry, under 1st Lt. John B. Blount, and F Company, 180th Infantry, commanded by Captain Tiller, which was attached to the 179th, attacked after the artillery and mortar fire. With C Company moving in from the left and F Company, supported by a tank, coming in from the right finger of Old Baldy, the assault forces soon ran into heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from the two Chinese companies who comprised the defense force. After an hour of fighting the Chinese suddenly pulled back and directed artillery and mortar fire upon the attacking units. When the fire ceased, the enemy quickly came back and closed with the men of C and F Companies in the trenches. A Company, 179th Infantry, under 1st Lt. George L. Vaughn, came up to reinforce the attack during the afternoon, for the enemy machine guns were making it difficult for men of C and F Companies to move over the crest of the hill. The attack force regrouped, with F Company taking over the holding of the left and right fingers of Old Baldy, C Company holding the old Outpost 11 position, and A Company working its way around the right flank of the enemy defenders. For two hours the battle continued as the Chinese used hand grenades and machine guns to repel each attempt to drive them from their positions. Late in the day two tanks lumbered up the hill to help reduce the enemy strongpoints; one turned over and the second threw a track, but they managed to inflict some damage before they were put out of action. Gradually the enemy evacuated his positions and the 179th was able to send engineers and several more tanks up to the crest.[28]

During the night of 26 June and the following day the three companies dug in to consolidate their defense positions on Old Baldy. On the afternoon of 27 June L Company, 179th Infantry, under 1st Lt. William T. Moroney, took over defense of the crest and F Company, 180th Infantry, moved back to a supporting position. C Company and elements of A Company held the ground northwest of the crest which had been won from the enemy.

When night fell, enemy activity around Old Baldy increased. Mortar and artillery fire began to come in on the 179th Infantry Regiment's positions and enemy flares warned that the Chinese were on the move. At 2200 hours the enemy struck the defenders of L Company from the northeast and southwest. An estimated reinforced battalion pressed on toward the crest until it met

[28] (1) U.S. 179th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, Jnl, tab 7. (2) U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G–3 sec., POR's 296 and 297, 26 and 27 Jun 52.

a circle of defensive fire. From the main line of resistance, artillery, mortar, tank, and infantry weapons covered enemy avenues of approach. L Company added its small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades to the circle which kept the Chinese at bay. Unable to penetrate the ring, the enemy withdrew and regrouped at midnight.

The second and third attacks followed the same pattern. Each lasted over an hour during the early morning of 28 June and each time the enemy failed to break through the wall of defensive fires. After suffering casualties estimated at between 250 and 325 men, the Chinese broke off the fight. The 179th Infantry reported six men killed and sixty-one wounded during the three engagements.[24]

Late in the evening of 28 June, the Chinese artillery and mortar fire on Old Baldy signaled the approach of another attack. Four enemy squads reconnoitered the 179th positions at 2200 hours, exchanging automatic weapons and small arms fire. About an hour later the main assault began with a force estimated at two reinforced battalions moving in from the northeast and northwest behind a very heavy artillery and mortar barrage. This time the Chinese penetrated the perimeter and hand-to-hand fighting broke out. Shortly after midnight a UNC flare plane began to illuminate the battle area and the defensive fires from the main line of resistance, coupled with the steady stream of small arms and automatic weapons fire from the three companies of the 179th on the hill, became more effective. By 0100 on 29 June the Chinese disengaged to the north, having suffered losses estimated at close to 700 men. In return the enemy had fired over 4,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire and the 179th Infantry had suffered 43 casualties, including 8 killed in action.[25]

As June ended, the 45th Division, despite the lack of combat experience of many of its troops, had acquitted itself well on the battlefield. In the fight for the outposts the division had withstood more than twenty Chinese counterattacks and inflicted an estimated 3,500 casualties on the enemy. It had also won a commendation from Van Fleet.[26] The enemy made one more attempt to wrest control of Old Baldy from the 45th Division's possession on the night of 3–4 July. Three separate attacks—the last in battalion strength—met the same fate as their predecessors as the concentration of defensive firepower first blunted and then forced the Chinese to desist in their assaults.[27] The thorough manner in which the division had organized the defense of the outposts and the skill with which it had used its positions during the fighting were a testimonial to the leadership on all levels and to the courage of its troops.

The 45th Division was less successful in another field. On 8 June Clark directed Van Fleet to prepare a plan for capturing Chinese prisoners in the Ch'orwon area. Clark wanted to discover the identity of the enemy forces in that sector and learn more of their role. Several

[24] (1) U.S. 179th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, Jnl, tab 7. (2) U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G–3 sec., POR 298, Jun 52.

[25] (1) U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G–3 sec., POR 299, 29 Jun 52. (2) U.S. 179th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, Jnl, tab 7.

[26] Msg, G 6671 KGO, CG Eighth Army to CINCUNC, 27 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, G–3 Jnl, 29 Jun 52.

[27] U.S. 45th Div, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, G–3 sec., Jnl.

days later Van Fleet submitted two plans, one envisaging the use of a regiment from the ROK 9th Division and the second a reinforced battalion from the 45th Division. The latter contemplated tank, air, and artillery support and the 45th Division was authorized to carry it out as quickly as possible.[28]

Early on 22 June, the 2d Battalion, 279th Infantry Regiment, set out to capture enemy prisoners on the north bank of the Yokkok-ch'on. The difficulty encountered by the battalion in taking Chinese prisoners was later succinctly related by the Eighth Army historian: "The raiding party had destroyed enemy positions, inflicted numerous casualties and captured three prisoners. The prisoners, however, were not interrogated: two of them died of wounds inflicted by enemy troops as the prisoners were being brought to the MLR and the third was killed when he attempted to throw a grenade after being captured." Despite other efforts on a smaller scale to take prisoners, the 279th Regiment's total bag for the month of June was but six prisoners.[29]

The experience of the 279th Regiment was by no means isolated. In combat the Communist soldier could be killed or wounded, but seldom taken prisoner during this period. The fact that General Ruffner issued a letter to his troops in June providing for a special rest and recuperation leave in Japan to any soldier capturing an enemy prisoner amply demonstrated the problem.[30]

Nevertheless, in July Clark approved another attempt, this time by the ROK 11th Division of the ROK I Corps, to capture North Korean prisoners. BUCKSHOT 16, as the plan was dubbed, sent a reinforced battalion into the sector west of the Nam River on 8 July. The battalion suffered casualties of 33 killed, 157 wounded, and 36 missing as against estimated enemy losses of 90 killed and 82 wounded. Not a prisoner was taken.[31]

The results of these abortive raids convinced Clark that the UNC losses in their efforts to take prisoners were not worthwhile. On 19 July he turned down Van Fleet's request for a similar operation in the 1st Commonwealth Division area. If the Eighth Army did not feel an enemy attack was imminent, Clark did not think the high UNC casualty rate incurred in such raids was warranted.[32]

For General Van Fleet, who may have hoped that the change-over in commanders from Ridgway to Clark might result in less restriction upon his activity along the front, June and July may have been disillusioning. Van Fleet's plans for the IX U.S. Corps to advance to new positions north of P'yonggang and secure control of all the Iron Triangle met with little enthusiasm from Clark in late June. To the Eighth Army commander's arguments that the operation would provide intelligence of enemy positions, give

[28] (1) Msg, C 69843, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 8 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, an 4, pt. II, J–6, 8 Jun 52. (2) Msg, 50431, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 18 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, an. 4, pt. II, J–15, 18 Jun 52.

[29] (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 63. (2) 279th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, p. 23.

[30] Ltr, Hq 45th Inf Div, 18 Jun 52, sub: Rest and Recuperation in Japan, in Hq 45th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, G–3 sec., tab 32.

[31] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, pp. 4–5.

[32] (1) *Ibid.*, p. 5. (2) Memo, Col J. B. Crawford, SGS, for CofS, 11 Jul 52, no sub, UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 21.

the UNC troops experience, destroy enemy stockpiles, and utilize U.S. firepower and ROK Army mobility, Clark listed corresponding disadvantages. The possibility of adverse effects upon the negotiations, the numbers of friendly casualties involved, the lack of UNC reserves if a heavy enemy counterattack followed, and the unprofitable nature of an advance beyond P'yonggang without further exploitation, Clark told Van Fleet in disapproving the plan, exceeded the advantages.[33] It was evident that the new commander would be as reluctant as Ridgway had been to step up the pace of the ground war merely to gain real estate.

Behind Clark's disinclination to approve even limited objective attacks lay his realization that the enemy ground and air strength had almost doubled since the initiation of negotiations. The Communists' divisions along the front were at full combat strength and their air forces based in Manchuria now numbered about 2,000 aircraft of which approximately half were jets. In addition, the enemy had an increased number of rocket launchers and field artillery, around 400 tanks, an improved supply situation, and stronger defense lines. Under these circumstances, Clark felt that the best way to punish the Communists lay in letting the enemy take the offensive and not vice versa.[34]

Thus it was not surprising that the Far East commander became disturbed over Van Fleet's instructions to his corps commanders on 18 July. Van Fleet told them there were indications that, in some sectors, the enemy had shifted forces and evacuated a number of forward positions. When this occurred, he desired contact with the enemy maintained and the evacuated positions to be occupied for at least twenty-four hours. Commanders should be ready for a violent Communist reaction, Van Fleet continued, and complete fire plans should be made and communications insured.[35] As soon as Clark heard of this directive, he instructed his staff to determine whether the Eighth Army should be allowed to carry out such a procedure. His own reaction was that all plans for raids by units of battalion size or larger should be approved by the Far East Command first.[36] In late July, he told his staff that he intended to discourage attacks against hills like Old Baldy in the future. Clark wanted the U.N. Command to confine itself to patrolling and let the enemy do the attacking.[37]

The concern of the United Nations commander over the merit in seizing terrain features like Old Baldy was caused by the resurgence of activity in that area in mid-July. The enemy had not attempted to take the hill again until the U.S. 2d Division relieved the 45th Division during mid-July. All of the Eighth Army's corps followed a policy of rotating their divisions periodically on

[33] (1) Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 10 Jun 52, sub: Limited Objective Attacks, in FEC G–3 Completed Actions. (2) Msg, CX 50832, Clark to Van Fleet, 25 Jun 52, DA–IN 154621.

[34] Msg, C 50218, CINCFE to JCS, 15 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 40.

[35] Msg, GX 7022 KGO–O, CG Eighth Army to CG I U.S. Corps *et al*, 18 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 28.

[36] Memo, Crawford for CofS, 19 Jul 52, no sub, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS Supporting Docs, tab 23.

[37] Memo, Crawford for CofS, 26 Jul 52, no sub, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 26.



FLOODED BRIDGE CROSSING ON THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE, CH'ORWON VALLEY

the line and the 45th had spent over six months at the front. The Chinese took advantage of the relief as they mounted two attacks on the night of 17–18 July in strengths exceeding a reinforced battalion. Through quick reinforcement of the Old Baldy outpost and heavy close-defensive fires, E and F Companies, 23d Infantry Regiment, who were defending the hill managed to repel the first enemy assault. But the second won a foothold on the slopes which the enemy reinforced and then exploited. Chinese artillery and mortar fire became very intense; then the enemy infantry followed up swiftly and seized the crest. Counterattacks by the 23d Regiment supported by air strikes and artillery and mortar fire, did not succeed in driving the Chinese from the newly won positions. By 20 July the 2d Division elements had regained only a portion of the east finger of Old Baldy. The onset of the rainy season made operations exceedingly difficult to carry out during the rest of the month.[38]

As the torrential downpours converted the Korean battleground into a morass in the last week of July, the U.N. Command counted its losses on Old Baldy during the month. Through 21 July the tally showed 39 killed, 234 wounded,

[38] (1) U.S. 2d Div, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, G–3 sec., Jnl. (2) 23d Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Jul 52.



SETTING UP BARBED WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS ON OLD BALDY

and 84 missing for the UNC and an estimated 1,093 killed and wounded for the Chinese.[39] Although the totals were not unusually high considering the intensity of the fighting and the artillery exchanges, it is not difficult to understand General Clark's concern over the casualties suffered in the fight for one more hill.

Six consecutive days of heavy rain flooded the streams and rivers and swept away bridges. As the water seeped into the ground, landslides began and roads were blocked or washed away. The task of resupply became a distinct challenge to surmount nature's obstacles.[40] Since the Communists had to cope with similar problems both sides devoted their main efforts against the common enemy and tactical operations were strictly limited.

When the rain eased off at the end of July, the 23d Infantry Regiment again sought to secure complete control of Old Baldy. Since the Chinese had an estimated two platoons on the crest, the 23d sent two reinforced companies up the slopes after artillery and mortar preparatory fires on the enemy positions. Edging toward the Chinese defenses, the 2d Division forces used small arms fire and

[39] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 75.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

hand grenades as they reached the enemy trenches. After bitter hand-to-hand combat, the two companies finally gained the crest early on 1 August and dug in to prepare for the customary counterattack. Two hundred flares were distributed around the friendly positions and forty-two air sorties were flown during the day in support. That night the enemy sent first mortar, then artillery, fire at the crest, dropping an estimated 2,500 rounds on the 23d Regiment elements. But counterattacks were driven off.

Mines, bunkers, and additional wire helped to strengthen the UNC hold on Old Baldy on 2 August and extremely heavy and effective artillery fire broke up another enemy assault on 4 August. For the remainder of the month, the Chinese refrained from further attempts on Old Baldy.[41]

In mid-September, the enemy employed two reinforced companies, supported by artillery and mortar fire and two tanks, in another desperate effort to regain control of the controversial hill. Infiltrating groups fought their way into 2d Division positions on 18 September and hand-to-hand fighting broke out. Under the pressure of the assault, the defending forces withdrew more than 400 yards from the crest and regrouped. Elements of the 38th Infantry Regiment tried unsuccessfully to envelop the Chinese defenders on 20 September, but the following day a platoon of tanks moved up and supported a second two-pronged drive that forced the enemy to withdraw once more.[42]

The fight for Old Baldy was typical of the battles waged during the summer and fall of 1952, a savagely contested, seemingly endless struggle for control of another hill. And there seemed to be little hope that there would be any significant change in the pattern.

### *Up the Hill, Down the Hill*

The renewal of activity at the front and the lack of great expectations from Panmunjom produced several intelligence estimates during the summer of 1952 that were discouraging in tone. In Washington and in the Far East the planners and intelligence experts foresaw little change in the tenor of the war. The enemy, in his estimate, was strongly entrenched, had expanded his air and ground strength, and showed no signs of accepting an armistice on UNC terms. On the other hand, the Communists evidenced no disposition to return to large-scale fighting and seemed content to rest on their increased defensive strength, confident of their ability to wait out the UNC. Unless the United Nations Command mounted a major offensive and broadened the geographical limits of the war, the intelligence officials did not believe that sufficient military pressure could be applied upon the enemy to bring about a swift conclusion to the war. Since there was small likelihood of securing substantial troop augmentations for the U.N. Command that would have to precede any major offensive, or of gaining approval of more than limited objective attacks, the prospects of a dramatic shift in the tempo of the conflict appeared remote. As long as the Communists made no attempt to alter the *status quo,* the outlook was for more of the same type of hill warfare that had

[41] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 67–69.

[42] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 75.

characterized the second year of the war.[43]

Although the fight for Old Baldy had received the bulk of the publicity during the summer months, sporadic excitement had flared up in other sectors. In early July on the U.S. I Corps front the ROK 1st Division had carried out a successful battalion raid against Chinese positions south of Sangnyong-ni, approximately seventeen miles southeast of Ch'orwon. Two days later, on 3 July, the 1st Marine Division sent a company raiding party against the Chinese positions at Punji-ri, three and a half miles northeast of Panmunjom. The marines destroyed enemy troops and bunkers, then withdrew to the main line of resistance.[44]

Other forays were not quite so fortunate. On the ROK II Corps front, the ROK Capital Division's attempts to take over Communist hill positions near Yulsa-ri, fifteen miles northeast of Kumhwa, were repulsed. The ROK 5th Division, ROK I Corps, also met determined North Korean resistance when it tried to drive the enemy from a hill close to Oemyon, seven miles south of Kosong on the east coast. The North Koreans mounted a retaliatory attack on 10 July against a nearby hill controlled by the ROK 5th Division and held it for four days before they were forced to withdraw.[45]

In August the limited ground pressure applied by the UNC to help its negotiators at Panmunjom led to the outbreak of several bitter, small-scale battles for favorable terrain features. Four miles east of Panmunjom elements of the 1st Marine Division on 9 August lost an outpost to the Chinese on Hill 58. The position changed hands five times during the next two days, but the enemy eventually gained the upper hand. The marines then shifted their attack to nearby Hill 122 which dominated Hill 58 and caught the enemy unawares. From 12 to 14 August a reinforced Marine company turned back Chinese counterattacks of up to a battalion in strength. Despite the failures of these attempts, the enemy tried again on 16 and 25 August, sustaining heavy casualties and no success in its efforts to drive off the marines. Hill 122 won a proud name in these encounters—Bunker Hill.[46]

About seven miles east of Kumsong, on the ROK II Corps front, the ROK Capital Division became embroiled in another fierce struggle. Overlooking the division's positions stood a hill, later to be known as Capitol Hill, where the enemy maintained outposts. On the night of 5–6 August elements of the Capital Division infiltrated and captured two of the outposts. The response was immediate. Building up from a reinforced platoon to two companies, the Communists hurled their troops against the ROK's manning the positions. For the next four days control seesawed back and forth, but the ROK 26th Regiment stubbornly fought back and drove the enemy off. On 10 August, the Communists broke off the attack, having suffered casualties of 369 dead, an additional 450 estimated

[43] (1) Memo, J. Weckerling, G–2, for ACofS G–3, 28 Jul 52, sub: Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea, in G–3 091 Korea, 64. (2) JSPOG Memo, 9 Aug 52, sub: To Obtain a Military Victory in Korea . . . , in JSPOG Staff Study No. 410.

[44] (1) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, Narrative. (2) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, p. 22.

[45] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, pp. 22–23.

[46] *Ibid.*, Aug 52, an. 4, G–3 sec., p. 2.



A South Korean Mortar Emplacement on Capitol Hill

dead, and 190 wounded. The ROK 26th Regiment lost 48 killed and 150 wounded during the action and won a commendation from Van Fleet for its courageous defense.[47]

While the negotiators at Panmunjom were meeting once a week in August and the Korean rainy season continued, activity along the front eased. Then in early September the weather improved and the Chinese hit Capitol Hill again. They gained possession of the crest temporarily until the ROK 26th Regiment joined forces with the ROK 1st Regiment to retake the hill on 9 September. Up to three enemy companies sought to fight their way back to the top at a time, but the ROK units refused to be dislodged again.[48]

Two miles west of Capitol Hill lay a long, finger-shaped ridge, which unsurprisingly soon came to be known as Finger Ridge. Held as an outpost by the Cavalry Regiment of the Capital Division, the position was overrun by the enemy on 6 September—the same day it launched its assault on Capitol Hill. The Cavalry Regiment struck back, but had to withdraw as the enemy increased his

[47] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 72.

[48] *Ibid.*, Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 71–72.

defending forces. Up the hill, down the hill went friendly and hostile forces as they wrestled for control during the rest of September and well into October. By mid-October, Finger Ridge was once more in the hands of the Capital Division.[49]

After the heavy rains of August came to an end, the Chinese renewed the Battle of Bunker Hill (Hill 122) in the 1st Marine Division sector. On 5 September the Marine positions were first subjected to a heavy artillery concentration and then to an assault by an enemy battalion. For two hours the contest for the heights swung back and forth, but the marines would not give in. Finally the Chinese began to disengage. Over the next ten days the enemy sent a number of raids and harassing expeditions against Bunker Hill with the marines successfully defending their outposts on each occasion.[50]

The Chinese probing for soft spots in the UNC lines continued in mid-September. In the U.S. 3d Infantry Division sector of the JAMESTOWN line there were a series of outposts manned by forces varying from a squad to a company in strength on the low-lying hills in front of the main line of resistance. One of these was Outpost KELLY, situated three miles south of Kyeho-dong and about one mile west of the double horseshoe bend of the Imjin River. On 17 September C Company, under the operational control of the 2d Battalion, 65th Infantry, defended KELLY.[51]

Facing the 65th Regiment in the area around KELLY were the *2d* and *3d Battalions, 348th Regiment, 116th Division,* CCF *39th Army.* There had been an increase in the number and aggressiveness of enemy patrols in the entire 65th Regiment sector during September and also an increase in the frequency of enemy mortar fire. These signs usually heralded an impending enemy attack.

On the night of 17 September an estimated enemy company from the *2d Battalion, 348th Regiment,* probed Outpost KELLY's defenses. When C Company requested reinforcements to fight off this probe, Col. Juan C. Cordero, commanding officer of the 65th, ordered B Company to relieve its sister company on KELLY. B Company took over KELLY and passed to the operational control of the 2d Battalion commander, Lt. Col. Carlos Betances-Ramirez, early in the morning of 18 September.

The enemy mortar fire on KELLY continued throughout the day and 1st Lt. William F. Nelson, B Company commander, in the early evening requested that the artillery supporting his position be prepared to fire variable time fuze shells in the event of an enemy attack. Less than an hour after his request an estimated two companies from the *2d Battalion, 348th Regiment,* attacked the outpost from the southwest, northwest, and northeast. The northeast attack evidently surprised Lieutenant Nelson and his men, for the Chinese swept across the hill and took the B Company machine gun position on the northwest corner of the hill from the rear. Killing the gunner, the enemy advanced along the trenches and closed in hand-to-hand combat. The sergeant in charge of the machine gun position managed to escape after he sustained arm injuries in the

[49] (1) *ibid.,* Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 73–74. (2) *Ibid.,* Oct 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 59–60.

[50] *Ibid.,* Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 71.

[51] The following account is based upon: (1) 65th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Staff Sec Jnls and Bn Jnl's, Sep 52; (2) 3d Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Sep 52.

fight. Communications between KELLY and battalion headquarters were cut off and the situation was very confused by midnight, but reports of Chinese herding American prisoners down the slopes of KELLY indicated that the position had been lost. There were also reports that some of the Chinese were wearing U.S. uniforms, but it was not clear whether the enemy had donned the American clothes before or after the attack.

To find out whether the enemy intended to occupy the outpost, the regimental intelligence officer ordered the 2d Battalion to send a platoon as quickly as possible from E Company to reconnoiter the hill. The patrol cleared the main line of resistance shortly before daylight on the 19th, but soon ran into machine gun and rifle grenade fire as it advanced up the hill.

Convinced that the Chinese planned to remain, Colonel Cordero made an assessment of the situation. The heavy mortar fire and the attack that had followed had badly depleted B Company, although there might be some remnants of the company still on the hill. He assumed that the enemy now held the position with small arms, light machine guns, and light mortars. There was a waist-deep, circular trench that ringed the military crest of the hill completely and four bunkers. At the base of the hill, on the approaches, the Chinese had established combat outposts of squad size.

Colonel Betances, the 2d Battalion commander, ordered two platoons from E Company to advance on KELLY on the morning of 20 September. By late afternoon one platoon under the company commander, 1st Lt. Harold L. Gensemer, had fought its way to the top. The second was still on the porters' trail moving forward slowly. The Chinese, however, had no intention of surrendering possession of KELLY for they quickly sent reinforcements to bolster their defending forces. Lieutenant Gensemer's platoon began to take casualties from the small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire, and the second platoon was forced to fall back as it encountered similar enemy opposition on its way to the crest. Faced with the Chinese determination to hang on to the outpost and the mounting casualty list, the two platoons withdrew to the main line of resistance.[52]

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion, commanded by Maj. Albert C. Davies, prepared to counterattack through the 2d Battalion's positions. During the evening of 20 September, A Company, under 1st Lt. St. Clair Streett, Jr., moved forward to take up the attack from the south and C Company, under 1st Lt. Robert E. Stevens, advanced to the base of the hill on which KELLY was located. The enemy mortar and artillery became very heavy as the men crossed the valley floor en route to the hill approaches.

As the two companies began their ascent, B Company moved forward toward the outpost line to support the attack. Mortar fire came in swiftly and with deadly effect as casualties cut the strength of B Company to twenty-six men and forced the cancellation of the company mission.

The Chinese small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire was also taking its toll of A and C Companies. In addition, the Chinese used time-fuzed artillery fire as the 1st Battalion troops edged their way

[52] E Company reported 33 casualties when it closed at the assembly area.

to the top. The airbursts over the heads of A and C Company were demoralizing and caused panic. Lieutenant Streett had to fall back and reorganize A Company, while Lieutenant Stevens clung to a finger of the hill with two platoons. The forces under Streett and Stevens totaled about 60 men each at this juncture, while the enemy had an estimated 100 men on the hill and was reinforcing freely.

A UNC artillery barrage pounded the Chinese positions on KELLY early in the morning of 21 September. But when the remnants of A and C Companies tried to close in on the Chinese positions, the enemy again met them with small arms and hand grenades. Two squads from C Company almost reached the crest of KELLY shortly before noon only to receive mortar concentrations that forced them to fall back to the trenches. No sooner had the enemy mortar fire ceased when the Chinese counterattacked and forced C Company to pull out completely. In the early afternoon Major Davies ordered A, B, and C Companies to return to their company areas. They had suffered over seventy casualties in the fight for KELLY. That night the 1st Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion and the action around KELLY slowed down for several days.

As the 3d Battalion took over responsibility for the 1st Battalion positions, Lt. Col. Lloyd E. Wills, who had assumed command of the 3d Battalion on 20 September, and his staff, drew up an attack plan to recapture KELLY. Since the previous efforts by forces ranging from one to four platoons had failed to dislodge the enemy, Colonel Wills received approval to use his three rifle companies. K Company, under Capt. William C. English, would attack from the east and L Company, under 1st Lt. Frederick Bogell, would come in from the west. 1st Lt. Ben W. Alpuerto's I Company would be the reserve.

At 0520 on 24 September the 105-mm. howitzers of the 58th Field Artillery Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Mario DeMaio, opened up on the Chinese positions on and around KELLY for thirty minutes. Meanwhile a platoon of tanks from the 64th Tank Battalion rumbled into position to support the 3d Battalion attack. Artillery and tanks sent 25,000 rounds against the Chinese in support of the attack. K and L Companies were in their attack positions by 0540 and launched their assault half an hour later. As Captain English and his K Company troops approached KELLY, the Chinese opened up with intense small arms, machine gun, artillery, and mortar fire and soon had K Company pinned down. The heavy enemy concentration of firepower and the growing list of casualties led to panic and confusion in the company. With control of the company disintegrating and the casualties mounting, English asked for permission to pull back and reorganize. Colonel Cordero at 0700 ordered that this request be denied and that the company continue its attack. Shortly thereafter contact with K Company was lost. The artillery forward observer managed to hold together ten men from the company, however, and Colonel Wills, the battalion commander, instructed him to continue the attack on KELLY with his small force.

On the western slopes of KELLY, L Company assaulted the Chinese positions at 0635 hours. Despite heavy mortar fire, one squad reached the top at 0720 and quickly asked for tank fire. Clinging to

the trenches on the south slope of KELLY, the L Company squad was unable to move forward against the stubborn enemy resistance. Chinese artillery and mortar fire continued to be very heavy.

Since contact with K Company had not been regained by 0800 hours, Colonel Cordero ordered I Company to move to the rear of Hill 105, 800 yards east of KELLY, and to prepare to take over K Company's zone. Lieutenant Alpuerto moved his men toward Hill 105, but the enemy artillery zeroed in on the company and scored several direct hits. The men began to scatter and drift back to the main line of resistance. Colonel Wills sent his S–3, Capt. Paul O. Engle, to help reorganize the company, since contact with Lieutenant Alpuerto had been lost after the enemy artillery concentrations had begun. Colonel Wills left at 0900 hours to take over the reorganization of both I and K Company stragglers as they returned to the main line of resistance without weapons or equipment.

With only the remnants of L Company still on KELLY, and the other two companies depleted and demorilized, the situation appeared grim. The two squads from L Company hung on to one of the trenches on the south slope and at 0920 hours Colonel Cordero ordered them to stay there at all costs.

When Colonel Wills finally regained contact with Lieutenant Alpuerto at 1000 hours, I Company had reorganized and had two platoons intact; the remainder of the company's whereabouts was unknown. Colonel Wills telephoned the assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. Charles L. Dasher, Jr., and informed him that the battalion had approximately two platoons available for combat. General Dasher told Wills to cease to attack and to continue the reorganization of the battalion, which had suffered 141 casualties in the action. By early afternoon the squads from L Company had been withdrawn and the stragglers reassembled. But the division commander, Maj. Gen. Robert L. Dulaney, decided that the battalion and the regiment should not resume the battle for KELLY. The 3d Battalion went into reserve positions on the night of 24 September and the 65th Regiment confined itself to routine patrolling until the ROK 1st Division relieved the 3d Division on 30 September.

During the action between 17 and 24 September for KELLY and the surrounding outposts, the 65th Regiment suffered casualties of approximately 350 men, or almost 10 percent of its actual strength. Yet the casualties alone do not serve to explain the weaknesses that arose when the regiment went on the offense. Colonel Cordero in his command report for the month attributed the poor performance of his combat units to the rotation program.

During the nine-month period January–September 1952, Colonel Cordero stated, the regiment had rotated almost 8,700 men, including close to 1,500 noncommissioned officers. Only 435 noncommissioned officers had been received to replace the losses, and company commanders had been forced to assign inexperienced privates first class and privates to key positions in many rifle platoons. Out of an authorized strength of 811 noncommissioned officers in the upper three grades, the 65th Regiment had only 381 and many of the latter had been developed from recent replacements. The lack of experienced platoon

sergeants and corporals had affected the combat efficiency of the regiment, Colonel Cordero went on, despite the high *esprit de corps* shown by the many Puerto Rican members of the regiment. In many cases, as soon as the company and platoon leaders became casualties, the inexperience and lack of depth at the combat company level became readily apparent. There was a failure to sustain the momentum of the attack and a tendency to become confused and disorganized after the leaders became casualties. Colonel Cordero recommended that his regiment be provided with a monthly quota of 400 replacements including a fair proportion of the upper three grades so that he could remedy this basic weakness.[53]

Although Colonel Cordero did not mention the language barrier, it should not be overlooked that the great majority of enlisted men in the regiment spoke only Spanish, creating a problem of communication between the continental English-speaking officers and the enlisted men from Puerto Rico.

On the other side of the coin had been the determination and skill with which the Chinese *348th Regiment* had defended Outpost KELLY. The enemy had used his artillery, mortars, automatic weapons, and small arms fire extremely effectively and had sent in reinforcements liberally to blunt and turn back the 65th Regiment's attacks. Thus, the failure of the 65th Regiment to take KELLY could be attributed both to its personnel weaknesses and the enemy's strong performance and skill in using his weapons.[54]

[53] 65th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, sec. VI.
[54] U.S. 3d Div, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, an. 1.


### *The Battle for White Horse*

Communist activity along the front increased in the early fall of 1952 as the enemy sought to improve his defensive positions before the onset of winter. The fight for Outpost KELLY was but one of several contests for hill positions waged by the Eighth Army. Perhaps one of the most dramatic came in early October in the U.S. IX Corps sector west of Ch'orwon.

On 3 October the Eighth Army learned through interrogation of a Chinese deserter that the enemy proposed to attack White Horse Hill (Hill 395), which was five miles northwest of Ch'orwon on the ROK 9th Division front. White Horse was the crest of a forested hill mass that extended in a northwest-southeast direction for about two miles. Overlooking the Yokkok-ch'on Valley, it dominated the western approaches to Ch'orwon. (*Map 5*) Loss of the hill would force the IX Corps to withdraw to the high ground south of the Yokkok-ch'on in the Ch'orwon area, would deny the IX Corps use of the Ch'orwon road net, and would open up the entire Ch'orwon area to enemy attack and penetration.[55]

Since other intelligence sources supported the prisoner's story, IX Corps reinforced the ROK 9th Division, under Maj. Gen. Kim Jong Oh, with additional tanks, artillery, rocket launchers, and antiaircraft weapons to be used in a ground

[55] Unless otherwise specified, the account of the White Horse action is based upon the following sources: (1) Hq IX U.S. Corps, Special After Action Rpt, Hill 395 (White Horse Mountain), 6–15 Oct 52; (2) Hq IX U.S. Corps, Comd, Rpt, Oct 52, bk. I; (3) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, sec. I, Narrative.


THE CH'ORWON VALLEY
Elevations in meters
MILES
KILOMETERS
PONGNAE RESERVOIR
TO P'YONGGANG 11.1 MI
Jackson Heights
391
Taegyo-ch'on
Yokkok-ch'on
White Horse Hill
Arrowhead
281
Ch'orwon Station
CH'ORWON
TO KUMHWA 3.1 MI
M.C. Brewer, Jr.

*MAP 5*

role. General Kim stationed two battalions of infantry on the threatened hill and held a regiment plus a battalion in ready reserve. On the flanks of White Horse he positioned the tanks and antiaircraft guns to cover the valley approaches. Searchlights and flares were distributed to provide illumination at night and a flare plane was made available to supply additional light on call during the hours of darkness. From the Fifth Air Force came extra air strikes against enemy artillery positions adjacent to White Horse. As the hour of the attack approached, the ROK 9th and its attached units were well prepared.

Just before the Chinese began their advance on White Horse on 6 October, they opened the floodgates of the Pongnae-Ho Reservoir, which was located about seven miles north of the objective, evidently in the hope that the Yokkokch'on which ran between the ROK 9th and the U.S. 2d Division would rise sufficiently to block reinforcement during the critical period. Although the water level rose several feet, at no time did it present a tactical obstacle. But the Chinese did not rely upon nature alone. They threw a battalion-sized force at Hill 281 (Arrowhead), two miles southeast of White Horse across the valley, to pin down the French Battalion astride the hill and to keep the 2d Division occupied. Before the night was over six additional companies joined in the action. The French held firm and inflicted heavy casualties upon the attackers. Two later assaults on 9 and 12 October met with similar responses. As a diversion to the main attack on White Horse, Hill 281 proved effective but expensive.

In the meantime, two battalions of the *340th Regiment, 114th Division,* CCF *38th Army,* moved up to the northwest end of the White Horse Hill complex. After heavy artillery and mortar fire upon the ROK 9th Division positions on the heights, the Chinese tried three times to penetrate the ROK defenses. Each time they were hurled back by troops of the ROK 30th Regiment, suffering an estimated 1,500 casualties the first night as against only 300 for the defenders. Notwithstanding the heavy losses, the Chinese committed the remnants of the original two battalions and reinforced them with two fresh battalions from the same division the following day. Cutting off a ROK company outpost, the Chinese pressed on and forced the elements of the ROK 30th Regiment to withdraw from the crest. Less than two hours after the loss of the peak, two battalions of the ROK 28th Regiment mounted a night attack that swept the enemy out of the old ROK positions. Again the enemy losses were heavy and a Chinese prisoner later related that many of the companies committed to the attack were reduced to less than twenty men after the second day of fighting.

By the third day Chinese diversionary attacks elsewhere along the corps front decreased and the main enemy effort concentrated on Hill 395. Chinese artillery and mortar fire averaged 4,500 rounds a day in support of the infantry assaults, and the enemy continued to assemble fresh troops to renew the battle. On 8 October two battalions from the *334th Regiment, 112th Division,* and one from the *342d Regiment, 114th Division,* relieved the depleted Chinese forces around White Horse. Elements of the *342d* fought their way to the crest during the afternoon, only to lose it to a

ROK 28th Regiment counterattack that night.

Nothing daunted, the Chinese committed another battalion to the attack on the following day. General Kim, the ROK 9th Division commander, moved two battalions of his 29th Regiment over to Hill 395 to help the 28th Regiment. Throughout the day the battle seesawed as first one side controlled the peak, then the other. Early on 10 October, the 29th Regiment reported that it was in possession of the crest.

The UNC forces apparently were fortunate on 9 October, for a Chinese prisoner later related that Fifth Air Force planes had caught elements of the *335th Regiment, 112th Division,* in an assembly area north of Hill 395, had inflicted heavy casualties upon the regiment, and had delayed its commitment to the attack.

By 10 October the pattern of the fighting was well established. Regardless of casualties, the enemy continued to send masses of infantry to take the objective. Evidently, once given a mission, Communist commanders adhered to it despite their losses. On White Horse, the Chinese kept funneling their combat troops into the northern attack approaches where Eighth Army artillery, tanks, and air power could wreak havoc. The enemy's determination to win White Horse made sitting ducks out of the Chinese infantry as the IX Corps defenders saturated the all-out assaults with massed firepower of every caliber.

On 12 October there was a break in the bitter struggle. The 30th ROK Regiment passed through the dug-in 29th Regiment and counterattacked. In the morning the 28th Regiment moved up through the 30th and pressed the assault. Leapfrogging the battalions of the leading regiment and substituting attack regiments from time to time, the ROK 9th Division began to inflict extremely large casualties on the enemy. By 15 October the battle for White Horse was over.

Although the Chinese had used a force estimated at 15,000 infantry and 8,000 supporting troops during the ten-day contest, they had failed to budge the ROK 9th Division. Despite ROK losses of over 3,500 soldiers during the nine ROK and twenty-eight Communist attacks, the 9th Division and its supporting troops had exacted a heavy toll from the Chinese *38th Army.* Seven of the *38th Army's* nine regiments had been committed to the White Horse and Hill 281 battles and taken close to 10,000 casualties.

Throughout the fight, the timely injection of fresh troops by General Kim on both offense and defense had sparked the ROK effort. The ROK units had withstood the determined drive of the Chinese infantry and taken over 55,000 rounds of enemy artillery during the battle. The performance of the ROK 9th Division under fire provided an excellent testimonial to the type of leadership, skill, and experience that the ROK Army was capable of developing and won high praise from Van Fleet.[50]

The ROK 9th Division received outstanding support from the air, armor, and artillery units that backed up the division. During the daylight hours, the Fifth Air Force had dispatched 669 sorties and another 76 sorties had been sent out on night bombing missions. In ten days the tactical air support had dropped

[50] Msg, GX 30376 KGO-O, CG EUSAK to CINCUNC, 28 Oct 52, in IX U.S. Corps, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, G-3 sec., bk. V, tab 13.

over 2,700 general-purpose bombs and 358 napalm bombs and launched over 750 5-inch rockets at enemy concentrations and positions. From IX Corps artillery alone, 185,000 rounds of artillery ammunition had been hurled at the Chinese. Tanks and antiaircraft quad-50's had protected the flanks of the hills and prevented the enemy from dispersing its attacks. At White Horse, prebattle preparation, made possible by effective intelligence, added to well-trained troops, skillfully employed, and backed by co-ordinated air, armor, and artillery support, demonstrated what might be accomplished on defense. White Horse seemed a prime example of the kind of action that General Clark had argued for earlier in the summer.

### *Jackson Heights*

In addition to the diversionary attack on Hill 281, the Chinese had attempted to disperse the ROK 9th Division forces by threatening the ROK outpost positions on Hill 391 almost seven miles northeast of White Horse Mountain on the eastern divisional front. Sporadic and indecisive fighting continued from 6 to 12 October when the enemy made a serious effort to storm the hill. After the ROK units pulled back, a reinforced company from the U.S. 7th Division attempted in vain on 13 October to regain the lost positions.[57]

Once the White Horse issue was settled, the ROK 9th Division sent a battalion from the 28th Regiment to clear Hill 391 on 16 October. The battalion won through to the crest and was able to maintain control until 20 October, when enemy counterattacks regained possession of the hill for the next two days. On 23 October, after a bitter hand-to-hand encounter, elements of the ROK 51st Regiment drove the Chinese off again, repulsed a counterattack, then withdrew. On the following night the 65th Infantry Regiment relieved the ROK 51st on the line.[58]

Since the unsuccessful battle for Outpost KELLY the 65th Regiment had been undergoing a vigorous program of training under a new commander, Col. Chester B. De Gavre. Two weeks of intensive training, however, could not remedy the basic weakness of the regiment—the lack of experienced noncommissioned officers at the infantry platoon level—but the unit was again assigned to assume responsibility for a portion of the main line of resistance.[59]

On the night of 24–25 October, G Company, under Capt. George D. Jackson, took over the defense of the high ground immediately south of Hill 391.[60] Jackson Heights, as it was soon to be called, had enough bunkers to house the command posts of the three rifle platoons, the company headquarters, and the forward artillery observer, but none of these was adequate for fighting off an attack. Captain Jackson's plans for improving his defenses had little chance for early success, since the Chinese artillery and mortar fire upon the heights was accurate and the enemy had excellent observation of the G Company

[57] U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, bk. I, p. 21.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[59] The following account of the action at Jackson Heights is based on: (1) 65th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52; (2) 3d Inf Div, Comd Rpt and Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52.

[60] *Stars and Stripes* named the hill after Captain Jackson.

movements from the surrounding hills.

Facing the company were elements of the *3d Battalion, 87th Regiment, 29th Division,* CCF *15th Army.* The *87th Regiment* was commanded by Hwueh Yiang-hua. On the afternoon of the 25th the artillery supporting the *87th Regiment* began to send direct 76-mm. gunfire against the Jackson Heights positions from Camel Back Hill, 2,800 yards to the northwest. Enemy 82-mm. and 120-mm. mortars followed and by dusk G Company had received 250 rounds of mortar and artillery fire and suffered 9 casualties.

During the night the enemy sent out patrols that probed G Company's dispositions and continued to send harassing artillery and mortar fire onto Jackson Heights. Captain Jackson used his own 60-mm. mortars and supporting mortar and artillery fire to break up the Chinese probes.

Late in the afternoon of 26 October the enemy sent over 260 rounds of direct 76-mm. gunfire from Camel Back Hill and caused 14 more casualties. From the company listening posts that night came frequent reports of the enemy moving about and digging in. Two Chinese approached within hand grenade range of one of the listening posts on the southwest flank. The men at the post were given permission to use grenades against the interlopers. As the two men hastily withdrew, mortar fire was called in to speed their departure.

An enemy platoon probed the northern approach to Jackson Heights shortly after midnight, then fell back under interdicting artillery and mortar fire. Another platoon advanced from the north an hour later and closed to hand grenade range. After a 15-minute fire fight, the Chinese pulled back, taking an estimated 17 casualties with them.

The next eight hours were relatively quiet. Then, about 0930 hours on 27 October, the 76-mm. guns on Camel Back Hill opened up again. One enemy round scored a direct hit on the mortar ammunition supply and blew up all but some 150 rounds. By nightfall the Chinese firepower had reduced the mortar platoon to two mortars and seven men and the second platoon had lost both its platoon leader and sergeant. Captain Jackson reported to 2d Battalion that he needed aid for his wounded and wanted smoke laid about the heights to obstruct the enemy's ability to pinpoint the company's movements. He was told to be calm, that smoke and aid were on the way.

So were the Chinese. An hour after Jackson called, they loosed a heavy concentration of artillery and mortar fire on G Company's positions and then sent an estimated company in from the north. Using the remaining mortars, automatic weapons, small arms, and hand grenades, Captain Jackson and his men beat off this attack.

The second enemy assault of the evening came after the Chinese artillery and mortar crews had fired an estimated 1,000 rounds at Jackson Heights within half an hour. One estimated Chinese company struck from the north and a second from the south. Jackson called for final defensive fire on the area until the situation clarified. His ammunition dump had been hit again and the enemy attack had fanned out and become general on all sides.

At this point the company communications sergeant evidently reported that there were only three men left in the

platoon in his area and asked battalion for permission to withdraw. Whether the sergeant acted on his own or not was unclear, but Colonel Betances, the battalion commander, assumed that the request was from the company commander and ordered G Company to withdraw. When Captain Jackson learned of the withdrawal order, he attempted to verify it, but the communications lines were out and radio contact proved unsatisfactory.

At any rate, Captain Jackson passed the order to withdraw back to his platoon leaders. The first and second platoons went down the east side of the heights and Captain Jackson went with the third platoon down the western slope. His platoon ran into heavy enemy small arms fire on the way and he was separated from his men during the action, finally rejoining them on the trail back to the main line of resistance.

When Colonel De Gavre learned of G Company's withdrawal, he quickly ordered that A Company, commanded by 1st Lt. John D. Porterfield, be placed under the operational control of Colonel Betances for a counterattack to regain Jackson Heights. A Company was to be used for the attack phase only and F Company, commanded by Capt. Willis D. Cronkhite, Jr., would take part in the attack and then would man the outpost. C Company, under Lieutenant Stevens, would prepare to pass to the operational control of the 2d Battalion, if it were necessary to back up the attack.

As daylight broke on the 28th, Captain Cronkhite led F Company toward Jackson Heights. The Chinese platoon defending the hill resisted with small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades, but F Company won control of the crest by 1000 hours. In the meantime, progress by Lieutenant Porterfield's A Company had been slowed down by artillery and mortar fire. Despite the enemy fire, two platoons pushed on and joined F Company on the heights; the remaining platoon was pinned down by mortar fire at the base of the hill.

The operation seemed to be well in hand, until the Chinese artillery put all of A Company's officers on the hill out of action. One platoon leader was killed by a direct hit and then a shell landed in the middle of the company command post killing Lieutenant Porterfield and the forward observer and wounding the one remaining platoon leader. The loss of leadership became immediately apparent, for enlisted men in both A and F Companies began to "bug out." Slipping away from the heights alone or in groups, the men drifted back toward the main line of resistance. By late afternoon only Captain Cronkhite and his company officers remained on the hill; all of his men had left along with those of A Company.

Efforts by the 2d Battalion to round up the stragglers and send them back to Jackson Heights met with no success. The men by this time evidently regarded the hill as a suicide post and refused to return. When night fell, Colonel Betances ordered Captain Cronkhite and his fellow officers to withdraw from the hill.

On the following day the 65th Regiment made one more effort to take Jackson Heights. Colonel De Gavre put Major Davies, the 1st Battalion commander, in charge of the operation. Davies sent C Company, under Lieutenant Stevens, to Jackson Heights in the morning of 29 October. The company

moved up and took possession of the hill without encountering any enemy resistance. Again all seemed well. The enemy artillery was quiet and no counterattack developed. Suddenly fear set in and the enlisted men left en masse. Lieutenant Stevens and his fellow officers found themselves alone with a handful of men.[61] Once more the stragglers were gathered together and ordered back up the hill and over 50 refused. Major Davies finally recalled Lieutenant Stevens and his little group to the main line of resistance.

This proved to be the last attempt of the 65th Regiment to take Jackson Heights. Maj. Gen. George W. Smythe, the division commander, ordered the 15th Infantry Regiment to take over responsibility for the 65th's sector beginning that same night.[62] In November the 65th Regiment returned to an intensive training program. General Smythe requested that a combat-trained regiment be either assigned permanently or for at least four months while the 65th Regiment underwent its retraining. If neither of these alternatives were possible, Smythe went on, he favored the reconstitution of the regiment with 60-percent continental personnel and the assignment of the excess Puerto Ricans to other infantry units.[63]

At any rate, the U.S. 15th Regiment took over the defensive positions of the 65th in late October. Outposts set up on Jackson Heights were subjected to frequent probes by the enemy throughout the first half of November. By the middle of the month only a couple of outposts at the base of Jackson Heights remained in the possession of the 3d Division. Although the Chinese exerted considerable pressure upon the outposts during the remainder of November and overran them several times, elements of the 15th Regiment managed to maintain their precarious positions at the end of the month.[64]

### *Operation SHOWDOWN*

As the indications that the Communists were seizing the initiative on the ground became more apparent in late September and early October, General Van Fleet grew concerned. In his letter of 5 October to Clark urging the approval of a limited objective attack on the U.S. IX Corps front, he commented: "It is extremely desirable that we take the initiative by small offensive actions, which will put the enemy on the defensive in order to reverse the present situation. Our present course of defensive

[61] Colonel De Gavre suggested later that the presence of many dead bodies on the hill and the lack of good NCO's to counteract the fear may have been responsible for the "bug out." See 65th Infantry Regiment, Command Report, October 1952.

[62] This was not the end of the affair, however, for during November and December, the only remaining officer of A Company, twenty-nine members of F Company, and thirty-eight members of C Company were charged and the majority were tried at general courts-martial. The officer received a sentence of 5 years and the men tried received sentences varying from 6 months to 13 years for their conduct during the operation. 65th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, Nov, Dec 52.

[63] *Ibid.*, Nov 52, an. 1. The 65th did not return to the line until 22 December when it took over the 15th Regiment's sector for a few days before the relief of the 3d Division by the ROK 2d Division. In early 1953 the bulk of the Puerto Rican personnel were transferred to other Eighth Army units and integrated. Some 250 Puerto Ricans remained with the regiment and were integrated with the new replacements. See 3d Infantry Division, Command Reports, November 1952–April 1953.

[64] U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, bk. I, pp. 17–19.

action in the face of the enemy initiative is resulting in the highest casualties since the heavy fighting of October and November 1951." [65]

To offset this trend, Van Fleet recommended the adoption of the IX Corps plan, called SHOWDOWN, that was designed to improve the corps defense lines north of Kumhwa. Less than three miles north of this city, Van Fleet pointed out, IX Corps and enemy troops manned positions that were but 200 yards apart. On Hill 598 and Sniper Ridge, which ran northwest to southeast a little over a mile northeast of Hill 598, the opposing forces looked down each other's throats and casualties were correspondingly high. If the enemy could be pushed off these hills, Van Fleet went on, he would have to fall back 1,250 yards to the next defensive position. Counting on maximum firepower, consistent with ammunition allowances, and maximum close air support, the Eighth Army commander was optimistic about the possibilities of SHOWDOWN.[66]

Although Clark had voiced his opposition to hill-taking expeditions in the past, he evidently decided that SHOWDOWN offered a better than average chance for winning its objectives without excessive casualties. If all went according to plan, two battalions, one from the U.S. 7th Division and the other from the ROK 2d Division, would be sufficient to accomplish the mission. The field commanders estimated that the operation would take five days and incur about 200 casualties. With sixteen battalions of artillery mounting some 280 guns, and over 200 fighter-bomber sorties in support, the infantry was not expected to encounter serious obstacles.[67] At any rate, Clark approved SHOWDOWN on 8 October, but cautioned Van Fleet to give the operation only routine press coverage and to stress the tactical considerations arguing for the seizure of the hills.[68]

Efforts to treat SHOWDOWN as a routine operation were doomed from the start by the Chinese. Although the five days of preparatory air strikes had to be reduced to two because of the demands of White Horse Hill and because the artillery support also had to be curtailed, the Chinese were ready for the attack and soon demonstrated that they intended to hold on to the Hill 598–Sniper Ridge complex.

Hill 598, the objective of the American troops, was V-shaped with its apex at the south. (*Map 6*) At the left extremity of the V lay Pike's Peak and on the right arm were two smaller hills christened Jane Russell Hill and Sandy Ridge, from north to south. The resemblance of the Hill 598 complex to a triangle soon led to the designation of the area as Triangle Hill. On 14 October 1952 the hill mass was defended by a battalion of the *135th Regiment, 45th Division,* CCF *15th Army,* one of the Chinese elite armies. As usual, the enemy was well dug in, had adequate ammunition supplies, and defiladed reinforcement routes.


Maj. Gen. Wayne C. Smith, the 7th Division commander, assigned the mis-

[65] Ltr, Van Fleet to Clark, 5 Oct 52, no sub, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.

[66] *Ibid.* SHOWDOWN was submitted by General Jenkins, former Army G–3, who succeeded Lt. Gen. Willard G. Wyman as corps commander on 9 August 1952.

[67] Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu,* pp. 78–79.

[68] Msg, C 56547, Clark to CG Eighth Army, 8 Oct 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Oct 52.




*MAP 6*

sion of taking Triangle Hill to the 31st Infantry Regiment, commanded by Col. Lloyd R. Moses. Although the original plan had called for the use of one battalion in the assault, Colonel Moses and his staff estimated that enemy resistance would be greater than previously anticipated and that it would be impossible for one battalion commander to control all the forces operating in the entire objective area. Thus, he assigned the task of seizing the right arm of Triangle Hill to his 1st Battalion, under Lt. Col. Myron McClure, and the mission of gaining possession of the left arm to the 3d Battalion, commanded by Maj. Robert H. Newberry. The forces committed to the assault had doubled before the operation began.[69]

[69] The account of the U.S. Army participation in Operation SHOWDOWN is based upon the following sources: (1) 31st Inf Regt, After Action Rpt, Opn SHOWDOWN; (2) 31st Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52; (3) 32d Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52; (4) 17th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and Staff Sec Jnls, Oct 52; (5) 7th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Oct 52.

After the air strikes and artillery preparations had placed tons of explosives on Triangle Hill, Major Newberry sent the 3d Battalion in a column of companies to take the apex of the hill complex. L Company, commanded by 1st Lt. Bernard T. Brooks, Jr., moved out first, followed by K Company, under 1st Lt. Charles L. Martin. In reserve, ready to assist either of its sister companies, was I Company, commanded by Capt. Max R. Stover.

As Lieutenant Brooks led his company out of the assault positions, he ran into immediate trouble. From a strongpoint on Hill 598 the Chinese sent hand grenades, shaped charges, bangalore torpedoes, and rocks to disrupt L Company's attack. In less than half an hour, Lieutenant Brooks and all his platoon leaders became casualties and the remainder of the company was pinned down in a small depression below the enemy strongpoint.

After the assault bogged down, Lieutenant Martin moved K Company forward. Securing tank fire to knock out the Chinese strongpoint that had dominated the fight thus far, Martin rallied L Company and got the men again moving ahead.

A few men from the two companies managed to work their way into the outlying trenches on Hill 598, but the Chinese evidently had no intention of withdrawing from the crest. They hurled numerous hand grenades and liberally expended small arms ammunition, shaped charges, and torpedoes to repel the 3d Battalion.

With the casualty list mounting and the attack again slowing down, Major Newberry committed I Company to the battle. Captain Stover took his men up Sandy Ridge, which had been captured by the 1st Battalion, and then moved southwest along the ridge line toward Hill 598. Since the Chinese were well dug in, I Company had to proceed slowly, rooting the enemy out of the holes and trenches. As night fell, Captain Stover's men began to meet with increasing artillery and mortar fire. Enemy troops were spotted massing for a counterattack and Stover called for defensive fire. Disregarding the artillery and mortar concentrations laid down by the units supporting the 3d Battalion, an estimated two companies from the *135th Regiment* passed through the fire and hit I Company with small arms, automatic weapons, and grenades.

The fierce enemy resistance and the growing casualty list led to a consultation between Colonel Moses and Major Newberry early in the evening. They decided to pull back all three rifle companies to the main line of resistance. By 2100 hours, the 3d Battalion had reassembled and taken up blocking positions.

On the 1st Battalion front, Colonel McClure selected A Company, reinforced, under 1st Lt. Edward R. Showalter, Jr., to lead the attack against Jane Russell Hill and Sandy Ridge. B and C Companies, commanded by Capts. William B. Young and Roy W. Preston, respectively, would be in reserve.

Part of the experience of the 3d Battalion was repeated as the 1st Battalion attacked. An enemy strongpoint on Jane Russell Hill quickly pinned down Lieutenant Showalter's men with small arms and automatic weapons fire. Showalter became an early casualty during the action and had to be evacuated. Colonel McClure had to commit B Company, then C Company, to reinforce the assault and to get the troops moving forward

again. By early afternoon members of B and C Companies had fought their way to the crest of Jane Russell Hill and began to prepare defensive positions to ward off the expected enemy counterattack.

They were not disappointed. In a very violent reaction to the loss of Jane Russell Hill, the Chinese mounted four counterattacks to regain possession. Each was preceded by heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire. By the end of the third enemy assault, Colonel McClure's men were in trouble, because their supply of ammunition was running low and the Korean supply carriers were extremely reluctant to run the gauntlet of enemy fire on the hill.

As a reinforced battalion from the *135th Regiment* began the fourth counterattack, a strange event occurred. The Chinese assault troops moved right through both their own artillery and mortar fire and the final protective fire called for by the 1st Battalion. With a disregard for their own safety that suggested to some observers of the battle that they might have been under the influence of drugs, the Chinese closed in on the trenches in hand-to-hand combat. By this time the 1st Battalion had run out of ammunition and Colonel Moses decided to pull his troops back to the main line of resistance. Carrying their casualties and as much equipment as they could bring out, the remnants of the three companies returned to the main line shortly after midnight.

At the end of the first day of fighting, the Chinese had shown that they intended to hold Triangle Hill and were willing to pay the costs. They had blunted and then repelled the two-battalion attack launched by the 31st Regiment despite heavy casualties. The next move was up to the 7th Division.

On 15 October General Smith committed two fresh battalions to take Triangle Hill. The 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, was placed under the operational control of the 31st Regiment and given the mission of taking Jane Russell Hill and Sandy Ridge. For the attack on Hill 598 Colonel Moses had his 2d Battalion, commanded by Maj. Warren B. Phillips.

Major Phillips decided to use the same plan employed by Major Newberry the day before. The battalion would attack in a column of companies, with E Company leading off, followed by F and G Companies.

After artillery and mortar preparatory fire had been laid on the hill mass, 1st Lt. William C. Knapp led E Company toward the crest. Against light enemy artillery and mortar fire, Knapp and his men reached the outlying trenches and started to clean out the bunkers and strongpoints. They won possession of Hill 598 without meeting strong resistance and then pushed on to the base of Pike's Peak where they found the Chinese entrenched in deep caves and tunnels capable of holding entire units.

In the meantime, Capt. Joseph V. Giesemann took F Company through E Company positions on Hill 598 and advanced along the northeast arm toward Sandy Ridge. G Company moved up to the crest of Hill 598 to reinforce its sister companies in case of trouble and to help prepare the defensive positions for Chinese counterattacks.

Maj. Seymour L. Goldberg, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, also employed a column of companies against Jane Russell Hill. A

Company, under 1st Lt. Rudolph M. Tamez, spearheaded the attack, followed by C Company, commanded by Capt. James E. Early. B Company, under 1st Lt. John H. Green, was the reserve company.

The attack started auspiciously as A Company, supported by elements of B Company, met only light resistance. As they neared the crest, a reinforced battalion from the *135th Regiment* swept down and counterattacked vigorously. The enemy assault forced the 1st Battalion to withdraw and regroup. I Company of the 31st Regiment was placed under Major Goldberg's operational control. The 1st Battalion (+) then joined the 2d Battalion, 31st Regiment, on Sandy Ridge to prepare for the enemy counterattack.

Late on 15 October operational control of the 2d Battalion, plus I Company, passed to the 32d Regiment, commanded by Col. Joseph R. Russ. Colonel Russ, therefore, became responsible for the direction of the fight for Triangle Hill at this point.

Heavy artillery and mortar barrages were laid on the American positions on Triangle during the night of 15–16 October, but the Chinese attacks were platoon size and repulsed without difficulty.

On the morning of 16 October General Smith approved the attachment of the 2d Battalion (less F Company), 17th Regiment, to the 32d Regiment for another assault upon Jane Russell Hill that afternoon. Under Maj. Louis R. Buckner, the 2d Battalion won possession of the hill without meeting serious opposition.

On the left arm of Triangle Hill, however, the 2d Battalion, 31st Regiment, had made no progress in its efforts to take Pike's Peak. With the approach of darkness on 16 October, the Chinese began a series of counterattacks on the 2d Battalion positions abutting the peak. During one of these, the gallant commander of E Company, Lieutenant Knapp, lost his life. The 2d Battalion fought off the Chinese attempts to dislodge it, but in turn could not budge the enemy from Pike's Peak on 17 October.

The situation at this juncture found Colonel Russ with three battalions atop Triangle Hill. His own 1st Battalion was on Hill 598; the 2d Battalion, 31st Regiment, was on the left arm facing Pike's Peak; and the 2d Battalion (−), 17th Regiment, occupied Jane Russell Hill. The Chinese, in the meantime, had committed the *134th Regiment, 45th Division,* to the fight. They still held the well-fortified Pike's Peak positions.

On the afternoon of 17 October the 3d Battalion, 17th Regiment, under Lt. Col. James L. Spellman, relieved the 2d Battalion, 31st Regiment, in place. At the same time the 1st Battalion, 32d Regiment, was withdrawn from Triangle Hill. Colonel Russ, therefore, was in operational control of two battalions of the 17th Regiment as the fight entered its fifth day.

Colonel Spellman's battalion took the task of seizing the one remaining objective—Pike's Peak—on 18 October. After heavy preparatory fires were laid on the Chinese positions, L Company, under 1st Lt. William E. Cantrell, fought its way to the top and began to organize the defense. I Company, commanded by Capt. Joseph H. Hoffman, passed through L Company and tried to drive the Chinese, entrenched on the fingers,

off the hill. Again the Chinese showed that they would not be ousted and forced I Company to break off its attack.

During the early evening hours of 19 October two companies from the *134th Regiment* stormed into Company L's trenches and hand-to-hand combat ensued. Prisoners later reported that they had been ordered to fight to the death. Colonel Spellman quickly asked for a reinforcing company, since Lieutenant Cantrell, the company commander, had been hit and the enemy had rewon possession of Pike's Peak. Platoons from M and H Companies, 17th Infantry, were rushed up to the aid of L Company, which by this time had lost all of its officers and was falling back southeastward toward Hill 598. To make matters worse, artillery and mortar fire supporting the 3d Battalion began to land uncomfortably close to the withdrawing troops and had to be lifted until the situation became more stable.

Two companies from the 1st Battalion, 32d Regiment, were dispatched by Colonel Russ to succor the beleaguered 3d Battalion and all available artillery and mortar fire was directed against the left arm of Triangle Hill to break up the fierce enemy attack. The reinforcements and the intense firepower finally slowed and then stopped the Chinese. About 0600 on 20 October, Colonel Spellman reported that some of the enemy troops were beginning to "bug out." He asked that the heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire be continued on the withdrawal routes to Pike's Peak. As the "bug out" became general, Spellman requested regimental headquarters to "hit Pike's Peak with everything we have." A parenthetical note following this entry in the 3d Battalion Journal stated simply, "complied with." [70] In any event, the Chinese pulled back to their caves and tunnels on Pike's Peak.

In the lull that followed, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 32d Regiment, relieved the 17th Regiment's forces. On 22 October the 2d Battalion, 32d Regiment, under Maj. John W. Szares, relieved the 1st Battalion on the left arm of Triangle Hill. The 3d Battalion, commanded by Maj. Thomas W. Brown, defended the right arm.

On 23 October the action picked up when the Chinese made another attempt in force to clear the 32d Regiment's forces from the hill complex. Shortly after nightfall the Chinese artillery and mortar units opened up and pounded the 32d Regiment's positions on Triangle Hill for an hour. Then a force estimated at from three to six companies from the CCF *45th Division* advanced from Pike's Peak on F Company's defensive positions, using small arms, automatic weapons, machine guns, and hand grenades as they closed in. For almost an hour an intense fire fight went on. Elements of G Company had to move up and reinforce F Company before the Chinese attack faltered.

Over at Jane Russell Hill an estimated two Chinese companies had launched an attack at the same time as the assault on the 2d Battalion. Only a slight penetration was made in the 3d Battalion lines and this was quickly restored as reinforcements counterattacked.

As the ROK 2d Division relieved the 7th Divsion on 25 October, the Chinese still held Pike's Peak. Twelve days of combat had involved 8 of the division's 9 infantry battalions and cost the division

[70] 17th Inf Regt, Oct 52, 3d Bn Staff Jnl, 20 Oct 52.

over 2,000 casualties, mostly in these 8 battalions.

Many of the lessons in Operation SHOWDOWN had been learned before in the battles for other hills, General Smith's report on the action revealed.[71] The rehearsal of an operation over similar terrain with all arms and services participating so that each man and each unit would know their objectives was vitally important to the success of the operation. The value of closing quickly with the enemy and of keeping the attack moving was also stressed by General Smith. If the attack leaders would not allow the troops to become pinned down, fewer casualties would result in the long run. Once the men had won the objective, General Smith went on, they must dig in quickly and provide adequate overhead cover for their defensive positions. The enemy's ability to bring heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire quickly upon positions newly won from him and to counterattack swiftly made rapid organizations of the defense and the setting up of overhead cover mandatory.

To keep his troops at the front fresh and to prevent battle losses from seriously affecting morale, General Smith had rotated his battalions frequently during the fight for Triangle Hill, much as General Kim had done at White Horse Mountain. He believed that the use of fresh forces had proved effective in winning most of the hill complex and in repulsing the enemy counterattacks. Reserve forces must be kept close to the front in the difficult terrain of Korea, the 7th Division commander noted, since they could not travel long distances at night, when the Chinese usually attacked, and arrive in time to reinforce the threatened positions. Finally, leadership, especially by officers and men known to the attacking unit, was a key factor in fighting the troops effectively.

Operation SHOWDOWN had an ironic ending. The ROK 2d Division, which had taken over the U.S. 7th Division's positions on 25 October, had engaged in a bitter and frustrating fight for Sniper Ridge. Attack and counterattack had followed as the Chinese and South Koreans had struggled for possession, but neither could win complete control of the ridge. Thus, when the ROK 2d Division assumed responsibility for Triangle Hill, it was still engaged on Sniper Ridge.

On 30 October three Chinese battalions swept the ROK defenders from the crest of Hill 598 and on 1 November the enemy seized Jane Russell Hill after an attack in force. The Chinese then beat off the ROK counterattacks until the mounting casualty lists caused the corps commander, General Jenkins, to suspend further attacks on Triangle Hill on 5 November.

The Sniper Ridge battle continued until 18 November when the ROK units took part of the ridge for the fourteenth time since the initiation of SHOWDOWN. At this point the Chinese pressure slackened and the probes and light attacks against the ROK forces during the remainder of the month were repulsed.


Thus, after six weeks of hard fighting, the UNC forces controlled a portion of Sniper Ridge and none of Triangle Hill. The original two-battalion attack lasting five days and costing 200 casualties had drawn in over two divisions and cost over 9,000 casualties. Although estimates of

[71] See 7th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, pp. 71ff.

Chinese losses ran to over 19,000 men, the enemy had no shortage of manpower. The Chinese time and time again had shown themselves willing to incur heavy casualties in order to hold on to key terrain features during the past year. At Triangle Hill they gained face as their tenacious defense reversed the offensive defeat at White Horse and forced the U.N. Command to break off the attack.

The heavy fighting begun in the middle of October subsided in November. As cold weather approached, the front settled back to the previous pattern of patrolling, probes, and small-scale attacks. Surprisingly enough, despite the increase of activity in the combat zone during October, the Communists actually had fewer forces on the front line than they had had in May. (*Map V*) During the six-month period the Chinese reserves had been built up and enemy armies in the areas behind the lines now contained an estimated 36,000 men each. Four additional artillery regiments swelled the number of guns and crews available to the Communists. But on the front there were over 80,000 less soldiers facing the UNC forces at the end of October.[72] What this reduction might signify in terms of future Communist strategy was not clear. Although no indications of a shift to the offensive on a large-scale were evident, the enemy over-all strength had increased by over 60,000 during the same time period. Should it be offense or defense during the winter ahead, the enemy had the manpower on hand.

[72] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, May and Oct 52, sec. I, Narrative.




H. C. Brewer, Jr.

MAP V

# CHAPTER XIV

# The Air and Sea War, Mid-1952

### *Strategic and Tactical Air Operations*

On the ground the Communist advantage in manpower was substantial, but the U.N. Command still had control of the air space over North Korea. Despite the build-up of the enemy air strength in Manchuria, the Communists made no serious effort to challenge the UNC dominance aloft during the spring of 1952. Fighters and bombers roamed at will with only occasional brushes with the enemy.

But a significant change in UNC air-combat operations policy came about in May. The rail interdiction program had reached the same status as the truce negotiations. As fast as the UNC pilots disrupted the rail system, Communist repair crews put them back in operation again. It was apparent that "to continue the rail attacks would be, in effect, to pit skilled pilots, equipped with modern, expensive aircraft, against unskilled oriental coolie laborers, armed with pick and shovel." [1] If military pressure was to be maintained upon the enemy to influence the Communists to agree to a truce, then a shift from the diminishing returns of rail interdiction seemed in order.

Accordingly, in early May the scope of interdiction operations was broadened. Along the front, the Fifth Air Force's fighter-bombers concentrated their attacks upon enemy supplies, equipment, and personnel massed within striking distance of the battlefield, while medium bombers began to devote their attention to airfields, railway systems, and supply and communications centers, in that order. One of the first endeavors of the change came on 8 May when 485 fighter-bombers descended on Suan, about forty miles southeast of P'yongyang, and over a 13-hour period caused widespread damage to buildings, supplies, trucks, and gun positions in the biggest single attack of the war up to that time.[2]

### *The North Korean Power Complex*

As interest in rail interdiction lessened, the search for profitable targets soon led the air planners back to the important, undamaged hydroelectric complex in North Korea. The location of certain dams and plants, such as that at Suiho on the Yalu, made them sensitive targets, since they furnished power to the Chinese as well as to the North Koreans. To avoid giving the Chinese an excuse to intervene, U.S. leaders had placed a ban upon the bombing of dams and plants along the Yalu on 6 Novem-

[1] USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Jul 52–27 Jul 53, p. 26.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

ber 1950 and it had never been rescinded.[3] Later, when the truce negotiations began, the restrictions on Yalu power plant bombing had been repeated, but no mention had been made of the remainder of the power complex.[4]

Fearing that an effort to destroy the power installations might have an adverse effect upon the armistice proceedings, Ridgway had been reluctant to permit the Air Force to bomb them. In March 1952, he informed General Weyland that if the Communists appeared to be deliberately delaying an agreement and strengthening their offensive capabilities, he might change his mind, but in the meantime, he would not recommend an attack.[5] It seemed to him that as long as the primary use of the power facilities was for the civilian economy, their destruction was not justified.[6]

General Weyland did not agree. In response to a request for his views on the matter from the Air Force planners in Washington, he stated that the disruption of electric power would complement other air attacks. By cutting off this power, the U.N. Command could make it difficult for the enemy to carry out repair work that was done in small establishments and in railway tunnels. Through reduction of small-scale production, Weyland went on, added pressure might be put on the Communists and spur them to speed up the negotiations. As for the means, Weyland estimated that 500 fighter-bomber and 80 medium bomber sorties could do the job over a period of several good flying days.[7]

It was not very surprising that Weyland's views should be communicated swiftly to the JCS by the Air Force or that Ridgway showed a little annoyance when the JCS questioned him on the divergence between Weyland and himself on the subject. The U.N. commander informed his superiors that there had been no unusual circumstances that would necessitate them to direct an attack upon the hydroelectric installations rather than follow the normal procedure of waiting for a recommendation from him. He was keeping a close watch on the situation, Ridgway concluded, and he did not want an attack unless he decided that it was warranted and opportune.[8]

On 12 May, Clark took over as Ridgway's successor. Shortly thereafter, he surveyed the situation and decided to intensify the air pressure campaign as much as possible. One of the most lucrative targets, he discovered, was the untouched hydroelectric complex. Although he did not have the authority to bomb the Yalu installations, he instructed Weyland to prepare plans for destroying all other major hydroelectric facilities. The Air Force would be the co-ordinating agent and the Navy would participate in the initial attack which was to be staged as soon as possible.[9]

When the Joint Chiefs learned of Clark's desire to strike the hydroelectric targets, they approached the Secretary of

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–30.

[4] Msg, JCS 95977, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jul 51.


[5] Memo, EKW [Wright] for CofS, 2 Apr 52, sub: N.K. Hydroelectric Power Installations, in FEC G–3 091 Korea, folder 1, Jan–Feb 52.

[6] Memo, MBR [Ridgway] for CofS FEC, 26 Apr 52, no sub, in FEC G–3 091 Korea, folder 1, Jan–Feb 52.

[7] Msg, VCO 118, CG FEAF to Hq USAF, 29 Apr 52, 5285.

[8] Msg, CX 67909, CINCFE to JCS, 2 May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, an. 4, incl 2.

[9] Msg, CX 50328, CINCFE to COMNAVFE and CG FEAF, 17 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 15.



BOMB STRIKE ON SUIHO HYDROELECTRIC PLANT BY CARRIER-BASED PLANES

Defense to secure Presidential approval that would remove the restrictions on the Suiho plant, since this was the largest and most important installation in North Korea. President Truman's consent opened the entire complex to air destruction and the JCS told Clark to go ahead at his own discretion. The JCS warned that the ban on operations within twelve miles of the Soviet border still applied and care should be exercised not to bomb Manchurian territory inadvertently.[10]

Vice Adm. Joseph J. Clark, who had assumed command of the Seventh Fleet on 20 May, was anxious to have naval air units take part in the Suiho attack as well as those against other power targets.[11] He flew to Seoul and easily convinced Maj. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus that he should allow Navy dive bombers and fighters to join the Fifth Air Force assault force.[12] Thus, on 23 June, 35 Navy attack bombers (AD-Skyraiders) and 35

[10] (1) Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 19 Jun 52, sub: Removal of Restriction on Attacks Against Yalu River Hydroelectric Installations. (2) Msg, JCS 911683, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jun 52.

[11] Clark succeeded Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe, who was appointed Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, on 4 June when Admiral Joy was rotated.

[12] General Barcus took over command of the Fifth Air Force on 30 May from General Everest.

Panther jet fighters (F9F's) from the carriers *Princeton, Boxer,* and *Philippine Sea* hit the Suiho plant while squadrons of Air Force Sabrejets (F–86's) provided overhead cover. The Navy dive bombers dropped their bombs while the Panthers provided antiaircraft suppression. As soon as the Navy planes completed their mission, 79 Thunderjets (F–84's) and 45 Shooting Stars (F–80's) followed and dropped their loads. Over 200 Communist fighters, perched on airfields across the Yalu, made no attempt to halt the attack; many of them took off in haste and flew inland.

During the next three days the Fifth Air Force mounted over 700 fighter-bomber sorties and over 200 counterair sorties while the Navy launched well over 500 sorties against the power system. Suiho was badly damaged, according to the pilot reports, and ten other plants were made unserviceable. Two installations suffered less vital hits. For two weeks a power blackout existed in North Korea with only gradual restoration thereafter.[13]

The bombing of the hydroelectric installations drew immediate fire in Great Britain from the Labour Party and from the press. Since the British Defence Minister, Lord Alexander, had but recently visited Clark, the British were upset that he had not been informed of the proposed strikes. Actually the Clark request had not been approved by the JCS until after Alexander had left Korea on 18 June, but it was difficult to convince the British on this score. The Churchill government narrowly survived a Laborite motion of censure after Secretary of State Acheson admitted in London that the United States had been at fault and should have consulted the British beforehand. Although there was no compulsion for the United States to keep the British informed, Acheson said that they should have been told about the power plant operations as a matter of courtesy.[14]


Most of the British concern seemed to rest in the fears that the power plant destruction might lead the Chinese to break off the truce negotiations or to attempt retaliation. Clark later stated that he was somewhat surprised by the furor the attacks had caused in Britain, but was determined to repeat them, wherever profitable, until an armistice was concluded.[15] It should be noted that although the Communist negotiators complained that the bombings were wanton, they neither ended the meetings nor sought revenge.

In the United States, the reaction was quite the reverse of that in the United Kingdom. The question of why the power complex had not been bombed earlier was raised in Congressional and other quarters. Clark could do little to help the JCS answer this query since he saw no reason why they should have been spared so long. On 19 July, Mr. Lovett told a congressman that seven factors had forestalled prior efforts to strike the

[13] Msg, CX 50733, CINCFE to JCS, 24 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 18. For more complete accounts of these raids, see: (1) R. Frank Futrell, *The United States Air Forces in Korea, 1950–1953,* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), pp. 451–52; (2) James A. Field, Jr., *History of the United States Naval Operations, Korea* (Washington, 1962), pp. 436–39; (3) Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, *The Sea War in Korea* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), pp. 441ff.

[14] Dept of State, Press Release No. 516, 30 Jun 52, in Dept of State *Bulletin,* vol. XXVII, No. 681 (July 14, 1952), p. 60.

[15] Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu,* pp. 72–74.



B-29 ATTACK ON P'YONGYANG

power targets: 1. the postwar reconstruction problem; 2. the knowledge that some of the plants had been dismantled and only recently reconstructed; 3. the status of excess capacity in the plants; 4. possible losses of UNC air forces; 5. use of North Korean power in Manchuria and in the USSR and possibility that destruction of the plants might invite a Communist offensive; 6. estimated effect upon the armistice talks; and 7. other priority targets.[16] As it turned out, some of these factors had obviously been overrated or had become obsolescent.

One by-product of this flurry was the appointment of a British representative on the UNC staff. This had been discussed previously and rejected, since Ridgway had felt that making an exception in favor of the United Kingdom would lead to similar requests for representation from other U.N. countries participating in Korea. When Alexander visited Korea, Clark told the JCS that he was willing to accept a British staff officer despite the possible disadvantages. To counteract opposition criticism that had led to the censure motion, Churchill

[16] (1) Msg, JCS 912750, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 52. (2) Msg, C 51395, Clark to JCS, 5 Jul 52, DA-IN 157923. (3) Msg, JCS 914021 to CINCFE, 21 Jul 52.

announced on 1 July that a representative would be named shortly. Actually, it was not until the end of the month that Maj. Gen. Stephen N. Shoosmith was designated as a deputy chief of staff of the U.N. Command. His directive, however, made it clear that his appointment was solely as a normal staff officer and that liaison between the United States and the United Kingdom would be carried on through normal political and military channels as it had been in the past, both in Korea and in Washington.[17]

At any rate, the bombing of the hydroelectric system became an accepted part of the air campaign. Suiho was subjected to a B–29 raid on 11–12 September and other plants were hit whenever they seemed to be getting back into operation.

*P'yongyang*

During May the Far East Air Forces also proposed to mount another attack upon the North Korean capital of P'yongyang. New military targets near the city had been uncovered and could be destroyed, Weyland told Clark. The latter was not averse to a strike on P'yongyang, but he was worried about Prisoner of War Camp No. 9 which the Communists had placed close to the city. Since air reconnaissance had not located this camp, Clark wanted the Far East Air Forces to conduct the attack by visual means or with the assistance of short-range navigational beacons so that the prisoner camp would not be bombed.[18]

On 5 July, subject to these conditions, Clark approved the operations against P'yongyang. In the course of eleven hours on 11 July, 1,254 sorties were flown. Fifth Air Force Sabrejets and Thunderjets, ROK and Australian fighters, British Meteors, and Navy Panthers and Corsairs from the Seventh Fleet vectored in three waves to hit the forty-odd targets in and around the city. When night fell, B–29's arrived to bomb targets specially reserved for them. Supply depots, factories, billeting areas, railway centers, and gun positions were destroyed and damaged and the Communist radio claimed that 1,500 buildings had been leveled and 900 others had suffered harm from the 1,400 tons of bombs and 23,000 gallons of napalm dropped on the capital. Despite heavy and accurate antiaircraft fire, only one air force and two naval fighters were lost. Eight air force planes, however, were seriously damaged.[19]

On 4 August the Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers hit P'yongyang again with 273 sorties, bombing buildings, a fuel dump, gun positions, and military personnel. A third huge effort against the city came on 29 August. Clark and Weyland decided that a psychological air blow should be struck while the Soviet and Chinese representatives were conferring in Moscow. In another three-wave assault, 1,403 Air Force and Navy sorties blanketed the capital and inflicted additional damage. After this pounding P'yongyang possessed too few worthwhile

[17] (1) Msg, C 50318, Clark to JCS, 17 Jun 52, DA 151297. (2) Msg, DA 914543, Jenkins to CINCFE, 26 Jul 52.

[18] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, an. 4, pt. I, p. 20.

[19] (1) USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 July 1952–27 July 1953, pp. 88–99. (2) Futrell, *United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–53*, pp. 481–82. (3) Cagle and Manson, *The Sea War in Korea*, pp. 450–53.

targets to warrant major strikes for a time.[20]

*Air Pressure and Air-Ground Support*

General Clark realized that although there was little he could do to increase the ground pressure against the Communists in Korea, he could give the Air Force and Navy full encouragement to step up the pace of the air campaign.[21] The attacks on the power plants and on P'yongyang were the most spectacular during the summer of 1952, but by no means the only ones that were launched.

In late July 63 B–29's mounted their greatest single-target effort thus far against the Oriental Light Metals Company, an aluminum alloy plant within five miles of the Yalu River. Enemy jet and propeller-driven night fighters provided but slight and ineffective opposition to this raid, which inflicted heavy damage on the plant.[22]

On 27 July naval aircraft from the *Bon Homme Richard* attacked a lead and zinc mine and mill at Sindok and others from the *Princeton* bombed a magnesite plant at Kilchu the next day. On 1 September, carrier aircraft from the *Essex, Princeton,* and *Boxer* struck the oil refinery at Aoji, just eight miles from the Soviet border. Special permission from the JCS enabled the Navy to send over 100 fighters and fighter-bombers against the previously undisturbed oil supply center and reports indicated that the destruction was extensive.[23]

Despite the nearness of many of the Air Force and Navy operations to the Chinese border during the summer and the impressive fighter strength of the Chinese Air Force located just across the Yalu, enemy air activity was conspicuous by its absence. The MIG–15's generally avoided combat and the majority of the aircraft losses was due to antiaircraft fire. As the bombing of industrial targets increased in July and August, enemy aircraft began to be sighted more frequently, but they showed little disposition to fight. When they did, the Sabrejets usually took a heavy toll of Communist planes.[24]

The reluctance of the Communist fighters to defend their troops, cities, and plants offered a contrast to the efforts of the UNC air forces to afford their ground forces support during the summer of 1952. However, there had been complaints from ground force commanders regarding the Van Fleet–Everest agreement which had specified that 96 close air support sorties a day would meet Eighth Army requirements under conditions of limited ground activity.[25] In December 1951, Van Fleet himself had sought in vain to have one squadron of fighter-bombers assigned to each of his corps, maintaining that this would improve close air support operations. The parceling out of air combat units

[20] (1) USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Jul 52–27 Jul 53, p. 99. (2) Futrell, *United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–53,* pp. 483, 489.

[21] Msg, CX 53391 CINCFE to CG FEAF and COMNAVFE, 8 Aug 52, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 410.

[22] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, p. 28.

[23] Cagle and Manson, *The Sea War in Korea,* pp. 454–59.

[24] Futrell, *United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–53,* pp. 477–78.

[25] (1) USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50–30 Jun 52, pp. 206ff. (2) USAF Historical Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Jul 52–27 Jul 53, pp. 184ff.

ran counter to Air Force doctrine and had been firmly rejected on the grounds that such a system would be inflexible and wasteful inasmuch as the squadrons could not be shifted to the more active fronts as necessity arose. But Van Fleet was not easily dissuaded. After Clark became commander in chief, he tried again. Early in June he suggested that the 1st Marine Wing be placed under the operational control of the Eighth Army.[26]

Van Fleet's plan was essentially the same as it had been six months earlier. He would put one squadron under each corps commander and establish a joint operations center to control the use of the Marine units at each corps headquarters. To counteract the Air Force argument that this system would be inflexible, he intended to retain sufficient control at Eighth Army level to divert aircraft not being used adequately to other corps or back to the Fifth Air Force. The chief benefits, the Eighth Army commander maintained, would be to reduce the time lag between the request for support and its arrival; to allow the pilots to become familiar with the terrain that they would be called upon to attack and the ground personnel they would be working with; to increase the number of sorties per day by having the aircraft stationed close to the corps front lines; and to insure better control of air strikes by eliminating the spotter aircraft that now directed them.[27]

Although Clark sympathized with Van Fleet's approach, he had no desire to stir up the old feud between air and ground forces on the role of tactical aviation. On 1 July he turned down the Eighth Army commander's proposal and directed his staff to improve procedures for carrying out air-ground operations doctrine.[28]

Six weeks later Clark issued his plan for improving conditions. He did not find anything basically wrong with the present system. One of the difficulties, he maintained, was a lack of understanding at subordinate levels of the limitations of the air arm and of the fact that air policies were only arrived at after consultation between the Air Force and Army commanders. Clark felt that ground commanders frequently called for air strikes when their organic artillery could do the job better. After all, he went on, the air forces in the FEC had only limited forces and had many tasks to perform. The Army could not afford to adopt the Marine air-ground team system because it was not designed for the same kind of operations and had entirely different allocations of artillery to carry out its missions.[29] Actually, Clark suggested, the tactical air forces were engaged in three types of action—antiair, antimatériel and installations, and antipersonnel. Ground support was not the least of these, although it seemed

[26] Msg, G 6262 TAC, Van Fleet to Clark, 6 Jun 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal Msg File, 1949–52.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] (1) Memo, for CofS, 1 Jul 52, no sub, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, G–3 Jnl, J–3, 12 Aug 52. (2) Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 91–92.

[29] The 1st Marine Division had the 11th Marine Regiment as its artillery regiment. The regiment had basically the same armament as the four separate battalions employed by the Army to support divisions—three battalions of 105-mm. howitzers and one battalion of 155-mm. howitzers. In Korea, it was part of a corps and received corps artillery support. Ordinarily, however, Marine divisions did not have corps artillery at their disposal to take care of the long-range, heavy-duty artillery tasks, and Marine air support was often used as a substitute.

always to be mentioned last. He thought that co-operative training between the air and ground forces would do much toward eliminating many of the misconceptions that existed and proposed that steps be taken to allow more understanding of mutual problems.[30]

In the meantime, Van Fleet had consulted with General Barcus, Fifth Air Force commander, in June about applying the maximum air effort to destroy the enemy air offensive potential close to the battle front. He feared that the build-up of Communist strength close to the front might portend a possible offensive before the rainy season, so he urged de-emphasis of the rail interdiction program and increase in close air support. In addition, Van Fleet asked Clark to let the B–29's, which were running into mounting enemy night fighter opposition on their raids close to the Manchurian border, hit Communist personnel, supplies, and material close to the front lines by employing night radar-controlled bombing techniques.[31]

Barcus was willing. He informed Van Fleet that the air effort from the main line of resistance to areas forty miles behind the enemy front was growing substantially. But there were difficulties, he continued. Personnel and supply bunkers were extremely hard targets to destroy since the enemy was so well dug in.[32] Admiral Clark, Seventh Fleet commander, was also eager to help. After a tour of the Eighth Army front in May and talks with Van Fleet, he came to the conclusion that naval aircraft were particularly well suited for the type of pinpoint attacks that would be necessary to hit enemy personnel and supply bunkers. Van Fleet and his ground commanders were all in favor of naval air aid and the Seventh Fleet staff began to lay plans for joining in the close combat support program.[33]

As the number of air support missions increased, fighter-bombers and medium bombers (B–29's) began to unload their bombs and guns on targets in the enemy's immediate rear. Van Fleet was encouraged. During the rainy season in July, he was successful in securing light bomber and medium bomber support from Barcus and Weyland, who were eager to co-operate if suitable targets could be uncovered for the heavier aircraft.[34]

There is little doubt that the end of the rail interdiction campaign opened a new and—to the ground forces—more satisfactory phase of the air war. The growing numbers of aircraft overhead meting out punishment to the enemy across the lines could not help but boost front-line morale. During the bitter bat-

[30] Ltr, Hq FEC to CG Eighth Army *et al.*, 11 Aug 52, sub: Air Ground Opns, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, G–3, Jnl, J–3, 12 Aug 52. See discussion in Chapter XVII, below, of the results of the experiments ensuing from this plan. See also USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Jul–27 Jul 53, pp. 197ff.

[31] (1) Msg, G 6267 TAC, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 7 Jun 52. (2) Msg, G 6390, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 12 Jun 52. (3) Msg, GX 6490, Van Fleet to Barcus, 17 Jun 52. All in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jun 52, Papers 20, 28, and 38.

[32] Msg, CG 117, CG Fifth AF to CG EUSAK, 19 Jun 52, in Hq Eighth Army Gen Admin Files, Jun 52, p. 43.

[33] Cagle and Manson, *The Sea War in Korea*, pp. 461ff. The naval support program did not get under way until October. See Chapter XVII, below.

[34] (1) Msg, G 6644 TAC, Van Fleet to Clark, 25 Jun 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jun 52, Paper 82. (2) Msg, GX 7229 KCG, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 31 Jul 52, in FEC G–3 Completed Actions. (3) Msg, CX 52915, Clark to Van Fleet, 1 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 17.

tles of October, the U.N. Command air force flew almost 4,500 close support sorties against enemy personnel, equipment, supplies, and strongpoints, and of these over 2,200 were in support of Operation SHOWDOWN alone. General Jenkins, the IX Corps commander, sent his "grateful thanks" for the Fifth Air Force's outstanding assistance.[35]

As the ground and air force officers began to swap visits to the front and to the air control centers, some of the misunderstanding between the two groups started to fade. The ground troops learned that they could help the pilots by using proximity fuzes before air strikes to suppress antiaircraft fire. Since losses of friendly planes had mounted during the close support campaign because of heavy flak, the efforts of the artillery to reduce the hazard were appreciated by the air force. Another symptom of the change for the better, according to the official Air Force historian, came from Van Fleet himself. By fall he no longer was urging that air squadrons be assigned to his corps.[36] This in itself seemed to denote an overall improvement.

### *The Kojo Demonstration*

Naval surface operations during the summer of 1952 consisted mainly of routine patrol and blockade of the Korean coast, mine sweeping operations, and the shelling of targets along the coast to harass and interdict the enemy's lines of communication. For the ROK I Corps the naval surface guns provided splendid artillery support whether on offense or defense.

But the biggest naval operation was the demonstration at Kojo on the east coast of Korea. In July Clark had asked Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe, the naval commander, whether it might not be wise in the interest of economy to hold a landing exercise in connection with the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division's 8th Regimental Combat Team to Korea. Owing to housing difficulties in Japan, Clark had decided to rotate the three RCT's of the 1st Cavalry to Korea, one at a time. Since the first team was scheduled to be transferred from Japan in October, Clark felt that the opportunity for alarming the Communists should not be missed.

Admiral Briscoe was heartily in favor of some action and suggested that an amphibious demonstration be mounted. This could conceivably lure enemy reinforcements out on the roads and expose them to attack by air and surface craft. In addition, the training would be excellent for all the UNC forces involved, Briscoe concluded. Encouraged by this reception, Clark told his naval commander to go ahead with the planning and to co-ordinate with Eighth Army and XVI Corps staffs on the role of the 1st Cavalry Division units.[37]

Under Admiral Clark, the Seventh Fleet commander, Joint Amphibious Task Force Seven was set up and 15 October established as the target date. The demonstration was scheduled for the area near Kojo and planning for the land, sea, and air phases proceeded at a swift pace. For purposes of deception, only the highest echelon of command

[35] USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Jul 52–27 Jul 53, p. 188.

[36] Futrell, *United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–53*, pp. 505–07.

[37] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, p. 5.

knew that the maneuver was to be only a demonstration.[38]

Although the 187th Airborne Regiment was to be withdrawn and prepared for an airdrop and Eighth Army was to prepare for an offensive to link up with the amphibious forces, Clark told Van Fleet this was simply to confuse enemy intelligence and no more than limited land objectives would be attacked.[39]

On 12 October rehearsal operations held at Kangnung ran into high surf conditions and had to be broken off. For the next three days, FEAF and naval planes hit the enemy positions around Kojo and naval surface craft, led by the battleship *Iowa,* shelled the beach area. The assault troops climbed down to the assault landing craft in the early afternoon of 15 October and made a pass at the shore. Sudden high winds made recovery of the boats a difficult task, but there were no serious casualties.

The enemy response to the elaborate scheme was disappointing. Little evidence of significant troop transfers came to light and the Communist shore batteries threw only a few answering shells at the assault force. Whether this denoted a lack of mobility to respond quickly or perhaps a preference to wait until the UNC troops had landed and then to launch a counterattack was impossible to surmise. Evidently the discovery that the operation was only a feint added to the frustration of all the UNC personnel who had not been in on the secret. The realism of the planning and mounting of the operation had built up UNC expectations and although the training was adjudged valuable, the damage to morale served to balance this off.[40]

As operations tapered off in the fall, the results of the fighting during the May–October period remained open to speculation. Although the air pressure campaign had evoked some protests from the Communists at Panmunjom, it had in no way softened their attitude toward an early armistice on the UNC terms. On the ground the hill battles had caused the enemy more casualties than the UNC had suffered, but gains on both sides had been minor and neither could claim a victory. Communist attrition in men, supplies, matériel, and installations was considerable during the six-month span, but they showed no sign of cracking or of submitting to a truce. From every aspect it was still a stalemate and no end was in sight.

[38] Ltr, Clark to Collins, 4 Sep 52, no sub, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.

[39] Ltr, Clark to Van Fleet, 13 Sep 52, no sub, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.

[40] See Cagle and Manson, *The Sea War in Korea,* pp. 391–96.

# CHAPTER XV

# Problems of Limited War

The frustrating conditions at Panmunjom and on the battlefield in Korea could not fail to affect domestic affairs in the United States during mid-1952. As long as the objective in Korea had been military victory, opposition to the expenditures of American lives, funds, and resources had not been difficult to cope with. But a slow process of reaction had set in, once the decision to end the war through negotiation was taken. The political and military leaders of the United States had to deal with a phenomenon new to them—limited war—and all its ramifications. With the passage of time and the failure to reach an agreement on a truce, criticism of the conduct of the war, set off by the Congressional investigation of the dismissal of General MacArthur in 1951, mounted.

To many people it seemed that the conflict in Korea had served its purpose. The North Koreans had been pushed back of the 38th Parallel and the Communists now knew that the United States would fight in the event of outright aggression. On the other hand, the United States and its allies had learned not to underestimate Chinese military strength. From all indications, both sides desired peace since little further gain could be expected from the stalemate. Only the principle of repatriation lay between the increasing casualty lists and the signing of an armistice.

How this obstacle was to be surmounted remained unclear, but it was inevitable that the settlement of the Korean problem should become the outstanding issue of the Presidential campaign of 1952. The debates, personalities, and political maneuvers of the race for the White House had but little effect upon the war itself, yet it was against this backdrop that events of the period unfolded. Both General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican candidate, and Adlai E. Stevenson, his Democratic opponent, made peace the keynote of their platforms. The slackening of interest in military victory and the avowed intentions of both political parties to make an end of the Korean commitment meant that requests for additional manpower, expenditures, and resources would be closely scanned by both the executive and the legislative branch. In view of the election year atmosphere that fostered criticism of the administration's policies and the possibility—of which the Army was well aware—that there might be a change in the direction of the war if the Republicans proved victorious, mid-1952 was characterized by caution.

## *Reviewing the Alternatives*

A radical change in the course of action being pursued in Korea was impos-

sible under the circumstances. Although the military leaders in the field might chafe under the restrictions imposed upon them, there was little prospect that these would be altered except in detail. They could not be, in fact, without augmenting the military forces at the disposal of General Clark. It had been patent since July 1951 that, as presently constituted, the Eighth Army could hold the line and punish the enemy, but that was all. Limited war meant limited forces. One of the assumptions that military planners in Washington and the Far East had to contend with constantly in plotting courses of action was the dictum that the military strength of the Far East Command would remain substantially as it was.[1] Only a return to full-scale warfare by the Communists or a breaking off of the negotiations could have caused a shift from this policy and, as noted earlier, the enemy seemed content to maintain the *status quo*.

Thus, the studies produced by the Joint Chiefs in Washington reflected the static conditions in Korea and the political atmosphere in the United States. The Joint Staff Planners frankly admitted that the war in Korea could not be brought to a successful conclusion with the currently authorized force levels in the three services. If increased forces were sent to Korea, the strategic reserve in the United States would be depleted and allocations for Europe would have to be cut back. The alternative was an accelerated mobilization effort and this appeared to be out of the question. To maintain successfully the military pressure then being exerted upon the Communists seemed to warrant increases in ground, sea, and naval forces in the estimation of the Joint Planners, but, until decisions on a national level established the long- and short-range objectives of the United States in Korea clearly, even this limited support was impossible. As they stated in May 1952: "At the present time we are faced with a set of conditions in Korea which preclude, from a military point of view, a conclusion which can be termed satisfactory. Under these unfavorable conditions, it is necessary to determine what immediate objectives and lines of action can be taken which will be least damaging to our national security, international prestige, and long-range objectives." [2]

The Washington planners seemed doomed to the same kind of frustration that hobbled their counterparts in the Far East Command. Unless the Communists erupted militarily in Korea or cut themselves off completely from the negotiations, intensification or broadening of the war, except in its air phase, was not likely to be considered. In the event the Eighth Army could not contain an enemy offensive, the conflict would probably no longer be limited to Korea, but might well become global in nature. If the Communists refused to continue the truce talks, however, the question of increased military pressure might again become vital and herein lay the weakness of the U.S. military position, for it did not have the strength in being to insure Communist acceptance of an armistice on UNC terms without leaving the United States and Europe unaccept-

[1] See Memo, Col John T. Hall, G–3, for Chief Training Br G–3, 13 May 52, sub: The Effect on the Army of Possible Resumption of Hostilities in Korea, in G–3 091 Korea, 77.

[2] JSPC 853/106, 9 May 52, title: U.S. Courses of Action in Korea.

ably exposed. And any attempt to secure the additional personnel and means would have taken at least a year and required some additional industrial and manpower mobilization as well as a change in the global concept of placing the defense of Europe first.[3]

To be sure, the United States retained its atomic superiority, but the question of use of nuclear weapons in a mountainous area like North Korea which offered few worthwhile targets was still moot. In addition, the moral issue of whether the United States should employ atomic bombs again unless it were attacked had not been settled. It was doubtful that the United States would have initiated atomic warfare against a stubborn, but static enemy in Korea. This, then, reduced the U.S. position in Korea to a gamble that the Chinese did want peace and that the limited military pressure that the FEC forces could apply would secure that peace. In the meantime, the ROK and Japanese defense forces would be built up in the hope that they eventually would be capable of handling the Communist threat by themselves. This was the insurance policy that the United States took out against an interminable prolongation of the Korean affair. Eventually, whether an armistice was concluded or not, the non-Korean forces would be gradually withdrawn from the peninsula.[4]

Under these circumstances, planning for military victory appeared to be an academic exercise. The Joint Staff worked up plans and consulted with Clark's headquarters. In Tokyo the Far East Command examined ambitious outlines of operations that would increase the military pressure on the enemy or carry the Eighth Army through to victory. But the hard fact remained that none of these plans could be carried out by the forces then at Clark's disposal. To a JCS query on 23 September for his comments on possible courses of action if the negotiations failed, Clark said that he could do little more on the ground front.

> We confront undemoralized enemy forces, far superior in strength, who occupy excellent, extremely well-organized defensive positions in depth and who continue to provide themselves with sufficient logistic support. Under these conditions, it appears evident that positive aggressive action, designed to obtain military victory and achieve an armistice on our terms, is not feasible by this command with current forces operating under current restrictions. Only with increased forces and the removal of certain restrictions could the FEC mount intensified operations with some hope of winning success without "highly unpalatable personnel costs."

Clark did not think that the United Nations Command should take the losses inherent in decisive offensive operations unless it intended to carry the fight to the Yalu. Intermediate objectives would be costly and undecisive, he felt.[5]

Although Clark did not believe that the USSR would enter the Korean War if the UNC drove to the Yalu, his concept of military victory had no chance for acceptance on the eve of the elections or thereafter. It ran squarely against the trend that favored the quick liquidation of the Korean commitment by political

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 12 May 52, sub: Courses of Action in Korea, in G–3 091 Korea, 29/11.

[5] (1) Msg, JCS 919187, JCS to CINCFE, 23 Sep 52. (2) Msg, CX 56022, CINCUNC to JCS, 29 Sep 52, in Transcript of Briefings G–3 091 Korea, 78.

action. It was well for Clark to be ready in the event of an unexpected change of conditions, but the possibilities for such a shift were remote. The alternatives to a continuation of the policy of seeking a political settlement backed by limited military pressure in the field meant more men, more casualties, more expenditures, and more resources. By 1952 it was obvious that the era following the outbreak of the war when men, money, and matériel had been supplied on a comparatively liberal basis was over and the time for retrenchment was at hand. In this climate of opinion, broadening or intensifying the war to any great degree would appeal to but few.

### *Budget, Manpower, and Resources*

The Presidential budget message in January 1952 had foreshadowed the time of austerity. In previous estimates the JCS had hoped to build up military forces to what might be considered acceptable defense levels by 1954. Presidential budget restrictions now made this impossible for the Chief Executive cut back the funds requested by the services. By lowering the allocations he stretched the period of preparedness from 1954 to 1956. This meant that, in the opinion of the JCS, if the Soviet Union attacked in full force before 1956, the United States capacity to resist successfully would be reduced. Although the cuts would affect the Air Force's attainment of 126 modern combat wings primarily, the Army would also have to draw in its belt.[6]

In some respects, the lower budget request for the armed services was deceptive, for it was predicated upon the hope that the Korean War would be over by the end of the fiscal year. Extension of the war beyond 30 June 1952 meant that supplementary appropriations would have to be requested later on to take care of deficiencies. General Collins and his staff had found it difficult to plan their fiscal estimates on this restricted basis and in May he asked the JCS to press the Secretary of Defense again for consideration of the assumption that hostilities would continue through the next fiscal year, subject to review at the beginning of each fiscal quarter. In late June, Secretary Lovett agreed that the JCS could assume that the war would last until 30 June 1953 insofar as planning for fiscal year 1954 estimates was concerned.[7]

Nevertheless the original Army estimate of 22.2 billion dollars for fiscal year 1953 had been tapered down by the President and his budget advisors to 14.2 billion dollars and Congress had lopped off nearly two billion dollars more in July. This would mean that the combat readiness date for the Army would be postponed until fiscal year 1956 and the expanded production base for items such as trucks, tanks, and artillery would be reduced. In addition, Army personnel requirements would have to be lowered.[8]

In Secretary Lovett's opinion, the Army had only itself to blame for the budget cuts. He told Secretary of the Army Pace that Congressional commit-

[6] JCS 1725/175, 20 May 52, title: Information for the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

[7] (1) Memo, CofS for JCS, 21 May 52, sub: Assumption of Termination of Hostilities in Korea, in G–3 091 Korea, 1/15. (2) Memo, Lovett for JCS, 24 Jun 52, no sub, incl to JCS 1800/195.

[8] Draft Statement of Secy Army before the Senate Appropriations Committee . . . , ca. 10 Jun 52, in G–3 110, 10.

tees invariably asked Army witnesses why they had not obligated the funds already advanced if the need for matériel were so great. Evidently the witnesses had not answered these questions satisfactorily, he went on, and could not as long as undelegated funds continued to pile up and production was not accelerated to turn the money into usable goods. He found the excuse of "no funds" offered by the Army "tiresomely threadbare." [9]

The failure of the Army to obligate all the funds previously voted by Congress was due in part to the administrative delays inherent in arranging and concluding large contracts with hundreds of firms. In this case the care and caution exercised by the Army in negotiating contracts redounded to its disadvantage. Instead of having all the moneys deemed necessary on hand at the beginning of the fiscal year, it seemed that the Army would again have to depend upon supplemental appropriations to cover future deficiencies in carrying on the war.

This piecemeal approach to financing the war on a contingent basis made it difficult for the Army planners to formulate firm programs, for frequently it took eighteen months to two years to secure production of many items and few could guess how long the war would drag on. But the knowledge that money could be gotten if the need could be demonstrated was at least comforting. In the field of manpower, the situation was more serious and the prospects were less encouraging.

During the remainder of 1952, most of the men called into service during 1950 would have completed their two years of duty and would be eligible for discharge. Almost three-quarters of a million trained troops were scheduled to be released and an estimated 650,000 raw recruits would replace them. To train this tremendous number of men, the Army would have to devote about 25 percent of its total manpower to this task alone. If hostilities did not end shortly, the effective strength of Army forces in the United States would be limited to one airborne division because of the influx of the untrained troops. Other divisions would be undermanned and would have to be utilized as replacement and training divisions. To cope with the problem, General Collins urged the JCS in June to support his request for an increase of 92,000 men for overhead for the Army.[10] Although Mr. Lovett tried to secure this augmentation, he ran into opposition from the Bureau of the Budget and the National Security Resources Board and was unsuccessful. From a total of almost 1.7 million in April 1952, Army personnel steadily shrank to about 1.58 million at the end of October.[11]

Cuts in personnel required reduction of officer strength as well. In the Far East Command the Army officer strength was to be cut by almost six hundred officers because of the budget limitations. Clark protested vigorously but G–3 informed him in June that the reduction on a world-wide basis had amounted to 5 percent. In the case of the FEC, Korea

[9] Memo, Secy Defense for Secy Army, 15 Aug 52, incl to Summary Sheet, Eddleman for CofS, 15 Oct 52, in G–3 091 Korea, 36/3.

[10] Memo, CofS for JCS, 14 Jun 52, sub: Assumption of Termination of Hostilities in Korea, in G–3 091 Korea, 1/28.

[11] (1) Memo, Jenkins for Taylor, 11 Jul 52, sub: Implication of Continued Hostilities in Korea, in G–3 091 Korea, 1/32. (2) STM–30, Strength of the Army, 30 Apr and 31 Oct 52.

had been excluded and the actual cut had been made on the officer strength in Japan and the Ryukyus; otherwise it would have been more.[12]

At the end of July, G–3 suggested to Clark that he might be able to decrease the number of officers training the Japanese defense forces and give additional responsibility to Japanese instructors at battalion level and below. If U.S. officers could be confined to the higher echelons, the saving would help meet the anticipated over-all shortage of officers. Clark, in his reply, asserted that the Japanese forces would experience a large turnover in trained personnel in late 1952 as two-year enlistments expired and were also about to undergo training in heavy armaments that would preclude a reduction of U.S. officers for the present.[13]

In a frank letter to Clark on 1 August, General Collins discussed Army personnel prospects for the year ahead. The loss of half of the strength of the Army and the huge problem of training all the new replacements would sharply affect the status and quality of the reserve forces in the United States. Each month, Collins continued, the Army had to send 40,000 replacements overseas and this demand could be met until November. After that, FEC would receive its full quota, but other areas would go understrength. Collins felt that this would be a difficult period and much would depend upon the character of leadership at all echelons, if the Army were going to weather it successfully.[14]

The tone of Collins' letter left no doubt but that the Army manpower situation would deteriorate further. As ROK forces became trained and demonstrated their ability to take on further responsibility, they would replace the U.S. troops in the line. If the *status quo* in Korea continued, the U.S. contribution would be gradually diminished.[15]

The changing attitudes to U.S. funds and manpower were also reflected in the distribution of resources during the mid-1952 era. When General Clark in May voiced his concern over a possible Communist air build-up in North Korea once an armistice was concluded, and asked that his fighter force be increased by four F–86 fighter-interceptor wings and eight automatic weapons battalions to counter this threat, the Joint Chiefs were sympathetic. But after carefully surveying F–86 production and the availability of antiaircraft units, they could only offer limited support. By October, the JCS informed Clark in early July, the F–86 Sabres that had been promised him in February would be delivered. In addition, 65 Sabrejets and 175 F–84's would be diverted to the FEC from other commitments to bring all FEAF fighter wings up to full strength and provide a 50-percent reserve. To help out on the defense of Japan, the JCS continued, one Strategic Air Command fighter wing of 60 F–84's would be deployed to Japan on a rotational basis. As for the antiaircraft battalions, one 90-mm. gun and two

[12] (1) Ltr, TAG to CINCFE, 14 May 52, sub: Military and Civilian Personnel Authorization, in G–3 091, 46. (2) Msg, CINCFE to DA, 22 May 52, DA 141852. (3) Msg, DA 911831, G–3 to CINCFE, 22 Jun 52.

[13] (1) Msg, DA 914690, G–3 to CINCFE, 30 Jul 52. (2) Msg, C 53302, CINCFE to DA, 8 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, and CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 47

[14] Ltr, Collins to Clark, 1 Aug 52, no sub, in FEC G–3 320.2 Strength No. 1.

[15] Memo, Pace for Secy Defense, 16 Oct 52, sub: Reduction of U.S. Manpower in Korea, in G–3 320.2 Pacific, 13.

automatic weapons battalions could be provided by taking them from the continental United States defense forces.[16] Although the provision of these air and antiaircraft units and equipment involved some risk in spreading out very thinly the forces not involved in the Korean War, the JCS attempted to scrape together at least part of what the FEC requested.

### *Ammunition Again*

One of the problems that continued to plague the Army during the summer and fall of 1952 was the supply of ammunition. As noted earlier, there was little expectation that conditions would improve noticeably before the end of the year.[17] And if the war waxed hot in Korea once more, even an increase in production would do little more than replace the rounds expended.

At a briefing in late April, the Army chiefs in Washington were informed that in the five major deficient categories—60-mm., 81-mm., and 4.2-inch mortars, 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers—the situation was especially serious. If war broke out in Europe on 1 January 1953, the United States would only be able to supply six divisions with these five types of rounds and a year later the total that could be kept in action would be fifteen divisions. Current U.S. ammunition production facilities by early 1953 would have reached their maximum capacity and it would take another year and a half before new ones could be brought into production. When Secretary of the Army Pace heard about this, he directed that the entire question of expanding the ammunition production base be re-examined.[18]

Early in May another discordant note sounded from Korea. A newspaper story claimed that the American soldiers were fighting with secondhand equipment and a shortage of ammunition. When the Army asked the Far East commander to comment, he replied that ammunition was plentiful and rationing was a normal military precaution. Since this information seemed diametrically opposed to the stand then being taken by General Collins before Congress to secure additional funds for ammunition, G–3 asked FEC to explain further. As it turned out, the theater staff had based its estimates upon action on the battlefield continuing at the limited pace of the April–May period. If the action should quicken, the ammunition situation might alter radically. The one round whose supply did appear to be in a precarious position considering proposed production schedules in the United States was the 155-mm. howitzer shell, the theater staff concluded.[19]

The dependence upon restricted operations at the front to maintain ammunition levels came to the fore again in early June. When Van Fleet toured his corps headquarters, he discovered that it had been necessary to limit deliveries of 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzer shells to the other corps in order to provide the U.S. I Corps with adequate quantities for its

[16] (1) Msg, CX 68196, CINCFE to JCS, 9 May 52, DA–IN 136993. (2) Msg, JCS 913020, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Jul 52.

[17] See Chapter X, above.

[18] (1) G–3 Memo for Rcd, 22 Apr 52, sub: Ammunition Supply Situation, in G–3 470, 4. (2) Memo, Col H. C. Hine, Jr., for Jenkins, 29 Apr 52, sub: Ammunition Supply Situation in FY 1953, in G–3 337, 23.

[19] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, pp. 129–30.

missions. The corps commanders were aware that the situation would become even more complicated as additional ROK battalions were activated and supplied.[20]

By the end of June Clark had become gravely concerned over supplies of the 155-mm. howitzer shell. The Communists had almost doubled their artillery and mortar fire during the month and the Eighth Army had to increase its expenditures in self-defense. As mentioned earlier, the 105-mm. howitzer was not effective against enemy bunkers and lacked the range for counterbattery fire. Clark pointed out that when the 6 ROK 155-mm. battalions became active, the FEC would have to supply 486 pieces instead of 378. Although the authorized day of supply was 40 rounds per tube, Clark had had to restrict the expenditures to a bit over 15 rounds a day. If the scheduled delivery of 155-mm. ammunition during the summer were maintained, only 140,000 rounds would arrive in the FEC and this would require further limitations. By 1 September, Clark concluded, theater stocks would be reduced to about 350,000 rounds or only 62 days supply instead of 90.[21]

General Collins recognized that the situation in the Far East Command was far from ideal, but he relayed several hard production facts to Clark in early July. At the present, only about 100,000 rounds of 155-mm. ammunition were coming off the lines each month and this would gradually climb to 650,000 rounds a month in approximately a year. To provide Clark with the full 40 rounds a day for 486 pieces would require about 583,000 rounds a month, a rate that would not be reached until March 1953, Collins continued. The most the Army could provide, without leaving Europe critically short and eliminating firing in training, would be on the order of 400,000 to 500,000 rounds during the 1 July–31 October 1952 period. Of course, Collins went on, in the event of a major attack, the Eighth Army could fire whatever was necessary to halt it, but it would take time to replace ammunition expended at a higher daily rate than 15 rounds. If the steel strike, which had begun on 2 June, lasted for a considerable length of time, Collins felt that improvement in the situation would be delayed further.[22]

Actually the Christie Park plant at Pittsburgh which produced over 60 percent of the 155-mm. shell forgings had already lost production of 60,000 forgings during the first month of the strike. Secretary Pace urged Mr. Lovett on 5 July to bring this loss to the attention of both labor and management in the hope that further damage might be averted.[23]

The urgency of the 155-mm. shell situation was reflected at the army and corps level in Korea several days later. Van Fleet informed his subordinates that the resupply rate through October would amount to about six to eight rounds per day and therefore the Eighth Army would employ its 155's only on the most remunerative targets, using other caliber

[20] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 139–41.

[21] Msg, CX 51020, Clark to Collins, 28 Jun 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jun 52, Paper 53.

[22] Msg, DA 912775, Collins to Clark, 3 Jul 52. The strike was not settled until 25 July 1952 and endured fifty-four days in all.

[23] Memo, Pace for Secy Defense, 5 Jul 52, sub: Opening of Christie Park Plant . . . , in G–3 470, 7.

weapons and tactical air wherever possible as substitutes.[24]

On 13–14 July, Collins and his deputy assistant chief of staff, G–4, General Reeder, visited Eighth Army and assured Van Fleet that he would get a minimum of five rounds of 155-mm. ammunition per day per tube including the tubes in the new ROK battalions. To help out during the emergency, Reeder suggested to Van Fleet that he might convert some of his 105-mm. to 8-inch howitzer battalions since tubes were available and ammunition was plentiful.[25]

Clark was not willing to let the daily rate rest at such a low figure and he authorized Van Fleet in early August to expend fifteen rounds of 155-mm. howitzer shells a day per tube. General Collins was able to secure approval of this rate later in the month by curtailing other allocations severely.[26]

To help alleviate the shortage, Clark had asked for permission to procure 600,000 rounds of 155-mm. ammunition (less explosives) in Japan. But when the Army discovered that the cost would be more than 60 percent over the U.S. rate, it turned down the request.[27]

However, the Army did agree in mid-August to replace ammunition expended in Korea. This would mean that a ninety-day level for the Korean area at the full rate of forty rounds per day per tube would be sought. When this was attained, Clark would only requisition ammunition on the basis of the number of rounds actually fired.[28]

As the action on the front mounted in September and October, ammunition expenditures on both sides climbed. In one week in September the UNC artillery and mortar units hurled over 370,000 rounds at the enemy and received over 185,000 in return. During the fierce battles of October, the Eighth Army sent 423,000 rounds of 105-mm. howitzer and 108,000 rounds of 155-mm. howitzer shells at the Communists in a six-day period.[29]

The sharply accelerated rate of fire per tube per day from less than 8 rounds of 155-mm. in September to 18 in October posed a new worry for General Clark. If the rate should continue, theater stocks would be reduced to 26 days of supply instead of 60 by the end of November.[30] The prospect led him to urge the Army to review its efforts to expedite deliveries and rebuild the theater stocks. Clark also pointed out that the 155-mm. howitzer shells were not the only cause for concern. 81-mm. high explosive light shells for mortars and 155-mm. high explosive gun shells had been slow in arriving and what was more serious, only 355 fragmentation hand grenades had been shipped to the FEC between 15 August and 7 October.[31]

[24] Msg, GX 6904, CG EUSAK to CG I U.S. Corps *et al.*, 10 Jul 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jul 52, p. 15.

[25] Memo, Mudgett for Clark, 15 Jul 52, sub: Items of Personal Interest to CINCFE . . . , in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 16.

[26] (1) Msg, CX 53249, Clark to CofS, 7 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 62. (2) Memo, Ralph J. Watkins for Bendetsen, 28 Aug 52, no sub, in FEC Gen Admin Files.

[27] Msg, DA 915309, G–4 to CINCFE, 7 Aug 52.

[28] Msg, DA 915951, G–4 to CINCFE, 14 Aug 52.

[29] (1) Memo, Eddleman for DCofS Opns and Admin, 29 Sep 52, sub: Statistical Data, in G–3 091 Korea, 93/3. (2) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, p. 32.

[30] Msg, CX 57223, Clark to DA, 18 Oct 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 51.

[31] *Ibid.*



AN 8-INCH HOWITZER AND CREW

In its reply the Army assured Clark that it was doing all it could to improve the situation and that the supply picture was steadily becoming better.[32] Some production was lost in the 155-mm. howitzer shell because of the steel strike and this had held down the delivery rate of this critical round. Yet in this and in the other rounds that were in short supply, the FEC got the lion's share. The real danger, General Reeder commented later on, lay in the precarious position of theater stocks in Europe. If hostilities had broken out there, the situation would have been disastrous.[33]

There were two points that should be kept in mind in considering the ammunition situation during the last two years of the war. First, there were no shortages of more than a temporary nature in the hands of the troops. Whenever it was necessary, the Eighth Army could use whatever ammunition it needed to protect itself. Secondly, despite the restrictions on the rounds per

[32] Msg, DA 922080, G–4 to CINCFE, 25 Oct 52.

[33] Reeder, The Korean Ammunition Shortage, ch. VI, p. 9.

day during the more quiescent periods, the Eighth Army consistently fired far more ammunition than it received from the Communists. And this did not include the bombs, gun, and rocket fire launched by the UNC air forces. The troops could not fire as much as they desired all the time, it was true, but the picture was not all black. The bleakest spot was in the U.S. global ammunition situation rather than in Korea. Provided that Korean demands remained fairly stable, this condition would not be alleviated until production facilities reached their peak in 1953. In the meantime, restrictions would remain in effect and the dispute over shortages would continue.

### *The Expansion of the ROK Army*

Discussion of the domestic problems of budget, manpower, and availability of resources for the Korean War could hardly avoid the closely related subject of the role of indigenous forces in the conflict. Since the United States wished to decrease gradually its commitments in the Far East, the contributions of the ROK, Japanese, Chinese Nationalist, and the armed forces of the other free nations in the area became more important. U.S. funds invested in native troops produced multiple returns, for the same amount of money would train, equip, and maintain more Far East nationals than Americans and by the same token should permit the United States eventually to reduce its responsibilities and its manpower in the theater. Whether the additional quantities of indigenous soldiers would also succeed in attaining a high degree of quality was as yet undetermined, but the improvement in the performance of some ROK units during the mid-1952 period was definitely encouraging.

With the replacement of General Ridgway by General Clark in May, there had been a change of attitude toward the enlargement of the ROK Army. Both MacArthur and Ridgway, it will be remembered, had favored a ten-division force of 250,000 men as a desirable size and strength. But Clark was inclined from the start toward an expanded ROK Army. Several times during the first two weeks of his assumption of command, he remarked that the bigger the ROK Army was, the better he would like it.[34]

In reality the ROK Army had grown steadily above the 250,000-man level and had long been overstrength. Just before Ridgway had left the theater, he had submitted a new troop list totaling over 360,000 spaces, covering the additional artillery, tank, and security forces being organized and providing for ten additional infantry regiments.[35] The ten-division ceiling had been retained, but the independent regiments could be used as cadres for new divisions if and when this became desirable.

Clark was thoroughly in accord with the expansion of the troop list. As he pointed out in June to the Washington staff, the ROK Army had supplanted the National Police in the corps areas and had taken on increased security duties in guarding prisoners of war and in suppressing guerrillas in the rear. In addition, the replacement and training

[34] Memo, Moorman for CofS, 26 May 52, sub: Expansion of the ROK Forces, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.

[35] Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experiences, pt. IV, pp. 43–44.

system which produced seven hundred ROK soldiers a day had begun to pile up surpluses because of the low attrition rate at the front. To disrupt this smoothly functioning process, Clark reasoned, would not be wise, since it formed insurance against a period of heavy action. It should not be forgotten, Clark concluded, that there were 30,000 patients carried on the rolls because the ROK had no veteran's organization to care for them. Under these conditions, he felt that the Army should grant him authorization for 92,100 bulk personnel and 19,458 to form six separate regiments.[36]

Four days later, Clark followed up with another request. He wanted to add two more ROK divisions to the troop list and increase the total for logistical support from 363,000 to about 415,000. With the creation of the new divisions, Clark maintained, the number of Asians fighting communism would rise and the number of American casualties would decline. The ROKA replacement system would sustain the extra divisions and the six separate regiments, and help make the best use of South Korean manpower.[37]

As it turned out, the movement for expanding ROKA ground forces was not opportune. The Korean Ambassador to the United States, You Chan Yang, was at the time urging the State Department, the Air Force, and Congress to adopt a three-year plan for building up the ROK Air Force tactically.[38] As already indicated, Ridgway had opposed the existence of a small, ineffective ROK air force which he thought would be annihilated at the outset by superior Communist air power.[39] The objections to an augmentation of the ground forces stemmed from altogether different reasons. Owing to the shortages in artillery equipment and ammunition, ROK Army increases in these categories could be supported only by equivalent reductions in U.S. or U.N. forces that were being currently maintained. If there were to be an expansion in the ROK Army, both G–3 and G–4 preferred the increase to be in separate regiments that would not require additional artillery support rather than in divisions.[40]

The JCS, however, were not yet prepared to approve an augmentation of the ROK armed forces. At the end of June they decided to hold to the ten-division, 250,000-man Army and the existing Navy and Air Force.[41]

When General Collins visited Korea in mid-July, he approved raising the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) to 2,500 men per division, but this was as much as he could do at the time. Clark had to inform Van Fleet not to activate further separate light infantry regiments and that ROK Army strength could not exceed 362,945 men. To insure that the replacement and training system did not cause the total strength to go over this figure, Clark told the Eighth Army commander to take action to separate the physically dis-

[36] Msg, C 50459, Clark to DA, 19 Jun 52, DA-IN 152025. The bulk allotment included patients, trainees, interpreters, general prisoners, etc.

[37] Msg, CX 50698, Clark to JCS, 23 Jun 52, DA-IN 153560.

[38] Ltr, You Chan Yang to Bradley, 18 Jun 52, no sub, in G–3 091 Korea, 82.

[39] See Chapter X, above.

[40] Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 7 Jul 52, sub: Strength, Organizational and Logistical Support of Wartime ROK Army, in G–3 091 Korea, 74.

[41] Decision on JCS 1776/281, 30 Jun 52.

abled and other nonuseful members of the ROK Army from the service.[42]

The Collins tour and his discussions with Clark and Van Fleet bore fruit in early August. The Chief of Staff overrode his staff by approving the requested bulk allotment of 92,100 men and directing Army support for a two-division augmentation for the ROK Army. As Collins envisioned the divisional expansion, it would be progressive and fitted within current budget guidelines and availability of logistical resources. He felt it would be desirable to capitalize on the ROK capability to supply trained manpower economically and to pave the way for the eventual withdrawal and redeployment of U.S. Army forces.[43]

While the JCS studied the implications of adding two divisions to the ROK Army, the strength of this army grew to over 350,000 men in August.[44] Since KATUSA was not included in the ROKA totals, Van Fleet asked Clark to seek a further increment in KATUSA strength to a ceiling of 27,000.[45] Clark agreed and urged the Army to permit up to 28,000 KATUSA soldiers to be distributed among the UNC units. Not only would the South Koreans bolster the fighting strength of the UNC organizations, he argued, but they would also receive the training that would make them the finest cadres.[46]

The FEC requests for augmenting the ROK Army and KATUSA were passed along to the JCS together with a third Clark recommendation covering the enlargement of the ROK Marine forces from 12,376 to 19,800.[47] The Joint Chiefs also were reconsidering whether to allow the ROK Air Force to grow as Ambassador You had suggested in June. In mid-September, they determined to hold firm to their earlier position and maintain the ROK Air Force as it was.[48]

The following week the JCS approved Clark's plan for increasing the ROK Army, Marine forces, and KATUSA, lifting the troop ceiling for the ROK Army and marines to 463,000. In their memorandum to Secretary Lovett, the JCS admitted that to supply and equip the ROK increments would mean that the continental U.S. forces would have to go on operating under a 50-percent ceiling on critical items, that 105-mm. howitzers would have to be diverted from NATO programs, and that other critical items would have to be withdrawn from

[42] (1) Memo, Mudgett for Clark, 15 Jul 52, sub: Items of Personal Interest to CINCFE . . . , in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp. (2) Msg, C 52744, CINCFE to Van Fleet, 29 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, an. 4, pt. III, incl 3.

[43] Memo, Brig Gen John C. Oakes, SGS, for ACofS G–3, 8 Aug 52, sub: Additional Logistical Support of War Time ROK Army, in G–3 091 Korea, 71/5.

[44] The strength figures broke down as follows: 10 divisions, 144,420; corps troops, 16,004; Army troops, 101,113; bulk allotment, 92,100; total, 353,637. See Msg, CX 54184, CINCFE to DA, 25 Aug 52, DA–IN 176440.

[45] At 2,500 men per division, KATUSA strength could reach 20,000 since there were 8 divisions—6 U.S. Army, 1 Marine, and 1 Commonwealth. The other 7,000 would be placed in combat support units. See, Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 90.

[46] Msg, C 55066, Clark to DA, 12 Sep 52, DA–IN 183011.

[47] Msg, CX 54489, CINCFE to JCS, 1 Sep 52, DA 179035.

[48] Memo, Brig Gen Charles P. Cabell for Secy Defense, 19 Sep 52, sub: A Three Year Plan for the ROK Air Force, in G–3 091 Korea, 60/5. It should be noted that this decision was somewhat deceptive, for the U.S. Air force had added twenty more fighter planes to the ROK Air Force between the JCS decision of 30 June and the end of September. See Ltr, Col C. C. B. Warden, TAG FEC, for JCS, 30 Oct 52, sub: Peacetime ROK Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy, in G–3 091 Korea, 74.

mobilization reserve stocks. Despite these disadvantages, the JCS felt that the opportunity to add more Asians to the fight against communism made the program worthwhile.[49]

On 1 October, on the heels of the JCS memo, Clark sent an urgent request for decision on the expansion of the ROK armed forces. The efficient replacement and training machine that was feeding the ROK Army seven hundred recruits a day was working all too well. In July the Eighth Army had tried a subterfuge to hold down the flow of recruits by carrying all the new trainees as civilians until they had completed basic training; otherwise the ceiling would have been exceeded in August. Rather than disrupt the steady input into the induction stations, the Eighth Army decided to gamble that the requests for ROKA increases would be approved ultimately and resorted to civilian trainees. If and when the augmentation were granted, the men would be trained and ready to go into the new units as they were organized.[50]

There were certain advantages to this procedure since it permitted the physically unfit and undesirables to be weeded out before they were sworn into the Army. But the delay in the decision at Washington had led to a crisis. The training cycle was only eight weeks long and by September the first civilian trainees were finishing the course and beginning to funnel into the Army officially. With casualties still at a moderate level, the new influx would soon send the ROKA total above the present ceiling. If the ROK Army were not going to be enlarged, Clark told the JCS, he would have to cut back the number of replacements to the current attrition level.[51]

Before the Secretary of Defense gave his support to ROK expansion, however, he wanted to know more about the impact of the program upon NATO, the Japanese defense forces, the Chinese Nationalist Army, and military assistance to the countries of Southeast Asia. General Bradley quickly informed him that deliveries of critical items like 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers and 75-mm. recoilless rifles to other nations would be delayed by two months and that the necessity to supply ammunition for these weapons, if they were assigned to the ROK Army, would further limit the capability of the United States to provide ammunition for Europe and the zone of interior. As for other items that would be required, these could be furnished from Army mobilization and depot stocks.[52]

On 25 October, Mr. Lovett forwarded to the President his recommendation that the ROK forces be expanded with a new ceiling of 463,000 men and five days later Mr. Truman approved the proposal.[53] In the meantime, the Republican candidate, General Eisenhower, had made his famous announcement that he would go to Korea if he were

[49] Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 26 Sep 52, sub: Augmentation of the Wartime ROK Army and Marine Corps, in G–3 091 Korea, 66.

[50] (1) Memo, GCM [Mudgett] for CINC, 20 Sep 52, sub: Strength of the ROK Army, in FEC G–3 320.2 Strength No. 1. (2) Msg, CX 56149, Clark for JCS, 1 Oct 52, DA–IN 190069.

[51] Msg, CX 56149, Clark to JCS, 1 Oct 52, DA–IN 190069.

[52] (1) Memo, Deputy Secy Defense Foster for JCS 8 Oct 52, sub: Augmentation . . . , incl to JCS 1776/-322. (2) Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 10 Oct 52, sub: Augmentation . . . , in G–3 091 Korea, 66/8.

[53] (1) Ltr, Lovett to the President, 25 Oct 52, no sub, in G–3 091 Korea, 66/17. (2) Memo, Lovett for JCS, 30 Oct 52, sub: Augmentation . . . , G–3, Korea, 66/16.

elected and had urged that the ROK forces be increased. On 29 October, at a political speech, he had read excerpts of a letter from Van Fleet to his former chief of staff, General Mood, in which the Eighth Army commander expressed his familiar theme that the ROK Army should be doubled from ten to twenty divisions so that U.S. forces could be released.[54] Whether the political pressure of the campaign had an appreciable effect upon President Truman's decision would be difficult to ascertain, but it was possible that it might have speeded up favorable action.

At any rate, the first big step toward building a more formidable ROKA force had been taken and Eisenhower's victory at the polls in early November indicated that this move was only the forerunner of further developments along the same line.

The drive for expansion had garnered the major share of the attention during the summer and fall of 1952 and tended to throw into the shadows the other developments in the ROK Army. During April the ROK 1st Field Artillery Group of two 105-mm. howitzer battalions completed its training and in May moved into the line in support of the ROK 6th Division. By October eight of the ROKA artillery groups were available for duty and the remaining two would be ready before the end of the year. In the field of armor, four ROKA and one Korean Marine tank companies were operational by the close of October and three others were awaiting the arrival of tanks from the United States.[55] The cadres of the six ROKA 155-mm. howitzer battalions authorized were sent out in June—one to each U.S. division. By November they were ready to take their battalion firing tests.[56]

The assignment of ROKA artillery battalions to U.S. artillery units in the combat zone complicated the problems of the latter considerably. In addition to surmounting the language barrier, the U.S. artillery commanders had to devote a great deal of time to the training of the ROKA outfits and to the finding of suitable firing positions for the ROKA pieces in their often crowded sectors.

To improve the caliber of the ROKA officer corps, Clark requested the Army in June to raise the allocations of student spaces in U.S. service schools to 581 for fiscal year 1953. Three months later, he asked that 100 spaces in the Artillery School and 150 spaces in the Infantry School be made available for ROKA officers in the session that was to begin in March 1953.[57]

Under Brig. Gen. Cornelius E. Ryan the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) had almost 2,000 U.S. personnel assisting in ROK training by October, but the lifting of the troop ceiling to 463,000 betokened additional duties. Van Fleet levied twenty-four officers from his corps and divisions and channeled sixty-eight more from his pipeline into KMAG. Unfortunately, losses to rotation deprived KMAG of many officers and enlisted men during

[54] New York *Times*, October 30, 1952.

[55] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, May and Oct 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 41–42 and pp. 62–64, respectively.

[56] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, June and Oct 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 73 and 63, respectively.

[57] (1) Msg, CX 50924, CINCFE to DA, 26 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, an. 4, pt. II, J-17, 27 Jun 52. (2) Msg, CX 55484, CINCFE to DA, 20 Sep 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 55.

the last half of 1952 and imposed a heavy burden upon the KMAG staff.[58]

In mid-September, Van Fleet asked the ROK Army to increase the Korean Service Corps (KSC) from 75,000 to 100,000. He planned to form six new regiments and bring the existing units up to strength. Since members of the KSC served six-month terms, the ROK Army would have to bring in 4,000 personnel each week to keep the program at full strength.[59]

### *Crisis in the Rear*

In addition to the support and training functions behind the lines, the ROK Army had to cope with security problems as well. Prisoners of war and the safeguarding of the lines of communication were two facets of this function. ROKA units joined other UNC forces in providing personnel to watch over the prisoner camps as they were dispersed in May and June. In the rural areas, guerrillas or bandits—it was difficult to distinguish one from the other—formed a constant threat to the lines of communication. In some sections the roads were unsafe during the hours of darkness and many farmers were afraid to cultivate their land even under the protection of guards during the daytime.[60]

Although guerrilla activity was mainly of nuisance value only, the bands operating in the important Pusan port sector assumed an important role in the development of the internal crisis in the



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ROK Government during the spring of 1952. The basic cause for the rise of domestic dissension lay in the conflict between President Rhee and the members of the National Assembly who opposed him. With the national elections destined to be held in the summer, Rhee determined to have the constitution changed so that the President could be elected by popular vote rather than chosen by the Assembly. His foes were equally resolved to keep this function in the legislative branch.[61]

On 24 May matters came to a head. Rhee placed Pusan under martial law and had some of his opponents in the Assembly arrested. Evidently he intended to dissolve the Assembly and have a new one elected to amend the constitution so that there would be a bicameral legislature and popular election of the President. At any rate, he charged the

[58] Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experience, pt. IV, pp. 8–10.

[59] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 105–06.

[60] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 204.

[61] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, pp. 46–47.

arrested assemblymen with complicity in treason in a Communist conspiracy and justified the continuation of martial law as a measure to counteract guerrilla operations in the Pusan area.[62]

The consternation caused by Rhee's actions was immediate both within and outside Korea. Political and military representatives of the U.N. and the United Nations Command sought to dissuade him from further steps that might result in weakening Korean democratic institutions and might endanger military operations at the front. Since the problem was primarily political, Clark and Van Fleet preferred to let the State Department handle the affair, although Van Fleet did go to see Rhee on 28 May, together with General Lee Chong Chan, the ROKA Chief of Staff, in an effort to persuade the President to lift the martial law edict.[63] Rhee promised to consider this, but took no action.

In the meantime, Van Fleet took precautionary steps to safeguard the UNC personnel and installations. Security guards were reinforced and plans prepared to protect UNC troops, vehicles, and property from mob violence. Since the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment was engaged in prisoner of war duties at Pusan, Van Fleet ordered the unit pulled back to the United Nations Reception Center at Taegu to act as a mobile reserve. He warned General Yount of the 2d Logistical Command that extreme care should be taken to avoid participation in civil disturbances where no danger to the U.N. Command existed.[64] As an added safety measure the JCS authorized Clark to divert up to a regimental combat team from Japan if the political situation deteriorated.[65]

The chief concern of the UNC rested in the uninterrupted flow of supplies to the front, since Pusan was the major port of South Korea and handled the bulk of shipments for the Eighth Army.[66] But the State Department requested full support from the UNC in its efforts to alter Rhee's stubborn stand on martial law and the National Assembly and Collins instructed Clark to back the U.S. political representatives firmly.[67]

On 2 June President Truman sent a note to Rhee deprecating the loss of confidence in Korean leadership that was taking place and asking him to defer further action until Ambassador Muccio returned from the United States.[68] Truman's request may have given Rhee pause, for although he did not lift martial law, he evidently decided not to dissolve the National Assembly.

The impasse between Rhee and his legislature eased as they began to negotiate a compromise during June. It took the form of a constitutional amendment on 3 July that among other things provided for the popular election of the President and Vice President and the establishment of a second legislative chamber. Despite the clear-cut victory over his opponents, Rhee did not end martial law until 28 July.[69]

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[63] Msg, LC 893, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 28 May 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Opn Planning Files, May 52, item 106A.

[64] Msg, GX 6155, CG Eighth Army to CG 2d Logistical Comd, 30 May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, CinC and CofS, incl 27.

[65] Msg, JCS 910146, JCS to CINCFE, 30 May 52.

[66] Msg, C 69322, Clark to DA, 30 May 52, DA-IN 145040.

[67] Msg, DA 910149, CSUSA to CINCFE, 31 May 52.

[68] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, p. 47.

[69] *Ibid.*, Jul 52, pp. 54–55.

During the tense moments in late May and early June, the U.N. Command carefully watched the effects of the crisis upon the military supply lines and on the ROK Army. Since the political parties had abstained from interference in military logistics and Van Fleet had taken a firm stand against political tampering with the leadership of the ROK Army, Clark and Van Fleet were inclined to remain aloof and let the Koreans work out their own internal problems.[70] They had supported the U.S. political representatives faithfully, if without great enthusiasm, in the efforts to end the Korean political war.[71]

While the guerrilla threat that Rhee had used as a reason for imposing martial law had not posed a significant challenge to either the ROK Government or the UNC, small-scale action of a bandit nature mounted during June. On 24 June guerrillas or bandits blew up a train in southwest Korea, destroyed eleven coaches, and killed over forty passengers.[72]

ROK Army and police units waged a constant skirmish with these predators—whose chief objectives seemed to be food and clothing. But despite the toll that the ROK forces exacted, the guerrilla bands managed to gain new recruits and to carry out harassing raids. In July the ROK 1st Division was pulled out of the line and sent to southwestern Korea to help eliminate the nuisance. This had been tried before with only moderate success and the ROK 1st Division had to undergo a similar experience. As the division moved through the mountainous Chiri-san region with National Police units attached, it met no organized resistance. The guerrillas followed the same pattern of dispersion and evasion that they used before. Breaking up into small groups until the ROK forces passed them by, they came together again afterwards and resumed their depredations. After a campaign of more than three weeks chasing the elusive bandits, the ROK 1st Division returned to the front and the National Police again resumed responsibility for the rear areas. From August to October, about three to four hundred guerrillas were reported killed and a hundred or so were captured each month, yet the over-all guerrilla strength declined very slightly.[73]

It was evident that the problem did not admit of an early solution and would probably continue. In Clark's opinion, however, hunting of guerrillas, like the settlement of political squabbles, was an internal ROK affair and in September he told Maj. Gen. Thomas W. Herren, commander of the newly formed Korean Communications Zone, that American soldiers could be used to guard prisoners, safeguard property, and protect supply routes and U.N. nationals, but not to chase bandits.[74]

Although the United Nations com-

[70] (1) Msg, GX 74495 KCG, Van Fleet to Clark, 17 Jun 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal Msg File, 1949–52. (2) Memo, Col Walter R. Hensey, Jr., G–5, for SGS, 19 Jun 52, no sub, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.

[71] (1) Msg, GX 6632, Van Fleet to Clark, 24 Jun 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personel Msg File, 1949–52. (2) Msg, GX 51399, CINCUNC to JCS, 5 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 15.

[72] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 204.

[73] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Jul 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 6; Aug 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 80–81; Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 118; Oct 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 66.

[74] Msg, C 54962, CINCFE to CG KCOMZ, 10 Sep 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 6.



GENERAL HERREN

mander was able to remain neutral in the ROK domestic situation, he found it difficult to avoid participation in the republic's embroilment with Japan. Relations between the two countries, embittered by the controversy over Japanese claims to vested properties in Korea, were aggravated by the Japanese practice of fishing off the Korean coast. In September the ROK Navy seized several Japanese fishing vessels that had violated ROK territorial waters and tension mounted. Clark was forced to establish a sea defense zone on 22 September off the Korean coast, ostensibly to secure the UNC lines of communication and to prevent enemy agents from being landed, but in reality designed to form a buffer area between the ROK and Japanese vessels.[75]

Hardly had this uneasy moment passed when Rhee decided to put an end to the UNC practice of employing about 2,000 Japanese in Korea. Most of the Japanese were working in port areas, installing equipment and training Korean replacements. But ROK resentment at the presence of its former overlords in positions of responsibility led Rhee to direct the arrest of all Japanese who came ashore without the permission of the ROK Government. Clark countered by instructing all Japanese employees to remain on shipboard except in case of absolute necessity. Since the Department of the Army did not wish Clark to make an issue of the matter, Collins told him to intensify his efforts to replace the Japanese with Koreans and to work out a program for doing this that Rhee might approve.[76] In early October Clark passed these instructions on to General Herren, advising him that the emphasis should be put upon training Koreans quickly as replacements and upon an amicable solution of the altercation.[77]

[75] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, pp. 44–46.

[76] (1) Msg, DA 919564, DA to CINCFE, 27 Sep 52. (2) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, pp. 46–49.

[77] Msg, CX 56725, CINCUNC to CG KCOMZ, 9 Oct 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 55.

# CHAPTER XVI

# Conservation of Resources

The return of sporadic activity on the battlefield in November 1952 and the suspension of other than liaison officer's meetings at Panmunjom forecasted a long, uneventful winter. With raids, patrols, and small-unit actions characterizing operations at the front and with bickering over incidents and infractions of the neutrality of the conference area highlighting the contacts between the negotiators, the problems of limited war continued to receive a considerable share of attention during the winter of 1952–53. In Washington and in the Far East the accent remained on conserving and protecting the most precious commitment of the United States to the war—its manpower. Since military victory was no longer at stake, there seemed to be no reason why American lives should be expended needlessly nor for the burden of fighting to be carried on by the old hands. Under static conditions along the battle lines, more ROK troops could be trained and utilized and units could be rotated more frequently. This would allow U.S. forces to be placed in reserve more often and decrease the number of U.S. casualties. The United States could not end the Korean War nor could it withdraw its troops from the peninsula, but it could trim its losses and equalize the risks that each soldier would have to take.

## *The Turning Coin*

Paradoxical though it may seem, rotation was both the main strength and the chief weakness of the Eighth Army in late 1952. As a bolster to morale, rotation played a vital and necessary role in sustaining the ground forces through the depressing and frustrating conditions created by a deadlocked battle situation. By rotating units in and out of the lines at regular intervals, the monotony of routine patrolling and defensive warfare was broken and a change of pace provided. But even more important was the point system that promised a quick return home to the individual as soon as he had served his time at the front.

Before September 1951, a soldier in Korea had to have a minimum of 6 months in a combat division or 12 months in a support unit to be eligible for rotation. New criteria were drawn up in August establishing the point system. For each month in the close combat zone, a soldier received four points. For service in the rear areas two points were earned, and duty in the rest of the FEC merited one point. In September the requirements were 55 constructive months service (CMS) for officers and 43 for enlisted men.[1]

[1] Under these standards, eleven months in the close combat zone (11 x 4) would be enough to make an enlisted man eligible for rotation.

As Army strength increased in the fall of 1951 the criteria were lowered to 40 CMS for officers and 36 for enlisted men. The officer standards were raised to 45 CMS in December to cope with an expected shortage of officer replacements scheduled for early 1952.[2]

March 1952 witnessed an overhauling of the rotation system. Effective 1 April, four points were still awarded for a month in the close combat zone, but only three were given to the troops in the divisional reserve, now called the intermediate combat zone. By June requirements stood at 37 CMS for officers and 36 CMS for enlisted men.[3] Generally, slightly less than a year in Korea in a combat division would suffice to put a man on the rotation list and it was small wonder that the point score became the chief topic of conversation among the combat troops.[4] There could be no doubt of the value of this bright side of the coin in maintaining the fighting spirit of the Eighth Army during the last year of the war.

But the reverse side disclosed some of the disadvantages in adhering to the practice rigidly. To supply the Far East Command with the 20,000 to 30,000 replacements a month that were necessary to meet rotational demands imposed a severe strain on the Army's manpower resources. As General Hull told Clark in early October, drastic levies on the zone of interior units and installations were going to be necessary to meet the FEC quotas during the coming months. Personnel shortages in the European Command, he went on, had already resulted and overseas tours in all other theaters had been extended six months.[5] To keep the point total at 36 for the combat zone during the winter, Clark had to transfer combat troops from Japan and Okinawa to the Eighth Army and to increase the point requirements for the rear areas, first to 38, and later, to 40 points.[6]

To Clark's request for additional replacements to cover the rotational needs, General Collins replied in December that the Army's ability to furnish replacements was determined by the budget, Army strength ceilings, and by draft calls. The point system, he continued, was devised to establish priority of individuals for rotation and not to set up the rate at which the Army was supposed to supply replacements. Collins, however, was able to offer some comfort, for he informed Clark that the shipments of replacements in January and February would be well over 30,000 and this would permit some of the November and December deficits to be made up.[7]

At the front, rotation also had an adverse effect upon combat efficiency. By October 1952, most of the junior officers with World War II experience had returned home as their tours expired and their replacements usually had little or no acquaintance with the battlefield. Many of the troops sent over from the United States lacked field training and

[2] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Oct and Dec 51, sec. I, Narrative, p. 10 and p. 13, respectively.

[3] (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, G–1 sec., p. 3. (2) *Ibid.*, Jun 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 83.

[4] Memo, Watkins for Bendetsen, 28 Aug 52, no sub, in FEC Gen Admin Files, Aug 52. It should not be inferred that the service units at the rear were uninterested in the point score, but there was less at stake here—time not life.

[5] Msg, DA 920367, Hull to Clark, 7 Oct 52.

[6] (1) Msg, C 57617, Clark to Collins, 24 Oct 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, incls 1–89, incl 32. (2) Msg, C 58392, Clark to Collins, 6 Nov 52, in same place, incl 33.

[7] Msg, DA 925905, CSUSA to Clark, 10 Dec 52.

had to learn the hard way under combat conditions. By the time the new men became proficient soldiers, they had amassed enough points to qualify them for rotation and the process had to start all over again. Proficiency standards were extremely difficult to maintain and the artillery and the technical services were especially hard hit. General Van Fleet complained that the artillery had lost the ability to shoot quickly and accurately and blamed this on the rotation program that had stripped the artillery units of their veteran gunners.[8]

There were other unfortunate by-products as well. In a defensive war such as in Korea in 1952, strong fortifications in depth, with carefully laid out fire patterns for supporting weapons, well-planned mine fields, and barbed wire entanglements to prevent or delay enemy access to strongpoints or outposts were required. The enemy had developed a high degree of skill in establishing his defensive lines and in providing for their protection. In many instances, enemy units defending the forward areas had remained in the same sectors for long periods and become thoroughly familiar with the terrain. Spurred by the knowledge that they would stay in position for some time, they took every possible step to increase the strength of their defenses.

For the UNC troops, the opposite was often true. Since they did not usually man a given sector of the front for any considerable length of time, the tendency was to lay as few mines and as little barbed wire as possible so that the patrols would not have to worry about these hazards. Terrain familiarization was difficult as the outfits constantly shifted in and out of the line.

The enemy also used the terrain much more adeptly. While UNC positions were often located on the crest of hills and ridges or on the forward slopes, where they were more exposed to enemy fire, the enemy used the reverse of slopes for his sleeping and supply bunkers and dug tunnels deep into the hills. When the enemy built his trenches, they were angled and parapeted with raised firing positions; the UNC trenches, on the other hand, too frequently were deep, straight, and difficult to fire from. All too often enemy soldiers could infiltrate and sweep a long straight trench with automatic weapons fire.[9] The difference between the enemy and UNC attitude toward defense during this period was similar to that between a homeowner and an overnight guest at a hotel. The enemy became well-acquainted with the neighborhood and took every precaution to protect his property, while the UNC forces adopted the short-term, casual approach of the transient.

### *Facets of the Artillery War*

With rotation as the carrot dangling before his eyes, the individual soldier's main concern was to stay alive until his year of combat service expired. Neither officers nor enlisted men were particularly interested in taking undue chances under these conditions and an air of caution arose. As the reluctance to jeopardize lives grew, the effort to substitute firepower for manpower increased. In

[8] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 68–69.

[9] FEC G–3 Staff Study, Sep 52, title: Defensive Capabilities of Eighth Army, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, an. 4, pt. III, Paper 3.

October and November, UNC gunners fired eight rounds of artillery and four rounds of mortar fire for every enemy round received. By December, although the mortar ratio dipped to three to one, the preponderance in artillery rounds favored the UNC by nineteen to one.[10] The attempt to bury the enemy under tons of explosive hardware generated some interesting experiments.

General Van Fleet was quite concerned over the Eighth Army's use of artillery during the fall of 1952. After conferring with his corps commanders in September, he decided to alter the ratio of 155-mm. guns to 8-inch howitzers. The Eighth Army had forty-four 8-inch howitzers and twenty-eight 155-mm. guns in September and was in the process of converting a battalion of 155-mm. guns to 8-inch howitzers. Van Fleet halted this conversion and ordered the conversion of a 105-mm. howitzer battalion to 8-inch howitzers instead. When the change-over was completed, the Eighth Army would have forty-eight 8-inch howitzers and thirty-six 155-mm. guns. Van Fleet believed that this ratio would provide his army with a better balance in heavy artillery and allow it to get maximum benefit from its superior firepower.[11]

Once he had reorganized the heavy artillery, Van Fleet determined to try out his plan to concentrate heavy firepower against the enemy's artillery. Choosing the Triangle Hill–Sniper Ridge area in the U.S. IX Corps sector as the locale for the test, Van Fleet attached the 1st Observation Battalion and major elements of two 8-inch howitzer and two 155-mm. gun battalions from the U.S. I and X Corps to the IX Corps artillery. During the long and difficult struggle for control of this hill complex, Van Fleet wrote to Clark, each time that the UNC forces had gained the top, intense artillery and mortar fire had made retention of the crest too expensive. When the enemy forces had moved onto the heights, the UNC artillery had forced them to withdraw. The only way to break this sequence, Van Fleet went on, was to destroy the enemy artillery. Then, the ROK 2d Division could seize and hold on to the hard-contested hill mass.[12]

Clark was willing to permit Van Fleet's counterbattery program to proceed and to countenance the extra expenditure of ammunition for a five-day period, but he did not want the ROK 2d Division to renew the battle for Triangle until he was sure the results would be commensurate with the risks. If excessive casualties or abnormal ammunition outlays were going to be required to keep Triangle, Clark was opposed to the move.[13]

Using aerial photography and sound, flash and radar plots, supplemented by shelling reports, the IX Corps artillery

[10] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 1, gives the following figures:

| Date | UNC | | Enemy | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Arty | Mortar | Arty | Mortar |
| Oct 52... | 1,757,557 | 1,323,704 | 220,596 | 351,899 |
| Nov 52.. | 811,203 | 857,996 | 106,203 | 189,750 |
| Dec 52... | 990,758 | 388,241 | 50,983 | 130,545 |

[11] *Ibid.*, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 61–65.

[12] Ltr, Van Fleet to Clark, 3 Nov 52, no sub, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.

[13] Msg, C 58517, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 8 Nov 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Nov 52.

staff compiled a target list of enemy weapon locations. On 3 November the experiment began as the greater part of three 8-inch howitzer and three 155-mm. gun battalions fired single guns and salvos at the Communist gun positions. During the next week the heavy artillery shot close to 20,000 rounds in an effort to eliminate the enemy's artillery in the vicinity of Sniper Ridge and Triangle Hill. But the success was only limited. Artillery observers estimated that it took approximately 50 rounds of accurate fire to achieve destruction of an enemy artillery piece because of the Communist's skillful use of caves, tunnels, and heavy overhead protection. During the test period over 250 enemy gun emplacements were damaged or destroyed, but only 39 artillery and 19 antiaircraft pieces were put out of action. The Communist artillery was not silenced and the battle for the hills continued.[14]

General Clark was not averse to the continuance of a counterbattery program, but he told Van Fleet on 10 November that it would have to be carried on within the normal ammunition allocations assigned to the Eighth Army—at least, until the over-all supply of heavy artillery shells increased.[15]

Better success attended a second experiment conducted in September and October on the IX Corps' front. The Fifth Air Force commander, General Barcus, requested a flak-suppression effort by Eighth Army artillery units in conjunction with close support strikes by his fighter-bombers. He believed that the use of artillery against enemy antiaircraft artillery weapons before and during the strikes would help cut down Fifth Air Force plane losses to AAA fire. Van Fleet approved a thirty-day test period that began on 25 September. As the fighter-bombers approached the target in the IX Corps sector, the artillery fired proximity fuze shells at the known enemy AAA positions in the area. When the planes closed on the target, the artillery switched to quick-fuze ammunition and continued to fire until the air attack was over. At the conclusion of the experiment on 25 October the Fifth Air Force reported only 1 plane had been lost and 13 had been damaged by enemy antiaircraft fire during the test. A total of 1,816 sorties had been flown and, according to statistics based on previous experience, the losses should have been between 4 and 5 planes destroyed and about 64 damaged. No Fifth Air Force plane had been hit by IX Corps artillery fire during the test. In view of the favorable outcome of the experiment under static ground front conditions, Barcus and Van Fleet instructed their units to make the flak-suppression program standard operating procedure in the future.[16]

The heavy expenditure of ammunition during the October fighting stimulated a suggestion from Under Secretary of the Army Johnson in the latter part of the month. Impressed by the magnitude of the task of providing adequate 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzer ammu-

[14] Report of Counter Battery Destruction Program IX Corps Artillery, 3–10 November 1952, in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, bk. 8: Artillery, tab 2.

[15] (1) Ltr, Clark to Van Fleet, 10 Nov 52, no sub. (2) Ltr, Van Fleet to Clark, 15 Nov 52, no sub. Both in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.

[16] (1) Ltr, Fifth AF to CG Eighth Army, 11 Nov 52, sub: Results of Thirty Day Flak Suppression Experiment . . . (2) Ltr, Eighth Army to CG U.S. I Corps *et al.*, 13 Nov 52, sub: Artillery Fire During Air Strikes. Both in Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, bk. 8: Artillery, tab 2.

nition for the Eighth Army, Johnson requested General Collins to investigate the feasibility of substituting mortar fire for artillery fire whenever possible. Not only were mortar shells easier to produce and transport, Johnson pointed out, but, he claimed, they also were causing the bulk of the casualties in Korea.[17]

When Collins passed Johnson's proposal on to the Army Field Forces, they made a quick rebuttal. While granting that two more 81-mm. mortars might profitably be added to each infantry battalion, they stated that both artillery and mortars were designed for particular missions. To use mortars, which were meant for close-in support, to replace artillery, which handled the longer-range tasks, would result in an over-all loss of firepower and battlefield effectiveness. The Field Forces staff doubted that the mortars were producing more casualties than artillery fire, for the statements of prisoners of war indicated just the opposite.[18]

The Under Secretary's concern over the slow progress of ammunition production was reflected in Secretary of Defense Lovett's message to Clark on 21 November. Noting that the problem had been a continuing one for two years despite large appropriations and attempts to expedite the program, Mr. Lovett informed Clark that he would use all his powers to insure that the shortages did not affect the U.S. forces in combat. He had already ordered a maximum effort to move the necessary stocks to meet FEC needs, including diversion of shipments for other theaters if it proved necessary. To help him correct deficiencies in the United States, Lovett asked Clark to send a complete appraisal of the UNC ammunition situation and its effects.[19]

In his reply two days later, Clark maintained that the currently authorized ninety-day level of supply for the FEC, at the Department of the Army approved day-of-supply rates for ammunition, was quite adequate.[20] The trouble, Clark went on, was that many of the items were below the ninety-day level and that the shipments scheduled for the remainder of the year would not make up the deficits. Since a high rate of artillery fire resulted in lower friendly casualties, he deplored the need to reduce the allocations of 155-mm. howitzer ammunition from 15 to 9.4 rounds per day. The necessity to watch and hoard ammunition had also curtailed the ability of his command to retain the initiative by launching limited objective attacks, Clark continued, and worse than that, made the U.N. Command particularly vulnerable to critical shortages in the event of a general offensive by the Communists. Under the circumstances, he concluded, the only prudent solution was to increase ammunition production as soon as possible to the point where the FEC could be supported at the authorized Department of the Army rate.[21]

Secretary Lovett promised Clark that the Army would deal with the shortages

[17] Memo, Under Secy Army Johnson for CofS, 23 Oct 52, sub: Employment of Mortar vs. Artillery in Korea, in G–3 091 Korea, 103.

[18] AFF Staff Study, 21 Nov 52, title: Employment of Mortars vs. Artillery in Korea, in G–3 091 Korea, 103/2.

[19] Msg, DEF 924436, Lovett to Clark, 21 Nov 52.

[20] If the day-of-supply rate was 50 rounds for a particular caliber gun, the number of guns in the FEC of that caliber would be multiplied by 50 and then that total would be multiplied by 90 for ninety days of supply.

[21] Msg, C 59373, Clark to Lovett, 23 Nov 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, incls 1–89, incl 67.




COLLECTION POINT FOR SALVAGED CARTRIDGE SHELLS

in ammunition as though the United States were under full production mobilization and that overriding priorities would be granted as needed. One way in which the FEC could help, Mr. Lovett said, would be in returning brass cartridge cases from expended 105-mm. rounds, since this had become a choke-point in production. Clark immediately asked Van Fleet to aim as close as possible at a 100-percent return of reusable cartridge cases. "While we are still a long ways from being 'out of the woods,' " he told Van Fleet, "I am convinced that our repeated requests for increased supply have finally struck home and that the ammunition supply road ahead will be considerably smoother." [22] As the appropriations voted in 1951 for ammunition production expansion finally began to bear fruit in late 1952 and early 1953, the prospects for some relief in the ammunition situation would become much brighter.

In the meantime, the Far East Command and Eighth Army resorted to substitutions to tide themselves over the period of shortages. When the supply of 81-mm. mortar shells became low in January 1953, the Eighth Army units on the line were directed to fire 4.2-inch mortars or to use artillery fire until thea-

[22] Msg, C 59528, Clark to Van Fleet, 1 Dec 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, incls 1–89, incl 68.

ter stocks could be replenished.[23] To lessen the drain on 155-mm. howitzer ammunition, Clark again sought to convert two of his battalions to 240-mm. battalions, since there supposedly was sufficient ammunition of this caliber available to sustain two battalions at a rate of fifteen rounds per day. The Department of the Army informed him that equipment and spare parts would arrive in March.[24]

As the ammunition situation began to improve in early 1953, General Van Fleet returned to the United States to retire. In March and April he appeared several times before Congressional committees for questioning on conditions in Korea. His statements that he had been handicapped during his twenty-two months of command by shortages of ammunition brought the subject out into the open and the Army had to defend publicly its handling of the problem.[25]

General Collins quickly asked Clark to prepare a statement and on 16 March the Far East commander complied. His assessment of the situation was as follows:

> There has been no shortage of small arms ammunition in the theater; stocks of other ammunition as indicated below have been less than they should have been. However, such shortages were mostly in theater stocks and the pipeline and not in forward area combat units. As far as I have been able to determine Eighth Army has never been 'out' of ammunition nor denied authority to shoot ammunition in adequate quantities when required by the tactical situation. Insofar as can be determined, no unit in Korea was refused ammunition for an essential mission.
>
> While Eighth Army was never 'out' of ammunition the shortage limited the combat potential of theater forces. The continued increase in enemy artillery activity with a corresponding increase in friendly casualties required an increase in Eighth Army's counterbattery effort which included the employment of the Corps and Division artillery 155mm Howitzer material and therefore necessitated the expenditure of a critical type of artillery ammunition. In addition, the attack of targets characteristically dug-in at considerable depths required increased expenditures to accomplish their neutralization or destruction. With the knowledge of shortages of critical types of ammunition and their limited production, the amount of ammunition available for day to day operation was necessarily restricted and care was taken to hold down expenditure whenever possible without denying their use when necessary. Had the enemy launched and sustained an all-out offensive during the periods of ammunition shortage, theater stocks would have been reduced dangerously low since this type of operation always results in the expenditure of 3 or 4 times the DA day of supply of ammunition and therefore would have placed us in an unfavorable position in our capability of striking back hard at the most opportune time and place.

He listed the types that had been in short supply at various times and then went on to state that he considered the present levels of ammunition in the theater to be adequate for maintaining current operations and to counter a general Communist offensive if it should materialize, provided *"on-hand assets are maintained at the 90-day level."* [26]

[23] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I, Narrative, p. 126.

[24] (1) Msg, CX 59611, CINCFE to DA, 3 Dec 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1–78, incl 46. (2) Msg, DA 925751, G–3 to CINCFE, 7 Dec 52. The 159th Field Artillery Battalion and the 213th Field Artillery Battalion were converted to 240–mm. battalions on 20 March 1953.

[25] For a detailed account of the matter, see U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 83d Congress, 1st session, Hearings on Ammunition Supplies in the Far East.

[26] Msg, C 61525, Clark to Collins, 16 Mar 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1–72, incl 37.

The complexities of the ammunition story made the accuracy of the shortage charges extremely difficult to evaluate. But it was doubtful whether more ammunition in the critical categories would have substantially influenced the battle situation in the last two years of the war, for the restrictions on offensive operations were not dependent upon the ammunition supply, but rather upon the political and military objectives of the United States and its U.N. allies at the time. As long as they preferred to settle the war at the conference table and to delimit the Korean commitment, even full stocks of ammunition could have made no real difference in the outcome. The Communist disregard for the loss of lives involved in protracting the war argued that a few thousand more casualties alone would not have impelled them more quickly toward a settlement of the dispute.

### *The Bulwark Grows*

As already related, one way in which the United States could limit the commitment in Korea was by building up the ROK fighting forces. Shortly after President Truman approved the expansion of the ROK Army to 12 divisions in late October, the ROK 12th and 15th Divisions were activated, along with 6 separate regiments. The Eighth Army estimated that the 12th Division and 3 separate regiments would be operationally ready by the end of December and the 15th Division and the other 3 regiments would be prepared for action a month later.[27]

Thus as early as November, the ROK ground forces had a strength ceiling of 463,000 men.[28] But a twelve-division army was only a stopgap measure, in Clark's opinion, and he submitted a plan and schedule on 1 November for augmenting the total to 20 divisions by August 1953. The number of ROK Army Corps would be increased from 2 to 6 to handle the additional divisions. With a 16-week training period set up for the new divisions, the last one activated would be ready for combat before the close of 1953. As the ROK units were organized, equipped, and trained, Clark informed Collins, 1 U.S. or other U.N. division could be placed in reserve for each 2 new divisions prepared. By May 1953, he could begin to release the U.S. divisions—one at a time—for employment elsewhere. If all went well, up to 4 U.S. divisions and 2 corps headquarters could be redeployed by mid-1954.

ROK Army expansion, Clark cautioned, also had its negative side. The Military Advisory Group would have to be enlarged to carry the increased load and over five hundred officers and enlisted men would have to come from outside the theater. If U.S. forces were withdrawn from the line and eventually from Korea, pressure from other UNC countries to decrease their commitments

[27] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 44–46.

[28] Msg, CX 58179, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 1 Nov 52, in FEC G-3 320.2 Strength No. 1, gives the following breakdown:

| Ground Forces | Strength |
|---|---|
| Total | 462,920 |
| ROK Army | 415,120 |
| KATUSA | 28,000 |
| ROK Marines | 19,800 |

could also be expected. And as ROK troops began to assume more responsibility for manning the front lines, the United States would have to turn over more and more matériel and equipment to them and this could never be recovered regardless of the outcome of the war. Much of this would come from the FEC's strategic reserve and would affect the growth of the Japanese defense forces. If the ROK Army were expanded to double its present size, its combat efficiency would suffer as cadres were taken from the present units, Clark continued. To counter this watering-down, he recommended that the balance of the program be implemented as U.S. logistical capabilities permitted, with the emphasis being laid on the development of sound forces as well as U.S. personnel savings.[29]

In Washington, the Army G–3 approved Clark's note of caution. ROK manpower, General Eddleman pointed out, was not a limiting factor, but the scarcity of competent leaders from noncommissioned officers up to the corps level would restrict the effectiveness of the newly formed units. Since the United States would have to provide the bulk of the logistic support, including initial equipment, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and NATO augmentation would both incur delay. Eddleman urged that Clark's moderate approach to the ROK Army expansion be adopted and that the problem of budgeting the cost of the program—which could not be absorbed by the U.S. Army under present limitations—be taken up by the Joint Staff.[30]

Secretary of the Army Pace and General Collins agreed that the time had come to consider the ultimate goal for ROK forces. On 17 November Pace passed the matter on to Secretary Lovett, as the implementation of the twenty-division program was beyond the purview of the Army. The broader aspects of such an increase would involve the over-all conduct of the war in Korea, governmental relations with nations who were recipients of Mutual Defense funds, and the structure of the federal budget, Pace declared, but the Army favored the establishment of a ROK capability to man the entire battle line as quickly as possible.[31]

Although Mr. Lovett turned the problem over to the JCS early in December, there was small chance that a decision would be reached until the new administration took over in January. Both President-elect Eisenhower and his designated Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, were briefed in the interim on the implication of raising a twenty-division ROK Army. General Collins pointed out that 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers and certain types of ammunition were the most critical items of equipment and supply that would have to be considered, but the main question

[29] Ltr, Clark to CofS, 1 Nov 52, sub: Expansion in ROKA, in G–3 091 Korea, 77/2. Although Clark did not mention comparative costs in maintaining U.S. and ROK divisions, a study by the Eighth Army in November estimated that the monthly pay and rations for a U.S. division amounted to $6,104,164 as against $76,745 for a ROK division. See Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 55.

[30] (1) Summary Sheet, Eddleman for DCofS, 3 Nov 52, sub: Proposed Two Year Program . . . , in G–3 091 Korea, 75. (2) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 4 Nov 52, sub: Development of Wartime ROK Army, in G–3 091 Korea, 73/3.

[31] Memo, Pace for Secy Defense, 17 Nov 52, sub: Further Expansion of ROK Forces, in G–3 091 Korea, 76.



CADETS OF THE KOREAN MILITARY ACADEMY ON PARADE

remained that of financing the program. In the past, the Chief of Staff declared, there had been no specific Congressional authority for the Army's support of ROK forces. There was, however, tacit approval; Congress had been informed and had voted appropriations for the Army to provide replacement of equipment furnished the Republic of Korea. Collins felt that the expansion program was feasible: if the current stalemate continued and the enemy did not increase his forces appreciably; if a supplementary two billion dollars were added to the Army budget for fiscal year 1954 and the cost of supporting twenty divisions were budgeted far in advance; and if estimated delays in the completion of the NATO program and in the provision of normal artillery strength of four battalions for all the ROKA divisions were accepted.[32]

[32] (1) Memo, Collins for Bradley, 26 Nov 52, no sub, in G–3 091 Korea, 82. (2) Briefing for the Secy Defense Designate by the CofS, ca. mid-Dec 52, in G–3 337, sec. IV, 64.

As the Republicans under President Eisenhower took over control of the government in January and began to weigh the pros and cons of the ROKA expansion, events in Korea provided an additional impetus to their deliberations. The ROK induction machine, still working in efficient fashion, had continued to train replacements at a brisk pace. By mid-January Clark had informed the JCS that if the present induction rate were maintained, all major ROKA units would be overstrength by the end of the month. It was basically the same problem as before; curtailment would interrupt the flow of trainees and entail a loss of time if the operation were to be resumed at a later date. Since cadres and replacements for two more divisions were now available, Clark recommended approval of the activation of two divisions in January and the raising of the strength ceiling to 460,000, exclusive of KATUSA. If possible he would like to have the entire ten-division augmentation approved in principle and theater stocks expended in outfitting the eleventh and twelfth ROK divisions expeditiously replaced.[33]

While the decision was pending, the JCS told Clark that he should proceed under the assumption that favorable action would be taken in Washington.[34] On 31 January Clark instructed Van Fleet to go ahead with the formation of the 20th and 21st ROK Divisions and three days later official permission came from the President for fourteen divisions and six separate regiments. Including KATUSA and marines, the new ceiling would be 507,880. On 9 February Van Fleet activated the two new divisions.[35]

The pattern for permitting the ROK induction machine to generate pressure for the formation of additional organized units seemed likely to continue. Since the Eisenhower administration favored the increased use of indigenous forces in order to lessen the eventual demands on the United States, the chief problems in the future, as in the past, would center upon the timing and the financing of the expansion. In the meantime, the ROK Army began to take on the proportions of a well-rounded force. By January, five of the ten original divisions had been assigned organic artillery of three 105-mm. and one 155-mm. howitzer battalions, and the other five were being supported as they entered the line by a full complement of four ROK artillery battalions. Seven ROK tank companies were operational and each had twenty-two M36 medium tanks mounting 90-mm. guns. The eighth and ninth tank companies were expected to become operational in March and April.[36]

Although Clark and Van Fleet were in favor of adding a second Korean Marine regiment (less one battalion) and another 105-mm. howitzer battalion to provide a Marine force of 23,506 men, they opposed further expansion. The small ROK Navy did not have the personnel or sea transport to support a larger Marine Corps, they maintained in February 1953, and there were no known or anticipated requirements for such a force. If

[33] Msg, CX 60941, Clark to JCS, 14 Jan 53, DA-IN 226714.

[34] Msg, JCS 929141, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jan 53.

[35] (1) Msg, EX 40140, Clark to Van Fleet, 31 Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, G-3 sec., pt. III, tab 5. (2) Msg, JCS 930325, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Feb 53. (3) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, sec. I, Narrative, p. 45.

[36] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Jan and Mar 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 42–43 and p. 53, respectively.

equipment were committed for developing more Marine units, they went on, the ROK infantry division program would be delayed.[37] Clark also urged that the ROK Air Force strength of 8,600 men and one F–51 fighter wing be maintained. The JCS agreed in February that the ceiling should be 9,000 personnel rather than the 11,550 desired by the ROK Government.[38]

The growing military strength of the Republic of Korea was matched by its mounting economic instability. As more of its resources, both human and material, were devoted to the prosecution and support of the war, inflation increased. The large U.S. demands for advances of ROK currency to sustain the UNC forces were the main target of ROK complaints on the shaky status of the South Korean financial position, but as already indicated, this was but one cause. To help stabilize the Korean economy, the United States went on making its dollar payments during the winter. In December, Clark paid the ROK Government over $8,500,000 for the *won* advances of October and November, bringing the total of payments to over $74,000,000.[39]

Although the unofficial rate of exchange was over 20,000 *won* for one dollar, the ROK officials insisted upon maintaining the old 6,000 to 1 rate in its dealing with the U.N. Command. Negotiations between the ROK and UNC in January 1953 found the former striving to gain a settlement of $87,000,000 for all advances up to 16 December 1952. In the agreement reached in late February, the United States agreed to pay a total of $85,800,000 for advances through 7 February, but secured ROK agreement to a quarterly adjustment of rate of exchange that could more accurately reflect the actual value of the ROK currency.[40] The influx of American dollars, coupled with a ROK currency conversion in February that forced the South Koreans to turn in all their *won* for new *whan* at a 100 to 1 rate, was expected to ease the crisis somewhat, at least for the time being.[41] But the indications grew as spring approached that the ROK Government intended to push for increased U.S. support of the South Korean war effort to alleviate the internal economic situation.[42]

Across the Sea of Japan, the efforts of the United States to strengthen its bulwarks met with a different response. The Japanese seemed content to hold their defense forces at the four-division, 110,000 man level until the political climate of opinion became favorable to a change in the Constitution that would permit armed forces to be raised legally. In the meantime, the funds set aside for equipping the proposed ten-division Japanese defense forces were held in abeyance, pending the conclusion of a Japanese-

[37] (1) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, pp. 36–37. (2) Msg, GX 2084 KGO, CG EUSAK to CG AFFE, 10 Feb 53 in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jan–Jun 53. (3) Msg, CX 61365, CINCFE to DA, 28 Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1–88, incl 30.

[38] Msg, JCS 931029, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Feb 53.

[39] Hq FEC, Press Release, 12 Dec 52.

[40] (1) Msg, CX 60997, CINCUNC to DA, 21 Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1–67, incl 56. (2) Msg, CX 61338, CINCUNC to DA, 25 Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1–88, incl 48. The payment was made to the Korean Ambassador in Washington on 10 March.

[41] Msg, CX 61258, CINCUNC to DA, 17 Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1–88, incl 51.

[42] Msg, AX 73181, CG KCOMZ to CINCUNC, 28 Mar 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1–72, incl 41. See Chapter XX, below.

U.S. bilateral agreement.[43] By February 1953, the Department of Army estimated that only $350,000,000 of the $528,600,000 allocated for Japan would be expended by the end of the fiscal year, because of the Japanese reluctance to build up their forces further.[44] Under these circumstances, the lion's share of the available equipment went to the ROK and the imbalance between Japanese and ROK armed strength became greater. The Japanese lack of enthusiasm only provided a stronger stimulus for the growth of the military power of the Republic of Korea.

### *The Reorganization of the Far East Command*

Since the winter of 1952–53 reflected in many ways the eagerness of the United States leaders in Washington and in the Far East to conserve manpower at the front, it was not surprising that retrenchments in the administrative and housekeeping functions in the rear should also be considered. Shortly after Clark assumed command, he decided to make a careful study of the command organization of the FEC.

The Koje-do crisis had demonstrated the weakness of the Eighth Army commander's relationship with his rear areas and one of the first steps that Clark had taken was to establish a separate Korean Communications Zone on 10 July 1952. By relieving Van Fleet of concern over his lines of communications, logistical support, prisoners of war, and civil affairs, Clark hoped to give the Eighth Army commander more time "to fight the war without having to look over his shoulder to keep tabs on what was happening in the rear areas." [45]

With headquarters at Taegu the Korean Communications Zone, under General Herren, extended over the southern two-thirds of the Republic of Korea. Its new responsibilities included the prisoner of war camps, supply movement and stockpiling, maintenance of ports and railroads, and co-ordination of relief and reconstruction work insofar as was possible under the divided authority existing between the UNC and other U.N. agencies.[46]

As the separation of combat and service functions on the Korean peninsula got under way, Clark decided to reorganize his Tokyo headquarters into a truly joint command. Under MacArthur and Ridgway, the Far East Command staff had consisted almost entirely of Army officers and enlisted men. Ridgway had considered the possibility of setting up a joint staff, but had not gotten around to putting the plan in effect before his departure.[47]

As noted in the previous discussion of the channels of command, there was a U.S. Army Forces, Far East, on paper, in 1951, but it had no staff and was not operational. (*See Chart 1.*) Instead the Eighth Army operated on the same level as the Naval Forces, Far East, and the Far East Air Forces, despite the fact that it was technically below them in the chain of command. To dispel any resentment that this ar-

[43] Incl to Memo, G–3 for JSPOG, ca. 10 Dec 52, sub: U.S. Military Assistance to Japan, in FEC G–3 322.01, Commanders and staffs.

[44] Msg, DA 931246, G–3 to CINCFE, 13 Feb 53.

[45] Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 145–46.

[46] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 205–07.

[47] See USAF Hist Study No. 72, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflicts, 1 Nov 50–30 Jun 52, p. 72.

rangement may have incurred among Navy and Air Force commanders, Clark decided to staff the Army Forces, Far East headquarters, and place it on a par with the top naval and air commanders. He would remain Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, as he had been before, to avoid the necessity for putting another four-star general senior to Van Fleet in the position. When Clark informed the JCS of his intention on 20 August, he noted that the Army Forces, Far East (AFFE) command would eventually replace the Japan Logistical Command. This would make possible the elimination of subordinate commands, such as the Northern, Central, and Southwestern Commands as well as the Headquarters and Service Command in Tokyo.[48]

On 1 October the Japan Logistical Command was discontinued and all of its functions were transferred to AFFE. At the same time the Northern Command of the Japan Logistical Command was also abolished.[49] Clark appointed General Harrold as his deputy in command of AFFE, and staff sections from the Far East Command were assigned to perform similar functions in the new organization. Later in the month, Clark set up a manpower board to survey the requirements of AFFE and the rest of the joint FEC staff. He estimated that the reorganization would take until the end of the year and would release initially over 1,100 military spaces for reallocation in addition to saving a considerable number of U.S. and Japanese civilian spaces.[50]

With the establishment of AFFE, Clark proceeded to the second task of making the Far East Command a joint organization in the hope that if the other services shared the top assignments and the personnel burden, "it would increase the effectiveness of the team play that was so needed in Korea." [51] His first inclination was to assign the J–1 (Personnel), J–3 (Operations), and J–5 (Civil Affairs) slots to Army officers, the J–2 (Intelligence) position to an Air Force officer, and the J–4 (Logistics) task to a Navy officer.[52] But when the Joint Staff began its operation on 1 January 1953, J–1, J–2, and J–3 were filled by the Army and J–4 and J–5 were manned by Navy officers. It was not until after the armistice was signed that an Air Force general took over the operations job. Three deputy chiefs of staff, one from each service, were set up under General Hickey, the chief of staff, to provide additional triservice representation.[53] (*Chart 4*)

Thus the FEC entered the last stages of the war with an organization that finally conformed to the concept of a joint command. Whether the change would have a real effect upon the conduct of a static war would be difficult to determine, since the prospects for facing

[48] Msg, C 53964, Clark to JCS, 20 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CINCUNC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 3.

[49] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, p. 3. Although the Headquarters and Service Command was also eliminated in early 1953, the Central and Southwestern Commands both endured to the end of the war and beyond.


[50] Msg, C 57646, Clark to DA, 23 Oct 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, CINCUNC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 45.

[51] Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 133.

[52] Msg, C 54992, Clark to JCS, 11 Sep 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CINCUNC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 1.

[53] Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 133–34.

CHART 4—FAR EAST COMMAND STAFF AND MAJOR COMMANDS ORGANIZATION, 1 JANUARY 1953



major challenges seemed remote. Nonetheless, the arrival of Navy and Air Force officers to fill positions on the Joint Staff meant that the Army could expect further personnel savings in this area. And if the battlefield erupted in grandiose fashion, General Clark's team might be in better shape to organize its defenses and prepare for the counterattack more quickly.

# CHAPTER XVII

# Cold Front

After the bitter fighting of October and early November 1952, the approach of another winter witnessed a rapid decline in the scale of operations at the front. The enemy retired into his deep bunkers and caves to hibernate, and action settled down to the old routine of raids, patrols, and small unit skirmishes. Waiting patiently for a break in the recessed armistice negotiations, both sides seemed content to watch each other warily along the battle lines and to conserve their energy. The slackening of operations permitted the enemy to replenish his supplies and to bring up replacements, despite the efforts of the UNC air forces to destroy Communist depots and communications lines. But the build-up appeared to be perfunctory and not directed toward the resumption of large-scale fighting. As the cold weather set in, its influence dominated the front.

## *The Demise of Military Victory*

Despite the stalemate, General Clark had not given up all hope of mounting a large-scale operation against the enemy. During the flare-up of activity in October, he had voiced his concern to the Chief of Staff that the UNC failure to achieve an armistice stemmed from the lack of sufficient military pressure upon the Communists. With the forces presently at his disposal, Clark told Collins, positive aggressive action was not feasible, but he had developed an outline plan of action that would compel the enemy to seek or accept an armistice. If the JCS would approve the outline plan, he went on, the FEC staff could draw up supporting plans.[1]

In mid-October, a task force of three FEC officers arrived in Washington to explain and defend Clark's proposal. Basically it was a drive to the P'yongyang-Wonsan line in three phases, each lasting about twenty days. It included enveloping drives by ground forces, a major amphibious assault, airborne action as opportunities developed, and air and naval action against targets in China. To expand the war would require an accompanying augmentation of the FEC forces and the tally was impressive. Three U.S. or U.N. divisions (1 infantry, 1 airborne, and 1 Marine), 2 ROK divisions, 2 Chinese Nationalist divisions, 12 field artillery battalions, and 20 antiaircraft artillery battalions would be required in addition to those already in the U.N. Command to sustain the offensive successfully.[2]

According to Clark's later account,

[1] Ltr, Clark to Collins, 9 Oct 52, no sub, in G-3 091 Korea, 8/56.

[2] G-3 Staff Study, ca. 21 Jan 53, title: Capability of U.S. Army to Implement CINCUNC Operations Plan 8-52, in G-3 381 Pacific, 4/4.

every subordinate commander in the FEC "heartily endorsed this course of action." With the possibility of a change in the political administration in the United States and the elevation of a military man to the leadership of the country's affairs, the prospects of an additional effort to wind up the Korean War did not seem to be far-fetched. As Clark remarked later on, "I knew we had to be ready with the plan if the turn of events called for a more vigorous prosecution of the war.[3]

The military leaders of the FEC were doomed to disappointment. President-elect Eisenhower arrived in Korea on 2 December with a large and distinguished party, including the Secretary of Defense-designate, Charles E. Wilson, General Bradley, and Admiral Radford. He toured the front and visited President Rhee, talking with a great many people on the scene, but never once did he bring up the matter of seeking a military victory in Korea. Speaking to a press conference at Seoul on the last day of the visit—5 December—the President-elect admitted that he had "no panaceas, no tricks" for bringing the war to a close. The most significant thing about Eisenhower's visit, in Clark's opinion, was that he, Clark, was given no opportunity to set forth the detailed estimate of forces required and the plans formulated to increase the military pressure upon the enemy. The conversations with General Eisenhower clearly demonstrated to Clark that the new President would follow the course set by Mr. Truman and seek an honorable peace.[4] Thus died the last hope for a military settlement to be won by the force of UNC arms; it was evident that the political leaders, whether they were Democratic or Republican, intended to negotiate an end to the conflict.

### *Winter Action*

As long as the desire to negotiate was not matched by a willingness to concede, the future course of the war seemed likely to be a repetition of what had gone before. The enemy had taken losses in October that had cut its estimated strength from 1,008,900 to 972,000 at the end of the month.[5] But when the fighting tapered off in November, the enemy total began to climb slowly once again.

Reports from the front indicated that the Communists were digging in to stay. Although it took from three to five months to excavate their large caves, they steadily hollowed out space for squads and platoons in the bowels of strategic hills. Here, protected from UNC air and artillery as well as cold weather, the enemy could comfortably sit out the winter. Interrogation of prisoners revealed no knowledge of a general offensive, and the disposition of enemy forces along the front gave no indication of other than a usual defensive alignment. On the immediate front there were 7 Chinese armies with 166,000 men and 2 North Korean corps of 49,700 soldiers on 1 November 1952; the latter anchored the extreme eastern end of the line. (*See Map V.*) Ten Chinese armies containing over 350,000 troops and

[3] Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 81.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 233.
[5] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 5. CCF strength declined from 732,300 to 705,200 and the North Korean Army dipped from 266,000 to 257,000.



PRESIDENT-ELECT EISENHOWER AND GENERAL JENKINS NEAR CH'ORWON

4 North Korean corps with about 140,000 soldiers were in reserve positions where they could either reinforce the front or defend against possible amphibious landings by the UNC. Facing them were eighteen UNC divisions and their supporting troops totaling about 350,000 men.[6]

As the ground operations fell off in mid-November, Communist road traffic mounted as the enemy strove to rebuild his stocks. More enemy aircraft began to appear over North Korea, but they showed little sign of increasing aggressiveness. Of the 1,227 planes sighted during the month, only 395 engaged UNC aircraft with estimated enemy losses of 21 destroyed, 4 probably destroyed, and 19 damaged.[7]

The enemy made one major relief in November, moving the CCF *47th Army* into the Imjin River sector and the *39th Army* back into reserve. On the UNC side, the U.S. 25th Division took over the positions of the U.S. 7th Division on 12 November and the ROK 9th Divi-

[6] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I, Narrative, Figure 2.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.

sion relieved the ROK 2d Division on 24 November; both of these changes were routine as the U.S. IX Corps rotated its divisions on the line.

*The IX Corps*

The U.S. IX Corps had taken the brunt of the Chinese attacks at White Horse, Triangle Hill, and Jackson Heights during October, but the pressure along the corps front eased after mid-November. Only in the Sniper Ridge sector north of Kumhwa did the Chinese continue to demonstrate their sensitivity to ROK possession of outposts on the hill.

On 2 December an enemy platoon probed the ROK 9th Division outposts on Sniper Ridge and a second platoon joined in the action. Intense fire from artillery and mortars was exchanged for a time, and then the Chinese advanced and took over the crest. But the UNC artillery concentrations soon made enemy possession of the newly won positions too costly. As the enemy withdrew, the ROK forces returned to the outposts. A brief respite followed, then a second Chinese attack led to a hand grenade duel. Once again the ROK defenders fell back. On the next day two ROK platoons carried on a seven-hour battle with the enemy before regaining the crest. During the ensuing ten days, the Chinese launched 40 probes against Sniper Ridge without success. It is interesting to note that of the 114 probes reported along the corps front during December, the Chinese directed 105 against the ROK 9th Division.[8]

[8] U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, G–3 sec., pp. 13–14.



ENTRANCE TO A COMMUNIST BUNKER

The pattern held steadily through January as the Chinese sent frequent probes of up to three platoons in strength against the Sniper Ridge outposts with no success. Outside the ROK 9th Division area, the Chinese were hard to find. The IX Corps divisions sent out 2,668 night patrols during the month of January and reported only 64 engagements initiated by these patrols.[9]

In February and March the corps dispatched over 2,500 patrols to raid, ambush, or reconnoiter and fewer than a hundred made any contact with the enemy. All of March witnessed the capture

[9] U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, G–3 sec., pp. 11–12. It is quite possible that neither the UNC nor the enemy patrols were searching too intently for the opposition during the cold winter nights.

of only one prisoner of war by a patrol.[10] Neither side showed any inclination to disturb the quiet state of affairs on the central front and IX Corps was able to effect two routine division reliefs—one at the end of December when the ROK 2d Division moved into the U.S. 3d Division positions and the other a month later when the U.S. 3d came back into the line and permitted the U.S. 25th Division to pull back into corps reserve —without incident. (*Map VI*)

What was life like in the average infantry company during the last winter? I Company, 35th Infantry Regiment, 25th Division, was a typical example.[11] About six miles northeast of Ch'orwon, the 3d Battalion of the regiment manned main line of resistance positions, with B Company, 1st Battalion, attached, holding the left flank, I Company the middle, and K Company the right flank of the battalion front. I Company's positions extended 1,500 yards from the broad floor of a valley to the crest of a north-south ridge more than 100 meters above the valley. Because of the wide front, all three rifle platoons were stationed on the main line. This meant that the company headquarters and mortar crews were the only force located on the reverse slopes of the hilly portion of the front and had to assume the counterattack role usually assigned to a support platoon.

Elements of the *130th Regiment, 44th Division,* CCF *15th Army,* controlled the higher terrain to the north of I Company and enjoyed excellent observation of all the company positions, especially those located on the valley floor. In the hilly area on the eastern end of the company front, the Chinese positions were only 500 yards distant. As usual, the enemy had constructed the bulk of his bunkers and trenches on the reverse slopes and carefully camouflaged the openings on the forward slopes whence he fired his weapons.

Since October 1952 1st Lt. Travis J. Duerr had commanded the company and he was one of the few officers in the unit who had some combat experience. Under him were 5 officers, 174 enlisted men, and 48 KATUSA's. One officer and 13 enlisted men were Negro, 10 were Puerto Ricans, one was a native Irishman, and one a native Hawaiian.

Lieutenant Duerr distributed the KATUSA personnel along the front line, assigning each Korean to an American "buddy." The "buddy" system enabled the Americans to train and supervise the Koreans in U.S. methods, care of weapons, and at the same time to teach his "buddy" some words of English. For the most part, the language barrier prevented the two from becoming close friends and, in I Company, many Americans adopted a paternalistic or patronizing attitude toward their "buddies."

The company had 39 bunkers placed at intervals across the front; 34 contained automatic weapons and 5 were used as living quarters only. Many of the fighting bunkers were divided into fighting and living quarters housing from two to seven men. Eighty percent of each bunker was underground and could be entered from the trenches which linked the entire front in this sector. Thick logs and sandbags covered by a burster layer of loose sand, stones, and sticks

[10] U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Feb and Mar 53, G–3, Sec. pp. 7–8 and p. 7, respectively.

[11] The following account of I Company is based upon the study by 2d Lt. Joseph J. Comps, Eighth Army Historical Unit, A Rifle Company in Winter Defensive Positions. MS in OCMH files.

# THE EIGHTH ARMY FRONT
## THE WEST SECTOR
### 31 March 1953

XXXX CCF 23 — EIGHTH ARMY MAIN LINE OF RESISTANCE, 31 MAR
ENEMY FRONT LINE ORDER OF BATTLE AS OF 31 MAR

ELEVATIONS IN METERS
0 100 500 1000 AND ABOVE

5 0 5 MILES
5 0 5 KILOMETERS

Sibyon-ni
Yesong R
Kaesong
Panmunjom
Munsan-ni
Imjin R
Yonch'on
Ch'orwon
Kumhwa
Yokkok-ch'on
Hantan R

XXXX CCF 23
XXXX CCF 47
XXXX CCF 46 (+)
XXXX CCF 24

Hill 380
Whitehorse Mountain
Arrowhead
The T-Bone
Porkchop Hill
Old Baldy
Queen Hill
Hill 179
Bak
Hannah
Big Nori
Little Nori
Outpost Kelly
Little Gibraltar
The Hook
Detroit
Reno
Carson
Vegas
Hill 101
Hill 58
Bunker Hill
Hill 67
Hedy
Hill 90
Hill 391
Jackson Heights
IRON TRIANGLE
Outpost Harry
Boomerang
Triangle Hill

ROK 2 ✕✕ 3
3 ✕✕ ROK 9
ROK 1 ✕✕ 7
2 ✕✕ ROK 1
1 ✕✕ 1X
1 Mar ✕✕ 2

TO SEOUL
TO SEOUL

D. Holmes, Jr.

*MAP VI*



PART OF THE BUNKER AREA OF THE 25TH U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION

protected the bunker roofs from artillery and mortar hits. In some instances the bunkers had been originally located close to the topographical crests of the hills rather than on the military crests and had not been moved. In others the steep, uneven nature of the terrain permitted the automatic weapons sited in these bunkers only limited fields of grazing fire.

Since I Company defended an extended front, it had additional automatic weapons on hand to cover the enemy approach routes. One .50-caliber, six .30-caliber heavy, and twelve .30-caliber light machine guns were backed by fifteen automatic rifles in the bunkers. Three 57-mm. recoilless rifles, three 3.5-inch rocket launchers, and two M2 flame throwers were located in open emplacements. The .50-caliber machine gun, five of the heavy .30's, and six of the light .30's, sited to provide interlocking bands of fire, were sector weapons and I Company would leave them in place when it left the area. The added strength in automatic weapons permitted Lieutenant Duerr to throw "a sheet of steel" at the enemy when he attacked.

Three tanks from the regimental tank company with firing positions on the ridge line and on the reverse slopes provided antitank defense from approximately the center of the company front. The tanks were M4's with 76-mm. rifles. Besides the 60-mm. company mortars,

the 60-mm. mortars of L Company, the 81-mm. mortars of M Company, 4.2-inch mortars of the 27th Infantry Regiment, and the 105-mm. howitzers of the 64th Artillery Battalion could be called upon for direct support.

From one to four double aprons of barbed wire guarded the approaches to I Company's positions, and Duerr placed bands of triple concertina wire in front of and behind the aprons for increased protection. Four combat outposts lay athwart the Chinese approach trails along the company front. Each consisted of four two-man foxholes arranged in a diamond shape with the point toward the north. Concertina, double aprons of barbed wire, mines, and trip flares surrounded the combat outposts, which were manned only at night by 3 relief teams, of 1 noncommissioned officer, 2 riflemen, and 1 automatic rifle crew of 2 men in each outpost. The outposts stayed in place if they were attacked and fought until ordered to pull back.

Because most of the riflemen in the company were inexperienced, they carried M1 rifles rather than carbines. Lieutenant Duerr felt that new men unaccustomed to fire fights often had "a tendency, often a fatal tendency, to fire all their ammunition in the first two or three minutes of a firefight." Since the M1 ammunition clips held fewer cartridges than the carbine clips, they could not be expended so rapidly. Each platoon had two snipers with rifles equipped with telescopic sights. All weapons were test fired daily, and the riflemen stripped and cleaned their weapons every day to make sure they would be ready to meet an enemy attack.

Next to his weapons, the most important item to the infantry soldier was his armored vest. In I Company, the majority preferred the Marine-type vest, which fitted more comfortably and appeared to provide more protection to the wearer. The Marine vest was sleeveless, had nylon padding around the upper chest and shoulders, and had plates of Fiberglas bonded with resin that covered the lower chest, back, and abdomen. The Army vest relied upon layers of basket-weave nylon to take the impact of shell fragments. Neither vest could stop a bullet at close range, but both could help decrease the number of casualties caused by mortar and artillery fire and hand grenade fragments. There was general agreement in I Company that the vests had saved the lives of the men on the lines on many occasions.

The men of I Company also liked the mountain sleeping bag and the insulated rubber combat boot called the "Mickey Mouse." Both afforded excellent protection against the Korean winter weather.

Nightly, the three rifle companies of the 3d Battalion, 35th Infantry, sent out patrols. Col. Autrey J. Maroun, the regimental commander, and his staff planned the patrols one day in advance. They set up the sector, route, objective, mission, strength, time of departure, and equipment to be carried if anything unusual were to be taken along on the patrol. Lt. Col Victor G. Conley, the 3d Battalion commander, frequently briefed the patrol leader, who had been selected by Lieutenant Duerr, on important missions. One company of the battalion furnished the combat patrol on a rotational basis and the other two provided screening patrols. In some cases, the combat patrol probed 1,000 or more yards in front of the main line of resist-



MARINE PFC. PULLS PIECE OF SHRAPNEL FROM HIS ARMORED VEST

ance while the screening patrols rarely went more than 500 yards.

No soldier went on a patrol until he had been on the line for at least ten days; then, under average conditions he could expect patrol duty once every seven to ten days. The rest of the time he would serve as a guard in the trenches, man a fighting bunker or combat outpost at night, hack trenches in the frozen ground, or erect tactical wire along the slopes. Since there was a 50-percent alert, two men shared one sleeping bag to discourage any shirking of night chores. Eighty percent of the company's work was accomplished at night.

Living conditions depended upon each man's own ingenuity. Since few of the bunkers' living quarters exceeded five feet by eight feet in size, double and triple bunks constructed out of logs, steel pickets, and telephone wire were the norm. Plastic bags used for packing batteries served as windows, straw matting covered the floor, and candles shed their pale light in the bunkers at night. Oil stoves provided heat in most cases, but charcoal and wood stoves sunk into the earth to keep the ground warm were also used.

Breakfast and dinner were hot meals served in the two mess areas, while the noon meal consisted of C-rations. The company jeep carried the hot food in marmite cans from the kitchen to the mess area. Since I Company had twenty

Korean Service Corps personnel assigned to it, the latter performed all kitchen police (KP) duties.

To insure cleanliness, each man had to shower at least once every five days. By groups the soldiers rode to the battalion shower point and got a complete change of clean clothes after the shower. Every man was required to change his socks daily to guard against trench foot; in addition, the company aidmen inspected the feet of all members of the unit each day. The aidmen also sprayed the bunkers with disinfectant once a month and spread rat poison to control the rodent problem.

Although the biggest morale booster among I Company troops was the rotation system, there were several other programs to provide the men with a change of pace at the local level. A warm-up bunker behind the lines served as a day room for reading, writing letters, washing clothes, and getting a haircut. Normally a man could spend several hours in the warm-up bunker every three or four days. Ten men per day left for the Regimental Service Company area to the rear for a 24-hour rest period. During a tour of duty with I Company, every man could generally count on one 5-day rest and recuperation (R and R) leave in Japan being granted. These privileges helped to make the waiting for rotation home a little easier.

When an I Company soldier approached the magical mark of thirty-six points which qualified him for rotation, he usually stopped going on combat patrols. There were two reasons for this: first, consideration for the soldier whose time was "getting short"; and second, consideration for the other men in the patrol, since the high-point man tended to become cautious and less dependable in combat.

Considering that each company rotated its platoons on the line, that each battalion rotated its companies, and so on right up to the corps level, the chances for an individual to survive during the period of comparative inaction on the battlefield were fairly good. This prospect could not fail to have a favorable effect upon most of the combat troops of the Eighth Army.

The limited nature of the war and the static conditions at the front had an unfavorable side as well. The absence of enemy air operations imparted a false sense of security that might well have been disastrous had the Communists mounted a large-scale air sweep of the battlefield and the supply lines and centers to the rear. Lulled by the lack of enemy air activity over South Korea, the troops tended to become careless in their use of camouflage and in their massing of supplies and equipment at the major ports and depots. Fortunately, the Communists did not exploit this weakness, but the possibility always existed of a swift and bitter lesson in the advantages of dispersion and concealment.

Another mixed blessing was the presence of the Korean Service Corps. In the process of relieving the combat troops of many of the distasteful tasks of soldiering, the KSC had a spoiling and softening effect upon the men in the same fashion that the provision of Italian and Polish displaced persons and prisoners of war had had upon U.S. units in Europe during World War II. At another time there might not be any servants available to perform the unpleasant chores.

A third by-product of the stationary



KOREAN SERVICE TROOPS CARRYING INSULATED CONTAINERS OF HOT FOOD *to U.S. troops.*

front was the quantity of possessions that the average unit and individual began to collect after a period in the combat zone. Extra equipment and clothing could easily be kept on hand even though they went far beyond the amounts called for in the tables of organization and equipment. As long as mobility was not essential, the surplus might not prove detrimental. But the necessity to shift a unit quickly to meet an enemy threat demonstrated the disadvantages of having too much. During the Triangle Hill battle, one 7th Division artillery battalion took three days to move all its unit and personal impedimenta from the Ch'orwon sector to the Kumhwa area. The loss of mobility indicated that front-line inspections and inventories of unit and individual equipment should have been held frequently to restrain unwarranted accumulations.

### *X Corps, ROK I and II Corps*

Only one important encounter with the enemy in the U.S. X Corps sector had taken place during November. In the Heartbreak Ridge area, on Hill 851, the 2d Battalion, 160th Infantry Regi-

ment, U.S. 40th Division, manned the Eighth Army lines. The terrain north of the 2d Battalion's defensive positions was held by the *14th Regiment, 1st Division,* N.K. *III Corps.* In the opening days of November the North Korean artillery and mortar units devoted increasing attention to the Hill 851 area, and intelligence information gleaned from a deserter and from papers taken from a dead North Korean indicated that the enemy intended to attack the 2d Battalion's positions. (*Map VII*)

Lt. Col. Robert H. Pell was the commanding officer of the battalion and had deployed his own E and F Companies and attached C and A Companies from west to east along the battalion front. The 143d Field Artillery Battalion, one platoon of 4.2-mm. mortars, H Company's 81-mm. mortars, and one platoon from the 140th AAA Battalion provided direct fire support to the 2d Battalion. G Company and attached B Company, 1st Battalion, were in reinforcing positions south of Hill 851.

On 3 November the enemy artillery and mortar fire became intense. Approximately 4,500 rounds were hurled at the 2d Battalion during the night. At 2030 hours a reinforced battalion from the N.K. *14th Regiment* attacked from the north in a general assault along the 2d Battalion front.[12] Proceeding along the ridge which ran north and south and up the draws that led to the 2d Battalion's positions, the North Koreans closed and made slight penetrations in the E, F, and C Company sectors. Based on later evidence from POW interrogations, the enemy apparently intended to seize, hold, and reinforce Hill 851, then strike south against Hill 930.

The North Korean attack failed as the four front-line companies threw back the enemy assault without calling for reinforcements. Direct fire from the supporting units helped to disrupt and decimate the North Korean ranks. When the enemy broke contact four hours later, he had suffered 140 counted casualties and 7 prisoners of war had fallen into the 2d Battalion's hands. The 160th Regiment had taken 73 casualties, including 19 dead, in the fight.

After a relatively quiet interval of patrols during the rest of November and most of December, the Communists chose Christmas Day to make their next serious attack. On Hill 812, five miles north of the Punchbowl, K Company, 179th Infantry Regiment, U.S. 45th Division, manned the outpost positions on the northern slopes of the hill. Early on Christmas morning the North Korean guns and mortars opened up and sent about 250 rounds on the K Company positions. During the bombardment, a reinforced company from the N.K. *45th Division* advanced from Luke the Gook's Castle, a rocky hill nearby, and overran the forward positions defended by K Company. Capt. Andrew J. Gatsis, the company commander, called for artillery and mortar defensive fires.[13] Tanks from the 179th Tank Company joined with the artillery and mortar to halt the enemy advance.

Captain Gatsis then sent the second platoon, under 2d Lt. Russell J. Mc-

[12] The account of the attack upon the 2d Battalion is based on: 160th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and Bn Jnls, Nov 52.

[13] The account of the Hill 812 action is based upon: (1) 179th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and Jnls, Dec 52; (2) 45th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, bk. VII.

# THE EIGHTH ARMY FRONT
## THE EAST SECTOR
### 31 March 1953

EIGHTH ARMY MAIN LINE OF RESISTANCE, 31 MAR

XXX NK III — ENEMY FRONT LINE ORDER OF BATTLE AS OF 31 MAR

ELEVATIONS IN METERS

0 100 500 1000 AND ABOVE

5 0 5 MILES

5 0 5 KILOMETERS

Kosong
Anchor Hill
339
269
345
350
Pukhan R.
XXX NK V11
Nam R.
ROK II ROK 15
XXXX CGF 67
XXXX CGF 24
Kumsong
Soyang R.
XXX NK III
394
Finger Ridge
Capitol Hill
Lightning Hill
Kumsong R.
XXXX CGF 60
854
812
Kansong
689
Mundung-ni
Triangle Hill
1220
HEARTBREAK RIDGE
755
PUNCH BOWL
R.
Kumhwa
ROK 6 ROK 8
ROK 8 ROK 3
1179
BLOODY RIDGE
ROK 9 ROK CAP
ROK 7 45
45 ROK 20
ROK 20 ROK 12
IX ROK II
ROK II X
Soju-ch'on
X ROK I
TO CH'UNCH'ON

H.C. Brewer, Jr.

*MAP VII*

Cann, to counterattack. McCann's platoon closed with the North Koreans and pushed them back. In the hand-to-hand fighting in the trenches, Lieutenant McCann was killed. Col. Jefferson J. Irvin, the regimental commander, approved the attachment of A Company to K Company, and L Company was also on hand to reinforce K Company's positions, if necessary. During the early morning hours, the North Koreans sent three platoon-sized attacks and over 2,000 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery fire against the K Company defenders, but failed to dislodge Captain Gatsis and his men. The company suffered 25 casualties in the holiday fighting, including 5 dead, while the enemy incurred an estimated 36 casualties.

On 27 December the newly organized ROK 12th Division began to take over the 45th Division's sector and the relief was completed on 30 December.[14]

The ROK 12th Division received its baptism of fire some two weeks later when a North Korean battalion launched a surprise attack against outpost positions on Hill 854, seven miles northeast of the Punchbowl. Three enemy companies advanced against elements of the 51st Regiment and made some progress on the left flank. Pushed back by a counterattack, the North Koreans tried once more, then withdrew. Over 19,000 rounds of UNC artillery, mortar, and tank fire were hurled into the enemy zone of attack and the ROK units reported that over 200 casualties were suffered by the North Koreans.[15]

In early February the North Koreans returned to Hill 812 again. On the night of 2 February, the 37th Regiment of the ROK 12th Division reported enemy troops concentrating for an attack. Intense artillery fire poured into the assembly area, but a North Korean battalion pushed on toward the hill. Within fifty yards of the ROK positions, a savage hand grenade battle broke out and lasted until a reinforcing ROK company turned the tide. The North Koreans used close to 7,000 rounds of mixed explosive ammunition in this heaviest action of the month and suffered over a hundred estimated casualties. They received over twice as many rounds from the UNC artillery.[16]

During the remainder of February and the following month, operations in X Corps sector were more or less routine. Patrols were sent out regularly, but contacts with the enemy were on a small scale and no sizable attacks took place.[17]

The North Korean forces had meanwhile been more active on the ROK I Corps front along the east coast of Korea. The ROK main line of resistance positions rested on Anchor Hill (Hill 351), less then four miles south of Kosong. On 9 November, two North Korean battalions struck Anchor Hill and pushed the ROK 5th Division defenders off the crest. It was only after two counterattacks marked by hard close fighting and backed by intense artillery and mortar support that the ROK troops were able to eject the enemy and restore their positions. At the same time, further to the south, the North Koreans

[14] U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, p. 7.
[15] U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, p. 6.
[16] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, sec. I, Narrative, p. 36.
[17] There was one major relief during the first three months of 1953. The U.S. 45th Division returned to the line without incident and assumed responsibility for the positions occupied by the U.S. 40th Division.

dispatched platoon-sized groups to assault Hills 268 and 345, less than two miles south of Anchor Hill. On the former they won a brief foothold but were driven off on 10 November. Close defensive fires dispersed the enemy attack force as it approached Hill 345. Nothing daunted, the North Koreans hit both hills again on 11 November with a larger force and engaged the ROK troops for an hour and a half before they withdrew.[18]

The failure of this effort marked the beginning of a period of comparative calm on the ROK I Corps front. Active patrolling and small skirmishes occurred frequently, but the over-all situation was not affected. In early January patrols from the ROK 5th Division located a tunnel entrance and ventilating shaft near Anchor Hill, where the enemy was digging his way close to the ROK positions. After the enemy's work detail entered the tunnel on 7 January, a ROK patrol blew up the entrance and sealed the shaft with explosives. Within a few days the enemy had reopened the entrance, so the South Koreans called for an air strike and closed it once again.[19]

Little unusual activity marked the ROK I Corps sector until the end of March. The ROK 15th Division completed its organization and training period in late January and moved into the ROK 5th Division's position on the northeastern tip of the battle line.

On 30 March the 13th Regiment of the ROK 11th Division carried out two raids on enemy hill positions just west of the Nam River. The regiment took the crest of Hill 350, which was less than a mile south of Sindae-ri, with the aid of about 6,000 rounds of mortar fire, then withdrew to the main line of resistance at dusk.[20]

The ROK II Corps had patrolled vigorously during November and December, but operations had remained on a small scale. Its greatest challenge arose in mid-January when an increase in enemy artillery and mortar fire on a platoon outpost on Hill 394, three miles southeast of Kumsong, alerted the ROK 6th Division to the possibility of imminent attack. The commanding general of the division alerted his artillery units and had three tanks move into supporting positions.

On the night of 17 January the enemy guns hurled over 5,000 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar fire at the ROK positions in the vicinity of Hill 394. Close on the heels of the barrage, four Chinese platoons advanced to engage the ROK defenders. When the ROK artillery and tanks opened up on the enemy and threatened to halt the attack, the Chinese sent in two more reinforced platoons. So great was the volume and accuracy of ROK fire that only seven Communist soldiers reached the ROK lines and they were killed or captured in hand-to-hand combat. After regrouping, the enemy tried again with like results. The ROK soldiers estimated that they had killed 125 Chinese in this fray as compared to losses of 3 killed and 14 wounded for their own side.[21] After this brief but bitter action, activity on the corps front settled back into its familiar routine and contacts

[18] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 41–42.

[19] *Ibid.*, Jan 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 39–40.

[20] *Ibid.*, Mar 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 51–52.

[21] (1) KMAG, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, ROKA Combat Units,-ROK II Corps. (2) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I, Narrative, p. 16.

occurred infrequently and involved very small groups of men.

*The U.S. I Corps*

Over on the western flank the U.S. I Corps had not encountered a great deal of opposition during the last two months of 1952. U.S. 2d Division outposts on Porkchop defended by the Thailand Battalion were attacked twice in the first part of November, once by a Chinese company and the second time by two companies. On 7 November a heavy artillery and mortar concentration on Porkchop heralded the Chinese advance. After a 45-minute fire fight the enemy broke off and regrouped, then stormed back again and was repulsed. Four days later, the Chinese bombardment of Porkchop announced the second assault. Approaching from the north, east, and southwest, two enemy companies reached the Thailand trenches before they were thrown back. Later that night the Chinese made two further attempts to penetrate the Porkchop positions and then disengaged completely.[22]

The 1st British Commonwealth Division came in for a bit of excitement on 18 November when a sudden increase in Chinese artillery and mortar fire signaled forthcoming enemy action. After shelling the positions of the 1st Battalion, King's Liverpool Regiment, as a diversion, the Chinese quickly shifted their efforts to a hill known as the Hook. The Hook was part of an east-west ridge four miles northwest of the confluence of the Sami-ch'on and Imjin Rivers and was held by the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch. Forty-five minutes of heavy firing followed; then an enemy company sought to close with the Black Watch. But the Commonwealth forces took cover in nearby tunnels and directed an artillery concentration on the assault troops. As soon as the artillery ceased, the Black Watch seized the initiative, and drove the Chinese off the Hook. While the Communists tried to regroup on adjacent ridges, artillery and tank fire forced them to disperse.

On the following day the Chinese brought up reinforcements and sent two companies against the Hook. Commonwealth tanks and reinforcements moved up and after a hard-fought exchange that witnessed hand-to-hand combat, the British forces turned the Communists back. Again the Chinese reorganized and dispatched a company to pierce the Black Watch line. The third try effected a penetration of 100 yards before it was contained. Finally, the 3d Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry mounted a counterattack and in close combat ejected the enemy troops. There were 100 counted Chinese dead on the battlefield after the engagement and 85 Commonwealth casualties.[23] Evidently convinced that the British intended to hold the Hook, the Chinese made no further serious attempts to seize the hill until the following March, after the U.S. 2d Division had taken over the Commonwealth Division's sector.

The first ten days of December gave little indication that the enemy intended to test the ROK 1st Division's defense in the vicinity of the double horseshoe

[22] U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, pp. 20, 26–27.


[23] (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, sec. 1, Narrative, pp. 42–43. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, pp. 37–38.



2D U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION SQUAD ON PATROL IN CAMOUFLAGE SUITS

bend of the Imjin River. On the west bank of the river, as it began its first horseshoe turn, lay a low hill complex known as Nori; Big Nori formed the western half of the ridge and Little Nori the eastern half. (*Map 7*) The ROK 15th Regiment maintained outposts on these hills and also on Hill Betty, about three-quarters of a mile south of Little Nori, and on Hill 105, approximately a mile southwest of Little Nori. The Chinese controlled outposts on the terrain to the north and west of Nori, but had remained fairly inactive in that sector in early December.

On the 11th, however, two battalions of the *420th Regiment, 140th Division, 47th Army,* closely followed 800 rounds of artillery and mortar fire in an attack upon the ROK outposts on Little Nori, Betty, and Hill 105. The main weight fell on Little Nori as two enemy companies sought to dislodge the men of the ROK 15th Infantry. After a bitter 3-hour exchange at close range, the ROK defenders were ordered to pull back to Hill 69, 300 yards to the east of Little Nori. After regrouping, the ROK 15th launched two counterattacks, but the two platoons committed failed to drive the enemy off the heights. The Chinese waited until the attack forces neared their defensive positions, then hurled hand grenades and loosed a withering artillery, mortar, and small arms fire. Later in the morning, however, a small force from the ROK 11th Regiment, which had relieved the 15th Regiment,




*MAP 7*

reoccupied Little Nori without opposition.

In the meantime, the ROK units on Betty had held, but those on Hill 105 had to fall back temporarily. Evidently the Chinese movement against Hill 105 was only a diversion, for the enemy left shortly thereafter and the ROK forces reoccupied the positions without incident.

On the night of the 11th, the Chinese first launched a two-company drive against Little Nori, then increased the attacking force to a battalion, and the ROK's again withdrew to Hill 69. Air support was called in and six B–26's dropped over one hundred 260-pound fragmentary bombs on the hill. Twelve battalions of artillery poured a continuous hail of shells on the Chinese, but four counterattacks by the ROK 11th Regiment on 12 December failed. Despite the punishment administered by large and small arms and the mounting toll of losses, the Chinese refused to be budged.

The artillery concentrations went on during the night of 12–13 December and when morning arrived, a battalion from the ROK 11th Regiment moved in with two companies in the attack. Fighting steadily forward, they won their way back to Little Nori, but met with little success in their efforts to clear Big Nori. On the evening of the 13th, the South Koreans dug in and awaited the expected enemy counterattacks. Two Chinese companies vainly attempted to penetrate the ROK positions during the night and as the morning of 14 December dawned, the contest resolved itself into a stalemate.[24]

Although this encounter lasted but four days, the statistics are quite significant. The entire action on Big and Little Nori took place in an area 300 yards wide and 200 yards deep. During the engagement the UNC artillery fired 120,000 rounds, and the mortar crews over 31,000 while tankmen added over 4,500 90-mm. shells to the deadly concentration. Supporting aircraft flew 39 missions of 177 sorties to bomb and strafe the enemy positions with napalm, high explosives, and rockets. In return the ROK's received over 18,000 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar fire from the Chinese guns. Not counting the aerial contribution, the UNC forces took one round for every eight they hurled at the Communists. It was an excellent example of air, artillery, and tank co-ordination in support of the infantry. As for casualties, the ROK's suffered about 750, including 237 dead, while the estimated total for the enemy ranged between 2,290 and 2,732. According to a deserter from the Chinese *420th Regiment* in January, the regiment was removed from the line because of the heavy casualties it took in the battle and placed in reserve.[25]

Action in the Nori sector settled down to patrols and raids during January. The enemy dispatched two platoon-sized probes during the month and on 23 January the ROK 11th Regiment sent a three-platoon raiding party against Big Nori. Air strikes, artillery, and mortar fire, and fire from twelve supporting tanks enabled the raiders to gain the crest, destroy enemy bunkers, and then withdraw safely.[26]

After a 6-week period of comparative quiet, the Chinese chose Christmas Eve to launch an attack upon the outposts of the U.S. 2d Division on T-Bone Hill. *(See Map 4.)* The southern tip of T-Bone, which contained the outposts of EERIE and ARSENAL, lay approximately two miles northeast of Porkchop Hill. On 23 December, two platoons from B Company, 38th Infantry Regiment, manned ARSENAL, located about 600 yards north of EERIE. On the terrain to the north two battalions of the *338th Regiment, 113th Division,* CCF *38th Army,* held the enemy lines.

A message intercepted that morning indicated that the Chinese might stage an attack either on the night of the 23d or the morning of the 24th, so all battalions were alerted. Despite the warning, the enemy achieved the element of surprise when the *7th, 8th,* and *9th*

[24] The account of the Nori battle is based upon: (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 41–42; (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, pp. 6–10; (3) KMAG, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, ROKA Combat Units, Jnl, 1st ROK Div.

[25] U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, p. 25.

[26] (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I, Narrative, p. 33. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, p. 7.



VIEW OF THE T-BONE HILL SECTOR

*Companies, 338th Regiment,* opened their attack about midnight. The Chinese departed from their customary tactic of heavy preparatory artillery and mortar fire before the assault.[27] Instead they infiltrated the B Company outposts on ARSENAL, cutting through the barbed wire and successfully bypassing the listening posts. Approaching from several directions, the Chinese reached the communication trenches and closed in hand-to-hand combat with the defenders of B Company. To prevent the 1st Battalion, 38th Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Roy I. Brooks, from reinforcing ARSENAL, the enemy placed a blocking force between EERIE and the main line of resistance and sent over 2,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire against nearby 38th Regiment outposts. Evidently the Chinese hoped to isolate the ARSENAL-EERIE outposts until they could gain possession of the hill complex.

In this they were disappointed, for Col. Archibald W. Stuart, the commander of the 38th Regiment, quickly alerted Lt. Col. George C. Fogle, his 3d Battalion commander, to move his four companies forward to reinforce the 1st Battalion. Two squads from EERIE advanced to reinforce ARSENAL, in the meantime, and a platoon from C Company reinforced EERIE.

The battle in the ARSENAL trenches had also turned against the Chinese at-

[27] The account of the ARSENAL action is based upon the 38th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and Bn Staff Jnls, Dec 52.

tackers. B Company had requested close defensive fires to deter the enemy from reinforcing the infiltrators and then set about to wipe out the Chinese already in the outpost positions. How successful the defensive fires and the stout defense mounted by B Company proved to be was graphically illustrated by the following intercepts of enemy messages during the early morning hours of 24 December.

0026 hours. Send reinforcements quick. There are around 30 enemy coming now—pause—lots of enemy coming now.

0040 hours. How soon will the reinforcements arrive?

Very soon. They are running over. They got plenty of prisoners now, but they can't find a way to get back.

0050 hours. Our reinforcements haven't reached No. 25 yet. They won't be able to get down themselves even without the prisoners.

0052 hours. Can you come down?

No.

Try if situation allows. We don't have a chance without reinforcements.

0120 hours. Where are the reinforcements now? I am sure they will reach your place pretty soon. Now there are too many enemy. We are all surrounded. I don't think our reinforcements can break through and come up either. Our situation is pretty dangerous, besides we have to watch the prisoners. In time of emergency what shall we do with the prisoners?

0130 hours. If it's possible, your people had better just come down yourselves, as to the PW's or wounded, just bring any number you can or leave them there. This is an order. You must come down or we won't contact you anymore.

0132 hours. Send more reinforcements or we won't be able to come back with the PW's.

0217 hours. Our 900 dollars [9th Company] probably has been annihilated. One of the men in the 900 dollars escaped and reported this.

0435 hours. Check how many men we have. I have already checked the 700 dollars [7th Company] has 17 back. 800 dollars [8th Company] has 13 back. 900 dollars unknown.

Two hours later the enemy had gotten back two more men from the *8th Company,* but there was no news from the *9th Company.* The Chinese battalion had been heavily hit with 11 counted killed in action and estimated casualties of 500 more. The 38th Regiment suffered 47 casualties, including 6 killed in action.

When Brig. Gen. James C. Fry, the 2d Division commander, learned of the high ratio of enemy casualties to those of the 38th Regiment, he commented: "Very nice piece of work." He enjoined his unit commanders to "mention what happens when you stand in your trenches and fight." [28]

The men of B Company had fought bravely and systematically cleaned out the enemy infiltrators. Yet without the superb defensive fire that had been provided by the artillery, mortar, tank, and AAA units in direct support of the 38th Regiment, the infantrymen might not have fared so well. The enemy had wanted desperately to reinforce his attacking forces on ARSENAL, but had been unable to get them through the curtain of fire laid down by the direct support crews. The success could justly be shared by infantrymen and gun-crew members alike.

On 29 December the U.S. 7th Division completed the relief of the 2d Division in this sector and the Chinese evidently decided to take advantage of the change-over. A reinforced enemy

[28] Briefing Notes, 24 Dec 52, in 38th Inf Regt, Dec 52, Comd Rpt, Regtl Opnl Jnls.

company that night hit an outpost at Chongjamal, two miles southwest of Old Baldy, and forced the defenders to pull back. Since the U.S. artillery units had the co-ordinates of the outpost, they began to zero in on the Communists and the punishment finally forced the Chinese to evacuate the position.[29]

The 7th Division took part in an experiment in air-tank-artillery-infantry co-ordination in late January that produced loud repercussions in the United States. In mid-December a joint Army–Air Force conference at Seoul had discussed the carrying out of General Clark's direction that a series of air-ground operations experiments be mounted.[30] Three experiments were planned: A. An air strike by 24 fighter-bombers with briefing and observation of the target by air force personnel before the operation; B. An air strike by 8 fighter-bombers, without prebriefing, which would be controlled by the tactical air control party at the divisional level; and C. An operation similar to B above, but with 4 fighter-bombers.

When Eighth Army G–3 officers approached General Smith of the 7th Division on the matter, he suggested using the air effort in conjunction with a tank-infantry raid to capture prisoners. The task of preparing the operations plan fell upon the 31st Infantry Regiment and the S–3, Capt. Howard H. Cooksey, on 15 January drew up what was to be called Operation SMACK.

The objective selected for the test was called Spud Hill and was an enemy strongpoint on the eastern side of the shank of T-Bone Hill, about 1,300 yards north of EERIE. After the Air Force had launched 125 fighter-bomber sorties and 8–12 radar-controlled light and medium bomber sorties on selected targets in the T-Bone area, the artillery would carry on the bombardment. One field artillery battalion and elements of 6 others with 78 light and 32 medium artillery pieces would fire in direct and general support of the raiding party, from their positions behind the main line of resistance. For the attack force 1 platoon from the 2d Battalion of the 31st Infantry Regiment and 3 platoons of medium tanks, mounting 90-mm. guns, were designated. Two additional platoons of infantry, 1 light tank company, and 6 platoons of medium tanks would act in a supporting role.

During the period 12–20 January, the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, alone in direct support of the 31st Regiment, poured close to 10,000 rounds of 105-mm. fire into the T-Bone complex, seeking to destroy enemy bunkers, mortars, and automatic weapons in preparation for the attack. As D-day—25 January—approached, Air Force officers visited the 7th Division command post and received their briefing and reconnoitered the target area.

Since the experiment promised to be of interest to both air and ground officers, General Barcus and members of his Fifth Air Force staff arrived at the battle locale and were joined by General Smith and Lt. Gen. Paul W. Kendall, the I Corps commander, along with some of his staff. Also present were about a dozen members of the press. To help these visitors understand the schedule and purpose of the exercises, the 7th Division had prepared a combination

[29] U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, p. 12.

[30] The following account, unless otherwise stated, is based upon Hq Eighth Army, Mil Hist Detachment, Operation SMACK, by 2d Lt Samuel M. Kind. MS in OCMH.

itinerary, description of the experiment, and a scenario outlining the main events. The cover for this six-page collection of information was in three colors, showing a 7th Division black and red patch superimposed on a map of Korea in blue.[31] The choice of a tricolor cover and use of the word "scenario" was unfortunate, as it turned out.

On 24 January the Air Force dropped 136,000 pounds of bombs and 14 napalm tanks on the target complex. The next morning, as the infantry and tankers gathered in the assembly areas, the Air Force began the first of eighteen strikes. Carrying two 1,000-pound bombs each, eight F–84 Thunderjets swept over the cross of T-Bone and unloaded their cargo. By midmorning, 24 more Thunderjets, in flights of eight, had bombed enemy positions on T-Bone. Then came a mass strike by 24 Thunderjets, with 48,000 pounds of bombs. This completed experiments A and B. Twenty additional Thunderjets in 2 flights hit the objective before the tanks and infantry began to move out.

Diversionary tank movements and fire to confuse the enemy began as the assault troops made their final preparations. Then the 15 supporting tanks from the 73d Tank Battalion (M) crossed the line of departure. While the tanks rumbled forward to their positions, Experiment C was attempted by two flights of four F–84 Thunderjets each. The first flight missed Spud Hill with its bombs and the second flight put on the target only one of the eight napalm tanks that the planes carried. Shortly after the last strike by the Air Force, eight F4U Marine Corsairs attempted to lay a smoke screen in front of the tanks and infantry to conceal their approach, but some released the bombs too soon and others failed to place them where they would shield the attack force.

Once the air phase was completed, the supporting artillery, mortars, AAA, and automatic weapons along the main line of resistance opened fire. As the supporting tanks reached their firing positions close to Spud Hill, they joined in the bombardment of the enemy strongpoints and trenches. To co-ordinate the available firepower, a communications network had been set up between all supporting units, fire direction centers, the 2d Battalion command post, and the infantry Fire Support Co-ordination Center. Major Phillips, the 2d Battalion commander, directed the operation from his command post and had an artillery liaison officer at his side.

For the assault of the hill, Major Phillips had ordered E Company to furnish the platoon and the company commander had chosen his 2d Platoon, under 2d Lt. John R. Arbogast, Jr., for the task. The platoon had rehearsed the operation nine times on similar terrain and knew what it had to do. To increase the possibilities for success, two flamethrower teams had been added to the platoon for the operation.

Since the infantry had to wait until the air strikes were completed, the attack was not set up for a prescribed time, but rather was to begin on Major Phillips' order. Unfortunately, a radio failure caused a fifteen-minute delay in the receipt of the attack order and Arbogast and his men were late in crossing the line of departure. As they moved forward to the base of Spud Hill in person-

[31] Msg, G 1733 KCG, Van Fleet to Clark, 29 Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1–67, incl 8.

nel carriers, the supporting tanks and artillery continued to pound the objective and enemy positions in the surrounding areas.

Arbogast's platoon dismounted quickly when it reached the foot of the hill and divided into two groups. Two squads began to climb up the northern finger and the remaining two squads took the southern finger of Spud Hill. During this ascent, the supporting weapons, with the exception of the three tank platoons, shifted their fire to targets north of the objective.

Desultory fire from small arms and automatic weapons greeted the 2d Platoon as it headed for the crest. It was not until the squads neared the point where the two fingers met, reuniting the attacking troops, that the Chinese started to react strongly. Then, suddenly, the machine gun fire became intense, driving the men of the 2d Platoon into a defiladed hollow between the two fingers. The depression gave Arbogast's men respite from the chattering machine guns, but exposed them to another danger. Boxed in in a small area, they fell easy prey to the hand grenades that the Chinese lobbed into the hollow from their trenches on the crest of the hill.

As grenade after grenade fell into the midst of the hemmed-in platoon, the casualty list mounted. Lieutenant Arbogast was hit in the arm, but refused to leave. With grenade fragments filling the air, the litter bearers found it difficult to keep up with the growing number of wounded.

In an attempt to break up the grenade attack, the two flame thrower teams were called forward. A rifle bullet instantly killed one of the operators as he worked his way toward the crest. The second operator managed to get off one short burst before the machine malfunctioned. Flames engulfed the Chinese trenches for a few seconds and halted the flow of grenades briefly. After the fire died out, however, the Chinese sent increasing numbers of grenades into the hollow and the list of wounded grew.

Seeing that the assault platoon was pinned down, Major Phillips ordered the 1st Platoon to reinforce Arbogast's remaining troops. The 1st Platoon followed the same route up the fingers and enemy machine guns soon forced it to take cover. Efforts by the supporting tanks to silence the enemy's automatic weapons met with little success since smoke and dust obscured the tankers' view. Every half hour four Thunderjets dropped bombs on the T-Bone complex, but they, too, had little influence upon the fight on Spud Hill.

Lieutenant Arbogast tried to get his men moving out of the trap. But even as he sought to organize a charge, he was again hit by grenade fragments, this time in the face and eye. Although he refused to be evacuated at first, the seriousness of his injuries soon forced him to give in. His platoon sergeant and several of the squad leaders had already been put out of action.

With two platoons now pinned down short of the objective, Major Phillips decided to commit the 3d Platoon to the attack, but the end result proved to be the same. The stream of automatic weapons and rifle fire coupled with the grenades from the enemy trenches halted the advance of the 3d Platoon and inflicted numerous wounds on its members.

When Col. William B. Kern, the regimental commander, learned of the fate

of the 3d Platoon, he called off the attack and ordered the men remaining on the approaches to Spud Hill to withdraw. By this time all three platoon leaders had been wounded and the casualty total had reached 77 men.

The expenditures in ammunition for Operation SMACK had also been rather costly. Besides the bombs and napalm dropped the day before the attack, the Air Force had loosed 224,000 pounds of bombs and eight napalm tanks on 25 January. The supporting artillery fired over 12,000 rounds of 105-mm. and 155-mm. and nearly 100,000 rounds of .50-caliber and 40-mm. ammunition. From the tanks came over 2,000 rounds of 90-mm. and over 75,000 rounds of lesser caliber. A heavy mortar company added over 4,500 rounds of mortar fire to the attack and the infantry assault force shot over 50,000 rounds of machine gun and small arms ammunition and threw over 650 hand grenades at the enemy. Even if the highest estimate of enemy casualties was accepted, all of this potential death and destruction cost the Chinese fewer than 65 men, while the enemy, using but a fraction of this amount of ordnance, had inflicted greater losses upon the 7th Division force. To top it off, since the infantry had not closed with the enemy, not a prisoner had been taken.

What went wrong? In review, one might say—everything. The air bombardment evidently had little effect upon the enemy in his deep, protected bunkers and caves and the strikes attempted to hit too many targets peripheral to the infantry objective. Secondly, the infantry's late start in setting out for the objective after the strikes allowed the enemy time to prepare for the attack. By confining the assault to a narrow front, as was the case in the earlier Bloody Ridge–Heartbreak Ridge operations, the enemy could concentrate on containing the small attack force. The latter was fairly green and its leadership was impaired early in the fight through the effective enemy use of hand grenades while the platoon was pinned in. In addition the available flamethrowers which might have saved the situation malfunctioned and some of the automatic weapons jammed. The assault platoon had rehearsed the operation many times and felt overrehearsed, while the two supporting platoons that had been thrown in late had not been adequately rehearsed or briefed. All in all, Operation SMACK was a fiasco.

Yet since the entire exercise was on a small scale insofar as the number of infantrymen and tanks engaged was concerned, it might well have been chalked up to experience and quietly passed over, but for a zealous member of the press. Although the correspondent had but recently arrived in Korea and had not been present at the scene of action, the attendance of high-ranking officers of the Air Force and Army at the experiment and the use of the three-color cover and the term "scenario" for the information sheets assumed roles of importance in the story that he wrote. The implication that a show involving needless loss of life had been put on for the visiting brass created a furore in the United States and led to a brief Congressional investigation.[32]

An official statement by Van Fleet's headquarters and appearances by Gen-

[32] (1) Msg, DA 392127, CINFO to CINCFE, 28 Jan 53. (2) Msg C 61077, CINCFE to DA, 30 Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1–67, incl 9. (3) Msg, DA 393167, CINFO to CINCFE, 31 Jan 53.

eral Collins before Congressional armed services committees served to put the SMACK operation in proper perspective as a test of methods of co-ordinating a combined attack on enemy outposts and not as a "gladitorial" exhibition staged in the Hollywood style to entertain visitors.[33] Congressional leaders accepted the Army's explanations and the ill-fated SMACK incident was closed. It was an expensive lesson that demonstrated again that firepower in itself, whether dropped from above or hurled from the ground, was not enough to neutralize an enemy well dug in and that the advantage in this limited war lay on the defensive side.

Elsewhere on the U.S. I Corps front, the action was confined chiefly to small raids during January. A platoon from the Marine 7th Regiment on 8 January took Hill 67, which was a mile and a half east of Panmunjom, with the aid of air, artillery, and seven flame-throwing tanks, then withdrew. A week later three platoons from the same regiment hit this hill and another close by for three hours before breaking off the fight. On 24 January two platoons of the Ethiopian Battalion attached to the U.S. 7th Division seized a hill south of Old Baldy after a 45-minute battle and fought off a counterattack. Both the enemy and the Ethiopians built up their forces the following day, as two Chinese companies tried to win back the hill from four platoons of Ethiopians. The latter made a good showing and did not break contact and withdraw until they were ordered to.[34]

Toward the end of the month, General Clark warned Van Fleet that there were indications the enemy might try to take advantage of the period before the ground thawed to launch an offensive toward Seoul. During the winter the Communists had built up their forces in Korea to an estimated total of 1,071,080 by 1 February and had been stockpiling ammunition and rations at the front. In January three Chinese armies and one North Korean corps had been replaced on the line by fully equipped and combat-trained units and the strength of the remainder of the divisions at the front had been increased from reserve elements. It was, of course, quite conceivable that the Communist preparations were only defensive in nature since considerable publicity had been given to the possibility that the new Republican administration in the United States might change the tenor of the Korean War and go over to the offensive.[35]

Van Fleet was not worried. He was going ahead with the divisional reliefs scheduled for the closing days of January and told Clark that the Eighth Army was in better condition insofar as reserves were concerned than ever before in the war. He was sure that Eighth Army could handle anything that the enemy could throw at it.[36] In his last

[33] Msg, Z 35701, CINCFE to Hull, 30 Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1–67, incl 10.

[34] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 33–34.

[35] (1) Msg, CX 61016, CINCFE to CG AFFE *et al.*, 24 Jan 53, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 495. (2) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 5–8, 21.

[36] Msg, GX 1607 KCG, CG EUSAK to CG AFFE, 25 Jan 53, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin files, Jan–Jun 53. The four reliefs were: the U.S. 45th Division for the U.S. 40th Division in the X Corps area; the U.S. 2d Division for the 1st Commonwealth Division in the U.S. I Corps sector; the U.S. 3d Division for the U.S. 25th Division in the IX Corps front; and the ROK 15th Division for the ROK 5th Division along the ROK I Corps battle line. These were all completed by 31 January without incident.

days as commander of the Eighth Army, Van Fleet remained confident that the force he had helped build up into an efficient and reliable army could meet the Communists head on at any time and emerge victorious. Despite the frustrations of fighting a limited war, the energetic and aggressive old warrior had lost none of his drive or desire to deal the enemy a crippling military blow. He had frequently shown his impatience at being forced to play a waiting, defensive game, but had never wavered in his efforts to maintain Eighth Army at peak efficiency in case either the United States or the Communists decided to alter the complexion of the conflict. As he left for retirement and home in February 1953, his contributions to the maintenance of his command as one of the better armies fielded by the United States were beyond question.

Notwithstanding Van Fleet's assurances, Clark told General Weyland to have his air reconnaissance planes intensify their observations of Communist ground forces, supplies, and equipment along the P'yongyang-Kaesong route. The Far East commander was concerned over the mounting ability of the enemy to stage an air offensive and ordered his subordinates to take all possible passive air defense measures to absorb hostile air attacks. If trouble developed, Clark wished every precaution possible taken to lessen the blow and he was ready to move the 1st Cavalry Division and 187th Airborne RCT back to Korea in the event of an emergency.[37] As Clark pointed out to the JCS in early February, the Communists' recent expansion in men and planes might well be only defensive, but the publicity given UNC ammunition shortages, personnel deficiencies, weakness in reserve divisions, and difficulties in building up NATO strength, coupled with predictions of UNC augmentation and offensive action because of the change in political administration, could influence the enemy to use his offensive strength.[38]

The growth of Communist air power featured the addition of jet bombers and fighters which gave the enemy a broad air capability. If the Chinese carried out a surprise low-level attack with the MIG's escorting the jet bombers, Clark felt that they might knock out the UNC interceptor bases and gain a respite during which they could repair the North Korean airfields. This, in turn, could lead to a ground offensive, backed by piston fighters, bombers, and ground attack planes. Under the circumstances, Clark asked for permission to attack the Chinese air bases if the security of the UNC forces seemed to be threatened.[39]

As in the past, the American leaders in Washington were sympathetic but noncommittal. They recognized the potential danger, but told Clark that they wished to be informed of the immediate situation before they gave their authorization.[40]

Clark's air chief, General Weyland, shared his commander's concern over

[37] (1) Msg, CX 61087, CINCFE to CG FEAF, 31 Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1–67, incl 41. (2) Ltr, Clark to CG AFFE *et al.*, 4 Feb 53, sub: Communist Offensive . . . , in JSPOG Staff Study No. 495.

[38] Msg, CX 61157, CINCFE to JCS, 7 Feb 53, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 495.

[39] Msg CX 61172, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Feb 53, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 495, in JSPOG files. The estimate of Communist air strength in Manchuria was 830 jet fighters, 250 piston fighters, 220 piston light bombers, and an estimated 100 jet bombers.

[40] Msg, JCS 931744, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Feb 53.

the Communist air threat, but had no doubt about the ability of the UNC forces to turn the enemy back. "I have no fears," he told Clark on 11 February, "that the enemy could take the Seoul complex if faced with concerted and aggressive counteroperations. In fact, I believe that an attempted air and ground offensive by the Communists can be made a most costly venture for him and would provide opportunity for an outstanding UN victory." [41]

As February progressed and no larger enemy attacks developed, Clark's anxiety diminished. On 11 February, Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor took over General Van Fleet's post as Eighth Army commander and began to make his own impression upon his troops.[42] He stressed the need for planning and rehearsing patrols; for providing a complete eight-week training program for reserve divisions before they re-entered the line; for moving artillery battalions frequently to maintain their basic mobility; and for better concealment measures for troops on skyline positions. He also decided to drop the designation of "Korea" from the Eighth Army. In the future, the title would simply be Eighth U.S. Army.[43]

Although the pattern of fighting underwent little change during early February, the enemy reacted strongly to any challenge. On 3 February a tank-infantry force from the 5th Marine Regiment followed air strikes and artillery fire in a raid on Hill 101 and Un'gok, ten miles north of Munsan-ni. The marines destroyed installations and beat off several determined counterattacks until they were ordered to withdraw. Estimate of enemy killed during the engagement ran to about 400 men while the marines lost 15 killed and 55 wounded.[44]

On 20 February the Chinese sent two companies along the shank of T-Bone Hill to attack Outpost EERIE and ran into a 7th Division ambush patrol. Reinforcements from the 17th Infantry Regiment were rushed forward to bolster the patrol and finally a platoon of tanks moved forward to screen the battlefield and help evacuate the wounded. Although all the members of the patrol were either killed or wounded, they had evidently staved off a battalion-sized assault on ARSENAL and EERIE.[45]

Across the valley at the lower Alligator's Jaw, which was located a mile and a half northeast of EERIE, another Chinese company caught a 7th Division combat patrol and subjected it to heavy fire on 24 February. Before the engagement finished, the entire 20-man patrol became casualties. The day before, on the 1st Marine Division front, a tank-infantry patrol was surrounded by the enemy at Hill 90, two miles east of Panmunjom, and a reinforcing platoon had to be dispatched to help them break through the Chinese circle. Hand-to-hand combat ensued as the marines bat-

[41] Ltr, Weyland to CINCFE, 11 Feb 53, sub: Communist Offensive . . . , in JSPOG Staff Study No. 495.

[42] General Taylor had commanded the 101st Airborne Division in World War II; had served as superintendent at West Point until 1949; was commander in Berlin from 1949–51; and lately had been G–3, Department of the Army, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration.

[43] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 28, 29, 62.

[44] (1) *Ibid.*, p. 32. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, p. 11. (3) First Marine Div, Comd Diary, Feb 53, p. 4.

[45] (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 32–33. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, p. 10.

tled their way back to the main line of resistance. On 25 February a Marine patrol started out to capture prisoners of war and destroy installations on Hill Detroit, a little over a mile southwest of the Hook, and encountered a reinforced enemy company. The marines used flame throwers in the caves and bunkers to root out the Chinese and a bitter 45-minute fight took place before the raiders disengaged.[46]

The growing Chinese sensitivity to the I Corps raids was the prelude to a shift in the enemy's tactics. As March began, the Chinese went over to the offensive again—on a limited scale, to be sure. Dropping the passive role of the early winter period, the enemy started to take advantage of the prethaw season. As the Chinese sent out larger forces in an effort to regain the initiative, pressure along the I Corps front mounted.

On 1 March, a Communist company struck at the positions of the French Battalion after an intense artillery and mortar preparation. The French were attached to the U.S. 2d Division, now manning the section of the line formerly held by the 1st Commonwealth Division. They met the Chinese attack and beat it off after a brief hand-to-hand encounter. Two days later, the Chinese overran a 38th Regiment outpost on the Hook. On 6 March the scene moved to the ROK 1st Division line where the Chinese launched two fruitless company-sized attacks on the outposts of the 11th Regiment. That same evening, a combat patrol from the 31st Infantry Regiment of the U.S. 7th Division intercepted an estimated enemy battalion apparently on the way to attack Porkchop Hill and the surprise contact disrupted the Chinese plans. The Communists gunners dropped 8,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire on Porkchop during the night, but the enemy infantry made no serious attempt to push on toward the 7th Division's outposts.[47]

There was brief lull along the front with the advent of the late winter rains. Mud restricted the movements of vehicles but did not deter the enemy from resuming the attack shortly after the middle of March. Hill 355, located about three and a half miles southwest of the Nori Hill complex, was also known as Little Gibraltar. Defended by elements of the U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Division, Hill 355 received a battalion-sized attack on 17 March. The enemy breached the wire entanglements and pushed through the mine fields into the trenches of the 9th Infantry Regiment. One platoon's position was overrun but the remaining platoons held firm in their blocking positions until reinforcements arrived. As the Chinese began to disengage, 2d Division artillery fire interdicted their route of withdrawal. The action cost the 9th slightly over 100 casualties, but enemy losses were estimated at over 400 men.[48]

The 2d Division came in for a bit more action four days later when two enemy companies fell on a patrol near the Hook. While the patrol tenaciously fought off the Chinese attackers, artillery and mortar fire were called in and rein-

[46] (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 33–34. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, p. 15. (3) First Marine Div, Comd Diary, Feb 53, p. 10.

[47] (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 41–42. (2) U.S. 7th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, pp. 23–25.

[48] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, sec. I, Narrative, p. 43.

forcements rushed up. The Chinese pulled back the next morning.[49]

On 20 March the 7th Division had indications that the enemy contemplated an attack in the Old Baldy–Porkchop area. The increase in artillery and mortar rounds on the division's positions on these long-contested hills usually signified a Communist offensive move, and the capture of two deserters in the sector strengthened the belief that action would soon be forthcoming.[50]

The Old Baldy–Porkchop area was held by the 31st Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Kern, and its attached Colombian Battalion. Colonel Kern had deployed his 2d Battalion on the left, the Colombian Battalion in the center, which included Old Baldy, and the 3d Battalion on the right in the Porkchop Hill sector. One rifle company from the 1st Battalion manned blocking positions behind each of the three front-line battalions.[51]

Elements of two Chinese armies faced the 7th Division. The *141st Division,* CCF *47th Army,* manned the enemy positions opposite Old Baldy and to the west and the *67th Divisions,* CCF *23d Army,* defended the terrain from the Porkchop Hill area to the east.

On the evening of 23 March the Chinese staged a double-barreled attack on both Old Baldy and Porkchop. A mixed battalion from the *423d Regiment, 141st Division,* attacked Old Baldy and caught the Colombian Battalion in the middle of relieving the company outpost on the hill. The Chinese closely followed an intense artillery and mortar concentration upon Lt. Col. Alberto Ruiz-Novoa's troops and fought their way into the trenches. To reinforce the Colombians, Colonel Kern placed B Company, 31st Regiment, under Colonel Ruiz' operational control. 1st Lt. Jack M. Patteson, B Company commander, led his men toward Old Baldy at 2130 hours, approaching from Westview, the next hill to the southeast. As B Company drew near the outpost, the Chinese first called in intense artillery and mortar fire along the approach routes and then took Patteson's men under fire with small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades. B Company slowly made its way into the first bunkers on Old Baldy at 0200 hours and began to clear them out one by one. As the company came up against the main strength of the Chinese on Old Baldy, however, progress lessened and then ground to a halt.

In the 3d Battalion sector on Porkchop Hill, Lt. Col. John N. Davis' L Company had been attacked by two companies from the *201st Regiment, 67th Division.* As in the Old Baldy assault, the Chinese had laid down heavy mortar and artillery concentrations on the L Company positions before they advanced. 1st Lt. Forrest Crittenden, the company commander, and his men fought until their ammunition began to run low, then had to pull back from the crest of the hill and await resupply and reinforcement. Proximity fuze fire was laid directly on Porkchop while ammunition was brought forward and A Com-

[49] *Ibid.,* p. 46.

[50] Believing that the men would fight better if they knew what they were about to accomplish, the Communists discussed the operation on the lower levels before an attack. The knowledge that an attack was to be carried out often led some of the Communist soldiers to desert.

[51] The account of the Old Baldy–Porkchop Hill action is based upon: (1) 31st Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and Staff Jnls, Mar 53; (2) 32d Inf Regt, Comd Rpt and Staff Jnls, Mar 53; (3) 7th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Mar 53.

pany, under 1st Lt. Gerald Morse, advanced to the aid of L Company. Elements of I Company were ordered to secure Hill 200, a mile southeast of Porkchop, which had also been reported as under attack.

Colonel Davis had to wait until the early morning hours of 24 March before he could launch a counterattack against Porkchop. Lieutenant Morse's company, en route to join L company, was pinned down for two hours by proximity fuze fire. Attacking abreast with A Company on the right, the two companies met only light resistance from the few Chinese left on the crest. They reported that Porkchop was a shambles with many of the bunkers aflame and many dead and wounded. Colonel Davis dispatched the ammunition and pioneer platoon to repair the damage and sent aidmen and litter bearers to clear the dead and wounded from the hill.

In the meantime, Maj. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, who had just assumed command of the 7th Division, had arrived at the 31st Regiment's command post and had taken charge. He ordered the 1st Battalion, 32d Regiment, under Lt. Col. George Juskalian, to move forward and placed it under the operational control of the 31st Regiment. The 1st Battalion with B Company, 73d Tank Battalion, in support, would carry out a counterattack to regain Old Baldy. The tanks would fire from positions in the valley to the northeast of the hill.

B Company, 32d Regiment, under 1st Lt. Willard E. Smith, led the 1st Battalion's attack from the southwest on the morning of 24 March. Two platoons from the 73d Tank Battalion and one platoon of the 31st Tank Company supported the assault. The Chinese met the assault with artillery and mortar fire as B Company approached and then opened up with small arms and automatic weapons, inflicting heavy casualties on Lieutenant Smith's men. The 1st Battalion's assault stalled on the southwest finger of Old Baldy.

Colonel Juskalian reorganized his forces and sent B Company and A Company, under 1st Lt. Jack L. Conn, in a second attack during the afternoon of the 24th. The two companies reached Lieutenant Patteson's B Company, 31st Regiment, positions and passed through them. By nightfall they had won back one quarter of Old Baldy, but were forced by enemy resistance to dig in and hold. Lieutenant Patteson suffered a broken jaw during the fighting and had to be evacuated.

At 0430 hours on 25 March, Colonel Juskalian sent C Company, under 1st Lt. Robert C. Gutner, around the right flank to attack up the northeast finger of Old Baldy. Again the Chinese used their individual and crew-served weapons effectively and reinforced their units on Old Baldy to halt the 1st Battalion attack. By 0930 Juskalian reported that B and A Companies were one-third the way up the left finger, halted by small arms and hand grenades. C Company was "pretty well shot up" and had to be withdrawn and reorganized. Some members of the company were still pinned down on the right flank of Baldy and could not get out. Colonel Juskalian called for tank support to knock out the Chinese bunkers being used to pin down the 30 to 40 C Company men left on the hill.

Despite the tank support, the 1st Battalion's situation had not improved by 1315 hours. Colonel Juskalian's three

rifle companies were clinging to their positions, but A Company had only 2 officers and 14 men; B Company and C Company had 2 officers and 40 men between them. The colonel asked for smoke and medical aid so that he could evacuate his casualties.

With the 1st Battalion's effective strength reduced to less than sixty men, Colonel Kern ordered Juskalian to withdraw his men from Old Baldy during the night of 25–26 March. Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighters and bombers mounted air strikes against nearby hills, strongpoints, and supply routes during the night and then hit Old Baldy the next morning after the 1st Battalion had cleared the hill. From reports made later by Colombians who had hidden in bunkers during the Chinese domination of the heights, it appeared that the enemy troops left Old Baldy when the air strikes came, and this, incidentally, had enabled the Colombians to make their way back to the UNC lines on 16 March.


General Kendall, I Corps commander, ordered another attack to regain Old Baldy to be scheduled for either 27 or 28 March after rehearsals had been held. To carry out the assault, General Trudeau selected the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment. The battalion held two rehearsals on terrain similar to Old Baldy in the closing days of March and was prepared to execute the attack. On 30 March, however, General Taylor, the Eighth Army commander, arrived at General Trudeau's headquarters for a conference. After considering the psychological, tactical, and doubtlessly the casualty aspects of the planned operation, General Taylor decided that Old Baldy was not essential to the defense of the sector and that consequently no attack would be carried out.

The two days of fighting for Old Baldy and Porkchop had been costly for the 7th Division. Casualties had run over 300 dead, wounded, and missing in action. Although Chinese losses were estimated at between 600 to 800 men, the enemy had committed his troops freely to maintain possession of Old Baldy. The Chinese willingness to expend their manpower resources offered a clear contrast to the UNC reluctance to risk lives for tactical objectives of questionable value at this stage of the war.

On the 1st Marine Division front the Chinese had also accelerated the tempo. An outpost of the Korean Marine regiment was overrun by two enemy platoons on 18 March and the following day the Chinese threw two company attacks against 5th Marine Regiment ouposts. The latter were beaten off and the marines quickly mounted a counterblow—a raid into the enemy's positions. This, in turn, elicited retaliation from the Chinese. On the night of 22 March they sent two companies supported by 1,700 rounds of artillery and mortar against the 1st Marine Regiment's outposts and main line of resistance positions at Hill Hedy and Bunker Hill, four miles east of Panmunjom. Hand-to-hand combat and a brisk fire fight ensued before the Chinese began to disengage. During the encounter a UNC flare plane and searchlights lit up the battlefield and enabled the marines to spot the enemy's movement.[52]

The biggest engagement of the month took place in the closing days of March.

[52] (1) First Marine Div, Comd Diary, Mar 53, p. 9. (2) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 44–45.




*MAP 8*

After a series of diversionary squad attacks on 1st Marine Regiment outposts, the *358th Regiment, 120th Division,* CCF *40th Army,* launched an assault upon combat outposts of the 5th Marine Regiment, 10 miles northeast of Panmunjom and between 2 to 3 miles southwest of the Hook. Outpost VEGAS was on Hill 157; Outpost RENO was on Hill 148, less than half a mile to the west; and Outpost CARSON was on an unnumbered hill 700 yards south of RENO. *(Map 8)* Prisoners of war and other intelligence sources later indicated that the mission of the *358th* was to seize and hold the three outposts before an expected UNC spring offensive could get under way. On 26 March, the Chinese overran VEGAS and RENO after heavy, close fighting. The marines fell back and hastily prepared blocking positions between the lost positions and the main line of resistance. Despite the arrival of reinforcements during the night, efforts to rewin VEGAS and RENO failed because of intense enemy artillery, mortar, and small

arms fire. A battalion from the 7th Marine Regiment was placed under the operational control of the 5th Regiment on 27 March, but even with the additional troops, the counterattacks made little progress. As the day wore on, 3 light battalions, 2 medium battalions, 2 8-inch batteries, 1 4.5-inch rocket battery, 2 companies of 4.2-inch mortars, and 1 battalion of 25-pounders pummeled the enemy positions, and close air support sought to destroy Chinese strongpoints. Over 100,000 artillery rounds, 54,000 mortar shells, 7,000 rounds of 90-mm. tank ammunition, and 426 tons of explosives were directed at the Communists during the fight, while the Chinese sent back about 45,000 at the marines. The decision was made not to recapture RENO for the time being and the Marine units, increasing the attacking force to the infantry strength of two battalions, concentrated on VEGAS. Not until the afternoon of 28 March were the marines able to battle their way back to the top, for the Chinese fire was heavy and deadly.

Enemy counterattacks followed each other swiftly during the night of 28–29 March, but were broken up by defensive fires. Despite the Chinese pressure, the Marine defenders worked hard to strengthen their hold on VEGAS. When the Communists moved forward to the assault, the marines called for boxing fires, and flare planes exposed the enemy to Marine automatic weapon and small arms fire. One Chinese concentration was neutralized by rocket fire before it could organize its attack. Before the enemy broke off the fighting on 29 March, the marines had repelled several battalion-sized attacks and inflicted over 1,300 estimated casualties upon the enemy. Marine losses were 118 killed, 801 wounded, and 98 missing in action, figures which testified to the bitterness of the battle.[53]

### *Air and Naval Operations*

The uneven tenor of ground operations was reflected in the type of activity that the air and naval forces carried out during the winter of 1952–53. During the sporadic fighting of November 1952, the Far East Air Forces devoted over 3,000 sorties to close combat support and a lesser amount of its effort to interdictory missions. Bomber components of the command continued to work over rail lines and bridges, storage facilities, repair shops, supply centers, and troop concentrations in addition to their strikes against strongpoints along the battle line.

According to the basic FEAF operations policy that was in effect until the end of 1952, the air forces were trying: to maintain pressure on the Communist military units; to influence the armistice negotiations, so that UNC could obtain the most favorable terms; to retain the capability for other operations, in the event of a general emergency; to prevent or minimize enemy air attacks against the U.N. Command; to furnish air support to the UNC, including close combat support; and to interdict the enemy's logistical and communications system. First priority went to the task of maintaining air superiority and second to the close support of ground operations, whenever the tactical situation required

[53] (1) First Marine Div, Comd Diary, Mar 53, pp. 10–12. (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, pp. 28–37. (3) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, sec. I, Narrative, p. 49.

it.[54] The emphasis on close support and the successful suppression of antiaircraft fire during the FEAF strikes by friendly artillery promoted better air-ground relationships during the winter months.

Navy and Marine planes also contributed greatly to the support of the ground forces during November. Task Force 77 devoted half of its combat effort to "Cherokee" strikes on behalf of the Eighth Army. A Cherokee strike was a prebriefed operation against a specific target in front of friendly ground positions and differed from regular close air support in that it was not directed by spotters. Usually a control plane was assigned by the Air Force, however, to assist in locating the target and for assessing the damage caused by the strike.

In addition to the Cherokee operations, Navy planes pounded industrial centers in northeastern Korea. On 17–18 November, they bombed Ch'ongjin, Kilchu, Kyongsong, and other coastal rail facilities, factories, and mines. During these operations separate targets were assigned to the air groups of each carrier to eliminate the impromptu exchanges between group leaders who, when they were assigned to the same targets, normally did their co-ordination in the air. The Ch'ongjin attack found five air strikes co-ordinated with the concentrated firepower of the battleship *Missouri* and the cruiser *Helena.* On the 18th, Task Force 77 sent 64 attack planes, 16 piston-type fighters, and 24 jet fighters against Hoeryong on the Yalu River. The synthetic oil plant, supply buildings, power plant, iron factory, and other facilities in this border town were all bombed by means of visual methods.[55]

On 9 December the carriers *Orishany, Bon Homme Richard,* and *Essex* sent 350 sorties to blast rail facilities at Rashin, Musan, Hyesanjin, and Hunyung—the latter was the northernmost raid of the Korean War. One week later, planes from the same carriers traveled to the Manchurian border to reach hitherto undamaged rail targets at Yuson-dong.[56]

Although intelligence reports pointed to a steady increase of Communist air strength in Manchuria, enemy air activity remained at a low ebb during the closing months of the year. In December reconnaissance planes observed a growing number of Soviet-built Il–28, twin-engine jet bombers close to the border and the threat of a surprise attack against UNC airfields ballooned. This, coupled with the statements of UNC pilots that their MIG opponents seemed to be getting more competent in their attempts to intercept the F–86 Sabrejets, aroused some concern. But the Communists, as noted earlier, demonstrated no enthusiasm for aggressive operations either on the ground or in the air. By the end of 1952, Air Force and Navy pilots were once again devoting the bulk of their combat effort to the North Korean rail and highway network.[57]

Typical of the air assaults of the period was the bombardment of the Sinanju complex beginning on 9 January.

[54] FEAF Comd Rpt, Nov 52, vol. II.

[55] (1) COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Oct–Nov 52, sec. 1-1, 1-15. (2) Msg, CX 58908, CINCFE to DA, 17 Nov 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, G–3 sec., pt. III, tab 3.

[56] COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Dec 52, sec. 1-1, 1-2.

[57] (1) FEAF Comd Rpt, Dec 52, vol. I, pp. 1, 2, 8; vol. II. (2) COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt, Dec 52, sec. 1-1, 1-6.

Seventeen B–29's launched the attack and then, for the next six days, Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers raided the important freight yards and bridge approaches daily. Flying 1,243 sorties in support of the program to knock out Sinanju's transportation system, the fighter-bombers managed to render all the bridges into the town unserviceable by 14 January. Rail traffic between Sinanju and P'yongyang was severed for about eleven days and the Communists had to strain their truck transport system to take up the slack.[58]

During the Sinanju raid period, the Sabrejets ran into a number of MIG's and on 14 January the F–86's claimed a banner day. They reported that 8 enemy planes had been knocked down, 2 others probably destroyed, and 8 had been damaged. But outside an exceptional occasion like the foregoing, the Chinese air forces evidenced little change in their indisposition toward combat in January.[59]

A month later, on 16 February, the Navy celebrated the completion of the second year of the longest effective siege in United States naval history. Almost daily since February 1951, Navy aircraft had swarmed over the key port of Wonsan and surface guns had added to the destruction. On 31 January and on 9–10 February, the carriers *Kearsarge, Philippine Sea,* and *Oriskany* mounted large-scale air attacks on Wonsan, with the battleship *Missouri* and other surface vessels also taking part in the January operation.[60]

When the concern voiced by General Clark over the possibility of a Communist air attack coupled with an attempt to take Seoul before the spring thaw proved groundless, the Air Force and Navy commanders continued to press the campaign to make the continuance of hostilities as expensive as possible to the Communists. On 18–19 February 511 Air Force and Marine fighters and fighter-bombers raided the tank and infantry school near P'yongyang with 541 tons of high explosives, and 24 fighter-bombers hit Suiho again in a surprise low-level attack. Despite the intense antiaircraft concentrations around Suiho, not a plane was lost or damaged.

Twenty-four Thunderjets from the Fifth Air Force made an 800-mile round trip to Ch'ongjin, some sixty-three miles from the Soviet border, to bomb the city's industrial facilities on 5 March. Only sixteen days later, planes from three Navy carriers hit the same town again with 169 sorties, causing huge secondary explosions in the ammunition storage area. In the meantime, the Fifth Air Force sent twenty-six B–29's to destroy a troop and factory complex near Sinuiju on 17 March. The bombardiers claimed 147 buildings, 4 warehouses, and 1 manufacturing plant were wiped out in this raid.

Emphasis continued on air interdiction during the December–March period, but it was not the same type that the air forces had tried unsuccessfully in the STRANGLE rail cutting program of the previous year. Rather the air forces aimed at striking and destroying vulnerable enemy targets that would not only impede the Communist supply effort but also apply pressure on them to end the

[58] FEAF Comd Rpt, Jan 52, vol. I, pp. 11–12; vol II, Opns, tab 3.

[59] *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 13.

[60] COMNAVFE Comd and Hist Rpt, Jan–Feb 53, sec. 1-1, 1-12.

hostilities. By the destruction of communications centers and supply facilities, such as factories, warehouses, and depots, the task of supporting the enemy's troops at the front became a bit more complicated every day. But the quietness along the battle lines during most of the period did not require extraordinary expenditures of matériel and ammunition and, despite the air forces' efforts, the Communists were able to stockpile supplies to sustain themselves from thirty to forty-five days in the forward areas.[61]

As the enemy increased his ground activity during March, both the Air Force and Navy began to put more stress upon close air support and Cherokee-type missions. The outbreak of fighting at Old Baldy and VEGAS brought a spate of calls for air operations against Chinese strongpoints, supply dumps, and personnel concentrations close to the front. On Old Baldy, FEAF provided 483 fighter-bomber, 87 light-bomber, and 11 medium bomber sorties during the last week of March. The FEAF planes dropped about 400 tons of bombs on the enemy ground positions, and Navy and Marine aircraft added 77 tons of bombs and 66 tons of napalm to the assault.[62]

The advent of spring and the accelerated tempo of enemy operations at the close of March seemed to presage a departure from the somewhat uneventful pattern of the winter months. From time to time the actions had grown warmer during the period, but the fighting had never decided more than the temporary possession of another hill. Air and sea operations had provided a measure of pressure upon the enemy as towns and installations were destroyed or damaged, but the Communists' powers of recuperation had been adequate to readjust to these losses and irritations. As April arrived, the military situation remained essentially unchanged—neither side was vitally hurt nor willing to risk a vital hurt. The sparring match continued as both opponents awaited an opportune moment to end the contest on terms favorable to their own cause. In view of this reluctance to seek a military decision, the truce tent still appeared to offer the only arena in which a settlement would be effected.

[61] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, sec. I, Narrative, p. 24.

[62] FEAF Comd Rpts, Feb and Mar 53, vol. I, pp. 1–2 and 1–3, respectively.

# CHAPTER XVIII

# The Beginning of the End

When General Harrison and his associates walked out of the tent at Panmunjom on 8 October, they neither knew when they would return nor if they would come back at all. The possibility that the Communists would alter their attitude toward repatriation appeared extremely unlikely at that time and the military pressure that the U.N. Command could hope to muster gave no promise of producing a change in the enemy's stand. Since the UNC had fallen back upon its final negotiating position, the discussion phase and the period of maneuvering were at an end. Until a break occurred in the adamant fronts presented by both sides, the prospects for a settlement remained remote.

The liaison officers meanwhile continued to meet at Panmunjom and furnished one point of contact for reflecting a shift in the situation. The activity on the battlefield, especially during the October–November operations, provided another. And in the air over North Korea, the Far East Air Forces did its best to help speed up the enemy's desire to reach an agreement. To counter the application of military pressure, the Communists reverted to their old standbys—political and psychological warfare. But the efficacy of either the UNC or the enemy method was doubtful, since both had been tried before and found wanting.

## *The Long Recess: First Phase*

The first nonmilitary attack by the Communists in October was aimed at the UNC tactics at Panmunjom. As soon as the Harrison team left the tent, the enemy began to charge that the UNC had broken off the negotiations. Since the onus for a collapse in the talks had always been a sensitive point to the political and military leaders in Washington, they quickly instructed Clark not to use the term "indefinite recess" in the UNC statements. They informed him that there was no desire to have the armistice negotiations debated in any forum other than that of Panmunjom and that all the efforts of the United States in the U.N. General Assembly were directed towards facilitating an agreement at the meetings in the tents.[1]

As the letters flew back and forth between the liaison officers in October, the courses adopted by the opponents became clear. The UNC stand rested upon the conclusion that the Communists had neither accepted any of the plans offered by the U.N. Command nor proffered any of their own that were new or reasonable; therefore, the UNC delegation would wait until the enemy satisfied one of the two conditions listed above before it would reconvene. Har-

[1] Msg, JCS 920838, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Oct 52.

rison and Clark denied repeatedly that the UNC had ended the negotiations.[2]

The Communists, on the other hand, pursued two tactics. While they pressed their accusations that the UNC had ended the truce talks, they missed no opportunity to cite UNC violations, real and alleged, of the neutral zone around Panmunjom. And as the incidence of violence in the prisoner of war camps started to increase again, the enemy negotiators strongly censured the UNC for its treatment of the Communist prisoners.[3]

To lessen the impact of the enemy's charges and to explain the UNC position in the negotiations to the rest of the world, Secretary of State Acheson addressed the U.N. Political Committee on 24 October. Tracing the beginnings of the talks and the development of the issues, he admitted that the growth of the conflict over repatriation had been "wholly unexpected" and "surprising" to the U.N. Command.[4] He pointed out the inconsistencies of the position adopted by the USSR in opposing the concept of no forced repatriation in Korea when it had on various occasions previously upheld the right of the prisoner of war to choose or refuse repatriation. In closing he stressed that the UNC was ready to reconvene the meetings at Panmunjom at any time that the Communists were willing to accept the "fundamental principle of nonforcible return." [5]

While the debates in the General Assembly over the U.S. resolution against forcible repatriation were going on, other suggestions and resolutions were brought forth. One of these was an informal Canadian proposal that the UNC seek a cease-fire in Korea and leave the nonrepatriate problem to later negotiations. Both Army and State Department staffs objected to this procedure. To remove the threat of military compulsion would amount to a surrender of the UNC's most potent weapon, they maintained, while, at the same time, the Communists would keep their trump card—the UNC prisoners. The enemy could protract the discussions on the disposition of prisoners and in the meantime rebuild its airfields, roads, bridges and restock its supply dumps. If the talks proved fruitless and hostilities again broke out, the Communist military position could be greatly improved and UNC morale would be sadly depressed.[6]

Several weeks later when the Joint Chiefs forwarded their views on the matter to the Secretary of Defense, they endorsed the Army-State staff arguments. There could be no justification for giving up the UNC air superiority in Korea, they told Mr. Lovett, unless the

[2] (1) Ltr, Harrison to Nam, 15 Oct 52, no sub. (2) Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 19 Oct 52. Both in G–3 File, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, 1952, bk. II.

[3] Ltrs, Nam to Harrison, 16 and 29 Oct 52, no sub, in G–3 File, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, 1952, bk. II.

[4] From the context it is evident that Secretary Acheson used the term "UNC" loosely, encompassing the political and military leadership in the U.S. and other allied U.N. countries. As already noted, General Ridgway had had misgivings about the UNC position on voluntary repatriation before it became the official stand. See Chapter VII, above.

[5] Department of State Publication 4771, *The Problem of Peace in Korea*, a report by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, October 24, 1952 (Washington, 1952).

[6] G–3 and State Dept Staff Paper, no title, no date (ca. 28 Oct 52), in G–3 091 Korea, 3/22.

Communists accepted the concept of no forced repatriation.[7]

On 17 November the Indian delegation presented its plan to end the Korean War to the United Nations. The Indian resolution recognized the U.S. contention that no force should be used to prevent or effect the return of prisoners to their homeland. Yet in deference to the Communist stand, it suggested that a repatriation commission, composed of two Communist and two UNC nations, be set up to receive all the prisoners in the demilitarized zone. There they would be classified according to nationality and domicile, as the Communists had wished, and be free to go home. Each side would have the freedom of explaining to the prisoners their rights, and all prisoners who still had not chosen repatriation after ninety days would be referred to the political conference recommended in the armistice agreement. In case the four members of the repatriation commission could not agree on the interpretation of the details of handling the prisoners and their disposition, an umpire would be named by the members or the General Assembly to break any deadlock.[8]

Although many of the United States allies favored the Indian proposal, at least in principle, the U.S. official reaction was quick and adverse. Most of the objections voiced by the United States concerned the vagueness of the duties and responsibilities that the repatriation commission would carry out and the indefinite procedure for handling nonrepatriates. Not only was the time limit of ninety days too long for the interrogation period, but the U.S. still opposed turning over the nonrepatriates to a political conference.[9]

But the Communist response proved to be even stronger. Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky roundly denounced the Indian plan in the United Nations, and Chou En-lai rejected it by stating on 28 November that the Russian-sponsored proposal calling for forcible repatriation was the only reasonable one. When it came to a vote on 3 December, the U.N. voted down the USSR's resolution, 40 to 5, and adopted the Indian plan, 54 to 5. Only the Communist bloc supported the Russian and opposed the Indian proposal. The latter provided that if the peace conference did not settle the nonrepatriates' fate in thirty days, the prisoners would be turned over to the United Nations for disposition.[10]

There was small chance that the Communists would pay much heed to the action of the General Assembly in the matter beyond attacking it vigorously. But the bitter assault that they launched on the Indian suggestion served two purposes: it alienated public opinion in some of the neutral countries that had supported this solution; and it helped obscure the milder disapproval evidenced by the United States.

The unfavorable publicity garnered by the Communists on this score, however, was soon to be matched by the gathering storm of unfortunate events

[7] Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 17 Nov 52, sub: U.S. Position on Korea. . . .

[8] Msg, DA 924505, G-3 to CINCFE, 22 Nov 52.

[9] (1) Msg, DA 924551, G-3 to CINCFE, 23 Nov 52. (2) U.S. Reaction to India's Proposal on Prisoners of War, Statement made by Secretary Acheson, in Dept of State *Bulletin*, vol. XXVII, No. 702 (December 8, 1952), pp. 910ff.

[10] Text of Resolution on Prisoners of War, 3 Dec 52, in Dept of State *Bulletin*, vol XXVII, No. 702 (December 8, 1952), pp. 916–17.

taking place in UNC prison camps. Although the Communist prisoners had been relocated in smaller, more manageable groups and scattered on a number of islands to lessen the threat of concerted action, the hard-core leaders and their followers had shown no disposition toward ending their fight in the compounds.

As already indicated, the problem of maintaining order and discipline in the Communist enclosures was fraught with pitfalls. A policy of leniency and laxness would allow the zealous partisans full opportunity to control and administer the compounds as they saw fit. On the other hand, a ruthless, hard policy with tight control and discipline meant continual clashes and bloodshed. The Communists seemed to welcome violence and—even more—to encourage it. For every man that the UNC was inveigled into wounding or killing meant another propaganda advantage to the enemy. The Communist prisoners acted therefore as a double weapon since they forced the UNC to maintain strong guard forces in the rear and since their agitation placed the UNC constantly on the defensive to justify its repressive measures.

When the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group suggested in early October that the UNC Armistice Delegation should seek to forestall Communist propaganda gains by charging the enemy with instigation of the disturbances in the camps each time one occurred, the delegation agreed that this approach had merit. But it pointed out that seizing the initiative would probably neither deter the Communists from causing the disorders nor from magnifying them to suit their purpose. The delegation felt that if the UNC intended to accuse the enemy of fomenting trouble, concrete evidence of such activity would have to be presented to substantiate the charges. This would mean that intercepted orders, confessions, plans that were uncovered, and other proof of enemy direction would have to be produced and publicized.[11] The concern of the Far East Command with the enemy's techniques in exploiting the situation in the prison camps was to produce results later on, but for the time being nothing was done.

Meanwhile the enemy seldom attended a meeting of the liaison officers without citing a violation of the Geneva Convention in regard to the treatment of prisoners or an infringement of the neutral zone around Panmunjom by UNC aircraft or ground troops. On 30 November the Communists alleged that the UNC had wounded thirty-two prisoners at Koje-do five days earlier and then went on to claim that during October and November a total of 542 Communist prisoners had been killed or wounded.[12] By the end of the year, General Nam charged that the UNC had caused 3,059 casualties among the Communist internees since July 1951 and noted that the Communists had lodged 45 protests on this score since February 1952.[13]

[11] Ltr, Col S. D. Somerville, Exec to UNC Delegation, to Chief JSPOG, 14 Oct 52, sub: Letter on POW Incidents, in FEC SGS Corresp File, 1 Jan–31 Dec 52.

[12] Memo for Rcd, sub: Liaison Officers' Mtgs, 30 Nov 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, incls 1–89, incl 1.

[13] Ltr, Nam to Harrison, 30 Dec 52, no sub, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1–78, incls 1 and 2.



ENCLOSURE 1 OF THE POW CAMP AT PONGAM-DO

The growing toll in the prison camps caused UNC leaders a great deal of uneasiness as December began. Direct disobedience of orders was a common occurrence and was usually countered by direct application of force. Indications from the UNC Prisoner of War Command pointed to considerable planning among the prisoners for a mass breakout from the camps in early December and one of the worst trouble spots was at the civilian internee compounds on Pongam-do, a tiny island not far from Koje-do.[14]

It was difficult to understand why Pongam-do had been chosen for a prison camp site. The island was small and compounds had to be located on the side of a steeply terraced hill. Since the prisoners were placed on the upper terraces and access could only be gained by proceeding level by level up the hill, the Communist internees were given all the advantages of terrain. For some time, the prisoners at Pongam-do had been getting bolder and bolder. They organized and conducted military drill in defiance of UNC orders and mounted demonstrations at will. Among the 9,000 inmates on the island were many of the prisoners who had been participants in the February 1952 outbreak on Koje-do. They were guarded by one ROK security

[14] Msg, CX 59869, CINCUNC to DA, 8 Dec 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1–78, incl 6.

battalion and some U.S. administrative personnel.

On 14 December matters came to a head. Around 3,600 internees in six compounds were ordered to disband their drilling and to cease causing a commotion. Instead they formed three ranks on the upper terrace and locked arms. Others gathered behind this protective screen and began to hurl rocks and debris on the ROK troops as they ascended the hill to enforce the order. Ordinarily concussion grenades and nontoxic gas would have been used, but, in this instance, the prisoners could throw the grenades back down the hill and a strong cross-wind ruled out the employment of gas. Thus, when orders and warning shots were disregarded, the ROK soldiers began to take aim at the solid, defiant ranks above them. At close range the bullets opened gaps in the human chain and resistance collapsed. But when the melee was over, 85 prisoners lay dead, 113 were hospitalized, and there were over 100 minor injuries. Only four ROK personnel received major wounds.[15]

The affair at Pongam-do again led to a flurry of activity on POW matters. Clark told Van Fleet to have available one U.S. infantry battalion that could be shifted to the Korean Communications Zone on twenty-four hours' notice and authorized General Herren to utilize one battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division on the prisoner of war mission. When Herren asked that helicopters be furnished so that tear gas grenades could be dropped on rioters to disperse them without casualties, Clark approved his request.[16] These measures would help to cope with the results of the prisoner agitation if not with the causes.

To strengthen his hand against further outbreaks in the prison camps, Clark pressed anew for authority to establish a U.N. military commission to try prisoners charged with postcapture offenses. His urgings in July and August had elicited no positive action, despite the support of General Collins, but with the example of Pongam-do fresh in the news, Clark reminded his superiors that the lack of appropriate judicial machinery weakened the disciplinary powers of the camp commanders.[17] In view of the legal and political complications involved in conducting trials of prisoners of war, the U.S. political and military leaders had been reluctant to use this weapon in the past, but Clark's plea reopened the matter. Speedy action approving such authority, however, appeared to be out of the question, since the JCS intended to have the entire POW problem reviewed at the highest level.[18] This meant consideration by the new President and his advisors and would take time.

Pongam-do produced protests from the Communists and criticism by the International Committee of the Red Cross of the methods used by the U.N. Command. The latter complaint was more difficult to cope with, for the ICRC was highly regarded throughout the non-

[15] Msg, CX 60206 and CX 60301, CINCUNC to DA, 15 and 18 Dec 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1–78, incl 8.

[16] (1) Msg, CX 60234, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 16 Dec 52. (2) Msg, CX 60303, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 18 Dec 52. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1–78, incls 9 and 10.

[17] Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 19 Dec 52, sub: Trial of POW's for Post-Captive Offenses, in G–3 383.6, 64.

[18] Msg, JCS 928298, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jan 53.

Communist world. In answer to the Red Cross allegation that the UNC control of prisoners had been overly strict and the members of the security forces had been unnecessarily harassing the prisoners, Clark issued a statement defending the UNC actions and attacking the Communist prisoners' behavior. He reminded the ICRC representatives that the UNC had voluntarily observed the Geneva Convention while the Communists had ignored it. When it came to deliberate disobedience, marked by mutiny, riots, or refusal to carry out orders, on the one hand, and terrorism in the camps, on the other, the UNC had used force, but only after all other methods had been tried. Clark pointed out that the UNC had constantly sought to improve the physical facilities and supply procedures for the camps and that only the pro-Communist enclosures, whose inmates had never accepted their nonbelligerent status as prisoners, had turned to organized violence.[19]

Despite the voluminousness of the enemy's protests during the latter part of 1952, Clark did not believe that the Communists had any intention of terminating the negotiations. The continuous barrage of enemy grievances seemed designed, in his opinion, to play upon the fears of the United States' allies and to create sympathy for the Communist position on prisoners of war.[20]

Nevertheless, the Far East commander took steps to lessen the opportunities of the prisoners to incite unrest. To eliminate the necessity for visiting the latrines at night, the prison command installed facilities in each barracks. In the corridors between the compounds guards were armed with shotguns so that prisoners moving around in disobedience to the camp curfew could be identified by the buckshot they absorbed, but not killed or seriously injured.[21]

In early January, the Department of the Army and the Far East Command decided that the time had come to expose the Communist methods and techniques of stirring up trouble in the prison camps. The Military Intelligence Section, G–2, of the FEC was assigned the task of compiling a report on the organization, control, and methods used by the enemy to exploit their faithful followers and to demonstrate the problems facing the U.N. Command as it attempted to deal with the matter. The end result was the study entitled *The Communist War at POW Camps,* published in late January.[22] The press reaction in the United States to the release of this report was highly favorable, but complete copies were not available there and full advantage of the study could not be attained.[23]

The enemy seemed to hold the upper hand in the battle of indirect pressures as 1953 began. However, the UNC still retained several weapons that it had not

[19] (1) Msg, C 60412, CINCFE to DA, 21 Dec 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1–78, incl 19. (2) Msg, CX 60820, CINCUNC to CSUSA, 5 Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1–67, incl 16.

[20] Msg, CX 60789, CINCFE to JCS, 2 Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1–67, incl 15.

[21] (1) Msg, CX 60811, CINCUNC to Herren, 3 Jan 53. (2) Msg, AX 72028, Herren to Clark, 8 Jan 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1–67, incls 17 and 18.

[22] Msg, DA 928223, DA to CINCFE, 9 Jan 53.

[23] (1) Msg, ZX 35682, CINCFE to DA, 28 Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1–67, incl 23. (2) Msg, DA 930068, DA to CINCFE, 30 Jan 53.

used. In mid-December, Col. Charles W. McCarthy, senior UNC liaison officer, had urged that the UNC strike back. In a letter to the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group he pointed out that the UNC pilots were allowing the Communists to utilize the P'yongyang-Kaesong road for convoys to the truce area every day. In effect, what this meant, McCarthy continued, was that the enemy had a main supply route open all day despite the fact that the negotiations were in recess. He proposed that the UNC cut back the number of convoys permitted the enemy to three or less a week and require the Communists to adhere to a tight timetable for each trip allowed. Such action would strike a blow at the enemy and perhaps let the people back home know that the UNC was not adopting a passive approach to the Communists' behind-the-scenes tactics.[24]

Thus, when the liaison officers met on 15 January, Colonel McCarthy's successor, Col. William B. Carlock, informed Col. Ju Yon, who had recently taken Colonel Chang's place, of the new UNC policy. Starting on 25 January, the Communists would be allowed to run only two convoys a week as long as the negotiations were in recess. One would leave P'yongyang and the other Kaesong every Sunday morning; both would be required to finish their journeys by 2000. To the protest by the Communists that the UNC could not unilaterally break the agreement of November 1951, Colonel Carlock informed Ju that there was no "agreement" on the immunity granted the Communists, since the enemy had not extended any like consideration to the UNC.[25]

### *The Republicans Take Over*

When Dwight D. Eisenhower became President of the United States on 20 January, John Foster Dulles succeeded Dean Acheson as Secretary of State and Charles E. Wilson became Secretary of Defense. Yet, as noted above, there was no basic change in U.S. policy insofar as the Korean War was concerned. The new administration had no panacea for ending the conflict expeditiously and no intention of expanding the military pressure to force a settlement upon the Communists. On the whole the Republicans adopted the policy of watchful waiting pursued by the Truman administration.

The new President quickly changed one of the procedures followed by Mr. Truman during his term of office. No longer were all the important messages concerning the Korean War routed across his desk for final approval. This task now fell largely to the Secretaries of State and Defense and Mr. Dulles' role in the making of Korean policy increased during the early months of 1953.

In one substantive respect, too, President Eisenhower swiftly divorced himself from the course followed by his predecessor. In his State of the Union message to Congress on 2 February, Mr. Eisenhower revealed that he had decided to end the U.S. naval blockade of Taiwan.

[24] Ltr, McCarthy to Col Donald H. Galloway, Deputy Chief JSPOG, 16 Dec 52, no sub, in FEC SGS Corresp File, 1 Jan–31 Dec 52.

[25] (1) Ltr, Carlock to Ju, 15 Jan 53, no sub. (2) Ltr, Ju to Carlock, 21 Jan 53, no sub. (3) Liaison Officers Mtgs, 21 Jan 53. All in G–3 File, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan–Jun 53, bk. III.

No longer would the U.S. Seventh Fleet serve as a screen for the Chinese Communists and prevent Chiang Kai-shek from attacking the mainland, the President affirmed. As might be expected, reaction to this shift was loud and varied. General MacArthur, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, Chiang Kai-shek, and President Rhee all supported the rescinding of the restriction, while leading Democrats and prominent newspapermen in Great Britain and India immediately voiced their concern lest the act provoke an extension of the war into the Taiwan area. Backers of the President hailed the "unleashing" of Chiang's forces and praised Eisenhower for having seized the initiative in the battle with communism. But if it were true that the enemy might be confused and forced to guess at the next move that the United States might make, it was also fair to state that the sword was two-edged. It was also conceivable that the Communist Chinese might attack Taiwan.

British Foreign Secretary Eden was quite cool to the "unilateral" decision taken by the new government without consultation with its allies and warned that the move might "have very unfortunate political repercussions without compensating military advantages." In India, one newspaper accused the President of "hunting peace with a gun." [26]

Despite the excitement generated by this announcement, there was no sudden outbreak of operations in the Taiwan sector. The Nationalist Chinese forces had but few landing craft and only a small number of their troops were amphibiously trained. Without greater support in equipment from the United States and the preparation of more divisions for assault landings, the Nationalist threat could become little more than a threat. The principal result of the "unleashing" was to stir up the political and diplomatic waters of the world, while those about Taiwan remained militarily serene. As the historian of the Far East Naval Forces remarked: "Despite internal uneasiness over the decision, it did not have the immediate strategic significance expected, and, tactically, had no effect on the operation of the Formosa Patrol." [27]

Gradually the Eisenhower administration became more familiar with the problems in Korea and began to consider what positive steps could be taken within the accepted political framework to break the impasse. Once again the concept of unilateral release of the nonrepatriates and the presentation to the Communists of a *fait accompli* was revived and Clark was asked to comment on this approach. Because of the sensitivity of the matter, Clark sent a member of his staff, Lt. Col. Arthur W. Kogstad, to Washington to present his views. Meeting with Washington officials in early March, Kogstad informed the group that Clark was fully in favor of releasing the Korean nonrepatriates and did not think that such a move would have an appreciable effect upon the UNC's prospects for an armistice in Korea. As for the Chinese nonrepatriates, their disposition would require careful attention, since it would have political implications. Kogstad later reported that the tenor of opinion among the

[26] The reaction to the 2 February speech may be found in the New York *Times*, February 3, 4 1953.

[27] COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Jan, Feb 53, p. 4.

conferees attending the meeting had been favorable to Clark's recommendation, but other factors were at work. Mr. Dulles, who had a major hand in making policy in Mr. Eisenhower's administration, was busy with the U.N. General Assembly and unable to devote his time to the POW question in early March. Then, too, the sudden demise of Joseph Stalin of a cerebral hemorrhage on 5 March had injected any number of new elements into the world political picture, and time was required to assess them before bold ventures were embarked upon.[28] At any rate time overtook the concept of unilateral release insofar as the U.N. Command was concerned and the next time it reared its head, it bore the visage of Syngman Rhee.[29]

The rash of incidents in the prison camps meanwhile continued unabated. Clark decided in February to sound out the new political chiefs on the old question of trial of prisoners for their postcapture offenses. Pointing out that the publication of the study of the Communist prisoners had raised questions among the press and his own troops as to why no disciplinary action had been taken against the prison leaders, Clark requested immediate consideration for this pressing problem.[30]

The Far East commander received some solace in late February. In cases of flagrant attack against UNC security personnel, the JCS told him, Clark might bring the offenders to justice, but no undue publicity would be given to the trials. This was only a halfway measure. Clark immediately protested, since most of the violence had been directed at fellow prisoners rather than at the U.N. Command. In the face of this reclama, the JCS secured authority for the UNC to try prisoners charged with offenses committed after June 1952 against other prisoners.[31]

Despite this apparent victory, events conspired to delay the trial and punishment of the Communist troublemakers in the prison camps. Before the Far East Command brought the first cases to court, the State Department wanted to line up judicial support and participation in the trials from the United States' allies in Korea. By the end of March, however, only four nations had agreed to serve on military commissions.[32] This reluctance to share the responsibility for trying prisoners of war for postcapture offenses and the swift flow of developments on the negotiating front in late March seemed to offer small hope that the ringleaders of violence would ever come to trial.

The Communist threat to Seoul in February, discussed in the preceding chapter, produced several exchanges between Tokyo and Washington concerning the neutral city of Kaesong. Under the October 1951 agreement, Kaesong was protected from UNC attack. Yet, Clark told the JCS in early February, the

[28] A good account of the Kogstad mission will be found in Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 52–Jul 53), vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 271ff. See also Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 262.

[29] See Chapter XX, below.

[30] Msg, CX 61135, CINCUNC to DA, 4 Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1–88, incl 15.

[31] (1) Msg, DA 931969, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Feb 53. (2) Msg, CX 61323, CINCUNC to DA, 24 Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1–88, incl 17. (3) Msg, JCS 932476, JCS to CINCFE, 28 Feb 53.

[32] (1) Msg, JCS 933135, JCS to CINCFE, 7 Mar 53. (2) Msgs, CX 61627 and CX 61647, CINCUNC to G–3, 25 and 27 Mar 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1–72, incls 13 and 14.

enemy was using the town for restaging troops, for resupply, and as an espionage headquarters. If and when he became convinced that a major Communist offensive was in the offing, Clark wanted authority to abrogate the 1951 agreement and attack Kaesong. On 9 February, just two days after his initial request, the United Nations commander asked for permission to open up Kaesong to assault.[33]

When Clark's recommendation came up for discussion in Washington, Mr. Dulles urged that the U.N. Command should unilaterally abrogate the security agreement of 1951 as of a specific date and remove Kaesong and Munsan, but not Panmunjom, from a neutral status, if an enemy offensive of division size or larger seemed imminent. The JCS, in passing the decision on to Clark, pointed out that such an action would help alleviate an adverse military situation, while lessening the political implications that the negotiations were being completely broken off.[34] As it turned out, the large-scale Communist offensive failed to materialize and Clark did not have to retract Kaesong's immunity.

### *The Big Break*

Amidst the search for ways and means to apply pressure upon the enemy and to strengthen General Clark's hand in the conflict, the UNC made a rather perfunctory gesture that, at the time, seemed to offer little chance of a favorable response. Back in December, Clark had read a news despatch from Geneva which reported that the Executive Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies had passed a resolution on 13 December calling for the immediate exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. Clark suggested that, although he did not think the Communists would agree to such an exchange in the light of their previous reaction to similar proposals, he felt that the UNC should support the resolution for its psychological and publicity value.[35]

No action was taken on his suggestion until February. Then the State Department learned that the question of an exchange of sick and wounded would probably be raised when the U.N. General Assembly met on 24 February. The political advantage in having the United States propose and support a resolution of this nature was obvious and the State Department had little difficulty in securing the approval of the JCS and of Clark.[36]

On 22 February the Far East commander thus sent a letter to Kim and Peng requesting an immediate exchange of sick and injured prisoners. He believed they would turn it down, as they had earlier efforts along this line.[37]

The matter lay fallow during the remainder of the month and most of March. In the meantime, the enemy

[33] Msgs, CX 61160 and CX 61173, CINCUNC to JCS, 7 and 9 Feb 53, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 495, in JSPOG Files.

[34] (1) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 12 Feb 53, sub: Abrogation of Security Agreement Re Kaesong-Panmunjom-Munsan, in G-3 091 Korea, 12/4. (2) Msg, JCS 931311, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Feb 53.

[35] Msg, CX 60418, CINCUNC to G-3, 21 Dec 52, DA-IN 220029.

[36] (1) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 16 Feb 53, sub: Proposal to Exchange Sick and Wounded POW's, in G-3 383.6, 13/4. (2) Msg, JCS 931724, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Feb 53. (3) Msg, CX 61281, Clark to DA, 19 Feb 53, DA-IN 239084.

[37] (1) Msg, CX 61281, Clark to DA, 19 Feb 53, DA-IN 239084. (2) Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 22 Feb 53, no sub, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.

sustained the flow of complaints on prisoner of war incidents, infringements of the vital area by UNC aircraft, and even resurrected the charge that the UNC was resorting to germ warfare. On 24 February Clark issued a statement refuting the Chinese claim that captured American personnel had admitted the employment of germ warfare. He pointed out that Communists evidently expected new outbreaks of disease during the spring and were trying to cover up the inadequacy of their own health service to cope with epidemics. In conclusion, he reaffirmed that the U.N. command had never engaged in germ warfare in Korea.[38]

As March opened, events began to change the world situation dramatically. Stalin's successor, Georgi M. Malenkov, assumed the reins of government on 5 March and another transition period for world communism was inaugurated. Whether the policies of the new controlling group surrounding Malenkov would differ radically from those of Stalin was unknown, but that there would have to be a period of consolidation to establish Malenkov and his associates in power seemed self-evident. Under the circumstances, the United States and its allies cautiously awaited indications of the direction that the Malenkov regime intended to take.

Although the Communist prisoners of war seemed little affected by Stalin's death and mounted an attack on the prison commandant on the island of Yoncho-do on 7 March, which resulted in the death of twenty-three prisoners and the wounding of sixty more, there were signs that a shift in Soviet strategy might be approaching.[39] On 21 March Moscow radio, for the first time since the close of World War II, admitted that the United States and Great Britain had played a role in the defeat of the Axis Powers. The Russians also agreed to intervene to obtain the release of nine British diplomats and missionaries held captive in North Korea since the outbreak of the Korean War. In Germany, the Soviet reaction to the West German ratification of the European Defense Community treaty was fairly mild.[40] The possibility that a new Communist peace offensive was in the making evoked a spirit of hope in diplomatic circles throughout the non-Communist world.

The big break came on 28 March. Replying to Clark's request for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, Kim and Peng said that they were perfectly willing to carry out the provisions of the Geneva Convention in this respect and then went on to state: "At the same time, we consider that the reasonable settlement of the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of both sides during the period of hostilities should be made to lead to the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war, thereby achieving an armistice in Korea for which people throughout the world are longing." [41]

What the Communist leaders meant by their vague reference to a "smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war" was a matter of conjecture, but their acceptance of the sick and wounded exchange promoted optimism.

[38] Msg, Z 35882, CINCFE to DA, 24 Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1–88, incl 7.

[39] Msg, EX 13138, CG AFFE to DA, 9 Mar 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1–72, incl 16.

[40] New York *Times*, March 20, 21, 25, 1953.

[41] Ltr, Kim and Peng to Clark, 28 Mar 53, no sub, in G–3 file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan–Jun 53, bk. III.

Clark immediately told the JCS that he would go ahead with the arrangements for the sick and wounded through the liaison officers, but would decline to resume plenary sessions until the enemy either came forward with a constructive proposal or demonstrated willingness to accept one of the offers that the UNC had made.[42] In their reply, his superiors suggested that Clark's letter imply that the Communists intended to meet in substance the UNC position on prisoners if the negotiations were reconvened. In this way the burden would be placed upon the enemy to either agree to that assumption or admit publicly that there was no change in their stand on repatriation. In no case, the Washington leaders concluded, would the resumption of negotiations be tied in as a condition for the exchange of the sick and wounded.[43] Clark followed the instructions and dispatched his response to Kim and Peng on 31 March.[44]

While Tokyo and Washington pondered the significance of the Communist move, Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of Communist China, provided a measure of clarification. On 30 March he issued a statement covering the course of the negotiations and the agreements already reached. Chou then went on to the prisoner of war problem and offered what apparently was the key concession, as he urged that both sides "should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state so as to ensure a just solution to the question of their repatriation." Lest the U.N. Command assume that the enemy had surrendered its views on repatriation, Chou strongly affirmed that the Communists believed that the prisoners of war had been filled with apprehensions and were afraid to return home "under the intimidation and with oppression of the opposite side." He was confident that once explanations could be tendered to the prisoners, they would quickly decide to be repatriated.[45] At any rate, the Chou proposal, which was quickly seconded by Kim Il Sung the following day, presented the brightest hope of settling the Korean War since screening in April 1952.

The initial reaction to Chou's communication in Washington was continued caution. While not denying that it held promise, the U.S. leaders maintained that the Communists still had to come forward with a detailed plan for implementing their proposal. They could foresee a number of questions that would have to be answered such as: What did Chou mean by a "neutral" state? Where would the neutral state take over control of the prisoners—in or outside of Korea? Who would make the explanations? Who would determine the final disposition of the nonrepatriates? If the Communists went forward with the exchange of sick and wounded and produced a detailed statement indicating their good faith in desiring a settlement of the over-all problem, the American leaders were willing to permit

[42] Msg, CX 61673, Clark to JCS, 29 Mar 53, DA-IN 252152.

[43] Msg, JCS 935136, JCS to CINCUNC, 30 Mar 53.

[44] Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 31 Mar 53, no sub, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.

[45] Statement of Chou En-lai, 30 Mar 53, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.

concurrent discussion of Chou's proposal during the exchange.[46]

Clark agreed fully that the enemy must produce a concrete plan for discussion before the plenary sessions could reconvene and that the Communist performance in following through on the sick and wounded trade would provide a demonstration of their good faith. In a letter to the enemy leaders on 5 April, he proposed that the liaison officers meet the following day and requested that Kim and Peng furnish the UNC with more particulars on the Communist method for disposition of the nonrepatriation question.[47]

In preparation for the first meeting of the liaison officers on the arrangements for the transfer of the sick and wounded, Clark and his staff formulated a UNC plan. It contemplated that each prisoner to be exchanged would be brought to Panmunjom, furnished with a medical tag on his condition and treatment and given unmarked, serviceable clothing. No incapacitated prisoner accused of postcapture war crimes would be held back for this reason, since it did not appear probable now that war crimes trials would ever be held. To insure that the enemy return the maximum number of UNC personnel, Clark told Harrison to avoid the use of the term "seriously" sick and wounded. As for the treatment of the prisoners turned back to the UNC through the exchange, Clark wanted to permit the members of the press and other news media to observe the whole process, but to restrict their numbers to fifty at Panmunjom and to allow interviews only with the prisoners selected by medical personnel as physically and mentally up to being questioned.[48]

### *Operation LITTLE SWITCH*

Admiral Daniel and General Lee Sang Cho led the liaison officers groups when they gathered at Panmunjom on 6 April. Relieved of the task of lodging and refuting charges and complaints, the representatives quickly got down to business and Admiral Daniel launched into an account of the UNC proposal. The United Nations Command was ready to start immediate construction of the facilities necessary for the delivery and receipt of the sick and wounded at Panmunjom and to begin delivery of 500 prisoners a day within seven days of the agreement on procedures. To expedite matters Daniel suggested that each side turn over its lists of names and nationalities of the prisoners to be exchanged and that officers be appointed to discuss administrative details. Lee pointed out that the Communists wanted to repatriate *all* sick and wounded eligibles under Articles 109 and 110 of the Geneva Convention.[49]

[46] Msg, JCS 935344, JCS to CINCUNC, 1 Apr 53. The message was drafted by the State Department and approved by the Services, General Bradley, and the Department of Defense.

[47] (1) Msg, C 61723, Clark to JCS, 3 April 53, DA-IN 253841. (2) Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 5 Apr 53, no sub, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.

[48] (1) Msgs, CX 61741 and 61743, Clark to JCS, 4 Apr 53, DA-IN's 254454 and 254434. (2) Msg, CX 61751, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 4 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256, incl 7. (3) Msg, CX 61767, Clark to DA, 6 Apr 53, in same place, incl 48.

[49] First Meeting of Liaison Group for discussing arrangement for repatriation of sick and wounded captured personnel, 6 April 53, in G-3 file, Transcript of Proceedings, Meetings of Liaison Group, 6 April-2 May 1953. All the meetings of the group are in the above file and will be henceforth referred to only by number and date.

After some hesitation, while the UNC checked the Geneva Convention carefully, Daniel informed the Communists on 7 April that his side was prepared to repatriate all prisoners eligible under the two articles, subject to the proviso that no individual would be repatriated against his will. Daniel stressed that the UNC would give the broadest interpretation possible to the term "sick and wounded." [50]

The effort of the United Nations Command to encourage the enemy to return as many prisoners as possible met with a disappointing response. When Lee announced the total on 8 April of 450 Korean and 150 non-Korean sick and wounded, Daniel called the figure "incredibly small." Actually, considering that the enemy was returning 600 of the 12,000 prisoners under its control, or 5 percent, the figure compared favorably with that presented by the UNC. For the latter intended to transfer 700 Chinese and 5,100 Koreans over to the enemy out of the 132,000 prisoners in its custody and this averaged out to only about 4.5 percent. Nevertheless, Daniel again asked the Communists to be more liberal in their classification of the sick and wounded.[51] As he told Clark after the meeting, the enemy liaison officers relaxed their strained attitudes visibly after the UNC disclosed its figures and he felt that he should press strongly for an increase in the totals the UNC would receive.[52]

In the succeeding days the details were gradually worked out. Security guards at Panmunjom were increased to thirty for each side during the exchange period and the UNC agreed to let the Communists move the prisoners up to the conference area in convoys of five vehicles over routes that were clearly marked out.[53]

The agreement that was signed on 11 April completed the general arrangements. Within ten days the exchange at Panmunjom would begin, with the enemy delivering 100 and the UNC 500 a day in groups of 25 at a time. Rosters prepared by nationality, including name, rank, and serial number would accompany each group and receipts would be signed for a group as it was turned over to the other side.[54]

April 20 was established as the date for initiating LITTLE SWITCH, as the U.N. Command dubbed the operation, and in the interim trucks and trains began to transport the Communist prisoners north from Koje-do and the other offshore islands. On 14 April, twenty-three vehicles left the North Korean prison camps with the first contingent of UNC sick and wounded. Five days later the first trainload of enemy prisoners set out from Pusan to Munsan. But even as the Communist invalids prepared to go home, they sought to embarrass the UNC. Some refused a new issue of clothing because the letter "P" for prisoner had not been stenciled on the shirts. Others would not permit UNC personnel to dust them with DDT powder. Demonstrations broke out, with chanting and singing, until camp authorities warned the leaders that failure to obey orders would result in loss of their opportunity

[50] Second Mtg, Liaison Group, 7 Apr 53.
[51] Third Mtg, Liaison Group, 8 Apr 53.
[52] Msg, HNC 1611, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 8 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256, incl 20.
[53] Fourth and Fifth Mtgs, Liaison Group, 9–10 Apr 53.
[54] Sixth Mtg, Liaison Group, 11 Apr 53.



SIGNING THE AGREEMENT FOR THE EXCHANGE OF SICK AND WOUNDED PRISONERS, *Panmunjom, 11 April 1953.*

for repatriation. As the prisoners rode to the waiting LST for shipment to the mainland, they threw away their rations of tooth powder, soap, and cigarettes with hand-printed propaganda messages cached inside, charging the United States with "starvation, oppression and barbarous acts against the Korean people." At Pusan they demanded the right of inspection of hospital facilities before they debarked and had to be told they would be forcibly removed unless they complied with instructions. Some of the Chinese went on a hunger strike for several meals because they claimed that the food had been poisoned. When the time came for the final train ride from Pusan to Munsan, many of the prisoners cut off buttons, severed the half-belts of their overcoats, and removed their shoelaces in an attempt to create the impression that they had been poorly treated.[55]

As the U.N. Command gathered all of the Communist prisoners eligible for return, it discovered that there were more than 5,800 who could be repatriated. The question immediately arose whether to include the additional 550 Communists in the exchange or to adhere to the original tally. General Clark felt that the advantages of demonstrating

[55] Msg, PWCG 4-386, POW Comd to AFFE, 19 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256, incl 106.




THE COMMUNIST POW EXCHANGE SITE AT PANMUNJOM

the good faith of the UNC and of possibly spurring the enemy to increase its total of returnees outweighed the disadvantages of introducing a new figure and his superiors agreed.[56]

A new element was injected into the situation after LITTLE SWITCH got under way on 20 April. When the UNC sick and wounded were delivered to Panmunjom they were rushed back to Munsan for initial processing. Some were then flown to Japan for rest and treatment preparatory to shipment home, while the ROK patients were transferred to base hospitals in South Korea. As the press descended upon the prisoners for accounts of their experiences while in Communist hands, stories arose of other ill and injured prisoners still remaining in the enemy camps. Harrison quickly suggested that the UNC use the 550 extra Communist prisoners as a lever to pry more UNC personnel away from the enemy. But Clark preferred that Harrison simply ask the Communists to reexamine the matter, since many prisoners might not be in a fit condition to be moved.[57]

[56] (1) Msg, HNC 1634, CINCUNC to DA, 20 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256, incl 111. (2) Msg, JCS 936993, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Apr 53.

[57] (1) Msg, HNC 1637, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 21 Apr 53. (2) Msg, C 62028, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 22 Apr 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256, incls 114 and 117.



OPERATION LITTLE SWITCH. *Left, a wounded U.N. soldier is repatriated. Right, a wounded Communist is carried by a North Korean soldier.*

Whether the enemy was influenced by the UNC revelation that it was going to turn over 550 more patients than originally estimated, or by the uproar that the press stories of the UNC sick and wounded reportedly still in Communist custody occasioned in the United States, was difficult to ascertain. On 23 April, however, the Communists did announce that they would also exceed the 600 figure that they had submitted.[58]

Hoping to encourage further relaxation of the Communists' standards, the UNC added more enemy prisoners to its list, but on 26 April General Lee abruptly stated that his side had completed its share of the exchange. When Admiral Daniel protested that evidence in UNC possession showed that there were still about 375 UNC sick and wounded who could be repatriated, Lee termed it a groundless accusation and refused to consider the matter. Faced with an unyielding stand, the U.N. Command on 3 May finished delivering the last group of Communists that it intended to turn over.[59]

The final tally of deliveries disclosed

[58] (1) Msg, C 62042, Clark to DA, 23 Apr 53. (2) Msg, HNC 1639, Harrison to CINCUNC, 23 Apr 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256, incls 121 and 122.

[59] Tenth and Eleventh Mtgs, Liaison Group, 1 and 2 May.

that the UNC had relieved itself of 5,194 North Korean and 1,030 Chinese soldiers and 446 civilian internees, for a total of 6,670. Of these patients 357 were litter cases. In return the enemy had brought 684 assorted sick and wounded, including 94 litter cases, to Panmunjom.[60]

Perhaps the Communists had not been as liberal as many had hoped, but at least they had carried out their part of the bargain and thrown in a small bonus. In the light of this performance and the apparent disposition of the enemy to put an end to the shooting war in Korea, the resumption of plenary negotiations seemed to be in order.

### *Preparations for the Return to Plenary Sessions*

While the Communists were evidencing their sincerity in following through with the LITTLE SWITCH exchange, General Clark and his advisors sought to find out more about the intent and extent of the concession that Chou had offered on 30 March. As already pointed out, the Chinese statement had produced a mixed atmosphere of hope and caution throughout the non-Communist world, but it had been couched in such vague terms that it generated more questions than it answered. Clark's letter to Kim and Peng on 5 April had asked for further details and clarification.

The response came from Nam Il rather than his superiors on 9 April. Repeating in essence the same line that Chou had used about the Communist desires to find a peaceful solution to the conflict and to permit the prisoners to return home quickly, Nam went on:

> It is precisely on the basis of this principle of repatriation of all prisoners of war that our side firmly maintain that the detaining side should ensure that no coercive means whatsoever be employed against all the prisoners of war in its custody to obstruct their returning home. . . . The Korean and Chinese side does not acknowledge that there are prisoners of war who are allegedly unwilling to be repatriated. Therefore the question of the so-called 'forced repatriation' or 'repatriation by force' does not exist at all, and we have always opposed this assertion. Based on this stand of ours, our side maintains that those captured personnel of our side who are filled with apprehensions and are afraid to return home as a result of having been subjected to intimidation and oppression, should be handed over to a neutral state, and through explanations given by our side, gradually freed from apprehensions. . . .[61]

Based on Nam's reply, the problem was quite simple—if the U.N. Command would stop trying to detain the prisoners forcibly and would hand them over to a neutral nation, the Communists would soon convince the so-called nonrepatriates of the needlessness of their fears and all would be glad to go home. It was a glib attempt to save face and dismiss their concession as only procedural and not substantive.

Although Nam's letter failed to answer the questions that the Washington leaders had raised earlier on the identity of the neutral nation or on the treat-

[60] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, app. I, p. 51. A breakdown of the UNC and Communist repatriates and nonrepatriates involved in the prisoner of war exchanges in 1953–54 will be found in Appendixes B–1 and B–2.

[61] Ltr, Nam to Harrison, 9 Apr 53, no sub, in G–3 file, Transcripts of Proceedings, Mtgs of Liaison Group at Pan Mun Jom, 6 Apr–2 May 53.

ment of the nonrepatriates once they were surrendered to the neutral nation, these were details that the plenary conference would have to settle. But to maintain the initiative, the UNC notified Nam on 16 April that since his letter had not offered concrete proposals, it assumed that the Communists were either ready to accept one of the UNC's earlier plans or to offer a constructive one of their own. To prepare the enemy with some idea of what the UNC considered constructive, Harrison cited Switzerland as a neutral state in view of its long tradition in this respect and urged that the neutral state take custody of the nonrepatriates in Korea itself. As for the time limit for persuading the nonrepatriates to come back home, sixty days appeared sufficient. In closing Harrison warned that if the plenary meetings did not give promise of an acceptable agreement within a reasonable time, the UNC would recess them again.[62]

On the eve of the LITTLE SWITCH operation, Admiral Daniel proposed 23 April as a date for the resumption of plenary conferences, but the Communist representative preferred 25 April. Later on they postponed the opening date to 26 April.[63]

The few days before the first meeting proved a busy period of last-minute preparations and instructions. Clark told Harrison to reject the Soviet Union or any of its satellites as candidates for the neutral state role and to insist upon the retention of the nonrepatriates in Korea. In response to the Far East commander's request for acceptable nominations for the neutral state, his superiors advanced Switzerland and Sweden in that order. They felt that he could agree to a 90-day limit for the custody of the nonrepatriates by neutral nations. As a talking point, General Collins told Clark that the U.N. Command should emphasize the fact that it had the absolute legal right to grant asylum and was making a major concession in permitting a neutral nation to assume control of the nonrepatriate prisoners.[64]

To acquaint Clark with current policy on a Korean settlement, the JCS forwarded some basic instructions on 23 April for his guidance. The first two items were direct inheritances from the previous administration and reaffirmed that it was to the interest of the United States to obtain an acceptable armistice, yet not at the expense of a compromise on the principle of no forced repatriation. Until proved to the contrary, the instructions stated, the Communist proposal would be taken at its face value; however, the United States would not countenance long and inconclusive haggling. Since the UNC had seized the initiative through the Harrison suggestions of 16 April, it should strive to retain this favorable position to keep the enemy on the defensive. Any of the former plans submitted by the UNC would be satisfactory as a basis for agreement, but it might be desirable to confine the task of processing nonrepatriates to the Chinese and to release the

[62] Ltr, Harrison to Nam, 16 Apr 53, no sub, in G–3 File, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan–Jun 53, bk. III.

[63] Seventh Mtg, Liaison Group, 19 Apr 53.

[64] (1) Msg, C 62022, CINCUNC to DA, 22 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256, incl 182. (2) Msg, JCS 937205, JCS to CINCUNC, 23 Apr 53. (3) Msg, DA 937371, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 24 Apr 53.

North Koreans without further processing, the instructions concluded.[65]

Thus, in the six months of recess, the top political personnel in the United States had been replaced, but the politics lingered on. The new leaders had tried several minor expedients to induce the Communists to halt the fighting in Korea and the enemy had reciprocated with its own brand of pressure. Under ordinary circumstances, this game could have been played indefinitely, without reaching a decision. But, with the death of Stalin, the balance shifted to the advantage of the U.N. Command. It would appear from Soviet actions in March and April that the removal of external distractions such as the Korean affair with its drain on Russian resources acquired a new sense of urgency during the period of consolidation of power. As part of the new peace offensive, or as Secretary Dulles termed it, peace "defensive," launched after Stalin's demise, the Communists' concession on the nonrepatriate question dangled the hope of a settlement before the eyes of the United States and its allies.[66] Based on past experience, however, the UNC was properly cautious as it prepared to discover just what the Communists had in mind. The brightening prospect for an armistice was tempered by the rising tide of opposition in South Korea to any agreement that accepted a disunited Korea. In the critical days that lay ahead the UNC might well find it more difficult to deal with the dissension behind its lines than with the enemy.

[65] Msg, JCS 937205, JCS to CINCUNC, 23 Apr 53.

[66] For Dulles' views on the Soviet shift in tactics, see his address of 18 April 53, reprinted in the Dept of State *Bulletin*, vol. XXVIII, No. 722 (April 27, 1953), pp. 603–08.

## CHAPTER XIX

# The Communists Come to Terms

Against a backdrop of heightening tension stemming from the bitter opposition of the ROK Government to an armistice, the plenary sessions of the negotiations reconvened at Panmunjom on 26 April.[1] The UNC delegates found themselves confronted with the doubly difficult task of reaching an agreement with the Communists in the face of open ROK threats to continue the war alone if the solution failed to satisfy their objections. Doubt over the future intentions of President Rhee and his followers hung like a pall over the UNC truce tents. With the enemy enjoying the United Nations' embarrassment in being unable to control its agitated fosterchild, the delegations assembled to discover whether the last obstruction—repatriation—could be overcome.

### *The Exploratory Stage*

Since the last meeting in October 1952 a large personnel turnover had taken place on both sides. The redoubtable Hsieh Fang with his scurrilous tongue was no longer a member of the enemy delegation and General Pien Chang-wu of the Chinese Volunteer Army and Maj. Gen. So Hui of the North Korean forces had been given other assignments. But the new faces joining Nam Il and Lee Sang Cho were not all unfamiliar. Former liaison officers Chang Chun San and Tsai Cheng-wen had been promoted to general officer rank and elevated to the plenary delegation. Only General Ting Kuo-yu, replacing General Pien, was a newcomer to the negotiations. Both Chang and Tsai had been involved in the conferences from the outset and were thoroughly acquainted with the issues at stake.

The UNC situation at the table was in definite contrast. General Harrison and Admiral Daniel were joined by three officers who had had no previous part in the proceedings. Generals Lee Han Lim, Morris, and McConnell were replaced by Maj. Gen. Choi Duk Shin of the ROK Army, Brig. Gen. Edgar E. Glenn, USAF, and Brig. Gen. Ralph M. Osborne, USA.[2] Thus, the experience

[1] An account of the ROK efforts to prevent or delay the armistice will be found in the next chapter.

[2] General Glenn had been chief of staff to Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault and the Fourteenth Air Force in China during World War II and had had considerable experience as an air attaché in Latin America. General Osborne had been director of the Research and Development Division, Army Services Forces, in World War II and served later as Assistant Chief of Staff, G–4, in Washington. General Choi had been Commanding General, 11th ROK Division; Commandant, ROKA Infantry School; and Deputy Commanding General, ROK I Corps, before being appointed as liaison officer between the ROK Army and the U.N. Command in December 1952.



UNC DELEGATES AT PANMUNJOM, 26 APRIL 1953: *General Glenn, Admiral Daniel, General Harrison, General Choi Duk Shim (ROK Army), and General Osborne.*

level of the Communist delegation in the intricacies of negotiations was much higher than that of the UNC group.

After the introduction of his new associates Nam Il wasted little time in presenting the Communist proposal for solving the POW question. There were six points in all: (1) Within two months after the armistice agreement became effective, both sides would repatriate all the prisoners desiring to return home. (2) During the following month all nonrepatriates would be sent to a neutral state and turned over to its jurisdiction. (3) Then, for a period of six months, the nations to which the nonrepatriates belonged should have the opportunity and facilities to talk to and persuade them to come back. (4) All prisoners changing their minds during this time would be repatriated. (5) Disposition of any prisoners remaining in the hands of the neutral state at the end of the six-month explaining period would be decided by the political conference provided for in the armistice agreement. (6) All expenses of the nonrepatriates in the neutral state would be borne by the nation to which the prisoners belonged.

To the UNC two features of the Communist plan were unacceptable and Gen-

eral Harrison immediately turned it down. There was no justification, he told Nam, for removing the nonrepatriates from Korea to the neutral state for the exorbitant period of six months to persuade the prisoners to go home. Sixty days should be ample for this purpose and the neutral state could take over custody in Korea itself, he went on. Noting that the Communists had not nominated a nation to perform the neutral function, Harrison suggested that Switzerland would be the obvious choice.[3]

Nam was just as quick in rejecting Switzerland. Since the U.N. Command had already selected this country as one of its nominees on the Supervisory Commission, Nam stated that it would be unsuitable for the neutral nation role. He defended the need for six months to eliminate the prisoners' fears on the ground that these apprehensions were a result of their long detention and time would be required to neutralize them.[4]

By the end of the second session, the differences between the two sides were quite clear. The selection of the neutral power, the place of custody, the duration of the custody, and the disposition of the nonrepatriates after the explaining period remained to be settled. Although the Communists had frowned upon Switzerland, they showed no inclination to produce a nomination of their own. The enemy continued to insist upon a long period of captivity for the nonrepatriates while the explanations went on and preferred to have the prisoners transported out of Korea to the territory of the neutral. If plans of the Communists went off as well as they expected, there would be no further problem with nonrepatriates since, they maintained, once they had an opportunity to talk to the recalcitrant prisoners, all would be willing to go back home.

The U.N. Command held otherwise. After the waiting and uncertainty of the past two years, the UNC did not want to move the nonrepatriates into a strange country and then subject them to another six months of doubt and detention while the Communist persuaders sought to break down their resistance. Sixty days, the UNC argued, was enough time for the enemy to talk and the explanations could be made in Korea.

Thus, the initial positions were assumed and the delegations settled down to the chore of finding out how much the other side was willing to concede. General Harrison felt that the Communists were ready to bargain and wanted the UNC to submit a counterproposal. But his Washington and Tokyo superiors decided to do nothing until the neutral state was selected. This was the first issue, they believed, and discussion should be confined to eliciting agreement from the enemy on a nation acceptable to both sides.[5]

On 29 April the Communists gave their first indication of preference by stating that the neutral nation should be Asian, but refused to submit specific names. Nam also revealed that the six-month explaining period might be "discussed" in view of the UNC objections to

[3] Transcript of Proceedings, 123d Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 26 Apr 53, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VI.

[4] *Ibid.*, 124th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 27 Apr 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI.

[5] (1) Msg, HNC 1647, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 28 Apr 53. (2) Msg, C 62139, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 28 Apr 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256 to app. I, incls 205 and 206.

its length. Since the UNC delegation could make no counterproposal until the neutral nation was selected, Harrison came back the following day to prod the enemy. Pointing out that the Communists had "released" large numbers of personnel at the front during the early stages of the war, Harrison suggested that it would now be appropriate and humane to release all the prisoners who desired to remain in South Korea. Needless to say, Harrison's proposal met with no encouragement from Nam Il, but the Communists were apprised of the possibility of eventual UNC action along this line if the negotiations threatened to bog down again.[6]

The enemy lines held firm until the 2 May meeting when Nam offered the names of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Pakistan as suitable Asian neutrals. Before he would commit the Communists to support any one of these four, however, Nam tried to persuade the U.N. Command to send the nonrepatriates to the neutral state chosen.[7] This maneuver failed.

Although the United States would have preferred Switzerland or Sweden, it was willing to accept Pakistan as the neutral state. When the session reconvened on 4 May, Harrison told Nam that the UNC nominated Pakistan.[8]

It took two more days of fruitless discussion before the enemy became convinced that the UNC would do nothing until the neutral state was selected. Finally, on 7 May, the Communist delegation brought forward an expanded eight-point plan that contained several concessions.

### *Give and Take*

In the new proposal the enemy dropped the earlier requirement that the nonrepatriates be transported physically to the neutral state and reduced the explaining period from six months to four. To handle the nonrepatriates, Nam suggested that a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission with five members—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden, and India—be set up. Each of these countries would provide an equal number of armed personnel and would share in the task of maintaining custody of the nonrepatriates in their original places of detention. If their plan were adopted, the Communists desired all of its terms communicated to the prisoners.[9]

Since the Communists had yielded on the most objectionable features of their first proposal, President Eisenhower and some of his top political and military advisors met in Washington to discuss the latest offer. Encouraged by the spirit of compromise reflected in the 7 May plan, they agreed that it represented a significant shift in the enemy position and provided a basis for negotiating an acceptable armistice. They found in the plan close resemblance to the Indian resolution in the General Assembly, but several matters required clarification. Chief among these were fixing a limit

[6] Transcripts of Proceedings, 126th and 127th Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 29 and 30 Apr 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI.

[7] Transcript of Proceedings, 129th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 2 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI.

[8] (1) Msg, DA 938041, G-3 to CINCFE, 2 May 53. (2) Transcript of Proceedings, 130th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 4 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI.

[9] Transcript of Proceedings, 133d Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 7 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI.

upon the length of time to be accorded to the political conference for deciding the disposition of the nonrepatriates and the problems certain to arise from the stationing of Communist troops in the rear of the UNC forces. The President and his counselors did not consider these insurmountable and they felt that the selection of India as the fifth member of the repatriation commission was acceptable if the other four members acquiesced.[10] While the political and military chiefs mulled over the broad pros and cons of the enemy proposition, the UNC delegation explored the details. Harrison asked Nam for more information, especially on the connection between the political conference and the final fate of the nonrepatriates and on the manner in which the repatriation commission would operate. In his reply Nam reiterated that once the Communists had opportunity to talk to the nonrepatriates, there would be no problem since all would return. As for the operation of the repatriation commission, Nam felt that it should reach decisions by majority vote and work out its own operating procedures.[11]

As the arguments developed during the ensuing few days, it became evident that the Communists thought that the next move should come from the U.N. Command. They dismissed the objections and questions of Harrison as small points that could be ironed out later and accused the UNC of employing dilatory tactics designed to block an armistice.[12]

Actually the two sides were fairly close on most points by this time. On 10 May, General Collins told Clark that if the UNC could secure Communist agreement on the following matters, the United States would be willing to conclude the prisoner of war issue. First, the repatriation commission should conduct its business on the basis of unanimity, except in procedural affairs when a majority vote would suffice. Secondly, a time limit of thirty days should be imposed upon the political conference for settling the nonrepatriates' future. After this period the prisoners would be released and given civilian status. Thirdly, India should supply all the armed forces and operating personnel to handle the custodial task and should act as supply chairman and executive agent of the commission. And lastly, although up to ninety days could be allowed for the Communist explanations to the prisoners, the United States preferred restricting the period to sixty.[13]

As the UNC labored to fashion its counterproposal, developments in South Korea took a serious turn.[14] Syngman Rhee had become disturbed by the trend of events that pointed toward the probable conclusion of an armistice in the near future. With agitation mounting in the ROK Government and demonstrations reaching new peaks of intensity in South Korean cities, Clark decided to see Rhee in person. On 12 May he flew to Korea and had a frank discussion with the ROK President. From

[10] Msg, DA 938429, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 7 May 53. General Hull attended the meeting with the President on 7 May and reported its conclusions to Clark.

[11] Transcripts of Proceedings, 134th and 135th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 9 and 10 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI.

[12] *Ibid.*, 136th and 137th Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 11 and 12 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI.

[13] Msg, DA 938571, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 10 May 53.

[14] See Chapter XX, below.

the conference two facts emerged that Clark reported to Washington. First, Rhee was "in dead earnest" about his rejection of the release of the Korean nonrepatriates to another state or group of states, particularly if any were controlled by the Communists. And second, Rhee did not consider India to be a neutral state and did not want Indian troops to set foot on any part of South Korea. In the light of Rhee's strong feelings and in sympathy with his position, Clark urged the JCS to allow the UNC delegation to propose that the Korean nonrepatriates be released as soon as the armistice was effective. He felt that this would be the only solution to the problem and that the Communists would accept it if the UNC supported it firmly. Release of the Korean nonrepatriates would also lessen the number of custodial personnel required to care for the non-Korean nonrepatriates and might eliminate some of Rhee's opposition.[15]

Although the response from Washington was swift, it granted Clark permission to present release of the Korean nonrepatriates as a tentative position only. In the meantime, the policy makers would study the question further.[16]

Thus, when the U.N. Command disclosed its counterproposal on 13 May, release of the Korean nonrepatriates was included. In addition, it advocated that India supply the chairman and operating force of the repatriation commission; that the explaining period be limited to sixty days; and that all nonrepatriates remaining at the end of the explaining period be released.[17]

The enemy's reaction to these points was less than warm. Having yielded on several controversial issues, the Communists evidently expected that their adversary would reciprocate. Instead the UNC had taken a leaf from the Communist book, accepted the concessions, and then pressed for more. Nam and his fellow delegates moved in to attack this "incooperative" attitude of the UNC and were particularly critical of the attempt to secure release of the Korean nonrepatriates. This was "a backward step" and another effort at "forced retention," Nam charged. When Harrison again referred to the 50,000 UNC personnel that the Communists had released at the front, Nam dismissed his remarks as groundless, irrelevant, and unworthy of refutation.[18]

Since the Communist response was not unexpected, Harrison marked time until 16 May. By then, the military and political leaders in Washington and in the Far East had begun to concentrate on the preparation of the final UNC position. While they readied this last offer, Harrison first asked for a four-day recess and when this proved insufficient he requested and secured a five-day extension to 25 May.[19]

In the event that the enemy did not accept the final terms and another long

[15] Msg, HNC 1678, CINCUNC (Adv) to JCS, 12 May 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1–194 to app. I.

[16] Msg, JCS 938704, JCS to CINCUNC, 13 May 53.

[17] Transcript of Proceedings, 138th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 13 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI.

[18] *Ibid.*, 139th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 14 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VI.

[19] (1) Msg, C 62435, CINCUNC to American Embassy, Pusan, 15 May 53. (2) Msg, C 62449, same to same, 16 May 53. (3) Msg, CX 62496, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 19 May 53. All in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1–194 to app. I.

recess developed, Clark laid plans to expand air operations, to remove Kaesong's immunity, and to engage in limited ground operations around Kaesong later on. He also urged his superiors to agree to the unilateral release of the 35,000 North Korean nonrepatriates if the stalemate at Panmunjom remained unbroken.[20]

Clark felt that the time had come to take positive steps to make the Communists choose between accepting an armistice or demonstrating their bad faith. In his comments of 16 May on the content of the final UNC position, he urged that the five-nation repatriation commission be dropped and that either Sweden or Switzerland be given custody of the nonrepatriates. Possibly an Asian neutral might be added, if the Communists insisted, to take charge of the Chinese nonrepatriates either in or outside of Korea. At the end of ninety days of explanations, the political conference would be given an additional thirty days to reach agreement on the disposition of the remaining nonrepatriates. If it failed to meet or reach an agreement, the prisoners would be released. Clark believed that the U.N. Command should present this proposal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. He would then recess unilaterally until the enemy accepted or came up in writing with a new plan in detail.[21]

On 23 May the policy makers in Washington completed and forwarded their conclusions to the U.N. commander through the JCS. Other considerations and pressures evidently had exerted a great influence upon their decision, for it bore little resemblance to Clark's plan. In the first place, they did not want the UNC to imply that this was to be final or an ultimatum. Therefore, Harrison was to present the proposal at a closed, secret session. Secondly, since the United States had supported the Indian resolution of 3 December, its allies had applied "intensive pressure" upon the U.S. leaders to adhere closely to the principles embodied therein. Hence the UNC final offer would embrace terms in general consonance with the Indian resolution, so that if the enemy rejected them, the UNC would be in the "strongest possible position to terminate negotiations."

There were six important elements that the President desired to have presented at Panmunjom when the conference resumed on 25 May. The U.N. Command would accept the five-nation custodial arrangement if all armed forces and operating personnel were provided by India. This represented no change from the 13 May proposal. However, the UNC would discard its insistence upon the immediate release of the Korean nonrepatriates when the armistice became effective and instead would agree to turn these prisoners over to the repatriation commission.[22] In matters requiring decision by the repatriation commission, the UNC would consent to the Communist argument for a majority vote rather than unanimity. The treatment of the prisoners while they were in the custody of the repatriation commission was a fourth field of interest. To insure that no threats or

[20] Msg, C 62419, CINCUNC to JCS, 14 May 53, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 495.

[21] Msg, CX 62456, Clark to JCS, 16 May 53, DA-IN 268196.

[22] The United States preferred the term "custodial commission" to "repatriation commission," but to save possible confusion "repatriation commission" has been used throughout.

coercion were used, limitations were to be imposed upon the number of Communist explainers permitted access to the prisoners. In addition, the UNC observers were to be present at the interviews along with members of the repatriation commission. As for the period allowed to the persuaders, the President desired to hold it to ninety days. Lastly, the UNC would agree either to turn disposition of the nonrepatriates over to a political conference with a thirty-day time limit and then release them, or alternatively let the U.N. General Assembly determine their final fate.

If the Communists failed to accept the UNC proposal or to provide a basis for further discussion, the JCS informed Clark, the negotiations would be terminated and the immunity granted the conference area withdrawn. But, they continued, such a decision should and would be made in Washington, if it proved necessary, and not by Clark or Harrison.

In defense of the administration's abandonment of support for the release of the Korean nonrepatriates, the JCS explained that the measure "is not an essential element of our position on no forced repatriation and has failed to command any support outside Korea. It is not an issue on which we can permit negotiations to break down." Only in the case that the Communists rejected the UNC plan and negotiations were terminated would all the nonrepatriates be promptly released.[23]

There was little doubt that Syngman Rhee and his government would be highly disappointed with the concessions contained in the final position and especially with the provision turning over the Korean nonrepatriates to the repatriation commission. Therefore, Clark and Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs received instructions to meet with the ROK President on the morning of 25 May to inform him of the contents of the UNC proposal and to attempt to soften the blow.[24] This promised to be a delicate matter, since each effort to placate the Communists was certain to increase the intensity of ROK opposition. Even if the enemy could be induced to reach agreement on the issues remaining, there was still no guarantee that Rhee would permit the fighting to cease.

### *A Goal Is Reached*

Despite the risks involved in attaining rapprochement with the enemy on the armistice terms at the cost of alienating its strongest supporter in the conflict, the United States was determined to make a serious effort to end the Korean commitment. When the negotiators met at Panmunjom on 25 May, Harrison asked that the meeting be conducted as a closed or executive session "to reinforce the solemn, nonpropaganda character of the proceedings." After a brief recess, the Communists consented.[25]

Harrison prefaced his remarks by emphasizing the UNC intention to adhere firmly to the concept of no forced repatriation, then launched into a discussion of the four major concessions that the U.N. Command was now willing to

[23] Msg, JCS 939673, JCS to CINCUNC, 23 May 53.

[24] See Chapter XX, below.

[25] Nam presented the replacement for Maj. Gen. Chang Chun San after the recess. This was Rear Adm. Kim Won Mu of the North Korean Navy who had served an earlier tour on the delegation in 1952.

make. In consenting to the enemy arguments for turning Korean nonrepatriates over to the repatriation commission, for allowing more time for the explaining period, for submitting the disposition of nonrepatriates to a political conference after the explaining period, and for permitting decisions on the repatriation commission to be by majority vote, Harrison maintained that the UNC had done all that it could to reach agreement with the Communist proposal of 7 May. However, there were certain matters that remained in dispute, which he proceeded to set forth. There must be no force or threat of force used against the prisoners and India must supply all armed forces and operating personnel. Only 90 days would be permitted for the explanations and the political conference would be given but 30 days to dispose of the nonrepatriates. Thus, Harrison concluded, 120 days after the custodial force assumed control of the nonrepatriates they should be released or the problem should be turned over to the U.N. General Assembly.

After an hour-and-a-half break, Nam and his associates returned. They limited their comments to the UNC proposition that either nonrepatriates be released after 120 days or the question of their fate be given to the General Assembly. Neither of these solutions was permissible, since the former was still "forced retention" while the latter was "inconceivable" since the United Nation was one of the belligerents in the affair. The other provisions of the UNC offer required further consideration, Nam went on, and he suggested meeting again on 29 May. But Harrison insisted that the enemy give the proposal thorough study and take until 1 June to insure full consideration. Nam finally agreed.[26]

To underline the importance that the U.N. Command attached to this offer, Clark followed it up with a letter to Kim and Peng on 27 May. After strongly urging the two leaders to accept the terms put forward by the UNC as a "just solution to the prisoners of war question," Clark finished on a note of warning. "I believe you are aware that it is not our purpose to engage in prolonged and fruitless repetition of arguments. It is our earnest hope that you will give urgent and most serious consideration to our delegation's alternative proposals regarding the sole issue on which an armistice still depends. If your Governments' stated desire for an armistice is in good faith, you are urged to take advantage of the present opportunity." [27]

It was not until 4 June that the plenary sessions reconvened, for the Communists had requested a three-day extension of the recess for what they called "administrative reasons." In the meantime, the ROK delegate to the conference, General Choi, had expressed his opposition to the 25 May formula publicly and the tenor of feeling throughout South Korea was being fanned to fever pitch by the ROK Government. Despite this ominous trend, the Communists showed that they were ready to conclude the armistice. It was true that Nam had a revised version of the UNC proposal which he presented

[26] Transcript of Proceedings, 142d Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 25 May 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VII.

[27] Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 27 May 53, no sub, in G–3 Misc Material, Jan 53–Dec 53.

on 4 June, but basically it did not differ greatly from the original.

There was, however, some question over the exact meaning of the Communist provision for the nonrepatriates left over after 120 days. It read: "Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, those who elect to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and by the Red Cross Society of India." In Harrison's mind this phrasing did not make clear whether the Korean nonrepatriates could stay in Korea, but the Communists refused to amplify this sentence. Clark's superiors, in commenting on the enemy revision, advised him to assume that the text meant what it said and that the UNC should not seek clarification at this time.[28]

In Washington, it was the consensus of the State and Defense Department policy makers that the Communist proposal afforded the Chinese a face-saving device to cover their actual acceptance of voluntary repatriation. Except for several items relating to the number of explainers that would be permitted access to the prisoners refusing to go back and the number of communications personnel that the enemy intended to introduce into South Korea, the State-Defense group felt that the Communist plan was satisfactory.[29]

During the next two meetings at Panmunjom the negotiators worked on the last important points at issue. The Communists had asked for a total of ten explainers for each thousand nonrepatriates, arguing that it would take this number to talk the prisoners out of their ingrained fears of repatriation. Although the UNC would have preferred the more modest figure of five per thousand, it was willing to settle for seven. After surprisingly little haggling the enemy agreed. As for the size of the communications team that would service the Communist personnel at the prison camps, the enemy stated that one team of six men would suffice for each location where the explaining representatives were quartered. If all the nonrepatriates were brought together in one place, then a maximum of two communications teams would be adequate.[30]

On 7 June the staff officers were given the task of straightening out the final details of the terms of reference for handling prisoners of war.[31] Since the remaining differences were minor and the disposition on both sides now favored a quick settlement, the staff officers were able to finish their assignment and to present the document for the signatures of the chief delegates on 8 June.[32]

After a year and a half of debate, in and out of the conference tent at Panmunjom, punctuated by the long recess during the winter of 1952–53, the troublesome question of the right of a prisoner of war to determine whether he would return home or not had been settled. Regardless of how it was disguised

[28] (1) Transcript of Proceedings, 143d Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 4 Jun 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VII. (2) Msg, DA 940674, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 4 Jun 53.

[29] Msg, DA 940728, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 5 Jun 53.

[30] Transcripts of Proceedings, 144th and 145th Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 6 and 7 Jun 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VII.

[31] The complete terms of reference will be found in Appendix C.

[32] Transcript of Proceedings, 146th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 8 Jun 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VII.

or negatively acknowledged in the final instrument, the principle of no forcible repatriation had been recognized on the international level by the Communists. Previously they had used the concept when it had been to their interest and ignored it when their own nationals had been involved, as in World War II. The establishment of the precedent had been a long and costly venture for the U.N. Command, since thousands of casualties had been suffered in the interim in the fight to protect the defectors from communism. On the other hand, the UNC had kept faith with the nonrepatriate prisoners and won a psychological victory. The efforts of the Communist prisoners to discredit the UNC approach through disobedience, riot, and rebellion had taken some of the luster from this victory, but the Korean example of permitting prisoners to decide whether to go home or not was bound to have an influence upon future conflicts and their settlement. The concept of no forcible repatriation now became a part of the body of international law and the next time a similar situation arose, Korea could be invoked and argued as a case in point. Whether the Communists would yield a second time on the principle remained moot, but, at least, their armor, once pierced, might henceforth prove to be more vulnerable.

### *Residue*

With repatriation resolved there seemed to be little standing in the way of bringing the war to an end insofar as the enemy was concerned. The rising rumblings of discontent from the ROK Government gave warning of serious trouble ahead, it was true, but in the effort to complete the negotiations, both sides chose to ignore the threat.

Among the matters intrinsic to the truce that still had to be settled was the setting up of the line of demarcation and the demilitarized zone. When the original line was established back in November 1951, it was agreed that it would be valid for thirty days. If the rest of the armistice terms were completed within that time, the line would not be redrawn. On the other hand, if the discussions dragged on for more than thirty days, the line would be renegotiated prior to the signing of the armistice. Shortly before the agreement on prisoners of war was reached, General Harrison suggested to the Communists that since the changes that had taken place in the battle line during the preceding year and a half were relatively minor in nature, the old line of demarcation should be retained. This would simplify and expedite the task of concluding the armistice, Harrison pointed out.[33] But the enemy delegation was noncommital and indicated only that it would study the UNC proposal.[34]

On 9 June the Communists expressed their views. In keeping with the November 1951 agreement, Nam stated, his side desired to have the line revised and brought up to date so that it would correspond with the current battle positions. However, Nam continued, the Communists were willing to postpone

[33] In a message to the JCS on 18 April, Clark had informed them that the line of contact at that time was south of the November 1951 line in twelve places by from one to two-and-a-half kilometers and north of the line in only one place by one kilometer. See Msg, C 61971, Clark to JCS, 18 Apr 53, DA-IN 258819.

[34] Transcript of Proceedings, 145th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 7 Jun 53, in FEC Main Delegates, Mtgs, vol. VII.

the actual revising of the line until after the armistice was signed. Harrison quickly demurred. If the enemy wished to negotiate, the UNC was ready to go ahead with the task at once. He appointed the capable and experienced Colonel Murray of the Marine Corps to head the UNC staff group for determining the line of demarcation. After a mild effort to secure reconsideration of the Communist suggestion, Nam consented the next day to the immediate initiation of work on the project by the staff officers. He named Col. O Hung Song of the Korean People's Army and Col. Huang Chen-chi of the Chinese Volunteers as the Communists' representatives.[35]

On the night of 10 June the enemy opened up a limited offensive principally on the ROK II Corps front in Central Korea with the evident intention of improving the Communist positions.[36] It was against this background that the staff officers met on 11 June and sought to reach agreement on a new line of demarcation. In the areas where the battle line was stable, they had little difficulty in compromising their differences. The fluid portions of the front where the action was taking place occasioned more discussion. As Colonel Murray told his counterparts on 15 June: "Attack begets counter-attack, and counter-attacks in turn lead to further counter-attacks. The action of any one side in seeking to improve the position during the negotiation of the Demarcation Line could easily lead to a situation which would delay the determination of the line indefinitely. We think it preferable to settle the line on the basis of the present dispositions." [37]

By 16 June the Communist offensive came to a halt and the staff officers were able to finish their task. All in all, the altercations had been minor and a spirit of give and take had prevailed. The bargaining had indicated that when the Communists wanted to come to terms, they could unbend and compromise.[38] On the following day the plenary conference met and ratified the line of demarcation that the staff officers had fashioned. The latter were given a word of praise by Nam Il and then were instructed to go ahead and delimit the demilitarized zone.[39]

The imminent conclusion of the armistice meanwhile focused attention upon the necessity for securing the quick acceptance of the nations agreed upon for membership on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. On 9 June, Sweden had announced that it would serve on both commissions, but Switzerland had proved to be less eager. The Swiss Government did not want to send its citizens into Korea unless all the belligerents, including the Republic of Korea, agreed to observe the terms of the armistice. In rebuttal, the United States pointed out to the Swiss authorities that the ROK forces were under the

[35] Transcripts of Proceedings, 147th and 148th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 9 and 10 Jun 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VII.

[36] See Chapter XXI, below.

[37] Transcript of Proceedings, Fifth Mtg of Staff Officers To Renegotiate the Military Demarcation Line, 15 Jun 53, in G–3 File, Transcripts of Proceedings To Renegotiate the Military Demarcation Line . . . , Jun–Jul 53.

[38] The 11–16 June meetings of the staff officers will be found in the G–3 file mentioned in the previous footnote.

[39] Transcript of Proceedings, 149th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 17 Jun 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. VII.

command of the U.N. commander who had full authority to negotiate an armistice with the Communists. Furthermore, all of the prisoners of war were held by the UNC and not by individual belligerents. After some hesitation, the Swiss Federal Council voted to accept membership on the two neutral nations organizations. Switzerland's agreement arrived on 13 June and was based on the proviso that Swiss members would be allowed to carry out their functions satisfactorily by both sides.[40]

In view of the ROK actions which were demonstrating the strong antiarmistice feeling prevalent in the country in early June, Clark and Ambassador Murphy called in the Indian Ambassador to Japan and informed him of the problems that would face India if it decided to serve as chairman of the repatriation commission. ROK hostility to India as a member of the commission and to any introduction of Indian troops into Korea had been unmistakably expressed in this period and Clark and Murphy felt it only fair that the Indian Government have adequate warning of the potential explosiveness of the situation. Despite the threatening signs, however, the Indians conveyed their official acceptance of the difficult assignment confronting them to the State Department on 13 June. Two days later the Polish and Czech Governments also signified through their embassies in Washington that they were willing to become members of the repatriation commission.[41]

Once all the acceptances had been received, the main question became when and how the neutral personnel could be transported to Korea. The gathering together of the military and civilian staffs depended entirely upon the five neutral nations, of course, and the United States could only recommend that these be assembled as quickly as possible so that they could assume their responsibilities when the armistice was concluded. In the days following the signing of the prisoner of war terms of reference there was a sense of urgency and concern on the part of Clark and his staff lest there be too much of a gap between the beginning of the truce and the arrival of the members of the supervisory and inspection teams. If the Communists were given considerable time free of both UNC air observation and inspection by the neutral nations groups, they might easily build up their airfields, stocks, and the like. On 11 June Clark asked that the United States make every effort to expedite the arrival of the supervisory commission staffs, since there was a serious risk involved in having an armistice without the inspection teams being in place and ready to carry out their duties.[42]

The news from Washington was not encouraging on this score. Although the Department of State was urging the Swiss and Swedish Governments to send their representatives as quickly as they could, the advance parties would not be able to leave until 21 June and the main bodies would follow about 1 July, all on U.S. air transports. Since both groups would travel via the United States, the

[40] Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 52–Jul 53), vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 425ff.

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 431–34.

[42] Msg, CX 62984, Clark to DA, 11 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers, 1–150, incl 34. See also: (1) Msg, V 0399, FEAF to CINCFE, 14 Jun 53, incl 96; (2) Msg, COMNAVFE to CINCUNC, 14 Jun 53, incl 97; (3) Msg, G 6069 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 16 Jun 53, incl 98.

prospects of their arrival in Korea before 8 July were small. Clark estimated that it would take another week before the Swedes and Swiss became briefed and oriented, which would mean that 15 July would be the earliest date that their inspection teams could be prepared to go into action. However, it appeared that the Poles and Czechs would not be on hand until approximately the same time anyway; therefore it would not make much difference whether the Swedes or Swiss arrived earlier or not.[43]

By this time—mid-June—Clark had changed his mind about the dangers of having a hiatus between the signing of the armistice and the advent of the supervisory personnel on the scene. In the interests of securing an earlier truce, he was now willing to take the risk that the enemy might bring in reinforcements in the interim. In explaining his volte-face to the JCS, the United Nations commander commented: "As I see it, the matter is largely academic. The Communists could easily circumvent the provisions of the armistice agreement, particularly with respect to aerial reinforcements, even if the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams were in place and functioning. Furthermore, if the Neutral agencies were to detect Communist reinforcements of personnel and materiel including air forces, it is unlikely that such violations of the Armistice Agreement would result in a resumption of hostilities." Under the circumstances, he requested permission to accept an interval of up to twenty days between the cease-fire and the inception of inspection.[44] Although the U.S. leaders in Washington agreed to this contingency, later developments were to make the question "largely academic." [45]

With the Communists behaving in an almost agreeable fashion and the end of the war apparently within hailing distance, the focus of attention shifted dramatically in mid-June to the last roadblock in the way of the armistice. The oft-mentioned opposition building up in the Republic of Korea was about to reach its climax and to cause the member nations of the UNC some uneasy moments. Faced with the possibility of a truce contrary to the aspirations of his young republic, the formidable Syngman Rhee found himself in a difficult situation that appeared to call for desperate measures.

[43] (1) Msg, DA 941357, G–3 to CINCUNC, 13 Jun 53. (2) Msg, DA 941369, G–3 to CINCUNC, 14 Jun 53. (3) Msg, CX 63109 CINCUNC to DA 16 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers 1–150, incl 104.

[44] Msg, CX 63109, CINCUNC to DA, 16 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers 1–150, incl 104.

[45] Msg, JCS 941491, JCS to CINCFE, 16 Jun 53. See Chapter XX, below.

# CHAPTER XX

# Leader of the Opposition

"During the hectic final four months before the cease-fire in Korea," General Clark commented in his memoirs, "the U.N. Command was confronted almost literally with a crisis a day. Never, it seemed to me, was it more thoroughly demonstrated that winning a satisfactory peace, even a temporary one, is more difficult than winning a war." [1]


It was perhaps ironic that the majority of the problems to which the U.N. commander referred emanated from the actions of the ROK Government and its shrewd chief, Syngman Rhee, rather than from the machinations of the enemy. But such was the case. Although none of the political, economic, and military questions that were at the bottom of the ROK agitation were arising for the first time, there was a new sense of urgency on the scene. With the UNC and the Communists on the verge of composing their differences, the ROK Government felt it had to find the answers to the problems considered vital to the future of the nation before the war ended or its bargaining powers would be materially lessened.

Conceivably the UNC could sign a military armistice without the concurrence of the ROK, but how long would it last? If the Rhee Government decided to fight on alone or to create a succession of provocative or embarrassing incidents, a paper truce would be of little value. The United States had too much at stake in Korea to abandon its investment lightly. On the other hand, the Republic of Korea depended and would continue to depend heavily upon economic, financial, and military assistance from the United States for its existence as a nation. It was clear that each needed the other. The uncertainty centered on whether Rhee would come to terms or refuse to accept the conditions of the armistice. If he chose the former course the price for his acquiescence might come high in financial and economic aid. If he elected to carry on the war on his own, the cost in UNC casualties and prestige might be even less palatable. This was a turning point for the Republic of Korea; a wise or a hasty decision might make or break its future.

## *A Sense of Insecurity*

The roots of ROK resistance to the armistice rested in a bed of insecurity and frustration. As the United States and its U.N. allies had shown less and less interest in the active prosecution of the war, President Rhee and his advisors had seen their hopes for a Korea unified by force become more and more un-

[1] Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 257.



PRESIDENT RHEE GREETING DR. TASCA *and members of the Tasca mission at the President's residence, Seoul.*

attainable. They had no way of knowing what role the United States would assume in Far East affairs during the years ahead; it was quite possible that the United States might again decide that Korea lay outside its area of strategic concern and abandon the ROK after the truce was arranged.[2] Of course, there was still the political conference stipulated in the truce agreement, but, in the light of past experience with the Communists, few realists expected that such a meeting would produce results of any importance.

On the bright side, the ROK was receiving from the United States financial and economic help that enabled the country to fight the tide of inflation and to begin the task of reconstruction. The ROK Army was expanding and was better trained and equipped than it had ever been before. But the inescapable fact remained to plague the ROK leaders—all of this depended upon the United States and they had no guarantee of the future policy of the

[2] In January 1950 Secretary of State Acheson had declared that the United States would fight to defend Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, omitting both Korea and Taiwan as strategic objectives of vital concern to the United States. Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol XXII, No. 551 (January 23, 1950), pp. 111ff.

United States in the postwar period. During the spring of 1953, the ROK search for security formed the backdrop to the action taking place on stage.

There were evidences of ROK feelings of doubt and uncertainty even earlier. In February General Clark heard that the ROK Government wanted to move its seat back to the capital city of Seoul. During the two-and-a-half years of war the government had spent most of its time in Pusan. The instability of the battle situation had argued against the re-establishment of the administrative and legislative functions so close to the lines, and the U.N. Command had opposed placing such a tempting target within reach of a Communist offensive again. Besides, as Clark had pointed out in his request for U.S. support to block a move to Seoul, if the ROK Government returned, it would mean that thousands of people would flow into the capital and dozens of buildings would have to be rehabilitated.[3]

While Clark was protesting, the ROK Government asked the U.N. Command to transfer its headquarters from Tokyo to Seoul. Rhee also wanted the economic reconstruction organizations, such as UNKRA, to move to Seoul along with the UNC. In view of his mission as Far East commander, which precluded leaving Japan, and the lack of adequate housing and communications facilities in the South Korean capital, Clark rejected the suggestion. He felt that Rhee's dislike of Japan had inspired this recommendation.[4]

The U.S. political and military leaders supported Clark's stand against bringing the governmental machinery back to Seoul. In early March the U.N. commander was able to approach Rhee on the matter and secure his assurance that the chief ROK ministries would remain in Pusan.[5] Yet the desire of Rhee and his followers to bolster the feeling of governmental stability by a return to Seoul and their jealousy of Japan's status reflected the tenor of the times.

On the economic front ROK newspaper stories in mid-January claimed that the prisoners of war were fed more adequately than the ROK Army security forces guarding them. As the accounts were picked up by the U.S. news services, President Eisenhower became concerned over the situation. He remembered that during World War II he had encountered a similar problem in Europe. The German prisoners, living off U.S. rations, had fared far better than the French and British soldiers who comprised the custodial troops. The President wanted to know what measures were being taken to remedy the discrepancies and whether U.S. surplus foods might help.[6]

Actually the ROK Government was responsible for the food consumed by its own troops, Clark commented, but frequently, because of poor distribution facilities and command failures, the ROK soldiers had not always received their quotas. The United States fur-

[3] Msg, CX 61134 and CX 61225, CINCUNC to DA, 4 and 14 Feb 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1–88, incls 57 and 58.

[4] Msg, C 61247, CINCUNC to DA, 16 Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1–88, incl 45.

[5] (1) Msg, JCS 932503, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Feb 53. (2) Msg, C 61511, CINCUNC to JCS, 13 Mar 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1–72, incl 47.

[6] (1) Msg, CX 61237, CINCUNC to CSUSA, 15 Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1–88, incl 40. (2) Msg, DA 932033, Secy Army Stevens to Clark, 22 Feb 53.

nished only the materials for making biscuits and for canning purposes. He did not think that malnutrition was the primary cause of the poor physical condition of many ROKA troops, but rather it was secondary to the chronic diseases, such as tuberculosis, which had gone undetected during the initial physical examination of recruits. As spring approached, Clark noted, the availability of fresh produce would increase and the ROKA rations would improve. The Eighth Army, meanwhile, would study the matter and help set up a food supervisory service for the ROKA.[7]

Clark suspected the motivation behind the publicity accorded the ROKA and prisoner of war rations, for he surmised that the objective sought was more financial aid from the United States.[8] At the end of March he received a confirmatory report from General Herren, the Korean Communications Zone commander. Although Herren felt that the ROK Government was seeking greater financial aid without accurately appraising its own assets or attempting to rectify its deficiencies, he estimated that the United States would have to provide more assistance in its drive to build up the armed forces and yet maintain reasonably stable economic conditions.[9]

Early in April the President decided to get a firsthand report on the economic situation in South Korea. On 9 April he named Dr. Henry J. Tasca to carry out a full investigation of ways and means to strengthen the Korean economy and to make recommendations as to the amounts and types of assistance that should be provided by the United States.[10] Dr. Tasca arrived in mid-April and spent the next seven weeks in surveying the scene. When he returned to the United States in June, he submitted a bulky and comprehensive report on existing conditions and suggested a number of remedial actions that could be taken. The initial recommendations called for the expenditure of a billion dollars over a period of three years and urged the reorganization of U.S. economic activities under a single head to promote more co-ordination and efficiency in the spending of funds.[11] The Tasca mission offered evidence that the United States contemplated a long-term financial investment in the Republic of Korea and served to allay some of the ROK's fears about its economic future.

In the military field, meanwhile, the efficient mechanism established to produce recruits for the ROK Army continued to dominate the making of policy on ROKA expansion. Feeding some 7,200 inductees a week into the training units during a period of low casualties at the front inevitably led to a rapid increase in the over-all strength of the ROK Army. In early April Clark reported that the induction machine's pace would send the ROK Army beyond

[7] Msg, C 61376, CINCFE to DA, 2 Mar 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53, incls 1–72, incl 39.

[8] (1) Msg, CX 61237, CINCUNC to CSUSA, 15 Feb 53. (2) Msg, CX 61259, CINCFE to DA, 17 Feb 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1–88, incls 40 and 41. (3) Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 182–84.

[9] Msg, AX 73191, CG KCOMZ to CINCUNC, 28 Mar 53, UNC/FEC, in Comd Rpts, Mar 53, incls 1–72, incl 41.

[10] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, pp. 46–47. Dr. Tasca had formerly served as Treasury Attaché in Italy and more lately as deputy for economic matters to the Special U.S. Representative in Europe, William H. Draper, Jr.

[11] Discussion of the Tasca mission and its report will be found in the UNC/FEC Command Reports of June and July 1953. Study and revision of the report was still going on when the armistice was concluded.

its authorized strength of 460,000 before the month ended.[12] Since he was still reluctant to curb the flow of replacements, Clark suggested that he be granted authority to build up to a balanced, twenty-division force of approximately 655,000 men. At the present rate, this total would be reached around late August and would constitute the ultimate strength of the ROKA. He pointed out that if permission were given now, he could cut back promptly on the men assigned to training duties when the time arrived and could activate the additional divisions quickly as they were needed. As an extra inducement for approval of his request, the U.N. commander mentioned that when the seventeenth of the twenty ROKA divisions attained the halfway mark in training, he would be able to release the first U.S. division from Korea.[13]

Two days later, on 9 April, Clark asked for authorization to activate two new ROK divisions. He desired that the Department of the Army replenish theater stocks used to outfit the thirteenth and fourteenth ROK divisions and provide enough equipment to take care of the two new ones. Despite the possibility of a cease-fire, he urged the continuance of the twenty-division program. As he pointed out, if the war went on, the expanded ROK Army could either contribute toward the winning of a military victory or make possible the eventual withdrawal of U.N. forces and, if the fighting stopped, it could help to guarantee ROK independence. The Secretary of Defense granted Clark permission on 17 April to raise the total of activated ROK divisions to sixteen and G–3 informed him that an increase of 65,000 in the ROKA ceiling strength was under consideration.[14]

Behind the gradual, piecemeal approach to ROK Army augmentation adopted by the Eisenhower administration lay the hope that the promise of further expansion might reassure President Rhee. Clark was concerned lest the enemy seek to block the growth of ROK forces through stipulations written into the truce agreement and in May he again pressed for approval of the twenty-division program.[15] General Collins supported Clark's request and on 14 May the President approved the twenty-division, 655,000-man ROK Army. Activation of the last four divisions was left to Clark's discretion, but Collins warned him that certain critical items of equipment such as artillery might not be available until later.[16]

In view of the increasing tension of the ROK situation in late May, Clark deferred action on the augmentation. When he finally decided to bring up the matter again in early June, the JCS informed Clark that if he decided to go ahead with the increase, then he should make it clear to Rhee that the expansion would be effected on the assump-

[12] The ROKA had 438,000 men at this time, plus 75,000 trainees and 16,000 KATUSA, for a total of over 529,000 men.

[13] Msg, CX 61791, CINCFE to Secy Army, 7 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–110, incl 38.

[14] (1) Msg, CX 61837, CINCFE to DA, 9 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–110, incl 39. (2) MSG, DA 936843, G–3 to CINCFE, 17 Apr 53.

[15] Msg, CX 62372, Clark to Collins, 12 May 53, DA–IN 266645.

[16] Msg, DA 938886, CSUSA to CINCFE, 14 May 53.

tion the ROK would co-operate with the U.N. Command.[17]

As it turned out, the difficulties that the UNC continued to have with the ROK Government led to the deferment of the activation of the additional divisions until after the armistice was signed.[18] The strengthening of the ROK Army, in this case, was delayed by the unwillingness of the ROK Government to accept the conditions attached. It was, of course, another effort by the United States to bolster the security of the Republic of Korea and to prepare the young nation for the task of eventually defending itself, but the build-up had to await a more opportune moment.

In the matter of Marine, Navy, and Air Forces, the ROK Government fared somewhat better. President Rhee had expressed a personal interest in the status of the augmentation of the ROK Marine Corps to Clark in late April and the U.N. commander in turn told the JCS that a favorable answer might be helpful in mitigating ROK discontent. In mid-May the Secretary of Defense informed Clark that an increase in the ROK Marine Corps to 23,500 had been approved by the President, along with new personnel ceilings of 10,000 for the ROK Navy and 9,000 for the ROK Air Force.[19]

But the planned growth of ROKA forces and the economic assistance that the United States hoped would provide a firmer base for the future security and development of the Republic of Korea were not enough. President Rhee and his advisors were deeply concerned over the present and with what they could salvage from the dying embers of a three-year war.

### *Friend or Foe?*

During the long winter recess ROK opposition to the armistice had lain dormant. There seemed to be little purpose in beating a dead horse. But when the Communists indicated in late March that they would be willing to resume negotiations and to settle the prisoner of war question, the ROK Government quickly awoke to the implications of what this could mean to its national aspirations.

Within a week of the Communist offer Rhee and his staff had reopened their campaign to block a truce that did not meet their terms. The ROK National Assembly adopted a resolution in the opening days of April urging the United States to avoid any plan not guaranteeing the complete unification of Korea. On 5 April Rhee addressed the soldiers of the ROK II Corps on their first anniversary. He called for military victory and a drive to the Yalu rather than a truce along the present lines. In Seoul, on the next day, 50,000 people attended a rally that featured a succession of speakers denouncing the armistice and posing five demands as prerequisites to a settlement in Korea. First on the list came the matter of ROK representation in the United Nations; second, the total disarmament of North Korea; third, the removal of all Chinese forces from North Korea; fourth, ROK representa-

[17] (1) Msg, CX 62955, CINCFE to DA, 10 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, an. 3, sec II, tab J-66. (2) Msg, JCS 941344, JCS to CINCFE, 12 Jun 53.

[18] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 90–93.

[19] (1) Msg, C 62181, Clark to JCS, 30 Apr 53, DA-IN 262924. (2) Msg, JCS 938796, JCS to CINCFE, 14 May 53. The 10,000 for the ROK Navy was 6,000 less than Clark had requested.

tion at all meetings discussing Korean problems; and last, cessation of support of North Korea by certain U.N. members.[20]

As the full weight of the ROK drive against the armistice began to make itself felt, Clark and his advisors started to worry. General Herren warned of stubborn resistance ahead which should not be discounted. When the U.N. commander communicated his anxiety to his superiors in Washington, they admitted their own concern over the situation.[21]

On 10 April 50,000 students paraded in Pusan displaying "Unification or Death" posters in great numbers as they wended their way through the city. The theme of national unification by force was repeated by public officials on every level. As General Herren pointed out to Clark on 14 April, the motivation behind the rising clamor linked the strong national desire for unification with the feeling of insecurity stemming from the 1950 aggression, with the reality of political pressure of the Russo-Chinese powermass, and with the fear that the United States would not again come to the ROK's aid in the event of future aggression. Herren was afraid that Rhee might do something rash to achieve his objectives, since the ROK President seemed to be in a position to channel "public opinion" in whatever direction he desired. To prevent hasty action by Rhee, Herren suggested that an approach be made along the lines of a bilateral security pact, which the ROK Government appeared to desire very much, coupled with postwar economic aid and the promise of U.S. support of Korean unification by peaceful means and of ROK participation in the political conference.[22]

Clark shared Herren's anxiety over the deterioration of the situation, but did not think that the United States should offer Rhee a bilateral security pact under pressure. One of the weaknesses of the UNC's position, he informed the JCS on 18 April, lay in the fact that under the present arrangements Rhee could make independent use of the ROK forces after the armistice was signed, since no agreement on UNC control in the posttruce period existed. He did not think, however, that it was the proper moment to raise this matter either.[23]

As it happened, Clark did not have to bring up the problem. On 21 April the ROK National Assembly passed resolutions in support of Rhee's position on the military unification of Korea by an advance to the north. Rhee followed this move by having Ambassador You deliver a message to the State Department three days later. The message informed Mr. Eisenhower that Rhee was preparing to withdraw ROK forces from the U.N. Command if the latter made any arrangement permitting the Chinese Communists to remain south of the Yalu. Under such circumstances, the

[20] (1) Msg, G 3731, Taylor to Clark, 5 Apr 53. (2) Msg, G 3756, Eighth Army to AFFE, 6 Apr 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256 to app. I, incls 222 and 223.

[21] (1) Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 261. (2) Msg, C 61736, CINCFE to DA, 4 Apr 53, UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256 to app. I, incls 218 and 216. (3) Msg, JCS 936213, JCS to CINCUNC, 10 Apr 53.

[22] Msg, C 61949, CINCFE to DA, 16 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256 to app. I, incl 230.

[23] Msg, CX 61976, Clark to JCS, 18 Apr 53, DA-IN 258833.

ROK armed forces would fight on—alone if necessary.[24]

The arrival of this brief document created consternation in Washington and Tokyo, for with the plenary sessions about to reconvene the threat of ROK non-co-operation loomed large. Since the timing of the withdrawal of ROK forces was the critical point, Clark told General Collins that he intended to see Rhee immediately and discover when the ROK President intended to pull out his troops from the UNC. If Rhee would wait until after the posttruce political conference was held, arrangements could be made to disengage other U.N. units and Clark could retain a large measure of control over the ROK forces by restricting their logistical support. On the other hand, if Rhee made his move as soon as the armistice was signed and initiated action against the enemy, the UNC would be caught in the middle.[25]

Word came quickly from Washington for Clark to delay his visit until Ambassador Briggs turned over a message from Eisenhower to the ROK President. In this missive, Mr. Eisenhower attempted to reassure Rhee. The United Nations he pointed out, had successfully repelled the Communist invasion and would continue to press for the peaceful unification of Korea. But it had not and would not commit itself to achieving this latter objective through war. The U.S. President urged Rhee not to attempt to block the armistice, for such a course could conceivably lead to the loss of all that the Republic of Korea had gained at such terrific cost.[26]

On 27 April, Clark flew to Seoul to talk to the ROK President. Rhee was "calm, dispassionate and unemotional," the U.N. commander reported, and expounded his views "in a friendly manner." But these views had not changed a whit. What Clark did discover during the course of the conversation was that Rhee was not thinking of taking the ROK forces away from UNC control except as a last resort. The ROK President told Clark that he would pull out his troops only after "thorough and frank discussions" with the U.N. commander. After talking privately for over an hour with Rhee, Clark felt that the old man was bluffing and would not go it alone without giving the matter long and careful consideration.[27]

One of the topics that Rhee had stressed in the dialog with the U.N. commander was the feasibility of the simultaneous withdrawal of both Chinese Communist and U.N. forces. By 30 April the ROK leader had thought over this question and decided that only if certain safeguards were applied could the U.N. troops be removed. The conditions laid down by Rhee included in part: a bilateral defense pact; U.S. guarantees of immediate help in the event of Soviet aggression; the continuance of the naval blockade and air defense until peace was

[24] (1) Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 261. (2) Msg, G 4404 KGI, Eighth Army to AFFE, 26 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256 to app. I, incl 237.

[25] Msg, C 62098, Clark to Collins, 26 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256 to app. I, incl 250.

[26] Ltr, Eisenhower to Rhee, 23 Apr 53. From p. 182 of THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS: MANDATE FOR CHANGE, 1953–1956, by Dwight D. Eisenhower. Copyright © 1963 by Dwight D. Eisenhower. Reprinted by permission of Doubleday & Company, Inc.

[27] (1) Msg, C 62143, Clark to Collins, 28 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256 to app. I, incl 255. (2) Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 261–62.

firmly established; and the expansion and strengthening of ROK armed forces in the meantime.[28]

Behind the adamant front presented publicly by the ROK President on unification and the ousting of the Chinese Communists, therefore, lay a disposition to bargain. He wanted the U.N. Command to remain to bolster the ROK position even though this was clearly inconsistent with his stand on the Chinese forces. But, unfortunately, his speeches and press releases were leaving him very little room to maneuver without making important concessions. The parades and demonstrations went on unabated even while he cautioned his people against improper acts that might be interpreted abroad as malicious in their intentions.[29]

During the early part of May another facet of the problem of relations with the ROK Government came into sharper focus. Rhee and his counselors had stated on several occasions that they would never permit the Korean nonrepatriates to be transferred to a neutral state.[30] When the Communists dropped their demand on 7 May that the nonrepatriates be physically moved out of the country, the ROK Government entered a new spate of objections. Both the Communist and UNC plans for disposing of the nonrepatriates were predicated upon the stationing of custodial personnel and troops upon ROK soil. General Choi, the ROK delegate, quickly introduced a counterproposal amending the UNC plan. Provided that Switzerland was selected to serve as chairman of the repatriation commission and furnished all of the custodial forces, which would be concentrated on the island of Cheju-do, more than 50 miles south of the mainland, the ROK Government would be willing to agree to a neutral nation taking over control of the nonrepatriates in Korea.[31]

On 12 May Clark again visited Rhee to discuss the ROK attitude toward the repatriation Commission and found him "in dead earnest" about not turning over Korean nonrepatriates to any state or group of states having Communist inclinations. During this meeting Rhee asked Clark about the possibility of his having the ROK security troops guarding the Korean nonrepatriates release them without involving the U.N. commander. Clark reminded Rhee that the ROK security forces were under the UNC and the ROK President did not pursue the subject. In this matter Clark admitted his sympathy with Rhee's desire and urged the JCS to insist upon the release of the Korean nonrepatriates as soon as the armistice was signed.[32] As has been mentioned above, the Washington policy makers allowed Clark's stand on the release as an initial position only and later gave way to the Communists' objections. But it was a clear indication of the seriousness of the sit-

[28] Ltr, Rhee to Clark, 30 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256 to app. I, incl 253.

[29] (1) Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 263. (2) Msg, AX 73675, KCOMZ to CINCFE, 27 Apr 53, UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256 to app. I, incls 247 and 245.

[30] (1) Msg, AX 73525, KCOMZ to CINCFE, 16 Apr 53. (2) Msg, C 62143, Clark to Collins, 28 Apr 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–256 to app. I, incls 103 and 255.

[31] Msg, HNC 1680, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 12 May 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1–194 to app. I.

[32] Msg, HNC 1678, Clark to DA (JCS), 12 May 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1–194 to app. I. For Clark's account of the meeting and his views on the release of the nonrepatriates see Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 262–65.

uation in ROK eyes and foreshadowed later developments.

Since he had received no encouragement in his efforts to gain unification by force, to secure the eviction of the Chinese Communists, or to arrange for the release of the Korean nonrepatriates, Rhee cast his line into other waters. After the 12 May talk with Rhee, the U.N. commander relayed his impressions of the course that the ROK leader was following: "I feel Rhee realizes that, in spite of some of his heated objections, we will go ahead and obtain an armistice if we can get one that does not sacrifice the principle of no forced repatriation. He is bargaining now to get a security pact, to obtain more economic aid, and to make his people feel he is to have a voice in the armistice negotiations." Clark saw no reason why a mutual security arrangement could not be worked out as quickly as possible to satisfy this ROK goal. And he had suggested to Rhee that the staff of General Choi, the ROK representative at Panmunjom, be increased by several administrative officers to magnify the role of the ROK in the negotiations. Rhee had agreed and on 20 May three assistants of general officer rank joined Choi in the conference area.[33]

Although the threat of ROK action to prolong the war by fighting on alone diminished in early May, the Eighth Army staff dusted off the plans prepared during the ROK domestic crisis of a year earlier for safeguarding UNC forces and supplies in the event of internal disturbances. The situation had altered a great deal, of course, for now the chief concern lay in the observance of the armistice once it was signed. Much would depend upon the response of the ROK Army and populace to an actual appeal from Rhee to continue the conflict, and plans were hinged to the various degrees of co-operation that might be given to Rhee by his people. The task of disengaging UNC forces from the battle line during active hostilities between the ROKA and the Communists would present the most acute problem if it arose, and instructions were issued to the major commanders involved to cover such an eventuality.[34]

The possibility that the U.N. Command and the ROK Government would be able to reconcile their differences without serious incident lessened after the middle of May. When the Communists rejected the 13 May UNC proposal at Panmunjom, policy makers in Washington began to prepare the final UNC position. The abandonment of the stand on the release of the Korean nonrepatriates and the acceptance of India as chairman and supplier of custodial forces would be extremely difficult for the Republic of Korea to accept in the light of the strong declarations by Rhee and his fellow-leaders condemning such concessions. As the UNC gravitated closer to the Communist views on the outstanding issues, it drifted as a matter of course farther away from ROK desires.

Since the United States realized that the final UNC position would be dis-

[33] (1) Msg, CX 62406, CINCFE to JCS, 13 May 53. (2) Msg, G 5100 KCG, Taylor to CINCFE, 19 May 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1–194 to app. I.

[34] (1) Eighth Army, Plan EVERREADY, 4 May 53, in G–3 381 Pacific, 15/3. (2) Memo, Brig Gen James A. Elmore, Chief Opn Div, for Gen Eddleman, 4 May 53, sub: CINCUNC Plans . . . , in G–3 091 Korea, 34/3.

tasteful to Rhee, officials in Washington fashioned a statement in the form of a personal message from President Eisenhower designed to reassure the ROK Government that the United States would not desert it in the days ahead. Clark and Briggs were instructed to deliver and discuss this with Rhee on 25 May. Perhaps the most important item at the moment was the bilateral security treaty, but because of ROK agitation against the armistice, the United States was not ready to negotiate a pact. The disinclination of the Washington policy makers to conclude a mutual security arrangement puzzled Clark, for he believed that Rhee attached great importance to this matter. Without a security agreement they would have little to offer Rhee that would serve to soften the impact of the concessions that the United States was about to make.[35]

Nevertheless, while the UNC delegation was presenting the new offer at Panmunjom on 25 May, Clark and Briggs met with Rhee and informed him of the terms that were being proffered to the Communists. They then informed Rhee in effect that the United States would support the Republic of Korea militarily, economically, and politically provided Rhee accepted and co-operated in carrying out the conditions agreed upon in the armistice. To bolster the prospects of peace after a truce, a "greater sanctions" statement by the U.N. countries participating in the Korean War would be issued immediately following the conclusion of the cease-fire. A bilateral security pact, however, could not be considered at the present, for it would weaken the U.N. aspects of the Korean efforts and might be hard to justify to the U.S. Congress under current circumstances.

The aftermath of this interview was hardly surprising. Since Rhee had not been consulted on the formulation of the final position and was kept in the dark on the extent of UNC concessions, Clark and Briggs were merely apprising him of the *fait accompli*. At the same time, to make matters worse, they had to tell him that he was not going to get a security treaty now and if he did not behave he might also not get all the assistance that had been promised him. According to the two U.S. representatives the armistice proposals came as "a profound shock" to Rhee. He immediately declared them unacceptable to his country and said therefore he could give none of the assurances of co-operation which the United States desired. Rhee did, however, ask that the points covered by Clark and Briggs be submitted in writing.

What Rhee would do to retrieve the situation remained unknown, but Clark warned his superiors shortly after the 25 May meeting of one dangerous possibility:

> . . . he may either covertly or overtly initiate action to cause the release of all Korean non-repatriates. He has the capability, and should he attempt this action, there are few effective steps that I can take to counter it. Accordingly, I am bringing this matter to your attention, for such an eventuality would be most damaging to the UNC cause. It would be practically impossible to avoid charges of UNC duplicity, not only from the Communists but from our allies as well.[36]

[35] Hq UNC/FEC Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 52–Jul 53), vol. 4, pp. 129ff.

[36] Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pages 268–71, contains a detailed account of this meeting. See also, Msg, C 62630, Clark to JCS, 26 May 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1–194 to app. I.

It was true, Clark continued, that he could replace the ROK security battalions with U.S. troops, but this might aggravate an already delicate state of affairs and might also result in placing the U.S. forces in a position of having to employ force against the nonrepatriates if they attempted to escape. Since the only motive of these Koreans was to resist return to Communist control, it would be "particularly unfortunate" if U.S. personnel had to use violent means to avert a breakout. He had discussed the problem with his subordinate commanders and all were alerted to the potential explosiveness of the prisoner of war situation. They would take what preventive measures they could under the circumstances, but these might well be inadequate.[37]

During the interim between the presentation of the 25 May proposal to the Communists and the next meeting of the plenary conference, the tempo of ROK denunciations of the UNC offer increased. On 27 May the major points of the plan found their way into the ROK newspapers, apparently leaked by governmental sources. The ROK National Assembly listened on the next day to Foreign Minister Pyun Yung Tai attack the concessions granted and then lined up solidly in support of President Rhee. From General Choi, the ROK representative at Panmunjom, came a blast at the provisions for turning over the nonrepatriates to the repatriation commission, for holding the prisoners until either the political conference or the U.N. General Assembly could dispose of them, and for permitting Communists to enter ROK territory.[38]

When Choi's statements were given to the press, thus violating the executive nature of the plenary meetings, Harrison remonstrated with him in vain. After Choi declared that he would not attend further executive meetings and refused to promise compliance with the security rules, Harrison had little choice but to halt the flow of classified information to the ROK representative and his staff.[39]

As emotions began to run high, especially in ROK official circles, and warnings of trouble streamed in from U.S. military and diplomatic sources, the leaders in Washington wondered whether they might not have been too hasty in denying Rhee a mutual defense pact. On 29 May, Secretary of State Dulles and Secretary of Defense Wilson agreed that Clark could offer Rhee a bilateral security treaty if the U.N. commander thought that this might stave off a dangerous situation. Mr. Eisenhower approved on the following day.[40]

The belated decision had only one drawback—there was no guarantee that Rhee would accept the bargain now. Neither Clark nor Briggs were sure of the reception that Rhee might give the tardy offer, but both felt that it should be held in abeyance until the Communists responded to the UNC 25 May proposal and Rhee had an opportunity

[37] (1) Msg, 250610, Clark to JCS, 25 May 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1–194 to app. I. (2) Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 272–74.

[38] Msg, HNC 1706, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 29 May 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1–194 to app. I.

[39] Msg, HNC 1711, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 1 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1–194 to app. I.

[40] Memo for Rcd (sgd Eddleman), 1 Jun 53, sub: Conf on the Current Difficulties with the ROK Govt . . . , in G–3 091 Korea, 46.

to react to the Communists' reaction.[41]

Before the Communists could enter the picture again, however, Rhee sent an answer to the President's message of 25 May. Surprisingly enough, this letter was mild in tone and omitted all reference to the controversial matters of the Korean nonrepatriates and the repatriation commission. Instead the ROK leader concentrated upon what he considered the four major conditions that would make an armistice acceptable to the ROK people. First, the United States would conclude a mutual defense pact with the Republic of Korea and, second, would pledge military and economic support to strengthen ROK defenses. Third, the U.N. and Chinese Communist forces would withdraw simultaneously from Korea and, fourth, U.S. air and naval forces outside Korea would remain in the area to act as a deterrent to further aggression. As Clark pointed out to the JCS on 2 June, the U.N. Command could satisfy all of these conditions except for the question of withdrawal of all non-Korean forces. This would have to be taken up at the political conference unless the Communists would agree to include it in the armistice. Clark did not think that they would, but admitted that Rhee's answer was encouraging and showed no disposition toward undertaking rash acts. Nevertheless, Clark and Briggs still wanted to wait until after the next plenary session before they talked to Rhee again.[42]

Approval for deferring the visit arrived from Washington the following day. Collins informed Clark that he and Briggs could use their own discretion on whether to bring up the matter of the pact.[43] In the opening days of June everything hinged upon the Communist acceptance or rejection of the UNC proposal. Despite the fact that both Rhee and the UNC expected the enemy to agree to the 25 May offer, they preferred to wait and make sure before taking the next step.

During this brief interlude there was one development that was quite significant in the light of later events—Rhee appointed Lt. Gen. Won Yong Duk, a trusted henchman, to the command of the Provost Marshal General's office. This command was directly under the Minister of National Defense rather than under the ROKA Chief of Staff and placed all military police at Rhee's disposition.[44]

When the Communists signified on 4 June that they would go along with most of the UNC suggestions, the ROK antiarmistice machine gathered fresh momentum. But it was operating now on two levels. On the level below Rhee, speeches, parades, and demonstrations continued to be inflammatory in tone, while the ROK President himself proceeded at a more cautious pace. At the meeting with Clark and Briggs on 5 June, Rhee attacked the armistice as appeasement, a Communist victory, and as the first step toward World War III. On the other hand, he hedged on ROK future action and refused to commit him-

[41] (1) Msg, GX 5478 KCG, Eighth Army to CINCUNC, 30 May 53. (2) Msg, CX 62747, CINCFE to JCS, 30 May 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 53, incls 1–194 to app. I.

[42] (1) Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953–1956*, p. 183. (2) Msg, Eighth Army to CINCUNC, 2 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers 1–150, Paper 149. (3) Msg, CX 62781, Clark to JCS, 2 Jun 53, DA-IN 273323.

[43] Msg, DA 940543, CSUSA to Clark, 3 Jun 53.

[44] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 46.

self on whether a mutual defense treaty would counterbalance his objections to the truce. Clark and Briggs decided not to make the definite offer of a pact until a more favorable moment arose.[45]

Rhee issued a public statement on 6 June that was very similar in content to the letter he had sent Clark on 30 April. He proposed a simultaneous withdrawal of all non-Korean forces from the peninsula after a mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea had been concluded. The pact would guarantee U.S. military assistance, support in the event of aggression, and the retention of U.S. air and naval forces in the Far East area. If such an arrangement were not possible, then the ROK troops would fight on.[46] It was Rhee's wish that the UNC delegation introduce the matter of non-Korean troop withdrawal at Panmunjom, but there was little chance that his desire would be gratified at a time when the UNC and Communists were so close to finishing up the truce arrangements.

Shortly after Rhee released this statement, President Eisenhower decided to try again. In his letter, delivered on 7 June by Clark, Eisenhower defended the negotiating of the armistice and then went on to again pledge U.S. support—political, military, and economic—in the posttruce period. The message seemed to have little effect upon Rhee. Clark, reporting on his meeting with the ROK President, noted: "I have never seen him more distracted, wrought up and emotional." During the interview Rhee indicated that he and his people would never accept the armistice and that from now on he would feel free to take whatever steps were necessary. He refused to elaborate on what he would do or when he would act, causing Clark to conclude: "He himself is the only one who knows how far he will go, but undoubtedly he will bluff right up to the last." [47]

The first measures adopted by Rhee came on 7 June when "pseudo-extraordinary" security restrictions were imposed on all of South Korea and all ROK officers on duty in the United States were ordered home. By the time the terms of reference on prisoners were signed on 8 June at Panmunjom, the ROK campaign was in full swing.[48] There were three principal themes stressed in the speeches, slogans, and placards: the unification of Korea; the release of the anti-Communist prisoners of war; and the use of military force to prevent the entry of the "so-called" neutral nations forces that were to take over custody of the prisoners.

In the midst of the wave of increasing internal excitement, General Taylor called on Rhee and introduced an alleviating factor into the situation. After a diatribe against the armistice Rhee reiterated his intention of continuing the struggle alone. Taylor proceeded to point out that the ROK Army still suffered from many deficiencies and needed time to convert itself into a bal-

[45] Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 274–76.

[46] Msg, CX 62854, CINCUNC to JCS, 6 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers, 151–297, Paper 157.

[47] (1) "Public Papers of the Presidents," *Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 1953 (Washington, 1960), pp. 377–80. (2) Msg, CX 62876, CINCUNC to Eighth Army, 7 Jun 53. (3) Msg, CX 62890, CINCUNC to JCS, 7 Jun 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers, 151–297, Papers 163 and 166.

[48] Robert C. Allen, *Korea's Syngman Rhee* (Rutland, Vermont, Charles E. Tuttle Co., Inc., 1960), p. 160.

anced force capable of defending South Korea. Evidently the thought that the truce and the political conference would provide time to allow completion of the twenty-division program had not occurred to Rhee. In a more temperate tone, he told Taylor that he needed assurances to convince the Korean people of the palatability of the armistice. These would include: 1. the limiting of the political discussion, preferably to sixty days; 2. a mutual security treaty with the United States; 3. the expansion of the ROKA to twenty divisions and the development of the ROK Navy and Air Force; 4. the barring of Indian and Communist representatives from Korean soil. However, Rhee went on, he was not yet ready to take a final stand on this matter and wanted to think it over a bit more. Taylor received the impression that the ROK President was out on a limb because of the extreme position he had assumed on the withdrawal of foreign troops and was casting desperately for a means to save face while extricating himself.[49]

The uncertainty reflected in Rhee's conversation with Taylor was mirrored in the domestic events of the second week in June. Demonstrations in Seoul led to the injury of some high school girls and unfavorable publicity for the U.S. Military Police, even though they were not responsible for the cuts and bruises suffered. Yet, at the same time, many Koreans were weary of war and realized the futility of fighting on alone.[50]

On 12 June Secretary of State Dulles sent a letter to President Rhee suggesting that the latter come to Washington for high-level talks with the President and himself. Although the offer reportedly pleased Rhee, he turned it down because of the press of affairs. Apparently the ROK President was not yet ready to come to terms; instead he asked Dulles to visit him in Korea, where he would have the psychological advantage. This time Dulles had to decline. As an alternative he proposed sending Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson, who had the full trust of Eisenhower and Dulles, in his place. On 17 June Rhee told Briggs that he would be delighted to see Robertson when he arrived.[51]

On the same day, 17 June, Rhee called Briggs back and gave him his answer to Eisenhower's letter of 6 June. While expressing appreciation at the U.S. offers of assistance and a mutual security pact, Rhee did not feel that these could be accepted if they entailed ROK consent to the armistice.[52] Later in the day he addressed a group of U.S. and ROK officers at ROK II Corps headquarters and became quite emotional in his speech denouncing the armistice and repeating the ROK intention to carry on the fighting by itself.[53]

The vague threats and hints of ROK action to block the truce cropped up again in Rhee's talk to the ROK officers,

[49] Msg, G 5812 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 9 Jun 53, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jan–Jun 53.

[50] Msg, A 6661, FEAF to CINCFE, 16 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers 151–297, Paper 178.

[51] (1) Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953–1956*, p. 184. (2) Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 279.

[52] (1) Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953–1956*, p. 185. (2) Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 52–Jul 53), vol. 4, pp. 223–25.

[53] Msg, G 6092 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 17 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers, 151–297, Paper 199.

but the U.S. officials could do little to forestall a hostile or embarrassing act without aggravating the situation. By the same token Rhee faced a similar dilemma, for he was personally friendly to the United States and appreciated the help it had given South Korea. Yet his implacable opposition to the armistice could not be suddenly altered without loss of face in his own land. And any daring move that might save his face was bound to produce strained relations between his country and the United States. Rhee's choice was a difficult one, but it had to be made.

### *The Pacification of Rhee*

On 18 June Rhee revealed his decision and confirmed the worst expectations of General Clark. The UNC press release issued was brief and succinct:

> Between midnight and dawn today, approximately 25,000 militantly anti-communist North Korean prisoners of war broke out of the United Nations Command prisoner of war camps at Pusan, Masan, Nonsan, and Sang Mu Dai, Korea.
>
> Statements attributed to high officials of the Republic of Korea now make it clear that the action had been secretly planned and carefully co-ordinated at top levels in the Korean Government and that outside assistance was furnished the POW's in their mass breakout. ROKA Security units assigned as guards at the POW camps did little to prevent the breakouts and there is every evidence of actual collusion between the ROK guards and the prisoners. . . .
>
> U.S. personnel at these non-repatriate camps, limited in each case to the camp commander and a few administrative personnel, exerted every effort to prevent today's mass breakouts, but in the face of collusion between the ROKA guards and the prisoners, their efforts were largely unavailing. The large quantities of non-toxic irritants employed proved ineffective because of the great number of prisoners involved in the nighttime breakouts. Nine prisoners were killed and 16 injured by rifle fire. There were no casualties among U.S. personnel.
>
> As of 1 o'clock this afternoon 971 escaped POW's had been recovered.
>
> ROKA Security Guard units which have left their posts at non-repatriate camps are being replaced by U.S. troops.[54]

Despite the celerity with which the U.S. security units took over their duties at the prison camps, they were forced to operate at a distinct disadvantage. In the event of mass escapes the custodial troops were authorized to use riot control measures but not gunfire. The United States was especially reluctant to use force against the anti-Communist prisoners and thus could only employ nontoxic gases and other nonlethal methods of control. Although the bulk of the prisoners gained their freedom on 18 June, mass attempts continued and hundreds more broke out in spite of the presence of U.S. guards. On 17 June there had been around 35,400 Korean nonrepatriates in the compounds; by the end of the month, only 8,600 remained. The price of liberty had become more costly, however, for 61 prisoners had died and 116 had been injured in the escape attempts.[55]

The uproar caused by Rhee's unilateral action did not center on whether the freeing of the prisoners was justified or not; it concerned itself rather with the effects of the ROK coup upon the

[54] Msg, ZX 36907, CINCFE to DA, 18 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers, 151–297, Paper 217. The number of prisoners still at large on 18 June was 25,131.

[55] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 46.

negotiations. Although Clark had known that Rhee was in a position to release the nonrepatriates at any time, he told the ROK President that he was "profoundly shocked" at the abrogation of the personal commitment that Rhee had previously given him not to take unilateral action involving ROK troops under UNC control without informing Clark. A message from President Eisenhower echoed Clark's charge and intimated that unless Rhee quickly agreed to accept the authority of the U.N. Command to conclude the armistice, other arrangements would be made.[56]

Actually the accusation by Clark was not entirely pertinent. The promise made by Rhee had applied to the withdrawal of ROK forces from UNC control. After Rhee had appointed General Won as Provost Marshal, he had placed the security troops at the prison camps under him. Won, in turn, was responsible to the ROK Minister of National Defense and Rhee rather than to the ROKA Chief of Staff and the UNC. As for giving Clark prior warning of the plan to free the prisoners, Rhee pointed out: "Under the circumstances, if I had revealed to you in advance my idea of setting them free, it would have embarrassed you. Furthermore, the plan would have been completely spoiled." [57]

Although the ROK Government wanted to let all of the Korean nonrepatriates go, Rhee made no effort to use force. Neither he nor the U.S. officials wished to have armed clashes between the ROK and UNC troops. In response to Clark's request that Rhee promise not to free the Chinese nonrepatriates and any of the Communist prisoners, the ROK President agreed not to take any action along this line.[58]

The uncertainty over Rhee's next move and the delicate situation in the nonrepatriate prison camps made the latter part of June a very unsettled period. The escaped prisoners, for the most part, were integrated with the local population and were nearly impossible to recapture because of the assistance furnished them by the ROK authorities. In the newspapers, stories of UNC collusion on the prisoner escapes appeared and Clark had to issue a strong statement on 21 June denying that he had known about or abetted the release of the nonrepatriates.[59]

To forestall similar charges from the Communists, Harrison had informed Nam Il immediately on 18 June of the breakouts and placed the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the ROK Government. But the enemy refused to believe that the U.N. Command had not known about the plan in advance and had not "deliberately connived" with Rhee to carry it out. Despite this, the Communists did not threaten to break off negotiations as they might well have done. Instead they posed several perti-

[56] (1) Ltr, Clark to Rhee, 18 Jun 53, quoted in Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 52–Jul 53), vol. 4, pp. 239–40. (2) Msg, CX 63164, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 19 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers, 151–297, Paper 221. (3) Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953–1956*, pp. 185–86.

[57] Ltr, Rhee to Clark, 18 Jun 53, quoted in full in Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 52–Jul 53), vol. 4, pp. 246–47.

[58] (1) Msg, CX 63216, CINCUNC to Taylor, 20 Jun 53. (2) Msg, CX 63230, CINCUNC to DA, 20 Jun 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers, 151–297, Papers 227 and 233.

[59] (1) Msg, DA 941831, Parks to Clark, 19 Jun 53. (2) Msg, C 63212, CINCFE to CINFO, 20 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers, 151–297, Paper 237. (3) Msg, C 63242, Clark to JCS, 21 Jun 53, in same place, Paper 240.

nent questions that struck at the heart of the matter. Is the United Nations Command able to control the South Korean government and army? If not, does the armistice in Korea include the Rhee group? If the Rhee group is not included, what assurance is there for the implementation of the armistice agreement on the part of South Korea? [60] The Communists had a right to know the answers to these queries, but the UNC was in no position to provide them. Only Rhee could supply this information and he seemed disinclined to be helpful.

At a meeting with Taylor on 20 June the ROK President appeared surprised that the Eighth Army commander had not gotten an official reaction to the four points he had made on 9 June.[61] He had evidently forgotten that he had not been ready at that time to present them as an official position. During this conference he gave notice that the signing of an armistice would automatically free him for further unilateral action, though he refused to commit himself on what this action might be.[62] The mixture of threat, on the one hand, with interest in further horse trading, on the other, indicated that he had not closed the door to bargaining.

When Clark visited Rhee two days later, he found him nervous and tense, but very friendly. Both Clark and Taylor, when they compared impressions, felt that the adverse comments of the world press on Rhee's unilateral release of the prisoners was making an impact on him. The U.N. commander got straight to the point and told the ROK leader that he must accept the premises that the United States was determined to sign an armistice under honorable terms and would not try to eject the Communist troops from Korea by force. Moving on to the four points of 9 June, Clark said he thought that there should be a time limit on the political conference; that the United States could sign a security treaty, but would never agree to come to the aid of the ROK if the latter were the aggressor; and that the ROK forces would be built up. As for the last point, Clark aired his purely personal view that some modification in the prisoner of war agreement might be worked out. The 8,600 Korean nonrepatriates might remain in U.N. custody and the ROK representatives might be given full opportunity to explain the terms of reference to them. When the time came to turn these prisoners over to the repatriation commission they could be moved to the demilitarized zone and ROK representatives might sit in as observers while the Communists explainers carried on their sessions. The Chinese non-Communist prisoners could be turned over to the custody of a neutral state for final disposition. Such an arrangement, Clark told Rhee, would eliminate the need for Indian or Communist personnel to enter ROK rear areas.

Turning to another subject, Clark gave his frank opinion on the status of

[60] (1) Ltr, Harrison to Nam, 18 Jun 53, in G–3 file, Liaison Officers' Mtgs at Pan Mun Jom, Jan 53–Jun 53, bk. III. (2) Ltr, Kim and Peng to Clark, 19 Jun 53, in FEC Main Delegates' Mtgs, vol. 7.

[61] These had included a time limit on the political conference, a mutual security pact, expansion of the ROK armed forces, and the barring from Korea of Indian and Communist representatives.

[62] Msg, GX 6228 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 20 Jun 53, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jan–Jun 53.

the ROK Army. It could not fight on its own, offensively or defensively, at the present and needed time to prepare for the assumption of larger tasks.

Throughout the discussion Rhee had listened intently, Clark noted, and he had appeared to be interested in the tentative solution that the U.N. commander had proposed. Although Rhee would not commit himself, Clark felt that he made one very significant remark. Despite the fact that he could not sign an armistice, since this would be an admission of the division of Korea, the ROK leader had indicated that he could support it. Clark requested quick guidance as to whether the United States desired him to continue further along the avenue he had suggested to Rhee.[63]

Before an answer could arrive from Washington, Clark forwarded an amendment to one of his proposals: instead of turning over the Chinese nonrepatriates to a neutral country, he advocated transporting them to the demilitarized zone in the same fashion as the Korean nonrepatriates and delivering all of the prisoners who were unwilling to return home to the repatriation commission.[64]

By this time the President and his advisors had decided to send Assistant Secretary of State Robertson and Army Chief of Staff General Collins to Korea. Clark had been told to discuss the matter of armistice modifications with the emissaries upon their arrival. The conference in Tokyo between U.S. military and diplomatic leaders in the Far East and Robertson and Collins took place on 24 June. All agreed that the armistice should be signed as quickly as possible. Clark and Murphy felt that the enemy would accept an armistice even though the UNC could not specifically guarantee that Rhee would live up to all of its provisions.[65]

At a meeting held in Washington the same day the report of this conference arrived, Mr. Eisenhower told his counselors that since Clark was on the spot and in the best position to assess the situation, he should be given wide authority to go ahead and conclude the armistice. In the instructions sent to Clark on 25 June he was told that as long as he did not compromise the principle of no forced repatriation and did not imply that the UNC would force the Republic of Korea to accept the armistice terms, he could handle the rest of the arrangements on his own. There should be no UNC commitment to withdraw from Korea, the Washington leaders stated, but if Clark thought it would be helpful, he could let the ROK leaders think that the UNC intended to pull out.[66]

After the demonstrations and speeches attendant upon the celebration of the third anniversary of the war's outbreak were over, Robertson conferred with Rhee on an almost daily basis. His chief mission was to clear up the misunderstandings that threatened to disrupt U.S.-ROK unity and to reassure President Rhee of U.S. friendship and

[63] (1) Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 282–84. (2) Msg, Clark to JCS, 22 Jun 53, DA–IN 280121.

[64] Msg, Clark to JCS, 23 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers, 151–297, paper 250.

[65] (1) Msg, DA 942047, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 22 Jun 53. (2) Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 284–85.

[66] (1) Msg, JCS 942368, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Jun 53. (2) Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 289.

concern for the future of the Republic of Korea. He immediately encountered the deep fear of the ROK Government that the United Nations might be weary of the war and might be ready to sacrifice Korea. As Robertson later reported, the bitterness found in the United States and among its allies over the release of the prisoners was duplicated in South Korea by a bitterness "distilled of their fears." [67]

Although at the meeting of 27 June Rhee admitted that President Eisenhower had met all of the conditions he had laid down and requested that they be given to him in writing, agreement was fleeting. Rhee added new conditions and modified his assurances.[68]

While the private conferences between Rhee and Robertson continued, Clark acted on the permission he had received to go ahead with the effort to wind up the armistice agreement. In his letter of 29 June to Kim and Peng, Clark attempted to answer the questions asked by the Communists. He pointed out that the UNC did command the ROK Army, but did not exercise control over the Republic of Korea, which was a sovereign nation. As to whether the armistice included the government of Rhee, he reminded his opposites that the armistice was a military agreement between the military commanders. Since the co-operation of the ROK Government was necessary in this case, however, the UNC and the U.N. governments concerned would make every effort to obtain ROK co-operation and would also set up military safeguards insofar as possible to insure observance of the terms. Clark suggested that the delegations meet immediately and discuss the final arrangements.[69]

Both Clark and Harrison became impatient as the diplomatic talks dragged on into early July. They felt that it was time to stop letting the ROK Government call the turn. General Clark believed that Mr. Eisenhower had made maximum concessions to Rhee and that it was time to let him know that there would be no more. In accord with the permission he had gained on 25 June to give the impression that the UNC intended to withdraw from Korea, Clark told the Secretary of Defense on 5 July, he had been pursuing a campaign of counterpressure upon the ROK. He had held conferences with his senior commanders, carried out some troop movements, consolidated the camps of the Korean nonrepatriates, slowed down the movement of supplies and equipment to Korea, and suspended the shipment of equipment for the activation of the last four ROKA divisions. In the future, he intended to curtail projects employing indigenous labor and reduce the use of Korean *hwan*. Military and naval activity would be aimed at fostering the belief that the UNC was preparing to pull out of Korea. As the indications that the UNC was leaving mounted, Clark thought that they would have a considerable impact upon Rhee and his advisors.[70]

[67] Radio Address of Dulles and Robertson, July 17, 1953, reported in *Congressional Record*, July 18, 1953, vol 99, pt. 7, p. 9128.

[68] Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 286–87.

[69] Msg, HNC 1796, CINCUNC (Adv) to JCS, 29 Jun 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, Source Papers, 151–297, Paper 264.

[70] (1) Msg, HNC 1800, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 4 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, 1–143, incl 2. (2) Msg, CX 63500, CINCUNC to Secy Defense, 5 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 144–286, incl 176.

On the same day—5 July—one of the facets of Clark's campaign produced encouraging results. In an interview with the press, General Taylor remarked that he could extricate the U.N. forces from the battle line amicably if the ROK Government decided to continue the fighting after the armistice. He went on to note, however, that the Eighth Army was like a twenty-cylinder automobile with a complex system of wires and cogwheels. If the U.N. forces were taken away, the ROK troops that remained would have to fashion a completely new automobile, Taylor concluded.[71] The implication was clear that the ROK Army would face a major problem of reorganization in the event it fought on alone.

The evident U.S. determination to go on with the armistice negotiations was matched by Robertson's patience and tact with Rhee behind the scenes. As President Eisenhower has noted: "Day by day he argued with this fiercely patriotic but recalcitrant old man on the futility of trying to go it alone. He gave assurance of United States support if Rhee would be reasonable." [72] To satisfy Rhee's fears that a postarmistice political conference might be carried on indefinitely to breed uncertainty and to serve as a cover for infiltration of hostile propaganda in South Korea, Robertson agreed that if it turned out that way, the United States would try to end the conference "as a sham and a hostile trick." [73]

While Robertson worked to allay the ROK President's doubts, the Communist liaison officers on 8 July delivered the long-awaited answer to Clark's request for the resumption of negotiations. Kim and Peng were still highly suspicious of the role the UNC had played in the escape of the prisoners of war and bitterly critical of the actions of Rhee and his government. Despite their detailed reservations about accepting the UNC explanations, the key sentence came in the last paragraph: "To sum up, although our side is not entirely satisfied with the reply of your side, yet in view of the indication of the desire of your side to strive for an early Armistice and in view of the assurances given by your side, our side agrees that the delegations of both sides meet at an appointed time to discuss the question of implementation of the Armistice agreement and the serious preparation prior to the signing of the Armistice agreement." [74] Although this was a long-winded way of saying "yes," the fact that the Communists were willing to proceed in spite of the uncertain status of the ROK situation demonstrated how much they wanted an armistice.

The enemy's agreement to return to Panmunjom and the UNC counterpressure campaign evidently combined to have an effect upon Rhee. During the next three days Robertson was able to wind up his conversations with President Rhee. When Robertson left Korea on 12 July he had a letter signed by Rhee expressing his appreciation of Robertson's performance and "his fine

[71] (1) Msg, CX 63524, CINCFE to DA, 7 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 144–286, Incl 178. (2) New York *Times*, July 6, 1953, p. 3.

[72] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953–1956*, p. 187.

[73] Radio Address of Dulles and Robertson of July 17, 1953, reported in *Congressional Record*, July 18, 1953, vol 99, pt. 7, p. 9128.

[74] Msg, HNU 7–1, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 8 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–143, incl 7.



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spirit of consideration and understanding." Rhee also assured President Eisenhower that "he would not obstruct in any way the implementation of the terms of the armistice" despite "his misgivings over the long-term results." [75]

In return for this promise Rhee obtained five main pledges from the United States: 1. the promise of a U.S.-ROK mutual security pact after the armistice; 2. assurance that the ROK would receive long-term economic aid and a first installment of two hundred million dollars; 3. agreement that the United States and the Republic of Korea would withdraw from the political conference after ninety days if nothing substantial was achieved; 4. agreement to carry out the planned expansion of the ROK Army; and 5. agreement to hold high-level U.S.-ROK conferences on joint objectives before the political conferences were held.[76]

These were important concessions, to be sure, but in the process of negotiation Rhee had dropped many of his previous demands. Through his agreement not to obstruct the armistice, he abandoned his insistence upon the withdrawal of Chinese Communist Forces from Korea and for the unification of Korea before the signing of the armistice. He also gave up his objections to the transportation of Korean nonrepatriates and Chinese prisoners to the demilitarized zone for the period of explanations, provided that no Indian troops were landed in Korea.

This was not the end of the Rhee story. During the closing days of the truce negotiations his presence was felt even as it had been before, but to a lesser degree. The reservations he had attached to his promises not to impede the armistice allowed him some room to maneuver and he caused the United States and its allies several anxious moments up to the end. But the period of his dominance of the negotiation was over when he agreed in writing to go along in general with the conclusion of the truce terms.

What the old warrior had accomplished by his fight was difficult to assess immediately. He had not succeeded in gaining United States support

[75] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953–1956*, p. 187.

[76] Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 287–88.

for his drive to unify Korea by military force nor had he carried the day for his plan to have the Chinese Communists withdraw from Korea before the armistice was signed. On the other hand, he had won the pledge of a bilateral security pact with the United States coupled with economic and military assistance; he had freed thousands of Korean nonrepatriates from the prison camps; and he had blocked the entry of Indian and Communist personnel into South Korea. Because of the delicate situation vis-à-vis the Communists at Panmunjom, the United States had been forced to cater to Rhee's desires in several instances to prevent further incidents and Rhee had gained face among his own people on these occasions. He had also shown the world that the Republic of Korea was not a puppet state. At the same time his tactics in blocking the arrangement of a cease-fire in Korea could not help but cause him to suffer a loss of friends and confidence among the other nations around the globe who desired an end to the fighting and the casualties. The use of speeches and mass information media such as the radio and press to fan public emotion and the organization and encouragement of demonstrations and parades to make clear ROK opposition to the armistice were quite effective, but in the long run may have cost Rhee more than they gained. The United States was willing to meet all reasonable demands to compensate the ROK for its acceptance of the truce; the campaign of open pressure merely made it more difficult for the United States to yield gracefully. In retrospect, it appeared that through diplomatic bargaining Rhee could have had all that he eventually won and could have avoided giving the Communists a chance to gloat over the falling out of allies. No one could belie his devotion to the national objectives of his country or his sincerity in pursuing them, but his tactics and judgment in attaining these goals were certainly open to question.

## CHAPTER XXI

# The Last Offensive

While the U.N. Command was attempting to allay the doubts and fears of Syngman Rhee and his government over the armistice, the Communists had not been idle. The disturbed state of affairs behind the UNC lines offered the enemy an opportunity to reap psychological and propaganda advantages by exploiting the differences. In addition, the winter lull in the fighting had enabled the Communists to build up their stockpiles of ammunition and matériel and to bring their combat units up to full strength despite the constant efforts of the Fifth Air Force to interdict the lines of communication. With a plentiful supply of well-fed, well-equipped, and battle-hardened troops at their disposal, the Communists were in a good position to launch a military offensive as well. If they could conclude the fighting with a successful assault upon the UNC lines, the general impression of a Communist military victory in the war might, in the eyes of the Asian community, be sustained. But there were difficulties that the enemy would have to surmount if he determined to pursue such a course, particularly in timing the offensive and in selecting the objectives. Unless the victory could be tied in closely with the conclusion of the truce, the Communist claims could be discounted. As for the seizing of terrain, the question was more complicated. Obviously the offensive must be on a large enough scale to merit Communist assertion of a military victory, yet on the other hand not so large as to threaten the loss of more territory along the front than the UNC was willing to sacrifice. As later developments showed, the problems of when to launch the assault and where to delimit it probably demanded much attention by enemy military planners in the spring of 1953.

### *The Preliminaries*

During the month of April, while the negotiators at Panmunjom were arranging the details for the exchange of the sick and wounded and for the resumption of the plenary conferences, the tempo of operations had slackened. The flurry of activity in March had been superseded by a return to the small-scale probes and raids so characteristic of the winter months. Seldom was an enemy attack mounted with more than two companies; more often it was one or less. Since April was the spring thaw period, the sloppy condition of the ground helped to restrict the scale of operations; the uncertain status of the negotiations was also a factor. Eighth Army intelligence reports estimated that the enemy would continue to employ the active defense with the twenty-nine divisions available in or near the front line

and would not stage a general offensive in the near future.[1] (*See Maps VI and VII.*)

For the U.N. Command the resumption of the talks at Panmunjom had some side effects, especially upon strategic air operations. General Weyland had intended to mount a high altitude, B–29 night attack upon the Yangsi target complex near the mouth of the Yalu River in mid-April and Clark gave his personal approval on 12 April. But his superiors decided that since the sick and wounded prisoners were going to be assembled in that general area for movement to Panmunjom, the operation should be postponed. They did not wish to give the Communists any excuse not to go through with the prisoner exchange.[2] Another attack, upon facilities at Koksan, fifty miles east of P'yongyang, was postponed for the same reason ten days later.[3]

In the matter of close air support, the negotiations played a less important role. Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighters and fighter-bombers continued to strike enemy troops and strongpoints whenever opportunity arose. During April, Navy and Marine pilots concentrated on Cherokee-type missions against targets that were out of reach of the artillery. They discovered that making successive runs in the same area for several days allowed them to become familiar with the terrain and tended to muzzle the antiaircraft fire in that vicinity. Evidently the Communists gunners could not be resupplied quickly and once they had fired the shells on hand were forced to sit and watch the attacks helplessly.[4]

On 21 April naval force jet pilots were given a chance to select their targets. The flyers on the U.S. carrier *Oriskany* chose the Hamhung highway bridge in northeast Korea and succeeded in demolishing two spans and damaging a third in their attack. From the naval night fighter patrol along the rail lines of northeastern Korea came an interesting report of two fighter flights chasing two fast-moving enemy trains into opposite ends of a short tunnel. Shortly after the trains vanished from sight there was a rush of steam and smoke pouring from the mouth of the tunnel that indicated a probable collision and damage to both trains.[5]

With the completion of the sick and wounded prisoner of war exchange and the initial plenary conferences at Panmunjom, the main reasons for restricting the UNC air forces disappeared. Since the meetings showed that the Communists were not going to come to terms quickly, Clark approved Weyland's request to increase the air pressure upon the enemy by striking sensitive targets in North Korea. On 10 May, 8 Thunderjets bombed the Suiho power plants again in the face of heavy antiaircraft fire, but did not succeed in knocking out the two generators still functioning. The attack on the Yangsi complex, deferred by the prisoner trade, was staged on the night of 10–11 May

[1] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, pp. 19, 30.

[2] (1) Msg, A 4390, FEAF to CINCFE, 11 Apr 53. (2) Msg, CX 61886, CINCFE to JCS, 12 Apr 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–110, incls 1 and 3. (3) Msg, DA 936440, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 14 Apr 53.

[3] Msg, CINCFE to CG AFFE, 24 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1–110, incl 10.

[4] COMNAVFE, Comd and Rpt, Apr 53, sec. 1-3, 1-10.

[5] *Ibid.*, sec. 1-4, 1-5, 1-23.

by 39 B–29's, and eight days later 18 B–29's returned and dropped another load of bombs on the area.[6]

One of the most dramatic strikes of the war came on 13 May. About twenty miles north of P'yongyang lay the big Toksan irrigation dam with a three-square-mile lake behind it. Air Force planners had long realized that destruction of irrigation dams would have a serious effect upon the rice crop of North Korea, but humanitarian considerations had argued against the bombing of such targets. As the war progressed, however, more and more of the rice crop found its way into military and international barter channels and this knowledge decreased the objections against destroying the dams. The Toksan dam was an especially strategic target for it was close to the main Sinanju-P'yongyang rail line and to a major north-south highway as well. Thus, 59 F–84 Thunderjets of the 58th Fighter-Bomber Wing set out in four waves to eliminate the dam on 13 May. The first 4 skip-bombed the exposed face of the 2,300-foot dam and a second 4 loosed their bombs on the water side. Then 12 jets raced along the length of the dam and let go their loads. The fourth wave flew in close to the water side of the dam and tried to use the hydraulic pressure caused by the bomb explosions to complete the task, but as the planes returned to their base, the dam still held. Sometime during the night, however, the weakened dam succumbed to the pressure of the lake. Floodwaters poured forth and left a trail of havoc. Over six miles of rail lines and five rail bridges were damaged or destroyed and two miles of highway and five highway bridges suffered the same fate. Buildings, crops, and irrigation canals were all swept away in the devastating torrent.

Elated by the success of the Toksan mission, the Fifth Air Force followed up on 15–16 May and breached another dam north of P'yongyang at Ch'osan, thereby cutting a second railroad line and washing away three rail bridges. A third attempt to break through the dam at Kuwonga, also north of P'yongyang, on 21–22 May revealed that the enemy was now ready to counter the attack. As soon as the B–29's dropped their loads, the Communists lowered the water level by twelve feet and reduced the water pressure. A later raid forced the enemy to drain the lake completely in order to make repairs, so that although there was no flood damage, the reserve water supply was dissipated. Both of the rail lines north from P'yongyang were out of commission until 26 May and this probably placed a temporary strain upon the enemy's lines of communication.[7]

The Communists had learned their lesson by this time and efforts in June to repeat the earlier success at Toksan found the enemy quickly draining the reservoirs under attack. The water was lost, but flood damage was averted.[8]

Retaliation by the Communist air forces was always a possibility during the last months of the war since Russian jet bombers were made available to the Chinese Communists. Yet no effort to strike back materialized. The enemy carefully hoarded his air forces in the

[6] Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953*, p. 624.

[7] (1) FEAF Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 1–6. (2) Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953*, pp. 624ff.

[8] FEAF Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 3.

Manchurian sanctuary as he had previously and made no serious attempt to challenge UNC domination of the Korean skies.

Instead the Communists adhered to the type of pressure that had been applied so frequently in the past—the ground assault. After a quiet first half of May, the enemy launched a series of limited objective attacks ranging in strength from company to regimental size; eighteen of these drives were of battalion size or larger. Despite the increase in tempo at the front, there were still no indications that the Communists intended to broaden the scale of operations into a general offensive. Rather they seemed to be concentrating upon winning dominating terrain features along the line to improve their positions both on the battlefield and at the truce tents at Panmunjom.[9]

The most ambitious enemy offensive came in the closing days of May in the U.S. I Corps sector. When the U.S. 25th Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Samuel T. Williams, had shifted over to the I Corps in early May in exchange for the U.S. 2d Division, it had promptly relieved the 1st Marine Division on the line. The new 25th Division sector was generally east of Panmunjom and northeast of Munsan-ni. On low hills, approximately ten miles northeast of Panmunjom and the same distance north of Munsan-ni, lay a series of outposts called the NEVADA complex. (*See Map 8.*) General Williams assigned the responsibility for the defense of these positions and neighboring outposts, BERLIN and EAST BERLIN, to the attached Turkish Armed Forces Command under Brig. Gen. Sirri Acar on 5 May.[10]

Facing the Turkish forces were the three regiments—*358th, 359th* and *360th*—of the *120th Division,* CCF *46th Army.* Since the enemy seizure of Outpost RENO in March, the area had remained quiet except for the customary probes and patrols. But the Chinese capability of mounting a large-scale attack upon Outposts VEGAS, ELKO, and CARSON from RENO and other nearby hills posed a constant threat that demanded constant vigilance.

Tactically, possession of NEVADA complex by the enemy would mean improved observation of the I Corps main line of resistance positions that lay south and east of the outposts. Since I Corps regarded these defensive positions as critical, the Turkish forces were instructed to hold them against all enemy attacks. This promised to be a difficult task if the Chinese were determined to take the outposts, for the latter were at a considerable distance from the main line of resistance and the enemy's approach routes were easier than those of I Corps.

It was not until 25 May, after the U.N. Command had made its final offer at the truce talks, that the Chinese artillery began to open up on the NEVADA complex. For the next three days the shells came in with growing frequency and enemy troop movements in the area increased. General Acar secured artillery support from I Corps and the 1st Marine Division artillery, in addition to that

[9] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 1, 8.

[10] The following account is based upon: (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 50–57; (2) U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 18–28; (3) U.S. 25th Div Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 9–10; (4) U.S. 14th Inf Regt, Comd Rpt, May 53.

which the 25th Division could provide, to counter the Communist concentrations. From the 1st Marine Tank Battalion, 34 tanks rolled into position to funnel direct fire support to the outposts.

When the first attack came on the evening of 28 May, the Turkish units defending the outposts were well dug in and adequately armed. Barbed wire, trip flares, and mines were in place and automatic weapons sited to cover the enemy approach routes. There were 140 men at VEGAS, 44 at CARSON, 33 at ELKO, 27 at BERLIN, and 16 at EAST BERLIN.

On the heels of an intense artillery and mortar preparation, the *120th Division* sent four battalions forward—two to the east against the main objective, VEGAS, one to the south against CARSON and ELKO, and one in a diversionary attack against BERLIN and EAST BERLIN. The last was halted and broken off early in the evening.

Over on VEGAS the Chinese succeeded in taking one small finger of the hill and clung tenaciously despite the heavy automatic weapons, small arms, artillery, and mortar fire at them. The Turks sent a reinforcing platoon in to bolster the defenders and it arrived in time to help throw back a three-pronged enemy assault on the outpost. After reorganizing, the Chinese again sent a force estimated at two battalions to take the position. Ammunition began to run low and the Turkish 2d Battalion commander sent another platoon accompanied by Korean Service Corps personnel to resupply the embattled troops. After a brief respite in the fighting, the enemy tried again and this time the Chinese pushed through and hand-to-hand combat broke out in the trenches.

Meanwhile the Chinese had added a second battalion to the assault on CARSON and ELKO and closed upon the Turkish positions. Bayonets and hand grenades were used freely as the Turks managed to throw back the attack. The battalion commander sent an engineer platoon, then committed the rest of the engineer company to the defense of CARSON. Shortly after midnight the pace slackened, but observers reported that a third enemy battalion was assembling to join in the assault. Fire support from the 1st Battalion of the Turkish force and the U.S. 35th Infantry Regiment helped to disperse this reinforcing enemy battalion.

As the night wore on, ELKO held out against continuing Chinese attacks, but the Turkish soldiers on CARSON were dying one by one. A few managed to slip over and join their comrades on ELKO, but the majority died in the trenches and bunkers from enemy fire. By morning CARSON belonged to the Chinese.

Convinced of the Chinese determination to take the NEVADA outposts, General Williams placed the 1st Battalion of the U.S. 14th Infantry Regiment under General Acar so that the latter could commit his reserves to the counterattack.

Gradually the enemy gained control of the northwest portion of VEGAS and Turkish casualties were increasing. In a desperate effort to blunt the Chinese drive, the Turks began a counterattack to clear the hill. Savage in-fighting followed as the Turks slowly swept the enemy off of VEGAS.

Nothing daunted, the Chinese regrouped and reinforced their offensive units, then came back again. They

edged their way up VEGAS and met the indomitable Turks, who refused to be budged. Late in the morning of 29 May, the Turks launched a four-platoon attack that cleared VEGAS with cold steel. But the enemy in turn would not accept defeat and sent wave after wave of men against the Turkish stone wall, as casualties on both sides increased sharply.

The struggle for ELKO continued throughout of the night of 28–29 May, as the enemy increased his pressure against the remnants of the Turkish force on the hill. General Acar ordered Lt. Col. Carl E. Mann, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, to send one of his companies to reinforce ELKO and to retake CARSON on the morning of 29 May. Company B approached ELKO from the southeast, overran the Chinese holdings around the outpost, and secured the objective after a 25-minute fight.

Using two platoons in the attack and two in the support roles, Company B then advanced west on CARSON. Midway between ELKO and CARSON, the company began to receive heavy automatic weapons, artillery, and mortar fire, and the assault slowed, then halted. Withdrawing to ELKO, Company B tried twice to gather momentum enough to break through the Chinese wall of fire on CARSON. Each time it failed and had to turn back. UNC artillery, mortars, and automatic weapons could not silence the Chinese weapons nor dislodge the enemy defenders.

After the third assault ground to a halt, the Chinese retaliated. Six times they crossed from CARSON to ELKO and on several occasions managed to advance within hand grenade range. Company B, stoutly supported by artillery, tank, mortar, and automatic weapons fire, forced the enemy to break off the attack each time and ELKO remained in UNC possession.

By midafternoon, General Williams and I Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke evidently felt that the Chinese intended to remain on the offensive until the outposts were taken. The strength on VEGAS was down to 40-odd men, many of them wounded, and to 20-odd on ELKO. Over 150 men had been killed and 245 had been wounded in the defense of the NEVADA complex. On the other hand, the Chinese casualties were estimated roughly at 3,000 men. The question was: Should the U.N. Command hang on to the outposts while the losses on both sides mounted, or should the terrain be evacuated and more UNC lives be conserved? Under the circumstances the commanders decided that the outposts had served their main purpose in uncovering and delaying the enemy attack. Early in the evening of 29 May orders went out for the Turks to withdraw from VEGAS and for the U.S. troops to leave ELKO.

It had been a bitter struggle as the losses on each side attested. Over 117,000 rounds of artillery fire and 67 close air support missions had aided the UNC ground units in withstanding the determined assaults of the Chinese. The enemy had sent 65,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire in return, up to this point an unprecedented volume in the Korean War.

The tenacity of the enemy attack following the submission of the UNC 25 May proposal at Panmunjom indicated that the Communists were beginning to jockey for improved positions along the front in anticipation of an armistice.

Undeterred apparently by the casualties incurred, the enemy now seemed ready to use personnel and carefully hoarded supplies of ammunition with a free hand as the negotiations entered the final phase.

### *The Tempo Mounts*

To General Taylor, as he watched the enemy gather strength for offensive action in the early days of June, the weakest links in the Eighth Army line lay in the U.S. I and IX Corps areas. As he pointed out to Clark on 2 June, the UNC positions north of the Imjin and Hant'an Rivers had not been chosen for their defensive strength. Relatively shallow penetrations would force the UNC to pull back behind the rivers and the enemy had the capability to push the Eighth Army troops back if he desired to expend the effort. In this event, Taylor continued, he would have to face the alternative of conceding the lost territory or of making costly counterattacks to regain the positions. Taylor was ready for an offensive and had alerted the reserves, increased photoreconnaissance by the Fifth Air Force, and enlarged the stockage of ammunition, but the problem of how long the Eighth Army should cling to present battle lines in the face of intense pressure remained to be settled.[11]

The Communists, however, did not choose to take advantage of the defensive weaknesses of the Eighth Army in the west. Instead they began to attack the eastern and central sectors of the line, where the ROK forces were concentrated. The enemy seized Hill 812, four miles northeast of the Punchbowl, from the ROK 12th Division, U.S. X Corps, on 1 June and Anchor Hill on the ROK I Corps front three days later. Despite heavy ROK counterattacks, the North Koreans accepted the casualties involved and continued to reinforce the holding forces. In view of the growing toll of ROK losses, the U.N. Command halted the attacks to regain Anchor Hill and sealed off Hill 812. By tying in all the positions abutting Hill 812 and then concentrating heavy artillery fire and close air strikes on the 1,000-square-meter area held by the North Koreans atop the hill, the UNC reportedly forced the enemy to use about seven battalions during the period 7–15 June to maintain possession of this small piece of terrain.[12]

Following the agreement on 8 June on the terms of reference for the exchange of prisoners, the Communists mounted their biggest drive since the spring of 1951. Again the chief targets of the enemy assault were the sectors guarded by ROK forces. Beginning on 10 June the Communists shifted their offensive threats from the east flank to the ROK II Corps and western X Corps lines in the Eighth Army center.

According to later reports, the enemy followed a customary pattern for the offensive. Before the attack, detailed plans were drawn up and carefully rehearsed on terrain similar to the contemplated objectives. Before the actual assault, heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire saturated the objective, then small forces moved up quickly to carry out a frontal attack. Other units

[11] Msg, G 5558 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 2 Jun 53, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jan–Jun 53.

[12] (1) KMAG, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 16. (2) U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 1–3.

joined in on the flanks of the objective until the pressure caused a penetration or breakthrough. Once an advantage was won, the Communists would seek to exploit it rapidly.[13]

The enemy's objective was the bulge in the Eighth Army lines that began roughly about 3 miles northeast of Kumhwa, extended northeast to the hills south of Kumsong, leveled off to the east for about 10 miles, then dipped to the southeast for some 13 miles to the village of Mundung-ni, northwest of Heartbreak Ridge. Since the terrain was very rough, ranging from hills 400 to 600 meters high in the west to somewhat over 1,000 meters at the eastern end of the bulge, the ROK troops defending the sector had great difficulty in maintaining lateral lines of communication. Five ROK divisions manned positions in the bulge, with the ROK Capital Division of the U.S. IX Corps on the left flank, the 6th, 8th, and 5th Divisions of the ROK II Corps in the center, and the ROK 20th Division of the U.S. X Corps on the right. The ROK 3d Division was II Corps reserve.

Facing the ROK forces were three Chinese armies. During the early days of June the enemy had brought in the CCF *68th Army* and placed it between the *60th* and *67th Armies*. In addition, the Chinese had strengthened the *60th Army* by attaching to it the *33d Division*. Thus, the enemy had available for the attack on the bulge four new divisions that had been training on a similar type of terrain in the rear.[14]

For the first ten days of the month the enemy had been deceptively quiet on the central front. Then, on the evening of 10 June, the artillery fire became intense and the Chinese followed up with co-ordinated attacks ranging from a battalion to a regiment in strength on the sector held by the ROK 5th Division. Using elements of both the CCF *68th* and *60th Armies*, the Communists began to build up the pressure. Smashing through the outposts, the Chinese seized Hills 973 and 882, ten miles northwest of Heartbreak Ridge and part of the main line of resistance.[15] ROK II Corps quickly released the 22d Regiment of the ROK 3d Division to the operational control of the ROK 5th Division to redress the enemy inroads on 11 June. Elements of the ROK 35th Regiment counterattacked to recapture Hill 973, but were only partially successful. Enemy units swiftly moved to the offensive again and forced the ROK troops to pull back 1,000 meters south of Hill 973. Two battalions of the 22d Regiment attempted to regain Hill 882 that same day and were able to approach the crest and dig in. Using the 22d, 27th, and 35th Regiments to launch counterattacks on 12 June, the ROK 5th Division was unable to drive the Chinese off the hills. Heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms

[13] U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 34.

[14] In addition to those already mentioned, the following major deployment changes had taken place prior to the outbreak of the June offensive. For the enemy the CCF *1st Army* replaced the CCF *47th Army* on the western front. For the UNC, the ROK 5th Division relieved the ROK 3d Division in the ROK II Corps area on 18 April and the U.S. 40th Division relieved the ROK 20th Division in the U.S. X Corps sector on 25 April. Two days later the U.S. 2d Division had passed to the operational control of the U.S. IX Corps. On 16 May the ROK 20th Division had relieved the ROK 7th Division at the front in the U.S. X Corps area.

[15] The account of the mid-June enemy attack is based upon the following sources: (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 36ff. (2) U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 4–8. (3) KMAG, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 11ff.

fire, coupled with the enemy's willingness to reinforce his units and counterattack the ROK assault forces, prevented the UNC troops from recouping their terrain losses.

The Chinese broadened the pressure upon the ROK II Corps on 12 June by attacking elements of the ROK 8th Division on the left flank of the ROK 5th Division. In the Capitol Hill sector, six miles northwest of Hill 973, which was defended by the 21st Regiment, the Communists used two companies initially, reinforced later with three more, and penetrated first the outposts and then the main line positions of the regiment. Two battalions of the ROK 10th Regiment moved up to counterattack early on the morning of 13 June, but were unable to restore the original line. Another enemy attack by an estimated two companies during the afternoon forced the abandonment of a company outpost and further withdrawal by the ROK forces.

The next morning the Chinese continued the offensive, employing several companies to sustain pressure against the 21st Regiment. Although the ROK units fought off these drives, disaster struck on the evening of 14 June. First a reinforced battalion enveloped the 3d Battalion of the 21st, causing it to break up into small groups fighting independently to regain UNC lines. Two enemy companies then hit the main line positions of the 1st Battalion and forced it to pull back. A third attack by a reinforced battalion succeeded in enveloping the 2d Battalion. Assembling behind the lines, the remnants of the 21st managed to establish a new main line of resistance that was to prove short-lived.

On the right flank of the ROK 5th Division, the ROK 20th Division of the U.S. X Corps, guarding the sector known as Christmas Hill, four miles southeast of Hill 882, had also been subjected to enemy attack. On 10 June two enemy companies from the CCF *33d Division* captured a company outpost on the approaches to Hill 1220, part of the Christmas Hill area. The ROK 61st Regiment counterattacked, rewon, and then relost the outpost. Further action to regain the position was suspended as the gravity of the situation on the ROK 5th Division front increased. When the Communists showed that they intended to retain possession of Hills 973 and 882, which were located on the main ridge leading to Hill 1220 from the west, the X Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Isaac D. White, moved up the ROK 7th Division, the corps reserve, and placed it on the left flank of the ROK 20th Division.

While the ROK 7th Division was advancing north, the 61st Regiment made several efforts to relieve some of the pressure on the ROK 5th Division. The Chinese reacted quickly and managed to blunt each attack.

On 14 June the CCF *33d Division* renewed the offensive against the ROK 5th and ROK 20th Divisions and forced the former to fall back south of the Pukhan River. This withdrawal exposed the flank of the ROK 7th Division, which had just reached its defensive lines. Fortunately, the Chinese this time failed to reorganize their attacking force quickly enough. X Corps artillery and Fifth Air Force close air support were concentrated on the enemy units facing the ROK 5th Division while the ROK 7th readjusted its front-line positions to tie in with the new ones established by the ROK 5th. On the other flank of the

5th, the ROK 8th Division also had to retreat over a mile to tie in its main line of resistance with its sister division on 15 June.

The two remaining regiments of the ROK 3d Division were ordered on 15 June to assume responsibility for the sector east of the 8th Division along the south bank of the Pukhan River, where they served to strengthen the left flank of the ROK 5th. As the ROK 3d Division took over its defensive positions, the ROK 22d Regiment reverted to the control of its parent unit. At the same time the ROK 5th Division was attached to the X Corps, which became responsible for the ground east of the Pukhan. The corps immediately made efforts to speed supplies and equipment forward to the ROK 5th and to replace its personnel losses. Since lateral roads were scarce, twelve H–19 helicopters were allocated to help out and they lifted a quarter of a million pounds of matérial forward to the front. On 16 June the ROK 11th Division shifted over from the ROK I Corps area to become ROK II Corps reserve.

The action tapered off during the next few days. In the ROK 8th Division territory west of the Pukhan on 16 June the enemy overran an outpost of the ROK 10th Regiment on Finger Ridge, two miles east of Capitol Hill, but the Chinese units broke contact and withdrew that evening. The ROK 21st Regiment repelled several company-sized attacks during the day. Later, aided by the 19th Regiment of the ROK 6th Division, the 21st Regiment mounted a counterattack and the enemy pulled back. Two Chinese companies penetrated the main line positions of the ROK 16th Regiment, 8th Division, southeast of Finger Ridge, but did not attempt to follow up the breakthrough. By the evening of 16 June, enemy operations on the 8th Division front had become sporadic.

During the next two days, the Chinese launched several minor assaults on the ROK 20th and 8th Divisions, effecting slight penetrations. By 18 June the situation began to be stabilized and the Eighth Army had an opportunity to survey the damage of the nine-day offensive.

The enemy had driven the ROK forces back an average of 3,000 meters along a 13,000-meter front and in the process had taken over a series of hill positions east of the Pukhan River. As a result of the Chinese drive, three ROK divisions had been redeployed in reinforcing and counterattacking roles. During the action the ROK units had taken a total of over 7,300 casualties while enemy losses were estimated at over 6,600. In close support of the UNC defense, Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft had flown 810 sorties in the nine-day period and the strategic air program had been delayed.

Elsewhere along the Eighth Army front, the Chinese had mounted a series of diversionary attacks on the U.S. IX Corps lines to keep the corps fully occupied while the main offensive was in progress. In the ROK 9th Division sector, the *70th Division* of the CCF *24th Army* launched a three-company drive on 11 June at outposts on Sniper Ridge. The next day 2 enemy companies penetrated main line positions of the division four miles west of Sniper Ridge in the area known as Boomerang. During the action the Chinese were reinforced with several additional companies and the

ROK's brought up 6 infantry companies and 1 tank company before the enemy broke off the engagement. On the night of 13 June the Chinese committed 3 battalions of the *70th Division* in the same sector and returned the following night with elements of 3 more battalions. On each occasion the enemy made no effort to hold on to the terrain gained; the Chinese withdrew before daylight to their own lines. The three-day assault on Boomerang proved to be costly for the *70th Division* for its casualties were estimated at over 2,200 and close to 2,000 of these were killed and tallied by the ROK forces.[16]

The U.S. 3d Division on the left flank of the ROK 9th also received its share of attention. On 10 June the CCF *74th Division* opened a succession of assaults against Outpost Harry, two-and-a-half miles southeast of Jackson Heights. Beginning with a company, the Chinese added two battalions and penetrated the position. Counterattack was followed by counterattack with the U.S. forces emerging on top on the morning of 11 June. The enemy came back with an estimated regiment that night and the pattern of the preceding encounter was repeated. There was a small-scale probe on 14 June and then a two-battalion assault on 18 June, but the end result was the same. The 3d Division estimated that the Communist efforts to take Harry had cost over 4,200 casualties during the nine-day period.

Over in the Arrowhead (Hill 281) sector, five to six miles northwest of Ch'orwon, the ROK 2d Division experienced a company-sized attack on 11 June. The enemy took three outpost positions in the White Horse Hill area the next day, using a force estimated at a battalion, but did not retain possession long. In the morning hours they pulled back to their own lines.[17]

The U.S. I and ROK I Corps sectors were quiet during the big offensive, with only small unit actions, patrols, and probes. After 18 June the whole Eighth Army front settled back to the old pattern.

It was on this same date that Syngman Rhee released the Korean nonrepatriates and introduced a new note of uncertainty into the truce negotiations and into the course of military operations as well. If the Communists had geared their offensive operations to coincide with the last days of the war, as some UNC officers believed, so that they might reap the political and psychological advantages of ending the long struggle on a high note, the ROK Government's provocative action that threatened to postpone the conclusion of the armistice must have been disconcerting.[18] If the cease-fire were unduly delayed, the June effort by the Communists might well become ancient history and the enemy might have to mount another offensive close to the end of the war. Thus, the possibility existed that the fighting might flare up again later on.

Since the ROK Army had been the chief target of the recent enemy attack and might also have to bear the brunt of future Communist pressure, the question of its efficiency and reliability under fire was of considerable significance. During the course of the enemy assault,

[16] U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 8–10.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 3–6.

[18] See U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 31–32.

the Korean Military Advisory Group personnel had ample opportunity to observe the progress of the ROK Army under heavy enemy attacks. They concluded that the size and intensity of the Chinese assault accounted for the initial enemy successes in the battle. Although hard hit, in many cases ROK units had continued to fight and had inflicted many casualties upon the foe. When pressure had increased, they had promptly taken up blocking positions behind the line to stem further advances. On the other side of the ledger, KMAG reported, there was a tendency among ROK officers to depend too heavily upon one type of communication. When this broke down, units often lost contact with their companion and supporting forces, making co-ordination between them difficult or impossible. The question of "face" continued to play an important role in the ROK Army, KMAG went on, since officers delayed informing their superiors quickly and fully about unfavorable developments that might cause the officers to lose face. Thirdly, the ROK leaders frequently placed too much reliance upon artillery fire when small arms and mortar fire would be more appropriate. KMAG reported that it was attempting to remedy these defects immediately.[19]

Despite the deficiencies, the ROK Army appeared to be far more mature and effective than it had been during the spring of 1951 under comparable conditions. The training and experience acquired in the interim were beginning to pay off. Whether or not the ROK forces could stand by themselves against an all-out offensive was still a moot question, but there could be little doubt about their improvement.

### *Final Test*

The brief respite on the battlefield ended on 24 June and the Communists disclosed their decision to devote special attention to the ROK divisions along the front. Concentrating on the eastern and central sector of the line, they evidenced their intention to demonstrate to the South Koreans that continuation of the war would be a costly business.

First to feel the effects of the resumption of operations was the ROK 9th Division. In the Boomerang area, northwest of Kumhwa, the CCF *70th Division* sent two separate company-sized attacks against the main line positions of the ROK 29th Regiment and then rapidly reinforced them to battalion size during the night of 24–25 June. The ROK forces fought off these attempts to pierce their lines until the Chinese broke off the fight and withdrew, carrying an estimated 700 casualties with them. In the Sniper Ridge area, the ROK defenders were less successful. A reinforced Chinese company drove them from an outpost and refused to be ejected in turn. On 25 June the Chinese tried again to seize a neighboring outpost, but the ROK troops clung tenaciously to their positions despite the loss of over 240 dead and wounded. In repulsing the Communist drive, the 29th Regiment estimated that the Chinese casualties were more than double their own.[20]

Southeast of the confluence of the Imjin and Yokkok Rivers in the U.S. I Corps sector lay a series of outposts

[19] KMAG, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 17.

[20] U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 10–12.

manned by the ROK 1st Division. The increase in vehicle traffic and in artillery fire from the enemy in front of these outposts warned the I Corps that the Chinese were preparing for an offensive late in June but gave no indication of the scale. On 25 June elements of two regiments of the *7th Division* of the CCF *1st Army,* supported by heavy artillery fire, struck the outposts on Bak, Hannah, and Hill 179 and mounted diversionary attacks against five other strongpoints. The ROK 1st Division received orders from the U.S. I Corps to hold on despite the strength of the offensive units, and artillery fire started to interdict the enemy lines of approach to the defensive positions. Gradually the Chinese pushed their way into the trenches and bunkers where bitter hand-to-hand combat broke out. Grenades flew back and forth. Bit by bit the ROK troops were forced to pull back until the enemy won the crests of the hills. By the morning of 26 June the Chinese were in possession of Bak, Hannah, and Hill 179. The ROK 12th Regiment moved up to reinforce the ROK 15th, which had borne the brunt of the battle, and they launched two battalion-sized drives on Bak on 26 June and one on Hill 179 on 27 June. Neither was able to regain the outposts.

The Chinese moved forward against nearby Outpost Queen on 28 June and penetrated ROK positions on this hill. Counterattacks against the determined Chinese forces on Queen, Hill 179, and Bak on the same day were all repulsed. When the I Corps commander, General Clarke, broke off the efforts to retake the lost outposts on 29 June, the enemy remained in control.

After the action General Clarke voiced his objections to the practice of attempting to cling unyieldingly to isolated points far in front of the main line of resistance. The garrison could not be reinforced easily because of the distance and terrain between the outposts and the main line, whereas the enemy's task was much simpler. Once the enemy closed in, artillery, mortar, and air strikes were of little value because of the danger of hitting friendly forces. Under conditions like these, the outcome could only be a high cost of casualties far above the worth of the outposts, Clarke declared.[21]

Over on the ROK II Corps–U.S. X Corps front the quiescent period had been spent in reorganizing the battered ROK 5th Division. By 26 June the ROK 5th was adjudged ready for action once again and control of the division was returned to the ROK II Corps. In the meantime the ROK 7th Division had taken over the ROK 20th Division's positions on the right flank of the ROK 5th.[22]

During the night of 26 June the *179th Division* of the CCF *60th Army* dispatched one regiment against elements of the ROK 5th east of the Pukhan River and a second regiment against units of the ROK 7th Division on the main ridge leading to Hill 1220. Heavy artillery and mortar fire accompanied the attacks and the Chinese pressed on vigorously despite a staunch defense by both ROK divisions. As the ROK 5th stubbornly gave ground and retreated to the next terrain line, the ROK 7th also had to pull back to protect its left flank. The Chinese pressed on and managed to penetrate the ROK 7th's positions on Hill

[21] U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, pp. 10–12, 29.
[22] U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 6.

938 just northwest of Hill 1220. For several days the ROK 7th counterattacked to regain Hill 938, but the enemy refused to yield possession. The Chinese held the hill with a small force and permitted the ROK troops to move in, then directed heavy artillery and mortar fire on the area and counterattacked in mass. After several experiences along this line and study of the growing list of ROK casualties, Lt. Gen. Isaac D. White, the corps commander, shifted to a policy of containment on 3 July. Terrain to the rear was readied for defense and helicopters rushed up materials and ammunition to prepare the new fortifications for further attacks. The Chinese made two attempts on 4 July to move in closer to Hill 1220, but the ROK 7th fought off both of these assaults.[23]

The intensification of enemy operations and the reports from intelligence sources that the enemy intended to launch a major offensive in the ROK II Corps–U.S. X Corps sectors, with the Hwach'on Reservoir as the objective, led General White to redeploy his forces in an effort to buttress the right flank of the ROK II Corps. Beginning on 1 July he sent the U.S. 45th Division westward to relieve the ROK 20th and one regiment of the ROK 7th Division. The latter became responsible for a smaller segment of the front and was placed under the ROK II Corps. On 10 July the ROK 20th Division relieved the U.S. 40th Division in the Heartbreak Ridge area and the 40th Division displaced west to strengthen the right flank of the 45th Division. The X Corps was also reinforced by the movement of the U.S. 5th Regimental Combat Team from the IX Corps on 1 July. While the X Corps was shifting its forces the action on the corps front fortunately subsided to a level that did not interfere with the redeployment.

To bolster the rear areas and the security of the prisoner of war camps, Clark in late June ordered the 24th Infantry Division, under Maj. Gen. Charles L. Dasher, Jr., to prepare for a temporary move from Japan to Korea. Moving by air and water the 34th Regimental Combat Team (−) arrived in the Korean Communications Zone on 3 July; the 19th Infantry Regiment followed on 11 July; and the 21st Infantry unloaded at Pusan on 12 July.[24]

In the first days of July the Communists carried out few attacks in strength, but the Eighth Army had no illusions about the future. Reports of troop movements, heavy traffic, and stockpiling behind the enemy lines alerted all commanders that the Communists were preparing to strike again in force. Enemy counterreconnaissance screens made it difficult to ascertain how much strength the Chinese were massing, but the concentrations were greatest on the central front around Kumsong.[25]

The first offensive, however, came in the Ch'orwon rather than in the Kumsong sector. On 6 July elements of the CCF *73d Division* attacked through the defensive positions of the CCF *69th Division* and struck two ROK 2d Division outposts on Arrowhead. For over thirty hours the defenders had to repel the Chinese forces, often at close range. The Communists drew back on 8 July to regroup, but that night they returned

[23] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8. (2) U.S. X Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, p. 3.

[24] U.S. 24th Inf Div, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 1–8.

[25] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 25–26.

in the wake of 6,500 rounds of artillery and mortar fire, and won possession of the north slope of one of the ridges. A ROK counterattack on 9 July failed to oust them and action became intermittent. Early on 11 July, two ROK companies, in a fight lasting almost three hours, forced the Chinese to pull back. During the battles for Arrowhead the ROK commander rotated his assault troops. In the 11 July encounter he used four battalions to exert maximum pressure and to provide a continuous flow of fresh troops. The six-day struggle for Arrowhead caused over 500 casualties for the ROK 2d Division while the estimated Chinese losses were slightly over 750.[26]

In the Porkchop Hill area, the U.S. 7th Division met an attack from its opposite number in the Chinese Army on 6 July. An unknown number of enemy soldiers fought their way up the slopes of Porkchop and took up squatter's rights on a part of the crest. The 17th Regiment quickly reinforced its defenders at the outpost with two additional companies. On the night of 7–8 July the U.S. troops launched two counterattacks to drive the Chinese from the crest with no success. The enemy struck back on the next evening and the U.S. 7th Division tried to counterattack again on 9 July, but neither could dislodge the other. On the following day the Chinese executed a series of assaults, ranging from company to battalion size, which the U.S. forces again withstood.

Generals Taylor, Clarke, and Trudeau, the army, corps, and division commanders respectively, conferred on the night of 10 July and decided that the Chinese disregard for casualties and obvious intent to hold on to the outpost on Porkchop outweighed the tactical value of UNC retention of the position. The Eighth Army commander believed that the withdrawal should be carried out by night, but the 7th Division G–2, who had recommended the move, pointed out that the Chinese were accustomed to the daily sight of armored personnel carriers taking ammunition and supplies to the troops on the hill. Since the carriers were inclosed, the G–2 went on, the enemy had no way of knowing what they contained. A daylight evacuation using the carriers would avoid the hazards of a night operation and would keep the Chinese in the dark to boot, he concluded. After hearing these arguments, General Taylor agreed.[27]

On the afternoon of 11 July, after the carriers moved up over the usual route, the troops climbed aboard and rode back without incident. From intelligence sources the I Corps later learned that the Chinese had thought that the vehicles were moving forward to support another attack rather than a withdrawal. When nearly two days after the evacuation they realized what had happened and advanced to occupy the hill, they were hit with all the artillery at the disposal of the 7th Division and had to contend with a great number of booby traps as well.[28]

The resumption of armistice negotiations at Panmunjom on 10 July and the apparent pacification of Syngman Rhee during early July provided an incentive for the last Communist offensive. With the end of hostilities at long last in sight,

[26] U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 2, 27, 28.

[27] Interv of author with Col Leonard G. Robinson, 6 December 1960. Colonel Robinson was G–2 of the 7th Division at that time.

[28] U.S. I Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 23–24.

the enemy was faced with its final opportunity to give the world a convincing display of Communist military might; to teach the upstart ROK forces another lesson; and to improve defensive terrain positions in the bargain. The June offensive had accomplished these aims to some degree, but much of the Kumsong salient still remained.[29] Furthermore, the ROKA units had bent but not broken under the Communist assault; perhaps this time the Chinese might really give them a trouncing.

By evening of 13 July the Communists had moved elements of five Chinese armies into attack and support positions along the central sector that encompassed the Kumsong salient. Facing them from west to east lay the ROK 9th and Capital Divisions of the U.S. IX Corps and the ROK 6th, 8th, 3d, and 5th Divisions of the ROK II Corps.

The increase in the tempo of artillery and mortar fire on 13 July corroborated earlier intelligence reports from prisoners, deserters, agents, and reconnaissance that the Communists were about to launch a major drive aimed primarily at ROK units on the central front. After darkness descended, the Chinese forces moved forward en masse. A reinforced regiment from the *72d Division* of the CCF *24th Army* struck the ROK 9th Division's right flank while the *203d Division* of the CCF *68th Army* smashed into the ROK Capital Division guarding the left shoulder of the Kumsong bulge. Friendly outposts were overrun as wave after wave of Chinese joined the assault. By midnight, enemy units had penetrated the main line of resistance up to 1,000 meters in some places. In the Sniper Ridge sector—long a bone of contention—friendly forces had to pull back to avoid being cut off. Throughout the night the pressure continued, with huge expenditures of artillery and mortar fire from both sides.[30]

In the ROK 6th Division area adjacent to the Capital Division, four battalions from the *204th Division* of the CCF *68th Army* hit a company-sized outpost of the ROK 19th Regiment. By the morning of 14 July, they had penetrated the main line positions of the regiment and surrounded one friendly battalion. Elements of the *204th Division* moved through the ROK 6th Division sector and then swung to the west and joined in the attack upon the Capital Division.[31]

To the east the Chinese on 13 July sent four companies to surround an outpost in the ROK 8th Division lines and a battalion against a company outpost in the ROK 3d Division area on the right shoulder of the Kumsong salient. They also attacked the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions to keep them occupied while the main assault was in progress.

By the morning of 14 July the pattern of the Communist offensive attack had developed as the enemy increased the weight of his pressure upon the ROK 3d Division. Battalion and two-battalion attacks accompanied by heavy artillery and mortar support broke through the ROK 3d outpost system and drove into the main line positions. The 22d and 23d Regiments received assault after assault, but with the aid of the 18th Regi-

[29] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 25–26.

[30] U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 3–4, 30–32.

[31] The account of the July offensive is based on the following sources: (1) Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 53; (2) U.S. IX Corps, Comd Rpt, Jul 53; (3) KMAG, Comd Rpt, Jul 53; (4) G–3 Opns Jnls, 13–20 Jul 53.

ment in blocking positions managed to hold on. Then four enemy companies filtered in through the adjacent ROK 5th Division sector and swung in behind the 23d Regiment. When the indication of a double envelopment became apparent, the ROK 3d began to pull back.

As the Chinese pierced the ROK lines along the central front and cut off units from their parent organizations, the situation became confused. Soldiers from the 6th, 8th, and Capital Divisions found themselves defending strongpoints together. Lateral and front-to-rear lines of communications were soon out of commission and radio and foot messengers became the chief means of sending and receiving instructions and information. Sister regiments were often out of contact and unaware of what the other was doing. Reports trickling in from the front were often delayed and usually incomplete as the ROKA commanders displayed their customary unwillingness to forward unfavorable news that would cause them to lose face.

Despite the lack of details, it was apparent after the first day of the Chinese assault that the enemy's use of major elements of six divisions had made serious inroads in the ROK Capital and 3d Divisions' sectors. Since these guarded the shoulders of the salient, the ROK 6th and 8th Divisions were in danger of having their flanks exposed to a double envelopment. General Taylor, therefore, on 14 July ordered the ROK Capital, 6th, 8th, 3d, and 5th Divisions to fall back south of the Kumsong River line at the base of the bulge. This would straighten out the defensive line and shorten the front to be covered. In the process of complying with Taylor's instructions, however, the ROK commanders lost contact with and control of some of their units, with the result that many of them did not stop at the Kumsong line. Instead they continued to retreat farther south replacing the bulge with a sag in the Eighth Army lines.

The intensity and determination of the Chinese offensive impressed Clark and Taylor to the point that they decided to fly reinforcements from Japan to Korea to bolster the front. The U.S. 187th Airborne RCT was rushed to Korea and on 14 July Taylor attached the unit to the U.S. 2d Division. The latter took over the U.S. 3d Division's positions, and the airborne troops relieved elements of the ROK 9th Division, permitting the ROK's to narrow their front and to strengthen the left flank of the retreating Capital Division. In the meantime, the U.S. 3d Division shifted over into blocking positions behind the Capital Division to stem the enemy advance. As the Capital's units fell back, they passed through the 3d Division and were reorganized and rehabilitated in the rear. On 15 July the 3d took over responsibility for the Capital Division's sector and assumed operational control of the division.

In the ROK II Corps area, Taylor released the ROK 11th Division to the corps commander, Lt. Gen. Chung Il Kwon, who dispatched the division forward to relieve the ROK 3d Division. The ROK 6th Division was also withdrawn from the line and, along with the ROK 3d, was reorganized and reconstituted. Thus, on 15 July, the Eighth Army had the ROK 9th, the U.S. 3d with the remnants of the Capital Division, the ROK 11th, 8th, and 5th Divisions on the front lines from west to

east to check the Communist offensive.

On 16 July the ROK II Corps received orders to counterattack and restore the Kumsong River line. The enemy offensive had slowed by this time and the Chinese were engaged in the involved task of organizing the defense of the terrain they had taken and in replacing the heavy casualties they had suffered in breaking through the ROKA positions.

The ROK 11th, 8th, and 5th Divisions, attacking abreast, launched the counteroffensive the same day. Against variable enemy opposition they edged forward toward the Kumsong River east of Kumhwa. Between 16–19 July the three divisions, with the 6th, 3d, and 7th ROK Divisions in blocking positions in reserve, attained the high ground south of the river. On 19 July the ROK 6th Division passed through the 5th Division and assumed responsibility for its sector. Efforts to cross the river and take defensive positions on the north bank of the Kumsong met with increasing enemy resistance and were abandoned after 20 July. For the last week of the war the ROK II Corps held the Kumsong River line against minor enemy pressure.

Despite the gains of the counteroffensive, the Chinese had removed the Kumsong salient and straightened out their lines on the central front. Their penetration had been approximately six miles and the weight of their assault had cut off and disorganized many of the ROKA units facing them. It had taken nine ROK and U.S. divisions in blocking and counterattacking roles to halt the Communist advance and to regain some of the lost terrain. The enemy offensive had also provided additional grist for the Communist propaganda mill, which loudly claimed military victory for its side. On the other hand, the price that the enemy had paid to sustain a major drive was extremely high; the Eighth Army estimated that over 28,000 casualties had been inflicted upon the Chinese during their breakthrough and its aftermath.[32]

While the ROK II Corps was carrying out its counteroffensive, the Communists exerted pressure upon several scattered points along the Eighth Army line in an effort to take long-contested hills and outposts prior to the signing of an armistice. The reasons behind this pressure were difficult to fathom, since all of the threatened points fell in the demilitarized zone and would have to be abandoned by the UNC forces anyway. As it turned out, the Communists had to surrender possession of their new gains shortly thereafter.

The operations along the front during the last week of the Korean War subsided again to small-scale probes and patrols, as each side now anticipated that the armistice soon would be signed.


### *The Tally Sheet*

A recapitulation of enemy activity in the final months might prove helpful in assessing the military situation when hostilities ended.[33] (*Map VIII*)

The close relationship between the Communist military operations and the truce negotiations at Panmunjom were apparent through the April–July period. As the two sides moved toward settle-

[32] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, pp. 17, 51, 58.

[33] The statistics in the following section have been extracted from the Headquarters, Eighth Army, Command Reports, for April, May, June, and July 1953.




H. C. Brewer, Jr.

MAP VIII

ment, the intensity of the enemy's operations varied according to the prospects for reaching final agreement. Beginning in late March, the Communists assumed an increasingly offensive attitude at the front and displayed a willingness to employ their forces more lavishly than they had in the past.

While the negotiations dragged in late April and early May, the tempo of enemy action slackened again. In the closing days of May, after the 25 May UNC proposal, which seemed to offer the possibility of a truce within the near future, the Communist attacks commenced to pick up impetus once again. The agreement on prisoners of war on 8 June was followed by the large-scale assaults of 10–17 June which succeeded in attaining better terrain positions, cowing the growing ROK opposition to the armistice, and providing the Communists with a propaganda mantle of military victory.

The dramatic release of the Korean nonrepatriates by Syngman Rhee on 18 June reintroduced the elements of uncertainty into the situation and ground operations again declined until the truce meetings resumed on 10 July. Then, in their largest offensive since the spring of 1951, the Communists sought to repeat the June objectives on a more grandiose scale.

As Clark later commented: "There is no doubt in my mind that one of the principal reasons—if not the one reason—for the Communist offensive was to give the ROK's a 'bloody nose,' to show them and the world that 'PUK CHIN'—Go North—was easier said than done." [34]

[34] General Mark W. Clark, "The Truth About Korea," *Collier's*, vol. 133, No. 5 (March 5, 1954), p. 48.

Of some significance was the fact that the enemy used Chinese rather than North Korean troops during most of the important attacks and that the bulk of the offense was directed against the ROK forces. It suggested that the Communists desired to improve the relative strength of the North Korean and ROK forces prior to the truce. If this were their hope, they were doomed to disappointment, for despite the losses of the period, the ROK ground forces rose from 537,350 at the end of March to 590,911 at the close of July, while the North Korean ground forces remained close to 260,000 during the four-month span.[35]

The following table of casualties and artillery expenditures serves to depict more graphically the intensification of combat activity between April and July:

| | Communist | | UNC | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Date | Casualties (Est.) | Artillery Rounds | Casualties | Artillery Rounds 105-mm. and Above |
| *1953* | | | | |
| April.... | 10,500 | 51,690 | 4,343 | 1,255,015 |
| May.... | 16,454 | 99,340 | 7,570 | 1,747,718 |
| June.... | 36,346 | 329,130 | 23,161 | [a]2,710,248 |
| July..... | 72,112 | [a]375,565 | 29,629 | 2,000,982 |

[a] Highest total during the Korean War.

The Communists established two artillery records for themselves in July, the highest total for any month and the highest total for a ten-day period—197,550 rounds during the 11–20 July span. The freedom with which enemy troops expended artillery and mortar

[35] The ROK totals includes ROKA combat, service, and security troops, KATUSA, and the ROK marines while the North Korean figures include combat, security, and support troops.

shells demonstrated clearly that their supply situation had improved greatly and that they were willing to fire the rounds necessary to support their attacks. Even after the drains of June and July, there were no shortages of ammunition except on a local basis.

Thus, at the close of the shooting war the Communists were in fairly good condition, militarily speaking. Despite the large personnel losses of June and July, there were over a million Chinese and North Korean soldiers under arms in Korea. They were eating three meals a day as compared to two during the earlier stages of the war and were adequately clothed. The enemy transportation and communications systems had been continually bombed and harassed during the conflict, but the prodigious use of manpower, on the one hand, and camouflage, deception, and subterfuge, on the other, had permitted the Communists to maintain their forces at the front and to create stockpiles as well. The enemy armies were in a position to continue the limited type of warfare of the 1951–53 period for a considerable length of time if the need had arisen. Fortunately, the developments at Panmunjom during July obviated this eventuality, at least for the nonce.

# CHAPTER XXII

# Finale

Amid rumbles of ROK discontent and the mounting roar of Communist cannon warning of the impending offensive at the front, the plenary session of the truce conference reconvened at Panmunjom on 10 July. The ominous signs in the background were offset somewhat by the simple fact that the enemy was willing to resume the armistice discussions. After the ROK President had effected the release of the Korean nonrepatriate prisoners, the Communists might well have broken off the talks completely on the grounds that the U.N. Command had not kept faith with the tentative understandings already reached. Nevertheless, they had returned. Whether they now intended to use the negotiations as a forum for their complaints on this score or earnestly desired to conclude the arrangements for a cease-fire could not be presaged, but at least the possibility of a settlement had not been entirely ruled out. If the Communists proved to be seriously interested in finishing the military phase of their Korean experiment, the chief task of the United Nations Command delegation might well be to allay the misgivings of the enemy over the future conduct of the government of Syngman Rhee.

### *Assurances and Reassurances*

General Clark was well aware of the problem. Before the truce teams met at Panmunjom, he asked his superiors in Washington for confirmation of the power granted him in late June to terminate the conflict with or without assurances of co-operation from the ROK Government. The reply on 8 July reaffirmed his authority but, at the same time, cautioned him against implying to the Communists that the UNC would employ force to insure ROK compliance with an armistice.[1]

Since the U.N. Command could not guarantee that it would use force if necessary to prevent the ROK forces from violating the truce, Clark approached the question from another direction. On 9 July he suggested to the JCS that if Harrison were pressed by the Communists, the senior delegate might inform them that the UNC would immediately withdraw all logistical and military support from any ROKA unit that sought to contravene the armistice through aggressive action. General Collins quickly advised him that the State Department objected to such a commitment since it would restrict Clark's freedom of action.[2] Thus, on the eve of the resump-

[1] (1) Msg, CX 63548, CINCUNC to JCS, 8 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. 1–143, incl 12. (2) Msg, DA 943508, CSUSA to CINCFE, 8 Jul 53.

[2] (1) Msg, CX 63567, CINCUNC to JCS, 9 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, 1–143, incl 12. (2) Msg, DA 943508, CSUSA to CINCFE, 9 Jul 53.

tion of plenary sessions, Clark and Harrison found themselves in an awkward situation. The only answers that they could offer to the specific and pointed questions certain to be posed by the enemy would have to be phrased in vague and general terms.

The first plenary conference exposed the weakness of the UNC position.[3] In his opening statement Nam Il harked back to Clark's letter on 29 June to Kim and Peng. He wanted to know what steps had been taken to recapture the prisoners released by Rhee and what measures had been adopted to prevent further moves by the ROK Government in the same vein. Did the armistice include the ROK Government and Army, he went on, and what guarantees could the UNC provide to insure that the South Korean forces would abide by its terms? In view of the inflammatory statements made by Rhee against both the personnel of the United Nations Commissions and the Communist side, how could the UNC protect these people in the pursuit of their postarmistice responsibilities, Nam continued. "If an armistice does not include the South Korean Government and Army, the war in Korea will not actually stop even if the representatives of the United Nations Command undertake to sign the Korean Armistice. . . . Therefore, in order to insure that the Armistice Agreement can become truly effective, your side has the inescapable responsibility for putting forward concrete and effective measures in regard to the various questions mentioned above and putting them into effect," he concluded.

In his reply Harrison could only state:

> We assume that Republic of Korea Forces presently under the command of the United Nations Command will remain so after an armistice and that they will carry out the instructions of the United Nations Command and withdraw from the part of the demilitarized zone in which they are now deploying in accordance with the Armistice Agreement.
>
> As stated in General Clark's letter of 29 June, the United Nations Command will make every effort to abide by the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. We cannot guarantee that the Republic of Korea Government will lend full support to it, but the United Nations Command shall continue to do everything within our power to cause them to cooperate.

Harrison went on to promise police protection for the members of commissions and Red Cross teams to insure their safety. Then, using the risk factor presented by ROK opposition, he took the opportunity to bring up the suggestion that all the nonrepatriate prisoners be moved to the demilitarized zone and turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Although this would impose heavy logistical burdens upon the U.N. Command, Harrison declared that the commission personnel could operate unmolested in the demilitarized zone. Possibly this matter could be handled after the armistice through the Military Armistice Commission, he said.[4]

[3] The composition of the delegations had not changed since the last meeting on 20 June, but two of the delegates were relatively new. Maj. Gen. Kim Dong Hak of the North Korean Army had replaced Rear Adm. Kim Won Mu on 17 June and Maj. Gen. George G. Finch, USAF, had replaced General Glenn. General Choi of the ROK Army did not attend the meetings after 16 May. General Finch had been a lawyer and had organized the first Air National Guard wing in 1946.

[4] Transcript of Proceedings, 151st Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 10 Jul 53, in FEC Min Delegates Mtgs, vol. VII.

While the Communists studied the UNC statements, Harrison and Clark sought to strengthen their position at the conference. Harrison had been encouraged by the attitude of the enemy delegation during the meeting. The questions asked by the Communists had been logical and pertinent and their behavior was calm, matter of fact, and not aggressive, he reported. In view of the reasonable approach of the Communists, both he and Clark felt that they should offer more concrete assurances at the next meeting. If the ROK forces should violate the armistice, they thought that the enemy was entitled to know where the UNC would stand. The policy makers in Washington, however, were still unwilling to be too specific. After consultation with Defense and State Department representatives, the JCS informed Clark that although he had the power to withdraw logistical support from the ROK forces, they preferred that a more general answer be offered to the enemy. They suggested the following response: "The UNC will not give support during any aggressive action of units of ROKA in violation of the armistice. In saying this we do not imply that we believe any such violation to be probable." [5]

At the 11 July meeting the Communists dismissed the UNC statements of the previous day as "full of contradictions" and "not satisfactory." Nam pressed again for definite "yes" or "no" answers to his queries without success. In responding, Harrison pointed out the measures adopted by a side to fulfil its armistice obligations were internal matters to be determined by that side alone. He did, however, inject into the record the general declaration proposed by the State-Defense group the day before. But the enemy delegates wanted more; they insisted that the commanders on each side should order and enforce the complete cessation of hostilities by all units under their control.[6]

The inability of the U.N. Command to relieve adequately the Communists' doubts about the future conduct of the ROK armed forces led Clark to cast about for another expedient. He found one in the Rhee letter of 9 July to Robertson wherein the ROK President stated that he would not obstruct the truce. But Robertson pointed out that he had agreed not to release this letter publicly pending further negotiations. On the other hand, Robertson saw no reason why Harrison could not tell the Communists that suitable assurances had been received from the ROK Government that it would work during the post-hostilities period in close collaboration with the UNC for common objectives.[7]

On 12 July Harrison passed this information on to the Communist delegation and told them that the UNC, which included the ROK forces, was prepared to carry out the terms of the truce. After a recess, Nam commented that while the UNC statement was "very good" and "helpful," it still was not quite enough. The rest of the session witnessed a series of thrusts and parries, with the enemy pressing for definite pledges and the UNC shunting aside the demands and

[5] (1) Msg, CX 63583, Clark to Collins, 10 Jul 53, DA-IN 285965. (2) Msg, JCS 943567, JCS to CINCUNC, 10 Jul 53.

[6] Transcript of Proceedings, 152d Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 11 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VII.

[7] (1) Msg, CX 63627, Clark to JCS, 11 Jul 53, DA-IN 286476. (2) Msg, CX 63635, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 12 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1-143, incl 29.

standing pat on the general assurances already given.[8]

To assess whether the Communists were genuinely worried about the ROK threats at this point or had simply decided to delay a settlement until the results of their July offensive were determined, would be difficult. Probably both factors entered into their calculations, since the disturbing press releases attributed to Rhee indicated that the old warrior viewed the truce merely as a temporary rather than a long-term halt in the fighting. This, of course, ran counter to the soothing statements made by the UNC at Panmunjom and might well have made the Communists suspicious. On the other hand, the July offensive had been planned for some time and it was unlikely that the enemy would have come to terms before its completion regardless of whether Rhee had been silent or even co-operative. At any rate, the Communists used the uncertainty over Rhee's actions as a convenient screen—real or fancied—for the deferment of final agreement.

After the 13 July meeting the enemy clearly was awaiting the outcome of its operations at the front. During this session Harrison gave some frank answers to the questions previously raised. He told the Communists that the U.N. Command would turn over the rest of the nonrepatriates to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to quiet their anxiety lest the ROK Government seek to release additional prisoners in this category. The UNC was prepared to insure that the ROK forces observed the cease-fire and withdrew from the demilitarized zone. It would guarantee the safety of the personnel connected with the various commissions and of the Communists engaged in carrying out post-armistice duties in South Korea. If the ROK forces violated the truce and the Communists took counteraction, the UNC would continue to maintain the state of armistice and would give no support in equipment and supplies to the ROK units carrying out the aggressive operations.[9] It was true that the UNC would not promise to use force to secure ROK obedience to the truce, but it must have been obvious to the enemy that no ROK offensive could have been successful for long without UNC assistance.

Nam, however, was not prepared to accept the UNC responses as yet. He reverted to the matter of the escaped nonrepatriates despite the fact that there was little hope of recovering them at that late date. Then he proceeded to press Harrison for a reconciliation between the ninety days, mentioned in Rhee's recent speeches as the length of time that he had agreed to for not obstructing a truce, and the armistice, which specified no such time limit. Harrison repeated several times that the UNC recognized that there was no time limit to the cease-fire and would act in conformity with this knowledge.[10]

When this meeting was over, Harrison urged that the U.N. Command recess the conferences, unilaterally if necessary, until the Communists realized that no more promises or pledges would be made. He regarded the enemy tac-

[8] Transcript of Proceedings, 153d Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 12 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VII.

[9] Transcript of Proceedings, 154th Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 13 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VII.

[10] *Ibid.*

tics of the succeeding days as plainly harassing while the Communists watched the progress of the actions on the central front.[11]

By 14 July Clark and his superiors had come to agree with Harrison and they gave him authority to walk out of the discussions the following day if the enemy persisted in pursuing its policy of procrastination.[12] The UNC delegation left the tent on 15 July after pointing out that the scale of the Communist offensive belied their sincerity in reaching agreement on an armistice. But before the UNC recessed the conference for a longer period, Clark suggested that Harrison give the enemy a more explicit answer on the ROK position as it had been developed in the Rhee-Robertson talks. Clark wished to inform the Communists that the ROK President had given the UNC "written assurances" that he would not obstruct the truce, but the political and military leaders in Washington modified the phrase to "necessary assurances." [13]

As it turned out, the change in wording made little difference. On 16 July the Communist delegation stole a march on the UNC and suggested a two-day recess in the negotiations.[14] They later asked that it be extended to 19 July and the UNC agreed. In the meantime the enemy consolidated its gains along the front and halted the UNC counterattack in the ROK II Corps area.

Clark flew to Korea on 17 July and conferred with Harrison at Munsan-ni. They informed the JCS that they intended to reject further enemy demands for the return of the escaped prisoners and for firmer pledges on ROK future behavior. If the Communists requested a renegotiation of the demarcation line because of the current military operations, the U.N. Command would agree and then recess unilaterally for four days. The Washington leaders concurred in this course of action, provided that the Communists consented to naming a date on which the armistice would be signed and insisted upon renegotiation of the demarcation line.[15]

When the conferees returned to Panmunjom on 19 July, the enemy offensive was over and the battle line had been stabilized once again. The Communists were now ready to go ahead with the final arrangements for the cease-fire, Nam declared, although they were not yet completely satisfied with the UNC guarantees. They reserved the right to bring up the problem of the released prisoners at the postarmistice political conference. And since the ROK Government had refused to admit the Indian forces into their territory, Nam demanded that the truce conference settle the matter of handing over the remainder of the nonrepatriates to the repatriation commission now rather than committing the task to the Military Armistice Commission. As Clark and Harrison had anticipated, Nam also asked for renegotiation of the demarcation line. He evaded the efforts of Har-

[11] Msgs, HNC 1819 and 1821, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 13 and 14 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–143, incls 38 and 43.

[12] Msg, JCS 943836, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Jul 53.

[13] Msg, JCS 943913, JCS to CINCFE, 15 Jul 53.

[14] Transcript of Proceedings, 157th Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 16 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VII.

[15] (1) Msg, C 63749, CINCUNC to JCS, 17 Jul 53 in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 144–286, incl 273. (2) Msg, JCS 944074, JCS to CINCFE, 17 Jul 53.

rison to establish a target date for the signing of the truce.

The UNC senior delegate tried to discover when the Communists expected the Czech and Polish contingents for the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to arrive, by announcing that the Swiss and Swedish advance components would be prepared to function shortly. If all went well, Harrison stated, the details could be concluded within five days and he urged that the effective date of the cease-fire be twelve hours after the signing. The supervisory commission should be ready to take over as soon as the armistice went into effect, he went on, and until that time each side should be responsible for the safety of the members it had nominated.

The Communists agreed that the plenary sessions should be suspended and that the staff officers should now begin at once to settle all the points still in dispute. For the U.N. Command, Harrison informed Nam, Col. Douglas W. Cairns, USAF, would replace Colonel Darrow and join Colonel Murray on the staff group on the renegotiation of the demarcation line and revision of the armistice agreement. Col. Louis C. Friedersdorff, USA, would head the UNC officers discussing the repatriation of prisoners, and Col. John K. Weber, USA, would be in charge of the UNC staff group considering physical arrangements and rules of procedure pertaining to the functioning of the Military Armistice Commission.[16]

Late in the afternoon the plenary conference finished its penultimate session. After 158 meetings spread over more than two years, the original ten members of the delegations had dwindled to two —Nam Il and his fellow countryman, Lee Sang Cho, who had helped to sustain the fiction that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was directing the truce discussions for the Communist side. Despite the loss of continuity occasioned by the rotation of personnel, the major issues had finally been solved and the prospects for peace became brighter.

Now the task of reaching agreement on the minor problems descended upon the shoulders of the staff officers as it frequently had in the past. They would have to work their way through the maze of petty details that would determine when the fighting officially would come to a halt.

### *The Home Stretch*

There were four areas in which the two sides still had to come to an agreement: the line of demarcation and demilitarized zone; the place of delivery of the nonrepatriate prisoners; the inception of activities by the various commissions established under the armistice; and the physical arrangements for the actual signing of the truce document. Negotiations on the staff level began almost immediately on these matters and continued, in at least one case, until the final day of the war.

On 20 July Colonel Murray and his opposite, Col. Huang Chen-chi of the Chinese Communist delegation, set to work on the revision of the demarcation line. In many places the job was relatively simple, since there had been little or no action in the locale and the line of contact was easy to determine.

[16] Transcript of Proceedings, 158th Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 19 Jul 53, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VII.

In others, where recent fighting had shifted the front line, the problem became more complex. Here bargaining proved to be necessary, as each side sought to retain possession of as much favorable terrain as possible. Indeed, on occasion both sides claimed more than they had a right to, since it was apparent that the Communists and the U.N. Command could not both control a particular hill simultaneously. But, on the whole, the sessions were without rancor and even had their moments of humor. On 22 July Murray tried to end the haggling over several points in dispute along the line by making a package compromise offer. Colonel Huang, in typical fashion, accepted only the portion favorable to the Communists, leading Murray to comment: "In other words, in the interest of getting agreement, I offered you the shirt off my back. In place of accepting it gracefully, you returned to the conference table and asked for my drawers." Nevertheless, the horse trading continued until early the next morning, when all differences had been settled. Murray and Huang then initialed the copies of the maps to be printed and included with the armistice agreement.[17]

Before the staff officers took up the disposition of the nonrepatriates, Harrison and Clark decided that the expressed desire of the Communists to settle the place of delivery before the armistice went into effect should be exploited. To accomplish this, they instructed Murray to introduce an amendment to the draft agreement for consideration at the opening session on 22 July, proposing that the Communist prisoners who did not wish to return home should be turned over to the repatriation commission in the southern part of the demilitarized zone.[18]

Col. Ju Yon, senior staff officer for the Communists, accepted the suggestion in principle, but dismissed the idea that an amendment would be necessary. Instead he proposed that a temporary supplementary agreement be used covering the terms of admission for the nonrepatriates and the administrative personnel into the demilitarized zone. The Communist draft permitted each side to use its own half of the demilitarized zone for turning over nonrepatriates to the repatriation commission and for establishing the facilities required to handle the prisoners of war. Since the substance rather than the form of the understanding was the important thing, Clark and Harrison approved the enemy's alternative. The Communists, in turn, agreed that, to save time, the supplementary proposal should be typed up and signed separately instead of being printed and added to the text of the armistice agreement. By 25 July the staff officers had worked out the details and ordered the interpreters to go ahead with putting the terms into final shape.[19]

[17] Transcripts of Proceedings, Eighth through Tenth Mtgs of Staff Officers To Renegotiate the Military Demarcation Line, 20–22 Jul 53, in G–3 File, Transcripts of Proceedings To Renegotiate the Military Demarcation Line . . . , Jun–Jul 53.

[18] (1) Msg, HNC 1833, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 19 Jul 53. (2) Msg, C 63821, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 19 Jul 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–143, incls 70 and 71.

[19] A copy of the supplementary agreement is reproduced in Appendix C. (1) Msg, C 63904, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 23 Jul 53. (2) First through Fourth Mtgs of Combined Staff Officers, 22–25 Jul 53. All in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–143, incls 88, 83, 89, 93, and 96.

During the staff meetings the Communists had on several occasions evidenced great interest in learning the exact number of prisoners that were to be repatriated directly and of those that would be given over to the repatriation commission. The U.N. Command refused to supply other than round figures to the enemy, reasoning that there might well be some last-minute changes and that it would be simpler not to have to explain them to the Communists. Thus, leaving some margin for shifts in loyalty or homesickness, the UNC announced on 21 July that there would be 69,000 Koreans and 5,000 Chinese returning to Communist control. Three days later the UNC followed up with the release of the totals on the nonrepatriates—14,500 Chinese and 7,800 Koreans. In contrast, the Communists evidently had made up their minds on the exact figure they would deliver to the United Nations Command. The tally came to 12,764, including 3,313 U.S. and 8,186 Korean personnel.[20] Since the enemy totals were not too far off from the numbers the UNC had estimated they could expect, Clark recommended they be accepted and his superiors agreed.[21]

The staff committee on repatriation of prisoners, headed by Colonels Friedersdorff and Lee Pyong Il of the North Korean Army, had the task of determining the rate of delivery for the repatriates. To a large degree the rate depended upon the transportation facilities and the administrative capacity of each side to handle the prisoners. At first, the UNC had calculated that it would be able to bring 1,800 repatriates a day to Panmunjom plus 360 sick and wounded. When Friedersdorff passed the information on to Lee, the latter immediately asked for 3,000 a day, in addition to the sick and wounded. As it was, the UNC would be transferring more than seven times as many prisoners over to the Communists each day than it received. For Lee disclosed that his side would turn over only 300 a day because of the paucity of transportation facilities and the fact that the Communist prisoner camps were distant and scattered. On 26 July a reassessment of UNC capabilities revealed that it could bring daily to Panmunjom 2,400, plus the 360 sick and wounded, but the enemy clung to its earlier figure.[22] At that rate the U.N. Command would repatriate all of the prisoners in its custody desiring to return home in about thirty days, while the Communists would spread their deliveries over a forty-day period.

Meanwhile, over in the committee considering the preparations for the functioning of the Military Armistice Commission, Colonel Weber and his associates presented the UNC plans for the rules and *modus operandi* on 20 July.

[20] Msg, CX 63970, CINCUNC to CG AFFE, 25 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 144–286, incl 227. The remaining UNC personnel were broken down as follows: U.K., 922; Turkey, 228; Philippines, 40; Colombia, 22; Australia, 15; Canada, 14; France, 13; South Africa, 6; Belgium, 1; and Greece, 1. Three Japanese were also to be returned, according to the Communist tally, to total 12,764 in all. For the final figures on repatriation, see Appendix B.

[21] (1) Msg, CX 63929, CINCUNC to JCS, 23 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–143, incl 102. (2) Msg, JCS 944523, JCS to CINCUNC, 24 Jul 53.

[22] Second and Fourth Meetings of Staff Officers on the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, 23 and 26 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–143, incls 104 and 105.

Clark had already selected Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, FEC, as senior UNC member and established headquarters for the group at Munsan-ni on 20 June. During the succeeding month General Bryan had gathered his staff together and was ready to take up his duties as soon as the armistice went into effect.[23]

The Communists did not have any basic objections to the UNC recommendations, but showed no disposition toward haste. They agreed that the Military Armistice Commission should hold its first meeting on the day after the armistice was signed. Once the sessions got under way, they went on, the staff members could arrange the details of the operation.[24]

As one item after another was settled, the question of timing assumed greater importance. From the outset, the UNC staff officers had sought to have the armistice take effect twelve hours after the signing. The Communists, estimating that the personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission might not arrive in Korea and be able to exercise their functions for at least a week after the signing, had proposed that the effective date be seven and a half days later. In his rebuttal, Colonel Murray argued that even if the supervisory groups did not begin to carry out their responsibilities for a week, the agreement not to augment forces should become effective twelve hours after the cease-fire. On 22 July the enemy representatives stated that although the UNC interpretation was at variance with the provisions of the armistice agreement in some respects, they were willing to accept it.[25] Whether the Communists would scrupulously observe the restrictions imposed by the truce during the interim week was a matter for conjecture, but at least the casualty lists would not be increased by an extra seven days of fighting.

The first target date for the signing of the cease-fire had been 24 July, since five days had been adjudged sufficient to take care of the details and the physical arrangements. But complicating factors soon made this choice appear unduly optimistic—the demarcation maps had to be printed and checked after the line had been settled, the building for the signing ceremony had to be constructed and outfitted, and a difference in opinion had broken out over the signing procedure.

The debate over this formality produced the final enemy effort to eke out political advantage during the conflict. In the initial exchange on the ways and means that might be adopted, the Communists stated on 20 July that, in view of the uncertain ROK situation, they did not think it wise for the military commanders to attend and sign in person. Colonel Ju suggested that the commanders affix their signatures before the ceremony and then the senior delegates could countersign at Panmunjom.[26]

Clark looked with disfavor upon the enemy plan, for he strongly felt that the

[23] UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, app. I, pp. 313–14.

[24] First, Second, and Third Mtgs of Committee for Making Preliminary Arrangements for the MAC, 20, 22, and 26 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 144–286, incls 252, 253, and 255.

[25] (1) Liaison Officers Mtg, 21 Jul 53. (2) First Combined Mtg of Staff Officers, 22 Jul 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–143, incls 111 and 83.

[26] Liaison Officers Mtg, 20 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–43, incl 74

commanders should show their good faith by personally signing the armistice, thus lending prestige to the agreement. When Murray pressed the Communist representatives on 21 July to change their position, however, he met with little encouragement.[27] Nevertheless he returned to the fray two days later and sought to assure the enemy that all possible precautions would be taken at Panmunjom to guarantee the safety of the commanders during the ceremonies. The U.N. Command, Murray said, would be willing to increase the number of guards, to limit and carefully screen all the representatives admitted to the conference area, and to provide immunity from attack for the Communist commanders en route to Panmunjom. But Colonel Ju pointed to the disconcerting statements that Rhee and other members of the ROK Government were still making as prejudicial to personal appearances by the commanders. To answer some of the UNC objections to the Communist proposal, Ju continued, his side was willing to have the senior delegates sign the armistice first and to have the truce go into effect twelve hours later. Thus any delay in securing the commanders' signatures would not hold up the actual cease-fire.[28]

At the liaison officers meeting on 24 July, Ju offered a third alternative. If no representatives of Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek were admitted to the conference area and if the number of personnel permitted to witness the signing were restricted to 100 for each side and included no press members, the Communists might reconsider and have their military commanders sign in person.[29]

Clark's initial reaction to the latest enemy suggestion was to accept even though he knew that the press would be very unhappy over being excluded from the signing room. General Taylor had conversed with Rhee and discovered that the ROK leader did not desire to send a representative to Panmunjom, so this potential obstacle was removed. But after further study of the enemy's demands, Clark changed his mind. He had no intention, he told the JCS, of banning ROK and Chinese Nationalist correspondents from the conference site area as the Communists insisted. If the enemy refused to allow the ROK and Nationalist newsmen to be present at the signing, he would settle for the senior delegates holding the ceremony first, with the commanders countersigning later.[30]

When the liaison officers convened their meeting on 25 July, Colonel Murray made several fervent pleas in behalf of the ROK and Nationalist press members, but they fell upon deaf ears. Ju would not consider their being in the area during the signing. If the UNC consented to their exclusion, Marshal Choe Yong Gun, Kim's deputy, and General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, would come to Panmunjom on 27 July at 1000 to sign for the Communists, Ju de-

[27] Liaison Officers Mtg, 21 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–143, incl 111.

[28] Liaison Officers Mtg, 23 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–143, incl 119.

[29] Liaison Officers Mtg, 24 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–143, incl 112.

[30] (1) Msg, CX 63963, CINCFE to JCS, 24 Jul 53. (2) Msg, CX 63969, CINCFE to JCS, 25 Jul 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–143, 144–286, incls 121 and 277.

clared. Otherwise, he went on, his side would not allow any press representatives to be present.[31]

The adamant stand by the enemy against ROK and Nationalist participation decided Clark. Early on 26 July he instructed Harrison to go ahead and sign at Panmunjom; he would countersign afterwards at Munsan-ni since President Eisenhower wanted him to do this on Korean soil.[32]

At the liaison officers conference later that day, Murray and Ju completed the arrangements. Each side would be given 350 spaces in the Panmunjom area, but only 150 persons would be granted access to the signing building. Newsmen, photographers, and cameramen would be included in the 150 figure. The conference site would be divided into two sections and all personnel from one side should remain in its own half. Additional security guards would be on hand to preserve order and prevent disturbances. As previously suggested, the ceremony would be held at 1000 on 27 July.

Murray and Ju encountered little difficulty in straightening out these matters. But an attempt by Murray to simplify the exchange of documents after they were signed by the commanders met with immediate suspicion and rejection by his opposite number. Since only 6 of the 18 copies of the truce were to remain in UNC possession, Murray suggested that the Communists take 6 copies to Kim and Peng while the UNC had the 12 copies intended for enemy possession countersigned by Clark. This procedure would necessitate only one exchange, Murray explained. Ju insisted upon absolute equality right to the end; each side would have 9 copies for countersignature despite the fact that two exchanges would be required under this method. In arguing for the Communist view, Ju discounted the time lost under his scheme as unimportant, causing Murray to retort: "Do I understand you correctly in that the strong point of your proposal is that it takes a long time to carry it out?" Ju ignored the thrust and early on 27 July Murray agreed to the Communists' proposal to end the matter.[33]

### *The Big Day*

Although there were occasional puddles in low-lying spots and a heavy cloud cover, the sun managed to break through intermittently on 27 July. A strong wind whipped across Panmunjom stirring up little whirls of dust here and there. In the background the sound of artillery served as a reminder that the war was not quite over.

The building constructed for the ceremony had had a deletion and an addition in recent days. A UNC complaint had succeeded in securing the removal of two Communist peace doves from the gables of the peace pagoda and General Clark had insisted upon the provision of a south entrance to the structure. In the original plan the only door lay on the north side and this would have required all of the UNC entourage to pass

[31] Liaison Officers Mtgs, 25 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–143, incls 122 and 97.

[32] (1) Msg, DA 944648, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 25 Jul 53. (2) Msg, CX 64002, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 26 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–143, incl 126.

[33] Liaison Officers Mtgs, 26 and 27 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 1–143, incls 127 and 136.

through the enemy section to enter the building.[34]

Along the south approach to the pagoda a UNC honor guard composed of members of the nations that had fought in Korea lined the walk, with only the Republic of Korea not represented. Smartly turned out in white gloves, scarves, and helmets, the guard added a dash of color to the scene. On the north side the Communists, clad in olive-drab fatigue uniforms and canvas shoes, were busily cleaning up the area near the entrance.

A half hour before the ceremony the spectators began to drift into sight. Correspondents and cameramen went into the building and took up their stations, followed soon after by the military officials from each side assigned to act as observers. In severe contrast to the casual, informal entrance and appearance of the UNC officers, the Communists were stiff and disciplined as they filed into the hall and took their seats. Both Chinese and North Koreans "sat straight and rigid like students at a graduation ceremony, sized and posed."

Upon one of the tables at the head of the room lay nine blue-bound copies of the agreement and a small U.N. flag and upon another, nine maroon-colored copies and a North Korean flag.

At 0957 the associate delegates of the plenary conference came in and sat down at the front. As the minute hand signaled the hour, Generals Harrison and Nam briskly walked in from opposite ends of the building and took their places behind the tables. Not a word of greeting was exchanged between the two men as they began to write their signatures on the documents. The atmosphere was marked by cold courtesy on both sides. At 1012 the task was completed and Harrison allowed himself a small smile at the cameras. As he and Nam rose to leave, they locked glances for a moment, but neither spoke. Harrison went out and chatted with the newsmen for a few minutes, then left for Munsan-ni by helicopter. Nam and his group climbed into their Russian-built jeeps and drove out of the area. The armistice but for twelve hours was finally a fact. (*Map IX*)

### *Postlude*

Surrounded by his top military advisors, including a ROKA representative, General Clark countersigned the blue-bound copies on the afternoon of 27 July at Munsan-ni. In the speeches that followed, the U.N. commander cautioned that the armistice was only a military agreement to cease fire while the opposing sides sought a political solution to the conflict. Until the diplomats negotiated a permanent conclusion, Clark warned, there could be no UNC withdrawal from Korea nor any lessening of alertness and preparedness.[35]

While Clark was speaking, the guns along the front continued to bellow out their lethal salutes. Ground activity had come to a halt, but artillery and mortar fire lasted until the end. In the air the UNC planes pounded North Korean airfields, rail lines, and road systems in a

[34] The description of the ceremony is based on UNC/FEC, Command Report, July 1953, Appendix I, pages 134ff.

[35] (1) ZX 37264, CINCFE to CG AFFE *et al.*, 26 Jul 53. (2) Msg, C 64152, CINCUNC to JCS, 31 Jul 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 144–286, incls 159 and 156.




D. Holmes, Jr.

MAP IX

last-ditch effort to curtail Communist activities until the supervisory commission and its inspection teams could begin to function. The air program, carried out by Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft, had been intensified during the last week of the fighting, but unfortunately, inclement flying weather had permitted the enemy to bring a number of airplanes into Korea before the armistice was signed.[36] On the sea naval warships bombarded Kosong and finally ended the longest naval siege in history by shelling Wonsan for the last time.[37] When the clock hands reached 2200 the guns fell silent across Korea and the shooting war was over.

How long the truce would last was uncertain. When Taylor had gone on the eve of the truce to inform Rhee that it would be signed on the morrow, the ROK President had seemed relieved that the long and trying struggle was almost over.[38] During Clark's visit with Rhee on 27 July the latter had told the U.N. commander that he would tell his people that the ROK would co-operate with the armistice and that he would prepare a message to be read to the nonrepatriate prisoners to reassure them. In the course of their chat, Clark told the ROK President of an offer from Eisenhower to make 10,000 tons of food available immediately to the civilian population. The rations would be distributed through the Korean Civil Assistance Command in conjunction with the ROK authorities, if the latter were agreeable to the acceptance of the gift. Rhee seemed glad to receive the news and gave his consent, Clark reported.[39]

Despite these favorable signs, Rhee and his aides in their public utterances and interviews continued to indicate that the truce might not last long and that the ROK forces might again resort to arms if and when the political conference failed.[40] It was impossible to estimate whether these threats might be serious or were simply delivered for home consumption to soften the blow of ROK acquiescence to the armistice. But they did inject into the situation a note of uneasiness that would have to be eliminated if the cease-fire were to be other than temporary. The United States could only hope that when fulfilled the pledges of military and economic assistance made to the ROK Government would overcome its objections to the truce and induce the ROK leaders to halt their agitation for a resumption of hostilities in the future.

The inability of the UNC participants to depend upon Rhee's behavior made them very hesitant about issuing the joint declaration, agreed upon earlier, providing for "greater sanctions" in the event the Communists began anew the fighting in Korea. As long as there was reasonable doubt about Rhee's intentions, the U.N. countries who had joined in the war preferred not to give broad publicity to their commitments under the agreement. Instead they decided to

[36] Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953*, pp. 639–40.

[37] Hq UNC, Communiqué No. 1689, 28 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 144–286, incl 158.

[38] Msg, G 7445 KCG, Taylor to Clark, 27 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 144–286, incl 206.

[39] Msg, GX 7452, CINCUNC to JCS, 27 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 144–286, incl 286.

[40] Msg, GX 7608, Taylor to Weyland, 31 Jul 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 53, incls to app. I, incls 144–286, incl 209.



THE ARMISTICE BUILDING, PANMUNJOM

issue notice of the warning through a special report that the U.N. commander would submit to the United Nations on the armistice about a week after it was signed. Thus, in place of an independent statement which would have been given wide distribution, the following item was included in Clark's summary of the negotiations presented to the U.N. on 7 August:

We the United Nations members whose military forces are participating in the Korean action support the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terms.

The task ahead is not an easy one. We will support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea based on the principles which have long been established by the United Nations, and which call for a united, independent and democratic Korea. We will support the United Nations in its efforts to assist the people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war.

We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal



GENERAL HARRISON TAKES SALUTE FROM HONOR GUARD *on his way to the Armistice Building.*


of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.

Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia.[41]

Regardless of the manner of presentation, the commitment was made and no less noted for having been slipped into Clark's report. Whether the Communists would heed the warning or not, only the future could reveal. It was possible that Syngman Rhee might take the decision out of their hands and place both sides in a quandary. In the meantime an armed truce during which the opponents could seek to improve their relative positions offered a *modus vivendi* less costly than open war.

The organizations which the U.N. Command and the Communists had designed to prevent one side from improving its military position significantly during the truce quickly assumed their duties and enjoyed some initial success. On 28 July the Military Armistice Com-

[41] Unified Command's Special Report on Korean Armistice, in the Dept of State *Bulletin*, vol. XXIX, No. 739 (August 24, 1953), p. 247.




SIGNING THE ARMISTICE—GENERAL HARRISON AND GENERAL NAM IL

mission held its first meeting and the proceedings were conducted in a businesslike manner. Arrangements were made in subsequent sessions for the withdrawal of troops from the demilitarized zone, the conduct of salvage operations, the removal of hazards such as mines, and the matter of credentials and identification of personnel entering or working in the zone. But the era of co-operation was soon shattered by a series of incidents in August which arose from the Communist Red Cross activities in the UNC prisoner of war camps. The atmosphere at the MAC meetings grew strained and charges and countercharges again became the order of the day. Each side denied the accusations of the other and the joint observer teams set up to investigate violations of the demilitarized zone usually had to submit split reports.[42]

Even more important were the experiences of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its inspection teams. The latter were stationed at the ten ports of entry specified in the truce agreement to observe and report on the arrival and departure of personnel and the replacement of combat matériel. In North Korea the inspection teams soon ran into difficulties, and the UNC charged that the enemy was violating the spirit and letter of the agreement by using other ports of entry to introduce more men and equipment. Little could be done to enforce the maintenance of the *status*

[42] UNC Summary of the Implementation of the Armistice Agreement in Korea, Part Two, no date. In OCMH.



THE NINE BOUND COPIES OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

*quo* under the circumstances, the UNC concluded, and the Communists would continue to gain in strength as long as the UNC closely observed the provisions of the truce.[43] Whether the apparent enemy build-up was offensive or defensive in nature or simply opportunistic, only time would reveal.

Another of the armistice's creations—the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission—also suffered its share of frustrations. Shortly after the truce was signed, the flow of prisoners north and south got under way. Between 5 August and 6 September the U.N. Command transferred over 75,000 prisoners of war directly to the Communists in the demilitarized zone and the enemy sent back over 12,000 to the UNC.[44] Then, on 23 September, the United Nations Command turned over more than 22,000 nonrepatriates to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in the demilitarized zone; the Communists delivered over 350 UNC nonrepatriates to the NNRC the following day.[45]

The Communists soon complained that the facilities provided them for persuading their nonrepatriates to return

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] See Appendix B for a breakdown of the statistics on prisoners of war.

[45] The following account is based upon the Interim Report, 28 December 1953, and the Final Report, no date, of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the United Nations Command Report on Operations of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, no date. All in OCMH.



GENERAL CLARK COUNTERSIGNS THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AT MUNSAN-NI, *while Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe and Vice Adm. Joseph J. Clark look on.*

home were inadequate and it was not until 15 October that they began their explanations. Between this date and 23 December, when the ninety-day period agreed upon for explanations expired, they utilized only ten days for explanations. Large groups of the prisoners refused to listen to the enemy representatives at all and the number of those who chose repatriation after hearing the explanations amounted to only a little over 600 out of the 22,000 involved. The NNRC retained custody of the remainder until the 120 days stipulated in the truce agreement was up and then returned them to the UNC. In the early part of 1954 the Korean nonrepatriates were released and the Chinese were shipped by plane and boat to Taiwan, except for some 86 who chose to go with the Custodial Forces of India when they sailed for home.[46]

Of the 359 UNC nationals who had decided not to be repatriated, two of the Americans and eight Koreans changed their minds before the 120-day period was up and two Koreans elected to go to India with the custodial forces. The remainder were turned back to the Communists in January 1954.

When the American prisoners of war were interviewed after their repatriation, disturbing charges of collaboration and moral and physical softness were leveled at many of the returning soldiers. Criticism of the U.S. prisoner of war behavior became widespread in the press

[46] See Appendix B.

during the fall and winter of 1953–54. Over 500 of the repatriated prisoners were investigated, but only a few were convicted of misconduct. The Secretary of Defense did, however, appoint a ten-man Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War to investigate the matter. As a result the committee drafted a new code of conduct for the armed services, which President Eisenhower signed on 17 August 1955. It was hoped that the code would prevent a recurrence of the Korean experience.[47]

Since the war had never been declared, perhaps it was fitting that there should be no ending. In late August 1953 the U.N. General Assembly had welcomed the holding of a political conference which the truce agreement had recommended, but it was not until February 1954 that the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France agreed to participate in a conference at Geneva to discuss the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.[48]

Delegations from the Republic of Korea and from all the nations participating in the United Nations Command except the Union of South Africa met with delegations from the USSR, Communist China, and North Korea on 26 April 1954 in Switzerland.[49] The fundamental differences in the approaches of the two groups to the unification problem quickly demonstrated that agreement would be impossible unless one side made wholesale concessions. The UNC nations proposed free elections throughout Korea under U.N. auspices after the Chinese Communist forces had been withdrawn from the country. To the Communists, the U.N. was one of the belligerents and could not act as an impartial international body; they were willing to have free elections but only under the auspices of a body composed of equal representation from both sides wherein they would have veto privileges. To the UNC delegations the Communist proposals seemed to offer the prospects for elections only after long delays and on the Communists' terms. After nearly two months of discussions, the conference came to a close in mid-June with neither side willing to accept the other's solution. A negotiated unification of Korea appeared to be as distant in 1954 as it had been in 1948.

[47] New York *Times*, August 18, 1955. The justice and validity of the charges have been discussed in detail in postwar writings. For the arguments upholding the thesis that the prisoners did collaborate excessively with the enemy and demonstrated signs of moral and physical weakness, see Eugene Kinkead, *In Every War But One* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1959). For a convincing rebuttal of the thesis, see Albert D. Biderman, *March To Calumny* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1962).

[48] See Department of State, *The Record on Korean Unification, 1943–1960* (Washington, 1960), p. 25.

[49] For the record of the proceedings at the Geneva Conference see Department of State, *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26–June 15, 1954* (Washington, 1954).

# CHAPTER XXIII

# Retrospect

What had the war in Korea accomplished? While it may still be too soon to view the conflict in proper perspective, some of the immediate consequences are not difficult to discern.

Despite the claims of the enemy, there had been no victory—political or military—in Korea. At best, the outcome could be called a draw. Yet several developments were momentous. Facing its sternest test, the United Nations had weathered a challenge, which, if unanswered, might have resulted in disaster and eventual disintegration. Under the U.N. flag, the original objective of the intervention in Korea—halting Communist aggression—had been successfully carried out and the independence of its foster child, the Republic of Korea, had been preserved. This practical demonstration of how the United Nations could function when peace was threatened greatly enhanced the prestige of the organization and established a precedent for future U.N. military action if the need should again arise.

The effort had not been given unanimous support by U.N. members, it is true, but twenty-one nations had contributed forces of one kind or another to sustain the U.N. decision. Although many of these countries had supplied only small token units, the mere fact that they had participated at all was encouraging, since it indicated their belief in the U.N. and their willingness to put teeth in the enforcement provisions of its charter. The Korean War marked a real departure from the dismal experience of the League of Nations in this respect.

For the United States the Korean War was also a crucial test. The United States had entered World Wars I and II at a relatively late date and as a member of a coalition. At the conclusion of World War II, however, the realignment of power had placed the United States in a position of dominance and cloaked it with the mantle of leadership of the non-Communist world. When the foe threw down the gauntlet by invading South Korea, the responsibilities that went with the new position of power became agonizingly apparent. No longer could the nation rely upon some other country to battle the aggressor until it was ready to join the fray. Now only the United States had the resources to do the task. Fortunately, it had responded quickly, meeting force with force. By working within the framework of the U.N., it had at the same time helped give increased stature to that organization. The amazingly swift recourse to armed action had shown the Communists that the United States had accepted its role of leadership and would not permit outright aggression on their part to go unchecked. In an instance when failure to act might well have led

to a repetition of the tragic events following Hitler's uncontested march into the Rhineland, the United States had won its spurs as the champion of the anti-Communist powers.

In the course of leading the UNC team during the hostilities, the United States had to devote far more attention to Pacific-Asian affairs than it had in preceding years. Before the war the emphasis had been placed upon Europe, and the NATO pact had linked many of the nations of Europe to the United States. This policy had been rewarded, for most of them had sent forces to serve with the U.N. Command. Under the impetus of war the United States decided to expand its system of alliances and began to conclude security pacts with the countries in the Pacific-Asian area. New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Japan, and Korea entered defensive alliances with the United States during or shortly after the war and others, such as Nationalist China, followed later. The Korean experience demonstrated that allies are helpful in marshaling favorable world opinion and that their contributions in men, matériel, and political support are very valuable in the search for peace. The multiplication of U.S. politico-military ties with non-Communist nations throughout the western Pacific and on the Asian mainland was a direct consequence of the war.

In the Far East, two nations had emerged from the conflict stronger than before. The armed forces of the Republic of Korea had increased sixfold during the three-year period and at the conclusion of the truce totaled close to 600,000 men. The bulk of these troops were trained and equipped and had steadily improved in battle efficiency. In forces in being, the ROK units had a considerable advantage over the North Koreans at the end of the war. With further training and development of the officer and noncommissioned officer corps, the ROK forces could eventually become a bulwark against future Communist aggression or, conversely, an instrument for the fulfillment of the ROK dream—the unification of Korea—when the Chinese Communists withdrew from Korea.

The other state that had added to its status as a result of the war was Communist China. From the stout defensive and offensive capabilities that the Chinese had displayed throughout the fighting, the United States and its allies had learned the hard way that Communist China was a formidable foe who bore little resemblance to the feeble nation of World War II. With a tremendous pool of manpower at its disposal and energetic leadership, Communist China had also won its spurs on the battlefields of Korea and appeared ready to assume its place as the leader of the Communists in the Far East and western Pacific areas.

In the passage at arms in Korea the United States and the Chinese had an opportunity to test each other's mettle and to learn each other's strengths and weaknesses. Both had discovered that the price of military victory was more than they were prepared to pay and neither was likely to underestimate the immense task that a further resort to arms with military victory as the goal would entail.

The rise of Communist China also raised some intriguing questions concerning the future role of the Soviet Union in the Far East. Before the war

the Russians had exercised a controlling interest in the affairs of North Korea. With the entry of Communist China into the struggle, the USSR had seemingly been content to provide much of the war matériel for both the North Koreans and Communist Chinese and to support their protegés vigorously in the United Nations debates. During the negotiations the North Koreans appeared to take their cue from the Communist Chinese, and the Soviet influence in the making of policy became difficult to discern. But the growth of Communist Chinese power and prestige could not fail to have an adverse effect upon Soviet leadership of Communist elements in the Far East. As the voice of Peiping gained in strength, Moscow's could not help but diminish. What the long-range consequences of this shift in power would be upon Sino-Soviet relationships were impossible to forecast, yet it seemed evident that there would be an immediate elevation in the position of Communist China in the Communist hierarchy. For the first time since 1917 a potential rival for the leadership of the Communist world had appeared upon the scene.

In an indirect fashion both Communist China and North Korea had benefited diplomatically from the lengthy truce negotiations. Although the United States recognized neither of these regimes officially and the U.S. representatives had acted in behalf of the United Nations when they negotiated and signed the armistice, it was difficult to dismiss the argument that the United States had given them a sort of *de facto* recognition in the process. In the meantime the Communists throughout the discussions had refused to grant either the ROK or the Chinese Nationalist Governments any official status whatsoever. The advantage in this field lay decidedly with the Communists.

On the other hand, the United States had established the precedent for no forced repatriation of prisoners of war, although this victory had been tarnished by the spate of outbreaks of violence in the camps that tended to discredit the screening process. Nevertheless, the United States had clung firmly to the concept for fifteen months, refusing to consider a settlement on any other terms. Alternatives had been proposed, including the 1952 suggestions by Harrison and others to simply free the nonrepatriates as Rhee did with many in June 1953. Such a *fait accompli* approach to a solution by the U.N. Command might well have afforded the Communists their easiest way out, since they could have charged the UNC with unilateral action and might have avoided the loss of face that came from having to meet the problem directly. But until the archives at Peiping are opened to researchers, the Chinese reaction to such a move in 1952 will remain merely a matter for conjecture.

The long-term effects of no forced repatriation may also be a matter for conjecture, but the fact that 50,000 prisoners had taken advantage of the UNC stand and had rejected return to Communist control cannot be disputed. Yet the humanitarian approach in protecting nonrepatriates had been expensive. To safeguard their rights had cost over 125,000 UNC casualties during the fifteen-month period while the enemy lost well over a quarter of a million men—killed, wounded, and captured—according to Eighth Army estimates. Viewed

from this angle, the precedence given the 50,000 nonrepatriates and the 12,000-odd prisoners held by the enemy over the hundreds of thousands of soldiers at the front raised a complicated question. In negotiating a military truce, should the prime consideration be for the men on the line and in action or for those in captivity? Such a decision would always be difficult to make. Comparatively speaking, the casualties incurred during the fifteen-month span were but a small part of the over-all total suffered during the war. The UNC suffered over 500,000, including more than 94,000 dead.[1] For the Communists the estimates reached over 1,500,000, including prisoners of war. The monetary costs were more difficult to compute, especially on the Communist side, but one U.S. expert figured that the war and its by-products had cost the United States over 83 billion dollars by 1956, placing it second to World War II in this department.[2]

Since the territorial adjustments in Korea had been minor in character, the absence of a clear-cut winner, frustrating as it might have been to the participants, was not necessarily a poor solution under the circumstances. Both sides had sought an armistice and the compromise that had resulted had not generated a disgruntled loser seeking revenge. Syngman Rhee might be unhappy over the truce, but as long as he was dependent upon the United States for military assistance, it might be difficult for him to rekindle the flame of military conflict.

In addition to these international consequences, there were several significant domestic developments. In the course of fighting this indecisive bout in Korea the United States had begun to overhaul and strengthen its own military machine once again. The deterioration of the once-powerful U.S. military organization after World War II had been checked and rebuilding and renovation had been started. In this respect, the Korean experience had been salutary and the failure to defeat the enemy served to remind leaders and public alike that the country could not afford to relax its vigilance or its capability to act in the face of future challenges. After the armistice there was no effort to disband the armed forces, to junk the implements of war, and to return to the military *status quo,* as there had been after World Wars I and II. The Korean War helped to convince most of the U.S. leaders that military spending on a large scale to provide adequate forces and weapons in a state of readiness to counteract the growing Communist threat must be sustained. In the postwar period the huge sums allocated to the defense budget were stark evidence that the need for preparedness had not been promptly forgotten.

The United States had also gained valuable experience in the difficulties of fighting a limited war. The lack of definite military objectives had complicated

[1] U.S. losses: 33,629 dead, 103,284 wounded, 5,178 missing or captured—total, 142,091.

[2] Raymond E. Manning, Cost of U.S. Wars, prepared by the Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, 1956. Manning deducts the costs which would presumably have been incurred regardless of whether there had been a war or not and includes the cost of expanding U.S. forces at home and abroad, foreign aid, stockpiling, etc., which grew out of the war and the atmosphere it created.

the task of military planners, since all plans for large-scale operations had to be placed on a contingency basis. As the war dragged on, the problem of budgeting its costs followed the same pattern. The length of the conflict argued strongly for the maintenance of a liberal rotation program that was uneconomical and inefficient as a practical solution, but valuable as an answer to the morale problem.

The desire to minimize the war in Korea politically made it hard for the U.S. administration to convince the nation's manufacturers that they should convert to war production on what might well have turned out to be a short-term basis. Since war conversion was expensive and domestic civilian consumption was at a high level, the manufacturers were very reluctant to disrupt normal production. In this instance, the need for a war production base sustained in peacetime by regular orders and capable of immediate expansion was demonstrated once again. The inescapable fact that it took eighteen months to two years to develop and get new production into the fighting areas was clearly shown by the ammunition situation, yet only limited mobilization of industrial resources was put into effect. The civilian economy was scarcely disturbed by the butter and guns policy. Perhaps it was only by making it as easy as possible upon soldiers and civilians alike that the United States was able to be so patient in the negotiations at Panmunjom. Excessive hardship upon either category might have generated strong sentiment for an end to the war either through direct action or through further concessions on the prisoners of war.

*The Negotiations*

The initiation of the negotiations in July 1951 was in many ways a turning point in the war. As long as fluid conditions had prevailed on the battlefield during the first year of the conflict, the United States, which had been supplying the bulk of the forces and carrying the financial burden of supporting the war, had largely determined the policy pursued by the U.N. Command with only token opposition. After the static phase began, however, the UNC allies and the Republic of Korea became less reticent. The length of the armistice negotiations gave ample opportunity for the disagreements to be aired privately and publicly. Disturbed by the drains of the Korean commitment, some of the European members of the United Nations Command became anxious to redirect the attention of the United States towards the needs of NATO. But until the war was concluded, there was little hope for a shift in emphasis. Thus, NATO national interests dictated that an armistice be negotiated quickly, so that they could devote their efforts to their own domestic and colonial problems and, at the same time, secure more sympathetic consideration, militarily and economically, from the United States. For the ROK Government, the opposite was true. A truce would mean, in all probability, the end of ROK aspirations for a united Korea and the eventual waning of U.S. concern for Korean affairs.

With pressure mounting from both groups, the United States had to play the role of mediator. Self-interest argued for the liquidation of the Korean diversion and a return to the primary

task of safeguarding the NATO community, but the protection of South Korea and Japan was a responsibility that could not be denied. For two years, therefore, the United States sought an equitable solution that would permit the attainment of both objectives. The continuing effort to end the fighting in Korea was matched by the concomitant drive to establish in the ROK and in Japan adequate defense forces that one day would be capable of resisting the Communist threat effectively. As has been noted, the expansion of the ROK forces was far more significant than that of the Japanese, but this was not the fault of the United States; the Japanese, for a number of reasons, had chosen to move cautiously down the road to rearmament.

The dissension from within the alliance was all too usual in coalition warfare. With so many diverse national objectives involved, agreement upon a common goal was but the initial step. Generally all could agree that the enemy must be stopped, contained, or defeated, as the case might be. The debates on the means and methods, however, were quite another thing and even in general war, such as World War II, were likely to occasion some heated and tense moments. The Korean War was no exception to this rule, despite its limited nature.

After the United States had decided to open negotiations with the Communists, it had refused to be hurried by its U.N. allies into an agreement or to be deflected from its objective by ROK opposition to an armistice. Fortunately the enemy had shown no disposition toward seeking a military solution during the negotiating period, although limited pressure had been applied by both sides to induce swifter consent to a truce. But extreme measures had been shunned. The U.N. Command had not wilfully violated the Manchurian sanctuary nor had the United States pushed strongly for sterner military or economic steps against the rest of Communist China. The enemy in turn had made no hostile moves against the Japanese base or even against the crowded port of Pusan. To localize the war politically and militarily both sides had voluntarily imposed limitations upon their military operations.

The manner in which the United States opened the negotiations has been attacked by some critics as overhasty. Admiral Joy felt that the quick response given by the United States to Malik's offer of June 1951 created the impression that this country wanted or needed a cease-fire badly and that this was interpreted by the Communists as a sign of weakness.[3] Perhaps the United States might have avoided the injection of a sense of urgency into the atmosphere by a slower and more devious approach and deprived the enemy of a psychological and propaganda edge. But it is doubtful whether the truce would have been concluded any sooner in the long run, since the UNC actions at Kaesong and on the battlefield during the summer of 1951 must have quickly dispelled any illusions that the enemy might have had concerning the UNC need for an armistice.

Among the UNC delegates and newsmen who attended the first meetings at Kaesong, there had been an initial note of optimism on the length of time that

[3] See Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, p. 165.

it would take to arrange a truce. Just three days after the negotiations opened, Admiral Burke wrote to his wife and closed with: "Hope I'm not in this orchard [at Munsan-ni] when the apples ripen." But, by the end of the battle of the agenda in late July, he sent a far different postscript: "Maybe leave in a year or so if things don't break soon." [4] Exposure to Communist demands and tactics had quickly induced the admiral to discard his expectation of a fast settlement.

Perhaps there might have been a relatively swift truce if the discussions had been limited strictly to military affairs. Originally the United States had intended to bar political questions and to restrict the delegations to the military considerations inherent in a cease-fire. There was to be no debate on the disposition of Taiwan nor on the seating of Communist China in the United Nations and these matters had been successfully avoided. Recognizing that a political settlement in Korea might not be possible in the near future, the United States had sought a long-term truce and the Communists had not contested this point. The U.S. proposal for a Military Armistice Commission had been accepted, although the Communists had inserted the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its inspection teams as the instruments to carry out the supervisory functions outside the demilitarized zone. Surprisingly enough, the Communists had permitted the concept of inspection, on a limited basis to be sure, to be written in the final agreement. How closely they would observe their promise not to increase their non-Korean troops or to build up material in Korea from outside sources was unknown, but they had made a paper pledge. The enemy had narrowed the demilitarized zone to four kilometers as opposed to the U.S. desire for a broad twenty-mile strip. On the other hand, the Communists had given up their insistence upon a return to the 38th Parallel and settled for the line of contact. Eventual withdrawal of non-Korean troops from the country, which the United States had maintained was a political question, had also been shelved.

It was impossible to shun the political aspects of many of these points in the discussion, for there could be no real separation of political and military matters. The Communists were keenly aware of the relationship and they let no opportunity pass to make political, psychological, or propaganda capital out of the causes they espoused. Before the negotiations began, Ridgway had accurately predicted that the enemy would make many propaganda speeches that would require rare patience on the part of the UNC delegates. The performance of the Communist delegates, who had had far more extensive political experience than their UNC counterparts, had borne him out.

Yet it had not been the enemy that had introduced the very touchy subject of voluntary repatriation, with all of its political implications, into the negotiations. The Communists had wanted to effect a simple all-for-all exchange of prisoners and it was the United States who decided, for combined humanitarian and political reasons, to insist upon letting the prisoners have the right of self-determination.

The reluctance of the enemy to accept

[4] Ltrs, Adm Burke to Mrs. Burke, 13 and 27 July. In OCMH.

defection from the Communist world on a wholesale scale was hardly astonishing, for it constituted a direct admission that life in the free world was better than that under the Communist system. From the beginning of the truce meetings the enemy had been extremely sensitive to any suggestion of inequality. The rapidity with which they had produced a flag and stand to match the UNC flag at the first plenary session had been followed up by swift construction of colorful sanitation facilities to outdo those erected by the UNC and by the importation of a sedan from Russia to provide transportation for Nam Il comparable to Admiral Joy's. This attitude had lasted until the very end when the Communists had persisted in their demand that each side sign nine copies of the armistice agreement.

Despite the Communists' strong denials that they were horse traders, their actions had belied their words. Back in the spring of 1951, an old China hand had offered some sage counsel to the Army high command on this score. Col. David D. Barrett, military attaché to Nationalist China, had warned of the hazards of bargaining with the Chinese. If the U.N. Command would set its price and then calmly sustain a firm position, the Chinese might howl, bluster, and threaten, but they would finally give in, Barrett declared. If, on the other hand, the U.N.C. showed weakness or vacillation, the Chinese would persist in haggling until they won their point. It was only when they informed you calmly and without bluster, Barrett concluded, that you would be sure that they definitely had made up their mind not to accept your price.[5]

[5] Msg, AT 174, Barrett to DA, 17 May 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 1.

The validity of these observations was sustained during the negotiations. Time after time the Communists waited out the UNC delegation, so that they could accept the advantageous portions of the UNC proposal and probe for more concessions. Eventually, if the UNC refused to yield further, the Communists would produce a counteroffer that surrendered a corresponding part of the Communist demands. As long as both sides could give in on an equal number of items, a compromise agreement could be reached. The quickest results had come when the UNC had been able to balance the give-and-take in its final offer on an item and then had refused to discuss the matter further. For until the enemy delegates were convinced that they were not going to get a better deal, they would continue to delay and argue tirelessly.

As Barrett had cautioned, the Communist tactics had run the gamut. Admiral Burke gave his impression of their impact early in the negotiations. "No amount of reading about Communists' tactics in conferences," he commented, "can ever prepare a man completely for the rude shock he is bound to receive when he is first exposed to those tactics." [6] Overnight they could shift from the harsh, brow-beating, name-calling attacks of a Hsieh Fang, which were designed to harass or to secure further concessions, to a quiet, reasonable, and businesslike approach to a problem they were ready to settle. The flow of propaganda could become a trickle if they scented a UNC concession or a veritable flood, if things were going badly for them.

Since the Communist dialectic per-

[6] Ltr, Adm Burke to Comdr Alan Brown, USN, 13 Aug 51. In OCMH.

mitted the ends to justify the means, the enemy had no hesitation in employing any method calculated to achieve success in the negotiations. The distortion of history, the manufacturing of false charges, and the creation of incidents in the prisoner of war camps were as much a part of the Communist arsenal as the yelling, cursing, insults, and discourtesy in the conference tent. They were all part of the game to discompose the opponent through every kind of pressure. If the UNC delegates became emotional, they might make mistakes. The cold war at the truce table complemented the hot war at the front, such as it was.

In this battle of nerves, Admiral Burke noted:

> It is essential, of course, in dealing with these people that you have no personal feelings whatsoever. Emotion can never affect a conference at all. The only possible way of winning, in such a conference as this, is by coldly calculating every move and every statement and exercising the maximum amount of patience, calmness and stamina. Once in a while, after a particularly long series of sessions in which these qualities have been displayed, the Communists appear to be a little bit perturbed.[7]

Both Joy and Harrison had done an admirable job in displaying these characteristics despite the constant Communist provocations and had resisted, except on rare occasions, the temptation to lash back at the enemy in kind.

The lack of language qualifications of the UNC delegates, except for the ROK member, was a blessing as well as a disadvantage. Since they could not understand the loud harangues until they were translated, and since some of the flavor and harshness of the original speech was usually lost in the process, the effect was diminished. On the other hand, the semantic difficulties were considerable. General Ridgway had warned the delegation of this pitfall and advised the groups to take great care about possible misunderstandings. Because of the contrasts in tradition, background, and training, words like "logic," "reason," "injustice," and "democracy" meant entirely different things to each side and literal interpretation served only to complicate the problem. Only when these terms were meticulously spelled out and clarified, could they take on intelligible meaning to the other side.

As the negotiations wore on, the two delegations began to sound more and more like each other. "The peace-loving peoples of the world" were always solidly lined up behind the UNC or the Communist proposal, as the case might be, since the sincerity and reasonableness of the proposal as a "bridge to peace" was unmistakable. Sentences like "Your logic is untenable, while ours is reasonable" were freely used by both delegations. After several weeks of conferences, Admiral Burke warned his wife that: "We all will have difficulty in the future, I imagine, in writing statements without superlative adjectives. Unjust, unfair, unreasonable are becoming standard usage in our vocabularies." [8]

The semantic bouts with the enemy illustrated the necessity for thorough staff work prior to negotiations in order to investigate the exact meaning of each

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Ltr, Adm Burke to Mrs. Burke, 4 Aug 51. In OCMH.

word in translation and so prevent misinterpretation. The enemy was quick to notice and take advantage of lapses when he desired to prolong the haggling.

In all the verbal encounters in the truce tents, the key qualities of patience and firmness appeared to be the most essential ones for the UNC delegates. They needed patience to endure all the attacks, slurs, false charges, and the like, that the Communists emitted to erode an opponent's resistance, and they also had to have firmness to present the UNC stand in a manner that could not be misinterpreted when the final or minimum position was reached. If the delegation weathered the storm of invective, the half truths, and distortions convincingly, the enemy eventually would come up with a better offer or even with acceptance of the UNC proposal. For representatives of a people that have frequently been accused of excessive impatience, the U.S. delegates, despite their personal feelings, acquitted themselves extremely well in the negotiations.

### *The Battlefield*

During the last two years of the war the battlefield received its cue from the negotiations. The first reaction of the UNC to the policy of delay adopted by the Communists in the summer of 1951 at Kaesong had been a resort to military pressure. Without question, the limited operations that had followed represented the best military effort of the UNC during the last two years of the war. In October 1951 the Eighth Army had inflicted upon the enemy the highest monthly total of casualties for the negotiations period and had won valuable defensive terrain as well. Moreover, there was little doubt that the UNC success on the battlefield was a factor in the enemy's decision to resume negotiations.

But this success not been won lightly. The hard fact that 40,000 UNC casualties had been suffered in the offensive could not be ignored. For the remainder of the conflict the dominating element in making military decisions was the estimated cost in personnel losses. The development of the "active defense" in November 1951 was an outgrowth of this sentiment as well as of the resumption of negotiations, and Ridgway and Van Fleet disapproved or discarded several ambitious offensive plans during the fall and winter because of the high estimates of casualties involved.

The wisdom of relaxing the ground pressure upon the enemy and of fixing a provisional line of demarcation in November was later questioned by some observers, who maintained that this course of action permitted the enemy to strengthen his lines and deprived the U.N. Command of the means to induce the Communists to take more reasonable positions at Panmunjom.[9]

Whether or not sustained ground pressure would have persuaded the enemy to come to terms sooner is an academic matter. Continued heavy losses might have altered their attitude toward negotiating, but human life was one of the Communists' most abundant resources and was freely used during the war. And it should not be forgotten

[9] (1) Joy, *How Communists Negotiate,* p. 129. (2) Memo, Kinney for CINCUNC, no date, sub: Armistice Negotiations, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp, Paper SGS 3718.

that maintaining the offensive would have meant a rapidly growing list of casualties for the Eighth Army as well. With mere terrain rather than military victory as the objective, how long could the Eighth Army have sustained a costly offensive before stern criticism arose in the United States?

It was evident that the thirty-day acceptance of the demarcation line late in 1951 had resulted in a *de facto* cease-fire that lasted until October 1952. The low casualty rate on both sides during the December 1951–September 1952 period attested to this fact, with the UNC averaging less than 3,500 and the enemy less than 15,000 (estimated) per month. By way of comparison, the totals in October 1951 showed almost 20,000 for the U.N. Command and over 80,000 (estimated) for the Communist forces.[10]

Given the strait jackets that the opponents had voluntarily donned for the last two years of the war, the struggle resolved itself into a pushing and shoving contest with a ten-mile strip of Korea as the arena. With both parties keeping one eye on the truce tent, the attritional battles at the front, punctuated by long and frequent pauses between the rounds, went on inconclusively. For the greater part of the fight, neither side made efforts to expend large amounts of men and matériel simply to take the terrain, since this process had proved to be extremely costly. The one ground effort of any proportion mounted under General Clark—the expensive Triangle Hill venture—had been a suction pump type operation that had gone far beyond its original plan. After this test of the formidable strength and depth of the Communist lines, Clark remained strictly on the defensive.

Only at the end of the war did the ground front return to the fore. In the spring of 1953 the Communists decided to use the battlefield to apply pressure upon the negotiations and to prepare some basis for their claim of military victory. They had little hesitation in expending lives to take a few more hills when the sacrifice seemed to promise a future political gain.

The UNC renunciation of major ground operations led to the attempt to substitute air for ground pressure in late 1951 and most of 1952. The valiant efforts by Air Force, Navy, and Marine pilots in the air campaigns hurt the enemy considerably, to be sure, but, because of the lesser logistical demands of the static war, not enough to force concessions on the vital prisoner of war issue.

How great a role the military operations of both sides played in influencing the course of negotiations would be difficult to assess with any degree of accuracy. It is far easier to show the direct relationship between the negotiations and the battlefield than to demonstrate the indirect effects of combat operations upon the truce settlement.

Nevertheless, the stalemate on the ground did establish conditions which were far-reaching in other respects, such as the very real problem of morale at the front. The liberal UNC rotation policy and the rest and recreation program in Japan helped to ease some of the frustration, but as General Taylor pointed out in May 1953, one factor

[10] Casualty figures are based on UNC/FEC, Comd Rpts, Jul 51–Jul 52 and Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Aug 52–Jul 53.

tended to spoil the otherwise excellent morale situation.

That factor stems from the fluid, uncertain political circumstances which exist through the world, and which are apparent in a unique fashion in Korea. Political objectives hold little appeal and are not highly evaluated generally by soldiers in battle positions, whereas a clearly defined physical objective constitutes a goal, attainment of which tends to hold promise of a cessation of conflict, physical hazards, and the other unpleasant facts of war. Particularly to the American soldier, the mission of occupying or defending a static line during an extended period tends to create an impression of futility, as well as uncertainty regarding an ultimate outcome.[11]

Here was the crux of the matter in the field—the lack of meaningful battle objectives that could not help but build frustration and impatience, especially among the military commanders.

Despite its lack of purpose during the truce negotiations, the Eighth Army had performed well. There were several instances when components of the UNC forces conducted themselves less than nobly, but these were exceptions and not the rule. The Eighth Army, as rebuilt by Ridgway and later strengthened by Van Fleet and Taylor, had impressed observers as an excellent field army. It had been tested defensively and had managed to blunt the limited enemy assaults and to counterattack effectively. But the Eighth Army had not had a real opportunity to prove how good it was offensively during the last half of the war, because of restrictions on its scale of operations. The outline plans for launching major attacks northward had all encountered the same fate—oblivion —and the war had ended, as it had begun, on a defensive note.

With the infantry confined to trenches and bunkers for the most part, the artillery arm had taken on additional importance. In December 1952, Van Fleet had characterized the war as an artillery duel and told an observer team from the United States that he placed 90 percent of the task of defeating the enemy upon the UNC artillery.[12] Through huge expenditures of artillery ammunition the U.N. Command helped to compensate for the enemy's superiority in manpower and to hold down its own losses. This was especially true when the Communists employed their "human sea" attacks to overwhelm UNC positions. Out in the open the enemy was completely vulnerable to co-ordinated firepower and suffered heavy losses. In addition, counterbattery, interdictory, and harassing fire served to continue pressure upon the Communists, to inflict damage and casualties, and to lower enemy morale while bolstering that of the UNC forces.

However, as long as the Communist troops remained in their well-prepared field fortifications, they were extremely difficult to hit. During the relatively inactive month of April 1953, the UNC artillery had fired over a million and a quarter rounds at the enemy and Communist battle casualties from all causes had been estimated at 10,500 men.[13] Even assuming that all of the casualties had resulted from the artillery fire—which they did not—the ratio would still

[11] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, May 53, pp. 55–56.

[12] Summary Sheet, Eddleman for CofS, 17 Dec 52, sub: Survey . . . Artillery Units in Korea, in G–3 091 Korea, 109.

[13] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Apr 53.

be well over a hundred rounds per casualty.

The UNC advantage in artillery lay in better fire control equipment and techniques and in the supply of ammunition, rather than in numbers of battalions and pieces. The Communists had over twice as many battalions in Korea as the UNC had and a considerable edge in the number of guns as well. The big difference stemmed from the number of rounds fired by each gun and here the UNC, with more ample stocks and a speedier resupply system, had the advantage. In this respect, the UNC air interdiction campaign did yeoman service, for it made the enemy task of bringing ammunition to the front especially hazardous and laborious. By restricting the number of rounds on hand at the front, the air forces helped to curtail enemy operations and to save UNC lives.

Control of the air over Korea and of the sea approaches gave the U.N. Command other advantages as well. It meant that all of the enemy's supplies had to come in on the limited overland route and the strain on the line of communications was greatly increased. On the other hand, the UNC had a free rein in using both sea and land lines to supply its own forces. The air and sea domination also provided a valuable psychological advantage, for the threat of a major enemy attack from the air and on the water, although it was always a possibility, never materialized and the challenge offered to the Communists to break the UNC control was ignored. This was perhaps very fortunate since areas like Pusan were very vulnerable to surprise attacks.

As the war became more static, the Communists were able to improve their supply situation. Despite the air attacks on enemy lines of communication, stockpiles of ammunition grew and enemy fire techniques became more skilfull. Artillery fire in June and July 1953 was both heavy and accurate in support of their final offensives.

The greater supply of ammunition enjoyed by the U.N. Command and its control of the air meant that the Communists had to construct field fortifications that would be able to take severe poundings from artillery and air attack. In organizing the defense, the enemy troops dug deeply, using overhead cover effectively to absorb heavy punishment, and then carefully camouflaged their positions. As one senior observer later commented, they built their fortifications much closer to the specifications set forth in the U.S. Army field manual than most Eighth Army soldiers did.[14] Only a direct hit by a large bomb or from a flat trajectory weapon could penetrate the enemy's defense bunkers and gun positions, in most cases. Many outfits in the Eighth Army were not so thorough and built their bunkers and shelters without adequate interior support or overhead cover. After a heavy Korean rain, cave-ins were all too common, especially before the winter of 1952–53.

The Chinese Communist concept of tactics had in the past embraced a fluid rather than a positional type of warfare, and the shift had been rapid and adept. Fortifying their lines in great depth, the Chinese defended their positions skilfully. And, within the framework of positional defense, they still clung to

[14] Conversation of author with Maj Gen Patrick H. Tansey, 11 Feb 60.

vestiges of the fluid concept. Often when a UNC attack was launched, they would fall back quickly, let the UNC take over an objective, and then mount a swift counterattack.

In late 1952, the U.S. 2d Division compiled a volume of data on the Chinese in battle, which the Eighth Army considered worth reproducing. The following excerpts are from this study:

a. The enemy makes good use of the terrain during an attack. He maneuvers his troops regardless of the size of the unit and habitually attacks from more than one direction.

b. When using artillery and mortar support in the attack the Chinese follow their preparatory artillery and mortar fires closely. This is done to the extent of accepting some casualties from their own fire.

c. Positive steps must be taken to protect and to insure communications. Heavy Chinese bombardments prior to an attack have usually rendered our communications useless.

d. The Chinese employ a system of mutually supporting strong points in the defense. The areas between and the approaches to their positions are covered with fire.

e. The Chinese soldier digs in quickly and deeply which effectively protects him from all UN bombardments. He immediately takes up his fighting position to defend his sector when the shelling subsides.

f. Chinese patrols are well planned, have a definite purpose, i.e., reconnaissance of UN positions to determine strength and disposition of weapons. He also watches our patrol routes and habits in preparation for ambush patrols.

g. The enemy's implementation of maneuver also applies to his patrols. Elements of Chinese patrols move to the flanks and rear of our patrols in an attempt to encircle them.

h. The enemy makes a determined effort to police the battlefield of material and both his own and friendly dead and wounded. Therefore, we must control the scene of a battle when the fight is over.[15]

The report then sums up:

The Chinese soldier is not a superman. He is well and courageously led at the small unit level and the results of actions at this level offer definite proof that he is thoroughly disciplined. His industry is shown by his thorough fortifications. His conduct of the defense is accomplished in spite of UN air superiority, UN liaison aircraft, lack of his own liaison aircraft and inferior communications equipment. He is operating on a shoestring basis as is evidenced by the hodge-podge of equipment picked up on the battlefield after every encounter.[16]

To these encomiums might be added the observation that the enemy was not only brave and resourceful, but also tough. Growing up in an underdeveloped nation, where famines were common, the Chinese could subsist on very little and endure great privation. They had to be tough to survive in an atmosphere where life was held so cheaply. And the comment about "operating on a shoe-string basis" could be applied to the whole Chinese effort in Korea in many respects. Pitted against opponents who had attained a high degree of technological skill and who were able to bring superior matériel into play against them in the air, on the ground, at sea, and in matters of communication and transportation, they still managed to hold their own by the prodigious use of manpower. Lacking construction equipment, Chiang Kai-shek had used hand labor to construct the airfields for U.S. planes in World War II and had successfully completed the huge task.

[15] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 25–27.

[16] *Ibid.*

In Korea the Chinese again demonstrated how manpower could be used in quantity to take the place of machines. Although this process might be uneconomical and wasteful in principle, it was effective as an expedient and as a countermeasure. In this case superior technology, far from leading to an easy victory, produced no victory at all.

But the enemy's armor was not without weaknesses and the Chinese were by no means "supermen." Their practice of informing the troops of the objectives before an attack and discussing the operation in open session frequently led to desertion by soldiers who had decided that their chances for surviving the action were not particularly good. From these deserters the U.N. Command was sometimes forewarned of an approaching assault and had time to prepare a warm reception for the enemy. It was on such occasions that another flaw in the Chinese system appeared. Once the orders for an attack were issued, a certain amount of inflexibility crept in. Unit leaders persisted in trying to carry out the original plan even when it became clear that unpredictable factors had entered the picture and had made the execution of the plan impossible.[17] The failure to use initiative and to cancel the operation led to some of the heaviest enemy casualties of the two-year period, as the battle for White Horse Hill bore witness.

Neither the strengths nor the weaknesses of the UNC or the Communists are absolute, and a second encounter, even if limited in nature, might find an entirely different set of circumstances in operation and might result in an outcome quite unlike the first. The frantic efforts to industrialize Communist China might remedy some technological deficiencies, only to breed others in their place. As industrial development moves forward, weapons and tactics would probably change and the relative capabilities of the opposing sides would shift as well.

On the other hand, a later clash might prove to have a great deal in common with the Korean venture. Even if much of the military experience had to be scrapped because of the growth of the new weapons and tactics, the knowledge of the foe gained in Korea would help to formulate future plans and strategy and should avert the possibility of again underestimating the opponent. And since the Communist objective of eventual world domination is not likely to change, regardless of the variety of means adopted to achieve this end, the political experience with the Communist techniques obtained in Korea could turn out to be invaluable in working out a settlement if it came to open conflict again or to counteracting Communist efforts on the political level. It would indeed be unfortunate if the hard-won lessons learned in the Korean War, both on the battlefield and in the negotiations, should be ignored or forgotten because of the absence of victory.

[17] Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 53, p. 10.

# Appendix A

## Strength of the UNC Ground Forces in Korea

### Appendix A–1

| Date | Total | United States[a] | Republic of Korea[b] | Other United Nations[a] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 30 June 1951 | 554,577 | 253,250 | 273,266 | 28,061 |
| 30 June 1952 | 678,051 | 265,864 | 376,418 | 35,769 |
| 31 July 1953 | 932,539 | 302,483 | 590,911 | 39,145 |

[a] Includes Marine and Navy personnel under operational control of U.S. Army.

[b] Includes KATUSA, ROK marines under operational control of U.S. Army, and civilian trainees.

[c] See Appendix A–2 for distribution by country.

*Source:* Comptroller of the Army Summary, ROK and U.N. Ground Forces Strength in Korea, 7 Oct 54. OCMH Files.

### Appendix A–2

| Country | 30 June 1951 | 30 June 1952 | 31 July 1953 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total | 28,061 | 35,769 | 39,145 |
| British Commonwealth | 15,723 | 21,429 | 24,085 |
| United Kingdom | 8,278 | 13,043 | 14,198 |
| Australia | 912 | 1,844 | 2,282 |
| Canada | 5,403 | 5,155 | 6,146 |
| New Zealand | 797 | 1,111 | 1,389 |
| India[a] | 333 | 276 | 70 |
| Turkey | 4,602 | 4,878 | 5,455 |
| Belgium[b] | 602 | 623 | 944 |
| Colombia | 1,050 | 1,007 | 1,068 |
| Ethiopia | 1,153 | 1,094 | 1,271 |
| France | 738 | 1,185 | 1,119 |
| Greece | 1,027 | 899 | 1,263 |
| Netherlands | 725 | 565 | 819 |
| Philippines | 1,143 | 1,494 | 1,496 |
| Thailand | 1,057 | 2,274 | 1,294 |
| Italy[a] | 0 | 64 | 72 |
| Norway[a] | 79 | 109 | 105 |
| Sweden[a] | 162 | 148 | 154 |

[a] Contribution consisted of noncombat medical units only.

[b] Includes Luxembourg detachment of approximately forty-four men.

*Source:* Comptroller of the Army, Summary, ROK and U.N. Ground Forces Strength in Korea, 7 Oct 54. OCMH files.

# Appendix B

## Prisoners of War

### Appendix B–1—Repatriates

| Nationality | Little Switch | Big Switch | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total | 6,670 | 75,823 | 82,493 |
| North Koreans | [a]5,640 | [b]70,183 | 75,823 |
| Chinese | 1,030 | [c] 5,640 | 6,670 |
| Total | 684 | 12,773 | 13,444 |
| U.S. | 149 | 3,597 | 3,746 |
| ROK | 471 | 7,862 | 8,321 |
| U.K. | 32 | 945 | 977 |
| Turks | 15 | 229 | 243 |
| Filipinos | 1 | 40 | 41 |
| Canadians | 2 | 30 | 32 |
| Colombians | 6 | 22 | 28 |
| Australians | 5 | 21 | 26 |
| Frenchmen | ..... | 12 | 12 |
| South Africans | 1 | 8 | 9 |
| Greeks | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Netherlanders | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Belgians | ..... | 1 | 1 |
| New Zealanders | ..... | 1 | 1 |
| Japanese | ..... | 1 | 1 |

[a] Included 446 civilian internees, of which 3 were female and 18 female POW's.
[b] Included 60,788 male POW's, 473 female POW's, 23 children, and 8,899 civilian internees.
[c] Included 1 female POW.

*Source:* See Hq, U.S. Army, Pacific, Mil Hist Office, The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean Conflict, by John A. McReynolds, pp. 67, 89. MS in OCMH.

## Appendix B–2—Nonrepatriates

*Held by UNC*

| Disposition | Total | Chinese | Korean |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total | 22,604 | 14,704 | 7,900 |
| Returned to Communist control | 628 | 440 | 188 |
| Escaped and missing | 13 | 2 | 11 |
| Died in custody of Custodial Forces of India | 38 | 15 | 23 |
| Went to India with CFI | 86 | 12 | 74 |
| Returned to UNC control[a] | 21,839 | 14,235 | 7,604 |

*Held by Communists*

| Disposition | Total | U.S. | U.K. | Korean |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | 359 | 23 | 1 | 335 |
| Returned to Communist control | 347 | 21 | 1 | 325 |
| Went to India with CFI | 2 | ..... | ..... | 2 |
| Returned to UNC control | 10 | 2 | ..... | 8 |

[a] Final action completed on 19 Feb 54.

*Source:* Final Report of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, no date, in OCMH. Hq, U.S. Army, Pacific, Military History Office, The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean Conflict, by John A. McReynolds, pp. 97–98. MS in OCMH.

# Appendix C

## ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE COMMANDER OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONCERNING A MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA

### PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean Conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peace settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

### ARTICLE I

### MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map.

3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map.

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the

Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map. Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.

## ARTICLE II

## CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND ARMISTICE

### A. GENERAL

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement).

13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of the military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.

b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands," as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58'N,

124°40′E), TAECHONG-DO (37°50′N, 124°42′E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46′N, 124°46′E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38′N, 125°40′E), and U-DO (37°36′N, 125°58′E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.

c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. In order to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished.

f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides, and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

h. Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.

i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective parts of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.

j. Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and immunities to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.

14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of

Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.

17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall actively cooperate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

## B. MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION

### 1. COMPOSITION

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.

## 2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37°57′29″N, 126°40′00″E). The Military Armistice Commission may relocate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.

b. Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.

c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and the Han River Estuary.

e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.

f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

h. Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.

j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one-half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of

this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

### 3. GENERAL

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.

34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

## C. NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION

### 1. COMPOSITION

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term "neutral nations" as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side

is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.

40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.

b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

## 2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY

41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.

42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Adopt such rules of procedures as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of the Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.

d. Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.

f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraph, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry:

| Territory under the military control of the United Nations Command | Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers |
|---|---|
| INCHON (37°28'N, 126°38'E) | SINUIJU (40°06'N, 124°24'E) |
| TAEGU (35°52'N, 128°36'E) | CHONGJIN (41°46'N, 129°49'E) |
| PUSAN (35°06'N, 129°02'E) | HUNGNAM (39°50'N, 127°37'E) |
| KANGNUNG (37°45'N, 128°54'E) | MANPO (41°09'N, 126°18'E) |
| KUNSAN (35°59'N, 126°43'E) | SINANJU (39°36'N, 125°36'E) |

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map.

### 3. GENERAL

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.

45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.

46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as informational only.

47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.

## ARTICLE III

## ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.

a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number.

b. Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission."

c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation" in English, " 송환 " (SONG HWAN) in Korean, and " 遣返 " (CH'IEN FAN) in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoners of war.

52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement.

53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route.

54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51a hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.

55. PANMUNJOM is the place designated where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place (s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

56. a. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom

shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to coordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place (s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoners of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to coordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57 hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place (s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; to arrange for security at the place (s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war.

57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of the countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place (s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and shall visit the prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from prisoner of war camps to the place (s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

b. The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below:

(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place (s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be coordinated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place (s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.

(3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoners of war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place (s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation contributing forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.

(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from this team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances require.

(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, to the team operating in the territory under his military control.

(6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

c. The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure the security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control.

d. The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the program of repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation.

58. a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war:

(1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the data last exchanged.

(2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.

b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph 58a thereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

c. Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition.

59. a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers to return to the area south of the Military Demarcation Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home.

b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph,

and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side.

c. Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59a hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59b hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective.

d. (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of the Displaced Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing point(s); and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.

(2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission.

## ARTICLE IV

## RECOMMENDATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED ON BOTH SIDES

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

## ARTICLE V

## MISCELLANEOUS

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.

62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on 27 July 1953.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July, 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

(Signed)
KIM IL SUNG
Marshal, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Supreme Commander,
Korean People's Army

(Signed)
PENG TEH-HUAI
Commander,
Chinese People's Volunteers

(Signed)
MARK W. CLARK
General, United States Army
Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations Command

PRESENT

(Signed)
NAM IL
General, Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

(Signed)
WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command Delegation

## ANNEX

## TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION

(See Sub-paragraph 51b)

### I

### GENERAL

1. In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested by both sides to appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, have not exercised their right to be repatriated. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall establish its

headquarters within the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom, and shall station subordinate bodies of the same composition as the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at those locations at which the Repatriation Commission assumes custody of prisoners of war. Representatives of both sides shall be permitted to observe the operations of the Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies to include explanations and interviews.

2. Sufficient armed forces and any other operating personnel required to assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose representative shall be the umpire in accordance with the provisions of Article 132 of the Geneva Convention, and shall also be chairman and executive agent of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Representatives from each of the other four powers shall be allowed staff assistants in equal number not to exceed fifty (50) each. When any of the representatives of the neutral nations is absent for some reason, that representative shall designate an alternate representative of his own nationality to exercise his functions and authority. The arms of all personnel provided for in this Paragraph shall be limited to military police type small arms.

3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners of war specified in Paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their repatriation, and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see Paragraph 7 below). This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. This Commission shall ensure that prisoners of war shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that Convention.

## II

## CUSTODY OF PRISONERS OF WAR

4. All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right of repatriation following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement shall be released from the military control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon as practicable, and, in all cases, within sixty (60) days subsequent to the effective date of the Armistice Agreement to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

5. At the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission assumes control of the prisoner of war installations, the military forces of the detaining side shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations specified in the preceding Paragraph shall be taken over completely by the armed forces of India.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 5 above, the detaining side shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring security and order in the areas around the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody and for preventing and restraining any armed forces (including irregular armed forces) in the area under its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion against locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 above, nothing in this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary jurisdiction.

## III

## EXPLANATION

8. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received and taken into custody all those prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that within ninety (90) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission takes over the custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send representatives to the locations where such prisoners of war are in custody to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these nations their rights and to inform them of any matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home to lead a peaceful life, under the following provisions:

a. The number of such explaining representatives shall not exceed seven (7) per thousand prisoners of war held in custody by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission; and the minimum authorized shall not be less than a total of five (5);

b. The hours during which the explaining representatives shall have access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and generally in accord with Article 531 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;

c. All explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and a representative from the detaining side;

d. Additional provisions governing the explanation work shall be prescribed by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and will be designed to employ the principles enumerated in Paragraph 3 above and in this Paragraph;

e. The explaining representatives, while engaging in their work, shall be allowed to bring with them necessary facilities and personnel for wireless communications. The number of communications personnel shall be limited to one team per location at which explaining representatives are in residence, except in the event all prisoners of war are concentrated in one location, in which case, two (2) teams shall be permitted. Each team shall consist of not more than six (6) communications personnel.

9. Prisoners of war in its custody shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to representatives and subordinate bodies of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to inform them of their desires on any matter concerning the prisoners of war themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

## IV

## DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

10. Any prisoner of war who, while in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, decides to exercise the right of repatriation, shall make an application requesting repatriation to a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Once such an application is made, it shall be considered immediately by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission or one of its subordinate bodies so as to determine immediately by majority vote the validity of such application. Once such an application is made to and validated by the Commission or one of its subordinate bodies, the prisoner of war concerned shall immediately be transferred to and accommodated in the tents set up for those who are ready to be repatriated. Thereafter, he shall, while still in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, be delivered forthwith to the prisoner of war exchange point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in the Armistice Agreement.

11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in Paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Conference recommended to be convened in Paragraph 60, Draft Armistice Agreement, which shall endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days, during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoner of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the Political Conference within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, those who choose to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society of India. This operation shall be completed within thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution. After the dissolution of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, whenever and wherever any of those above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the authorities of the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting them in returning to their fatherland.

## V

## RED CROSS VISITATION

12. Essential Red Cross service for prisoners of war in custody of the Neutral

Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided by India in accordance with regulations issued by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

## VI

## PRESS COVERAGE

13. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall insure freedom of the press and other news media in observing the entire operation as enumerated herein, in accordance with procedures to be established by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

## VII

## LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR PRISONERS OF WAR

14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the prisoners of war in the area under its military control, delivering required support to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at an agreed delivery point in the vicinity of each prisoner of war installation.

15. The cost of repatriating prisoners of war to the exchange point at Panmunjom shall be borne by the detaining side and the cost from the exchange point by the side on which said prisoners depend, in accordance with Article 118 of the Geneva Convention.

16. The Red Cross Society of India shall be responsible for providing such general service personnel in the prisoner of war installations as required by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

17. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall provide medical support for the prisoners of war as may be practicable. The detaining side shall provide medical support as practicable upon the request of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and specifically for those cases requiring extensive treatment or hospitalization. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall maintain custody of prisoners of war during such hospitalization. The detaining side shall facilitate such custody. Upon completion of treatment, prisoners of war shall be returned to a prisoner of war installation as specified in Paragraph 4 above.

18. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is entitled to obtain from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties and tasks, but both sides shall not under any name and in any form interfere or exert influence.

## VIII

## LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION

19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission stationed in the

area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute on an equal basis to such support within the Demilitarized Zone. The precise arrangements shall be subject to determination between the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the detaining side in each case.

20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting the explaining representatives from the other side while in transit over lines of communication within its area, as set forth in Paragraph 23 for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, to a place of residence and while in residence in the vicinity of but not within each of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be responsible for the security of such representatives within the actual limits of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

21. Each of the detaining sides shall provide transportation, housing, communication, and other agreed logistical support to the explaining representatives of the other side while they are in the area under its military control. Such services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

## IX

## PUBLICATION

22. After the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the terms of this agreement shall be made known to all prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining side, have not exercised their right to be repatriated.

## X

## MOVEMENT

23. The movement of the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and repatriated prisoners of war shall be over lines of communication as determined by the command (s) of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. A map showing these lines of communication shall be furnished the command of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Movement of such personnel, except within locations as designated in Paragraph 4 above, shall be under the control of, and escorted by, personnel of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken; however, such movement shall not be subject to any obstruction and coercion.

## XI

## PROCEDURAL MATTERS

24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and/or any subordinate bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by

the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall operate on the basis of the majority vote.

25. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall submit a weekly report to the opposing Commanders on the status of prisoners of war in its custody, indicating the number repatriated and remaining at the end of each week.

26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the five powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the Armistice becomes effective.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1400 hours on the 8th day of June 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

NAM IL
General, Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command Delegation

# Appendix D

Plenary Members of the Armistice Delegations [a]

*United Nations Command Delegation*

| | |
|---|---|
| Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, USN | 10 July 1951 – 22 May 1952 |
| Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, USA | 10 July 1951 – 17 December 1951 |
| Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, USN | 10 July 1951 – 11 December 1951 |
| Maj. Gen. Laurence C. Craigie, USAF | 10 July 1951 – 27 November 1951 |
| Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, ROKA | 10 July 1951 – 24 October 1951 |
| Maj. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon, ROKA | 24 October 1951 – 6 February 1952 |
| Maj. Gen. Howard M. Turner, USAF | 27 November 1951 – 5 July 1952 |
| Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, USA | 17 December 1951 – 6 February 1952 |
| Rear Adm. Ruthven E. Libby, USN | 11 December 1951 – 23 June 1952 |
| Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., USA | 6 February 1952 – 27 July 1953 |
| Maj. Gen. Yu Chae Heung, ROKA | 6 February 1952 – 28 May 1952 |
| Brig. Gen. Frank C. McConnell, USA | 22 May 1952 – 26 April 1953 |
| Brig. Gen. Lee Han Lim, ROKA | 28 May 1952 – 26 April 1953 |
| Brig. Gen. Joseph T. Morris, USAF | 5 July 1952 – 26 April 1953 |
| Rear Adm. John C. Daniel, USN | |
| Brig. Gen. Ralph M. Osborne, USA | 23 June 1952 – 27 July 1953 |
| Brig. Gen. Choi Duk Shin, ROKA | 26 April 1953 – 16 May 1953 |
| Brig. Gen. Edgar E. Glenn, USAF | 25 April 1953 – 20 June 1953 |
| Brig. Gen. George M. Finch, USAF | 20 June 1953 – 27 July 1953 |

*North Korean and Chinese Communist Delegation*

| | |
|---|---|
| Lt. Gen. Nam Il, KPA | 10 July 1951 – 27 July 1953 |
| General Teng Hua, CCF | 10 July 1951 – 24 October 1951 |
| Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho, KPA | 10 July 1951 – 27 July 1953 |
| Maj. Gen. Hsieh Fang, CCF | 10 July 1951 – 26 April 1953 |
| Maj. Gen. Chang Pyong San, KPA | 10 July 1951 – 24 October 1951 |
| General Pien Chang-wu, CCF | 24 October 1951 – 26 April 1953 |
| Maj. Gen. Chung Tu Hwan, KPA | 24 October 1951 – 28 April 1952 |
| Rear Adm. Kim Won Mu, KPN | 28 April 1952 – 11 August 1952 |
| Maj. Gen. So Hui, KPA | 11 August 1952 – 26 April 1953 |
| General Ting Kuo-yu, CCF | 26 April 1953 – 27 July 1953 |
| Maj. Gen. Chang Chun San, KPA | 26 April 1953 – 25 May 1953 |
| Maj. Gen. Tsai Cheng-wen, CCF | 26 April 1953 – 27 May 1953 |
| Admiral Kim Won Mu, KPN | 25 May 1953 – 17 June 1953 |
| Maj. Gen. Kim Dong Hak, KPA | 17 June 1953 – 27 July 1953 |

[a] In this appendix the tour of duty of a delegate is concluded on the date that his replacement is officially accredited in a plenary session, even though in many cases the delegate may have been relieved and reassigned while the meetings were in recess.

# Bibliographical Note

This volume was written primarily from records kept by the Department of the Army and subordinate commands during the Korean War, interpreted with the help of a number of other sources, principally armed forces' histories, reports, and monographs. Unless otherwise specified, the primary materials discussed below may be found in the collections in the custody of the National Archives and Records Service of the General Services Administration, Washington, D.C.

### *Primary Sources*

For the Washington side of the narrative, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Operations, official central correspondence file, arranged according to the Army decimal system, forms the most complete and useful Army collection of high-level policy and planning papers. Since G–3 acted as the executive agent for the Chief of Staff, most of the important letters, memorandums, reports, and studies pertinent to the direction of the war in Korea passed through this office.

G–3 also maintained a special collection of the official transcripts, letters, and other documents pertaining to the truce conference. The minutes of meetings of the plenary, subdelegate, liaison, and staff officers sessions and the correspondence between the delegations will be found in this collection.

The bulk of the correspondence between the JCS/Department of the Army and the Far East Command/United Nations Command was carried on by radio communication. A complete file on the messages sent and received by the JCS/Department of the Army to the UNC/FEC is kept in the Staff Communications Center, Office of the Chief of Staff, DA.

Messages exchanged between UNC/FEC and subordinate commands in the field are available in The Adjutant General's files, FEC, at the Federal Records Center, GSA, Kansas City, Missouri, and in the files cited in the footnotes of the text.

For the theater story the most valuable sources are the command reports submitted on a monthly basis by each major command. The narrative sections of the reports provide an excellent guide to the major activities of the month; the accompanying staff section reports, annexes, appendices and inclosures amplify the narrative sections and include copies of many of the basic documents discussed. The UNC/FEC and the Eighth Army Command reports were especially helpful in the preparation of this volume.

Theater files on plans, operations, command, administration, and the armistice are in several collections. Far East Command files covering 1951 and 1953 activities in these departments and a small group of numbered binders originating in the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group are in the custody of the National Archives and Records Service. But the FEC G–3 and General

Administrative files for 1952 are at the Kansas City Records Center, as are the Eighth Army Operational Planning and General Administrative files.

The combat story is based principally upon battalion, regimental, and divisional journals and reports. These contain both narrative accounts of the action and much of the raw materials that provided the basis for the narrative. The journal entries and transcripts of exchanges were especially helpful.

During and shortly after the war, members of the Historical Detachments attached to the Far East Command and to the Eighth Army produced a number of monographs, studies, and after action reports on different phases of the conflict. Covering the armistice, small unit actions, logistics, and a myriad of other subjects, these manuscripts are invaluable, especially the comprehensive four-volume study on the armistice negotiations. Copies of the FEC and Eighth Army monographs are in the Office of the Chief of Military History files.

The records of the interviews conducted by the author and the correspondence between the author and various participants in the events covered in the volume will also be found in OCMH files.

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke graciously turned over to the author a number of personal letters written during his tour as a member of the armistice delegation. These letters are in OCMH files.

### *Secondary Sources*

The following list is by no means complete but notes the works the author found most useful.

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# List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AAA | Antiaircraft artillery |
| Abn | Airborne |
| ACSI | Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence |
| Admin | Administration |
| AFF | Army Field Forces |
| AFFE | Army Forces, Far East |
| an. | Annex |
| AU | Army unit |
| BAR | Browning automatic rifle |
| Bn | Battalion |
| Br | Branch |
| CCF | Chinese Communist Forces |
| CG | Commanding general |
| CinC | Commander in chief |
| CINCFE | Commander in Chief, Far East |
| CINCPAC | Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet |
| CINCUNC | Commander in Chief, United Nations Command |
| CINFO | Chief of Information |
| CMS | Constructive months service |
| Cmte | Committee |
| CofS | Chief of Staff |
| COMNAVFE | Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Far East |
| Comd | Command |
| Conf | Conference |
| Cong | Congress |
| Corresp | Correspondence |
| DA | Department of the Army |
| DA–IN | Incoming message |
| DCofS | Deputy Chief of Staff |
| Dept | Department |
| DF | Disposition Form |
| EUSAK | Eighth U.S. Army in Korea |
| FA | Field artillery |
| FEAF | Far East Air Forces |
| FEC | Far East Command |
| G–1 | Personnel section of divisional or higher staff |
| G–2 | Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff |
| G–3 | Operations and training section of divisional or higher staff |
| G–4 | Logistics section of divisional or higher staff |
| G–5 | Civil affairs section of divisional or higher staff |
| Hist | History, historical |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| Instr | Instructions |

| | |
|---|---|
| Intel | Intelligence |
| Interv | Interview |
| IRO | International Refugee Organization |
| J–1 | Joint Staff personnel section |
| J–2 | Joint Staff intelligence section |
| J–3 | Joint Staff operations section |
| J–4 | Joint Staff logistics section |
| J–5 | Joint Staff civil affairs section |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| Jnl | Journal |
| JSPOG | Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group |
| KATUSA | Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army |
| KCOMZ | Korean Communications Zone |
| KMAG | United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea |
| KSC | Korean Service Corps |
| LST | Landing ship, tank |
| MAAG | Military Assistance Advisory Group |
| MAC | Military Armistice Commission |
| MIS | Military Intelligence Service |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NPRJ | National Police Reserve Japan |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| OCA | Office, Comptroller of the Army |
| Opnl | Operational |
| Opns | Operations |
| ORO | Operations Research Office |
| PIR | Periodic Intelligence Report |
| Plng | Planning |
| POR | Periodic Operations Report |
| POW | Prisoner of war |
| Rcd | Record |
| RCT | Regimental combat team |
| ROK | Republic of Korea |
| ROKA | Republic of Korea Army |
| RandR | Rest and recuperation |
| SCAP | Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers |
| Sec | Section (office unit) |
| sec. | Section (document) |
| Secy | Secretary |
| Sess | Session |
| SGS | Secretary of the General Staff |
| TAC | Tactical Air Command |
| TAG | The Adjutant General |
| Teleconf | Telephone conference |
| UNC | United Nations Command |
| UNKRA | United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency |

# List of Code Names

| | |
|---|---|
| BIG STICK | Operation plan to destroy the Communist supply complex based on Sibyon-ni, to advance Eighth Army left flank to the Yesong River, and regain Kaesong. |
| BUCKSHOT 16 | Operation by 11th Division, ROK I Corps, to take North Korean prisoners. |
| CHOPSTICK 6 | Plan for envelopment of the high ground south of P'yonggang by a reinforced ROK division. |
| CHOPSTICK 16 | Plan for a 2-division attack to drive the enemy from the area east and south of the Nam River. |
| CLAM-UP | Operation to delude the Communists which imposed silence along the front lines from 10 to 15 February 1952. |
| COMMANDO | Operation plan for offensive to establish the JAMESTOWN line. |
| COUNTER | Plan for 45th Division, I Corps, to capture strategic outpost sites. |
| CUDGEL | Plan for advance from WYOMING line in the U.S. Army I and IX Corps sectors. |
| DULUTH | Line of defense to be established by operation SUNDIAL. |
| EVERREADY | Plan covering eventualities of ROK domestic disturbances and disengaging UNC forces. |
| HIGHBOY | U.S. I Corps artillery operation to bring direct fire onto enemy positions and bunkers not accessible to other artillery and mortar fire. |
| HOME COMING | Limited operation plan offered as substitute for BIG STICK. |
| JAMESTOWN | Defensive line to be established by Operation COMMANDO. |
| KANSAS-WYOMING | Defense lines in the vicinity of 38th Parallel. |
| LITTLE SWITCH | Operation for repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war. |
| OVERWHELMING | Plan for offensive by Eighth Army to the P'yonggang-Wonsan line. |
| POLECHARGE | Operational plan for capture of hill objections on JAMESTOWN line during Operation COMMANDO. |
| SATURATE | Plan for interdiction bombing of North Korean railroads. |
| SCATTER | Screening plan for repatriation of prisoners of war. |
| SHOWDOWN | Operation plan designed to improve IX Corps defense line positions north of Kumhwa. |
| SMACK | Operation plan for combined air-tank-infantry-artillery test strike. |
| STRANGLE | Air operations to disrupt North Korean logistics by interdiction bombing. |
| SUNDIAL | Operation plan to establish DULUTH defensive line. |
| TALONS | Outline plan for ground offensive to bolster Eighth Army's eastern front. |
| TOUCHDOWN | Operation to gain control of Heartbreak Ridge. |
| WRANGLER | Plan to follow up CUDGEL with an amphibious operation on the east coast. |

# Basic Military Map Symbols

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply point.

## Military Units—Identification

Antiaircraft Artillery 

Armored Command 

Army Air Forces 

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery 

Cavalry, Horse 

Cavalry, Mechanized 

Chemical Warfare Service 


Coast Artillery 

Engineers 


Infantry 

Medical Corps 

Ordnance Department 

Quartermaster Corps 


Signal Corps 


Tank Destroyer 


Transportation Corps 

Veterinary Corps 

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing symbol with the arm or service symbol:

Airborne Artillery 

Airborne Infantry 

# Size Symbols

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:

Squad ..... •

Section ..... ••

Platoon ..... •••

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight ..... I

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron ..... II

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following identifying numeral) ..... III

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force Wing ..... X

Division or Command of an Air Force ..... XX

Corps or Air Force ..... XXX

Army ..... XXXX

Group of Armies ..... XXXXX

EXAMPLES

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:

Company A, 137th Infantry .....




8th Field Artillery Battalion .....




Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division .....





Observation Post, 23d Infantry .....




Command Post, 5th Infantry Division .....




Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry .....




# Weapons

Machine gun .....



Gun .....



Gun battery .....



Howitzer or Mortar .....



Tank .....



Self-propelled gun .....



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